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WHITE HOUSE PERIMETER BREACH: NEW 

CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECRET SERVICE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 

Serial No. 113–154 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 30, 2014 ..................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. Julia Pierson, Director, U.S. Secret Service 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

The Hon. W. Ralph Basham, Partner, Command Consulting Group, LLC 

(Former Director of the U.S. Secret Service) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Mr. Todd M. Keil, Senior Advisor, Torchstone Page, Inc. (Former Assistant 

Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27 

APPENDIX 

Inventory sheet provided by the Virginia State Police, submitted for the 

record by Mr. Cummings ..................................................................................... 80 

Opening statement of Rep. Elijah E. Cummings .................................................. 82 

Opening statement of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton ......................... 84 

Map of White House, submitted by Chairman Issa .............................................. 86 

August 20, 2014, letter to Julia Pierson from Rep. Jason Chaffetz, submitted 

by Rep. Chaffetz ................................................................................................... 87 

Letter from U.S. Dept of Homeland Security U.S. Secret Service ....................... 89 

Remarks by the President at Signing of America’s Promise Summit Declaration, submitted by Rep. Jackson-Lee .................................................................. 91 

Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General report, submitted 

by Rep. Chaffetz ................................................................................................... 92 

(1) 

WHITE HOUSE PERIMETER BREACH: NEW 

CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECRET SERVICE 

Tuesday, September 30, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Chaffetz, Gowdy, Collins, 

Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Norton, Tierney, 

Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, Duckworth, Kelly, Horsford, and 

Lujan Grisham. 

Also Present: Representatives Long and Jackson Lee. 

Staff Present: Alexa Armstrong, Legislative Assistant; Brien A. 

Beattie, Professional Staff Member; Melissa Beaumont, Assistant 

Clerk; Will L. Boyington, Deputy Press Secretary; Molly Boyl, Deputy General Counsel and Parliamentarian; Lawrence J. Brady, 

Staff Director; David Brewer, Senior Counsel; Sharon Casey, Senior Assistant Clerk; Steve Castor, General Counsel; John Cuaderes, 

Deputy Staff Director; Brian Daner, Counsel; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and Committee Operations; Linda Good, 

Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm, Senior Professional Staff Member; Frederick Hill, Deputy Staff Director for Communications and Strategy; 

Christopher Hixon, Chief Counsel for Oversight; Michael R. Kilo, 

Legislative Assistant; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark D. 

Marin, Deputy Staff Director for Oversight; Ashok M. Pinto, Chief 

Counsel, Investigations; Andrew Rezendes, Counsel; Laura L. 

Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk; Jessica Seale, Digital Director; Andrew 

Shult, Deputy Digital Director; Jonathan J. Skladany, Deputy General Counsel; Katy Summerlin, Press Assistant; Peter Warren, Legislative Policy Director; Rebecca Watkins, Communications Director; Sang H. Yi, Professional Staff Member; Aryele Bradford, Minority Press Secretary; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Communications Director; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator; Juan 

McCullum, Minority Clerk; Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; 

Brandon Reavis, Minority Counsel/Policy Advisor; Valerie Shen, 

Minority Counsel. 

Chairman ISSA. The committee will come to order. 

The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans have a right to know that the money 

Washington takes from them is well spent; and, second, Americans 

deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. 

2 

Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers. It is our job to work tirelessly 

in partnership with Citizen Watchdogs to bring genuine reform to 

the Federal bureaucracy. This is our mission, and today’s hearing 

follows one of the most important parts of that mission. 

With $1.5 billion spent by the Secret Service, nearly a billion of 

that spent on protection of the First Family, the Second Family, 

former Presidents and presidential candidates, the United States 

Secret Service was always considered to be the elite law enforcement Agency, made up of men and women who were highly regarded, highly respected and highly trusted. The country has 

placed great faith and trust in the Secret Service. 

The agents of the Uniformed Division, their officers and the Secret Service agents have a monumental task, that of protecting the 

Nation’s Presidents, past, present and future. They do so honorably 

and not without considerable personal sacrifice. They ensure the 

safety of the First and Second Family, yes, and the safety of foreign 

dignitaries throughout Washington and, at times, around the 

world. They ensure the safety of every man and woman who enters 

the White House and accompanying buildings. But a history of misbehavior, security failures has clearly blemished that record. 

On September 19, Omar Gonzalez jumped the North Fence, ran 

across the White House lawn, up the steps of the North Portico and 

into the front door of the White House. He was armed with a 3- 

inch serrated knife. He entered through an unlocked door, passed 

the staircase to the presidential residence and into the East Room 

of the White House. 

Ladies and gentlemen, that was the part of my opening statement that was changed last night when the early false report that, 

in fact, he had been apprehended just inside the front door was 

turned upside down by a revelation that, in fact, he penetrated 

much further into the White House. Secret Service officers only 

subdued him after he was clearly well inside the White House. 

An intruder walked in the front door of the White House, and 

that is unacceptable. Common sense tells us that there were a series of security failures, not an instance of praiseworthy restraint. 

Inexplicably, Omar Gonzalez breached at least five rings of security 

on September 19. 

The White House is supposed to be one of America’s most secure 

facilities and, in fact, one of the world’s most secure facilities. So 

how on Earth did it happen? This failure has once again has tested 

the trust of the American people in the Secret Service, a trust we 

clearly depend on to protect the President. 

After allowing a paparazzi-crazed reality TV star to crash a State 

Dinner, after engaging prostitutes in Cartagena, after excessive 

drinking and an agent falling asleep outside his room in the Netherlands and, yes, after the mishandling of the 11/11/11 event, a 

gunman who sprayed bullets across the White House and, it is reported, caused over $100,000 in damage that was not properly reported in real time or understood in real time, it is understandable 

that morale at the Agency appears to be in decline, according to 

news reports. 

3 

In light of the recent break-in, we have to ask whether the culture at the Secret Service and possible declining morale have an 

impact in operation, and those are some of our questions today. 

The appointment of Director Pierson brought new hope that the 

Agency would reclaim its noble image, but recent events have so 

troubled us that, in fact, we have called the Director here to face 

some tough questions. 

How could Mr. Gonzalez scale the fence? We understand that. 

That happens often. People try to scale that fence. But how is it 

that, as would ordinarily happen, agents didn’t immediately apprehend him? How was he able to sprint 70 yards, almost the entire 

length of a football field, without being intercepted by guards inside the fence? Why didn’t security dogs stop him in his tracks? 

What about the SWAT team and assault rifles—or sniper rifles? 

Why was there no guard stationed at the front door of the White 

House? And, yes, how much would it cost to lock the front door of 

the White House? 

The Secret Service must show us how there is a clear path back 

to public trust. The purpose of today’s hearing is to gain answers 

to these many questions plaguing the Secret Service. Today we will 

hear from experts on both the Agency’s protocol, foreign and domestic. But, most importantly, we will hear from the Secret Service 

Director herself on her plans to improve the Agency’s performance. 

Americans face real danger as we serve interests abroad, especially those stationed at our embassies. It is a time of great peril. 

We are engaged in a battle against ISIL as we speak, but that is 

not limited to foreign soil. Americans know that the next attempt 

to take the White House may not be by a crazed solo knife-wielding 

veteran with PTSD. It could well be a planned attack from a terrorist organization. 

The fact is the system broke down on September 19, as it did 

when the Salahis crashed the State Dinner in 2009, as it did when 

Ortega-Hernandez successfully shot the White House on November 

11, 2011, as it did in Cartagena when agents paid for prostitutes 

and compromised security, as it did in the Netherlands in 2014. We 

cannot further allow this. 

But, more importantly, as I said to the Director before today’s 

hearing, the Secret Service relies on two important skills—or facts. 

Their skill, their capability to protect the President, must be at the 

highest level because they cannot succeed 99 percent because 1 

percent failure is not an option. 

But they also rely on a good-faith belief by most people that they 

shouldn’t even try, that this is the hardest target on Earth. We 

need to make sure that that second hardest target on Earth is true 

again both in reality and in the minds of anyone who might take 

on the Secret Service to get to the President or the First Family. 

And, with that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

We began today’s hearing with an obvious premise: No individual 

should be allowed to scale the fence of the White House, sprint 

across the North Lawn and burst into the residence of the First 

Family with a weapon. No one. 

4 

Our goal today is also clear: To determine how this happened 

and make sure it never happens again. This is our watch. This recent incident, unfortunately, causes many people to ask whether 

there is a much broader problem with the Secret Service. 

Last night the Washington Post reported that Omar Gonzalez 

made his way into the East Room much further than the Secret 

Service previously disclosed. Another report in this weekend’s Post 

about a shooting incident in 2011 raises even more questions about 

the competency and culture of this elite Agency. What concerns me 

most about this report is that agents said they were hesitant. 

Agents in this Agency said they were hesitant to raise security concerns with their supervisors. 

Ladies and gentlemen, something is awfully wrong with that picture. The Secret Service is supposed to be the most elite protective 

force in the world; yet, 4 days went by before they discovered that 

the White House had been shot seven times. Then, in 2012, there 

was the prostitution scandal in Colombia. Although it had little to 

do with tactical protection issues, it seriously damaged the Agency’s credibility. 

The Secret Service must not only carry out its duties with the 

highest degree of excellence and effectiveness, but it also must 

maintain a reputation which matches that performance. As the 

chairman has said, much of what deters people from trying to 

pierce the protective veil of the Secret Service is the reputation, 

and that reputation must be one of excellence and effectiveness. 

Today’s witness, Ms. Julia Pierson, was appointed as the Director 

of the Secret Service last year to help restore the Agency’s standing. She has had a distinguished 30-year career with the Agency. 

And to her credit, she immediately ordered an internal review and 

agreed to testify. 

With respect to this most recent incident, I have key questions 

for the Director that I know are shared by many people across the 

country: Did the Secret Service have specific protocols for handling 

this type of perimeter breach? If so, were those protocols followed 

in this case? And if they were followed, do they need to be changed 

in light of what happened? If the protocols were not followed, why 

were they not followed? And how can we have confidence that they 

will be followed in the future? 

I also want to understand what happened prior to the incident. 

Gonzalez was arrested in Virginia 2 months earlier, on July 19. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record an inventory 

sheet that was provided to us by the Virginia State Police. It lists 

the contents of his car, which included an arsenal of 11 firearms, 

including sniper rifles and a sawed-off shotgun. It also—— 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, the entire report will be 

placed into the record. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

It also included the contents of his car, which included a small 

arsenal of 11 firearms, including sniper rifles and a sawed-off shotgun. It also included a map of Washington, D.C., with ‘‘a line 

drawn to the White House.’’ 

According to the Virginia State Police, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives concluded that there was no information in Gonzalez’s history that prohibited him from owning 

5 

these firearms; yet, he was severely mentally ill and a military psychiatrist reportedly treated him for post-traumatic stress disorder 

and paranoid schizophrenia. 

Mr. Chairman, I hate to even imagine what could have happened 

if Gonzalez had been carrying a gun instead of a knife when he 

burst inside the White House. That possibility is extremely unsettling. 

Today our work faces two challenges. First, the Secret Service 

has not yet completed its internal review. I understand that the Director will provide us with a status update, but the final results are 

not yet in. 

Second, some of the information is classified; so, we cannot discuss it in public. The very last thing we want to do is give people 

like Gonzalez a road map for how to attack the President or other 

officials protected by the Secret Service. This does not mean the 

committee cannot obtain the information. 

The Director sent a letter on Friday offering not only to testify 

here today in the public setting, but also to provide all of us with 

a classified briefing. The chairman has now agreed to hold this 

classified session in a separate room directly after this hearing concludes. 

Let me close by making this very final point. This, ladies and 

gentlemen, is not a Democratic issue. This is not a Republican 

issue. This is an American issue. This is also an issue of national 

security. 

The vast majority of men who serve and women who serve in the 

Secret Service are dedicated, experienced public servants who are 

willing to lay down their lives for their country. And on behalf of 

a grateful Congress and a grateful Nation, I thank every one of 

them. They have an extremely difficult job and, like others in similar positions, they are required to make instant life or death decisions in extremely stressful situations. 

Last year, for example, the Capitol Police shot and killed an unarmed woman with a 1-year-old girl in the backseat of her car. 

Some praised their quick responses. Others criticized their actions. 

But they acted based upon their first-hand experience right here in 

the Capitol when another deranged individual burst through the 

doors and killed two Capitol Police officers. 

The Secret Service has a high-profile job, but it is critically important and it requires accountability so that the spotlight is rightly on their actions today. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony. I thank you for 

bringing us back for this hearing. And I look forward to the questions that I have already raised and others being answered. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. 

Chairman ISSA. I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. 

Chaffetz, the Subcommittee Chairman on National Security, for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the chairman, and I also thank the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, and his statement. He is absolutely 

right: This is not a Republican issue, a Democratic issue. This is 

an American issue. 

6 

I don’t want it to be the political football. But we in the United 

States of America are self-critical. One of the beauties of our Nation is we do hold ourselves accountable. And so I appreciate, 

Chairman, you holding this hearing. 

We have wonderful men and women who serve this Nation. They 

do it patriotically. They do it—they put their lives on the line. They 

walk away from their families and their spouses. They don’t know 

what today is going to bring them. And they do so in a very, very 

honorable way, and we thank them for their service and their dedication. 

But I have serious concerns about the current leadership, I have 

concerns about training, and I have concerns about protocol. And 

that is what I want to get at today. 

Since the current Director has taken on this role, it is also important to note that she was the Chief of Staff since 2008. And so over 

the last several years, it is not good enough to just simply excuse 

this as something we were trying to clean up before because she 

was the Chief of Staff starting in 2008. I am concerned about her 

leadership and the mixed messages that are sent to those who 

serve in the Secret Service. 

For instance, after the fence-jumping incident, the Secret Service 

was very quickly—very quick to put out a statement that honored 

the officers and agents for their ‘‘tremendous restraint.’’ Tremendous restraint is not what we’re looking for. Tremendous restraint 

is not the goal and the objective. It sends a very mixed message. 

The message should be overwhelming force. If one person can 

hop that wall—hop that fence and run unimpeded all the way into 

an open door at the White House, don’t praise them for tremendous 

restraint. That is not the goal. That is not what we are looking for. 

If there were alarms that were inside the door that were muted 

or silenced, I want to know why that is. Who makes that call and 

decision? That, to me, is a leadership decision. 

I think at some point we need to go back and review the 2013 

Inspector General’s report, which actually said there is not a problem here, but has over 1,000 indications of security concerns. 

And the opening statements say we have to be 100 percent right 

all the time. Everybody agrees with that. And, yet, the Inspector 

General’s report is pretty damning when it comes and looks at 

what the agents are feeling like happens within the Agency itself. 

Very concerned about the 2011 incident. I am thankful for the 

Washington Post and Carol Leonnig and what she did in the reporting there. 

As best I can tell from the spot report, as well as the article in 

the Washington Post, the event in 2011 where eight shots were 

fired at the White House, you had no less than five Secret Service 

agents report that they thought they heard shots fired. You had 

somebody on Twitter report that they saw somebody shoot at the 

White House. There were two people in two different shuttle vans 

who reported that they saw somebody firing a weapon at the White 

House. Blocks away, moments later, somebody crashes a vehicle. 

An assault rifle is in there. And, yet, the—and the Secret Service 

is on the scene and nobody ties those two together. I don’t understand that. 

7 

Later the Arlington County Police actually detained this person. 

He had been positively identified based on what was—that vehicle 

that was there, but nobody put it into the system to put him on 

the watch list. Consequently, when the Arlington County Police 

pull him over, they take his picture and they let him go. And it was 

only the Pennsylvania police 5 days later that actually find this 

person. Now he’s serving some 25 years in jail, but he could have 

done a lot more damage. 

If the Director is truly going to take full responsibility, I think 

your opening statement and the goals you have should also talk 

about leadership. Because, as I talk to the whistleblowers at the 

Secret Service and others, they are concerned about leadership. 

I am also concerned about training. As I look at the 2015 budget 

request from the White House, on page 39, there is a basic class 

totals. And I want to run through these numbers because it is important on the training aspect. 

Under Special Agent Basic Classes, in 2009, there were eight 

classes; in 2010, there were eight classes; in 2011, there were five 

classes; 2012, there were no classes; in 2013, there was one class. 

In the Uniformed Division Basic Class, 2009, 11; 2010, there 

were 11 classes; in 2011, there were six classes; then in 2012, there 

was one class; 2013, one class. 

And you look at the budget line appropriation for this, it didn’t 

go down. It is maintained basically the same. Why did that training diminish? 

And then, finally, Mr. Chairman, I worry about protocol. Again, 

I mention tremendous restraint is what the Secret Service touted. 

That is not the objective. If you project weakness, it invites attacks. 

We want to see overwhelming force. If a would-be intruder cannot 

be stopped by a dog or intercepted by a person, perhaps more lethal 

force is necessary. 

And I want those Secret Service agents and officers to know at 

least this Member of Congress has their back. Don’t let somebody 

get close to the President. Don’t let somebody get close to his family. Don’t let them get in the White House ever. And if they have 

to take action that is lethal, I will have their back. 

In this day and age of ISIL and terrorists and IEDs and dirty 

bombs, we don’t know what’s going on underneath that person’s 

clothing. If they want to penetrate that, they need to know that 

they are going to perhaps be killed. That is the message we should 

be sending every single time. And that is the kind of Secret Service 

that I expect. 

I thank them again for their service, their dedication. We love 

them. We care for them. But we need better leadership. It is not 

happening. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank the gentleman. 

Chairman ISSA. We now recognize the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for her opening statement. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for this hearing. 

My respect for the Secret Service goes back to when I was growing up as a child in the District of Columbia and continues profoundly to this very day. 

8 

But today we must ask—recent events call for an—recent unprecedented events call for an unprecedented response, first, an increasing number of White House jumpers, including the most recent this month who was able to get deep into the interior of the 

White House; before that, in 2011, multiple shots into the living 

quarters of the First Family discovered only 4 days later not by Secret Service investigation, but by White House staff. 

Beyond these failures, in the core mission of the Secret Service 

to protect the White House and the First Family is an unsettling 

failure to disclose, perhaps even understand, what has occurred or 

to promptly investigate. 

Together, this combination of failures suggests strongly that the 

time is ripe for a 21st century makeover of the Secret Service. I do 

not regard this matter as a mere question of personnel. I believe 

it goes far deeper than that. Moreover, the stunning events have 

occurred during a period when the United States and, by definition, 

the White House and even the President are being targeted by domestic and international terrorists. 

