SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0035-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MATEO FRANCISCO-ACOSTA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted November 16, 2021 – Decided December 30, 2021

Before Judges Currier and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 03-09-1231.

Raymond S. Santiago, attorney for appellant.

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Attorney, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Mateo Francisco-Acosta appeals from the July 24, 2020 order 

of the Law Division denying his fourth petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). 

We affirm.

I.

In 2003, a grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with: (1) thirddegree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one); third-degree

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count two); and second-degree possession of a firearm 

while engaged in drug activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a)

(count three).

On November 13, 2003, pursuant to an agreement, defendant entered a 

guilty plea to counts two and three of the indictment. Defendant, who is not a 

United States citizen, was represented by counsel. Next to the question "[d]o 

you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may 

be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty?" the plea form has the entry "N/A." 

The entry was made by defendant's attorney who was at the time in possession 

of a police report indicating that defendant is not a United States citizen.

On January 16, 2004, the court sentenced defendant pursuant to the 

agreement to an aggregate five-year term of imprisonment. The State agreed to 
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dismiss count one of the indictment, along with all charges arising from the same 

incident against co-defendant Zulma Baez, who was defendant's girlfriend.

On July 19, 2004, defendant filed a petition for PCR. He alleged that the 

trial court failed to elicit a sufficient factual basis to accept his guilty plea to the 

weapons charge. The trial court denied defendant's first PCR petition on August 

25, 2004. Defendant did not appeal from the denial of his first PCR petition.

On July 26, 2004, while defendant's first PCR petition was pending, he 

received a notice from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that he 

was subject to deportation as a result of his guilty plea.

On April 21, 2006, defendant filed his second PCR petition. On April 25, 

2006, the trial court denied defendant's second PCR petition pursuant to Rule

3:22-4 because the claims he raised could have been, but were not, raised in the 

first PCR petition.

On May 11, 2006, defendant moved to reconsider the order denying his 

second PCR petition, arguing that his plea counsel was ineffective because he 

did not advise him of the risk of deportation from the guilty plea.

On December 8, 2006, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on 

defendant's motion. On December 19, 2006, the trial court denied defendant's 

motion.
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We affirmed the denial of defendant's second PCR petition. State v.

Francisco-Acosta, No. A-2075-06 (Oct. 9, 2007). We held that

[a]lthough we agree with defendant that the evidence 

adduced at the PCR hearing permitted no finding except 

that defendant's attorney should have but failed to 

advise of the deportation consequences of defendant's 

guilty plea, we conclude there was ample evidence to 

support the judge's findings that, even if proper advice 

had been provided, it was not reasonable to believe that 

defendant would have decided to go to trial.

Our conclusion was based on the strength of the evidence against defendant and 

the dismissal, as part of the agreement, of charges against Baez. The Supreme 

Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Francisco-Acosta, 

194 N.J. 445 (2008).

On December 7, 2011, defendant filed a third PCR petition alleging he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his first PCR petition. 

On August 6, 2015, the trial court denied defendant's third PCR petition.1

On August 11, 2016, defendant received a notice to appear for his removal 

in immigration court. That proceeding was terminated without prejudice

1

 The delay in resolution of defendant's third PCR petition appears to have been 

the result of a stay of proceedings to await the outcome in State v. Gaitain, 209 

N.J. 339 (2012).
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because of a defect in the notice. On October 12, 2018, defendant received a 

second notice to appear for his removal in immigration court.

On September 4, 2019, defendant filed a fourth PCR petition reiterating 

the claims he alleged in his second petition. On December 2, 2019, the trial 

court ordered defendant to show cause why his fourth PCR petition should not 

be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b) and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2).

On July 24, 2020, Judge Guy P. Ryan issued an order and written opinion 

concluding defendant's fourth PRC petition was untimely. The judge rejected

defendant's argument that his receipt of the October 12, 2018 notice to appear 

for his removal was a new factual predicate on which he sought relief, triggering 

a one-year period to file the fourth PCR petition under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B). 

To the contrary, the judge found that defendant was aware he was facing 

deportation when he received the July 26, 2004 notice from the INS. Judge 

Ryan concluded that "it is not the date of court notice for immigration court that 

controls in this matter, but the date upon which petitioner became aware of the 

potential immigration consequences" of his guilty plea.

In addition, Judge Ryan concluded that defendant's fourth PCR petition 

was procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-5 because his claims of ineffective 

assistance of plea counsel were raised and decided in his second PCR petition.
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Finally, the judge concluded that the court did not have the authority to 

relax the rules to enlarge the time in which defendant could file his fourth PCR 

petition. See State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 292 (App. Div. 2018) 

(holding that "enlargement of Rule 3:22-12's time limits is absolutely

prohibited.") (quotations omitted). Judge Ryan noted that a defendant's alleged 

excusable neglect in making a timely filing may be considered only to extend 

the time in which to file a first PCR petition. See Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).

This appeal followed. Defendant makes the following arguments.

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED 

THE FOURTH PCR MOTION AS BEING 

UNTIMELY.

POINT II

THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY 

PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL RENDERING HIS PLEA DEFECTIVE.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO WARN THE 

DEFENDANT ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES 

UPON HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS AT THE TIME 

OF HIS GUILTY PLEA OR SENTENCING (Not 

Raised Below).
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II.

We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant extended 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm the July 24, 2020 

order substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and comprehensive 

written opinion of Judge Ryan. We add only the following brief comments.

Rule 3:22-4(b) requires that a second or subsequent PCR petition be 

dismissed unless it is timely filed in accordance with Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). That 

Rule provides that a second or subsequent PCR petition must be filed within one 

year of the latest of one of three events. See Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(A)-(C). 

Defendant argues that subsection (B) of the rule applies because the October 12, 

2018 notice to appear for his removal is a "factual predicate for . . . relief" that 

"could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence . . . ." R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(B). We agree with Judge Ryan's wellsupported conclusion that defendant was aware of the potential immigration 

consequences of his guilty plea when he received the July 26, 2004 notice from 

the INS, and the 2018 notice, which cured a procedural defect in the prior notices 

sent to defendant, does not constitute a previously undiscoverable fact triggering 

a new one-year period to file a second or subsequent PCR petition.
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Defendant's knowledge of the potential immigration consequences of his 

guilty plea prior to his receipt of the 2018 notice is amply illustrated by the fact 

that defendant raised his trial counsel's failure to advise him of that very issue 

in his second PCR petition, which was decided by the trial court and affirmed 

by this court. As Judge Ryan found, defendant's fourth PCR petition raises the 

same claims of ineffective assistance of counsel he asserted in his second 

petition. This constitutes an independent basis for dismissal of the fourth 

petition under Rule 3:22-5.

Affirmed.