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S. HRG. 113–529 

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND GREAT LAKES REGION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 26, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Affleck, Ben, director, actor, writer, producer; founder, Eastern Congo Initiative, Los Angeles, CA ........................................................................................... 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 2 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region 

and the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 64 

Responses and attachments to questions submitted for the record by 

Senator Bob Corker ...................................................................................... 69 

Gilpin, Dr. Raymond, academic dean, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University, Washington, DC ................................................. 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 65 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Bob Corker ... 68 

Meece, Hon. Roger, former U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic Republic 

of Congo, former United Nations Special Representative for the Democratic 

Republic of Congo, Seattle, WA .......................................................................... 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Bob Corker ...... 66 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Written Statement of Dr. Denis Mukwege, founder and director of the Panzi 

Hospital in the DRC ............................................................................................ 58 

Written Statement of Mark Dwyer, country director, Democratic Republic 

of Congo, Mercy Corps ......................................................................................... 60 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND GREAT LAKES 

REGION 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:21 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Coons, Markey, Corker, 

Risch, Johnson, Flake, McCain, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. This hearing will come to order. 

We want to welcome our panelists, and our distinguished colleague who is doing an incredible job as special envoy. We welcome 

him back not only to the Senate, but to this committee, where he 

served with such distinction and had a passion for Africa that is 

still evident today. And welcome to all of our distinguished panelists and guests, and to Mr. Affleck for clearly drawing so much 

attention to this important international issue. [Laughter.] 

Now, I say that on a serious note. Mr. Affleck has pursued his 

interests in the eastern Congo with thoughtfulness and seriousness 

of purpose, over nine trips, and so we appreciate him in that 

context. 

We are here to shed light on the best way forward to end the 

horrific violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Over the last 

two decades, over 5 million people have been killed, hundreds of 

thousands more displaced. There have been brutal killings, continued recruitment and conscription of child soldiers, and horrendous 

acts of sexual violence against women and girls. 

The M23 rebellion was just the latest iteration of a long conflict 

that has stalled economic development and destroyed the social 

fabric of communities in eastern Congo. I commend the work of the 

international group of envoys, including our own special envoy, as 

I said, a good friend and former colleague, Senator Feingold, as 

well as regional players like Uganda for their efforts to promote 

political reconciliation in the DRC. 

But the apparent end of the M23 rebellion has not ended the violence. The latest U.N. group of experts report documented evidence 

of continued recruitment by the M23 and the regional threat posed 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

by the FDLR, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, 

by Kata Katanga, by various Mai-Mai militias and by dozens of 

other groups. 

At the end of the day, the international community must send 

a clear and forceful message that the era of impunity for those who 

commit human rights violations is over. I commend the Congolese 

Government for taking the first important step with the passage of 

a new amnesty law that seeks to hold those who have committed 

acts of genocide fully accountable. There is, however, much more to 

do. 

Before I turn to our distinguished ranking member, I am pleased 

that we are joined today by Dr. Denis Mukwege, founder of the 

Panzi Hospital in Bukavu. Dr. Mukwege has been a tireless advocate for human rights and the rights of women. Both he and the 

Panzi Hospital are internationally known for being there 24/7 for 

survivors of sexual violence. So, Doctor, I would ask you to stand 

and be recognized. We do not do that often, but this is an extraordinary feat. Thank you very much. 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you, Doctor, for being with us 

today. I ask unanimous consent that the Doctor’s prepared statement be submitted for the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—Dr. Mukwege’s prepared statement can be found 

in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at 

the end of this hearing.] 

His statement and our panelists’ testimony will help to answer 

the questions before us. What is their assessment of the security 

situation in the east since the end of the M23 rebellion? Do other 

armed groups pose a threat to the Congolese Government and civilian populations? What are the economic and political dimensions of 

the conflict? What is the current status of political reconciliation 

under the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process? And what 

role will other regional actors play? And how can the United States 

Government best continue to support regional and international 

efforts toward peace and stability in the African Great Lakes 

Region? 

So again, with our thanks to all of our panelists, let me turn to 

the distinguished ranking Republican, Senator Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very 

much you having this hearing today. 

And I want to thank Senator Feingold for coming back. We 

talked in the back room about his passion for this issue and his 

interest. I appreciate you being here with much lesser known witnesses behind you. And I do thank them, by the way, all of them, 

for their input later. But it is great for our Nation that we have 

people, because of who they are, able to generate so much interest 

in an issue. 

So, again, I thank you for this hearing. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

For about 14 years now, the international community has sought, 

without much success, to bring some resolution to the conflict that 

has extracted such a terrible toll on the people of DRC. Since 2000, 

the United States has devoted about $10 billion to the DRC in 

humanitarian assistance, development assistance, and peacekeeping contributions. Additional U.S. assistance is contributed 

through multilateral contributions of the World Bank, IMF, African 

Development Bank. The peacekeeping mission is the largest and 

most expensive in the world at over $1 billion a year. 

Yet, I am concerned that we have not seen the progress to show 

for all of these investments. Rebel groups continue to terrorize 

civilians, the governments, and the armies of the region—including 

that of the DRC—continue to act as criminal syndicates plundering 

the country and causing needless human suffering. 

While we have seen glimmers of hope in this past year with the 

signing of the 2013 framework agreement—and we thank you for 

your efforts in that regard—and the M23’s announcement that it 

was ending its rebellion, this is a fragile accord, as we all know, 

and one that is being implemented very slowly. The framework 

agreement is an opportunity that I know the administration has 

worked hard to make real and one that we do not want to slip 

away. 

I am also aware that this is not something over which the United 

States has full control by any stretch of the imagination. Yet, as 

we look ahead, I want to know that we are doing all that we can 

to make sure that the next 13 years in the DRC are not like the 

last 13. And I thank all of you for your efforts in that regard. 

So I look forward to exploring these issues with you more in 

depth. I want to thank all the distinguished witnesses for being 

here today and look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, before I turn to Senator Feingold, recognize someone who has done incredible work for us as the full committee, the chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, Senator Coons. 

I appreciate your very significant, thoughtful work on the committee, joined by Senator Flake in a bipartisan spirit, and we look 

forward to hearing your insights during the course of this hearing. 

With that, let me turn to our first witness. During 18 distinguished years in the Senate, he served on, and led, the African 

Affairs Subcommittee, and we look forward to his perspective as 

the special envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the 

DRC. Senator Feingold, as you know, your full statement will be 

included in the record, and we ask you to summarize it in 5 minutes or so. But, you know, we certainly want to hear from you so 

that we can enter into a dialogue and get some questions and perspectives from you on the ground. And with that, we welcome you 

back to the committee and are looking forward to hearing your 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SPECIAL 

ENVOY FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. It is good to be back, and thank 

you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today on 

the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region. 

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the 

DRC has long been one of the most volatile in Africa. 

I do want to say, though, looking at the region today, I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead. The highest levels of the 

U.S. Government are now committed to helping the DRC and the 

Great Lakes region realize peace and development. President 

Obama’s and Secretary Kerry’s decision to appoint a full-time 

special envoy to the Great Lakes is just one testament to their 

commitment to maintaining high-level, sustained attention to the 

region. 

And I want to say that the support of the State Department in 

my efforts has been tremendous. I was on the other side of this for 

many years, and it is something to be on the inside and see the 

incredibly hard-working and talented people you have to support 

you in a complicated task like this. 

Since early September of last year, I have made seven trips to 

the region to try to bring sustained attention and a comprehensive 

approach to resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes. Today we are 

seeing progress in addressing the threat from armed groups and 

also in furthering a regionally led peace process. We are also, I 

think, seeing the region’s attitude toward the United States 

improve in recognition of our consistent high-level engagement. 

The last time the State Department testified on the DRC in 

December 2012, the Congo was actually consumed by the M23 

rebellion. Since then, there has been significant international focus 

on the Great Lakes, including the signature of the 13 countries to 

the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework Agreement for 

the Great Lakes, which you mentioned, and also the appointment 

of U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson. 

I can thankfully report that in response to combined military and 

political pressures, the M23 ended its rebellion on November 5 of 

last year. This important outcome was a result of military pressure 

on the M23, diplomatic pressure in the region, but also the successful conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue between the M23 and the 

DRC Government. After months of stalemate between the parties, 

I joined my fellow envoys from the U.N., the AU, and the EU in 

traveling to Kampala last September to try to get this impasse out 

of the way. We subsequently made repeated trips to engage directly 

with the parties over the contents of what became known as the 

Nairobi Declarations, which the M23 and the DRC Government 

signed on December 12, 2013, and which set out the conditions for 

the demobilization of the M23. 

Now, having said that, there are three key steps to building on 

this recent progress in the DRC: implementing those Nairobi Declarations, furthering the framework peace process, and also undertaking domestic reforms within the DRC. And I list these not in 

any particular order of priority. They are all three equally important and must be pursued simultaneously. 

First, on the Nairobi Declarations, the DRC Government fulfilled 

one of its primary commitments just a few days ago by promulgating a law which grants amnesty for the act of insurrection to 

those individuals who actually renounce rebellion. But—and this is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

critical—the law does not grant amnesty for war crimes or for 

crimes against humanity or other human rights abuses. And this 

is different from the other peace agreements in the past. The 

Nairobi Declarations call for accountability and leave no room for 

impunity, which in the past has just sown the seeds for future 

rebellions, as Senator Corker was alluding to in his remarks. 

I was encouraged during my recent trip to the DRC to hear that 

the government also is very likely to support mixed chambers. 

These are hybrid courts that would be staffed and supported by 

both the DRC and also international personnel and which would 

significantly aid in the fight against impunity. 

The next important step in implementing the declarations is ensuring that the hundreds of ex-M23 combatants who are currently 

in the DRC and Uganda and Rwanda actually complete the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. It is known as 

DDR. We are actively engaging the DRC Government regarding the 

urgency of implementing an effective DDR plan for not only the 

M23 but also for the dozens of other armed groups that were still 

active in eastern Congo. The DRC has an unprecedented opportunity to capitalize on the willingness of thousands of combatants 

to demobilize. However, I will say this. If the government does not 

act soon, it risks having these ex-combatants regroup or join other 

armed groups. 

The second point. Beyond the declarations in Nairobi, the Great 

Lakes region needs to continue robust implementation of the 

broader framework peace process. We commend U.N. Special 

Envoy Robinson’s stewardship of the process and the substantial 

progress that has been made to date. We believe that fulfilling the 

framework’s overarching objectives will also require key signatories 

to undertake a broader political dialogue aimed at identifying and 

resolving the regional root causes of this very complicated conflict. 

And actually sort of a surprising but very promising thing happened just in January of this year, and that is the budding dialogue led by Angolan President dos Santos who assumed the chair 

of the International Conference on the Great Lakes last month. I 

had a chance to witness in Rwanda during his first day as Chair 

that President dos Santos convened, after having no particular 

plan to do so in advance, the Presidents of the DRC, Rwanda, 

Uganda, and South Africa to discuss the FDLR, which is an armed 

group led by the former Rwanda genocidaires which has plagued 

the eastern Congo and Rwanda for more than a decade. My fellow 

envoys and I, as well as regional leaders, were pleasantly pleased 

and saw in this meeting the potential start to the needed broader 

dialogue. We strongly support and encourage Angola’s role in facilitating a regionally owned and initiated dialogue under the auspices 

of the framework and stand ready to support President dos Santos 

in furthering it. 

Finally, the third issue. While ending the M23 rebellion was a 

critical step, the DRC still has much, much more it needs to do to 

stabilize and secure the country, including comprehensive security 

sector and governance reform. For starters, the DRC needs to immediately ramp up its preparations for upcoming elections if it is 

to avoid a repeat of the seriously flawed 2011 elections. It is critical 

for the trajectory and credibility of the country that these next elecFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

tions, the local, provincial, and national elections, over the next few 

years be credible and meet international election standards. If we 

are serious about prioritizing democratization, we should also consider identifying additional funds to ensure adequate support for 

upcoming elections. 

On security, the government has to do more to ensure members 

of the security forces are professionally trained, adequately paid, 

and respectful of human rights. While the FARDC experienced a 

commendable victory against the M23, it continues to be hampered 

sometimes by ineffective command and control, limited resources, 

corruption, and poor military planning capability. The DRC Government and MONUSCO also need to follow up the defeat of the 

M23 by applying equal military pressure on other armed groups, 

starting with the FDLR and the ADF. Indeed, we are hopeful that 

the FARDC and MONUSCO will launch robust operations against 

the FDLR soon. 

Despite these challenges, Mr. Chairman, I reiterate my previous 

assertion that I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead for 

the DRC and the Great Lakes. The DRC is at a crossroads but has 

a real opportunity to realize the peace and prosperity that has 

evaded it for far too long. 

So thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the invitation to testify today on the recent progress in and continuing 

challenges facing the African Great Lakes Region and the Democratic Republic of 

Congo (DRC), and our comprehensive efforts to support the region in resolving the 

root causes of conflict and instability. 

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the DRC has long been 

one of the most volatile in Africa. An estimated 5 million people have lost their lives 

since 1998, millions more have been displaced, and billions of dollars have been 

spent trying to stabilize the region. Looking at the region today, however, I am cautiously optimistic about the road ahead, while recognizing that myriad challenges 

still stand in the way of lasting peace and stability. 

The highest levels of the U.S. Government are committed to helping the DRC and 

the Great Lakes region permanently break the cycle of violence and realize its 

democratic and economic potential. President Obama’s and Secretary Kerry’s 

appointment of a full-time special envoy is a testament to their commitment to 

maintaining high-level attention on this region. On my own part, I have made seven 

trips to the region in 6 months, meeting repeatedly with heads of state, civil society, 

and our donor partners to bring sustained attention and a comprehensive approach 

to resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes. Today, we are seeing progress in addressing the threat from armed groups and in furthering the regionally led peace process. 

We are also seeing the region’s attitude toward the United States improve in recognition of our consistent high-level engagement. 

SITUATIONAL UPDATE

The last time the State Department testified on the DRC in December 2012, the 

country was consumed by the M23 rebellion and the capture of Goma had raised 

grave doubts about the ability of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC, called 

MONUSCO, to protect civilians against the threat of armed groups. I can thankfully 

report that the outlook today is very different. In response to combined military and 

political pressures, the M23 was defeated and formally ended its rebellion last 

November. 

Three key developments contributed to the military defeat of the M23. First, the 

DRC Government put in place more operationally effective and accountable military 

officers in the embattled region of North Kivu, helping to overcome previous reluctance by the DRC military, or FARDC, to pursue the M23. Second, last March, the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

U.N. Security Council approved the establishment within MONUSCO of the first 

regionally led, 3,000-troop-strong Intervention Brigade, or IB, composed of troops 

from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. We strongly supported this more explicit 

Chapter VII mandate in an effort to increase MONUSCO’s capability to protect 

civilians by more robustly targeting armed groups. The IB provided critical support 

to the FARDC and helped to successfully protect civilians and defend Goma during 

the M23’s attacks last year. Third, as the U.N. Group of Experts and other reporting 

indicates, outside support to the M23 decreased toward the end of the rebellion. We 

believe this was in part the result of sustained, high-level diplomatic and financial 

pressure on Rwanda to cease support for the M23. 

The political resolution of the M23 rebellion, on the other hand, came via the 

Kampala Dialogue, successfully facilitated by Uganda in its role as chair of the 

regional organization the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, or 

the ICGLR. While the Kampala Dialogue started in December 2012, it lagged for 

months in large part because of the lack of sufficient military pressure on and continued external support to the M23. However, the talks gained traction last fall 

when the M23 was forced to drop its more unrealistic demands in the face of 

increased military pressure from the FARDC and MONUSCO. The Ugandan Government’s continued engagement throughout this period also is commendable; had 

they given up when talks lagged, we might have seen a very different outcome. 

I also believe the eventual success of the Kampala Dialogue was a result of the 

added participation of a set of five international envoys—U.N. Special Envoy Mary 

Robinson, the Special Representative of the Secretary General Martin Kobler, Special Representative for the African Union Boubecar Diarra, Senior Coordinator for 

the European Union Koen Vervaeke, and me. Prior to last September, the international community had not participated in the Kampala Dialogue, or even been 

allowed in the room during the substantive negotiations. This changed last September, when during the envoys’ first joint trip to the region, we met with the DRC 

and the M23 delegations in an effort to overcome the stalemate in the talks and 

pressure the parties toward an internationally acceptable outcome. We subsequently 

made repeated trips to Kampala, engaging directly with the parties over the contents of an eventual peace arrangement. I believe the active participation of the 

envoys was a key turning point in the Kampala Dialogue. 

The Kampala Dialogue concluded on December 12, 2013, with the M23s and the 

DRC Government’s signing of their respective Nairobi Declarations, which among 

other things, set out the conditions for the disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration of the M23 into Congolese society, and called for those responsible for 

war crimes and crimes against humanity to be held accountable. Unlike previous 

agreements between the DRC Government and rebel groups that failed to hold up 

over time or achieve lasting stability, the Nairobi Declarations do not grant blanket 

amnesty to the M23 for mass atrocities and do not provide for the reintegration of 

the M23 as a group into the DRC military. The Declarations have yet to be fully 

implemented, however, and M23 fighters and leaders remain spread out in Uganda, 

Rwanda, and the DRC. Thus, while the official end of the M23 rebellion is promising, the long-term success of the declarations will be dependent on the parties’ 

prompt and full implementation of their commitments, as well as the cooperation 

of neighboring countries in supporting the implementation of these commitments. 

Similarly, the continuation of the positive momentum gained from the end of the 

M23 rebellion is dependent on the region’s implementation of the broader Peace, 

Security, and Cooperation Framework Agreement, signed a year ago by the DRC, 

Rwanda, Uganda, and an unprecedented 10 other countries in the region, and 

signed by the U.N., the AU, the ICGLR, and the Southern African Development 

Community (SADC) as guarantors. We believe the Framework, which sets out commitments by the DRC, the region, and the international community, provides the 

Great Lakes with the best opportunity to resolve the root causes of conflict, if 

participating governments maintain the political will necessary to implement their 

commitments. 

NEXT STEPS

Looking forward, there are three key next steps to building on recent progress in 

the DRC and to preventing backsliding. I list these not in order of priority, as all 

three are equally important and must be pursued simultaneously. The first is following up on the Kampala Dialogue with the full implementation of the Nairobi 

Declarations. Second is the advancement of the Framework peace process, including 

through broader political dialogue between and among key signatory states. And 

third, and perhaps the most challenging, is undertaking domestic reforms within the 

DRC. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

I. Followup to the Kampala Dialogue 

On the Nairobi Declarations, the DRC Government has already fulfilled one of its 

primary commitments by promulgating the recent amnesty law, which grants 

amnesty for the act of insurrection on a case-by-case basis to those individuals who 

renounce rebellion. The law does not grant amnesty for war crimes, crimes against 

humanity, sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers, or other human rights 

abuses. The envoys played a key role during the Kampala Dialogue in ensuring that 

unlike previous peace arrangements, the Nairobi Declarations do not provide for 

impunity, which has in the past sown the seeds for future rebellions. 

In this same vein, I was encouraged, during my trip to the DRC last month, to 

hear a variety of Congolese officials express support for mixed chambers—hybrid 

courts to be staffed by both Congolese and international jurists and support staff. 

I was told repeatedly that the necessary legislation is slated for the March session 

of Parliament, although it remains to be seen whether Parliament and the President 

will, indeed, exhibit the political will necessary to establish the courts. We believe 

that the international community could play an important role in assisting the Congolese to establish a mechanism with the requisite expertise and independence to 

investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of mass atrocities. In the meantime, we 

continue to urge the DRC Government to further reform its judicial sector to fight 

impunity, including increasing the capacity for fair and speedy trials, deploying 

additional trained jurists, and improving its prison and detention facilities and witness protection program. 

The next important step in implementing the Nairobi Declarations is ensuring 

that the hundreds of Congolese ex-M23 combatants currently spread out across the 

DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda, complete the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, or DDR. We are actively engaging the highest levels of the DRC 

Government and MONUSCO regarding the urgency of implementing an effective 

DDR plan. We are concerned that, while the DRC Government passed a DDR plan 

in December 2013 and promulgated a budget for it on February 1, details on the 

operational plan and implementation are still lacking, particularly with regard to 

community reintegration programs, a critical component to end the cycle of violence. 

During my recent trip, I visited one of the identified DDR sites. While the buildings 

were more or less ready to house people, the processing procedures and the programs for those ex-combatants brought to the sites was unclear. The lack of funding 

and preparation by the DRC Government and the resulting concerns of the international community are also stalling MONUSCO’s ability to provide logistical support for DDR. This is complicating and delaying the DDR process for not just the 

M23, but for the dozens of other armed groups in eastern DRC that have surrendered in the wake of the M23’s defeat. Rwanda and Uganda, which combined are 

hosting and feeding upward of 2,000 ex-M23 combatants, are also unlikely to transfer these combatants back to the DRC in the absence of an established DDR 

program. 

Particularly worrisome is how unclear the DDR process is to those ex-combatants 

who are to go through it. This lack of information and resulting skepticism is keeping some armed groups, who might otherwise demobilize, in the bush. Some armed 

groups are even sending low-level fighters to surrender in order to learn what is 

being offered through the DDR program. The DRC Government has an unprecedented opportunity to capitalize on the willingness of thousands of current and excombatants to demobilize; however, if the government does not act soon, it risks 

having these ex-combatants regroup or join other armed groups. On the flip side, 

were the DRC Government to institute an effective DDR program, it would be one 

of the best vehicles for drawing out defections from other armed groups and preventing the recycling of combatants. 

While the DRC works to implement DDR, Rwanda, and Uganda still have a 

responsibility for maintaining effective control over the M23 ex-combatants, which 

they accepted onto their respective territories. They have a responsibility under the 

Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework to not support armed groups, and in 

turn not to allow these ex-combatants to slip out of their containment camps and 

back into the DRC potentially to regroup or join other armed groups still operating 

in the DRC. This is especially the case for the M23’s most notorious leaders, many 

of whom face arrest warrants in the DRC, are subject to a worldwide travel ban, 

and under U.S. and U.N. sanctions. It is critical that Uganda and Rwanda uphold 

their commitments to turn over the M23 leaders responsible for human rights violations to the DRC so that they can be held accountable for the international crimes 

they have committed. 

Moving the hundreds of current and expected ex-combatants through the first 

stages of DDR will potentially take at least a year, with the reintegration phase 

taking considerably longer, all at considerable expense. It also will require the full 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

cooperation of the neighboring countries where the ex-combatants are currently 

quartered. While the onus is on the DRC Government to fund and implement DDR, 

donors should consider supporting DDR efforts as part of our broader efforts toward 

security sector reform and stabilization. 

The final phase of DDR—reintegration—is arguably the most challenging as it 

requires extended efforts to help ex-combatants return to civilian life as well as help 

the communities to which they return. Within such communities during this period, 

there are serious risks of increases in domestic violence and trauma among those 

who suffered violence during the conflict. Restoring state authority, increasing 

employment opportunities, working to prevent gender-based violence, and building 

social cohesion in communities who are integrating ex-combatants is critical to the 

success of DDR. 

II. Framework Peace Process 

Beyond the Nairobi Declarations, the Great Lakes region needs to continue robust 

implementation of the broader Framework peace process. We commend U.N. Special 

Envoy Robinson’s oversight of the process and are encouraged by the signatories’ 

development of regional and international benchmarks and the establishment of a 

Women’s Platform to support the Framework, recognizing that women’s continued 

involvement in the peace process will be critical to its success. We believe, however, 

that fulfilling the Framework’s overarching objectives will also require key signatories to undertake a broader political dialogue aimed at resolving the regional root 

causes of conflict. 

While many of the challenges in the DRC are strictly domestic, there are regional 

root causes to the country’s chronic instability. The DRC has experienced two devastating regional wars within the past 20 years, suffered from the region’s use of 

proxy forces, and is losing substantial revenue in the illegal exploitation of its natural resources. The resulting refugee flows and ethnic tensions do not recognize borders. These complex regional factors necessitate a transparent and in-depth dialogue 

between and among the DRC and key neighbors, conducted under the auspices of 

the Framework. 

With this in mind, I believe one of the most promising signs in the Great Lakes 

region is the budding dialogue taking place under the stewardship of Angolan President Jose ́ Eduardo dos Santos, who assumed the chair of the ICGLR on January 

15 of this year. During his first day as the ICGLR chair, President dos Santos convened the Presidents of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa to discuss the 

FDLR, an armed group led by Rwandan genocidaires which has plagued eastern 

Congo and Rwanda for more than a decade. My fellow envoys and I, as well as 

regional leaders, saw in this meeting the potential start to the needed broader dialogue. Participating Presidents were particularly complimentary of dos Santos’ role 

in the process. We strongly support and encourage Angola’s role in facilitating a 

regionally owned and initiated dialogue within the context of the Framework and 

stand ready to support President dos Santos in furthering it. We hope the ICGLR 

mechanism under Angolan leadership will expand to cover issues such as the return 

of M23 combatants from Rwanda and Uganda, border security, ethnic tension, 

domestic challenges to the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional economic cooperation. We welcomed Angola 

Foreign Minister Chicoti’s recent trip through the Great Lakes region and Angola’s 

pledge of financial support to the ICGLR Executive Secretariat to strengthen its 

technical and organizational capacity, as indicators of Angola’s commitment to its 

new role as Chair of the organization. 

The Framework peace process has the potential to not only resolve security matters but to also boost regional economic cooperation and development. We welcomed 

the World Bank’s announcement last year of $1 billion for Great Lakes projects that 

promote regional economic development and integration and contribute to peacebuilding, and support U.N. Special Envoy Robinson’s efforts to boost private sector 

investment. We are hopeful that the budding ICGLR dialogue can further regional 

development and integration by building trust and helping to overcome trade barriers. Development supports stability by creating employment and improving livelihoods, which in turn provide incentives to discourage continued ethnic conflict and 

the rise of new armed groups. We are also encouraged by the array of initiatives 

underway to combat the illegal trade of natural resources. The combination of ending illegal and increasing the legitimate trade in natural resources will help restore 

government revenues and assist the DRC to assert authority over its borders, territory, and natural resources such as minerals, wildlife, and timber. These steps will 

help create a climate more conducive to investment and assist the DRC in working 

with its neighbors on longer term regional development and integration. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

III. Domestic Challenges in the DRC 

While the end of the M23 rebellion was a critical step, many challenges remain 

on the DRC domestic front. The government still has a long way to go to stabilize 

and secure its country, including improving governance and expanding state authority across the territory, increasing democratization, ensuring that upcoming elections are credible, and accelerating real security sector reform. A series of attacks 

around the country on December 30, 2013, including at the airport in Kinshasa, the 

increase in attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the east, and the 

recent violence in the Katanga province, underline the continued volatility inside 

the Congo. 

As a first step, the DRC Government, with MONUSCO’s support, needs to follow 

up its defeat of the M23 by applying equal military pressure on other armed groups, 

starting with the FDLR and the ADF. The M23 was the largest and most militarily 

capable armed group, so defeating it was no small feat and was understandably a 

priority for the DRC. However, there is a plethora of other armed groups that continue to prey upon the population, undermine state authority, complicate the DRC’s 

relations with its neighbors, and illegally exploit the country’s natural resources. 

The internal displacements and humanitarian consequences caused by these armed 

groups make sustainable development in the region virtually impossible. 

I made clear during my recent trip, and I continue to emphasize, that it is essential that the FARDC and MONUSCO, conduct military operations against the FDLR 

and the ADF. Part of our success in ending outside support to the M23 last fall 

came from the U.N.’s and the international community’s commitment to pursue the 

FDLR next. While it is understandable that going after an entrenched guerilla 

group like the FDLR, which is embedded within the population, is more complex 

and presents greater risks to civilians than fighting the more conventional M23, following through on this is important to building confidence within the region and 

maintaining MONUSCO’s credibility as an impartial actor. We are encouraged by 

the DRC Government’s recent month-long effort to pursue the ADF and initial 

efforts against the FDLR, and are hopeful that the FARDC and MONUSCO will 

launch robust operations against the FDLR soon. 

These military efforts must also be combined with a comprehensive approach to 

resolving the threat of armed groups, including the promotion of defections and the 

demobilization and societal reintegration of those combatants who peacefully surrender through an effective DDR process. We encourage the governments of the 

DRC and Rwanda to work with MONUSCO to implement this comprehensive 

approach to ending the threat of the FDLR. 

In addition to security, the DRC needs to immediately ramp up its preparations 

for upcoming elections. While many expect the DRC to hold local elections early 

next year, the government has yet to approve an elections calendar. Local elections, 

which have never been held in the country’s five decades since independence, will 

be an extreme logistical challenge in this vast country with virtually no infrastructure. I have spoken with the head of the DRC’s election commission on several occasions and am concerned by the commission’s lack of urgency in planning and implementing an effective elections strategy. 

It will be a steep uphill climb—for the DRC, the region, and the international 

community alike—to ensure that these next elections are credible and inclusive. 

With sufficient attention, coordination, and resources, and political commitment by 

the DRC Government, I believe this goal could be attained. However, the DRC Government and donors need to start planning now if we are to avoid a repeat of the 

seriously flawed 2011 elections, for which neither the DRC nor the international 

community were adequately prepared. And if we are serious about prioritizing 

democratization, we should consider identifying additional funds to ensure adequate 

support for the local, provincial, and national elections expected between now and 

2016. We should also position MONUSCO with the mandate and capacity to provide 

logistical support to the DRC Government. These elections will be a critical test for 

the DRC’s political system, in part because President Kabila will have served the 

maximum two terms permitted by the DRC’s Constitution. 

In addition to elections and DDR, there are many other challenges that the DRC 

must overcome. One is the ever-present need for security sector reform, or SSR. 

While the FARDC experienced a commendable victory over the M23, it did so with 

extensive and robust logistical and military support from MONUSCO. Overall, the 

FARDC continues to be hampered by ineffective command and control, inadequate 

leadership, logistical deficiencies, limited resources, corruption and poor military 

planning capability, in turn inhibiting the government’s ability to fulfill its fundamental responsibility to protect its territory and all its citizens. In many instances, 

the FARDC is itself responsible for horrific human rights abuses against the vulnerable populations it should be protecting. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

While we continue to support SSR efforts, the DRC Government needs to demonstrate better its own commitment to SSR by ensuring that members of the security forces are professionally trained, adequately paid and supported, respectful of 

international human rights norms, and held accountable when they commit human 

rights violations. The Congolese Military Reform budget must also be passed, and 

the Congolese leadership must finalize the assignments of recently promoted officers 

to key positions that allow for the military reform plan to be implemented. SSR 

must also go beyond the military to include police, judicial, and prison reform, and 

the increased participation of women in all security sectors. Furthermore, reform 

and stabilization efforts must include strengthening state institutions and establishing state authority throughout the country, particularly in the territories previously held by the M23 and other armed groups. We were encouraged by the government’s initial efforts to restore state services to those areas, and hope to see the 

expansion of services and improved security conditions across greater swaths of the 

DRC. 

Despite these challenges, I reiterate my previous assertion that I am cautiously 

optimistic about the road ahead for the DRC and the Great Lakes. As we move forward with the Framework peace process, the international community must not 

repeat its past mistake of abandoning the region at the first sign of progress or for 

the next, latest crisis elsewhere in the world. We must ensure sustained high-level 

attention on the region and be prepared to follow up our words with assistance, particularly with regard to elections, DDR, SSR, and restoring state authority in eastern DRC. 

The DRC and the Great Lakes are at a crossroads and the decisions that the 

Congo, the region, and the international community take now will set the trajectory 

of the next several years in terms of security, good governance, and development. 

With the Framework peace process, the ICGLR dialogue, and the end of the M23 

rebellion, the DRC has a real opportunity to realize the peace and prosperity that 

has evaded the Congolese people for too long. We urge the international community, 

the Great Lakes region, and the DRC Government to demonstrate the resolve to see 

the peace process through to the prosperity that we know lies ahead for the Congo. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold. 

We will start off. You mentioned the M23, and there are reports 

that they are still being recruited in Rwanda after the official end 

of the rebellion in November. What are we doing to ensure that the 

M23 does not reconstitute itself? And in the current status of 

former combatants, how do you evaluate the Congolese Government’s plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, 

and what are regional leaders’ commitments to such a progress? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Mr. Chairman, the first thing is to recognize that if there is any evidence of this M23 rebellion reconstituting itself in a way that actually makes itself present in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo, I support Martin Kobler, the special 

representative of the Secretary General’s statement, that it will be 

met very directly and with force. That is clear. Simply because this 

happened and was taken care of once does not mean it will never 

be done again. 

But we are hoping that that is not necessary. And you alluded 

to the reasons or ways in which we can avoid that being necessary. 

There are substantial numbers, members of the group, ex-combatants both in Rwanda and Uganda, and we need to make sure that 

those individuals are transferred appropriately to the Democratic 

Republic of Congo. And to make that possible, what you said is the 

key. That is, there has to be a credible and effective DDR program 

within the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Now, they have started with a plan. I had the opportunity on an 

extensive visit during January to visit some of the DDR facilities. 

Some aspects of it heartened me. In the Katanga province, I had 

a chance to see that a facility was being prepared with appropriate 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

cots and food and opportunities for work, in other words, for the 

first part of the process, disarmament and the demobilization part. 

What I am less sure about is whether the reintegration part is 

properly planned. That is a very tricky part. This means what is 

the plan for allowing people to return to their communities. What 

is the plan for people to be reunited with their communities? 

Where is the clarity of a plan to provide some kind of training or 

opportunity so people who have only known basically working in 

some kind of an armed group have some other training or ability 

to do something peaceful? I believe that the Democratic Republic 

of Congo, with our help and the help of other donors, have to significantly and quickly accelerate this so that the kinds of consequence that you described does not occur. Once that is done, of 

course, we can ask Uganda and Rwanda to, as expeditiously as possible, make sure those people are transferred rather than allowing 

other problems to brew. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in that respect, an adequate DDR, particularly reintegration of combatants, is essential to ensure sustained 

security because otherwise combatants may very well take up arms 

again. 

So the question is, What external technical assistance is in the 

works to improve the quality of the program and to monitor its implementation? Specifically, what role might the United States play 

in assisting with the DDR process? And how will those activities 

be integrated with community reconciliation efforts and skillsbuilding opportunities? Those, I think, are some important building 

blocks toward a more sustainable peace. 

Senator FEINGOLD. They are. And this is where somehow, working with MONUSCO, working with the DRC, working with the various potential donor countries—we have got to get both sides to 

merge their plans, who will do what. We need more clarity from 

the Democratic Republic of Congo and not simply how much they 

intend to devote to this but also exactly the kinds of things you 

were describing. 

On the other hand, I believe the donor community—and I will be 

urging our fellow donors in Europe next week to do this. I think 

maybe we should be a little more specific about what we can do 

best, whether it is the training part, whether it is the reconciliation 

part. There are many NGOs and as much expertise in different 

countries that are concerned about this who can come together. But 

we have to not just wait for the other one. 

And here, I was pleased that Martin Kobler and also the Foreign 

Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo are convening meetings in the near future to discuss who can do what best. And in 

this regard, we, here in the United States, will be able to contribute aspects of this as well. We already had efforts made by our 

AID people after the victory over the M23 in the Rutshuru area 

where the military group was gone, but what happens next? And 

they had to sort of cobble together help from different NGOs, but 

they at least showed a vision of what can happen if you are ready. 

In order for that to work; in order for those places to be ready 

for people that have been brought out of the military, that has to 

happen as well. You cannot just say to somebody, well, go back to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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your home place and the place is not a place where they could live 

in any event. So that is part of it as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. In this context, what specific efforts are being 

made to benefit female combatants and women associated with 

armed groups and other vulnerable groups such as children and 

disabled ex-combatants? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, this is, of course, one of the complicated 

aspects of these kinds of armed groups where often the families 

and the kids are with them in the camps. And this, of course, presents problems when you are trying to take actions to not harm 

civilians, but it also presents problems when you try to put a DDR 

process into effect. 

When I was, a couple of weeks ago, in Goma, we had a chance 

to visit a MONUSCO facility and we got to talk to some of the 

young men, the M23, some of the FDLR, but I did not see the family members. I did not see the others. And that is a problem not 

only in terms of how they are being handled, but also how can the 

reunification occur? This is one where I think more clarity needs 

to come, and this is why I focused, when we talk about DDR, on 

the need for more clarity with regard to the reintegration part. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, in all of these conflicts, in Africa and 

elsewhere, human rights violations are always the concern of the 

Chair. And the question is, What is being done to find, prosecute, 

and bring to justice those who have committed human rights 

abuses, both within rebel groups and within the FARDC? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Mr. Chairman, this is where the process that is a little more promising is the key, and that is that the 

justice system of the DRC has to move forward in an effective way 

to be able to prosecute these individuals. The first step has 

occurred. They passed an amnesty law that does not allow amnesty 

for those types of individuals. That had not happened before. 

Now, how do you get these individuals to the right place where 

they can be prosecuted and where a fair trial can occur? They have 

to have credible courts, and this is where the idea of mixed chambers, which the United States has been trying to advocate for and 

tried to enlist other countries where you have—it is a Congolese 

court. It is part of the Congolese system, but it benefits from the 

addition of international jurists, often African jurists, who will help 

increase the credibility and expertise of the court so it is credible. 

Often they are dealing here with international law and international crimes. 

And in addition to that, Mr. Chairman, in order to have these 

individuals extradited, whether they are being extradited from 

Uganda or Rwanda or from somewhere else in the world, the Congolese have to be able to demonstrate that they have proper prison 

conditions, that there is due process afforded these individuals, and 

that the dossiers prepared to ask for such extradition are proper. 

So that needs to be done as well. And we have been messaging the 

need for all of this. 

But if all those steps are taken, the amnesty, the creation of 

mixed courts, the proper conditions, then we will certainly work 

very hard to ask the countries that know where these individuals 

are, extradite them so they can face justice in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I look forward to that moment because I 

personally believe that in conflicts such as these, for those who 

commit human rights abuses and feel they can get away with it— 

we send a message globally that impunity, in fact, is a reality and 

therefore, those who are inclined that way will not hesitate. So I 

know there is work to be done, but I do not want to lose sight of 

that at the end of the day. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your testimony. 

Over the last two decades, the DRC has had constant invasion, 

rebellion, counter-rebellion. It has outside actors playing a role. 

What is it that we have available, together with our diplomatic 

efforts, to put some teeth in what we are doing and to help deal 

with some of the spoilers that continue to reinsert themselves in 

this nation? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, this is where I think this framework 

agreement is fairly unique in this sad history. A year ago, it was 

not just the United Nations or the United States signing a series 

of provisions about what ought to be done in the DRC. It was these 

countries. Every country that has been involved in this signed on 

the dotted line. And in that document is a pledge to give no support whatsoever to illegal armed groups in the DRC. In that commitment is the support for the notion that there should not be 

impunity, that individuals who have constantly gotten away in the 

past cut a deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and said, 

all right, we will stop as long as you give us amnesty and let us 

take our whole units back into the military. This is not permitted 

under the Nairobi Declarations. So there are commitments that 

have been made. So the fair question is, Are the commitments 

being lived up to? 

I would say that has been a rather positive development. It was 

not easy to confront some of these nations about support for these 

groups, but the record shows that we had an impact, that both the 

diplomacy and, of course, there is teeth in the military aspect. You 

mentioned MONUSCO in your remarks. Yes, there was legitimate 

criticism of MONUSCO and MONUC before it in the past. What 

is different is this intervention brigade that was created a year ago. 

It was the intervention brigade working with MONUSCO and the 

Armed Forces of Congo that conducted a successful—and most people were surprised by this—a very successful military operation 

that basically forced the M23 to surrender. Very few people 

thought that would happen. 

Now, in order for this to be credible, in order for this to have the 

teeth you mentioned, it also has to be that they just do not go after 

one armed group that might be associated with one side, if you 

will. This is why it is critical that MONUSCO and the intervention 

brigade and the Congolese military pursue the FDLR and ADF, 

which is an extremist organization whose agenda is not so much 

about Congo but about Uganda, wanting to overthrow the government in Uganda. So in order for this IB organization to be a major, 

positive precedent for United Nations action, this kind of further 

activity has to happen and it has to happen soon. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

But I would say in answer to your question that has got some 

teeth if it continues. 

Senator CORKER. So we have a lot of national interests with 

Uganda and Rwanda, and yet there is no question they have 

played a role, a negative role, in the DRC. So I am just wondering 

whether the administration is willing to make difficult policy tradeoffs relative to those two countries and the DRC, and ask you to 

talk about what some of those might be. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, that is precisely what we did in order 

to achieve what we have already achieved. We visited directly with 

each of the Presidents. We spoke directly about the fact that we believe that in some instances support was being given and that that 

was not tolerable. We also talked about the fact that this is a situation where all of the countries in the region have signed this agreement and that means also that the DRC cannot in any way be supporting any of the armed groups within its own midst, which is an 

accusation that has occurred in the past. So we have not been shy 

about this. 

In addition, as you are probably aware, during the course of this 

period, the United States, following through on congressional 

action on child soldier legislation, did identify Rwanda as a country 

that was in violation of this, and that was made clear. And also the 

Democratic Republic of Congo—it got a partial waiver because it 

had made some improvements. These were not easy conversations, 

but they were direct and I think they were helpful in making it 

clear that the United States certainly does not overlook that sort 

of thing in this context and we cannot if we are going to have peace 

in the eastern Congo. 

Senator CORKER. Since 2000, we have invested about $10 billion 

in this country through our direct and multilateral efforts. We are 

spending about $1 billion a year now. We have ramped up to that 

level. And yet, the country still is ranked at the lowest levels on 

the Human Development Index. I am just wondering what you see 

with our efforts—what you see changing relative to that low base 

and to the quality of life in the country and prospect for improvements. Or, is this just going to continue to be, 14 years from now 

the same type of hearing with the same type of misery inside the 

country? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, I certainly would not have taken 

this assignment if I thought there was no way to change it. I felt 

that there was a combination of things happening, both within the 

region and internationally, that suggested a far more serious and 

sustained attitude. I mentioned the framework agreement, the fact 

that the nations signed it, the fact that we had this rather unusual 

intervention brigade, the fact that the World Bank said that if we 

could make some progress here, they pledged $1 billion to try to 

help for economic integration and progress in the region, the 

appointment of a group of special envoys who work all the time and 

every day to try to encourage and help in this regard. So these 

were reasons why I think it could change. 

But in order for it to change, there has to be, in effect, a synergy 

between regional noninterference and cooperation and domestic 

reform. And in order for that amount of money to not have to be 

spent in the future, in order for MONUSCO not to have to be there 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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in the future, this is the moment when the Democratic Republic of 

Congo has to show it can have credible elections. This is the 

moment when the Democratic Republic of Congo has to show it can 

legitimately reform its military, including logistics and how people 

are paid in the military, as well as justice within the military. And 

we have to show that this DDR program that we have been talking 

about actually is effective so that ex-combatants are not just shuffled around and go to some other armed group because that is all 

they know how to do. 

I believe these things can happen. It is not easy, but it is something that I think there is sufficient attention not only from the 

international community but, as I mentioned, from a country like 

Angola which one might not have expected to be involved in this 

as deeply. They are showing a renewed and intense commitment to 

it. So I think it is well worth taking the chance of trying to resolve 

this, and frankly, what we are going to be doing to try to resolve 

it costs infinitely less than the kinds of figures you are talking 

about. 

Senator CORKER. And just briefly. I am out of time. But all of us 

have been frustrated watching peacekeeping missions in Darfur 

and other places just be totally feckless. And we have this intervention brigade now. Is this something that you see being utilized in 

other places on the continent? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, not necessarily just on the continent. 

This is a real test. I will tell you—as you all know, I am not a military man, but I have had the opportunity to spend a lot of time 

with Santos Cruz, the commander there, as well as Martin Kobler. 

I have traveled through the region. I have seen where the armed 

groups are. We have had extensive briefings on the strategies. My 

sense is this is a very effective group; a very effective group of 

international participants. Some are the ones just in the intervention brigade, but they are integrated with the countries that are 

involved with the broader MONUSCO group. 

So, yes, of course. I hope, first of all, that we do not have to do 

things like this, but I am not naive. There will be other conflicts 

in the world. If this model works of creating an intervention brigade that has the ability to protect civilians by, frankly, taking 

stronger action with armed groups, it could be a model, and frankly 

from my point of view as an American, a model of where these 

things can be maybe handled not just by the United States, not by 

always asking the United States to have to do these things. So it 

is an experiment, but what I like to say is the first couple chapters 

were good. We will see about the third chapter. We are in the middle of it. But at the outset, it is promising and certainly should be 

renewed in March. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. I want to thank my chairman and ranking member for having this important hearing. 

Senator Feingold, once a Senator, always a Senator. So I will call 

you ‘‘Senator.’’ It is so great to see you and in such great form continuing the work that you were always pressing forward on when 

you were right here. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Walking down the memory lane just a little bit, you and I have 

long been concerned about the dire situation for women and girls 

in the DRC, and tragically hundreds of thousands of women have 

been victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence, earning the 

country the tragic distinction of being called the ‘‘rape capital of the 

world.’’ 

And, Dr. Mukwege, I am so honored to be in the same room with 

you again, and thank you for your work. I know you risk your own 

safety every time you come out. So I am just thrilled that you are 

here and that you are continuing your work to help the survivors. 

So when we had started, thanks to Senator Kerry, our first Subcommittee on Global Women’s Issues, you and I got together and 

we held the first hearing ever on the use of violence against women 

as a tool of war in Sudan and in the DRC. I am sure you remember 

it. It just seems like it was yesterday. 

And shortly after that hearing, then-Secretary of State Clinton made a historic visit to the DRC and she unveiled a $17 million 

plan to combat violence against women in the country. And those 

funds were used for a number of critical initiatives, including care 

and support for survivors of sexual violence such as treating traumatic fistula, building community awareness and education about 

violence against women, and enhancing their protection. 

So how is the State Department now building on Secretary Clinton’s efforts to address violence against women in the DRC, and do 

you think, we, right here in this committee and in the Senate and 

in the House, could do more to help in that area? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Boxer, first, I have many memories 

of this place, and the one you are describing is a strong one. I 

remember you coming to me and talking to me about this unbelievably tragic treatment of women. I had gotten some sense of it in 

2007 when I first visited the eastern Congo. I happened to have my 

daughter with me, and I remember we were asked to come into a 

private place and just meet with the women who had been so brutally treated. And I remember they looked a little uncomfortable to 

see me but when I said this was my daughter, they relaxed a little 

bit and told their stories. 

So when you came to me and said you wanted to take the lead 

on this, which you did, and hold this critical hearing, it was a real 

turning point. And, yes, what Secretary Clinton did by looking at 

this issue and sticking with it and initiating a lot of the programs 

was a very important step in the right direction that has led to, 

for example, support for the Panzi Hospital, which is the heroic 

achievement of Dr. Mukwege. 

This has been continued under Secretary Kerry who has strongly 

encouraged me to continue this. And when I was at the hospital 

and getting briefed in Bukavu, I asked whether this level of violence had significantly been reduced, and sadly the answer was no, 

maybe some downturn in some places but this is still going on. We 

still have a place where hundreds of thousands of women have 

been raped and gotten HIV because of this. So that is the history. 

And what are we going to do now? Well, there are at least three 

levels to this: treatment, the kind of thing—and the first thing the 

doctor always says is there are others doing this as well. He has 

done an enormous amount. There is North Kivu. There is South 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Kivu. There are all kinds of places where this has occurred and we 

have been able to support programs for treatment. Treatment is 

not just the medical side. It is also the psychological side and all 

the other familial and societal consequences of this kind of monstrous use of rape as a mechanism of war, as an instrument of war. 

So that continues. And, frankly, yes, we will want to see even more 

support in this regard and guarding against any reduction. 

The second, which we often hear about when you visit there, is 

also prevention, trying to prevent these attacks from occurring. The 

story you often hear is that there may be people in an IDP camp. 

There are huge numbers of people in these IDP camps. And the 

women are there with their kids. And if they do not have food or 

they do not have a way to cook food, what do they do? Well, they 

have to go out in a field or somewhere where outside of the camp 

to get some wood. That is where they are usually attacked. And if 

they had the proper cook stove or some kind of a thing so that they 

did not have to do that, there is an element and programming that, 

frankly, the World Bank discussed with me where that can help. 

Finally, Senator, I think the most important thing we can do, 

although that programming is critical, is fundamentally creating a 

justice and accountability element to this. And this was what was 

alluded with regard to making sure wrongdoers are brought to justice. The people of eastern Congo, particularly the women of eastern Congo, have to believe that the military is there for them, not 

to be an opportunity for abusing them. The same with the police. 

It means that the rule of law has to exist in the Democratic Republic of Congo. All of the people of the eastern Congo are entitled to 

that. And that means that those who have committed these heinous crimes have to be held accountable. People have to see them 

prosecuted. People have to see them convicted and punished or, of 

course, as some have said here already today, this sort of impunity 

will continue. So this is part of the framework effort. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I am glad that you are continuing this 

work, and I would love to be able to talk to you more about it to 

see if there is something else we can do here because this committee in a bipartisan way really started that whole movement to 

address the rapes. And it is not just rapes. It is just beyond the 

pale what happens over there. I do not want to go into it at this 

point. 

But my last question is one that Senator Durbin had asked me 

to ask you because he is off at a funeral today, unfortunately. As 

a Senator, you were instrumental in crafting legislation to improve 

transparency and accountability in the trade of minerals from the 

DRC, which was signed into law by President Obama in 2010. As 

a result of this law, U.S. companies must now disclose the origin 

of minerals purchased from the DRC. This is critical because the 

mining and trading of conflict minerals by armed groups in the 

DRC has helped finance ongoing violence. 

As the U.S. special envoy to the DRC and an author of the conflict minerals law, you certainly have a unique perspective on this 

issue. In your opinion, what has been the impact of this law on 

stemming the flow of conflict minerals into the United States? We 

know that last month Intel became the first major U.S. tech company to declare the microprocessors it manufactures are now free 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

of conflict minerals. But can you give us a feeling about the European Union? Are they working on this? Are we keeping our eye on 

this? 

Senator FEINGOLD. We are. And I want you to know and I hope 

you will convey to Senator Durbin that my conclusion after 7 

months is that this law has had a dramatic impact. The impact, 

of course, is specific under section 1502 of helping to end the trade 

in conflict minerals. In particular, it has been effective on tin, tantalum, and tungsten, which are easier to track than, let us say, 

gold. So the specific provisions are important. They are, of course, 

binding with regard to companies that deal with us, but they are 

also a model. And I am pleased to report to you that the European 

Union is considering a similar law. We were the first. We took the 

lead. 

Now, sometimes when you talk to companies—I was out in Palo 

Alto teaching, and some of the people representing those companies 

said, you know, this is going to be tricky. This is going to be difficult. But the feedback I get now is we want to comply. We want 

to figure out how to comply. And in fact, I had a long conference 

call with a coalition of advocacy groups and representatives of some 

of those biggest companies a couple weeks ago. And they said, well, 

we understand these are the rules, but also what kind of incentives 

can be created to have us do more. And I think that is a fair question from the business community. They understand that the regulatory piece is there and has to continue, but what are the positive 

incentives? 

In addition, of course, we have to ask the countries in the region 

to play the lead role in making sure that they do everything they 

can to prevent this. 

Now, this organization, the ICGLR, the International Conference 

on the Great Lakes Region, is beginning the process of creating a 

certification system. We need to encourage that. We need to help 

that so that we can have the kind of legitimate operations and 

legitimate mining that I actually saw on my trip. I was in Katanga 

and got to visit the American company there. There are two Senators from Arizona on this committee. This is an Arizona company, 

Freeport-McMoRan. They have hired thousands of people, mostly 

Congolese people. Some of them work at the mine. They also support the community with their agriculture. They are respectful of 

the cultural issues there. Tremendous health facilities, in a lot of 

ways environmentally sound. It is a model of how things could be 

done. 

Now, just down the road, they will show you people that are illegally mining, artisanal mining, and that has to be made an unattractive alternative, something that cannot be sold very easily 

while this kind of legitimate work is done. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Feingold, welcome. It is nice to see you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Good to see you. 

Senator JOHNSON. I appreciate your testimony. I certainly appreciate your hard efforts and your good work in this troubled region 

of the country. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

Both in your written testimony and in your verbal testimony, you 

mentioned the word ‘‘root cause.’’ As a manufacturer, I am always 

interested in really digging down to the root cause. Can you just 

describe to me your evaluation? What is the root cause in not only 

DRC but also regionally? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, this is one of the most important 

phrases in this whole discussion. Sometimes it means different 

things to different people. But what it means to me is just coming 

up with another agreement, signing a piece of paper, and saying, 

okay, now everybody is going to behave, that is not going to do it. 

We have to get at why it is that in this, frankly, beautiful place 

with enormous resources that this would happen. What are the 

root causes? 

Well, one of them is the presence of dozens of armed groups who 

keep regenerating themselves. 

Another is the lack of border security, the fact that there is not 

a credible border guard from the DRC to make sure that those 

intrusions do not happen. 

Even deeper is the historical tensions, sometimes tensions 

between ethnic groups of different backgrounds in the eastern 

Congo. Some of these groups, known as the Rwandaphone groups, 

feel that they have been discriminated against and feel sometimes 

that their land rights and other opportunities have been taken 

away over the years. This is part of the tension, and taking away 

these kinds of difficulties within the community is part of it. 

And then, of course, the up side, in terms of root causes, is the 

failure to be able to use the resources of that region for the people 

of the region. This region has been brutally exploited by colonial 

powers and by other countries in a way that is shameful and has 

denied the birthright of the Congolese people. And so we have to 

get at that as well. And, of course, the mining issues, illegal mining, and others—we have to do that as well. 

So these are all part of it. It is not just a political solution. It 

is a complex relationship between the peoples in that region. And 

that is why this broader dialogue that I have been advocating with 

Angola in the lead can have people at the very highest level, even 

the Presidents of the countries, sit down and talk about this 

instead of talking around the edges. 

Senator JOHNSON. Let us drill down a little bit further. You mentioned the first thing, armed groups. Are those all ethnic? I mean, 

have they all been formed because of ethnicity? Why are these 

groups formed and why are they armed? What is the specific conflict between the groups? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Different stories. They are not all the same. 

This M23 group was an outgrowth of frustration of some of the 

individuals from the east who felt that they were being discriminated against and were not treated according to previous agreements, and this has happened several times. 

On the other hand, the FDLR is a completely different story. The 

FDLR is a remnant of those that committed the enormous atrocities in Rwanda in 1994. Two million people came as refugees, but 

included in the group were these so-called genocidaires, these people that committed these crimes, and many of them have never 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

been brought to justice. They continue to operate as an armed 

group. 

Another group, completely different profile, so-called ADF. The 

ADF has very little to do traditionally with Congo or with Rwanda. 

It has to do with Uganda and their desire to topple the Ugandan 

regime. After being pushed by the Ugandan military out, they are 

operating, frankly, sometimes in an incredibly brutal way in that 

region. 

Then you have Mai-Mai groups. This is a group of sort of disparate organizations who go back a fair ways in Congolese history 

who notice that when you have no sort of control, you can do whatever you want. You can go and destroy communities, rape women, 

take everything people have. Sort of that is your job. You just go 

in, take what you need, and continue your group. It is a way of life. 

And so to unravel all this, you have to knock off the big operators, the ones that have the most military capacity. And then I 

think most experts believe it is much easier to cause people in 

some of these Mai-Mai groups and others to surrender because 

they realize they will not have the cover of these other sort of 

regional issues. You noticed all the first three I mentioned had a 

regional character to them. 

Senator JOHNSON. You had mentioned that outside countries are 

supporting some of these groups. Can you describe some of those 

situations? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, of course, we had concerns about support for the M23. We raised this issue with the Rwandan Government that we had seen a credible body of reporting that that was 

happening, and we made it very clear to them that we thought that 

was a violation of the framework and something that should not 

happen. And we believe that it was greatly reduced, and we think 

that had a lot to do with this. 

Support for other organizations sometimes comes from within the 

DRC. Sometimes it comes from diaspora groups around the world 

who happen to maybe associate with a group like the FDLR. So the 

sources of support can be many, but we have seen with the M23 

it is possible, with a combination of military and diplomatic pressure, to persuade people maybe it is a good idea for them to abandon these people who are forcing them to live out in the bush and 

have this awful life and to come in and have a different life. 

Senator JOHNSON. You talked about domestic challenges. Other 

than the minerals, what else does DRC have going economically? 

What are the most promising prospects? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, they have enormous potential in the 

mining area, but also agriculture. When you talk to the governors 

of South and North Kivu and Katanga, they like to talk about agriculture, which you and I can certainly relate to. So that has great 

potential. Also something you and I can relate to, they have some 

of the greatest forests in the world. And in our State, that was not 

always handled well back in the 19th century. This could be handled in a responsible way that could provide timber but regeneration of forests. 

And I do want you to know that despite the fact the DRC is very 

low on all those indicators, they have had positive economic growth 

in the last few years. Their Prime Minister Matata is a very capaFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

ble individual, a very serious man with a business attitude about 

taking care of these issues, and they want to build on that growth 

rate. I think the last piece I saw yesterday was 8 percent. Now, it 

is a low base, but it is possible that a country with those kinds of 

resources could make great strides. And some of those statistics 

have to do with greater results in the mining area, in particular, 

in copper. 

Senator JOHNSON. Have you witnessed or have you seen any unintended consequences, any problems with the conflict minerals 

provision? I certainly hear from different businesses, and that it is 

here. But I mean, what about in terms of the DRC? Have there 

been unintended consequences in terms of the loss of livelihood, 

those types of things? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I think there has been some of that, but I 

think, based on my actual observation of what is happening over 

there, less than I would have expected based on those comments. 

Senator JOHNSON. Any modifications you would want to consider 

to address those? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I think we ought to look at any modifications 

where people give specific problems with the mechanism. I have 

not heard anything yet that says change this piece of it and it 

would work better. But I think we should be open to that. We all 

know if you pass legislation, it may not be perfect. But, in fact, I 

asked on this conference call with the leaders of these companies 

tell me exactly what it is that would help them comply, you know, 

remove anything that may seem unreasonable or that is not working right. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you so much, Chairman Menendez, for 

convening this hearing. 

I want to join my colleagues in warmly welcoming back Senator 

Feingold, now in his role as our special envoy to the Great Lakes. 

It is in my view a great gift that you and all of the other witnesses 

here today and our distinguished visitors bring to this issue. Your 

efforts to bring sustained and meaningful and thoughtful attention 

to the real challenges of the eastern DRC and of the whole region 

and to focus us on this moment of hope and real opportunity for 

peace in the eastern DRC is a great gift. 

It was roughly a year ago this week that I traveled to the capital 

of the DRC to express support for this regional framework agreement, which formalized the multilateral support that you spoke to 

to tackle the root causes of conflict that have plagued the DRC now 

for many, many years. Since that time, I have been really encouraged by the progress of the intervention brigade, as you have spoken about, in taking down M23, as well as the reduction of outside 

support for the M23 from Rwanda and Uganda which I think were 

the direct result of international engagement and effort. 

Despite this, as we have heard from you and we will hear from 

other testimony today, there are many remaining challenges: ongoing violence by the FDLR and by the ADF, impunity for perpetrators of war crimes, and the very real challenges of electoral reform 

and court reform within the DRC, and persistent humanitarian 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

issues, sexual violence, violation of human rights. So let us turn to 

those for a few minutes, if we might. 

First, on electoral reform, as the DRC approaches national elections in 2016, we had a huge missed opportunity I think in the last 

elections to not just provide some support but to insist on credible 

and accountable elections. What sorts of technical assistance do you 

think we can meaningfully provide? What do you think are the 

prospects for real elections? I want to specifically thank Cindy 

McCain for her passionate advocacy for bringing electoral and 

democratic reform to the DRC. But as our special envoy, Senator 

Feingold, what might be the impact of a third-term bid by President Kabila and what can and should we, as a country, do to ensure some progress toward transparent and effective elections in 

this coming year in the DRC? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, first, Senator Coons, just let me take 

the liberty of thanking you for taking such a great role. I was so 

heartened that you took over the subcommittee, immediately 

talked to me about it, and have taken this role. You know, it has 

been a model of cooperation between the branches that I have 

experienced with Senator Coons. 

Now, this, of course, is a subject I can get excited about, having 

been a political guy for 28 years. Elections. So it is something that 

I find very easy to motivate myself on and I find it very important 

to understand the guts of the difference between what happened in 

2006 and 2011. People say, well, it has always been the same. 

Things never work out in the DRC. That was not true in 2006. It 

was not perfect. But I remember being very surprised at how well 

it went, and they had an opportunity to show that they could create an electoral system that would have credibility over time. 

That is the opposite of what happened. In 2011, it was a failure 

and it caused great loss to the credibility of President Kabila who 

had made significant progress after 2006 in his credibility as a 

president. He had not been elected. He came in, as we know, after 

the assassination of his father. And this was the first real election 

in the Democratic Republic of Congo since Lumumba in 1960. 

So what can be done? Well, we need to dig into the specifics here. 

What happened in 2011 was things like the ballots were not properly transported and preserved. When it was time to convey the 

election results—we have had some issues here in our country on 

this, but they do not have the technology and the ability to convey 

those results quickly for credibility. We can help with that. We can 

provide at relatively low cost the kind of computer assistance 

where those results could be conveyed. 

Now, that is the kind of technical assistance that I think we 

should be looking at, but that is not enough. There has to be public 

information, public conveying of the fact that all Congolese are welcome and invited to be part of this process. And that means public 

messaging through the various media techniques they have. I think 

that is something the United States might be good at helping with. 

So I am not suggesting it by any sense that we go this alone, but 

the truth is we are only putting $3.7 million so far into elections 

there, which frankly is a paltry sum compared to what needs to be 

done in that country. They need to step up to the plate, but the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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other donor countries have to as well. But I think this is something 

we should be heavily engaged in. 

Now, as to the question of Presidential succession, I was asked 

this question in Kinshasa, which is a tougher place to be asked 

than here. [Laughter.] 

And I said what I believe to be our policy and certainly my view, 

and that is, our experience is it is better to follow your constitution 

than change it for somebody who is already in office. I even said 

that Bill Clinton might still be President if we did not have that 

sort of rule here. 

And what is different about their constitution is that somebody 

who has done the two terms is not prohibited for life from coming 

back and running again. We are somewhat unusual in that regard. 

So I simply indicated—and I believe this is the view of most of the 

Congolese people—that it would be best for them, for their future— 

it is their country. It is their decision. But it would be best for their 

future that the constitution be respected in this regard. 

Senator COONS. Well, thank you. And I look forward to hearing 

more from you and working with you because we have a number 

of critical elections coming up in Nigeria and many other places on 

the continent, and there are other countries where there are efforts 

underway or may be efforts underway to amend constitutions to 

allow for extensions of terms. This is a place I think in a bipartisan 

way we really can be leaders in supporting positive efforts on the 

continent. 

The intervention brigade, as you have mentioned, has been particularly effective, and it is my hope that they will continue to pursue the FDLR, which I think would have real regional positive 

impacts, and the ADF and the Mai-Mai and others. 

What sort of a model do you think we can draw from this? You 

mentioned that in conflicts in other regions we are grateful the 

United States is not being called on to intervene, but frankly, without the French, things in Mali and the Central African Republic 

might have turned out differently. I am very encouraged by your 

positive suggestion—your characterization of the intervention brigade as being militarily effective, respectful of human rights, 

appropriately governed and managed. 

We have got a challenge, though, with the United States not 

meeting the financial commitments for peacekeeping operations. If 

you would just speak briefly to whether you think the IB is a positive role model for the continent and whether you think the United 

States needs to continue to provide sufficient support for peacekeeping. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think we need to continue to support 

an extension which will be decided in March. I think it is a good 

opportunity to do something very different that is effective. I simply will not say that it is fine, it is great until the job is done. The 

first step was incredibly impressive, but it has to be balanced. The 

FDLR, the ADF, and others have to proceed. 

And we have to also remember this is not a military force that 

operates on its own. Not only is it part and parcel of MONUSCO, 

it is supposed to support the Democratic Republic of Congo’s military. It is not supposed to be off doing these things on their own. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

But what is different and what can be replicated in other similar 

situations is where you have a conflict and there is not a sophisticated or effective military, that it may be necessary to have an 

intervention brigade like this that is skilled at taking tough action 

but protecting civilians at the same time. That is the difficult 

balance. 

And I am enormously impressed, as we fly over in the helicopter 

the region, being shown exactly where they think these groups 

might be embedded with civilians, where they might not be, and 

how careful they are trying to be in getting that right. 

Having said that, action against the FDLR and the ADF has to 

happen I think relatively soon to make sure that the diplomatic 

commitments that we made are fulfilled. When we met with President Kagame, we did suggest to him that any support for armed 

groups—and we said this to all the leaders in the region—is unacceptable. On the other hand, he said to us, well, what about which 

armed groups are you going to go after. Are you going to go after 

the FDLR? And we all indicated, yes, but the M23 was the first priority but that the FDLR had to follow. And so that commitment is 

a legitimate commitment, a legitimate request by Rwanda and the 

world community, and I believe that they are working to make that 

happen. 

Senator COONS. Well, thank you so much for your testimony, for 

your service. I look forward to staying in close contact with you and 

appreciate your real leadership in holding the best of America’s 

values in terms of advocating for human rights and for civil liberties, for progress toward democracy, but also engaging this whole 

region in a way that brings some hope of peace after so many years 

of war. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your insights and performance here today remind us of why, one, we miss you and, two, why we know that we 

are in good hands in terms of our interests on behalf of the people 

of the DRC and the Great Lakes region. So you have our gratitude. 

I agree with you on Presidential succession. I know that there 

are some in our own country—it might be that Hillary Clinton 

would not agree with Presidential succession beyond the Constitution. So there are many examples of that. 

But really, thank you very much for your service, and we look 

forward to continuing to engage with you as we move forward. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, the Senator is excused. 

Let me bring up our second panel this afternoon. We have a very 

distinguished panel. Ambassador Roger Meece served as the U.S. 

Ambassador—and I will ask you to come up as I introduce you— 

to the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2004 to 2007 and most 

recently, he has served as the U.N. Special Representative of the 

Secretary General for the DRC and head of the U.N. stabilization 

mission in the DRC. Ambassador Meece was a Career Foreign 

Service officer who served as Ambassador to Malawi and as interim 

Ambassador to Nigeria, and he has graciously taken time out of his 

retirement to give us his insights here today, and we appreciate it. 

Dr. Raymond Gilpin is the academic dean at the Africa Center 

for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Prior to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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joining the Africa Center, he served as the director of the U.S. 

Institute for Peace’s Center for Sustainable Economies, director of 

International Programs at Intellibridge Corporation, senior economist at the African Development Bank Group, research director at 

the Central Bank of Sierra Leone, and an economist at the World 

Bank. And his research focuses on the economics of conflict. We 

welcome you. 

And last, but certainly not least, we are pleased to welcome Ben 

Affleck, who many of us in Washington remember as Tony Mendez 

in Argo. But today, Mr. Affleck—close—Mendez, Menendez, but in 

any event. Today Mr. Affleck is here in his real-life role for which 

he will, I believe, be long remembered as a serious, thoughtful 

activist committed to helping end violence in Africa. The Eastern 

Congo Initiative he founded provides funding and advocates for 

organizations that are finding local solutions for vulnerable populations, particularly women and children, and through the Eastern 

Congo Initiative, he is helping Congolese civilians overcome barriers to good governance and move toward sustained development. 

So we thank you all for coming today. 

Before I turn to Ambassador Meece first, I also want to mention 

Cindy McCain who is with us here today. She has been very active 

on the issue of DRC and has traveled to the country various times 

and has encouraged a comprehensive response to the conflict that 

includes investments and economic assistance. So thank you very 

much. We occasionally hear from your spouse here on the committee. [Laughter.] 

With that, your full statements will be included in the record, 

without objection. I would ask you to summarize around 5 minutes 

or so, so that we can enter into a dialogue, as we just did with Senator Feingold. And, Ambassador, you are first. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER MEECE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, FORMER 

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, SEATTLE, WA 

Ambassador MEECE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, 

members of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity and for holding this hearing. 

I find myself echoing and endorsing many of the comments 

already made by Special Envoy Feingold. Having had the opportunity to work in and around the region for many years, I am well 

aware that there has been significant progress achieved over time, 

but this progress has obviously been incomplete. Recent developments offer considerable promise to move further, and this includes 

the deployment of the intervention brigade and operations that has 

already been referenced in MONUSCO, the appointment and work 

of Special Envoy Mary Robinson, Special Envoy Feingold, and other 

special envoys and representatives working together and I think 

already showing great results, building on the potential and provisions of the framework accord that was signed last year. All of this 

offers a basis for optimism, and I am in that camp. But clearly, 

there remain enormous challenges. 

Clearly, establishing basic conditions of security particularly in 

eastern Congo is an essential prerequisite for progress in a broad 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

array of things, particularly in the eastern zone where conflict has 

been going on for so long. There are still four foreign armed groups 

operating in the Congo: two from Uganda; one, Rwanda; and a 

smaller group from Burundi. All of them, to varying degrees, retain 

considerable potential and threats to stability, as well as the local 

population. The FDLR, which has been discussed, has had its 

capacity reduced over the years but clearly remains a force and a 

problem and a threat that needs to be dealt with. 

There are, as well, an array of domestic militias and armed 

groups, none of these having the same kinds of capabilities, subject 

to shifting alliances and coalitions, but all are problematic. Most 

tend to more resemble groups of armed gangs rather than militaries as such, but must be dealt with as well. 

Beyond basic security, in my view there are four areas that need 

to be the key areas of focus. 

One is what I would call a full normalization of regional relations, as has already been discussed, and by that, of course, I mean 

going beyond simply formal diplomatic relations or the signature of 

peace accords. As has been referenced, there is a long history of 

peace accords which have failed demonstrating that this is not 

enough. I mean a full engagement of the governments, particularly 

Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda, in a positive and constructive manner in political, economic, and other areas. 

The Congolese reform agenda, which Special Envoy Feingold discussed at length, clearly needs to move forward. 

And conflict resolution of generally localized conflicts I believe 

merits much more attention. These include land issues, return of 

displaced populations, ethnic tensions, access to economic resources, and political issues, and other factors depending upon the 

situation. It is an area that has not received enough attention that 

I believe is also essential, and I think we are seeing in the deteriorating or growing problem in Katanga province some of the reflections of these kinds of problems. 

Economic and social development in a third area needs to advance to provide economic opportunities for young people in particular to provide for an increasing standard of living for the population. This is easier said than done but remains tightly tied and 

directly related to the overall security environment and possibility 

or potential for future problems down the road. 

And finally, also an area that has been discussed, democratic 

governance. Not only is democracy in the Congo problematic, particularly following the 2011 elections, but those in neighboring 

countries as well, notably Uganda and Rwanda, which are far from 

perfect and all bear the seeds of future instability and security 

problems. 

There is a vital role for the international community up to now 

in all of this, and there continues to be particularly, in my view, 

of the U.S. conveying support or, as needed, criticism publicly and 

privately of actions by governments and groups consistent with the 

principles established by the framework accord. Reference to the 

treatment of the M23 combatants, including those for whom there 

is substantial evidence of responsibility for war crimes, is an important issue and an indicator. And reports from the U.N. panel of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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experts, the U.N. mission, government sources, NGOs, and others 

can help inform as well. 

Progress on the reform agenda in Congo is also critical. The amnesty law is promising. The DDR program has been already talked 

about but is critical as a part of many other reforms. Maximum 

coordination among the donors and the partners is critical. The 

special envoys have already demonstrated effective close collaboration, and that needs to include not only governments but regional 

organizations such as SADC and the African Union, multilateral 

institutions including the international financial institutions and 

the United Nations. 

And finally for the U.N., I would mention continued strong support from the United States for the mission in Congo and others. 

Financial but political and diplomatic is also essential for its success. 

I share the feeling that we have in the current circumstances the 

best opportunity that has existed for many years, if not ever, to 

achieve durable peace and stability in the region, and I think it is 

important to take advantage of it. 

I thank you again for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Meece follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER MEECE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, I am 

honored to testify today regarding one of Africa’s longest running areas of conflict 

and large-scale humanitarian crises, and I thank you for this opportunity. Too often 

this area is in my view erroneously viewed as condemned to permanent instability, 

not susceptible to resolution. I am therefore particularly appreciative of this committee’s focus on prospects for peace in the region. 

Having had the opportunity to work in the region over the span of many years, 

I can affirm that significant progress has been achieved in the Democratic Republic 

of Congo and Great Lakes region in many key aspects, putting in place essential 

elements to provide for long-term stability and development. I am also well aware, 

however, of continuing major problems, and resultant enormous human suffering 

marked by widespread ongoing violence, large population displacements, and appalling levels of sexual-based violence. Members of this committee are well aware that 

this is in the context of ongoing conflict, especially in eastern Congo, dating from 

the 1990s. The conflict has been catalyzed by weak government authority and institutions in the Congo and external involvement in the Congo, at one point involving 

at least eight national armies operating in Congolese territory. The legacy of this 

terrible history has left four foreign armed groups from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi still operating in the DRC, and a large number of domestic Congolese armed 

groups or militias of varying capabilities. The latter are marked by shifting alliances 

and ties, and overall have a character more of criminal gangs than ideologically 

based groups. All the armed groups, foreign and domestic, prey on the civilian populations in areas where they operate. 

Against this backdrop, there are positive elements on which to build a stable and 

successful future, albeit all requiring further development. First, despite years of 

conflict, foreign occupation, division of the Congo into zones controlled by competing 

armies, and ongoing conflict, there is a sense of Congolese national self-identity that 

crosses political, ethnic, and political boundaries—an essential prerequisite for 

future stability. This national self-identity, however, is tempered with national cohesion threatened by underlying tensions driven by regional, ethnic, political, and 

other divisions fed by a competition for resources in a country desperately in need 

of economic opportunity for its population. In another important area, in recent 

years the Democratic Republic of Congo has achieved impressive improvements in 

its macroeconomic performance marked by good GDP growth rates, stable exchange 

rates, low inflation, and improving foreign exchange reserves. This has been particularly true during the tenure of Prime Minister Matata with his focus on economic 

reforms. These achievements, however, have not yet resulted in general broad benefits for average Congolese, with investment and commercial activity hampered by 

a continuing lack of transparency in key areas of economic activity, corruption, and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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an overall very difficult environment for business operations. On a regional level, 

critically important relations, especially between Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala, 

have progressed from open warfare to the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations and ongoing contacts at multiple levels, albeit all continuing to be marked by 

deep mutual mistrust and accusations of cross-border misconduct. Finally, a promising start to democratic government has been made in the Congo, with the 2006 

elections the first legitimate democratic exercise in the country since independence. 

Free and fully participatory government, however, clearly remains an incomplete 

and threatened process in the Congo, as well as in several of its neighbors. Within 

these threats lie the seeds of potential future further domestic and regional instability. 

In all these and other problem areas, the size of the Congo, the large population 

involved, and the relative lack of infrastructure contribute to the difficulty of putting solutions in place. Projects, initiatives, and development programs must often 

confront dimensions of scale that render implementation difficult, or in some cases 

producing incomplete results. 

These circumstances suggest to me the outlines for a path forward to peace, stability, and improved prospects for development, and appropriate roles for the international community to facilitate solutions. I strongly believe such solutions for the 

region are not only achievable, and are of key importance for not just Central Africa, 

but a significant portion of the continent. Full international community engagement 

and support is essential for these solutions to be achieved. 

First, the key priority must be to establish basic security and order, particularly 

in eastern Congo. Very promising progress has been made recently in this regard, 

with the Congolese M23 armed movement in the Kivus defeated by the Congolese 

Army (FARDC) bolstered by a strengthened U.N. peacekeeping force (MONUSCO), 

including the operations of the newly established Force Intervention Brigade. While 

this brigade is quite properly fully integrated into the mission structure and command, I believe its mandate providing for a strengthened peace enforcement role 

and specialized capabilities have provided a critical new element, and opened the 

door for progress after too many years of ongoing conflict. With the end of the M23’s 

military operations, primary attention has turned to other major foreign groups. 

These include the Rwandan FDLR and Ugandan ADF, both representing major ongoing threats to civilians and regional stability, albeit with the FDLR’s capability 

significantly reduced from what it was several years ago. As well, domestic militias 

cannot be neglected, and are responsible for many massacres, extensive violence, 

and large-scale human suffering. Broadly speaking, however, their force and military capabilities in no way compares to those of the foreign armed groups. 

It is important to emphasize that the FARDC and MONUSCO recent successes 

do not mean that a military solution to the issues of eastern Congo and Great Lakes 

region represents the answer to the problems of the region. Rather the increased 

capability and authority to operate preemptively against those committed to armed 

action provides an essential tool to help establish the conditions that permit comprehensive strategies and programs to be put in place. Beneficial effects of these 

military operations include the prospect of significantly increased flows of foreign 

and Congolese combatants seeking voluntary disarmament and reintegration into 

their home communities, increased prospects for needed political agreements to be 

achieved within the Congo and between Congo and its neighbors, and realization 

of the conditions necessary to establish and extend needed state authority throughout the Congo, clearly a prerequisite for long-term stability and development. 

These military operations are and must be a part of a comprehensive strategy for 

the region which includes a number of elements. In my view, I would identify four 

areas of particular importance. 

1. Political and economic normalization of regional relations, especially between the 

DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda 

While formal reestablishment of diplomatic relations, and especially last year’s 

achievement of a regional Framework Accord, have been very important steps, a sad 

history of failed accords and peace agreements is testimony to the fact that these 

agreements by themselves are not enough. The aspirations represented by the goals 

of the Framework Accord must be realized through commitments and actions by the 

respective parties, and such commitments have not necessarily been evident. Strong 

positions taken by the United States and other countries have been essential to a 

major change in cross-border actions by neighboring states contributing to instability. It is not clear, however, that such cross-border support has ended fully, and 

it is important for international attention to continue. Treatment of M23 leaders 

who have fled to Uganda and Rwanda, including some for whom substantial evidence exists of responsibility for war crimes, will be an important indicator of poliFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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cies consistent with Framework Accord principles. Reports from the U.N. Panel of 

Experts, the U.N. missions and agencies in the region, nongovernment organizations, and other sources will also be very useful to a full understanding of conditions 

throughout the region. 

2. Congolese institutional reforms and conflict resolution 

It is of obvious importance to accelerate Congolese reform programs of key institutions, including the police, judiciary, and perhaps most importantly the military, 

which for long was essentially stalled. These reform objectives certainly include 

improved performance, for example through appropriate training programs, but 

must also address organizational structural changes to facilitate full deployments of 

necessary civilian and uniformed personnel, necessary physical infrastructure development, needed and appropriate oversight mechanisms, and well qualified and 

trained personnel at all management levels. There is also a pressing need for effective disarmament, demobilization, and civilian reintegration programs (DDR), avoiding past mistakes that failed to provide for successful long-term civilian integration 

of militia and other armed combatants, lacked accountability standards for 

egregious abuses of human rights or other serious crimes, and too often provided 

the wrong incentives, including essential wholesale integration of people into the 

FARDC. The latter not only propagated the cycle of militia activity and a general 

sense of impunity, but also degraded overall FARDC standards of performance and 

behavior. In this regard, the recently enacted amnesty law in the Congo provides 

an encouraging step, incorporating lessons learned. There is much more to be done, 

however, to develop comprehensive and effective DDR and military reform 

programs. 

It is also important that that there be increased attention to conflict resolution 

essentially addressing localized issues. In various areas, these include difficult land 

issues, return of displaced populations, ethnic and community tensions, and other 

social and political issues. Strong involvement by local leaders, including clergy, traditional leaders, and others of influence in the respective areas is key to this effort, 

as underlying cultural and social aspects are complex. Progress is, however, essential to achieve durable security, not only in eastern Congo, but in other regions, for 

example in Katanga province where growing violence is creating very significant 

new security and humanitarian concerns. 

3. Economic and social development 

In addition to the obvious need for development for a large population long struggling to achieve an acceptable standard of living, there is a direct linkage between 

economic conditions and security. The attractiveness of local militias to young people would be greatly reduced by increased prospects of a productive livelihood 

through legitimate means. As well, existing large-scale illicit mining and trade of 

Congo’s minerals involving both Congolese and foreign interests, provide an important source of support for many armed groups, and does little to promote the general well-being of the local population. Congolese economic potential, in eastern 

Congo and across the country, is well recognized. Realization of this potential requires simplification of the maze of regulations, taxes, and other burdens imposed 

by a large number of poorly coordinated and financed government agencies, greatly 

increased transparency regarding mining concessions and contracts and general 

commercial activities, and major improvements in judicial operations to provide for 

increased business confidence. None of this is easy to achieve, and it will require 

difficult decisions, including likely unpopular civil service reforms. Essential 

improvements, however, will not only increase prospects for legitimate investment 

and commercial activities, including employment levels, but as well an expanded tax 

base for essential government operations now hobbled by completely inadequate 

government budgets at both the national and provincial level. 

4. Democratic governance 

Free and unhindered popular participation in an open political system clearly can 

contribute to long-term stability in the region. While the 2006 Congolese elections 

represented a very promising major step forward, subsequent developments, including the flawed 2011 elections, underscore that a stable and successful democratic 

future for the country is far from assured. Very important provincial elections which 

should have been held as a part of the 2011 election cycle have not yet been held, 

resulting in the coexistence of 2006 produced legislative bodies at the provincial 

level and national Senate, with a 2011 elected National Assembly and executive 

president. Local elections provided for in the 2006 constitution have not been held 

to-date at all. Very difficult and contentious issues associated with prospective 

decentralization measures also contained in the new constitution pose further risks 

at both the provincial and national levels. It is my understanding that planning is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

underway to hold the delayed provincial and local elections, although I would note 

that time is growing short before the next scheduled general national elections 

expected in 2016. All of these will require substantial domestic efforts, and I hope 

that the reformed Independent National Election Commission will be equal to the 

task. I have little doubt, however, considerable continuing external support will be 

required as well. A fractious national political structure, with hundreds of parties 

and political figures largely based on narrow regional, community, and ethnic interests obviously adds to this challenge. 

I must also note that problems of open, free, and fair democratic government are 

not limited to the Congo. Political systems in most of Congo’s neighbors, notably to 

include neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, are far from free and well-functioning 

democratic models. Recent major security problems in the Central African Republic 

(C.A.R.) and South Sudan underscore the threats to domestic and regional stability 

that can arise from elsewhere in the region. All contain the seeds of potential crossborder violence and wider conflict, and all should be a focus of international concern. 

The agenda outlined obviously is not a simple one, nor is it susceptible to quick 

or short-term solutions. It is, however, achievable. When the situation of presentday Congo and Great Lakes region is contrasted with that of 5, 10, or 15 years ago, 

the progress already made is dramatic, and provides a good foundation to move forward. Clearly, the leaders, governments, and people of the region bear the primary 

responsibility to build their own future and achieve the security, economic, and 

social success needed and deserved by all the people of the region. I firmly believe 

continued international community engagement and support, however, is important 

and necessary. 

The United States has played a key role for many years through bilateral programs, in coordination with other partners, and through multilateral institutions 

including the U.N. and international finance institutions. I strongly urge that such 

engagement continue. United States bilateral diplomatic and assistance programs 

well targeted toward priority objectives are key, including support for positive developments, and as needed frank criticism of negative or unhelpful policies and actions. 

Obviously, close coordination with other partners including traditional donors such 

as various European governments, the European Union and Japan is essential to 

maximize effectiveness. Close cooperation with African institutions and governments 

including the African Union, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and 

its member states, and other governments in the region is also of critical importance. The fact that those contributing troops to the MONUSCO Force Intervention 

Brigade consist exclusively of SADC member states is no accident, and reflects the 

interest attached to the region by these governments, and the important role those 

countries play. Close consultation and collaboration with other key partners, including fellow Security Council permanent member China and Russia, have also been 

important and helped the international community to speak and act in a unified 

manner on issues of the region. Strong U.S. support to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo, as well as other missions in the region, for example through the 

Security Council and American financial support, has been of critical importance to 

avoid on many occasions general collapse and for key initiatives such as the F.I.B. 

and deployment of reconnaissance UAVs, and the overall effectiveness of the U.N. 

mission’s work. 

The appointment of Special Envoy Feingold has in my view been a key action to 

bolster effectiveness of international community action. The close collaboration 

achieved with U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson, and other special envoys of the 

African Union, European Union, and various governments, and the U.N. Special 

Representative in the Congo, has I think already demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of this work. I believe this is particularly important as the Framework 

Accord and other agreements largely set out desired goals and objectives, but the 

Framework Accord lacks effective oversight or enforcement mechanisms, and it is 

certainly not at all clear that all signatories had a real commitment to realize its 

provisions. The burden of ensuring success of this initiative, therefore, has largely 

fallen on the team of special envoys. Their strong engagement is likely to continue 

to be needed I believe for some time given the scale and complexity of the issues 

involved. 

I must also note, however, that we should not overestimate our powers to control 

events or achieve desired results. Many of the issues in the Congo and region 

involve complex social, cultural, ethnic, and other issues with long and deep roots, 

often difficult to understand fully. Solutions, including viable structures, institutions, and relationships must in any case be built on indigenous foundations. Sensitivity not simply to sovereignty concerns, but to the views and expertise of regional, 

national, and local leaders, and related cultural, social and other factors is essential, 

and will often dictate the shape and nature of actions, development, and solutions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

We neglect such considerations only with considerable peril to the very objectives 

we seek to realize. 

I have no illusions of the difficulty and scope of the continuing remaining challenges. I am convinced, however, that building on the work already done solutions 

are achievable. Further, I am convinced that current prospects are better than they 

have ever been to achieve real and durable peace and security in eastern Congo and 

Great Lakes region. I am also convinced this result will require substantial engagement and support from the international community, and specifically from the 

United States, likely for some time. I believe, however, the importance of putting 

an end to the long-running humanitarian disaster and violence of the region provides a strong rationale for this engagement. It is important that we are not locked 

into a quasi-permanent cycle requiring international community ongoing engagement without end in Great Lakes conflict resolution and related large-scale humanitarian relief and other actions, with attendant risks to even broader conflict in 

Africa. Peace can be achieved, and I believe current policies and actions provide a 

good basis to be optimistic of progress. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Gilpin. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN, ACADEMIC DEAN, 

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL 

DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much. I would like to start by thanking Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and the members of this committee for inviting me to speak here today. 

I would also like to state that my testimony does not represent 

the position of the Africa Center, the National Defense University, 

or the Department of Defense. The views I will express here are 

solely mine, and I will focus almost exclusively on the economic 

dimensions of conflict and economic levers that could be used to 

address the persistent violence in the DRC. 

Many had hoped that the reversal suffered by the M23 rebel 

group late last year, the reduction in the scale of conflict minerals 

being traded, and the pervasive war fatigue within and outside the 

DRC would contribute to an easing of tensions and help lay the 

foundation for sustained peace in this troubled region. 

However, shortly after the December communique was signed, 

we have had reports of regrouping and recruitment by rebel 

groups, instability persists, and the lives and livelihoods of millions 

of Congolese remain both stark and dire. 

Progress in the DRC has been plagued by what can only be 

described as a complex emergency, one characterized by collectively 

reinforcing factors, which have already been discussed. As we have 

already mentioned, over the past decade, the DRC has received significant humanitarian and development assistance. There is no 

denying that more could have been done to help accomplish some 

of the goals that the assistance was intended to achieve. 

It must be noted, however, that this is not just a matter of corruption, weak capacity, or waste. It is a function of poorly coordinated efforts within and outside the DRC. The vast majority of 

development-focused initiatives emphasized either a specific security or societal threat such as defeating a certain rebel group, 

diminishing trade in certain minerals, and reducing specific types 

of violence. There is an urgent need for the DRC to shift away from 

a threat-centric to a more population-centric approach to stability 

and sustainability. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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I would submit that economic development is a viable point of 

entry when we are seeking a solution. There are a number of reasons for this. 

First, economic development is focused on the welfare of the individual, and it helps dismantle a very complex political economy and 

also stabilizes communities by creating opportunity and institutions that are more resilient; thereby creating a more viable constituency for peace. In my view, it is about time that the 76 million 

inhabitants of the DRC believe that the peace process is about 

them and not just about threat reduction or a string of development projects. 

In 2009, I led a research team to both Bukavu and Lumumbashi 

and we interviewed over 1,000 small- and medium-scale businesses. And what we found was a resilient, adaptable business 

sector who had learned how to survive through the worst of the 

conflict. They were not looking for handouts. They had already internalized the costs of conflicts in their business models and were 

broadly optimistic about the future. I believe that this is still the 

case. Received wisdom usually suggests that peace-building and 

stability are essentially military, political, or diplomatic endeavors 

with economic development initiatives relegated to the second 

phase. This is not necessarily true. There is an urgent need to integrate them very early on in the process, and that time is now. 

The DRC also needs to ensure that its vast mineral wealth benefits the vast majority of its people. At the heart of this conundrum 

is the efficiency, efficacy, and honesty with which the country’s natural resources are managed. The United States has taken the lead 

in garnering international support for responsible mining in the 

DRC via the Dodd-Frank Act. 

However, the introduction of verification mechanisms has had a 

mixed socioeconomic impact. We recognize that there has been a 

reduction in the trade in conflict minerals. Conflict-free mines are 

emerging all over the DRC, and a number of local and international companies have included livelihood projects in their portfolios. 

On the other hand, many analysts question the assumption that 

denying armed groups access to funds from the mineral trade will 

be an effective deterrent. They point to the fact that the M23 

raised the seed capital for its infamous 2012 offensive by robbing 

banks and taxing people as they traded. 

Looking ahead, I think there are three ‘‘D’s’’ that should be borne 

in mind: duration—having a long-term view; diversification—not 

focusing on a single issue; and dialogue—ensuring that engagement does not start and stop around the peace deals. 

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member, and members of this 

committee, there are three things I believe the United States can 

do to enhance prospects for sustainable peace, shared prosperity, 

and effective democratic governance in the DRC. 

First relates to the trade in conflict minerals. I think that the 

next step should be the United States working more closely with 

development organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, the 

African Development Bank to put structures in place that would 

facilitate the use of DRC’s mineral wealth for the benefit of all its 

people. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Secondly, we could help sustain interest and engagement in the 

great opportunities that the DRC presents for national and subregional stability. I think episodic interventions tend to be wasteful 

and could be counterproductive. 

The third thing relates to funding. It is true that the DRC is 

home to vast natural resources. However, for those natural 

resources to become true national resources, the country requires 

significant upfront investment and particularly in the social sectors 

and infrastructure. I think the creative use of partnerships—the 

public-private partnership alliance is an example of this—could 

achieve a lot in this regard. 

It is also important to advocate a more balanced approach of 

financial assistance with economic and governance portfolios receiving as much attention as security. 

Thank you very much for your kind attention and thank you for 

inviting me to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilpin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN

I wish to start by thanking Chairman Robert Menendez, Ranking Member Bob 

Corker and members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for inviting me 

to speak at this important hearing. I am Raymond Gilpin, currently the Academic 

Dean at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which is part of the Defense 

Department’s regional center enterprise. Kindly note, however, that my testimony 

does not in any way reflect or represent the position of the Department of Defense, 

the Africa Center or the National Defense University (with which the Africa Center 

is affiliated). My testimony represents my personal views, based on almost three 

decades of experience working on African issues, as well as: my experience working 

on economic development in the Democratic Republic of Congo; field research on 

business and peace in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Bukavu; coordinating the DRC 

diaspora dialogues at the United States Institute of Peace (2008–2012); and managing the web-based International Network on Economics and Conflict (2009–2013). 

My testimony will focus on economic development strategies to enhance peace-building in the DRC. 

The 12 December 2013 communique on prospects for peace in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo was significant for four important reasons: first, it purportedly 

heralded the end of the M23 crisis; second, it highlighted the subregional nature of 

the conflict by focusing on issues beyond the Congolese border; third, it reflected the 

growing level of international concern, having been initiated at the behest of the 

United Nations and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region 

(ICGLR); and, fourth, it emphasized the multifaceted nature of the DRC conflict and 

included language that covered demobilization, resettlement, economic development 

and social justice.1 Many had hoped that the reversals suffered by the M23 rebel 

group, reductions in the scale of war minerals being traded and pervasive war 

fatigue would contribute to an easing of tensions that would help lay the foundation 

for sustained peace in this troubled region. Shortly after this communique was 

signed, it was clear that it was destined to go the way of its predecessors. There 

were reports of regrouping and recruitment by rebel groups, instability persisted 

and the lives/living standards of millions of Congolese remain both stark and dire. 

