Ap pe lla nt re pr e se nte d him se lf a t tr ia l wi th the a ssi sta nc e of sta nd by c ouns e l and

c on tin ue s to 1 repr esent himself on a

ppeal. Appe llant’s brief does not c omply with the appellate rules in numerous 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00427- CR

Da nie l O’ De ll, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 6 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 63699 3, HO NORAB LE J. F. CLAWS ON, JR., JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant Daniel O’ Dell g uilty of har assment. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 42.07 (West 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at 180 day s’ incar cer ation and a $2000 fine, suspende d imposit ion of sentenc e, and placed appellant on community supervision. Appellant bring s forwa

rd seve n points of err or: (1) se ction 42.07 is facia lly unconstitutional; (2) he wa s denied due proc ess during pretria l proce eding s; (3) he w as deni ed his rig ht to call witnesses; (4) he was denied the rig ht to prese nt evidenc e in his defe nse; (5) his m otion to recuse w as er roneously denied, and he w as unlawf

ully held i n contempt; (6) “relative standards” wer e not followed duringtrial; and (7) the punishment phase of trial was unlawfully conducte d. We overrule these points of er ror a nd aff irm the conviction. 1re sp e c ts, inc lud ing its le ng th (1 83 pa g e s) and its fa ilure to co nta in cl e ar an d c on c ise argume nts , w ith

a p p r o p r iate c it a ti o n s to a

u th o r it ie s an d to th e r ecor d. See T ex. R . App. P. 38.1(g ), 38.4. Our consideration of this appeal has be en fa cilitated by the compre hensive res p o n s ive brief filed by counsel for

the State. We refe r to these a g encie s by their name s during most of the time in question. 2 2 Backg ro und Ap pe lla nt s uf fe re d w or kp la c e inj ur ie s in

19 97
. Sub se qu e ntl y , a

pp e lla nt e ng a g e d in a runningbattle with his employ er’ s insurer, the T exas W orker ’s Compensation Commi ssion, and the Te xas Re ha

bil itatio n Commis sio n (T RC)
. On Ma y 15 , 20 03 , a he ari ng of

fi c e r app oi nt ed to 2 resolve c erta in disputes between a ppellant and the T RC is sued an or der de ny ing most of a ppellant’s demands. That sa

me day , appellant made a ser ies of telephone calls to the TRC that constitute the primary basis of this prosecution. Th e inf or ma tio n a lle g e d th a t a

pp e lla nt:
wi th t he int e nt t o h ara ss, ann oy , a larm , a bu se , to rm e nt, and

e mba rr a ss a no the r, to w it: the Texas Rehabil i t at i o nC o m m i s s i o n(“ T R C ”) , a go v ern m en tage n cy , m ad e r epea ted te le ph on e c omm

un ic a tio ns in a

mann er rea so na

bly lik e ly to h ara ss, ann oy , a larm , a bu se , to rm e nt, e mba

rr a ss, and of fe nd ano the r, to w it:

• on May

15, 2003, the defe ndant called the TRC and spoke with employ ee L aura York a nd called he r a “ ly ing pie ce of filth,”

• on May 15, 2003, the defendant called t he TRC and spoke with employ ee Sarah F lores and y elled at he r and ref err ed to another

employ ee a s a “pie ce of shit,”

• on May

15, 2003, the defe ndant ca lled the TRC and spoke with employ ee Yvonne Ga

rcia -F uentes a

nd y elled pr o f

a n it y in cluding the phra se “you sons of bitches,”St a lk in g is n o w th e s u b je c t o f a sepa rate statute. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 4 2. 07 2 ( Wes t 3 2003). 3

• on May

15, 2003, the defe ndant called the TRC and spoke with employ ee Tony L awren ce an d

yel l ed p ro fan i t y i n cl u d i n g t

h e p hra s e “ fu ck

y our mother,”

• on May 15, 2003, the defendant called t he TRC and spoke with employ ee Maria Rutledg e and c alled her a “da mn piece of

filth,”

• on May 15 , 2 00 3, the de fe nd ant c a lle d th e TRC and le ft a vo ic e ma il me ssa g e fo r e mpl oy e e B arb ara B e ard e n r e fe rr e d to o ther e mpl oy e e s a s a “lying pie ce of

filth” and a

“lying pie ce of

filthy trash,”

• on May

23, 2003, the def

endant c alled the TRC and spoke with employ ee Sy lvia Har deman a

nd ref err ed to her

as “you piece of filth trash.”
Se e id . § 4 2
. 0 7 ( a ) ( 4 )
. T h e r e i s n o t a p o i n t o f e r r o r c h a l l e n g i n g t h e s u f

f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e to
su pp or t th e jur y ’s fi nd ingof

g uil t.
Cons tit

utio nal ity of Sta tute I n h is f ir st p oin t o f er

ro r, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t se c tio n 4 2. 07 (a )( 4) is
un c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue . H e c ite s Ma yv . S tat e , 765 S.W .2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), and Long

v . S tat e , 931 S.W .2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), in support of this contention. May held that an
ear lier version of the ha

rassment statute wa s unconstitutionally vag ue. 765 S.W.2d at 440. I n Long , the c ourt of c ri min a l app e a ls al so up he ld a va g ue ne ss ch a lle ng e to the sta lki ng pr ov isi on fo un d in a subseque nt version of sec tion 42.07. 931 S.W .2d at 29 7
. Neither May nor Long speaks to the 3 constitutionalit y

of sec tion 42.07(a)( 4) as it re ads now a nd in 2003. Two cour ts of appea ls have re

jected va g ueness c halleng es to section 42.07(a )(4) as it now rea ds. De W

ill is v . S tat e , 951 S.W .2d 212, 217 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1997, no4

pe t.) ; Ba de r v . S

tat e , 773 S.W .2d 769, 770 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d) . I n Bader , the cour t held that the def

ects identified in May had been cur ed by subsequent ame ndments to the statute. 773 S.W .2d at 770. I n De W ill is , t h e c o u rt re ac h edt h e s am e c o n c l u s i o naf t er a t h o ro u gh
s u r v e y o f t h e p e rt i n e n t a

u t h o r i t i e s . 9 5 1 S
. W
. 2 d a t 2 1 7
. W e a g r e e w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g of the se op ini on s. We h old that se c tio n 42 .0 7( a )( 4) is n ot u nc on sti tut ion a lly

va g ue on its fa c e and

ov e rr ule point of err or one.
Pr e tri al D ue Pr oc ess I n p oin t of e rr or

tw o, a pp e lla nt a sse rt s th a t he wa s “ a

bu se d b y [the ] pr os e c uti on

tim e and ag ain” pr ior to tr ial. He lists five spec ific violations of his due proc ess rig hts: (1) denial of a speedy trial; (2) inade quate notice of the a lleg ations ag ainst him; (3) denial of co n fr o n t at i on; (4) de nia l of c omp uls or

y pr oc e ss; and

(5 ) d e nia l of

c ouns e l. Spe e d y t r ial . We find no indication that appellant ra ised the spee dy trial issue below. Se e Du nn v . S

tat e , 819 S.W .2d 510, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Appellant’s trial be g an one y ear afte r the orig inal info rm at i o n was filed. D uring that y ear , appellant f iled voluminous pretrial motions, i ncluding at least six m otions for continuanc e, that we re he ard d u ri n g s even pretrial hear ings. A

ppellant last moved for a

continuance on the day

trial beg an. Appe llant’s claim that he was denied a speedy trial is without foundation i n the record. See B arker v . W ingo , 407 U.S. 514, 53 0 ( 19 72 ); J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 954 S.W .2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Notice . Appellant filed a motion to quash the infor mation that was hea

rd by the trial court on June 7, 2004, two wee ks befor e trial. Although the motion complained that the information did not alleg e the of

fense in “plain and intellig ible words,” the only argument made by appellant at5

the hea ring was his contention that sec tion 42.07 is unconstit utional. We find no basis for concludingthat appellant wa s denied a dequate notice.

Co nfro nt at ion and c om puls or y pr oc e ss. Appellant does not ref er us to any

pretria l proce eding in which he wa s denied the r ight to conf ront witnesses aga inst him or denie d compulsory proce ss for the attendanc e of witnesses. The State c alls our attention to appellant’ s pretria l “demand fo r a nc ill ary pr oc e e din g s” in w hic h he a sk e d to de po se tw o pe rs on s sa id t o h a ve his me dic a l r e c or ds
. When this m otion wa s taken up at a pretria l he aring on May 5, 2004, appellant a dvised the cour t that it w a s mo ot. No vio la tio n o f a pp e lla nt’ s c on fr on ta tio n a

nd c omp uls or

y pr oc e ss r ig hts is s ho wn to have oc c ur

re d d ur ingpr e tr ia l pr oc e e din g s. De nia l of c ouns e l. The re cord r efle cts that appe llant voluntarily elec ted to repr esent himself, alth o u g h standby counsel wa s appointed to provide a ssistance upon re quest. We are not
re fe rr e d to any

ins tanc e in w hic h a

pp e lla nt w a s d e nie d a ssi sta

nc e by c ouns e l. Point of error two is ove rruled.

Witn esses and Def

ensive Evidence I n point of err or three , appellant a g ain urge s that he was denied his Six th Amendment ri g ht to ca ll witne sse s in his own be ha lf . In p oin t f

our, he c on te nd s th a t he wa s d e nie d th e ri g ht t o prese nt evidence in his d efe nse. Appe llant’s argument under the se points is that he was denie d
a d e qu a t e d i s c o v e r

y. On Fe bruar

y 20, 200 4 , a

p p e ll a nt r e q u e s te d th a t s u b p o e n a s a n d s ubpoenas duc es tec um be is sued for 119 persons, including the President of the United States, the Attorney Gene ral of the Un ite d State s, the Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l of

Te xas, nume ro us fe de ra l and state jud g e s, and

oth e r p ub lic6

of fi c ia ls. Ap pa

re ntl y , a pp e lla nt be lie ve d that the se pe rs on s ha d p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e and a c c e ss t o documents provingthat he had been wrong ed by the TR C. The S tate moved to quash the subpoena s
and so ug ht an or de r re qu ir ing a pp e lla nt to obt a in le a ve of c ourt be fo re re qu e sti ngsu bp oe na s. Th e se motions were g rante d following a hea ring on Marc h 12. At a subsequent hear ing on Ma y 5, the cour

t explained to appellant that he should se parately apply for eac h subpoena he wished to have issued and desc ribe the r eleva

nce of the t es t i mony

or docume nt sought. Appe llant indicated that he w as
satis fi e d w iththi s arr ang e me nt.

Another pr etrial he aringwas c onducted on J une 7, 2004. At the he aring , appellant acknow ledg ed re ceivingdiscovery mat er i al from the State, but he insisted that it was incomplete. Appellant aske d the cour

t to act on his further

“re quest for pr oduction” and “ reque st of evidenc e and wi tne sse s. ” I nc lud e d in

the se mot ion s w e re the name s o f f if ty -s ix pe rs on s a

pp e lla nt w ish e d to subpoena f

or trial. All of these subpoena r equests we re e ither g rante d by the court or withdrawn by
a pp e lla nt d ur ingthe he ari ng . Th e c ourt a lso g ra nte d a pp e lla nt’ s r e qu e st t

hat th e State te nd e r t o h im: the re c or din g of

the TRC a

pp e a l he ari ngthat tr ig g e re d a pp e lla nt’ s te le ph on e c a lls that w e re the ba sis of the prose cution; appellant’s TRC appea l case file; all TRC case notes pe rtaining to appellant for Marc h throug h Aug ust 2003; ap p ellant’s TRC “contra ct”; appe llant’s TRC “officia l action statement”; a

nd any photogr aphs in TRC’s possession pertaining to the char g ed incident. The c ourt
a lso a uth or ize d a

pp e lla nt t o p ho tog ra

phthe TRC of

fi c e s a nd to s e nd writte n in te rr og a tor ie s to his
su bp oe na e d w itn e sse s.

On J une 21, 2004, bef

ore jury selec tion beg an, the c o u rt consi dere d a number of additional motions filed by appellant. Among them was a motion for continuance complaining that appellant ha d not rec eived the disc overy previously

order ed. Cou n s el for the State r esponded by7

saying that a

ppellant had rec eived ever y thing reque sted that exis ted. The pr osecutor e x plained that there wer e no case notes dated later than Marc h 2003 beca use appellant’ s TRC file had bee n closed, that he ha d b e e n in fo rm e d th a t T RC h a d no p ho tog ra ph s in its po sse ssi on , a

nd that th e re wa s n o T RC “contr act” or “of

ficial a ction statement.” The re w as no evide nce c ontradicting this e x planation. The motion for continuance was de nied.

Appellant make s no showing t h a t a ny ma te r ia l e v id e n ce or

witness was withheld fr om him. Poi nts of err or three and four are overr uled.
Mo tio n to Re c use Appellant’s f

ifth point of error

raises two issues, the f

irst o f wh i ch co ncer

ns the
overr uling of his moti on to rec use Judge Clawson. The elec ted judg e of th e co u n t y co u rt at law
rec used her self ea

rly in t h e p roceeding s after appellant a ccuse d her of criminal misconduct and
corr uption. Two other visiting judg es pre sided over hear ings be fore J udg e Clawson wa s assig ned to the case
. On May

14, 2004, appellant filed a motion to rec use J udg e Clawson asser ting that the judge had a persona l bia s and prejudice ag ainst him and had bec ome par t of a “ conspirac y

of abuse , fra ud and bribe ry ” desig ned to deny appellant his leg al rig hts. T h e m otion was not verifie d as require d by rule. See Tex. R. Civ. P . 18a(a ). Ne verthe less, the motion was ref err ed to the pre siding administrative judg e for a h ea ri n g, which wa s conducte d on May 27. At this hearing , appellant testified that J udg e Clawson had pe rsonal knowledg e of fraudule nt acts committed by the pre vious judge and had himself c onspired with the prosecutor; complained that J udg e Clawson had r efuse d his request to subpoena

the President of the United States; a nd asser ted that J udg e Clawson “ca nnot8

hear this c ase and allow due proce ss of law due to his bias a nd his conspirac y

of cor ruption.” The
rec usal motion was denied.

Appellant filed a

second motion to rec use Judge Clawson on J une 4, 2004, and a third on J une 21, 2004. B oth motions wer e filed le ss than ten day s befor e the ne x t scheduled he aring
. See id . They contained a lleg ations substantially identical to those made by appellant at t h e May

27 h ea ri n g. Bo t h we re o v erru l edb y t h e p re s i d i n g ad m i n i s t ra t i v e j u d ge w i t h o u ta h ea ri n g. Given the proce dural de fec ts in the recusa l motions , no err or is prese nted. Se e Ar no ld

v . S tat e , 853 S.W .2d 543, 544-45 (Te x . Crim. App. 1993). I n any case , there is nothing in the re cord that w ou ld l e a d u s to c on c lud e that th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e jud g e e rr e d b y ov e rr uli ngthe mot ion s.
Crim inal C

ontem pt The other contention made by

appellant in his fifth point of er ro r i s t h at h e was
un lawf ull y he ld in co nte mpt
. At the c on c lus ion of a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l, t

he State a sk e d th e c ourt

to h old appellant in conte mpt for havingmade g roundless and false statements in his motions t o rec use. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc
. Ann. art. 1.052(d) (West 2005)
. Following a brief heari n g, t h e c o urt adjudg ed app e ll a

nt g u ilty of cr iminal contempt and sentenc ed him to thirty day s’ conf

inement, which he suspende d. This decision is not appeala ble, eve n in conjunction with the appea l of appe llant’s conviction. The va lidity

of a c ontempt order c an be attacked only by a writ of ha be as c or pu s or , in some instances, w rit of mandamus
. Metzger v . Sebek , 892 S.W .2d 20, 54-55 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Di st. ] 19 94 , w ri t de nie d) ; see Kidd v. Lance , 7 94 S.W. 2d 58 6, 58 7 n .1 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 1990, orig . proce eding ).

Point of error f

ive is overr

uled.9 “Re lat iv eSta nda rd

s” Appellant’s sixt h point of err or is that “re lative standar ds” wer e not followed dur ing his trial. Appellant’s brief devotes seventy -three pag es to this point. The St ate a ccur ately descr ibes
a pp e lla nt’ s argume nt a s “ ve e r[i ng ] f ro m top ic to top ic wi tho ut c le arl y ide nti fy ingwh a t le g a l po int s he wa nts this C ourt to consider.” A s u b s t an t i al portion of the a rg ument is devoted to appe llant’s complaints reg ardingthe scope of pre trial discover y and the r ulings on his motions to rec use, issues we have alr eady

addre ssed. Appellant’ s addi t ional arguments do not lead us to alter our previous ho ldi ng s. On e of

the ite ms p ro du c e d f

or a pp e lla nt before tr ial wa s th e re c or din g of his TRC ap p ea l h ear ing. O n the day trial was se t to beg in, appellant filed a motion to have this recor ding examined by

an expert o n t h e gro u n d that it “may have be en tamper ed with.” The motion was untimely and did not state g rounds to be lieve that the reque sted examination was nece ssary . No er ror in o ve rr uli ngthe mot ion

is s ho wn . App e llant a sse rt s th a t va ri ou s o the r d oc ume nts a dmi tte d in
e vid e nc e we re fa lse or

a lte re d. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e of thi s. Appellant complains that witnesse s he wished to ca ll did not appear f or trial. The re is no indication, howeve r, that appellant subpoe naed the se witnesses. In addition, on the second da y of tr ia l, a pp e lla nt a nd the State re a c he d a

n a g re e me nt b y

wh ic h a pp e lla nt lim ite d h is s ub po e na

lis t to two persons, both of whom appe are d and testified.

Appellant complains that the State w as per mitted t o re ad the information to the panelists during voir dire. He does not cite a uthority holding that this was e rror .10 Appellant complains that he was not pe rmitted to of fer evidenc e reg arding the long history of his de aling s with the TRC, alleg ed misconduct by TRC employ ees, a

nd alleg ed fina

ncial irregularities on the par

t of the ag ency . We sha

re the trial court’ s opinion that thi s evidenc e wa s not
re le va nt t o a ny iss ue a t a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l. Appellant urge s that the court err ed by excluding, for

lack of rele vance and a pr oper p r e d i c a t e , d e f

e n s e e x h i b i t s s e v e n ( a

p p ar e n t l y a

p p e l l an t ’ s e n t i r e T R C c a s e f i l e ) , e i g h t( a

p p ar e n t l y a
c op y of a fe de ra l r e g ulatio n) , and nin e te e n (t he natur e of

wh ic h is un c le ar f

ro m th e re c or d) . T he se exhibi ts were not made a pa rt of the a ppellate r ecor d. Nothing is pre sented for revie w. Point of error six is overruled.

Puni shment and Se nte nc ing I n his la s t p o i n t of er

ror, a ppellant asser

ts that the trial court “ did not follow applicable rules of law” during the puni shment and sentencing phases of trial. Appellant arg ues that the cour t “limited the scope of the argument,” “ag g ravated the fa cts,” a nd “misled the jury .” He does not identify

wher e or howthese a lleg ed er rors oc curr ed. Ap pel lan t doe s id e nti fy

a pr ob le m th a t aro se re g ard ingthe punis hme nt v e rd ic t. A p p e l l an te l e c t e d

t o g o t o t h e j u r

y f o r p u n i s h m e n t
. T h e j u r

y r e tu r n e d a v e r d i c t a s s e s s i n g 1 8 0 d a ys in jail and a $2000 fine . Be cause of an e rror in the verdic t form, the jury rec ommended that the f

ine, but not the term of inca

rce ration, be pr obated. After a discussion, it was ag ree d by all parties that
a pp e lla nt w ou ld w ith dr aw h is r e qu e st f or jur y sen ten cin g an d th a t th e c ourt wo uld a sse ss a punishment of 180 day s’ incar cer ation and a $2000 f ine, fully probate d. We ag ree with appel lant that this was confusing , but no error or har m to him i s shown. Point of error se ven is overr uled.11 The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: January

12, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh