The Court consider ed the f ollowing pa

pers: plaintiff’ s First Amende d Complaint 1 (“ Com pl. ” ); pla int if

f’ s A me nd e d M oti on

fo r L e ave to F ile F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int ; de fe nd ant’ s O pp os iti on

to P la int if

f’ s Mo tio n f

or L e ave to F ile F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int ; pla int if f’ s Re ply in S up po rt

of Am e nd e d M oti on

fo r L e ave to F ile F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int ; defe ndant’s Motion to Dismis s Count Iof Complaint; plainti ff’ s Opposition to Defenda nt’s Mo tio n to Di smi ss C ount I of the Com pla int ; de fe nd ant’ s Re ply B ri e f i n Su

pp or t of Mo tio n to Dismiss C ount Iof Complaint; defenda nt’s Motion to Dism iss Count I I Iof F irst Amended Com pla int ; pl a int if

f’ s O pp os iti on

to D e fe nd ant AARP’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss C ount I I Iof F ir st Am e nd e d Co mpl a int ; and de fe nd ant’ s Re ply

B ri e f i n Su

pp or t of De fe nd ant A ARP’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss C ount I I Iof

F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int
. UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) L I NE VREVEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 08 -10 99 (P L F) ) AMERI CAN ASSOCI ATI ON OF RETI RED ) PER SON S, ) ) De fe nd ant. ) __________________________________________)
OPI NI ON This matter, which stems fr om defe ndant’s ter mination of plaintiff L ine Vre ven’s employ ment, is before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, and on defe ndant’s two motions to dism iss for fa ilure to state a c laim under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Fe dera l Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure . T he Court he ard or a l argume nt o n M arc h 1 8, 20 09 . A ft e r c are fu lly
c on sid e ri ngthe pa

pe rs fi le d b y

the pa rt ie s, the re le va

nt c a se law, and

the argume nts of

c ouns e l, the Court g rants plaintiff’ s motion t o amend, a nd g rants def

endant’ s motion t o dismiss in part
and de nie s it in p art
. 1Al l r e fe re nc e s to the “ Com pla int ” in t

his Op ini on

are to t he F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int
. 2 2 I . BA CKGROUND Plaintiff alleg es that she wor ked for defe ndant, the Amer ican Assoc iation of Retired Persons (“ AARP”), in var ious capa cities in the International Affa irs depar tment from May 17, 2006 until her dischar g e on May 15, 2008. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 13. Duringher 2 employ ment by AARP, plaintiff alleg es that she e x presse d conce rns to her supe rvisors about AARP’s relationship with AARP Global Network, L L C (“AGN ”), a limit ed liability

company founded a nd wholly owned a nd operated by

AARP. See id. ¶¶ 9, 10. Plaintiff alleg es that she
was c oncer

ned that AARP’s re lationship with AGN jeopardized AARP’s tax ex empt status (p ur su ant t o Se c tio n 5 01 (c )( 4) of the Inte rn a l Re ve nu e Cod e ). Se e id. ¶¶ 6, 10 . Pl a int if

f a lso
a lle g e s th a t du

ri nghe r e mpl oy

me nt s he e xpre sse d c on c e rn s to he r s up e rv iso rs a bo ut A ARP employ ees’ mishandling a nd improper spe nding of

AARP funds as well as the ir use of inadequate audit proc edure s. See id. ¶ 11. She alleg es that she wa s terminated be cause she had objected to AA RP’s “abuse a nd its structure and tax -exempt status resulting in AARP’s eva sion and avoida

nce of taxes pursuant to the I nterna l Revenue Code.” I d. ¶ 15. Pla int if f f ur the r a lle g e s th a t de fe nd ant’ s c hie f e xec uti ve of fi c e r, Willi am N ov e lli , tol d o the rs at A ARP th at pl a int if f’ s e mpl oy

me nt w a s te rm inate d b e c a us e sh e e ng a g e d in mis c on du c t, b or e re sp on sib ili ty fo r m iss ingmon e y

or a sse ts, did

no t ma na g e he r A ARP
su bo rd inate s a

pp ro pr iate ly , a

nd a llo we d th e m to ste a l f

ro m A ARP, a

nd that sh e pe rs on a lly

sto le money from AARP. See Compl. ¶ 29. She also alleg es “upon infor mation and belief

” that Mr. No ve lli re pe ate d th e se c omm e nts to u nn ame d p e op le outsi de of AA RP. S e e id. Pla int if

f a lle g e sPlaintiff, a re sident of Mary land, alleg es jurisdiction based on diver sity of 3 citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C . 1332(a) . See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3. De fenda nt, a District of Columbi a nonprof

it corporation with it s principal plac e of business in the District of Columbi a, does not cha lleng e diver sity jurisdiction. See Compl. ¶ 2.

3 that Mr. Novelli’s stateme nts about the rea son for he r discharg e we re f alse a nd defa matory . See Compl. ¶ 30. Plaintiff filed suit in thi s Court on J une 25, 2008. Her orig inal complaint 3
asser ted two counts — wrong ful dischar g e (Count I ) and unla wful discrimination based on he r national orig in (Be lgia

n) (Count I I ). On De cembe r 22, 2008, plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add a c laim for def amation (Count I I I ).
I I . STANDARD OF REVI EW Rule 12(b)(6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a llows dismi ssal of a complaint if a plaintiff f

ails “to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)( 6). In Be ll Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supre me Court clar ified the standar d of plea ding that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismi ss under Rule 12(b)(6) . The Court noted that “ Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 8(a )(2) require s only ‘a sh or t and pla in s tate me nt o f t

he c la im s ho wi ngthat th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to re lie f, ’ i n o rd e r t o ‘g ive the def

endant f air notice of what the . . . claim is and the g rounds upon which it re sts[ .]’” I d. at 544 (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Erickson v. Par dus, 127 S. Ct . 2197 (2007); Aktiese lskabet AF 21 v. Fame J eans I nc., 525 F .3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Al tho ug h “ de ta ile d f

a c tua l a lle g atio ns ” are no t ne c e ssa ry to w ith sta

nd a Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

to dismiss , to provide the “ g rounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “mor e than la be ls a nd c on c lus ion s” or

“ a fo rm ula ic re c itatio n o f t

he e le me nts of

a c a us e of a c tio n. ” B e ll4

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555; see a lso Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1 98 6) . T he Court

state d th at th e re wa s n o “ pr ob a bil ity re qu ir e me nt at th e ple a din g sta g e ,” B e ll Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, but “something beyond . . . mere possibili ty
. . . must be alleg ed[.] ” I d. at 557 The f acts a lleg ed in the complaint “must be e noug h to raise a rig ht to relief a bove the spe culative leve l,” id. at 555, bec ause Rule 8( a)( 2) re quires a “ showing ,” rathe r than a

“blanke t assertion,” of

entitlement to relief, id. at 555 n.3. The complaint must be sufficie nt “to state a c laim for re lief that is plausible on its face .” I d. at 570. The Court re fer red to this newly

clar ified standar d as “the plausibilit y standard.” I d. at 560 (a

bandoningthe “no se t of fa cts” languag e fr om Conley v. Gibson). The D .C. Circuit has noted that Twombly “leaves the long -standingfundame ntals of notice plea ding intac t.” Aktieselskabe t AF 21 v. F ame Jeans Inc., 525 F .3d at 15.

On a motion to dismi ss under Rule 12(b) (6), the Court “ must acce pt as true a ll of the fa ctual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. at 2200; see
a lso B e ll A tla

nti c Cor p. v. Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S. at 55 5. Th e c omp la int “ is c on str

ue d li be ra lly

in the [plainti ff’ s] favor, and [the Court should] g rant [the plaintiff] the benefit of a ll inferenc es that can be derive d from the f acts a lleg ed.” K owal v. MCICommuni cations Corp., 16 F .3d at 1276. Neve rtheless, the Court ne ed not ac cept infe renc es dra wn by the plaintiff if those infe renc es ar e unsupported by

fac ts alleg ed in the complaint; nor must the Court acc ept plaintiff’s leg al conclusions. See Kow al v. MCICommuni cations Corp., 16 F .3d at 1276; Br owning v. Clint on, 292 F.3d 235, 242 ( D.C. Cir. 2002).Be cause the alleg ations in the amende d complaint as to Counts Iand I Iappea r 4 ide nti c a l to tho se in t

he or ig ina l c omp la int , th e Court wi ll tre a t de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s Count I of the or ig ina l c omp la int

a s a pp lyingto t

he ame nd e d c omp la int
. 5 I I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Motion to Amend Complaint Plaintiff moves to amend her complaint to add a ne w count (Count I I I ) for de fa matio n r e late d to he r d isc ha rg e by AA RP. R

ule 15 (a ) o f t

he F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e allows for

liberal amendment of plea dings, “ when justice so r equire s.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 15(a) ; see, e .g ., Howar d v. Gutierre z, 237 F.R.D. 310, 312 (D.D.C. 2006) ( quoting Da vis v. L iberty Mutual I nsurac e Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1136- 37 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“ I t is common ground that Rule 15 embodies a g ener ally favor able policy

toward a mendments.”) ( citations omitt ed))
. The pre sumption runs in t he plaintiff’ s favor that she may

amend he r complaint “[i] n the abse nce of any appar ent or de clar ed re ason — such a s undue dela y , bad fa ith or dilatory

motive on the part of the [pl aintiff], repea ted fa ilure to cure defic iencies by amendments pre viously

allowed, undue pre judice to the opposingparty by virtue of a llowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, e tc.” F oman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) . The de cision whether to gr ant or deny leave to amend is within the district court’s discre tion. See Fire stone v. Fire stone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Def endant oppose s plaintiff’s motion to amend on the g round of f utilit y , making virtually the same a

rguments as those conta ined in its subsequent motion t o dismiss Count I I I
. Since the def

endant ha s moved to dismis s the complaint as ame nded, and the Court hear d oral argument on that motion, the Court will g rant plaintiff’ s motion t o amend a nd consider the mot ion to d ism iss Count I I Ion

its me ri ts. 46 B. Plaintiff

Has Stated a Claim for W rongful Discharge Def endant moves to dismiss Count Iof plaintiff’s c omplaint, alleg ing wrong ful dis c ha rg e , f or fa ilure to s tate a

c la im und e r R

ule 12 (b )( 6) of

the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e. Unde r District of Columbia law, “ [a] n employ ee who serve s at the will of his or her employ er ma

y be discha rg ed ‘at any

time and for a

ny rea son, or for no r eason at all.’” L iberatore v. Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326, 1329 (D .C. Cir. 1999) (quoting A dams v. Geor g e W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 30 ( D.C. 1991)). District of Columbia law thus pre sumptively bars
wro ngful termi nat io n cl aim s b rou ght b y at- wi ll emp lo y ees. S ee Ho lm an v . W il li ams , 4 36 F. Supp. 2d 68, 76 (D.D.C. 2006).

District of Columbia courts re cog nize lim ited exceptions to thi s presumptive bar
. In Adams v. Ge org e W. Cochran & Co., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals re cog nized a “ver y narr ow” policy

exception to this rule — a discharg ed employ ee ma y bringa wr ong ful termination claim whe n “the sole r eason f or the discha

rg e is the employ ee’ s ref

usal to violate the law.” A dams v. Geor g e W. Cochron & Co., 597 A.2d at 34. Despite plaintiff’ s argument to the contra ry , she has not alleg ed any fac ts to support the conclusion that defe ndant dischar g ed her be c a us e sh e re fu se d to a ssi st i n th e c omm iss ion of un lawf ul a c ts. Th e c on c lus or

y a sse rt ion to this effe ct, see Compl. ¶ 16, is not sufficie nt under B ell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (to survive dismissal, plaintiff must furnish “more tha n labels and c onclusions”). The District of Columbia Court of Appe als expanded the Ada ms ex ception slightly in Carl v. Children’s Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997), in whic h it stated that circ umstances other

than an e mploy ee’ s outright r efusa l to violate a law may constitute g rounds fo r a pu bli c po lic y

e xce pti on

if the e mpl oy e e a c te d in

fu rt he ra nc e of a pu bli c po lic y

“ so lid lyRelying on Ca rl v. Children’s Hospital, the cour ts have tre ated Judge Terr y ’s 5 con curr in g opi ni on as t he re lev antst and ard. S ee, e. g., R iggs v. Hom e Bui ld ers Ins t. , 2 03 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 n.5 (D.D.C. 2002) (“ Whil e a ma jority of judg es on the en banc court . . . did not expli citly articulate the pre cise c onfines of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, Judg e Te rr

y ’s c on c ur

re nc e a pp e ars to at le a st i mpl ic itl y re pr e se nt t

he br oa de st d e marc a tio n o f i ts boundarie s acc eptable to a majority of the c ourt.”).

7 ba se d o n a

statut e or re g ulatio n th at r e fl e c ts the pa rt ic ula r p ub lic po lic y

to b e a pp lie d o r ( if appropr iate) on a

constitutional provision concrete ly applicable to the defe ndant’s conduc t.” I d. at 163 (Te rry , J ., concur

ring ). The c ourt in Carl consider ed the c laims of plaintiff, a nur se, that 5 she had be en discha

rg ed bec ause she advocated for patients’ rig hts and ag ainst her e mploy er’ s interests both befor e the Council of the D istrict of Columbia and in court as a n expert witness for plaintiffs in medical malpra ctice c ases. See Carl v. Children’s Hospital, 702 A.2d at 160. Relying on a

provision of the District of Columbia Code that prohibited threatening behavior ag ainst witnesses bef

ore the Council of the District of Columbia, the cour t determined that the Code constituted “a de clar ation of policy by the Council seekingto ensure the availability of information essential to its leg islative function by imposing cr iminal penalties on anyone who seeks to impede Counc il acce ss to such information.” I d. at 165. The c ourt furthe r explained that plaintiff had a lleg ed an a dequate ly “close fit” betwe en this public policy and her termination: “the most sever e and most ef fec tive [m ethod of influenc ing the employ ee’ s testimony befor e the Council] — the one that would inflict the greatest injury on the per son or prope rty of the employ ee — is the te rmination of employ ment.” I d. Th e Court

fi nd s th at pl a int if

f h a s st a te d a

c la im und e r t

he e xce pti on

art ic ulate d in Carl v. Children’s Hospital base d on her a lleg ations that she was te rminated be cause “she
o b j ec t edt o AA R P ’s ab u s e o f i t s s tru cture an d t ax -e x em p ts t at u s . ” C o mp l
. ¶ 1 5
. As J u d ge8

Hog an explained in Rigg s, a ca se involving Sec tion 501(c)( 3) of the I nterna l Revenue Code, “ the po lic y of pr ote c tin g a g a ins t a

bu se of the pu bli c tr e a sury

by uti lizin g its fu

nd s f or pa rt isa n a c tiv ity is a su ff ic ie ntl y c le ar m and ate of

pu bli c po lic y

fo r t he purp os e s o f C arl .” Rig g s v . H ome Builder s I nstitut e, 203 F . Supp. 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2002). While plaintiff has not specifie d the
manner in which AARP alleg edly violated its tax exempt st atus under Sec tion 501(c)( 4) and evade d or avoide d taxes, other than throug h its relationship with AGN, Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, the Court finds her a lleg ations sufficient unde r Rule 8(a ) and Tw ombly to invoke the Carl exception. See Holman v. Williams, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 78; Ri g g s v. Homebuilders Institut e, 203 F . Supp. 2d at 21-22. The y

make plausible the conclusion that def endant discha

rg ed plaintiff a s a re sult of he r o bje c tio ns to a lle g e d v iol atio ns of de fe nd ant’ s tax exem

pt s tatus . D e fa

nd ant’ s mo tio n to dismiss Count Iwill be denied.

C. Plainti ff Has Not St ated a Claim for Defamation In order to make out a pr im a fa c iec a se of de fa matio n und e r D istri c t of

Col umb ia law, a pla intiff must alleg e fa cts showing : (1) that the de fenda nt made a f

alse a nd defa matory statement conc erningthe plaintiff; (2) that the defe ndant published the statement without privileg e to a third pa

rty ; (3) that the de fenda

nt’s fault in publishing the state ment amounted to at least neg lige nce; a

nd (4) e ither that the stateme nt was ac tionable as a matter of la

w irre spective of spec ial harm or that its publ ication ca used the plaintiff spe cial har m. See Marsh v. H ollander, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D .C. 2004) (citingCrowley v. North Am. Telc oms. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. 1997)); se e also Restate ment (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977)
.9 Def endant a rgues that the de famation claim should be dismis sed bec ause the complaint is insufficiently specific as to the sec ond element — de fenda nt’s publication of the statement to a th ird

pa rty . Def

endant a sserts that the desc ription in plainti ff’ s complaint of the alleg ed third par

ties is too vague to state a c laim adequately . Plaintiff has alleg ed that Mr. Novelli made de famatory statements about her

to “others at AARP and, upon information and belief, [to people] outside of AARP . . .” Compl. ¶ 29. W hile there is no heig htened plea ding sta nd ard fo r d e fa matio n c la ims in t

he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , s e e Cr oixla

nd Pr op s. L td. Part

ne rs hip
v. Cor c or an, 17 4 F .3 d 2 13 , 2 15 n. 2 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 9) , s uc h c la ims mus t be ple a de d w ith particula rity and spec ify

the per son or per sons to whom the statements wer e made or published. C o a t e s v . LawS c h o o l A dm i s s i o nC o un c i l , C i v i l A c t i o nN o . 0 5
- 0 6 4 1 , 2 0 0 5 U
. S
. D i s t
. LE X IS 35217 at *6 (D.D .C. October 25, 2005) (citingWigg ins v. Dist. C ablevision, Inc., 853 F .Supp. 484, 494 (D.D.C. 1994)) . In addition, all plaintiffs, of cour se, ar e bound by the pleading require ments of Rule 8(a) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, a nd the Supreme Court’s
rec ent explication of that Rule in Twombly . The Court there fore must determine whe ther Count I I Iof plaintiff’s c omplaint adequate ly identifies third parties, or “listeners,” with sufficient specific ity

to enable the defe ndant to answe r the c omplaint and there by withstand defe ndant’s motion to di smiss. S ee O para ug o v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 77 (D.C. 2005) (“w e conside r whe ther the fa ctual alleg ations are sufficie nt to respond to appellant’ s claim of def amation”)
. In Opar aug o v. Watts, t he District of Columbia Court of Appe als conc luded that the alleg ation that a def

amatory letter wa s published to “various per sons, both private and public, in Nige ria” was insuffic ient to state the third par ties to whom the letter wa s published and thus too broad to provide suf

ficient notice to enable the opposing pa rty to prepa re a n answe r.10

Opar aug o v. Watts, 884 A.2d at 78. The cour t contrasted the brea dth of that alleg ed publication wi th a se pa rate a lle g atio n th at th e le tte r w a s p ub lis he d to “ the Ni g e ri an a uth or iti e s in

[pla int if f’ s] court c ase,” and found that the latter wa s sufficiently specific to state a c laim for def amation, while the for

mer wa s not. I d. Her e, plaintiff’ s alleg ation “on information and belief” that Mr. Novelli defa

med her to unnamed people outside of AARP is as vague and a morphous as the alleg ation reje cted by

the cour t in Opara ug o. The Court also conc ludes that plaintiff’s a lleg ation th atM r. No v el l i d ef

am edh er t o un n am edAA R P em p l o y ee s al s o fa i l s t o cl ea r t h e O p ar au go threshold. The c ourt in Opara ug o relied on the fac t that plaintiff specifie d the par ticular Nig eria

n court e mploy ees involved in the pla intiff’s ca se, name ly , those “Nig eria n authorities who we re consideringappellant’ s complaint ag ainst Mrs. Opar aug o’s family in Nige ria.” See Opa

raug o v. Watts, 884 A.2d at 78. “These alleg ations,” the c ourt held, we re “ sufficie nt to apprise appe llees of the pe rsons to whom the letter wa s published, at least by cate g ory .” I d. In this case, plaintiff a lleg es that AARP’s CEO, Mr. Nove lli, who oversee s the
en t i re o rga n i z at i o n , “h as t o l d [ un n am ed ] o th er s atAA R P ” v ar i o u s al l ege d l y d ef am at o ry th i n gs about plaintiff. See Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff fa ils to narrow this alleg ation any further by identifying a

ny one to whom Mr. Nove lli spoke or wrote by name, by depar tment, or by

any other i d e n t i f yi n g f e atur e . A to r a l ar g u m e n t , c o un s e l f o r d e f e n d an tr e p r e s e n t e d

th a tA A R P e mp l o ys about 2,200 people, most of whom wor k in the same building as did plaintiff. Plaintiff’s complaint, taken at fac e value , makes possible the c onclusion that Mr. Novelli may have defa med her to any one of the se employ ees. Absent any fac tual alleg ations that narr ow this field, defe ndant would have to conduct thousands of inter views in order

to answer

the complaint. The Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint thus does not g ive def endant “ fair notice ” of the nature ofPlaintiff’s counsel sug g ested at oral ar g ument that the Court could “infe r” f rom 6 pa ra g ra ph31 of the c omp la int

that Mr . N ov e lli a t le a st t old me mbe rs of

AA RP’ s B oa

rd tho se things whic h plaintiff say s are defa matory . But that is not what par ag raph 31 a sserts. “Without some fac tual alleg ation in the complaint” that Mr. Nove lli made these stateme nts to the Boar d of Di re c tor s, “ it i s h ard

to s e e ho w [p la int if

f] c ou ld s atis fy

the re qu ir e me nt o f p ro vid ing
. . . ‘ fa ir notice’” to defe ndant. B ell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 n. 3. 11 the claims and the “g rounds” on whic h the claim re sts, both of which are nece ssary in order f or de fe nd ant t o r e sp on d p ro pe rl y . Se e B e ll A tla nti c v. Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S. at 55 5 n .3 ; se e a lso Opar aug o v. Watts, 884 A.2d at 77-78.

Plaintiff is not helped by

Crowley v. North Am. Telc oms. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1997). The plaintiff in that case alleg ed that a f ormer supe rvisor def

amed him to unnamed

“ e mpl oy e e s and

fo rm e r c o- wo rk e rs [.]” I d. a t 11 71 . Wh ile the c ourt in C ro wl e y

did no t qu ote fr om p la int if

f’ s c omp la int , it

fo un d th e c omp la int

su ff ic ie nt t o w ith sta

nd a mot ion to d ism iss beca use it allowed for

“identification by

employ ment” of the third party

audienc e for

the de fa mator y c omm e nts . I d. at 11 72 . It pr ov ide d n o e xplanatio n f or that f ind ing , a nd the Court

is unwilling to conc lude that this chara cter ization was shorthand for a n alleg ation as broa d and unref ined as plaintiff’ s alleg ation that she wa s defamed to unnamed AA RP employ ees a ny wher e in the building in which she worke d. Interpre ting Crowle y this broadly

would compel the Court to r e a c h th e c on c lus ion

that an a lle g atio n th a t de fa mator y state me nts ma de , f

or e xamp le , to “employ ees at Gener al Motors,” would be sufficie nt to state a cla im sim ply beca use the plaintiff had identified a

cate g ory of employ ees. Such a

conclusion flies in the fa ce of the re quirement that defa mation case s be pled with par ticularity , as we ll as the pleadingrequire ments of Rule 8(a) of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure . T he Court the re fo re g ra

nts de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s w ithre sp e c t to Count I I Iof pla int if f’ s c omp la int
. 612 I V. CONCLUSI ON F or the se re a so ns , th e Court

wi ll g ra nt p la int if f’ s mo tio n f

or le ave to f ile he r f ir st amende d complaint and will deny in part and grant in par

t defe ndant’s motions to dism iss. Count I I Iof

the Am e nd e d Co mpl a int is d ism iss e d. Counts Iand I Ire ma in p e nd ing . Ase pa rate O r d e r c o n s i s t e n tw i thth i s O p i n i o nw i l l i s s u e th i s s am e d ay.
_/s/_______________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: Mar ch 25, 2009