ELIZABETH GOFF GONZALEZ, 

DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

STEVEN C. JACOBS, 

Real Party in Interest. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION 

FOR WRIT RELIEF (DOCKET Na 68265), GRANTING PETITION FOR 

WRIT RELIEF (DOCKET NO. 68275), AND DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT RELIEF (DOCKET NO. 68309) 

These consolidated writ petitions challenge the following four 

orders: a May 28, 2015, order determining that petitioner Sands China is 

preliminarily subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada and a March 6, 

2015, order imposing discovery sanctions on Sands China (Docket No. 

68265); a June 19, 2015, order denying Sands China's motion for a 

protective order (Docket No. 68275); and a June 12, 2015, order declining 

to vacate a trial date (Docket No. 68309). The petitions also request that 

the underlying matter be reassigned to a different district court judge.' 

Docket No, 68265 

Personal jurisdiction order 

"A writ of prohibition is available to arrest or remedy district 

court actions taken without or in excess of jurisdiction." Viega GmbH v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 40, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 

(2014). "As no adequate and speedy legal remedy typically exists to 

'The Honorable James E. Wilson, Jr., District Judge in the First 

Judicial District Court, and the Honorable Steve L. Dobrescu, District 

Judge in the Seventh Judicial District Court, were designated by the 

Governor to sit in place of the Honorable Ron Parraguirre, Justice, and the 

Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, who voluntarily recused themselves 

from participation in the decision of this matter. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4(2). 

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correct an invalid exercise of personal jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition is 

an appropriate method for challenging district court orders when it is 

alleged that the district court has exceeded its jurisdiction." Id. "When 

reviewing a district court's exercise of jurisdiction, we review legal issues 

de novo but defer to the district court's findings of fact if they are 

supported by substantial evidence." Catholic Diocese, Green Bay v. John 

Doe 119, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 29, 349 P.3d 518, 520 (2015). 

The district court determined that, under Trump v. Eighth 

Judicial District Court, 109 Nev. 687, 857 P.2d 740 (1993), real party in 

interest Steven Jacobs had made a preliminary showing of personal 

jurisdiction over Sands China based on general, transient, and specific 

jurisdiction theories. 2Having considered the parties' arguments and the 

record, we agree with the district court's determination that Jacobs made 

a preliminary showing of specific jurisdiction, 3as the record supports the 

district court's preliminary conclusion that Sands China purposefully 

availed itself of the privilege of acting in Nevada and that Jacobs' claims 

arose from those actions. Catholic Diocese, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 29, 349 

P.3d at 520. We also agree with the district court's rationale as to why it 

would be reasonable to require Sands China to appear in Nevada state 

court. Id. 

2We reject Sands China's suggestion that the district court's May 

2015 order precludes it from contesting personal jurisdiction at trial. 

3We reject Sands China's argument regarding the mandate rule, as 

this court's August 26, 2011, order did not explicitly or impliedly preclude 

Jacobs from amending his complaint. Nguyen v. United States, 792 F.2d 

1500, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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We conclude, however, that the district court's determinations 

regarding general and transient jurisdiction were based on an 

unsupported legal premise. In particular, the district court determined 

that Sands China was subject to general jurisdiction in Nevada because 

Sands China utilized the employees of its Nevada-based parent company, 

Las Vegas Sands Corporation, to conduct Sands China's business. 4We 

agree with Sands China's argument that Sands China, as Las Vegas 

Sands' subsidiary, lacked the legal authority to control the employees of 

its parent company. Cf. Viega, 130 Nev., Adv, Op. 40, 328 P.3d at 1158 

(recognizing that "an agency relationship is formed when one person has 

the right to control the performance of another" and observing that, in the 

parent/subsidiary corporate relationship, it is the parent corporation that 

has varying degrees of control over the subsidiary). Consequently, we 

agree that the conduct of Las Vegas Sands' employees could not be 

attributed to Sands China for general jurisdiction purposes. 5 

4We need not separately address the district court's transient 

jurisdiction analysis because that analysis largely tracked the district 

court's general jurisdiction analysis. 

5In light of this conclusion, we need not address the subsequent 

issue of whether the Nevada contacts of Las Vegas Sands' employees, if 

attributed to Sands China, would have rendered Sands China "essentially 

at home" in Nevada. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. „ 

n.20, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761, 762 n.20 (2014) (observing that a general 

jurisdiction inquiry "calls for an appraisal of a [defendant's] activities in 

their entirety, nationwide and worldwide"). 

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We therefore grant Sands China's writ petition in Docket No. 

68265 insofar as it seeks to vacate the district court's determination that 

Sands China is subject to personal jurisdiction under general and 

transient jurisdiction theories. Accordingly, we direct the clerk of this 

court to issue a writ of prohibition instructing the district court to vacate 

from its May 28, 2015, order the determinations that Sands China is 

subject to personal jurisdiction under general and transient jurisdiction 

theories, and further instructing the district court to prohibit Steven 

Jacobs from introducing evidence at trial that pertains solely to those 

theories. 6 

Discovery sanctions order 

As acknowledged by Jacobs at oral argument, the district 

court's May 28, 2015, order did not intend to prohibit Sands China from 

introducing evidence at trial regarding personal jurisdiction. Thus, Sands 

China's challenge to the portion of the district court's March 16, 2015, 

discovery sanctions order prohibiting Sands China from introducing 

evidence to that effect at the preliminary evidentiary hearing is denied as 

moot. As for the $250,000 monetary sanction, we conclude that the 

district court exceeded its authority in awarding sanctions to the Sedona 

Conference. See RPC 6.1(e) (setting forth the permissible entities to which 

a monetary sanction may be made payable). Accordingly, we direct the 

clerk of this court to issue a writ of prohibition instructing •the district 

court to vacate from its March 16, 2015, order the sanction that was made 

6We vacate the stay imposed by our June 23, 2015, order. 

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payable to the Sedona Conference and to reallocate the total $250,000 

sanction in compliance with RPC 6.1(e). 7 

Docket No. 68275 

Sands China challenges the district court's June 19, 2015, 

order in which it declined to vacate the deposition of Sands China's 

Independent Director and directed the deposition to be held in Hawaii. 

We conclude that our intervention is warranted because the district court 

lacked the authority to order the Independent Director, who is neither a 

party nor a corporate representative under NRCP 30(b)(6), to appear for a 

deposition in Hawaii. See NRCP 30(a)(1) (providing that the attendance of 

a nonparty deponent may be compelled by subpoena under NRCP 45); see 

also NRCP 45(c) (affording certain protections to nonparty deponents). 

Accordingly, we direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of prohibition 

instructing the district court to vacate its June 19, 2015, order in which it 

directed Sands China's Independent Director to appear for a deposition in 

Hawaii. 8 

Docket No. 68309 

Sands China, Las Vegas Sands Corporation, and Sheldon 

Adelson challenge the district court's June 12, 2015, order in which it 

declined to vacate an October 2015 trial date. The parties agree that this 

challenge is moot in light of this court's July 1, 2015, order in which it 

vacated the trial date pending resolution of this writ petition. 

7We vacate the stay imposed by our April 2, 2015, order in Docket 

No. 67576. 

8We vacate the stay imposed by our June 23 and July 1, 2015, 

orders. 

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Accordingly, we decline to further entertain this writ petition, other than 

to note that the stay imposed by this court's August 26, 2011, order served 

to toll NRCP 41(e)'s five-year time frame because that stay prevented the 

parties from bringing the action to trial while the stay was in place. 9 

Boren v. City of N. Las Vegas, 98 Nev. 5, 6, 638 P.2d 404, 404-05 (1982). 

Thus, the writ petition in Docket No. 68309 is denied. 

Request for reassignment 

Sands China requests that this matter be reassigned to a 

different district court judge on the ground that the presiding district 

court judge harbors a bias against Sands China, Las Vegas Sands 

Corporation, and Sheldon Adelson. Because the district court's rulings 

and the district court's comment that Sands China has identified do not 

suggest bias, we deny the request. See Millen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 1254-55, 148 P.3d 694, 701 (2006) 

("[D]isqualification for personal bias requires an extreme showing of bias 

that would permit manipulation of the court and significantly impede the 

judicial process and the administration of justice." (quotation and 

alteration omitted)). In any event, Sands China's request is procedurally 

improper because it did not submit in district court an affidavit and a 

certificate of counsel under NRS 1.235 or file a motion pursuant to NCJC 

Canon 2, Rule 2.11. See Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 121 Nev. 251, 259-60, 112 P.3d 1063, 1068-69 (2005) (noting that "if 

9It is unclear whether the district court entered its own stay order, 

as directed by this court in our August 2011 order, or if the district court 

and the parties simply treated our August 2011 order as the stay order. 

Regardless, we clarify that any tolling of NRCP 41(e)'s five-year time 

frame ended on May 28, 2015, the date when the district court entered its 

personal jurisdiction decision. 

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, C.J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Saitta 

, D.J. 

new grounds for a judge's disqualification are discovered after the time 

limits in NRS 1.235(1) have passed, then a party may file a motion to 

disqualify based on [current Rule 2.11] as soon as possible after becoming 

aware of the new information"); cf. A Minor v. State, 86 Nev. 691, 694, 476 

P.2d 11, 13 (1970) (explaining in the context of an appeal that when a 

litigant fails to avail itself of the relief set forth under what is now NRS 

1.235, the litigant has waived any right to seek disqualification). 

It is so ORDERED. 

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge 

Alan M. Dershowitz 

Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP 

Holland & Hart LLP/Las Vegas 

Morris Law Group 

Pisanelli Bice, PLLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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J. 

CHERRY, J., and GIBBONS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

We concur with the majority on all issues except for monetary 

sanctions. While we agree with the majority that the discovery sanctions 

the district court ordered payable to the Sedona Conference exceeded its 

jurisdiction, we would strike these sanctions and not order them to be 

reallocated. Further, we would defer the imposition of monetary sanctions 

until the conclusion of trial. In our view the better procedure would be to 

award monetary sanctions, if any, to the opposing party to offset costs and 

attorney fees. 

Gibbons 

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