United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-50858

Deborah Laufer, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Mann Hospitality, L.L.C., 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:20-CV-620

Before Jones, Costa, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

Deborah Laufer sued Mann Hospitality, LLC (“Mann”), owner of 

the Sunset Inn in Caldwell, Texas, under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182. She alleges the inn’s information, posted on 

third-party booking websites, failed to identify rooms accessible to disabled 

persons like her. Laufer, however, professes no definite plans to travel to the 

Sunset Inn or anywhere else in Texas. A Florida resident, she does not claim 

she has ever traveled in Texas. Nor does she allege she tried, or intends to 

try, to book a room at the Sunset Inn. At most, she claims that, after the 

coronavirus pandemic abates, she “intend[s] to travel all throughout 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 28, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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[Texas], . . . including Caldwell.” And while grateful for her show of interest 

in the region, we note that Laufer has filed hundreds of identical lawsuits in 

federal district courts around the country.1 She considers herself a “tester,” 

monitoring places of public accommodation and suing to ensure their 

compliance with the ADA.

The district court dismissed Laufer’s suit, finding no standing for 

want of an injury in fact.2 We agree and affirm. However, the district court

also awarded attorneys’ feesto Mann under 28 U.S.C. § 1919. This was error

because § 1919 authorizes “just costs” but not attorneys’ fees, so we vacate 

the court’s order to that extent and remand. 

I

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Campos v. United States, 888 F.3d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 

2018); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “The burden of proof for a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction,” here, 

Laufer. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). At the 

pleading stage, her “burden is to allege a plausible set of facts establishing 

jurisdiction.” Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 

2012). Where the district court rules on jurisdiction without resolving factual 

1 See, e.g., Laufer v. Dove Hess Holdings, LLC, No. 5:20-CV-379, 2020 WL 7974268, 

at *17–18 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2020) (noting Laufer “has filed over 500 lawsuits in at least 

15 states within the last year,” which are “nearly identical”); Laufer v. Fort Meade Hosp., 

LLC, No. 8:20-CV-1974, 2020 WL 6585955, at *4 n.1 (D. Md. Nov. 10, 2020) (collecting 

some cases).

2 District courts have divided on whether Laufer has shown injury in fact in her 

many lawsuits. Compare Laufer v. Ganesha Hosp., LLC, No. 3:20-CV-943 (D. Conn. Mar. 

25, 2021) (finding standing), and Laufer v. Lily Pond LLC C Series, No. 20-CV-617, 2020 

WL 7768011 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30, 2020) (same), with Laufer v. Patel, No. 1:20-CV-631, 

2021 WL 796163 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2021) (dismissing on standing grounds), and Laufer 

v. Naranda Hotels, LLC, No. 20-2136, 2020 WL 7384726 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2020) (same). 

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disputes, as here, we “consider the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as 

true” and review “whether the district court’s application of the law is 

correct.” St. Tammany Par., ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 

F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 

II

To have standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must have 

“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)), as revised (May 

24, 2016). This case turns on the first requirement, injury in fact. “To 

establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an 

invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 1548 (quoting 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As the Supreme Court recounted in Spokeo, statutes may define what 

injuries are legally cognizable—including intangible or previously 

unrecognized harms—but cannot dispense with the injury requirement 

altogether. Id. at 1549. Congress may undoubtedly “elevat[e] to the status of 

legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 

inadequate in law.” Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

578). Nevertheless, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in 

the context of a statutory violation.” Ibid. “Put differently, the deprivation 

of a right created by statute must be accompanied by ‘some concrete interest 

that is affected by the deprivation.’” Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 837 F.3d 

523, 529 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 

Laufer fails to show the necessary concrete interest to support 

standing. She alleges she cannot tell from the Sunset Inn’s online reservation 

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systems (ORS), through which Mann markets the motel on third-party 

platforms, whether it has rooms that could accommodate her disabilities. But 

regardless whether that violates the ADA—a question we do not reach—

Laufer fails to show how the alleged violation affects her in a concrete way. 

While she does claim to have visited the ORS, she does not claim she tried to 

book a room or even intended to do so. According to her declaration, she 

visited the sites “for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessible 

features at the hotel and ascertain[ing] whether the websites contain the 

information required by [ADA regulations].” As for using that information 

or the motel’s services, though, she attests only to a general intent to visit the 

area someday: “I have plans to travel to Texas as soon as the Covid crisis is 

over and it is safe to travel. I intend to travel all throughout the State, 

including Aust[i]n and the surrounding towns, including Caldwell, and I need 

to stay in hotels when I go.” 

In other words, she visited the ORS to see if the motel complied with 

the law, and nothing more. Such allegations do not show enough of a concrete 

interest in Mann’s accommodations to confer standing. To be sure, Laufer 

has a right to “the full and equal enjoyment of the . . . services, facilities . . . 

or accommodations of any place of public accommodation” irrespective of 

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. But she has failed adequately to allege that her 

“concrete interest” in the ADA-compliance of Sunset Inn’s ORS was “at 

risk from the purported statutory deprivation.” Lee, 837 F.3d at 530. 

Laufer’s framing of her harm as an “informational injury” does not 

cure her lack of standing. Even assuming arguendo that a failure to advertise 

accessibility information could support an ADA claim,3 Laufer still “would 

3 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(ii) (describing duty of places of public 

accommodation to “[i]dentify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest 

rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit 

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need to allege at least that the information had ‘some relevance’ to her.” 

Brintley v. Aeroquip Credit Union, 936 F.3d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation 

omitted); see also Griffin v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649, 654 

(4th Cir. 2019) (“Inability to obtain information is sufficiently concrete to 

constitute injury in fact only when the information has some relevance to the 

litigant.”). Without sufficiently concrete plans to book a stay at the motel, 

Laufer has failed to do so.

Likewise, Laufer’s assumed status as an “ADA tester” does not 

absolve her of the need to show an injury in fact for standing purposes.

4

Laufer’s case differs from the Supreme Court’s seminal “tester” case,

Havens Realty, where a tester plaintiff was “the object of a misrepresentation 

made unlawful under § 804(d)” of the Fair Housing Act. Havens Realty Corp. 

v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).5 There, the “information” had “some 

relevance” to the tester, cf. Griffin, 912 F.3d at 654, because the statute 

forbade misrepresenting it to “any person,” quite apart from whether the 

tester needed it for some other purpose. Laufer cannot say the same here.

In sum, the district court correctly dismissed Laufer’s complaint for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room 

meets his or her accessibility needs”).

4 See Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2013)

(explaining a “mere tester of ADA compliance” “also must show a real and immediate 

threat of future injury”); Griffin, 912 F.3d at 656 (noting “tester status . . . cannot create 

standing” absent some concrete injury); Brintley, 936 F.3d at 494–95 (explaining tester 

status did not “give[] Brintley a pass to skip the ordinary constitutional requirements to 

suing in federal court”).

5 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o represent to any person 

because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any 

dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so 

available.”).

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III

Laufer also appeals the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to 

Mann under 28 U.S.C. § 1919, which we review for abuse of discretion. Iscavo 

Avocados USA, L.L.C. v. Pryor, 953 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2020). She is 

correct that this statute authorizes costs, which the district court also 

awarded, but not attorneys’ fees.6 See Wilkinson v. D.M. Weatherly Co., 655 

F.2d 47, 49 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (“Although [the district court] may 

order the payment of ‘just costs,’ 28 U.S.C. [§] 1919, such ‘costs’ do not 

include attorney’s fees.”). Unlike other fee-shifting statutes with explicit 

provisions governing fees, § 1919 references only “just costs” without 

mentioning attorneys’ fees.7 The district court’s fee award under this statute 

was therefore an abuse of discretion. 

To be sure, federal courts may award attorneys’ fees “in the exercise 

of their equitable powers . . . when the interests of justice so require.” Hall v. 

Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). The Supreme Court has recognized such awards 

as a “punitive” measure for litigants acting “in bad faith, vexatiously, 

wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Ibid. (citation omitted); see also 

Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 990 F.3d 852, 867 (5th Cir. 2021) (“When 

acting pursuant to its inherent powers, a court can shift attorney’s fees only 

in a few circumstances,” such as when “a litigant has engaged in bad-faith 

conduct or willful disobedience of a court’s orders” (quoting Chambers v. 

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991))). But here the district court made no 

6 Section 1919 provides in relevant part, “Whenever any action or suit is dismissed 

in any district court . . . for want of jurisdiction, such court may order the payment of just 

costs.”

7 Cf., e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“An order remanding the case may require 

payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result 

of the removal.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“[T]he court . . . in its discretion, may allow the 

prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.”).

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such determination, finding only that fees were “appropriate.” We therefore 

vacate the award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. We do not preclude the district court from 

imposing attorneys’ fees on remand under another applicable rule or statute,

or under the court’s inherent power. 

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

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