RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6021-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT THOMAS, a/k/a 

KOFI BAYETE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted September 17, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Hoffman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 92-07-0823.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (John K. Mc Namara, Jr., Chief 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 26, 2019
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Defendant1appeals from the June 19, 2018 Law Division order denying

his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We affirm.

I 

In June 1993, a jury found defendant guilty of all counts of a ten-count 

indictment that charged him with two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual 

assault, two counts of second-degree burglary, and related charges. The trial 

court sentenced defendant to an extended term of life imprisonment, with thirtyfive years of parole ineligibility. 

The relevant events occurred in September and October, 1991, at the 

Hensyn Village complex in Mount Olive Township. Defendant and his alleged 

victims, S.A.2and M.T., all resided in that complex. On October 12, 1991,

defendant used S.A.'s phone multiple times in her apartment during the day and 

later appeared in her doorway at 3:20 a.m. Defendant put a knife to her throat 

and proceeded to cover her mouth with a pillow. He entered her vaginally and 

had difficulty maintaining an erection. The assault took place on S.A.'s bed. 

After defendant left, S.A. noticed he cut her phone cord. 

 

1

 While in prison, defendant legally changed his name from Robert Thomas to 

Kofi Bayete.

2

 We use initials to protect the privacy of the victims. 
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On October 23, 1991, M.T. reported defendant raped her. Similar to the 

circumstances with S.A., defendant put a knife to her throat and then covered 

her mouth with a pillow. Defendant had difficulty maintaining an erection and 

cut M.T.'s phone cord before he left. M.T. immediately reported the incident to 

police.

S.A. learned of M.T.'s rape and proceeded to file a police report against

defendant. Initially, she did not file a report out of fear and fled to her parents' 

home in Connecticut. Both victims provided a description of defendant and 

identified him at trial. 

Body exemplars were taken from S.A., M.T., and defendant. Janice 

Williamson, a technologist at CBR Laboratories, conducted the DNA test and 

confirmed defendant was the source of the semen present at the scene of M.T.'s 

sexual assault. Gail Tighe, a senior forensic scientist employed by the New 

Jersey State Police, testified that the two pubic hairs recovered from S.A.'s 

sheets matched defendant's pubic hair after conducting a microscopic 

comparison. 

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, and we affirmed. State 

v. Thomas, No. A-6140-93 (App. Div. Nov. 6, 1996). The Supreme Court 
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thereafter denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Thomas, 149 

N.J. 37 (1997).

Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the Law 

Division denied on January 17, 2001. We affirmed the trial court's order 

denying PCR. State v. Thomas, No. A-5218-00 (App. Div. March 7, 2003), and 

the Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Thomas, 177 N.J. 495 (2003).

In 2005, the Innocence Project represented defendant pro hac vice and 

filed a motion to compel DNA testing on evidence related to M.T. found at the 

crime scene. The DNA test confirmed defendant's DNA at the scene. The 

Innocence Project later withdrew its representation.

In 2006, defendant filed a PCR petition, seeking to correct what he 

claimed is an illegal sentence. He also sought a new trial and additional DNA 

testing on two hair samples found in the apartment of S.A. The PCR court 

denied the petition, finding the results of the DNA tests on the hair samples was 

insufficient to warrant a new trial because the results were, at best, neutral and 

not exculpatory. We affirmed the order denying PCR. State v. Thomas, No. A4103-09 (App. Div. July 19, 2012). The Supreme Court denied certification. 

State v. Thomas, 213 N.J. 45 (2013)
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In 2009, defendant filed a pro se motion for an order permitting additional 

DNA testing on two hair samples found in S.A.'s bedding. Mitochondrial DNA 

tests conducted on the two hair samples excluded defendant from one hair 

sample, but the other hair sample showed a 99.74 percent probability defendant 

or a maternal relative matched the source. 

In November 2009, Judge Thomas V. Manahan denied defendant's second 

PCR petition, his motion for a new trial, and defendant's pro se motion to have 

an expert retained to conduct additional DNA testing. Judge Manahan held the 

DNA test results of the hair found on the mattress cover were insufficient to 

warrant a new trial because the evidence was neutral rather than exculpatory. 

We affirmed the order denying PCR and defendant's motions. State v. Thomas, 

No. A-4103-09 (July 19, 2012).

In March 2017, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging newly 

discovered evidence. On June 15, 2018, following oral argument, Judge 

Michael E. Hubner denied defendant's motion. He concluded the newly 

discovered evidence "related to questioning the reliability of microscopic hair 

analysis that [has] arisen many years after the defendant was convicted" did not 

warrant a new trial. He opined that while defendant attempted to attack the 

reliability of microscopic hair analysis, his argument still centered around the 
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same question of whether evidence that excluded defendant as a source of a 

single hair warranted a new trial. Judge Hubner held the trial court previously 

adjudicated this question; as a result, defendant was procedurally barred from 

raising this claim based on Rule 3:22-5. 

Assuming for the purposes of defendant's motion that Tighe's testimony 

regarding a match of the disputed hair was erroneous, Judge Hubner stated 

defendant "has to come forward and demonstrate . . . there may be new evidence 

that excludes him as the source of the solitary stray hair inside the victim's 

bedroom was material." Since defendant failed to demonstrate the materiality 

of this evidence, Judge Hubner found no "reasonable probability that the jury 

would have reached a different verdict if it heard . . . this newly proffered 

evidence regarding the reliability of the hair analysis." Judge Hubner further 

explained mitochondrial and nuclear DNA testing replaced microscopic hair 

analysis and the results of those tests were "consistent with the jury's conclusion 

as to guilt." 

Defendant then filed this appeal, presenting the following point of 

argument:

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 

BASED UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, 

PERTAINING TO THE S.A. CONVICTIONS, 

SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DUE TO THE 
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DEBUNKED "SCIENCE" OF MICROSCOPIC HAIR 

ANALYSIS. 

By leave granted, defendant filed a supplemental brief, presenting this 

additional point of argument:

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 

BASED UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, 

PERTAINING TO THE S.A. CONVICTIONS, 

SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DUE TO GAIL 

TIGHE'S LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS AND 

CREDIBILITY. 

II

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new 

trial because he was convicted in a proceeding that involved erroneous 

microscopic hair analysis testimony that identified him as the source of the hairs 

found on S.A.'s sheets. 

"A motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence 

is not favored and should be granted with caution by a trial court since it disrupts 

the judicial process." State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133, 171 (App. Div. 

1984) (citing State v. Haines, 20 N.J. 438, 443 (1956)). "A motion for a new 

trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination 

will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of that 
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discretion." State v. Puchalski, 45 N.J. 97, 107 (1965) (quoting State v. Artis, 

36 N.J. 538, 541 (1962)).

When seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, our

Supreme Court requires the defendant to meet a three-part test:

To meet the standard for a new trial based on newly 

discovered evidence, defendant must show that the 

evidence is 1) material, and not "merely" cumulative, 

impeaching, or contradictory; 2) that the evidence was 

discovered after completion of the trial and was "not 

discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand"; and 

3) that the evidence "would probably change the jury's 

verdict if a new trial were granted." State v. Carter, 85 

N.J. 300, 314 (1981).

[State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 187 (2004).]

A defendant must satisfy "all three prongs" of the Carter test to obtain a 

new trial. Ibid. The court must review the newly discovered evidence "with a 

certain degree of circumspection to ensure that it is not the product of 

fabrication, and, if credible and material, is of sufficient weight that it would 

probably alter the outcome of the verdict in a new trial." Id. at 187-88. The 

defendant bears the burden to show he is entitled to a new trial. State v. Johnson, 

34 N.J. 212, 223 (1961) (stating "[f]ailure of a defendant to satisfy any one of 

the three prerequisites of newly discovered evidence is sufficient to warrant a 

denial of a motion for a new trial.").
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Under prong one of the Carter test, a defendant must show the evidence 

"ha[s] some bearing on the claims being advanced." Id. at 188 (quoting State v. 

Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512, 531 (App. Div. 1997)). This requires the court to 

engage in "an evaluation of the probable impact such evidence would have on a 

jury verdict." Id. at 188-89. Because the issue of materiality inquires whether 

the evidence would change the jury's verdict, the court should evaluate the first 

and third prongs of the test together. Id. at 189.

Under prong two of the Carter test, "the new evidence must have been 

discovered after completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier 

through the exercise of reasonable diligence." Id. at 192. A defendant must "act 

with reasonable dispatch in searching for evidence before the start of the trial." 

Ibid.

Under prong three of the Carter test, a defendant must show the evidence 

"would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." Id. at 

187 (quoting Carter, 85 N.J. at 314). "The power of the newly discovered 

evidence to alter the verdict is the central issue . . ." before the trial judge. Id.

at 191. "[T]he test is whether the evidence if introduced is such as ought to have 

led the jury to a different conclusion — one of probability and not mere 

possibility[.]" Haines, 20 N.J. at 445.
10 A-6021-17T4

Here, Judge Hubner properly found defendant's first claim failed to satisfy 

the first and third prongs of the Carter test. Both M.T. and S.A. provided incourt identifications at trial. Although previously unsure, S.A. identified 

defendant in court explaining she feared defendant would return to her home

and harm her child. The State also provided evidence revealing the virtually 

identical attacks of S.A. and M.T. Moreover, the mitochondrial DNA results 

were not dispositive in establishing S.A. incorrectly identified defendant 

because the hair found in the fitted sheet tested more likely than not to belong 

to defendant or to his maternal relative. The second hair provided greater 

certainty defendant was in S.A.'s room on the night of the attack. Therefore, the 

new evidence in the present case is not "material." Ways, 180 N.J. at 187.

The DNA evidence strongly suggests defendant not only was in S.A.'s 

apartment but was also in her bed because his hair was found in her fitted sheet. 

Thus, the evidence tends to corroborate the identification and "would [not] 

probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." Id. at 187. In 

fact, the evidence is stronger than the initial trial because there is a 99.74 percent 

probability that defendant was the donor or the hair came from a relative on his 

maternal side. Therefore, defendant's claim failed to satisfy the first and third 

prongs of the Carter test. 
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Defendant alleges that Tighe provided erroneous testimony because 

subsequent mitochondrial testing results excluded him as a source of one of the 

two hairs. He contends Tighe lacked qualifications as a trial expert because she 

concealed the extent of her scientific education to secure a promotion and was 

subsequently disciplined by her employer. Additionally, he argues Tighe 

testified in an unrelated case regarding microscopic hair analysis, and the

defendant in that case was subsequently exonerated based on DNA testing. 

In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, Judge Hubner concluded 

that the impeachment of Tighe's trial testimony based on her alleged lack of 

qualifications as an expert would not lead to a different verdict. He reasoned 

Tighe's conclusion as to one of the hairs was correct based upon the 

mitochondrial DNA results, which showed that defendant or a maternal relative

was the source of the hair found on the fitted sheet. 

In the present case, defendant's second claim also fails the first and third 

prongs of the Carter test. Tighe's partially inaccurate testimony is not 

dispositive to establish that S.A. incorrectly identified defendant. Although the 

mitochondrial DNA test results suggest that Tighe's microscopic hair analysis 

testimony was partially inaccurate as to defendant being the source of one of the 

two hairs, the results do not call into question the probative value of the other 
12 A-6021-17T4

hair. Subsequent mitochondrial DNA testing excluded defendant as the source 

of the hair found on S.A.'s mattress cover and inculpated defendant as the source 

of the hair found on S.A.'s fitted sheet. 

The newly discovered evidence does meet the second prong of the 

standard for a new trial. Evidence regarding Tighe's subsequent disciplinary 

history relating to her scientific education was not available at the time of 

defendant's trial in 1993, nor was her erroneous testimony in an unrelated case 

that led to the conviction of a defendant who was later exonerated. 

While the questions related to Tighe's qualifications and credibility could 

provide fodder for argument before the jury, this evidence is not exculpatory in 

nature. Moreover, it does not undermine S.A.'s identification of defendant as 

her attacker. The new evidence in the present case, therefore, is not "material." 

Ways, 180 N.J. at 187. 

Regarding the third prong of the Carter test, it is doubtful whether the new 

evidence "would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." 

Ways, 180 N.J. at 187. The mitochondrial DNA test result indicating that 

defendant was a source of the hair found on S.A.'s fitted sheet provides stronger 

evidence of defendant's guilt than was presented at the time of trial. In light of 

the later evidence supporting the accuracy of Tighe's testimony regarding the 
13 A-6021-17T4

hair recovered from the fitted sheet, the later discovered evidence regarding 

Tighe's qualification and credibility would probably not "change the jury's 

verdict if a new trial were granted." Ways, 180 at 187. Judge Hubner correctly 

denied defendant's motion for a new trial. 

Affirm.