Filed 2/15/24 Quigley v. Bis Club & Bar CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CAROLINA QUIGLEY et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

BIS CLUB & BAR, INC. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 D082759

 (Super. Ct. No. RIC2001940)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, 

Carol A. Greene, Judge. Reversed in part; affirmed in part; and remanded 

with directions.

Law Office of Randy K. Bell and Randy K. Bell for Defendants and 

Appellants.

Sahagun Law and Bryan Owens Sahagun for Plaintiffs and 

Respondents.

Defendants Bis Club & Bar, Inc. (Bis Club) and Guadalupe Arizpe 

Villavicencio (Villavicencio) (together Defendants) appeal an order denying in 

part their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, 

alternatively, a new trial after the trial court entered a judgment on a jury 

verdict in favor of plaintiffs Carolina Quigley and Veronica Maya (together 

Plaintiffs). Following trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding 
2

Defendants liable on Plaintiffs’ causes of action for nonpayment of minimum 

wages, meal period violations, rest period violations, failure to provide 

itemized wage statements, failure to timely pay wages, sexual harassment 

(as to Maya only), failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy, and sexual assault/battery (as to 

Maya only). The jury also awarded punitive damages to Plaintiffs.

On appeal, Defendants contend the trial court erred by denying in part 

their motion for JNOV on the following grounds: (1) duplicate damages were 

erroneously awarded to Maya; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support a 

finding of liability to Quigley for wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to support the award of punitive 

damages to Maya. In addition to refuting those contentions, Plaintiffs assert, 

among other things, that we do not have jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ 

appeal and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ 

motion for JNOV.

As explained below, we conclude: (1) we have jurisdiction to consider 

this appeal; (2) the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the JNOV motion; 

(3) certain damages awarded to Maya were duplicative; (4) there is 

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding for Quigley on her cause of 

action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and

(5) Defendants waived or forfeited their contention that substantial evidence 

does not support the award of punitive damages to Maya. Accordingly, we 

reverse the order in part, affirm it in part, and remand with directions that 

the court vacate its order and issue a new order as specified below.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Maya and Quigley filed an action against Defendants and 

testified at their trial.1 Maya and Quigley testified that in late 2018, they

were hired by Bis Club as waitresses and to perform other tasks. Bis Club is 

a bar that offers live music and dancing. Villavicencio was the owner of Bis 

Club. Joaquin Arizpe was its manager. Arizpe was also Villavicencio’s 

former husband.

Villavicencio held employee meetings during which she discussed work 

duties, but also threatened employees, called them derogatory names, and 

warned them not to hang out with Arizpe. In particular, while looking 

toward Maya and Quigley, she stated: “The whore that may be going out 

with [Arizpe], and if I become aware of that, I’ll pull her eyes out with these 

nails.”

Shortly after Maya was hired, Arizpe began making harassing 

comments to her. He asked her why she did not wear less clothing and 

suggested that if she wanted more tips, she should wear a thong. He called 

Maya, “Mi pollo,” which meant “my little chicken.” About three times per 

month, Arizpe asked Maya for a hug or kiss. About three times per week, he 

asked Maya to go on a date with him. Maya never kissed him or went out on 

a date with him.

Arizpe also brushed his hands against Maya’s breasts, rubbed his 

pelvis against her backside, and looked down her shirt as she leaned over. 

Maya did not consent to Arizpe’s touching of her and repeatedly asked him to 

1 The record on appeal does not contain a copy of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
4

stop it, but did not report it to Villavicencio. His actions made her feel sad, 

depressed, and uncomfortable.

At about 2:00 a.m. one night after all the customers had left, Maya was 

preparing to leave through the back door. Arizpe stopped her and asked her 

why she was going out that way because he had already closed that door. As 

Maya turned to head toward the front door, Arizpe slapped her on her 

buttock. Maya felt very sad, depressed, ashamed, and afraid after he slapped 

her. She told another employee what happened and then drove home.

Villavicencio called Maya at home soon after the slapping incident. She 

called Maya a “fucking bitch,” stated that she knew Maya was the “whore”

that was with Arizpe, and stated she did not want to see her or her sister 

(i.e., Quigley) again. When Maya tried to explain, Villavicencio stated she 

would send her the video.2 She was not paid her final wages.

Quigley testified that Arizpe made sexual comments to her, asked her 

why she did not wear a thong and a bra, and stated he wanted to see more 

skin. He also asked her out on a date. She also testified that Arizpe brushed 

up against her bust, brushed his penis against her backside, and looked down 

her shirt. Although she confronted Arizpe regarding his conduct, she did not 

report it to Villavicencio. On November 9, 2019, Quigley received a text 

message from Villavicencio, calling her a “bitch” and stating: “I know that 

you’re going out with [Arizpe]. Whore. . . . [¶] Your sister [i.e., Maya] is a 

whore. . . [¶] . . . I’m going to play that video for you. I don’t want you to come 

into work anymore here. I don’t want to see you again in my business.” She 

was not paid her final wages.

2 Arizpe later sent Maya a copy of the video recording of the incident. 

That video recording was played for the jury during trial.
5

After Plaintiffs rested their case in chief, Defendants moved for a 

nonsuit on their causes of action for retaliation, sexual battery, and failure to

prevent sexual harassment. The court granted the motion for nonsuit in part 

as to the retaliation causes of action, but denied the motion as to the other 

causes of action.

In their defense, Defendants presented the testimony of Arizpe, two 

other employees of Bis Club, and one of its customers. In particular, Arizpe 

testified that he maintained a binder (Exh. 21), in which he recorded the 

dates and hours that employees worked and the wages owed to those 

employees. He also recorded the sales of Bis Club. He testified that 

employees were paid weekly in cash. He testified that during employee 

meetings, Villavicencio did not threaten physical violence against employees 

or call them derogatory names. He also denied touching Quigley 

inappropriately or asking her out on a date. He testified regarding the 

incident during which he slapped Maya’s buttock and believed that another 

employee had informed Villavicencio about it.

After the defense rested, the court read its jury instructions and gave 

the jury a special verdict form. After closing arguments, the jury deliberated 

and returned a special verdict form which, among other things, found 

Defendants liable to Plaintiffs for nonpayment of minimum wages, meal 

period violations, rest period violations, failure to provide itemized wage 

statements, failure to timely pay wages, sexual harassment (as to Maya 

only), failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy, and sexual assault/battery (as to Maya only). The jury also 

found that: (1) Arizpe, as an officer, director, or managing agent of the Bis 

Club, engaged in sexual harassment against Maya with malice, oppression, 
6

or fraud; (2) Arizpe or Villavicencio, as an officer, director, or managing agent 

of Bis Club, failed to prevent sexual harassment against Maya and Quigley 

with malice, oppression, or fraud; (3) Arizpe or Villavicencio, as an officer, 

director, or managing agent of Bis Club, wrongfully terminated Maya and 

Quigley in violation of public policy with malice, oppression, or fraud; and

(4) Arizpe, as an officer, director, or managing agent of the Bis Club, sexually 

assaulted or battered Maya with malice, oppression, or fraud. In the second 

phase of the trial, the jury awarded Maya $8,000 and Quigley $2,000 in 

punitive damages against Defendants.

On February 1, 2022, the court entered a judgment against Defendants, 

jointly and severally, in favor of Maya in the total amount of $48,307.75, with 

interest until paid, and in favor of Quigley in the total amount of $19,378.70, 

with interest until paid.

On March 10, Defendants filed a notice of motion and motion for JNOV 

or, alternatively, a new trial on the grounds that: (1) the amount of damages 

awarded to Maya was excessive, inconsistent, and resulted in double or 

multiple recovery; (2) insufficient evidence supported their liability to 

Quigley for wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (3) 

insufficient evidence supported the jury’s awards of punitive damages. 

Plaintiffs opposed their motion. On May 9, after hearing arguments of 

counsel, the court issued a minute order denying the motion for new trial, 

denying in part the motion for JNOV, and granting in part the motion for 

JNOV as to the punitive damages awarded to Quigley.3 Defendants timely 

appealed the May 9 order.

3 The May 9, 2022 minute order stated that Defendants’ motion for 

JNOV “is denied in part” and explained that the court was “inclined to grant 

the [JNOV motion] as to [Quigley] on punitive damages. To the extent there 

is any ambiguity in that order regarding the award of punitive damages to 
7

DISCUSSION

I

Jurisdiction to Consider This Appeal

Plaintiffs argue that we lack jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ appeal 

of the May 9, 2022 order because their notice of appeal challenged only the 

February 1 judgment and did not challenge the May 9 order.

A

On February 1, 2022, the trial court entered the judgment against 

Defendants. On February 23, Plaintiffs served a notice of entry of judgment

on Defendants. On August 1, Defendants filed a notice of appeal challenging 

the February 1 judgment after jury trial and an order “under [Code of Civil 

Procedure], § 904.1(a)(3)-(13).” On August 18, Defendants filed their civil 

case information statement, which, among other things, attached a copy of 

the May 9 order. On November 22, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 

Division Two, issued an order dismissing the appeal as untimely filed. On 

December 21, that court issued an order granting in part Defendants’ motion 

to vacate its dismissal as to their appeal of the May 9 order and denying in 

part their motion to vacate its dismissal as to their appeal of the February 1 

judgment. That order reinstated the appeal only as to the May 9 order. The 

order explained that Defendants had attached a copy of the May 9 order to 

their civil case information statement and the court liberally construed their 

notice of appeal to challenge both the February 1 judgment and May 9 order. 

Although their appeal of the February 1 judgment was untimely, their appeal 

Quigley, we conclude the only reasonable interpretation of that order is that 

the court, in fact, granted in part Defendants’ motion for JNOV as to the 

award of punitive damages to Quigley because that was the only action that 

the court took in granting in part their motion and “den[ying] in part” the 

remainder of their motion for JNOV.
8

of the May 9 order was timely filed within the applicable 180-day appeal 

period. On September 23, 2023, the Supreme Court issued an order 

transferring this case to us from the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 

Two.

B

In arguing that Defendants’ notice of appeal did not challenge the May 

9 order, Plaintiffs omit any reference to the orders previously issued by the 

Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two, in this case. As discussed 

above, that court, in liberally construing the notice of appeal as required 

under California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2), concluded in its

December 21, 2022 order that the notice of appeal challenged both the 

February 1 judgment and the May 9 order denying in part the motion for 

JNOV.

We agree with that court’s conclusion. First, although the notice of 

appeal did not expressly specify the date of the May 9 order, it checked boxes

for appealing both the February 1 judgment and an order “under Code of 

Civil Procedure, § 904.1(a)(3)-(13).” Second, to the extent the notice of appeal 

may have been ambiguous regarding the order being appealed, that 

ambiguity was clarified by Defendants’ civil case information statement, 

which attached a copy of the May 9 order.

“The notice of appeal must be liberally construed. The notice is 

sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed. . . .”

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) Furthermore, “[o]nce a notice of 

appeal is timely filed, the liberal construction requirement compels a 

reviewing court to evaluate whether the notice, despite any technical defect, 

nonetheless served its basic function—to provide notice of who is seeking 

review of what order or judgment—so as to properly invoke appellate 
9

jurisdiction.” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 

883.) Notices of appeal are to be liberally construed as to protect the right of 

appeal if it is reasonably clear what the appellant was trying to appeal from 

and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced. 

(Id. at p. 882.) Here, we conclude, as did the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 

Division Two, that Defendants’ notice of appeal sufficiently identified the 

May 9 order as being appealed and Plaintiffs have not shown they were 

misled or prejudiced by its omission of the specific date of its issuance. 

Therefore, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument and instead conclude that we have

jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ appeal of the May 9 order.

II

Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Consider Motion for JNOV

Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider Defendants’ motion for JNOV and therefore erred by denying their 

motion in part. In particular, they argue that Defendants failed to timely 

and properly serve a notice of intention to move for a new trial or JNOV, 

thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to consider the motion.

A

As discussed above, after the court entered its judgment on February 1, 

2022, Defendants filed a notice of motion and motion for JNOV or, 

alternatively, a new trial on March 10 on the grounds that: (1) the amount of 

damages awarded to Maya was excessive, inconsistent, and resulted in 

double or multiple recovery; (2) insufficient evidence supported their liability 

to Quigley for wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and

(3) insufficient evidence supported the jury’s awards of punitive damages.
10

On March 21, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion. In 

particular, they argued, among other things, that the motion had not 

complied with procedural requirements, such as failing to provide a notice of 

intent, supporting affidavits, and appropriate grounds for relief. They also 

argued that Defendants had not given them notice as to what modified

judgment they requested.

On March 22, Defendants’ counsel, Randy K. Bell, submitted a 

declaration in support of the motion, which, among other things, attached as 

exhibits excerpts from Maya’s deposition transcripts, copies of documents 

that she produced during discovery, Exhibit 21 (admitted at trial), and 

selected jury instructions given by the court. Thereafter, Plaintiffs objected 

to Bell’s declaration as untimely filed (i.e., one day late) after the expiration 

of the 10-day period following the notice of intent, citing Code of Civil 

Procedure sections 629 and 659a4.

On March 29, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition, 

admitting their technical violations of procedural rules requiring a “notice of 

intention” to move for a new trial or JNOV and specification of grounds for a 

new trial, but arguing, among other things, that the court was not precluded 

by those violations from considering their motion and Plaintiffs were not 

prejudiced by them. Defendants also argued that the court could, and should, 

consider Bell’s declaration despite the fact that it was filed one day late, 

arguing that case law has held that the 10-day deadline for filing affidavits is 

4 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 

unless otherwise specified.
11

not jurisdictional and that Plaintiffs suffered no prejudice from their late 

filing.

On May 9, after hearing arguments of counsel, the court issued a 

minute order denying Defendants’ motion for new trial, denying in part their 

motion for JNOV, and granting in part their motion for JNOV as to the 

punitive damages awarded to Quigley.5 In so doing, the court overruled 

Plaintiffs’ objection to Bell’s declaration.

B

Section 659, subdivision (a) provides: “The party intending to move for 

a new trial shall file with the clerk and serve upon each adverse party a 

notice of his or her intention to move for a new trial, designating the grounds 

upon which the motion will be made and whether the same will be made 

upon affidavits or the minutes of the court, or both, either: [¶] (1) After the 

decision is rendered and before entry of judgment. [¶] (2) Within 15 days of 

the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court 

pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written 

notice of entry of judgment . . . , whichever is earliest. . . .” The deadlines in 

section 659, subdivision (a)(1) and (2) “shall not be extended by order or 

stipulation . . . .” (§ 659, subd. (b).) Section 629, subdivision (b) provides in 

part: “A motion for [JNOV] shall be made within the period specified in 

Section 659 for the filing and service of a notice of intention to move for a new 

trial.”

Regarding affidavits and other supporting papers, section 659a 

provides: “Within 10 days of filing the notice, the moving party shall serve 

upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, 

5 The record on appeal does not contain the reporter’s transcript from the 

May 9, 2022 hearing.
12

including affidavits in support of the motion. . . . These deadlines may, for 

good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties, be 

extended by any judge for an additional period not to exceed 10 days.”

“As a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated 

in the notice of motion. [Citations.] An omission in the notice may be 

overlooked if the supporting papers make clear the grounds for the relief 

sought. [Citations.] The purpose of these requirements is to cause the 

moving party to ‘sufficiently define the issues for the information and 

attention of the adverse party and the court.’ [Citation.]” (Luri v. Greenwald

(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125 (Luri).) “Even though the notice of motion 

fails to state a particular ground for the motion, where the notice states . . . 

that the motion is being made upon the notice of motion and accompanying 

papers and the record, and these papers and the record support that 

particular ground, the matter is properly before the court and the defect in the 

notice of motion should be disregarded.” (Carrasco v. Craft (1985) 164 

Cal.App.3d 796, 808 (Carrasco), italics added.)

“[T]he trial court loses jurisdiction to hear a new trial motion if no 

notice of intent is filed within 15 days of the mailing or service of notice of 

entry of judgment . . . . (§ 659 subd. (b); [citations].) . . . [¶] By contrast, the 

Courts of Appeal have consistently held that the 10-day deadline for the filing 

of affidavits is not jurisdictional. A court may retroactively extend the 

[section 659a] deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did 

not seek an extension in advance.” (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 337 (Kabran).)

C

Although Defendants did not file with the trial court a document 

entitled “Notice of Intention” in compliance with section 659, subdivision (a), 
13

their notice of motion and motion for JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial had 

the effect of providing Plaintiffs with notice of their intention to file their 

motion and the specific grounds on which Defendants sought their relief. In 

particular, as Defendants argue, their notice of motion and motion for JNOV 

or, alternatively, a new trial included a memorandum setting forth their 

specific grounds and arguments thereon in support of their motion. In so 

doing, Defendants sufficiently defined for Plaintiffs and the court all of the 

specific grounds and issues on which they sought relief. (Cf. Luri, supra, 107 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1125.) Accordingly, we conclude, as the trial court 

presumably did, that Defendants substantively complied with section 659, 

subdivision (a) and, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, their due process right 

to notice was not violated. To conclude otherwise, would be to favor form over 

substance, which the law generally does not condone. (Troyk v. Farmers 

Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1332–1333 [doctrine of substantial 

compliance gives effect to our preference for substance over form].) 

