*Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

 United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-1479

DANY HENG,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

 Howard, Circuit Judge,

Selya, Senior Circuit Judge, 

and Shadur, Senior District Judge. *

Martin J. McNulty on brief for petitioner.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Terri J.

Scadron, Assistant Director, Civil Division and Janet A. Bradley,

Trial Attorney, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation,

United States Department of Justice, on brief for respondent.

July 12, 2007
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HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Dany Heng petitions for review of

an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejecting her

claims for asylum and withholding of removal. Heng is a native of

Cambodia who came to the United States on a tourist visa in

February 2001. In March 2003, she applied for asylum, claiming

that she had been persecuted on account of her membership in a

Cambodian political party. Three months later, the Department of

Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Heng for

overstaying her visa. Heng appeared before an immigration judge

(IJ) and conceded removability but sought asylum. The IJ ruled

that Heng's asylum application was untimely and that the late

filing was not excused by extraordinary circumstances or changed

conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2). The IJ therefore treated

Heng's asylum request as a request for withholding of removal.

Heng was the only witness at her removal hearing.

Through a translator, she testified as follows. Heng was born in

Cambodia in 1958 and married Seng Sophal in 1984. She and her

husband were members of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), a political

rival to the Cambodian People's Party headed by Prime Minister Hun

Sen, a former member of the Khmer Rouge. Heng's mother and older

sister had been killed by the Khmer Rouge during Pol Pot's reign.

Heng's husband worked on behalf of the SRP every day.

Heng was less active but did raise funds to support the party. In

April 1996, police officers loyal to the People's Party came to
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Heng's house and held Heng and her husband at gun point. The

officers told Heng and her husband to cease their political

activities and to take down a pro-SRP poster hanging on their wall.

When Heng's husband refused to take down the poster, the officers

threatened to kill him.

Just before the 1998 national election, People's Party

members tried to kill members of the SRP. Heng and her husband

were able to escape the violence and temporarily relocated to

another part of the country. When they returned home, they

continued working for the SRP. Shortly after their return, Heng

and her husband were assaulted by People's Party officials while

attempting to distribute SRP literature. At that time, the

officers threatened to kill Heng and hit her on the shoulder with

a gun.

The People's Party won the 1998 national election.

Shortly thereafter, government officials arrested Heng's husband,

but he was able to escape. In September 1998, Heng and her husband

were detained while leading another protest. The police beat

Heng's husband in front of her and then separated them. Heng was

detained for three days, given no water, and was almost suffocated

while imprisoned. SRP officials were, however, able to secure

Heng's release.

In November 2000, a battle broke out between government

forces and the SRP. The government forces murdered several of
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Heng's husband's associates and wanted to murder him as well, but

he escaped. This was the last time that Heng saw her husband.

Heng came to the United States in February 2001. In January 2003,

Heng learned from her sister that her husband had been murdered by

People's Party officials.

The IJ rejected Heng's withholding of removal claim on

the ground that she was not a credible witness. The IJ gave four

reasons for this credibility determination: (1) it was not

believable that People's Party members would come to Heng's house

to order her to take down an SRP poster hanging on an interior

wall; (2) Heng stated at her hearing that SRP members secured her

release from prison but stated in her asylum application that human

rights workers obtained her release; (3) Heng testified that her

husband was arrested after the 1998 national election but did not

mention this incident in her asylum application; and (4) Heng first

testified that she learned about her husband's death while in

Cambodia but then testified that she learned about his death after

coming to the United States. Heng appealed to the BIA, which

affirmed in a per curiam order adopting the IJ's opinion. 

Heng initially challenges the ruling that her asylum

application was untimely. We lack jurisdiction over this aspect of

her petition for review and therefore consider only whether her

claim for withholding of removal was properly denied. See Stroni
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v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2006); Mehilli v. Gonzales,

433 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2005).

Withholding of removal is available if "the alien's life

or freedom would be threatened in the destination country because

of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion." Da Silva v.

Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§1231(b)(3)(A)). To qualify for withholding of removal, the alien

must demonstrate either that she has suffered past persecution on

account of a protected ground (thus creating a rebuttable

presumption that she may suffer future persecution) or that it is

more likely than not that she will be persecuted on account of a

protected ground if sent to the destination country. Id.; see Ang

v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that

applicant for withholding of removal must show a "clear

probability" of persecution upon removal from the United States).

While we normally review the BIA decision, where as here

the BIA adopted the IJ's decision we review the IJ's decision

directly. Simo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006). When

reviewing a determination that a petitioner was not credible, we

ask whether the adverse credibility determination is "supported by

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole." Id. Under this standard, we will not

upset the IJ's determination "unless any reasonable adjudicator
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would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." Hoxha v.

Gonzales, 446 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 2006). However, a

petitioner's testimony may not be rejected unless the IJ has

provided a specific, cogent, and supportable explanation for this

conclusion. Settenda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 2004).

Moreover, where an IJ's adverse credibility finding rests on an

analysis of the petitioner's testimony and not her demeanor, the

finding may receive "less than [the] usual deference." TolozaJimenez v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 155, 159 (1st Cir. 2006).

We have reviewed the IJ's grounds for the adverse

credibility determination and find them inadequate, alone and in

combination. The IJ's first ground was his disbelief that People's

Party operatives would enter Heng's house to remove an SRP sign

hanging on an interior wall. The IJ's description of Heng's

testimony is inaccurate. Heng did not testify that the operatives

came to her house to remove the sign. Rather, she testified that

the operatives knew that her husband was a leader of the SRP and

came to the house to threaten violence if he continued his

political activities. As part of the threat, they ripped down the

sign.

Second, the IJ stated that Heng's testimony concerning

her release from prison was inconsistent with her asylum

application because, at her hearing, she testified that SRP

officials won her release, while in her application she credited
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"human rights workers." When government counsel questioned Heng

about this apparent inconsistency, she stated that it resulted from

a mistranslation by the individuals who helped her prepare her

asylum application. See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th

Cir. 2003) (stating that "faulty or unreliable translations can

undermine evidence on which an adverse credibility determination is

based"); accord Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir.

2004); Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1998).

Moreover, this alleged discrepancy does not "involve the heart" of

Heng's claim. Bojorques-Villanueva v. INS, 194 F.3d 14, 16 (1st

Cir. 1999) (stating that an adverse credibility finding may not be

based on discrepancy in testimony that does not go to "the heart"

of petitioner's claim). The essence of Heng's claim was that she

had been arrested at a political rally by government officials and

held in detention for three days without water while almost

suffocating. The accuracy of the description she applied to the

people who helped secure her release was not a central fact. See

Ren v. Ashcroft, 145 Fed. Appx. 378, 382 (1st Cir. 2005)

(concluding that the discrepancy regarding why government officials

were searching for petitioner did not go to the "heart of the

asylum claim," even though it was not "entirely unrelated" to it).

Finally, we are not sure that this is even properly characterized

as a discrepancy. A witness could understandably refer to someone

who saved her from political imprisonment as a "human rights
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worker," even if the person was also a member of a political party.

Third, the IJ faulted Heng for testifying that her

husband was arrested after the 1998 election because she did not

include this incident in her asylum application. "Asylum

applicants are not required to list every incident of persecution."

Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); accord Pop v. INS,

270 F.3d 527, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2001) ("We hesitate to find that one

seeking asylum must state in his or her application every incident

of persecution lest the applicant have his or her credibility

questioned if the incident is later elicited in direct

testimony."); Aguilera-Cote v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir.

1990) (stating that an alien's "failure to file an application form

that was as complete as might be desired cannot, without more,

properly serve as the basis for finding a lack of credibility").

Here, the omitted incident was not one of the major claims

underlying Heng's request for relief. Indeed, her entire testimony

concerning this incident accounted for less than a half page of

transcript. In light of Heng's allegation that she was held in

confinement without water for three days, and that her husband was

subsequently murdered by People's Party officials, the failure to

include this less serious event in her application should not be

fatal to her claim.

Finally, the IJ doubted Heng's testimony because of a

purported inconsistency concerning when she learned that her
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husband had been murdered. The IJ understood Heng as first

testifying that she learned of the murder while she was in

Cambodia, and later testifying that she learned about the murder

after coming to the United States. This latter testimony was

consistent with the information in her asylum application. This

discrepancy is insufficient to ground the IJ's credibility finding.

Heng corrected her testimony almost immediately, and before anyone

brought to her attention the discrepancy between her testimony and

her application. Moreover, Heng's hearing was marked by numerous

translation difficulties, and it appears to us that the alleged

discrepancy resulted from confusion, and not from an attempt at

fabrication. As the Seventh Circuit recently observed:

Translation is a complex and tiring task;

errors are bound to occur even in the best of

circumstances with the most competent

translators. Errors cannot be avoided, but

immigration judges must be sensitive to the

complexities of receiving testimony through a

translator and take into account these

difficulties when assessing credibility.

Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006). 

For the reasons stated, the IJ's credibility determination

is not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore grant the

petition for review, vacate the order of removal, and remand to the

BIA for further proceedings.

So ordered.