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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

BILLIE JO DEBOER,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED April 28, 2016

v No. 329765 Kent Circuit Court CHARLES STRICKLAND a/k/a CHASE STRICKLAND, LC No. 10-012449-DC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: S AAD , P.J., and B ORRELLO and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant appeals by right an Oc tober 6, 2015, circuit court o rder denying his motion for parenting time with his minor c hild AS (d/o/b 8/30/2007). For the reasons set forth in more detail below, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand fo r further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant is the father of AS, who was born on August 30, 2007 . The biological mother is plaintiff Billie Jo DeBoer. Plaintiff and defendant lived t ogether for approximately four years from 2006 to 2010, but did not marry. Plaintiff and defendant had a contentious relationship and it appears that there was a physical altercation between the pa rties on the night of AS’ birth, which prompted involvement of Ch ild Protective Services (CPS).

At some point, the circuit court assumed jurisdiction over AS and the child was placed in foster care for a time. AS was eventually reunited with plaint iff in August 2010 after plaintiff and defendant separated. On December 6, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint for custody. At that time, defendant exercised parenti ng time with AS for about two hours per week.

On January 21, 2011, the circuit court entered a temporary ord er awarding plaintiff physical and legal custody of AS. The court awarded defendant unsupervised weekly parenting time on Saturdays from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. The court also ordered defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and indica ted that it would consider “jo int legal custody and expanded parenting time” pending submission of the evaluation to the cou rt. In addition, on April 27, 2011, the court granted plaintiff a personal protection order ( PPO) against defendant.-2- On May 29, 2011, defendant was scheduled to have unsupervised parenting time with AS, however, defendant did not return AS to plaintiff at the ap pointed time, instead keeping her overnight. Plaintiff called the police who appeared at defenda nt’s residence the next day to retrieve AS. Thereafter, plain tiff moved to suspend parenting time. The circuit court entered an ex-parte order suspending pare nting time on May 31, 2011. Foll owing a hearing, on June 19, 2011, the circuit court entered an o rder reducing defendant’s p arenting time to one hour per week of supervised visitation at Journ ies, Inc., a social service ag ency. Initially, defendant refused to participate in supervised parenting time because he considered it to be “degrading.” Ultimately, however, defendant participated i n six supervised parenting tim e visits at Journies.

On October 20, 2011, defendant moved to modify parenting time. Thereafter, the FOC prepared a report, recommendation and proposed order. The repo rt chronicled the multiple instances of domestic violence that led to CPS involvement and indicated that plaintiff also had 29 prior involvements with CPS. However, the report also indic ated that defendant completed a domestic violence program, work crew, and satisfied all of his financial obligations to the court. The FOC indicated that defendant “continues to have issues with his temper,” and the FOC had continuing concerns. The FOC summarized as follows:

[T]he information obtained does not clearly support that [defen dant’s] efforts to obtain parenting time with his da ughter are solely, or even pri marily, motivated by his desire to maintain a relationship with her; if it was, h e would be seeing his daughter no matter what kind of restrictions were in place. Ra ther, it would appear that he is much more inte rested in righti ng the perceive d wrongs within the “system(s);” which includes the Foster Care System, the Secreta ry of State, and the Judicial System. I am not saying he doesn’t have the right to address and/or seek changes to these systems, he does; just not at the expense of seeing their daughter. Finally, it does not appear that [defendant] has a h istory of maintaining a stable home environment in whi ch to exercise parenting time.

The FOC recommended that defendant’s supervised parenting time remain unchanged and that plaintiff mother retain fu ll legal custody of AS.

On December 28, 2011, defendant objected to the FOC’s report. Defendant’s motion was referred to an FOC referee; in the meantime, on January 5, 2011 , the trial court entered an order indicating that it would adopt the FOC’s recommendations regard ing parenting time. The court indicated that it would reexamine parenting time after defendan t completed the supervised parenting time at Journies. 1

Thereafter, on February 29, 2012, the trial court reversed its elf and entered an order vacating its January 5, 2012 order, finding that defendant rais ed valid objections to the FOC’s report and recommendation. The court remanded the matter back to an FOC referee for a

1 This Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal the November 23, 2011 order. DeBoer v Strickland I , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 3 , 2012, (Docket No. 307380).-3- hearing on defendant’s objections. Following the hearing, the FOC again recommended that the court deny defendant’s request f or unsupervised visitation and for joint legal custody of AS.

On April 20, 2012, the circuit court entered an order adopting the FOC’s recommendations. Defendant objected and on June 12, 2012, the circuit court denied defendant’s objection, explaining i n relevant part as follows:

The Court recognizes the defendant’s desire to see his child ou tside of supervised visits. However, the Court is mindful of the episode on May 29 , 2011 in which Grand Rapids police physically r etrieved the minor child from t he defendant’s home. Supervised parenting time was offered since that inciden t. The defendant reported that in June 2011 he m oved from the Grand Rapids area to Shelbyville, Michigan. He subsequently returned to Grand Rapids in October 2011. The defendant stated he began to utilize supervised parenting time beginning in February 2012. Since April 9, 2012, the defendant reports he h as appeared at Journies five times. The Court mu st see consistency in supervi sed visitation before it will move on to unsupervised parenting time.

The defendant shall provide documentation from Journies in rega rd to the supervised visits. When the Court is satisfied that he has act ed appropriately during supervised parenting time, the Court will consider expan ding his parenting time. . . .

Following the June 12, 2012 order, defendant filed multiple ad ditional motions concerning parenting time. The c ircuit court denied defendant’ s motions, indicating that the June 12, 2012 order clearly set forth the steps defendant neede d to take before the court would consider unsupervised parenting time.

In an August 31, 2012, order, the trial court transferred supe rvised parenting time to the YWCA Safe Connections program and a September 12, 2012, order i ndicated that the transfer was necessitated because defendant refused to accommodate Journ ies’ schedule. However, a report completed by Journies’ do es not support that finding. I nstead, the Journies report summarized six parenting time visits that were paid for through an “Access and Visitation Grant.” For the most part, the report reflected positively on defendant’s progress with AS. Journies indicated that the vis its ended after d efendant reques ted evening visits a nd after Journies was unable to contact plaintiff to arrange Tuesday or Friday ev ening visits because plaintiff disconnected her phone. The re port concluded by stating, “Jour nies is happy to provide services to this family if the party should agree to any other times whe n the room and a supervisor is available.”

On February 8, 2012, defendant once again moved for unsupervis ed parenting time. Defendant attached a letter from the YWCA Safe Connections prog ram that indicated defendant had completed 12 of 16 supervised parenting time sessions. How ever, the letter indicated as follows:

The strengths identified within this category are: minor issues in adhering to the parenting time schedule have not l ed to significant problems, p articipant generally-4- adheres to expectations of timeliness in attendance. Risk fact ors in this category are identified as: an inability to adhere to a program rules ha s led to corrective actions during sessions.

* * *

Staff has had to intervene numerous times during parenting time . On 10/12/12, Mr. Strickland questioned the chi ld extensively about warts tha t were on her hand. Mr. Strickland also began to take pictures of the warts and sta ted to the child that her mother was “supposed to take you to the doctor.” Staff ask ed him to change the subject and focus on the time that he has with [AS]. On 11 /16/12, the monitor intervened when Mr. Strickland be gan to video record his intera ctions with [AS]. Mr. Strickland ignored the monitor’s request and continued with the recording. He then took a picture of the monitor and stated that he was on ly taking pictures of [AS]. Video recording is not allowed in Safe Connections an d Mr. Strickland was informed of this policy dur ing his intake assessment.

* * *

Mr. Strickland does not accept redirection positively from moni tors and discusses how his constitutional rights are being violated. On 12/21/12, Mr. Strickland brought a needle and peroxide to “clean” [AS’] ear. When staff asked him to not use the needle, he proceeded to use it on the other ear. The m onitor then told him for a second time to put the needle away. Mr. Strickland respo nded by yelling at the monitor in front of [AS] . . . He also refused to get [AS] ready to leave when his parenting time was over . . . After [AS] was returned to he r mother, Mr. Strickland became agitated and screamed at staff. He got close to the monitor’s face and yelled: “She has an infection! How do you not understand?” He was dismissive and condescending towards the monitor . . . .

The report did indicate positives, including that AS “particip ates positively in parenting time sessions,” but noted that defendant “exhibits a marginal s ense of empathy towards the child.” The report stated that AS “informed her father that sh e wanted to have contact with him but that she was also afraid of him.” The report also stated t hat defendant parked in the wrong parking location, which was a violation of the rules. Despite identifying these weaknesses, the YWCA did not discharge defendant “unsuccessfully,” as the circu it court concluded, but rather stated that “Safe Connections is fully able to continue to offe r supervised parenting time to this family.”

In his motion for unsupervised parenting time, defendant argue d that the report “is garbage and slanderous!” Defenda nt stated that the YWCA would not include any “good stuff” about him and was “setting me and my child up to fail.” The ci rcuit court deni ed defendant’s motion on February 15, 2013.

On April 7, 2015, defendant again moved for unsupervised paren ting time. The circuit court held a hearing on April 24, 2015, where only defendant wa s present. At the hearing, the circuit court summarized the history of the case and indicated that defendant was required to-5- complete supervised parenting time before he was eligible for u nsupervised parenting time. The court indicated that Journies ter minated supervised parenting t ime because “among other things, [defendant] was unwilling to acc ommodate Journies’ scheduled parenting time for him.” The court indicated that defendant w as given a second chance at sup ervised parenting time at the YWCA, “[a]nd then, it doesn’t work out at the Y either . . . An d so you were given an opportunity to establish appropriate parenting time at a second supervising agency and they also terminated unsuccessfully.” The court then explained as follow s:
So that’s sort of the history and now you come back and it cer tainly sounds to me after reading this like you may have done some goo d things since the last time I saw you . . . But wh at you still ha ven’t done i s to complete any kind of supervised parenting time to show me that I should be thinki ng about expanding it to unsupervised parenting time. What has changed since we’ve been through this a million times . . . about supervised parenting t ime at an agency? The only thing so far in my view that’s happened is, you got to ssed out of both programs that we tried. So convince me.

The trial court also noted that defendant previously wrote lett ers to state senators indicating that if he did not get what he wanted, “that you might just have to pull a Gabrielle Giffords.” Defendant disputed the court’s assertion.

Defendant acknowledged that his unsupervised parenting time wa s suspended when he kept AS beyond his allotted time on Memorial Day weekend 2011 n ecessitating police involvement. Defendant admitted “[t]hat was my mistake . . . I should have communicated that with the - - - with the mother.” However, defendant argued tha t, the previous month, AS stayed overnight, presumably beyond his parenting time, and “Nobody ca red.” Defendant argued that he did not have any felony convictions, he did not have any rec ent misdemeanors or DUIs, and he recently completed his college degree. Defendant stated tha t he was “being punished,” while plaintiff had many problems incl uding drug and alcohol problems and issues with CPS, yet he was being denied his right to have a relationship with his chil d.

Defendant also disagreed that he was terminated from the YWCA program, stating “[n]o, I didn’t get bounced because . . . what happened was when . . . when that $1,000 grant ran out, and I had to pay $50.00 . . . and if you read that the report . . . you will see that they even said, we can continue to provide serv ice for this family.” Defendant also took issue with the other substantive parts of the report that indicated his weaknesses o r violations of the rules and his obstinate behavior. Defendant stated,

I’m the legal father. You know, I love my daughter, I have a great relationship with her. I don’t have any felonies at all. But [plaintiff] has four daughters from four different men. The other three men all hav e felonies. They get to see the child. She has a felony now, she gets to do wha tever she wants to do and she has - - she gets full reign. I want to see my daugh ter. And I - - and I requested for four to six hours once a week to start with unsup ervised and then just let it go from t here. I want to take my daughter to dinne r.

The court denied defendant’s motion, explaining as follows:-6- Trial Court . And with all due respect I’m going to deny your motion.

* * *

Defendant . So then set it up. Then what do you want me to - - what do you want me do- -

Trial Court . Sir - -

Defendant . - - supervised parenting tim e? I went everywhere- -

Trial Court . We’ve given you two agencies and both of them said that you screwed it up.

Defendant . Okay.

Trial Court . Go and find another agency- -

Defendant . There is no agency - -

Trial Court . - - that might be w illing to - -- well

Defendant . - - there is no more agency . . .

Trial Court . Not my problem. Make a propos al to me for some other kind of supervised who can turn in reports.

Defendant . Okay, then - - then I ’ll - - then- -

Trial Court . I’m denying your motion. Thank you.

Defendant . Then - - okay, well then what do you want me to do because I want to see my daughter. Do you want it supervised? Then who - - who do you want it [sic] supervise it?

* * *

Trial Court. I have ruled that the Court ha s already made it clear to you what you need to do to have the Court’s . . . extend your paren ting time.

Defendant . There is no place to - - there is no place to have somebody to babysit me and my daughter.

Trial Court . And you have utterly failed. The motion is denied. Thank
you.
Defendant . So how - - how am I supposed to see my daughter? It’s the same as last time- --7- Trial Court . Go to the Court of App eals, Mr. Strickland.

On May 7, 2015, defendant filed a claim of appeal in this Cour t, but this Court dismissed defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the circuit court’s order was not a “final order” for purposes of MCR 7.203( A)(1). This Court directed de fendant to file a delayed application for leave to appeal. DeBoer v Strickland II , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 20, 2015 (Docket No. 327269).

Thereafter, on June 11, 2015, defe ndant filed a delayed applic ation for leave to appeal the trial court’s April 24, 2015 orde r. This Court denied the appl ication. De Boer v Strickland III
, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 30 , 2015 (Docket No. 327867), lv den DeBoer v Strickland , ___ Mich ___; 872 NW2d 482 (2015).

Meanwhile, on September 18, 2015, defendant moved for joint le gal custody and courtordered parenting time. The critical thrust of defendant’s arg ument was that he had not been able to see his child since 2012 because the circuit court refu sed to permit unsupervised parenting time and because the court would not assist defendantin arranging supervised parenting time. Defendant also reasserted numerous grievances that he had with the legal system and the perceived injustices that had been levied against him.

The case was referred to a FOC referee for a hearing 2 after which the referee recommended denying defendant’s motion. After reviewing a vide o recording of the referee hearing, the circuit court adopted the referee’s recommendationand denied defendant’s motion on September 25, 2015. Defendant objected to the referee’s rec ommendation, and the trial court denied the objection in an O ctober 6, 2015, opinion and order, explaining as follows:

There is a lengthy history in this case. As a summary, in Janu ary 2011, the defendant was granted unsupervised parenting time, and was orde red to undergo a psychological evaluation. The e valuation did not diagnose a me ntal illness, but did find that defendant was abrasive, narcissistic, and resiste d answering questions about substance abuse. On May 29, 2011, upon failing to return the child at the end of his parenting time, the Grand Rapids police had to intervene and the defendant ref used to open the door.

Over the next several years, the defendant was discharged unsuc cessfully from both of the Kent County supervised parenting time agencies. De spite the Court suggesting to the defendant tha t he should propose a supervised parenting time alternative, he instead periodi cally moves for parenting time w ithout offering anything new.

The same is true here. Before the Referee, and in his written objection, his position is that the undersigned is ignorant, evil, and biased. While he is entitled to his opinion, he simply repeat s himself and fails to present any plan that would

2 The hearing transcript is not i ncluded in the lower court reco rd.-8- allow the Court to give him another chance at successfully comp leting supervised parenting time so that the C ourt can move to an expansion of pa renting time.

Defendant appeals the Oc tober 6, 2015, order by right.

II. ANALYSIS

“Orders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal u nless the trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a major is sue.” Pickering v Pickering , 268 Mich App 1, 5; 706 NW2d 835 (2005). “Under the great weight of the evidence standard, this Court should not substitute its j udgment on questions of fact u nless the facts cl early preponderate in the opposite direction.” Shade v Wright , 291 Mich App 17, 21; 805 NW2d 1 (2010). In child custody cases, “[a]n abuse of dis cretion exists when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a pervers ity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” Berger v Berger , 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Clear legal error occurs “when the trial court errs in its choice, interpretation, or application of the existing law.” Shulick v Richards , 273 Mich App 320, 323; 729 NW2d 533 (2006).

At the outset we note that we ha ve jurisdiction to address def endant’s appeal of right. Pursuant to MCR 7.203(A), this Court has jurisdiction over an a ppeal of right from a “final judgment” or “final order” of the circuit court. MCR 7.202(6) defines a “final judgment” or a “final order” in relevant part t o include “a post-judgment orde r affecting the custody of a minor.” The term “‘[c]hild-custody dete rmination’ means a judgment, dec ree, or other court order providing for legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with respect to a child. Childcustody determination includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order . . . .’” Shade , 291 Mich App at 22, quoting MCL 722.1102(c) (emphasis added i n Shade ). Here, the circuit court’s October 6, 2015, order affected the custody of AS in that it denied defendant the right to parenting time. Therefor e, it was a “final order” for purposes of MCR 7.202(6).

On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in reading th e psychiatric evaluation, imposed cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, erred in reading the reports from Journies and the YWCA, and violated defendant’ s due process rights when it failed to hold a fitness hearing and where there was no evidenc e that defendant would harm AS. The underlying theme to all of these arguments is that the circ uit court erred in denying defendant parenting time and that the denial violated the Child Custody Act and defendant’s constitutional rights. Therefore, we proceed with an analysis of the law governing requests to modify parenting time.

“The term ‘[c]hild-custody dete rmination’ means a judgment, de cree, or other court order providing for legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with respect to a child. Childcustody determination includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. . . .” Shade , 291 Mich App at 22, quoting MCL 722.1102(c). A court may notmodify a parenting time order without conducting a threshold inquiry to determine if there has been a “change of circumstances” or “proper cause shown.” Terry v Affum (On Remand ), 237 Mich App 522, 534- 535; 603 NW2d 788 (1999).-9- “The framework for evaluating ‘proper cause’ or ‘change of cir cumstances’ when a party requests to modify a parenting time order depends on whether an established custodial environment is affected and the type of modification requested. ” 1 Kelly, Curtis & Roane, Michigan Family Law (7th ed.) (ICLE, 2011), § 12.33, p. 679. “ If a change in parenting time results in a change in the established custodial environment, t hen the . . . framework [set forth in Vodvarka v Grasmeyer , 259 Mich App 499; 675 NW2d 847 (2003)] is appropriate.” Shade , 291 Mich App at 27. However, if the proposed modification does not change the established custodial environment, but merely alters the duration or freque ncy of parenting time, then the framework set forth in Shade , 291 Mich App at 28-30 governs and the court should apply “a more expansive definition of ‘pr oper cause’ or ‘change in circu mstances’ . . . for determinations regarding parenting time.” Id . at 28. In particular, the Shade framework considers “the type of normal life changes that occur during a child’s life and that d o not warrant a change in the child’s custodial environment.” Id . at 29.

In the event that a court determines that changed circumstance s or proper cause warrants modification of a parenting time order, the focus of any new pa renting time order must always be “to foster a strong relationship between the child and the chil d’s parents.” Shade , 291 Mich App at 29. Therefore,

Parenting time shall be granted in accordance with the best int erests of the child. It is presumed to be in the best intere sts of a child for the child to have a strong relationship with both of his or her parents . Except as otherwise provided in this section, parenting time shall be granted to a pa rent in a frequency, duration, and type reasonably calculated to promote a strong relationship between the child and the parent granted parenting time . [MCL 722.27a(1) (emphasis added).]

To ensure that parenting time orders foster a strong parent-ch ild relationship, our Legislature has provided the fo llowing list of non-exhaustive f actors that a courtshould consider when entering or modifying a parenting time order:

(a) The existence of any special circumstances or needs of the child.

(b) Whether the child is a nursing child less than 6 months of age, or less than 1 year of age if the child recei ves substantial nutrition through nursing.

(c) The reasonable likelihood of a buse or neglect of the child during parenting time.

(d) The reasonable likelihood of a buse of a parent resulting fr om the exercise of parenting time.

(e) The inconvenience to, and burdensome impact or effect on, t he child of traveling for purposes of parenting time.

(f) Whether a parent can reasonab ly be expected to exercise par enting time in accordance with the court order.

(g) Whether a parent has frequen tly failed to exercise reasonab le parenting time.-10- (h) The threatened or actual dete ntion of the child with the in tent to retain or conceal the child from the other parent or from a third person who has legal custody. A custodial parent’s temporary residence with the chil d in a domestic violence shelter shall not be cons trued as evidence of the cust odial parent’s intent to retain or conceal the child from the other parent.

(i) Any other relevant factors. [MCL 722.27a(6).]

Turning to the case at hand, the circuit court did not articul ate how the October 6, 2015, order is in AS’ best interests or how the order facilitates a s trong relationship between AS and defendant. 3 While the record may have supported denying defendant unsuper vised parenting time, by rejecting defendant’s request for assistance in reinit iating supervised parenting time, neither defendant nor AS have the opportunity to have a parent- child relationship. Instead, the court denied defendant parenting time and the denial was based on the circuit court’s erroneous factual finding that defendant w as “discharged unsuccessfully,” from Journies and the YWCA. As discussed above, Journies and the YWCA both completed report s that, while they support that defendant certainly needed to make improvement, they do no t support that defendant was “discharged unsuccessfully.” Journies’ report indicated that d efendant made positive progress with AS and the sessions ended when Journies could not make con tact with plaintiff to arrange evening sessions. Journies indicated that it could continue to provide services to defendant and AS. Similarly, with respect to the YWCA report, although the r eport indicated that defendant certainly had challenges to overcome and that he needed to impr ove his attitude toward YWCA staff, the YWCA indicated that it could continue to provide ser vices to defendant and AS.

In short, the circuit court’s or der did not comply with MCL 72 2.27a in that the circuit court did not articulate how the present parenting time arrange ment—i.e. that defendant and AS do not have any parenting time t ogether—is in AS’ best interest s or how this arrangement “foster[s] a strong relationship” between AS and defendant. Shade , 291 Mich App at 29. Furthermore, the circuit court di d not examine or apply any of the best interest factors set forth in MCL 722.27a(6) in determining whether to award any parenting ti me. On remand, the circuit court should consider the relevan t best interest factors above and articulate a parenting time

3 We note that, while a court ma y place reasonable restrictions on a parenting time order, MCL 722.27a(8), here, the court instructed defendant to locate an a gency to supervise parenting time when defendant clearly needed assistance in this regard. Altho ugh it appeared at the last motion hearing that defendant would abide by the court’s instructions regarding supervised parenting time, defendant indicated that he needed assistance locating an agency and arranging the parenting-time visits. To the ex tent that the court’s assistan ce in locating an agency would be in AS’ best interests and would serve to promote a healthy parent- child relationship, then the court should not hesitate to utilize the resources it has at hand inc luding the FOC to facilitate reunification and supervised parenting time.-11- arrangement that is in AS’ best interests with the primary focu s being facilitation of a strong bond between defendant and AS. 4

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with t his opinion. No costs awarded. MCR 7.219(A). We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Michael F. Gadola

4 Given our conclusion that the circuit court’s order did not co mply with the CCA, we need not address defendant’s arguments tha t the circuit court’s order vi olated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, defendant failed to develop th ese arguments or support them with adequate legal authority. See e.g. VanderWerp v Plainfield Charter Twp , 278 Mich App 624, 633; 752 NW2d 479 (2008) (“appellants may not merely annou nce their position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for thei r claims; nor may they give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting auth ority.”) Furthermore, a circuit court has the authority to place reasona ble restrictions on parenting time in the event that the court finds that such restrictions are in the child’s be st interests. See MCL 722.27a(8).