A couple of weeks ago, Congolese President Joseph Kabila announced an amnesty 

for M23 members covering the period up to 20 December 2013,2 recapitulating on 

what had been a nonnegotiable 2 months ago. The possibility of the peace deal 

unravelling is one of many indicators that the situation in the DRC requires significantly more attention and support. 

Progress in the DRC has been plagued by what can be described as a persistently 

complex emergency. One characterized by collectively reinforcing factors like: a perverse political economy; extremely weak governance at all levels; transnational 

political, financial and intergroup dynamics; and a persistent war economy. It is crucial to understand that addressing these factors in isolation is unlikely to have the 

desired impact, because they are collectively reinforcing. For example, attempting 

to address the nefarious impacts of the trade in conflict minerals without concomitant efforts to improve governance is unlikely to succeed. Likewise, signing a peace 

deal with a rebel group without bolstering the capacity to deliver transitional justice 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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could be futile. Over the past decade, the DRC has received over $5 billion in 

humanitarian assistance and almost $20 billion in official development assistance.3

Over the same period, almost $10 billion has been spent to support the mission of 

some 20,000 personnel and troops who constitute the U.N. peacekeeping mission in 

the DRC, known by its French acronym—MONUSCO.4 USAID’s economic develop- ment projects in the DRC amounted to $983 million between 2004 and 2014, while 

the World Bank spent $3.7 billion in the DRC over the same period.5

While some would point to the uncertainties created by tardy disbursements and 

the requirement—pledge gap (the DRC received consistently less in pledges that 

was required), and others might quibble with the adequacy of the assistance 

received (relative to the population and size of the country), there is no denying that 

much more could have been accomplished with the support received to date.6 This 

is not just a matter of corruption, weak capacity, or waste. It is also a function of 

poorly coordinated efforts by national officials (at all levels) and the DRC’s bilateral, 

multilateral and nongovernmental partners. 

Like all fragile states affected by conflict, the DRC crisis would only be resolved 

if a consistent and coordinated strategy is designed and successfully implemented 

to ensure a shift from a threat-centric to a population-centric approach to stability 

and sustainability. The vast majority of existing initiatives emphasize specific security or societal threats, such as: defeating certain rebel groups, diminishing trade 

in specific minerals, reducing particular types of violence and addressing myriad 

factors that keep millions of Congolese in grinding, intergenerational poverty. However, as explained earlier, this approach fails to account for the collectively reinforcing nature of instability in the DRC. While there might be individual successes 

in some areas, they are neither lasting, nor do they further human security for the 

vast majority of Congolese. What is required is a carefully nuanced strategy with 

coordinated interventions that reinforce humanitarian efforts, promote equitable 

economic recovery and establish the conditions for rules-based governance across the 

country. 

Economic development is a viable entry point for such a strategy. This is because 

it is focused on the welfare of the individual citizen, it helps dismantle the political 

economy, and it stabilizes communities by creating opportunities and institutions 

that establish a more resilient constituency for peace. It is about time that the 76 

million inhabitants of the DRC feel that the peace process is about them, and not 

just about threat reduction or a string of development projects. Adopting a more 

population-centric approach requires engaging communities more meaningfully and 

ensuring that processes are accountable to the people. Here, the role of community 

leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and elected leaders must be emphasized. A population-centric approach also entails making the DRC’s vast wealth 

(mineral resources, agriculture, and forestry) less regime focused and more attuned 

to the needs of each citizen. This might seem counterintuitive to many who are only 

accustomed to thinking about the DRC as a problem that needs to be fixed. With 

the right approach, the DRC could be an opportunity for substantial gains not only 

in that country, but across the subregion. 

In 2008/09 I led a research team to Bukavu in the North East and Lubumbashi 

in the South.7 We interviewed over 500 small- and medium-sized businesses in both 

locations and found a very resilient and adaptable cohort of business professionals 

who had learned how to survive throughout the worst of the conflict. They were not 

looking for handouts. Their main challenges related to weak government institutions, stifling government policy/regulations, poor or nonexistent infrastructure, and 

corruption. Businesses in the northeast were much less concerned about the violent 

conflict that was being waged all around them, especially since most had already 

internalized those costs in their business models. Respondents were broadly optimistic about the future and their economic prospects, and believed that they should 

play a greater role in helping to shape their communities. Received wisdom usually 

suggests that peace-building and stability are essentially military, political and diplomatic endeavors, with economic development initiatives generally viewed as a second phase.8 There is ample evidence that the business community could play a more 

active role in promoting peace and could be solid anchors for stability, not least 

because they will have a direct stake in the process. 

Equitable and broad-based economic progress in the DRC could also help dismantle the DRC’s perverse political economy. In recent decades, nonformal economic 

actors, relationships, and institutions have emerged that are more focused on group 

agendas, rather than community or national development. You will notice that I 

used the term ‘‘non-formal’’ rather than the more commonly used ‘‘informal.’’ This 

is because the DRC economy operates in a very broad grey space where formal and 

nonformal are often practically indistinguishable. Strategies based on providing contracts and opportunities to those at the helm of the DRC’s perverse political econFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36 

omy crowd out, and further alienate, what could be a budding middle-class.9 Anthropological research examines how some ethnic groups in the DRC have thrived in the 

midst of instability and violent conflict by negotiating a practical solution, based 

largely on the economic muscle of a mining-based middle class.10 Institutional relationships and incentive structures within the existing political economy are difficult 

to address if there are no alternatives. Existing programs and projects in the DRC 

could be reoriented to ensure that small- and medium-scaled enterprises receive the 

support, structure and security they deserve. It must, however, be noted that this 

is a longer term proposition.11 Hence, the emphasis should shift from quick gains 

to sustained progress. 

Projects and programs that adhere to a population-centric philosophy are necessary, but by no means sufficient. The DRC also needs its vast wealth to benefit 

its people. At the heart of this conundrum is the efficacy and honesty with which 

the country’s natural resources are managed. The DRC faired very poorly in the 

recent Resource Governance Index, particularly as it relates to government regulations, nontransparent institutional frameworks, unaccountable officials and corruption.12 Improved management of the DRC’s natural resources is attainable. Success 

in this area will help diminish the scope and impact of a persistent war economy, 

and also create opportunities for existing private sector operators and emerging 

entrepreneurs. It will also create a multiplier effect as activity increases along the 

value-chains of natural resource production. For example, it would generate private 

sector jobs and opportunities that lie outside the natural resource industries (like 

mining and agriculture). Support services, infrastructure, transportation, and marketing activity related to production and export could become instrumental at various stages of the value chain. Although field research in 2009 noted this phenomenon in the DRC’s mining industry, the same is true in other sectors of the 

economy. Innovation (both process and product) is showing signs of life in the DRC. 

Young entrepreneurs are finding creative solutions to old challenges and are looking 

to be connected to markets and capital in their country. Entrepreneurship is an 

often neglected, but crucial, component of economic reform. 

In order for economic actors to play a more active role in the stability of the DRC, 

significant investment must be directed to improving political and economic governance, addressing impunity, reducing the infrastructure deficit and augmenting 

human capacity—particularly in vulnerable areas. The vastness of the DRC and its 

large population compounds the task at hand. In many cases, the required investment will have to start from scratch. Existing programs to improve social outcomes 

in health and education should be realigned. More realism should be introduced 

in the area of infrastructure investment, with consortia and partnerships being 

emphasized. International investors should be more active partners via publicprivate partnerships.13 National and international legislative frameworks should be 

strengthened. 

The United States took the lead in garnering international support for responsible 

mining in the DRC via specific legislation (i.e., sections 1502 and 1504 of the ‘‘Wall 

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’’ of December 2010, introduced in the 

House of Representatives by Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney 

Frank, and in the Senate Banking Committee by Chairman Chris Dodd (also known 

as the Dodd-Frank Act). Since then, the Securities and Exchange Commission has 

issued rules for the implementation and in January 2014, Intel, the global computer 

chip manufacturer, became the first major company to declare its supply-chain ‘‘conflict free.’’ 14 While these are laudable developments, much more work needs to be 

done. The introduction of verification mechanisms has had a mixed socioeconomic 

impact. It is much more difficult to trade in conflict minerals, but in some cases it 

has led to the development of smuggling routes, with an attendant rise in corruption. Some researchers have pointed to the negative impact on artisanal miners who 

either have to accept lower prices or abandon their mines altogether. Others question the assumption that denying the armed groups access to funds from the mineral trade would be an effective deterrent. They point out that the M23 raised the 

funds it needed for its infamous 2012 offensive by allegedly robbing banks and 

extortion (taxation) at numerous check points.15 Thus, while the Dodd-Frank Act 

has clearly made a difference in the purchase and sale of minerals from the DRC’s 

conflict zones, much more needs to be done to understand/address the root causes 

and channels of conflict in the DRC. More also needs to be done to mitigate potentially negative impacts across the value chain. 

Looking ahead, three important ‘‘Ds’’ should be borne in mind. The first is duration. Engagement strategies in the DRC must be conceptualized from a long-term 

perspective. Rather than focusing on putting out the existing fires, strategic 

responses should have a long-term end-state in sight. This calls for sustained 

engagements, and not sporadic encounters. Linkages among the various intervenFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

tions (economic, social, security, and diplomatic) must be clear, with in-built flexibility to ensure the inevitable course correction. The second is diversification. Our 

approach to the DRC’s complex emergency should not be predicated on a single 

issue, be it conflict minerals, sexual violence, ethnic cleavages, governance challenges or humanitarian interventions. The international community must go beyond 

peacekeeping and humanitarianism in the DRC. More robust economic engagements 

and investments in the rule of law are more likely to yield the desired longer term 

outcomes, sustainably. The third is dialogue. Engagement must not start and stop 

around peace deals. Measures should be taken to more effectively institutionalize 

consultation and communication at all levels. Institutions charged with these 

responsibilities should be strengthened. This is an effective way to promote accountability, foster responsible governance, and establish a productive (and symbiotic) 

relationship between national/local governments and the people. 

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of this committee, 

there are a number of things the United States can do to enhance the prospects for 

sustainable peace, shared prosperity, and effective democratic governance that is 

inclusive, accountable and just in the DRC. The first is an extension of sections 1502 

and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. With your help, the United States has led the way 

in diminishing the odious trade in minerals from the DRC’s conflict zones around 

the world. The next step should be working with development institutions (like 

USAID, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank) to put structures in 

place that would facilitate the use of the DRC’s mineral wealth for the benefit of 

all its people, and not just a select few. It may be recalled that the significant 

increase in social investments across the African Continent (which has recently 

begun to bear fruit) was initiated as part of an external debt relief initiative that 

was supported by the United States. Second, the United States could help sustain 

interest and engagement in the great opportunities the DRC presents for economic 

progress and subregional stability. Episodic interventions tend to be wasteful and 

could be counterproductive. To this end, some consideration could be given to the 

clear articulation of interconnected long-range plans for stability and progress, as 

well as the institutionalization of regular updates. Given its size, location, and 

potential, the DRC is of immense strategic value in the Great Lakes region and 

beyond. It must not only be viewed as a problem that needs to be fixed. The third 

thing the United States can do relates to funding. It is true that the DRC is home 

to vast natural resources. However, for those natural resources to become true national resources, the country requires substantial upfront investments, particularly 

in the social sector and infrastructure. The creative use of partnerships (bilateral, 

multilateral, and commercial) could enable the United States to leverage its support 

in the DRC, while working with partners to put the country on the path toward selfsustained democratic progress. It is also important to advocate a more balanced approach to financial assistance, with the economic and governance portfolios receiving 

as much as security. Furthermore, aligning United States support more closely with 

a longer term plan that is country-owned (as opposed to ‘‘pet projects’’) could also 

ensure that we realize a bigger bang for our buck. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1December 2013 communique http://www.scribd.com/doc/191157617/Joint-ICGLR-SADC-FinalCommunique-on-Kampala-Dialogue (accessed 22 February 2014). 2See http://www.independent.co.ug/news/regional-news/8729-drc-president-declares-amnestyfor-former-m23-rebels (accessed 21 February 2014). 3 Humanitarian Assistance: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/democratic-republic-of-congo (accessed (21 February 2014). 4MONUC http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/facts.shtml (accessed 21 

February 2014). 5 USAID work in the DRC http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/democratic-republic-of-the-congo 

(accessed 21 February 2014). 6Date showing need vs. pledges for humanitarian assistance to the DRC http:// 

www.unocha.org/drc/about-us/ocha-funding (accessed 21 February 2014). 7 Report on ‘‘Conflict-Business Dynamics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,′′ http:// 

www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Conflict-BusinesslDynamicslinlRDC.pdf (accesse 21 February 

2014). 8 I make the case for the role of economic development as a catalyst for peace in ‘‘How Business can Foster Peace,′′ http://www.usip.org/publications/how-business-can-foster-peace and 

‘‘Using Entrepreneurship to Promote Fragility in Fragile Regions,′′ http://www.usip.org/publications/using-entrepreneurship-promote-stability-in-fragile-regions (both accessed 23 February 

2014). 9 Nancy Birdsall discusses the socioeconomic importance of Africa’s middle class in fragile regions in http://www.cgdev.org/publication/do-no-harm-aid-weak-institutions-and-missing-middleafrica-working-paper-113 (accessed 21 February 2014). 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38 

10See ‘‘In and Out of the State: Working the Boundaries of Power in the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo’’ by Patience Kabamba, http://openanthcoop.net/press/http://openanthcoop.net/press/ 

wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Kabamba-OACP-Working-Paper-151.pdf (accessed 21 February 

2014). 11 Background papers for the 2011 World Development Report on the theme: ‘‘Conflict, Security and Development’’ provide empirical evidence that economic reconstruction initiatives in 

conflict affected economies (like DRC) need at least a decade to take effect. http://web.world 

bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:23252415 

∼pagePK:478093∼piPK:477627∼theSitePK:477624,00.html (accessed 21 February 2014). 12 Resource Governance Index http://www.revenuewatch.org/countries/africa/drc/overview 

(accessed 21 February 2014) 13 USAID launched an alliance with mining companies and manufacturers in October 2011 to 

combat conflict mining. See http://blog.usaid.gov/2011/11/joining-together-to-combat-conflictminerals/ (accessed 22 February 2014). 14 Intel’s White paper on conflict mining http://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/policy/policyconflict-minerals.pdf (accessed 21 February 2014). 15 Reports include http://christophvogel.net/2012/12/15/kampala-sets-up-kabila-wakes-up-m23- 

makes-up-masisi-flares-up/and http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-30-00-m23-puts-pressure-on-kabila 

(both accessed 21 February 2014). 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Affleck. 

STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK, DIRECTOR, ACTOR, WRITER, 

PRODUCER; FOUNDER, EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE, LOS 

ANGELES, CA 

Mr. AFFLECK. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, 

distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

thank you for inviting me here today. My name is Ben Affleck. I 

am an actor and a director and the founder of the Eastern Congo 

Initiative, a grantmaking and advocacy organization investing in 

and working with the people of eastern Congo. I am, to state the 

obvious, not a Congo expert. I am an American working to do my 

part for a country and a people I believe in and care deeply about. 

I want to take a moment to acknowledge one of the people who 

inspired me to create ECI. He just left because he had to make his 

plane. But the legendary Dr. Denis Mukwege. He is a two-time 

Nobel Peace Prize nominee and one of the bravest people I have 

ever known. His Panzi Hospital has provided critical care to more 

than 30,000 women who have been raped and brutalized, and even 

in the face of persistent death threats, he remains a tireless advocate for women’s rights. So I want to thank him even in his 

absence. 

I would also like to acknowledge my friend and fellow ECI board 

member, Cindy McCain, for being an extraordinary person and a 

valuable partner and champion for the Congolese people. Thank 

you, Cindy. 

Fourteen months ago, I was invited to testify before the House 

Armed Services Committee on this very topic. At the time of my 

previous testimony, an armed militia known as M23 had just taken 

over Goma, which is the capital of the North Kivu province. They 

subjected women to deplorable forms of sexual violence, including 

rape, and forcibly recruited children to fight or be killed. 

As a result of the prolonged conflict, this year the U.N. reported 

an estimated 2.9 million Congolese had been displaced internally 

and another 428,000 have sought refuge in neighboring countries. 

Today, I am thankful that I can tell a more hopeful story, one 

of small but powerful victories. 

In November, through the combined efforts of the Congolese 

Army and a special African-led U.N. peacekeeping force known as 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

the Intervention Brigade, which the Senator and others discussed 

earlier, M23 surrendered and signed a peace agreement. This force 

is comprised of troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. 

Their success, combined with high-level and focused diplomacy, 

reinforces our belief that when the international community acts 

and the Congolese Government rises to its moment, these challenges are, in fact, solvable. 

If it were not for bold leadership by you, the U.S. Congress, 

together with the Obama administration, Congo would not be at 

this important turning point. So on behalf of our team in Goma 

and all our Congolese partners, thank you for your commitment 

and for your bipartisan leadership. 

Without overstating what has taken place since December 2012, 

I can say unequivocally that the situation in eastern Congo has 

improved. Last year, both the U.N. and the Obama administration 

appointed high-level special envoys to the region. In July, Secretary 

Kerry presided over a high-level U.N. Security Council meeting 

focused on security challenges in the Great Lakes region. And on 

November 7, M23 was forced to surrender. 

I am also here today with an urgent message. Our work in DRC 

is not done. We cannot risk diminished U.S. leadership at a time 

when lasting stability and peace are within reach. 

In the last year, many of your colleagues visited Congo. In 

August, Senator Lindsey Graham led a Senate delegation to eastern Congo, joined by Senators Chambliss, Blunt, Thune, Johanns, 

and Barrasso, alongside Cindy McCain. Senator Coons also traveled to Congo and has been a champion for increased United States 

engagement. In December, Congressman Adam Smith traveled 

with ECI to meet with U.N. leadership and some of ECI’s remarkable Congolese grantees. 

The accomplishments over the last year were hard fought. They 

are fragile and they are reversible. Sadly, we have seen this before. 

Over the past decade, the international community has focused 

more on signing peace deals than on implementing the mandates 

found within those deals. Failed cycles of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, which again has been discussed here 

already at some length, of combatants have resulted in enormous 

suffering for the people of eastern Congo and severely slowed existing efforts toward military reform. 

I would like to share with you five specific actions that the U.S. 

Congress can take to help to ensure that we remain on a path to 

peace while saving U.S. tax dollars over the long term. 

First, urge Secretary Kerry to ensure Special Envoy Feingold has 

the support needed to successfully achieve his mission. And we 

commend President Obama and Secretary Kerry for selecting your 

former colleague, someone who brings extensive experience and 

credibility to the position. 

Second, call on U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power to 

support extending the Intervention Brigade past its March 31 expiration. We also recommend that this committee hold an oversight 

hearing to consider a sunset to MONUSCO that compels DRC to 

follow through and fully reform its security sector. After nearly 15 

years and billions of dollars in appropriated funds, an endless 

MONUSCO mandate disincentivizes reform. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

Third, we request that Congress call on President Obama to 

directly engage with President Kabila to encourage him to make 

good on his critical commitment of long overdue security sector reforms by establishing a clearly defined roadmap. 

Fourth, the United States must play a pivotal role and robustly 

participate in multilateral efforts to ensure that the Congolese Government holds free, fair, and timely local and national elections 

that respect the Congolese Constitution, including strict observance 

of term limits. 

And finally, call upon USAID to scale up its economic development initiatives in eastern Congo. DRC’s agriculture sector has 

massive potential, and ECI has trained cocoa farmers to increase 

the quality and quantity of their production so it can be sold for 

a fair price on the global market. USAID should be encouraged to 

invest in more programs like these. Targeted investment in promising Congolese-driven solutions can and will drive economic 

growth and will create jobs. 

Let me share with you a final example of the extraordinary 

opportunity that exists in Congo. One of ECI’s partners in our work 

with Congolese cocoa farmers is Theo Chocolate, the fastest-growing organic, fair-trade chocolate company in the United States. 

Today, Theo sources more than 50 percent of its cocoa from DRC. 

This year alone, more than 640 tons of cocoa will be purchased 

from the smallholder farmers ECI supports, which would be 

enough to make 9 million chocolate bars. This is neither charity 

nor aid. It is good business for the Congolese and is paying off for 

this American company. 

Our partner, Theo’s Joe Whinney, joins us here today. And Joe 

saw the potential of this country and its people, and it is now yielding extraordinary results for his business. Just imagine what can 

be achieved for both the Congolese people and the American businesses with increased peace, stability, and additional investments 

in this sector. 

There is a Congolese proverb that says no matter how many 

times you strike a boulder with a knife, it will never turn to dust. 

The Congolese people have been struck time and time again by 

conflict, poverty, and disease, and by an international community 

who looked upon Congo and called it hopeless. I hope you can see 

that it is not, and I hope you will commit again to the focused leadership that you have shown these past 14 months. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Affleck follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, distinguished members of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. My 

name is Ben Affleck. I am an actor and director and the founder of Eastern Congo 

Initiative, a grant-making and advocacy organization investing in and working with 

the people of eastern Congo. I am, to state the obvious, not a Congo expert. I am 

an American working to do my part for a country and a people I believe in and care 

deeply about. 

I want to take a moment to acknowledge one of the people who inspired me to 

create ECI, the legendary Dr. Denis Mukwege. He is a two-time Nobel Peace Prize 

nominee, and one of the bravest people I have ever known. His Panzi hospital has 

provided critical care to more than 30,000 women who have been raped and brutalized, and even in the face of persistent death threats, he remains a tireless advocate 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

for women’s rights. Although he is not testifying today, he has asked me to submit 

a statement for the record, on his behalf. 

I would also like to acknowledge my friend and fellow ECI Board Member, Cindy 

McCain, for being an invaluable partner and champion for the Congolese people. 

Fourteen months ago I was invited to testify before the House Armed Services 

Committee on this very topic. 

At the time of my previous testimony, an armed militia known as the M23 had 

just taken over Goma, the capital of the North Kivu province. They subjected 

women to deplorable forms of sexual violence including rape, and forcibly recruited 

more than 120 children to fight or be killed. As a result of prolonged conflict, this 

year the U.N. reported that an estimated 2.9 million Congolese had been displaced 

internally and another 428,000 have sought refuge in neighboring countries. 

Today, I’m thankful that I can tell a more hopeful story—one of small but powerful victories and cautious optimism. In November, through the combined efforts of 

the Congolese army and a special African-led U.N. peacekeeping force known as the 

Intervention Brigade, M23 surrendered and signed a peace agreement. This force 

is comprised of troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. Their success combined with high-level and focused diplomacy reinforces our belief that when the 

international community acts, and the Congolese Government rises to the moment, 

these challenges are in fact solvable. 

If it were not for bold leadership by you, the U.S. Congress, together with the 

Obama administration, Congo would not be at this important turning point. 

So, on behalf of our team in Goma and all of our Congolese partners, thank you 

for your commitment and your bipartisan leadership. 

Without overstating what has taken place since December 2012, I can say, unequivocally, that the situation in eastern Congo has improved: 

1. Last year, both the U.N. and the Obama administration appointed highprofile special envoys to the region. 

2. In July, Secretary Kerry presided over a high-level U.N. Security Council 

meeting focused on security challenges in the Great Lakes region. 

3. And on November 7, M23 was forced to surrender. 

I am also here today with an urgent message: Our work in DRC is not finished. 

We cannot risk diminished U.S. leadership at a time when lasting peace and stability are within reach. 

In the last year, many of your colleagues visited Congo. In August, Senator 

Lindsey Graham led a Senate delegation to eastern Congo joined by Senators 

Chambliss, Blunt, Thune, Johanns, and Barrasso alongside Cindy McCain. Senator 

Coons also traveled to Congo and has been a champion for increased U.S. engagement. And in December, Congressman Adam Smith traveled with ECI to meet with 

U.N. leadership and some of ECI’s remarkable Congolese grantees. 

The accomplishments over the last year were hard fought, but they are fragile 

and they are reversible. 

Sadly, we’ve seen this before. Over the past decade, the international community 

has focused more on signing peace deals than on implementing the mandates found 

within those deals. Failed cycles of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

of combatants have resulted in enormous suffering for the people of eastern Congo 

and severely slowed existing efforts toward military reform. 

I would like to share with you five specific actions the U.S. Congress can take 

to help ensure we remain on a path to peace while saving U.S. tax dollars over the 

long term: 

• First, urge Secretary Kerry to ensure Special Envoy Feingold has the personnel 

and support needed to successfully achieve his mission. And we commend President Obama and Secretary Kerry for selecting your former colleague, someone 

who brings extensive experience and credibility to the position. 

• Second, call on U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, to support 

extending the Intervention Brigade past its March 31 expiration. We also recommend that this committee hold an oversight hearing to consider a sunset to 

MONUSCO that compels DRC to follow through and fully reform its security 

sector. After nearly 15 years and billions of dollars in appropriated funds, an 

endless MONUSCO mandate disincentivizes reform. 

• Third, we request that Congress call on President Obama to directly engage 

with President Kabila to encourage him to make good on his critical commitment of long-overdue security sector reforms by establishing a clearly defined 

roadmap. 

• Fourth, the United States must play a pivotal role and robustly participate in 

multilateral efforts to ensure that the Congolese Government holds free, fair, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

42 

and timely local and national elections that respect the Congolese Constitution, 

including strict observance of term limits. • And finally, call upon USAID to scale up its economic development initiatives 

in eastern Congo. DRC’s agriculture sector has massive potential, and ECI has 

trained cocoa farmers to increase the quality and quantity of their production 

so it can be sold for a fair price on the global market. USAID should be encouraged to invest in more programs like these. Targeted investment in promising 

Congolese-driven solutions can and will drive economic growth and create jobs. 

Let me share with you a final example of the extraordinary opportunity that 

exists in Congo. One of ECI’s partners in our work with Congolese cocoa farmers 

is Theo Chocolate, the fastest growing organic, fair-trade chocolate company in the 

United States. Today, Theo sources more than 50 percent of its cocoa from DRC. 

This year alone, more than 640 tons of cocoa will be purchased from the smallholder 

farmers ECI supports—enough to make 9 million chocolate bars. This is neither 

charity nor aid, it’s good business for the Congolese and its paying off for this American company. Our partner, Theo’s CEO, Joe Whinney, joins us here today. Joe saw 

the potential of this country and its people, and it’s now yielding extraordinary 

results for his business. Just imagine what can be achieved for both the Congolese 

people and American businesses with increased peace, stability, and additional 

investments in this sector. 

There’s a Congolese proverb that says no matter how many times you strike a 

boulder with a knife, it will never turn to dust. 

The Congolese people have been struck time and again by conflict, poverty, and 

disease, and by an international community who looked upon Congo and called it 

hopeless. I hope you can see that it is not, and I hope you will commit again to the 

focused leadership that you’ve shown these past 14 months. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Let me start with you, Ambassador Meece. You and other witnesses have stressed the need for the security sector reform in your 

testimonies. What steps has the Congolese Government made 

regarding that reform, and what assistance, technical or otherwise, 

should the United States provide in helping the Congolese Government to meet its responsibilities in this regard? 

Ambassador MEECE. Mr. Chairman, I think that is, indeed, a key 

area of reform. I would note that I disaggregate that normally into 

three different areas, each of which is substantial in terms of the 

security sector, starting with the police where, in fact, there has 

been notable action already, and the scope of the programs in 

terms of training, in terms of professionalization, various other 

things has shown results but is limited largely by resource constraints. As the Special Representative of the Secretary General, I 

was engaged often in trying to obtain greater donor support in the 

area with limited results. The Japanese Government has been the 

largest single contributor and reliable source in that. But that is 

one set of things for the police. Clearly, the police are vital to longterm security. 

The judicial sector, justice systems, clearly vital not only in 

terms of overall security, but things like putting it into impunity, 

sexual violence, a rule of law generally that is essential for longterm success of the Congo and stability and security, economic 

development as well. But the institutions are very weak, and it 

needs a great deal more work. 

The United States has been active in various ways, but it is an 

area that I think could use more attention on a bilateral basis, 

through multilaterals, whatever seems to be the most appropriate 

or effective in partnership with other donors. 

And finally, we get to the military, which is in many ways the 

most problematic and has lagged the most in terms of any signifiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

43 

cant progress going forward. The military reform programs have 

been a problem. It is something that we worked hard to try to 

advance with very limited results—I think probably because of fear 

of the Congolese Government of having too much external involvement or potential control over what is obviously a key strategic sector—but it is, nonetheless, vital both in terms of improving overall 

performance as well as rules of conduct and putting an end to 

improper behavior. This includes a number of things, including the 

command structure, including training, including construction of 

barracks. They do not exist. As referenced earlier, families have to 

move at this point with army units who are traveling. It includes 

military justice, continued development of military justice and 

other factors. 

There has been some progress, agreement, and a strong commitment to put an end to any involvement with children, minors being 

involved in the military. There have been some other structural 

things but much more to be done. 

And finally, as has already been referenced, demobilization and 

integration programs which are essential. 

I would just build on Senator Feingold’s earlier statement in saying that in my own view one of the missing components of the failure of past DDR programs has been a sufficient emphasis on community involvement for a reintegrated or demobilized combatant, 

as opposed to exclusively on the combatant. And this community 

approach to reintegration, I believe, is an essential element that 

offers promise for greater success than has been achieved in the 

past as well. All of those are essential. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you—in your testimony, you talk 

about economic reforms as well as some institutional reforms. And 

Mr. Affleck suggested that President Obama directly engage with 

President Kabila on these issues. How do you assess his ability and 

willingness to make those tough reforms? 

Ambassador MEECE. As was mentioned earlier, there has been 

substantial progress in terms of macroeconomic governance. If you 

look at the macroeconomic indices, inflation, GDP growth, other 

factors, it has been pretty good in recent years, and Prime Minister 

Matata is, I think, key to helping continue those efforts. 

What I think is still a significant problem is in two major areas. 

One is a lack of transparency particularly in the extractive 

industries in terms of contracts, concessions, overall commercial 

dealings that needs much broader openness in terms of what is 

going on. 

Second is a simplification of the maze of complex and uncoordinated regulations, rules, taxes imposed by a weak government 

infrastructure. That too requires considerable effort. There are 

many vested interests that would resist in both areas. It will probably involve serious civil service reform, which is also difficult and 

politically unpopular. But these are all things to get to a business 

and investment climate that, one, provides benefit for the people of 

Congo, provides the revenues to the government that it should 

have out of commercial operations and promote investment in the 

kinds of economic activity that is needed and opportunity for the 

average Congolese. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

44 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Affleck, one final question before I turn to 

Senator Boxer—I understand Senator Barrasso has yielded to her. 

Your organization, the Eastern Congo Initiative, supports local 

solutions for development challenges. You talked about the one 

experience. It seems very successful. 

Sometimes in the midst of such conflict, one wonders whether 

local solutions can actually be driven. You seem to feel, evidently 

through the work of your foundation, that, in fact, they can. Can 

you give the committee a sense of what you have found in terms 

of the Congolese people’s willingness to engage in a way that creates that locally driven solution? 

