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86

Information Notice No. 93­86: Identification of Isotopes in the

Production and Shipment of Byproduct Material at Non­Power

Reactors

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

October 29, 1993

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93‐86: IDENTIFICATION OF ISOtopES IN THE PRODUCTION

AND SHIPMENT OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL AT NON‐POWER

REACTORS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for test and

research reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to a problem with the identification of isotopes in

byproduct material produced and shipped at a non‐power reactor. It is

expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to

their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is

required.

Description of Circumstances

In response to NRC concerns regarding shipping errors at the University of

Missouri‐Columbia Research Reactor Facility (MURR), the licensee established a

task force to review the shipping of byproduct material produced in the

reactor. When the task force reviewed the information on target composition

(isotopic enrichment, impurities, or encapsulation) and isotopes to be

produced submitted by requesters of irradiation services, the task force found

17 target types that had been submitted with incomplete information. Because

the licensee accepted the incomplete information from the requesters, some of

the isotopes produced by irradiation of the targets in the reactor were not

listed on the shipping papers. Apparently, the target composition information

submitted by the requesters contained only the isotope(s) of interest to the

requesters and did not contain other isotopes that would be produced in the

target. The task force determined that less than 90 percent of the total

sample activity was reported on the shipping papers for the 17 target types.

The task force also found that the calculations of expected isotope activity

levels submitted by requesters were accepted without independent licensee

verification.
A particularly significant example in which activity levels were understated

on the shipping papers concerned the irradiation of a sample of ytterbium

(Yb). The isotope of interest to the requester was Yb‐169 (half‐life of

32.03 days) which was listed on the request for irradiation form. MURR

accepted this information as listed on the request form and the sample was

shipped as containing 592 MBq [16 millicuries] of Yb‐169. However,

9310250225.

IN 93‐86

October 29, 1993

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conservative calculations (which ignored self shielding or flux perturbations)

showed that up to 185,000 MBq [5 curies] of Yb‐175 (half‐life of 4.19 days)

may have been in the target when it was shipped.

Another concern was found in the manner that facility personnel used the

information prepared for irradiation of targets. For irradiation experiments,

MURR prepares safety analyses called reactor utilization requests that contain

comprehensive information on the isotopes that will be produced in irradiated

targets. The technicians who prepare the targets for irradiation refer to

summary sheets of pertinent data taken from the prepared reactor utilization

requests. However, there was no administrative mechanism to ensure that the

data on the summary sheets is updated if changes were made to the reactor

utilization requests.

To correct the problems with preparation of shipping papers, MURR will measure

directly the activity of samples for shipment if feasible. Where direct

measurement is not feasible, MURR will calculate the activity produced in the

target. The activity of samples of phosphorus‐32 and sulfur‐35 will be

determined by reference to previously verified activities for identical

targets with similar irradiation histories. To correct the problem with the

use of summary sheets, MURR committed to develop a mechanism to ensure that

the summary sheets are updated to reflect any pertinent changes to information

on the reactor utilization requests.

Discussion

The circumstances described above demonstrate the importance of licensee

verification of information on targets (isotopic enrichment, impurities,

encapsulation, isotopes produced) for insertion into a non‐power reactor. In

accordance with technical specifications, licensees are responsible for

ensuring that targets meet the requirements of an approved safety analysis.

The calculations for these safety analyses evaluate the effects of irradiating

the target material and assist in the determination of health physics and

shipping requirements for isotopes produced by the irradiation.

Identification of these isotopes is important for radiation protection of

plant personnel and also for documenting the makeup of the irradiated target

prior to shipment.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Section 5(a)[10 CFR

71.5(a)] requires that licensee who transport licensed material outside the

confines of their plants or deliver licensed material to a carrier for

transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations

appropriate to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT)

IN 49 CFR 170‐189. DOT regulation 49 CFR 172.203(d) requires that shipping

papers specify, along with other information the activity contained in each

package of the shipment in terms of curies, millicuries, or microcuries and

the name of each radionuclide. Improper identification of isotopes in a

sample could present a hazard to personnel who handle or package the samples

for shipment, may result in incorrect shipping papers and package labeling .

IN 93‐86

October 29, 1993
Page 3 of 3

which could be misleading during shipping emergencies, and could cause

unnecessary or incorrect exposure if the isotopes are used without

verification by the end user.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: A. Adams Jr, NRR

(301) 504‐1127

C. Cox, RIII

(708) 790‐5298

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