United States Tax Court

160 T.C. No. 13

PRINCE AMUN-RA HOTEP ANKH MEDUTY,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 32817-21P. Filed May 23, 2023.

—————

P owed more than $100,000 in unpaid, legally 

enforceable federal income tax liabilities and frivolous 

return penalties relating to eight taxable years. R was 

unable to collect those liabilities and certified to the 

Secretary of State that P had a “seriously delinquent tax 

debt” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 7345 for the relevant 

years and liabilities. P filed a petition with this Court 

under I.R.C. § 7345(e)(1) to challenge the certification. R 

filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the 

certification was proper. 

Held: P’s liabilities constitute a “seriously 

delinquent tax debt” under I.R.C. § 7345, and R’s 

certification to the Secretary of State was not erroneous.

Held, further, the Court lacks jurisdiction under 

I.R.C. § 7345(e) to review challenges to R’s compliance with 

the notification requirement set forth in I.R.C. § 7345(d).

—————

Prince Amun-Ra Hotep Ankh Meduty, pro se.

Susan K. Bollman, for respondent.

Served 05/23/23
2

OPINION

URDA, Judge: In this passport case petitioner, Prince Amun-Ra 

Hotep Ankh Meduty, seeks review pursuant to section 7345(e)1 of the 

certification by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

to the Secretary of State that Mr. Meduty has a “seriously delinquent 

tax debt” for his 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2012 tax 

years. The Commissioner has filed a motion for summary judgment 

under Rule 121, contending that his certification was proper and that 

he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Seeing no error, we will 

grant the Commissioner’s motion.

Background

The following facts are based on the parties’ pleadings and motion 

papers, including the attached declarations and exhibits. See Rule 

121(c). The exhibits included the relevant portions of the administrative 

record that formed the basis of the certification. Mr. Meduty lived in 

Georgia when he timely filed his petition.

Mr. Meduty (formerly known as Steven Bell) failed to file timely 

tax returns for the 2003–07, 2009, and 2012 tax years. For each of these 

years except 2007, the IRS prepared a substitute for return under 

section 6020(b) and later assessed the tax shown on the substitute for 

return with penalties and interest. Mr. Meduty filed a belated tax 

return for 2007, and the IRS assessed the amount shown on that return. 

The IRS also assessed frivolous tax return penalties against Mr. Meduty 

with respect to his 2005–08 tax years. 

In an effort to collect these liabilities, the IRS levied against Mr. 

Meduty’s right to receive his state income tax refunds through an 

automated levy process known as the State Income Tax Levy Program. 

These levies took place on a rolling basis from 2012 through 2018 as 

liabilities for various periods were assessed.

On July 3, 2018, the IRS sent via certified mail to Mr. Meduty’s 

last known address a notice of intent to levy with respect to his 

outstanding liabilities. Although the IRS received a signed return 

receipt three days later, Mr. Meduty did not request a collection due 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal 

Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.), in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule 

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All monetary 

amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
3

process (CDP) hearing or otherwise contest the levy (and the time for 

doing so has long since expired). The IRS recorded an “initial levy” 

transaction code with respect to each of the periods and liabilities at 

issue on August 31, 2018. 

On October 1, 2018, the IRS certified Mr. Meduty as an individual 

owing a seriously delinquent tax debt arising from tax years 2003, 2004, 

2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2012. The IRS concurrently sent Mr. 

Meduty, at his last known address, a Notice CP508C, Notice of 

Certification of Your Seriously Delinquent Federal Tax Debt to the State 

Department. At that point, Mr. Meduty’s assessed liabilities totaled 

$106,346.

Approximately three years later, Mr. Meduty petitioned this 

Court to review the section 7345 certification under section 7345(e)(1). 

He asserted in his petition, inter alia, that the Commissioner had failed 

to cite any “authority implementing regulations published in the 

Federal Register for Code § 7345,” that a levy is restricted to “salary or 

wages of an officer, employee or elected official of the United States or 

District of Columbia,” and that “value of $10,000,000 was sent for 

acceptance[,] approval[, and] discharge of any debt.”

Discussion

I. Background Law

A. Scope and Standard of Review Under Section 7345

The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and 

avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. 

v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). In cases that are subject to a 

de novo scope of review, we may grant summary judgment when there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a decision may be 

rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a)(2); Sundstrand Corp. v. 

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). 

In cases in which the Court “must confine [itself] to the 

administrative record to decide whether there has been an abuse of 

discretion,” the ordinary “summary judgment standard is not generally 

apt.” Van Bemmelen v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. 64, 78 (2020). In those 

cases, “summary judgment serves as a mechanism for deciding, as a 

matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the 

administrative record and is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. at 79.
4

We need not decide in this case either the applicable scope or 

standard of review. See, e.g., Rowen v. Commissioner, 156 T.C. 101, 106 

(2021). As to the scope of review, there is no material dispute between 

the parties regarding the evidence we should consider. As to the 

standard of review, our decision would be the same whether we reviewed 

the Commissioner’s certification de novo or for abuse of discretion. 

B. Section 7345 Overview

If the Commissioner certifies that a taxpayer has “a seriously 

delinquent tax debt,” section 7345(a) provides that the certification shall 

be transmitted “to the Secretary of State for action with respect to 

denial, revocation, or limitation of [the taxpayer’s] passport.”2 The 

Commissioner is responsible for notifying the taxpayer of the 

certification. I.R.C. § 7345(d).

Generally, a “seriously delinquent tax debt” is a federal tax 

liability that has been assessed, exceeds $50,000 (adjusted for inflation), 

and is unpaid and legally enforceable. I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1), (f).3 In 

addition, to prevail on his motion for summary judgment, the 

Commissioner must demonstrate that either “(i) a notice of lien has been 

filed pursuant to section 6323 and the administrative rights under 

section 6320 with respect to such filing have been exhausted or have 

lapsed, or (ii) a levy is made pursuant to section 6331.” I.R.C. 

§ 7345(b)(1)(C). As relevant here, section 6331 requires that the 

Secretary provide the taxpayer a “brief statement” describing, inter alia, 

levy procedures, administrative appeal rights, and collection 

alternatives at least 30 days before the issuance of the levy. I.R.C. 

§ 6331(d).

If a certification is found to be erroneous, or if the certified debt is 

fully satisfied or ceases to be seriously delinquent, the IRS must reverse 

its certification and notify the Secretary of State and the taxpayer. 

2 Section 7345 outlines a two-step procedure whereby the Commissioner sends 

certification to the Secretary of the Treasury, who then transmits the certification to 

the Secretary of State. In practice, the IRS follows a one-step procedure whereby the 

Commissioner, as the Secretary’s delegate, transmits the certification directly to the 

State Department. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(11); Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 

5.1.12.27.1, .6, .8 (Dec. 20, 2017).

3 The inflation-adjusted amount for 2018, the year of the certification here, was 

$51,000. See Rev. Proc. 2017-58, § 3.53, 2017-45 I.R.B. 489, 499. Although 

section 7345(b)(2) sets forth certain exceptions to the term “seriously delinquent tax 

debt,” Mr. Meduty does not argue that any applies. We thus will not tarry over them.
5

I.R.C. § 7345(c)(1), (d). Section 7345(e)(1) permits a taxpayer who has 

been certified as having a “seriously delinquent tax debt” to petition this 

Court to determine “whether the certification was erroneous or whether 

the [IRS] has failed to reverse the certification.” If we find that a 

certification was erroneous, we “may order the Secretary [of the 

Treasury] to notify the Secretary of State that such certification was 

erroneous.” I.R.C. § 7345(e)(2). The statute specifies no other form of 

relief that we may grant. Adams v. Commissioner, No. 1527-21P, 160 

T.C., slip op. at 8 (Jan. 24, 2023).

II. Analysis

A. Whether the Certification of Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt 

Was Erroneous

The record shows that the Commissioner met the criteria to 

certify that Mr. Meduty has a “seriously delinquent tax debt.” The 

Commissioner has supplied Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessments,

Payments, and Other Specified Matters, for Mr. Meduty’s income tax 

liabilities for 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2012, as well as 

Forms 4340 related to the frivolous return penalties for 2005 through 

2008. These Forms 4340 reflect assessments for each of the years and 

liabilities at issue and show that as of October 2018, Mr. Meduty had 

assessed, unpaid, and legally enforceable federal tax liabilities of 

$106,346. Although Mr. Meduty contests the validity of the underlying 

liabilities (primarily referencing run-of-the-mill tax-protester

arguments), “we do not have jurisdiction to review the liabilities 

underlying the certification of a seriously delinquent tax debt.” See

Adams, 160 T.C., slip op. at 12–13 (citing Ruesch v. Commissioner, 154 

T.C. 289, 295–98 (2020), aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded per

curiam, 25 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2022)); see also Belton v. Commissioner, T.C. 

Memo. 2023-13, at *13.4

4 We recognize that, after certification, the collection period of limitations 

expired for the 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 federal income tax liabilities and the

2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 frivolous return penalty liabilities, and the balances due 

were written off. The total amount of Mr. Meduty’s tax liabilities thus dipped below 

the 2018 threshold amount after the date of the certifications. This change in 

circumstances does not suggest that the certification should be reversed. Once a valid 

certification is made, section 7345(c)(1) and (2) provides that a debt “ceases to be a 

seriously delinquent debt” only if the debt “has been fully satisfied or has become 

legally unenforceable.” (Emphasis added.) Since at least some of the debt remains 

outstanding and legally enforceable, this requirement has not been satisfied. See

Belton, T.C. Memo. 2023-13, at *16 n.17.
6

The record also establishes, with respect to each year and type of 

liability, that a “levy [has been] made pursuant to section 6331.” See

I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii). To demonstrate levies pursuant to 

section 6331, the Commissioner relies on both the Forms 4340 and the 

declaration of a senior program analyst overseeing passport 

certifications, who was familiar with the Integrated Data Retrieval 

System (IDRS).5

The Forms 4340 for each of the periods and tax liabilities at issue 

reflect that the IRS (1) issued a notice of intent to levy via certified mail 

on July 3, 2018, (2) received a signed return receipt on July 6, 2018, and 

(3) made an initial levy6 on August 31, 2018. For his part, the senior 

program analyst declared that he had reviewed Mr. Meduty’s IDRS 

transcripts and that those transcripts displayed action code “TC 971 AC 

640.” This code “has been created to identify tax periods for which levy 

action has occurred.” IRM 5.19.1.5.19.5(1) (Dec. 26, 2017); see also

Belton, T.C. Memo. 2023-13, at *22.

“[B]earing the presumption of regularity in mind, we agree that, 

absent any allegations or evidence that the levies were improper, action 

code[] . . . 640 would usually suffice to show that the Commissioner 

properly levied . . . the taxpayer[] . . . .” Belton, T.C. Memo. 2023-13, 

at *22; see also United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 

(1926) (“The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public 

officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts 

presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”). Mr. 

Meduty challenges neither his receipt of the notice of intent to levy with 

respect to each period nor that the IRS properly levied upon his right to 

receive any state income tax refund by providing notice to the 

appropriate state official. See Belton, T.C. Memo. 2023-13, at *22. We 

5 As we recently explained, IDRS is a computer interface that allows the IRS 

to retrieve a portion of the data it possesses regarding each taxpayer’s federal tax 

obligations and generate transcripts with respect to such information. See, e.g., Belton, 

T.C. Memo. 2013-13, at *14.

6 The senior program analyst explained that the transcripts showed numerous 

levies against Mr. Meduty’s state tax refunds through the automatic State Income Tax 

Levy Program starting in 2012. As the IRS acknowledges, such automatic levies are 

subject to a postlevy CDP proceeding under section 6330(c)(2) and plainly do not 

comport with the section 6331 requirement of notice before levy. See also IRM 

5.1.12.27.5(3) (Dec. 20, 2017) (flush language) (“For purposes of passport certification, 

a state income tax refund levy will not be recognized as a levy until CDP notification 

is provided.”). 
7

thus conclude that the IRS satisfied the requirement that the levy be 

made pursuant to section 6331. 

On the record before us, at the time of certification Mr. Meduty’s 

liabilities met the statutory definition of “seriously delinquent tax debt.” 

B. Mr. Meduty’s Remaining Arguments

In his objection to motion for summary judgment and his 

supplement thereto, Mr. Meduty raises a panoply of silly and frivolous 

arguments, including that (1) section 7345 was ineffective without 

implementing regulations, but see Int’l Multifoods Corp. & Affiliated 

Cos. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 579, 587 (1997) (“It is well established 

that the absence of regulations is not an acceptable basis for refusing to 

apply the substantive provisions of a section of the Internal Revenue 

Code.”); Trans City Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 274, 300 

(1996) (“The Constitution does not require that the Commissioner 

prescribe regulations . . . [and i]n the absence of regulations, the 

statutory text may be interpreted in light of all the pertinent evidence, 

textual and contextual, of its meaning.”); (2) levies under section 6331

are only proper against an “officer, employee, or elected official, of the 

United States or District of Columbia,” but see Pierson v. Commissioner,

115 T.C. 576, 578–80 (2000) (finding an identical argument frivolous and 

without merit); and (3) he has fully satisfied his debt through the posting 

of a “bonded promissory note” for $10,000,000, but see Goff v. 

Commissioner, 135 T.C. 231, 236 (2010) (“Simply put, neither the note 

nor anything in connection with the note constitutes payment of [a 

taxpayer’s] liabilities.”). We will give no longer shrift to these 

contentions. Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498, 501 (2011).

Mr. Meduty raises one nonfrivolous argument that implicates the 

scope of our jurisdiction under section 7345(e). Specifically, he contends 

that the IRS did not send him proper notice of the certification consistent 

with section 7345(d). 

The jurisdiction Congress conferred in section 7345(e) does not 

extend to the review of the IRS’s compliance with section 7345(d). 

Section 7345(e)(1) provides that after certification, “the taxpayer may 

bring a civil action . . . against the Commissioner in the Tax Court, to 

determine whether the certification was erroneous or whether the 

Commissioner has failed to reverse the certification.” “The text of 

section 7345(e) focuses exclusively on the Commissioner’s actions 

certifying seriously delinquent tax debts and authorizes our Court (and 
8

the district courts) to determine whether those actions are erroneous.” 

Adams, 160 T.C., slip op. at 16.

As the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recently 

noted, “§ 7345 does not say that a flawed or failed notice renders a 

certification erroneous.” McNeil v. United States, No. CV 20-329 (JDB), 

2021 WL 1061221, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2021), aff’d per curiam sub 

nom. McNeil v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 21-5161, 2022 WL 4349598 (D.C. 

Cir. Sept. 20, 2022). And the structure of section 7345 belies such a 

conclusion. Subsections (a) and (b) describe when the Secretary of the 

Treasury must transmit certification to the Secretary of State and 

identify which debts qualify as “seriously delinquent tax debt.” Neither 

suggests that notice is a prerequisite to a proper certification by the IRS 

of a “seriously delinquent tax debt.” See McNeil, 2021 WL 1061221,

at *5. To the contrary, “subsection (d) says that notice to the taxpayer 

should be ‘contemporaneous[]’ with certification to State, so it logically 

cannot be a prerequisite to that certification.” Id. 

Like the District Court for the District of Columbia, we struggle 

to see any prejudice adhering to a taxpayer who does not receive proper 

notice of the certification contemplated in subsection (d). Subsection (e) 

supplies no period of limitations, and a taxpayer such as Mr. Meduty 

who does not receive proper notice (accepting his factual allegations in 

their most favorable light) is nonetheless able to challenge a 

certification. See I.R.C. § 7345(e); see also McNeil, 2021 WL 1061221,

at *5. 

In short, we do not believe that our jurisdiction to determine 

whether a certification is erroneous encompasses patrolling compliance 

with the requirement to provide notice to a taxpayer “in simple and 

nontechnical terms of the right to bring a civil action under subsection 

(e).” See I.R.C. § 7345(d). 

III. Conclusion

We hold that the certification of Mr. Meduty as a taxpayer owing 

a “seriously delinquent tax debt” was not erroneous. We will grant 

summary judgment for the Commissioner.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.