According to threat assessments, this President has had three 

times as many threats as his predecessors. Just as troubling have 

been indications of unwarranted secrecy in the Secret Service. The 

Secret Service is not a secret society. If there is a willing avoidance 

of needed transparency, that in itself poses a danger to the White 

House. 

For example, when noise is heard that some believe could be 

gunfire at the White House, others believe is automobile backfire, 

and still others believe is gun—gun—gang gunfire, isn’t it the job 

of the Secret Service to presume, presume, such a sound is gunfire 

until an immediate investigation shows it was not? 

When line officers close to the sound have to become whistleblowers, has active suppression of information become yet another 

threat to the White House? Worse, do such failures show that some 

in the Secret Service are in denial of danger, perhaps posing the 

greatest risk to the White House? 

Particularly troubling, in light of such unanswered questions 

would be the rush to quick fixes, such as suppression of public access to the area around the White House without a thorough investigation. The White House and Lafayette Park, just like the Congress, are First Amendment areas, and the public must be allowed 

to express their grievances as they always have been. 

In light of the seriousness of recent breaches, the investigation 

at the first instance by the Department of Homeland Security 

should go well beyond the details of these events. They are merely 

the most recent raw data for a top-to-bottom investigation of Secret 

Service operations at the White House. This is not a mere question 

of personnel. Changing people at the top or in between will not 

solve the issue I think we are presented. 

We must learn whether today’s Secret Service, as structured, for 

example, could stop five or six fence-jumpers jumping at the same 

time, intent on harm to the White House and the President, not 

just a demented war vet, who even alone might have succeeded. No 

scenario should be off the table for the needed 21st century study 

of Secret Service operations in the age of terrorism. 

9 

Director Pierson has shown accomplishments in her 18 months 

as director. The heroism of the Secret Service is beyond debate. 

The White House intruder was brought down, after all, by an 

agent, but the White House and the President have been thrust 

into a new era of danger. 

The Secret Service should welcome an outside investigation to 

assure that the necessary resources and the expert backup and the 

structure for the 21st century is necessary for it to do its job. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

Chairman ISSA. Members may have 7 days to submit opening 

statements for the record. 

Chairman ISSA. I now ask unanimous consent that our colleague, 

the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

Additionally, I ask unanimous consent that our colleague, the 

gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

We now welcome our panel of witnesses. The Honorable Julia 

Pierson is the Director of the United States Secret Service. The 

Honorable Ralph Basham is the former Director of the United 

States Secret Service and currently a partner at Command Consulting Group. The Honorable Todd Keil is the former Assistant 

Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at United States Department of Homeland Security and is currently a senior advisor to 

TorchStone Page. 

Pursuant to the committee’s rules, I would ask that you, please 

all rise and raise your right hand to take the oath. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you’re about 

to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 

truth? 

Please be seated. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow sufficient time for discussion and questions, 

please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire opening 

statement will be made a permanent part of the record. 

And, with that, Director Pierson is recognized. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF HON. JULIA PIERSON 

Ms. PIERSON. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings, distinguished Members of the committee. 

I am here today to address the concern that we all share following the incident of September 19 at the White House. It is clear 

that our security plan was not properly executed. This is unacceptable. I take full responsibility, and I will make sure that it does 

not happen again. 

As director, my primary concern is ensuring the operational 

readiness of my workforce. I have been aggressive in addressing 

our human capital challenges, ensuring professionalism, and developing leaders. Through active engagement with the Agency’s superVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
10 

visors and employees, I have made it clear my expectations for professionalism and personal accountability. 

Much of what we do to protect the President and the White 

House involves information that is highly sensitive or classified; so, 

I’ll be limited in what I can say in a public hearing. 

On September 19, a man scaled the North Fence of the White 

House, crossed the lawn while ignoring verbal commands from Uniformed Division officers, entered through the front door and was 

subsequently arrested on the State Floor. 

Immediately that night I ordered enhancements around the complex and, in consultation with the Secretary, initiated a comprehensive review of the incident and protective measures to ensure this 

will not happen again. 

The review began with a physical assessment of the site and personnel interviews. All decisions made that evening are being evaluated, including those on tactics and use of force, in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting those officers. 

I am committed to the following: A complete and thorough investigation of the facts of this incident; a complete and thorough review of all policies, procedures, protocols in place that govern the 

security of the White House complex and a response to this incident; and, based on the results of that review, a coordinated, informed effort to make any and all adjustments, to include training 

and personnel actions that are necessary to properly ensure the 

safety and security of the President and the First Family and the 

White House. 

The White House emergency action plans are multifaceted and 

tailored to each threat. The Secret Service has apprehended 16 individuals who have jumped the fence over the last 5 years, including six this year alone. In fact, on September 11, 2014, a week 

prior to the events that are the subject of today’s hearing, officers 

apprehended an individual seconds after he scaled the fence and 

ran onto the grounds. 

In addition to fence-jumpers, over the last 5 years, hundreds of 

individuals have approached the White House perimeter, verbalizing threats to our protectees or acting in a suspicious manner. Officers and agents routinely leverage their experience and training 

to make decisions to either arrest or transfer these individuals to 

appropriate facilities for mental health evaluations. 

Protecting the White House complex is a challenge in any threat 

environment. In addition to being a national icon, the complex consists of public spaces, executive offices where our Nation’s highest 

leaders congregate, and the private residence of the President and 

First Family. Ensuring the safety of all who live and work in the 

White House while preserving access to the millions of visitors each 

year requires a unique balance. 

In this environment, we are never satisfied by the status quo and 

we are constantly reviewing our security protocols. With the help 

of Congress, we have enhanced our protective countermeasures and 

security features at the White House. 

In the past 5 years, the Secret Service has upgraded perimeter 

cameras, officer booths, vehicle gates and command and control 

systems, along with enhancements to highly classified programs 

that have made the President and the complex more secure. 

11 

We have generated many of these new security enhancements in 

direct response to intelligence information on known and emerging 

terrorist tactics. I thank the Congress for their support in this time 

of constrained resources. 

Beyond technology, approximately 75 percent of our annual 

budget is dedicated to payroll costs, which support our most valuable asset, our people. The Agency relies heavily on experience, 

training and judgment of our men and women to make critical 

split-second decisions. 

With respect to the many questions that have been raised and 

the opinions proffered in the wake of the September 19 incident, 

I do not want to get ahead of the investigation that is underway. 

The Secret Service has had its share of challenges in recent years 

and some during my tenure. I intend to lead the Secret Service 

through these challenges and restore our Agency’s reputation to 

the level of excellence that the American public expects. As Director, I am proud of the Secret Service’s workforce who serve each 

day with honor and distinction. 

Last week our employees successfully implemented security operations in conjunction with the 69th United Nations General Assembly in New York City, where they protected the President and more 

than 140 world leaders. 

Over the last 12 months, they have completed over 5,600 successful protective missions. It is my responsibility to ensure that these 

men and women have the resources and training that they need to 

succeed. 

As Director, I have worked with the Department of Homeland 

Security, with Secretary Johnson, the administration and Congress, to include Members of this committee, to develop a comprehensive, forward-leaning strategy to further enhance the Secret 

Service’s workforce and operational capabilities. We remain dedicated and committed to protecting the President, the First Family 

and the sanctity of the White House. 

I thank the committee today for the opportunity to appear, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Pierson follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Mr. Basham. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. RALPH BASHAM 

Mr. BASHAM. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings—— 

Chairman ISSA. Could you turn the mic on and pull it a little 

closer, please. 

Mr. BASHAM. Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. BASHAM. —Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my 

perspective today on the recent events of the White House and, 

more broadly, on the state of an Agency I care a great deal about, 

the United States Secret Service. 

Let me say at the outset that I look forward to discussing how 

the recent incident highlights some of the challenges the Secret 

Service has long faced at the White House complex in balancing desired levels of security along with the functional needs of those who 

work and live in that complex, the practical realities of the thriving 

city it resides within, and the historic symbolism and imagery of 

the people’s house. 

The incident exposes certain steps Secret Service got right and 

those they got wrong and will identify corrective measures and additional resources that can be considered. However, it also poses 

some difficult questions for all of us on issues, like the use of lethal 

force and our tolerance for additional fortifications around the 

White House complex. Those questions do not have easy answers, 

and the long-term potential consequences must be thought through. 

Let us also be mindful that, while our analysis of actions and the 

shortcomings has the benefit of days of hindsight and consideration, anyone who has served on a protective detail knows the decision-making in an actual event with life and death consequences is 

measured in milliseconds. Those who were on duty during this incident had a much harder job in trying to get it right than we do 

here today. 

My perspective is one that is shaped by a career of over 30 years 

in the Secret Service, but also from my experiences at the head of 

three other operational components within the Department of 

Homeland Security and now from 5 years in the private sector, 

where I remain deeply involved in the Homeland Security issues 

and the implementation of international best practices as it relates 

to the protection of individuals and high-value assets. 

I had the honor of joining the Secret Service in 1971, and I enjoyed a challenging and very interesting career, including being on 

protective details of Henry Kissinger, Vice President Bush, Quayle, 

Gore, and countless foreign Heads of State and foreign dignitaries. 

Later, President Clinton appointed me as the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. And, eventually, I returned 

to Washington after the September 11 attacks to help start up the 

Transportation Security Administration. 

I rejoined the Secret Service in 2003, when I was appointed Director, where I was honored to serve for over 3 years. I subsequently was appointed by President Bush to serve as the Commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection, the 

largest law enforcement agency in the United States. I remained 

16 

in that position into the Obama Administration at the request of 

Secretary Napolitano. 

Upon retiring from the government in 2009, I helped found the 

security company that works for private-sector and government clients. Therefore, the viewpoint that I will share on the subject before the committee today is informed largely by my experience with 

the Secret Service, but with the benefit of having worked for and 

with many other elite security organizations around the world for 

almost 40 years. 

Let me commend the Members of this committee for the time 

and interest you are showing on this subject, especially at this 

juncture when there are so many pressing security concerns to 

which our government must pay attention. 

It goes without saying that the recent incident with the individual jumping the White House fence, running across the North 

Lawn and making it inside the White House is unprecedented and 

unacceptable. This is not just my view, but, as the Director has 

stated, it is her view and other senior management of that Agency 

as well as the rank and file. 

Again, perspective is critically important in this incident. We 

could easily be sitting here today discussing why an Iraq veteran 

possibly suffering through post-traumatic stress disorder, armed 

with only a pocketknife, was shot dead on the North Lawn when 

the President and First Family were not on the property. 

At the Secret Service, some of the split-second decisions made 

during this latest incident will thoroughly be examined, procedures 

will be debated, training will be altered, and, in the end, the Secret 

Service will learn valuable lessons, as they have been doing 

throughout their history, of protecting the President and his family. 

This is an Agency which has never been reluctant to ‘‘red team’’ 

incidents, those of high consequences and those of less importance, 

to find opportunities for improvement in the way it conducts its 

business, the way it trains its people and the tools it uses to accomplish its incredibly important mission. 

I can tell you that my confidence remains extremely high that 

this aspect of the Service’s culture remains as strong today as it 

has ever been. And I know that the Agency will learn valuable lessons that it can apply immediately to improve security at the 

White House and in other settings. 

I would urge the committee to keep in mind that—when examining any incidents, that the broader context in which the Secret 

Service operates is not one which is valued on security alone. 

The Service has to ensure that the President, other protectees, 

and facilities in which they work and live are safe and secure, but 

they do so in the context of important American values, like freedom and openness, and in close coordination, cooperation and almost always after negotiation with a myriad of other stakeholders 

and decision-makers who have diverse priorities, responsibilities 

and viewpoints. 

And this dynamic is, in fact, more true when it comes to the area 

surrounding the White House complex than in any other. As much 

as I may have wished it when I was the Director, the Secret ServVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
17 

ice absolutely cannot act unilaterally when it comes to almost any 

security feature in and around the White House. 

Stakeholders with a voice include the government of the District 

of Columbia, as Ms. Norton would recognize, the National Park 

Service, White House Historical Society, GSA and others, who all 

provide input into any architectural changes and improvements, 

new infrastructure or changes in appearance. 

A prime example of this is the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue 

in front of the White House to vehicular traffic, a security imperative, for the Service—from the Service’s perspective, for many years 

that was politically impossible until the Oklahoma City bombing in 

1995 made the impact to have—a vehicle-borne explosive could 

have on a government building, no less a 200-year-old sandstone 

mansion made it very vivid and undeniable. Even then, it was not 

until 2004, when I was director, that we were able to complete the 

project to permanently converting this portion of the road into a pedestrian mall. 

I might add, to this day, there are those who believe the avenue 

should be reopened in spite of the overwhelming and irrefutable 

evidence of the extreme risk such a move would put the First Family and hundreds of employees who work there. 

I can also tell you that there have been numerous studies conducted over the years by the Secret Service and at the Secret Service’s request to test and explore options to address vulnerabilities 

of concern at the White House complex, motivated, in part, by concerns about the inadequacy of the current White House fence as an 

outer perimeter for a complex giving the ability of an individual or 

group of individuals to quickly scale it and be on the White House 

grounds. 

While notable improvements have been made, especially over the 

last decade, to the security of the White House complex, many 

unnoticeable to the public, there have been several priority improvements desired by the Service that have not been possible in 

light of other considerations or given the level of funding provided 

to the Agency for such capital improvements. 

Let me be clear. I am not in any way trivializing the importance 

of these other considerations. As a security professional, there have 

almost always—there almost always being things that I would like 

to do for security purposes, but could not, given the factors or—and 

limited funding. And that is always going to be the case. 

We must always keep in mind that the White House, like the 

United States Capitol, is an important symbol for the American 

people. It is obviously critically important that it be kept safe, but 

that security must be accomplished in a way that does not jeopardize the very values that we seek to protect and that these buildings themselves indeed symbolize. I ask that you keep this in context when looking at this particular incident and examining how 

something could have happened or how it could be and should be 

prevented in the future. 

Finally, I want to make sure the committee is aware of another 

fundamental principle on which the Secret Service, in fact, any 

good security organization’s protective methodology is based. In the 

military, it is called defense in depth. In law enforcement, it is usually referred to as multilayered security. 

18 

When it comes to protecting the President or the White House 

complex, there are many layers of protection through which an 

attacker must travel in order to achieve their desired objectives 

and to pose an ultimate threat to the person or thing that is the 

target. 

A breach of the fence and the entry of an individual into the 

White House is undeniably—— 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Basham, could you summarize. You’re at 

twice 5 minutes. 

Mr. BASHAM. Oh. I apologize. 

Then, having said that, Mr. Chairman, I am ready to take questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Basham follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Mr. Keil. 

STATEMENT OF TODD M. KEIL 

Mr. KEIL. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings and distinguished Members of the committee for inviting me to testify today regarding the U.S. Secret Service’s security 

protocols. 

I believe I can offer a unique perspective on protecting high-visibility, targeted facilities after spending nearly 23 years as a special 

agent with the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security 

Service, with responsibility for developing and implementing security programs for U.S. personnel, embassies, consulates and other 

official facilities around the world. I have also spent numerous 

years in the private sector, working in and advising corporate security operations and management. 

Additionally, from late 2009 until early 2012, I was the Assistant 

Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland Security. As the Assistant Secretary, I was responsible for 

public-private partnerships and a regulatory program to protect the 

critical assets of the United States. 

Last year I was also selected and served on the Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommended Independent Panel on 

Best Practices, which was established to identify best practices 

from across U.S. government agencies, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations and allied countries on management 

and operations in high-threat, high-risk locations globally. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States Secret Service has a proud history of almost 150 years protecting the most important government 

leaders of our country, the White House and other official facilities, 

and conducting criminal investigations to ensure the integrity of 

our currency, banking systems and financial communications and 

cybersecurity. 

The men and women of the Secret Service are on the frontline 

every day, keeping our Nation safe, and they do a tremendous job. 

The agents and officers of the Secret Service are constantly in the 

spotlight, especially serving at the White House, one of the most 

prominent symbols of our Nation’s strength and democracy, and we 

owe them a debt of gratitude for their service to our country. 

However, every organization, even those with a century and a 

half of history, must be willing to learn. Those who wish to do us 

harm, from an unpredictable, lone, possibly mentally unstable person, to an organized terror group intent on unleashing a calculated 

attack, typically have the element of surprise. 

Our country today faces a very dynamic, fluid and evolving 

threat environment in which the aggressors have become very patient, resilient and determined. We have to be better than they are. 

To counter this threat, security, intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies like the Secret Service must have solid strategic and tactical management and leadership, focus on their primary mission, 

and provide their people with the best training and resources and, 

possibly most important, be ready to act aggressively and appropriately when faced with a threat. The Secret Service, like any successful organization, must be willing to continuously evolve and improve to adapt the Agency ahead of the threat curve. 

25 

Throughout my career, I have found that government agencies 

and private-sector organizations who are at the top of their game 

become complacent. Time tends to annoyingly erode and blunt the 

pointy end of the spear, and organizations and their management 

teams rely on, ‘‘This is the way we’ve always done it’’ or, ‘‘We know 

how to do it best.’’ So they are unwilling or unable to change. 

The Secret Service, I believe, would benefit from expanded use 

of new and emerging technologies to assist with its protective security responsibilities. In fact, when I was at the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Secret Service partnered with my office 

and the DHS Office of Science and Technology to research and develop cutting-edge technology for use at major events in the United 

States. Now is the time for the Department of Homeland Security 

to bring some of those technological enhancements out of the lab 

and expand their use in the Secret Service tool kit. 

In addition to emerging technology, management and leadership 

of an organization must adapt, change and improve. Policies and 

procedures and deployment of personnel and resources should be 

under constant scrutiny and exercised based on real-world scenarios. The officers and agents of the Secret Service are some of 

the best this country has to offer, and they deserve this strategic 

and tactical leadership to match. 

All too often, Mr. Chairman, after something has gone wrong, the 

cry is simply for more money, more personnel, and a larger physical setback. This is rarely the correct answer. Absent a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental issues that led to 

systemic failures, throwing more money and people at the problem 

will only exacerbate existing management weaknesses and compound and magnify, rather than correct, management challenges. 

Internal reviews post-incident are typical in the U.S. government 

from agency to agency. But from my experience, these reviews are 

impacted by intentional or unintentional personal and professional 

bias and are often informed by the same agency cultural and management gaps that may have been a contributing factor in the 

original incident. 

The Department of Homeland Security and the Secret Service 

now have a unique opportunity and critical moment in time to obtain an unbiased, independent, top-to-bottom review, focusing on 

the Service’s management and policies and procedures related to 

the incident on September 19 and other similar incidents. 

I strongly recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

appoint a panel of external independent experts to conduct this review, and this group should be tasked with providing advice, guidance and formal recommendations to the DHS and the Secret Service. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the panel I was on on Benghazi was 

chaired by former Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan. 

Mr. Chairman, throughout my career, I have always been proud 

to work side by side with my Secret Service colleagues at every 

level in the Agency. The United States Secret Service is a recognized world-class organization, and I am confident they will learn 

from this most recent and related incidents and innovate, strengthen and improve as they keep our country and leaders safe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee Members. And I am 

happy to answer any questions. 

26 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Keil. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Keil follows:] 

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30 

Chairman ISSA. I’ll recognize myself now. 

And I think the first question—if you can put out the map of the 

White House up there. The first question, Director—if you look at 

the lower portion, the first question the American people want to 

know was: Is there a crash button? And had it been pushed, would 

it have locked the front door of what’s marked as the ‘‘Entrance 

Hall’’? 

Ms. PIERSON. The front door at the time did not have an automatic locking mechanism. It required an individual to hand-lock 

the door. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So we have an automated system that can 

lock down the White House. $800 million a year. Millions of dollars 

more during your tenure each year than the President’s request. 

And that door was unlocked with no one standing at it when Mr. 

Gonzalez came through it. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. The door was unlocked at the time of Mr. Gonzalez’s entry. That is correct. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. And earlier there was a report and in the 

indictment of Mr. Gonzalez that he was apprehended at the entrance hall. 

Isn’t it true today that we understand that is not true, he was 

actually apprehended at the Green Room? Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. If I may clarify my first answer, the front door actually consists of two doors. There is an outer door, which is a 

glass—almost described as a storm door, and an inner door, which 

would be a wood, ornamental, historic door. The outer door, the 

glass storm door, was not locked. The internal wood door was in 

the process of being hand-locked. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. Bottom line is automated locking is a capability within the White House, but not at that entrance at that 

time? 

Ms. PIERSON. Not at that time, but has since been installed and 

is effective today. 

Chairman ISSA. We learn from our mistakes. 

The second question: Your Agency previously had reported and 

an indictment against Mr. Gonzalez asserted that he was arrested 

in that entry area. 

Isn’t it true that he actually penetrated the Cross Hall, the East 

Room and, in fact, was arrested in the vicinity of the Green Room? 

Ms. PIERSON. Referring to your map on the wall—— 

Chairman ISSA. Yes. 

Ms. PIERSON. —as I have been briefed, the—Mr. Gonzalez entered the front double doors—— 

Chairman ISSA. Ma’am, I want a short answer. I have very little 

time. 

Was he, in fact—the Federal complaint said he was, in fact, apprehended in one place. 

Isn’t it true he was apprehended further into the White House? 

Ms. PIERSON. As Mr. Gonzalez entered the door, he knocked back 

the officer that was standing at the doorway. The officer then engaged Mr. Gonzalez. They crossed the east Entrance Hall together, 

made the left turn down the Cross Hall. They stepped momentarily 

into the East Room. 

31 

Another officer rendered aid. And he was placed on the ground 

on the carpet and handcuffed on the Cross Hall just outside of the 

Green Room. There is no indication at this time—— 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So, in fact, the Federal complaint and the 

earlier reports were not accurate. Is that correct? Yes or no, please. 

Ms. PIERSON. I think the original complaint is accurate that Mr. 

Gonzalez scaled the fence—— 

Chairman ISSA. Ma’am. Ma’am, hold it. Hold it. I have very little 

time, and I am not—the American people want to know is the 

President safe. I want to know if we can rely on reports from your 

Agency. 

Now, going back to Mr. Hernandez, during your watch not as Director, but as Chief of Staff to the Director, is it true that, in fact, 

as reported, agents falsely assumed that they were not gunshots 

when they were gunshots, that, in fact, there were stand-down orders to people who had already pulled shotguns out, that, in fact, 

the bullets were not discovered to have hit the White House in real 

time within a 24-hour-or-greater period by the Secret Service? Yes 

or no, please. 

Ms. PIERSON. Mr. Chairman, you’re referring to the Ortega 

shooting that—— 

Chairman ISSA. The—yes. 

Ms. PIERSON. —occurred in November—— 

Chairman ISSA. Ortega-Hernandez, if I remember. 

Ms. PIERSON. —2011? 

Chairman ISSA. Yes. 

Ms. PIERSON. At that time, it is my understanding that there 

was reports of shots being fired in proximity to Constitution Avenue—— 

Chairman ISSA. Ma’am, ma’am, I—ma’am, ma’am, this was—— 

Ms. PIERSON. —by the United States Secret Service. 

Chairman ISSA. No. Stop, please. 

I want to be considerate to you. You have a hard job. But you 

head an agency whose morale has gone down. It is lower than 

other comparable Federal agencies. It has had a series of embarrassments. We are going to leave the embarrassments out. We’ve 

had two cases in which the reporting is evolving. 

Only last night did the public learn that, in fact, it was far 

worse, or at least somewhat worse, on September 19th. Only recently has it been revealed—and you said you wanted to correct the 

record. The Washington Post makes it clear, from what I read, 

that, in fact, on November 11th of 2011, shots were fired, the assailant left, while, in fact, the Secret Service supervisor shut down 

the response of people who believed, rightfully, there had been 

shots fired. And, in fact, the follow-up did not discover the damage 

to the White House and the actual shots in realtime. 

Additionally, Mr. Ortega—‘‘Ortega-Hernandez’’ is the way I have 

it written—would not have been apprehended except that he had 

a car accident. And even when he was, it was not immediately 

linked to his criminal activity. 

That, in fact, the system at the White House did not detect the 

actual shots fired and begin the pursuit of somebody who had provided lethal force against the facility of the White House; is that 

correct? You were chief of staff at the time. Is that roughly correct? 

32 

And if it isn’t, I will allow you whatever time you need to properly explain what really happened on November 11th, 2011, so the 

American people can understand that September 19th is not the 

first time there has been considerable lapse, as I see it, and, in 

fact, during a long period of time, during your chief of staff time, 

now during your director time, we have had the kinds of things 

that we should be concerned about for protecting the President. 

So, please tell us, in whatever time you need, about November 

11th, 2011, where The Washington Post is right or wrong. This is 

your chance. 

Ms. PIERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you’re aware, my assignment as chief of staff—— 

Chairman ISSA. Could you get the microphone a little closer, 

please? 

Ms. PIERSON. Certainly. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

As you’re aware, in 2008, my assignment with the United States 

Secret Service was chief of staff. My primary responsibilities at 

that time were business transformation and IT transformation for 

the organization. My focus was on the business operations of the 

organization. 

To my knowledge and based on the briefings that I have received 

of this 3-year-old investigation that occurred in November of 2011 

that appeared in The Washington Post on Sunday—I had also had 

been aware that Representative Chaffetz had asked for a data inquiry. And we responded back to the committee on September 12th 

and provided him detailed information of the Secret Service’s activities on that weekend. 

Shots were reported by the United States Secret Service officers 

in area of Constitution Avenue and 15th. There were witness accounts of a black vehicle that had fired shots. There was confusion 

at the time by the part of the witnesses as to what they had witnessed and what they had saw. Several of those witnesses put out 

Twitter accounts of what they had witnessed. They were subsequently located and interviewed and recanted those statements. 

The actual shorts that were fired in proximity to Constitution 

Avenue and 15th, the vehicle sped away and went westbound on 

Constitution, erratically driving, and struck a lightpost in the area 

of 23rd and Constitution. Mr. Ortega then fled the vehicle. 

Park Police officers and Uniformed Division officers ultimately 

responded to the scene, where the vehicle was left with the AK– 

47 in the front seat. Park Police has jurisdiction over the traffic accident and assumed responsibility for the initial phases of the investigation. 

Chairman ISSA. Ma’am, I’m going to give you all the time you 

need—and thank the ranking member. But the answer is: Where 

are the inconsistencies with what we now know from the Washington Post? You said that they got the story wrong, they were misstating it, they were mischaracterizing it. I’d like to hear the inconsistencies. 

So far, you’re just corroborating that, in fact, the understanding 

of the series of failures in realtime to protect the White House are, 

in fact, correct, according to The Washington Post. So please tell 

us where they are not correct, please. 

33 

Ms. PIERSON. Throughout the course of this, there was a command post established down at Constitution Avenue and 23rd 

Street. Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Park Police, the 

United States Secret Service were there attempting to resolve or 

understand from the witness accounts what had happened on Constitution Avenue. 

Back at the White House, individuals had heard what they believed to be shots. The Secret Service, according to the records that 

I have been able to locate on this 3-year-old investigation, did response properly. The emergency response teams and other officers 

did a protective sweep of the area to make sure that we did not 

have any intruders, to make sure that there were not any injuries 

and obvious signs of anything that had been damaged. 

Further investigation with the Park Police, they were unable to 

resolve at that time as to whether or not these were shots being 

fired at other vehicles or shots being fired at the White House. 

That took some time to understand. 

It wasn’t until the Usher’s Office was preparing for the return 

of the President and First Family—or the President and the First 

Lady that they identified damage on the Truman Balcony. That led 

to further investigation, and that led to us contacting the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation to initiate their full investigation. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Cummings, I want to thank you for your understanding and 

just relate something that you and I discussed yesterday, if I may. 

In Washington, D.C., and around the country, there are a number of systems that we all know—and Baltimore, I believe, has it 

too—that they’re basically microphones that hear gunshots, can 

identify the direction, can quickly without human intervention figure out whether or not a real shot has been fired, confirm it, and 

often give a very accurate direction. That type of technology isn’t 

so odd that we don’t see it in our cities. And I think that’s the reason I went on so long with this question. 

Ms. Norton, I know, knows this. The District does have a sophisticated system. And I think the committee is going to want to make 

sure that not only does the White House have a higher level of 

awareness of this system but that the District’s system be enhanced, if necessary, to make sure that something like this never 

happens again. 

And I thank the gentleman for his patience. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pierson, I have thought about all of this long and hard, 

and I think my major concern goes to the culture. It is very disturbing to know that Secret Service agents in the most elite protective agency in the world feel more comfortable, apparently, from 

what I’m hearing, coming to members of this committee and telling 

things than coming to you and members in the agency. 

That, I’m telling you, when I boil all of this down, that, to me, 

is dangerous. It has to go against morale. I don’t even see how good 

decisions can be made if your own people don’t feel a level of comfort that—or they feel fear that they are going to be able to talk 

about the things that concern them. 

34 

And I just want to go through some questions, and I want to give 

you a chance to address that. Because, to me, when all the dust 

settles, that’s a problem. 

And so, going back to this November 11th, 2011, incident—and 

I know you were not the Director. I understand that. A lot of people talk about the culture problem with the Secret Service, and the 

press reports—of all the press reports, the one that concerned me 

is that, back there on the 2011—and it said, ‘‘Officers who were on 

the scene who thought gunfire had probably hit the house that 

night were largely ignored, and some were afraid to dispute their 

boss’s conclusions.’’ 

Did you see that report, and are you aware of this issue? 

Ms. PIERSON. Ranking Member Cummings, I, too, read that 

newspaper article and was troubled by those accounts. 

I have asked my Office of Professional Responsibility to retrieve 

the file and those records of what we know and when we knew it, 

if this young officer had made such a statement. I did find a statement where that young officer alleges that they were reluctant to 

report it to their supervisor to be criticized, I believe was his statement. That troubles me, as well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And that’s a major problem. 

Ms. PIERSON. I am going to ask my Office of Professional Responsibility to reinterview that officer—they remain on the job today— 

to determine whether or not that officer would be more competent 

today or what were some of the problems that night that she felt 

like she could not say that. That extremely troubles me. 

Now—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. It said that she heard shots, ‘‘she heard shots 

and what she thought was debris falling overhead. She drew her 

handgun and took cover, then heard a radio call reporting possible 

shots fired near the south grounds.’’ 

She then called the Secret Service Joint Operations Center to report that she was breaking into the gun box near her post, pulling 

out a shotgun. According to this article, she replaced the buckshot 

inside with a more powerful slug in case she needed to engage an 

attacker, but then the call came over the radio to stand down.’’ 

The next day, the officer, ‘‘listened during roll call before her 

shift Saturday afternoon as supervisors explained that the gunshots were from people in two cars shooting at each other.’’ The report said that she, ‘‘had told several senior officers Friday night 

that she thought the house had been hit,’’ but on Saturday she did 

not challenge her supervisors for fear of being criticized, she later 

told investigators. 

Now, Director Pierson, as a former field agent and as the head 

of the agency, that has to concern you tremendously; is that right? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir, it does. It’s unacceptable. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Does it trouble you that some of your own agents 

apparently do not feel comfortable raising security concerns? 

And this is just one person. And there are others who, again, 

would rather be whistleblowers—and, again, I have no problem 

with whistleblowers. As a matter of fact, we do everything in our 

power to protect them. But this agency, if they’d rather be a whistleblower than to bring their concerns to you? 

35 

See, you started off by saying that you’re going to make sure this 

never happens again. Let me tell you what the problem is here. If 

you’re heading an agency where the folks are not providing you 

with the information to do the right thing, to make the changes, 

how do you even know what the problems are? You follow me? 

Help me with this. 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir, if I may. 

Anytime, any organization, you start to make significant 

changes, some people will have resistance. Some people will push 

back. However, I will continue to lead and transform the Secret 

Service to ensure that we’re prepared for our mission and ensure 

that we can restore our reputation to the American public. 

What I will tell you, over the last 18 months that I’ve been serving as Director and over the last 6 months, I have met personally 

with over 1,500 of our supervisors and employees. I’ve had a number of engagement sessions and spent over an hour with each of 

them, expecting—advising them of what my expectations are, what 

their performance requirements are, what personal accountability 

is, how to manage this workforce, how to ensure that we are performing at the highest levels in everything that we do, that we’re 

operationally ready, that we are training, that we’re evaluating 

each other, and that we’re constantly looking at our mission to 

make sure we’re being effective in everything we do. 

I can’t speak for what has happened in the past, but I can tell 

you, as we’re moving forward into the future and while I am Director, I will not tolerate personnel missteps where people either fail 

to act or do not support the workforce or do not work in unison. 

But I would say that I suspect there are many people that are still 

pushing back, and I’m going to continue to lead forward. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, the problem is that that officer, she 

was right. And that was the morning after the shooting. Yet it took 

4 days for the housekeepers to discover that the bullets had struck 

the building; isn’t that right? 

In other words, the officer was right. 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, ultimately, the officer was right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Washington Post story says that this agent 

subsequently reported her concerns to investigators. Was there an 

after-accident report about the 2011 shooting? Did it include recommendations relating to agents reporting their concerns without 

fear of being criticized? Do you know? 

Ms. PIERSON. I don’t know, but I would say that the officer’s 

statement to our interviews that occurred with Secret Service employees are different than the officer’s statement to the FBI and 

the investigators conducting the investigation. 

And that is why I’ve asked my Office of Professional Responsibility to go back and have a robust conversation with that employee to ensure that she feels supported, knows that we want her 

to come forward with any information, and that we understand 

what some of the impediments may be with the management team, 

where we feel like we can make improvements to ensure that that 

never happens again. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me say this, and then I’ll close. Former Director Sullivan invited me a few years ago—you may have been 

there—to speak before your top agents after the Colombia situation 

36 

with the prostitutes. And one of the things that I said to them back 

then—I expressed my tremendous respect and appreciation, but I 

also told them that I don’t want anyone to imagine, imagine— 

imagining—that they can pierce the protective veil of the Secret 

Service, period. Because I firmly believe that the reputation is so 

very, very, very, very important. 

And, you know, I’d just—again, that culture thing is an issue. 

I’m sure others will question you about that. But I just—thank you 

for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. [Presiding.] Thank you. 

I now recognize myself. 

Following up on Ranking Member Cummings, I sent you a letter, 

Director, specifically asking for details about this situation in 2011. 

I’d ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record so all Members can see it, the unclassified spot report on the incidents in November of 2011. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Director, why is it—why is it that when I look at 

this report there isn’t even a mention of Officer Carrie Johnson? 

And yet The Washington Post reports details about her calling into 

the Secret Service headquarters. Why isn’t her name even mentioned in the spot report? 

Ms. PIERSON. The spot report reflects the active investigation. I 

don’t know what information that you have relative to Officer 

Johnson’s reporting. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, you gave us this report. I asked you for all 

the details and information. This is minute by minute—2052 hours, 

2053 hours. It is minute by minute what happened in this situation. 

Are you telling me that The Washington Post is wrong, that she 

didn’t call into the headquarters? Did she not do that? 

Ms. PIERSON. I’m confused by your statement about ‘‘call into 

headquarters.’’ 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, according to The Washington Post, she 

called in and reported and said that she had heard shots fired. She 

reported that she was opening a box, getting out a shotgun—all 

those details. 

Ms. PIERSON. That’s the confusion that I have with the Washington Post article. Typically, when there is an emergency happening around the White House or alerts are made, much like the 

shots being fired on November 11th, I would expect officers to react 

according to their security protocols. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And she says in The Washington Post—it says 

that she called into the headquarters. There is no mention of that. 

Other officers are mentioned in there, but she is not. We will follow 

up on that. It is unacceptable to not even mention the actions that 

she took and that The Washington Post could get that but the Congress couldn’t and you couldn’t provide it. 

Let’s go back to the fence-jumping situation. State police—the 

fence-jumper. State police had detained a person. Had a map in the 

car, all the weapons that Congressman Cummings had talked 

about, suspicious behavior. My understanding is that, actually, 

three officers had actually spotted him that day and not reported 

37 

it—not reported it. And I want to know if that’s true as we go 

along. 

The fence failed. Officers chased him, didn’t catch him. Sniper 

was in position. No shots were fired. Dogs were out there, weren’t 

released. Countersurveillance, I’m understanding, is understaffed. 

There was no—nobody shot anything. There was nobody that was 

intercepted. The doors were unlocked. An officer was overwhelmed. 

The crash box was evidently silenced. 

And yet the Secret Service puts out a statement that that they 

offered, ‘‘tremendous restraint and discipline.’’ 

My question to you is, do those officers have your authority to 

use lethal force to prevent somebody from entering the White 

House? 

Ms. PIERSON. Those officers do have the authority to use independent judgment to leverage lethal force when appropriate. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is that true when somebody is trying to get at the 

President? 

Ms. PIERSON. That is always true. They are law enforcement officers. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So it’s always true when there’s somebody who’s 

trying to penetrate the White House that they can use lethal force? 

Ms. PIERSON. As appropriate, within the confines of the law. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. If somebody tried—explain the details of that. If 

somebody is approaching the White House, has penetrated the security and making a run for the White House, no apparent weapon, 

can they take that person down? 

Ms. PIERSON. The law requires that law enforcement officers ensure that they are in imminent danger or others are in imminent 

danger before they can leverage lethal force. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So if the person is running at the White House, 

but no apparent weapon, they can or cannot use lethal force? 

Ms. PIERSON. Those are going to be independent decisions made 

by the officer based on the totality of the circumstances. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. How does an officer know if they have an improvised explosive device or a dirty bomb or if it’s a terrorist? How do 

they know that? Shouldn’t they assume that this person has ill intention? 

Ms. PIERSON. Law enforcement officers are trained in observation 

skills, and I would assess that they are constantly looking at people 

for ill intentions. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I think it’s confusing. This is part of what they 

have to deal with. They make a split-second decision. 

I want it to be crystal-clear: You make a run and a dash for the 

White House? We’re going to take you down. I want overwhelming 

force. Would you disagree with me? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do want our officers and agents to execute appropriate force for anyone attempting to challenge or breach the White 

House. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We’ve got to explore this further. 

The Secret Service put out a statement that, according to the— 

talked to the Associated Press, I should say. They reported that on 

September 20th at 1:24 a.m. Eastern time, Donovan, the spokesperson, Ed Donovan—Donovan said the man appeared to be unVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
38 

armed to officers who spotted him climbing the fence, and a search 

of the subject turned up no weapon. 

Why would he say that there’s no weapon? 

Ms. PIERSON. I will have to have a—have to ask Mr. Donovan 

that question. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You haven’t done that since the incident happened? 

Ms. PIERSON. I know when Mr. Gonzalez was placed into custody 

he was found to have a folded knife in his right front pants pocket. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you consider that a weapon? 

Ms. PIERSON. That is a weapon. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Would why the Secret Service put out an official 

press release saying that—or put out a statement to the Associated 

Press? Did you ever correct the—did you correct the Associated 

Press? Did you call them back and say, you got that wrong? 

Ms. PIERSON. I have no knowledge of that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So you just let it linger out there that there was 

no weapon. And that was wrong. It was inaccurate. Correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do know that there has been a lot of information 

in this case, and that’s why we are doing a robust review. I can’t 

speak for conversations that I was not a part of or the press’s interest in—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did you read the press release before it went out? 

Ms. PIERSON. I have read the press release before it went out. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you agree that the officers showed tremendous 

restraint and discipline? You agreed with that comment? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do think, based on the totality of the circumstances and from Mr. Gonzalez’s arrest, that these officers did 

use restraint in making a very difficult decision as to whether to 

employ legal force or subdue and arrest him. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you think they responded appropriately? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do not think the security plan was properly executed, and that is why I’m conducting a robust investigation to ensure that we have a comprehensive review of what people were— 

that I have the facts, all of the facts, so I can make an assessments 

of what the decisions were on that night. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I’ve gone well past my time. 

We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia. 

Pardon me. We’re going to recognize Mr. Horsford. 

Go ahead. We’ll go to Ms. Norton. 

You’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank Director Pierson for her 30 years of service 

in the Secret Service, for rising through the ranks to become the 

first woman director. And I am aware of what she has inherited 

and of her many accomplishments. 

Director Pierson, I’m going to ask you about the rumors that 

have been out there about what the Secret Service may do. When 

Pennsylvania Avenue was closed down after Oklahoma City, there 

was a kind of example of how public access can remain. I was 

heartbroken. Both sides of the White House were closed down. I 

worked with the Clinton administration to open E Street, the back 

side of the White House, not only for its vista but because it’s a 

39 

major thoroughfare and it affected the entire region. That was narrowly closed down. 

But as Mr. Basham testified, in front of the White House, though 

cars can no longer go there, people can go there. And, essentially, 

it was made a park, a walkway. And I—none of my constituents, 

no one says it should be reopened. Because that would mean cars, 

not people. 

So my concern is whether or not people will continue to have access around the White House. I walked to the White House yesterday. I was pleased to find not only tourists but protestors, as usual, 

there. 

I ask you, I noticed that on—I followed your testimony, and 

you’ve testified 16 jumpers in only 5 years. So there’s been an increase in fence-jumpers. And so I want to know whether you have 

considered before today simply asking that a higher fence be built, 

one that, for example, could curve, you know, still be historic, that 

wrought-iron fence, but with the curves going outward so maybe 

you’d damage one of your body parts if you tried to get over it, or 

even—and here, these are off the top of my head—multilayered 

glass behind the fence that could resist blasts from guns or bombs. 

Since there have been 16 in 5 years, at least—I think many more 

over the years—have you considered such commonsense devices as 

that so that the public would still have access but the President of 

the United States and his family would be protected? Have you 

ever recommended that? 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative Norton, we do want to work in 

partnership to ensure that the people have access in proximity to 

the White House and the historic nature and the national significance of Lafayette Park and Pennsylvania Avenue and the White 

House. 

And so I do look forward to continuing to work with you and the 

administration and the Department to look at what additional security features can be put in place, not only for White House fencejumpers but for the other challenges that face in us in securing 

public areas. 

Ms. NORTON. I recognize that most of these fence-jumpers are 

harmless. I am worried about multiple fence-jumpers and whether 

you have the resources and the staff if there were five or six of 

them who came across the fence. By my calculations, you are down 

almost 300, more than 250 agents in the Uniformed Service in the 

last year or 2 since the sequester and the cuts. Is that the case? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, Representative Norton, the Secret Service has 

had a reduction in its staffing as a result of sequestration and 

other fiscal constraints. We are close to 550 employees below our 

optimal level. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you have—do you have to—I understand that 

staff has had to be brought in from other units, who may not have 

been as familiar with the White House, because of the shortage of 

staff. Is that the case? 

Ms. PIERSON. Earlier this summer and based upon the work requirement that the Secret Service is faced with in the month of 

September in order to support the United Nations General Assembly, I made the decision to bring in special agents from around the 

country to support some of the Uniformed Division posting assignVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
40 

ments in proximity to the White House tours. That’s provided some 

relief for our Uniformed Division to be able to take some annual 

leave. 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah. 

Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is gone, but I do think that 

Congress has to take some responsibility when the sequester went 

across the board, including police agencies like the Secret Service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Gowdy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I’m actually a big fan of law enforcement, and I don’t 

take any delight in asking you the questions I’m going to ask you. 

But law enforcement are given unique powers in our society, and 

with those unique powers come unique responsibilities. And I can’t 

think of any responsibility greater than guarding the safety and security of our President and his family. 

So, as I understand it, several agents believe that shots were 

fired, and the supervisor concluded that it was a vehicle backfiring. 

Even if that were true, given the very small investment of resources, why not investigate the shots fired? 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative, I think that is where some of the 

confusion starts to come out, as the story that’s in The Washington 

Post versus—— 

Mr. GOWDY. I’m not asking you about a Washington Post story. 

I’m asking you about why a housekeeper, who doesn’t go to Glynco, 

who doesn’t spend 14 weeks in training, who doesn’t have 18 weeks 

of training thereafter, found glass and your agents did not. That 

didn’t come from The Washington Post. 

Is that true? Did a housekeeper find evidence of the shooting and 

your agents did not? 

Ms. PIERSON. The housekeeper was able to locate fragments of 

glass on the Truman Balcony, which is not an area that is frequented by security personnel. 

Mr. GOWDY. And I didn’t you about who it’s frequented—I asked 

you—there was a spontaneous conclusion that shots were fired. 

There were officers who believed they smelled gunpowder. Your officers drew their weapons, Director. That’s how seriously they took 

it. 

So I’m not interested in cursory searches. When did your agency 

find evidence of the shooting? 

Ms. PIERSON. I believe it was on the 15th or 14th of November. 

Mr. GOWDY. Which was how many days after the shooting? 

Ms. PIERSON. Three to 4 days later. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. So you have an officer contemporaneous 

with the shooting believing that shots were fired. You have officers 

taking cover because they believed shots were fired. You have officers at the White House drawing their weapons because they believed shots were fired. Now give me all the evidence to support a 

vehicle backfiring. 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative, I am sure your familiarity with law 

enforcement—in downtown areas, there is sound attenuation. Oftentimes—— 

41 

Mr. GOWDY. I’ve never heard a car backfire six to eight times, 

Director, ever. Have you? 

Ms. PIERSON. I’ve heard car backfires, but I don’t think—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Six to eight times? 

Ms. PIERSON. I think it’s undisputed that there were witnesses 

that observed shots being fired. 

Mr. GOWDY. Right. And it is also undisputed that a housekeeper, 

who doesn’t train at Glynco, who doesn’t have 18 weeks of intensive training, found the evidence of the shooting and your agency 

did not. 

And I’m going to give you credit because you didn’t bring it up; 

it was brought up by a colleague. But I have some colleagues who 

are just obsessed with sequestration. We can’t have any hearing 

without it coming up. But you’re not going to sit there and tell us 

that sequestration is the reason your agency did not find evidence 

of the shooting, are you? 

Ms. PIERSON. No, I am not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Okay. And I give you credit for that. And I was 

stunned that one of my colleagues would try to conflate, to use the 

Attorney General’s word, sequestration with the fact that a law enforcement agency waited 4 or 5 days to find evidence of a shooting 

that a housekeeper found. 

So give me all the evidence to back the vehicle-backfiring narrative. Because we already know all the evidence to support the 

shooting. Give me all the evidence that made your department so 

sure that it was a vehicle backfiring that you didn’t even search 

the White House. 

Ms. PIERSON. The Secret Service was actively engaged with the 

United States Park Police in an effort to determine where and 

what direction the shots were fired on Constitution Avenue. 

That—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Madam Director? Madam Director, you reached the 

conclusion that it was a vehicle backfiring as opposed to shots 

fired. Now, this is the third time I’ve asked. Give me all the evidence to support that supervisor’s conclusion that it was not shots 

fired, despite all the contemporaneous claims that it was and despite all of the reaction of your agency that it was. Give me all the 

evidence to support the theory that it was a vehicle backfiring. 

And then tell me, why not invest the very minimal resources required to exhaustively search the White House? 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative, oftentimes in these cases there are 

a number of different people that make different statements. What 

I can tell you is that Uniformed Division officers on Constitution 

Avenue heard gunfire and reported gunfire. I can’t speak to the 

specificity of the individual you’re talking about that reported it 

as—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, can you speak to why a housekeeper found it 

and your department did not? 

Ms. PIERSON. Housekeepers routinely work in the private residence of the President and First Family. 

Mr. GOWDY. So even when there is overwhelming, let’s just say, 

suspicion that shots were fired—we won’t say ‘‘overwhelming evidence’’ because that would’ve required you to search the premises— 

42 

overwhelming suspicion of shots fired, and you don’t go through 

every inch of that residence? 

I want you to imagine a prosecutor is in front of a jury, Madam 

Director, because this is where sometimes these cases wind up, and 

you explain to the jury why a housekeeper found evidence of the 

shooting and your agency did not. 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative, again, this case has been prosecuted in Federal court, and those explanations were made before 

a Federal—— 

Mr. GOWDY. And thank the Lord the explanations were sufficient 

for a jury. Now, I want you to make them sufficient for Congress. 

Ms. PIERSON. The initial shooting incident occurred at 9:30 at 

night. It’s difficult to see at night. 

Mr. GOWDY. How about hear? 

Ms. PIERSON. Officers—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Can you hear at night? 

Ms. PIERSON. —heard the shots fired on Constitution Avenue. Officers reacted, picked up security positions, swept the area looking 

for any type of injury, any type of intruder. 

It was not known until days later that these shots had actually 

struck the upper level, the third-floor level, of the White House. 

Mr. GOWDY. Okay. I’m going to end, because I’m out of time, with 

the same question that I began with: Why not search every inch 

of the White House, given the very small investment of resources? 

I mean, I went on your Web site, and I saw that you have training for psychology, you have training for survival skills, none of 

which I’ll minimize, all of which I’m sure is very important. This 

is just processing a crime scene, Director. This is not high math. 

It is processing a crime scene. You actually don’t need 18 weeks of 

training to be able to do that; you just need to walk around. So 

why wasn’t it done? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is my understanding that a perimeter sweep was 

done. Was it as thorough as it needed to be? Obviously—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Evidently not. 

Ms. PIERSON. —not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Evidently not. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, the 

ranking member of our Subcommittee on National Security, Mr. 

Tierney, for 7 minutes. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Well, thank all the witnesses here this morning. 

Director, I want to talk a little bit about preventions. If we look 

back in July, several months before the incident where the perimeter was breached and Mr. Gonzalez went into the White House, 

it’s our information that he was stopped by the Virginia State Police and in his car they found at least 11 weapons and a map with 

a line drawn directly to the White House. Is that your understanding, as well? 

Ms. PIERSON. It was a regional map with a line pointed to the 

memorial area of the Mall, including the White House and the 

other historic monuments. 

43 

Mr. TIERNEY. And our reports are also that these Virginia State 

Police and the ATF then referred that matter to the Secret Service, 

presumably because of that line. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, that’s correct. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So the Secret Service, based on that, then had an 

interview with Mr. Gonzalez at that time. Is that also correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. The case was later referred to the Secret Service for an interview of Mr. Gonzalez. 

Mr. TIERNEY. How thorough would that interview have been, according to your protocols? How deep would they have gone into 

their examination of Mr. Gonzalez and his history? 

Ms. PIERSON. They had a very thorough initial interview with 

Mr. Gonzalez and initiated contacts with his family members, his 

mental health history, and the police reports. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So they determined that he had a mental health 

history? 

Ms. PIERSON. He acknowledged that he had a mental health history as a veteran suffering from PTSD. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And do your protocols allow you to then look at his 

records, to obtain his records, or is that not something you can do? 

Ms. PIERSON. If the individual consents to the release of their 

medical records, we do pursue that. And in this case Mr. Gonzalez 

consented to the release of his military medical records. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So you had all of his medical records to review. I 

presume your agents did review them? 

Ms. PIERSON. They were obtained over a period of time. And we 

have received them, and they have been reviewed. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And despite all of that, what happened? You didn’t 

take any action, you didn’t have him arrested, you didn’t have him 

continue to be under observation, did you? 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative, it is a very difficult thing for people dealing with disabilities and people dealing with mental illness 

when they don’t exhibit any unusual direction of interest in our 

protectees. Mr. Gonzalez at the time denied any interest or any intent to harm anyone. He indicated that his information relative to 

the map in his car was given to him by another individual who had 

recommended places in Washington, D.C., to site see, and that he 

intend to go on camping trips, and wanted to go to the Valley 

Forge, Pennsylvania, area. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Was the individual whom he said gave him that 

map ever questioned? 

Ms. PIERSON. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. TIERNEY. How does that comport with your protocols and 

your procedures? 

Ms. PIERSON. I know our investigators are as thorough as they 

possibly can be in investigations like this to make sure that we 

have a good understanding of Mr. Gonzalez—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. So is it your testimony the individual wasn’t available for some reason? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do not know the specifics of that, but I can get 

back with you. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I wish you would, because I think that would be 

an indication of whether or not they really were as thorough as 

they should have been. 

44 

Now, notwithstanding that, there was a second incident before 

the perimeter was breached by Mr. Gonzalez when he went into 

the White House where he was found walking in front of the White 

House with a hatchet in his belt. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Mr. Gonzalez was observed on August 25 on the 

south fence line. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And he was interviewed again by Secret Service 

agents? 

Ms. PIERSON. He was interviewed by uniformed division officers—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. Of the Secret Service? 

Ms. PIERSON. —of the Secret Service and special agents of the 

Secret Service. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And his name was run against a database? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, his name was run against a database. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And the database basically indicated the earlier incident, right? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. The database provided information, the original contact with Mr. Gonzalez. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So at that time they knew he had been arrested 

in Virginia, had a map pointing towards the area of the White 

House, had ammunition in his car, was now found outside the 

White House walking with a hatchet. We knew he had mental 

health problems, his records had been reviewed. What happened 

then? 

Ms. PIERSON. Officers and agents made contact with Mr. Gonzalez, advised—asked him about the hatchet that he was carrying. 

He indicated that he had been camping in the area of, like, Prince 

William County down around Quantico. 

The agents and officers had asked him for a consent search of his 

vehicle. He agreed and was going to return the hatchet to the vehicle. They went back and they looked through the vehicle. Mr. Gonzalez was extremely cooperative, dispelled any concerns that the officers had. He had camping gear and camping equipment in his 

car. He appeared to be living out of his car. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And so they just let him go. 

Ms. PIERSON. Mr. Gonzalez had not violated any laws and he had 

to be released. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Did they have any follow-up? Did anybody talk to 

any other agencies in the Washington area about observing this individual or making sure that somebody knew what his behavior 

was after that second incident? 

Ms. PIERSON. That information, the second incident was also 

passed into our analysis desk so that it could be evaluated in context to our first contact with Mr. Gonzalez in July. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And what happened at the end of that evaluation, 

what was the recommendation? 

Ms. PIERSON. That he had not committed any violations, that 

nothing—that he was under mental health evaluations by both the 

military, VA, and that no further action could be taken by the Secret Service, other than to continue to monitor his behavior 

through his family. 

45 

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, is that the only way they could monitor, is 

through his family? There was no other indication of law enforcement activity that could monitor his behavior? 

Ms. PIERSON. He was currently on bond pending the charges 

from the State police and the incident that brought him to our attention. So there was some criminal conduct on the State level that 

was still being addressed and that he was returning to that area. 

The case was still under evaluation as to what Mr. Gonzalez’s mental history was and whether or not he was going to come to our 

attention again. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And it was your understanding that you thought 

it was particularly appropriate that the Secret Service did nothing 

else in regard to making sure that this individual was monitored 

in his behavior? 

Ms. PIERSON. No, what I am trying to reflect, Representative, it 

is very difficult for the Secret Service. When these individuals come 

to our attention, as many as 300 a year—or a day—are being evaluated by our Office of Protective Intelligence. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Do those 300 all have a history of twice being 

picked up with weapons and a situation would put in question that 

they were in proximity or heading to a proximity of the White 

House? 

Ms. PIERSON. No, but many of them are brought to our attention 

for either having an unusual direction of interest or making a direct threat against our protectees. They are mentally ill, many of 

them have a long mental health past. Some of them are more cooperative than others. But in the specific case of Mr. Gonzalez, he 

was being very cooperative. His family had been contacted by investigators. The family members indicated that he was cooperative, 

that he did not have a violent past. His mental health records, to 

my understanding, as I’ve been briefed, did not reflect any of his 

mental health contacts referred him as being a danger to himself 

or others. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

One follow-up to that. It is my understanding people have told 

us that there were three different officers that had seen him, recognized him the day that the incident happened, but did not report 

it. Is that true or not true? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is my understanding, based on how I’ve been 

briefed, that two of the officers recognized Mr. Gonzalez in the area 

of the White House on September 19 and observed him for some 

time. They had remembered him from the contact they had had 

with him on August 25 when he was on the south fence line. They 

observed him for some time, he wasn’t acting inappropriately, he 

didn’t violate any laws. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. They did not report that and they did not approach him, correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. I think they noted that, but they did not approach 

him. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And they didn’t report it. 

Ms. PIERSON. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Collins, for 5 minutes. 

46 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

I think there are several concerns. And I think one of the things 

that I agree just wholeheartedly with, with the ranking member is 

this is something that both Republicans and Democrats, this is— 

we’re talking about the White House. It is not a national icon, as 

you said, it is a world icon. Everyone, you think of America you 

think of the White House. 

And one of the concerns that I have and we’ve been mentioning 

many of the issues here recently on just different events going on 

is the issue is not the protocols that have been put in place now 

and how it wasn’t done. It’s the issue of why are there seemingly 

so many incidents on a foundational level. Because if we don’t start 

at the foundational, why there doesn’t seem to be a willingness to 

report, why there doesn’t seem to be a willingness to exercise, you 

know, a willingness to say this is something that I’ve noticed. As 

the officer said, she didn’t feel that she could report up line. 

If there’s other issues where you’re having the instances described overseas, in other places, there seems to be a foundational 

issue that we have got to address in these—not only from your perspective, but from hearings. 

And there are several things that I want to address. You made 

a statement just a moment ago, it was curious, because you said 

in the matter of one sentence you said we get 300 suspicious people 

a year and 300 a day in the same sentence. Which is it? 

Ms. PIERSON. Let me correct myself. In talking to our Protective 

Intelligence Division, as of yesterday they were directly overseeing 

327 investigations. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. So in totality we are looking at 327 at this 

point. 

The question I have is, you said that you’re still making a review, but it is our understanding, it has been reported, and it is 

also very visual, as my colleague from the District of Columbia has 

pointed out, there has already been a new fence or perimeter, a police line perimeter put in front of the White House. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. We have put up a temporary bicycle rack—— 

Mr. COLLINS. Yes or no? 

Ms. PIERSON. —to provide us with some standoff areas to the 

fence while this investigation is underway. 

Mr. COLLINS. Ms. Pierson, I thank you for the long answer to 

yes, but I have several things that I want to have, because I think 

they are important here, because you’ve made several comments 

that we’re doing an investigation, we’re saying why these protocols 

were breached, how they got there further. But yet you also said, 

we don’t want to rush to change—or we don’t want to change 

things, but yet we have already started with putting up a perimeter fence or at least a barrier now back from the fence currently. 

I’m wondering here is the problem doesn’t seem to be the fence. 

The problem seems to be the fact that someone jumped the fence, 

run 70 yards, went into the White House with nobody stopping 

them. 

You made a comment—I also have from my background my father was in law enforcement, so this is hard for me in looking to 

it—but you made an analogy just a few moments ago that I’m not 

sure should be accurate here. You talk about discretion and reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
47 

straint. Discretion and restraint in the way you—police officers do 

this all the time, they do so on the side of the road when they have 

made a stop. You are talking about officers who are protecting a 

national icon. 

When they jump the fence, there should be an immediate understanding this person should not be here and there should be an immediate understanding that there is not a restraint factor here, 

this is not the nice, cuddly Secret Service, that you’ve got on our 

property, let’s move you back off. 

Someone running, I’m having trouble how you correlate restraint 

and discretion in a traffic situation, which is the way it came 

across, to someone actually going after the President’s home. 

Ms. PIERSON. Representative, I have stated that they did not 

properly execute the security protocols that are appropriate to respond to—— 

Mr. COLLINS. You believe because that is because of the information or guidance that they have gotten from the top that they were 

not sure what to do? Have they been told to exercise restraint in 

these measures or they have been told to exercise protection? 

Ms. PIERSON. Those officers have the authority to take legal law 

enforcement action as individuals. I am conducting an investigation 

to find out what were the decisions that were made, what are the 

facts in the totality of the circumstances that those officers saw. 

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Keil, I want to give Ms. Pierson a break here, 

because this issue of putting the fence line in front or at least a 

police barrier in looking at this area, I think we have—again, we’re 

trying to make ourselves appear better as we’re working on it, as 

hard as that is to say. This President and his family deserve to be 

protected. It is very concerning to me that they were not told even 

about the shooting until many days later. That’s just mind boggling 

to me for this President and his wife to have to deal with that, especially when their daughter was actually in the residence that 

night. 

I do have a question, Mr. Keil. Explain to me, is putting the 

fence, is this the only fix here? I mean, we have not heard from 

anybody else. Help me out here. Is there a better way to go about 

this? 

Mr. KEIL. Sir, from my perspective protecting U.S. Embassies 

around the world, as Mr. Basham even pointed out, it is a concentric ring of security, layered security. The fence typically is one of 

the last things. And typically fences are meant to keep good people 

out. Bad people find ways over fences. So you can’t simply rely on 

a fence to be your last resort. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I think the issue that has 

come as we go forward here is the protection of this not just a national icon, but a world icon. In the threat environment in which 

we’re in it’s very concerning that we get half-truths to start with, 

more truth. It’s just a leaking out, when this is a group here that 

truly wants to say what is the issue here and why are we not doing 

it in the proper way. And simply putting up a visual we’re doing 

something is not right. The foundation has go to be laid, and over 

the past few years the Secret Service has a foundational problem, 

and I think that’s your bigger issue here, along with protocols not 

being followed. 

48 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding] I thank the gentleman. 

As we go to Mr. Lynch, I just want to make sure one thing was 

clear. Director, the failure to apprehend Mr. Gonzalez before he got 

well into the White House, the change of a further setback or fence, 

since you successfully stopped 16 jumpers in the last 5 years, you 

said that in your opening testimony, was there any reason that you 

couldn’t have stopped 17? 

In other words, you’re taking the American people’s space with 

this additional fence and the proposal for a setback that would include Pennsylvania and Lafayette being restricted. And yet you’ve 

made no case here today that you couldn’t have had 17 out of 17 

apprehensions if not for outright human error and procedural failures. Isn’t that true? 

Ms. PIERSON. The placing of the bike rack to provide a buffer 

zone for the fence is to allow us time to do this analysis to make 

sure that our personnel and our procedures are going to be effective with the time constraints that the individuals have to be able 

to effect an effective tactical response to runners or fence jumpers. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay, I guess I get it that you’re not up to snuff 

to the level you’d like to be and until you’re sure you are you want 

to have that extra time. I sort of get that, but I have to be honest, 

that’s a little concerning. 

Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the witnesses. 

Madam Director, I want to go over again the prior contacts between Mr. Gonzalez and the Secret Service. 

As my colleague Mr. Tierney noted, there was a prior contact 

with Mr. Gonzalez back in July 2014. He had been pulled over and 

he had a small arsenal of weapons in the car. 

I just want to try to explore, when does the red flag come up for 

the Secret Service? So the Secret Service was informed that he had 

11 weapons in the car. And I just want to go over, I had the evidence list from the State police that was provided to the Secret 

Service. 

Mr. Gonzalez had a Mossberg Maverick model 88 .12 gauge 

pump service shotgun in the car. He had a Springfield Armory .308 

Winchester with a scope and a bipod. He had an Adler Italy Jager 

AP–85 with a red dot scope in the car. He had a Tristar 12 gauge 

shotgun in the car. He had an AR–15, which is a pretty sophisticated weapon, with a flashlight and scope. He had a Weatherby 

Vanguard 270 caliber bolt action rifle with a scope and a bipod. He 

had a Smith and Wesson 380 caliber automatic black handgun. He 

had a Glock 45 in the car with an empty magazine, although later 

we found he had 800 rounds of ammunition. He had a .357 Magnum revolver. As well, he had another .45 caliber. And he also had 

a map—and this is the evidence list and you seem to be minimizing 

all this stuff—but it says, one map of Washington, D.C., with writing and a line drawn to the White House. 

Okay. So that’s what we have with our introduction to Mr. Gonzalez. And also subsequent to that we know he has a history of 

mental illness. Then he shows up at the White House in August 

of 2014, he’s got a hatchet in his belt. No red flags, we let him go. 

49 

Then, of course, there’s the day that he jumps the fence and runs 

into the White House. And I want to talk about that for a minute. 

You say that he came in through the front gate, went through the 

front door at the portico, and was wrestled to the ground—or to the 

carpet actually you said—wrestled down to the rug near the Green 

Room. I just want to remind you that the distance from the front 

of the White House where he came in to the Green Room is about 

80 feet. This is only 60 feet, the width of this room right here, this 

60 feet. So—— 

Chairman ISSA. Seventy yards. 

Mr. LYNCH. No, no, it wouldn’t be 80 yards. No, it’s 70 yards the 

lawn, it’s 30 yards inside the house, inside the house. I’ve been 

there many, many times. To talk about somebody transversing the 

White House foyer, the full length of the East Room, down to the 

Green Room, to the American public that would be half of a White 

House tour. That’s what that would be. That isn’t just getting inside the portico, that’s half of a White House tour to the American 

public. 

And you keep minimizing this stuff. I’m just wondering, when do 

the red flags go up for the Secret Service? I know you have a lot 

of wonderful people over there, but this is not their best work. And 

we have a serious, serious issue here about protecting the President and his family. This is disgraceful, this is absolutely disgraceful that this has happened. And I’m not even going to mention the 

fact that it took us 4 days to figure out that somebody had shot 

seven rounds into the White House. 

This is beyond the pale. And I have listened to your testimony 

very deliberately here this morning. And I wish to God you protected the White House like you’re protecting your reputation here 

today. I wish you spent that time and that effort to protect the 

American President and his family like I’m hearing people covering 

for the lapses of the Secret Service on these several occasions. I 

really do. 

Mr. LYNCH. So what are we going to do—and, look, this whole 

thing is the United States Secret Service versus one mentally challenged man, one man with mental illness, who you knew had mental illness. 

This is the Secret Service against one individual with mental illness, and you lost. You lost. And you had three shots at this guy, 

three chances, and he got to the Green Room in the White House. 

What happens when you have a sophisticated organization with 

nefarious intent and resources going up against the Secret Service? 

What happens then? 

Chairman ISSA. The time of the gentleman has expired. I thank 

the gentleman. 

But if the gentlelady has any answers to any of his questions, I 

would appreciate hearing them. 

Ms. PIERSON. Let me be clear. The United States Secret Service 

does not take any of these incidents lightly. They are all an extremely—— 

Mr. LYNCH. With all due respect, that is my point. 

As a casual observer to what has happened here, I don’t think 

the Secret Service is taking as their duty to protect the American 

50 

President and his family at the White House—I don’t think you are 

taking it seriously. That is exactly my point. 

Based on the evidence—based on the evidence and the series of 

lapses, unfortunately, that is the conclusion that I arrive at, that 

you are not taking your job seriously. 

I’m sorry. I hate to be critical. But we’ve got a lot at stake here. 

We have a lot at stake. And I know people are dancing around this 

issue, but I’ve got to call it like it is. 

I have very low confidence in the Secret Service under your leadership. I have to say that. And that is not—that’s not an easy thing 

for me to say. But based on the evidence, that’s how we have to 

call it here. 

Based on the evidence, my confidence in you protecting the 

American President right now at the White House, which is supposed to be one of the most secure buildings in the country, if not 

the world—my confidence in you doing that is very, very low right 

now. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pierson, I want to come back. You were appointed in 

March of 2013. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. That’s correct. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So what three things have you done to improve 

the culture since you have gotten there? Very briefly. I have limited time. What three things have you done to improve the culture? 

Because that has been brought up, that there is a culture problem. 

Ms. PIERSON. We have instituted an Office of Professional Integrity. We have established a new discipline process so that discipline 

is done in a more transparent and consistent way. We have initiated development training for our supervisors, for our SES, and for 

our work and file workforce. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So you’ve done some training and some 

new positions. Because I’m a little concerned. When that question 

came up—I watch people all the time—and no less than four people 

that are here with you today agree that you have a cultural problem. And, you know, you can tell from their responses that there 

is an issue within the Agency. But I also want to go back and give 

you a chance to correct your testimony. 

I thought I heard earlier that you said that you were short 500 

Uniformed Secret Service people due to sequestration. I can’t believe that would be accurate. So I’ll give you a chance to correct 

that. 

Ms. PIERSON. Across the organization, the Secret Service is down 

550 personnel. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. 

Chairman ISSA. Will the gentleman yield for just a second? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. He wanted—would you stop the clock for just a 

second—the amount of people who are in the U.S. Secret Service 

the day you were sworn in and the amount of people that are there 

today, if you would, please, because these numbers of full-time 

equivalents and so on—I think all of us on the dais have a right 

to understand what the impact is from the day you were sworn in. 

51 

Ms. PIERSON. Well, I don’t have those specific numbers for you 

today. Representative Chaffetz did bring up the fact that there had 

not been any basic training classes in fiscal year 2012 and 2013. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But we’re talking about the number of people. 

And you’re saying 500 fewer people? That cannot be right, Director. 

Ms. PIERSON. That is correct, sir, over the last 2 years. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, let me tell you why it is confusing. Because 

I am looking at your budget request for last year, and it says in 

here, in your request, that you plan to reduce the staffing by 376 

full-time equivalents. 

Why would you do that? If you’re already short 500, why would 

you, in your budget request, request a 376 full-time equivalent reduction? I am confused. Wouldn’t you be confused? 

In your budget request, you also said that we need to be reducing 

the number of years of experience by 5 years over the next 4 years. 

I am confused. 

Why would we want less-experienced Secret Service agents, Director? These are your numbers. Do you have an answer? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do know that we have provided a human capital 

strategy to the Congress, at their request, that outlines the Secret 

Service’s requirements—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. But these are your requests. 

And let me tell you what is even more confusing then. I will go 

ahead a little bit further. 

It says the committee—the congressional committee is concerned 

that the President’s budget request creates a pay shortfall that will 

result in the reduction of at least 376 full-time equivalents and 

that this will fundamentally affect the dual mission within the Secret Service. The committee was recognizing this, not you. 

Do you not think that that creates a cultural problem when 

you’re seeking reductions and you’re here testifying today that you 

have too few people? Do you see the hypocrisy in that? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do see the difficulty in trying to operate a critical 

Federal Agency in times of fiscal constraint. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Well, let’s go, since you’re talking about fiscal constraints—because I started looking real quickly—because I 

agree with Mr. Lynch. We need to do all we can to give you the 

tools to make sure that you can change the culture and protect our 

President. 

So I started looking at it, but I was concerned to find a whistleblower came to us and said that you spent over $1 million on an 

executive luxury suite—is that correct?—on the eighth floor. On 

your eighth floor, over $1 million spent on a luxury suite since 

you’ve come to power. 

Ms. PIERSON. I don’t know what that is in reference to unless—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Did you spend $1 million or more on a conference 

room, outfitting it—a luxury suite—on the eighth floor? Yes or no? 

Ms. PIERSON. No. What we have done is spent money to transform our Director’s Crisis Center. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. The Director’s Crisis Center, which is on 

the ninth floor. Now we’ve done it again on the eighth floor. 

We’ve got locators on each one of those floors. Is that correct? 

That’s what the whistleblower is telling me. 

52 

Ms. PIERSON. That information he has talks about the integration of both the Director’s Crisis Center—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. How do you know? Because the whistleblower 

talked to us. 

Ms. PIERSON. I know from what we have done in the way of installations within our office. I can’t speak to what your individual 

is reporting—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Do you have a locator on the eighth floor 

now? 

Ms. PIERSON. We have multiple locators in the building. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you have one on the eighth floor? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Is that a secure area? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Is the eighth floor a secure area where vendors 

that don’t have classified—can they go in and out, if they don’t 

have a clearance, on the eighth floor? 

Ms. PIERSON. All of our vendors are either escorted or have clearance, and the locator itself is not a classified document. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So—but it does tell you where the President and 

the Vice President and all relative people are. It is a locator. Right? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is a reference point for our management team. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Why would you need another one of these? When 

you already have two, why would you need another one one floor 

down in your luxury suite? 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady may answer. 

Go ahead and answer. 

Ms. PIERSON. I am—we need to have instant information for us 

to be able to make informed decisions as a management team, and 

having quick access and enough people to leverage technology and 

look at camera views and look at information being provided to us 

realtime from our protective missions is critically important to me 

and critically important to my staff. This is one of the areas where 

some of those key decisions are made, and it is integrated in with 

other systems throughout the building. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I think we need to 

explore this further, though. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

And for the Director, during the hearing, we are going to try and 

get more accurately the correct number because I have got to tell 

you, from the dais, I think all of us want to understand this 500. 

We show 1,420 authorized uniformed officers, 1,300 on hand. 

And we don’t show that is an appreciable drop during your tenure, 

as your budget has gone up, with 2,200 agents. 

So we are trying to find where the 500 represents a shortfall in 

full-time equivalent other than a legacy of, perhaps, never filling 

the authorized slots. 

I am going to give the additional time to the gentleman from Virginia. 

But if you will answer just one question: 

Isn’t it typical that, although your budgets are increasing, that 

you plus-up going into the 2016 or a Presidential cycle and that’s 

53 

when you want to peak and that you do have lesser requirements 

when you don’t have Presidential candidates and so on? 

Because I am very concerned about the—coming before Congress 

at a time when we are giving you more money than you’re asking 

for and complaining about sequestration and limited resources. 

So be prepared to answer that. I am not going to take the time 

right now. It is the gentleman from Virginia’s time. But those questions are going to continue throughout this hearing, and we are 

going to follow up in writing afterwards. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pierson, in light of the facts that have come out and in 

light of your own review thus far, had the First Family been in the 

family quarters or anywhere in the White House, would you conclude professionally that there was a threat to the First Family? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. I think Mr. Gonzalez coming into the main 

floor mansion is a threat. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think it is really important to remember—you 

know, I was a freshman in high school on November 22, 1963, and 

all of us who lived at that time remember where and when we were 

when we heard the terrible news from Dallas. 

But, you know, in my mind is that Secret Service agent, Mr. Hill, 

who threw himself on the speeding car that contained the President and the First Lady and used his body to shield her. It is a 

sacred mission the Secret Service has. It is not an easy mission. 

But it is very troubling to all Americans that our duly elected 

President and his family were actually potentially in real jeopardy 

on the White House grounds itself. 

I wonder whether you would agree that, when you look at every 

aspect of this, sadly, it represents a comprehensive failure. They 

add up one by one. I think there was a failure, frankly, to take the 

Gonzalez threat seriously after the information provided by the 

Virginia State Police. 

We knew he had a history of mental illness. We knew that he 

was loaded up with guns. We knew that he had a map of Washington. You indicate that that map was described as just a tourist 

map, looking at places he might go. That might make sense except 

for the fact that he was loaded up with ammunition and weapons 

in his car at the time. 

Now, my friend from Utah has made headlines and made a statement here today that he believes your reaction should be one of 

maximum force. I guess we should read that to mean that he 

should be shot on sight when he crosses the fence, when he goes 

over the fence. 

I am very reluctant to join him in that kind of advice to the Secret Service because there is a First Family in the White House. 

There are guests in the White House. It is a busy and bustling 

place. And the idea that we’re going to have a shoot-out on the 

White House grounds seems to me a last resort, not a first resort. 

And I am not sure Members of Congress ought to be in the business of actually spelling out Secret Service protocols for you. I am 

not sure that’s our competence. 

But having said that, one can still conclude that the reaction of 

the Secret Service on sight was profoundly inadequate and, actuVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
54 

ally, potentially put the First Family in direct jeopardy, physical 

harm. 

And I don’t sense from you, Director Pierson, a sense of outrage 

about that, a sense of mission that you want to reform and correct 

this cascading set of mistakes that led to, potentially, a catastrophe 

for the United States. 

Could you comment. 

Ms. PIERSON. I am sorry you don’t get that sense from me. I have 

spent a career in the United States Secret Service, protecting 

Presidents, their families, and the White House complex, in addition to our other missions. 

There is nothing more sacred to any Secret Service agent, Uniformed Division officer or Administrative-Technical Professional 

Employee, than our responsibilities for mission success. We don’t 

take it lightly. 

But we do it under very difficult and challenging conditions. 

There is not a lot we can do in managing individuals with mental 

illness who do not commit a crime or who do not put themselves 

in a position where the Secret Service can take further actions 

against them. We are limited by the system that we have to work 

within, the laws of our country. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Pierson, I don’t doubt for a minute your sincerity. What I said was I don’t sense any sense of outrage about 

what happened. 

Ms. PIERSON. We all are outraged within the Secret Service of 

how this incident came to pass, and that is why I have asked for 

a full review. It is obvious. It is obvious that mistakes were made. 

It is self-evident that mistakes were made. 

We must identify what the facts are, learn from the facts, assess 

and make changes, enhance training, to ensure that this never 

happens again. The Secret Service has a proud history of making 

sure that we go back and look and do after-actions after every incident so that we can apply better security measures to ensure the 

protection of those we are bound to protect. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think that’s really important, and I think it is 

really important in this discussion and this hearing that we remember there are real human beings whose safety and security is 

at stake. 

And it just so happens one of those human beings was elected 

not once, but twice, by a majority of this country to be its President, and that sacred responsibility has to be uppermost in our 

minds, even if that means that reputations fall, careers get interrupted, demotions occur, or people get fired. His safety and that of 

his family is the paramount concern here, and that’s what we all 

need to be concerned about. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

We now go to a gentleman who served in what I think fairly is 

called difficult conditions both in Vietnam and in Iraq. And with 

all due respect, I think he will object to your calling working at the 

White House a difficult environment. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio, is recognized. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

55 

Mr. Basham and Ms. Pierson, thank you very much for your 

service in the Secret Service, one of the premier law enforcement 

agencies, in my opinion, an aspiration many, many years ago, from 

investigating counterfeiters to protecting the President of the 

United States. I commend you all for your dedicated service in the 

past. 

Mr. Basham—did I pronounce that right? 

Mr. BASHAM. ‘‘Basham.’’ 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. ‘‘Basham.’’ Thank you very much. 

In your introduction, you said you went from—well, we have an 

intruder that got into the White House and went 30 yards and was 

finally apprehended and we have a hearing about that right now. 

And you said we would have a hearing as well had we shot him 

once he jumped the fence. And you’re absolutely right. 

But I was trained that you only use as much force as is absolutely necessary to subdue or fix the problem, never any more 

undue force. And that’s a difficult challenge in itself; is it not? 

But we have dogs patrolling the White House, and you seem to 

have forgotten about 10 other, probably, protocols you could have 

used to subdue that person before they went into the White House. 

Correct? 

Mr. BASHAM. You’re absolutely correct. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. All right. So in the after-action review, were 

any of those considered? And what other actions could they have 

taken to stop this intruder before he entered the White House? 

Mr. BASHAM. Clearly, as the Director has stated, there were mistakes, there were failures, there were opportunities to take this individual down based upon the reactions of the officers that were in 

place at the time. And they clearly did not take those actions. 

And that is why the Director has to—and the staff has to determine why they made those decisions or lack of making those decisions and understand what was going through their minds, what 

was going on on the White House grounds at the time, what was 

the clutter situation. They need to have the time to do the investigation to determine what the circumstances were on the ground. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. But they had the opportunity to do an investigation when they—well, they found out that there was—Mr. Gonzalez had guns in his car, he had a map to the White House. I 

would have been asking a lot more questions other than just letting 

him go. 

Why wasn’t he brought in for further questioning by the Secret 

Service especially? 

I mean, just the map alone—I think lawyers call that a preponderance of evidence, indicating that he had some intent in doing 

something wrong or illegal, jeopardizing the President of the 

United States and the White House. 

Why wasn’t he brought in for questioning then? 

Mr. BASHAM. I believe the Director did state that the individual 

was interviewed and that the agents made a determination—which 

is a very difficult determination to make—as to whether the individual truly represents a threat to the President of the United 

States. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Are we privy to those questions and that report, 

Mr. Chairman? Do we have access to that report? 

56 

Chairman ISSA. In an appropriate setting, we’ll make them available. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Great. 

Mr. BASHAM. Even subsequent to that, when they interviewed 

him when he was at the White House, unless he is breaking the 

law, there is no power that the Secret Service has to take this individual into custody, and that is the difficulty that they face. 

And, you know, I totally agree with the Representative, that I do 

not believe that we want the Secret Service’s first action on the 

White House ground when someone climbs over the fence, what, 16 

times in the last 5 years—that the Secret Service’s first reaction is 

to kill that person. That is, in my mind, not acceptable to me or 

to the American people. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Well, I agree. 

But there is an element of—there is responses that are well within the power of the Secret Service to protect the intruder when 

they jump the fence and come in, use of dogs, for instance, a mass 

going—a mass of Secret Service agents heading in that direction to 

take down that individual. But at the same time, they have to— 

it could be a diversion. 

So there’s a lot of things going on in the Secret Service’s head, 

I am sure, when we have an intruder like that. But I just have a 

real—well, I think I am out of time. 

Mr. BASHAM. But I will say, in 1976, there was an individual 

who came over the fence, apparently was carrying some type of device that was—appeared to be a weapon, but turned out to be a 

pipe, and they shot him. And there was criticism for that shooting 

in 1976. This is a difficult, difficult balance to strike. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. I understand. And I am out of time. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pierson, you have served in the Secret Service for 30 

years. You have served under both Republican and Democratic administrations. 

And so you know—and you have stated publicly that this recent 

security breach was unacceptable, and we’ve heard other adjectives 

here today from both sides of the dais: profoundly inadequate, 

shocking, disgraceful, outrageous. 

Is there any one of those adjectives you disagree with? 

Ms. PIERSON. No. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you. 

And there have been—there has been some discussion about 

what we knew about the person leading up to the incident where 

he jumped the fence and crashed the White House. 

We actually had his medical records, did we not, before he 

jumped the fence? 

Ms. PIERSON. I believe we had received the medical records and 

they were being reviewed prior to him jumping the fence. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. So with everything else we knew—we stopped 

him, he had a carload of high offensive ammunition and guns, and 

he had a map to the White House—you know, he just about was 

wearing a hat saying ‘‘I am the most dangerous person who could 

57 

come to the White House,’’ and, yet, all of these things happened. 

And not to put too fine a point on it, Director Pierson, there were 

numerous layers of security that he was able to flummox. 

A surveillance team outside the fence reportedly did not spot Mr. 

Gonzalez quickly enough to give an early warning. An officer stationed in a guard booth as well as a SWAT team on the North 

Lawn reportedly did not react in time. A dog trained to intercept 

intruders reportedly was not released. No officer reportedly was 

stationed outside the front entrance of the White House, and the 

door was left unlocked. And then just yesterday press accounts reported that Mr. Gonzalez made it all the way into the East Room 

and that the alarms had been silenced. 

To me, all of those adjectives apply. This was a stunning, outrageous, disgraceful breach. And I know you can’t discuss specific 

details and we are going to go into executive session so that you 

can be more forthcoming about tactics and procedures, but I want 

to start here with broader questions. 

First, I assume that the Secret Service has a specific protocol— 

or multiple protocols for handling these types of breaches. Am I 

correct in that? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir. We do. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And without getting into those protocols themselves and providing anybody at large a road map, can you tell us 

whether they were followed in this case. 

Ms. PIERSON. No, they were not. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And why weren’t they followed, Ms. Pierson? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do not know. And that is going to be one of the 

main issues that I hope to resolve through the course of this investigation. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Well, I think it is—we have said multiple 

times here that you have been on the job, what, for about a year 

and a half now and you’re on the job to reestablish the credibility 

and the reputation of the Secret Service as the finest, most formidable protective force on the face of the Earth. Is that a fair statement? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. If someone wants to do us harm, it behooves 

all of us to remember that right now you are protecting the most 

threatened American President in our Nation’s history. 

It is kind of a bad time to have something like this happen, isn’t 

it, Ms. Pierson? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is never acceptable to have an individual breach 

the White House. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. So would you please explain to me in terms 

that you can reveal in public what you have done since becoming 

the new Director of the Secret Service to turn this Agency around 

and prevent things like this from happening. 

Ms. PIERSON. From the start of my appointment, I have made it 

perfectly clear to the workforce of my expectations for professionalism and accountability. How that was accomplished: by the 

establishment of a new Office of Integrity, the establishment of a 

new table of penalties for a discipline process that is more transparent and consistent and well known to the workforce as to what 

the expectations and the level of tolerance will be. I personally 

58 

have a zero tolerance level when it comes to misconduct, and we 

are addressing it accordingly. 

In addition to that, training is critically important and developing leaders is critically important. This year we have established 

a lot of in-service training for our workforce as well as specialized 

training for our leadership. I have had a lot of personal engagement with my supervisors and the workforce. 

When I became Director, I had over 70 professional supervisory 

positions that were vacant. I made those promotions. I offered orientation to those new supervisors, and I have continued to make 

sure that there is no doubt that we are going to be held to the 

highest standard that the American public expects. 

I do understand, when you start to bring change into an organization, there is pushback. We’re going to continue to improve. This 

incident is an operational incident. Although it is being addressed, 

it is very similar—or a side effect of some of the other cultural 

problems. I looked at this as a strict tactical concern. We have a 

security procedure that wasn’t followed. 

One week prior an individual had climbed the fence and was arrested within seconds. Why didn’t that same activity happen on the 

night of the 19th? That is part of my concern, and that is what 

we’re investigating. I agree that mistakes were made and the proper protocols were not followed. It is unacceptable. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Ms. Pierson, my time is up, and I look forward 

to closer questioning in the executive session. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MICA. [Presiding.] I thank the witness. 

And I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pierson, you had just said that this was an operational 

failure. So I just want to be clear. Because there was talk about 

salaries, the number of personnel, budgets. 

This September 19 failure was in no way related to a lack of 

funding or personnel. Is that accurate to say? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is accurate to say that the officers on duty that 

night failed to execute the security protocols that they should have. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But you’re not saying it is a 100 percent operational failure. You’re saying that it may be—you’re not ruling out 

that this may be a resource issue. Correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. I do believe that we need to look at our training 

protocols and our staffing protocols. And so, yes, that would refer 

back to resourcing. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. Because I think—and the budgets have 

been mentioned—the budget request for fiscal year 2014 from the 

Agency was $822.6 million for salaries and expenses, but, yet, Congress appropriated $846.7 million for salaries and expenses. So 

there is a disconnect here, and I think that—let me ask you this 

relating to this: 

You have a guy, Gonzalez. All the agents know who he is by this 

time on September 19 because he had been arrested in Virginia. He 

had weapons, ammunition, a map with the White House circled. So 

this is clearly something that would have been disseminated to the 

agents. He’s able to, of course, leap the fence and get deep inside 

the White House. 

59 

How many Secret Service agents stood between him penetrating 

that first fence and getting in? In other words, were there just not 

enough people there? How many people were there? 

Ms. PIERSON. The White House complex is secured, and the 

building is defended by the United States Secret Service Uniformed 

Division, and I can provide you information in a different setting 

as to the location and numbers of personnel. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Because I noticed for this hearing you—there was 

a request of the Sergeant at Arms for people to accompany you to 

this hearing, and I believe that they’re probably sitting behind you. 

How many people have accompanied you to this hearing today? 

Do you know? 

Ms. PIERSON. I would believe 12 of my senior managers. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. Because we had a request for 18 personnel, 

but you say maybe only 12. So at least 12, maybe more, are accompanying you here for testimony, which is important, but it kind of 

cuts against this idea that we’re at a manpower shortage, especially in some of the numbers that we have been doing. 

Let me ask you this about the culture of the Agency. Now, a 

number of incidents have been raised. You had the celebrity crash 

the White House dinner a few years back; of course, the 2011 

shooting incident, and the Agency’s poor response to that has been 

talked about; you did have the 2013 May incident at the HayAdams Hotel involving an agent; a Miami 2014 car accident involving agents with alcohol suspected; in the Netherlands, 2014, excessive drinking by agents, and some had to be sent home; and, of 

course, what got the most publicity, probably, is the 2012 incident 

in Colombia. 

So a lot of people look at this and I think they think that there 

are, obviously, a lot of good people in the Secret Service, but they 

think there may be a cultural problem. Now, you say you don’t 

think that the September 19 breach is a result of that culture. 

But let me ask you: How do you assess the health of the culture 

in the Secret Service right now? 

Ms. PIERSON. Well, since becoming Director, we have established 

an Office of Integrity. I have made my position known on the level 

of professionalism that is expected, accountability at all levels. 

I have met personally with every front-line supervisor up to my 

SES managers and have provided them some additional training to 

ensure that they know how to lead, that they know how to manage 

and they know how to work with this dedicated workforce. 

At the same time, we are providing training for the workforce, 

but we are doing it at the same time that we are meeting very difficult protective requirements and investigative requirements 

around the world. 

I believe that we have started to make a pretty significant transition within the organization in recognizing that we have made 

missteps and that we need to learn from these incidents and improve. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And you think that the steps that you have taken 

have resulted in a discernible improvement in the culture? 

Ms. PIERSON. I think these steps, along with continuing to promote and support new management, will help us in that process. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

60 

Mr. MEADOWS. Will the gentleman yield for a follow-up? 

Mr. DESANTIS. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Let me just ask a follow-up because it gets back 

to this budget question. 

So, under your direction, was there a reduction in the countersurveillance manpower under your directorship? 

Ms. PIERSON. Under my directorship? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. 

Ms. PIERSON. I established a new permanent division—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Was there a reduction? Yes or no? 

Ms. PIERSON. I don’t believe there was a reduction. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Because the whistleblower seemed to indicate that there is a study that recommended that there should be 

100 people for counter-surveillance and that you personally made 

the decision to cut that by a third. Is that not correct? 

Mr. MICA. The witness can answer. And the time has expired. 

Would you answer, please. 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

I would like to review that study. I know that we have asked for 

a study in the past that related to counter-surveillance and 

counter-surveillance methodologies to be employed by the Secret 

Service in the context of the National Capital Region, and we earlier this year established a counter-surveillance division and staffed 

it with what we believe are the appropriate resources for this time. 

And we’ll continue to go back and look at that process and see how 

we need to continue to resource it as appropriate. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the witness. 

I recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have tremendous respect for the members of the Secret Service, 

and I can’t believe that I am about to begin this line of questioning 

as a Member of Congress because it should never have gotten to 

this point where I have to ask you these questions. 

Specifically, I would like to touch on your AAR process, the afteraction review process. 

Do you conduct AARs? You mentioned that you did earlier. But 

do you? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. We do refer to them as fact-finding. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Do you conduct fact-finding at all levels? 

For example, following the Hernandez shooting incident, were 

there fact-finding sessions conducted at every level, for example, 

with the personnel that were on the White House grounds that 

night, maybe during the shift change brief, maybe the next morning at the next shift change and then all the way up the region and 

then all the way up to the director level? Would that be a normal 

course of action? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, it would. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So, at the fact-finding sessions, once you discover something that is deficient, do you then change your procedures based on what you learn at the fact-finding sessions? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, we would. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Have you changed your procedures for when 

the White House comes under a shooting incident? 

61 

For example, if the shooting happened at 9 p.m. at night and it 

was too dark then, I am not sure why you don’t have access to 

flashlights and spotlights to check the White House in the evening. 

But okay. It was too dark. 

Do you now have a procedure for checking the entire building, 

including the third floor, either at night or the next day? Is that 

now part of the new procedures? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, it is. And, again, that night—it is a threestory building. So oftentimes it would require lift trucks and such. 

But we do have a better protocol now to ensure that proper sweeps 

are done across the complex as a result of that after-action. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. It is the people’s house and the President of 

the United States. I think the American public would begrudge a 

lift truck at night to go check the outside of the building, I would 

imagine, but you have that procedure in place. 

So if there is a suspected shooting incident, it would be sooner 

than 3 or 4 days and the housekeeper before we find the bullets 

in the side of the White House because of the new procedures. Correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, ma’am. Lessons learned. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Post-Hernandez, the first—I am sorry. 

The—not Hernandez—the recent breach that just happened—after 

he was initially apprehended with the ax in his waistband and he 

had this story, were information of that apprehension or that discussion that those agents had with him—was that shared—would 

have been shared as part of the fact-finding the next day at a shift? 

Would pictures of him have been shown to the officers coming on 

shift—on the next shift, ‘‘Hey, we stopped this guy. He had an ax 

in his waistband. He had all this ammo in his car. Watch out for 

him. He may come by’’? Was that ever done? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is my understanding that he was initially observed by members of our counter-surveillance division. So I am assuming—and I would have to get back to the committee—that that 

would be part of the protocol of our counter-surveillance division as 

well as our Uniformed Division officers that are frequently seeing 

these people come along the south fence line. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Would that have been shared with all of 

the officers stationed along the south fence line or who might have 

contact with passersby, ‘‘This guy’s been by a couple times. He’s’’— 

you know, ‘‘keep an eye out for him’’? Is that a standard thing that 

would now happen as part of your procedures every shift? 

Ms. PIERSON. I would assume it is discussed, but I don’t know 

to what specificity it is physically reported amongst Uniformed Division. But the information that Mr. Gonzalez had appeared on the 

south fence line, was interviewed, his car was—he consent to a 

search to his vehicle—all of that was in a written report provided 

and supplemented a part of Mr. Gonzalez’s contact. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What about any results from fact-finding that 

spoke to the lack of communications between the agents who were 

safeguarding the First Daughters being on a different frequency as 

the agents who were taught responding to the 2011—the shooting 

incident? 

My understanding is that the agent inside did not know—because she did not hear traffic—that the suspected shooting had 

62 

happened and did not find out about it until through a third party, 

another agent. 

Has that been fixed? Now are all the agents listening to multiple 

frequencies? 

Ms. PIERSON. Our protocol would require that all agents are notified regardless of their assignment for that type of incident with a 

shooting on the complex. So, yes, I would say that information is 

now passed through our joint operations system. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I am running out of time. 

I am just very concerned that we’re not learning from lessons 

learned, that these things are happening—whether or not the factfinding sessions are happening, this information is not disseminated in some way. 

And I would love to maybe end up in executive session or something to touch more on how you’re fixing and updating your protocols because this seems pretty standard to me. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you. 

And I am going to recognize myself. 

Welcome, Director Pierson. There has been a lot of chest-beating, 

and there has been a lot of beating up of the Director today. 

And I want to give you an opportunity to talk about not just 

what took place, but also what we can do to make certain that the 

White House is safe, the First Family is safe, and these incidents 

don’t happen again. 

There are basically two things that we deal with to do that. One 

would be personnel, your personnel, and the second would be technology. I would believe those two would resolve the problem in the 

future. 

Since you came in sort of to clean up some of the mess—the problems with performance, the problems with morale—I will say, too, 

that you’re the first Director in 22 years to ever call me personally 

and ask for some assistance. 

Before this incident took place, folks, she actually called and she 

said, ‘‘I want to improve the quality of our personnel,’’ and she 

asked for, actually, two things. And they are still pending before 

this committee, interestingly enough. I just checked. 

But one was to improve the standards for the agents. I know 

there had been a lack of academy training and not a lot of folks 

trained. 

But you were also—and you formerly headed HR, concerned 

about the agents. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. And then, also, the ability to hire and fire. We 

saw in the VA scandal the hands tied to hire and fire. 

And you asked for—I guess to create—to call the service an exempt service. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir. It is referred to as excepted service. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

And that would be—would give you more ability to discipline. 

I asked the staff the status of those, and it is still pending. There 

has been some objection from the other side of the aisle even to 

take them up. So I thank you for stepping forward and, also, for 

recommending that. 

63 

Little things like technology—now, you weren’t the Director in 

2011 when the bullets hit the White House, were you? 

Ms. PIERSON. No, sir, I was not. 

Mr. MICA. Well, you got beat up pretty good on that one today. 

But it is kind of interesting that the White House—and, really, 

they discovered some concrete or something that had been chipped 

out of a balcony that isn’t examined and was—the surface area of 

the White House is quite a bit, and you would want to examine 

some of it. And that wasn’t done at 9:50 at night, whatever it was. 

But the fact remains that a window was broken. Now, that concerns me because, at my house, I have a security system. If a window is breached—actually, when I left this morning, I didn’t want 

to disturb my wife quite early, but the security alarm sort of notifies you that someone’s coming in or going out. I don’t have a very 

sophisticated system. 

But a window breaking in the White House in 2011, it seems like 

that should—and I know there are two barriers. One is bulletproof, 

and the other is the original—or antique glass. That should have 

been taken care of. 

Has that been taken care of? Do you know? 

Ms. PIERSON. I know that the windows have been replaced. 

Mr. MICA. No. I am talking about security for breaching that. 

Again, a simple thing. If someone opens a window or a window 

is broken at my house, I have an alarm. Have you ever heard of 

these guys? It is not very costly. You can subscribe. But that can 

be installed. It is a simple technology device and company, private 

system, that can do that. So I don’t think we have to spend a lot 

of money. 

I think, one, we have got to improve the quality and professionalism, which you’re trying to do. You have got to be able to hire 

and fire people. And you have to put some technology in place. We 

don’t have to put cement trucks and barriers in front of the White 

House. It is the people’s house. 

Now, do you know when the current 7-foot, 6-inch fence was installed? 

Ms. PIERSON. 1965. 

Mr. MICA. 1965. 

And I don’t want to go through some outrageous things. I know 

the taxpayers have to fund this. But maybe we could raise that a 

little bit. 

The other thing, too, is you are part of the—you have lived in 

Florida. We could even put some vegetation barriers, simple things 

like—how about Spanish bayonet? You jump that fence and you get 

quite a greeting when you hit the ground. Inexpensive vegetation 

barriers. 

But there is a whole host of things that we can do cost effectively. So I hope you will consider some of them as we look at some 

solutions. 

Jumping the fence at the White House is not new. Is that right? 

Ms. PIERSON. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. MICA. But what has happened is they went beyond the barrier. 

The other thing, too, is I understand the President and the First 

Family were not at the White House when this took place and 

64 

sometimes the security personnel and Secret Service do get refocused to address where the President is. 

And he had just departed. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. That is correct. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Well, again, welcome to the Government Reform 

and Oversight Committee. It is good to have you here today. Thank 

you. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, can I just make an inquiry? 

Mr. MICA. Sure. 

Mr. TIERNEY. You made some reference during your remarks 

that the Director had made two requests and some—there was 

some objection from this side. 

Could you expand on that for us. Because we’re not aware of 

that, as far as I know. 

Mr. MICA. She told you the two requests that were made. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Right. 

Mr. MICA. She actually contacted me. We contacted staff. And we 

have asked staff to look at it. I asked the staff just now. 

I said, ‘‘Well, what is the status of that?’’ 

And they said there was—I said, ‘‘Have we moved forward on her 

request?’’ 

They said, ‘‘No.’’ 

I said, ‘‘Why?’’ 

They said, ‘‘Because some of the staff’’—or ‘‘some of the Members 

on the other side of the aisle objected to that.’’ 

And, I mean, you can object to it—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I don’t think anybody has. That is my point. 

We’re not aware of that. 

Mr. MICA. The Director has taken steps to improve both the performance—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, we understand that and we are 

willing to accept that. 

Mr. MICA. And the qualifications and the status of one of the 

most respected law enforcement services in the world, not just—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. We’re appreciative of that. I think—and we don’t 

disagree that she did that. 

Mr. MICA. I am just telling—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. Where we disagree is nobody on this side knows 

what you are talking about. 

Mr. MICA. I have got to tell it like it is, and that is how it is. 

Mr. TIERNEY. No. You are telling us like somebody told you it 

was. 

Mr. MICA. Well, that is the facts. 

So, again, she testified under oath that she did contact me in 

that regard. I asked staff. And that is the status of that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the chairman yield just for a moment, 

please? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the chairman yield just for a moment? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to make something very, very clear. 

On this side of the aisle, we will do everything in our power to 

make sure that the Secret Service has everything it needs—— 

Mr. MICA. There, too, I—— 

65 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me—may I finish, please? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. Go right ahead. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. —it needs to protect the President, his family, 

the Vice President, his family, the families of—and the President— 

and our former Presidents. 

This is extremely important to us. And I don’t want this hearing 

or anybody to get the impression that we are not a million percent 

supportive of making sure that the Secret Service has what it 

needs legislatively or financially. 

Mr. MICA. Well, I thank the gentleman. And I know he’ll work 

with us to try to accommodate the request of the Director. 

Does the gentleman from—— 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding.] Would the chairman yield? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Perhaps just to clear the record, I think that the 

entire committee needs to be aware that there have been requests 

to have personnel standings of exempt changed, in some cases, to 

make them easier to terminate. Now, that is a debate we can certainly have. 

I do believe today that, although that is something the committee 

should consider—and I am certainly supportive of at this level people being subject to disciplinary action if they’re unable to fulfill 

their mission easier—I don’t believe today that is the basis under 

which these various failures occurred. So—and I am happy to have 

a discussion later on the details of the personnel changes, but that 

was the limit. 

And, again, for the Director, I did receive that. 

I did not—because we can’t immediately act on it unilaterally, 

but I don’t believe it has anything to do with today’s—the number 

of failures. It may have something to do with low morale. But, then 

again, if you make people easier to fire, that also sometimes leads 

to low morale. 

Mr. MICA. Well, respectfully stating my point on this, I think the 

Director has taken on the responsibility of improving the performance, and very key to that is also the educational qualifications, 

which she asked, and the ability to hire and fire people. 

And I think they are relevant because, when you don’t have discipline, you don’t have good performance. And when the Director 

doesn’t have the tools to accomplish that, then we don’t get what 

we should. 

With that, Mr. Horsford, the gentleman from Nevada, is recognized. 

Mr. HORSFORD. I want to thank Chairman Issa and the ranking 

member, Mr. Cummings, for holding this extremely important 

hearing. 

Director Pierson, let me be frank. I believe that you have done 

a disservice to the President of the United States. Not only have 

you compromised his safety and security, you have compromised 

the safety and security of his family and the staff of the White 

House. The pattern of lax security and following basic protocols indicate a culture at the Secret Service that needs to change. 

Now, while the President may not be in a position to publicly 

criticize this failure to adequately protect his needs, I will. This 

President has far too much to worry about both here and around 

66 

the world. He should not have to also be concerned with his personal safety and security and that of his family. 

So my question, Director, is: Why should we have confidence in 

the Secret Service’s ability to protect the President of the United 

States and the First Family when there has been such a pattern 

of lax security? 

Ms. PIERSON. I believe the incident on September 19 is not representative of pattern. As I have stated, there have been others 

that have attempted to gain access to the property that were immediately arrested. My biggest concern is that security plan—that effective security plan was not properly executed on the night of the 

19th. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Beyond September 19, which is the most recent 

incident, the fact that we are just now learning from the Washington Post that ran a story about the 2011 shooting incident 

where Ortega-Hernandez fired at the White House, it took 4 days 

for the Secret Service to realize that bullets actually hit the White 

House residence, and that only occurred after a housekeeper and 

an usher identified the concern because of a broken window. 

Can a broken window be observed visibly from both the inside 

of the White House as well as the outside? 

Ms. PIERSON. In this case, the location of the broken window, up 

against the mansion facade, along the trim and balcony, it was not 

visible from the exterior. 

Mr. HORSFORD. From the exterior. 

What about the interior? 

Ms. PIERSON. The interior, in the private residence of the President and the First Lady, there were indications that the ballistic 

glass had a dimple, or actual damage to the ballistic glass. It was 

not recognized by the housekeeping staff until the curtains had 

been pulled in preparation for the President and First Lady’s return. 

Mr. HORSFORD. And so how was it that the Secret Service personnel, prior to the housekeeper finding that—they did not do the 

proper assessment, inspection of that location in order to identify 

that until 4 days later? 

Ms. PIERSON. I will be happy to have a discussion with you in 

a private session. But, typically, the private residence of the President and First Lady is just that. It is their private residence. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Well, I understand that you are not able to discuss all of the exact details of some of the security protocols in this 

open hearing, and I look forward to asking you more detailed, stepby-step questions about the exact protocols that failed, the missteps 

by individual agents, and the depth and breadth of this review that 

the investigation of this incident covers. 

Has there been any disciplinary action pursued against any of 

the personnel who failed to follow proper protocol to date? 

Ms. PIERSON. That is pending, based upon the conclusion of the 

investigation to determine exactly what the facts are, and, appropriately, enhancements will be made and personnel actions will be 

taken. 

Mr. HORSFORD. And that is where I tend to differ a little bit. Because of this pattern of lax security not just from the most recent 

incident, but from prior incidences, someone should be held acVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
67 

countable. The security of the President of the United States is serious and his family is serious, and we don’t need a long, lengthy 

review for someone to be held accountable. 

So I look forward to getting more facts about this in our executive briefing. But, ultimately, Director, we need to make sure that 

people are held accountable. There are men and women in the Secret Service that do a great job, and they are to be commended for 

that job. But when an individual fails to do their job properly, they 

need to be held accountable. 

Ms. PIERSON. I agree with that statement. People make mistakes. They need to be held accountable. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

For all members, as we near the end of this hearing, we will be 

going into executive session upstairs at the subcommittee room immediately following this. 

The gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Grisham, is next. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to do a couple of things. I want to go back to many of the 

statements that have been made today, and I want to try to fastforward to the situation that we’re all dealing with. And then I 

have got a very specific question about a protocol that I am hoping 

not in executive session you can answer. 

So we’re all trying to figure out what we can do in this hearing 

to understand this incredible breach but, at the same time, recognize that this is a—the people’s house, a public building, and to 

work on those balances. 

And you have heard many Members be concerned about the 

thought that we would have sort of a shoot to kill first. And, of 

course, I think about earlier—I think in this year we had a toddler 

breach the fence. 

And so it is clear, for me, at least, that that is too far and want 

to create an environment where we all feel that there is a public 

safety aspect here. 

But I think in your earlier testimony you said that we have had 

60 individuals try to breach the fence this year. So that is, roughly, 

one a week. 

Ms. PIERSON. 16 over 5 years. Six individuals this year. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. This year. 

In any event, so this—we know that folks, whether it is a mental 

illness issue or something in addition to that—we know that we 

have an issue. 

And I also heard you earlier in your testimony talk about part 

of your career in the Secret Service, that you were, at one point in 

time, working on some of the IT issues. Is that correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. So I am going to now go back to the 2011 

incident, and I am going to read to you what the Washington Post 

said about that shooting incident. And I know that we have said 

this several times. It bears repeating. 

‘‘Back in the White House, key people in charge of the safety of 

the President’s family were not initially aware that a shooting occurred. Because officers guarding the White House grounds communicate on a different radio frequency from the ones used by 

agents who protect the First Family, the agent assigned to Sasha 

68 

learned of the shooting a few minutes later from an officer posted 

nearby.’’ 

Now, while communications and radio dispatch in and of themselves may not be narrowly construed as IT, I construe communications efforts, particularly in the context of interoperability, to be 

definitely inside that realm. 

Since 2011, have you resolved those communication issues? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. And as a result of the incident, we have ensured that information is passed—even if agents, officers or others 

are operating on different radio frequencies, that that same information is passed—that emergency information is passed to all people who have a need to know. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. So all of the radio frequencies are now—you 

are communicating on a single or—and that may be an inappropriate statement about how that works—but they’re all interoperable. All those communications techniques are working collectively 

and so are the alarms? 

Ms. PIERSON. The radio systems are operating with commonality, 

and that is controlled through our joint operations center. So 

agents and officers are allowed to operate on particular frequencies 

based upon their work. 

The alarm systems are now becoming more and more integrated 

with some of our radio systems, but we are still in that transition 

phase. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Because I’m really—among all of the other 

issues, I’m really struggling with the communications and the unilateral efforts by any personnel to decide not to have an alarm, 

such as the door, by the ushers or anybody else. 

And I’m really trying to understand that, if you are doing this 

continuous improvement, training, investments and making sure 

that this elite protective force is, in fact, just that—state of the art, 

effective, elite—how that miscommunication could occur without 

anyone having any idea. And, for me, it is gross neglect. 

How does that occur? How does somebody at that level interfere 

with the protocol established by the Secret Service? 

Ms. PIERSON. I think the concern was, when these alarms were 

put into place, the proximity to other activities within the White 

House, it could be an interference, such as the tour lines or other 

public events. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. So an interference. And I said that I think 

that you need to be able to address the balances of the public visiting, utilizing, meeting at the White House. 

But it is stunning to me that that would trump your own protocols from making sure that you have alarms whose purpose is to 

trigger a threat so that you can have an effective, global within the 

Secret Service, both interior and exterior—a communications plan 

that would allow you to effectively execute a protocol. Otherwise, 

you can’t. 

And I know I’m out of my time. But something is wrong with this 

idea—— 

Chairman ISSA. We will be going into a classified session. I think 

that is going to help. I thank the gentlelady. 

69 

The chair would announce that we now have two members who 

have been waved on that will ask their questions. That will complete the full round. 

With the indulgence of the ranking member, we’re going to have 

an additional 5 minutes per side divided by whoever Mr. 

Cummings would like to recognize, myself, and then we will go upstairs into an executive session. 

So 5 minutes a side for our two guest members, then 5 minutes 

a side, which will include closing. So that will give everyone an understanding that roughly 10 minutes—or 20 minutes from now we 

will conclude, for anyone—any staff who want to make sure their 

Members are available upstairs. 

And, with that, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pierson, are your agents that are charged with guarding 

the White House and guarding the occupants of the White House— 

are they allowed to use smartphones while on duty—and I’m talking about personal smartphones—texting, tweeting, playing games? 

Are they allowed to use personal smartphones while on duty? 

Ms. PIERSON. No. They would not be. 

Mr. LONG. And that is strictly enforced? You are confident? 

Ms. PIERSON. I know that they have access to a Blackberry, 

which is part of the tools that we give our officers and agents to 

receive information and pass information. 

Mr. LONG. That is an official phone, to me. 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

Mr. LONG. That is something that they need in their day to day 

to say go this gate or that or watch for this guy. But I am talking 

about personal smartphone usage. 

You say they are not allowed to do that while on duty, guarding 

the White House and its occupants? 

Ms. PIERSON. It is possible that some employees have a personal 

cell phone for emergency contact by their family, but they are discouraged from using any kind of technology—— 

Mr. LONG. They are discouraged from using. Okay. 

A week before someone was caught jumping a fence. A week 

later someone was not. Correct? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Were you at the White House picnic this year? 

Ms. PIERSON. No, I was not. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. I am sure you are familiar with it. 

Do you know when it was? I’ll answer that. It was 2 days before 

the event. 

At the White House picnic, it was Senators, Congressmen, Republicans, Democrats. Everyone is invited. Our families were invited. We took our families. We get stopped at the street. We have 

to show an ID, Members of Congress, Senators, our families. 

They are checking the books, making sure everything is in order 

to let us go another—I want to say 70 yards. I don’t know exactly, 

but just down the sidewalk a little tiny ways. 

And then they check our ID again, ‘‘Get your driver’s license out. 

We need to check your ID again before you can go onto the premises of the White House.’’ So we go into the picnic. Several hundred 

people there. I don’t know—200, 300, 400—what it was. 

70 

The President and the First Lady are normally there. On the 

17th of September this year, the First Lady was out of State. The 

President of the United States was there at that event. 

We have had four assassinations in this country. We have had 

about 2 dozen attempted, including the shooting of Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. We just heard my friend, Ms. Holmes 

Norton, earlier in her questioning say that this President has received approximately three times the number of threats on his life 

of any other President. I was surprised to hear that. 

The President of the United States was there that night among 

300 people, let’s say, 400, whatever it was. I shudder to think—he 

was behind a rope. Those of you old enough to remember clotheslines, it was about a three-quarter-inch—looked like a clothesline 

rope was his protection that evening from 300, 400 people. 

I shudder to think if this gentleman would have come 48 hours 

earlier, jumped the fence that night, run into the crowd, or say he 

had eight or ten friends with him. 

The President of the United States was behind a clothesline rope 

that night. I’ve got pictures on my cell phone of him having—letting people take selfies with him, holding babies, taking pictures. 

It is a great gesture from the President. We want to be close to the 

President. We want to be able to talk to him, reach out to him. 

But if you don’t take anything else away from this hearing today, 

take that picture in your mind. You weren’t there, but 48 hours 

earlier we could be having a whole different conversation here 

today, and that is very, very upsetting to me. 

I love first-responders. I’ve got a great deal of admiration, respect 

for first-responders, police, whether it is the local police, the sheriff, 

the highway patrol, the Secret Service, the FBI, the people that 

protect us. 

Let me ask you another question: Are there people with automatic weapons patrolling the White House grounds inside or out, 

standing there with their finger on a trigger of an automatic weapon in plain sight that might be a deterrent? 

Ms. PIERSON. We do have a number of tactical assets that are deployed at the White House routinely. 

Mr. LONG. Are they in plain sight with an automatic weapon 

with their finger on the trigger, like they are outside of this building and next door here at the Capitol? 

And I was driving down the street yesterday here. There was a 

Capitol Hill policeman with an automatic weapon, finger on the 

trigger, very, very observe—we were stopped at a stop sign, and I 

said, ‘‘I wonder if they have an extra threat today or something because this guy is really on point.’’ 

But I think that—if we had something like that and I am thinking about jumping the fence, whether I have my full mental faculties or not, and I see someone there with an automatic weapon, 

their finger on the trigger, do you think I am not going to think 

two or three times about—just like I would about doing something 

at the Capitol because I see all these people around with automatic 

weapons guarding us, safeguarding our lives? 

But, again, I shudder to think what could have happened 48 

hours earlier, if that guy would have wanted to jump the fence that 

night and run out in the middle of 300 or 400 people or have two 

71 

or three friends with him and the President is behind a clothesline 

rope. 

I appreciate you being here. Appreciate your testimony. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

I would second his point, that I’ve seen Senators wait 2 hours 

after the Salahi incident to get into the White House in 9-degree 

temperatures. 

I certainly hope that we won’t have the kind of craziness that 

you can take 2 hours to get in the White House as a member of 

the House or Senate, but somebody can just jump the fence and be 

inside in a matter of seconds. That is, I think, what this hearing 

is all about. 

And I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the patient gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila 

Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

courtesy. 

And to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, thank you for your 

courtesy and thank you for acknowledging that Homeland Security 

and this committee has worked together on a number of issues. 

Before I started, I want to put into the record by reading it the 

words expressed by Mr. Obama, our President, just last week, as, 

Madam Director, you made it very clear that, at the General Assembly, you protected not only the President, but 140 Heads of 

State. 

And the President said, ‘‘The Secret Service does a great job. I 

am grateful for all the sacrifices they make on my behalf and on 

my family’s behalf.’’ 

I wanted to just add that because the President has confidence. 

I also want to acknowledge that your storied history equates to 

the storied history of the Secret Service starting in 1865, and we 

recognize that it has continued in that service. 

And I hope this hearing, as my colleagues have said, between Republicans and Democrats, would alter this headline that I hold up 

that says ‘‘The Secret Service opens door to ridicule.’’ I disagree 

with that and say it opens the door to restructuring and revamping 

because I think you have been very honest with us today. 

And I also hold, since it was mentioned, documents, which I 

would ask, if I am able to put into the record, unanimous consent. 

I don’t know if that—— 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, the entire document will be 

put into the record. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The list of assassinated presidents, four dead—too many—and 

six was attempted. That is the basis of our passion. 

I also want to acknowledge the Homeland Security Inspector 

General report on three headlines that I’ll read—and maybe we 

will get into this because I have some specific questions—in the 

classified. 

But it had three points: Policies and procedures for proposing 

and issuing discipline are insufficient; United States Secret Service 

is not always in compliance with Federal disciplinary rules; interVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:18 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91798.TXT APRIL
72 

nal controls are insufficient to ensure discipline is aligned with 

agency. 

Now, you would probably say that a lot of this has been corrected, and I look forward to those questions. But let me go specifically to my concern. 

On July 19, the State Virginia Police found a man that had any 

number of indictable things—and when I say that, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, a number of items that are not the normal course— 

even though he is under the Second Amendment. And then, on August 25, our officers stopped this gentleman. 

I am going to say to the American people, since this President 

is documented, maybe because he is different, maybe because of the 

policies, that he has had more threats than others. 

I am going to say to the American public maybe someone should 

have known the gentleman who jumped the fence on the 19th. 

Maybe his family should have reported him. 

But I do believe that it was unacceptable that he was stopped on 

August 25 with the information and there could not have been 

some basis upon which this gentleman could have been referred to 

an institutional hold or referred to call family members in and to 

address the question. Yes. Individuals have that. 

My question to you is: Why was this gentleman that jumped on 

September 19, stopped on August 25 with a background of the 

enormous amount of guns and other threatening items—why 

wasn’t he taken into custody? 

Let’s not say that law didn’t allow us. Why wasn’t there a way 

that he could have been held, his family could have been called, the 

military’s an ex-retiree—or an ex-officer of the military could not 

have been called? 

And I have another question. So maybe I should ask it out of 

courtesy to my colleagues. 

The other egregious thing that I thought was particularly outrageous is, in the 2011, when it was either—it either was a car 

backfiring or gang fights—which I have never heard of gang fights 

at the White House—I am asking you this question on the one that 

happened on the 19th. The most egregious that I could ever think 

is that the individuals surveying the White House on that day 

failed to stop him. 

And we have a picture, which you cannot see, of—one, two, three, 

four, five—six uniformed officers—I wonder if there is a fitness 

problem here—chasing this gentleman who could not capture him. 

All six of them in this picture could not capture him. 

And so my question is: What in the open domain stopped them 

from getting him before he jumped the fence? This is on September 

19. What stopped them from getting him when he jumped over the 

fence with six or more officers chasing him—uniform officers? 

And why would in the September 2011 event you think that it 

was a gang fight instead of a more serious investigation into the 

fact that there was gunfire? 

Ms. PIERSON. We are looking into why Mr. Gonzalez was not 

stopped when he came over the fence, I’ve stated publicly, and I’ll 

continue to work with my workforce to understand why he was allowed to make access to the mansion and why he wasn’t detained 

earlier, as soon as he jumped the fence. 

73 

I need to understand why he was not recognized earlier in the 

day and further surveillance put on him as to further analysis as 

to why he was there and why he had returned to the White House. 

I cannot explain those questions today. 

In regard to the shooting back in November of—11 of 2011, all’s 

I can advise is that, in collaboration with the U.S. Park Place, the 

Metropolitan Police Department, the Secret Service, the conflicting 

witness statements, at—that night at that time there was confusion about whether there were shots at the White House or shots 

from car to car. 

It appears to me that those are also documented in the police reports. I regret the confusion. It occurred 3 years ago. I know that 

we have learned from that incident and the Secret Service would 

react differently today than it did 3 years ago. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by saying, 

in the light of ISIL and Corazon, with direct interest and commitment to attacking the United States and maybe the President, I 

think this hearing highlights the serious need for revamping and 

restructuring that is so key when we all are working together for 

the ultimate good of protecting the First Family’s life. I hope you 

agree with me. 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Pursuant to the agreement, chairman and ranking member will divide 10 minutes equally, 5 minutes per side. 

I will now yield 4 of those minutes to the gentleman from Utah, 

Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman and, again, appreciate this 

hearing. 

Director, anytime there is a breach of protocol or the President’s 

personal security has been jeopardized or the White House security 

perimeter has been breached, is there an internal review? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And are you aware—are you—can you assure the 

committee that you are informed anytime those things happen? 

Ms. PIERSON. I am expected to be informed. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is the President of the United States informed? 

Ms. PIERSON. I would assume that the President of the United 

States is informed. I don’t know. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You are the head of the Secret Service. Explain 

to me why you wouldn’t know that. 

Ms. PIERSON. Well, your question was subjective as to whether 

or not I would know. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, who briefs—do you brief the President or 

don’t? 

Ms. PIERSON. If your question is when are—there are incidents 

that involve the President of the United States or the First Family 

and security concerns, yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Then, you do brief the President? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you brief the President if there has been a perimeter breach at the White House? 

74 

Ms. PIERSON. I have confidential conversations with the President. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you brief the President if he has—his own personal security has in any way been jeopardized? 

Ms. PIERSON. I have confidential conversations with the President, and those would be the topics that we would cover, in addition to other things. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What percentage of the time do you inform the 

President if his personal security has been breached? 

Ms. PIERSON. I would say in proximity to the incident. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No. I asked you: What percentage of the time do 

you inform the President if his personal security has in any way, 

shape or form been breached? 

Ms. PIERSON. Percent of the time? 100 percent of the time we 

would advise the President. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You would advise the President? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. In calendar year 2014, how many times has that 

happened? 

Ms. PIERSON. I have not briefed him, with the exception of one 

occasion for the September 19 incident. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So the only time you have briefed the President 

on perimeter security, the President’s personal security, the First 

Family’s security, has been one time in 2014? 

Ms. PIERSON. That is correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, as we kind of wrap up here, I 

think there is a bipartisan call for change, to change. I would like 

to ask for an independent review. I think there needs to be a topdown review of not only security but, also, the culture. And I want 

to refer our colleagues to this. 

And, Madam Director, I don’t understand why Special Agent 

Basic Classes, in 2012, there were zero and, in 2013, there was 

one. In the Uniformed Division Basic Classes, in 2012, there was 

one and, in 2013, there was one. I don’t understand that. 

I also want to again go back to this Inspector General’s report 

because I think there is a serious, serious problem here. 

Let me read some questions in how the Secret Service agents 

themselves responded: 

‘‘If a senior manager engages in misconduct or illegal activity, he 

or she is held accountable.’’ Less than half of the respondents said 

that that was true. 

‘‘I can report a suspected violation of any rule, regulation or 

standard of conduct without fear of retaliation.’’ Only 55.8 percent 

of the respondents said that that statement was true. 

Again, Secret Service agents themselves in a confidential survey, 

when asked, ‘‘The Secret Service’s disciplinary process is fair,’’ only 

40.3 percent said ‘‘yes.’’ 

‘‘Disciplinary actions within the Secret Service are applied consistently for similar offenses.’’ Only 30 percent said ‘‘yes.’’ 

‘‘Disciplinary actions within the Secret Service are at the appropriate level of severity, given the offense.’’ Only 36.6. 

This demands an independent investigation and review team— 

the FBI, military, whatever it takes—but they need to look at the 

75 

management, they need to look at the leadership, they need to look 

at the culture and the security. 

I thank the chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

The entire IG report will be included in the supplemental of the 

hearing. 

Chairman ISSA. I am going to reserve that last minute and yield 

to the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Pierson, I just—Director Pierson, I just want 

to follow up on some of Ms. Jackson Lee’s questions. 

Going back to Mr. Gonzalez, you confirm that the Secret Service 

did an extensive interview of him. Is that right? Is that right? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I believe you testified that you requested his 

medical files, which documented his medical illness, and he agreed 

that you could have them. Is that what you told us? 

Ms. PIERSON. Our procedures are, in consultation with the individual, Mr. Gonzalez, the scope of the investigation would include 

a confidential release of their medical records, and he complied. 

Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you actually—Secret Service had his medical 

files. Is that right? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. That is part of their investigation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Here is my question. Federal law prohibits certain people with mental illnesses from possessing firearms. That 

statute is 18, USC, 922(g). 

Now, the statute is detailed, but the prohibition covers people 

who have been ‘‘adjudicated as a mental defective’’ or who have 

been committed to an institution for mental illness. 

Are you aware of that statute? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes, I am. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. According to press reports, Gonzalez had severe 

mental illness. He was apparently seeing a military psychiatrist, 

who diagnosed him with severe mental illnesses, and his family 

confirmed the same thing. 

What steps did the Secret Service take to prevent this individual 

from possessing firearms after he was arrested in July and after 

the Secret Service interviewed him? 

Ms. PIERSON. Ranking Member Cummings, he was interviewed 

by the Virginia State Police. We notified the Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms, who interviewed Mr. Gonzalez, who notified the Secret 

Service, based on their discussions with Mr. Gonzalez, to have a 

further discussion with him. So many Federal agencies have been 

in contact with Mr. Gonzalez. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But—so you consulted with ATF? 

Ms. PIERSON. ATF was the initial investigators, first responded 

to Virginia State Police’s inquire of his weapons. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When the Secret Service spoke to the family, 

didn’t they also say he had a mental illness and needed help? 

Ms. PIERSON. The family concurred that he exhibited signs of 

PTSD. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The statute says the prohibition applies when 

any lawful authority has made a determination that the person, as 

a result of mental illness, is a danger to himself or to others. 

76 

Don’t you think that applies here? 

Ms. PIERSON. It would be worth having further investigation in 

concurrence with his interview. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me just conclude. 

You know, the question has come up—and every time I step out 

in the hall just for a minute, I have got reporters coming up to me, 

asking me, ‘‘Do you think that Ms. Pierson—Director Pierson can 

correct the situation?’’ And what I have said is that the jury is still 

out. 

And let me tell you why I say that. You were talking about internal review a little bit earlier. And again I go back to that whole 

culture question. If your Secret Service members don’t feel comfortable sharing information, I don’t know how you get the information that you need to address the kind of concerns that you might 

have because you won’t even have the information. 

And then it hit me, as I was thinking about this whole thing, if 

I have got Secret Service members who are more willing to be 

whistleblowers and come before the Congress, what that tells me 

is that they don’t trust each other. There is a problem of trust 

within an agency—and correct me if I am wrong on this point— 

that really needs to have trust within it. 

Is that right? Wouldn’t you agree with that piece? 

Ms. PIERSON. Yes. We do need to have confidence and trust with 

each other. That is correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So—so—— 

Chairman ISSA. Gentleman, I think she answered to the negative 

of your question of: Isn’t there a lack of trust? And she said:Yes. 

There is trust. I will restore the time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. 

Do you believe that there is a lack of trust? 

Ms. PIERSON. No. I do believe that employees trust each other. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But—so, then, help me. Please help me with this. 

Help me with this. 

How do you—and I—and I know—I think you have the greatest 

of intent. You have given us 30 years, and I appreciate it. 

How do you get past that—it is hard for me to get past that 

whole issue of folks not being willing. Members of the Secret Service are coming to Members of this committee—not to me, but to 

others—telling them things that—and they don’t even seem to discuss them with you all, their higher-ups. And it goes back to the 

lady back—the agent, back to 2011, when she was apparently 

afraid or thought that nobody would listen to her. 

Help me. Just tell me how you are going to deal with that. 

Ms. PIERSON. Ranking Member Cummings, I have made a number of changes in our management and our leadership team. I am 

going to continue to make changes in our leadership team for promoting individuals, for spending a lot of time helping them become 

leaders and supervisors or holding them accountable. 

We are holding the workforce accountable. We are providing 

more opportunities for training. We are spending time doing engagement sessions with the workforce to find out what are some of 

the inherent problems. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You said a little bit earlier you are going to support new leadership. 

77 

So you are constantly bringing in new leadership. Is that right? 

Ms. PIERSON. When I took this position, we were down 70 special 

agent supervisory positions. Those positions have now been filled. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much for your testimony. I look 

forward to talking with you in the classified briefing. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

I now yield 1 minute to Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to come back because, in testimony here, you have been 

very specific. You have said 500 to 550 employees. Chairman Issa 

asked you that again, and you continued to stay with that. So I 

went and asked for what you were requesting this year, and you 

should have a copy of that. We have given that to your staff right 

there. 

How is it that, if you are down 550 full-time employees, that you 

are only asking for 61 more? Why would you not ask for 500? 

These, again, are your numbers. And I am just trying to find— 

you know, in all of this, it is all about trust and integrity, and some 

of your testimony just doesn’t seem to line up with the facts. 

Ms. PIERSON. Well, it is challenging when you start to talk about 

operational positions and—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, it is challenging, from an oversight standpoint, to get to the truth, and that is what we are trying to do. We 

are giving you this opportunity. 

Ms. PIERSON. Thank you. 

If you would, it is challenging to talk about an FTE in a full-time 

position. The FTEs represent 50 percent in that first year that they 

would be hired. 

Part of the challenge that we have had and part of what I have 

presented to the committee and asked for their support on, both 

from the chair and the ranking member, is authority for the Secret 

Service to pursue accepted service legislation. Hiring is a challenge 

for me, and trying to hire in a process that is cumbersome is more 

difficult. 

The agents in the Uniformed Division, officers and personnel 

that we hire within the Secret Service, require a robust background 

investigation. They require a lot of security clearance. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But why don’t you request the funds to do that? 

Ms. PIERSON. I requested legislation to support me and to be able 

to identify new efficiencies in the hiring process. 

We put out a vacancy announcement for special agents, received 

45,000 applications, and because of the cumbersome processes that 

I have to comply with, we have only been able to onboard 72 this 

year. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So how long will it be before the President is safe, 

then? Under your scenario, you have got to wait for legislation. You 

have got to wait for an act of Congress. That doesn’t make sense. 

Ms. PIERSON. Well, we are currently trying to work with the Office of Personnel Management and identify every efficiency that we 

possibly can to assist us in being able to bring on these personnel 

that we critically need. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So is the President safe today, then? 

Ms. PIERSON. The President is safe today. And we are going to 

continue to migrate our resources to every place that we need to 

78 

ensure the President, his family, those others that we protect, as 

well as the White House complex, are safe. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I am troubled you didn’t ask. 

I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

As promised, we will now recess and go into executive session. 

Briefly, before we do, I want to make sure that the Director in 

open hearing understands and our other witnesses who we are 

going to dismiss at this time it is the considered view of the chair— 

and, I believe, with—in concurrence with the ranking member— 

that an internal investigation by the Secret Service is not sufficient—I repeat—is not sufficient to provide the kind of confidence 

back to the American people. 

So I will be working with the ranking member to send a letter 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security, asking for a far greater and 

more independent investigation of the assets needed and the 

changes needed to bring back the kind of confidence the American 

people and the President deserve. 

We stand in recess. And we will reconvene in a secure location. 

[Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed session.] 

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