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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

June 4, 2015 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 322808 

Washtenaw Circuit Court 

JOSHUA MATTHEW PACE, LC No. 14-000272-AR 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: WILDER, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by leave granted an order entered by 

the Washtenaw Circuit Court denying plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal a district court 

order which granted defendant’s motion for a specific jury instruction. We reverse and remand. 

 The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. On June 5, 2013, as Michael John Bly, 

walked across Church Street in Ann Arbor along a pedestrian crosswalk, defendant made a lefthand turn onto Church Street, striking Bly with his vehicle in the process. As a result of the 

collision, Bly suffered head trauma that left him permanently disabled. Defendant was charged 

with the misdemeanor offense of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a 

body function pursuant to MCL 257.601d(2). 

 Prior to trial, defendant moved the district court for a jury instruction requiring the 

prosecution to prove, as an element of the charged offense, that defendant was negligent in the 

operation of his vehicle. The prosecution argued, in contrast, that the applicable jury instruction, 

M Crim JI 15.19, provides that to prove the charge of committing a moving violation causing 

serious impairment of a body function, the prosecution is required to prove only (1) that the 

defendant committed a moving violation; and (2) that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle 

caused a serious impairment of a body function to the victim. According to the prosecution, this 

standard jury instruction accurately stated the law and that there was no requirement that the 

prosecution also prove that defendant was negligent in his actions. The district court granted 

defendant’s motion, citing People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446; 697 NW2d 494 (2005) and reasoning 

that the Legislature did not expressly indicate that it sought to dispense with negligence as an 

element of the offense. 
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 The prosecution subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal the district court’s 

order in the Washtenaw Circuit Court, which denied the application. We granted the 

prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the Washtenaw Circuit Court’s denial of its 

application. In addition to the issue of whether negligence is an element of the offense of 

committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, this Court 

directed the parties to address two additional issues: “(1) if negligence is not an element of 

committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function, MCL 

257.601d(2), then what, if any, mens rea is required for conviction of this offense; and (2) if no 

mens rea is required, is the statute constitutional?” People v Pace, unpublished order of the 

Court of Appeals, entered October 7, 2014 (Docket No. 322808). 

 On appeal, the prosecution contends that MCL 257.601d encompasses a pre-existing 

negligence component such that the district court’s requirement of proof of negligence as a 

separate, distinct element was superfluous and contrary to legislative intent. Alternatively, the 

prosecution contends that the statute is a constitutional, strict liability offense. We conclude that 

that the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability offense. 

 Matters of statutory construction are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo. 

People v Williams, 491 Mich 164, 169; 814 NW2d 270 (2012). Determining the elements of a 

crime is also a question of law that we review de novo. People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1, 4-5; 

684 NW2d 730 (2004). 

 MCL 257.601d(2) provides: 

(2) A person who commits a moving violation that causes serious impairment of a 

body function to another person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by 

imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or 

both. 

MCL 257.601d(4) states: 

As used in this section, “moving violation” means an act or omission prohibited 

under this act or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to this act that 

involves the operation of a motor vehicle, and for which a fine may be assessed. 

Thus, MCL 257.601d(2) clearly requires the prosecutor to prove (1) the commission of a moving 

violation; (2) another person suffered a serious impairment of a body function; and (3) a causal 

link between the bodily injury and the moving violation, i.e., factual and proximate causation. 

The statutory provision is silent with regard to fault or intent. However, “the failure to include a 

fault element in the statute does not end our inquiry. Where the statute does not include 

language expressly requiring fault as an element, this Court must focus on whether the 

Legislature nevertheless intended to require fault as a predicate to guilt.” People v Adams, 262 

Mich App 89, 93; 683 NW2d 729 (2004). 

 In Tombs, 472 Mich at 452-453, our Supreme Court noted that criminal offenses that do 

not require a criminal intent are disfavored. “The Court will infer the presence of the element 

unless a statute contains an express or implied indication that the legislative body wanted to 

dispense with it. Moreover, the Court has expressly held that the presumption in favor of a 
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criminal intent or mens rea requirement applies to each element of a statutory crime.” Id. at 454-

455. According to Tombs, if there were no mens rea element in a criminal offense, “the statute 

could punish otherwise innocent conduct.” Id. at 458. 

 However, as Justice Cooley early observed in People v Roby, 52 Mich 577, 579; 18 NW 

365 (1884): 

I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent, but this is not 

by any means a universal rule. One may be guilty of the high crime of 

manslaughter when his only fault is gross negligence, and there are many other 

cases where mere neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the 

nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of 

any intent to violate them, the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for 

the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible. 

 Our Supreme Court still recognizes that there are circumstances where the lack of 

criminal intent does not preclude a criminal prosecution. In Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1, the 

Supreme Court was called upon to determine the mens rea associated with manslaughter when 

the prosecutor proceeded on a theory of gross negligence. Citing to People v Townsend, 214 

Mich 267, 273-274; 183 NW 177 (1921), and its discussion regarding the proofs necessary to 

demonstrate the “unlawful-act” theory of involuntary manslaughter and the “lawful-act” theory, 

the Holtschlag court noted that under the “unlawful-act” theory: 

[I]f the defendant committed an unlawful act that resulted in death, it is sufficient 

to allege the commission of the unlawful act and the resulting death whereas, if 

the defendant committed a lawful act resulting in death, the prosecutor must 

specifically allege the manner in which the defendant’s actions were grossly or 

culpably negligent. That is, under Townsend, lawful-act manslaughter requires 

that the defendant acted with a mens rea of culpable negligence; whereas 

unlawful-act manslaughter does not require that the defendant acted with a 

specific mens rea-all that is required is that the defendant committed the unlawful 

act. [Holtschlag, 471 Mich at 17](emphasis in original). 

Thus, as observed in Holtschlag, under some circumstances, the fact that a defendant committed

an unlawful act has been found sufficient to form the basis of a criminal charge, even where a 

specific mens rea is absent. 

 This Court also noted in People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34, 42; 836 NW2d 883 (2013), 

that the Legislature can constitutionally enact offenses that impose criminal liability without 

regard to fault and that whether the Legislature intended to enact such an offense is generally a 

matter of statutory interpretation. These offenses, called strict liability offenses, are ones “in 

which the prosecution need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 

the prohibited act, regardless of the defendant's intent and regardless of what the defendant 

actually knew or did not know.” Janes, 302 Mich App at 41-42 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The distinction between a strict-liability crime and a general-intent crime is that, for a 

general-intent crime, the people must prove that the defendant purposefully or voluntarily 

performed the wrongful act, whereas, for a strict-liability crime, the people merely need to prove 
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that the defendant performed the wrongful act, irrespective of whether he intended to perform it. 

People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231, 241; 551 NW2d 656, 660-61 (1996), overruled on other grounds 

by People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). 

Morissette v United States, 342 US 246; 72 S Ct 240, 246; 96 L Ed 288 (1952) discusses 

the origin of criminal offense charges which disregard any intent. Citing to the industrial 

revolution, increased traffic, congestion of cities, and wide distribution of goods, the Morissette 

Court noted that as dangers increased so did duties and regulations and that lawmakers sought to 

make the duties and regulations more effective by imposing criminal sanctions in some cases. 

Id. at 252-255. These “public welfare offenses” do not necessarily result in a direct or immediate 

injury to person or property “but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law 

seeks to minimize.” Morissette, 342 US at 256. 

[W]hatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences 

are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such 

offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. 

The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it 

with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion 

than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, 

penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does not grave damage to 

an offender's reputation. Under such considerations, courts have turned to 

construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing 

with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime. [Id. at 256.] 

The purpose of imposing criminal penalties in this class of regulation is “to require a degree of 

diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible.” Id. at 257. 

Examples of such strict-liability offenses include narcotics laws, traffic laws, adulterated food or 

drug laws, criminal nuisances, and liquor control laws. People v Nasir, 255 Mich App 38, 42; 

662 NW2d 29 (2003). 

 “Courts in this country have almost universally held that traffic violations are strict 

liability offenses, in which the motorist’s negligence or lack of intent to commit the infraction is 

irrelevant.” People v Jones, 132 Mich App 368, 370; 347 NW2d 235 (1984). For example, the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an Ohio statute defining involuntary manslaughter as 

causing death during the commission of a misdemeanor driving offense, without a separate mens

rea requirement in Stanley v Turner, 6 F3d 399 (CA 6, 1993). The Sixth Circuit noted that: 

[w]here a criminal statute prohibits and punishes conduct not innocent or 

innocuous in itself, the criminal intent element may be dispensed with if the 

criminal statute is designed for the protection of the public health and safety and if 

it has no common law background that included a particular criminal intent. 

Because citizens are presumed to know the ordinary traffic safety laws and that 

violating them is dangerous and wrong, Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute, 

as applied in this case, is based on the obviously wrongful and blameworthy 

conduct of violating traffic safety laws. [Id. at 404.] 
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As the Court in Stanley recognized, our Legislature is entitled to enact public welfare statutes, 

such as those regulating traffic, that dispense with the requirement of mens rea on the basis that 

citizens are presumed to know the ordinary traffic safety laws and that violating them is 

dangerous. Id. 

 Based upon the above, it may be inferred from the Legislature’s use of the term “moving 

violation,” without any reference to a mens rea requirement, that it intended to dispense with the 

criminal intent element and make committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of 

a body function a strict liability offense. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of and to 

legislate in harmony with existing jurisprudence. People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 241; 351 NW2d 

822 (1984). The requirement that a defendant have committed a moving violation in order to be 

charged with and convicted of a violation of MCL 257.601d clearly indicates that public welfare 

is at issue. “[I]it is the motorist's duty in the use and operation of his automobile to exercise 

ordinary and reasonable care and caution, that is, that degree of care and caution which an 

ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.” 

Zarzecki v Hatch, 347 Mich 138, 141; 79 NW2d 605 (1956). The commission of a moving 

violation indicates that the motorist failed to do so, regardless of intent, and, as previously 

indicated, the violation of a traffic law is typically a strict-liability offense. Nasir, 255 Mich App 

at 42. Thus, MCL 257.601d is strict liability offense.1

 

 

1

 This conclusion is also supported by the legislative history. We recognize that Legislative bill 

analyses “are ‘generally unpersuasive tool[s] of statutory construction’ ” and “do not necessarily 

represent the views of any individual legislator.” Kinder Morgan Mich, LLC v Jackson, 277 

Mich App 159, 170; 744 NW2d 184 (2007) (citation omitted). However, they “do have 

probative value in certain, limited circumstances.” Id. 

 MCL 257.601d was added to the Motor Vehicle Code by 2008 PA 463, effective October 

31, 2010. At the same time that MCL 257.601d was added, the offenses of Felonious Driving, 

MCL 750.325, and Negligent Homicide, MCL 257.626c, were repealed. The Legislative bill 

analyses, attached to the prosecution’s brief, suggest that the changes were made in response to 

concerns by legislators that 

[t]he current standard for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent 

homicide or felonious driving is ambiguous, based on whether the person 

operated the vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner. The language 

prescribing those offenses is antiquated and based on common law notions of 

negligence. Applying those concepts to criminal law creates some uncertainty 

about what constitutes a violation, leading to inconsistent enforcement of the law. 

For example, a driver who loses control of a car on an icy overpass and is 

involved in a fatal accident could have foreseen the possibility that the bridge 

might be icy, and therefore could be charged with negligent homicide, although 

most people would not consider that to be appropriate in such a case. The bill 

would remove that ambiguity, and instead enact prohibitions under which a 

person would not be guilty of a criminal offense unless a moving violation had 

occurred. This would reduce inconsistencies in the application of the law and 
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 Because the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability 

offense, the prosecution is required to prove solely (1) the commission of a moving violation; (2) 

another person suffered a serious impairment of a body function; and (3) a causal link between 

the bodily injury and the moving violation, i.e., factual and proximate causation. The 

prosecution is not required to also prove that defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent 

manner, and the trial court erred in so concluding. 

 After reaching the conclusion that the prosecution is not required to prove negligence, we 

next consider whether MCL 257.601d is constitutional. Constitutional questions are generally 

reviewed de novo by this Court. People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 144; 605 NW2d 49 (1999). 

 “[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized as a general matter that the 

constitution does not preclude the enactment of even strict liability criminal statutes.” People v

Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 185; 487 NW2d 194 (1992), citing Lambert v California, 355 US 225; 78 

S Ct 240; 2 L Ed 2d 228 (1957). See also Janes, 302 Mich App at 42, citing Quinn, 440 Mich at 

188 (“Our Supreme Court has recognized that the Legislature can constitutionally enact offenses 

that impose criminal liability without regard to fault.”). This is especially the case with public 

welfare regulations, as previously discussed. There does not appear to be a well-settled test for 

determining when such a strict liability crime offends due process. However, this Court has 

previously stated that “ ‘[t]he elimination of the element of criminal intent does not violate the 

due process clause where (1) the penalty is relatively small, and (2) where conviction does not 

gravely besmirch.’ ” People v Olson, 181 Mich App 348, 352; 448 NW2d 845 (1989), quoting 

United States v Wulff, 758 F 2d 1121, 1125 (CA 6, 1985). See also Lardie, 452 Mich at 255 

(noting that penalties for public welfare offenses are generally “relatively small” and do no 

“grave damage to an offender’s reputation”). 

 There is no question that the Legislature has the constitutional authority to enact MCL 

257.601d as a strict liability offense concerning public welfare. Lambert, 355 US 225; Quinn, 

440 Mich at 188; Janes, 302 Mich App at 42. We are satisfied that imposing strict liability for 

the offense of committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body function 

does not offend due process. First, the offense is a misdemeanor; that is, despite the severe harm 

that such an offense inflicts upon the victim, it is punishable only by imprisonment for not more 

than 93 days and/or a fine of not more than $500. The penalty is thus relatively small. See 

People v Adams, 262 Mich App 89, 98-99; 683 NW2d 729 (2004) (upholding a strict liability 

crime of failing to pay child support despite a potential four-year jail term); People v Motor City 

clarify proscribed conduct.[Senate Fiscal Analysis, SB 104 (as passed by the 

senate), August 5, 2008, available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/ 

2007-2008/billanalysis/Senate/htm/2007-SFA-0104-B.htm (accessed March 26, 

2015).] 

The above analysis supports a conclusion that in enacting MCL 257.601 and repealing the 

Felonious Driving and Negligent Homicide statutes, the Legislature sought to erase uncertainty 

as to what conduct was punishable by removing any consideration of whether a motorist’s 

conduct was careless, reckless, or negligent, and instead focusing solely on whether the motorist 

committed a moving violation. 
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Hosp & Surgical Supply, Inc, 227 Mich App 209, 210; 575 NW2d 95 (1997) (upholding a strict

liability crime despite a potential punishment of four years’ imprisonment and a $30,000 fine). 

Second, because the crime is a misdemeanor only, it is far less likely to “besmirch” the 

defendant. Cf Wulff, 758 F 2d at 1125 (“[A] felony conviction irreparably damages one’s 

reputation[.]”). Thus, we conclude that it does not offend due process to hold individuals strictly 

liable for committing moving violations that cause serious impairment to a body function in 

another individual. 

 In sum, MCL 257.601d imposes strict liability upon a motorist who commits a moving 

violation causing serious impairment of a body function to another person and the statute is 

constitutional. The prosecution is not required to prove that defendant operated his vehicle in a 

negligent manner, and the trial court erred in so concluding. 

 Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens