# EUR-Lex - 52013PC0381 - EN

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# 52013PC0381

**Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION establishing that no effective action has been taken by Belgium in response to the Council Recommendation of 2 December 2009 /* COM/2013/0381 final */**

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Recommendation for a

COUNCIL DECISION

establishing that no effective action has
been taken by Belgium in response to the Council Recommendation of 2 December
2009

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(8) thereof,

Having regard to the recommendation from
the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1)       According to Article 126
of the Treaty, Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.

(2)       The Stability and Growth
Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of
strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable
growth conducive to employment creation. The Stability and Growth Pact includes
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying
the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure[1], which was adopted in order to
further the prompt correction of excessive general government deficits.

(3)       The Council, acting upon a
recommendation by the Commission, decided on 2 December 2009, in accordance
with Article 126(6) of the Treaty, that an excessive deficit existed in Belgium[2]. On the same day, and also on
the basis of a recommendation by the Commission, the Council adopted recommendations
under Article 126(7) asking the Belgian authorities to take action in a
medium-term framework in order to bring the deficit below 3 % of GDP by 2012 at
the latest.

(4)       Specifically, in order to
bring the general government deficit below 3% of GDP in a credible and
sustainable manner, the Belgian authorities were recommended to (a) implement
the deficit-reducing measures in 2010 as planned in the draft budget for 2010
and strengthen the planned fiscal effort in 2011 and 2012; (b) ensure an average
annual fiscal effort of 3⁄4% of GDP over the period 2010-2012, which should also
contribute to bringing the gross debt ratio back on a declining path that
approaches the reference value at a satisfactory pace by restoring an adequate
level of the primary surplus; (c) specify the measures that are necessary to
achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by 2012, cyclical conditions
permitting, and to accelerate the reduction of the deficit if economic or
budgetary conditions turned out better than expected at the time the EDP
recommendations were issued; and (d) strengthen the monitoring mechanisms to
ensure that fiscal targets are respected. In its recommendations, the Council
established a deadline of 2 June 2010 for effective action to be taken in line
with the provisions of Article 3(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.

(5)       The Commission services’
2009 Autumn Forecast, which was underlying the Council recommendation under
Article 126(7) of the TFEU of 2 December 2009, projected that the Belgian
economy would expand by 0.6% in 2010 and 1.5% in 2011. The year 2012 was beyond
that forecast's horizon, but under the hypothesis of a gradual closure of the
large negative output gap by 2015, higher growth than in 2011 was expected for
2012. GDP growth in 2010 was substantially above that expected in the
Commission services' 2009 Autumn Forecast, in 2011 it was slightly above the
projected 1.5%, while in 2012 the Belgian economy went through a contraction of
0.2%.

(6)       On 15 June 2010, the
Commission concluded that based on the Commission services' 2010 Spring
Forecast, Belgium had taken effective action in compliance with the Council
recommendation of 2 December 2009 to bring its government deficit below the 3%
of GDP reference value and considered that no additional step in the excessive deficit
procedure was therefore necessary at that point in time.

(7)       Based on the Commission
Services' 2011 Autumn forecast, there was clear evidence of compliance risks
with the 2009 EDP recommendation, given the still significant excess over the
3% of GDP deficit threshold close to the deadline in the absence of a 2012
budget and the fact that the fiscal effort achieved until then fell short of
the recommended one. Therefore, the Commission expressed its concerns and urged
Belgium to take the necessary measures in time to avoid a stepping up of their
EDP. In December 2011, the newly constituted Belgian government agreed on a
draft budget. On 11 January 2012 the Commission concluded that, based on the
macroeconomic scenario prevailing at that moment (a growth projection of 0.9%
according to the Commission services' 2011 Autumn Forecast), the consolidation
measures in the budget and the additional freeze, the deficit would reach 2.9%
of GDP in 2012. Hence the Commission considered that no further steps in the
excessive deficit procedure of Belgium were needed at that point in time.

(8)       A new assessment of the
action taken by Belgium to correct the excessive deficit by 2012 in response to
the Council recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty, leads to the
following conclusions:

–
Following the EDP notification of the 2012
general government deficit and its validation by the Commission (Eurostat), the
2012 deficit came out at 3.9% of GDP. This was partly due to the urgent need to
recapitalize the banking group Dexia at the end of 2012, which had a negative
impact of 0.8% of GDP on the government deficit. However, also without this
operation the deadline would have been missed, with a deficit of 3.2% of GDP
excluding the one-off negative impact of that operation. Moreover, the 2012
budget contained substantial deficit reducing one-off measures, estimated at
around 0.4% of GDP.

–
The primary balance improved from a deficit of
1.9% of GDP in 2009 to 0.4% of GDP in 2010, while remaining broadly stable in
2011. In 2012, the primary deficit deteriorated to 0.5% because of the impact
of the Dexia recapitalization, without which the primary balance would have shown
a surplus of 0.3% of GDP.

–
The average annual fiscal effort since 2010 is
estimated at 0.3% of GDP, significantly below the 3⁄4% of GDP recommended by the
Council. Also after correction for the effects of revised potential output
growth and revenue developments, the adjusted average fiscal effort is less
than half of the recommended effort. A bottom-up calculation estimates the
cumulative net impact of discretionary measures of a permanent nature at around
2% of GDP over 2010-2012. This calculation includes both deficit-reducing
measures as well as expenditure increases to some extent due to policy
decisions of the past (e.g. welfare adaptations of social benefits, rapidly
rising wage subsidies to companies) which partly offset the consolidation
efforts. Moreover, the impact of these 2% of GDP of discretionary measures has
been insufficient to offset the autonomously rising trend in public expenditure
due to population ageing and at the same time achieve the recommended improvement
of the structural balance over the consolidation period.

–
In 2010, Belgium broadly implemented the
deficit-reducing measures as planned, which led to a structural improvement of 1⁄2
% of GDP, of which 1⁄4 pp. thanks to a strong decline in interest expenditure.
The nominal deficit fell from 5.6% of GDP in 2009 (which included 0.6 pp. of negative
one-off factors) to 3.8% of GDP, substantially lower than the objective of 4.8%
of GDP planned by the Belgian authorities in the January 2010 Stability
Programme, thanks to the better-than-expected macro-economic outturn. In 2010
GDP grew by 2.4%, compared to a growth rate of 0.6% expected at the time of the
EDP recommendation.

–
Despite relatively favourable macro-economic
conditions in the first half of 2011 (annual GDP growth of 1.8%), the nominal
balance fell only marginally that year, to 3.7% of GDP, compared to a target of
3.6% of GDP in the 2011 Stability Programme. The structural balance
deteriorated by 0.1% in 2011. Therefore, Belgium failed to take advantage of
the relatively favourable economic times to reduce its deficit, partly due to
the political deadlock at federal level between the June 2010 elections and
December 2011.

–
In December 2011, the newly constituted Belgian
government included in the 2012 budget a series of consolidation measures
amounting, according to the budget and the 2012 Stability Programme, to about
3% of GDP. Additional measures were taken in March 2012 and October 2012 in
order to offset the negative impact of the economic slowdown on the budget. At
the end of 2012, the Belgian and French governments needed to increase the
capital of the banking group Dexia, in order to remedy a negative net asset
position and allow the orderly resolution of the group to go ahead. For
Belgium, this had a one-off negative impact on the deficit of 0.8% of GDP.
Moreover, despite a mechanism of reinforced monitoring, the economic downturn
impacted government revenue more than expected, resulting in a deficit at federal
level of 2.7% of GDP excluding the impact of the Dexia operation compared to a
target of 2.4%. In addition, in the April 2013 EDP notification, it turned out
that the local government level had missed its deficit target (-0.3% of GDP
instead of -0.2%), which was only partly offset by a better than expected
result by regions and communities (-0.1% of GDP instead of -0.2%). The
structural budget balance is estimated to have improved by 1⁄2 pp. of GDP in
2012. Sizeable government measures have been partly offset by rising interest
expenditure, a negative impact of the automatic indexation of wages and social
benefits linked to past inflation, and a strong increase in pension
expenditure.

–
Public debt rose from 84.0% of GDP in 2007 to
99.6% of GDP in 2012. The dynamics of the deficit and of GDP account for around
6.5 pp. of the increase, while exogenous factors amount to around 9 pp., mainly
due to rescue operations in the financial sector in the form of equity injections.

(9)       Belgium took some measures
to strengthen the monitoring mechanisms to ensure that fiscal targets are
respected, such as the instauration of a monitoring committee in 2010 and a strengthened
monitoring of the budget execution in 2012. However, no significant progress
has been made to adjust the fiscal framework in order to ensure that the
budgetary targets are binding at federal and sub-federal levels, and increase
transparency of burden-sharing and accountability across government layers.

(10)     This leads to the
conclusion that the response of Belgium to the Council recommendation according
to Article 126(7) of the Treaty of 2 December 2009 has been insufficient. Belgium
did not put an end to its excessive deficit by 2012. The fiscal effort falls
significantly short of what was recommended by the Council, and was even
entirely absent in 2011,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Belgium has not taken effective action in
response to the Council recommendation according to Article 126(7) of the
Treaty of 2 December 2009.

Article 2

This
Decision is addressed to Belgium.

Done at Brussels,

For
the Council

The
President

[1]               OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

[2]               OJ L 125, 21.5.2010, p. 34. All documents related to
the excessive deficit procedure of Belgium can be found at:             
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/belgium_en.htm