2023 IL App (4th) 221029-U 

NO. 4-22-1029 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ELISSHA C. BOUGHTON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of

Tazewell County 

No. 21CF375 

Honorable 

Christopher R. Doscotch, 

Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Steigmann and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) Under the circumstances of this case, the sentence of eight years’ imprisonment 

was not an abuse of discretion and, hence, was not a plain error.

(2) Because the sentence was not an abuse of discretion, it was within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance for defense counsel to refrain from 

filing a motion for a reduction of the sentence.

¶ 2 In the circuit court of Tazewell County, a jury found defendant, Elissha C. 

Boughton, not guilty of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 2020)) but 

guilty of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)). The court sentenced her to 

imprisonment for eight years. Defendant appeals, arguing that a sentence of such severity is, in the 

circumstances of her case, a plain error. Alternatively, she argues that, by failing to file a motion 

for a reduction of the sentence, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We conclude that 

FILED

August 22, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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defendant has failed to show either a plain error or ineffective assistance. Therefore, we affirm the 

circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In the jury trial, the State called Nicholas Clark, who testified essentially as follows. 

He used to date defendant. On June 29, 2021, he visited defendant in her second-story apartment 

in Delavan, Illinois, and stayed overnight. The next morning, his phone vibrated off a dresser top 

and fell into a garbage can. When retrieving his phone, he saw, in the garbage can, a used condom. 

He confronted defendant about this discovery, and they “had a disagreement about it.” He decided 

to leave. As Clark was gathering his things, defendant went to a closet, but he did not see if she 

took anything out of the closet. She followed him out of the apartment, down the stairs, out of the 

apartment building, and into the parking lot. On the way out of the apartment and to the parking 

lot, they said nothing to one another.

¶ 5 Clark’s car was parked next to defendant’s car, but their cars were facing in 

opposite directions. Only Clark and defendant were in the parking lot. She went to her car. He 

unlocked the driver’s-side door of his car and opened the door. As he was bent over, putting his 

belongings inside his car, he heard a gunshot. He backed out of his car and looked up. Defendant 

was walking around her car, coming toward him with a pistol in her hand. As Clark was standing 

next to his driver’s-side door, she fired a second shot, which ricocheted off the trunk of his car and 

went through the back windshield. She fired a third shot, which hit the roof of his car. He backed 

up toward the front of his car, with his hands raised. Then, aiming directly at him, with her gun 

arm fully extended, she fired a fourth shot, which punctured the gym shorts he was wearing but 

missed him. Still aiming at him, she pulled the trigger two more times, but now the pistol did not 

fire. She opened up the pistol as if to wonder, “[‘W]hat’s wrong with this thing[?’]” closed it back
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up, pointed it at him again, and pulled the trigger two more times, but still the pistol did not fire. 

She then jumped in her car and drove away, almost running over Clark as he stood in her way and 

tried to prevent her from leaving. No words had been exchanged between them from the time he 

walked out of her apartment to the time she sped away. He telephoned the police.

¶ 6 The police pulled defendant over, arrested her, and seized the pistol from the front 

passenger seat of her car. It was a .38-caliber revolver, and all the cartridges in its cylinder were 

spent. A Tazewell County detective, Ricardo Mancha, interviewed defendant at the police station. 

The interview was video-recorded.

¶ 7 Defendant’s statement to the police was essentially as follows. Clark was her exboyfriend. She and Clark agreed that on June 29, 2021, he would come to her apartment. When 

Clark came over, she had a pistol in a closet of her apartment. She had obtained the pistol from a 

close friend, whose name she refused to divulge. As Clark was leaving her apartment, she took the 

pistol out of the closet. Deciding not to fire the pistol inside the apartment building, she followed 

Clark outdoors, taking the pistol with her. She had little familiarity with firearms, and at first, she 

accidentally fired a shot into the ground. Then she aimed the pistol at Clark and at his car and kept 

firing until the pistol was empty. Her intention, she told the police, was to shoot Clark without 

killing him. She aimed for his car and for his feet. After using up the ammunition in the pistol, she 

got in her car and drove away.

¶ 8 An Illinois state trooper, Erin Bowers, interviewed Clark and collected the gym 

shorts that Clark was wearing at the time of the shooting. In the left leg of the shorts, near the 

bottom hem, was a hole.

¶ 9 On April 26, 2022, the jury found defendant not guilty of attempted first degree 

murder but guilty of aggravated discharge of a firearm.
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¶ 10 On June 24, 2022, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing, in which the court 

considered, among other evidence, a presentence investigation report. In police reports that were 

attached to the presentence investigation report, defendant had complained of successive acts of 

vandalism to her car. In October 2020, for instance, all four tires on her car were slashed. In 

December 2020, defendant reported that the back windshield of her car been smashed—by Clark, 

she believed. In April 2021, defendant complained that, in a parking lot in Peoria, Illinois, Clark 

had bumped into the front of her car with his car.

¶ 11 There were other police reports, and they involved Clark. In November 2020, Clark 

had an argument with defendant in her apartment, and he refused to leave. In December 2020, he 

kicked her car and tried to get in. In March 2021, he caused another disturbance in her apartment. 

In April 2021, he reportedly spat on her in a parking lot, poured beer on her, and punched her.

¶ 12 Two Tazewell County cases in which defendant had obtained emergency orders of 

protection against Clark were dismissed for lack of prosecution. It appears that defendant had an 

on-and-off relationship with Clark. She told the probation officer that, after moving out of Peoria 

to get away from Clark, she revealed to Clark where she was living and resumed her relationship 

with him.

¶ 13 Defendant’s mother, Bertha Boughton, told the probation officer that “defendant’s 

Bi-Polar Disorder is aggravated by stress” and that “since this relationship [with Clark] was 

stressful, the defendant’s mental health also took a downturn.” Jail incident reports involving 

defendant were attached to the presentence investigation report. The probation officer noted “the 

number of reports reflecting odd behavior, rules violations, and comments of suicidal thoughts.”

¶ 14 On September 21, 2021, while defendant was in the Tazewell County jail, awaiting 

trial on the charges in the present case, another criminal case was instituted against her, in which 
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she was charged with two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2020)). 

According to a jail incident report by a correctional officer at the jail, Tyler Clark, defendant 

committed these aggravated batteries on September 18, 2021. On that date, according to Tyler’s 

report, he and another correctional officer, Ashlynne McGraugh, entered defendant’s cell and 

requested that defendant exit her cell and sit in the day room. Defendant asked why. Tyler 

explained to defendant that because she was disrespectful to him the night before and because she 

had violated detainee cell guidelines, her belongings were being confiscated. Defendant refused to 

leave the cell but told the correctional officers that if they wanted her belongings, they might take 

them. As Tyler and McGraugh were collecting defendant’s things, defendant threw her blanket at 

McGraugh and began throwing her papers. Tyler continued in his incident report: 

“We attempted to gain control of her arms with soft empty hands. When we did 

this[,] [defendant] yelled at us to not touch her and began hitting at us. She struck 

McGraugh in the head with a closed hand and hit me in the head as well with a 

closed hand. McGraugh removed [defendant] from her bunk and escorted her onto 

the ground. McGraugh and I both gave verbal command[s] to quit fighting us. 

[Defendant] continued to fight with us [and] began to get off the ground. I drew my 

Taser ***, turned it on, and fired it at her center mass as it was the largest area 

available to me. It had an immediate disabling effect[,] and [defendant] [lay] on her 

back. I commanded [defendant] to roll onto her stomach[,] which she did. 

McGraugh and I applied handcuffs to [defendant].”

Later, after collecting the property, the correctional officers removed the handcuffs from defendant 

without further incident. 
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¶ 15 The probation officer did not question defendant about hitting the correctional 

officers. He questioned her, however, about the aggravated discharge of a firearm. Under the 

heading of “Attitude/Values,” the presentence investigation report reads:

“The defendant had very mixed expressions about the offense. She stated 

the victim, Nicholas Clark, ‘bullied’ her. She also stated she thought they just had 

a ‘fight or misunderstanding,’ until he stated on the stand that he felt she was trying 

to kill him. She advised she never thought she would ever do something like shoot 

at someone. She states during the trial, when he stated she was trying to kill him, 

she was hurt by the comment, as she thought it was just a serious argument, and 

that they could still be friendly. Overall, she described the situation was very 

emotional and she lost control when he kicked the mirror to her car, damaging it. 

She expressed she was not making logical decisions in the moment.

*** It was clear her expression of shooting at the victim during this offense 

being an argument or misunderstanding was a vast mischaracterization which could 

only be described as deception or being out of touch with reality.

*** The defendant described her first arrest as a major physical fight with 

her sister 24 years ago. While physical fighting was not always a component, she 

further described a lot of conflict with her mother, past boyfriends, and her current 

boyfriend. When asked her perspective on whether life is a struggle with survival 

of the fittest or if living by the Golden Rule or if she was someone who moved back 

and forth between these two stances depending on the situation, she agreed with the 

latter.”
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¶ 16 Under “Marital/Family Comments,” the presentence investigation report stated that 

“[w]hen the defendant had a serious fight with her younger sister at age 18, just after high school, 

she was told there was a no-contact order and she could not live with her mother and siblings.”

Defendant was now 41 (according to the presentence investigation report). At times, she had been 

homeless, living in shelters. At times, she had lived with relatives. At times, she had lived in her 

own apartment. More than once, she has been admitted into a nursing home for psychiatric care 

and stabilization. For the 12 months prior to her arrest in the present case, she had lived in public 

housing. She reported that “she [had] worked for several staffing agencies as a [certified nursing 

assistant] before her incarceration” and that, on June 1, 2021, she began working part-time for 

Cross Country Medical Staffing Network.” Because of the number of hours she had been working, 

“she claimed she was in very good financial condition with no worries about money before her 

arrest.” The probation officer remarked, “Yet, the defendant was living in Section 8 Housing 

through the Pekin Housing Authority, therefore, it is difficult to quantify this exactly.”

¶ 17 In addition to the presentence investigation report, the circuit court viewed a video, 

which the defense presented as mitigating evidence. The video showed Clark bumping defendant’s 

car with his car and an ensuing argument between defendant and Clark. Defendant testified that, 

in this video, Clark was the driver of the car that hit her car. She further testified that the statements 

she had made in the police reports were accurate.

¶ 18 Defendant also made an allocution statement. She said she was “remorseful for ever 

having anything to do with [Clark], period,” and that, additionally, she was “remorseful [for her] 

actions using the firearm.” She realized, in retrospect, that she should have turned Clark down 

when he urged her to “ ‘work it out.’ ” Her resort to a firearm, she explained, was “a direct 

retaliation” for his months of going back and forth between abuse and apology. She shot his car 
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because he had inflicted over $3000 worth of damage to her car. “I wasn’t shooting at him,” she 

claimed. Rather, she “shot at his car intentionally.” She acknowledged, “That is not right”—but 

she was “just tired,” and she “[had not] want[ed] him to come back,” because he was abusive. She 

accused the police in the jail as having “pretty much *** the same outlook as [Clark had] toward[ ] 

her, as far as bullying and just [an] over-the-top confrontational attitude toward[ ] [her].” She 

complained that she had “been called more racial slurs since [she had] been in this jail than [in 

her] whole life”—and that if she yelled back at the person insulting her, she was the one who got 

written up. She understood that the “gun was dangerous.” She explained, however:

“It was my attempt to finally stand up for myself. I am a woman. I was trying to get 

a grown man to stop harassing me all by myself.

I recently discovered that he had three other people who also had enough 

problems with him where the police had to be called, all this during the ten-month 

span that he was supposed to be dealing with me. I had an idea about it. I wasn’t 

upset about it. I just wanted him to leave and stay gone, stay over there. But he 

kept—he would—he kept on coming back to the apartment.

I feel like 15 years is too long for somebody that was trying to defend their 

self. That’s all I was trying to do.”

¶ 19 After the allocution statement, the circuit court explained its reasoning for the 

sentence it was about to announce. The court began with the statutory factors in aggravation. The 

court found two such factors. The first aggravating factor was that defendant’s conduct had 

threatened serious harm not only to Clark but also to the inhabitants of the “apartment building a 

hundred feet away.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2020). The second aggravating factor 
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was the need for deterrence. See id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(7). “The use of a firearm to settle an argument or 

misunderstanding warrants deterrence of others,” the court concluded.

¶ 20 On the other hand, the circuit court found two statutory mitigating factors. The first 

mitigating factor was that defendant had been the victim of domestic violence. See id. § 5-5-

3.1(a)(15). The second mitigating factor was that defendant had no criminal history—“a strong 

consideration,” the court remarked. See id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(7). In addition, the court took into account, 

as nonstatutory mitigating factors, defendant’s education (a general equivalency degree and some 

college classes) and her employment history.

¶ 21 Because defendant had been, as defense counsel put it, “self-sufficient” and lawabiding for the 33 years of her life preceding the shooting incident, defense counsel urged the 

circuit court to sentence defendant to probation—notwithstanding the charges of aggravated 

battery, to which defendant recently had pleaded guilty. The court, however, had concerns. Not 

only did defendant lack, as the court put it, “a strong family network,” but her “peer association” 

was questionable. A friend had supplied defendant with the pistol that defendant subsequently used 

to shoot at Clark. The “minimization” of this shooting incident also was concerning to the court: 

“the explanation *** regarding a misunderstanding or an argument and it being justified and being 

escalated to the use of a handgun.” Mental health, the court noted, could “cut both ways in terms 

of mitigating and aggravating here.”

¶ 22 At the conclusion of its rationale, the circuit court reiterated that, regardless of 

whether it had specifically addressed one topic or other, the court had taken into consideration 

every matter presented in the sentencing hearing, including “the presentence investigation” and 

“what’s been argued here by counsel.” The court decided that, on balance, the fitting sentence for 

defendant’s aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction was imprisonment for eight years.
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¶ 23 Defense counsel never filed a postsentencing motion. On August 8, 2022—46 days 

after the sentencing hearing—defendant filed a pro se motion for a reduction of the sentence. The 

circuit court struck the pro se motion, however, on the grounds that it was untimely and that the 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. 

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 A. Our Jurisdiction Over This Appeal

¶ 26 To be timely, a notice of appeal “must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court 

within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against 

the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021). The final judgment in a criminal case is the oral 

pronouncement of the sentence. See People v. Allen, 71 Ill. 2d 378, 381 (1978); People v. Toolen, 

116 Ill. App. 3d 632, 643 (1983). In the present case, the circuit court orally pronounced the 

sentence on June 24, 2022. To be timely, a postsentencing motion or notice of appeal had to be 

filed no later than July 24, 2022, which was 30 days after sentencing. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) 

(West 2020). Neither a postsentencing motion nor a notice of appeal was filed during that 30-day 

period. Therefore, defendant missed the deadline for appealing.

¶ 27 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. Mar. 12, 2022) allows a late notice of 

appeal on the following conditions:

“On motion supported by a showing of reasonable excuse for failing to file a notice 

of appeal on time filed in the reviewing court within 30 days of the expiration of 

the time for filing the notice of appeal, or on motion supported by a showing by 

affidavit that there is merit to the appeal and that the failure to file a notice of appeal 

on time was not due to appellant’s culpable negligence, filed in the reviewing court 
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within six months of the expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal, in 

either case accompanied by the proposed notice of appeal, the reviewing court may 

grant leave to appeal and order the clerk to transmit the notice of appeal to the trial 

court for filing. However, when the appellant is filing the motion pro se from a 

correctional institution, the appellant may submit, in lieu of the affidavit referred to 

herein, a certification as provided in section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(735 ILCS 5/1-109).” 

¶ 28 Within 30 days after the expired deadline for filing a notice of appeal—that is, on 

or before August 23, 2022—defendant did not file in the appellate court a “motion supported by a 

showing of reasonable excuse for failing to file a notice of appeal.” Id. Therefore, within six 

months after the expired deadline for filing a notice of appeal—that is, on or before December 26, 

2022 (see 5 ILCS 70/1.10, 1.11 (West 2022))—defendant had to file in the appellate court three 

documents. First, she had to file a motion for permission to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(c) (eff. 

Mar. 12, 2022). Second, she had to file a proposed notice of appeal. See id. Third, she had to file 

an affidavit “showing *** that there is merit to the appeal and that the failure to file a notice of 

appeal on time was not due to appellant’s culpable negligence.” Id.

¶ 29 On November 30, 2022, within the six-month deadline, defendant filed in the 

appellate court a motion for permission to appeal and a proposed notice of appeal, combined into 

one document. She also filed in the appellate court an affidavit in which the following explanation 

was written after the preprinted language “State reasons that you did not file a notice of appeal in 

this case within 30 days of sentencing”: “Sent to Logan Correctional Center for 3 weeks then sent 

to D.C.C. where I was immediately put to work.” After the preprinted language “State why you 

believe your appeal has merit,” the following was written: “Important factors that were failed to 
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be presented in court/ineffective counsel.” It could reasonably be debated whether being 

transferred to different correctional centers—each of which presumably had pen, paper, and mail 

delivery--adequately explains the failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after sentencing. 

Also, it is reasonably debatable whether the merits of a proposed appeal are shown by vague, 

conclusory language such as “Important factors that were failed to be presented in court/ineffective 

counsel.” Even so, within the prescribed time, defendant filed documents that colorably conformed 

to Rule 606(c), and therefore, on December 1, 2022, we allowed her motion to file a late notice of 

appeal.

¶ 30 The State challenges our jurisdiction because the supporting affidavit required by 

Rule 606(c) is not in the common-law record from the circuit court. The appellate court, however, 

received a supporting affidavit from defendant. The rule says that the motion to file a late notice 

of appeal, the proposed notice of appeal, and the affidavit must be “filed in the reviewing court.” 

Id. By taking judicial notice of our own records, as we may do (see People v. Brown, 2023 IL App 

(2d) 220334, ¶ 26 n.2), we find the affidavit requirement to have been fulfilled. Therefore, we

grant defendant’s motion to take judicial notice of the affidavit in the appellate court’s records, 

and we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

¶ 31 B. Procedural Forfeiture

¶ 32 “[T]o preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and 

a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 

544 (2010). The postsentencing motion must be filed within 30 days after the sentence was 

imposed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2022). In this case, no postsentencing motion was 

filed within 30 days after sentencing. Therefore, any sentencing issue is unpreserved. See Hillier, 

237 Ill. 2d at 544.
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¶ 33 C. The Theory of Plain Error

¶ 34 We may review a claim of unpreserved sentencing error only if the defendant shows 

the applicability of the plain-error doctrine. See id. at 545. Specifically, the required showing is as 

follows: 

“To obtain relief under this rule, a defendant must first show that a clear or obvious 

error occurred. [Citation.] In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show 

either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or 

(2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” 

Id.

¶ 35 Defendant claims that her sentence is excessive and, for that reason, erroneous. 

Specifically, she argues that her

“sentence is excessive in light of the sentencing court’s overstatement of evidence 

in aggravation and where there was significant mitigating evidence that justified a 

sentence closer to the minimum, including [her] being the victim of domestic 

violence, her expression of remorse and cooperation with the police, her stable 

housing arrangements, employment, and education, her history of mental health 

issues, and her lack of [a] criminal record.”

Defendant invokes both theories of plain error. In her view, the mitigating factors dwarf the 

aggravating factors. Also, she complains that by failing to balance the factors fairly, the circuit 

court deprived her of a fair sentencing hearing.

¶ 36 To win relief under the plain-error doctrine, defendant must begin by establishing 

the commission of a clear or obvious error. See id. We could break down this threshold requirement 

by first considering whether defendant has shown the commission of any reversible error at all, for 
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“[a]bsent reversible error, there can be no plain error.” People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 602 

(2008). Reversible error is necessary but insufficient to cross the threshold of plain-error 

analysis—the error additionally would have to be “manifest or patent,” that is to say, clear or 

obvious. People v. Hammons, 2018 IL App (4th) 160385, ¶ 17. But unless the circuit court 

committed a reversible error, there would be no occasion to decide whether the error was clear or 

obvious. 

¶ 37 We begin, then, by considering whether (assuming no forfeiture of this contention)

the sentence is reversibly erroneous in the sense of being too severe. The sentence, we note, is 

within the statutory range. Aggravated discharge of a firearm is a Class 1 felony (see 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.2(a)(2), (b) (West 2020)), and Class 1 felonies are punishable by imprisonment for not less 

than 4 years and nor more than 15 years (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2020)). Eight years’ 

imprisonment is within the range of punishment that the legislature has delineated for the offense

of which defendant was convicted. See id. In fact, eight years’ imprisonment is closer to the lower 

end than to the higher end of the statutory range. “A sentence that falls within the statutorily 

prescribed range is presumed to be appropriate.” People v. Hampton, 2021 IL App (5th) 170341, 

¶ 136. The burden is on defendant to rebut this presumption of appropriateness. See People v. 

Lovell, 2022 IL App (3d) 200516, ¶ 19.

¶ 38 To carry that burden, defendant must establish that the sentence is an abuse of 

discretion. See id. ¶ 18. The Fourth District has explained this standard of review as follows: 

“An abuse of discretion will not be found unless the court’s sentencing decision is 

fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would 

agree with it. [Citation.] Also, an abuse of discretion will be found where the 

sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly 
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disproportionate to the nature of the offense. [Citation.] A trial court’s sentencing 

decision is entitled to great deference, and we may not substitute our judgment for 

the trial court’s merely because we might have weighed the sentencing factors 

differently.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Lawson, 2018 IL App 

(4th) 170105, ¶ 28. 

¶ 39 With that deferential standard of review in mind, we turn to defendant’s argument 

that the sentence of eight years’ imprisonment is an abuse of discretion. Defendant argues that 

“[t]he most important factors to consider in fashioning an appropriate sentence are the seriousness 

of the crime and the degree of harm caused by the defendant.” More accurately, it is an aggravating 

factor that “the defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm.” (Emphasis added.) 730 

ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2020). At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court found that 

defendant’s conduct posed “a risk to not only Mr. Clark, but the public, and a serious risk.” 

Defendant does not appear to dispute that she put Clark in danger of serious bodily harm. She 

disputes, however, that she endangered anyone else. Thus, she contends that the aggravating factor 

of threatened harm was overstated.

¶ 40 Defendant has a reasonable argument here. She aimed only at the ground, at Clark, 

and at his car. She did not aim in the direction of anyone else, and thus, by her logic, the public

(other than Clark) was not in danger. That defendant has a reasonable argument, however, does 

not make the circuit court’s contrary position unreasonable. The question for us is whether, by 

finding that defendant put the public at serious risk, the court made a finding that was fanciful or 

arbitrary, a finding with which no reasonable person could agree. See Lawson, 2018 IL App (4th) 

170105, ¶ 28. When we look at the photographs in the record, the apartment buildings appear to 

be rather close to where defendant fired the pistol. There is the row where defendant and Clark 
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had parked, and then there is a space large enough for cars to back out and go by one another, and 

then there is another row for parked cars, and then there are apartment buildings. When we see the 

photograph of the gouge that a bullet left in the asphalt of the parking lot, it does not seem 

impossible that the bullet, if fired or ricocheted in the direction of an apartment building, could 

have gone through a windowpane or a vinyl-sided wall. Admittedly unfamiliar with firearms, 

defendant accidentally fired a shot into the pavement. She could have accidentally fired, instead,

in the direction of an apartment building, or the bullet could have ricocheted off the pavement or 

off a car and in the direction of an apartment building. Arguably, someone who knows little or 

nothing about firearms but who nevertheless discharges a firearm, repeatedly, in a populated area 

endangers everyone in the vicinity. The danger comes from the person’s ineptitude and 

inexperience in the use of firearms. On this logic, we are unconvinced that every reasonable person 

would disagree with the circuit court that defendant threatened serious harm not only to Clark but 

also to other members of the public.

¶ 41 The threat of serious harm contributes to the seriousness of the offense, which is 

the most important factor in the sentencing decision (People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, 

¶ 112). To be sure, the sentencing court should take into account any other relevant factors as well, 

“including the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social 

environment, habits, and age.” People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977). But “[t]he most 

important sentencing factor is the seriousness of the offense, and the court need not give greater 

weight to rehabilitation or mitigating factors than to the severity of the offense.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶ 112. The appellate court has explained, 

“The word ‘offense,’ in the phrase the ‘seriousness of the offense,’ means not the statutory offense 
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in the abstract but the offense as committed by the defendant: the particular facts and circumstances 

of the defendant’s offense.” Id.

¶ 42 Four circumstances or features of the offense as committed by defendant could have 

reasonably led the circuit court to regard the offense as rather serious.

¶ 43 First, defendant fired at Clark, intending to shoot him. Firing at the victim, with the 

intention and expectation to strike the victim, is not, strictly speaking, an element of aggravated 

discharge of a firearm. Rather, all the statute requires is discharging a firearm “in the direction of 

another person”—not quite the same as shooting at a person. See People v. Hartfield, 2020 IL App 

(4th) 170787, ¶¶ 68-69 (in which a similar distinction is explained). Thus, a defendant could 

deliberately aim above the victim’s head or to the side of the victim, intending to miss the victim 

and to merely scare the victim, and the defendant thereby would discharge the firearm in the 

direction of the victim. But if a defendant deliberately aims a firearm at a victim and pulls the 

trigger, intending that the bullet rip through the victim’s flesh, the defendant has done more than 

fire in the victim’s direction. According to defendant’s statement to the police, she intended to 

shoot Clark, not just shoot in his direction. Arguably, that fact elevates the seriousness of the 

offense above the baseline. To say that defendant merely fired in Clark’s direction does not fully 

describe her wrongdoing with the pistol.

¶ 44 Second, the bullet hole in Clark’s shorts tends to suggest that defendant put Clark

in imminent mortal danger. Clark had a close call. If the bullet had struck him in the leg—as it 

nearly did—he could have bled to death.

¶ 45 Third, defendant fired repeatedly. Each discharge of the firearm in Clark’s direction 

could have been a separate count, a separate unit of prosecution. See id. That the State chose to 

charge defendant with only one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm would not have 
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precluded the sentencing court from taking into consideration that defendant committed that 

offense multiple times.

¶ 46 Fourth, even after committing the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm 

multiple times, defendant evinced an intention to persist in committing that offense. Upon running 

out of ammunition after firing every cartridge in the cylinder of her revolver, she continued aiming 

at Clark and pulling the trigger.

¶ 47 So, arguably, the offense was especially serious. The circuit court was entitled to 

give greater weight to the seriousness of the offense than to rehabilitation or to mitigating factors 

such as defendant’s having been the victim of domestic violence, her expression of remorse, her 

cooperation with the police, her stable housing arrangements, her employment, her education, her 

history of mental-health problems, and her lack of a criminal record. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 

200081, ¶ 112. Moreover, some of these mitigating factors might be regarded as questionable or 

less than compelling. For example, the mere fact of having a psychological disorder is not 

inherently mitigating. See People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 42-43 (2006). The expression of 

remorse in defendant’s allocution statement might have come across as an unconvincing revision 

in light of what defendant had told the probation officer: that the incident in the parking lot was 

“just a serious argument.” Defendant’s representation in her allocution statement that she “wasn’t 

shooting at [Clark]” is inconsistent with her statement to the police that she had intended to shoot 

Clark in the feet. Such an inconsistency could be important. In assessing a defendant’s potential 

for rehabilitation, the sentencing court might take into account the defendant’s credibility. See 

Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154. Arguably, while the lack of a prior criminal record at the time of the 

present offense bodes well for rehabilitation, the commission of further felonies while one is in 

custody, awaiting trial, bodes ill for rehabilitation.
- 19 - 

¶ 48 In short, in defendant’s case, the considerations are mixed. There is cause for 

severity, and there is cause for leniency. A reasonable person could take the view that the sentence 

of eight years’ imprisonment fairly reflects that mixture. By dialing the punishment down to 

somewhat below the mid-range, the circuit court took account of the mitigating factors. By 

stopping at eight years—four years above the minimum—the court took account of the aggravating 

factors, such as the seriousness of the offense and the commission of further felonies while in 

custody. We are unconvinced, then, that the sentence is an abuse of discretion. And we are far 

from convinced that the sentence is a clear or obvious abuse of discretion. Finding no plain error, 

we give effect to the procedural forfeiture of the sentencing issues. See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545.

¶ 49 D. The Theory of Ineffective Assistance

¶ 50 Defense counsel was obligated to render professionally reasonable assistance, and 

we strongly presume that he fulfilled that obligation. See People v. Rodriguez, 364 Ill. App. 3d 

304, 312 (2006). Professionally reasonable assistance does not require defense counsel to file a 

postsentencing motion in every case as a matter of course. See People v. Houston, 363 Ill. App. 

3d 567, 577-78 (2006). Defense counsel could legitimately decide that a postsentencing motion is 

called for only if the sentence is an abuse of discretion. As we have concluded, the sentence in this 

case was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, defense counsel’s decision to refrain from filing a 

postsentencing motion was “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” 

(Rodriguez, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 312). We find no ineffective assistance.

¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 53 Affirmed.