## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Pikovsky v

. 8440-8460 North Skokie Bou levard Condom iniu m Ass’n , 2011 IL App (1st) 103742

Appellate Court Caption TAMARA PI KOVSKY, P l aintiff-A ppellant, v. 8440-8460 NORTH SKOKI E BO UL EVARD CONDOMI NIUM ASSOCI ATI ON, I NC., and RO SE N REAL TY AND MANAGEMEN T, I N C.
, D e f e n d a n ts

- A p p e ll e e s and Third-Party Plaint iffs (Maintena nce Hot L ine, Inc., and Canopy Enterpr ises, Inc., d/b/a Canopy Snow Plowing, Third-Party Def endants).

District & N o. First District, Second D ivision Docke t No. 1-10-3742

Filed Rehea ringdenied Dec ember 27, 2011
Fe bruar y 2, 2012

Held (N ote : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t h e Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Summary judgme nt was properly enter ed for defe ndant condominium association i n plaintiff’s action for the injuries she suffe red when she slipped and fell on the “icy snow mounds” on the rea r-e ntranc e sidewalk
g oing to the building wher e her condominium unit was located, since the I llinois Snow and I ce Removal Act barred her neg lige nce claim ag ainst defe ndants and the snow remova l an d d i s posal ordinanc e of the city wher e the condominium was located did not apply to the sidewalk wher e plaintiff fell, beca

use that sidewalk was on private proper ty and was not a “public w ay .”

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of C ook County
, No. 08-L -62033; the Hon. Rog er G . Fe in, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Parad L aw Offic es, P.C., of Northbrook (B oris Parad, of counsel), for appellant.

Wiedner & McAuliffe
, Ltd., of Chicag o (Richar d J

. L eamy , J r., Robert H. Fr edian, J ohn E. Bau m an and Kristen A. Schank, of counsel), for appellee s.

Panel J USTI CE CUNNI NGHAM delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Quinn and Just ice Connors c oncurr ed in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This appea l arises from a J uly 14, 2010 order enter ed by the circ uit court of Cook County which grante d defe ndants-appe llees 8400-8460 North S k okie Boule vard Condomini um Association, Inc., and Rosen Realty Manag ement Inc.’s (Skokie and Rosen) motion for
summary judgme nt. O n appea l, pla intiff-appe llant T amar a Pikovsky (Tama ra) argues that: (1) the trial court err ed in finding that the I llinois Snow and I ce Removal Act (745 I L CS 75/1
et seq. (West 2008)) barr ed her neg lige nce claim ag ainst Skokie and Rosen; (2) Skokie and Rosen violated the Skokie obstructions and snow remova l and disposal ordinanc es (Skokie Code of Ordinanc es §§ 90-49, 90-51 (2002)) ; and (3) the trial court err ed in finding that the I llin o is Sn o w and I ce Removal Act pree mpted the Skokie obstructions and snow remova l and disposal ordinanc es. For the following we rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Cook County

.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 8460 North Skokie Boule vard is a building on the corne r of Skokie B oulevar d and L ee Street in the town of Skokie, I llinois

. The rea r entra nce to the building is acc essible through

a sidewalk that is adjac ent to the building’s p ar k i n g l o t (re ar entra nce sidewalk). The rea

r entra nce sidewalk abuts the L ee Street sidewalk. In 200 8
, t h e building was owned and controlled by 8440-8460 North Skokie Boule v ar d Condomini um Association, Inc. The building was manag ed by Rosen Realty and Manag ement, Inc. On October 18, 2007, Skokie and Rosen e ntered into a contra ct with Canopy Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Canopy Snow Plowing (Canopy ). The contra ct presc ribed that Canopy would plow awa y the snow in the parking lot of the building during the winter from Nov em b er 1 5
, 2007 through April 1, 2008. On November 10, 2007, Skokie and Rosen enter ed into a contra ct with Maintenanc e Hot L ine, Inc. (Maintena

nce Hot L ine). The contra ct presc ribed that Maintenanc e Hot L ine would provide daily
, wee kly
, monthly and seasona l janitorial service s for a period of one year

.

-2-Maintenanc e Hot L ine’s duties included removing snow from the L ee Street sidewalk.

Neither contra ct provided for sno w re m o val on the rea r entra nce sidewalk. The Canopy contr ac t stated that Canopy would provide snow remova l service s for are a other than the parking lot at an extra cost upon re qu es t

. S k okie and Rosen never reque sted that Canopy

remove snow from the r ear entra nce side walk. ¶ 4 On Fe bruar

y 21, 2008, Tamar a was a resident o f 8 4 6 0 N. S k o k i e Boule vard, Skokie, I llinois

. On that day
, Tamar a was returning home from a visit with her mother and attempted
to use the rea

r entra nce sidewalk to g et to the building. Tamar a claims that she slipped and fell on the rea

r entra nce sidewalk due to “icy snow mounds.” As a result of the fall, Tamar a suffe red a fra cture d left hip and re mained in the hospital from Fe bruar y 21 to F ebrua

ry 27, 2008. Tamar a claims that the icy snow mounds wer e formed by snow that was plowed from the parking lot onto the rea r entra nce sidewalk that leads to the building. Dur i n g h i s deposition, Georg e L ipp (L ipp), co-owner of Canopy
, stated that sometimes he plowed snow from the parking lot onto the rea r entra nce sidewalk and other times he plowed snow to the perimete r of t h e p arking lot. L ipp stated that Canopy was never asked to deposit snow in another manner

. Tamar a also claims that the snow and ice mounds wer e melting and fre ezing

over on the rea

r entra nce sidewalk during the entire winter and that the piles could rea ch up to four or f

ive fe et high. ¶ 5 On J uly 28, 2008, Tamar a filed a complaint for neg lige nce ag ainst Skokie and Rosen in the circ uit court of Cook Coun t y

. Tamar a claimed that Skokie and Rosen, as owner s, operators and controllers of the condominium building, failed to exercise rea sonable car e by

cre ating an unsafe and dang erous condition of unnatura l a ccumulation on the rea r entra nce sidewalk. On August 27, 2008, Skokie and Rosen filed an answe r and third-par ty complaint for contribution ag ainst Maintenanc e Hot L ine and Canopy

. In their answe r and third-par ty complaint, Skokie and Rosen denied all of Tamar a’ s al l egations and pled those same alleg ations ag ainst Maintenanc e Hot L ine and Canopy

. The parties exchang ed discovery and

on May 28, 2009, Tamar a filed suppl em en t al responses to Skokie and Rosen’s reque st to produce and Maintenanc e Hot L ine and Canopy ’s reque st to produce

. The sup plemental
response s contained a “dec laration” by Chad Paul, a resident of 8460 N. Skokie Boule vard. 1 The decla ration stated that plow trucks plowed snow onto the rea r entra nce sidewalk cre ating mounds that wer e icy and dang erous throughout the entire winter. On J une 12, 2009, Tamar a

was deposed. On J uly 24, 2009, L ipp was deposed. On Fe bruar y 22, 2010, Umut Ates, owner of Maintena

nce H ot L ine, was deposed. ¶ 6 On April 30, 2010, Skokie and Rosen filed a motion for summary judgme nt pursuant to

s ec t i o n 2 -1 005 of the I llinois Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-1005 (West

T he dec la ra ti on i s aone

- page do cument tha t con ta ins ei ght st at ements fr om a re si den t of 1 T amara’ s bui ldi ng re gardi ng the ic e and sno w m ound s on the re ar ent rance si dewa lk and Cano py’s plo wing pro cedure s. T he dec la ra ti on con ta ins the re si den t’ s si gnatur e bel ow the st at e me n t s a nd a

ve r i f i c a t i o n t h at is si gned by the re si den t as wel l. T he dec la ra ti on app ear s to be an at te m pt by T amara to pre sen t a doc um ent tha t fun ct ion s as an af fi davit

. T he dec la ra ti on was fi le d wit h the tr ia l

cou rt ; however
, it was not pre sen te d to the cou rt and not inc lud ed in T amara’ s J une 2, 2010 re spo nse oppo si ng summ ary j udgm ent

.
-3-2010)). Skokie and Rosen claimed that the I lli n o is Snow and I ce Removal Act (the Act) 2 (745 I L CS 75/2 (West 2008)) gr anted them immunit y from li abil i t y for neg lige nce arising
out of snow and ice remova l on residential sid ew al k s

. On J une 2, 2010, Tamar a filed a response to Skokie and Rosen’s motion for summary judgme nt claiming that: (1) Skokie and Rosen wer e not protec ted by the Act beca use they never actua lly attempted to remove snow from the rea

r entra nce sidewalk and thus are not of the class of owner s protec ted; (2) Skokie and Rosen brea ched the ir duties to remove an unnatura l a ccumulation of snow and ice and protec t the fore seea

ble plaintiff from har m ; (3 ) Skokie and Rosen violated the Skokie obstructions and snow and ic e re moval ordinanc es (Skokie municipal ordina nces) (Skokie C o de of Ordinanc es §§ 90-49, 90-51 (2002)) ; (4) the Act does not immuniz e neg lige nt

remo v al o f snow from the parking lot; (5) Skokie and Rosen’s conduct was willful and wanton; and (6) Skokie and Rosen have not demonstrated a lack of a g enui ne issue of materia l fac t. Tamar a d i d not include the Chad Paul decla ration in her response opposing

s u mmary judgme nt. On J uly 14, 2010, the trial court issued an order granting Skokie an d Rosen’s motion for summary judgme nt. The trial court held that the Act provided Skokie and Rosen with immunity from claims arising from neg lige nt snow and ice remova l and that Skokie and Rosen’s conduct was not willful and wanton. The court also held that the Skokie municipal ordinanc es do not apply beca use: (1) the rea

r entra nce sidewalk is located entirely

on Skokie a

nd Rosen’s proper

ty and there fore is not a “public way”; (2) the ordinanc es are not public safe ty measure s for which tort liability was intended; and (3) even if one or both of the o rd i n an ce s wer e applicable
, they do not superc ede or nullify the immuniz ation aff orded by the Act, nor

do the ordinanc es provide a civil remedy

. ¶ 7 On August 13, 2011, Tamar a filed a motion for rec onsideration of the trial court’s or der granting summary judgme nt. Tamar a attache d the Chad Paul decla ration to her motion t o

re co n s i d er

. On the same day
, Tamar a filed a motion for leave to file a first amende d complaint. On September 24, 2010, Skokie and Rosen filed a response to Tamar a’s motion for rec onsideration and argued that the Chad Paul decla ration shou l d b e s t ri cken. On November 18, 2010, the trial court issued an o rd er d en ying Tamar a’s motion for

rec onsideration. The court ref used to consider the Chad Paul decla ration beca

use Tamar a did
not prese nt the decla

ration to the court, did not includ e it in her response opposing the motion for summary judgme nt, and offe red no explanation as to why the decla ration was not available and utiliz ed at t h e t i m e of the orig inal hearing. Fur ther, the court found that Tamar a’s arguments in her motion to rec onsider wer e the same arguments restate d from her
response opposing the motion for summary judgme nt. The trial court did not rule on Tamar a’s motion for leave to file a first amende d complaint. On Dec ember 10, 2010, Tamar a filed the notice of appe al.

Cano py a ls o fi le d a m oti on for summ ary j udgm ent on Apri l 20, 2010

. However, bec aus e 2 the tr ia l cou rt rul ed in fa vor of Skokie and Rose n, it fou nd tha t the is sue of the thi rd-part y complai nt agains t Ca nopy was m oot

.
-4-¶ 8 ANALYSI S

¶ 9 We de termine the following issues on appea l: ( 1) whether the trial court err ed in ruling that the Act barr ed Tamara’s neg lige nce claim ag ainst Skokie and R osen; and (2) whether the trial court err ed in ruling that the Skokie municipal ordinanc es wer e inapplicable in this

case . As a preliminary matter be fore we c onsider Ta mara ’s ar guments, we must deter mine if this court has jurisdiction. On J uly 14, 2010, the trial court issued an order granting Skokie and Rosen’s motion for summary judgme nt. At this time, Canopy had also filed a motion for
summary judgme nt but the trial court did not rule on that motion. During oral argument, the trial court noted that any cause of action aga i n s t C an opy or Maintenanc e Hot L ine is predic ated on the exis tence of a cause of action ag ainst Skokie and Rosen. There fore
, beca use the court ruled that Skokie and Rosen wer e entitled to judgment as a matter of law
ag ainst Tamar a, the court rea soned that the issue of Canopy ’s motion for summary judgme nt

was moot and need not be decide d. Tamar a filed a motion for rec onsideration on August 10, 2010. The trial court denied the motion for rec onsideration on November 18, 2010. Tamar a then filed a timely notice of appea l on Dec ember 17
, 2 0 1 0
, pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (1) (ef f. J une 4, 2008). There fore
, we are able to consi d er Tamar a’s arguments on appea l. ¶ 10 When revie wing an order g ranting summary judgme nt, the standard of revie w is de novo

. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co.
, 183 I ll. 2d 342, 349, 701 N.E.2d 493, 496 (1998). The revie wing court must c onstrue the rec ord in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party and will reve rse an order granting summary judgme nt if it deter mines that a genui ne issue of materia l fac t ex i s t s

. S chulenburg v. Rex nord, Inc.
, 254 I ll. App. 3d 445, 449, 627 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1993)

. ¶ 11 W e fi rs t ex am i n e Tamar a’s argument that the trial court err ed in ruling that the Act barr ed her neg lige nce claim ag ainst Skokie and Rosen. The Act contains two rele vant parts, which state: “§ 1. It is decla

red to be the public policy of this State that owner s and others residing in residential units be encourag ed to clea n the sidewalks abutting their residenc es of

snow and ice. The Gene ral Assembly
, there fore
, deter mines that it is undesirable for any person to be found liable for damag es due to his or her eff orts in the remova l of snow or ice from such sidewalks, except for acts which amount to clea r wrong doing, as described in Section 2 of this Act.” 745 I L CS 75/ 1 (West 2008). “§ 2. Any owner , lessor, occupa nt or oth er person in charg e of any residential
proper ty , or any ag ent of or o t h er p erson eng ag ed by any such party , who remove s or attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the proper ty shall not be liable for any persona l injuries alleg edly cause d by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleg ed misconduct was willful or wanton.” 745 IL CS 75/ 2 (West 2008).
I ssues of st atutory construction are subject to de novo revie w. In re Estate of Dierke s , 191 I ll. 2d 326, 330, 730 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (2000). The court must g ive ef fec t to the intent of the leg islature. Id

. at 331, 730 N.E.2d at 1104. In order to do so, the court must first look at the plain languag e of the statute. Id

.

-5-¶ 12 Tamar a points out that the purpose o f t h e Ac t i s to encour ag e owner s of re sidential

prop erty to clea

n snow and ice off of sidewalks. Thus, she argues that the Act is designed only to protec t those owner s that actua lly make an ef fo rt to remove snow and ice from sidewalks. Tamar a argues that Skokie and Rosen never once attempted to remove the snow and ice mounds from the rea r entra nce sidewalk and there fore they do not fall under the class of owner s protec ted by the Act. Tamar a claims that the trial court’s interpre tation of the Act would contra dict the purpose and the plain languag e of the Act. She does not cite any case s in support of her the ory . We find this reasoningunpersua sive. ¶ 13 In this case , Skokie and Rosen had contra cts wi t h b o th Canopy and Maintenanc e Hot L ine reg arding snow remova l, among other service s. Canopy was in charg e of clea ring snow from the building’s parking lot and Maintenanc e Hot L ine was in charg e of shoveling snow and ice off the L ee Street sidewalk. Both Canopy and Maintenanc e Hot L ine perf ormed their duties pursuant to their contra cts through o ut the 2007-08 winter. Thus, Skokie and Rosen

wer e making a conscious eff ort to c lear

snow and ice from their pr emises in order to make the building more acc essible for residents and invitees. Section 2 of the Act states “[ a] ny

owner *** shall not be liable for any persona l injuries alleg edly cause d by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk resulting from his or her acts or omissions unles s the alleg ed conduct [ is] willful or wanton.” ( Emphasis added.) 745 I L CS 75/ 2 (West 2008). Although T am ar a argues i n opposition, we find that Skokie and R osen’s failure to remove the s now and ice mounds from the rea r entra nce sidewalk is an omission in their overa ll snow remova l eff orts. ¶ 14 Tamar a also arg ues that summary judgme nt should not have been grante d beca use the snow and ice mounds wer e unnatural acc umulations and S kokie and Rosen br eac hed their duty to reme dy the dang erous conditions. In support of h er arg ument, Tamar a cites many

cases that discuss the liability imposed on proper ty owner s under common law when they

cre ate unnatura l acc umulations that result i n injuries. She also cites case s that discuss a proper ty owner ’s common law duty to reme dy self-c reated unnatur al ac cu mulations and

unrea s o n a b ly d a n g e r o u s c o n d itio ns. Howeve r, Tamar a fails to rec ognize that the Act provides

an exc eption to the common law duty that would otherwise be imposed. Section 2 of the Act provides immunit y for owner s of residential proper ty reg arding neg lige nt acts or omissions in attempting to remove ice and snow from sidewalks. 745 I L CS 75/2 (West 2008). “Where
, under the common law, an owner or snow-re moval contra ctor may have been liable for such injuries wher e the injuries wer e the result of an u n n atura l acc umulation of snow and ice

cre ated or ag g ravated by the owner or snow-re moval contra ctor, they are now immune unless their conduct was willful or wa nton.” Gallagher v. Union Square Condominium Homeowne r’s Ass’n
, 397 I ll. App. 3d 1037, 1043, 922 N.E.2d 120, 1207 (2010). There fore
, it is irrele vant whether the snow and ice m o u n d s o n th e rea r entra nce sidewalk wer e an unnatura l acc umulation. Thus, the Act applies to Skokie and Rosen. ¶ 15 Tamar a contends that even if the Act does a pply to Skokie and Rosen in this case , they should be held liable for her injuries beca use their conduct was willful and wanton. Tamar a argues that Skokie and Rosen had actua l and constructive knowledg e of the snow and ice mounds, and showed rec kle ss disreg ard for Tamar a’s safe ty by failing to remove the mounds. Wil lful and wanton conduc t has bee n define d as “a course of action which shows actua l or

-6-deliberate intent to harm or whic h, if the cour se of a ction is not int entional, shows an utter

indiffer ence to or conscious disreg ard for a person’ s own safe ty or the safe ty or proper ty of others.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Kurczak v. Cornwell
, 359 I l l

. App. 3d 1051, 1060, 835 N.E.2d 452, 460 (2005) (quoting Pfister v. Shus t a , 1 6 7 I l l

. 2d 417, 421, 657 N.E.2d 1013 (1995))

. Tamar a points out that willful and wanton conduct can also mean “the failure
, afte r g aining actua l or constructive notice of an impending danger
, t o ex erc ise ordinary car e to preve nt harm to others, wh en t h at d ang er poses an unrea sonable risk of harm.” Sulliv a n v. C i t

y o f Hillsboro
, 303 I ll. App. 3d 650, 655, 707 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (1999). ¶ 16 In Sullivan
, the plaintiff was injured by striking his leg on a submerg ed pipe in a lake that

was 30 fee t f

rom the shore. See g ener ally Sullivan
, 303 I ll. App. 3d 650, 707 N.E.2d 1273. The plaintiff was able to survive a motion for summary judgme nt by alleg ing that the city had
actua l or constructive knowledge o f t h e latent haz ard, that the city council had considere d the hazard at council meeting s but failed to remove the hazard, and that the plaintiff had no knowledg e of the hazard. Id . at 655, 707 N.E.2d at 1277. In this case , the t rial court found that Tamar a prese nted no evidenc e that sug g ested willful a n d w anton conduct. We agree with that finding

. Tamar a does not prese nt any fac ts that show that the owner s co n s i d er ed the

snow and ice mounds to be dang erous in this case

. Fur ther, Tamar a did not show that there

wer e any complaints made about the snow and ice mounds, or any other injuries as a result of the snow and ice mounds. Tamar a attempts to ref ere nce the Chad Paul decla ration in her statement of f

acts a nd as an a ppendix t o her brief in order to establish Skokie and Rosen’s knowledg e of the snow and ice mounds. Howeve r, we ref use to consi d er t h e d eclaration beca use the trial c ourt did not c onsider the dec laration in making its ruling. Atrial court is not require d to consider e videntiary materia l submitt ed for the first time with a motion for

rec onsideration afte r an order granting summary judgme nt has been enter ed. Landers v. Equity Pro

perty & Dev elopment
, 321 I ll. App. 3d 57, 65-66 (2001). Fur ther, a revie wing
court will not supplement the rec ord on appea l with the documents attache d to the appellant’ s brief on appea l as an ap pendix, wher e there is no stipulation betwee n the parties to supplement the rec ord an d t h er e was no motion in the revie wing court to supplement the

rec ord with the materia l. McCarty v. W eatherford
, 362 I ll. App. 3d 308, 311 (2005). Skokie and Rosen’s failure to remove the snow and ice mounds from the rea r entra nce sidewalk does

n o t a mount to rec kless disreg ard for Tamar a’s safe ty

. There fore
, Skokie and Rosen’s condu c t was not willful and wanton. We hold that the t rial court d i d n o t err i n fi nding that the Act barr ed Tamara ’s neg lige nce c laim ag ainst Skokie and Rosen. ¶ 17 We next examine Tamar a’s argument that the trial court err ed in finding that Skokie a nd Rosen did not violate t h e S k o kie municipal ordinanc es and that the ordinanc es are inapplicable in this case

. “Municipal ord i n an ce s are interpre ted under the rules g overning statutory interpre tation.” DTCT

, Inc. v. City of Chicago D e p a r tment of

Rev enue , 407 I ll. App. 3d 945, 949, 944 N.E.2d 449, 453 (2011). The interpre tation of an ordinanc e is a question of law and the revie wing court applies the de novo standard of revie w. Id

. at 948, 944 N.E.2d at 452. The court must g ive effec t to the i ntent of the muni cipal i t y by first interpre ting the plain languag e of the ordinanc e. Id

. at 949, 944 N.E.2d at 449. The revie wing court will not

resor t to ex trinsic aids of construc tion if the languag e is clea r and una mbiguous. Id

.

-7-¶ 18 There are multipl e provisions in the Skokie Code of Ordinanc es that are at issue in this

case . The Skokie obstructions ordinanc e states: “Sec. 90- 49. Obstructions Gene rally

. It shall be unlawful for any person to ere ct or maintain any obstruction in any street, sidewalk, alley or public way so as to impede or p re v en t the fre e and unrestric ted
movement of vehicular or pedestria n traff ic, except as is permitted by this article or any other ordina

nce of the Villag e.” Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 90-49 ( 2002). The Skokie snow re moval and disposal ordinanc e states: “Sec. 90- 51. Snow removal a nd disposal.
I t shall be unlawful for any person to throw, dump or deposit an acc umulat i o n o f

snow or i ce upon any public way

. All persons in control of proper ty located in any business zoned district fronting or abutting paved sidewalks shall remove the snow and ice from the portions s o ab u tting or, if the snow and ice is too hard for remova l, shall

cover it wi t h abrasive materia ls within 24 hours afte r a snowfall or fre ezing
prec ipitation.” Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 90-51 ( 2002). The Skokie Code of O rdinanc es def ines the term “ public way” as: “Sec. 106- 31. Def

initions

. *** Public way means any sidewalk, alley street or other public thoroughfar e open to the

use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of trave l.” Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 106-31 (2002)

. The Skokie Code of O rdinanc es def ines the term “ sidewalk” as: “Sec. 90- 31. Def

initions

. *** Sidewalk mean s t h at p o rt ion of a street that is intended for pedestria n trave l and is situated betwee n the curblines or the lateral out s i d e lines of the stree t and the adjac ent proper ty lines, except that portion there of define d in this section as a parkw ay , car riag e walk, ser vice wa lk or drivewa

y .” Skokie Code of Or dinance s § 90-31 (2002). The Skokie Code of O rdinanc es def ines the term “ service walk” a s: “Sec. 90- 31. Def

initions

. *** Servic e walk means that portion of the street which is intended for pedestria n trave l
to and from the s i d ew al k t o the adjac ent proper ty or to and from the street to the sidewalk.” Skokie Code of Ordina nces § 90- 31 (2002). ¶ 19 Both parties make arg uments reg arding the way this court should interpre t the provisions

m en tioned above; howeve r, we use the plain languag e of eac h ordinanc e to guide o u r in t erpretation. For the purpose of clarity
, we will discuss the Skokie snow remova l and disposal ordinanc e first. As previously discussed, the trial court found that the rea r entra nce sidewalk was located entirely on Skokie and Rosen’s proper ty and could not be considere d

a “public way .” Thus, the trial court found that the snow remova l and disposal ordinanc e was

-8-inapplicable in this case

. We agree with this rea soning and find t h e plain languag e of the

definitions provision to be instructive. Acc ording to the Skokie Code of Ordinanc es, in order for an are a to be considere d a “public way” it must be “open to the use of the public, as a matter of right
, for purposes of trave l.” (Emphasis added.) Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 06- 31 (2002). In this case , the rea r entra nce sidewalk is proper

ty that is wholly owned by Skokie and Rosen. The public has no right to trave l on this proper ty

. Tamar a argues that the lack of signs, barriers or g ates betwee n the rea r entra nce sidewalk and L ee Street sidewalk made it clea r that the owner s intended the rea r entra nce sidewalk to be for the public’s unlimit ed use. Howeve r, it was completely within Skokie and Rosen’s right to put up a g ate or other barrier betwee n their proper

ty and the L ee Street sidewalk if they wanted. The fac t tha t the y chose
not to do so does not chang e the designation of their proper ty from private to public. The rea r entra nce sidewalk rema ins private proper ty reg ardle ss of its open appea ranc e, and the public does not have a right to use it. The rea r entra nce sidewalk is not a “public way .” There fore
, the Snow Removal and Disposal ordina nce is inapplica

ble in this case. ¶ 20 T a

ma r a f u r ther arg ues that the Skokie Obstructions ordinanc e applies in this case beca use the rea r entra

nce sidewalk meets the definition of “sidewa lk” as presc ribed by the Skokie Code of Ordinanc es. Skokie and Rosen argue that the rea r entra nce sidewalk actua lly meets the definition of a “ser

vice walk” as presc ribed by the Skokie Code of Ordinanc es. We agree with Skokie and Rosen’s interpre tation and loo k t o t h e p lain languag e of the definitions provisions for guidance

. Section 90-31 define s a “sidewa lk” as the portion o f t h e street betwee n the curblines and adjac ent proper ty lines, excluding parkw ay s, car riag e walks, service walks or drivewa

y s. Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 90-31 (2002). In this case , the rea r entra nce sidewalk is not in betwee n the curblines and the adjac ent proper ty lines. It is entirely

on the proper

ty belong ing to Skokie and Rosen. In order for the rea r entra nce sidewalk to be considere d a “sidewa lk” for the purposes of the Skokie Code of Ordina nces, it would have to be outside the private proper ty line. The rea

r entra nce sidewalk c lear ly

fails to meet this definition. ¶ 21 On t he other hand, section 90-31 def ines a “ service walk” a s “that portion of the s tree t which is intended for pedestria n trave l to and from the sidewalk to the adjac ent proper ty or to and from the street to the sidewalk.” (Emphasis added.) Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 90- 31 (2002). The phrase “t o an d from” means that the definition applies to are as that rea ch from the sidewalk to the adjac ent proper ty , and ar ea s t h at re ach to the sidewalk from the adjac ent property

. In this case , the rear entranc e sidewa lk clearly rea ches from Skokie and Rosen’s proper

ty to the L ee Street sidewalk. There fore
, it would be considere d a “ser vice walk” by definition in the Skokie Code of Ordinanc es. We note the possibili ty for confusion

as the walkwa

y identified as the “re ar entra nce sidewalk” is often ref

err ed to as a “sidewa lk.” Howeve r, t h is does not chang e its designation for the purposes of the Skokie Code of Ordinanc es. The Skokie Obstructions ordinanc e only imposes liability on persons that ere ct

or maintain obstructions on streets, sidewalks, alley s, or public ways. Skokie Code of Ordinanc es § 90-49 (2002). Fur ther, section 90-31 specific ally excludes service walks from its definition of “sidewa lk.” There fore
, the Skokie Obstructions ordinanc e is inapplicable in this case

. We hold that the trial court did not err in fi n d i n g t h at t he Skokie municipal ordinanc es wer e inapplicable in this case and that Skokie and Rosen did n ot violate the

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¶ 22 Tamar a also argues that the trial court err ed in finding that the Act pree mpted the Skokie municipal ordinanc es. Although Tamar a prese nts a coher ent and persua sive arg ument, it is immaterial beca

use we have alre ady decide d that the Skokie municipal ordinanc es d o not apply in this case and wer e not violated. Be cause t h e S k o k i e municipal ordinanc es are inapplicable in this case , there is no conflict to resolve betwee n the ordinanc es and the Act. There fore
, this argument has no eff ect on the resolution of this case and we do not consider it. The parties also make a rguments reg ardingwhether Canopy and Maintenance Hot L ine

wer e ag ents of Skokie and Rosen. Skokie and Rosen argue that Canopy and Maintenanc e Hot L ine wer e not their ag ents and, there fore
, they cannot be held liable for the actions of Canopy and Maintenanc e Hot L ine. Tamar a argues that C an o p y and Maintenanc e Hot L ine wer e ag ents of Skokie and Rosen. Also, Tamar a arg ues that even if there was no ag ency relationsh i p , S k o k i e and Rosen could be liable for Canopy and Maintenanc e Hot L ine’s actions through their re lationship as independent contra ctors. This issue is also immaterial beca use we have alre ady decide d that Skokie and Rosen are immune from liability under the Act. L ikewise, this issue has no eff ect on the outcome of this case and will not be considere d. ¶ 23 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Cook County is a ffirme d.

¶ 24 Affir

med.

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