Mr. AFFLECK. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, when I first looked for something to do around this 

issue, I did a lot of traveling and a lot of meeting of folks. And one 

of the things that struck me in the most profound way was that 

in the midst of—and this was in the heat of war and violence and 

a lot of misery and death—the need, the ability, the capacity that 

the Congolese had to repair their own country, the drive they had 

to make things work for themselves. And I anticipated finding people who were just blown apart and were sort of—I suppose I subscribed to that stereotype of Africans who are sort of lying around 

waiting for someone to show up and help them when, in fact, these 

are folks who were really trying their very best to help themselves. 

And what I saw, when I looked at the range of organizations 

working there from the largest foreign NGOs from North America 

and Europe and on down the scale, was that the Congolese-based 

community organizations were the ones who best understood the 

culture, the values, the mores of the place. And as a consequence, 

they really had a better ability to work in these cities and in the 

countryside for various reasons, but it made logical sense to me 

once I saw those figures. You know, the guys that I grew up with 

would know how best to work in the part of Boston I grew up with 

as opposed to somebody sort of parachuting in from, say, New Jersey. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. When we parachute in, we make a real difference. [Laughter.] 

Mr. AFFLECK. So I was impressed by that, and I thought this is 

what I want to do and enable these organizations, support them, 

help build their capacity, and so on. And people said you will not 

find enough of them, and that just has not been true. We found so 

many astounding folks and great organizations. We can furnish the 

committee a list of those. It is almost long to go into from bringing 

child soldiers out of the bush, to maternal health, to radio and politics and justice. We have a legal clinic at Dr. Mukwege’s hospital. 

And in all of those various ways, all the various areas, it is Congolese folks who are making the real difference, and it is those people 

who continue to inspire me to do this work. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is great. Thank you. 

Senator Barrasso yielded to Senator Boxer, and we appreciate 

that. 

Senator BOXER. I thank that spirit of cooperation. I have to go 

to a meeting of the WRDA conference, and you know how we are 

trying to get that done. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

45 

Can I just say thank you to everybody here for all you are doing, 

including the private citizens. 

Mr. Affleck, through your organization you have strongly advocated for strengthening and supporting civil society organizations 

in the DRC. And as you pointed out, ‘‘the people of eastern Congo 

remain committed to helping their neighbors and rebuilding their 

communities.’’ 

So as I look at the amount of money we have been spending 

there, it is a lot of money. It is a lot of dollars, and it is probably 

going to be cut in half this year, just given all the problems. So we 

have to be very wise about how we spend those dollars. 

So I would ask you are we doing enough to assist Congolese civil 

society organizations? Because I have found in so many parts of the 

world that we often overlook those organizations and we just go to 

the big players, but we do not go to the people on the ground. So 

is there room for improvement there that you could work with Senator Feingold on? 

Mr. AFFLECK. First of all, the amount of money that—people 

have been talking about a billion dollars. It is slightly misleading. 

At least half of that, $500 million, goes to MONUSCO, which is 

neither really humanitarian nor developmental aid. It is a peacekeeping bureaucracy and organization and so on, which we call for 

a sunset on. So in fact we are calling for reduced aid, technically 

speaking, to the region. 

We believe that a little bit goes a very long way. And this is a 

discussion that I was having with Senator Graham and others earlier that targeted investment and the way that we have done our 

chocolate bar, you know, places where you are spending a little bit 

of money to help people grow a lot and where they can then function in the marketplace on their own is really smart. 

And one other ask we have is that USAID who does a lot of 

humanitarian aid particularly in the West and some in the East 

refocus on development because we believe that economic development is the key for sustainable growth in DRC. 

If you take away military aid and you take away what was 

MONUC and is now MONUSCO, it is actually not a gigantic 

amount of money at all going to a country of 70 million people 

where 5 million died in the last 15 years. We are talking about 

$250 million. I mean, I am not the expert. Do not quote me on 

those numbers. There are people much more expert than I. But 

very broadly speaking, I am not wrong. And when you think of it 

that way, I think we are not properly serving the people of Congo. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I appreciate it. And you did hit the nail on 

the head in terms of what the administration requested, which was 

half, I think, of the $400 million provided last year. But the point 

is we can do better. I believe that, not just here, but in so many 

other places. So I look forward to working with your organization, 

with Senator Feingold, with all my colleagues here. 

And let me again say to everyone thank you for your concern and 

interest, it is so critical. I think when people have no sense of a 

future, they act out in many ways, and one of the ways in the DRC 

is definitely going after the women and it is just a horror story. 

And getting back to Senator Johnson’s question to Senator Feingold about the root causes. What are the root causes of people 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

46 

treating women this way? We could spend a long time on it. But 

the fact is it has to stop. 

So let us work better, Mr. Chairman and all my colleagues, with 

some of these organizations on the ground where, as you point out, 

they can do a lot with a little. And I think we can keep the progress going. I really do believe it. And it is really because of all of 

you. 

And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to Senator 

Barrasso. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake? Senator McCain? 

Senator MCCAIN. I always like to defer to my colleague who is 

50 years junior. [Laughter.] 

I thank all three of the witnesses here today, and I thank them 

for their expertise. And I especially again want to thank my friend, 

my dear, dear friend, Russ Feingold, for his continued efforts to 

serve not only this country but a lot of people in this world who 

I am sure will benefit from his dedicated work. 

Let me just ask all three witnesses, maybe beginning with you, 

Ambassador. Compare the situation in the Republic of Congo and 

the Great Lakes region 10 years ago with now, and what it will 

look like, if nothing changes, 10 years from now, and how we can 

change it from 10 years from now. Maybe I could begin with you, 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador MEECE. Senator, thank you for the question. 

I was in the Congo 10 years ago and have direct memory of it. 

Without thinking of the specifics of 10, as opposed to 11 or 12 

years, I would note that at one point we had, during the height of 

war, eight different national armies operating in Congolese territory, all with varying interests, a horribly complex and difficult 

domestic situation. Frankly, it was a mess. And it was difficult to 

identify a way out of it. 

To compare that to where we are today, without minimizing in 

any way, shape, or form the magnitude of the problems or the suffering of the people in the Congo, there has been an enormous progression, putting an end to the formal war, getting the foreign 

armies formally out of the Congo, setting up the transition which 

led to the successful 2006 elections and the conduct of those elections. 

This has not been a straight line. Things have moved back. 

There has been backsliding. There have been problems, and clearly 

as the hearing has indicated, there are enormous problems that 

remain. 

But as I stated earlier, I believe that the conditions that we have 

now are the best that have existed for a very long time, if ever, to 

get beyond what has been the cycle of continued violence in eastern 

Congo that we have seen for the past many years and start to put 

in place those things needed for a durable security, durable order 

and stability not only for eastern Congo but for the region, and 

obviously within that, provide for the betterment of the people 

which is the real focus of this activity, whether that is regarding 

sexual violence, killings, conflict, and the whole range of things. 

So, yes, there has been, in my view, solid progress. I think there 

are grounds for more progress, and it is important to do that to put 

an end to the violence. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

47 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Gilpin. 

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I would echo the Ambassador’s point that 10 years ago the DRC 

was in a very dire place. We had, from an economic perspective, a 

mass hemorrhaging of the DRC’s resources. We had a very complex 

political economy, one in which both institutions and incentive 

structures were geared toward numerous fiefdoms that preyed on 

communities, that destroyed livelihoods, and practically obliterated 

the future for millions in the DRC. We were also in a place in 

which human security was particularly tenuous. Most Congolese in 

the communities had very little hope for a bright and prosperous 

future. 

Where we are today is at a very critical juncture, one in which 

the reduction in the amount of conflict minerals being traded has 

done three important things. First, it has shone the spotlight on 

that political economy, and so the people who were benefiting and 

reinforcing the negativity—not just in the communities but also in 

the economy—are less likely to do so because of the constraints 

placed upon them by the act and the enforcement regime that has 

now become international, having been led by the United States. 

The second thing that it has done is to bring the business sector 

fair and square into the stability business. We now have companies 

like Intel saying they have a conflict-free supply chain. We have 

Apple announcing that its tungsten is conflict-free. But they are 

not stopping there. They are also including livelihood programs in 

their portfolios. Senator, that is important because one of the 

things that we saw in the initial months of the act was a lot of concern that livelihoods might be lost, investments in the social indicators would diminish, and the artisanal miners and the millions 

more who provide services to the mining industry will be out of 

jobs. That is no longer the case because companies are now 

partnering, and that is very important. 

The third thing that it has done, it has led to a lot more 

leveraging. Because the Congo is vast, a lot of people, and the need 

is great, no one partner can do it all. But we are seeing a lot more 

leveraging. USAID might build the roads and an NGO help create 

income-generating opportunities. This is not only expanding employment and income opportunities, it is also giving millions hope 

for a brighter future. 

Senator, what should we do so 10 years from now we would not 

be here talking about intervention brigades and foreign assistance 

and humanitarian assistance? I think there are three things. 

First, we need to focus on ensuring that opportunity counts, not 

violence. To ensure that we are able to do that, we have to make 

sure that the legislative framework is in place. The most important 

constraint we found when we interviewed over 1,000 small businesses in the DRC, was not the war or corrupt officials. It was the 

regulatory system. There are hundreds of regulations and taxes 

that are imposed upon businesses in the DRC. This needs to 

change. 

The second thing that has to happen is that we have to be able 

to connect the local economy more directly into the supply and 

value chain of economic activities like forestry and mining, because 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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there are a lot of enterprising Congolese who could step up to the 

plate and provide the services and products that support industry 

in the DRC. The need for humanitarian assistance and foreign aid 

will be greatly diminished if we could address that critical aspect. 

And the third thing that needs to be done now, as has been 

echoed by all the panelists, is the governance equation. The upcoming elections are critical not just at the national level, but at the 

local level as well. We need to ensure that the elections reflect the 

will of the Congolese people and provide both the freedom and 

opportunity that they so richly deserve. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, the doctor and the Ambassador have 

answered the question quite expertly and quite well. 

I can only add my personal experience. The first time I went to 

the Congo was in 2006 or 2007 or something like that. But I can 

tell you then from just a first-person perspective there was more 

fighting. There was more dying. There was more chaos. There were 

fewer people that even believed it was possible to get involved in 

DRC. I mean, even the NGO’s did not really want to show up. I 

remember saying what about Gates. They said Gates will not come 

here. I said Gates will not come here? He has all the money. It was 

like there was no—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You got some of it. [Laughter.] 

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you, Senator. I am glad you asked me that 

question, Senator. 

Anyway, the people were understandably quite cautious about 

getting involved, and that has changed incrementally. People are 

now getting more and more involved. 

I think the story of the elections I believe mirrors the point that 

we are at now. In 2006, they were coming out of the war. It was 

a rather desperate situation. Everyone in the international community understood how important the elections were. And the American Government worked hand in glove with the international community to embed themselves largely in the elections in 2006, and 

while there were problems, they were largely viewed as legitimate, 

and we had a legitimately elected Congolese President. And then 

there was the attitude that, okay, that is done. We know how to 

do that. The Congolese know how to do it. 

And there was a little laissez-faire with the more recent elections, and what happened was they were not legitimate. And as the 

doctor said, they still have not had provincial or municipal elections following the largely illegitimate national Presidential election. And that lesson, I believe, applies to the moment that we are 

at now, which is people view the fire as having gone down a little 

bit. As these men have said, it was much worse then and it has 

gotten better now. And that is that critical juncture where we can 

sort of say, oh, it will be okay. You know, like those second elections, it will be fine. We are going to sort of walk away from this. 

It is starting to go on its own. And I think that would be a big 

mistake. 

Rather, the opposite is true. This is the critical moment when 

things are starting to congeal and you are starting to see more 

functionality. You are starting to see investment from the outside. 

You are starting to see the intervention brigade and some of these 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

49 

tactics finally getting traction after years and years of failed efforts 

in that regard. This is the time to focus on DRC so that the fire 

does not reignite. 

ECI. We did a report on security reform, which we will submit 

for the record and make it available to the committee. We do believe that that is at the center of what needs to happen, a sort of 

coupling of security sector reform with electoral reform, which in 

concert will create an environment of opportunity for the Congolese 

people who I can assure you are more than ready to take advantage of it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Could I just say from time to time we have people who have 

some celebrity status that come and testify here? You are eminently qualified to give us the benefit of your experience and 

knowledge. And I think that your credibility is really remarkable 

because of the depth of your commitment. I thank you. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Gilpin, you mentioned a couple of things. One is that opportunity counts, not violence. The importance of governance. 

And when I was in Goma, what struck me was just the incredible 

mineral wealth as a source of both—on the balance, of financing 

the conflict versus the source for a possible tool for development. 

I am wondering if there is a way to get that done so that everyone 

can see the huge advantages of using this mineral wealth for the 

development and the advancement as opposed to a fight for power. 

Dr. GILPIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

The mineral wealth of the DRC is only part of the equation. The 

DRC also has vast agricultural wealth and forest reserve. The challenge is that we have focused, almost exclusively, on the negative 

side of the trade in the DRC’s minerals. We also need to talk a lot 

about financial sector reform because there are significant financial 

leakages in the DRC. 

The tax effort is improving. A host of macroeconomic indicators 

are improving. But the tax effort, i.e., the amount of taxation that 

the government takes in relative to the amount that it could take 

in, is still very low. That has two key drivers: one, very weak institutions which become weaker the further you go away from the 

capital. And we know how far away the mines are from Kinshasa. 

But the second is the issue of corruption. 

And as we focus on the conflict minerals issues, we should also 

focus a lot on the transparency issue. We have a lot of new investors that are demonstrating interest in the DRC’s wealth, and I 

think one of the things that we can do is hold their feet to the fire 

as regards their participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative which requires the industry to be transparent 

and lets us know exactly what the contracts stipulate and what 

accrues to the government. Then it becomes much easier to hold 

the government to task. But now there is so much opaqueness in 

the whole contracting environment. 

And one other thing. Senator McCain asked about over-thehorizon issues, 10 years hence, 10 years from now in the DRC. 

Another economic part of the equation will be the new discoveries 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

50 

of oil and natural gas, which is becoming a big issue. And so if we 

do not have an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative working, if we do not have civil society participating in initiatives like 

Publish What You Pay, then we are going to witness hemorrhaging 

of significant resources, as we have seen in the past. But we are 

at a critical juncture where things like the conflict minerals certification process is introducing the concept of accountability in this 

particular sector, and we hope that it extends beyond mining to 

include agriculture, forestry, and even tourism. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Mr. Affleck, following up on our earlier discussion today, Gates 

may have not been willing to go in but Cindy McCain was. [Laughter.] 

Mr. AFFLECK. Cindy McCain was there in 1994. She was in 

Goma when the cholera epidemic was happening and the genocide. 

Cindy McCain is so much braver than I am. It is humbling at the 

very least. 

Senator BARRASSO. Then I am just kind of thinking about following up on the visit to Goma, which is a long distance, as Dr. 

Gilpin said, from the capital, over 1,000 miles. That is where resources are, where the trauma is, the hospital, the atrocities that 

we are seeing there and the abuses and the effort, the commitment. 

It did seem that the most compelling part of our visit was visiting 

with the victims of all this that Cindy is so involved with. It did 

seem that there was, though, a ray of hope in talking with them 

for the future that may not have been there in the past. I do not 

know if you want to talk about that a little. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Sure. Really for me, there are two sides to that. 

One is having that experience that you did and Ms. McCain had 

being involved well before we were, which is that you talk to a 

woman, you talk to a middle-aged woman who suffered horrendous 

abuse or attack, maybe lost children. You talk to a 9-year-old girl 

and hear what she has had to go through. It hits home particularly 

if you have a daughter or you have a wife or you have a mom or 

a woman in your life that you care about, and all of a sudden, you 

go this person’s life is worth no less than any of the women in my 

family or the children in my family. And if this were my child who 

suffered this excruciating experience, even just being separated 

from their parents, so many orphans that you see, it would completely destroy my whole world. And once I started to really empathize with folks because I had met them and heard their stories 

firsthand, it kind awoke me to what I felt was a moral obligation. 

And I think by extension, it really reflects the values of this 

country, that we care about others and that we care about the freedom of others and we care about the well-being of other folks. This 

is not diplomacy and freedom at the end of a gun. It is diplomacy 

and freedom at the end of a diplomat who is engaging with folks 

in Congo to try to use our considerable leverage as the United 

States of America to push them toward practices that are more 

democratic where they can reinforce the security sector and so on. 

But to get back your original point, connecting with people one 

on one and hearing these stories from women and children is at 

once devastating, but also hopeful, hopeful because there is less of 

this happening now than there was, hopeful because you see 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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people’s will and drive to survive and that people are not waiting 

for others to do it for them. They are pulling themselves up and 

doing as best they can. They cannot perform surgery on themselves, for example, which is why the doctor has been a miracle 

worker there. But people have the desire to live, to do better, to 

survive. Not just the empathy for what they have gone through, 

but their desire to reclaim themselves and their personal human 

dignity is what drove me to want to commit to working there more 

and more. 

And I see that others have gotten involved. When we talk about 

comparing 10 years ago—now for me it is 8 or whatever—there 

were not nearly as many people who understood and identified 

with what was happening with women there in the United States 

and elsewhere. Their stories have gotten out, and they have started 

to galvanize folks, and those folks have started to act, and those 

actions are being felt. I think sometimes we have a tendency to 

want to look at things in a binary way: broken or fixed. This situation defies that kind of categorization. Rather, it is success in increments, and that is happening and it is enormously encouraging. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Meece, I have gone over your printed testimony, 

which is substantially lengthier than what you gave here. And I 

got to tell you I cannot tell you how impressed I am with your considered analysis based upon the time you spent in-country and 

your connection with the history. I have a specific question for you 

and I will get back to that in a minute. 

Dr. Gilpin, likewise I have been through your testimony, and the 

thing I am so impressed with on that, is your focused specific recommendations for how we need to move forward. I am going to 

keep this close by because I think you have got some things in 

there that really need and deserve study and attention. 

Mr. Affleck, I want to take up what John said a few minutes ago, 

and that is I have been here when you have been to this committee 

before, and you cannot ignore your celebrity status. And we see a 

lot of celebrities both in this committee and others. And you are 

certainly to be commended. So often we get from celebrities that it 

is as much about them as it is about the issue, and you have not 

shown one iota of that here. 

Senator MCCAIN. I can assure you it is also partially about him. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. AFFLECK. That is funny. I have always considered Senator 

McCain the real celebrity. [Laughter.] 

That is one thing he and I have in common. 

The CHAIRMAN. So do we on the committee. [Laughter.] 

Senator RISCH. John, I am working here. [Laughter.] 

In any event, you are to be commended for that, and certainly 

Cindy is the same on that. You guys are really to be commended. 

This is very personal with you and we can see that you are focused 

on what is going on here. 

The most profound thing that you said, I think, that impressed 

me was your laser focus really on this is not fixed, it is not broken, 

it is fragile. And I think that that is something we need to all focus 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

52 

on here that moving forward, we do not slip back. We are always 

so glad to hear things are improving because there is a lot of testimony that comes from that table around the world where things 

are not moving forward. Indeed, they are going the wrong direction. So I think in that regard, that is deeply profound as far as 

how fragile this is. 

And, Mr. Meece, that is where I want come back to you. Because 

of the history you have, because of the time in-country and because 

of your relationship with the Congo, what can you advise us? What 

would you say about how specifically we address the fragility of it 

and focus on it, as Mr. Affleck has suggested that we do, that we 

do not backslide here, that we go forward and that this thing does 

not come apart for us? 

Ambassador MEECE. I wish I had a clear and simple answer to 

that question because I think it is one of the key questions in 

terms of how to keep a fragile—and certainly I strongly concur 

everything is reversible—to move forward, as is so badly needed 

by the people in the region and indeed for a significant part of the 

continent. 

Senator RISCH. But surely you have some thoughts, I would 

hope. 

Ambassador MEECE. Yes. And I have tried to suggest those in 

the written testimony that I submitted as well in terms of the key 

areas. 

I think all of it requires a recognition that many of these issues 

are not short-term, quick fixes. Putting in place state authority, 

institutions that function, reform of the military and other kinds of 

reforms, democratic governance, these are things that will take a 

considerable amount of time and I think need to be approached 

with the thought that we are not simply achieving success, declaring victory, and withdrawing in 6 months or whatever the time 

frame may be, but that this will require a continued engagement 

over a period of time and building on whatever has already been 

done. 

I think we need to approach our policy in the region relative to 

all of the countries with a frank and honest appraisal and not be 

shy from offering criticism, again whether that is public or private, 

depending on the circumstances, and pressure as needed, as well 

as support and endorsement for positive actions. We need to focus 

priorities within the resources that are available on what can be 

done. 

And I get back to the point I was seeking to make about coordination with other partners. The country is simply too large. The 

scope of things is too big. You add a multiplication factor to virtually any problem there. We need to be working with the European Union, with other donors, with South Africa, with SADC, 

with the people in the region in terms of who can do what. What 

can you bring to the table and making sure everything is utilized 

as effectively as possible. And somewhat surprisingly perhaps, I 

think there is a broad area of agreement among the major partners 

and donors, at least in terms of key areas, although the specifics 

of it may vary. 

And finally and certainly represented by Mr. Affleck, the role of 

the NGOs and various organizations which have been engaged in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the area for so long and indigenous NGOs as well, civil society in 

Congo. We need to make sure that that is engaged. I spoke of localized conflict resolution, something that I do not think we or much 

of anybody else has given sufficient attention to, but that involves 

engaging traditional leaders, whether those be religious leaders, 

traditional leaders, others of influence in the communities, NGOs, 

civil society working as well with the NGOs to try to bring this 

together in a comprehensive way that keeps it moving forward and 

with the recognition that there are things that will take a considerable length of time to put in place. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Ambassador, and thank all of you for 

your efforts. 

Ambassador MEECE. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. 

And I would like to thank our second panel today for your testimony and for your service and leadership in this region. 

Ambassador Meece, if I might just first to you. Due to the cap 

on peacekeeping contributions that is a part of U.S. appropriations, 

we have not paid our full assessed rate into peacekeeping operations for several years now. What do you think is the impact of 

our failing to fully fund missions for which we voted in the Security 

Council, and what is its specific impact for MONUSCO? 

Ambassador MEECE. Senator, I cannot speak to the specifics of 

what may be underway or being looked at within the U.N. peacekeeping operations or the mission right now in terms of dealing 

with the budget resources that they have. But I can tell you that 

the budget of MONUSCO, while substantial—much of it is tied in 

to the nature of the mission, the size of the country, and what is 

needed. For example, a very large percentage of that budget ends 

up going toward the air operations of helicopters and civilian aircraft that are essential. There is no other way to get around, and 

indeed there are a lot of areas that can only be accessed by helicopter. But that consumes a lot of money. 

If you have to scale back on that, as we have seen at different 

times, there are clearly negative effects. For example, MONUSCO, 

the peacekeeping operation, maintains at any given time or has in 

the past on the order of about 90 forward bases as a part of a strategy to extend its reach, provide maximum protections for civilians 

in those zones, deal with conflicts and so forth. If you have budget 

constraints, whether that is in air support, reduction in troops, or 

ability to support those bases, you are going to have to close bases. 

And we have seen example after example of where that has produced immediate and rather dramatic negative effects in those 

regions where those bases have been closed. 

If you have to scale back on other programs beyond the core 

security mission of working in terms of sexual-based violence, 

whether that is aid to victims, prevention, education programs, impunity, justice, the range of things, that will have a serious impact. 

And I would make a similar statement about the involvement with 

children as well, which continues to be a serious problem with the 

armed groups. 

If you are having to scale back what you are looking at in terms 

of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, this too will have an 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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immediate impact and, indeed, carry potential long-term consequences as well in terms of the positive agenda of which we have 

been speaking. 

So these are serious problems. Clearly, the budget is large for a 

peacekeeping operation and it is incumbent upon all involved to be 

making maximum effective use and efficiencies, but at the same 

time significant cutbacks, particularly relatively abrupt ones, will 

have a significant and immediate dramatic effect as they work 

through the system. 

Senator COONS. Well, thank you. I intend to work in the Appropriations Committee to support peacekeeping but also to provide 

support for Special Envoy Feingold, as well as for elections. 

And, Mr. Affleck, I appreciate the very detailed list of actions 

that you suggested for the committee and things that we might be 

doing as the United States as one of the key regional players, in 

particular, that we continue to support Senator Feingold in his role 

as the special envoy. 

You also mentioned—I thought this was intriguing—that the 

open-ended mandate for MONUSCO in some ways is undermining 

a core goal which we have for the DRC which is for them to have 

stronger security system reform, for them to have their own independent capacity, and that the longer MONUSCO goes on without 

any clear end, the longer it allows the Kabila government to fail 

to really stand up an effective military of their own that is accountable and that protects civilians and human rights. While I have 

been very encouraged by what we have heard today about the 

intervention brigade and what a difference it has made and what 

missions it might take on, I am also intrigued by your suggestion. 

So how do you think we can most constructively support security 

sector reform, protection of civilians, while also not giving an openended blank check for MONUSCO going forward? 

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, first I want to say I admire so much the 

work that the Ambassador has done and is known to have been so 

excellent in his tenure. So it has been really a great education for 

me to listen to him testify on this and other matters. 

From my perspective, it has really been sort of on the ground 

talking to folks, getting a sense of what people’s, in the country, 

perception of MONUSCO was and knowing that the U.S. taxpayer 

is paying in the neighborhood of $400 million a year for this continuing mandate, and that there are budgetary pressures, and you 

know, we want to spend our money the right way. And I see a lot 

of developmental avenues and ways that I believe we could spend 

our money, and I think we need to have a hard look at that. 

It allows Kabila right now to sort of have his cake and eat it too. 

He could say I do not MONUSCO. I did not want MONUC. I do 

not want this. Other armies in our country is never a solution. But 

also it sort of keeps him afloat in many ways. You know, you are 

at the mercy of the host country. There you are but you have got 

to work—which is why they sort of are embedded with the FARDC 

or are put in a morally tenuous position because now the FARDC 

commits abuses. What are you supposed to do? The population 

grew to resent ways in which MONUSCO—you know, when you 

say we are going to protect you from civilians, you may be doing 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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it 9 out of 10 times, but the time it does not happen, people become 

quite resentful, in particular, if they are not your countrymen. 

I am not an expert on the U.N. and on MONUSCO, but I do 

know that without a clear set of goals, it feels like just a free-floating and very expensive proposition. It would be foolhardy, obviously, to just sort of wrench them out because they perform so 

many really vital services, as the Ambassador said, but I think it 

would also be smart to ask what are our long-term goals. How are 

we going to be able to accomplish them? What are our metrics? 

What does success mean? We need to be able to define those things 

to know where we are and at what point we want to withdraw ourselves in that particular way. Nobody believes that the goal of missions like MONUSCO is to stay in the country forever. That is not 

the idea. The idea is to go in, make change, protect people, and 

withdraw at the correct time. So we ought to figure out what that 

time is in concert with the thoughts of all the many experts who 

are involved in that. 

Senator COONS. Well, thank you, Mr. Affleck, and thank you to 

this panel and in particular to Senator Feingold for your service 

and leadership. 

I want to thank Chairman Menendez for holding this hearing 

today and in particular the Eastern Congo Initiative for your brave 

work on the ground and for what you do to help sustain focus and 

visibility on this important, fragile, and reversible opportunity here 

we have to secure real lasting peace for the people of DRC after 

so many years of suffering and conflict. Thank you for your work, 

and thank you to all of our witnesses today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding 

the hearing. 

Senator Coons and I are on the Africa Subcommittee. This is a 

great example of a bipartisan issue that we get behind. And I think 

the successes that we have seen owe some to that, that this is 

something that we all agree on. And I just want to pay tribute to 

the work that you all have done and those sitting behind you as 

well over this long haul. 

Just one question. I am sorry I was not here to hear the testimony in person. But, Mr. Affleck, you mentioned the Congolese 

cocoa farmers, and that is a great example of what can happen if 

there is stability and just a little help. Is that something that can 

be replicated in other areas? 

Mr. AFFLECK. I believe it can. We are trying to replicate it with 

coffee now. People know that they grow coffee in Rwanda, which 

is just across the border where you have the same climate and the 

same environment that is conducive to growing coffee there. But 

for various reasons, they have not had the security structure or the 

infrastructure or the access to the technology that is required to 

grow good coffee. And so we are working to cultivate that, and once 

again, we are going to try to bring that to market. 

It is just another case of kind of looking at this country and finding that there are so many opportunities particularly in investment. People would rather be invested in than accept aid. They 

would rather have a job than sleep in a camp. They would rather 

live in a way that they are proud of. They are proud of themselves, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

56 

they are proud of their country, and they want an opportunity to 

show it, just like we are in our country. And to me, that has been 

the most satisfying thing is to enable that, to find people who are 

gifted at something, help them see the ways they can exploit that 

gift and capitalize on it and see a community grow and an economy 

grow as a result. 

So I guess the answer is, yes, we see that there are other ways 

to do it. Yes, we are trying to do it, and yes, we believe that others 

should get themselves involved as well. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. I know that all of you have sat 

here for a while, and I just want to thank you again for what you 

do and, Mr. Affleck, for your sustained involvement here. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator FLAKE. You can tell that it is something that you care 

deeply about. So thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank 

you for having this hearing. 

Thank you, Senator Feingold, for all of your excellent work. 

And we welcome a hometown hero. 

Mr. AFFLECK. I am the Patriots fan. [Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY. And we are getting some wicked smart answers today, too, from that panel. [Laughter.] 

We admire your acting, but we admire your activism even more, 

Ben. So we thank you for everything that you are doing. 

You mentioned the success of public-private partnerships in the 

Congo. Can you give us an example or two that are concrete that 

you look to as good examples of how such partnerships can work? 

Mr. AFFLECK. I am going to brag on ourselves a little bit more 

because the CEO is right behind me, Joe Whinney who has got 

Theo Chocolate, and if I did not highlight it enough before—I am 

sorry most of the photographers left because it is for sale. It is at 

Whole Foods. [Laughter.] 

Mr. AFFLECK. This is a result of a public-private partnership that 

has worked really well where we have gone in and built the capacity of thousands of farmers in Congo who were not able to get their 

cocoa quite up to snuff because of a lack of resources and a lack 

of training, although they did not lack industriousness and grit. In 

doing that, we hooked them up with this incredible partner, and 

sort of through the magic of capitalism, they are selling their 

goods. Theo is buying it on the market. At first, they bought 40 

tons. Now they are going to buy 640 tons of Congolese chocolate 

this year. And this is precisely the kind of thing that we think that 

is happening elsewhere, and this is the most specific one that I can 

speak to. 

You know, I was speaking with Senator Graham earlier today 

talking about how specific smart investments, small-scale, actually 

in some ways better investments than big, massive ones because 

they can be monitored, they can be followed through on, and they 

can be given to folk dedicated, enthusiastic individuals or small 

businesses. 

It is not easy. They are not as set up to take investment as somebody in Boston is, but it is possible and it is doable. And it is a 

model that I really believe in, which is not the traditional aid 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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model but investment. I think it is the kind of thing that could 

really enjoy and has enjoyed bipartisan support here and I know 

that it could be successful. 

Senator MARKEY. Can you say a bit more about the root causes 

of the conflict, and can you talk about how empowering civil society 

in Congo can help to empower ordinary citizens? 

Mr. AFFLECK. Yes. Again, these gentlemen could speak much 

more eloquently and well to the sociopolitical causes of where 

Congo is now. I can tell you just broadly it starts with somebody— 

you know, it was only country that was owned by an individual. 

It was owned by King Leopold and then he was forced to divest the 

country, interestingly enough, through a campaign of activism that 

was spearheaded by Mark Twain. So there is a history of Americans being active around this country. And he divested. It became 

the Congo Free State, and then the United States helped turn the 

country over to Mobutu after independence where you have this 

kleptocrat who kind of basically purloined the whole country in the 

course of his reign. And so you had sort of a very, very rough history, and then the Rwandan genocide kind of spilled over the border. And particularly in the east, I believe it sort of ruptured the 

fabric. You know, you had this mentality of genocide that came in 

with millions of people and with the EXFAR and with the 

Interahamwe who mass raped and murdered. This was not a part 

of Zairian culture or history. This happened after the Rwandan 

genocide and after so many wars were fought there. 

So you have a fabric of society that has come undone that has 

dissolved. And part of it is injury and part of it is just presence of 

military of it is an absence of a presence of military. And part of 

it is a presence of FARDC military who in turn—you know, 

Mobutu’s attitude was sort of I am not going to pay you, so you are 

going to go out and feed on the population. And that mentality, I 

think, was still present. 

And what has happened since then is slow and incremental 

movements toward peace, spearheaded by the folks like the ones I 

am honored to sit at the table with today. And at the root of that, 

the only real change that has happened is when, as you say, people 

in civil society themselves have sort of taken responsibility for their 

four-by-four block area and committed to improving that. Now, 

they need the political space and they need the security space to 

do that, but when the brick and mortar work is getting done and 

rebuilding society, as you point out, that is who is doing it. 

Senator MARKEY. And USAID. You talked about some programs 

that you would like to see enhanced. Can you just give us a couple 

of examples of—— 

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, I think broadly speaking right now they are 

not as present in the east. They are spending money in the east, 

but it is mostly humanitarian. And in my view—and I am sure 

there are many who would take exception. We took Raj Shah to 

Congo—was it a year ago December? And we are continuing to 

make the point that we believe that USAID should continue to 

invest in the east and should invest in development aid, not just 

or primarily humanitarian aid. 

Senator MARKEY. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. Thank you. An excellent panel. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The CHAIRMAN. We agree. 

You know, the world is a challenging place. Multilateral, bilateral, and regional conflicts could keep this committee in permanent 

session. But when the committee meets in full, it can be an extraordinary force to help change and mold the course of events. I have 

a feeling that today’s 21⁄2-hour hearing has riveted the attention on 

both sides of the aisle in a way that can only inure to the benefit 

of the special envoy, as well as to your collective vision. And I think 

we have seen the best of what this committee has exhibited over 

the last year—a spirit of bipartisanship as it relates to foreign policy, which is when we exert our best abilities abroad. 

So with the thanks of all of the members of the committee to this 

panel, I will ask unanimous consent that the record be left open 

until the close of business Friday for any additional statements or 

submissions, as well as for any questions for the record. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

And this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DENIS MUKWEGE, FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR

OF THE PANZI HOSPITAL IN THE DRC 

We are delighted to have the opportunity to share to the U.S. Senate our thoughts 

and hopes for the future of Congo. 

Many of you have struggled alongside us so that the cries of the women who are 

victims of sexual violence in eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 

are heard. The restoration of peace and security is what so many sexual violence 

survivors in the Congo highlight as their greatest need. As health professionals, we 

advocate for peace and justice because we cannot only treat the consequences of the 

violence, we must also tackle its root causes and prevent it. 

WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED IN 2013

In 2013 we have seen renewed political and diplomatic commitment from the 

international community toward ending the violence in Eastern Congo and neutralizing rebel armed groups, and we are hopeful for more sustained action. Encouraging actions included the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement 

for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region, which was was signed on Feb. 

24, 2013, by 11 States and four intergovernmental organizations. I see this ‘‘framework for hope’’ as the first peace initiative truly aimed at addressing the causes of 

violence and recurring conflict in DRC. 

We have also been encouraged by the adoption of Resolution 2098 of the United 

Nations Security Council that includes a robust mandate and deployment of an 

Intervention Brigade; the appointment of Mary Robinson as Special Envoy of the 

U.N. Secretary General; new strong leadership of the peacekeeping operations 

MONUSCO under the deeply committed Special Representative of the Secretary 

General Martin Kobler and Force Commander Santos Cruz. 

In a crucial step, a package for peace and development was designed with the 

commitment of the World Bank. We are also enormously encouraged by the strong 

support of U.S. diplomacy. We recognize the firm determination and genuine political will of the Obama administration to put an end to the cycle of violence in eastern Congo. President Obama notably stated in 2013 that the Addis Ababa Agreement ‘‘cannot remain a mere sheet of paper,’’ and Secretary of State Kerry has 

affirmed that ‘‘the only one way to honor women of Congo is to give them peace.’’ 

President Obama’s appointment of former U.S. Senator Russell Feingold as Special 

Envoy to help coordinate efforts to resolve the instability and insecurity in Eastern 

Congo has sent a strong signal of the seriousness and level of the U.S. Government’s 

commitment to stability in our region. 

Many communities in eastern DRC are keenly aware of the proactive U.S. 

regional diplomacy, notably through your cooperation with International Criminal 

Court for the surrender last year of Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the Court for war 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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crimes and crimes against humanity and through the use of the 2008 Child Soldier 

Prevention Act to suspend U.S. military aid to Rwanda, an action that helped lead 

to the collapse of the M23 rebel movement. 

The political will demonstrated by the U.S. that drives these developments 

encourages Congolese civil society and provides a unique momentum to address the 

root causes of violence that plagues my country and allows us to envisage sustainable peace and development. 

There are significant challenges to this endeavor in a region that has now known 

violence and failed development for decades. 

I believe that for the current peace process to advance successfully, we must 

prioritize several critical initiatives. 

First, we must strengthen efforts to end impunity. I firmly believe that there will 

be no lasting peace without justice. The current Congolese judiciary is not able or 

willing to hold perpetrators of mass atrocities accountable. Therefore, we are urging 

the Congolese authorities and the neighboring countries to develop judicial cooperation, to continue their cooperation with the ICC and to implement the recommendations of the Mapping report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 

Rights, including by establishing ‘‘Mixed Chambers,’’ to prosecute and hold to 

account those responsible of the most serious crimes committed in DRC since 1993. 

Civil society actors have been encouraged by the political announcement made by 

President Kabila in this regard and are awaiting concrete steps to be taken for the 

establishment of such a hybrid domestic/international court. Other rule of law tools 

are necessary to support transitional justice initiatives. These include reparation 

programs, truth and reconciliation mechanisms, and institutional reforms, notably 

a thorough vetting of security forces. 

Second, we must continue to support regional dialogue. The surrender of the M23 

marks the first step on the long road to sustainable peace. We believe the length 

of the Kampala talks have slowed momentum for the implementation of the Addis 

Ababa Framework Agreement. In future rounds of negotiations, regional leaders 

must be involved. 

Third, the neutralization of other armed groups that remain active in the area 

is crucial to deliver a sense of security and recovery in the region. Most militias are 

driven by economic interests, not ideology. Mai Mai groups have begun to surrender 

after the fall of the M23, but there are no resources to support their reintegration 

into society and no visible incentives to other militias to surrender. A program of 

support, including the provision of basic needs, must be put in place. ADL–Nalu and 

FDLR are the current priorities for action and will require support of Ugandan and 

Rwandan leaders. 

For those in the FDLR accused of perpetrating many of the most serious crimes— 

war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, they should face international or 

domestic justice and the military solution shall be used when the following possibilities have been exhausted: 

• For those wishing to return to Rwanda: disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and repatriation in Rwanda must be facilitated; 

• For those not willing or able to return to Rwanda, former insurgents must be 

given the choice of: 

Æ Relocation to different provinces in the Congo on an individual base; 

Æ Relocation in third countries by facilitating asylum procedures with the 

support of the High Commissioner for Refugees. 

Most importantly, we need to prevent feelings of revenge and the stigmatization 

of any ethnic groups for crime that their parents are accused of. The danger of 

transferring guilt from generation to generation is real and should not be encouraged by leaders of the region. 

Reshaping the design of DDR programs should include mental health and social 

support for former combatants as they reintegrate into society. 

Fourth, security sector reform is vital and is at the heart of making the protection 

of civilians a reality. To date, the integration of militia and criminals in the security 

services has had disastrous consequences. For those entering public service, members of the security forces should go through a vetting process. Those trained to loot 

and rape cannot be assumed to be committed to protecting the population and the 

country. Such individuals could be deployed to ‘‘reconstruction brigades’’ deployed to 

rebuild the country—to develop our infrastructure, build and rehabilitate administrative buildings, install of water and electricity supply, and develop agriculture. By 

first becoming self-sufficient and then contributing to the productivity and the 

reconstruction of the nation, these former militia members and child soldiers would 

undergo ‘‘occupational therapy,’’ that will strengthen their potential and orient them 

towards carrying out work in the general interest of society. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Finally, we must support the role of civil society in the implementation of Addis 

Ababa Framework agreement. The recently adopted Plan of Action for the implementation of regional benchmarks under the commitments of the Framework Agreement stresses the need to ‘‘strengthen the involvement of civil society organizations 

and women’s groups in regional efforts aimed at addressing sources of instability,’’ 

notably through an inclusive monitoring of the commitments made by the 11 signatory States in Addis Ababa last year. 

Civil society, and most specifically women’s rights organizations, should actively 

be engaged in the peace process and in the oversight mechanisms established to 

monitor the implementation of the Framework Agreement. Therefore, I humbly suggest that Radio Okapi and the MONUSCO Public Information Office play a leading 

role in disseminating extensively information about the Peace, Security and 

Cooperation Framework Agreement in order to facilitate ownership at the grassroots 

level. 

Congolese women are expecting more than a reaffirmation of commitments or a 

reiteration of deep concerns. Their voices need to be heard and they must participate if we want to benefit from the dividend of peace and development in the eastern Congo once and for all. 

Today in the DRC, we are at a critical time. The ingredients for our future are 

in place. Now we must translate words into action and seize the current momentum 

to bring about a lasting peace, sustainable development, and justice, health and dignity for all. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK DWYER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR, 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, MERCY CORPS

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the invitation to submit written testimony regarding the challenges 

and prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great 

Lakes region. 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is now entering the 20th year of one 

of the gravest humanitarian emergencies the world has ever known. Armed conflicts, weak governance, epidemics, widespread violence against civilians and massive displacement have devastated the eastern part of the country. The number of 

people who have perished as a result has been estimated at 5.4 million, and the 

number who are currently displaced at 2.6 million. 

Mercy Corps has worked in DRC since 2007. We have main offices in Kinshasa, 

Goma, and Dungu with more than 200 staff working in three different provinces. 

As an agency, Mercy Corps has worked at the nexus of crisis, conflict, and development for over 30 years in over 40 of the most challenging countries in the world. 

Often in collaboration with the U.S. Government, our work helps communities 

recover stronger from natural disasters and conflict by empowering them with the 

tools and resources that they need to build resilience against future shocks. 

I have been the Country Director of or programs in the DRC for 3 years. Both 

my personal experience as Country Director and Mercy Corps’ unique purview into 

the opportunities and challenges for accomplishing systemic change in complex contexts informs the testimony below. 

I will begin by speaking briefly on the current state of the crisis in the DRC, a 

reflection on how we got here, and then conclude by proposing four practical ideas 

for catalyzing a new way forward: investing in long-term solutions, promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and accountability, supporting community-based infrastructure programs, and unlocking barriers to regional trade. 

THE CONTEXT FROM OUR VIEWPOINT

The DRC is a complicated country in which to operate. One must be constantly 

alert to endemic corruption, the many administrative road blocks, and dubious, 

mostly illegal, fees, taxes and penalties. Most days involve negotiating with government officials at some level to ensure our initiatives can move forward. Program 

implementation is made more challenging due to a lack of infrastructure and service 

provision, a volatile and dangerous security environment, weak law enforcement 

and judiciary (and in many areas in which we operate the complete absence of 

state), and low human capacity. 

In fact, it takes a substantial amount of energy and personal commitment to manage, develop, and sustain a mission in the DRC. So much so that most counterparts 

from other agencies rarely make it beyond 18-months of service, barely enough time 

to grasp the context, which in itself, is a testimony of the problem we face in a counFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

61 

try that desperately requires vision and long-term leadership, rather than shortterm fixes. 

Short-term emergency programs have been renewed time after time to address 

the immediate needs of the population, while few funding mechanisms (available to 

Non-Governmental Organizations) exist to address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis. I do not wish to understate the need for humanitarian assistance in 

the DRC; indeed, Mercy Corps has its own humanitarian division. If not managed 

carefully, however, the provision of long-term emergency assistance is not only 

expensive, but it can lead to community dependence and be counterproductive to 

longer term development goals. 

Since the invasion of Goma by the armed group M23 in November 2012, the U.N. 

peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, has been given a stronger mandate, along with 

an Intervention Brigade (IB) 3,000 troop-strong, to rid the eastern DRC of rebel 

groups. The M23, perhaps the strongest group in the Kivu regions, was recently 

defeated, with the help of much foreign diplomatic pressure in Kigali and Kampala, 

and the FDLR (an armed group led by Rwandan genocidaires) is next on the IB’s 

list. 

There is broad consensus that armed groups cannot be part of the landscape if 

the DRC is to progress and regional stability prevail, and we welcome efforts made 

through the Kampala Dialogue of 2013 and Nairobi Declarations toward this end. 

REMEMBER THE ROOT CAUSES

The predation, corruption, and conflict that led to the collapse of the Zairian state 

destroyed public infrastructure, undermined citizens’ access to basic services, and 

encouraged misrule at every level. Insecurity, social divisions, fragile democracy, 

and the inability of the government to deliver basic public services have compromised the legitimacy of public institutions. 

Many of the armed groups operating throughout the DRC have their roots in wartime social divisions and exit as a result of the shadow economy. The absence of 

the state enables these groups to control territories, tax its peoples, and exploit natural resources through illegal trade. Some groups have and still receive murky state 

support, domestically and regionally, and part of the crisis in the east of the country 

results from longstanding ethnic tension—following the Rwandan genocide more 

than 20 years ago—due to genocidaires finding refuge in the Congo. 

Rebuilding a Congolese state that can respond to the needs of its people and 

encourage long-term growth will require strategic commitments by actors in every 

sector to undertake institutional reform as well as building capacity within the 

national government (including State owned companies), local governments, civil 

society, and the private sector. However, ultimate stability can only be achieved 

through a commitment to regional peace and development. The Regional Peace Process and ICGLR dialogue seem to be heading in the right direction. 

As the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide approaches, it is important 

that the international community reflect on the connection between the two crises, 

as many of today’s crises in the region such as the Central African Republic and 

South Sudan pose similar regionally destabilizing threats. 

A NEW WAY FORWARD

Billions of dollars have been spent to try to address the humanitarian crisis in 

DRC over the past 20 years, and yet, it persists. This begs the question: is the 

humanitarian response to massive and protracted displacements in the DRC adapting to the needs of the populations and accountable to the communities it seeks to 

serve? 

Mercy Corps has joined in coalition with World Vision, Search for Common 

Ground, and the Congolese Government to identify a way forward. We believe a paradigm shift away from a risk mitigating ‘‘Do No Harm’’ approach to engagement 

toward a proactive ‘‘Do More Good’’ approach is necessary. Do More Good seeks to 

identify how to best connect emergency assistance to longer term recovery and 

development interventions; to promote self-sustaining, resilient, locally owned and 

community/market-driven outcomes that will catalyze sustainable change for the 

Congolese people. Our experience lends us to believe that this type of integrated 

programming is the best approach for preventing mass violence and rebuilding sustainable, inclusive, and effective governance structures. 

Mercy Corps would like to put forward the following recommendations gleamed 

from our work on ‘‘Do More Good’’ and our years of experience in the DRC and other 

protracted crises: 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

62 

1. Be dissatisfied with easy fixes; invest in long term solutions 

Effectively addressing the interconnected development and security challenges in 

a chronically insecure context such as DRC requires long-term investments. The 

systemic changes that the DRC needs will not be reached through short-term 

projects measured by quantitative outputs, but rather, through dynamic, impactdriven initiatives that integrate the needs and desires of local communities from the 

onset and adjust flexibly to changing demands on the ground. Assistance frameworks must better integrate emergency assistance with long-term development 

interventions, and focus on strategic interventions at all levels of society with the 

aim of transforming both behaviors and systems. 

For much of the last 20 years, humanitarian organizations have been tasked to 

facilitate the transportation of water from a lake in order to reach communities in 

areas not served by the aging infrastructure and to internally displaced people (IDP) 

on the outskirts of town. A similar short-term approach is still applied to many IDP 

camps in North Kivu. This approach makes sense to solve temporary needs but is 

wasteful if used over a long-term horizon as it does not solve systemic problems of 

resource scarcity, aid dependency, and a chronic of lack of water utility provision. 

Importantly for Congress to recognize: from our experience, long-term, crosssectoral gains are most achievable when funding mechanisms allow for long-term 

planning. 

2. Support and scale-up community based infrastructure programs 

One primary example of the above-described challenge is with infrastructure. The 

influx of people fleeing the conflict to cities in eastern Congo has overwhelmed a 

taxed urban infrastructure. In Goma, the largest city in North Kivu province, 

up to a million people depend on an aging water system that was originally constructed to serve a population of fewer than 100,000 people—and which was largely 

destroyed by volcanic lava flows in 2002. 

Mercy Corps has excavated 1 million cubic feet of lava rock to install 25 kilometers of pipelines and constructed a 700,000-liter water storage tank, as part of 

a USAID Food for Peace funded program in Goma that is addressing water sanitation, hygiene and food security. These improvements will provide clean drinking 

water for 200,000 people, many of whom live directly on top of the hardened lava 

flows from the 2002 eruption. We are also constructing latrines and rainwater 

capture systems and promoting good hygiene practice. The program has been 

extended—as a result of multidonor funding—with the aim of covering the whole 

of Goma as well as in two other cities. 

However, the key to the success of the program lies in the sustainable management of the systems that are being put in place. Mercy Corps is working in collaboration with the state water board (Regideso), the World Bank, the KfW, and local 

communities to ensure that we reform the Regideso at Provincial level to ensure 

that the system can be managed professionally and sustainably. This involves 

studying which business models and regulatory frameworks would work best to 

ensure effective and transparent management of the system, and then piloting 

interventions accordingly. 

We believe greater investment should be targeted toward community-based governance programs. The absence of water and energy make it almost impossible to 

develop modern agriculture and processing. Strengthening and diversifying livelihoods also requires water and energy, let alone to improve the daily lives of the people. Given the rapid rate of urbanization, low levels of utility provision, yet high 

potential for hydroelectric and agricultural production, prioritizing urban/peri-urban 

water/sanitation and energy infrastructure is key, and will prove catalytic. 

3. Promote a culture of entrepreneurship and accountability 

We believe that promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and development of propoor market systems is vital to prevent cycles of dependence, corruption, and conflict. For the past 2 years, Mercy Corps has been running a USAID Food for Peace 

Program that builds a culture of entrepreneurship by engaging communities in agriculture value-chain and market development activities, alongside behavioral change 

campaigns aimed at improving nutrition and promotion of good governance at all 

levels. Outcomes are achieved by building the capacity of groups and individuals to 

develop sustainable agri-businesses and related enterprises, developing communitybased common interest groups and capitalizing on opportunities. 

In a region divided for decades by conflict, we believe it is still possible to show 

the potential of ‘‘shared value and opportunities’’ created by developing solutions 

that are economically and socially beneficial to all key members of society—civilians, 

private sector, and government—while engaging the private sector in entrepreneurFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

63 

ship and development. Increasingly in our initiatives, Mercy Corps plays a facilitative role to ensure win-win scenarios for the communities and the private sector. 

Entrepreneurship and market development are therefore not only sustainable and 

cost-effective, but are more attuned to community development compared to relief 

assistance or conventional economic development programs. Private sector investment can be increased through this approach. However, to effectively engage the 

private sector, we are actively developing common understanding of shared value, 

shared opportunities and the need for shared partnerships with private sector 

actors. 

4. Prioritize domestic reforms that unlock barriers to regional trade 

Promoting cross-border trade and economic development between DRC, Rwanda, 

and Uganda is critical. We welcome efforts by U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson 

and the U.S. administration to invest efforts in boosting private sector investment. 

To achieve this in practice, however, we believe more support is needed to enable 

the environment and help offset risks. Innovative, accountable financing mechanisms and models will be necessary to realize this ambition. 

INGOs are frequently subjected to harassment by government officials and those 

in positions of power. INGOs have been particularly outraged and have advocated 

for change on many occasions, including during the U.S. Special Envoy Russell 

Feingold’s recent visit to the DRC. We believe that more emphasis should be placed 

on ensuring that bilateral and multilateral agreements that have been signed with 

the Congolese Government are fully enforced. This would not only ensure that tax 

payers’ money is spent according to agreements in place, but also to promote good 

governance. Although some efforts have been made by the international community 

in this area, much needs to be done so as to increase the credibility of implementing 

partners and reduce considerable resource wastage. 

The private sector suffers similar challenges, including trade barriers, unrealistic 

taxation, unreliable administration, poor governance, and a corrupt judiciary, are all 

areas that deter investment and paralyze exports. A potential investor recently told 

me that the DRC was one of only two countries in which venture capital would not 

be considered. If we are to make progress in this area, improve the enabling environment, and inverse the trends, tremendous domestic reform efforts are needed 

along with real regional commitment to resolving resource, ethnic tensions, and 

cross-border trade and administrative barriers. 

Prioritizing local ownership of natural resources, improved governance around 

resources, accountable and inclusive revenue flows from them and accountable 

cross-border trade is critical. In pursuit of such efforts, it seems wise that the international community seriously consider how and under which conditions aid is 

granted in the future. 

CONCLUSION

I am tremendously optimistic about the prospects for the DRC and its people. The 

country has abundant resources and there are numerous opportunities to meet peoples’ basic needs, create employment, and improve lives. The Congolese people are 

earnest, sharp, and good willed. 

Ultimately, the most important way to achieve systemic and sustainable change 

in the DRC and the Great Lakes region will be by giving communities a greater 

voice, considering them as agents of change, and as the primary humanitarian and 

development actors. Effective engagement and assistance requires an approach that 

is Congolese-led and inclusive, and which clearly identifies needs and opportunities, 

while building on existing capacities, and innovating and learning from best 

practices. 

In our programs, we are engaging communities to develop Community Development Plans at the local level, and facilitating linkages with government structures 

through which they can voice their concerns and contribute to discussions on issues 

affecting them. As a result, communities are better able to engage with the government, market sector players, INGOs, local NGOs and other civil society actors. This, 

in our experience, is the most sustainable way to prevent conflict, advance prosperity, and promote resilient, accountable, and just societies. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to submit testimony and for your continued 

support to the people of the DRC. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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RESPONSES OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Security sector reform (SSR) is a recurring theme in all of the witness testimonies 

today. Human rights advocates have long encouraged the Congolese Government to 

establish a vetting mechanism to weed out of the security forces perpetrators of war 

crimes. 

Question. Has the Congolese Government agreed to establish a vetting mechanism? If so, what, if anything, has been done to bring about its development? 

Answer. We have assisted the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) military 

justice sector to establish a database that tracks past, ongoing and future human 

rights abuse cases. We are currently conducting training on the use and maintenance of the system, which provides a means for the Congolese to vet soldiers that 

were accused and/or convicted of a crime. The Congolese are also in the process of 

developing a new recruitment strategy to better vet new soldiers entering the military and to remove older or disabled soldiers from the military. We will continue 

to strongly advocate for the full establishment and operation of this individual vetting mechanism as a key part of DRC security sector reform efforts. 

In addition, the DRC Government regularly vets individual members of armed 

groups during the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR), 

including removing child soldiers and turning them over to UNICEF. Regarding the 

ex-M23 combatants, the DRC Government has published a new DDR plan, but 

many details are still unclear, including specifics on how vetting will be conducted. 

We look forward to working with the DRC Government and the U.N. peacekeeping 

mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to ensure that the vetting process is thorough and 

identifies those who may be subject to prosecution for war crimes or other human 

rights abuses pursuant to the Nairobi Declarations, which the DRC Government 

and the M23 signed in December 2013. The Declarations do not provide for group 

reintegration into the DRC military; instead, any individual who wishes to reenter 

the DRC military, must be vetted and meet the same requirements as a new recruit. 

Question. Under what conditions would the administration consider training additional units of the FARDC? 

Answer. We are reviewing the training we provided to the 391st battalion, as well 

as the performance following the training, in an effort to further improve our 

human rights training. Members of the 391st battalion are alleged to have committed rape during the M23’s takeover of Goma in November 2012. We are awaiting 

the verdicts of the ongoing trials being conducted by the DRC Government to determine their involvement in this event. The administration would only consider training additional battalion units when we are more confident that the Congolese Government would provide the necessary support to sustain and discipline the unit 

during and following the training, keep the trained unit together for at least 2 years 

post-training, and better utilize the trained unit in the field. 

While we are not currently training a battalion, we are providing the DRC military with specialized training on civilian-military relations, human rights, ethics, 

and basic intelligence collection. The military suffers from an overall lack of professionalism, which goes beyond the soldiers’ performance in armed conflict. Any member of the military who receives training must first be vetted according to Leahy 

standards, which prohibit training and assistance to any recipient for which there 

is credible information that they have committed a gross violation of human rights. 

Question. How is the U.S. Government coordinating with other donor governments 

to develop a unified proposal for reforms and demonstrate the international community’s commitment to hold the Congolese Government accountable for the implementation of reforms? 

Answer. There are multiple mechanisms for donor coordination and monitoring of 

the Congolese Government’s implementation of reforms. We are a member of, and 

participate in, the Great Lakes Contact Group, a group of like-minded donors, 

including the United States, Belgium, the European Union, France, Germany, Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, the United Nations, and the United Kingdom, that 

meet regularly to coordinate policy and programming. The Contact Group also 

strives to agree on the conditions the DRC Government should meet prior to receiving donor funding for specific areas. The envoys from the United States, United 

Nations, African Union, and European Union also correspond regularly in-between 

meetings of the Contact Group to ensure constant coordination on messaging and 

policy. Additionally, MONUSCO established a high level working group in Kinshasa 

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this month, comprised of donors and designed to coordinate donor support toward 

elections, security sector reform, stabilization and DDR. MONUSCO is also working 

to include the DRC Government in these working groups to better support coordination between the government and donors. Lastly, our Embassy in Kinshasa coordinates regularly with other embassies to ensure message consistency and program 

harmony. 

The peace process underway to implement the Peace, Security, and Cooperation 

Framework Agreement also includes the establishment of benchmarks for the DRC’s 

Framework commitments, including governance and security sector reform. While 

we are still waiting to see the DRC’s draft benchmarks, once they are approved by 

the Framework’s Regional Oversight Mechanism, these benchmarks will be used to 

hold the DRC accountable for fully implementing its commitments. 

RESPONSES OF RAYMOND GILPIN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR EX-COMBATANTS

Question. Since the end of the M23 rebellion, the Congolese Government has 

launched a plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Analysts and development organizations have expressed concerns about the design of 

the program and the lack of clarity in how it will be implemented. Past iterations 

of DDR have failed in the DRC and often, former combatants were brought into the 

FARDC rather than being prepared for life as civilians. 

Answer. Thank you very much for these questions relating to the design and implementation of the DDR program unveiled by the Congolese Government in December 2013. This third iteration in recent years appears to have similar design flaws 

and implementation challenges as the previous two. One fundamental (and inadequately analyzed) aspect of these programs is the implicit assumption that we are 

dealing with a relatively homogenous group of ex-combatants. This is not accurate. 

There are three broad categories with varied interests, namely: the warlords, the 

mid-ranking commanders and the foot soldiers. Most DDRs are designed to impact 

the foot soldiers, and not the other two categories of combatants, who are more critical for both success and sustainability. This is partly why the incentives and opportunities offered in the past have not been very effective. The new DDR program 

promises to provide military and nonmilitary options for ex-combatants. However, 

the nonmilitary options (i.e., skills training) have not been closely linked to the real 

economy and the military options (i.e., joining the FARDC) may require more 

resources than have been allocated. Then there are the perennial questions surrounding oversight, transparency, and accountability. I provide these observations 

in order to preface my responses to the specific questions below. 

Question. In your testimony, you state that the business community could play a 

more active role in promoting peace. To this end, how can the international community incentivize the private sector to incorporate ex-combatants into their operations? 

Answer. The public sector is poorly equipped to address the needs of ex-combatants in the DRC. They lack the capacity, reach, and resources to effectively 

reintegrate these former fighters into communities. On the other hand, the private 

sector in the DRC has extensive reach (via an extensive supply chain) and could 

provide both direct and indirect opportunities to ex-combatants. The foot soldiers 

(who are generally unskilled) could become more relevant in the labor-intensive 

mining and agricultural sectors. Opportunities could also exist with infrastructure 

projects (given the DRC’s deep infrastructure deficit). Mid-level commanders could 

be engaged as contracted service providers (e.g., transportation, hospitality, and 

supplies). The difference between the mid-level commanders would be the scale/ 

scope of contracting. With some justification, DDR programs in the Congo aim to 

resettle all ex-combatants outside their areas of operation. This means requiring 

them to reestablish social, economic, and financial networks needed to guarantee 

success, post-reintegration. The private sector could partner with government agencies in order to facilitate a smooth transition. 

The international community can do three things to incentivize the business sector to more fully integrate ex-combatants in their operations: 

a. Steadfastly support international commitments/regulations—like the provisions 

of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Universal adherence to these programs helps reduce business costs, diminish risk, and 

create a level playing field. Such developments create an environment that allows 

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the private sector to become more engaged with the local economy . . . and ex-combatants. 

b. Identify and establish enduring public-private partnerships. Businesses are 

more likely to integrate ex-combatants if the environments in which they live and 

work are more permissible. A number of bilateral, multilateral, and private organizations finance development projects in the DRC. A level of coordination and focus 

on reintegration/resettlement regions will provide the clean water, roads, clinics and 

training facilities that are needed. The current fragmented approach to the economic 

transformation of affected areas is unhelpful. Encouraging development projects to 

be colocated with DDR programs will bode well for both success and sustainability. 

c. Consider rewarding ‘‘local content’’ contracts. Some consideration could be given 

to affording tax breaks to companies that purchase above a predetermined threshold 

of ‘‘local content’’ labor, goods, and services. Even notional inducements could make 

a big difference in what are highly competitive markets. Such an initiative would 

have the dual benefits of bolstering U.S. companies abroad and providing additional 

insights into the efficacy (and pace) of reintegration efforts. 

Question. What economic opportunities exist for ex-combatants and how should 

international aid and programs target this population specifically? 

Answer. There are relatively few economic opportunities in the DRC. Unemployment is high and the labor force is largely unskilled. The war economy introduces 

an added complication by raising the expectations of ex-combatants who earned 

much more from extortion and pillage than they could make via a regular job. 

Hence the dual challenge of creating jobs for this restive segment of the population 

and making such opportunities attractive enough to prevent recidivism. 

International aid programs could target ex-combatants directly and indirectly. 

Directly by (a) providing training opportunities, (b) ensuring key social investments, 

(c) revising regulations to minimize barriers to entry for would-be private sector 

operators and entrepreneurs, and (d) facilitating market access both within and outside the DRC. Case studies abound of success with similar efforts. Indirectly, international aid programs could (a) prioritize governance and rule of law programs to 

curtail impunity, (b) invest in a proprivate sector judicial sector and (c) introduce/ 

reinforce programs that enhance transparency and accountability in the economic 

and financial sectors. 

RESPONSE OF AMBASSADOR ROGER MEECE TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. In a response you provided committee members, in reference to the 

desired sunset of MONUSCO suggested by a fellow panelist from ECI, you indicated 

a deterioration in security in those areas that MONUSCO left. 

♦ Would you kindly expand on your reservations regarding the MONUSCO sunset 

and provide any guidance on such a contraction in its size and mandate? 

Answer. During my 3-year tenure as head of the U.N. Mission in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, at any given time, we maintained on the order of roughly 

90 forward bases (Temporary Operating Bases, or TOBs, and Company Operating 

Bases, or COBs) to increase the reach of our presence across the very large expanses 

of territory where armed groups operated. A significant number of these could be 

accessed and supported only by helicopter, as there were simply not viable roads. 

The same constraints, of course, apply to humanitarian agencies trying to access 

displaced civilians, often in large numbers, and other victims of violence, and they 

often depend on MONSUCO logistics help. The bases were more often than not very 

basic, but nonetheless relatively expensive to maintain by U.N. peacekeeping standards, especially related to helicopter or other required logistics support. It was often 

difficult to close TOBs, as these became perceived lifelines for villages and communities in those areas. 

We were obliged on a number of occasions to close or relocate MONSUCO forward 

bases because of helicopter, troop or other resource constraints, redeploy peacekeeping troops from one area to another to counter new priority threats, or reduce 

other functions in some areas due to security risks or other factors. A scaling back 

of MONUSCO’s presence in any area invariably provoked local unhappiness or opposition, fearing the consequences of the withdrawal. In areas of militia activity, 

including most of the Kivu provinces, Ituri District and parts of Bas Uele and Haut 

Uele Districts in Orientale province, in nearly all cases there would be an increase 

in militia activity in those areas following the pullback, with consequent increases 

in civilian displacements due to conflict and violence, apparent increases in violent 

crime including rape and other sexual-based crime, and a general deterioration in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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security conditions. In addition, in virtually all areas of MONUSCO security presence, we confronted requests for security escorts beyond our capability to fulfill from 

local authorities (for example, market day patrols and escorts) and from U.N. agencies, other aid agencies, and a variety of NGOs to enable humanitarian access and 

assistance to civilian victims of violence. While some NGOs preferred to avoid any 

association with the U.N., much less national security forces, we not infrequently 

also were obliged to utilize our presence to help following attacks on unescorted 

civilians as well. Such escorts or assistance with attacks obviously became more 

problematic without a local presence. 

A good example of this phenomenon was last year in the final months of my tenure, as after a good deal of study we were obliged to close some bases near Pinga, 

North Kivu, to enable formation and deployment of the newly authorized Intervention Brigade, and adjust deployments and logistic support given M23 operations in 

the province. Very soon after the closures, the Mai Mai ‘‘Sheka’’ and APCLS 

(‘‘Janvier’’) groups moved into the area, with consequent clashes between them and 

reported direct attacks on civilians. Pinga itself was overrun and overrun by militias 

at least once. We feared a potential eventual increase in FDLR and other groups’ 

activities in the territory as well. We sought to minimize the pullback, and we 

moved as quickly as possible to conduct patrols, helicopter operations, or conduct 

other mitigating activities as possible in the area; however, these operations did not 

and could not have the same deterrent and counterforce capability of the deployed 

presence. While the specifics of any given area vary, the general pattern was 

familiar. 

Virtually all MONUSCO military troops are deployed to areas of eastern DRC 

where armed groups operate. There is a constant internal review process to determine threat levels, and the resultant closure of bases and redeployment of troops 

whenever possible as security conditions improve in any given area, or national 

forces seem capable of providing at least minimal security themselves. These actions 

can sometimes have longer term negative effects, for example in Katanga province, 

where MONSUCO has had little capacity to address growing conflict and violence 

after a drawdown of the MONUSCO presence over time, but they nonetheless reflect 

the ongoing effort to deploy troops and resources to the highest threat zones. In addition to the purely internal MONUSCO assessments, in 2010 a Joint Assessment 

Process was established by MONUSCO and the government to provide a mechanism 

to arrive at a common understanding and assessment of security conditions, and 

promote dialogue at multiple levels between government authorities and the U.N. 

mission to improve overall communication and planning. This Joint Assessment 

Process has proven to be very useful. 

Regarding the proposal for a mission ‘‘sunset’’ date, it is my understanding that 

at least in part such a proposal has been advanced with the idea of increasing pressure on the Kinshasa government to move ahead with reforms and other measures. 

I would note that when I took up duties with the U.N. in July 2010, at the time 

DRC President Kabila was demanding the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission, MONUC at 

the time, be withdrawn entirely by mid-2011. This I believe was based on a perception that the mission was no longer providing a sufficiently robust security presence, 

and I think likely also reflected an underlying perception of an irritating international presence in the country infringing on national sovereignty. In my judgment, given the ongoing active conflict and the consequent ongoing major negative 

humanitarian effects, and the limited capacity of state institutions in eastern Congo 

at the time, such a withdrawal would have had disastrous effects. The key point, 

however, is that there is already substantial political and social pressure within government structures and a mind-set favoring a reduction and end to the U.N. peacekeeping mission. A specific sunset date set in advance by the Security Council could 

in fact reduce pressures in the DRC to effect reform programs, and impair a free 

and full conduct of elections, and thus be counterproductive. As well, such a set 

withdrawal date could potentially limit international community options in what 

has often in the past been a volatile and unpredictable region. Finally, such a signal 

could be very unhelpful in regard to neighboring countries where elements may seek 

to continue destabilizing activities in eastern Congo. 

Since 2010, Security Council authorizing resolutions for MONUSCO have included 

specific criteria to determine a reduction or any ‘‘reconfiguration’’ of MONSUCO’s 

presence, specifically based on a reduction of the threat to civilians posed by armed 

groups, and stabilization through establishment of state security institutions in conflict areas and improvement in democratic space and human rights (Note: These are 

contained in operative paragraph 11 of the current resolution, S/RES/2098). These 

criteria were established in 2010 essentially to define standards, responding to the 

government’s unilateral demand at the time for the mission to be closed. I believe 

this approach, gauging the need and size of the MONUSCO force through an assessFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ment of the situation on the ground in conflict areas, is a correct one. MONUSCO’s 

mandate has since 2010 been reviewed annually by the Security Council, permitting 

a periodic review of the overall situation and MONUSCO’s size and presence. While 

it is important to work toward establishing the needed security conditions and 

reducing the peacekeeping presence as quickly as possible, it is also important not 

to reduce prematurely a key stabilizing force in conflict areas, and risk a reescalation of the violence and conflict which has for too long plagued the region. The 

recent progress realized against key armed groups offers renewed promise that 

progress toward durable security and stabilization is at last being realized. 

There has always been a tendency to add to the peacekeeping mission’s mandate, 

and I would very much support an effort to review the scope of the mandate, removing or at least scaling back responsibilities and tasking outside of core security functions. Some of these additional responsibilities, including dealing with the terrible 

effects of sexual-based violence, use of children, and other major problems, are of 

clear importance. In my view, however, there should always be an effort to focus 

peacekeeping missions on only the priority tasks that they are in a unique position 

to carry out. 

RESPONSES OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. While the DRC’s mineral wealth is a source of conflict, it also poses an 

opportunity for future regional economic integration. 

♦ What steps toward greater economic integration in the Great Lakes are most 

feasible now and in the future? 

Answer. Nonformal business in the Great Lakes region is already integrated. The 

markets are fraught with graft, the channels lack transparency and economic actors 

are linked to various parts of the war economy. This severely limits their welfare 

and nation-building potential. Building on the positive impacts of the recent mineral 

certification process, improving the regulatory/legislative structures and providing 

strategic investments in both labor force capacity and infrastructure could help 

establish the conditions necessary for more meaningful and equitable economic 

integration. 

At the macrolevel, significant opportunities exist in both production and trade. 

Unfortunately, most existing integration (particularly those involving DRC, Rwanda, 

and Uganda). A combination of robust diplomacy and trade incentives could help 

delink such economic activity from the conflict economy. The extensive supply chain 

for most economic activity bodes well for meaningful and more broad-based economic integration if the following steps are taken: 

a. Liberalize and harmonize trade policies. Empirical evidence (e.g., documented 

in the annual ‘‘Doing Business Report’’) suggests that, this is the most significant 

barrier to progress. 

b. Invest in infrastructure—particularly transportation and marketing. 

c. Facilitate access to information on pricing and transactions. 

d. Create structures that promote transparent processes, predictable frameworks 

and accountable officials (public and private sector). 

Question. Are there any measures the U.S. Government and other donors can take 

to facilitate this and what is the private sector role? 

Answer. The United States has led the world in helping to reform the mining 

industry in the Great Lakes so that it benefits all Congolese, and not just a select 

few. There are three important things the United States could do to help further 

greater economic integration and shared economic prosperity in the DRC and Great 

Lakes region: 

a. The United States should consider rebalancing foreign assistance. Most current 

economic development support is earmarked for important social projects—particularly health and gender-related. While these projects are necessary, devoting a disproportional majority of available assistance to them means much less support for 

income generation and economic governance initiatives. The U.S. could also consider 

leveraging its social investments with support from other donors; thereby increasing 

the likelihood of a coordinated and reasonably comprehensive level of assistance. 

b. The United States could consider expanding market access initiatives for products from the Great Lakes region. Effective and sustainable stability will only be 

accomplished if the people are able to earn/trade their way out of poverty. Credible 

measures have been put in place to curtail/eliminate the trade in conflict minerals. 

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erals—particularly in the nonmining sector. One approach would be to create special 

provisions in an existing program. like the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act 

(AGOA), that would provide incentives for exports from this region. Having a 

regional initiative could help galvanize myriad nonformal economic entities (and 

linkages) and encourage them to operate profitably in formal channels. 

c. The United States should keep the crisis in the Great Lakes on the international agenda. Recent efforts to address impunity and corruption in the Great 

Lakes region could be reversed if global attention is diminished or diverted. Every 

effort must be expended to consolidate recent gains by fully supporting the work of 

the office of the U.S. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region and coordinating 

international support over the medium to longer term. 

When considering the role of the private sector, it is important to recognize the 

different categories of business entities operating in the Great Lakes region. Large 

international corporations (primarily in mining and forestry) are vested in the 

region by virtue of their significant upfront investments. Both corruption and instability affect their costs and (given a level playing field) they would be amenable to 

initiatives that more fully integrate the regional economy into their value chains. 

Local content requirements could encourage them to source more of their goods and 

services from the region. This could be accomplised within the context of existing 

transperency initiatives, like EITI. Regional/local small- and medium-scale enterprises could become more successful and integrated if steps are taken to enhance 

their skills, ensure standards and better identify value chain opportunities. Helping 

to ease nontarrif barriers (e.g., punitive bureaucracy, security of tenure and access 

to affordable credit) and measures to harmonize trade regulations/standards regionally could also help. Most private sector actors in the DRC are in the vast subsistence-oriented, nonformal sector. Targeted social investments through development 

organizations (like the World Bank and USAID) would make them better prepared 

to benefit from regional opportunities. 

RESPONSES OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. What is the total amount of U.S. Government bilateral spending in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from all USG accounts in 2000–2013? Please 

provide a table, including the years, accounts, and total amount of money spent each 

year by agency and purpose. Please do not wait for all agencies to report but as the 

consolidated State Department/USAID 150 Account and State Foreign Operations 

accounts are available please send that when complete. 

Answer. The total amount of U.S. Government bilateral funding to the DRC from FY 2000 to FY 2013 is $1,386,941,000. The attached table includes a break down 

by year and account. 

Question. How much humanitarian assistance has the United States provided the 

DRC since 2000? Please provide a table, including years, accounts, and total amount 

of money spent each year. 

Answer. The United States has provided $1,366,818,000 in humanitarian assistance to the DRC since FY 2000. The attached table includes a break down by year 

and account. 

Question. How much debt relief has the United States provided the DRC since 

2000? Please provide a table, including years, accounts, and total amount of money 

spent each year. 

Answer. The DRC received 100 percent debt reduction under the Paris Club Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. The attached table includes the 

amount of debt relief provided by the United States from FY 2000 to the present. 

In the table, the ‘‘face value treated’’ represents the amount of debt forgiven. The 

‘‘subsidy cost obligation’’ represents the cost of debt relief as obligated. Since FY 

2000, the United States has provided approximately $2.042 billion in debt relief to 

the DRC at a budget cost of $170,096,973. 

Question. What accounts and funding sources are included in the U.S. Government’s reporting to the OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)? 

Answer. Please see the attached table for a breakdown of the agencies and 

accounts that are included in the U.S. Government’s reporting to the OECD’s ODA. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The tables attachment can be found at the end of the hearing.] 

Question. How many lives have been lost to the conflict in the DRC in the past 

14 years? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

70 

Answer. The ongoing conflict in the DRC has been labeled the deadliest conflict 

since World War II; however, we are not certain of the total number of people killed. 

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted a series of mortality studies 

between the years 1998 and 2007, estimating that 5.8 million people had died as 

result of conflict. Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors without Borders conducted a 

limited mortality study in selective parts of North Kivu province in 2009, and found 

that of overall mortality rates, 36 and 40 percent were related to conflict in Masisi 

and Kitchanga. Doubtless tens of thousands more have been killed since then, but 

the specific number is unknown and perhaps unknowable. Some of the most notable 

incidents include: 150 people massacred by CNDP rebels in the town of Kiwanja in 

2008; 1,700 civilians killed, along with 1,100 Democratic Forces for the Liberation 

of Rwanda (FDLR), in 2009 as a result of fighting between the FDLR and the DRC 

army (FARDC) (mostly ex-CNDP units), and; 900 combatants estimated to have 

been killed during the height of the fighting between the M23, the FARDC, and the 

U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) between May and November 

2013. These are mere samplings and do not represent the breadth of violence that 

is sadly endemic in the DRC. Much of the killing in the DRC is unseen, including 

irregular fighting by Mai Mai groups, deaths that occur when civilians are forced 

into inhospitable terrain, and fighting that takes place in parts of the country with 

little international or media presence. 

Question. How many cases of sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) by U.N. peacekeepers have been reported in the DRC since official U.N. reporting began in 2006 

broken out by year? 

Answer. There have been 274 cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by U.N. 

peacekeepers reported in the DRC since 2006. Broken out by year: 

2007—59; 2008—40; 2009—59; 2010—36; 2011—31; 2012—25; 2013—23; 2014— 

1 (to date). 

Question. Of the cases of SEA cases by U.N. peacekeepers that have been 

reported, how many peacekeepers have been prosecuted for their alleged crimes by 

their home countries’ justice system? 

Answer. We do not know. The U.N. conducts an initial investigation when it 

receives a report of misconduct by a peacekeeper, whether it is minor (such as patronizing an off-limits bar) or serious (rape, child molestation). In the case of a 

minor infraction, the soldier is usually punished by his national contingent commander and remains in place. For serious or multiple infractions, the U.N. sends 

individuals home, and relies on the governments of troop/police contributing countries to take the appropriate action. The U.N. requests that troop/police contributing 

countries report back on action taken, which they frequently do, but not always. The 

U.N. does not have the authority to force or require that TCC/PCC government take 

action or report back in response to reports of sexual abuse or exploitation. 

Question. Where is U.S. development programming currently being conducted and 

what is the cost of each sector of programming? Please provide a map of the DRC 

and indicate what U.S. assistance programs are currently being conducted and 

where. 

Answer. The attached map shows current U.S. development assistance programs 

in the DRC. The funding estimates reflected on the map are based on amounts obligated as stated in USAID’s Operational Plans. These obligations were then divided 

between the number of provinces in which the mechanism operated. Actual development assistance programmed into these provinces varies. The Food for Peace funding is divided equally among all 11 provinces. These funds support the World Food 

Programme’s (WFP) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, which has operations 

in all provinces but adapts to varying needs. Embassy Kinshasa is working with 

WFP to obtain more accurate data. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The map attachment can be found at the end of the hearing.] 

Question. The U.N. Group of Experts’ final report and the State Department’s 

Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, refer to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 

having ties to terrorist networks. 

♦ a. How many members does the ADF have? 

Answer. We do not know for certain. The U.N. Group of Experts estimates ADF 

has between 800 and 1,200 soldiers. Other estimates suggest the number could be 

higher. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing in order to go into more 

detail on the ADF. 

♦ b. What nationalities and ethnicities does ADF’s membership comprise of? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Answer. ADF consists primarily of Ugandans and Congolese. It was formed as a 

marriage of convenience between Baganda ultramonarchists, Baganda Muslims, and 

Bakonjo (Nande living in Uganda) monarchists. The monarchist element has melted 

away as its demands were met, leaving an Islamic core. However, the commitment 

to Islam by the rank-and-file ADF is unclear, and the group has in the past 

partnered with Christian militias in the DRC. 

MONUSCO estimates ADF is 40 percent Congolese today, with the rest being 

mostly Ugandan. There are also reports of some Tanzanian members. According to 

the Enough Project, the total membership is primarily of the Nande ethnic group. 

The leader, Jamil Makulu, is a Muganda. The Baganda also remain well-represented in ADF. 

♦ c. What terrorist organizations is the ADF engaged with? 

Answer. The Ugandan Government has long alleged ADF connections with alShabaab and al-Qaeda. While there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that the 

claims are plausible, these connections have not been proven. 

♦ d. What are the nationalities of these terrorist entities that ADF is allegedly 

engaged with? 

Answer. There are reports of Somalis and Arabic speakers providing training to 

the ADF in the DRC, but these cannot be confirmed. A Reuters report on a 

MONUSCO task force says the trainers are Sudanese and Somali. ADF was once 

supported by the Sudanese Government, but there is no evidence that such support 

is ongoing today. 

♦ e. What offensive tactics like those used by terrorist organizations is ADF 

using? 

Answer. According to the U.N. Group of Experts, ‘‘a former ADF soldier and 

Ugandan intelligence estimate that ADF’s arsenal consists of mortars, machine 

guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Former ADF soldiers told the Group 

that when foreign trainers visited ADF in the past, they instructed them on the 

assembly of improvised explosive devices.’’ In the 1990s, ADF was responsible for 

a series of bombings in Kampala. 

♦ f. How should the U.S Government hold President Kabila accountable for holding fair and free elections in 2016? 

Answer. We are using a variety of diplomatic tools to promote free and fair elections. We continue to message privately and publicly that, in the aftermath of the 

seriously flawed 2011 elections, it is critical that the DRC’s next elections meet 

international election standards for being credible, free, fair, and transparent. We 

have similarly made clear that we will work with President Kabila until the end 

of his current and constitutionally mandated final-term of office, which is slated to 

end in December 2016. Special Envoy Feingold has said publicly that constitutions 

should not be amended to benefit those currently in office. 

The U.S. Government is also seeking to partner with and to supplement the work 

of other donors in assisting the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) 

to produce credible, free, and fair elections in the DRC, in particular working on 

election observation and voter education. In the end, the DRC is a sovereign country, and the quality of Congolese democracy is ultimately up to the political will and 

actions of the Congolese Government and people. 

ATTACHMENTS 

Table 1.—U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo 

(In thousands of U.S. dollars) 

Fiscal 

Year Total 

Food for Peace 

Title II 

Migration and 

Refugee 

Assistance 

Emergency Refugee 

and Migration 

Assistance 

Disaster 

Assistance 

FY 2000 23,814 3,332 7,340 — 13,142 

FY 2001 51,817 14,244 5,550 10,000 22,023 

FY 2002 43,827 11,555 5,468 — 26,804 

FY 2003 79,710 43,530 4,291 — 31,889 

FY 2004 56,928 30,813 3,720 — 22,395 

FY 2005 68,907 29,205 8,570 4,700 26,432 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

72 

Table 1.—U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo—Continued 

(In thousands of U.S. dollars) 

Fiscal 

Year Total 

Food for Peace 

Title II 

Migration and 

Refugee 

Assistance 

Emergency Refugee 

and Migration 

Assistance 

Disaster 

Assistance 

FY 2006 85,300 39,898 4,270 16,000 25,132 

FY 2007 88,128 37,138 21,397 600 28,993 

FY 2008 133,086 80,801 31,790 2,200 18,295 

FY 2009 204,464 125,997 41,489 4,000 32,978 

FY 2010 170,919 101,273 45,245 500 23,901 

FY 2011 124,882 67,250 24,121 — 33,511 

FY 2012 146,966 68,346 43,912 14 34,694 

FY 2013 

653(a) 88,070 28,000 60,070 — — 

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Bilateral and Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

African Development Foundation.11x0700 African Development Foundation ...................................................... 29 

Department of Agriculture .... 11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 2 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1106 National Forest System, Forest Service ............................................ 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1400 Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service ....................

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1500 Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, 

Education, and Extension Service.

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1600 Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service .... 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2277 Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I ......................................... 145 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2900 Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service ....................... 10 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2903 McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.163 

Department of Agriculture .... 70x0800 Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and 

Technology, Homeland Security.

0 

Department of Agriculture .... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1

Department of Agriculture .... 80x0120 Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ............... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 97x0134 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense .............................. 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x0500 Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST ........................... 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1006 Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses ..................... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 6 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1450 National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.0 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 3 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 154 

Department of Defense ......... 21x2020 Operations and Maintenance, Army .................................................. 103 

Department of Defense ......... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 2 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States ..............

Department of Defense ......... 97x0100 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide ...................................... 233 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0130 Defense Health Program ................................................................... 10 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0819 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense ............... 106 

Department of Energy ........... 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 6 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

73 

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Energy ........... 89x0309 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy ................ 71 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 11 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,385 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States ..............

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0140 Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ........................ 45 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0885 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.392 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0892 National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.156 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0949 Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0950 HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0951 Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.9 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0952 Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 157 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0956 Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0959 Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x1503 Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and 

Families.

587 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x8250 Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control ........................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 4 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0128 Department of Justice, General Legal Activities .............................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0200 Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x1100 Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration .............. 1 

Department of Justice .......... 15x5042 Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice ......................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 16x0165 Department of Labor, Departmental Management ........................... 68 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 5 

Department of State ............. 11x0040 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 36 

Department of State ............. 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 309 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 308 

Department of State ............. 12x3505 Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service ........................... 60 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

74 

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of State ............. 19x0113 Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State .............. 5 

Department of State ............. 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of 

State.

1 

Department of State ............. 19x0210 National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State .............. 117 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 338 

Department of State ............. 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 13 

Department of State ............. 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 85

Department of State ............. 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 76 

Department of State ............. 19x1124 Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State ...... 129 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 543 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 1,753 

Department of State ............. 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1,597 

Department of State ............. 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 102 

Department of Transportation 11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 0 

Department of Transportation 69x1301 Federal Aviation Administration, Operations .................................... 0 

Department of Transportation 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7

Department of Transportation 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0

Department of the Interior ... 14x0412 Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs .......................................... 3 

Department of the Interior ... 14x0415 Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior ...................... 198 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1611 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management .................... 7 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service.

11 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1696 Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service.

3 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5029 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 1 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5241 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.1 

Department of the Interior ... 14x8216 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds .......................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x0071 Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund ..................................... 75 

Department of the Treasury 11x0072 Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank ................... 86 

Department of the Treasury 11x0073 Contribution to the International Development Association ............. 1,492 

Department of the Treasury 11x0076 Contribution to the Asian Development Bank .................................. 207 

Department of the Treasury 11x0077 Global Environment Facility .............................................................. 237 

Department of the Treasury 11x0079 Contribution to the African Development Fund ................................ 231 

Department of the Treasury 11x0080 Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund ..................................... 230 

Department of the Treasury 11x0082 Contribution to the African Development Bank ................................ 32 

Department of the Treasury 11x0089 Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.25 

Department of the Treasury 11x1039 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.30 

Department of the Treasury 11x1045 International Affairs Technical Assistance ....................................... 25 

Department of the Treasury 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs

Department of the Treasury 11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

Department of the Treasury 11x1475 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) ..................... 160 

Department of the Treasury 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 3 

Department of the Treasury 72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0107 Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology ............. 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.20 

Export-Import Bank of the 

United States.

83x0100 Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account .................................... 14 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

75 

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x0120 Department of Commerce, Departmental Management ...................

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ...

Federal Trade Commission ... 29x0100 Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses ......................... 0 

Inter-American Foundation ... 11x3100 Inter-American Foundation ................................................................ 25

Millennium Challenge ...........

Corporation .......................

95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 230 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0100 Peace Corps ...................................................................................... 366 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0110 Salaries and Expenses, the White House ......................................... 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 22 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 5 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 37 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 6 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x2278 Public Law 480 Title II Grants ......................................................... 1,646 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x4336 Commodity Credit Corporation Fund ................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. -2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 4,854 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 47 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0300 Capital Investment Fund, United States .......................................... 121 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0302 Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act .................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0305 Civilian Stabilization Initiative ......................................................... 2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 406 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1000 Operating Expenses of USAID ........................................................... 1,265 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1007 Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General ....... 54 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1012 Sahel Development Program ............................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1014 Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance ................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1015 Complex Crises Fund ........................................................................ 30 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

76 

Table 2.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 2,469 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1027 Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program ................. 57 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1029 Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund .................................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1033 HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development ............ 402 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance ................................ 1,072 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1036 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund .... 45 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 5,092 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union -1 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1096 Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery 

Fund.

-1 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1264 Development Credit Authority, United States ................................... 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4344 Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.18 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4513 Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program ............... 22 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8342 Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund .................... 2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8824 Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation ....................... 83 

Total Gross Commitments .... ...................................................................................................... 30,871 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Bilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

African Development .............

Foundation ........................

11x0700 African Development Foundation ...................................................... 29 

Department of Agriculture .... 11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 2 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1106 National Forest System, Forest Service ............................................ 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1600 Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service .... 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2277 Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I ......................................... 145 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2900 Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service ....................... 10 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2903 McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.163 

Department of Agriculture .... 70x0800 Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and 

Technology, Homeland Security.

0 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

77 

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Agriculture .... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1

Department of Agriculture .... 80x0120 Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ............... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 97x0134 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense .............................. 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x0500 Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST ........................... 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1006 Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses ..................... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 6 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1450 National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.0 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 3 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 154 

Department of Defense ......... 21x2020 Operations and Maintenance, Army .................................................. 103 

Department of Defense ......... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 2 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0100 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide ...................................... 233 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0130 Defense Health Program ................................................................... 10 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0819 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense ............... 106 

Department of Energy ........... 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 6 

Department of Energy ........... 89x0309 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy ................ 71 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 11 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,385 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0140 Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ........................ 45 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0885 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.392 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0892 National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.156 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0949 Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0950 HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0951 Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.9 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0952 Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 157 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0956 Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0959 Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x1503 Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and 

Families.

587 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x8250 Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control ........................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 4 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

78 

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0128 Department of Justice, General Legal Activities .............................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0200 Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x1100 Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration .............. 1 

Department of Justice .......... 15x5042 Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice ......................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 16x0165 Department of Labor, Departmental Management ........................... 68 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 5 

Department of State ............. 11x0040 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 36 

Department of State ............. 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 309 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 230 

Department of State ............. 12x3505 Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service ........................... 60 

Department of State ............. 19x0113 Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State .............. 5 

Department of State ............. 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of 

State.

1 

Department of State ............. 19x0210 National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State .............. 117 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 4 

Department of State ............. 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 13 

Department of State ............. 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 85

Department of State ............. 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 76 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 28 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 1,743 

Department of State ............. 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1,597 

Department of State ............. 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 102 

Department of Transportation 11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 0 

Department of Transportation 69x1301 Federal Aviation Administration, Operations .................................... 0 

Department of Transportation 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7

Department of Transportation 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0

Department of the Interior ... 14x0412 Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs .......................................... 3 

Department of the Interior ... 14x0415 Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior ...................... 198 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1611 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management .................... 7 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service.

11 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1696 Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service.

3 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5029 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 1 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5241 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.1 

Department of the Interior ... 14x8216 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds .......................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1045 International Affairs Technical Assistance ....................................... 25 

Department of the Treasury 11x1475 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) ..................... 160 

Department of the Treasury 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 3 

Department of the Treasury 72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0107 Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology ............. 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.10 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

79 

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Export-Import Bank of the 

United States.

83x0100 Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account .................................... 14 

Federal Trade Commission ... 29x0100 Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses ......................... 0 

Inter-American Foundation ... 11x3100 Inter-American Foundation ................................................................ 25

Millennium Challenge ...........

Corporation .......................

95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 230 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0100 Peace Corps ...................................................................................... 366 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0110 Salaries and Expenses, the White House ......................................... 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 22 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 5 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 37 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 6 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x2278 Public Law 480 Title II Grants ......................................................... 1,646 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x4336 Commodity Credit Corporation Fund ................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. -2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 3,469 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 47 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0300 Capital Investment Fund, United States .......................................... 121 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0302 Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act .................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0305 Civilian Stabilization Initiative ......................................................... 2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 406 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1000 Operating Expenses of USAID ........................................................... 1,265 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1007 Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General ....... 54 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1012 Sahel Development Program ............................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1014 Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance ................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1015 Complex Crises Fund ........................................................................ 30 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

80 

Table 3.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 2,469 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1027 Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program ................. 57 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1029 Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund .................................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1033 HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development ............ 402 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance ................................ 1,072 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1036 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund .... 45 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 5,092 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union -1 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1096 Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery 

Fund.

-1 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1264 Development Credit Authority, United States ................................... 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4344 Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.18 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4513 Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program ............... 22 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8342 Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund .................... 2 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8824 Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation ....................... 83 

Total Bilateral Gross 

Commitments 

...................................................................................................... 25,766 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

Table 4.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 78 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 335 

Department of State ............. 19x1124 Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State ...... 129 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 515 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 10 

Department of the Treasury 11x0071 Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund ..................................... 75 

Department of the Treasury 11x0072 Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank ................... 86 

Department of the Treasury 11x0073 Contribution to the International Development Association ............. 1,492 

Department of the Treasury 11x0076 Contribution to the Asian Development Bank .................................. 207 

Department of the Treasury 11x0077 Global Environment Facility .............................................................. 237 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

81 

Table 4.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Multilateral Committments (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of the Treasury 11x0079 Contribution to the African Development Fund ................................ 231 

Department of the Treasury 11x0080 Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund ..................................... 230 

Department of the Treasury 11x0082 Contribution to the African Development Bank ................................ 32 

Department of the Treasury 11x0089 Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.25 

Department of the Treasury 11x1039 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.30 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.9 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development .....................

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,385 

Total Multilateral Gross 

Commitments 

...................................................................................................... 5,105 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

African Development .............

Foundation ........................

11x0700 African Development Foundation ...................................................... 31 

Department of Agriculture .... 11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 5 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1106 National Forest System, Forest Service ............................................ 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1400 Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service .................... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1500 Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, 

Education, and Extension Service.

1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1600 Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service .... 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2277 Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I ......................................... 152 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2900 Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service ....................... 17 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2903 McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.163 

Department of Agriculture .... 70x0800 Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and 

Technology, Homeland Security.

0 

Department of Agriculture .... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1

Department of Agriculture .... 80x0120 Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ............... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 97x0134 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense .............................. 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x0500 Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST ........................... 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1006 Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses ..................... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1450 National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.1 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 4 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 4 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 72 

Department of Defense ......... 21x2020 Operations and Maintenance, Army .................................................. 103 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

82 

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Defense ......... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 3 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 0 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0100 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide ...................................... 178 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0130 Defense Health Program ................................................................... 9 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0819 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense ............... 121 

Department of Energy ........... 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Energy ........... 89x0309 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy ................ 129 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 18 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,640 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 13 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0140 Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ........................ 16 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0885 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.392 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0892 National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.140 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0949 Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0950 HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0951 Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.3 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0952 Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and 

Prevention.

.............

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 75 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0956 Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0959 Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x1503 Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and 

Families.

631 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x8250 Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control ........................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 2 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0128 Department of Justice, General Legal Activities .............................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0200 Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x1100 Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration .............. 1 

Department of Justice .......... 15x5042 Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice ......................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1 

Department of Labor ............ 16x0165 Department of Labor, Departmental Management ........................... 68 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

83 

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 5 

Department of State ............. 11x0040 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 28 

Department of State ............. 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 322 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 269 

Department of State ............. 12x3505 Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service ........................... 60 

Department of State ............. 19x0113 Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State .............. 5 

Department of State ............. 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of 

State.

1 

Department of State ............. 19x0210 National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State .............. 117 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 338 

Department of State ............. 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 14 

Department of State ............. 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 63

Department of State ............. 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 29 

Department of State ............. 19x1124 Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State ...... 129 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 543 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 1,795 

Department of State ............. 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1,490 

Department of State ............. 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 64 

Department of Transportation 11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 0 

Department of Transportation 69x1301 Federal Aviation Administration, Operations .................................... 0 

Department of Transportation 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7

Department of Transportation 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... .............

Department of the Interior ... 14x0412 Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs .......................................... 2 

Department of the Interior ... 14x0415 Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior ...................... 206 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1611 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management .................... 5 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service.

7 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1696 Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service.

0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5029 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5241 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x8216 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds .......................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x0071 Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund ..................................... 75 

Department of the Treasury 11x0072 Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank ................... 86 

Department of the Treasury 11x0073 Contribution to the International Development Association ............. 1,492 

Department of the Treasury 11x0076 Contribution to the Asian Development Bank .................................. 290 

Department of the Treasury 11x0077 Global Environment Facility .............................................................. 237 

Department of the Treasury 11x0079 Contribution to the African Development Fund ................................ 246 

Department of the Treasury 11x0080 Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund ..................................... 230 

Department of the Treasury 11x0082 Contribution to the African Development Bank ................................ 32 

Department of the Treasury 11x0089 Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.50 

Department of the Treasury 11x1039 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.26 

Department of the Treasury 11x1045 International Affairs Technical Assistance ....................................... 20 

Department of the Treasury 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1475 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) ..................... 160 

Department of the Treasury 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 4 

Department of the Treasury 72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

84 

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0107 Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology ............. 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.13 

Export-Import Bank of the 

United States.

83x0100 Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account .................................... 14 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x0120 Department of Commerce, Departmental Management ................... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 29x0100 Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses ......................... 0 

Inter-American Foundation ... 11x3100 Inter-American Foundation ................................................................ 24

Millennium Challenge ...........

Corporation .......................

95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1,355 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0100 Peace Corps ...................................................................................... 372 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0110 Salaries and Expenses, the White House ......................................... 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 24 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 2 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 35 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 16 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x2278 Public Law 480 Title II Grants ......................................................... 1,639 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x4336 Commodity Credit Corporation Fund ................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 13 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 5,018 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 3 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0300 Capital Investment Fund, United States .......................................... 134 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0302 Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act .................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0305 Civilian Stabilization Initiative ......................................................... 5 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 475 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1000 Operating Expenses of USAID ........................................................... 1,315 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1007 Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General ....... 53 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

85 

Table 5.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral and Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 11 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1012 Sahel Development Program ............................................................. .............

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1014 Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance ................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1015 Complex Crises Fund ........................................................................ 22 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 1,932 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1027 Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program ................. 41 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1029 Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund .................................... .............

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1033 HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development ............ 454 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance ................................ 992 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1036 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund .... 45 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4,538 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 29 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1096 Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery 

Fund.

.............

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1264 Development Credit Authority, United States ................................... 24 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4344 Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.18 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4513 Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program ............... 20 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8342 Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund .................... 6 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8824 Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation ....................... 76 

Total Gross 

Disbursements 

...................................................................................................... 31,263 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

86 

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

African Development .............

Foundation ........................

11x0700 African Development Foundation ...................................................... 31 

Department of Agriculture .... 11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 5 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1106 National Forest System, Forest Service ............................................ 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1400 Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service .................... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1500 Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, 

Education, and Extension Service.

1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1600 Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service .... 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2277 Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I ......................................... 152 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2900 Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service ....................... 17 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2903 McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.163 

Department of Agriculture .... 70x0800 Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and 

Technology, Homeland Security.

0 

Department of Agriculture .... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1

Department of Agriculture .... 80x0120 Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ............... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 97x0134 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense .............................. 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x0500 Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST ........................... 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1006 Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses ..................... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1450 National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.1 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 4 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 4 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 72 

Department of Defense ......... 21x2020 Operations and Maintenance, Army .................................................. 103 

Department of Defense ......... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 3 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 0 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0100 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide ...................................... 178 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0130 Defense Health Program ................................................................... 9 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0819 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense ............... 121 

Department of Energy ........... 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Energy ........... 89x0309 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy ................ 129 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 18 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,640 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 13 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0140 Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ........................ 16 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0885 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.392 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0892 National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.140 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0949 Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0950 HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

0 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

87 

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0951 Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.3 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 75 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0956 Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0959 Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x1503 Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and 

Families.

631 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x8250 Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control ........................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 2 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0128 Department of Justice, General Legal Activities .............................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0200 Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x1100 Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration .............. 1 

Department of Justice .......... 15x5042 Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice ......................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1 

Department of Labor ............ 16x0165 Department of Labor, Departmental Management ........................... 68 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 5 

Department of State ............. 11x0040 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 28 

Department of State ............. 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 322 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 191 

Department of State ............. 12x3505 Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service ........................... 60 

Department of State ............. 19x0113 Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State .............. 5 

Department of State ............. 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of 

State.

1 

Department of State ............. 19x0210 National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State .............. 117 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 4 

Department of State ............. 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 14 

Department of State ............. 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 63

Department of State ............. 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 29 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 28 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 1,784 

Department of State ............. 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1,490 

Department of State ............. 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 64 

Department of Transportation 11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 0 

Department of Transportation 69x1301 Federal Aviation Administration, Operations .................................... 0 

Department of Transportation 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7

Department of the Interior ... 14x0412 Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs .......................................... 2 

Department of the Interior ... 14x0415 Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior ...................... 206 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1611 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management .................... 5 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service.

7 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

88 

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1696 Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service.

0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5029 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5241 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x8216 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds .......................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1045 International Affairs Technical Assistance ....................................... 20 

Department of the Treasury 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1475 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) ..................... 160 

Department of the Treasury 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 4 

Department of the Treasury 72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0107 Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology ............. 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.8 

Export-Import Bank of the 

United States.

83x0100 Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account .................................... 14 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x0120 Department of Commerce, Departmental Management ................... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 29x0100 Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses ......................... 0 

Inter-American Foundation ... 11x3100 Inter-American Foundation ................................................................ 24

Millennium Challenge ...........

Corporation .......................

95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1,355 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0100 Peace Corps ...................................................................................... 372 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0110 Salaries and Expenses, the White House ......................................... 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 24 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 2 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 35 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 16 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x2278 Public Law 480 Title II Grants ......................................................... 1,639 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x4336 Commodity Credit Corporation Fund ................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 13 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 3,632 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

89 

Table 6.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 3 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0300 Capital Investment Fund, United States .......................................... 134 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0302 Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act .................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0305 Civilian Stabilization Initiative ......................................................... 5 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 475 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1000 Operating Expenses of USAID ........................................................... 1,315 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1007 Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General ....... 53 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 11 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1014 Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance ................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1015 Complex Crises Fund ........................................................................ 22 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 1,932 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1027 Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program ................. 41 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1033 HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development ............ 454 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance ................................ 992 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1036 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund .... 45 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4,538 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 29 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1264 Development Credit Authority, United States ................................... 24 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4344 Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.18 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4513 Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program ............... 20 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8342 Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund .................... 6 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8824 Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation ....................... 76 

Total Gross 

Disbursements 

...................................................................................................... 26,042 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

90 

Table 7.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Multilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 78 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 335 

Department of State ............. 19x1124 Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State ...... 129 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 515 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 11 

Department of the Treasury 11x0071 Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund ..................................... 75 

Department of the Treasury 11x0072 Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank ................... 86 

Department of the Treasury 11x0073 Contribution to the International Development Association ............. 1,492 

Department of the Treasury 11x0076 Contribution to the Asian Development Bank .................................. 290 

Department of the Treasury 11x0077 Global Environment Facility .............................................................. 237 

Department of the Treasury 11x0079 Contribution to the African Development Fund ................................ 246 

Department of the Treasury 11x0080 Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund ..................................... 230 

Department of the Treasury 11x0082 Contribution to the African Development Bank ................................ 32 

Department of the Treasury 11x0089 Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.50 

Department of the Treasury 11x1039 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.26 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,385 

Total Multilateral Gross 

Disbursements 

...................................................................................................... 5,221 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

African Development .............

Foundation ........................

11x0700 African Development Foundation ...................................................... 31 

Department of Agriculture .... 11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 5 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1106 National Forest System, Forest Service ............................................ 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1400 Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service .................... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1500 Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, 

Education, and Extension Service.

1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1600 Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service .... 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2277 Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I ......................................... -178 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2900 Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service ....................... 17 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2903 McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.163 

Department of Agriculture .... 70x0800 Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and 

Technology, Homeland Security.

0 

Department of Agriculture .... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1

Department of Agriculture .... 80x0120 Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ............... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 97x0134 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense .............................. 0 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

91 

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x0500 Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST ........................... 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1006 Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses ..................... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1450 National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.1 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 4 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 4 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 72 

Department of Defense ......... 21x2020 Operations and Maintenance, Army .................................................. 103 

Department of Defense ......... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 3 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 0 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0100 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide ...................................... 178 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0130 Defense Health Program ................................................................... 9 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0819 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense ............... 121 

Department of Energy ........... 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Energy ........... 89x0309 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy ................ 129 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 18 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,640 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 13 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0140 Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ........................ 16 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0885 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.392 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0892 National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.140 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0949 Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0950 HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0951 Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.3 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0952 Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and 

Prevention.

.............

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 75 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0956 Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0959 Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x1503 Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and 

Families.

631 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x8250 Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control ........................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

92 

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 2 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0128 Department of Justice, General Legal Activities .............................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0200 Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x1100 Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration .............. 1 

Department of Justice .......... 15x5042 Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice ......................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1 

Department of Labor ............ 16x0165 Department of Labor, Departmental Management ........................... 68 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 5 

Department of State ............. 11x0040 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 28 

Department of State ............. 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 322 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 269 

Department of State ............. 12x3505 Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service ........................... 60 

Department of State ............. 19x0113 Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State .............. 5 

Department of State ............. 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of 

State.

1 

Department of State ............. 19x0210 National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State .............. 117 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 338 

Department of State ............. 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 14 

Department of State ............. 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 63

Department of State ............. 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 29 

Department of State ............. 19x1124 Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State ...... 129 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 543 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 1,795 

Department of State ............. 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1,490 

Department of State ............. 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 64 

Department of Transportation 11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 0 

Department of Transportation 69x1301 Federal Aviation Administration, Operations .................................... 0 

Department of Transportation 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7

Department of Transportation 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... .............

Department of the Interior ... 14x0412 Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs .......................................... 2 

Department of the Interior ... 14x0415 Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior ...................... 206 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1611 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management .................... 5 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service.

7 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1696 Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service.

0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5029 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5241 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x8216 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds .......................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x0071 Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund ..................................... 75 

Department of the Treasury 11x0072 Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank ................... 86 

Department of the Treasury 11x0073 Contribution to the International Development Association ............. 1,492 

Department of the Treasury 11x0076 Contribution to the Asian Development Bank .................................. 290 

Department of the Treasury 11x0077 Global Environment Facility .............................................................. 237 

Department of the Treasury 11x0079 Contribution to the African Development Fund ................................ 246 

Department of the Treasury 11x0080 Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund ..................................... 230 

Department of the Treasury 11x0082 Contribution to the African Development Bank ................................ 32 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

93 

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of the Treasury 11x0089 Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.50 

Department of the Treasury 11x1039 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.26 

Department of the Treasury 11x1045 International Affairs Technical Assistance ....................................... 20 

Department of the Treasury 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1475 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) ..................... 160 

Department of the Treasury 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 4 

Department of the Treasury 72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0107 Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology ............. 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.13 

Export-Import Bank of the 

United States.

83x0100 Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account .................................... 14 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x0120 Department of Commerce, Departmental Management ................... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 29x0100 Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses ......................... 0 

Inter-American Foundation ... 11x3100 Inter-American Foundation ................................................................ 24

Millennium Challenge ...........

Corporation .......................

95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1,355 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0100 Peace Corps ...................................................................................... 372 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0110 Salaries and Expenses, the White House ......................................... 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 24 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 2 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 35 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 9 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x2278 Public Law 480 Title II Grants ......................................................... 1,639 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x4336 Commodity Credit Corporation Fund ................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 13 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 5,018 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 40 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

94 

Table 8.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Gross Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 3 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0300 Capital Investment Fund, United States .......................................... 134 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0302 Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act .................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0305 Civilian Stabilization Initiative ......................................................... 5 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 475 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1000 Operating Expenses of USAID ........................................................... 1,315 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1007 Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General ....... 53 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 11 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1012 Sahel Development Program ............................................................. .............

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1014 Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance ................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1015 Complex Crises Fund ........................................................................ 22 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 1,932 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1027 Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program ................. 41 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1029 Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund .................................... .............

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1033 HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development ............ 454 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance ................................ 992 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1036 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund .... 45 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4,538 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 29 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1096 Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery 

Fund.

.............

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1264 Development Credit Authority, United States ................................... 24 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. -238 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4344 Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.18 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4513 Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program ............... 20 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8342 Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund .................... 6 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8824 Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation ....................... 76 

Total Net Disbursements ................... ............................................................................................................ 30,687 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

95 

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Bilateral Net Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

African Development .............

Foundation ........................

11x0700 African Development Foundation ...................................................... 31 

Department of Agriculture .... 11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 5 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1106 National Forest System, Forest Service ............................................ 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1400 Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service .................... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1500 Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, 

Education, and Extension Service.

1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x1600 Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service .... 1 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2277 Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I ......................................... -178 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2900 Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service ....................... 17 

Department of Agriculture .... 12x2903 McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants.163 

Department of Agriculture .... 70x0800 Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and 

Technology, Homeland Security.

0 

Department of Agriculture .... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1

Department of Agriculture .... 80x0120 Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ............... 0 

Department of Agriculture .... 97x0134 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense .............................. 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x0500 Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST ........................... 0 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1006 Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses ..................... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 2 

Department of Commerce ..... 13x1450 National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & Facilities.1 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 4 

Department of Commerce ..... 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 4 

Department of Defense ......... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 72 

Department of Defense ......... 21x2020 Operations and Maintenance, Army .................................................. 103 

Department of Defense ......... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 3 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Department of Defense ......... 72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 0 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0100 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide ...................................... 178 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0130 Defense Health Program ................................................................... 9 

Department of Defense ......... 97x0819 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense ............... 121 

Department of Energy ........... 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Energy ........... 89x0309 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy ................ 129 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 18 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,640 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 13 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0140 Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ........................ 16 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0885 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.392 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0892 National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control.140 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0949 Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0950 HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

0 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

96 

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Net Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0951 Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.3 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 75 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0956 Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x0959 Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention.

0 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x1503 Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and 

Families.

631 

Department of Health and 

Human Services.

75x8250 Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control ........................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 0 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 3 

Department of Homeland .....

Security .............................

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 2 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0128 Department of Justice, General Legal Activities .............................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x0200 Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................. 0 

Department of Justice .......... 15x1100 Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration .............. 1 

Department of Justice .......... 15x5042 Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice ......................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 0 

Department of Justice .......... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1 

Department of Labor ............ 16x0165 Department of Labor, Departmental Management ........................... 68 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 1 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 0 

Department of Labor ............ 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 5 

Department of State ............. 11x0040 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 28 

Department of State ............. 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................... 322 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 191 

Department of State ............. 12x3505 Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service ........................... 60 

Department of State ............. 19x0113 Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State .............. 5 

Department of State ............. 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of 

State.

1 

Department of State ............. 19x0210 National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State .............. 117 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 4 

Department of State ............. 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 14 

Department of State ............. 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 63

Department of State ............. 19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 29 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 28 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 1,784 

Department of State ............. 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 1,490 

Department of State ............. 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 64 

Department of Transportation 11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 0 

Department of Transportation 69x1301 Federal Aviation Administration, Operations .................................... 0 

Department of Transportation 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7

Department of the Interior ... 14x0412 Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs .......................................... 2 

Department of the Interior ... 14x0415 Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior ...................... 206 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1611 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management .................... 5 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service.

7 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

97 

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Net Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of the Interior ... 14x1696 Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service.

0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5029 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x5241 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.0 

Department of the Interior ... 14x8216 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds .......................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1045 International Affairs Technical Assistance ....................................... 20 

Department of the Treasury 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

Department of the Treasury 11x1475 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) ..................... 160 

Department of the Treasury 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 4 

Department of the Treasury 72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 0 

Department of the Treasury 72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0107 Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology ............. 0 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.8 

Export-Import Bank of the 

United States.

83x0100 Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account .................................... 14 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x0120 Department of Commerce, Departmental Management ................... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 13x1250 International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration ... 0 

Federal Trade Commission ... 29x0100 Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses ......................... 0 

Inter-American Foundation ... 11x3100 Inter-American Foundation ................................................................ 24

Millennium Challenge ...........

Corporation .......................

95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 1,355 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0100 Peace Corps ...................................................................................... 372 

Peace Corps .......................... 11x0110 Salaries and Expenses, the White House ......................................... 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 24 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 2 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 7 

Peace Corps .......................... 72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 1 

Peace Corps .......................... 75x0955 Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ............ 0 

Peace Corps .......................... 95x2750 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................... 0 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

11x1001 Trade and Development Agency ........................................................ 35 

Trade and Development 

Agency.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x0091 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 9 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

11x1096 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the 

President.

0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x2278 Public Law 480 Title II Grants ......................................................... 1,639 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

12x4336 Commodity Credit Corporation Fund ................................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1030 Global HIV/AIDs Initiative .................................................................. 13 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 3,632 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

98 

Table 9.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation—Continued 

Bilateral Net Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1121 Democracy Fund, Department of State ............................................. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1154 Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State ....................... 3 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0300 Capital Investment Fund, United States .......................................... 134 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0302 Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act .................... 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0305 Civilian Stabilization Initiative ......................................................... 5 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x0306 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) .............. 475 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1000 Operating Expenses of USAID ........................................................... 1,315 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1007 Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General ....... 53 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1010 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States ..................... 11 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1014 Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance ................................. 0 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1015 Complex Crises Fund ........................................................................ 22 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1021 Development Assistance ................................................................... 1,932 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1027 Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program ................. 41 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1033 HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development ............ 454 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance ................................ 992 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1036 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund .... 45 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1037 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 4,538 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1093 Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 29 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1095 Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States .............. 40 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x1264 Development Credit Authority, United States ................................... 24 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. -233 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4344 Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing Account.18 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4513 Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program ............... 20 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8342 Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund .................... 6 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x8824 Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation ....................... 76 

Total Bilateral Net 

Disbursements 

................... ............................................................................................................ 25,471 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

99 

Table 10.—CY 2012 ODA Totals by Implementing Agency 

and Appropriation 

Multilateral Net Disbursements (in $U.S., Millions) 

Agency 

Treasury 

Symbol Appropriation Amount 

Department of State ............. 11x1075 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 78 

Department of State ............. 19x1005 International Organizations and Programs, State ............................ 335 

Department of State ............. 19x1124 Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State ...... 129 

Department of State ............. 19x1126 Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 515 

Department of State ............. 19x1143 Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State ................ 11 

Department of the Treasury 11x0071 Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund ..................................... 75 

Department of the Treasury 11x0072 Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank ................... 86 

Department of the Treasury 11x0073 Contribution to the International Development Association ............. 1,492 

Department of the Treasury 11x0076 Contribution to the Asian Development Bank .................................. 290 

Department of the Treasury 11x0077 Global Environment Facility .............................................................. 237 

Department of the Treasury 11x0079 Contribution to the African Development Fund ................................ 246 

Department of the Treasury 11x0080 Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund ..................................... 230 

Department of the Treasury 11x0082 Contribution to the African Development Bank ................................ 32 

Department of the Treasury 11x0089 Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment Fund.50 

Department of the Treasury 11x1039 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.26 

Environmental Protection 

Agency.

68x0108 Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection Agency.4 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

19x1031 Global Health and Child Survival ..................................................... 1,385 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development.

72x4103 Development Loan Fund, Executive .................................................. -5 

Total Multilateral Net 

Disbursements 

...................................................................................................... 5,216 

0’s represent values less than $500,000 

Source: U.S. Annual Submission to the OECD/DAC via USAID’s Foreign Assistance Database (FADB) 

Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on November 26, 2013 

Table 11.—Agency List 

Agency Acronym Agency Name 

ADF .................................................................................... African Development Foundation 

AGR ................................................................................... Department of Agriculture 

AID ..................................................................................... U.S. Agency for International Development 

COMMERCE ....................................................................... Department of Commerce 

DHS ................................................................................... Department of Homeland Security 

DOD ................................................................................... Department of Defense 

DOE ................................................................................... Department of Energy 

DOT .................................................................................... Department of Transportation 

DTRE .................................................................................. Department of the Treasury 

EPA .................................................................................... Environmental Protection Agency 

EXIM .................................................................................. Export-Import Bank of the United States 

FTC .................................................................................... Federal Trade Commission 

HHS ................................................................................... Department of Health and Human Services 

IADF ................................................................................... Inter-American Foundation 

INTERIOR ........................................................................... Department of the Interior 

JUSTICE ............................................................................. Department of Justice 

LABOR ............................................................................... Department of Labor 

MCC ................................................................................... Millennium Challenge Corporation 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

100 

Table 11.—Agency List—Continued 

Agency Acronym Agency Name 

PEACE ................................................................................ Peace Corps 

STATE ................................................................................ Department of State 

TDA .................................................................................... Trade and Development Agency 

Table 12.—Appropriation List 

Treasury Symbol Appropriation Name 

11x0040 .................................... United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 

11x0071 .................................... Contribution to the Strategic Climate Fund 

11x0072 .................................... Contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank 

11x0073 .................................... Contribution to the International Development Association 

11x0076 .................................... Contribution to the Asian Development Bank 

11x0077 .................................... Global Environment Facility 

11x0079 .................................... Contribution to the African Development Fund 

11x0080 .................................... Contribution to the Clean Technology Fund 

11x0082 .................................... Contribution to the African Development Bank 

11x0089 .................................... Contribution to the Enterprise for the Americas Multilateral Investment 

Fund 

11x0091 .................................... Debt Restructuring 

11x0100 .................................... Peace Corps 

11x0110 .................................... Salaries and Expenses, the White House 

11x0700 .................................... African Development Foundation 

11x1001 .................................... Trade and Development Agency 

11x1022 .................................... International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

11x1039 .................................... Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development 

11x1045 .................................... International Affairs Technical Assistance 

11x1075 .................................... Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 

11x1096 .................................... Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Executive Office of the President 

11x1475 .................................... Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (Fund) 

11x3100 .................................... Inter-American Foundation 

12x1106 .................................... National Forest System, Forest Service 

12x1400 .................................... Salaries and Expenses, Agricultural Research Service 

12x1500 .................................... Research and Education Activities, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service 

12x1600 .................................... Salaries and Expenses, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service 

12x2277 .................................... Public Law 480 Program Account, Title I 

12x2278 .................................... Public Law 480 Title II Grants 

12x2900 .................................... Salaries and Expenses, Foreign Agricultural Service 

12x2903 .................................... McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants 

12x3505 .................................... Food Stamp Program, Food and Nutrition Service 

12x4336 .................................... Commodity Credit Corporation Fund 

13x0120 .................................... Department of Commerce, Departmental Management 

13x0500 .................................... Scientific & Technical Research & Services, NIST 

13x1006 .................................... Patent and Trademark Office, Salaries and Expenses 

13x1250 .................................... International Trade Administration, Operations & Administration 

13x1450 .................................... National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research & 

Facilities 

14x0412 .................................... Assistance to Territories, Insular Affairs 

14x0415 .................................... Compact of Free Association, Department of Interior 

14x1611 .................................... U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management 

14x1652 .................................... Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

101 

Table 12.—Appropriation List—Continued 

Treasury Symbol Appropriation Name 

14x1696 .................................... Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

14x5029 .................................... U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration 

14x5241 .................................... U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, North American Wetlands Conservation 

Fund 

14x8216 .................................... U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds 

15x0128 .................................... Department of Justice, General Legal Activities 

15x0200 .................................... Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

15x1100 .................................... Salaries and Expenses, Drug Enforcement Administration 

15x5042 .................................... Assets Forfeiture Fund, Justice 

16x0165 .................................... Department of Labor, Departmental Management 

19x0113 .................................... Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Department of State 

19x0209 .................................... Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State 

19x0210 .................................... National Endowment for Democracy, Department of State 

19x1005 .................................... International Organizations and Programs, State 

19x1030 .................................... Global HIV/AIDs Initiative 

19x1031 .................................... Global Health and Child Survival 

19x1121 .................................... Democracy Fund, Department of State 

19x1124 .................................... Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities, Department of State 

19x1126 .................................... Contributions to International Organizations, Department of State 

19x1143 .................................... Migration and Refugee Assistance, Department of State 

19x1154 .................................... Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Department of State 

21x2020 .................................... Operations and Maintenance, Army 

29x0100 .................................... Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses 

68x0107 .................................... Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology 

68x0108 .................................... Environmental Programs and Management, Environmental Protection 

Agency 

69x1301 .................................... Federal Aviation Administration, Operations 

70x0800 .................................... Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations, Science and Technology, Homeland Security 

72x0300 .................................... Capital Investment Fund, United States 

72x0302 .................................... Capital Investment Fund of the USAID - Recovery Act 

72x0305 .................................... Civilian Stabilization Initiative 

72x0306 .................................... Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) 

72x1000 .................................... Operating Expenses of USAID 

72x1007 .................................... Operating Expenses of the USAID, Office of Inspector General 

72x1010 .................................... Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States 

72x1012 .................................... Sahel Development Program 

72x1014 .................................... Sub-Saharan Africa, Development Assistance 

72x1015 .................................... Complex Crises Fund 

72x1021 .................................... Development Assistance 

72x1027 .................................... Transition Initiatives, International Assistance Program 

72x1029 .................................... Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund 

72x1033 .................................... HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund, International Development 

72x1035 .................................... International Disaster and Famine Assistance 

72x1036 .................................... Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund 

72x1037 .................................... Economic Support Fund 

72x1093 .................................... Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 

72x1095 .................................... Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, United States 

72x1096 .................................... Central America and the Caribbean Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund 

72x1264 .................................... Development Credit Authority, United States 

72x4103 .................................... Development Loan Fund, Executive 

72x4344 .................................... Housing and Other Credit Guaranty Programs, Guaranty Loan Financing 

Account 

72x4513 .................................... Working Capital Fund, International Assistance Program 

72x8342 .................................... Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund 

72x8824 .................................... Gifts and Contributions, Inter-American Foundation 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

102 

Table 12.—Appropriation List—Continued 

Treasury Symbol Appropriation Name 

75x0140 .................................... Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund 

75x0885 .................................... National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes 

of Health 

75x0892 .................................... National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health 

75x0943 .................................... Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control 

75x0949 .................................... Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention 

75x0950 .................................... HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

75x0951 .................................... Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention 

75x0952 .................................... Injury Prevention and Control, Centers and Disease Control and Prevention 

75x0955 .................................... Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

75x0956 .................................... Public Health Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention 

75x0959 .................................... Public Health Scientific Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

75x1503 .................................... Refugee and Entrant Assistance, Administration for Children and Families 

75x8250 .................................... Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control 

80x0120 .................................... Science, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

83x0100 .................................... Export-Import Bank Loans Program Account 

89x0309 .................................... Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department of Energy 

95x2750 .................................... Millennium Challenge Corporation 

97x0100 .................................... Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide 

97x0130 .................................... Defense Health Program 

97x0134 .................................... Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, Defense 

97x0819 .................................... Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Defense 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

103 

Table 13.—Democractic Republic of the Congo: 

USG Debt Relief (Paris Club) 

(U.S. dollars) 

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2010 Total 

Total All Agencies 

Face Value Treated 1 .......... 289,280,244 4,479,161 113,585,345 1,635,654,731 2,042,999,481 

Subsidy Cost Obligation 1 .. 60,930,045 947,107 21,120,031 87,099,790 170,096,973 

USAID 

Face Value Treated ............. 35,370,662 4,479,161 8,706,851 262,532,950 311,089,624 

Subsidy Cost Obligation ..... 7,561,087 947,107 1,618,950 12,180,370 22,307,514 

USDA 

Face Value Treated ............. 112,405,883 35,502,655 439,998,354 587,906,892 

Subsidy Cost Obligation ..... 23,751,492 6,601,355 20,675,351 51,028,198 

EXIM Bank 

Face Value Treated ............. 105,528,498 50,284,016 723,581,585 879,394,099 

Subsidy Cost Obligation ..... 22,129,029 9,349,797 42,504,343 73,983,169 

DOD 

Face Value Treated ............. 35,975,201 19,091,823 209,541,842 264,608,866 

Subsidy Cost Obligation ..... 7,488,437 3,549,929 11,739,726 22,778,092 

Notes: 

1 ‘‘Face Value Treated′′ represents amount of debt treated (forgiven); ‘‘Subsidy Cost Obligation’’ is the cost of debt relief 

as obligated. 2 There was an USAID action processed in FY 2003, but it was a rescheduling without subsidy cost. 

3 FY 2006: this was a USAID-only adjustment. 

4 All subsidy costs in this table were obligated in Treasury’s Debt Restructuring program account (11 0091). 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

104 

USAID ACTIVITIES PER SECTOR AND PER PROVINCE 

COMBINED FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2012, AND 2013 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, MARCH 2014 

Æ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER