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771

Matter of Anton PANIN, Respondent

Decided January 11, 2024

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

A respondent’s release from Federal pretrial criminal custody does not preclude an 

Immigration Judge from denying a respondent’s request for release from immigration 

detention under section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 

(2018).

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Roman Leonov, Esquire, New York, New York

BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER, PETTY, and CLARK, Appellate Immigration 

Judges.

PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The respondent, a native of the Soviet Union and citizen of Russia, 

appeals from the Immigration Judge’s order denying his request for custody 

redetermination. He contends that because a United States magistrate judge 

granted him release on bail in his Federal criminal proceedings, the 

Immigration Judge was collaterally estopped from making an independent 

determination of his dangerousness and flight risk. We adopt the unanimous 

view of the United States courts of appeals and dismiss the respondent’s 

appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2023, the respondent was charged with conspiracy to commit an 

offense against the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018), money 

laundering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2018), and money 

laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The indictment alleges that 

the respondent operated a prostitution ring, transported women from Russia 

and Eastern Europe to engage in prostitution, and laundered tens of 

thousands of dollars in prostitution proceeds. A Federal magistrate judge 

ordered the respondent’s release from pretrial criminal custody on a 

$200,000.00 bond. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

subsequently detained the respondent. He filed a request for custody 

redetermination before the Immigration Judge. The Immigration Judge 

denied the respondent’s request for release on bond because he did not meet 
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his burden to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community or a flight 

risk. This appeal followed. Whether collateral estoppel applies to the 

respondent’s bond proceedings is a legal issue we review de novo. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2020).

II. DISCUSSION

“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel can apply to preclude relitigation of 

both issues of law and issues of fact if those issues were conclusively 

determined in a prior action.” United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 

165, 170–71 (1984). Here, the respondent claims that collateral estoppel 

precluded the Immigration Judge from ordering his continued immigration 

detention. Specifically, he argues that because the district court had already 

found, for purposes of pretrial release under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 

Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976–87 (codified as amended 

in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), that he is not a danger to the community 

or flight risk, the Immigration Judge was estopped from reaching a different 

conclusion. The respondent does not meaningfully develop any other 

arguments regarding the Immigration Judge’s dangerousness and flight risk 

determinations. See Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330, 336 n.5 (BIA 2021)

(holding that arguments not meaningfully developed on appeal are waived). 

The respondent’s argument misapprehends the relationship between the 

separate statutory authorities governing his pretrial criminal detention and 

his pre-order immigration detention. The respondent’s pretrial criminal 

detention was governed by the Bail Reform Act, under which the government 

bore the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he presented 

a danger to the community. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 

(1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)–(g)). Conversely, the respondent’s 

pre-order immigration detention is governed by section 236(a) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018). 

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018). A noncitizen in a custody 

determination proceeding under this statute bears the burden to establish that 

he or she does not present a danger to the community, a threat to national 

security, or a flight risk. Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006).

The Bail Reform Act and the INA allocate the burden of proof to different 

parties, “serve different purposes, govern separate adjudicatory proceedings, 

and provide independent statutory bases for detention.” United States v. Lett, 

944 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2019). The authority to detain a noncitizen under 

the INA “does not disappear merely because the U.S. Marshal cannot detain 

him under the [Bail Reform Act] pending his criminal trial.” United States 

v. Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d 546, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Indeed, every court 

of appeals that has addressed this issue has held that “pretrial release under 
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the [Bail Reform Act] does not preclude pre-removal detention under the 

INA.” United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian, 990 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 

2021); accord Lett, 944 F.3d at 471–72; United States v. Soriano Nunez, 

928 F.3d 240, 245–47 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Veloz-Alonso, 

910 F.3d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Pacheco-Poo, 952 F.3d 

950, 952 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Barrera-Landa, 964 F.3d 912, 

918–21 (10th Cir. 2020); Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d at 552–54.

1

Although Baltazar-Sebastian controls the outcome here, we take this 

opportunity to establish a nationwide rule. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)

(“[T]he Board, through precedent decisions, shall provide clear and uniform 

guidance to the Service, the immigration judges, and the general public on 

the proper interpretation and administration of the Act . . . .”). Consistent 

with the unanimous view of the courts of appeals that have addressed the 

issue, we hold that a respondent’s release from Federal pretrial criminal 

custody does not preclude an Immigration Judge from denying a 

respondent’s request for release from immigration detention under section 

236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Instead, as in any custody 

redetermination proceeding, an Immigration Judge must determine whether, 

based on the record, a respondent has demonstrated that he or she merits 

release on bond under the custody redetermination provisions of the INA. 

Accordingly, we will dismiss the respondent’s appeal.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

1 Although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, it has recognized that 

“detention of a ‘criminal defendant pending trial pursuant to the [Bail Reform Act] and 

detention of a removable alien pursuant to the [Immigration and Nationality Act] are 

separate functions that serve separate purposes and are performed by different 

authorities.’” United States v. Diaz-Hernandez, 943 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d at 552).