Therefore, we conclude that Defendants’ motion was “properly before the 

[trial] court and [any] defect in the notice of motion should be disregarded.” 

(Cf. Carrasco, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 808.) Plaintiffs have not cited any 

case or other authority showing otherwise, nor have they persuaded us that

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ motion in the 

circumstances of this case or that their due process right to notice was 

violated.

Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, we conclude that the 

trial court did not err by overruling their objection to Bell’s declaration. 

Although Bell’s declaration was filed one day after the expiration of the

10-day period under section 659a, the court had the authority to extend that 

10-day period. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 337.) Plaintiffs do not 
14

persuade us that the court abused its discretion by doing so in the 

circumstances of this case. Also, contrary to Plaintiffs’ apparent assertion, 

Defendants’ late filing of Bell’s declaration did not deprive the trial court of 

jurisdiction to consider their motion. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we reject Plaintiffs’ 

arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ 

motion for JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial and, based thereon, that we 

also lack jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ appeal of the May 9, 2022 order.

III

Duplicative Awards of Damages

Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying in part their 

motion for JNOV and, in particular, failing to find that certain awards of 

damages to Maya were duplicative.

A

The trial court instructed the jury, among other things, with CACI 

3934 regarding damages on multiple legal theories, as follows:

“Carolina Quigley and Veronica Maya seek damages from 

Bis Club and Bar under more than one legal theory. 

However, each item of damages may be awarded only once, 

regardless of the number of legal theories alleged.

“You will be asked to decide whether Bis Club and Bar is 

liable to Carolina Quigley and Veronica Maya under the 

following legal theories: [¶] . . . [¶]

“6. Gender Based Harassment;

“7. Failure to Prevent Gender Based Harassment;

“8. Wrongful Termination;

“9. Sexual Assault.

“The following items of damages are recoverable only once 

under all of the above legal theories:

“1. Lost income from time of termination until trial;
15

“2. Lost future income;

“3. Emotional Distress. . . .”

In its special verdict, the jury awarded Maya, among other things, the 

following damages on her causes of action for sexual harassment, failure to 

prevent sexual harassment, wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy, and sexual assault/battery:

1. Sexual harassment:

a. Past lost earnings $3,194.40

b. Future lost earnings $0

c. Past emotional distress $5,000.00

d. Future emotional distress $5,000.00

Total: $13,194.40

2. Failure to prevent sexual harassment:

a. Past lost earnings $0

b. Future lost earnings $0

c. Past emotional distress $5,000.00

d. Future emotional distress $0

Total: $5,000.00

3. Wrongful termination:

a. Past lost earnings $3,194.40

b. Future lost earnings $0

c. Past emotional distress $5,000.00

d. Future emotional distress $0

Total: $8,194.40

4. Sexual assault/battery:

a. Past lost earnings $0

b. Future lost earnings $0
16

c. Past emotional distress $2,500.00

d. Future emotional distress $2,500.00

Total: $5,000.00

In its judgment on the verdict, the trial court presumably included each 

amount of the above damages awarded by the jury in calculating its total 

amount of damages awarded to Maya of $48,307.75.

In their motion for JNOV, Defendants argued, among other things, that 

the amount of damages awarded to Maya was excessive, inconsistent, and 

resulted in double or multiple recovery. They requested that the court modify 

the damages awarded to Maya for her emotional distress and loss of earnings 

based on the evidence and jury instructions. They argued that the special 

verdict form did not ask the jury to state the total amount of damages it 

awarded to Maya and that the judgment added up all of the separate damage 

awards despite their overlap with each other. Defendants argued that the

court should correct the jury’s duplicate awards of damages to Maya and

award her only $3,194.40 for past lost earnings, $5,000 for past emotional 

distress, and $5,000 for future emotional distress, for a total amount of 

$13,194.40 (in addition to her wage and hour damages). They argued the 

court should therefore modify the judgment to award Maya total damages of 

only $22,113.35.

In its May 9, 2022 order, the court rejected Defendants’ argument and 

did not reduce the amounts of damages awarded to Maya.

B

In general, a plaintiff “is not entitled to more than a single recovery for 

each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. 

[Citation.] Double or duplicative recovery for the same items of damage 

amounts to overcompensation and is therefore prohibited.” (Tavaglione v. 
17

Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158–1159 (Tavaglione).) However, “where 

separate items of compensable damage are shown by distinct and independent 

evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the entire amount of his damages, 

whether that amount is expressed by the jury in a single verdict or multiple 

verdicts referring to different claims or legal theories.” (Id. at p. 1159, italics 

added.) In the circumstances of Tavaglione, the court stated: “[A]s a matter 

of logic, it would seem unlikely that plaintiff’s damages from being defamed

by defendants would be identical to the damages he incurred from being 

ousted from RNB’s board of directors. . . . [T]hese theories of recovery seem 

based on different ‘primary’ rights and duties of the parties.” (Id. at p. 1158.) 

In Ruby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686 (Ruby), the court concluded 

in the circumstances of its case that a court’s addition of several individual 

awards of noneconomic damages “could only be justified if the awards of 

noneconomic damages for each of the three termination-related causes of 

action were all mutually exclusive. If they overlapped in part, then, to the 

extent of the overlap, adding the awards together had the effect of 

compensating [the plaintiff] multiple times for the same injury.” (Id. at

p. 703, italics added.)

In Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788 (Boeken), 

the court discussed the “primary rights” theory in the context of the doctrine 

of res judicata, stating: “The cause of action is the right to obtain redress for 

a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or legal theory

(common law or statutory) advanced.” (Id. at p. 798, italics added.) “Thus, 

under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm 

suffered. When two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for 

the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.” (Ibid., italics 

added.)
18

On appeal, in determining whether a trial court erred by denying a 

motion for JNOV, we review the record on appeal and generally uphold the 

court’s decision if there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 

(Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770; Sweatman v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) However, where an 

appellant challenges a trial court’s denial of its motion for JNOV on the 

grounds of inconsistency of a special verdict, we review that verdict de novo 

and independently determine that question. (Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, 

Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1092.) When two questions in a special 

verdict are patently inconsistent (i.e., inconsistency is “apparent on the face 

of the verdict”), we do not infer that the jury made findings in favor of the 

prevailing party and do not presume the verdict is correct. (Id. at pp. 1092–

1093.) Nevertheless, we “will interpret the verdict if it is possible to give a 

correct interpretation,” but will reverse the verdict if it is “hopelessly 

ambiguous.” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 

452, 457 (Woodcock).) If a verdict is not hopelessly ambiguous, we may 

“ ‘interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the 

pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Id. at pp. 456–457.)

C

Defendants argue that the jury’s awards of damages to Maya for past 

lost earnings and emotional distress on her causes of action for sexual 

harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy, and sexual assault/battery were duplicative and, in 

so arguing, implicitly argue those damages were awarded by the jury for the 

same injury or harm suffered. (Tavaglione, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1158–

1159; Ruby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 703; Boeken, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 798.) 

However, as discussed above, under the “primary rights” theory, a plaintiff 
19

may seek recovery of compensation for a harm suffered, regardless of the

specific legal theory advanced by the plaintiff. (Tavaglione, at pp. 1158–1159; 

Boeken, at p. 798.) It is only when a plaintiff seeks, or the jury awards, 

multiple damages for the same harm or injury does the rule against duplicate 

awards of damages apply. (Tavaglione, at pp. 1158–1159; Ruby, at p. 703.)

On appeal, we must interpret the jury’s special verdict “if it is possible 

to give a correct interpretation.” (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) In 

so interpreting the jury’s special verdict and the record on appeal, we 

conclude that, with two exceptions, the jury awarded Maya different awards 

of damages for different injuries or harms that she suffered relating to the 

four causes of action in question.

Duplicate damages. First, we conclude that the jury’s verdict awarded 

Maya duplicate damages for past emotional distress on her causes of action 

for sexual harassment and failure to prevent sexual harassment. As 

described above, Maya testified regarding the verbal and physical sexual 

harassment by Arizpe that she suffered while working for Defendants. She 

also testified that his actions made her feel sad, depressed, and 

uncomfortable. Given that evidence, the jury found that Maya had suffered 

emotional distress from that sexual harassment up until the time her 

employment was terminated by Villavicencio and awarded her $5,000 in 

damages for that past emotional distress.

On her related cause of action, the jury also awarded Maya $5,000 in 

damages for past emotional distress caused by Defendants’ failure to prevent 

sexual harassment. However, our review of the record does not show, nor do 

Plaintiffs cite, any evidence showing that the emotional distress that Maya 

suffered from Defendants’ failure to prevent sexual harassment while 

working for them was any different from the emotional distress caused by the 
20

actual sexual harassment that she suffered while working for them. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the record shows that the sexual harassment 

shown in support of both causes of action was, in fact, the same sexual 

harassment or, as described above, the same harm or injury (i.e., involved the 

same “primary right”). Therefore, the jury’s award of $5,000 in damages 

awarded to Maya for past emotional distress on her cause of action for failure 

to prevent sexual harassment was, as Defendants argue, the same 

compensation for the same harm and thus an award of duplicate damages in 

addition to the award of $5,000 in damages on her cause of action for sexual 

harassment. (Tavaglione, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1158–1159; Ruby, supra, 47 

Cal.4th at p. 703.) Accordingly, to the extent the trial court denied in part 

Defendants’ motion for JNOV as to the judgment’s award of those duplicate 

damages, it erred. Instead, the court should have stricken as duplicative the 

$5,000 award of damages to Maya for past emotional distress for Defendants’ 

failure to prevent sexual harassment.

Second, we conclude, as Defendants argue, that the jury’s award of past 

lost earnings in the amount of $3,194.40 on each of her causes of action for 

sexual harassment and wrongful termination in violation of public policy 

represented the same lost earnings and thus the same harm or injury under 

the “primary rights” theory. Our review of the record does not show, nor do 

Plaintiffs cite, any evidence showing that the past lost earnings that Maya 

suffered from Defendants’ sexual harassment of her were any different from

the past lost earnings that she suffered from their wrongful termination of 

her. Because the record shows that the $3,194.40 amount of past lost 

earnings shown in support of both causes of action were, in fact, the same 

past lost earnings (i.e., the same harm or injury), the jury’s award of 

$3,194.40 in damages to Maya for past lost earnings on her cause of action for 
21

wrongful termination was the same compensation for the same harm and 

thus an award of duplicate damages in addition to the award of $3,194.40 in 

damages for past lost earnings on her cause of action for sexual harassment. 

(Tavaglione, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1158–1159; Ruby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at

p. 703.) Accordingly, to the extent the trial court denied in part Defendants’ 

motion for JNOV as to the judgment’s award of those duplicate damages, it 

erred. Instead, the court should have stricken as duplicative the $3,194.40

award of damages to Maya for past lost earnings for Defendants’ wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy.

Nonduplicate damages. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, we 

conclude that the jury’s other awards to Maya of damages for past and future 

emotional distress are not duplicative. Specifically, the jury awarded to 

Maya: (1) $5,000 for past emotional distress on her cause of action for sexual 

harassment; (2) $5,000 for future emotional distress on her cause of action for

sexual harassment; (3) $5,000 for past emotional distress on her cause of 

action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (4) $2,500 for 

past emotional distress on her cause of action for sexual assault/battery; and 

(5) $2,500 for future emotional distress on her cause of action for sexual 

assault/battery.

Regarding the awards for her future emotional distress (i.e., $5,000 for

her sexual harassment claim and $2,500 for her sexual assault/battery 

claim), we interpret the jury’s verdict as correctly awarding her separate 

damages for separate harms or injuries that she suffered. (Woodcock, supra, 

69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) Contrary to Defendants’ apparent assertion, the jury’s 

special verdict was not patently inconsistent in awarding those two amounts 

of damages. Therefore, we interpret its special verdict in a manner to 

support its correctness. (Ibid.) Based on our review of the record, we 
22

conclude that there is substantial evidence to support findings by the jury 

that Maya will suffer future emotional distress from the sexual harassment 

that she generally suffered while working for Defendants and separate future 

emotional distress from the sexual assault/battery that Arizpe inflicted on 

her (i.e., slapping her buttock). Also, because the jury awarded Maya 

different amounts of damages for future emotional distress (i.e., $5,000 

versus $2,500), we conclude the jury necessarily found that the future 

emotional distress that she would suffer on those two causes of action to be 

different future harms or injuries. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s 

awards to Maya of damages for future emotional distress on those two causes 

of action are not duplicative. (Cf. Tavaglione, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1158.)

Regarding the three awards of damages for her past emotional distress 

(i.e., $5,000 on her cause of action for sexual harassment, $5,000 on her cause 

of action for wrongful termination, and $2,500 on her cause of action for 

sexual assault/battery), we conclude that those awards are not duplicative of 

each other. Again, contrary to Defendants’ apparent assertion, the jury’s 

special verdict was not patently inconsistent in awarding those amounts of 

damages. Therefore, we interpret its special verdict in a manner to support 

its correctness. (Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) Based on our review 

of the record, we conclude those three awards for past emotional distress 

reflect the jury’s compensation for different harms or injuries that she 

suffered.

Because the jury awarded Maya different amounts of damages for past 

emotional distress on her causes of action for sexual harassment and sexual 

assault/battery (i.e., $5,000 versus $2,500), we conclude the jury necessarily 

found that the past emotional distress that she suffered on those two causes 

of action to be different harms or injuries. As discussed above, Maya testified 
23

that she felt sad, depressed, and uncomfortable when Arizpe sexually 

harassed her and felt very sad, depressed, ashamed, and afraid after Arizpe 

sexually assaulted or battered her by slapping her buttock. Construing the 

jury’s verdict to give it a correct interpretation, we therefore conclude the jury 

found that the past emotional distress she generally suffered during the 

course of her employment by Defendants was different, and separate, from 

the emotional distress that she suffered from the single incident of sexual 

assault/battery when Arizpe slapped her buttock. (Woodcock, supra,

69 Cal.2d at p. 457.)

Similarly, we interpret the verdict in a manner such that the jury 

correctly found Maya’s past emotional distress that she suffered from 

Villavicencio’s termination of her was different, and separate, from her past 

emotional distress that she suffered from the other two causes of action for 

sexual harassment and sexual assault/battery. In particular, the jury could 

conclude that Maya suffered emotional distress from Arizpe’s sexual 

harassment of her during the course of her employment, then suffered 

different, and separate, emotional distress from the single incident of Arizpe’s 

sexual assault/battery of her, and finally suffered different, and separate, 

emotional distress from Villavicencio’s wrongful termination of her after 

viewing the video recording of the incident. As discussed above, Maya 

testified that she felt sad, depressed, and uncomfortable when Arizpe 

sexually harassed her. Maya also testified that she felt very sad, depressed, 

ashamed, and afraid after Arizpe sexually assaulted or battered her by 

slapping her buttock. Although Maya did not expressly so testify, we 

conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that she was likewise sad and 

depressed when Villavicencio called her a “fucking bitch” and wrongfully 

terminated her employment. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s awards 
24

to Maya of damages for past emotional distress on her causes of action for 

sexual harassment, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and 

sexual assault/battery are not duplicative. (Cf. Tavaglione, supra, 4 Cal.4th 

at p. 1158.) To the extent Defendants cite Ruby in support of their argument, 

we conclude that case is inapposite and therefore unpersuasive because, 

unlike this case, it involved three termination-related causes of action. 

(Ruby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 703.) Therefore, the trial court did not err by 

denying in part Defendants’ motion for JNOV as to the judgment’s separate 

awards for past emotional distress on those causes of action, nor did it err by 

denying in part their motion for JNOV as to the judgment’s separate awards 

for future emotional distress, as we concluded above.

D

To the extent Defendants argue the jury failed to correctly apply CACI 

No. 3934, quoted above, and/or correctly return its special verdict, we 

presume the jury followed the court’s instructions and we also “interpret the 

verdict if it is possible to give it a correct interpretation.” (NBC Subsidiary 

(KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1223 [absent 

contrary indication, we presume jury followed instructions]; Woodcock, supra, 

69 Cal.2d at p. 457 [interpret verdict if possible to be correct verdict].) In so 

doing, we conclude the jury properly applied CACI 3934 in awarding 

separate, and not duplicative, awards of damages for past and future 

emotional distress on Maya’s causes of action for sexual harassment, 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and sexual assault/battery, 

as discussed above.

In support of their argument, Defendants also cite Singh v. Southland 

Stone, USA, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338 (Singh), which suggested that 

trial courts should use jury instructions and special verdicts that do not ask 
25

the jury to avoid awarding duplicate damages, but instead leave those issues 

of duplicate damages for resolution by the trial court after the jury returns its 

verdict. (Id. at pp. 360–361.) However, we are not persuaded that the trial 

court in this case erred by instructing with CACI No. 3934, instead of 

following Singh’s suggested approach, nor are we persuaded that the jury 

erred by following that instruction and awarding the nonduplicate damages 

discussed above. Furthermore, to the extent Defendants contend that CACI 

3934 was misleading or otherwise erroneous, we conclude, as Plaintiffs argue, 

that they waived or forfeited any such instructional error by not objecting to 

that instruction or, at least, suggesting clarifying language. (Metcalf v. 

County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1130–1131 [appellant forfeits

claim that jury instruction was too general, lacked clarity, or was incomplete 

unless it requested additional or clarifying instruction]; Electronic Equipment

Express, Inc. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 834, 856–857 

[appellant waived jury instruction error by acquiescing to instruction].)

IV

Quigley’s Wrongful Termination Award

Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying in part their 

motion for JNOV on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to 

support a finding of liability to Quigley for wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy. In particular, they argue that there was insufficient evidence 

to support findings that Quigley reported to Defendants sexual harassment 

and that such reporting was a motivating reason for their termination of her 

employment.
26

A

The trial court instructed with CACI 2430 on Quigley’s cause of action 

for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, stating:

“[Quigley claims she was] discharged from employment for 

reasons that violate a public policy. It is a violation of 

public policy to discharge someone from employment for 

any of the following: (1) reporting the failure to pay proper 

minimum wage rates; (2) reporting the failure to provide 

meal periods; (3) reporting the failure to provide rest 

periods; [(4)] reporting sexual harassment; [(5)] being the 

victim of sexual harassment; [(6)] reporting sexual assault; 

or [(7)] being the victim of sexual assault. To establish this 

claim, [Quigley] must prove all of the following:

“1. That [she was] employed by [Bis Club];

“2. That [Bis Club] discharged [her];

“3. That any one of the following: (1) reporting the failure 

to pay proper minimum wage rates; (2) reporting the 

failure to provide meal periods; (3) reporting the failure to 

provide rest periods; [(4)] reporting sexual harassment; [(5)]

being the victim of sexual harassment; [(6)] reporting 

sexual assault; or [(7)] being the victim of sexual assault 

was a motivating reason for [her] discharge;

“4. That [she was] harmed; and

“5. That the discharge was a substantial factor in causing 

[her] harm.” (Italics added.)

The jury returned its special verdict, finding Defendants liable to Quigley for 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy and awarding her damages 

of $3,194.40 for past lost earnings and $5,000 for past emotional distress.

B

“[W]hen an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental 

principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort 
27

action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Tameny 

v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170.) “The elements of a claim 

for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employeremployee relationship; (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s 

employment; (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of 

public policy; and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (You v. Allen

(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 (You), italics added.) Therefore, if the 

plaintiff does not present substantial evidence of an underlying violation of 

public policy that substantially motivated the employer’s termination of his 

or her employment, there is insufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding 

that the employer wrongfully terminated the plaintiff in violation of public 

policy. (Ibid.)

C

Here, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for a nonsuit on 

Quigley’s causes of action for retaliation for reporting wage and hour 

violations and FEHA violations. In particular, the court noted that she had 

denied reporting to Villavicencio any sexual harassment by Arizpe. The court 

also noted that Quigley did not report any Labor Code wage and hour 

violations to Defendants or a public agency. The record shows that Quigley 

admitted she had not reported to Villavicencio the sexual harassment about 

which she had testified. She also admitted that she had not complained to 

either Villavicencio or Arizpe about her lack of rest periods or lunch breaks.6

6 Although Quigley testified that she went to the sheriff’s department 

and spoke with an officer there about Arizpe’s conduct, we presume the jury 

did not find that testimony credible because it found that she had not been 

sexually harassed as she testified. Furthermore, although Quigley testified 

that she asked Arizpe to stop his comments and physical touching of her, the 

jury could likewise have found that testimony not credible.
28

In its special verdict, the jury found in favor of Defendants on Quigley’s 

causes of action for sexual harassment and sexual assault/battery. Although 

the jury found Defendants liable on her cause of action for failure to prevent 

sexual harassment, that special verdict was later withdrawn by her counsel, 

conceding that it was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict finding that she had 

not been sexually harassed. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Quigley 

had, in fact, reported to Arizpe his sexual harassment of her, we nevertheless 

conclude that substantial evidence does not support a finding under CACI 

No. 2430 that such reporting to Arizpe was a “motivating reason” for 

Villavicencio’s termination of her employment. In particular, the record does 

not contain any evidence that would support a reasonable inference that

Arizpe informed Villavicencio about Quigley’s assumed reporting to him of 

sexual harassment such that Quigley’s reporting could have been a 

motivating reason for Villavicencio’s termination of her employment. Rather, 

as shown by Maya’s testimony regarding her phone conversation with 

Villavicencio and Quigley’s testimony regarding Villavicencio’s text message 

to her, Villavicencio was clearly upset when she heard about, and viewed the 

video recording of, Arizpe’s slapping of Maya’s buttock and that incident

therefore was the motivating reason for Villavicencio’s termination of 

Quigley’s employment. Absent that required motivating reason for 

Defendants’ termination of Quigley’s employment, we conclude, as 

Defendants argue, that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s 

finding for Quigley on her cause of action for wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy. (CACI No. 2430; You, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at

p. 154.) Plaintiffs do not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion. 

Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying in part Defendants’ motion for 

JNOV as to the jury’s award of damages to Quigley on her cause of action for 
29

wrongful termination in violation of public policy (i.e., $3,194.40 for past lost 

earnings and $5,000 for past emotional distress).

V

Maya’s Award of Punitive Damages

Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying in part their 

motion for JNOV on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the award of punitive damages to Maya.7 In particular, they argue 

Exhibit 21 was insufficient evidence to show that they had the ability to pay 

the $8,000 in punitive damages awarded to her.

A

At trial, the court admitted in evidence Exhibit 21, which was a binder 

that Arizpe maintained and in which he recorded the dates and hours that 

employees worked, the wages owed to those employees, and the sales of Bis 

Club. Following the second phase of the trial, the jury returned a special 

verdict awarding Maya $8,000 and Quigley $2,000 in punitive damages.

The court entered a judgment against Defendants on the jury’s special 

verdict, including awards of $8,000 to Maya and $2,000 to Quigley in punitive 

damages. The court denied in part Defendants’ motion for JNOV, but 

granted it in part as to the $2,000 in punitive damages awarded to Quigley.

B

A plaintiff must present evidence of a defendant’s financial condition as 

a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages. (Adams v. Murakami

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 108–109, 123 (Adams).) Absent such evidence, “the 

7 As we concluded above, we interpret the trial court’s May 9, 2022 

minute order as granting in part Defendants’ motion for JNOV as to the 

award of $2,000 in punitive damages to Quigley. Therefore, our discussion in 

this section addresses only the $8,000 award of punitive damages to Maya.
30

award can be so disproportionate to the defendant’s ability to pay that the 

award is excessive for that reason alone.” (Id. at p. 112.) However, Adams

declined “to prescribe any rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability 

to pay.” (Id. at p. 116, fn. 7.) “The amount of punitive damages is determined 

in the discretion of the jury. An appellate court will not reverse the jury’s 

determination unless the award as a matter of law is excessive or appears so 

grossly disproportionate to the relevant factors that it raises a presumption it 

was the result of passion or prejudice.” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 

Cal.App.4th 573, 623 (Rufo).)

“Although net worth is the most common measure of the defendant’s 

financial condition, it is not the only measure for determining whether 

punitive damages are excessive in relation to that condition.” (Rufo, supra, 

86 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.) “Net worth is the most common measure, but not 

the exclusive measure [of a defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages]. 

[Citations.] In most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone are not 

sufficient ‘without examining the liabilities side of the balance sheet.’ 

[Citations.]” (Baxter v. Peterson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 673, 680.) 

“Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets, and 

evidence of expenses should accompany evidence of income.” (Ibid.) “What is 

required is evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay the damage award.” 

(Robert L. Cloud & Associates, Inc. v. Mikesell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1141, 

1152.) “Evidence of a defendant’s income, standing alone, is not ‘meaningful 

evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 

Cal.App.4th 165, 194.)
31

C

Although Defendants contend that substantial evidence does not show 

they had the ability to pay the $8,000 in punitive damages awarded to Maya 

by the jury, we conclude they have waived or forfeited that contention by not 

providing an adequate record on appeal. As Plaintiffs argue, Defendants 

failed to make the reporter’s transcript for the second phase of the trial on 

punitive damages a part of the record on appeal. In arguing there is 

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of punitive damages, 

Defendants wholly ignore the requirement that they provide a record on 

which we may conduct such a review. In Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, 

Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121 (Aguilar), the Supreme Court stated: 

“[D]efendants must show that this finding [regarding ongoing conduct to 

justify injunctive relief] is not supported by substantial evidence. But, as 

noted above, defendants elected not to provide a reporter’s transcript of the 

trial proceedings. Accordingly, they have no basis upon which to argue that 

the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent a continuation of 

defendants’ unlawful conduct.” (Id. at p. 132; see also, Jameson v. Desta

(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608 (Jameson) [lack of verbatim record of trial 

proceedings will frequently be fatal to litigant’s ability to have appellate 

claims of error resolved by appellate court on the merits]; Oliveira v. Kiesler

(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1363 (Oliveira) [judgment was affirmed because 

appellant failed to present adequate record for review].) In LA Investments, 

LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044 (LA Investments), the court 

concluded that the appellants “failed to provide an adequate record for our 

substantial evidence review . . . for their assertion the evidence was 
32

insufficient to support the jury’s finding of malice. Consequently, the claim is 

waived, and we presume the record contains evidence to sustain the jury’s 

finding of malice.” (Id. at p. 1062.)

Here, because Defendants failed to provide a reporter’s transcript for 

the second phase of the trial on punitive damages, we conclude they have not 

met their burden to provide an adequate record on appeal for us to evaluate 

their contention that substantial evidence does not support the punitive 

damages awarded by the jury in its special verdict and by the court in its 

judgment. (Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 132; Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 

p. 608; Oliveira, supra, 206 CalApp.4th at p. 1362.) Alternatively stated, 

Defendants have waived or forfeited their substantial evidence contention by 

not providing an adequate record on appeal on which we may evaluate that 

contention. (LA Investments, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) Accordingly, 

we need not, and do not, address the merits of their contention that 

substantial evidence does not support the award of punitive damages to 

Maya.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed to the extent it denied in part the motion for 

JNOV as to the awards: (1) to Maya of $5,000 for past emotional distress on 

her cause of action for Defendants’ failure to prevent sexual harassment and 

$3,194.40 to Maya for past lost earnings on her cause of action for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy; and (2) to Quigley of $3,194.40 for 

past lost earnings and $5,000 for past emotional distress on her cause of 

action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. In all other 

respects, the order is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court 

with directions that it vacate its May 9, 2022 order and issue a new order 

reflecting its granting in part Defendants’ motion for JNOV as to and striking 
33

of: (1) the award to Quigley of $2,000 in punitive damages; (2) the award to 

Maya of $5,000 for past emotional distress on her cause of action for failure to 

prevent sexual harassment; (3) the award to Maya of $3,194.40 for past lost 

earnings on her cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy; and (4) the awards to Quigley of $3,194.40 for past lost earnings and 

$5,000 for past emotional distress on her cause of action for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy. The parties shall bear their own 

costs on appeal.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.