U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection's Unmanned 

Aircraft System Program Does 

Not Achieve Intended Results 

or Recognize All Costs of 

Operations 

December 24, 2014 

OIG-15-17 
 

 

 

HIGHLIGHTS 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Unmanned 

Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended 

Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations 

December 24, 2014 

Why We 

Did This 

We conducted this audit to 

determine the effectiveness 

and cost of the Unmanned 

Aircraft System program, 

in which U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) 

has invested significant 

funds. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made four 

recommendations to 

conduct an independent 

study before acquiring 

more unmanned aircraft, 

lift the limitations on radar 

sensor operations, 

establish attainable goals 

and performance 

measures, and gather and 

report all program costs. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

Although CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System program 

contributes to border security, after 8 years, CBP cannot 

prove that the program is effective because it has not 

developed performance measures. The program has also not 

achieved the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned 

aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals, and we found little 

or no evidence CBP has met its program expectations. We 

estimate it costs $12,255 per flight hour to operate the 

program; CBP’s calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not 

include all operating costs. By not recognizing all operating 

costs, CBP cannot accurately assess the program’s cost 

effectiveness or make informed decisions about program 

expansion. In addition, Congress and the public may be 

unaware of all the resources committed to the program. As a 

result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that 

has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot 

demonstrate how much the program has improved border 

security. The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program 

expansion could be put to better use by investing in 

alternatives. 

CBP Response 

CBP concurred with one recommendation and concurred in 

principle with the remaining three recommendations. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-15-17 
 

 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ..............................................................................1 

Background ..........................................................................................2 

Results of Audit .....................................................................................4 

Effectiveness of the UAS Program .................................................4 

UAS Program Cost .......................................................................7 

Future UAS Program Costs ...........................................................9 

Recommendations................................................................................11 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...........................................12 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ........................20 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ............22 

Appendix C: Excerpt from JFC Vader Concept of Operations ......30 

Appendix D: Data Used in OAM’s Cost Per Flight Hour ...............31 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report ..........................32 

Appendix F: Report Distribution .................................................33 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FY fiscal year 

GSA General Services Administration 

JFC Joint Field Command 

OAM Office of Air and Marine 

OCRSO Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OIIL Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 

USBP U.S. Border Patrol 

VADER Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-15-17 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) guards nearly 7,000 miles of U.S. 

land border and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding Florida, Texas, and 

southern California. CBP’s Office of Air and Marine uses air assets, including 

unmanned aircraft to patrol the borders, conduct surveillance, and assess 

disaster damage. The objective of our audit was to determine the effectiveness 

and cost of CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System program. 

Although CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System program contributes to border 

security, after 8 years, CBP cannot prove that the program is effective because 

it has not developed performance measures. The program has also not achieved 

the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight 

hour goals. Although CBP anticipated increased apprehensions of illegal border 

crossers, a reduction in border surveillance costs, and improvement in the U.S. 

Border Patrol’s efficiency, we found little or no evidence that CBP met those 

program expectations. CBP also planned to use unmanned aircraft to operate a 

radar sensor over the southwest border to increase awareness and analyze 

surveillance gaps, but sensor operations have been limited. In addition, the 

unmanned aircraft do not operate along the entire southwest border as has 

been reported. 

We estimate that, in fiscal year 2013, it cost at least $62.5 million to operate 

the program, or about $12,255 per hour. The Office of Air and Marine’s 

calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include operating costs, such as 

the costs of pilots, equipment, and overhead. By not including all operating 

costs, CBP also cannot accurately assess the program’s cost effectiveness or 

make informed decisions about program expansion. In addition, unless CBP 

fully discloses all operating costs, Congress and the public are unaware of all 

the resources committed to the Unmanned Aircraft System program. As a 

result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved 

the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the program has 

improved border security. 

Given the cost of the Unmanned Aircraft System program and its unproven 

effectiveness, CBP should reconsider its plan to expand the program. The $443 

million that CBP plans to spend on program expansion could be put to better 

use by investing in alternatives, such as manned aircraft and ground 

surveillance assets. 

We made four recommendations to put limited funds to better use, improve 

border security, demonstrate program effectiveness, and improve program 

transparency. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Predator B Capabilities 

x 20 hours of possible flight 

time 

x Speed of 276 miles per hour 

x Altitude of 50,000 feet 

x Carry 1.9 tons of equipment 

cameras, land and maritime radar, and communication equipment. 

CBP began UAS 

operations in fiscal 

year (FY) 2004 with a 

pilot study to 

determine the 

feasibility of using UAS 

along the southwest 

border of the United 

States. The study 

concluded that the 

unmanned aircraft 

could carry sensors and 

equipment and remain airborne for longer 

periods than CBP’s manned aircraft. CBP 

reported that, from FYs 2005 to 2013, it 

obligated about $360 million for the 

purchase of unmanned aircraft and 

related equipment, and for personnel, 

maintenance, and support. At the time of 

Figure 1: Predator B Unmanned Aircraft 

Source: CBP Photo 

Background 

CBP guards nearly 7,000 miles of U.S. land border and 2,000 miles of coastal 

waters surrounding Florida, Texas, and southern California. To accomplish its 

mission, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) uses a variety of air assets to 

patrol the borders, conduct surveillance, and assess disaster damage. The air 

assets include helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and Predator B unmanned 

aircraft. The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program includes Predator B 

aircraft, as well as ground control stations, pilots, sensor operators, video 

our audit, CBP had a fleet of 10 unmanned aircraft.1 Five were configured for 

land missions, two for maritime missions, and three could operate over both 

land and water. 

CBP’s long-term plan, which is approved by CBP’s Chief Procurement Officer, 

include adding 14 more unmanned aircraft to its fleet to be able to respond to a 

major event anywhere in the United States within 3 hours and provide first 

responders with real-time information and imagery. In October 2012, OAM 

proposed adding about $443 million to the existing support and maintenance 

contract for its unmanned aircraft to acquire, support, and maintain the 

additional 14 aircraft. The proposed acquisition of 14 more aircraft would bring 

 1 In total, CBP has purchased 11 unmanned aircraft for the UAS program, but 1 crashed in 

April 2006 and another crashed in January 2014. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 


 

CBP’s investment in the UAS program (aircraft, equipment, maintenance, and 

support) to more than $802 million. 

Since program inception, OAM has expanded UAS operations beyond the 

southwest border of the United States to the northern border, the Caribbean, 

the Gulf of Mexico, and the southern California coast. At the time of our audit, 

OAM launched its Predator B aircraft from bases in Corpus Christi, Texas; 

Cocoa Beach, Florida; Grand Forks, North Dakota; and Sierra Vista, Arizona. 

The UAS program contributes to border security by providing information to 

U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents and other agencies. For example, UAS 

operations in Arizona provide border patrol stations with real-time information 

on the location of suspected illegal border crossings by people on foot or in 

vehicles. Other UAS missions collect information on intelligence targets. 

Each unmanned aircraft carries a video camera that can provide images of 

people, vehicles, and buildings. Video images can be taken day and night and 

are transmitted in real time to personnel on the ground. Additionally, two 

unmanned aircraft in Arizona can carry a Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation 

Radar (VADER) to detect people and vehicles. When VADER detects a 

suspected target, a sensor operator uses the video camera to confirm and 

observe the activity. The sensor operator can then give the location of activity to 

border patrol agents. In addition, according to CBP, it employs personnel to 

analyze data obtained by VADER. 

Some unmanned aircraft carry a Synthetic Aperture Radar that captures still 

images. According to CBP, it can use the images to confirm USBP’s conclusions 

about activity in an area. For example, images from the Synthetic Aperture 

Radar may show tire tracks or footprints in areas where previous images from 

the sensor showed no activity. The maritime aircraft carry radar that can detect 

vessels on the ocean. 

CBP has conducted some UAS operations for other Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) components, as well as Federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security 

Investigations Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Minnesota 

Department of Natural Resources, and the Texas Department of Public Safety. 

According to OAM, it has achieved other milestones identified in its 2010 UAS 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS). These milestones, some which have been 

achieved ahead of the forecasted timeframe, include supporting a full range of 

mission sets; operating over land borders and over coastal waters and 

international waters; working with the Federal Aviation Administration to 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 


 

expand access to the National Airspace System; performing capabilities, 

including operation of interchangeable sensor payloads and long endurance 

missions; serving as a test platform for other agency technology projects; and 

modernizing the OAM UAS through block upgrades. 

Results of Audit 

Although CBP’s UAS program contributes to border security, after 8 years, CBP 

cannot prove its effectiveness because it has not established verifiable 

performance measures. In addition, the program has not achieved its expected 

level of operation. Specifically: 

x	 The unmanned aircraft are not meeting OAM’s goal of being airborne 

16 hours a day, every day of the year; in FY 2013, the aircraft were 

airborne 22 percent of the anticipated number of hours. 

x	 The extent of increased apprehensions of illegal border crossers is 

uncertain, but compared to CBP’s total number of apprehensions, 

OAM attributed relatively few to unmanned aircraft operations. 

x	 OAM cannot demonstrate that the unmanned aircraft have reduced 

the cost of border surveillance. 

x	 OAM expected the unmanned aircraft would be able to respond to 

motion sensor alerts and thus reduce the need for USBP response, 

but we found few instances of this having occurred. 

x	 VADER’s restricted operation over only a section of the Arizona 

border, rather than its anticipated operation over New Mexico, Texas, 

and a larger section of the Arizona border, has limited CBP’s ability to 

use the sensor to analyze surveillance gaps. 

In addition, the unmanned aircraft are not operating along the entire 

southwest border of the United States, as DHS has reported. 

We estimate that, in FY 2013, it cost at least $62.5 million to operate the 

program, or about $12,255 per hour. Although it may be useful for internal 

purposes, OAM’s calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include 

operating costs such as the costs of pilots, equipment, and overhead. As a 

result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved 

the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the program has 

improved border security. 

Effectiveness of the UAS Program 

Although CBP’s UAS program contributes to border security, its 

effectiveness cannot be fully evaluated because CBP has not established 

verifiable performance measures. According to program-related 

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documents, such as the UAS CONOPS and the UAS Mission Need 

Statement, expectations included 16-hour flights 7 days a week, 

increased apprehensions, reduced surveillance costs, improved USBP 

efficiency, and the ability to analyze surveillance gaps in Arizona, New 

Mexico, and Texas. A comparison of these documented program 

expectations with current operations shows that the UAS program is not 

meeting these objectives. In addition, DHS reported that UAS operations 

covered the entire southwestern U.S. land border. However, operations 

focus on relatively small sections of the border. 

UAS Flight Hours 

According to OAM’s UAS CONOPS, by FY 2013, OAM anticipated four 16­

hour unmanned aircraft patrols every day of the year, or 23,296 total 

flight hours.2 However, the unmanned aircraft logged a combined total of 

5,102 flight hours, or about 80 percent less than what OAM anticipated. 

According to OAM, the aircraft did not fly more primarily because of 

budget constraints, which prevented OAM from obtaining the personnel, 

spare parts and other infrastructure for operations, and maintenance 

necessary for more flight hours. Other contributing factors included 

flight restrictions and weather-related cancellations. OAM does not 

operate the unmanned aircraft in certain weather conditions, such as 

thunderstorms, high winds, or when there is cloud cover. Because of 

these weather-related limitations alone, OAM’s long-term goal of 

unmanned aircraft operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week is 

unrealistic and not attainable. 

OAM’s inability to achieve the anticipated number of flight hours for its 

unmanned aircraft is a persistent concern. We reached similar 

conclusions in our May 2012 audit report on the UAS program.3 

Apprehensions 

It is not possible to determine to what extent using unmanned aircraft 

increased apprehensions of illegal border crossers. When compared to 

USBP’s total number of reported apprehensions, however, OAM 

attributed relatively few to use of unmanned aircraft. Table 1 shows the 

number of apprehensions in FY 2013 that OAM attributed to the UAS 

program in Arizona and Texas compared to overall numbers reported by 

USBP for the same areas. 



2 Four patrols multiplied by 16 hours a day multiplied by 7 days a week multiplied by 52 weeks 

a year equals 23,296 hours. 

3 CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border Security, OIG-12-85, May 

2012. 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Table 1. OAM-reported Apprehensions Attributed to UAS and USBPreported Total Number of Apprehensions, FY 2013 

Sector Total 

Apprehensions 

Reported By 

USBP 

Apprehensions 

OAM 

Attributed to 

UAS 

Percent 

Arizona – Tucson 120,939 2,161 1.8% 

Texas – Rio Grande Valley 154,453 111 .07% 

Source: USBP- and OAM-reported apprehension figures 

According to border patrol agents and intelligence personnel in Arizona, 

USBP probably would have detected the people using ground-based 

assets, without the assistance of unmanned aircraft. These ground-based 

assets include Agent-Portable Surveillance Systems and Mobile 

Surveillance Systems, Unattended Ground Sensors, radar and camera 

towers, and border patrol agents. 

Border Surveillance Costs 

According to the UAS Mission Need Statement, OAM expected unmanned 

aircraft to reduce border surveillance costs by 25 to 50 percent per mile. 

However, because OAM does not track this metric, it cannot demonstrate 

that the unmanned aircraft have reduced the cost of border surveillance. 

Sensor Alerts 

OAM expected that unmanned aircraft would be able to respond to alerts 

from Unattended Ground Sensors, which USBP uses to detect 

movement. Sometimes, things like animals or weather, which do not 

require USBP action, set off the sensors. According to OAM, unmanned 

aircraft would fly to the location of the alert and determine whether 

action was necessary, thus reducing the need for border patrol agents to 

respond and improving USBP’s efficiency. We identified only six 

instances in FY 2013 of unmanned aircraft responding to ground sensor 

alerts. 

Arizona VADER Operations 

In Arizona, restricted operation of the VADER sensor limited CBP’s ability 

to analyze data to determine common entry points, times of entry, 

commonly used trails, and areas where people may have broken through 

the border fence. Initially, CBP planned to use VADER, which is mounted 

on unmanned aircraft, over sections of the southwest border. By doing 

so, CBP expected VADER to “dramatically” affect border operations in 

Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

According to CBP, in 2011, the Department of Defense loaned VADER to 

CBP for surveillance to identify people and vehicles illegally crossing the 

southwest border. According to CBP’s June 2012 VADER CONOPS, CBP 

would use the sensor primarily over sections of the border in Arizona, 

New Mexico, and Texas. VADER would increase awareness of border 

activity, identify gaps in CBP’s surveillance capabilities, and support 

decision making. 

In March 2013, CBP’s Joint Field Command (JFC) restricted VADER 

operations to Arizona and prepared its own CONOPS for the sensor. The 

JFC limited the length of border covered by the sensor primarily to an 

area around a single border patrol station. The JFC restricted operations 

to “increase the certainty of a positive law enforcement resolution,” such 

as apprehension, to VADER detections. 

Because of JFC’s diminished focus area of operation with VADER, border 

areas outside the focus area did not benefit from use of the sensor. In 

addition, CBP’s Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison (OIIL) 

could not analyze the sensor data as described in CBP’s June 2012 

VADER CONOPS to determine entry points, trails, and fence 

breakthroughs along other areas of the border. 

Border Coverage 

According to DHS’ Annual Performance Report, Fiscal Years 2012–2014, 

the UAS program “expanded unmanned aircraft system coverage to the 

entire Southwest Border.” Although the Federal Aviation Administration 

permits OAM to fly over the southwest border from California to the 

Texas gulf coast, the unmanned aircraft focus on relatively small 

portions of the border. 

For example, according to CBP, in FY 2013 UAS operations along the 

1,993-mile southwest border focused on about 100 miles of Arizona 

border and operations in Texas concentrated on about 70 miles of that 

state’s border. 

UAS Program Cost 

OAM has not accumulated or reported all the costs of the UAS program. 

For FY 2013, we estimated it cost about $62.5 million to support 5,102 

unmanned aircraft flight hours, or $12,255 per hour.4 In that same fiscal 

year, OAM calculated a cost per flight hour of $2,468, which included the 

 4 Our estimate includes about $7.6 million for depreciation of 10 unmanned aircraft and 

equipment. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

costs of the aircraft maintenance and support contract (parts, labor, and 

repairs), fuel, and satellites. OAM’s calculation does not include all costs, 

such as the costs of personnel, contract support, and equipment, which 

represent about 80 percent of our estimated cost to operate and support 

the program. According to OAM, its calculation for determining aircraft 

cost per flight hour is a standard practice similar to that used by the 

Department of Defense. 

Table 2 compares the costs the Office of Inspector General (OIG) included 

in our estimate of UAS program cost to the costs included in OAM’s 

calculation. We estimated the total cost per flight hour, both with and 

without personnel costs. 

Table 2. OIG-estimated Total Cost per Flight Hour and OAM 

Calculation of Cost per Flight Hour for UAS Program, FY 2013 

Cost Type OIG 

Estimate 

OAM 

Calculation 

Contract Support, Equipment, and Overhead 

Maintenance and Support (parts, labor, repairs) $24,543,564 $9,458,567 

Satellite $2,986,077 $1,952,000 

Fuel $643,651 $632,941 

Depreciation $7,650,000 $0 

VADER $1,700,000 $0 

Operational Support $5,541,227 $0 

Engineering Services $188,450 $0 

Base Overhead $2,146,569 $0 

Total $45,399,538 $12,043,508 

Flight Hours ÷ 5,102 ÷ 4,880* 

Cost per flight hour (without personnel) $8,898 $2,468 

Personnel 

OAM Personnel (full-time) $8,215,000 $0 

OAM Personnel (part-time)** $2,867,500 $0 

United States Coast Guard Support $1,775,853 $0 

USBP Sensor Operators $1,395,000 $0 

OIIL Personnel $2,726,780 $0 

Premium Pay & Overtime $145,413 $0 

Grand Total $62,525,084 $12,043,508 

Flight Hours ÷ 5,102 ÷ 4,880 

Full cost per flight hour (with personnel) $12,255 $2,468 

Source: OIG analysis of UAS program-related costs and OAM data on its cost per flight hour 

* According to OAM, it used flight hours from its maintenance system rather than hours 

from the Tasking, Operation, and Management Information System (the system we 

used). 

** According to OAM, it has also cross-trained some pilots to fly the unmanned aircraft 

when they are not flying their normally assigned aircraft. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 


 

OAM said it does not include all the costs we included in our estimate 

because some are funded by other sources. For example, OAM does not 

include: 

x the salaries of pilots because separate appropriations for air and 

marine operations funds them; and 

x the cost of the VADER or analysis of VADER data because OIIL 

funds these. 

The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-126 Revised, 

Improving the Management and Use of Government Aircraft, requires all 

Federal agencies with aircraft programs to accumulate all costs 

associated with the programs, including the cost of crew, maintenance, 

fuel and other fluids, leasing, landing fees, operations and administrative 

overhead, accident repairs, and acquisition costs. Agencies need to 

understand the full cost of a program to accurately determine cost 

effectiveness and to conduct cost comparisons when choosing aircraft. 

Federal agencies must also report all their aviation activities, including 

costs, in the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Aviation 

Interactive Reporting System. Agencies are to report costs for crew, fuel, 

maintenance, and overhead. According to data provided by GSA, OAM 

has not reported crew or overhead costs for the UAS, or any other 

aircraft, since 2005. 

We included costs in our estimate based on the cost elements defined by 

OMB. These include the costs necessary for UAS program support and 

operation, including pilots; support personnel, such as sensor operators; 

equipment; depreciation; and overhead. According to OAM, including the 

cost of personnel in a calculation of cost per flight hour is not standard 

practice. However, we believe OAM should report the full cost of the 

program so the Department can conduct a more accurate cost 

comparison to help choose the proper surveillance aircraft or decide to 

use nonflight-related surveillance methods. 

Future UAS Program Costs 

OAM’s long-term plans include acquiring 14 more unmanned aircraft for 

its fleet, which will cause the cost of the UAS program to continue to rise. 

On April 4, 2012, in response to a draft of our audit report on the UAS 

program, OAM asserted that it did not plan to add more unmanned 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

aircraft to the UAS fleet unless directed by a higher authority.5 Yet, in 

February 2012, OAM had already drafted a plan for acquiring 14 more 

aircraft. On April 6, 2012, 2 days after OAM’s assertion to us, the 

contracting officer reviewed and concurred with the plan, which the DHS 

Chief Procurement Officer approved in October 2012. In November 2012, 

in a Justification for Other than Full and Open Competition, OAM 

proposed adding about $443 million to the existing support and 

maintenance contract to acquire, support, and maintain the additional 

14 aircraft. This amount does not include funding CBP may need for 

more personnel to operate the aircraft, which could also increase the 

cost. 

According to OAM UAS program officials, they may have to expand the 

UAS program because, in a July 2008 memorandum, DHS approved the 

acquisition of unmanned aircraft. In its 2008 memorandum, however, 

DHS approved OAM’s plan to acquire up to 24 unmanned aircraft; it did 

not require OAM to acquire all 24 aircraft. 

OAM also continues to invest in new technology for the UAS program, 

which will further increase program costs. For example, in FY 2013, OAM 

acquired two VADERs for $16.8 million. Contracted support for these 

new sensors will cost OAM an additional $1.7 million for 1 year. In the 

long term, OAM plans to purchase more VADERs to increase its total 

number of sensors to six. 

Conclusion 

CBP’s UAS program contributes to border security, but the program’s 

effectiveness is unproven and program expectations have not been met. 

Specifically, CBP has not established performance measures and the 

unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals. Although CBP 

expected that the UAS program would result in increased apprehensions 

of illegal border crossers, reduce the cost of border surveillance, and 

improve the USBP’s efficiency, we found little or no evidence that CBP 

met those expectations. In addition, VADER operations have been 

limited, and the unmanned aircraft do not operate along the entire 

southwest border as has been reported. 

CBP does not calculate the total operating cost of the program. By not 

including all operating costs, CBP also cannot accurately assess the 

program’s cost effectiveness or make informed decisions about program 

 5 CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border Security, OIG-12-85, May 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-15-17 

2012 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 


 

expansion. As a result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program 

that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate 

how much the program has improved border security. In addition, unless 

CBP fully discloses all operating costs, Congress and the public are 

unaware of all the resources committed to the UAS program. 

 

Given that, after 8 years of operations, the UAS program cannot 

demonstrate its effectiveness, as well the cost of current operations, OAM 

should reconsider its planned expansion of the program. CBP could put 

the $443 million it plans to spend to expand the program to better use by 

investing in alternatives, such as manned aircraft and ground 

surveillance assets. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection: 

Recommendation #1: 

Coordinate with the DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer 

(OCRSO) to conduct an independent study, before acquiring more 

unmanned aircraft, to determine whether: 

x additional unmanned aircraft are needed and justified; and 

x future funding should be used to invest in the current program or 

invested in other alternatives, such as manned aircraft and ground 

assets, to enhance surveillance needs. 

Recommendation #2: 

Require the JFC to lift the limitations on VADER and allow the analysis 

expected in the original plan for the sensor’s operation. 

Recommendation #3: 

Require OAM to revise its UAS CONOPS to include attainable goals for 

the program, along with verifiable performance measures. 

Recommendation #4 

In coordination with the DHS OCRSO, require OAM to develop policies 

and procedures to ensure that it accumulates and reports all costs 

associated with the UAS program and other OAM flight programs. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-15-17 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP concurred with one of our recommendations, concurred in principle 

with the remaining three recommendations, and provided comments to 

the draft report. A summary of CBP’s responses and our analysis follows. 

We have included a copy of the management comments in their entirety 

in appendix B. CBP also provided technical comments to our report. We 

made changes to incorporate these comments, as appropriate. 

Response to Recommendation #1: CBP concurred in principle. 

However, CBP said that the recommendation is based on a 

misunderstanding of OAM’s procurement plans. According to CBP, at 

this time, it has no plans to acquire additional unmanned aircraft other 

than a replacement for the aircraft that crashed in January 2014, nor 

does OAM have a contract or funding in place to expand the program. 

OAM’s existing UAS program funding is being used to expand the 

program’s infrastructure and achieve a greater level of utilization of its 

existing fleet. Until OAM is able to elevate the staffing, operations, and 

maintenance of its existing fleet, it does not support expanding the 

number of unmanned aircraft. CBP requested that we close this 

recommendation. 

OIG Analysis: CBP’s comments do not address the recommendation. We 

believe that OAM’s long-term plan is to expand its fleet of unmanned 

aircraft. OAM’s intent to expand the program is clearly stated in its 

Acquisition Plan and Justification for Other Than Full and Open 

Competition. According to the justification, this “requirement” supports 

the CBP Commissioner’s 2008 Acquisition Decision Memorandum and 

CBP’s 2010 Strategic Air and Marine Plan “both of which document 

OAM’s plans for a fleet of 24 unmanned aircraft and supporting 

systems.” 

CBP said OAM does not have funding in place to expand its fleet of 

unmanned aircraft; however, according to OAM’s Acquisition Plan, “the 

plan is based on the assumption that the UAS program will receive new 

initiative or supplemental funding to reach end state goals. Prior funding 

has been provided in a similar manner.” 

In addition, CBP’s response indicates that if OAM elevates staffing, 

operations, and maintenance, it would support expanding the program. 

After issuing our draft report, we reached out to OCRSO to help CBP 

implement this recommendation. OCRSO has a key role in the DHS Joint 

Requirements Council and the Joint Requirements Council Aviation 

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Commonality Portfolio Team, which assesses current operational needs 

and determines ways to fulfill those needs. 

The recommendation will remain unresolved and open until CBP 

conducts an independent study to determine whether expanding the 

program is the best use of funds for border security. 

Response to Recommendation #2: CBP concurred in principle. 

However, according to CBP, the recommendation is based on a 

misunderstanding that the JFC has limited VADER operations and 

analysis of the sensor’s products. Previous limitations, based on external 

factors over which the JFC had no control, have already been resolved. 

CBP has operated VADER outside the JFC area of operations and will 

continue to deploy the asset to the highest priority location for DHS and 

CBP. CBP requested that we close this recommendation. 

OIG Analysis: CBP’s comments do not address the recommendation. In 

its response, CBP said that our assertion that the JFC decided on its own 

to set geographic limitations on the use of VADER is inaccurate. Yet, as 

shown in the portion of the JFC’s VADER CONOPS in appendix C, JFC 

set these limitations and identified a specific section of the border as the 

“primary focus” of the FY 2013 VADER campaign. CBP also said there 

were earlier geographic limitations placed on locations for VADER 

operations, due to factors external to the JFC, such as airspace and 

other restrictions. We recognize that there were airspace limitations in a 

portion of Arizona and other restrictions in Texas. However, we are 

unaware of any restrictions in New Mexico and the stated restrictions do 

not explain reducing VADER operations to a single station’s area of 

responsibility in Arizona. 

CBP also said it developed its June 2012 VADER CONOPS prior to 

VADER operations. According to the VADER CONOPS, however, CBP 

fully integrated VADER on its unmanned aircraft in December 2011. 

OAM flew 58 VADER missions between January 1, 2012, and June 26, 

2012 (the date CBP’s VADER CONOPS was approved). According to CBP, 

the JFC and OAM essentially outperformed the requirements in the 

initial (June 2012) VADER CONOPS. 

Table 3 shows the results of VADER operations in FY 2013 before and 

after the JFC limitation (set in March 2013). 

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Table 3. FY 2013 VADER Missions Before and After the JFC’s March 

2013 Limitation 

JFC Limitation, 

March 13, 2013 

Average Length of 

VADER Operations 

(Kilometers) 

Total 

Number of 

Detections 

Number 

of flights 

Before 164 12,968 83 

After 71 5,456 93 

Source: OIG analysis of FY 2013 daily VADER flight logs 

CBP also said the JFC has shared all VADER- and UAS-related data with 

OIIL. The OIIL Processing Exploitation Dissemination cell at the Air and 

Marine Operations Center receives all video feeds, intelligence collections, 

and VADER feeds directly. We recognize that OIIL received the data and 

produced daily VADER reports, but these reports are mission summaries 

that show where VADER detected people. The reports from the cell do not 

identify common entry points, times of entry, commonly used trails, and 

areas where people may have broken through the border fence. These 

daily reports are not the strategic analysis that OIIL and CBP envisioned 

in the initial plans. 

CBP provided information showing trend analysis of VADER data 

obtained between April 2012 and July 2013 in November 2014. 

We believe it would be more effective in the long term to use VADER as 

originally planned and capture more data to analyze and detect more 

people. The recommendation will remain unresolved and open until CBP 

requires the JFC to lift its limitation on VADER operations. 

Response to Recommendation #3: CBP concurred. CBP said that OAM 

has already begun the process of revising its UAS CONOPS, which will 

include performance measures. The estimated completion date is 

March 31, 2015. 

OIG Analysis: CBP’s comments appear to be responsive to this 

recommendation, which will remain open and resolved until OAM 

provides the revised UAS CONOPS that includes verifiable performance 

measures showing the impact unmanned aircraft have on border 

security. The performance measures should go beyond the capabilities of 

the aircraft and sensors to demonstrate return on investment and impact 

on border security. 

Response to Recommendation #4: CBP concurred in principle. CBP 

agreed that establishing and following policies and procedures ensures 

transparency of all costs associated with all flight programs and is a 

required and necessary part of flight programs. According to its response, 

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CBP currently reports all required costs directly associated with the 

operations of unmanned aircraft; however, there is no one formulaic tool 

that encompasses all parts of the program to derive totals for program 

cost. CBP said there are numerous methodologies and approaches that 

satisfy the requirement to report all costs associated with a program. 

CBP will continue to exercise its current methodology in computing 

program costs, including its previously developed cost per flight hour 

model. CBP’s use of the cost per flight hour provides management with 

one tool to assess program performance. Alone, cost per flight hour does 

not capture the total program cost because it does not include all 

elements of the program, but it does identify internal trends. CBP said it 

has met the intent of the recommendation because OAM’s approach 

meets current OMB standards. CBP requested that we close this 

recommendation. 

OIG Analysis: CBP’s comments do not address this recommendation. In 

its response, CBP acknowledged that establishing and following policies 

and procedures ensures transparency of all costs associated with all 

flight programs and is required and necessary for the programs. 

Although CBP recognized that its cost per flight hour does not capture 

the total program cost, it will continue to use its current methodology to 

compute program costs. CBP’s current methodology includes about 20 

percent of the full cost to own and operate unmanned aircraft. 

OAM said it did not agree with the figures we used for its calculation of 

cost per flight hour and they should not form the basis for cost per flight 

hour calculations. Appendix D contains the figures OAM informed us it 

used in its calculation. 

OAM disagreed with our estimate, specifically the cost for maintenance 

and support, satellite, and fuel. OAM said these figures are inaccurate 

because they are not the actual amounts billed to the contracts. OAM 

also acknowledged that Government contracts typically take months or 

years to fully close out depending on contract value, complexity, and 

number of subcontractors. We used the amounts in the contracts 

because contractors may continue to submit invoices for costs incurred 

in FY 2013. 

OAM said that amounts paid on the contract were significantly less than 

the amounts we used. In an attempt to reconcile differences in our costs 

and what OAM believed to be more accurate, we requested additional 

information from OAM. Based on OAM’s comments, we removed 

$427,278 from the amount for the engineering services contract. This 

amount includes services for both manned and unmanned aircraft, but 

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we could not separate them. According to information OAM provided, as 

of November 10, 2014, most of the maintenance and support, satellite, 

and operational support contracts have been paid. Table 4 shows the 

contract amounts and the updated information that OAM provided. 

Table 4. Contract Amounts Compared to Updated Information 

from OAM 

Contracts Contract 

Amount 

Amount 

Paid 

Percent 

Maintenance/Support $24,543,564 $23,079,992 94 

Satellite 2,986,077 2,338,768 78 

Operational Support 5,541,227 5,076,266 92 

Total $33,070,868 $30,495,026 92 

Source: Updated information from OAM on contract amounts 

OAM disagreed with our inclusion of depreciation in our estimate. 

According to GSA’s U.S. Government Aircraft Cost Accounting Guide, 

depreciation represents the cost or value of ownership and is the method 

used to spread the acquisition cost, less residual value, over an asset's 

useful life. Although these costs are not direct outlays as is the case with 

most other costs, it is important to recognize them for analysis. 

OAM also disagreed with us including UAS Headquarters Program Office 

support, base overhead, personnel, and VADER in the total cost of the 

program. OAM does not recognize the cost associated with VADER even 

though it uses VADER detections as a measure for UAS performance. All 

of these costs are all directly related to the UAS program. 

According to CBP, the language in OMB Circular A-126 and its governing 

authorities does not specifically apply to the operation of unmanned 

aircraft and “there is still a great deal of ambiguity in how the circular 

applies.” Nevertheless, CBP said that OAM has been “prudent” in 

applying “the general intent” of the circular and is operating in a manner 

consistent with its “spirit.” In its response CBP noted OIG’s reference to 

the circular’s requirement that “Federal agencies with aircraft programs 

to accumulate all costs associated with the programs, including the cost 

of crew, maintenance, fuel and other fluids, leasing, landing fees, 

operations and administrative overhead, accident repairs, and 

acquisition costs.” According to CBP, this is an important consideration 

for cost planning, which OAM applies to all of its aviation assets. 

However, as shown in our report and CBP’s response, OAM does not 

recognize all costs of the UAS program and intends to continue using its 

current methodology to compute program costs. 

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In addition, Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations § 102-33 – 

Management of Government Aircraft, requires Federal agencies to account 

for the operations and ownership cost of their aircraft as described in the 

Government Accounting Guide, which follows OMB Circular A-126. With 

some exceptions, such as the armed forces and intelligence agencies, the 

requirements “apply to all federally funded aviation activities of executive 

agencies of the U.S. Government.” GSA is revising this section of the 

Code of Federal Regulations to include unmanned aircraft and estimates 

the revision will be published in the Federal Register by December 31, 

2014. 

Subsequent to our draft report, we included DHS’ OCRSO to assist CBP 

in implementing this recommendation. OCRSO has a lead role on the 

Aviation Governance Board, which is DHS' governing authority over 

aviation-related mission support activities, including policy. 

The recommendation will remain open and unresolved until OAM 

recognizes and reports all costs associated with the UAS program and 

other OAM flight programs. 

Expected Results 

In its response, CBP said we cited a limited sample of expected results 

from historical documents, some going back to 2007. Because OAM does 

not have performance measures for the unmanned aircraft, we used all 

the expected results from OAM’s documents. The expected results we 

identified appear reasonable. For example, we expected to see an 

increase in apprehensions or an increase in USBP efficiency by having 

the unmanned aircraft respond to ground sensor alerts. In addition, we 

expected to see aircraft capable of being airborne for up to 20 hours to be 

in the air more than they are. Instead, we found little or no evidence that 

OAM achieved its expected results. 

Apprehensions 

CBP said that apprehensions are not an appropriate measure of 

unmanned aircraft performance. According to CBP, the role of the 

unmanned aircraft, specifically VADER, is to report detections. The 

unmanned aircraft detect targets of interest and provide this information 

to personnel on the ground who apprehend the suspects. Aircraft are 

only credited with contributing to the apprehension if they remain on the 

scene until the apprehension is verified. CBP said a better measure of 

performance is detections. 

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According to JFC’s VADER CONOPS, VADER’s primary role is to provide 

detection, classification, and tactical cueing in a geographically focused 

area, resulting in an increased certainty of interdiction. According to 

OAM, in FY 2013 VADER operations detected, identified, and classified 

18,239 suspected undocumented aliens and smugglers. However, OAM 

could only attribute 2,172 apprehensions to unmanned aircraft. In 

addition, OAM’s FY 2013 detection statistic is for VADER in Arizona, 

which only comprised about 28 percent of the total flight hours for the 

program in that fiscal year. 

CBP also said we did not recognize other UAS program achievements. 

Specifically, our draft report did not include seizure statistics along the 

southwest border and during transit zone operations. We did not include 

these statistics in the draft report because OAM’s documents did not 

identify expected results for seizures. However, Table 5 shows the 

amount of marijuana seized along the southwest border that OAM 

attributed to the UAS program compared to the overall numbers reported 

by USBP for the same areas. CBP also said that unmanned aircraft 

operations in Central America and Hispaniola interdicted 7,439 pounds 

of cocaine and 2,000 pounds of marijuana. 

Table 5. OAM-reported Marijuana Seizures Attributed to the UAS 

Program and USBP-reported Total Seizure Amounts, FY 2013 

Sector Total Pounds of 

Seized 

Marijuana 

Reported By 

USBP 

Pounds of 

Seized 

Marijuana OAM 

Attributed to 

the UAS 

program 

Percent 

Arizona – Tucson 1,193,083 16,345 1.37% 

Texas – Rio Grande Valley 797,249 33,103 4.15% 

Source: USBP- and OAM-reported marijuana seizure figures 

Border Surveillance Costs 

In its response to our draft report, CBP said it did not adopt reduction of 

border surveillance costs as a performance measure. 

Sensor Alerts 

CBP said that, initially, responding to sensor alerts with unmanned 

aircraft was appropriate for its technological capabilities. CBP used 

unmanned aircraft for this function before implementing VADER and 

continues to perform this function on a limited basis. According to CBP, 

however, technological advances to the system have made this a less 

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efficient use of the unmanned aircraft’s current capabilities, negating its 

significance as a performance measure. At the time of our audit, CBP 

operated one VADER in Arizona, which only comprised about 28 percent 

of the total flight hours for the program in FY 2013. 

Border Coverage 

According to CBP, our statements that unmanned aircraft are not 

operating along the entire southwest border are inaccurate. CBP said 

OAM has authorization to fly, and has flown, the unmanned aircraft 

along every stretch of the southwest border, from California to the Texas 

gulf coast. 

OAM provided additional flight hour information that showed 44.6 hours 

flown over California and 3.8 hours flown over New Mexico. The 

California hours involved an unmanned aircraft flying over that state to 

conduct missions over water off the state’s southern coast. We do not 

know what the 3.8 hours over New Mexico flight hours involved. OAM did 

not provide information that showed surveillance missions in either of 

these states. 

We believe it is misleading for CBP to report that its unmanned aircraft 

operate over every stretch of the southwest border when these flights 

appear to be simply on the way to another mission. 

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Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

DHS OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 

107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a 

series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight 

responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the 

Department. 

The objective of our audit was to determine the effectiveness and cost of CBP’s 

UAS program. To answer our objective, we: 

x	 Interviewed officials at OAM in Washington, DC, to gain an 

understanding of the UAS program and obtain program statistics and 

cost information; 

x	 Obtained and reviewed relevant criteria, policies, and other guidance 

related to the UAS program, such as the UAS CONOPS, Mission Need 

Statement, and the UAS Acquisition Plan, which we used to identify the 

expected results of the program; 

x	 Obtained and reviewed DHS’s Annual Performance Report, Fiscal Years 

2012 – 2014; 

x	 Obtained and analyzed unmanned aircraft flight data to learn when, 

where, how often, and for how long the unmanned aircraft were flown, as 

well as the types of missions performed; 

x	 Conducted sites visits to airbases in Sierra Vista, Arizona; Corpus 

Christi, Texas; Grand Forks, North Dakota; and CBP’s Air and Marine 

Operations Center in Riverside, California, to better understand those 

operations; 

x	 Analyzed apprehension data for the two border patrol stations in Arizona 

where CBP concentrated its southwest border UAS program surveillance 

operations; 

x	 Interviewed border patrol agents at border stations in Arizona and Texas, 

as well as border patrol agents and OAM personnel at the JFC in 

Arizona, to determine the impact of the UAS program on their operations; 

x	 Interviewed OIIL personnel in Washington, DC; at the Air and Marine 

Operations Center in Riverside, CA; at the UAS airbases we visited; and 

at the JFC in Arizona, to better understand their operations; 

x	 Performed data reliability testing on flight hour and detection information 

and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

audit; 

x	 Obtained data CBP reported for overall apprehension figures. We 

interviewed officials at CBP to determine how CBP collects apprehension 

data and obtained an independent verification and validation report of 

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reported statistics. We determined that the overall apprehension figures 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our audit; and 

x	 Could not verify the apprehension figures that OAM attributed to the 

UAS program. Given this limitation with OAM’s UAS-assisted 

apprehensions, which prevented an adequate assessment, we determined 

that OAM’s reported apprehension figures are of undetermined reliability. 

We used OMB’s guidance, as a basis, to identify aircraft program costs and 

estimated how much it cost CBP to own and operate its unmanned aircraft in 

FY 2013. Specifically, we: 

x Used the contract amounts for maintenance and support, operational 

support, VADER, satellite, and engineering services; 

x Estimated personnel costs for OAM and USBP personnel based on CBP’s 

personnel rate of $155,000 per employee; and 

x	 Obtained cost estimates from the United States Coast Guard and OIIL for 

UAS costs they incurred in FY 2013 and on the cost of base overhead 

and pilot overtime from OAM in FY 2013. These estimated costs were not 

significant compared to the total estimated cost, and we did not test the 

reliability of the estimates provided. 

Our cost estimate includes about $7.6 million for depreciation of the 10 

unmanned aircraft and equipment. We calculated straight-line depreciation, 

using the average cost of an unmanned aircraft system, less 10 percent 

residual value, over the useful life. The average cost of the unmanned aircraft 

and equipment was $17 million; therefore, the residual value is $1.7 million. 

The useful life of the Predator B is 20 years. 

$17,000,000 – $1,700,000 = $15,300,000 ÷ 20 years = $765,000 multiplied by 

10 aircraft. 

We conducted this performance audit between May 2013 and September 2014 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Excerpt from JFC VADER Concept of Operations 

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Appendix D 

Data Used in OAM’s Cost Per Flight Hour Calculation 

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Appendix E 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Donald Bumgardner, Director 

Sean Pettersen, Audit Manager 

Shawn Cosman, Auditor-In-Charge 

Douglas Bozeman, Program Analyst 

Patricia Benson, Program Analyst 

Marisa Coccaro, Program Analyst 

Peter Christopher, Program Analyst 

Vashti Gordon, Program Analyst 

Kelly Herberger, Communications Analyst 

Gloria Medina-Ortiz, Independent Referencer 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

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