J-S25018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

VINDANCAR, LLC, TRAP 

ENTERPRISES, LLC, VINCENT 

TRAPASSO, CHINLA, LLC

v.

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, JOSEPH P. HANYON, 

ESQUIRE, MERWINE HANYON & 

KASPSZYK, LLC AND PENN REALTY 

SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC.

APPEAL OF: VINDANCAR, LLC, TRAP 

ENTERPRISES, LLC, VINCENT 

TRAPASSO, CHINLA, LLC, CHARLIE 

TRAPASSO

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2715 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 

005564-CV-2016

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 1, 2023

Vindancar, LLC, Trap Enterprises, LLC, Chinla, LLC, Vincent Trapasso 

and Charlie Trapasso (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the order entered 

in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in 

favor of First American Title Insurance Company (First American) and Joseph 

P. Hanyon, Esquire (Hanyon), Merwine Hanyon & Kaspszyk, LLC (MHK), and 

Penn Realty Settlement Services, Inc. (PRSS) (collectively, Hanyon 

Defendants), in this action seeking damages for legal malpractice, breach of 
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contract, and negligence in connection with the purchase of real property. On 

appeal, Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of both First American and the Hanyon Defendants on Appellants’ 

claim that the defendants failed to clear clouds on the title to the property, 

regardless of the validity of the underlying judgments. We are constrained to 

conclude, however, that Appellants waived their claims on appeal when they 

filed an untimely court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained on appeal. Thus, we affirm.

The relevant facts underlying this dispute are summarized by the trial 

court as follows: 

[Appellants] bought several contiguous parcels of real property 

along Pa. Route 611 in Pocono Township, Monroe County in 2007.

. . . [Appellants] hired Hanyon and MHK to represent them in the 

transactions. PRSS issued the title insurance policy in the 

transaction on behalf of . . . First American. In or about December 

2014, [Appellants] learned of an alleged title issue [a]ffecting the 

real property at [the] time of entering into an agreement of sale 

with a Mr. Desai to purchase part of the real property for the 

development of a hotel. The Hanyon Defendants were made 

aware of the title issues and . . . First American, by letter to Desai’s 

title insurer, agreed to indemnify and insure over any title issue. 

. . . The agreement of sale was eventually terminated by Mr. 

Desai in 2015. The parties dispute the reasons . . . why Mr. Desai 

terminated the agreement of sale.

In or about July 2016, while attempting to obtain financing 

from [a bank] to further develop the real property themselves, 

[Appellants] were advised . . . there was a title issue[, and] 

Stewart Title Insurance Co. would not issue title insurance for the 

loan. The title issue raised in both 2014 and 2016 is alleged to be 

liens that were of record against the real property. [Hanyon] gave 

assurances the liens no longer existed and/or were resolved. . . .

First American then undertook steps to clear the alleged title issue 
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by filing an action to quiet title. That action resolved any 

remaining claimed title issues within seven months. . . . 

Trial Court Op. (Hanyon Defendants), 9/29/22, at 3-4.

On September 15, 2016, Appellants filed a complaint against the 

Hanyon Defendants and First American insisting the property was burdened 

by two unsatisfied judgments, of which, they allege, neither the Hanyon 

Defendants nor First American informed them at the time of their purchase. 

Appellants’ Complaint, 9/15/16, at ¶¶ 30-32. They insisted that due to these

“existing judg[]ments,” they were unable to “move forward” with certain 

projects and suffered damages as a result. Id. at ¶ 33; see also id. at ¶¶ 

34-36. Based on these factual averments, Appellants asserted six causes of 

action ─ (1) claims of legal malpractice/breach of contract, legal 

malpractice/negligence, negligent supervision, and negligence against the 

Hanyon Defendants (Counts I-IV); and (2) claims of breach of contract and 

negligent misrepresentation against First American (Counts V-VI). See id. at 

¶¶ 42-91. 

Both the Hanyon Defendants and First American filed motions for 

summary judgment. The Hanyon Defendants argued they were entitled to 

relief because neither of the purported outstanding judgments were “valid or 

enforceable” and that Appellants could not establish causation or damages.

See Hanyon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/15/22, at ¶¶ 61, 

80, 82, 119. First American argued that it did not breach the parties’ contract 

in 2007 because the policy required Appellants to provide formal written 

“notice of a claim[,]” and, when Appellants did provide notice of the issue in 
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July of 2016, it resolved the claim “within several months.” First American’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/15/22, at ¶¶ 26-27, 79. With regard to the 

negligent misrepresentation claim, First American averred that Appellants’ 

allegations were “based on representations made in the policy itself rather 

than anything First American said to” Appellants. Id. at ¶ 92.

Appellants filed responses to both motions on March 18, 2022, and, 

thereafter, all parties filed briefs in support of their positions. On May 16, 

2022, the trial court entered two separate orders, each accompanied by an 

opinion, denying the motions for summary judgment filed by the Hanyon 

Defendants and First American. See Orders, 5/16/22. 

Both the Hanyon Defendants and First American filed motions for 

reconsideration on June 14, 2022. The trial court subsequently granted the 

motions for reconsideration, vacated the May 16th order, and, following 

argument, issued two orders and opinions in September of 2022, granting the 

motions for summary judgment. See Order, 6/15/22; Orders, 9/29/22. 

With respect to the Hanyon Defendants, the trial court determined that 

it had failed to properly consider the fact that the purported judgment liens 

on the property were not valid ─ one mortgage lien was extinguished by 

operation of law prior to Appellants’ purchase of the property, and the other 

judgment lien was “not a lien on the real property” affecting the title because 

it was against only one of the prior property owners, and the property was 

held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. See Trial Ct. Op. 

(Hanyon Defendants), 9/29/22, at 5-6. Therefore, the trial court concluded
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that because the liens were “no longer enforceable as having any legal effect 

on the real property[,] there was no duty breached, and no misrepresentations 

. . . made, . . . and [Appellants] received good title.” Id. at 10. For the same 

reasons, the trial court determined there was no title issue with regard to the 

property “negat[ing] any collateral claims against First American.” See Trial 

Ct. Op. (First American), 9/29/22, at 5. This timely appeal follows.

Appellants present one issue on appeal for our review:

Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by granting [the Hanyon Defendants’ and First 

American’s] motion[s] for summary judgment and concluding that 

there was no duty incumbent upon [them] or their agents to act 

to remove clouds, whether valid or not, when evidence showed 

[the Hanyon Defendants and First American] were aware that 

clouds continued to appear on the title searches performed, and 

were interfering with [Appellants’] use of their land[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).

Before we may address Appellants’ substantive claim, we must first 

consider whether Appellants properly preserved their issues in a timely-filed, 

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The Pennsylvania Supreme has 

held that Rule 1925 is a “bright-line rule” and the “failure to comply with the 

minimal requirements of [Rule] 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of 

the issues raised.” Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. 

2005) (emphasis added).1 See also Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 

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1 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Schofield, Rule 1925 was 

amended; however, those amendments have no bearing on our present case. 

See Commonwealth v. Hopfer, 965 A.2d 270, 272-73 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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775, 780 (Pa. 2005); Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle 

Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).

In the present case, the trial court entered an order on October 25, 

2022, directing Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement “no later than 21 

days after the entry of [the o]rder.” Order, 10/25/22. The certified record 

includes a “Notice” that entry of the order was provided to the parties pursuant 

to Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2) that same day.2 See Notice of Entry of Order, 

10/25/22. See also Docket Entry, 10/25/22. Thus, Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) 

statement was due on or before November 15, 2022. 

However, Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) statement is time-stamped and 

docketed November 18th, three days late. Moreover, there is no indication in 

the certified record that Appellants attempted to file the statement prior to 

the November 15th deadline, or requested and were granted an extension of 

time from the trial court. Therefore, we must conclude that the Rule 1925(b) 

statement was untimely filed, and Appellants have waived their claims on 

appeal.

____________________________________________

(explaining amendments to Rule 1925 after Schofield allows trial court to 

grant extension of time or, in “extraordinary circumstances,” nunc pro tunc

relief, and provides for “automatic remand” when counsel in criminal case 

fails to file timely, court-ordered statement) (citations & emphasis omitted).

2 Rule 236 requires the prothonotary to “immediately give written notice of 

the entry of . . . any . . . order . . . to each party’s attorney of record[, and] 

include a copy of the order[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2).
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While we recognize that the trial court appears to have accepted 

Appellants’ untimely statement and addressed the claims on their merits,

3

this 

does not excuse the untimely filing. This Court’s en banc decision in Greater 

Erie is dispositive. 

In Greater Erie, like here, the appellant filed a court-ordered Rule 

1925(b) statement three days after the court-imposed deadline. See 

Greater Erie, 88 A.3d at 226. However, the trial court ignored the untimely 

filing and addressed the appellant’s issue on the merits. See id. at 224. 

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Castillo and its progeny, the en 

banc panel concluded that it was not permitted to ignore the timeliness issue:

Stated simply, it is no longer within this Court’s discretion to 

review the merits of an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement based 

solely on the trial court’s decision to address the merits of those 

untimely raised issues. Under current precedent, even if a trial 

court ignores the untimeliness of a Rule 1925(b) statement 

and addresses the merits, those claims still must be 

considered waived: “Whenever a trial court orders an appellant 

to file a concise statement of [errors] complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Rule 1925(b), the appellant must comply in a timely 

manner.” Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 803 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (citing Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780) (emphasis in 

original); see Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 940 (Pa. 

Super. 2011).

Id. at 225 (some emphasis added).

The Greater Erie Court did recognize that there were still some 

“operative exceptions” to Rule 1925(b)’s timeliness requirements ─ 

specifically, when the trial court’s Rule 1925 order does not sufficiently 

____________________________________________

3 See Statements Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 11/18/22.
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conform with the requirements of the Rule, since “it is the trial court’s order 

that triggers an appellant’s obligation” to file a concise statement. Greater 

Erie, 88 A.3d at 225 (citations & quotation marks omitted). Notably, the Rule 

requires that the trial court’s order: (a) specify the number of days after entry 

of the order within which the Rule 1925(b) statement must be filed and 

served; (2) direct that the statement must be filed of record, and served on 

the trial court; (3) provide both the place where the statement may be served 

in person and the address to which it may be mailed; and (4) inform the 

appellant that “any issue not properly included the Statement timely filed and 

served pursuant to [the Rule] shall be deemed waived.” See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(3)(i)-(iv). The order entered by the trial court in the present case 

complies in all respects with the requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3). See Order, 

10/25/22.

Because Appellants failed to comply with the trial court’s October 25, 

2022, order to file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement, we are constrained to 

conclude they have failed to preserve any issues for our review. See 

Schofield, 888 A.2d at 774; Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780; Greater Erie, 88 

A.3d at 224. Thus, we have no option but to affirm the order on appeal.

Order affirmed.
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Date: 12/1/2023