MAINE SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 91 Docket: Pen

- 18

- 79 Submitted

On	Briefs: June	27,	2018 Decided: July	5,	2018
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER, MEAD , GORMAN ,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	AMBER	L.

PER CURIAM [ ¶1] Amber	 L. appeals	 from the judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court (Bangor, Campbell,	J. )	that	terminated	her	parental	rights	to her child pursuant
to	22 M.R.S.	§ 4055 ( 1)(A)(1)(a),	(B)(2)(a),	and	(b)(i)

- (ii)	(2017)

. 1 The	mother contests	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 court’ s	 findings	 of parental	 unfitness.	 	 She further challenges	 the	 court’s	 determination	 that termination	of	her	parental	rights	is	in	 the	best	interest	of	 the	child,	arguing
that because the kinshi p	placement for	 the	child provides	sufficient	stability , the	 court was	 required to	 order	 additional	 time	 for	 her	 to attempt	 to
rehabilitate herself and	 reunify	 with the	 child

. We	 conclude	 that	 c lear	 and convincing	evidence	supports	th e	court ’s finding that the mother is	unfit	as	a

1 The child’s father	had	his	parental	rights	terminated after	failing	to	appear	at	the termination hearing.		The	father is	not	a	party	to	this	appeal.2 parent and that the	 court	 acted	 within	 its	 discretion	 in	 determining	 that

termination i s	in	the	child’s	best	interest .		W e therefore affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] After	a	two

- day	hearing in early February of 2018, t he	court	found
that the mother	is	unwilling	or	unable (1) to protect	 the	child	 from	jeopardy
and (2) to take	responsibility	for	h im and that both	of these circumstances are unlikely	to	change in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet the needs of	the	child

. See 22 M.R.S.	§ 4055 (1) (B)(2)(b)(i)

- (ii). After	carefully	considering	the	record,

t he	court ultimately determined that	terminating	the	mother’s	parental	rights
was	in	the	child’s	best	interest. See 22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B) (2)(a). To	support

its finding s	of parental	unfitness	and its best	interest determination ,	the	court made	the	following	factual findings based	upon clear	and	convincing evidence
in	the	record:
In	 this	 case , custody	 of	 [the	 child]	 was	 properly	 removed from	the	parents	and	granted	to	DHHS	on	October	21,	2016.

.	.	.	. .	.	.	Mother	clearly	loves	[the	child]	very	much,	and	she	has	a bond	with	him.		Mother	has	also	made	progress	in	some	areas,	for which	she	des erves	credit. For	example , m other	has	consistently engaged	in	 supervised	 visits	with	 [the	 child],	 and	 the	 visits	 have generally	gone	very	well.		Mother	also	regularly	attends	 [a	clinic] for	 replacement	 therapy,	 and	 she	 has	 not	 used	 opiates.

.	 .	 . Unfortun ately ,	however,	despite	the	progress	mother	has	made	in3 some	 aspects	 of	 this	 case,	 many	 of	 the	 very	 serious	 jeopardy concerns	remain.

.	.	.	.

.	 .	 . Throughout	 the	 case,	 DHHS	 has	 attempted	 to	 assist mother	 with	 her	 substance	 abuse	 and	 mental	 health	 issue s. Despite	 this,	 mother	 has	 continued	 to	 self

- medicate	 with marijuana,	and	she	has	been	very	inconsistent	in	her	mental	health therapy.		Mother	has	also	continued	 to	make	 very	impulsive	and irresponsible	decisions,	and	she	continues	to	maintain	contact	wi th unsafe	people. .	.	.	Mother	[has]	long

- standing	problems	with	a c annabis u se d isorder, p ersonality d isorder	 .	 .	 .	 ,	 and c omplex post

- t raumatic s tress d isorder.	.	.	.	Mother	has [a] limited	ability	to	self

- correct	and learn	 from	 the	 consequences	 of	 her behavior	 and	 acting	 out. Accordi ng	 to	 [the	 court

- ordered psychologist],	 without appropriate	treatment, m other’s	ability	to	safely	parent	as	well	as reunify	with	her	children	is	guarded.		[The	psychologist]	believes that	 mother’s	 mental	 health	 diagnoses	 ten d	 to	 be	 resistant	 to change	 and	 historically	 require	 long

- term and committed involvement	in	treatment.		Mother’s	prognosis	is	further	guarded because	of	her	tendency	to	self

- medi c ate	with	marijuana.

.	.	.	. Although	 the	 [termination	 petition]	had	already	been	 filed, mother	did	not	follow	through	with	her	therapy	[provider].		Rather than	 seeing	 her	 [therapist]	 twice	 a	 week,	 mother	 met	 with	 [her therapist twice between	 August	 and	 November	 of	 2017]

.	 .	 . . Although	 [her	 therapist]	 reports	 that	mother	 has	made	 progress since	 November	 3 rd ,	 mother	 still	 does	 not	 regularly	 attend	 her appointments.	 .	 .	 .	 Mother	 has	 only	 attended	 her	 [ dialectical behavioral therapy]	 groups	 three	 times,	 twice	 in	 December	 and once	i n	 January.		Mother	attended	individual	 therapy	 twice,	on c e on	December	11,	2017 , and	once	on	January	29,	2018.4 Mother’s	 level	 of	 commitment	 is	 unacceptable.	 	 [Her therapist]	 testified	 that	 mother	 still	 has	 a	 lot	 of	 work	 to	 do. According	 to	 [her	 therapist ],	 mother’s	 [ dialectical	 behavioral therapy]	will	take	a	year	from	November	3,	2017.		(This	assumes that	mother	will	be	fully	committed	to	her	therapy,	which,	at	this point,	has	not	been	the	case.)		[Her	therapist]	believes	that	mother’s individual	therapy will	take	longer.

.	.	. The	 court	 is	 very	 concerned	 about	 mother’s	 continuing pattern	of	engaging	in	unsafe	relationships	with	[the	father	of	her other children]	and	her	former	fiancé. .	.	.	Mother	has	had	numerous and	 consistent	 police	 contacts	 resultin g	 from	 family	 fights, threatening	 behavior,	 protection	 order	 violations,	 mental	 health crises,	and	other	incidents	involving	[her	former	partners].		Rather than	 demonstrating	 stability	 through	 her	 behavior, m other	 has consistently	been unstable in	her rela tionships	and	behavior.

.	.	.	. .	 .	 .	 Mother	 clearly	 has	 a	 long

- standing	 substance	 abuse problem.		She	has	continued	to	use	marijuana	throughout	the	time that	 this	 case	 has	 been	 pending.	 	 This	 is	 not	 a	 situation	 where mother	smokes	occasionally	to	relie ve	anxiety.		According	to	[the psychologist	in	this	case],	this	is	a	situation	where	mother	abuses her	 methadone	 and	 marijuana	 to	 g et	 intoxicated	 as	 a	 way	 of self

- medicating.

.	. .

.	.	.	.

.	.	. [The	child] has	special	needs,	and	he	requires	a	high	leve l of	care.		He	needs	a	safe	and	stable	home.		It	is	very	important	that he	receive	permanency	as	soon	as	possible.		Unfortunately,	mother is	unable	to	provide	permanency	for	[the	child].5
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 3 ] “ We	review	the	trial	court’ s	factual	findings	that	a	parent	is	unfit	and
that	termination	of parental	rights	is	in	the	child’ s	best	interest	for	clear	error and	 the	 ultimate	 decision	 to	 terminate	 parental	 rights	 for	 an	 abuse	 of
discretion. ” In	re	Child	of	Kelcie	L. ,	2018	ME	57, ¶	3 , --- A.3d

--- . A

. Parental	Unfitness [¶ 4 ] We	will	reverse	a	finding	on	parental	unfitness “only	if	there	is	no competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 to	 support	 it,	 if	 the	 fact

- find er clearly misapprehends	the	meaning	of	the	evidence,	or	if	the	finding	is	so contrary	to the	credible	evidence	that	it	does	not	represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.”

In	re	Cameron	B. ,	20 17	ME	18,	¶	10,	154	A.3d	1199 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶ 5 ] The	 m other does	 not	 dispute the	 finding	 that	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the hearing , rou ghly fifteen months	after	the	chi ld	was	removed	from	her	custody,
she could	not provide	the	child	with	permanency. Instead,	she	asserts	that the

circumstances causing her	 parenting	 deficits	 are	 likely	 to	 change	 in	 a
reasonable	 time. “Although	 the	 [mother]	contends	 that	 [she]	made	progress towards	 rehabilitation,	 the	 evidence	 was	 sufficient	 to	 support	 the	 court’s finding,	 by	 clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 of	 at	 least	 one	 ground	 of	 [her] parental	 unfitness.” In	 re	 Child	 of	 Kelcie L. ,	 2 018	 ME	 57, ¶ 5,

--- A.3d

--- .6
C ompetent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record,	 particularly	 the testimony	 of	 the mental health	 professionals , fully supported the	 court ’s finding s tha t the mother’s parenting	deficits pose	jeopardy	to	the	child	and are not	likely to be re solved absent	intensive,	long

- term	mental	health	treatment. See	id .; In	re	Mathew	H. , 2017	ME	151, ¶ 5,	167	A.3d 561.		The	court ,	as	a	result, did not	clearly	err by finding	 that	 mother’s	 circumstances	 are	 unlikely	 to	 change	 within	 a	 time

re asonably	calcu late d to	meet	the	child’s needs

. B

. Best	Interest	of	the	Child [¶ 6 ] Although	the	court granted the	mother’s two motions	to	continue the	 termination	hearing over	objections	by	 the	State , the	mother argues that the	 child	 protection	 statute’s prioritiz ation	 of “family	 rehabilitation	 and reunification,” 22	M.R.S.	§ 4003 (3)	(2017), and the absence	of record evidence suggesting that prolonging the kinship	 placement would	 harm	 the	 child , required the	court to	provide her with	additional	time	to attempt	to r ehabilitate
herself and	reunify	with	the	child , s ee 22	M.R.S.	§ 4055 (2)	(2017)

. The	m other further	argues	that	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	“overs tates7 the	 concept	 of	 permanency ” in	 defending	 the	 court’s	 termination	 of	 her parental	rights. [¶ 7 ] Among the	 general	 purposes	 for	 the	 child	 protection	 statute,	 the Legislature has given	 priority	 to “family rehabilitation	 and	 reunification

. ”

22 M.R.S.	§	4003(3).		The	Legislature,	however, has qualified	that general intent
with	the competing	goal to	“prevent	needless	delay”	in	achieving	permanency
for	the	child. Id. In	the statutory provisions	setting	out	the specific purpose s of terminating	parental	rights,	t he	Legislature	has	further	emphasized	its	intent
to	“ [ e ] liminate	the	need	for	children	t o	wait	unreasonable	periods	of	time	for their	parents	to	correct	the	conditions	which	prevent	their	return	to	the	family

. ”

See 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4050(2) (2017). A lthough we	 have recognized that

“ [ p ] ermanency	is	 a	 dynamic	 concept	 that	must	 be	 fashioned	 from	 the actual
circumstances	and	needs	of	the	child , ” In re	Child	of	Kelcie	L. ,	2 018	ME	57, ¶ 7 ,

--- A.3d

--- (quotation	 marks	 omitted), “[i]nstability	 is	 antithetical	 to permanence.” In re Marcus S. ,	2007 ME 24, ¶ 11,	916	A.2d	225. [¶ 8 ] The	court’s	best	inte rest	analysis	relied	on competent	evidence	of the	“mother’s	pattern	of	instability,	her	erratic	behavior,	and	her	continuing	to maintain	relationships	with	unsafe	people,”	as	well	as competent	evidence	of
her “ long

- standing	 substance	 abuse	 pro blem”	 and	 “significant	 mental	 health8 issues	 that	 will	 take	 an	 extended	 period of time	 to	 treat.” Contrary	 to	 the
mother’s	 contention , the	 court	 was	 not	 required	 to	 base	 its	 best	 interest determination	on	evidence	of	harm	to	the	child	resulting	from additi onal	time
for	 the	 mother	 to	 further attempt rehabilitation and	 reunification	 with	 the
child

. Pursuant	to	the	Legislature’s	mandate,	the	court deem ed in	this	case that
further delay of permanenc y is contrary	 to the	 child’s best	interest,	 existing
attachmen ts, and physical	 and	 emotional	 needs. See 22 M.R.S.	 § 4055(2);

In re Cameron	B. ,	2017	ME	18, ¶ 13 , 154	A.3d	1199 ; In re	Dakota	K. , 2016	ME 30, ¶¶ 8

- 10,	 133	 A.3d	 257

. The	 court ’ s	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	 competent evidence	 in	 the	 record;	 the	 court’s determination	 that	 termination	 of	 the mother’s	 parental	 rights	was	in	 the	 child’s	 best	interest	was	well	within	 the
court’s	discretion

. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Erik	T.	Crocker,	Esq.,	Farrell,	Rosenblatt	&	Russell,	Bangor,	for	appellant	mother Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

B angor	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2016

- 80 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY