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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

September 2016 Term FILED _______________ November 2, 2016 

No. 15-0971 released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

_______________ SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

PATRICIA S. REED, 

Commissioner, Division of Motor Vehicles, 

Petitioner 

v. 

PAMELA HAYNES, 

Respondent 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
 

The Honorable Tod. J. Kaufman, Judge
 

Civil Action No. 14-AA-96
 

REVERSED 

Submitted: October 25, 2016 

Filed: November 2, 2016 

Patrick Morrisey William B. Richardson, Jr., Esq. 

Attorney General Richardson, Richardson, and Campbell 

Elaine L. Skorich Parkersburg, West Virginia 

Assistant Attorney General Counsel for the Respondent 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Counsel for the Petitioner 

CHIEF JUSTICE KETCHUM delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 

1. “The standard of appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting 

relief through the extraordinary writ of prohibition is de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, Martin 

v. West Virginia Div. of Labor Contractor Licensing Bd., 199 W.Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 

(1997). 

2. “When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent 

is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty 

of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syllabus Point 5, State v. General 

Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chief Justice Ketchum: 

Petitioner Patricia S. Reed, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of 

Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), appeals the August 27, 2015, order of the Circuit Court of 

Kanawha County. The circuit court’s order upheld the revocation of Respondent Pamela 

Haynes’ (“Ms. Haynes”) driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol 

(“DUI”), but ruled that a previous DUI offense could not be used to enhance her penalty. 

The sole issue in this appeal is whether Ms. Haynes’ previous DUI offense may be used 

to enhance the penalty for her current DUI offense. 

After review, we find that the circuit court erred by granting a writ of 

prohibition to prevent the DMV from enhancing Ms. Haynes’ DUI penalty. We therefore 

reverse the circuit court’s order granting the writ of prohibition. 

I.
 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 

The relevant facts in this matter concern three separate DUI offenses. The 

first occurred in West Virginia in 2003, the second in Ohio in 2006, and the third in West 

Virginia in 2012. 

A. 2003 DUI 

On September 23, 2003, Ms. Haynes was arrested for DUI in Parkersburg, 

West Virginia. Her blood alcohol content was .236%. Ms. Haynes had an Ohio driver’s 

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license at the time of this arrest which she gave to the arresting officer. However, Ms. 

Haynes told the arresting officer that her address was “Lot 8 Coral Camp Ground, 

Parkersburg, West Virginia.” 

On September 30, 2003, the West Virginia DMV sent Ms. Haynes an 

“Order of Revocation” for DUI. The DMV sent this order to the address it had on file for 

Ms. Haynes: “1019 32nd Street, Parkersburg, West Virginia.” 

Ms. Haynes claims that she was an Ohio resident in 2003. Ms. Haynes 

asserts that she surrendered her West Virginia driver’s license to the Ohio Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles in 1999 in order to obtain her Ohio license. However, the West Virginia 

DMV states that it did not receive notification from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 

or from Ms. Haynes, that she had moved to Ohio and obtained an Ohio driver’s license. 

Hence, in 2003 the West Virginia DMV’s records showed that Ms. Haynes had a valid 

West Virginia’s driver’s license and that her address was “1019 32nd Street, Parkersburg, 

West Virginia.” 

The order of revocation the DMV sent to Ms. Haynes at “1019 32nd Street, 

Parkersburg, West Virginia” was returned to the DMV with the notation “FOE” 

(forwarding order expired). The order of revocation subsequently became final by 

default. 

B. 2006 DUI 

Ms. Haynes was arrested for DUI in Ohio in 2006. The appendix-record 

includes a document sent from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles to Ms. Haynes that 

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provides, “You have no driving privileges. . . . Suspended Apr 17 2006 UNTIL Oct 10 

2006.” Before the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles would reinstate Ms. Haynes’ Ohio 

driver’s license, it required her to offer proof that her driving privileges were no longer 

revoked based on her 2003 DUI in West Virginia. In order to remove the 2003 West 

Virginia revocation from her record, Ms. Haynes faxed the West Virginia DMV a 

document showing that she had completed a DUI safety and treatment course. Ms. 

Haynes also made a $45.00 payment to the West Virginia DMV, which was the amount 

she owed for the 2003 DUI revocation. After paying $45.00 and offering proof that she 

had completed the safety and training course, the West Virginia DMV sent Ms. Haynes a 

letter on October 11, 2006, providing, “This is to notify you officially that your driving 

privilege has been reinstated[.]” 

C. 2012 DUI 

On May 3, 2012, Ms. Haynes was arrested for DUI at a sobriety checkpoint 

in Kanawha County, West Virginia. Her blood alcohol content was .108%. At the time 

of the 2012 arrest, Ms. Haynes was a West Virginia resident with a West Virginia 

driver’s license. On May 31, 2012, the DMV sent Ms. Haynes an order of revocation 

providing that her driving privileges were revoked and that her penalty would be 

enhanced based on her 2003 license revocation. The DMV did not use Ms. Haynes’ 2006 

Ohio DUI conviction to enhance the penalty for her 2012 DUI. 

Ms. Haynes objected to the DMV’s 2012 order of revocation and requested 

an administrative hearing. The basis for Ms. Haynes’ objection to the DMV’s order of 

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revocation was as follows: “checkpoint compliance, not under the influence, lack of 

probable cause, chemical test procedure, challenge the FST [field sobriety test].” The 

Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) held a hearing on Ms. Haynes’ 2012 DUI 

offense on October 24, 2012. Following the administrative hearing, the OAH affirmed 

the revocation of Ms. Haynes’ driver’s license by order entered on September 5, 2014. 

Ms. Haynes filed a “Petition for Review and Writ of Prohibition” in the 

Circuit Court of Kanawha County in September 2014, challenging the OAH’s order. In 

this petition, Ms. Haynes stated that the OAH erred by “ignoring” her objection to the 

DMV’s imposition of an enhanced penalty based on the 2003 DUI. Ms. Haynes filed 

another “Writ of Prohibition” in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County in March 2015. 

Ms. Haynes again argued that the OAH erred by “ignoring” her objection to the DMV’s 

imposition of an enhanced penalty based on the 2003 DUI. It is unclear why Ms. Haynes 

filed two separate actions with the circuit court. 

The circuit court consolidated the two writs of prohibition filed by Ms. 

Haynes and, after holding a hearing, issued an August 27, 2015 order: “Granting the Writ 

of Prohibition Excluding the Previous Offense [2003 DUI], Affirming the Decision 

Below, and Remanding Back for the Purpose of Reconsidering the Administrative 

Penalty.” The circuit court’s order includes the following discussion regarding the 

enhanced penalty based on Ms. Haynes’ 2003 DUI: 

Petitioner [Ms. Haynes] has alleged that she was 

denied her due process rights in an earlier DUI revocation as 

notice was mailed to an address from which she had moved. 

Significantly, all records from that prior arrest document 

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show that she had an Ohio driver’s license at the time of that 

arrest. Petitioner was the subject of a prior administrative 

license revocation for a DUI that allegedly occurred in 2003; 

however, the notice of that proposed revocation was not sent 

to the proper address. Said notice was sent [sic] the 

Petitioner’s former West Virginia address, from which she 

had moved three years prior. Although Respondent [DMV] 

claims that they were under no obligation to send notification 

to the known current address, which petitioner provided at the 

time of the arrest and is evidenced in the investigating 

officer’s report, this rationale controverts justice. . . . 

[T]he Court hereby GRANTS Petitioner’s Writ of 

Prohibition to exclude the previous action from enhancing the 

current penalty; . . . and REMANDS the matter for the 

purposes of reconsidering the administrative penalty based on 

excluding the previous DUI from consideration. 

The circuit court’s order does not cite any authority in support of its ruling 

granting Ms. Haynes’ writ of prohibition. The only rationale provided for its ruling is 

that the DMV’s enhanced penalty based on the 2003 DUI “controverts justice.” After the 

circuit court entered its order, the DMV filed the present appeal with this Court, arguing 

that the circuit court erred by granting Ms. Haynes’ writ of prohibition. 

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The present appeal involves a challenge to the circuit court’s order granting 

extraordinary relief by way of a writ of prohibition. In Syllabus Point 1 of Martin v. West 

Virginia Division of Labor Contractor Licensing Board, 199 W.Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 

(1997), this Court held “[t]he standard of appellate review of a circuit court’s order 

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granting relief through the extraordinary writ of prohibition is de novo.” Further, this 

appeal concerns an administrative order revoking Ms. Haynes’ driver’s license. Our law 

concerning judicial review of an administrative order addressing the revocation of a 

driver’s license was set forth in State ex rel. Commissioner West Virginia Division of 

Motor Vehicles v. Swope, 230 W.Va. 750, 754, 742 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2013): 

[T]he provisions of chapter 17C, articles 5A and 5C, of 

the West Virginia Code set forth the administrative 

framework for license revocation for driving a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of alcohol. Nevertheless, judicial 

review of an administrative order or decision concerning 

revocation is obtained in circuit court, and subsequently in 

this Court, under the Contested Cases provision of the State 

Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va. Code, 29A-5-1 [1964], 

et seq. See Miller, Comm’r v. Moredock, 229 W.Va. 66, 726 

S.E.2d 34, 37 (2011) (Judicial review of a revocation order of 

the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles is 

conducted pursuant to the contested cases provision of the 

State Administrative Procedures Act.); syl. pt. 1, Muscatell v. 

Cline, Comm’r, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996) 

(Review by this Court in such cases is similar to the review 

conducted under the Act in circuit court); Dean v. West 

Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 195 W.Va. 70, 71, 

464 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1995) (Judicial review of the revocation 

of a license to operate a motor vehicle is under the State 

Administrative Procedures Act.). 

III. 

ANALYSIS 

The sole issue in this appeal is whether Ms. Haynes’ 2003 revocation for 

DUI may be used to enhance the penalty for her 2012 DUI offense. We again note that 

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the DMV did not use Ms. Haynes’ 2006 Ohio DUI to enhance the penalty for her 2012 

DUI offense. 

In this appeal, the DMV argues that Ms. Haynes did not receive the 2003 

revocation order because she failed to provide the DMV with her updated address. The 

DMV asserts that Ms. Haynes had a statutory duty pursuant to W.Va. Code § 17B-2­

13(a) [1999], to inform the DMV of her new address. Additionally, the DMV argues that 

Ms. Haynes had actual knowledge of the 2003 revocation order in 2006 when the Ohio 

Bureau of Motor Vehicles placed a hold on her driver’s license.1 According to the DMV, 

Ms. Haynes did not challenge the 2003 revocation order when she received actual notice 

of it in 2006; instead, she assented to the 2003 revocation order by paying $45.00 and 

submitting a safety and training course certificate to the West Virginia DMV. 

Conversely, Ms. Haynes argues that the DMV may not enhance the penalty for her 2012 

DUI based on the 2003 revocation order because the 2003 DUI revocation order was sent 

to the wrong address. Thus, Ms. Haynes claims that she “lost the ability to timely contest 

the proposed [2003] revocation.” 

After review, we find that the circuit court erred by granting Ms. Haynes’ 

writ of prohibition to preclude the DMV from enhancing her 2012 DUI penalty based on 

her 2003 DUI revocation. As an initial matter, we note that both parties have largely 

1 This hold was placed on Ms. Haynes’ driver’s license due to her 2003 West 

Virginia DUI. 

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framed the issue as being whether the DMV erred by mailing the 2003 revocation order 

to Ms. Haynes’ former West Virginia address instead of sending it to the address 

contained on her Ohio driver’s license.2 However, we find that the resolution of this 

2 The DMV argues that Ms. Haynes did not receive notice of the 2003 revocation 

order because she did not comply with her statutory duty to inform the DMV of her new 

address. West Virginia Code § 17B-2-13(a) provides: 

Whenever any person after applying for or receiving a 

driver’s license moves from the address named in the 

application or in the license issued to the person, or when the 

name of a licensee is changed by marriage or otherwise, the 

person shall within twenty days thereafter notify the division 

in writing of the old and new addresses or of the former and 

new names and of the number of any license then held by the 

person on the forms prescribed by the division. 

This Court reviewed W.Va. Code § 17B-2-13 in State ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 203 

W.Va. 673, 510 S.E.2d 507 (1998), and held in Syllabus Point 6 that “[p]ursuant to the 

provisions of West Virginia Code § 17B-2-13 (1996), an individual who holds a driver’s 

license issued by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles is required to notify the 

Division in writing concerning a change of address within twenty (20) days after a 

change of residence on the prescribed form.” From a regulatory standpoint, West 

Virginia Code of State Rules § 91-4-9.1 provides similarly as follows: “Change of 

Address.—In accordance with law, all licensees shall provide the Division with a correct 

address within twenty days of moving to a new location.” 

During the 2003 DUI arrest, Ms. Haynes gave the arresting officer her Ohio 

driver’s license that contained an Ohio address. However, she told the officer that her 

address was “Lot 8 Coral Camp Ground” in Parkersburg, West Virginia. Thus, Ms. 

Haynes held herself out to be a West Virginia resident at the time of the 2003 arrest that 

occurred while she was driving a car in West Virginia. Therefore, Ms. Haynes’ argument 

that she was not obligated to comply with W.Va. Code § 17B-2-13(a) and provide the 

DMV with her current West Virginia address (“Lot 8 Coral Camp Ground, Parkersburg, 

West Virginia”) appears to be dubious. However, we need not reach this issue in our 

resolution of this case. We note that this Court has held: “The person who holds a 

(continued . . .) 

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matter only requires a simple, straightforward application of W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) 

[1998], our statute setting forth the statute of limitations for a party contesting an 

administrative order. 

West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4(b) provides that a petition for review of an 

administrative decision must be filed within thirty days after the petitioner receives notice 

of the final order or decision of the agency. It states: 

Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a 

petition, at the election of the petitioner, in either the Circuit 

Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia or in the circuit 

court of the county in which the petitioner or any one of the 

petitioners resides or does business, or with the judge thereof 

in vacation, within thirty days after the date upon which 

such party received notice of the final order or decision of 

the agency. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the 

agency and all other parties of record by registered or 

certified mail. The petition shall state whether the appeal is 

taken on questions of law or questions of fact, or both. No 

appeal bond shall be required to effect any such appeal. 

driver’s license has the responsibility to notify the Department of a change of address and 

the Department has no obligation to seek out those persons who fail to notify the 

Division.” Davis v. W.Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 187 W.Va. 402, 405, 419 S.E.2d 470, 

473 (1992). Accord State ex rel. Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Sanders, 184 W.Va. 55, 59, 

399 S.E.2d 455, 459 (1990) (“the burden is on the licensee to notify the Department of 

Motor Vehicles of a change of address”); State ex rel. Mason v. Roberts, 173 W.Va. 506, 

509, 318 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1984) (“the DMV [Division] has no obligation to track him 

down”). Also, this Court has previously considered and rejected a driver’s claim that 

providing an updated address to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest is sufficient 

to place the DMV on notice that a change of address has occurred. See State ex rel. Miller 

v. Reed, 203 W.Va. at 681, 510 S.E.2d at 515. 

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Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 2(b) [2008] of the West Virginia Rules of 

Procedure for Administrative Appeals states: 

Time for Petition.—No petition shall be filed from a state 

agency decision or final order in a contested case after the 

time period allowed by law. The petition shall be filed in the 

office of the circuit clerk of the circuit court in which venue 

lies by law, within 30 days after the petitioner receives notice 

of the final order or decision from the agency, unless 

otherwise provided by law. 

See also W.Va. Bd. of Med. v. Spillers, 187 W.Va. 257, 259, 418 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1992) 

(“[P]rocedures for appeals of decisions by administrative agencies are governed by the 

State Administrative Procedures Act.”); Johnson v. Comm’r, Dep’t. of Motor Vehicles, 

178 W.Va. 675, 677, 363 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1987) (“That statute is a part of this state’s 

administrative procedures act and generally provides for judicial review of contested 

administrative cases, allowing a court to reverse, vacate, or modify an agency’s decision 

on certain grounds.”). 

This Court discussed W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) in State ex rel. Comm’r W. 

Va. Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Swope, 230 W.Va. at 755, 742 S.E.2d at 443, stating: 

After careful consideration, this Court cannot conclude 

that W. Va. Code, 29A-5-4(b) [1998], means less than what it 

plainly states. A party adversely affected by an administrative 

order or decision in a contested case must file the petition for 

appeal in circuit court “within thirty days after the date upon 

which such party received notice of the final order or decision 

of the agency.” 

West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4(b) provides a clear, unambiguous statement 

of when an appeal of an administrative decision must be filed: “within thirty days after 

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the date upon which such party received notice of the final order or decision of the 

agency.” Id. (emphasis added). In Syllabus Point 5 of State v. General Daniel Morgan 

Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959), this Court held: “When a 

statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not 

be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe 

but to apply the statute.” 

Applying the clear, unambiguous language of W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) to 

the present case, we find that Ms. Haynes had notice of the 2003 revocation order in 2006 

when she sent the West Virginia DMV a $45.00 payment and a safety and treatment 

certificate to have her driving privileges reinstated. Ms. Haynes did not file an 

administrative appeal of the 2003 revocation order upon receiving actual notice of it in 

2006. Instead, she waited until 2012, after the DMV sought to enhance her penalty for 

the 2012 DUI, to challenge the validity of the 2003 revocation order. Ms. Haynes does 

not dispute that she 1) became aware of the 2003 revocation order in 2006, 2) paid the 

West Virginia DMV $45.00 and sent it a safety and treatment certificate in 2006 upon 

learning of the 2003 revocation order, and 3) did not challenge the 2003 revocation order 

until 2012. Thus, her challenge to the 2003 revocation order, raised for the first time in 

connection with her 2012 DUI revocation hearing, is time barred pursuant to the plain 

language of W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b). 

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Because Ms. Haynes did not file a timely appeal of the 2003 revocation 

order, we find that the circuit court’s order granting Ms. Haynes’ writ of prohibition is 

clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 

Finally, we note that the DMV sought to enhance Ms. Haynes’ 2012 DUI 

penalty based only on her 2003 DUI. We find it puzzling that the DMV did not use Ms. 

Haynes’ 2006 Ohio DUI to further enhance the penalty for her 2012 DUI. The DMV’s 

brief to this Court notes this odd occurrence but does not explain why it occurred. The 

brief provides, “Even though the 2012 DUI was Ms. Haynes’ third offense in a ten year 

period, West Virginia treated it as a second offense.” 

License revocation laws are intended to protect the public. This Court 

previously stated, “The purpose of the administrative sanction of license revocation is the 

removal of persons who drive under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicants from 

our highways.” Shell v. Bechtold, 175 W.Va. 792, 796, 338 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1985) 

(citation omitted). In Shell, this Court held that “[a] DUI conviction in another state is 

ground for license revocation.” Id. at 795, 338 S.E.2d at 395 (citations omitted). 

Further, West Virginia is a member of the Driver License Compact, W.Va. 

Code §§ 17B-1A-1 to -2 [1972]. “Under the Driver License Compact, each state is 

required to treat a conviction in a sister state in the same manner as it would an in-state 

conviction.” 7A Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 154 (1997). This premise 

was stressed in Shell wherein the Court stated, “As a member of the interstate Driver 

License Compact and by virtue of Article IV, Code, 17B-1A-1, the DMV is required to 

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treat out-of-state convictions in the same manner as it would in-state convictions.” 175 

W.Va. at 795, 338 S.E.2d at 395-96. Despite our clear body of law on this issue, the 

DMV has not attempted to use Ms. Haynes’ 2006 Ohio DUI to enhance her penalty for 

the 2012 DUI. In the future, we urge the DMV to give substantial thought and 

deliberation to using out-of-state DUI convictions to enhance the penalty for committing 

a DUI in this State. 

IV.
 

CONCLUSION
 

The circuit court erred by granting Ms. Haynes’ writ of prohibition to 

prevent the DMV from enhancing her 2012 DUI penalty based on her 2003 revocation. 

Ms. Haynes failed to timely contest the 2003 revocation order pursuant to W.Va. Code § 

29A-5-4(b). We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order granting the writ of 

prohibition. 

Reversed. 

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