For t he s ake of cl ar i t y , an d t o avoi d unn ece s s ar y conf us i on, we s et fort h t he r el eva nt f act ual an d procedur al 1

a sp e c ts o f t h is c a se c h ro n o lo g ic a lly. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 12, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BUD CASH, J R.

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Bradley County Nos. M-96- 031, M-04- 178, M-04- 445 R. Steve n Bebb , Judge

No. E2004-02647-CC A-R3- CD - F iled May 18, 2005

T h e D e f e n d a n t , B u d C a s h , J r

. , w a s i n d i c t e d o n s i x t e e n c o u n t s o f p o s s e s s i o n o f

a h a n d g u n b y a
c on vic te d fe lon , an d thr e e c ou nts of po sse ssi on of a n alt e re d seria l numb e r we apo n. Af te r the statut e of limit ations had expired, the State filed two subsequent superc eding indictments. The trial court dismiss ed all thre e indictments, holding that the orig inal indictment was insufficie nt to provide the Def endant notice of the charg es and insufficient to protec t the Defenda nt from double jeopardy , and that the subsequent indictments we re untimely filed. The Stat e appe als, contending that the trial

c ou rt e rr e d whe n it dis mis se d the ind ic tme nts

. We ag re e wi th the State , a nd , a c c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt R ever sed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michelle Chapman Mc I ntire, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Jerry

N. Estes, District Attorney Gene ral; and Robert W. R ichar dson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee. Doug las A. Trant, Knox ville, Tennesse e (at trial) an d J ea nne L . Wigg ins, Athens, Tenne ssee ( on appea l) for the appellee , Bud Cash, Jr.

OP IN ION I. F acts

Th is pr oc e du ra lly c omp le x c a se ari se s fr om the dis mis sa l of thr e e se ts o f i nd ic tme nts a g a ins t the De fe nd a nt. On Janu ary 10 , 19 90 , a nd prior to the c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t g a ve ri se to this app e a l, 1 the Def endant wa s convicted o f agg ravated assault. On January 18, 1996, based on informationT h e tra n sc rip t o f t h e p re lim ina ry h e a rin g w a s inc lud e d in the re c o rd a s a n e x h ib it to the D e fen d a n t’s 2

m o tio n to su p p re ss e v id e n c e

.

T h e dat e of

t h e of fen s e wa s a ct u al l y J an u ar y 18, 1996. 3

-2- volunteere d by the Defenda nt’s ex-wife, officer s in Br adley Countyobtained and e x ecute d a sea rch

warra n t fo r t h e Def

endant’ s home. The of

fice rs found sixt een handg uns, three of which had the serial number s removed. T he De fendant was arrested, w ithout a warr ant, and bound ove r to the g rand jury . A pre l i m inary hearing w as held on January 26, 1996. I n Fe bruary

1996, the B radle y 2 C o u n t y G r a n d J u r y i n d i c t e d t h e D e f e n d a n t f o rs i x t e e n c o u n t s o f

p o s s e s s i o n o f

a h a n d g u n b y a
c on vic te d f

e lon , e a c h o f w hic h r e a d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

Th e Gr a ndJuro rs fo r the Sta te of Te nn e sse e , u po n th e ir

oath p re se nt that Bud Cash, Jr. on or about the 18th day

of January , 1995, in Bra dley County , Tenne ssee, a nd befor e 3 the fi nd ing of thi s ind ic tme nt, did un la wf ull y , int e nti on a lly , or

kn ow ing ly

po sse ss a handg un, to-wit: [description of make and caliber specific to e ach c ount] , afte r being

c on vic te d o f a

Ag g ra vate d A ssa

ult , a fe lon y , in viol a tio n of T. C.A . 3 9- 17 -1 30 7, a ll of which is ag ainst the pea ce and dignity of the State of T ennesse e.

The indictment also included thr ee c ounts of possession of a handg un with an altere d serial number , wh ic h r e a d a s f

oll ow s:
[O] n or about the 18th d ay of January

1996, in Bra dley

County , Tenne ssee, a nd be fo re the r e tu rn i n g o f

th i s i n d ic tme nt, [the De fe nd a nt] d id u nla wf ull y a ndkn ow ing ly possess wi t h intent to concea l or misrepre sent the identity of an item to wit: a g un whose pe rmane nt serial n u m ber, ma nufac turer’ s identification plate or other perma nent distinguishing number h ad been alter ed, cove red, de fac ed, destroy ed or

remove d, contra

ry to the statute, and a g ainst the pea ce and dignity of the S t at e of Tenne ssee.

Th e ca s e wa s assi g ned number 96-031. On F ebrua

ry 26, 1996, the Def

endant, r epre sented by

c ou ns e l, a c kn ow le dg e d r e c e ipt of the ind ic tme nt, a nn ou nc e d th a t he un de rs too d th e c ha rg e s a g a ins t him, and waived the formal a rra ignme nt. On Fe bruary 27, 1996, the Def

endant f iled a motion for a bill of particula

rs re g arding the “pa

rticular g uns” that counts s ev en t een thr oug h nineteen of the ind ic tme nt ch arg e d as m iss ing se ri a l nu mbe rs . O n A pril 2 5, 20 00 , th e De fe nd a nt f ile d a mot ionto stipulate the Def

endant’ s prior ag g ravated assault convic tion and to prohibit t h e S t at e fr om mentioning the spe cifics of that crime in the D efe ndant’s trial. On Marc h 12, 2001, the Def endant filed a motion for c o n t i n u an ce based on a United States Supreme Court dec ision that could have aff ecte d the Def

endant’ s ag g ravated assault conviction underly ing the char g es at issue in this case

. On Aug ust 25, 2003, the Defe ndant filed a motion to suppress evidenc e alleg edly found outside the scope of the sea rch w arr ant.W e no t e t hat , co nf usi ngl y , t hi s o rder, s i gned by t he t ri al co urt , ap p ears t o have cl o sed case 9 6

- 0 3 1 , y et t he 4

t ri al co urt s i gned a s ep arat e o rder al l o wi ng t he t hi rd set of i nd i ct m ent s t o s up erced e case 96

- 0 3 1 , and , f urt her, t he tria l co u rt e n te re d ju d g m e n ts d ism issin g e a c h c o u n t o f all thre e ind ic tm e n ts.
-3- On Fe bruary

20, 2004, the State fil ed a superce ding se t of indictments, char g ing the Defen d an t with six teen c ounts of possession of a ha ndg un by a convic ted fe lon and one c ount of possession of a ha ndg un with an alter ed serial number. This second set of indictments w as assig ned a diffe rent c ase numbe r, 04-178. Ea ch of the first six teen counts of t he indi ctment read, i n pertinent pa rt , a s f oll ow s:

On or about the 18t h day of January 1996, in Bra dley

County , Tenne ssee, a nd befor e the finding of this indictment, unlawfully an d intentionally , and knowing ly , car ry with the intent to go a

rmed, a firea rm, to wit: [ particula

r desc ription of the make and

c a lib e r of the g un in this c ou nt], a ndha s b e e n c on vic te d o f a fe lon y inv olv ing the us e
or a tte mpt e d u se of

fo rc e , v iol e nc e or a de a dly we apo n, to wi t: A g g ra vate d A ssa ult , with intent to employit in the commi ssion of or esca pe from an off

ense, in violation of T.C.A. 39-17- 1307, al l o f wh i ch is ag ainst the pea ce and dignity of the State of Tenne ssee.

Ad dit ion a lly , th e ind ic tme nt c ha rg e d th e De fe nd a nt w ith on e c ou nt o f p os se ssi on of a ha nd g un wi th

a n a lte re d s e ri a l nu mbe r, wh ic h r e a d a s f oll ow s:

On or about t he 18th day of J anuary , 1996, in Bra dley County , Tenne ssee, a nd befor e the fi nd ing of

thi s in dic tme nt, didun la wf ull y a ndkn ow ing ly po sse ss w ith int e nt t o
conce al or misrepr esent the ide ntityof an item, to-wit: a g un, whose pe rmane nt serial number, manuf

actur er’ s identification plate or other pe rmane nt disti n g uishing number ha d been a ltered, c overed , defa ced, de stroy ed or r emoved, in violation of T.C.A. 39-14-134, a ll of which is ag ainst t h e pea ce and dignity of the State of Tenne ssee.

On Marc h 15, 2004, the Def endant f iled a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of the Janu ary

18 , 1 99 6, se arc h w arr a nt, c on te nd ingthat th e se arch warra nt didno t su ff ic ie ntl y describe the location to be searc hed.

The State filed a

motion and proposed order to c onsolidate the ca ses, stating that the sec ond set of indictments was ba sed on the same ci rc u m s t an ces and offe nses, but the cause wa s “re

prese nted” to the Gra nd J ury to corr ect defec ts in the original i ndictment. The mot ion reque sted that the ind ic tme nts in c a se nu mbe r 0 4- 17 8 s up e rc e de tho se in c ase numbe r 9 6- 03 1, a ndthe Sta te reque sted that ca se number 96- 031 be closed. The mot ion and order to consolidate and superc ede is d a te d A pril 1 4, 20 04 . T he a tta c he d o rd e r, wh ic h state s “ On mot ion of the State a nd fo r g oo d c aus e sh ow n, the se c a se s sh a ll b e , a ndhe re by are , c on so lid a te d a nd Ca se No

. 04 -1 78 sh a ll s up e rc e de Ca se No . 9 6- 03 1” wa s si g ne d a nddate d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

on May 3, 20 04 , a ndthe c ou rt

c le rk ’s sta mp shows that the orde r wa s filed on this same dat e. On May 21, 2004, the Def

endant f iled an 4A gai n, we not e, wi t h s om e c onf us i on, t hat t hi s order appear s t o cl ose ca s e 96- 03 1. H owever , ca s e n umber 5
9 6 -0 3 1 w a s a p p a re n tly c lo se d b y the trial c o u rt’s o rd e r o n M a y 3 , 2 0 0 4 . A d d iti o n a lly, the m o tio n fi le d b y the S ta te

r eques t ed t hat t he t hi r d s et of i ndi ct ment s , 04- 44 5, s uper cede t he s econd s et of i ndi ct ment s , 04- 17 8, y et t he order d o e s n o t ad d re ss th is third se t o f i n d ic tm e n ts a t all.
-4- objection to the State’s motion to consolidate and super cede

.
On J une 24, 2004, the State f iled a sec ond superc eding set of indictments, t h e t h i rd s et of indictments in this case , and thi s set of i ndictments was assigne d case number 04-445. This third

s e to f i n d i c t m e n t s c h ar g e d t h e D e f e n d a n tw i t h s i x t e e n c o u n t s o f p o s s e s s i o n o f

a h a n d g u n b y a convicted f

elon and one count of possession of a n altere d seri al number item. The first six teen
c ou nts re a d a s f

oll ow s:

On or a bout the 18th day of J anuary 1996, in B radle y County , Tenne ssee, and bef ore the fi nd ing of

thi s in dic tme nt, did un la wf ull y a ndint e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

po sse ss a handg un, t o wit: [ description of handg un], and has been c onvicted of a felony inv olv ing the us e or

a tte mpt e d u se of

fo rc e vio le nc e or

a de a dly we apo n, to w it: Ag g ravated Assa u l t i n violation of T.C.A. 39-17-1307, a ll of which is ag ainst the peac e and dig nity

of the State of T ennesse e.

Th e se ve nte e nthc ou nt o f the ind ic tme nt r e a d a s f oll ow s:

On or a bout the 18th day of J anuary , 1996, in Bra dley County , Tenne ssee, a nd befor e the finding of this indictment, did unlawfully and knowingly possess with the intent to conce al or misrepr esent the ide ntityof an item, to wit: a g un, whose pe rmane nt serial number , manufa cture r' s identification plate or other pe rmane nt disti ng uishing number ha d been a ltered, c overe d, defa ced, de stroy ed or r emoved, in violat i o n of T.C. A. 39-14-134, all of which is ag ainst the pea ce and dignity of the State of Tenne ssee.

On J uly 12, 2004, the Def

endant a g ain filed his motion to suppress evidenc e obtained a s a re sult of the Janu ary

18 , 1 99 6, se arc h w arr a nt. On the sa me day , the De fe nd a nt al so fi le d a motio n to dis mis s the se c on d s up e rc e din g se t, o r thir d to ta l set, of ind ic tme nts , to wh ic h th e State fi le d a re sp on se Aug ust 9, 2004. T h e State filed a second motion and orde r to consolidate a nd superc ede, dated Aug ust 8, 2004, and stamped “f iled” on August 24, 2004, this time reque sting that the third set of indictments, case number 04-445, superc ede the first set of i ndictments, case number 96-031. T he order , signe d and date d by the trial court on Aug ust 24, 2004, is identica l to the previous order , save the date and si g nature of the trial c ourt, ordering that the second se t of indictments, case number 04- 178, superc ede the first set of indictments, ca se number 96- 031. 5
On September

2, 20 0 4 , af

t er a hearing on the Def

endant’ s motion t o dismiss the sec ond superc eding set of indictments, in case 04-445, the trial c ourt dismissed all the indictments in cases-5-

96-031, 04-178, a nd 04-445, ente ring separ ate judg ments for e ach of the counts in ea ch of the three sets of indictments. I n doing so, the trial court state d:

Wel l , I g u e s s t h e e a s i e s t w a y t o s a y w h a t I ’ v e g o t t o s a y i s t o s a y t h a t I ’ m a t le a st confuse d. . .

. I alway s ref er to it as t he “snake bit ” rule, and once a ca se g ets “snake bit” it stay s “snake bit” no matter what y ou do. I t appea rs t o m e that this case for

some rea son went ar ound, I know for a l ong time [ the parties] were wa iting on the result of some other

case

.

. . . .
Bu ti tl ai d ar o u n d fr o m1 9 9 6 u n t i l 2 0 0 4 b ef o re an y o n e a t t h e A t t o rn eyGe n er al 's [O] ffice rea liz ed that the date of the offe nse was wrong

. I think ther e’s merit to the defe ndant’ s ar gu m ent t hat had he g one to trial and be en convic ted per haps on the orig inal indictment that the statute oug ht to have run be cause he wouldn’t have be en protec ted from an indi ctment alleging this same offe nse on January the 18th, 1996. I think there’s some me rit in that. I also think the re’ s some merit in the indictment its e lf wh ic h s a y s “ be ing c on vi cte d of a g g ra vate d a ssa ult , a vio la tio n o f T CA 39-17-1307,” which is not the agg ravated assault statute. I think that, while it mi g ht

no t b e f a ta l, c e r tain ly

a d d e d to a ll th e o th e r

h e a d a c h e s c a u s e d b y

th e s e v ar ious indictments, it ought to be. . . . B ut I believe that beca

use of the state of the ind ic tme nt andthe a mou nt o f t ime that ha s b e e n in vo lve d a ndthe sa me wr on g statut e be ing c ite d s inc e the orig ina l in dic tme nt, that th is C ou rt is g oin g to d ism iss thi s indictment . . . . So Ig uessif [the State] decide [s] to ap p ea l I gu es s the Court of [Cri min a l] Ap pe a ls i s g oin g to h a ve to d e c ide wh e the r the “ sn ake bit ” ru le app lie s, but I think the statute of limitations has run, and I think that the delay

and somebody finding the mistakes as fa r as the date and not finding the mistakes as far as the p o s s es s i o n o f ah an d gu n s t at u t e a l l ege d t o b e a ggra v at ed as s au l ti s i n t er es t i n g.

I t is fr om this jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt that th e State no w a

pp e a ls.

II. Ana lys is

On app e a l, the State c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w hen it di sm isse d th e ind ic tme nts ag ai n s t t he De fendant. Specifica lly , the State asserts that the statute of limitations period had not

e xpir e d, the of

fe ns e date wa s n ot a

ma te ri a l e le men t of the of fe ns e c ha rg e d, a ndthe ind ic tme nts provided a dequate notice of thechar g es ag ainst the Def endant. The Def

endant c ounters that: (1) the first set of indictments was f atally defe ctive, bec ause the y

failed to provide him with adequate notice of the c harg es ag ain st him and failed to protec t him against double jeopardy ; (2) the statute of limit ations was not tolled be cause the orig inal indictment w as defe ctive and the De fendant did not have a dequate notice of the char g es ag ainst him; and (3) the superce ding indictments wer e not proper beca use they wer e untimely

and they materia lly

or subs tantially

altere d the cha

rg es ag ainst the Def endant.-6- A. The Or igi nal Indi c tm e nt
We beg in our ana ly sis by discussing the sufficie ncy o f t h e orig inal indictment. The De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t the orig ina l ind ic tme nt wa s fata lly de fe c tiv e be c a us e : (1 ) the of fe ns e date in the first six teen c ounts was incorre ct; and (2) the lang uag e is misleading as to the char g es that the Def endant must defe nd. The Te nnessee Supreme Court has a ddresse d the co n s t i t u t i onal

re q u i re m en t s fo r i n d i ct m en t s , s t at i n g:
[T]he Sixth andF ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nts to the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on a ndArtic le I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Consti t u t i o n gu arantee to the a ccuse d the rig ht to be inf orme d o f the natur e a ndc aus e of the a c c us a tio n. Ge ne ra lly state d, a n in dic tme nt i s valid if it pr o v i des suffic ient information (1) to e nable the a ccuse d to know the

acc usation to which answe r is require d, (2) to f urnish the court adequate basis for the entry of a pr oper judg ment, and (3) to protect the a ccuse d from double jeopa rdy

. State v. Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) . Further, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-13- 20 2 p ro vid e s th a t a n in dic tme nt mus t:
[S ]t ate the f

acts c onstitut ing the offe nse in ordinary and concise lang uag e, without prolix ity or r ep et i t i on, in such a manne r as to ena ble a pe rson of c ommon
un de rs ta nd ing to k

no w w hat is int e nd e d, a nd wi th that de g re e of c e rt a int y wh ic h w ill enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the prope r judg ment.
Despite the te chnica l require ments, t h er e is “little doubt that indictments which achieve the

overriding pur

pose of notice to the acc used will be considered sufficient to satisfy both the constitutional and statutory require ments.” State v. Hammonds, 30 S.W .3d 294, 300 (Tenn. 2000)

. I ndeed, “ we now a

pproac h attacks upon indictments, espe cially o f t h i s kind, from the broa d and enlig htened standpoint of c ommon sense and right rea son rathe r than from the nar row standpoint of petty prec iosity , pettifog g ing, technica lity or hair splitt ing fault finding .” Hill, 954 S.W .2d at 728 (citations omitted).

I n the ca se under submissi on, we conclude that the first indictment was not fatally defe ctive. The incor rec t date d i d n o t p l ac e the De fendant in dang er of double jeopar dy . I t has long been

acc epted that, in jury

trials, double j eopar dy does not attach until t he jury is empanele d and sworn. State v. Pennington, 952 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tenn. 1992). “ A def endant must be put in jeopar dy at least once , ‘for

only if that point has once be en re ache d does any subs eq u en t p rosecution of the de fe nd a nt b ri ng the g ua

rante e a g a ins t doub le je op ard y e ve n p ote nti a lly

int o p la y .’ ” I d. (q uo tin g Cr ist

v. Br etz, 437 U.S. 28, 29 (1978))

. Thus, the incorre ct date on the indictment could not have c reated

a da ng e r o f d ou ble je op ard y , b e c aus e the De fe nd a nt h a d not y e t bee n pla c e d in jeo pa rd y fo r the fi rs t time. The arg u me n t th a t th e in c o rr e c t d a te c o u ldc r e a te a p r o b le m w ith d o u b le je o p ar d y

– if the Def endant ha d been tried on that indictment within the limi tations period, and, afte r the re sult, the State re- in dicted the De fendant for the sa me conduc t with the corre ct offe nse date –relies on theAl t h ou g h t h e D ef en dan t c on t en ds t h at t h e pr el i mi n ar y h ea r i n g i s n ot i n t h e r ec or d on a ppea l , t h e t r an s cr i pt 6

o f t h is he a rin g is i n c lud e d in the re c o rd b e fo re this C o u rt a s a n e x h ib it to a p re tria l m o tio n fi le d b y the D e fen d a n t.
-7- condition that jeopardy

would attach if th e D e

fe n d a n t h a d b een tried

. I n the Def endant’ s case , howeve r, no jury

wa s ev er empane led and sworn, thus there wa s no originalje op ard y that w ou ld

cre ate e ven the possibilityof do ub le jeopar dy

.
Simi larly , we c onclude that the incorre ct offe nse date did not deprive the D efe ndant of adequate notice of

the cha rg e ag ainst him. Although an of fense date could be an e ssential element of the c rime cha

rg ed, bec ause t h e crime involves conduct that “may be innoce nt at one time and criminal at another ,” S tate v. Kenne dy , 10 S.W .3d 280, 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) , the indictment

was ne verthe less adequate. The c rime of possession of a handg un by a person convicted of a f elony involvi n g fo rc e, v iolence or a dea dly wea pon, cre ates a

criminal off

ense f or possession of the ha nd g un on ly

a ft e r the c on vic tio n for a fe lon y inv olv ing fo rc e , viol e nc e or a de a dly we apo n. Th us , the date of the possession could be material to the crime c harg ed. The offe nse date in the orig inal indictment was incorr ect by one y ear

. Howeve r, the date listed was, in fa ct, af ter the D efe ndant was convicted of ag g ravated assault. F urther, the indictment stated that the off ense oc curr ed bef

ore the finding of the indictment, and afte r the Def endant wa s convicted of

ag g ravated assault. Thus, the Def endant wa s on notice of the c harg e ag ainst which he w ould h ave to de fend. Mor eover , the Def endant had notice of the correc t offe nse date in sever al way s. First, the indictment contained the

corr ect of fense date, J anuary 18, 1996, for the la st three c ounts of the indictment, which cha rg ed the Def endan t w ith p o s s e s s io n o f th r e e a lt e r e d s e r ia l n u mb e r g u n s , a n d th e s e g u n s w e r e th r e e o f the six teen g uns that the Def endant wa s char g ed with possessing in the first six teen c ounts of the indictment. Second, the sea rch w arr ant was e x ecute d on J anuary 18, 1996, the Def endant wa s g iven a copy of this warr ant at the t ime, and the war rant c ontained the c orre ct date. A lso, the Defe ndant

was a rre sted for posse ssion on that date. Third, the c orre ct offe nse d at e wa s t es tified to at the Def endant’s p re l iminary

hearing. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the D efe ndant was c lear ly on 6 notice of the offe nse date and the c harg es ag ainst him.
The lang uag e of the indictment also did not mislead the Defenda nt or deprive him of notice of the c harg es ag ainst him. The indi ctment s tated that the Def endant wa s char g ed with possession of a h a n d g u n a f

te r b e in g c o n v ic te d o f “ a g g r a v ate d a s s a u lt , a f e lo n y , in v io lati o n o f T

. C. A . 39-17- 1307.” This statement a dequate ly advised the Def

endant of the crime with which he wa s char g ed. Al tho ug h th e str

uc tur e of the se nte nc e c ou ld b e re a d a s in c or re c tly c iti ng the a g gr a vate d a ssa ult statute, a c ommon sense re ading contra dicts that interpre tation. The statute cited is the possession of a ha ndg un statute, the offe nse with w hich the Def endant was char g ed in that indictment. Also,

a lth ou g h th e ind ic tme nt d oe s not s e t f orth that th e a g g ra vate d a ssa ult wa s a fe lon y inv olv ing the “ us e of fo rc e , v iol e nc e or

a de adl y weap on ,” the statut e c ite d inthe ind ic tme nt d oe s se t f orth the se elements. Thus, the indictment c lear ly provides notice of the char g es ag ainst which the De fenda nt must defend whe n rea d as a w hole, in c ontext , with r eason, and fr om a common sense pe rspec tive. See Hill, 954 S.W .2d at 728. As the Te nnessee Supreme Court observed, “[I ]n criminal cases, whe re the p u b li c s e c u r ity

is s o d e e p ly

in te r e s te d inth e p r o mp t e xe c u ti o n o f ju s ti c e , it

s e e ms th e minor consideration should give way to the g reater, a nd technica l objections be overlooked, rather than the-8-

ends of soc iety be defe ated.” Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727-728 (quoting State v. Pearse , 7 Tenn. (Pec k) 66, 67 (1823)) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the trial co urt err ed in finding that the orig inal indictment was fatally

defe ctive.

Be cause we ha ve conc luded that the orig inal indictment was not fatal l y d efe ctive, the question become s whether the trial court erre d in finding that the statute of limitations had ex pired in the De fe nd a nt’ s c a se

. Ge ne ra lly , a c ri min a l pr os e c uti on mus t be c omm e nc e d w ith in a statut orily set period of

time following the offense, or the g overnme ntal action will be for feited. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -2 -1 0 1 (2003); State v. Ta it, 114 S.W .3d 518, 522 (Tenn. 2003) ; State v. Neilson, 44 S.W .3d 496, 499 (Tenn. 2001) . The purpose of a c riminal statute of limitatio n s i s t o p rovide a defe ndant timely

notice of c harg es ag ainst which the de fen d an t may have to de fend. Tait, 114 S.W .3d at 522. Thus, the l imitations period saf eg uards a g ainst delay

and prote cts the def

endant’ s “ability to preserve re levant evide nce nece ssary to the defe ndant’s def

ense.” I d. (citing State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 886 (Tenn. 1993). The commence ment of the pro s ec ution toll s the running of the statute of

limit ations because it provides the de fendant with notice of the c harg es ag ainst which he must def end. I d.

Un de r T e nn e sse e la w, a

pr os e c uti on ma y

be c omm e nc e d inse ve ra l w a y s: A prosec ution is commenced, within the mea ning of this chapter, b y fi n d i n g an indictment, or prese ntment, the issuing of a w arr ant, binding ove r the off ender , by the filing of an information as provided for i n ch ap t er 3 of this titl e, or by making an appea ranc e in per son or throug h counsel in ge nera l sessions or any municipal court for the pur

pose of continuing the matter or any other appea ranc e in either

court for any purpose involving the offe nse.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 2-104 (2004)

.
I n th e c ase un de r s ub mis sio n, the pr os e c uti on a g a ins t th e De fe nd a nt, fo r c la ss Efe lon ie s, must have commenc ed within two y ear s following the commission of the offe nses. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 39-17-1307 a nd 40-2-101( b)(4) . The off enses we re co m mitted on J anuary 18, 1996, thus the statute of limitations period would have e x pired on January 18, 1998. The re cord r efle cts that the Def endant a ppear ed for

a pre liminary

hearing, w as bound over

to the Grand J ury , and wa s indicted, all well bef

ore January

18, 1998. Thus, i t is clear that the prosec ution ag ainst the Def endant wa s timely commence d, and this c ommenceme nt tolled the statute of limitations period. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-104. Conseque ntly , the trial court er re d i n finding that the limitations period ha d expired.

Be cau s e th e s tatu te o f li mi tati o n s w a s to ll e d a t th e c o mm e n c e me n t o f th e p r o s e c u ti on, the subsequent super ceding indictments were not untimelyfiled. I n State v. Har ris, 33 S.W .3d 767, 771 (Tenn. 2000) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court stated:

The power to se ek a superse ding indictment lies within this broad discretion of the-9-

State. A superse ding indictment is an indictment obtained without the dismiss al of a prior indict m en t . . . . Where ther e has be en no jeopa rdy on the first indictment, a g rand jury

may return a new indictment ag ainst an ac cused e v en t h o u g h another indictment is pending.

. . . Although the State may not bring a super seding indictment to hara ss or intimi date the a ccuse d, a legit i m ate decision to bring a superse ding indictment is u n iq u e ly w ith in th e St a te ' s a u th o r it y

. T h u s , th e St a te may o b tain a superse ding indictment at any time prior to trial without dismi s s i n g t h e pending ind ic tme nt andma y

the n s e le c t th e ind ic tme nt u nd e r w hic h to pr oc e e d at tria l.

I n the ca se under

submissi on, the S tate brought two sets of superceding indictments. The first set

corr ecte d the offe nse date of the fir st six teen c ounts of the orig inal indictment, and it also dropped two of the thre e orig inal counts of poss essing an altered serial number it em, cha rg ing the Def

endant wi t h o n l y o n e c o u n to f t h i s o ff

en s e. T h e s ec o n d s et o f s u p er ce d i n g i n d i ct m en t s ad d ed s o m e l an gu age from the possession of a

handg un statute, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec t i o n 3 9 -17-1307, unde r which the De fendant was cha rg ed. None of these c hang es materially or substantially

altere d the ind ic tme nt o r c ha

rg e s a g a ins t th e De fe nd a nt. Ac c or din g ly , we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in dismiss ing the s u p e r c e d in g in d ic tm e n ts a g ainst the Defe ndant bec ause ne ither of the two supe rce ding indictments we re improper, and, the ref ore, the State was within its right to choose upon which indictment it wished to procee d to trial. See Tait, 114 S.W .3d at 518; N eilson, 44 S.W .3d at 496.

III

. Conclusion

We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it d ism iss e d th e ind ic tme nts in this c a se , b e c aus e the orig inal indictment was not fat al l y defe ctive, the statute of limit ations was tolled with the

commence ment of the prose cution, and the subsequent indictments were proper and timely

filed. Consequently , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s judg ments dismis sing the indictments ag ainst the Def endant in ca se number M- 04-445, and w e re mand the c as e to the trial court f or further pr oc e e din g s.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE