UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4224

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JOEL CHRISTOPHER SIMCOX,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Chief District Judge. (1:03-cr-00248-JAB-1)

Submitted: July 7, 2011 Decided: August 1, 2011

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eugene E. Lester, III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, PA, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Joel Christopher Simcox was sentenced to fifteen 

months’ imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised 

release. Simcox’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating his opinion that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court properly ran Simcox’s sentence consecutive to an 

undischarged state sentence. Simcox filed a pro se supplemental 

brief raising essentially the same claim. The Government has 

declined to file a responsive brief. We affirm.

In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential 

appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of 

discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines 

sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 

(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439 (4th Cir. 2006)). We will affirm a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly 

unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th 

Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a 

determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 438. Only if the sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable does the inquiry proceed to the 
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second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.

A supervised release revocation sentence is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 

advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the 

Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised 

release revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 

F.3d at 438-40. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court stated a proper basis for concluding the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the 

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “A court need not 

be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence 

as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it 

still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence 

imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Simcox argues that the district court erred in 

imposing his sentence consecutive to his undischarged term of 

state imprisonment because it constitutes double counting under 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 5G1.3(b) (2009). We 

conclude that § 5G1.3(b) is inapplicable here. Application Note 

3(C) provides that “[s]ubsection (c) applies in cases in which 

the defendant was on federal or state probation, parole, or 

supervised release at the time of the instant offense and has 
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had such probation, parole, or supervised release revoked.” 

USSG § 5G1.3 cmt. n.3(c). Subsection (c) permitted the district 

court to impose Simcox’s federal sentence to run consecutively 

to his state sentence. See USSG § 5G1.3(c).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. This 

court requires that counsel inform Simcox, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Simcox requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Simcox.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED