The Chesapeake

 Campaign 1813–1814

The U.S. Army Campaigns

of the War of 1812
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CMH Pub 74–5
•••

The Chesapeake Campaign

1813–1814

by

Charles P. Neimeyer

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Center of Military History

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 2014

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Introduction

The War of 1812 is perhaps the United States’ least known conflict. Other than Andrew Jackson’s 1815 victory at New Orleans and 

Francis Scott Key’s poem “The Star-Spangled Banner” written in 

1814 during the British attack on Baltimore, most Americans know 

little about the country’s second major war. Its causes are still debated 

by historians today. Great Britain’s impressment of American sailors, 

its seizure of American ships on the high seas, and suspected British 

encouragement of Indian opposition to further American settlement 

on the western frontier all contributed to America’s decision to declare 

war against Great Britain in June 1812.

None of these factors, however, adequately explain why President 

James Madison called for a war the country was ill-prepared to 

wage. Moreover, the war was quite unpopular from the start. Many 

Federalists—chiefly in the New England states—opposed an armed 

conflict with Great Britain, continued to trade with the British, and 

even met in convention to propose secession from the Union. Some 

members of the president’s own Republican Party objected to the 

war’s inevitable costs and questionable objectives, such as the conquest of Canada.

To declare war was one thing, but to prosecute it successfully was 

a different matter. Much of the story of the War of 1812 is about 

the unpreparedness of America’s Army and Navy at the conflict’s 

outset, and the enormous difficulties the new nation faced in raising 

troops, finding competent officers, and supplying its forces. Most 

of America’s military leaders were inexperienced and performed 

poorly, particularly in the first two years of war. Only gradually did 

better leaders rise to the top to command the more disciplined and 

well-trained units that America eventually fielded. But despite costly 

initial setbacks, by the time the fighting stopped American arms had 

won key victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and New Orleans 

under excellent officers such as Winfield Scott, Jacob Brown, and 

Andrew Jackson. Although the United States achieved few of its 

political objectives in the War of 1812, its Regular Army emerged 

more professional, better led, and fit to take its place as the foundation of America’s national defenses.
•••• 6 ••••

I encourage all Army leaders and soldiers to read this pamphlet 

and the others in our series of campaign pamphlets in commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812. We can all profit from 

greater knowledge about the beginnings of our Army: an Army forged 

in victory and defeat during what has often been called the second 

war of American independence.

RICHARD W. STEWART

Chief Historian
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•••

The Chesapeake Campaign

1813–1814

Strategic Setting

Fate had not been kind to the United States after it had declared 

war on Great Britain in June of 1812. During the ensuing six months, 

the British had not only repulsed several American attempts to invade 

Upper and Lower Canada, but had also captured some U.S. territory. By year’s end, British Canada stood defiant, while America’s 

military and political leadership wallowed in recrimination, frustration, and doubt. 

Britain’s prospects in Canada, however, were by no means bright. 

The U.S. Army was growing in size and capability, deploying ever 

more soldiers to the Canadian frontier. In contrast, British North 

America was still thinly defended, as the vast majority of Britain’s 

army remained in Europe fighting against the French Emperor 

Napoleon. As they examined the prospects for 1813, Britain’s leaders searched for a way both to divert American regulars from the 

Canadian border and to put pressure on the United States to come 

to terms. A naval blockade offered one way to achieve these goals, 

but America’s coastline was so long that it seemed best to concentrate on one area until the Royal Navy could free more ships from 

the war in Europe. The area the British government selected was the 

Chesapeake Bay.

Situated between the states of Maryland and Virginia, the 

Chesapeake Bay was America’s largest estuary. The bay and the watershed it served were home to vibrant agricultural and fishing activities; important ports (Baltimore, Maryland, and Norfolk, Virginia); a 

major naval construction yard at Portsmouth, Virginia; and last but not 

least, the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C. Threaten these, the British 

reasoned, and America might shift its focus from trying to conquer 

Canada to defending its own homeland. Consequently, in December 

1812 the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Lord 

Henry Bathurst, directed Adm. Sir John Borlase Warren to impose a 
•••• 8 ••••

limited blockade of the American 

coast, with particular attention 

to the Chesapeake Bay. The lead 

elements of the British blockading force arrived at the mouth of 

the bay in February 1813 to begin 

what would become a two-year 

campaign.

Operations

The Fighting Begins

The initial action of the campaign occurred on 8 February 

when British frigates captured 

the privateer Lottery attempting 

to run the blockade. The ship 

became the first of many prizes 

the Royal Navy would seize during the following two summers. 

Warren’s advance frigates effectively closed the Chesapeake 

to American shipping, and even 

the most daring privateers evaded 

his warships with difficulty. The 

blockade became even tighter in early March when R. Adm. George 

Cockburn joined Warren as his second in command, bringing with 

him additional ships.

With even more ships sailing for North America, First Sea 

Lord Robert Dundas, the 2d Viscount Melville, counseled Warren 

not to concentrate overly on the Chesapeake Bay; but Portsmouth’s 

strategically important Gosport Navy Yard, located near Norfolk, 

proved too tempting a target to ignore. At anchor within the 

harbor was one of America’s major warships, the frigate USS 

Constellation, guarded by over three thousand Virginia militiamen, 

numerous gunboats, and two major fortifications, Forts Norfolk 

and Nelson. With few marines to act as land troops, Warren 

needed British Army assistance. While waiting for troops to arrive, the energetic Cockburn used ship’s boats and barges to enter 

bay tributaries, where they captured many shallow-draft vessels 

to use in future operations.

John Borlase Warren,

by Daniel Orme

(National Portrait Gallery, 

London) •••••••••••••••
•••• 9 ••••

By mid-April, one division of Warren’s fleet took station off the Elizabeth River to 

blockade Constellation, while 

Cockburn led the other on a series of raids on the towns of the 

upper Chesapeake (see Map 1). 

On the sixteenth, his squadron 

demonstrated off the mouth of 

the Patapsco River, the gateway 

to Baltimore. Cockburn meant 

the display to hold the attention 

of the militia commander in the 

region, Maj. Gen. Samuel Smith, 

before sailing farther north. For 

the rest of the month, Cockburn 

sent expeditions of sailors and 

marines ashore, supported by 

warships and auxiliary vessels, 

to raid small port towns. He 

established a policy that “should 

resistance be made, I shall consider [what I take] as a prize of 

war.” If a town submitted, however, he left its homes and other 

structures mostly intact. Although he claimed to have paid for any 

confiscated property, he usually did so with notes that could only be 

redeemed after the war. 

Cockburn struck first on the Elk River at the extreme northeastern corner of the bay. After overcoming some ineffective militia 

at Frenchtown, Maryland, on 29 April, he burned the depot there 

before turning toward Elkton, Maryland. There, however, the militiamanned battery—later named Fort Defiance—successfully repelled 

the British attack. Undeterred, Cockburn sailed toward Maryland’s 

Western Shore in early May and anchored off Havre de Grace at the 

mouth of the Susquehanna River. An artillery battery defended the 

seaward approach to the prosperous village of about sixty dwellings. 

Located on the southern outskirts, the fortification, called the Potato 

Battery, stood on Concord Point. The battery opened fire as the landing barges and a boat armed with Congreve rockets approached in 

the early morning of 3 May, but British return fire forced most of 

the militia to abandon the position. 

George Cockburn, 

engraving by Charles Turner

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
FRENCHTOWN

29 Apr 1813

PRINCIPIO

IRON WORKS

3 May 1813 HAVRE DE GRACE

3 May 1813

BALTIMORE

13–14 Sep 1814

NORTH POINT

12 Sep 1814

CHESTERTOWN

30 Aug 1814 CAULK’S FIELD

31 Aug 1814

QUEENSTOWN

13 Aug 1813

KENT ISLAND

5 Aug 1813

ST. MICHAELS

9 Aug 1813

BLADENSBURG

24 Aug 1814

FREDERICKTOWN

5 May 1813

GEORGETOWN

5 May 1813

PORT DEPOSIT

3 May 1813

ELKTON

29 Apr 1813

Susquehanna R

Patapsco R West Branch

South R St.

Michaels

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D e l a w a r e

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Sassafras R

Nor

ht east

R

Elk R

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Kent Island

Narrows

Kent Island

Fort

 Madison

Fort McHenry

Alexandria

Georgetown

Upper Marlboro Pig Point

Charlestown

Centreville

ANNAPOLIS

WASHINGTON

M A R Y L A N D

D E L A W A R E

N E W J E R S E Y

P E N N S Y L V A N I A

D I S T R I C T

O F C O L U M B I A

1813–1814

U P P E R C H E S A P E A K E B A Y

0 20

Miles

Battle
Map 1

FORT WASHINGTON

27 Aug 1814

WHITE HOUSE

LANDING

5 Sep 1814

ST. LEONARD CREEK

26 Jun 1814

ST. LEONARD

2 Jul 1814

BENEDICT

20 Jun 1814

CALVERTON

16 JuL 1814

HALLOWING

POINT

11 Jun 1814

NOMINI CHURCH

26 Jul 1814

KINSALE

3 Aug 1814

HUNTINGTOWN

17 Jul 1814

PRINCE FREDERICK

19 Jul 1814

P o t o m a c R

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Rappahannock R

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Kettle Bottom Shoals

Tangier Island

Blackistone

Island

Nottingham

Lower

 Marlboro

Piscataway

Leonardtown

St. Mary’s City

Port Tobacco 

Kilmarnock

V I R G I N I A

V I R G I N I A
•••• 12 ••••

Developed by William Congreve of the Royal Arsenal, British 

Congreve rockets comprised a three-foot iron tube containing black 

powder propellant topped by a conical or spherical shell that contained explosive, musket balls, or incendiary materiel. The entire apparatus was affixed to a fifteen-foot-long stabilizing pole. The noisy 

missiles proved most effective in unnerving unseasoned troops and 

setting buildings on fire. Although they rarely caused casualties, one 

struck and killed a Havre de Grace militiaman.

Despite Cockburn’s threats of punishing resistance, Lt. John 

O’Neill remained at his Potato Battery post and defiantly fired its cannon until he was injured. O’Neill and two other men were captured and 

briefly taken prisoner. Since the militia had opposed the landing and the 

town refused Cockburn’s ransom demand of $20,000, a British officer 

informed town leaders that “your village shall now feel the effects of 

war.” British sailors and marines looted and burned most of the town’s 

structures, including the home of Commodore John Rodgers, U.S. 

Navy, but neighbors extinguished the blaze before it did much damage. 

Cockburn next sent an expedition up the Susquehanna River to 

burn a warehouse at Smith’s, or Bell’s, Ferry, but was deterred from 

landing at Port Deposit across the Susquehanna by a battery manned 

by militia. Cockburn then targeted the nearby Principio Iron Works 

on the Northeast River. Described as “one of the most valuable Works 

of [its] kind in America,” with one of the few cannon foundries in the 

country, it represented the most significant target in the region. The 

raiders destroyed at least forty-six cannon, including twenty-eight 

32-pounders ready for shipment.

Cockburn then weighed anchor and returned to the Eastern 

Shore of the Chesapeake Bay. The citizens of Georgetown and 

Fredericktown, twin communities on opposite banks of the Sassafras 

River, feared the worst as British ships approached on 5 May. 

Cockburn dispatched a raiding force accompanied by three small 

support vessels and a rocket boat, and sent two captured slaves ashore 

under a white flag to deliver his offer to spare the towns if they surrendered. Col. Thomas W. Veazey of the 49th Maryland Regiment, 

however, manned a breastwork at the narrowest part of the river at 

Pearce Point armed with a 6-pounder cannon and only a few rounds 

of ammunition. The British opened fire with cannon and Congreve 

rockets and landed marines to outflank the American battery. The 

invaders suffered five wounded, but forced the militia to retreat, 

which left both towns defenseless. Due to the resistance, Cockburn 

ordered his men to loot the area and put both towns to the torch. The 

master’s log of HMS Maidstone recorded that “the fires from what 
•••• 13 ••••

had once been the ports of Fredericktown and Georgetown could 

be seen from the decks” ten miles away. In response, American newspapers called Cockburn’s men a “tiger banditti,” and Charlestown, 

on the Northeast River, sent a deputation to assure the admiral that 

he would encounter no resistance, which was exactly the effect that 

Cockburn had hoped. Its mission largely accomplished, the squadron 

returned to the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, where Admiral Warren 

was massing for the long-awaited assault on Norfolk. 

The Battles of Craney Island and Hampton 

What made the attack on Norfolk possible was the arrival from 

Bermuda in May of the British Army’s 102d Regiment of Foot, a company of Royal Artillery, two Independent Companies of Foreigners, 

and two battalions of Royal Marines. Col. Sir Thomas S. Beckwith, 

a veteran of Britain’s war against Napoleon, commanded the troops. 

The independent companies were composed of highly fractious men 

who proved to be troublesome. Led by British officers, their ranks 

included men of various nationalities, mostly French, who had been 

captured on European battlefields and who had elected to serve in the 

British Burning of Havre de Grace, by William Charles

(Maryland Historical Society)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 14 ••••

British Army rather than remain prisoners of war. Lt. Col. Charles 

Napier’s 102d Regiment of Foot also possessed a less-than-stellar 

pedigree. Originally formed in 1789 as the New South Wales Corps to 

garrison Australia, it had once served as a penal regiment for soldiers 

court-martialed in other units. After recruiting “150 lads born in the 

Colony [Australia] of free birth and good character,” the unit had 

returned to England in 1810, where it had been reconstituted as the 

102d Regiment of Foot. By the summer, Warren had over twenty-four 

hundred soldiers and marines under his command, which he believed 

sufficient to seize Norfolk. 

The town’s defenses—at Craney Island at the mouth of the 

Elizabeth River and at two forts located closer to the city—were 

considerable. The federal government had neglected the two 

Revolutionary War–era forts until 1794, when Congress had appropriated $3,000 to repair Fort Nelson on the west bank of the Elizabeth 

River at Windmill Point and to rebuild Fort Norfolk on the east. In 

1813, Fort Nelson had parapets “14 feet high and walls that were 

15 feet thick with embrasures for 42 guns” facing the water, but was 

considerably weaker on its landward side (Map 2). 

Due to the importance of Gosport Navy Yard, twenty-one gunboats augmented the region’s defenses. President Thomas Jefferson’s 

controversial policy was the building of low-cost gunboats for 

coastal defense instead of deep-water warships. Each gunboat 

measured between fifty to seventy-five feet long and was propelled 

by sails and oars. The boats mounted either one 24- or 32-pounder 

gun in the bow on a carriage and two 12-pounder carronades, one 

on each side.

The American militia’s commanding officer, Brig. Gen. Robert B. 

Taylor, complained that “the Gun Boats are most wretchedly manned 

. . . and should they fall into the Enemy’s hands . . . they will be 

turned against us.” Constellation’s commander, Capt. Charles Stewart, 

echoed Taylor’s complaints to Secretary of the Navy William Jones, 

adding that “to protect their falling into their hands, I was under the 

necessity of withdrawing them within the fortifications of Norfolk.” 

Of twenty-one gunboats, Stewart and Navy Yard Superintendent 

Capt. John Cassin could only man seven. 

By early June, the secretary of the Navy ordered Stewart to take 

command of the frigate Constitution, and temporarily replaced him 

with Master Commandant Joseph Tarbell. Captain Cassin, now the 

senior naval officer in the area, repositioned the gunboats toward the 

mouth of the Elizabeth River and forward of the line of sunken hulks 

blocking the channel. They formed a mutually supporting defensive 
•••• 15 ••••

arc that extended from Lambert’s Point on the east bank to lowlying Craney Island on the west. Meanwhile, the War Department 

had assigned Capt. Walter K. Armistead of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to begin construction of fortifications on the southeast part 

of Craney Island facing the channel and to dig trenches at its vulnerable northwest corner. General Taylor assigned Lt. Col. Henry Beatty 

to command the post and its garrison of about four hundred fifty men. 

Maj. James Faulkner commanded all the artillery on Craney Island. 

He had two heavy naval 24-pounders and one 18-pounder positioned 

in the unfinished fort, augmented with Capt. Arthur Emmerson’s 

USS Constellation

Gunboats

Barges

Barges

B R I T I S H F L E E T

Western Branch

Southern Branch

Eastern Branch

Tanner’s Creek

Thoroughfare E l i z a b e t h R i v e r

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Wise

Stringer

Willoughby Point

Sowel’s Point

Lambert’s Point

Craney Island

For t Nor folk

Gosport

Navy Yard

For t Nelson

Portsmouth

N O R F O L K

C R A N E Y I S L A N D

22 June 1813

Based on a sketch by Royal Navy Captain Robert Barrie

American Ship

British Ship

Map 2
•••• 16 ••••

Portsmouth Light Artillery company with four 6-pounder field guns 

and Capt. John Richardson’s Charlotte County Light Artillery acting 

as infantry. Maj. Andrew Waggoner commanded the infantry, which 

included his own battalion of the 4th Virginia Regiment and Capt. 

Thomas Robert’s company of riflemen. 

When they saw British masts approximately five miles away on 

20 June 1813, the Americans knew that the long-expected attack was 

imminent. The next day, Taylor reinforced the defenders with Capt. 

Richard Pollard’s company of regulars from the 20th U.S. Infantry, 

Capt. Jesse Naille’s detachment of the 5th Virginia Regiment, and a 

detachment of riflemen from the 3d Virginia Regiment commanded 

by Ens. Archibald Atkinson. Tarbell sent about one hundred sailors 

commanded by Lt. B. J. Neale to provide crews for the great guns and 

fifty marines under Lt. Henry Breckinridge to reinforce the infantry. 

Beatty then had about seven hundred forty men to oppose Warren’s 

soldiers and marines. Orderly Sgt. James Jarvis noted that all “arrangements thus made to defend the post, we waited the approach of 

the enemy and felt we were prepared to give them a decent reception 

for our troops were full of ardor.” 

During the early morning hours of 22 June, the alarm gun 

sounded after an alert, albeit jittery, sentry on Craney Island thought 

he saw a boat moving near the Thoroughfare, a narrow strait between 

the island and mainland. Although the illusion proved to be floating 

debris, the entire garrison was ready for action as dawn broke. By 

that time, the Americans clearly saw redcoats landing and assembling 

across the water at the nearby Wise farm. Colonel Beatty arranged his 

infantry into a line that faced the Thoroughfare on the northwestern 

part of the island. Major Faulkner’s artillerymen—without oxen or 

horses—manhandled the heavy naval guns to the threatened part of 

the island and combined them into a single battery with Emmerson’s 

6-pounders. 

Beckwith’s regiment provided the bulk of the British landing force. 

He had planned the landing at Wise farm as a diversion, while another 

detachment crossed Wise Creek to the Stringer farm on the western side 

of Craney Island. Meanwhile, additional barges carried soldiers and 

marines for a direct assault against the island’s northwestern beaches. 

The plan went wrong when the British discovered that neither Wise 

Creek nor the Thoroughfare was fordable. Beckwith’s troops, unable 

to cross, massed on the riverbank. In order to draw the American 

artillerymen’s attention away from this lucrative target, Beckwith had 

the supporting Congreve rocket batteries, located near a building on 

the Wise farm, fire their noisy missiles. They drew accurate American 
•••• 17 ••••

counterbattery fire that destroyed the building and caused a number 

of casualties. British soldiers who fled from the cover of the building 

were subjected to canister and grapeshot from Faulkner’s guns. 

As this carnage took place, the main British assault force of 

fifteen hundred soldiers and marines approached the northwestern 

shore of Craney Island in fifty barges. Led by Admiral Warren’s 

personal barge, named Centipede for its bright green color and numerous oars, the British landing craft began to close on the island 

at 1100. Warren’s flag captain, Capt. Samuel G. Pechell of HMS 

San Domingo, commanded the amphibious force. He had attempted 

to time his assault with Beckwith’s flank attack, unaware that it 

had already been smashed by Faulkner’s artillery. As Pechell’s men 

moved toward the beach, Faulkner’s gun crews focused attention 

on this new threat. They held their fire until the barges were well 

within range, at which point the artillerymen fired a deadly volley. Most of the barges grounded on unseen mudflats about three 

hundred yards from shore as the Americans poured shot after shot 

into them. Men who jumped over the sides of their barges sunk 

knee-deep into the muck. Standing in Centipede, Royal Navy Capt. 

J. M. Hanchett tried to rally his men when a shot smashed through 

the hull and severely wounded him in the thigh. Hanchett and his 

men abandoned Centipede, while nearby barges recovered survivors 

as best they could. Pechell ordered a retreat back to the ships, and 

Warren directed the troops in the vicinity of Wise farm to return 

to their ships as well. The Americans had won. 

Faulkner allowed a group of sailors to take the grounded 

Centipede as a prize. Although hulled in a few places, the damaged 

barge was quickly repaired. As the British withdrew, many defenders waded into the mudflats to take potshots at the fleeing enemy, 

giving rise to a British claim that the Americans had gone into the 

flats to kill the wounded left behind. Evidence that such occurred 

is lacking, while Midshipman Josiah Tatnall of Constellation wrote 

that his men brought a number of British wounded ashore in hammocks for medical treatment. 

A thrilled Captain Cassin wrote to Secretary of the Navy Jones 

that the gun crew from Constellation “fired their [cannon] more like 

riflemen than Artillerists,” but he did not mention the role Virginia 

militia had played at all. In contrast, Colonel Beatty praised all 

the participating units in his report, including the few gunboats 

that had briefly engaged British barges. The Americans reported 

no casualties, while the British suffered at least sixteen men killed 

and sixty-two missing. 
•••• 18 ••••

Stymied at Norfolk, Admiral Warren turned his attention across 

Hampton Roads to Hampton, Virginia, because he believed the 

town “commanded communication between [the] upper country and 

Norfolk” (Map 3). Unlike at Craney Island, the British did not have 

to contend with river forts, gunboats, or sunken hulks. The numerous 

undefended inlets just west of town made Hampton especially vulnerable to an amphibious attack. Cockburn positioned his ships off 

Blackbeard’s Point near Newport News. A joint force consisting of 

marines under Lt. Col. Richard Williams and soldiers of Beckwith’s 

regiment, nearly two thousand men, landed about two miles west 

of Hampton near the home of Daniel Murphy on 25 June. As the 

landing party advanced eastward on the Celey Road, Cockburn’s 

small craft fired their cannon at a militia camp and artillery battery 

commanded by Capt. Brazure W. Pryor, located at a farm called Little 

England, just southwest of and separated from Hampton by a small 

creek. Maj. Stapleton Crutchfield, commanding about four hundred 

fifty militiamen, later reported that Pryor’s guns repelled the British 

“in a manner worthy of veteran troops.” Cockburn actions, however, 

were merely a diversion to allow Williams’ and Beckwith’s troops to 

arrive on Crutchfield’s right flank. 

A militia rifle company, commanded by Capt. Richard B. 

Servant, guarding the Celey Road observed and reported that the 

British troops were advancing from the west. Crutchfield immediately sent reinforcements, only to be ambushed as they approached 

the wood line that flanked the road. Sergeant Jarvis described, “We 

advanced in column of platoons, thro’ a lane and open cornfield 

which led from our encampment . . . to the main and Ceyle [sic] 

Roads. When in the field within 200 yards of the gate opening into 

the Ceyley [sic] road and a thicket of pine, we were fired upon by the 

enemy’s musketry from a thick wood at the upper end of a field.” 

Jarvis continued, “orders were given to wheel to the left into line and 

march upon the enemy.” Advancing less than fifty yards, “the enemy 

opened upon us two six-pound field pieces loaded with grape and 

canister shot and his machines filled with rockets of a small size.”

Confused fighting raged in the woods that separated the Celey Road 

and the main militia camp until the British landed some light field guns 

and fired grapeshot into Crutchfield’s men, sending the Americans 

in full flight through Hampton and northward on the road toward 

Yorktown, Virginia. Just before being overrun, Pryor’s artillerymen 

spiked their guns and swam the creek to avoid capture. The British 

reported only five men killed, thirty-three wounded, and ten missing. 

The militia lost seven dead, twelve wounded, and eleven missing. 
CRANEY

ISLAND

22 Jun 1813

HAMPTON

25 Jun 1813

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HAMP TON ROADS

G o s p o r t N a v y Ya r d

Fort Norfolk

Fort Nelson

Tangier Island

Cape Charles

Cape Henry

Portsmouth

Williamsburg Yorktown

Kilmarnock

Newport

News

NORFOLK

V I R G I N I A

V I R G I N I A

1813

L O W E R C H E S A P E A K E B A Y

0 20

Miles

Battle

Map 3
•••• 20 ••••

As most of the inhabitants fled Hampton, British soldiers looted 

private homes and harassed civilians. The British claimed the depredations were committed in revenge for the Americans allegedly firing 

on their wounded at Craney Island. Officers confirmed that their 

men committed a number of crimes, but were nearly unanimous in 

blaming the green-coated Independent Companies of Foreigners for 

the most egregious conduct. Colonel Beckwith noted that with “their 

dispersing to plunder in every direction, [and] their Brutal treatment 

of several peaceable Inhabitants,” their officers “found it impossible 

to Check Them.” The independent companies’ behavior failed to 

improve, as he stated, “Since their return on board, their conduct has 

been uniformly the Same and . . . have not hesitated to say, that when 

next landed, they would choose a Service for themselves [desert].” 

The colonel sent them to Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Operations During the Remainder of 1813

Not yet prepared to quit the operations for the season, V. Adm. 

Sir Alexander Cochrane sent Cockburn in HMS Scepter with a 

detachment of ships and elements of Beckwith’s regiment to raid 

Ocracoke and Portsmouth Islands, North Carolina. The foray 

netted two privateers. While Cockburn was away, Warren ordered 

Capt. William H. Shirreff of HMS Barrossa to take his frigate, 

four shallow-draft vessels, and a landing force of six hundred men 

up the Potomac River toward Washington, D.C. Except as the seat 

of government, the city had little military value and, therefore, its 

defenses were less robust than those at Norfolk or Baltimore. Many 

believed that the capital’s protection rested in its largely inaccessible 

geographic location. An invading fleet had to travel against a strong 

current and avoid treacherous shoals just to come within sight of the 

city. Warren hoped threatening the national capital might compel the 

Americans to detach forces from the Canadian border. While the 

approaching British did cause the mobilization of local militia, the 

U.S. government did not redeploy any Regular Army units from the 

Canadian border. Secretary of War John Armstrong did, however, 

direct the 36th and 38th U.S. Infantry to Fort Washington, Maryland, 

overlooking the Potomac at Digges Point a few miles south of the 

capital district. 

Originally named Fort Warburton, Fort Washington was the 

only fortification guarding the river approaches to Washington, D.C. 

Capt. George Bomford, its chief engineer, conceded that the post had 

significant deficiencies. Based on the plan used for Fort Madison at 

Annapolis, Maryland, the dimensions proved too large for the four 
•••• 21 ••••

acres at Digges Point. He lamented that “Fort Washington was really 

an attempt to adopt a standard plan to an unsuitable site. It therefore 

violated a fundamental rule – the fort must suit its site.” Having no 

alternative, Bomford altered the plan, reducing the number of guns 

to fifteen, half as many it needed to be effective. Furthermore, the 

site did not allow enough room for barracks to house more than the 

regular artillerymen to man the guns facing the water, and relied on 

militia to defend the landward side. 

Aware that the fort would not stop a waterborne attack, in May 

1813 a deputation of citizens from the three major towns in the 

District of Columbia—Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria—

had urged the federal government to improve the defenses. Secretary 

of War Armstrong had sent Col. Decius Wadsworth, the Army’s 

Commissary-General of Ordnance, to investigate. He had concluded 

that neither a further reinforcement of heavy guns nor the construction of auxiliary batteries was necessary, as the challenges posed 

by navigating the Potomac provided enough protection. Maj. Gen. 

James Wilkinson had disagreed, remarking that Fort Washington 

“could easily be knocked out either by the guns of a frigate or taken 

by a landing force at night from the back.” Lt. Edmund Kennedy, 

commanding the Potomac Flotilla of gunboats, had likewise written 

Secretary of the Navy Jones on 13 April that “one Gun Boat well 

mann’d might attack it in the present Situation with certain Success.” 

As it turned out, Wilkinson’s and Kennedy’s concerns and 

Armstrong’s preparations proved unnecessary. On encountering the 

treacherous Kettle Bottom Shoals, forty miles from the city, the British 

had decided to return to the mouth of the Potomac. The stillborn probe 

notwithstanding, Cockburn landed about four hundred troops on 

Blackistone [St. Clement’s] Island off the western shore of Chesapeake 

Bay near St. Mary’s City, Maryland. He put the men to work digging wells for a convenient source of fresh water. When he heard of 

yet another British incursion into southern Maryland, Secretary of 

State James Monroe rode to personally reconnoiter, and requested 

Armstrong to send at least three hundred fifty regulars to drive off the 

enemy. Instead, the secretary of war sent a small detachment, which 

failed to intimidate the British as they plundered St. Mary’s, Charles, 

and Calvert Counties southeast of Washington. 

On 8 August, the British anchored fifteen ships off the mouth 

of the Patapsco River, appearing to threaten Baltimore again, but it 

proved to be a ruse. The British weighed anchor after a few days and 

headed south to threaten Annapolis. Considering the state capital too 

strongly defended, Cockburn established a base on the eastern side 
•••• 22 ••••

of the Chesapeake Bay at Kent 

Island, which permitted him to simultaneously threaten Baltimore 

and Annapolis. After driving off 

the local militia, the 102d Foot

and a battalion of Royal Marines 

built huts for an extended stay.

Hearing rumors that there 

were two privateers under 

construction at the prosperous Eastern Shore town of St. 

Michaels, Maryland, the British 

planned a raid. On the evening 

of 9 August, they embarked 

about three hundred troops in 

cutters and barges for a predawn 

attack that would catch the volunteer and drafted companies 

detached from the 12th Militia 

Brigade, under the command 

of Brig. Gen. Perry Benson, by 

surprise. Capt. Samuel Thomas 

of the Talbot Volunteer Artillery 

Company distributed his guns to 

several batteries. A four-gun battery commanded by Lt. William 

Dodson located at Parrott’s 

Point constituted the town’s 

principal defense, while Lt. John Graham commanded an auxiliary 

battery of two guns at the wharves. First Lt. Clement Vickers commanded two guns at Mill Point. 

As the British approached to within thirty yards, Dodson’s guns 

fired a single volley, which caused few casualties. British troops quickly 

overran the battery as the militiamen fled toward town. Vickers’ two 

guns then opened fire on the British, who after observing no vessels in 

the harbor, destroyed the Parrott’s Point battery and returned to their 

barges. By 1300, they headed back to Kent Island. The Americans 

suffered no losses, but claimed to have inflicted twenty-nine British 

casualties, although Cdr. Henry L. Baker of the Royal Navy reported 

only two wounded. While not substantiated, local tradition holds that 

inhabitants hung lanterns on the trees in the nearby woods to deceive 

the British about the actual location of the town. 

James Monroe,

by Samuel Morse 

(White House Historical 

Association) •••••••••••••••
•••• 23 ••••

A few days later, Cockburn went after a bigger target. The 38th 

Maryland Regiment had assembled near Queenstown, just a few miles 

across the Kent Island Narrows. The understrength Queen Anne 

County militia, commanded by Maj. William H. Nicholson, had 

an infantry battalion of 244 men; a cavalry unit of about 100 men 

under the command of Maj. Thomas Emory; and a 35-man artillery company with two 6-pounders commanded by Capt. Gustavus 

Wright. In the early morning of 13 August, a cavalry scout informed 

Nicholson that British troops had crossed the Kent Narrows and 

were headed toward Queenstown. Alerted, Nicholson prepared to 

resist the British advance. Concerned that the British would capture 

or destroy two companies of infantry, under the command of Capt. 

James Massey, positioned on the neck of land that separated his 

camp from the Kent Narrows, Nicholson feared the worst when he 

heard the sound of heavy musketry. During the ensuing skirmish at 

a defile near Slippery Hill, American fire killed two British soldiers 

and Beckwith’s horse.

At about 0400, a scout reported that a number of barges had 

entered Queen Anne’s Creek and three hundred British marines had 

landed at the Bowlingly Plantation. In fact, the British had mistakenly landed at Blakeford—the home of former Maryland governor 

Robert Wright—on the opposite shore. The error bought the militia 

time to escape being surrounded, and Nicholson ordered a retreat 

toward Centreville, which allowed the British to seize Queenstown 

without further resistance. The British did not burn Bowlingly, but 

looted several homes before withdrawing. With hurricane season 

approaching, and after another brief attempt at St. Michaels on 

26 August, Admiral Warren brought the campaign to a close. He 

established a small base on Tangier Island for the naval forces that 

would stay behind to maintain the blockade and to train the liberated and runaway slaves who agreed to join the Colonial Marines. 

In September, he sailed with the majority of his fleet to Halifax, 

while Cockburn took most of the rest to Bermuda for the winter. 

Although his squadron had spread terror throughout the region, 

Warren had failed to divert U.S. forces from Canada.

The 1814 Campaign Begins

Following Napoleon’s defeat and exile to the island of Elba 

in early 1814, Great Britain could focus all of its military might 

against the United States. The Admiralty replaced Warren with the 

more aggressive Cochrane. The move pleased Cockburn, who possessed remarkable intelligence on the region and remained second 
•••• 24 ••••

in command. He believed that his new commander understood 

the need not only to defeat but also to punish the Americans. The 

performance of the supporting British troops the previous year had 

been disappointing, and Cockburn hoped the crown would assign 

a more aggressive army commander as well. 

American defenses on the Chesapeake remained weak. The 

United States continued to commit most of its newly raised Regular 

Army regiments to the Canadian theater, while the USS Constellation

at Norfolk and the new sloops-of-war Erie and Ontario nearing 

completion at Baltimore remained blockaded. Only an ad hoc fleet 

of barges and sloops commanded by acting Master Commandant 

Joshua Barney operated on the waters of the bay. By late April 

1814, its fifteen vessels, including the sloop-rigged gunboat Scorpion

as flagship, moved to harass the British base on Tangier Island. 

Simultaneously, Col. Henry Carberry sent a detachment of his 36th 

U.S. Infantry to oppose British raids in the St. Leonard, Maryland, 

area. On seeing the regulars, many citizens assumed the government 

would finally take a stand. 

Barney’s flotilla attacked a number of smaller British vessels 

and forced them to flee southward to the safety of their warships. 

He pursued them until a ship-of-the-line bore down on his flotilla, 

which caused him to withdraw into the Patuxent River on Maryland’s 

Western Shore. After contrary winds forced his vessels into the shallow St. Leonard Creek, a number of shallow-draft British warships 

and auxiliaries blocked their exit. On 10 June, Barney counterattacked 

but failed to break the blockade. 

The Americans planned a joint operation for a second attempt 

to free Barney’s flotilla. Secretary of War Armstrong sent Colonel 

Wadsworth to command the land forces. These consisted of Colonel 

Carberry’s understrength 36th U.S. Infantry; several companies of 

the 38th U.S. Infantry; two 18-pounder long guns and their crews; 

and a detachment of three 12-pounder field guns commanded by 

Lt. Thomas Harrison. Secretary Jones augmented the ground forces 

with one hundred ten marines with three light 12-pounders under the 

command of Capt. Samuel Miller from the Washington Navy Yard.

As Wadsworth and Barney continued their planning, British 

Capt. Robert Barrie maintained the blockade and sent barges carrying troops to raid farms and plantations throughout the region. On 

11 June, members of the 45th Maryland Regiment fired on British 

raiders near Hallowing Point in Calvert County. In keeping with 

Admiral Cockburn’s standing order, Barrie deployed one hundred 

seventy marines to burn the farm of Capt. John Broome of the 31st 
•••• 25 ••••

Maryland Regiment. After raiding Benedict, Maryland, on 15 June, 

the British penetrated upriver to Lower Marlboro, dispersed the local 

militia without a fight, and burned more than twenty-five hundred 

hogsheads of tobacco. On 18 June, Colonel Carberry led his regulars 

in an effort to stop the raids, but failed to force an engagement. 

When the British appeared off Nottingham, Maryland, on 19 

June, Secretary Armstrong sent Maj. George Peter—in command 

of about two hundred eighty men of the District of Columbia militia, including an infantry company, some dragoons, an artillery 

company with six field pieces, and a rifle company—to meet them. 

The dragoons leading the column saw smoke and believed the town 

had already been burned. However, a detachment of regulars from 

the 36th U.S. Infantry, supported by Lieutenant Harrison’s artillery, 

had prevented the British from capturing the town. The following 

day, Peter’s force surprised a British raiding party near Benedict and 

captured several prisoners. 

On 20 June, Barney received an order from Jones to haul what 

military materiel he could salvage to Washington and destroy the 

flotilla. Before he could complete preparations to execute the order, Wadsworth convinced the secretary to countermand his order, 

suggesting that he could drive the blockaders away with artillery 

long enough for the flotilla to escape. A detachment of flotillamen, 

commanded by Sailing Master John Geoghegan, joined the soldiers 

to build an artillery emplacement under the cover of darkness. 

Despite some early disagreement on where to dig, the Americans 

completed an earthen battery, with a furnace to heat shot and two 

powerful 18-pounders, on a bluff at the mouth of St. Leonard Creek. 

Wadsworth positioned himself here. Miller and Harrison positioned 

their field pieces on the high ground facing the Patuxent farther upriver, with regulars and marines in support. Fire from Wadsworth’s 

guns would signal the attack. 

At dawn on 26 June, the U.S. artillery opened fire on two British 

warships, as Barney’s barges closed and added their guns. Capt. 

Thomas Brown of HMS Loire, commanding in Barrie’s absence, saw 

that his ships’ guns could not silence the land batteries. He ordered 

his ships to shift their fire to the barges, but soon signaled a withdrawal, allowing Barney’s force to escape the creek and head up the 

Patuxent after suffering six killed and four wounded. As the naval 

action continued, the British attempted to outflank the batteries by 

landing marines, supported by a rocket boat. Meanwhile, Miller’s 

12-pounders had exhausted their supply of shot, while the light field 

guns had also ceased firing. Wadsworth ordered a detachment toward 
•••• 26 ••••

the shoreline to oppose the landing. When the 36th U.S. Infantry 

started moving to reposition, however, the inexperienced 38th U.S. 

Infantry, having earlier received directions to follow the 36th wherever it went, followed suit. Miller, ignorant of Wadsworth’s orders, 

thought the army was retreating and joined the movement as well. 

Left without support, Wadsworth ordered his guns spiked and rode 

to the rear to try to rally his confused men.

Wadsworth was initially dissatisfied with the performance of the 

troops under his command, and noted in his report that “the fact 

is, the infantry and light artillery decided upon a retreat without my 

orders before they lost a single man killed or wounded.” However, 

“in justice to the infantry,” he added, “[I] acknowledge that they 

did not take to flight, but quitted the ground in perfect order.” The 

colonel then brought them back toward their original positions, but 

the British had already retired. Capt. Thomas Carberry then led his 

company of the 36th U.S. Infantry back to the abandoned battery 

and retrieved the guns, equipment, and five wounded men left behind 

during the retreat.

The flotilla’s escape from St. Leonard Creek left the town of 

St. Leonard uncovered. Some men returned to recover any military 

stores worth saving and to scuttle two gunboats that Barney had left 

behind. British forces ascended the creek on 2 July, and after a brief 

skirmish, laid waste to the town, sparing only the local physician’s 

house at which some wounded were treated. Near nightfall, loaded 

with hogsheads of tobacco and other plunder, the British retreated 

to the safety of their ships.

Meanwhile, learning from spies in Europe that the British were 

preparing to send an infantry division to the Chesapeake, President 

James Madison created the 10th Military District to encompass 

Virginia north of the Rappahannock River, the District of Columbia, 

and the entire state of Maryland. Over Armstrong’s objection, 

Madison appointed Brig. Gen. William H. Winder to the command. 

Winder, defeated and captured at the Battle of Stony Creek, Upper 

Canada, the year before, had recently been exchanged in a prisoner 

swap. He owed his selection as commander of the 10th Military 

District to the fact that he was the nephew of the Maryland governor, 

and Madison hoped his appointment would help garner Federalist 

support for the war in the state. 

General Winder discovered the region was unprepared. In a 9 July 

letter to Secretary of War Armstrong, he lamented that at best his 

district had only about one thousand regulars, which included artillerymen in fixed fortifications. The understrength and partially trained 
•••• 27 ••••

36th and 38th U.S. Infantry 

constituted his only mobile force, 

which left most of the burden on 

militia. He further reminded the 

secretary that the British, having 

conducted extensive reconnaissance for over a year, could land 

almost anywhere with little to no 

warning. 

As Admiral Cochrane pondered his next move, Cockburn 

suggested that landing an army at 

Benedict, Maryland, would simultaneously threaten Washington, 

Annapolis, and Baltimore, thus 

fixing the militia in their local 

areas and allowing the British to 

deal with American defenses piecemeal. In June, Lt. Gen. Sir George 

Prevost, Governor-General and 

Commander in Chief of British 

Forces in North America, wrote 

to Cochrane that U.S. forces had 

raided the town of Port Dover in 

Upper Canada the previous month 

and destroyed private property as 

well as military targets. Cochrane took the news as an order to retaliate 

in kind, although Cockburn had essentially been doing so, and directed 

the indiscriminate destruction of farms and towns. 

After leaving a few ships on the Patuxent, Admiral Cockburn 

divided the rest of his force into two squadrons. One sailed toward Baltimore, while he personally led the other to the mouth 

of the Potomac. Appearing in three major thoroughfares at once, 

Cockburn kept Winder guessing where the British would make 

their main effort. Meanwhile, he launched small raids up and down 

the coast. Along Maryland’s Western Shore, British troops burned 

the villages of Huntingtown and Prince Frederick (county seat of 

Calvert County) after dispersing the local militia without much of 

a fight. In mid-July, Cockburn turned his attention to Virginia’s 

Northern Neck, burning Nomini Church. The following month, 

the British admiral sent twenty barges up the Yeocomico River. 

Elements of the 47th Virginia Regiment, under the command of 

William H. Winder,

by Charles Balthazar Julien 

Févret de Saint-Mémin

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
•••• 28 ••••

Capt. William Henderson, attacked and killed a number of the Royal 

Marines as they came ashore on 3 August, but ran low on ammunition and retreated. The British then burned and pillaged Henderson’s 

plantation as well as other farms with fervor. According to Brig. 

Gen. John P. Hungerford, commanding officer of the 14th Virginia 

Brigade, hundreds of slaves flocked to the British after the redcoats 

laid waste to the village of Kinsale. On 6 August, Cockburn pushed 

up Virginia’s Coan River, where the Lancaster County militia put up 

a stout fight before they withdrew. The raiders again burned farms, 

confiscated supplies, and seized three schooners. Making nine raids 

in twenty-five days, the British seemed to be everywhere at once.

When it appeared that Annapolis was the next British target, 

Winder ordered the 36th and 38th U.S. Infantry to establish a new 

camp on the South River near the Maryland capital, with Brig. 

Gen. Stephen West’s Prince George’s County militia replacing the 

regulars at Nottingham, Maryland. While Winder was constantly 

in motion, he seemed to focus entirely on details better left to staff 

officers, rather than planning a coherent defense of the entire region. Militia units responded to alarms, many of which proved unfounded, while the two regular battalions remained near Annapolis. 

Cockburn’s raids had confused Winder exactly as the British had 

hoped. Militia commanders rarely mustered enough force to oppose 

even minor incursions, and vulnerable towns demanded that their 

soldiers remain at home. 

On 14 August, Cochrane’s flagship, HMS Tonnant, rendezvoused 

with Cockburn’s advance squadron at the mouth of the Potomac 

River. Two days later, transports carrying Maj. Gen. Robert Ross 

and the veteran 4th, 21st, 44th, and 85th Regiments of Foot and a 

detachment of the Royal Artillery arrived from Europe. Added to 

the Royal Marine battalions with the fleet, Cochrane now had a 

substantial land force. Cockburn advocated striking Washington, but 

Cochrane and Ross doubted the wisdom of such a move, reasoning 

that the distance of the capital city from the proposed landing point 

would make their ground force too vulnerable. Cockburn eventually 

won the argument, however, by pointing out that small British forces 

had easily dispersed the militia in the past. As a compromise, they 

decided to deal with Barney’s flotilla at Nottingham, clearing any 

militia from the banks of the Patuxent River, before making a final 

decision about striking Washington. 

At 0200 on 19 August, Ross’ army began an unopposed landing 

at Benedict, and all were ashore the following day. Ross took his time 

getting his men on the road to Nottingham, which they reached late 
•••• 29 ••••

on the twenty-first. Cockburn led the naval advance up the Patuxent, 

the barges and boats moving parallel to Ross’ column. Barney had 

moved his flotilla above the bend in the river at Pig Point, as far as the 

increasingly narrow and shallow Patuxent allowed. With the flotilla 

doomed, Barney marched with most of his men toward Washington 

to join forces with Winder. He left Lt. Solomon Frazier in command 

of one hundred twenty men with orders to burn their boats if the 

British approached. Barney also ordered Captain Miller to bring his 

company and the three 12-pounders to join him on the road from 

Upper Marlboro (see Map 4). 

On the morning of 22 August, Cockburn’s barges rounded Pig 

Point and spotted the flotilla. He wrote: 

I landed the marines under Captain Robyns on the left bank of the 

river, and directed him to march round and attack, on the land side. 

. . . I plainly discovered Commodore Barney’s broad pendant in the 

headmost vessel, a large sloop [Scorpion], and the remainder of the 

flotilla extending in a line astern of her. Our boats now advanced 

. . . but on nearing them, we observed the sloop . . . to be on fire, 

and she soon afterwards blew up. I now saw clearly that they were 

all abandoned, and on fire, with trains to their magazines; out of 

the seventeen vessels . . . sixteen were in quick succession blown to 

atoms, and the seventeenth . . . we captured. 

On the same day, Secretary of the Navy Jones notified Master 

Commandant John O. Creighton, commanding Washington’s naval 

defenses, that six British ships were “ascending the Potomac” and 

had passed Kettle Bottom Shoals. Admiral Cochrane had ordered 

these ships to act in support of the main effort by Ross, or to stand 

ready to evacuate the troops should their line of retreat be cut. 

Commanded by Capt. James A. Gordon, the squadron included 

two frigates, three bomb vessels, and a rocket-firing ship, which the 

British believed adequate to reduce Fort Washington and deal with 

any American gunboats. 

By the afternoon of 22 August, Ross’ infantry occupied Upper 

Marlboro, county seat of Prince George’s County, as Winder concentrated his forces at Long Old Fields—about eight miles from 

Washington. Cochrane congratulated Cockburn on the destruction 

of Barney’s flotilla, which he believed was the primary goal of the 

expedition, and wrote: “[T]he matter is ended, [and] the sooner the 

Army get[s] back [to Benedict], the better.” Cockburn chose to ignore the order and persuaded the hesitant Ross to advance on the 
R O S S

R O S S

R O S S

C O C K B U R N

24 Aug

22 Aug 22 Aug

21 Aug

19 Aug

BLADENSBURG 24 Aug

South R

Potomac R

Potomac R

Patuxent R

C

H E S A P E A K E B A

Y

Kettle Bottom Shoals

Wo o d yard

P l a nt at i o n

Blackistone Island

Hallowing Point

Fort

Washington

 Fort

Madison

Alexandria

Georgetown

St. Leonard

Nottingham

Pig Point

Long Old Fields

Prince

 Frederick

Benedict

Upper Marlboro

Lower Marlboro

Piscataway

Leonardtown

Port Tobacco 

WASHINGTON

M A R Y L A N D ANNAPOLIS

V I R G I N I A

V I R G I N I A

D I S T R I C T

O F C O L U M B I A

19–24 August 1814

A P P R O A C H T O W A S H I N G T O N

British Advance

Battle

0 15

Miles

Map 4
•••• 31 ••••

American capital. He then informed Cochrane that he found “Ross 

determined (in consequence of the Information he has received & 

what he has Observed of the Enemy), to push on towards Washington 

. . . I shall accompany him & of course afford him every Assistance.” 

At Long Old Fields, Winder gathered as much force as he could. 

He had about 330 regulars in a battalion that combined companies 

from the 36th and 38th U.S. Infantry under the command of Lt. Col. 

William Scott. Barney added 400 beached flotillamen and Miller’s 103 

marines. Secretary of the Navy Jones ordered forces under Commodore 

John Rodgers from Delaware Bay to come to Winder’s aid, although 

none reached closer than Baltimore before the British attacked. He 

also ordered Capts. David Porter and Oliver Hazard Perry, then in the 

capital, to prepare to assist in defending its river approach. 

As for the militia, on 4 July Armstrong had issued a call for 

ninety-three thousand militiamen from Virginia, Maryland, and 

Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania, reorganizing its forces, had no units 

available. The District of Columbia militia was organized as the 

Columbian Division under the command of Maj. Gen. John P. 

Van Ness, and consisted of two brigades. The 1st Brigade of the 

Columbian Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Walter Smith, 

numbered one thousand seventy men, with a regiment each from 

Washington and Georgetown, and two companies each of light artillery and riflemen. The 2d Brigade of the Columbian Division from 

Alexandria numbered about five hundred men under the command of 

Brig. Gen. Robert Young. It took up station across the Potomac near 

Piscataway, Maryland, where it could either support Fort Washington 

or threaten the rear of Ross’ column. 

To help counter the British presence near Washington, General 

Samuel Smith of Maryland’s 3d Division at Baltimore detached 

a 1,300-man brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. Tobias 

Stansbury to Winder on 20 August. Stansbury arrived at Bladensburg, 

Maryland, close to the border with the District of Columbia, two days 

later with one battalion each from the 1st and 2d Maryland Regiments 

under the command of Lt. Cols. John Ragan and John H. Schutz, respectively, and began to build earthworks. Joining them on 23 August 

were Lt. Col. Joseph Sterrett’s 5th Regiment, Maryland Volunteer 

Infantry; Maj. William Pinckney’s 1st Maryland Rifle Battalion; and 

Capts. Joseph Meyer’s American and Richard Magruder’s Franklin 

Artillery Companies, each with three 6-pounders. John Pendleton 

Kennedy, an 18-year-old private in Sterrett’s regiment, wrote: “This 

was a real army marching to a real war. The enemy, we knew, was in 

full career and we had the certainty of meeting him in a few days.” 
•••• 32 ••••

Late on 22 August, Winder ordered General Walter Smith to move 

his 1st Columbian Brigade and Colonel Scott’s composite battalion 

toward the Woodyard on the road to Upper Marlboro. Meanwhile, 

Major Peter led a detachment of militia on reconnaissance to determine British intentions. The 60th Virginia Regiment, under Col. 

George Minor, arrived from Falls Church, but many of the men 

lacked powder or flints. After sleeping on the floor of the House of 

Representatives on the night of the twenty-third, they reported to 

the arsenal at Greenleaf Point, where Colonel Carberry, formerly of 

the 36th U.S. Infantry, supplied the items. 

While the British remained at Upper Marlboro on the morning 

of 23 August, Armstrong convinced the president that since the 

British possessed no cavalry or artillery, they could not storm the 

city. Both he and General Winder firmly believed that Annapolis was 

the most likely British objective. By 1400, however, Ross revealed his 

intentions. After leaving a rear guard at Upper Marlboro, the army 

marched toward Washington. The 1st, or Light Brigade, under the 

command of Col. William Thornton, comprised the veteran 85th 

Regiment of Foot and the light infantry companies from all four 

regiments, plus one company each of British and colonial marines. 

The 2d Brigade, commanded by Col. Arthur Brooke, included the 

4th and 44th Regiments of Foot. The 3d Brigade of Col. William 

Patterson was composed of the 21st Foot and the 2d Battalion of 

Royal Marines. They were followed by detachments of sailors, 

shipboard marines, and artillery.

The advance guard easily forced Major Peter’s detachment to retire 

and then conducted some countermarches to confuse the Americans. 

Before Peter’s men arrived at Long Old Fields, Secretary of State 

Monroe, who fancied himself as more of a military man than a diplomat, wrote to Madison: “General Winder proposes to retire. . . . The 

enemies are in full march to Washington. Have the materials prepared 

to destroy the bridges. P.S. – You had better remove the records.” 

Just before nightfall, General Winder ordered his forces at Long 

Old Fields to retreat across the Eastern Branch of the Potomac 

(now called the Anacostia River), and told Stansbury to form a 

defensive line on the river’s right bank at Bladensburg. The Eastern 

Branch was too deep to ford between Bladensburg and its confluence with the Potomac. Ross had no means to build bridges, so 

the Americans could easily prevent him from entering Washington 

south of Bladensburg either by defending or destroying the two 

bridges that spanned the lower reaches of the Eastern Branch. A 

third bridge, however, existed at Bladensburg itself, just above the 
•••• 33 ••••

head of navigation. Here, the Eastern Branch narrowed and even 

became fordable in places. Winder was convinced that an advance 

toward Washington would come that way. 

As panic struck Washington, clerks loaded government records 

for shipment to safety. When he realized that no one had carried out 

his orders to destroy the two lower bridges over the Eastern Branch, 

Winder had the commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, Capt. 

Thomas Tingey, supply the necessary boats and powder, with Barney’s 

men protecting them until the job was complete. He then ordered the 

East Capitol Bridge set on fire. 

The Battle of Bladensburg, 24 August 1814 

As the Americans fell back to Bladensburg, Admiral Cochrane 

directed his subordinates to return to Benedict. Arguing that “we 

must go on,” Cockburn convinced Ross to disregard Cochrane’s order, and on the morning of 24 August, the British resumed marching 

toward Washington. Meanwhile, after some hesitation as to where 

best to establish his main defensive line, Winder deployed his forces. 

He ordered the 1st Columbian Brigade, Scott’s regulars, and Lt. 

Col. Jacint Laval’s 140-man squadron of the 1st U.S. Dragoons to 

march to Bladensburg immediately. Barney, left behind at the site of 

the lower bridges, requested and received the president’s permission 

to follow with his brigade. Madison and his entourage went out as 

well, nearly riding into the path of the British advance guard before 

observant vedettes redirected them to a place of relative safety. As 

the troops arrived, Winder had little time to sort out and position 

units, resulting in a haphazard defense. 

Stansbury had placed the six 6-pounders of his two artillery 

companies in an earthen battery position—called a barbette—about 

350 yards from the Bladensburg Bridge, and deployed Pickney’s 

riflemen in the brush along the river’s western bank. On orders from 

Winder, he posted the rest of his brigade in a second line to cover 

the junction on the Georgetown Pike, where the Washington Pike 

forked toward the capital. Stansbury arrayed Ragan’s and Schutz’s 

battalions on line in an orchard with Sterrett’s in support. When 

the Columbian Brigade arrived, Wadsworth positioned one of its 

artillery companies, with three 6-pounders, on the Georgetown 

Pike to the left of Stansbury’s second line, and Winder sent Capt. 

John Doughty’s Navy Yard Rifles to Pickney’s left flank. Laval’s 

dragoons, along with several militia cavalry units, took a position 

behind and to the left of Stansbury’s line. Monroe suggested that 

the horsemen occupy a deep ravine, but the ground proved so low 
•••• 34 ••••

that the troopers could see nothing to their front. He then without 

consulting either Stansbury or Winder ordered Schutz and Ragan to 

move their troops five hundred yards to the rear, where they could 

support neither Sterrett nor the skirmishers. The move essentially 

left the forward deployed artillery companies and riflemen without 

infantry support to oppose an attack. Before Stansbury could correct the error, British units appeared outside of Bladensburg. 

Winder hurriedly formed a third defensive line on high ground 

just beyond where Turncliff Bridge crossed the stream at the bottom of the ravine. Just north, or left, of the road, he positioned 

Walter Smith’s Columbian Brigade with Scott’s regulars extending 

to the left, supported by Major Peter’s six light field guns. Capt. 

John Stull’s District of Columbia Rifles and Capt. John Davidson’s 

Union Rifles took up positions forward of this line to dominate the 

ravine. As soon as Barney’s command arrived, he placed his heavy 

guns on the Washington Pike to the right of Smith’s brigade, and 

extended to the right with sailors acting as infantry and Miller’s 

marines. Finally, Col. William Beall’s composite brigade of eight 

hundred men drawn from three Maryland regiments arrived from 

Annapolis just ahead of the British advance and took position on 

a hill to Miller’s right (Map 5). Winder, however, never told Smith, 

Barney, or Beall what he expected them to accomplish. By noon, 

the hastily assembled defenders numbered about seven thousand, 

mostly inadequately trained militia.

The British Army consisted of about four thousand veterans. The 

Light Brigade arrived first. On seeing the Americans across the river, 

Lt. George Gleig of the 85th Foot described that the Americans “were 

on a bare hill, their battle line very awkward in appearance, drawn 

three ranks deep . . . [and more] like a crowd of spectators” than 

soldiers. He noted that “they were sufficiently armed but wretchedly 

equipped.” Ross decided to attack immediately and ordered Colonel 

Thornton to advance the Light Brigade across the bridge without 

waiting for the 2d and 3d Brigades. 

When the Americans near the bridge noticed the 85th Foot 

preparing to attack, they opened fire with artillery. To minimize 

casualties, Thornton ordered his men to form behind the cover of 

nearby Lowndes Hill, prompting the Americans to cheer believing 

the British were retreating. The 85th Foot re-formed and advanced. 

Maryland militia Pvt. Henry Fulford observed that “their men moved 

like clock-work; the instant a part of a platoon was cut down it was 

filled up by the men in the rear without the least noise and confusion 

whatever, so as to present always a solid column to the mouths of 
•••• 35 ••••

our cannon.” At the same time, Ross had his Royal Marine Artillery 

fire their Congreve rockets at the American first line. 

Thornton, mounted on his horse and waving his sword, led his 

men across the bridge. They reached the far side, fanned out to secure the bridgehead, and drove the Americans from the riverbank. 

The severely wounded Pinckney ordered his riflemen to withdraw, 

and despite the quickness of the British advance, the artillerymen 

brought most of their guns. Thornton deployed his men in open 

order and urged them forward in a rush toward the second American 

line. Stansbury’s battalions withstood the initial onslaught and 

forced the British back toward the riverbank. Stansbury ordered 

Sterrett’s 5th Maryland, with remnants of the rifle battalion, to 

counterattack the Light Brigade as it re-formed in the orchard. 

Sterrett’s men advanced and held their own, trading volleys with 

the British, until Thornton extended his line to overlap their flanks. 

Meanwhile, Ross ordered Colonel Brooke to advance the 2d Brigade

against the flanks of the American second line battalions as rocket 

fire concentrated on the militiamen. 

1 s t M D

2 d M D

1 s t D C

B A R N E Y

1 7 t h M D

3 8 t h

3 6 t h

5 t h M D

S T A N S B U

R

Y

First Line

Third Line

Second Line

PINKNEY

T H O R N TO N

Eastern Branch of

the Potomac R

Lowndes Hill

Turncli Bridge

G E O R G ET O W N PIKE

WA S H I N G T O N PIKE

Bladensburg

0 1000

Yards

24 August 1814

B A T T L E O F B L A D E N S B U R G

British Position

British Attack

American Position

American Retreat

Map 5
•••• 36 ••••

The 4th Foot crossed the bridge and pressed Stansbury’s right 

flank as the 44th Foot forded upstream and attacked Sterrett’s left. 

Seeing the 5th Maryland pressed on three sides, Winder ordered a 

withdrawal. Thornton’s redcoats then resumed their advance, with 

Brooke’s 4th and 44th Foot threatening the left and right flanks, 

respectively, of what remained of Stansbury’s line. Unnerved by 

the rocket fire, many of Schutz’s and Ragan’s men were unable 

to resist further. They managed two volleys and then began to 

retire. Although the withdrawal started in good order, it soon 

became a rout. Colonel Ragan attempted to rally his troops, but 

was injured, thrown from his horse, and taken prisoner. As British 

forces advanced on the retreating 5th Maryland, it too dissolved. 

Winder had expected the units from the first and second lines to 

rally behind the third line, but his orders were unclear, and instead 

the withdrawing troops raced down the Georgetown Pike toward 

Washington and away from the battle. As the fleeing infantry passed 

the dragoons, a number of the horsemen joined the retreat. After 

an out-of-control artillery wagon hit and injured him, Laval led his 

remaining troopers toward Georgetown. The president witnessed 

the debacle unfold. By 1400, he sullenly made his way back to 

Washington to prepare to evacuate the government. 

After forcing the District of Columbia militiamen guarding 

Turncliff Bridge to scatter, Ross’ men encountered stiffer resistance. Fire from Barney’s five guns in the road halted their advance, and Peter’s 6-pounders hammered the British as well. Ross 

therefore ordered a wider flanking movement. Beall’s militia fired 

two ineffective volleys and then retreated, leaving the American 

right flank exposed. Upon seeing this, Miller led the sailors and 

marines in a counterattack that briefly checked the threat to the 

American artillery. With most artillery ammunition expended, 

civilian drivers fleeing, and enemy troops dangerously near, Barney 

ordered his sailors and marines to spike their guns and to retreat 

as best they could. The British captured Barney and Miller, both 

wounded, and a number of their men before they could evacuate 

their position.

British units moving against the left of the American third 

line also enjoyed success. The nervous Columbian militiamen of 

Col. George Magruder’s 1st Regiment opened fire on the advancing British too soon and retreated after two ineffective volleys. 

Knowing that a large part of his third line was giving way, a shaken 

Winder ordered Smith to withdraw the rest of his brigade to form 

a new line, which it did in good order. The regulars remained in 
•••• 37 ••••

position until Winder personally ordered them to join Smith’s 

brigade, over Scott’s objection, before they had fired a shot. When 

Peter’s artillerymen received the order to retreat, they fired one last 

volley, limbered their guns, and skillfully withdrew. The British 

had inflicted about one hundred casualties on the Americans, but 

incurred close to three hundred of their own. Losses among officers were especially high, due in part to Ross ordering the Light 

Brigade’s hasty assault without waiting for the follow-on forces. 

The American defeat at Bladensburg opened the way for Ross 

to enter Washington. Most of Winder’s army fled through the 

city and did not stop until reaching Georgetown. Disheartened 

and concerned about their private property, many militiamen left 

the ranks and returned home. Armstrong, Monroe, and Winder 

debated whether to make a last stand on Capitol Hill. The secretary of war suggested that the stout limestone walls of the 

Capitol made an ideal strongpoint, but Monroe and especially 

Winder believed that the army had been reduced to a point at 

which it could not offer a credible defense. Rather than risk 

capture, General Winder recommended that they retreat to the 

heights beyond Georgetown. Meanwhile, President Madison’s 

wife, Dolley, supervised the evacuation of the executive mansion—or White House—and departed for Virginia. The president 

with some key aides fled first to Virginia then to Montgomery 

Court House (now Rockville), Maryland. 

After allowing his exhausted, albeit victorious, troops a 

short rest, Ross led the 3d Brigade into the city late on the 

twenty-fourth. At about sunset, British soldiers set the House 

of Representatives, Senate, and the Library of Congress ablaze. 

Shots fired from the vicinity of Robert Sweall’s house killed one 

and wounded three British soldiers, and shot Ross’ horse from 

under him. Unable to find those responsible, Ross ordered the 

house burned. Meanwhile, Captain Tingey and the last clerks 

and sailors evacuated the Navy Yard after demolishing it and 

setting the nearly completed frigate Columbia and sloop-of-war 

Argus on fire to prevent their capture. Admiral Cockburn ordered the president’s mansion and the nearby Treasury building 

looted and burned. The buildings were fully engulfed in flames 

in a short time, but a hard rain limited much of the damage. 

With their objective accomplished, the British troops began their 

return march to Upper Marlboro late on the twenty-fifth. Back 

in Benedict by 29 August, they loaded aboard their vessels and 

rejoined the fleet two days later.
•••• 38 ••••

British Raids, August 1814 

While Ross and his men returned to their transports, Capt. James 

Gordon’s Potomac River squadron arrived opposite Fort Washington 

on 27 August, just out of range of its batteries. In preparation for a 

dawn attack, Gordon had his powerful bomb vessels commence firing 

their heavy mortars. General Winder had earlier ordered the fort’s 

commander, Capt. Samuel T. Dyson, to blow up the magazine, destroy 

the works, and evacuate the fort if attacked from its landward side. 

Dyson did not wait. As soon as the first shells fell, he destroyed the 

fort and fled with his sixty-man garrison. With the fort neutralized, 

Gordon headed for Alexandria, with its fully stocked warehouses 

and harbor crowded with merchant vessels. 

The mayor and city leaders surrendered the city on 28 August, 

trusting Gordon’s promise that he would only seize property of military or commercial value and would not burn or loot the town if he 

encountered no resistance. After the army returned to the transports, 

a courier ship brought Gordon orders to rejoin the fleet. The return 

journey proved more dangerous than the raid. Capt. David Porter 

of the U.S. Navy had come to Washington with one hundred sailors 

Capture and burning of Washington by the British, in 1814 

(Library of Congress)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 39 ••••

and marines to man the frigate Columbia. With the ship destroyed, 

Porter joined forces with General Hungerford, who had positioned 

infantry and field artillery along the riverbank near White House 

Landing to harass Gordon’s ships as they struggled to get back down 

the river. Nevertheless, all eight British warships and twenty-one heavily laden prizes rejoined the fleet. After the fight, Porter commended 

“Captain Spencer of the U.S. Artillery late second in command at 

Fort Washington and now in command of the officers and men . . . 

attached to my command by the War Department—they have given 

the most unquestionable proof that it was not want of courage on 

their part which caused the destruction of that Fort.” 

Two days after the British left Washington, President Madison and 

most of his cabinet returned to the nation’s capital. Recriminations 

over who was responsible for the Bladensburg debacle followed, and 

much blame fell on Armstrong. No longer enjoying the president’s 

favor, Armstrong tendered his resignation and went home to New 

York. Monroe took over, concurrently serving as secretary of state 

and secretary of war. 

As the events around Washington transpired toward the end of 

August, a small British squadron under Capt. Sir Peter Parker appeared 

off Kent Island. Parker had orders to create a diversion that would 

keep Eastern Shore militia from reinforcing Baltimore or Washington, 

and to seize material worth prize money. After burning and looting 

two farms, Parker learned that two hundred men of the 21st Maryland 

Regiment, under the command of Revolutionary War veteran Lt. 

Col. Philip Reed, had gathered near Chestertown. Late on 30 August, 

Parker landed with 125 sailors and marines and raided two farms 

called Waltham and Chantilly before moving against the militia camp. 

Ordering his men to form a line near his campsite and on a slight 

rise at a clearing called Caulk’s Field, Reed prepared to contest the 

raiders’ progress. He arrayed four infantry companies in line, with an 

artillery company and its five light cannon in the center, facing the 

open field. In a wood just forward of the clearing, Reed deployed a 

company of riflemen under the command of Capt. Simon Wickes to 

act as skirmishers. With the ambient illumination of a full moon and 

guided by a captured slave, Parker’s force approached the American 

line. When the column was within seventy paces, Wickes opened fire. 

Parker’s men immediately deployed into battle formation and drove 

the riflemen back toward the right of Reed’s main line. Thinking that 

the militia were retreating, the British surged ahead to exploit their 

success. Instead of being routed, the Americans repulsed the British 

advance with blasts of grapeshot and musketry. 
•••• 40 ••••

Parker re-formed his men and attempted to turn Reed’s left flank, 

but once again the Marylanders stood firm. The fighting continued 

for more than an hour until both sides had nearly exhausted their 

ammunition. A crucial turning point in the fighting came when Parker 

was struck in the leg. Not believing that the wound was serious, he 

continued to urge his men forward. A piece of buckshot, however, 

had nicked his femoral artery and he bled to death. Other British 

casualties included fourteen dead and twenty-seven wounded, as 

compared to one dead and three wounded Americans. Defeated, the 

British returned to their ships to rejoin the fleet. 

Meanwhile, back on Maryland’s Western Shore, former Maryland 

governor Robert Bowie, 65-year-old Dr. William Beanes of Academy 

Hill, and a few other leading citizens of the area outside Washington 

had rounded up and imprisoned a number of stragglers, wounded, 

and deserters from Ross’ army once it had embarked. One of the detainees escaped and informed the British general—incorrectly—that 

Dr. Beanes and others were killing the stragglers. Ross sent sixty men 

back to Upper Marlboro to investigate. Finding that the Americans 

were holding stragglers and hiding deserters, the British threatened 

to burn the town unless they were returned. To show that they were 

serious, they took the doctor and other citizens as prisoners. 

Plans and Preparations 

In the two weeks that followed, Cochrane vacillated on his next 

target. He recognized that his primary mission was to draw U.S. forces 

away from Canada. He wrote to First Lord of the Admiralty Lord 

Melville on 3 September that once all his troops were re-embarked and 

fleet united, he intended to sail northward, and possibly raid Rhode 

Island. After a rest and refit in Nova Scotia, he would then return 

south in October to strike the Carolinas, Georgia, and ultimately New 

Orleans, Louisiana. But before he left the Chesapeake, he wanted to 

take some action against Baltimore. Home to hundreds of privateers 

that had long plagued British commercial shipping, he told Melville 

that “this town must be laid in ashes.” The question was whether to 

attack now while the Americans were still demoralized following 

the destruction of their capital or later after he had attacked Rhode 

Island. Ross preferred to head to Rhode Island first, but Cockburn 

persuaded both the general and Admiral Cochrane that the time was 

right to strike Baltimore. 

Fortunately for the Americans, they had now had over a year to improve Baltimore’s defenses. After the first British vessels had appeared 

near Baltimore in 1813, Maryland Governor Levin Winder had ordered 
•••• 41 ••••

the local militia commander, 

General Samuel Smith, to assume responsibility for improving 

the city’s inadequate defenses. 

An experienced combat veteran, 

Smith had served as an infantry 

officer during the Revolutionary 

War and had achieved notoriety 

for the defense of Fort Mifflin in 

1777. He had remained active in 

the militia and had commanded 

the state’s troops called to federal service during the Whiskey 

Rebellion in 1794. A sitting U.S. 

senator, Smith proved an excellent 

choice for the task of enhancing 

Baltimore’s defenses. 

His first priority had been 

to improve Fort McHenry, situated at Whetstone Point, where 

the Patapsco River split into the 

Northwest Branch, which led 

directly into the city’s harbor, 

and the Ferry, or Middle, Branch. 

Through great effort he had acquired additional cannon from a variety of sources and had Fort 

McHenry’s irascible commander, Maj. Lloyd Beall, replaced with 

the cooperative veteran Maj. George Armistead. By September 1814, 

Smith had created a credible defense system for Baltimore’s harbor. 

Fort McHenry’s well-trained garrison consisted of sixty regulars of 

the U.S. Army Corps of Artillery commanded by Capt. Frederick 

Evans and seventy-five members of the Baltimore Fencibles, a volunteer militia artillery company in federal service commanded by Capt. 

Joseph H. Nicholson. Across from Fort McHenry on the Northwest 

Branch was a battery of three 18-pounder guns at Lazaretto Point. 

Lt. Solomon Frazier commanded the post, which was manned by 

45 flotillamen acting as gunners and an additional 114 serving as 

infantry. The Lazaretto guns not only reinforced Fort McHenry, 

but also covered a log-and-chain boom, backed up by sunken hulks, 

that obstructed the harbor entrance. Eight barges commanded by Lt. 

Solomon Rutter, each manned by a crew of 34 flotillamen and armed 

with an 8- or 12-pounder in the bow, stood behind the line of hulks 

Samuel Smith,

by Rembrandt Peale 

(Maryland Historical Society)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 42 ••••

to further enhance the obstacle. The fact that the Northwest Branch 

was relatively narrow and too shallow to admit deep-draft warships 

further strengthened the defense of Baltimore’s harbor.

To guard the broader Ferry Branch that offered access to the city 

from the south, Smith had augmented Fort McHenry with a water 

battery. The battery, which covered both the main channel as well as 

the Ferry Branch, consisted of two parallel earthworks along the shoreline. At least fifteen of its thirty-six guns were long-range 42-pounders 

taken from the wrecked French ship-of-the-line, L’Eole, which had 

run aground off the Virginia Capes in 1806 and had been towed into 

Baltimore. Commanded by militia Capt. John Berry, the water battery 

guns were manned by a mixed force consisting of two companies of 

Maryland volunteer militia artillery—Berry’s own Washington Artillery 

with one hundred men and the Baltimore Independent Artillerists with 

seventy-five men under the command of Lt. Charles Pennington. Sixty 

flotillamen commanded by Sailing Master Solomon Rodman and two 

companies of U.S. Sea Fencibles, at least one hundred ten men in total 

commanded by Capts. Matthew S. Bunbury and William H. Addison, 

rounded out the defenders. The Sea Fencibles were a unique corps 

recruited from unemployed members of the maritime trades by the 

The Flag is Full of Stars,

by Dale Gallon

(Gallon Historical Art) •••••••••••••••
•••• 43 ••••

War Department (the modern-day 

Department of the Army) to serve 

in harbor defenses. 

Four other fortifications to the 

rear of Fort McHenry completed 

the water defenses. Situated on 

the Ferry Branch about one and 

three-quarter miles away from 

Fort McHenry, Fort Babcock 

(originally called the Sailor’s 

Battery) was a four-foot-high 

semicircular earthwork. Fiftytwo flotillamen commanded by 

Sailing Master John A. Webster 

manned its six 18-pounder naval guns. Two miles west of 

Fort McHenry and also facing the Ferry Branch was Fort 

Covington. Originally called 

Fort Patapsco, it consisted of a 

fleche or V-shaped battery with 

a six-foot-deep ditch and tenfoot-high brick wall. Lt. Henry 

Newcomb commanded the eighty 

sailors from USS Guerriere who 

manned its battery of ten to twelve 18-pounder naval guns mounted 

en barbette, thereby allowing them to fire over the top of the earthen 

parapet. Guarding the landward approaches to Forts Babcock and 

Covington was Fort Wood (originally called Fort Lookout), a circular structure with a ten-foot-high “demi-revetted” brick wall with 

emplacements for ten 18-pounders. A detachment of sailors commanded by Lt. George Budd manned its seven guns. Finally, seamen 

commanded by Sailing Master Leonard Hall manned a single-gun 

battery emplaced on Federal Hill overlooking Baltimore harbor. It 

provided a critical observation post to keep the defenders informed 

of British naval activity up to twelve miles away.

As for Baltimore’s land defenses, Smith recognized that the easiest land route into the city was from the east via the Patapsco Neck, 

with the most likely landing place being at North Point on Old 

Road Bay, near the point at which the Patapsco River empties into 

Chesapeake Bay. He had therefore picketed Patapsco Neck and turned 

Hampstead—or Loundenslager’s—Hill, located just east of the city, 

George Armistead,

by Rembrandt Peale

(Maryland Historical Society)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 44 ••••

into a veritable Gibraltar. Studded with batteries and strongpoints, the 

main American defense line stretched more than one mile long from 

the Patapsco River shoreline north along the hill to the Belair Road. 

Smith placed a second line of battery positions on the high ground 

behind the main line of resistance so that if compelled to retreat, the 

defenders could continue to fight in depth. Supplemental detached 

breastworks and batteries guarded approaches from the north and west.

Constructing all of these fortifications had taken considerable 

effort. Fortunately for Smith, he had received the full cooperation 

of city officials who had formed a Committee of Vigilance and 

Safety with access to money on easy terms and extensive authority 

for improving local security. In addition to authorizing Smith to 

call out the city militia for regular drill and exercises, the committee 

had required all able-bodied males who did not shoulder muskets to 

shoulder shovels. Working in shifts every fourth day, every male inhabitant—white and black, free and slave—had been put to work digging 

entrenchments. They reported at 0600 and toiled until dark. Several 

militia officers with engineering and construction experience assisted 

engineer and architect J. Maximilian M. Godefroy in supervising the 

civilian labor. To facilitate the preparations and relieve the congestion caused by the movement of troops, work parties, and supplies 

through the city, Smith had a floating bridge built across the harbor. 

Expecting an attack at any time, by September 1814 the United 

States had amassed a considerable force at Baltimore. The federal 

contribution consisted of the 1st Dragoons; detachments of regulars 

from the 14th, 36th, and 38th U.S. Infantry; and several hundred sailors 

and marines, the latter under the command of Commodore Rodgers. 

The War Department also supplied about fifteen hundred muskets to 

better arm local militiamen. Maryland provided three militia brigades 

drawn from around the state. Pennsylvania sent a provisional division 

of militia under the command of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Watson, while 

Virginia contributed a militia division under Maj. Gen. John Pegram. 

Determined to avoid a repeat of Bladensburg, General Smith had the 

various units of militia drilling every morning and evening to prepare 

for the coming battle. When the men were not at drill or on patrol 

down the Patapsco Neck, they helped dig entrenchments. All totaled, 

the defenders numbered nearly fourteen thousand, far exceeding the 

five thousand men the British could put ashore. 

Technically, the commander of the 10th Military District, General 

Winder, should have commanded this impressive force, particularly as 

he held a federal commission while Smith was only a militia general. 

The debacle at Bladensburg, however, had damaged General Winder’s 
•••• 45 ••••

reputation and several federal and state officials preferred that Smith 

hold command. Governor Winder deftly resolved the situation when 

he implied that Smith had become the ranking Army officer when 

the War Department had called him and his Maryland militia into 

federal service. When General Winder appealed, acting Secretary of 

War Monroe assented to Smith’s seniority with his silence. Although 

not pleased, General Winder accepted his subordination.

With the command situation resolved, Smith proceeded to deploy 

his forces. He placed the regular infantrymen led by Lt. Col. William 

Steuart at Fort McHenry. Together with Major Armistead’s mixed 

garrison of regular and militia artillery, Sea Fencibles, and flotillamen, 

about one thousand troops manned the harbor’s principal defensive 

post. Commodore Rodgers posted some elements of his naval contingent at the Lazaretto Point and Ferry Branch defenses. The rest, mostly 

from USS Guerriere, took position on Hampstead Hill, with sailors 

manning the fifteen guns in the five-battery positions closest to the river, 

and marines behind the breastworks covering the most likely avenue of 

enemy advance to that sector. That section of the front, running from 

the Sugar House near the mouth of Harris Creek to the Philadelphia 

Road, thus became known as Rodgers’ Bastion. Smith positioned 

a provisional brigade commanded by Maryland militia Maj. Bealle 

Randall behind Rodgers. Randall’s men included the reconstituted 

Assembly of Troops before the Battle of Baltimore,

by Thomas Ruckle Sr. (Maryland Historical Society) •••••••••••••••
•••• 46 ••••

1st Maryland Regiment—looking to redeem its reputation tarnished 

at Bladensburg and now commanded by Capt. Henry Steiner—and a 

battalion of Pennsylvania volunteer militia riflemen. The companies 

of Lt. Col. David Harris’ 1st Regiment, Maryland Volunteer Artillery, 

not deployed elsewhere, and Capt. George Stiles’ 1st Marine Artillery 

of the Union took position with forty-seven guns emplaced among 

the three batteries north of the Philadelphia Road. Smith supported 

them with two Maryland brigades to the rear—Brig. Gen. Thomas 

Foreman’s 1st and Stansbury’s 11th—and with detachments behind 

earthworks east of the York Road at McKim’s Hill. All together, the 

main defense line at Hampstead Hill and supporting locations contained ten thousand troops, with sixty-two artillery pieces in mutually 

supporting batteries and strongpoints. 

To ease the tension caused by the subordination of the district 

commanding general, Smith placed General Winder in charge of the 

infantry forces south of the city. His command, which included most 

of the Virginia and Pennsylvania militia brigades, was responsible 

for supporting Forts Babcock, Covington, and Wood and for manning a breastwork at Ferry Point. Although an important mission, 

General Winder protested because his command was away from the 

most likely scene of action.

The Battle of Baltimore, 12–14 September 1814

On 10 September, observers on Federal Hill watched as British 

warships scouted the mouth of the Patapsco. The next day additional 

vessels probed farther up the river. By noon on 11 September, enemy 

transports and escorting warships anchored off North Point. Alarm 

guns sounded throughout the city. Unlike Winder at Bladensburg, 

Smith intended to conduct an active defense. He directed a number of 

small units to reinforce the light forces already screening on the south 

bank of the Patapsco. He then instructed Brig. Gen. John Stricker 

to deploy his entire 3d Brigade forward to Patapsco Neck to delay 

the British as they advanced along the single road that led to the city. 

Numbering three thousand men, the 3d Brigade consisted of five 

infantry regiments, a battalion of riflemen, a company of artillery, 

and a regiment of cavalry, all from the Baltimore area. The brigade 

arguably was the most capable of the three Maryland militia brigades. 

Stricker—Barney’s brother-in-law—had served in combat during the 

Revolutionary War and had been called into federal service during 

the Whiskey Rebellion. 

The brigade marched at about 1500, headed down the North 

Point Road. It halted at approximately 2000, just below the junction 
•••• 47 ••••

with Trappe Road, where the neck 

of land narrowed to less than 

one mile wide between Bread 

and Cheese Creek on the north 

and Bear Creek on the south. 

Stricker chose his ground based 

on previous reconnaissance. He 

established camp behind a strong 

pike-rail fence at the edge of a 

wood line facing a large field 

where, except for the cover provided by the Bouldin farm, the 

enemy would have to cross an 

open area. On the rising ground 

behind the clearing, Stricker set 

up headquarters in a Methodist 

meeting house. As volunteer militia companies from Hagerstown, 

Maryland, and Pennsylvania arrived to reinforce his brigade, he 

attached them to several of his 

subordinate regiments and prepared for battle. He ordered Capt. 

William B. Dyer, commanding in 

the place of the wounded Major 

Pinckney, to advance the 1st Maryland Rifle Battalion, accompanied 

by the 5th Maryland Cavalry. After the riflemen formed a skirmish 

line two miles farther down the neck, Lt. Col. James Biay led the one 

hundred forty troopers one mile farther, and deployed as vedettes near 

the Gorsuch farm. 

At 0300 on 12 September, as British gun brigs came in close to 

North Point to lend naval gunfire support if needed, the first landing 

boats pulled toward shore loaded with red-coated soldiers. Soon after, 

the Light Brigade, now consisting of all the light infantry companies 

and the 85th Foot, was ashore. Ross sent them ahead at about 0700 

under the command of Maj. Timothy Jones to reconnoiter. Ross 

told his second in command, Colonel Brooke, to supervise the rest 

of the landing and advance with the 21st Foot and the artillery as 

soon as possible so as to attack that morning. By 0800, six field 

pieces and two howitzers, plus their horses and limbers, had landed 

and advanced inland. Brooke caught up with Ross at the Gorsuch 

farm to report, just when a British patrol brought in some captured 

John Stricker,

by Rembrandt Peale 

(Maryland Historical Society)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 48 ••••

American cavalrymen. The prisoners told Ross that he faced twenty 

thousand militia, at which the British commander scoffed, “I don’t 

care if it rains militia.” The general ordered Brooke to go back and 

hurry the troops along as American troops were probably in the area. 

The cavalry vedettes had kept Stricker well informed. By 0700, 

he knew the British had landed. He sent his baggage back toward 

Baltimore and deployed his brigade in three lines, with Dyer’s skirmishers to the front. He formed the first line just inside a wood astride 

North Point Road. Colonel Sterrett’s battle-tested 5th Maryland was 

posted on the south side with its right flank resting on a branch of 

Bear Creek. Lt. Col. Kennedy Long’s 27th Maryland formed on 

the north with its left flank extending to Bread and Cheese Creek. 

The six 4-pounder field guns of Capt. John Montgomery’s Union 

Artillery Company from Baltimore straddled the road between the 

two infantry regiments. The position stretched a mile long. Three 

hundred yards to the rear, behind the west bank of Bread and Cheese 

Creek, Stricker deployed Lt. Col. Henry Amey’s 51st Maryland on 

the right and Lt. Col. Benjamin Fowler’s 39th Maryland on the left 

Battle of North Point

by Don Troiani/National Guard Heritage Painting

•••••••••••••••
•••• 49 ••••

side of the road. One half mile farther to the rear, on Perego’s Hill 

near Cook’s Tavern, Stricker positioned Lt. Col. William McDonald’s 

6th Maryland in reserve (see Map 6). 

Stricker planned for Dyer’s riflemen to retard the enemy’s 

progress until the two forward regiments in the first line took up 

the fight against the leading British units. After forcing the British 

to deploy into battle formation, the first line would hold as long 

as possible without risking becoming decisively engaged, and then 

withdraw through the second line to take position on the right of 

McDonald’s regiment. The second line would then take up the battle, 

repeat the tactic of the first, and withdraw to McDonald’s left. The 

reunited brigade would then engage in a fighting withdrawal back 

to Hampstead Hill. 

The plan got off to a rocky start. Acting on a false rumor that 

British marines had landed to his rear, Dyer ordered the riflemen 

back before they had fired a shot. Chagrinned by the unauthorized 

retreat, Stricker ordered Dyer and the cavalrymen who had returned 

from scouting to take positions on the front line to the right of the 5th 

Maryland. When vedettes reported that a British advance party was at 

the Gorsuch farmhouse, several officers of the 5th Maryland Regiment 

volunteered to lead their companies for a strike. Maj. Richard Heath of 

the 5th Maryland advanced with Capt. Aaron Levering’s Independent 

Blues and Capt. Benjamin C. Howard’s Mechanical Volunteers of that 

regiment, Capt. Edward Aisquith’s Sharp Shooters from the rifle battalion, and Lt. John S. Styles’ detachment of artillerymen with one gun. 

They deployed about a half mile forward, and the two hundred fifty 

Americans quickly initiated a sharp skirmish with the British advance 

guard. After sustaining some casualties, the Americans withdrew while 

continuing a running fight through the thick woods. 

Ross and Cockburn heard the firing and rode forward to assess 

the situation. The American foray surprised Ross and caused him to 

overestimate his opponent’s strength. He decided to bring his army’s 

main body forward quickly, and just as he turned in the saddle to tell 

Cockburn, a round of ball and buckshot struck him in the arm and 

chest. He fell from his horse mortally wounded as aides and subordinate officers rushed to his assistance. Ross died as he was carried 

back to the landing site for medical treatment. His death shocked 

the British, and Colonel Brooke assumed command. He brought up 

reinforcements that drove Heath’s men back to the main American 

line. While bringing up his own artillery, Brooke perceived a “several 

hundred yard gap” between the American left and the Back River, 

and he moved to exploit it. Seeing the British move toward his left 
Map 6

BRITISH BOMBARDMENT

of FORT McHENRY

13–14 Sep

BRITISH FEINTS 14 Sep

No r t hwe st B ra n c h Jones Falls

Harris Creek

P a t a p s c o R i v e r

F e r r y B r a n c h

Cu r tis Cr e e k

P

a

t

a

p

s

c

H a m p s t e a d H i l l

F e d e r a l H i l l

P

Sunken Hulks

Fe l l ’s Po i n t

W h e t s t o n e P o i n t

Rodgers’ Bastion P H IL A D ELP H I A R O A D

TR A PPE R O A D

N O RT H P O I N T R 

REISTERST OWN R O A D

FRE D ERICK R O A D

B EL A IR R O A D

Y O RK R O A D

Fort Covington

Fort

 Babcock

Fort Wood

Lazaretto

 Battery

For t McHenr y

Ferry Point

Redoubt

Worthington’s Mill

B A LT I M O R E

0 2

Mile

12–14 September 1814

B A T T L E O F B A L T I M O R E

American Position

American Retreat

American Entrenchments

British Position

British Landing

British Advance

British Attack 
S T

R I C

K

E

R

5 t h M D

3 9 t h M D

5 1 s t M D

6 t h M D

2 7 t h M D

R O S S

R O S S

NORTH POINT 12 Sep 1814

B e a r C r e e k

Bread and Cheese Creek

Old Road Bay

Mi d d l e R i v e r

B

a c k

R i v e r

o

R

i

v

e r

C H E S A

P

E

A

K

E

B

A

Y

B

A

C

K

R I V

E

R

N

E

C

K

A

T

A

P

S

C

O

N

E

C

K

N o r t h Po i n t

S p a r r o w ’s Po i n t

R O A D

TR A PPE R O A D

Unnished

Trench

Sollers

Bouldin

Meeting House

Cook’s Tavern

Jones

Todd’s

Gorsuch
•••• 52 ••••

flank, Stricker ordered the 39th Maryland to the left of the 27th 

Maryland, and ordered the 51st Maryland to form at a right angle 

to protect his vulnerable left flank. Such a maneuver under fire was 

beyond the capabilities of the inexperienced troops, and instead of 

forming where Stricker wanted them, they milled about in confusion. 

The death of General Ross near Baltimore, by G. M. Brighty

(Library of Congress)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 53 ••••

Sensing the moment was right to attack, at 1450 Brooke launched 

a furious assault concentrated on Stricker’s left flank. Both sides traded 

volleys, but the 51st Maryland became confused and broke, taking part 

of the 39th Maryland along with them. While the left crumbled under 

the fire of Brooke’s 4th Foot, the more reliable troops on Stricker’s right 

held firm. Blasted with musketry and grapeshot, the 21st and 44th

Foot suffered heavy casualties assaulting the 5th and 27th Maryland. 

After an hour of heavy fighting, Stricker, whose orders were to fight a 

delaying action, directed his infantry and artillery to fall back to join 

the 6th Maryland at Cook’s Tavern. While the British claimed that they 

drove and scattered the Americans from the field, Stricker reported 

most of his units had re-formed. Brooke did not order his forces to 

exploit their success, but remained on the battlefield until the morning 

of 13 September. Stricker listed his losses as 24 killed, 139 wounded, 

and 50 men captured. In addition to General Ross, the British suffered 

38 killed, 251 wounded, and 50 men missing. 

Having accomplished his mission, Stricker withdrew toward 

Worthington’s Mills and took new positions as Smith had ordered. 

General Winder arrived with Brig. Gen. Hugh Douglass’ Virginia 

brigade from the south of town and some regulars not deployed 

elsewhere, including a company of U.S. dragoons under Capt. John 

Burd. These forces joined Stricker on the left flank and apart from 

the main American line. They were positioned to attack the right 

flank of Brooke’s army if it continued its advance on Hampstead Hill. 

Following a heavy rain on the night of 12–13 September, Brooke 

had his men moving toward Hampstead Hill at 0530. A short while 

later, he could hear Cochrane’s bomb ships shelling Fort McHenry. 

When he reached the junction of the North Point and Philadelphia 

Roads, the sight of the American defensive line stunned Brooke. He 

had assumed that the force he had driven off at great cost the day 

before at North Point represented the main American effort. After 

realizing his error, he tried to maneuver toward the entrenchments 

on Smith’s left flank, and immediately encountered Winder’s and 

Stricker’s men arrayed on high ground in prepared positions above the 

Belair Road. When Brooke withdrew back toward the Philadelphia 

Road, Stricker and Winder advanced their brigades in a demonstration that threatened his rear. By the afternoon of 13 September, 

Brooke was content with merely sending patrols to probe Smith’s 

main line for weaknesses, possibly for a risky night attack. 

Admiral Cochrane believed that if he could pound Baltimore’s 

harbor defenses into submission, his ships could enter the harbor and 

enfilade the Hampstead Hill line with their naval guns to assist Brooke 
•••• 54 ••••

in driving off the American defenders. Due to the shallowness of the 

river, Cochrane only advanced one frigate, five bomb ships, and one 

rocket-firing ship toward Fort McHenry. Each bomb vessel had one 

10-inch and one 13-inch mortar that could fire a 200-pound exploding 

shell or an incendiary carcass every five minutes. They began firing 

toward Fort McHenry from nearly two and a half miles away by 0700. 

When the defenders attempted to reply with their larger caliber guns, 

they realized the mortars’ greater range allowed the British to remain 

beyond their reach and ceased firing by 1000. The British continued 

their bombardment against the fort, but Cochrane could tell that his 

weapons were not having the desired effect. He wrote to Cockburn 

who was ashore with Brooke: “It is impossible for the Ships to render you any assistance . . . It is for Colonel Brooke to consider . . . 

whether he has Force sufficient to defeat so large a number as it [is] 

said the Enemy has collected; say 20,000 strong or even less number 

& to take the Town.”

Meanwhile, large bombs continued to fall inside the fort’s walls 

or to explode overhead. Captain Evans saw two men killed by shell 

fragments as they hid under a heavy gun. He also stated that he 

saw a woman carrying water vaporized as a shell hit her. He noted 

that some shells “as big as a flour barrel” fell nearby and failed to 

explode. At 1400, a shell scored a direct hit on bastion number four 

and its 24-pounder, killing Lt. Levi Clagett and Sgt. John Clemm of 

the Baltimore Fencibles and wounding a number of others. When 

Cochrane ordered his bomb ships closer, the move brought them 

within range of the fort’s larger guns. After American fire damaged 

two bomb ships and damaged the rocket ship so badly that it had to 

be towed to safety by the accompanying frigate, the admiral ordered 

his vessels to retire to a safer distance. 

Cochrane continued long-range firing through the night and into 

the early morning hours of 14 September. After considering his options, Cochrane ordered Capt. Charles Napier of HMS Euryalis to 

lead twenty ship’s boats loaded with nearly twelve hundred sailors 

and marines in an attempt to slip into Ferry Branch and threaten 

Fort McHenry from its landward side. Under a driving rain, eleven of 

the boats became separated and drifted toward the Lazaretto, where 

Lieutenant Frazier’s flotillamen and nearby Pennsylvania riflemen 

prepared to repel the landing. On realizing their mistake, the British 

pulled back toward their fleet. The nine remaining boats continued 

up Ferry Branch until detected by the men at Fort Babcock. They 

opened fire and were soon followed by the guns at Fort Covington. 

Sailing Master Webster later stated, “I could hear the balls from our 
•••• 55 ••••

guns strike the barges. My men stated to me that they could hear the 

shrieks of the wounded. . . . During the firing of the enemy, I could 

distinctly see their barges by the explosion of their cannon which was 

a great guide to me to fire by.” The other batteries in and around Fort 

McHenry added their fire to punish Napier’s force as it retreated. 

By Dawn’s Early Light depicts Francis Scott Key with 

outstretched arm toward the flag at Fort McHenry,

by Edward Percy Moran (Maryland Historical Society)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 56 ••••

By 0400, 14 September, the British firing began to slacken. At 

0700 it ceased altogether. Soldiers on Hampstead Hill worried the fort 

had fallen, but the post had withstood the onslaught. Georgetown 

lawyer and militia lieutenant Francis Scott Key had been taken 

aboard a British flagship to assist in negotiating Dr. Beanes’ release. 

Key, Beanes, and Col. John Skinner, the American prisoner exchange 

agent, witnessed the nightlong bombardment with fearful anticipation. After the firing had ceased in the morning, Key saw the large 

garrison flag flying from the fort’s flagstaff. The three Americans 

knew that the men in the fort had prevailed. The sight inspired Key to 

write the poem he originally titled “The Defense of Fort McHenry,” 

which he later renamed “The Star-Spangled Banner.” It became the 

national anthem of the United States in 1931. Skinner and Key’s 

mission ultimately succeeded in obtaining Beanes’ release.

With naval forces unable to outflank Hampstead Hill, Brooke’s 

only options were to conduct an unsupported attack against a strongly 

entrenched enemy or to retreat. After weighing the advantages and 

disadvantages, he decided on withdrawal. As his army marched 

back toward North Point, Brooke halted in an attempt to lure the 

Americans into a battle in the open. Smith, however, resisted the temptation to leave the trenches. By 15 September, Cochrane’s ships reembarked the exhausted troops. British operations in the Chesapeake 

had effectively ended for the season. Before long, Cochrane headed 

to Halifax, and Cockburn departed for Bermuda. The British retained their naval base and a small contingent of colonial marines 

on Tangier Island until March 1815, the month following ratification 

of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the war. 

Analysis

The British had launched their Chesapeake campaign to serve 

as a diversion, not an invasion. Their operations, however, failed to 

compel the United States to redeploy its Regular Army from the 

Canadian theater. Allegedly stating that the nervous citizens of the 

Chesapeake should not expect the Regular Army to “defend every 

man’s turnip patch,” Secretary of War John Armstrong had chosen 

to leave the defense of the region largely to the militia. The raid on 

Washington, while a propaganda coup, likewise failed to disrupt the 

U.S. government. In his official report, Admiral Cochrane stated that 

he never actually wanted to take the economically more important 

city of Baltimore. The operation to capture America’s third largest 

city and thriving commercial center resulted in a failure that cost 
•••• 57 ••••

the lives of more than fifty British soldiers, including General Ross, 

and numerous wounded. The resolute defense surprised British commanders who had come to expect easy victories, and proved that 

American regulars and militiamen, when ably led and adequately 

trained, were equal to the soldiers of the British Empire. News of 

America’s nearly simultaneous victories at Baltimore and Plattsburgh, 

New York, where a combined U.S. land and naval force had repelled 

an invasion down Lake Champlain, contributed to Britain’s decision 

to end the war without seeking any territorial concessions from the 

United States.
•••• 58 ••••

•••

The Author

Charles P. Neimeyer, a retired Marine Corps officer, is the director of Marine Corps History and the Gray Research Center at the 

Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Georgetown University. His publications include America 

Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army (1996), The 

Revolutionary War (2007), and On the Corps: USMC Wisdom from the 

Pages of Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette, and Proceedings (2008).
•••• 59 ••••

•••

Further Readings

Eshelman, Ralph E. A Travel Guide to the War of 1812 in the Chesapeake: 

Eighteen Tours in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Eshelman, Ralph E., and Burton K. Kummerow. In Full Glory 

Reflected: Discovering the War of 1812 in the Chesapeake. 

Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society Press, 2012. 

George, Christopher T. Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 

on the Bay. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 2001.

Lord, Walter. The Dawn’s Early Light. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972.

Pitch, Anthony S. The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion 

of 1814. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Vogel, Steve. Through the Perilous Fight: Six Weeks That Saved the 

Nation. New York: Random House, 2013.

Whitehorne, Joseph A. The Battle for Baltimore: 1814. Baltimore: 

Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1997.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the War of 1812, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812 series 

published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

(www.history.army.mil)
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MCHENRY 1814

Bladensburg 1814