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91–296 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–474 

STRENGTHENING U.S. ALLIANCES 

IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 4, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Auslin, Michael, resident scholar, director of Japan Studies, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC ......................................................................... 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening statement ... 1 

Helvey, David F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, U.S. 

Department of Defense, Washington, DC .......................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Benjamin L. 

Cardin ............................................................................................................ 38 

Russel, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Smith, Dr. Sheila, senior fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC ......................................................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Council on Foreign Relations Report submitted for the record by Dr. 

Smith .............................................................................................................. 39 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

STRENGTHENING U.S. ALLIANCES 

IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:57 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senator Cardin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Let me welcome you all to the Subcommittee on 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs’ hearing, ‘‘Strengthening the U.S. 

Alliance in Northeast Asia.’’ 

I know that Senator Rubio, who had planned to be here today 

as the ranking Republican member, will not be able to be here due 

to the travel problems associated with the weather conditions. And, 

as some might be aware, because of that, scheduled votes today in 

the United States Senate have been postponed until tomorrow. So, 

it probably will mean we will not have as many of the members 

of our subcommittee present today as we would otherwise have, but 

I just want to assure, not only our witnesses, but also those who 

are following this hearing, the incredible importance of today’s 

hearing of the subcommittee, not just for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but for the United States Senate. 

This is our first hearing this year. Last year, we held a series 

of hearings dealing with the administration’s ‘‘Rebalance to Asia’’ 

policy. We looked at it from a good governance standpoint, we evaluated its economic impact, and we also looked at the military security issues as well as environmental issues. We covered a lot of 

specific areas of interest that further demonstrated why the ‘‘Rebalance to Asia’’ is critically important for not only the administration, 

but also for Congress. So, we hope to assess how we are moving 

forward in regards to concrete actions and appropriate resources. 

The U.S. alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea serve as 

the centerpiece of U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia. How we 

work together and how the United States approaches and manages 

these relationships is vital to U.S. security interests and has important implications across the entire region. 

In this hearing, we will evaluate the status and trajectory of U.S. 

relations with each of these key allies, and I hope to hear from our 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

witnesses on areas where we should increase cooperation, both 

bilaterally and trilaterally. 

Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of U.S. engagement 

in the region. Last October, Secretaries Kerry and Hagel held a 

historic meeting in Tokyo with their Japanese counterparts and 

released a joint statement reaffirming the alliance and defining 

steps to upgrade the capability of the partnership, including the 

announcement of a revision to the United States-Japan defense 

guidelines. In recent months, Japan established a National Security Council, adopted the National Security Strategy, and established the National Defense Program Guidelines. These actions are 

moving Japan toward a more active role in the international sphere 

and opening the door for a more robust alliance with the United 

States. There have been positive developments for the Futenma 

Replacement Facility since the Governor of Okinawa approved a 

landfill permit. But, clearly, more challenges remain. When I was 

in Japan, one of the centerpieces of our conversations was the 

future of United States presence in Okinawa and how that relates 

to our security arrangements. And there have been stalled efforts 

to move that forward. Some of that has created political issues, 

both in Japan and the United States. So, it was encouraging to see 

some positive developments. 

In December, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act providing funding to make way for the eventual transfer 

of marines and their dependents from Japan to Guam and Hawaii. 

United States and Japan reached a milestone agreement in 2013, 

the U.S.-Japan Okinawa Consolidation Plan, which lays out details 

for consolidating and closing U.S. military bases in Okinawa and 

elsewhere in Japan, thereby reinforcing our efforts to modernize 

the alliance to meet emerging challenges in the region. And, of 

course, Japan announced last year that they would be joining the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, negotiations, a step that was welcomed by the United States. 

So, I hope at this hearing we can get more specifics on how we 

are moving forward on the security front and on the economic front 

with Japan. 

In South Korea last year, we celebrated the 60th anniversary of 

the alliance. In May, President Park visited the United States, and 

it was an honor to have her address a joint session of Congress. 

And I had a chance to have a conversation with her and go over 

her vision on how to improve security arrangements in Northeast 

Asia. We had a good conversation, and she moved forward with the 

suggestion of developing an OSCE-type forum for Northeast Asia. 

South Korea is an important economic partner for the United 

States, particularly since the signing and implementation of the 

U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2012. And it is promising to 

see South Korea’s expression of interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

In addition, our countries reached final agreement, earlier this 

month, on sharing the defense costs of U.S. troops stationed in 

South Korea. From cooperation on clean energy to supporting our 

mission in Afghanistan, this alliance has truly transformed into a 

global partnership. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

Although we see these positive steps in our bilateral alliance, 

this region is home to some very serious challenges. North Korea 

continues down the path of belligerent and erratic behavior, including expanding its Yongbyon uranium enrichment facility, restarting 

the reactor, and displaying complete disregard for the welfare of its 

own people. China continues to make aggressive moves to stake its 

claim in the East China Sea, including the November announcement of a new Air Defense Identification Zone. Japan and South 

Korea remain deeply suspicious of one another, based on sensitive 

historical issues, and the Japanese Prime Minister’s rhetoric on 

these issues is increasingly concerning to many. Additionally, fiscal 

constraints in the United States have raised questions among our 

allies about the potential impact on these important alliances. 

These are all issues I hope we will be able to address during this 

hearing. 

These issues not only demand that we work closely with our 

allies and avoid surprises, but they also present opportunities to 

reinforce our bilateral and trilateral cooperation. We need to build 

on our successes, focus on shared goals, and continue to grow and 

expand our alliance in Northeast Asia to ensure each relationship 

reaches its full potential. 

I hope President Obama will seek to reinforce these messages 

when he travels to the region again next month. I look forward to 

hearing from both our panels today on how we can be sure we are 

well postured from both a diplomatic and a strategic perspective in 

order to address these shared challenges. 

And, with that, we will turn to our first panel, where we have 

our government witnesses. And we thank you both for being here. 

Daniel Russel is no stranger to this committee, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs at 

the Department of State. Mr. Russel began his tour as an Assistant 

Secretary on July 13 of last year. He previously served at the 

White House as Special Assistant to the President and National 

Security Staff Senior Director for Asian Affairs. 

We are also pleased to have with us today David F. Helvey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Previously, he served as the 

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and was a Principal 

Director for East Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, East Asia. 

Welcome to you both. We will start with Mr. Russel. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL RUSSEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. RUSSEL. Chairman Cardin, thank you very much for the 

opportunity to appear today before you to discuss this important 

set of issues that you laid out in your introductory remarks. 

I would like to request that my prepared statement be entered 

into the record. 

Senator CARDIN. All the witnesses on both panels, their full 

statements will be made part of the record, so you may proceed as 

you wish. 

Mr. RUSSEL. Thank you. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

The Obama administration has made the Asia-Pacific a strategic 

priority, based on America’s stake in a prosperous and stable 

region. And the Department of State is focused on dedicating diplomatic, public diplomacy, and assistance resources to the region 

commensurate with the priority and the comprehensive nature of 

our engagement. 

From the outset, the governing principle of this administration’s 

Asia rebalance policy has been to ensure close ties with our partners and allies. Our alliances with the Republic of Korea and with 

Japan contribute significantly to regional security, stability, and 

prosperity. These alliances are rooted in our shared strategic interests, our deep and growing economic ties, our shared values, and 

in extensive people-to-people connections. 

I am pleased to report today, Mr. Chairman, that our alliances 

with both countries have never been stronger. We are working hard 

with our Japanese and South Korean partners to modernize these 

alliances and to address broader shared interests across the AsiaPacific and around the globe. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

as well as members of the other subcommittee, for your leadership, 

your travel, and your public statements underscoring the importance of these alliances. 

Let me speak briefly to each relationship. 

The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace and 

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. We cannot achieve our 

national goals without a strong partnership between the United 

States and Japan. 

And the alliance between the United States and the Republic of 

Korea is the lynchpin of stability and security in Northeast Asia. 

Our alliance with South Korea was forged in shared sacrifice in the 

Korean war, and it continues to anchor security on the peninsula 

today. 

Each alliance relationship rooted in security cooperation has 

evolved into an increasingly global partnership that helps provide 

significant benefits for our people and the international community. 

We cooperate closely on a wide range of issues, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and in dealing with global 

hotspots. At the same time, the alliances remain focused on the 

core mission of safeguarding our security. In particular, that means 

deterrence and defense against the threat posed by North Korea’s 

continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We 

will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies in the 

face of this danger. 

In order to achieve the shared goal of peaceful denuclearization 

on the Korean Peninsula, we will continue closely to coordinate 

with the ROK and Japan, as well as with other partners in the 

region, such as China. 

And I want to make very clear that our alliances in Northeast 

Asia and around the region are not aimed at China. The United 

States welcomes the rise of a stable and prosperous China which 

plays a greater role in strengthening regional stability, prosperity, 

and international rules and norms. Tangible, practical, and visible 

cooperation between the United States and China is critical to 

addressing regional and global challenges, from North Korea to 

climate change. Similarly, the United States seeks good relations 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

between China and its neighbors. We encourage all our allies to 

pursue positive and constructive relations with China. 

We are concerned, however, by an increase in risky and tensionraising activities by China in the East China Sea near the Senkaku 

Islands, including China’s uncoordinated announcement of an Air 

Defense Identification Zone there. These concerns are amplified by 

China’s behavior in the South China Sea. We will continue to discuss these issues directly with China and with affected countries 

in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, strategic cooperation among the United States, 

Japan, and the Republic of Korea is essential to the well-being of 

all our countries in the region. In light of this fact, the current friction between our Japanese and Korean allies is a cause for concern 

and a problem that requires dedicated efforts by all parties. 

In closing, let me make one final point. Bipartisan congressional 

support for our alliances and the close cooperation between the legislative branches of our three countries have been critical to the 

success we have achieved over the last six decades, and will be 

even more important in the future. 

So, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important topic. 

We will hear now from my colleague, but then I am happy to 

answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL R. RUSSEL

Chairman Cardin and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear 

before you today to discuss this important topic. 

Early in his first term, President Obama began implementing his vision for the 

Asia-Pacific rebalance, based on America’s enduring stake in a prosperous and stable region. The United States has been, we are, and we will remain a Pacific power. 

In the second term, the administration is building out this strategy. The Department of State is focused on dedicating diplomatic, public diplomacy, and assistance 

resources to the region in a way that is commensurate with the truly comprehensive 

nature of our engagement. And under Secretary Kerry we are intensifying our support for U.S. companies, climate and energy cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, 

youth and exchange programs, education, women’s empowerment, and other initiatives. 

The members of this subcommittee know well the importance of the Asia-Pacific 

region to American interests. The broader region boasts over half the world’s population, half of the world’s GDP, and nearly half of the world’s trade, and is home 

to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies. More and more American citizens 

are now living, working, and studying in the Asia-Pacific region; people-to-people 

and family ties have witnessed tremendous growth. Growing numbers of American 

companies are investing in and exporting products and services to rapidly expanding 

East Asian markets. And, as the region’s economies continue to grow and their 

interests expand, it becomes increasingly important that the governments and institutions there contribute to upholding and strengthening international law and 

standards—ranging from human rights to environmental protection to responsible 

policies on climate change, maritime security, and trade and investment. Simply 

put, the effects of what happens in the Asia-Pacific region will be felt across the 

globe and have direct implications for America’s interests. 

For all of the changes in Asia, this much is constant: our alliances in the region 

have been and will remain the foundation of our strategy toward the Asia-Pacific. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Ranking Member Rubio and the 

other members of the subcommittee for your leadership, travel, and public statements which have all underscored the importance of our alliances to our vision of 

a secure, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. As you have noted, shared values and a shared history of successful partnership with the United States place 

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) at the center of this administration’s rebalance strategy. The success stories of the ROK and Japan are powerful reminders 

of the broad range of benefits that accrue from a sustained commitment to free marFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

kets, democracy, and close cooperation with the United States. Our alliances with 

the ROK and Japan contribute significantly to expanded security, stability, and 

prosperity across the region. 

I am pleased to report today that our ties with both countries have never been 

stronger. Polling shows that the U.S.–ROK relationship enjoys record levels of 

favorability in South Korea—and the United States has enjoyed this high level of 

support for the last 2 years. Polling also shows that 84 percent of Japanese citizens 

support our bilateral alliance. But we do not take our allies for granted. We are 

working hard with our Japanese and South Korean partners to adjust our presence 

and to modernize our alliances to help maintain peace and security and address 

broader shared interests across the Asia-Pacific and around the globe. The upcoming 

visit by President Obama to Japan and the ROK will propel our efforts. 

U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

Let me begin with Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace and 

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region; we cannot achieve the President’s goals without strong and growing ties between the United States and Japan. Our two countries are coordinating closely on a wide range of issues, including regional security 

and global hotspots. As Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Kishida emphasized 

during their meeting in Washington last month, we are working diplomatically and 

militarily to strengthen and modernize the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

I cannot overstate the importance of our alliance with Japan to continued U.S. 

leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Over 50,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are 

stationed in Japan under the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the U.S.-Japan Status 

of Forces Agreement, under which Japan provides facilities and areas for U.S. forces 

for the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security. 

The Japanese Government provides over $2 billion annually to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan: including the USS George Washington, which is the 

only U.S. aircraft carrier in the world that is forward-deployed. This strategic posture means that U.S. forces in Japan are capable of carrying out missions throughout the region and beyond. 

U.S. support for the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ humanitarian assistance operations in the wake of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami were demonstrations of the 

alliance’s strength and capability and set the stage for U.S.-Japan coordination on 

Typhoon Haiyan relief in the Philippines in 2013. The unprecedented landing of a 

U.S. Marine Corps MV–22 Osprey on a Japanese ship during the Haiyan response 

demonstrated our joint capabilities, and highlighted the interoperability of the U.S. 

and Japanese militaries. 

Our security relationship with Japan made remarkable progress in 2013. Two 

important successes that my colleague from the Department of Defense can discuss 

in further detail were the October 2013 ‘‘2+2’’ meeting between Secretaries Kerry 

and Hagel and their Japanese counterparts, which launched the review of our two 

countries’ Bilateral Defense Guidelines, and Okinawa Governor Nakaima’s signing 

of the landfill permit for the Futenma Relocation Facility. We hope to use the 

Defense Guidelines review process to modernize our respective roles, missions, and 

capabilities for an alliance truly capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st 

century. 

Another key development is the Japanese Government’s review of what the U.N. 

Charter describes as, ‘‘the right of collective self-defense.’’ Collective self-defense is 

simply defined as one nation taking action to help defend another nation from 

attack by a third party. 

Japan’s Constitution is the only one in the world that explicitly renounces war 

as an instrument of foreign policy. In the past, Japanese Governments have chosen 

to interpret their constitution as not permitting the exercise of this right to collective self-defense. It is my understanding that the Japanese Government is studying 

this interpretation. 

The practical effect of a decision by Japan that it would be permissible to conduct 

collective self-defense could include enabling its U.N. peacekeeping troops to defend 

other U.N. peacekeepers under attack. Under the current policy, if North Korea 

were to launch a ballistic missile toward the United States, Japan could not use its 

ballistic missile defense interceptors to destroy that missile in flight. We recognize 

this is a decision for the Japanese Government and people, and we welcome Japan’s 

openness and its steps to consult with countries in the region about these deliberations. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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U.S.-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLIANCE

The U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance is the linchpin of stability and security in 

Northeast Asia. 2013 marked the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense 

Treaty, which serves as the foundation of our alliance and a force for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Our alliance with the ROK 

was forged in shared sacrifice in the Korean war, and it continues to anchor security 

in the region today. 

As Secretary Kerry reaffirmed during his meetings with ROK leaders in Seoul 

last month, the U.S.–ROK alliance is a critical component of Washington’s strategic 

engagement with the Asia-Pacific. Our open societies, our shared commitment to 

democracy and a market economy, and our sustained partnership provide a foundation for the enduring friendship that tightly binds the American and Korean 

peoples. Over the past six decades, our close cooperation has evolved into an increasingly global partnership, encompassing political, economic, social, and cultural 

cooperation and providing prosperity for both our peoples. 

The United States remains dedicated to the defense of the Republic of Korea, 

including through extended deterrence and the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, as emphasized in the Joint Declaration issued 

by President Obama and President Park in May 2013. 

The United States and the ROK recently concluded negotiations on a Special 

Measures Agreement (SMA), by which South Korea will increase its contributions 

to help offset the cost of stationing of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula to $867 

million in this year alone, demonstrating that both nations are politically and economically committed to making our alliance more sustainable and adaptable. 

We are constantly working to improve readiness and interoperability in order to 

meet existing and emerging security threats. As my colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary Helvey can describe in detail, last week the United States and the ROK 

began two of our largest annual joint military exercises, KEY RESOLVE and FOAL 

EAGLE. Another major annual military exercise, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, 

is scheduled for August. And even as our alliance continues to counter the threat 

from North Korea, we are expanding our cooperation to meet 21st century challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula. 

DPRK-RELATED TENSIONS

Our alliances with the ROK and Japan provide deterrence and defense against 

the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) continued 

pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology. We will continue to 

stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies in the face of this growing North Korean 

threat. 

Mr. Chairman, over the years we have seen a pattern of North Korean provocations followed by ‘‘charm offensives’’ aimed at extracting payoffs and concessions 

from the West. Despite the DPRK’s recent overtures at engagement, we have yet 

to see credible indications that North Korea is prepared to come into compliance 

with the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, or even negotiate on the key 

issue: denuclearization. The United States remains committed to authentic and 

credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement of the SixParty Talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization. We will not accept 

North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. We will not reward the DPRK merely for 

returning to dialogue. As the President has said, the DPRK can achieve the security, respect, and prosperity it claims to seek by choosing the path of denuclearization. For our part, the United States pledges to continue working toward a world 

in which the people of North and South Korea are peacefully reunited, and the 

Korean Peninsula is democratic, prosperous, and free of nuclear weapons. 

In addition to our concern about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, 

the United States remains gravely concerned about the human rights situation in 

the DPRK. The U.N. Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry released its 

report last month, documenting the deplorable human rights situation in the DPRK. 

We are working tirelessly to persuade the DPRK Government to release Kenneth 

Bae, the U.S. citizen who has been held in North Korea for more than a year. We 

welcome the recent release of an Australian citizen, but continue to urge the DPRK 

Government to release the ROK citizen still under detention, just as we seek resolution of the cases of the many ROK, Japanese, and other citizens abducted and held 

by North Korea over the decades. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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CHALLENGES: REGIONAL TENSIONS

Mr. Chairman, the United States takes a clear position with regard to behavior 

of states in connection with their territorial or maritime disputes: we firmly oppose 

intimidation, coercion, and the use of force. In the East China Sea, we are concerned 

by an unprecedented increase in risky activity by China’s maritime agencies near 

the Senkaku Islands. The United States returned administration of the Senkakus 

to Japan in 1972, and they fall within the scope of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense 

treaty, in particular its Article V. Tensions over the Senkakus have led to a sharp 

downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. China and Japan are the world’s second- and 

third-largest economies and have a shared interest in a stable environment to facilitate economic prosperity. Neither of these two important countries, nor the global 

economy, can afford confrontation and crisis. 

We object to unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo or advance a 

territorial claim though extra-legal or nondiplomatic means. Unilateral attempts to 

change the status quo raise tensions and do nothing under international law to 

strengthen claims. Therefore we were also concerned by China’s sudden and uncoordinated announcement of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East 

China Sea last November. One of the problems with the Chinese ADIZ announcement is that it purports to cover areas administered or claimed by Japan and the 

ROK. We have been clear that China should not attempt to implement or enforce 

the ADIZ and it should refrain from taking similar actions in other sensitive or disputed areas. 

I do not believe that any party seeks armed conflict in the East China Sea, but 

unintended incidents or accidents may lead to an escalation of tensions or a tit-fortat exchange that could escalate. As such, we wholeheartedly endorse calls for crisisprevention mechanisms, including senior-level communications to defuse situations 

before they become full-blown crises. 

Our concerns are amplified by the situation in the South China Sea, where we 

are seeing a similar pattern of coercive behavior, strident rhetoric, and ambiguous 

claims. This is an issue that senior administration officials have raised directly and 

candidly with Chinese leaders. 

I would like to underscore for the committee that the Obama administration has 

consistently made best efforts to build a strong and cooperative relationship with 

China. Tangible, practical, and visible cooperation between the United States and 

China is critical to addressing regional and global challenges, from North Korea to 

climate change. Similarly, the United States seeks good relations between China 

and its neighbors; we encourage all our allies to pursue positive and constructive 

relations with China. I want to make very clear that our alliances, in Northeast 

Asia and around the region, are not aimed at China. 

The United States welcomes the rise of a stable and prosperous China which 

plays a greater role in strengthening regional stability, prosperity, and international 

rules and norms. A strong diplomatic, economic, and military presence by the 

United States has helped create the conditions that made China’s extraordinary 

growth possible and that presence remains essential to regional stability. No country should doubt the resolve of the United States in meeting our security commitments or our determination to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation and 

overflight. But neither should there be any doubt about the administration’s desire 

for constructive relationship with China based on solving regional and global problems as well as managing disagreement and areas of competition. 

STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN THE REGION AND BEYOND

One of the strongest signs of the maturity of our partnerships with the ROK and 

Japan is our cooperation on global issues beyond our respective borders, from humanitarian assistance to climate change. The benefits of our cooperation with Japan 

and South Korea are not limited to the people of our three countries, but increasingly accrue to citizens around the world. 

Yet at this moment, and despite our many areas of cooperation and common interest, relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea are strained. The current 

tension between our two allies is a cause for concern, and a problem that requires 

sincere efforts by both parties to address. There is an urgent need to show prudence 

and restraint in dealing with difficult historical issues. It is important to handle 

them in a way that promotes healing. We are working closely with our Japanese 

and ROK partners to encourage them to take the steps needed to resolve tensions 

caused by the legacy of the last century through patient and persistent diplomacy. 

The simple fact, Mr. Chairman, is that strategic cooperation among the United 

States, Japan, and the ROK is essential to developing the security order in Northeast Asia, especially given the threats facing us and our allies from North Korea 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

and other regional uncertainties. No one can afford to allow the burdens of history 

to prevent us from building a secure future. 

That is why it is so important that we have been able to cooperate with Japan 

and the ROK on relief efforts, development, and other important projects throughout 

Southeast Asia. For example, we saw the benefits of increased trilateral disaster 

response capacity just last fall when the United States, Japan, and South Korea 

were leading contributors of humanitarian and recovery assistance to the Philippines following the devastation left by Typhoon Haiyan. We are working trilaterally with the ROK and Japan to further improve our interoperability and information sharing during a disaster. 

Japan and South Korea are models for other nations in the region and around 

the world. Both the ROK and Japan have transitioned from one-time recipients of 

foreign aid to important donors. Whereas once Peace Corps Volunteers were seen 

throughout the ROK, the Peace Corps and its counterpart recently signed a memorandum of understanding that will enable both parties to cooperate in third countries around the world—in fact, the ROK’s Peace Corps counterpart is now the 

world’s second-largest after our own Peace Corps. Last December, during Vice President Biden’s visit, the United States and Japan announced the initiation of a U.S.- 

Japan Development Dialogue between our respective foreign assistance and foreign 

affairs agencies. The first formal meeting of that dialogue took place last month in 

Washington. 

The Republic of Korea and Japan have been active supporters of international 

efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. We are working together on Syria, 

where Japan and the ROK are providing assistance to address the humanitarian 

needs of the Syrian people and where both have strongly supported international 

efforts to find a political solution. U.S. and ROK soldiers have served side by side 

in Afghanistan, where the Republic of Korea and Japan are major donors to reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Japan has provided over $1.35 billion in assistance to the Palestinians since the mid-1990s, making Japan one of the major donors 

to the Palestinians after the United States. Our cooperative partnerships with 

Japan and the Republic of Korea enable increased engagement and impact on a 

global scale. Both Japan and the ROK are invaluable partners on the international 

stage, as well; both currently promote our shared values while serving on the U.N. 

Human Rights Council, and this year the ROK will complete a successful term on 

the U.N. Security Council. 

ALLIANCE TIES

Our deep economic and trade ties with Japan and the ROK provide practical benefits, jobs, and lower consumer prices to Americans. To reap the full reward of our 

alliance partnerships, we are working to further strengthen our economic relationships and harness the dynamism of growth in the Asia-Pacific region for the benefit 

of the American people. 

The revitalization of Japan’s huge economy is of direct interest to the United 

States. An economically vibrant Japan will attract more U.S. exports, help stimulate even greater Japanese investment in the United States, and serve as a model 

and source of growth across the Asia-Pacific region. Economic growth will also 

strengthen Japan as an important partner. We support Japan’s goal of unlocking 

greater growth through structural and regulatory reforms and are working with the 

private sector as well as Japanese counterparts to bring out the best ideas and solutions to this end. We are also working with Japan to increase economic opportunities for women, both in our own economies and globally. Japanese companies 

account for approximately 650,000 jobs in the United States, and the United States 

is one of the largest sources of foreign investment in Japan. Our relationship will 

continue to grow closer in response to changes such as the availability of U.S. oil 

and gas to the international market, further integration in high-tech manufacturing, 

and mutual support for innovative enterprise. 

The Republic of Korea is Asia’s fourth-largest economy, our sixth-largest goods 

trading partner, and our fifth-largest export market for agricultural goods. Our two 

countries have one of the most vibrant trading relationships in the world. Two years 

since the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) entered into force, our 

bilateral trade in goods now tops $100 billion annually. During 2012 and 2013, the 

U.S. enjoyed a $4.4 billion foreign direct investment surplus with Korea. That positive trend looks likely to continue, with recent developments including Hankook 

Tire’s announcement that it plans to invest $800 million to build its first U.S. production plant in Clarksville, TN. The United States is the top destination for ROK 

foreign direct investment, and Hyundai, Kia, and Samsung now employ thousands 

of U.S. workers. We are working closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it fully 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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implements both the letter and spirit of its KORUS commitments, in order to be 

able to realize the full strategic and economic benefits of the FTA. 

As Secretary Kerry noted recently, ‘‘A shared commitment to economic growth and 

innovation is part of why the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement is a cornerstone of the President’s economic policy in Asia.’’ That’s why one of our highest 

economic priorities in the region is the successful completion of the TPP negotiations. In the United States, Japan, and other member nations, the TPP will support 

jobs, foster new business opportunities, and promote economic growth. The TPP will 

serve as a platform for building a high-standard trade and investment framework 

for the Asia-Pacific region—promoting transparency, openness, and innovation. 

Given close trade ties and the strategic importance of closer economic cooperation 

with our allies, we naturally welcome the ROK’s expression of interest in joining 

the TPP. 

Underpinning the historic success of our alliances and our hopes for the future 

are the robust people-to-people ties between citizens of the United States and citizens of Japan and South Korea. They form the foundation of our partnerships with 

both countries, helping us to understand and appreciate each other. 

Our people-to-people ties with the ROK are dynamic and strong. The ROK sent 

over 70,000 young people to study in the United States last year—more per capita 

than any other major sending country—and the number of U.S. students going to 

the ROK continues to rise. Continuing the trend of U.S.–ROK innovation and 

investment in educational exchange, last October our countries renewed the Work, 

English, Study, and Travel (WEST) program, which provides opportunities for qualified university students and recent graduates from the ROK to study English, participate in internships, and travel independently in the United States. ROK students contribute over $2 billion to the U.S. economy; even more important than the 

immediate economic boost these students bring is the intangible long-term investment in our alliance—a shared experience that underscores to younger generations 

the enduring value of our partnership. 

The Japanese Government has made educational internationalization a component of its growth strategy, and both our governments are working with the private 

sector, academia, and NGOs to expand mutual understanding and friendship 

between our young people. While the number of Japanese students earning credit 

at higher education institutions in the United States has dropped sharply over the 

last decade, the United States and Japan are committed to increasing two-way student exchange, and both countries have already taken steps—such as increasing 

grants for study abroad and demystifying the U.S. visa process—that we hope will 

reverse this trend. We remain dedicated to working with Japan to double student 

and youth exchanges by 2020 to ensure that our partnership remains strong for decades to come. 

I want to make a special note, Mr. Chairman, of acknowledging the Americans 

in uniform who are currently serving, or have served, in Korea and Japan. Our 

strong relations with Japan and the ROK would not be possible without the hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform who have dedicated themselves 

in the service of our strategic alliances. These service men and women represent the 

best of the United States in Japan, the ROK, and around the Asia-Pacific region, 

and upon their return to the United States, they continue to serve as grassroots 

ambassadors for the great friendship between the United States and our allies. 

CONCLUSION

Our alliances with Japan and the ROK are rooted in shared strategic interests 

in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world, our deep economic ties, and, most 

importantly, our shared values and the strong personal relationships that have 

developed through extensive people-to-people ties. Our alliances have never been 

stronger, and the United States is actively working to deepen our engagement with 

both countries. 

In closing, let me make one final point. Strong, enduring, bipartisan congressional 

support for our alliances and the close cooperation between the legislative branches 

of our three countries have been critical to the success we have achieved over the 

last six decades, and will be even more important in the future. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Helvey. 

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STATEMENT OF DAVID F. HELVEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. HELVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today to offer perspectives from the Department of Defense on our alliances in Northeast Asia. 

Our treaty alliances and other partnerships remain the foundation for protecting our interests and achieving our security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, which is why the modernization 

and continued transformation of these critical relationships forms 

a central pillar of President Obama’s strategy to rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific. 

Our treaty alliances in Northeast Asia with Japan and the 

Republic of Korea support this strategy through contributing to a 

secure and prosperous region, facilitating a defense posture that is 

geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically 

sustainable, investing in interoperability and strengthening our regional defense cooperation to promote shared interests and advance 

international rules and norms. 

I am pleased to have the opportunity, again, to meet today, and 

I commend the committee’s continued interest in this important 

subject. 

Mr. Chairman, transforming our alliances and partnerships to 

meet the challenges of the 21st century is the central driver of our 

efforts with both Japan and the Republic of Korea. We have developed for each alliance a forward-looking agenda based on enhancing security, increasing the ability of our militaries to work 

together seamlessly, and building our allies’ capacity to contribute 

to regional and global security. 

Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of peace and 

security in the Asia-Pacific region. In October, Secretary Hagel 

joined Secretary Kerry and their Japanese counterparts in Tokyo 

for a historic U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting 

that reconfirmed the alliance’s commitment to the security of 

Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, and that 

set forth a strategic vision reflecting our shared values to promote 

peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the AsiaPacific. 

As part of these efforts, we will be revising our bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation for the first time since 1997, updating 

our alliance roles and missions, and incorporating new areas of cooperation, such as space and cyber defense. The revision of the 

guidelines, which we hope to complete by the end of 2014, will ensure that our alliance is capable of responding to the 21st-century 

challenges. And I can point to the unprecedented landing of the 

U.S. Marine Corps MV–22 Osprey on a Japanese ship during the 

Haiyan response, demonstrating the interoperability of the United 

States and Japanese militaries and our ability to work jointly, as 

an example of what lies ahead. 

We are also taking steps to ensure that our forward military 

presence in Japan is sustainable over the long term. In December 

2013, the Governor of Okinawa approved the Government of 

Japan’s request for a landfill permit necessary to construct a new 

airfield at Camp Schwab to replace Marine Corps Air Station 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

Futenma. This was a major step forward. Closing Marine Corps Air 

Station Futenma and returning other U.S. facilities and areas in 

Okinawa is central to our plans to reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa by about 9,000 and establish a Marine air-ground 

task force of about 5,000 marines on Guam. We are delighted that 

this effort is now on track, and we are confident that the ultimate 

result will be one that is good for the United States, good for the 

United States-Japan alliance, and good for the people of Okinawa. 

Finally, Japan is one of our most significant ballistic-missile 

defense partners. Japan is codeveloping the SM–3 Block IIA. It 

hosts the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet. It operates its own BMD-capable Aegis ships, and has agreed to host a second ballistic missile 

defense radar, in addition to the radar that is already located in 

Shariki. We hope to have the second radar operational by the end 

of 2014. 

Turning to the Republic of Korea, our alliance with the Republic 

of Korea continues to serve as a lynchpin of peace and stability in 

the region, and is evolving into a partnership that contributes to 

security across the globe. Last year, we celebrated the 60th anniversary of the United States-Republic of Korea alliance, welcomed 

President Park’s first year in office, and stood shoulder to shoulder 

in the face of North Korean provocation. 

In October, Secretary Hagel met with Minister Kim for the 45th 

security consultative meeting in Seoul, a meeting which reaffirmed 

our bilateral commitment to build a comprehensive strategic alliance based on common values and mutual trust, as well as our two 

nations’ commitment to defend the Republic of Korea through a 

robust combined defense posture. 

In light of the continued threat posed by North Korea, we are 

taking a number of steps to enhance our force posture and capabilities on the Korean Peninsula so that our combined forces can 

continue to deter and, if necessary, respond to North Korean 

aggression or provocation. 

Mr. Chairman, the dynamic nature of the region, and the growing threat from North Korea, make trilateral cooperation among 

the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan more important than ever. Simply put, trilateral security cooperation is an 

essential element of deterrence against North Korean threats. The 

Department of Defense encourages a healthy and open United 

States, Republic of Korea, and Japan relationship. To that end, we 

will continue to look for opportunities for our three countries to 

exercise together and to use the defense trilateral talks to promote 

cooperation, dialogue, and transparency between Tokyo and Seoul. 

Let me turn briefly to offer some perspectives on another important relationship, the relationship with China. China’s economic 

dynamism, regional influence, and comprehensive military modernization present both opportunities and challenges for the United 

States-China relationship. We seek a constructive and productive 

United States-China relationship in which we will pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual benefit while managing differences in areas of competition. 

Within the Department of Defense, we seek to build a United 

States-China military-to-military relationship that is healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous and supports—and serves as an 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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important part of the overall bilateral relationship. However, we 

remain concerned about the lack of transparency regarding China’s 

growing military and its increasingly assertive stance on territorial 

and maritime disputes. We encourage all parties, including China, 

to deal with their disputes peacefully, without coercion or the use 

or threat of force, and to ensure that the maritime claims are 

resolved in accordance with international law. A first step is 

peacefully addressing these disputes would be to quickly reach 

agreement with ASEAN on a meaningful code of conduct for the 

South China Sea. 

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense will continue to 

prioritize the Asia-Pacific region, particularly our cooperation with 

our allies in Northeast Asia. We remain steadfast in our defense 

commitments to both Japan and the Republic of Korea, and we will 

continue to work to improve security cooperation, enhance military 

capabilities, and modernize each of these critical alliances. We look 

forward to continued support of this committee as we continue to 

rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Helvey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID F. HELVEY

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to offer perspectives from the Department 

of Defense on efforts to strengthen and transform our alliances in Northeast Asia. 

Our treaty alliances and partnerships remain the foundation for protecting our 

interests and achieving our security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, which is 

why the modernization and continued transformation of these critical relationships 

forms a central pillar of President Obama’s strategy to Rebalance to the AsiaPacific. Our treaty alliances in Northeast Asia—with both Japan and the Republic 

of Korea (ROK)—contribute directly to this strategy, principally through their contributions to promote a secure and prosperous region; to facilitate the enhancement 

of a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable 

defense posture in the region; to strengthen our readiness through updates to our 

operational concepts and plans; to invest in interoperable capabilities that are most 

relevant to the future security environment; and, to strengthen regional defense cooperation in a way that promotes shared interests and that advances international 

rules and norms. I am pleased to have the opportunity to describe how our alliances 

help meet these objectives and I commend the committee’s continued interest in this 

important subject. 

Mr. Chairman, we are actively working with Japan and the ROK to transform 

and modernize our alliances in ways that ensure they meet our original security 

goals of assurance and deterrence while also building our alliances into platforms 

for broader cooperation on traditional and nontraditional security challenges, both 

in Asia and globally. In fact, transforming our alliances and partnerships to meet 

the challenges of the 21st century is the central driver of our efforts with both 

Japan and the Republic of Korea. In recent years, and in concert with the senior 

leaders of both countries, we have developed for each alliance a forward-looking 

agenda based on enhancing security, increasing the ability of our militaries to work 

together seamlessly, and building our allies’ capacity to contribute to regional and 

global security. 

Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of peace and security in the 

Asia-Pacific region. In October, Secretary Hagel joined Secretary Kerry in Tokyo for 

the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or 2+2, a historic meeting 

that marked the first time Japan has hosted this bilateral meeting for the Secretary 

of Defense and Secretary of State to meet with both of their counterparts. That 

meeting reaffirmed the indispensable role our two countries play in the maintenance 

of international peace and security, reconfirmed our alliance’s commitment to the 

security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, and set forth 

a strategic vision that, reflecting our shared values of democracy, the rule of law, 

free and open markets, and respect for human rights, will effectively promote peace, 

security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. As part of our 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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efforts to strengthen this critical partnership, we will be revising our bilateral 

Guidelines for Defense Cooperation for the first time since 1997, updating alliance 

roles and missions in peacetime and during contingencies to reflect the contemporary security environment, and incorporating new areas of cooperation such as 

space and cyber defense. This revision of the Guidelines, which we hope to complete 

by the end of 2014, will ensure that our alliance is capable of responding to 21st 

century challenges. 

In addition to updating alliance roles and missions, we are taking steps to ensure 

that our forward military presence in Japan is sustainable over the long term. Critical to this effort is our plan for the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces on Okinawa. In December 2013, Governor Nakaima of Okinawa approved the Government 

of Japan’s request for a landfill permit necessary to construct a new airfield at 

Camp Schwab to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. This was a major step 

forward, and is testament to the strong leadership and commitment to the alliance 

on the part of Prime Minister Abe. Closing MCAS Futenma and returning other 

U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa—approximately 2,500 acres of land—is central 

to our plans to reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa by about 9,000 and 

establish a Marine Air Ground Task Force of about 5,000 Marines on Guam. 

When this effort is complete, we will have operational Marine Air-Ground Task 

Forces in multiple locations across the theater, increasing our ability to respond 

quickly to regional crises and contingencies. The remaining Marines on Okinawa 

will be more concentrated in less populated parts of the island, and centered on a 

new air station that the Government of Japan will build. This realignment and 

movement of troops to Guam advances our goal of having a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force presence in the region. 

We are delighted that this effort is now on-track, and are confident that the ultimate result will be one that is good for the United States, for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and for the people of Okinawa. 

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that Japan is one of our most significant ballistic 

missile defense (BMD) partners, as evidenced by our cooperation in codeveloping the 

next generation sea-based interceptor, the SM–3 Block IIA; its role as host for the 

U.S. Navy 7th Fleet, and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s own BMD-capable Aegis ships; and its agreement to host a second TPY–2 BMD radar, in addition 

to the radar already located in Shariki. We hope to have the second radar operational by the end of 2014. Japan is truly a model BMD partner, and we look forward to expanding on that cooperation in the future. 

Similarly, the U.S.-ROK Alliance continues to serve as a linchpin of peace and 

stability in the region and is evolving into a partnership that contributes to security 

across the globe. Last year we celebrated the 60th Anniversary of the U.S.-ROK 

Alliance, we welcomed President Park’s first year in office, and we continued to 

stand together in the face of North Korean provocation. In October, Secretary Hagel 

met with Minister Kim in the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). That 

meeting reaffirmed our bilateral commitment to build a comprehensive strategic 

alliance based on common values and mutual trust as well as our two nations’ 

mutual commitment to defend the Republic of Korea through a robust combined 

defense posture. To enhance effective deterrence options against North Korean 

nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Secretary Hagel 

and Minister Kim formally endorsed a bilateral ‘‘Tailored Deterrence Strategy’’ that 

establishes a strategic alliance framework that strengthens the integration of alliance capabilities to maximize their deterrent effects. 

In light of the threats posed by North Korea, we are also taking a number of steps 

to enhance our force posture and capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. We are especially focused on enhancing the alliance’s military capabilities to ensure that our 

combined forces maintain the defense of the Republic of Korea and can deter and, 

if necessary, respond to North Korean aggression or provocation. One of our highest 

priorities is the development of comprehensive alliance countermissile capabilities 

to detect, defend against, disrupt, and destroy missile threats. This effort includes 

interoperable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and missile defenses, as well as the supporting command, control, communications, and 

computers (C4). 

As part of our work to modernize the alliance, we continually assess progress 

toward implementation of the Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA 2015) plan in order to 

ensure continued readiness to provide for the combined defense of the Korean 

Peninsula after the transition of operational control in wartime to the ROK. A new 

cost-sharing agreement with the ROK will help ensure that we have the resources 

necessary for the combined defense and that both countries are sharing in the 

investment the alliance requires to defend South Korea. We continue to make 

progress in the development of our bilateral plans, including the completion last 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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March of the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan, which enables our two countries 

to respond jointly and more effectively to North Korean provocations. We also regularly exercise to ensure the readiness of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, we are in the middle of the bilateral military exercises KEY RESOLVE and 

FOAL EAGLE, which are, respectively, an annual command post exercise and an 

annual series of joint and combined field training exercises. 

In addition to advancing our bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, the 

dynamic nature of the region and the growing threat from North Korea make trilateral cooperation among the United States, the ROK, and Japan more important 

than ever. Simply put, trilateral security cooperation is an essential element of 

deterrence against North Korean threats. The Department of Defense encourages a 

healthy and open trilateral relationship in order to facilitate better relations with 

our two closest allies in Northeast Asia. To that end, we continually look for opportunities for our three countries to participate in military exercises and highly value 

our Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) as a forum to promote cooperation, dialogue, and 

transparency between Tokyo and Seoul. 

Let me turn briefly to offer some perspectives from the Department of Defense 

on another important relationship, the relationship with China. 

China’s economic dynamism, regional influence, and pursuit of a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program, present both opportunities and challenges for the U.S.-China relationship. Thus, we seek a constructive and productive 

U.S.-China relationship, in which we will pursue opportunities to engage where 

there is mutual benefit, while managing differences and areas of competition. Within the Department of Defense, we seek to build a U.S.-China military-to-military 

relationship that is healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous, and an important part 

of the overall bilateral relationship. The Department is pursuing three key areas of 

focus for the military-to-military relationship: (1) sustained, substantive dialogue; 

(2) concrete, practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as counterpiracy, 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, and maritime safety; 

and (3) building risk reduction mechanisms to manage differences responsibly. 

However, we remain concerned about a lack of transparency regarding China’s 

growing military and its increasingly assertive behavior in the maritime domain, 

highlighted by its announcement in November of an Air Defense Identification Zone 

in the East China Sea and continued pressure against other claimants in the South 

China Sea based on its ill-defined ‘‘9-dash line’’ claim. We encourage all parties, 

including China, to reject intimidation, coercion, and aggression and to base their 

claims on well-founded principles of international law and to pursue them peacefully 

through diplomatic processes in accordance with international law and norms 

through the establishment of peaceful, diplomatic processes for preventing maritime 

conflicts. A good first step would be timely conclusion of a China-ASEAN Code of 

Conduct for the South China Sea. 

Moving forward, as the United States builds a stronger foundation for a militaryto-military relationship with China, we will also continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development and encourage China to be 

more transparent about its military modernization program. In concert with our 

allies and partners, the Department will continue adapting U.S. forces, posture, and 

operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment. 

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense will continue to prioritize the AsiaPacific region, particularly our robust cooperation with allies in Northeast Asia. We 

remain steadfast in our defense commitments to both Japan and the Republic of 

Korea and will continue to work to improve security cooperation, enhance military 

capabilities, and modernize each of these critical alliances. We look forward to the 

continued support of this committee as we continue to rebalance toward the AsiaPacific. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank both of you for your testimony, but, 

more importantly, thank you for your service during this critically 

important time. 

Mr. Helvey, I want to start with a statement that was made this 

morning. I understand that it has been somewhat taken back, but 

I want to make sure that the record is clear here. I am referring 

to Assistant Secretary of Defense Katrina McFarland talking about 

the administration’s budget as it relates to the Department of 

Defense. And she said, and I quote, ‘‘Right now, the pivot is being 

looked at again, because, candidly, it cannot happen.’’ That had 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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many of us concerned as to the administration’s commitment to the 

Rebalance to Asia. Can you clarify the current priority within the 

administration and how this budget will be consistent with that 

priority? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, sir, there has been a clarification that was 

issued, and, you know, in brief, the Rebalance to Asia can and will 

continue. And this is exactly what we have done in the 2015 

Defense budget. 

The President’s decision to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific reflects 

a careful assessment of the long-term U.S. interest in the peace 

and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, and also reflects the 

strong and inextricable ties between the United States and other 

Pacific nations. In this respect, the rebalance is driven by our calculation of our interests rather than determined by the resources. 

This is not to say that resources do not count, however. As Secretary Hagel spoke of last week in discussing the 2015 budget 

which was submitted today, the funding levels we seek provide the 

opportunity to present a responsible approach that protects readiness and modernization while maintaining a force large enough to 

fulfill our defense strategy, though with some additional risk. As he 

said, we have to adapt, innovate, and make difficult decisions. And 

we have done that in our budget. Our resourcing will enable us to 

uphold our commitment to the region, including a strengthened 

posture and presence, and ensure the United States preserves its 

status as the preeminent military power in the region. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for that clarification. 

Let me just point out, when you look at the regional bureaus and 

the support that they have received within the Department of State 

budget and within DOD, Asia, while not at the bottom, is not as 

strong as it should have been. The last several budgets by the 

Obama administration have tried to balance that to reflect the priority in Asia. Can we expect that resources will continue to be 

prioritized toward the Rebalance to Asia? 

Mr. HELVEY. Yes, sir, at least from within the Defense budget, 

our resources do reflect those priorities, as outlined in the Defense 

Strategic Guidance from 2012. As I said, the budget that we have 

presented allows us to fulfill our defense strategy, which includes 

the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. 

Now, within the Department of Defense, as you know, sir, our 

budgets are not allocated by region, they are allocated through the 

services. And so, many of the things that we are doing, whether it 

is partner-building capacity or cooperation, investing in capabilities 

that are most relevant to the Asia-Pacific, those are reflected in the 

budget. 

Senator CARDIN. In the Department of State, there are regional 

allocations. How are we doing, Mr. Russel, with the budget? 

Mr. RUSSEL. Well, thank you for asking, Chairman. This is an 

important priority for all of us, and it is an important priority for 

President Obama. I know, from my time at the National Security 

Council, when we conducted an interagency exercise, along with 

the Office of Management and Budget, to bring together not only 

the Asia policy people from each of the relevant departments, but 

also the comptrollers and the budget people, to underscore the priFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ority that President Obama places on the Asia-Pacific as a strategic 

priority. 

In the case of the State Department, as you noted, the Obama 

administration has made some headway in funding more robustly 

our Asia-Pacific priorities. And, while Secretary Kerry himself will 

be testifying before the Senate on the State Department budget 

next week, and I know, as a matter of practice, it is not good for 

the Assistant Secretary to get out ahead of the Secretary, I can say, 

as Deputy Secretary Heather Higginbottom briefed the press earlier today, that the President’s fiscal year 2015 budget represents 

a continuation of the commitment to fully fund the rebalance. 

I know that the fiscal year budget, like the FY14 request, the 

budget for 2015 shows a significant increase in funding for our programs in the Asia-Pacific region. I believe Deputy Secretary Higginbottom pegged that at approximately a 9-percent increase. 

Moreover, in other areas, including public diplomacy and in the 

overall utilization and ability to maximize the resources and the 

personnel that we have in the region, we believe that we have 

made, and continue to make, headway in intensifying our efforts in 

fulfilling our national strategy. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for that. I had not intended to spend 

time at this hearing on that, but, considering Secretary McFarland’s initial comments, I thought it was important that we clarify 

that. And I expect, next week, when Secretary Kerry is before the 

full committee on his budget, that we are going to be talking more 

about Ukraine, Iran, and Syria than we will be able to get into the 

specifics on the budget, but I do intend to ask questions for the 

record on some of these issues, and I am pleased to hear your comments, Mr. Russel. 

Mr. Helvey, I want to discuss part of your statement on dealing 

with the Okinawa stationing of marines. This has been a thorn in 

our relationship for over 15 years. The community certainly has 

changed dramatically since that military facility was first constructed. It has presented a real PR problem between Japan and 

the United States. We all recognize that our future alliance requires different locations for facilities, and we have been working 

on this for a long time. And there have been challenges. There have 

been challenges in Japan, there have been challenges in Congress, 

there have been a lot of questions asked, a lot of good questions 

asked, about the economics of this and whether it works, and 

whether it works for the future. 

So, I am very much interested in your, I guess, summary comment, ‘‘We are delighted that this effort is now on track, and are 

confident that the ultimate result will be one that is good for the 

United States, for the United States-Japan alliance, and for the 

people of Okinawa.’’ 

If you would not mind just expanding a little bit more as to what 

you think is a realistic time schedule for us to implement the 

understanding between Japan and the United States. 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, sir, thank you for that question. As you 

pointed out, this is a longstanding issue that we have been working 

with our colleagues and counterparts in the Government of Japan. 

Since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have been in 

agreement on the need to relocate the existing Marine Corps Air 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Station at Futenma, around which, as you noted, a significant population has grown in recent years. 

Since 1999, we have agreed on a site in the vicinity of Camp 

Schwab, near the village of Henoko, so I am—this kind of gives you 

a sense of, you know, the timeline as it has evolved. And this, 

again, was confirmed most recently last October in the Two-PlusTwo statement that we had with our counterparts—Secretary 

Hagel and Secretary Kerry, with their counterparts. 

So, the agreement by the Governor of Okinawa to approve the 

landfill permit does reflect a significant step forward, because we 

are now in a position where the Government of Japan can now 

begin construction on the airstrip at Camp Schwab to start building out what the Futenma Replacement Facility, as it is known in 

the vernacular, where that is going to be—— 

Senator CARDIN. But, let me give you what I—— 

Mr. HELVEY [continuing]. In 10 to 20 years. 

Senator CARDIN. In my visit to Japan, and in my conversations 

with my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee and on the 

Appropriations Committee, it seems to me that we do not have a 

clear understanding as to the sequencing of appropriations in 

Japan and the United States to make this a reality. Are you confident that we have an understanding with the Government of 

Japan as to how their Parliament will be funding the staging and 

funding the new facilities that are necessary for this transition, 

consistent with the ability of Congress to also appropriate the 

funds necessary for the transition to Guam and Hawaii? 

Mr. HELVEY. Senator, I would like to take that question for the 

record, if I could. I am going to have to do some additional consultations to be able to provide a fulsome response. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The requested information can be found in the 

Q&A in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ at the 

end of this hearing.] 

Senator CARDIN. And I appreciate that. I want to make sure 

things are accurate. 

I just think it is important that we have clear understandings, 

and there has been a reluctancy in Congress to do certain things 

as it is still unclear what is being done in Japan. And I think it 

is important that, if we are all sincere, we are trying to move forward with this relocation, which is absolutely essential, that we 

have a transparent and an open strategy with Japan as to the viability of the projects, to make sure that we have accurate funding 

dollar amounts, and that there is a commitment to fund it in a 

timely way by both Parliaments, in the United States and in 

Japan. 

Let me move forward to Korea and talk a little bit about the 

transition of authority on the troops there, as the OPCON is supposed to be implemented in December 2015. How are we doing in 

regards to the implementation of that commitment to turn over 

command to the Koreans? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, Senator Cardin, the transition of wartime 

operational control, which is the central point of your question, 

should sustain and enhance the alliance’s combined defense posture and capabilities, support both the alliance’s bilateral defense 

priorities and its future development. The United States and the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

Republic of Korea remain committed to making the preparations 

necessary to transfer wartime operational control on the timeline 

that was established in the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan, which 

would be December 2015. 

OPCON transition, however, has always been conditions-based, 

and we continue to assess and review the security situation on the 

Korean Peninsula, in the context of implementation of the Strategic 

Alliance 2015 Plan. One of the key outcomes from the security consultative meeting last October between Secretary Hagel and Minister Kim was the establishment of an OPCON Working Group, 

where the United States and the Republic of Korea are examining 

where we are, in terms of both sides, the United States and the 

Republic of Korea, in meeting the timelines and the commitments 

under the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan, in light of a request from 

the Republic of Korea to look at the conditions for transition of 

operational control. 

So, we are in the process of doing that. It is something that we 

do regularly through our alliance. We are meeting the timelines 

now, but we just want to make sure that we are taking a look at 

where we are going to be going, in the context of the changing 

security environment, particularly in North Korea. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Russel, moving to the relationship between 

the Republic of Korea and North Korea, and the regional concerns 

on the activities within North Korea. Obviously what gets most of 

the attention is their nuclear activities, but there is also the erratic 

behavior of the government, the way that they treat their own people, and gross violations of human rights, the failure to have an 

economy that can adequately take care of the needs of their own 

people, all of which have presented challenges for the international 

community. 

It appears like there is a dialogue taking place between the 

Republic of Korea and North Korea. Of course, we had the sixparty talks. Can you just update us as to the confidence level that 

we have a method for trying to resolve issues in North Korea? 

Mr. RUSSEL. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First and foremost, our approach to North Korea is predicated on 

very, very close coordination, in the first instance, with our ROK 

ally, as well as with Japan, and then broader coordination with the 

other partners in the six-party process and with the international 

community. The ability of the United States to maintain a united 

front, and the insistence that North Korea has to come into compliance with its international obligation to begin denuclearizing, is 

one of the things that has served as a bulwark against now familiar North Korean tactics. 

One familiar cycle we have seen in North Korean behavior is 

generating regional tension through provocative steps and threatening behavior, only to follow that with a so-called ‘‘charm offensive,’’ in the hopes that they will be able to elicit concessions and 

substantive rewards from the United States, from the ROK, and 

from the international community. They have failed in that effort. 

The agreement by North Korea, belatedly, to move forward with 

the exchange of elderly family members separated by the Korean 

war, bringing together aged South and North Koreans who have 

not seen each other, in some cases, for many decades, was a welFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

come step, but it is a step that we attribute to the Park administration’s firm and principled-based approach to dealing with North 

Korea. 

Like the United States, the Government of the Republic of Korea 

insists that North Korea must take irreversible steps to begin coming into compliance on its denuclearization obligations, that 

humanitarian actions can be pursued, and the ROK has taken 

some modest steps in that direction, but there will be no progress 

until and unless North Korea accepts that its nuclear program and 

its ballistic missile program are not acceptable to the international 

community, and directly at odds with North Korea’s own stated 

desire for greater security, as well as economic assistance, if not 

integration. 

Based on this firm set of principles and close coordination 

between the United States and our allies and our partners, we 

have denied North Korea consistently the benefits that it had previously achieved through its misbehavior and through its threats. 

On human rights, the United States has strongly supported the 

Human Rights Council’s decision to form a Commission of Inquiry, 

which recently issued a report and will be discussed next month— 

or later this month, in Geneva, by the Human Rights Council. That 

report found a truly appalling set of circumstances in North Korea, 

and was able to document many of the very, very troubling practices there. 

The United States will continue to work with the international 

community and with our partners, including the ROK, to speak out 

and to shine a light on the problems of human rights in North 

Korea, even as we focus intently on the requirement that North 

Korea take steps to denuclearize and to end its illegal ballistic missile program. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for that answer. 

Is there anything new to report in regards to our efforts to 

improve the relationship between our two close allies, the Republic 

of Korea and Japan? Have there been any new initiatives? There 

seems to be some provocative activities; there were provocative 

activities last year. Do we see any good will that we might be able 

to foster a better relationship between those two countries? 

Mr. RUSSEL. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is very much in the interests 

of the United States, and therefore it is very much a diplomatic 

priority for the United States, that the friction and the tension 

between these two extraordinarily close friends and allies of the 

United States be reduced, and be reduced quickly. Both Japan and 

the Republic of Korea need to make respective efforts to help create 

a more conducive and positive climate. They are both dealing with 

the legacy of very, very sensitive and very difficult issues, historical 

issues from the 20th century. We have maintained a direct and 

candid dialogue with the political and the governmental on the 

opinion leaders in both countries. We continue to stress the need 

for prudence and for restraint for all parties to take steps that will 

promote healing. These legacy issues cannot be solved by any one 

party, alone. But, all parties can contribute to a reversal of the current atmosphere and the creation of a positive trend. 

Both the Republic of Korea and Japan are healthy, stable democracies. They are both important free-market economies. They, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

themselves, have close cultural ties and roots in shared values. 

Moreover, both the Republic of Korea and Japan have a huge strategic interest in bilateral, as well as trilateral, cooperation, including and particularly because of the threat posed by North Korea. 

The United States and Japan have, I think, set a positive model 

of how two countries can move from the enmity of war to reconciliation and an extraordinary partnership, friendship, and alliance. 

That is a model that I hope can increasingly be emulated by other 

countries. It is necessary to deal with the sensitive issues of history 

to ensure that that history does not obstruct the ability of Japan 

and the Republic of Korea to meet the challenges of today and to 

fulfill the goals of tomorrow. 

So, the short answer, after a long introduction, Mr. Chairman, to 

your question, is, yes, the United States has both an interest and 

a role, not as a mediator, but as a friend and as a partner. That 

is a role that we are pursuing with vigor. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I think this has to be a very high priority. 

We want to see good relations with all the countries in that region 

of the world. One of my concerns is that it looks like China is trying to increase the wedge between Japan and the Republic of Korea 

to establish a closer relationship with the Republic of Korea, to the 

detriment of Japan. It is critically important that the United 

States, which has close alliances with Japan and Republic of Korea, 

that we use our relationships to improve the relationship between 

those two countries. 

In my visit last year, it was so obvious. More questions were 

asked, I think, on that subject than any other subject, even though 

the maritime security problems were huge and China’s huge. But, 

these historic disputes have caused real challenges to the functioning relationship between two allies of the United States. 

With that, I thank our witnesses. 

Mr. Helvey, I just want to underscore the importance of trying 

to get on the same page on the replacements to Okinawa. This is 

an issue that is critically important to both countries. We support 

it, but we have to have the numbers that make sense, and we have 

to be on the same page with, in regards to our mutual commitments. So, I look forward to that information being made available 

to our committee. 

Thank you. 

We will now turn to our second panel. And we are pleased to 

have two distinguished experts on Northeast Asia. First is Dr. 

Sheila Smith, a senior fellow for Japan Studies at the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Dr. Smith currently directs the Project on 

Japan’s Political Transition and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 

And then we have Dr. Michael Auslin, a resident scholar and the 

director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 

AEI, where he studies Asian regional security and political issues. 

Mr. Auslin is also a biweekly columnist for the Wall Street Journal. 

Welcome, both of you. We look forward to your testimony. As I 

indicated earlier, your written comments will be made part of our 

committee record, and you may proceed as you wish. 

Dr. Smith. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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STATEMENT OF SHEILA SMITH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR JAPAN 

STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. SMITH. Chairman Cardin, thank you for the privilege of joining you today to discuss our alliances in Northeast Asia. 

Japan and the Republic of Korea are two of America’s closest 

allies. Both were forged in the wake of World War II and at the 

beginning of the cold war that defined the last half of the 20th century. We have over 60 years of shared history in managing regional 

security in Northeast Asia. We have economic ties that are deepening for the pursuit of new trade agreements and new energy ties. 

And we share a common interest in the norms and institutions that 

govern international relations, particularly regarding the peaceful 

resolution of international disputes. These are close U.S. partnerships, with a burgeoning agenda of cooperation. 

Both alliances also face new sources of challenge. The first is the 

changing strategic balance in Northeast Asia. For over a decade 

now, the stability of that region has been tested by the proliferation ambitions of North Korea. In addition, the rising influence of 

China is reshaping the region’s diplomatic, economic, and military 

relationships. 

Our bilateral relations with both Japan and South Korea are 

strong. Last fall, Secretary Hagel traveled to Seoul to mark the 

60th anniversary of our security treaty and for the bilateral ROK– 

U.S. Security Consultative Meeting. From there, he traveled to 

Tokyo, where he was joined by Secretary Kerry for a Security Consultative Committee ‘‘two-plus-two’’ meeting with their Japanese 

counterparts. At both meetings, a detailed agenda of alliance 

cooperation was outlined, with very similar aims of strengthening 

deterrence and defense cooperation. 

In Japan, the Defense reforms initiated by Prime Minister Abe 

inform our revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense 

Cooperation. Similarly, we are building strong economic and energy 

partnerships with Japan and South Korea. The KORUS Trade 

Agreement has been a tremendous benefit to both South Korea and 

the United States, and we are working with Japan to complete 

negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

Energy cooperation, I believe, also strengthens our partnership 

with these Northeast Asian allies. We continue to discuss renewal 

of our civilian nuclear agreement with Seoul, and we have initiated 

new LNG projects with Japan. 

But, today our biggest challenge may be the deterioration of relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Memories of the past century continue to infuse contemporary political relations in Northeast Asia. 

And, since 2012, the Japan-ROK relationship has taken a turn for 

the worse. President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Dokdo, or Takeshima, as the Japanese refer to them, that summer, and the 

progress of Korean court cases inside South Korea over victims’ 

claims for World War II compensation from Japan have called into 

question the foundation of postwar Japan-ROK diplomacy. 

Popular sentiments in both countries have gone from mutual 

respect to antagonism. Newly elected leaders in both capitals, 

President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, have 

failed to find a path to overcome their diplomatic estrangement. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Next year will be the 50th anniversary of the Bilateral Peace 

Treaty that negotiated the basis of postwar reconciliation and 

restored diplomatic ties between these two U.S. allies. Without 

high-level dialogue, that anniversary could be an even more difficult moment for the relationship. 

This worsening Japan-South Korea relationship comes at a time 

of considerable change in Northeast Asia. China’s rising economic 

and military influence has had a tremendous effect on both societies, and there, too, the postwar settlement is called into question. 

Most worrisome is the relationship between Japan and China, who 

have confronted each other in the waters around the Senkakus as 

Beijing has sought to contest Japan’s administrative control over 

these remote, uninhabited islands. Chinese paramilitary ships continue to challenge the Japan Coast Guard, and in 2013 the Chinese 

military began to intimate its interest in the airspace and waters 

around these islands. The announcement, in November last year, 

of a new Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone adds another 

layer of complexity to the already dangerous tensions developing in 

the East China Sea. 

The United States must pursue three priorities in Northeast 

Asia. First, Washington must continue its crucial role in deterring 

aggression and in advocating for risk reduction in this increasingly 

crowded East China Sea maritime space. Second, the United States 

must do all that it can to encourage the leaders of Japan and South 

Korea to overcome their political resistance to dialogue. Washington cannot broker reconciliation, but must continue to point out 

the costs of continued estrangement, for regional stability as well 

as to their own security. 

Finally, the United States must continue to deepen the economic 

bonds, including energy, that sustain our relations with Japan and 

South Korea. Our own future well-being and security will depend 

upon these alliances as we navigate the challenges of a transforming Asia-Pacific. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SHEILA A. SMITH

U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia are critical to the success of our Asia strategy. 

These alliances are half a century old, with extensive agendas of economic and security cooperation. Japan and South Korea continue to host the bulk of our forward 

deployed forces in Asia, yet these are not just military alliances. The people of 

Japan and South Korea share our commitment to democratic values, to an open and 

fair global trading order, and to a cooperative approach to ensuring regional stability in a rapidly changing Asia-Pacific. 

Both Japan and South Korea have new political leaders: in December 2012, Abe 

Shinzo was elected Prime Minister after his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gained 

a majority in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament and Park Geun-hye was elected 

to a 5-year term as South Korea’s President by a wide margin, assuming office in 

February 2013. Abe’s LDP received overwhelming support in the Upper House election of Parliament in the July 2013, giving the conservatives a majority in both 

Houses of Parliament for the first time since 2007. Park had led her Saenuri Party 

as it maintained its majority in the April 2012 legislative elections for the National 

Assembly. Thus both leaders have a strong electoral mandate, and will be in power 

for the next several years. 

Unfortunately, the relationship between Tokyo and Seoul has deteriorated significantly, making it difficult for the United States to deepen and expand cooperation 

with its allies. Where once strong trilateral cooperation between Washington, Seoul, 

and Tokyo could be expected across a wide range of issues, today that cooperation 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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is less likely. For over a year now, the leaders of Japan and South Korea have not 

met. 

UPDATE ON U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE

The Republic of Korea continues to face an unstable and unpredictable regime in 

Pyongyang. Last fall, the United States and the Republic of Korea commemorated 

the 60th anniversary of their alliance and outlined plans for advancing the emerging global partnership between Washington and Seoul. The U.S.–ROK alliance has 

successfully deterred aggression by North Korea against the South on the Korean 

Peninsula. Washington and Seoul work closely to craft and support the U.N. Security Council Resolutions that seek to sanction North Korean proliferation. After successive incidents in 2010 involving the use of force by Pyongyang against the South, 

the U.S.–ROK alliance has bolstered defense cooperation and strengthened their 

combined defense posture. In March 2013, the two governments completed their 

‘‘counter provocation plan,’’ designed to anticipate and meet any further military 

actions by the North Koreans. In addition, last fall Secretary of Defense Chuck 

Hagel and Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin approved a ‘‘tailored deterrence strategy’’ 

that would meet WMD threats from the North, and this includes the counter missile 

as well as the Korean Air and Missile Defense system. 

The U.S.–ROK alliance also includes a global agenda of cooperation. Since 2009, 

in accordance with the Joint Vision for the alliance, the United States and South 

Korea have set forth a broader agenda of global cooperation, including partnering 

in developing mechanisms for ensuring global nuclear security. South Korea hosted 

the second Nuclear Security summit in 2012. In addition, South Korea continues to 

expand its peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and disaster relief activities, 

and cooperates with the United States and others in Syria and Afghanistan. Future 

goals for the alliance include achieving the transition of wartime operational control 

(OPCON), deepening cooperation through their Cyber Cooperation Working Group, 

and continuing to implement base relocation and returns of U.S. Forces Korea 

(USFK). 

UPDATE ON U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

The U.S.-Japan alliance has also confronted a new security challenge. Since 2012, 

China has begun maritime patrols of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, 

challenging Japan’s administrative control. Rising tensions, and growing popular 

sensitivities over the islands, have frozen diplomatic relations between Tokyo and 

Beijing, and the increasing paramilitary patrols have upon occasion been supplemented by interactions between the two militaries. 

The United States has direct interests in this growing tension. As Japan’s treaty 

ally, the United States has increased its defense cooperation with Tokyo (such as 

the deployment of F–22s in Okinawa and expanded training between U.S. and Japanese forces, including amphibious landing operations) to deter miscalculation, and 

has conveyed to Beijing in repeated high-level meetings (including between President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping last year) the U.S. interest 

in a peaceful resolution of China’s maritime disputes with its neighbors. China’s 

announcement in November 2013 of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 

in the East China Sea, however, puts new pressure on Japan’s air defenses (as well 

as South Korea’s) and exacerbates tensions over the Senkaku Islands. 

The U.S.-Japan alliance has also begun an important set of revisions as Japan 

has initiated its own defense reforms. In October, Secretary of State John Kerry and 

Secretary of Defense Hagel traveled to Tokyo for a Security Consultative Committee 

(2+2) meeting with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Itsunori 

Onodera. The highlights of that meeting included an agreement to revise the U.S.- 

Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines to enhance the alliance deterrent (especially 

with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities). A review of 

roles, missions, and capabilities will supplement the discussion of the Guidelines, 

as will a review in Japan of the government’s interpretation of the constitution with 

regard to the right of collective self-defense. 

Finally, Japan’s economic policy reforms, dubbed ‘‘Abenomics,’’ have had some initial success in raising expectations for an improved economic performance. A combination of fiscal stimulus and a new emphasis on monetary policy combined to 

stimulate greater optimism in Japan’s economic future. Breaking the deflationary 

mindset is seen as the prerequisite to greater investment and consumer spending. 

Early signs of traction in 2013 were apparent, but much will depend on the Abe 

government’s ability to tackle the more politically difficult economic restructuring 

Japan needs to truly turn its economy around. Japan’s decision last year to join the 

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Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is widely seen as one of Prime Minister Abe’s best 

policy tools for opening the market and restoring economic competitiveness. 

CHALLENGES FOR 2014

The United States has several challenges ahead in managing its alliance relations 

in Northeast Asia. First, both alliances will need continued attention to defense cooperation. Regional security trends make alliance readiness and strategic adjustments to the alliance deterrent necessary. The United States and Japan will revise 

their Defense Cooperation Guidelines to consider new missions and upgrade capabilities based on their strategic assessment of regional military balance. Tensions 

in the East China Sea and the continued concern over the situation on the Korean 

Peninsula will require continued attention to crisis management provisions and to 

reassess the alliance readiness. Force posture adjustment continues to be necessary, 

as are upgrades in alliance deterrence (such as the ongoing improvements in ISR 

and ballistic missile defense capabilities). Japan’s own reorientation of its defense 

posture southward will also shape alliance cooperation. In the U.S.–ROK alliance, 

the most important consultations continue to be over whether to transition OPCON 

from the USFK to the Korean military. The nature and timing of this transfer, of 

course, will be conditions based, and should be undertaken in order to ensure a 

seamless combined deterrent force. The potential for provocations from the North 

cannot be underestimated, especially near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), and close 

allied consultations on how to anticipate and respond to such provocations remains 

a high priority. Finally, the potential for intermediate range missile and/or nuclear 

testing remains, and the continued ability to deter (including extended deterrence) 

is crucial to regional stability. 

Second, economic cooperation continues to be an important component in our alliance cooperation. The TPP negotiations are a critical component of U.S.-Japan cooperation. Recent slowing of progress rests largely on two requirements. The first 

is that the lack of trade promotion authority prompts concerns over the ability of 

the Obama administration to gain congressional approval of a final agreement. Second, the desire for a high standards agreement limits the U.S. willingness for compromise, particularly on Japanese agriculture. Domestic politics in both countries 

could undercut the U.S.-Japan cooperation that to date had enabled progress on this 

important economic security initiative. The United States and South Korea now 

enjoy the benefits of their free trade agreement (KORUS), approved by the U.S. 

Congress and the Korean Assembly at the end of 2011. Differences remain over 

some sectors, but overall trade has improved. 

Finally, energy cooperation will also be on the alliance agenda this year, and with 

both allies, energy has a strategic impact. The United States and South Korea will 

continue to discuss their civilian nuclear cooperation, and expectations remain high 

that a new agreement can be reached. Additional time was granted by the Senate 

in January 2014 to allow a more careful discussion. Japan too has new energy needs 

after its triple disasters in 2011 changed the national consensus on the country’s 

overall energy mix. Exports of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) and potentially 

other energy resources to Japan should be considered, as they will transform 

Japan’s dependence on Russia and the Middle East for the bulk of its imported 

energy needs. 

BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN TOKYO AND SEOUL

Perhaps the thorniest issue for U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia continues to 

be the difficult relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Since coming into office, President Park and Prime Minister Abe have failed to organize a high-level summit 

meeting, and as a result, domestic sentiments within each country have become 

increasingly antagonistic. Several factors account for the deterioration in this important bilateral relationship. First, the continuing sensitivity particularly in South 

Korea to issues related to historical memory impedes closer security cooperation. In 

2012, the two nations were close to concluding two important security agreements, 

an information-sharing agreement and an acquisitions and cross-servicing agrement 

(ACSA) that would have allowed cooperation in case of a contingency on the peninsula. Domestic politics in South Korea derailed this effort, however. 

Second, the visit in 2012 of former Korean President Lee Myung-bak to the island 

of Dokdo (Takeshima for the Japanese) inflamed popular sentiment in Japan, as did 

President Lee’s statements on Japan’s lack of remorse for its colonization of the 

Korean Peninsula. The change of leadership in Seoul only deepened the rift as 

President Park continues to advocate to others the need for Japan to reflect on its 

past and take a more ‘‘correct understanding of history.’’ Pressures within South 

Korea, largely led by court cases appealing for greater South Korean Government 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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activism to gain new compensation for victims of Japanese oppression during World 

War II, continue to make this a contentious issue, and sentiment in Japan toward 

South Korea has worsened considerably. The 50th anniversary of the bilateral peace 

treaty between Japan and South Korea next year will focus attention on this sensitive issue of remorse and compensation for WWII. 

Finally, the rise of China is deepening the difficulties in the Japan-South Korea 

relationship. President Park began her time in office by visiting Washington and 

Beijing, but ignoring South Korea’s longstanding diplomatic ties to Tokyo. Moreover, 

in high-level meetings with China, South Korean officials join with China to chastise Japan on its past history, creating the impression that Seoul and Beijing seek 

to isolate Japan diplomatically. While the historical legacy of World War II has long 

been a source of pain and friction in the diplomatic relations between Japan and 

South Korea, the growing synchronization of territorial disputes and criticism of 

Japanese leaders’ positions on history between Seoul and Beijing make it difficult 

for Tokyo to manage. Popular sentiments in Tokyo have become very sensitive to 

this notion that Japan is the target of attack by its neighbors, just as popular sentiments in Seoul have become very sensitive to Japanese revisionist statements on 

the conflicts of the 20th century. 

The U.S. role in these tensions is a difficult one. While U.S. interests are not 

served by the continuing estrangement between our two closest allies in Asia, Washington cannot broker a deal on the complex issue of historical memory. For reconciliation to occur, it must be undertaken directly by Tokyo and Seoul. Nonetheless, the 

United States must continue to urge President Park and Prime Minister Abe to take 

steps toward a concrete discussion on reconciliation, and to outline to both leaders 

the costs of their continued contention. Without leadership by both Park and Abe, 

this dispute could become much more difficult to resolve, and could undermine their 

ability to manage their own country’s security. A comprehensive review of the path 

to restoring strong political and economic ties must be undertaken, and no preconditions to dialogue should be set. 

The lost opportunities of this continued friction are real for the United States, and 

for the region. Close trilateral cooperation on North Korea is vital in case of a crisis 

or even worse, a conflict. U.S. access to bases in Japan is imperative to our ability 

to defend South Korea. Korean cooperation with Japan will be vital to ensuring the 

safety of Japanese citizens on the peninsula and in deterring North Korean aggression against Japan. Likewise, maritime cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo is 

essential for nonproliferation activities, as well as broader stability of East China 

Sea. Japan and Korea have a long history of coast guard and air defense cooperation, and should see this as an added stabilizer for the East China Sea, especially 

after the ADIZ. Furthermore, the ability of Tokyo and Seoul to cooperate in and 

around the East China Sea should become the basis for encouraging Chinese participation in similar risk reduction mechanisms, perhaps through the trilateral China, 

Japan, South Korea summitry. Finally, the frictions over their postwar settlement 

ultimately do affect the United States. More and more, U.S. citizens are raising 

questions about the historical disputes between Japan and South Korea, including 

the issue of compensation for the system of sexual slavery during WWII, and wondering about the rising nationalist impulses of both countries. There is plenty of 

room for nongovernmental discussions between U.S. and regional historians on some 

of these issues, and for U.S. engagement in a broader Asian discussion of historical 

memory. Our own leadership in demonstrating the importance of historical reconciliation has been a source of strengthening our relations with both countries. In both 

Korea and Japan, we must continue to emphasize the importance of reconciliation. 

WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE?

President Obama’s visit to both countries in April offers an opportunity to highlight the strengths not only of our bilateral ties, but also of the value of our trilateral partnership for regional security and prosperity. Elected representatives in 

Congress, too, should take every opportunity to demonstrate the importance of these 

alliances to the United States. Personal ties with the leaders of Japan and South 

Korea will allow for a more intimate dialogue on issues of reconciliation, and will 

allow for greater understanding of the changing security and economic concerns in 

the region. The United States has a tremendous stake in Asia, and our partnerships 

with both of these vibrant democracies and dynamic economies are indispensable to 

our own success. With Seoul and Tokyo, we have shared interests in a broad agenda 

of cooperation across the Asia-Pacific: freedom of navigation, the rule of law, an 

open and fair international economy, and the right of self-determination and territorial integrity. Finally, we must continue to invest in the next generation of alliance leaders, and the United States must continue to lean forward in funding, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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educating, and sending abroad our very best young minds. Building the personal 

relationships, and learning first hand about these two accomplished cultures, is one 

of the best means of ensuring the health of our relationships with Japan and South 

Korea in the generations ahead. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Dr. Smith. 

Dr. Auslin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL AUSLIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 

DIRECTOR OF JAPAN STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to 

come talk to you today about the status and trajectories of our alliances in Northeast Asia. 

This hearing is being held at a particularly important time, for, 

as the United States continues a broad drawdown in military 

forces, the security trendline in Asia is worsening, not improving. 

Security in Asia remains based on our alliances which, for the past 

half century, have been focused on a handful of key nations, Japan 

and South Korea preeminent among them. As the committee 

understands, strengthening these alliances is one of the surest 

ways to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region, preserve U.S. 

influence, and help promote a future of greater freedom and prosperity for half our world. 

You asked about the current status of the bilateral alliances and 

their progress. Regarding Japan, I would argue that we are witnessing a divergence between the politics and the policy of the 

United States-Japan alliance. While Washington applauds many of 

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s measures to strengthen Japan’s security and fulfill longstanding agreements with the United States, 

there is growing tension over perceptions of his approach to historical issues, such as the December visit to the controversial 

Yasukuni Shrine. While I argue that fears of the dangers of Mr. 

Abe’s nationalism are overblown, we should be worried about the 

potential political divergence between Washington and Tokyo over 

the coming year. 

As has been noted, South Korea and Washington continue to 

have close ties. In January 2014, we came to a new 5-year special 

measures agreement, under which Seoul will raise host-nation support payments for U.S. forces. However, one continuing source of 

uncertainty, which you have already highlighted, in this alliance is 

the so-called OPCON Transfer of Wartime Command of United 

States and South Korean Forces, which has already been delayed 

twice, and is most likely to be delayed after 2015. 

The challenges we face this year, I think are threefold. The first, 

we have discussed several times here, is poor Japan-ROK relations. 

America’s two closest allies barely speak to each other, and the tensions are at their highest in decades. While I have not been privy 

to what we have done to try to ameliorate that, Washington, I 

believe, should be doing much more behind closed doors in a very 

frank way to try and bridge the gap and stress common interests 

between our two allies. 

The second challenge, also discussed here earlier, is North Korea, 

which, under Kim Jong-un, has become even more of a wildcard 

than before. I believe the administration does not appear to have 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

any current initiatives to deal with the Kim regime. And, as long 

as there is a stalemate between North Korea and the rest of the 

world, Pyongyang wins. 

In China, President Xi Jinping’s first year in power saw new and 

destabilizing acts, such as the establishment of the East China Sea 

Air Defense Identification Zone. Having consolidated his power in 

his first year, he now has 9 full years to push forward, not only 

his program for domestic economic reform, which we should welcome, but also his national security objectives, which increasingly 

seem to be at odds with a stable Asia-Pacific region and dismissive 

of the Obama administration’s rebalance. 

There are areas for bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the 

coming year. Bilaterally with Japan, I agree with Dr. Smith that 

Washington must focus on preserving stability around the disputed 

Senkaku Islands. A greater American presence in the waters 

around the islands can help prevent an accident that causes conflict. 

The economic basis of the United States-Japan relationship 

surely can be strengthened by concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks, but we must recognize there remains a significant 

gulf between Washington and Tokyo, and the apparent death of 

fast-track trade promotion authority in the Senate means that any 

TPP agreement would find it difficult to get ratified. 

With Seoul, we should be working on setting a realistic timeline 

for OPCON transfer, and also thinking of new initiatives for dealing with North Korea, such as stronger financial measures aimed 

at the Kim regime. 

Many of these initiatives can be done in a trilateral fashion, such 

as greater cooperation and consultation on the ADIZ, on North 

Korea, and on building up missile defense. An innovative approach 

would be to try and expand the limited trilateral military exercises, 

which we currently conduct, or exploring limited joint training. 

Another idea is to consider a trilateral vision statement on the 

region’s opportunities and challenges. 

The Obama administration’s rebalance has helped the American 

Government and public begin thinking about our interests in the 

post-Iraq and -Afghanistan world. Yet, the administration has also 

undercut its own policy, in two ways: firstly, through defense cuts 

that make it more difficult to maintain our presence abroad and 

call into question our long-term credibility, and secondly, by a hesitant approach to China’s latest provocations that raise questions 

about our will to oppose their destabilizing actions. Washington 

must assure its friends and partners that it will not let the balance 

of power in Asia shift in favor of those who seek to use might to 

achieve their objectives. An Asia in which coercion is regularly 

employed cannot be an Asia that remains peaceful and prosperous 

in the long run. 

In conclusion, there are three things that the administration, I 

think, should focus on. First is to clarify what its actual goals are 

in Asia, and make those goals clear to our allies and to those with 

whom we must deal. Second, Congress and the administration 

must ensure that our projected defense cuts do not further erode 

our readiness or our presence in Asia. And third, I argue, it is time 

for a new interagency strategic vision statement on Asia that lays 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

out our interests and strategy. The result of such an approach 

would be stronger, liberal alliances and, quite likely, a region that 

is more stable and prosperous. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Auslin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL R. AUSLIN

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio, members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to come talk to you today about the status and trajectories of our 

alliances in Northeast Asia. This hearing is being held at a particularly important 

time, as the United States enters the final phase of winding down its combat role 

in Afghanistan and as the U.S. public begins looking forward to a future less 

focused on the Middle East. At the same time, several years of uncertainty regarding the U.S. defense budget are now being replaced by a better understanding of 

how our military will resize and reshape itself for the coming decade. 

That said, the choices we are making as to our future foreign and security policies 

obviously do not take place in a vacuum. Other countries have their say as to how 

the world will look, and in part the future judgment on the wisdom of our likely 

course will be based on how other countries react to our policies. Nowhere is this 

more true than in Asia, where the world continues to watch, with equal parts envy 

and apprehension, the rise of China. 

China continues to present a unique policy challenge to the United States. Our 

economic interdependence all but mandates close and smooth working relations at 

the public and private level; yet our political and security competition seems to grow 

without pause. This is the same dynamic faced by many of our allies and friends 

in Asia, to whom of course, the Janus-faced aspect of today’s China is of enduring 

concern. 

While the United States has broad-based economic, diplomatic, cultural, and 

social relationships with the nations of Asia, this hearing rightly seeks to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our alliance structure in Northeast Asia. Our 

alliances have been based for the past half-century on significant security commitments to a handful of key nations, Japan and South Korea preeminent among them. 

Because of this, China’s activities in the region, as well as the ongoing North 

Korean nuclear and missile challenge, are the major influences on our alliance 

relations with Tokyo and Seoul. 

Before discussing these two separately, it is important to note that our allies and 

partners in Asia are well aware of, and concerned about, projected drawdowns in 

the U.S. military. They are keenly attuned to how far the continental United States 

is from the flashpoints of Asia, such as the Korean Peninsula or the South China 

Sea. They read the headlines about our Navy shrinking to its smallest size since 

World War I and that the Air Force will shed hundreds of planes over the coming 

years. They find it hard to square such hard numbers with the constant statements 

of the Obama administration that it is rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. They 

worry that assurances by the United States Government that budget cuts at home 

will not affect the U.S. presence in Asia are mere rhetoric. 

Indeed, both governments and publics in Asia are aware that U.S. military activity throughout the region is declining. Last year, Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, testified before Congress that his travel budget 

had been cut by half. Similarly, the Pentagon has been forced to reduce militaryto-military exchanges, such as postponing the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium or canceling exercises run by Pacific Air Forces. General Hawk Carlisle, Commander of 

Pacific Air Forces, has been just one of the senior military leaders publicly to state 

his concern that resources have not followed the commitment to rebalance. 

By raising expectations throughout the region that the United States would be 

more involved in Asian issues, we have created a dangerous gap with our inaction. 

While Secretary of State Kerry focused on climate change during his visit to China, 

South Korea, and Indonesia just 2 weeks ago, many of the nations of the region are 

far more concerned about the growing risk of conflict and what must be considered 

coercive behavior by China. Just last week, our ally the Philippines protested the 

Chinese use of water cannons by patrol boats on Philippine fishermen around the 

disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Asia’s civilian airliners, except 

for Japan, are all complying with Beijing’s intrusive demands for identification of 

peaceful flights over the East China Sea through China’s new and unprecedented 

air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Japan continues to respond to regular incursions by Chinese vessels into the waters around the Senkaku Islands. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The nations of Asia watch very carefully Washington’s hesitation and desire to 

avoid confronting China. They get clear messages from our actions that they must 

expect to deal with China on their own. They already perceive a shift in the balance 

of power, and we must recognize that at some point we will be seen as a paper tiger, 

whose commitments are not backed up by commensurate national will. Meanwhile, 

the trendline in Asia is worsening, not improving, making our lack of response all 

the more noticeable. 

That said, our country retains a significant amount of influence in the Asia-Pacific 

region. This is due in no small part to the 325,000 men and women of U.S. Pacific 

Command, many of whom are forward deployed or on regular visits throughout the 

region. Our half-century old alliance structure also provides us with unique working 

relationships and the opportunity to remain involved with a core group of countries 

which themselves play diverse roles in Asia. As this committee understand, 

strengthening these alliances is one of the surest ways to help maintain stability 

in the Asia-Pacific region, preserve U.S. influence, and help promote a future of 

greater freedom and prosperity for half our world. 

CURRENT STATUS OF BILATERAL ALLIANCES AND PROGRESS IN RECENT YEARS

Today, our bilateral alliances reflect the changes rippling through Asia as well as 

constraints here in the United States. To begin with Japan, I would argue that we 

are witnessing a divergence between the ‘‘politics’’ and the ‘‘policy’’ of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance. We are still in a delicate period that began in 2009, when the then-ruling 

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) upended the relationship by reopening the question of realigning U.S. forces in Japan. The core of the 2006 agreement that the DPJ 

decided to relitigate, so to speak, was the proposal to move Marine Corps Air Station Futenma out of its crowded urban location and relocate it to the less-populated 

northern part of Okinawa. 

Fast-forward 5 years later and current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who resigned 

his position back in 2007, has moved to push the original agreement ahead and complete the Futenma Relocation Facility in Nago City. In addition, Mr. Abe has signaled his intention to reinterpret Japan’s ban on exercising collective self-defense, 

which is something the United States has long wanted. He has confirmed his predecessor’s decision to buy the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter and to loosen Japan’s restrictions on arms exports. Much of this is codified in Tokyo’s first-ever national security 

strategy. Just as significantly, Washington and Tokyo have agreed to revise the 

1997 Mutual Defense Guidelines by the end of 2014 to update the alliance for the 

21st century, including such new areas as the military use of space and cyber space. 

From this perspective, the policy of the U.S.-Japan alliance is moving in the right 

direction to respond to the new challenges it faces. 

Yet, if the bilateral relationship is looked at from a ‘‘politics’’ perspective, Tokyo 

and Washington have moved from disagreement over policy to political tensions over 

perceptions of Prime Minister Abe’s approach to historical issues. His December 

visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine resulted in a rare public reproach from 

the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and strong condemnations by Beijing and Seoul. Statements by his appointees to Japan’s public broadcaster have been criticized for their 

attempts to reinterpret Japan’s wartime past. Fears that Prime Minister Abe is 

thinking of backing away from previous governments’ statements on war-era comfort women have raised the ire of groups both in Asia and abroad. While I would 

argue that the fears of Mr. Abe’s nationalism are overblown, we should be worried 

about the potential political divergence between Washington and Tokyo over the 

coming year. 

However, whereas Japan and the United States continue to have difficulties in 

their relationship, the ties between Washington and Seoul remain extremely close. 

President Obama crafted an unusually tight relationship with former South Korean 

President Lee Myung-bak, and has continued the trend with current President Park 

Guen-hye. Uncomfortably for Tokyo, Presidents Obama and Park share similar sentiments regarding Prime Minister Abe’s perceived historical revisionism. In terms 

of the U.S.–ROK working relationship, in January 2014, the United States and 

South Korea came to a new 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA), under 

which Seoul will raise its host nation support payments for U.S. forces in Korea by 

nearly 6 percent, increasing spending to around $870 million per year. 

One continuing source of uncertainty in the alliance is the so-called ‘‘operational 

control’’ (OPCON) transfer of wartime command of U.S. and South Korean forces. 

Originally scheduled for 2007, it has been delayed twice at the request of the South 

Koreans, and is now planned for 2015, though that date, too, is likely to be pushed 

back. While our combined command structure in South Korea has resulted in an 

extraordinarily close training and working relationship between the two militaries, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Seoul’s inability to successfully develop the capabilities needed to lead military operations in wartime is a source of concern. 

With both Seoul and Tokyo modernizing their militaries, Washington can look forward to a future with ever more capable allies. Both countries are likely to purchase 

the F–35 fighter and each has ballistic missile defense capabilities, such as modern 

Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers. Each also has been the target of cyber 

attacks, and both are thus focused on increasing their cyber defense capabilities. 

One major difficulty for the United States in Asia is the poor state of bilateral 

relations between Japan and South Korea. America’s two closest allies barely speak 

to each other, and tensions are at their highest in decades. Part of this is due to 

the historical issue I noted above, but it also derives from the continuing dispute 

over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands in the Sea of Japan (terminology over this body 

of water was settled by the State Department in 2012). The lack of trust and bitter 

feelings between the two countries makes it difficult to optimize the U.S. presence 

in Northeast Asia. Instead of having two allies working closely together, U.S. military planners must conduct most of their operations on two bilateral tracks. Given 

that the common threat from North Korea, and now antagonistic behavior from 

China, such as the ADIZ, affects both, Tokyo and Seoul would be well advised to 

put aside some of their differences and embrace their similarities. Sadly, there 

seems no prospect of this happening anytime in the near future. 

Challenges for 2014 

The challenges we face in our Northeast Asian bilateral alliances this year are 

threefold: first, the poor state of Japan-ROK relations; second, North Korea; and 

third, Chinese provocations. This list has been steady for quite some time, and is 

unlikely to change soon. 

I have already briefly discussed the tensions in the Japan-ROK relationship, but 

it is worth mentioning here that, if anything, ties seem to be getting worse. Despite 

their deep economic links, and their shared liberal values such as rule law, freedom 

of the press, and the like, they find the tensions between them at historically high 

levels. President Park appears to desire to draw closer to China at Japan’s expense, 

and has steadfastly refused to meet Prime Minister Abe. She has taken the opportunity of visits by senior American officials, such as Vice President Biden, to publicly criticize Japan. For their part, leading Japanese now openly talk about ‘‘Seoul 

fatigue,’’ and a growing resentment against President Park’s refusal to reciprocate 

to Japanese outreach. This is a serious state of affairs, and while the United States 

cannot make the two nations end their feud, Washington should be doing much 

more behind closed doors to make clear that our patience is not infinite, and that 

we cannot be as effective as we want to be if we cannot work in a trilateral fashion 

with our two most important allies in Asia. 

The second major challenge this year is the unending crisis that is North Korea. 

It is disheartening to say that we currently know even less about what is happening 

inside Pyongyang than we did during the rule of the late Kim Jong-il. Since executing his uncle late last year, Kim Jong-un has become even more of a wildcard 

and enigma than his predecessors. By continuing his family’s long-term pursuit of 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, he has dashed the hopes of some 

who saw in him an incipient reformer, partial to Disney characters. We no longer 

have confidence that China retains its traditional influence over the Kim family, as 

tenuous as that may have been, nor are we any better at anticipating Pyongyang’s 

next provocative act. 

The six-party talks, designed to solve the nuclear crisis, have been stalled since 

2008, and the Obama administration’s one attempt at a deal, the 2012 Leap Day 

Agreement, was broken by the Kim regime just months after its signing. The administration does not appear to have any current initiatives to deal with North Korea, 

and U.N. sanctions continue to be undercut by China. As long as there is a stalemate between North Korea and the rest of the world, Pyongyang wins. Even the 

devastating U.N. report detailing human rights abuses and the crimes against 

humanity that are regularly perpetrated by Pyongyang seems to have had little 

effect on galvanizing some type of approach to put more pressure on this heinous 

regime. Moreover, the longer America waits and watches developments in the country, the more competent North Korea becomes in its nuclear and missile programs. 

Nor is there much reason to be confident about the trajectory of China. Unlike 

his immediate predecessors, President Xi Jinping has consolidated his power in his 

first year in office. He appears to have better control over the military than former 

President Hu Jintao ever did, and has streamlined his country’s national security 

decisionmaking process. He now has 9 full years to push forward not only his program for domestic economic reform, which the United States should welcome, but 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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also his national security objectives, which increasingly seem to be at odds with a 

stable Asia-Pacific region. 

President Xi’s first year saw new and destabilizing acts, such as the establishment of the East China Sea air defense identification zone. Provocations over the 

Senkakus also increased, with reports of Chinese fighter jets being sent near the 

area and an instance of a Chinese naval vessel locking its firing radar on a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense ship. If these are any indications to go by, President Xi 

is comfortable pushing the boundaries of provocative behavior. That is the reason 

the trendline in Asia is negative, and is not improving despite regular high-level 

U.S.-Chinese interaction, such as the Sunnylands summit between Presidents 

Obama and Xi last year and Vice President Biden’s visit to Beijing last December. 

It appears that the Chinese Government has calculated that it can continue its 

assertive, even coercive, actions in the face of America’s protestations that it is 

rebalancing to the Pacific. Tensions are running high enough in Northeast Asia to 

cause Prime Minister Abe to remark at Davos earlier this year that Sino-Japanese 

relations are in a pre-1914 stage. As of now, it does not seem that Washington has 

come up with a successful policy that can encourage Beijing to act in a constructive 

manner on security issues, while continuing its integration into the world economy. 

Not surprisingly, many believe this is the greatest foreign policy challenge our country will face in the coming generation. 

Areas for bilateral and trilateral cooperation in 2014 

Given the challenges in Northeast Asia faced by us and by our allies Japan and 

South Korea, there are important areas of cooperation that Washington can explore. 

Bilaterally with Japan, Washington should work to clarify how it can help preserve 

stability around the disputed Senkaku islands, including in the air domain. While 

war between Japan and China over the Senkakus is a remote possibility, there is 

a much higher likelihood that an accident could cause a true crisis, and perhaps 

even limited conflict. Although the U.S. Government has chosen not to take a position on the sovereignty claims by Japan and China, it recognizes Japan’s longstanding administration of the islands. Thus, showing support for Japan through a 

greater American presence in the immediate waters around the islands does not 

seem like a provocation on our part. 

In addition, continuing expanded military exercises between U.S. and Japanese 

forces, such as last month’s Iron Fist exercise in California with U.S. Marines and 

Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force units, will help the Japanese military become 

a more capable force and more credible in its new focus on protecting Japan’s southwestern islands from threat. There is also room for more cooperation between the 

U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force in refusing to recognize China’s 

ADIZ over the East China Sea. Such activities have a clear diplomatic component, 

as well, and can serve to promote a clear vision of U.S. engagement in the region. 

Finally, the economic basis of the U.S.-Japan relationship can be strengthened by 

a timely conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks. Unfortunately, the recent 

round of negotiations in Singapore showed that there remains a significant gulf 

between Washington and Tokyo on import tariffs, especially for agricultural goods. 

On top of that, the apparent death of ‘‘fast track’’ Trade Promotion Authority in the 

Senate means that any TPP agreement would find it difficult to get ratified. There 

are also reports that foreign negotiators are hesitant to make any agreement if they 

cannot be assured of fast track status in the U.S. Senate. The Obama administration must push both at home and in Tokyo to better sell the benefits of a highstandards free trade agreement. 

Washington’s interest in North Korean denuclearization means that 2014 should 

be a year of new initiatives with Seoul. To let another 12 months go by without any 

new approach to pressuring North Korea means that Kim Jong-un will further 

strengthen himself. Recommitting to financial sanctions against the Kim family and 

its lieutenants may be one way of bringing them back to the table, but the State 

Department must work with Seoul and Tokyo to have a united front in the face of 

Chinese opposition. On the security side of the U.S.–ROK alliance, clarifying Seoul’s 

readiness for OPCON transfer will help remove future uncertainty. Working, as 

well, to improve South Korea’s ballistic missile defense capability can provide some 

assurance that threats from the North can be answered. 

Most of these initiatives could be done in a trilateral fashion, since Japan and 

South Korea face similar security challenges. There is, however, little to no likelihood of Seoul and Tokyo agreeing to work more closely on their own. Nonetheless, 

the Obama administration should push firmly for more trilateral cooperation and 

consultation on the ADIZ, on North Korea, and on building up missile defense capabilities. Blunt talk about the costs of their diplomatic freeze may help move forward 

quiet initiatives, such as trilateral negotiations on North Korea. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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An innovative approach would be to try and expand the limited trilateral military 

exercises that we current conduct. Exploring limited joint training is another way 

to help build trust between the two country’s defense forces. Another idea is to consider a trilateral vision statement on the region’s opportunities and challenges. Such 

a diplomatic document by the liberal leaders in Northeast Asia could even develop 

into a larger document bringing in such stalwart U.S. allies as Australia and those 

that feel increasing pressure from China, like the Philippines. 

How to Create Stronger, Like-Minded Alliances? 

In making the rebalance a central part of its foreign policy strategy, the Obama 

administration has helped the American Government and public begin thinking 

about our interests in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan world. Recognizing the 

dynamic nature of the Asia-Pacific, its crucial importance to the global economy, its 

opportunity to help promote democracy, but also its security challenges is the beginning of setting American foreign and security policy on a new path. 

Yet the administration has also undercut its own policy in two ways: firstly, 

through defense cuts that make it more difficult to maintain U.S. presence abroad 

and call into question our long-term credibility; and secondly, by a hesitant 

approach to China’s latest provocations that raise questions about our will in opposing destabilizing actions. 

Our allies, foremost among them Japan, have raised concerns about the competing priorities of the Obama administration. They worry that the rebalance is 

empty rhetoric and that Washington is all too eager to avoid antagonizing China. 

Both Seoul and Tokyo wonder if Washington is doing everything it can to blunt 

North Korea’s plans to become a full nuclear power. They are concerned that we 

are too laissez faire about the balance of power, or perceptions of the balance of 

power, in Asia. 

It is in American interests to make clear to our allies that it is their responsibility 

to protect their own territory. But Washington must also assure its friends and 

partners that it will not let the balance of power in Asia shift in favor of those who 

seek to use might to achieve their objectives. An Asia in which coercion is regularly 

employed cannot be an Asia that remains peaceful and prosperous in the long run. 

There is much that we can do to ensure our resolve is clearly understood. The 

most important step the administration can take is to clarify for itself what its 

actual goals are in Asia. This was perhaps one of the key failings of the rebalance: 

it never articulated what the administration desired to accomplish. Is it to blunt 

China’s assertive behavior, to promote democracy and liberalism, or to open markets? For example, the administration never fully explained why it was seeking 

more rotational basing opportunities for U.S. forces in Asia, which was perhaps the 

most visible of its rebalancing moves. 

The nations of Asia well understand that Washington and Beijing have very different visions for Asia’s future. The administration would do well to recognize the 

reality that we and the Chinese unfortunately agree on very little and have competing goals. We can and should continue to try and work with the Chinese, but 

the clearest signal would be sent to our Northeast and Southeast Asian allies if we 

appeared to understand what is evident to everyone in the region: China seeks to 

build its power and influence to a point where it has the freedom of action to carry 

out any policy that it desires. While there is little reason to believe Beijing wants 

war or any type of conflict, it appears increasingly willing to risk hostilities because 

it believes that no one will oppose it. 

Second, Congress and the administration must do everything possible to ensure 

that current and projected defense cuts do not further erode our readiness or our 

presence in Asia. If the numbers of planes and ships in Asia start to dip, it will 

be harder to maintain our credibility. Joint exercises and military exchanges need 

to be fully funded, so that partner militaries believe that we remain a steadfast 

friend to them. 

Third, strategic planning exercises, like the Quadrennial Defense Review, should 

not be budget-driven documents, but rather explore what the military really needs 

in order to maintain its qualitative superiority in Asia. What types of weapons systems are best suited to Asia’s unique challenges of distance and potential adversaries with growing capabilities? How can we take advantage of asymmetric means 

of defense? Once we have done that, then the Pentagon needs to reach out to Tokyo 

and Seoul to discuss the best ways in which they can build to their strengths and 

complement our investments. 

In short, in order to build like-minded alliances, both Congress and the pubic 

should push the administration to be clear-eyed about the challenges we face, openly 

discuss them, and have a realistic plan for meeting them. That would reassure our 

allies that we truly put our shared values at the center of our foreign policy and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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that we will not ignore the actions of those who seek to destabilize Asia in their 

favor. The result of such an approach will be stronger liberal alliances and quite 

likely a region that is more stable and prosperous. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you both. You have given a good 

overview of the strengths and what we have been able to accomplish in the rebalance, but also the challenges that lie ahead. 

And I was listening to both of your testimonies. I was struck by 

the maritime security issues that we talk about a great deal. 

Rather explosive. We are worried that it could trigger a major incident at any time. And thinking about the events over the past 

week in Ukraine, where Russia, for the second time, is using its 

military force to take control over lands that do not belong to Russia. There is no dispute that Crimea is Ukrainian territory, yet 

Russia is using its military there. And in the China Seas, the dominant military force is probably China. And we are all concerned as 

to whether they are going to just use military might, causing an 

incident. And now, if Russia’s activities in Ukraine go unchallenged, does this raise the concern that China could use that as an 

example for its own military actions in disputed areas? 

Either one of you. 

Dr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start off the answer 

to that very complex question. 

I think last year I took a fairly careful look at the maritime risks 

inherent in China’s new contestation of the Senkaku issues. And 

so, I would like to submit that for the record here, the—— 

Senator CARDIN. Absolutely. It will be made part of our record. 

Dr. SMITH [continuing]. Council on Foreign Relations report on 

that. The United States has very deep interests, obviously, in any 

kind of incident, be it very small or in gray-zone areas or a more 

direct military confrontation in the East China Sea, so we have to 

be very careful in our thinking, but also talk very closely with 

Japan about its thinking about how it might manage a response to 

the Chinese. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The Council on Foreign Relations report mentioned above can be found in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted 

for the Record’’ section at the end of this hearing.] 

Dr. SMITH. I do not know that I would be ready quite yet to extrapolate from the Ukrainian situation into Chinese behavior. I 

have watched, over the last couple of days, China’s initial responses to this, and they seem, themselves, quite cautious yet. I 

think there is an opportunity to engage with China, through the 

U.N. and directly, on its understanding of the situation in the 

Ukraine, and I think we ought to, with a particular emphasis on 

Chinese practices, as well. 

But, I think the escalatory path that I imagine in the East China 

Sea is one that could be direct, could come out of the island dispute, but could also be an opportunity that presents itself in a different confrontation; for example, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or, as you say, perhaps even elsewhere around the globe. 

I think the Japanese are particularly concerned about their readiness and their ability to respond, should China move against these 

disputed islands. And our ability to help them in making sure that 

they are ready to respond effectively, I think, will be very, very important. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Auslin. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for raising that. 

I think the short answer is, yes. And I think it is probably 

equally useful to look in the other direction, which is to say, What 

has Vladimir Putin seen in our reactions, or lack of reactions, to 

what China has been doing in this region for several years?—to say 

whether that may have encouraged his assessment of our willingness to—and the West’s willingness, overall—to opposed his recent 

moves. 

I agree, I think that China is misjudging Japan’s willingness to 

defend the Senkakus for as long as is entirely possible. And we just 

recently saw a move, out of the Japanese, to set up a new quickresponse force of 3,000 forces that would be designed specifically 

for amphibious combat and to respond to any threats to the 

islands. 

But, in terms of what China, itself, is taking away from the 

Ukraine situation, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has come out with 

a statement supporting what Russia is doing. So, it is clear on 

which side they are aligning themselves. There is a consistency, in 

terms of their willingness to support destabilizing actors and 

actions around the world, and this is no different. 

Whether or not this, as Dr. Smith said, extrapolates into their 

willingness to raise the risk level and use force regarding the 

Senkakus, I would just simply say, I think the trendline has 

already moved in that direction. We and the Japanese have made 

very clear the ways in which we want this to be resolved peacefully. And yet, now we have an ADIZ, we have broader claims over 

the waters, and the spread of this to away from just patrol boats 

to the navy itself. So, I think we should be worried about the risk 

line, and certainly the lessons that Beijing is getting from watching 

our responses to other such provocations around the world. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I thank you for that observation. It does 

have us very concerned. Another reason why how Ukraine is ultimately resolved is so important. 

Both of you have raised the dilemma of our relationship with 

Japan and the Republic of Korea and, so far, our inability to 

strengthen the ties between those two countries. So, what would 

you suggest that we could do that could get two allies that have 

strong views about each other to look to the future rather than to 

the past, recognizing the responsibility to acknowledge the historical issues? 

Dr. AUSLIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, if there were an easy solution 

to that answer, you know, we would all be celebrating it, and I am 

sure it would have been implemented. I think, again, what we need 

to be concerned about, at one level, is the trendline. And the 

trendline is, these relations are getting worse, they are not getting 

better. Whether China, itself, is seeking to put a wedge between 

South Korea and Japan, clearly President Park of South Korea has 

seen it in her own interest to move closer to China, to move away 

from what had been a fairly good working relationship with Japan. 

And that is something that has not improved over the year. And, 

in fact, Mr. Chairman, I would argue that that was probably a lot 

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of the decision, going into the decision that Prime Minister Abe 

made to visit the shrine in December, quite frankly. You noted that 

it came on the first anniversary of his coming back into office. And 

I think he gave a year to try to see how these relations were going 

to work with both China and South Korea, and, at the end of it, 

concluded that he had very little to lose by doing what he thought 

was right for his own domestic constituency, and send a message 

that is—Japan would be looking out for its own interests. 

Again, I do not know what is going on behind closed doors, but 

I think there comes a time where we, given our commitments to 

both of these countries, need to be extraordinarily blunt and have 

a real heart-to-heart talk, so to speak, with both of them about the 

problems this is causing. And I would argue, quite frankly, that our 

patience is not infinite; that, to the degree that this makes our job 

harder for them, then they need to not only think about what that 

might ultimately cause, in terms of the ability of the United States 

to fulfill its commitments, but also how we may rethink what is in 

our own best interests. 

Thank you. 

Dr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the President’s visit—President Obama’s visit to the two 

capitals in April provides an opportunity, at the highest level, for 

the President to convey his concerns to both Prime Minister Abe 

and to President Park. I do think that there was a certain movement that we could see going on, on the part of governments in 

South Korea and Japan, toward the end of last year. Very initial 

discussions with our team here in Washington and people in the 

think-tank world, as well, to sort of feel our way through of what 

a comprehensive discussion might look like between these two 

countries. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Yasukuni, I 

think, has set that back somewhat. 

I do think reconciliation, the final reconciliation between these 

two countries, needs to incorporate a broad host of issues. South 

Koreans are very concerned about Mr. Abe’s views on history, have 

asked him, directly and repeatedly, to reaffirm his commitment to 

both the Murayama and the Kono statements. I think, on the side 

of the Japanese, I hear often that reopening the basis of the 1965 

treaty, restarting again a conversation about compensation and settlements, when that was diplomatically accounted for in 1965, that 

would be a problem on the Japanese side. So, I think you have 

bookends at both ends here within which the Japanese and South 

Korean leaders will have to discuss what they think is possible. 

I do think that the power of the Presidency is great, and the 

President’s direct engagement with these two leaders may provide 

some stimulus to a conversation, perhaps a trilateral meeting later 

this year at the UNGA meeting in September, for example, may be 

another opportunity, down the road. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. I would strongly support what you are saying 

about the President’s visit, and I would hope he would have concrete suggestions, not just, ‘‘You need to improve the relationship,’’ 

but steps that could be taken by both leaders in doing that. 

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I had a chance to meet with both leaders in May in their respective capitals, and I sensed a real interest in trying to move forward. But, since that time, just the reverse has taken place. 

One final question or observation for you, and that is, in Japan, 

the interpretation of their constitution to allow for self-defense I 

think makes it possible that Japan will take its military presence 

to a new level. Is that a positive or a negative or just a reality type 

of observation? Is this something that we should be concerned 

about, or is this a natural evolution for Japan? 

Dr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 

I think the interpretation of collective self-defense has been outlined by the Abe Cabinet in a very specific way. And I suspect that, 

in April, the report of his advisory committee will be issued, and 

we will see the government develop very concretely what it means 

when it says that the Japanese military should be able to work 

alongside the United States military and perhaps other countries 

in the region in humanitarian and disaster capacities. So, I think 

we will get more granularity to the concept that the Abe government is putting forward in the next 5 to 6 months. 

I also suspect that the United States Department of Defense and 

the Japanese Ministry of Defense will be talking very carefully 

about how this will affect and enhance alliance cooperation on a 

number of the kinds of contingencies that we have talked about 

here this afternoon. 

I am not so much worried about the progress of this discussion, 

in large part because I trust the democratic practices of Japan. 

Their legislature will be very involved in that discussion, and I do 

not think you are going to see any government, be it Mr. Abe’s or 

any others, be able to move the Japanese people in a direction that 

they do not want to go. 

So, I suspect you will have a very full parliamentary discussion 

this coming fall and that you will hear all kinds of viewpoints representing the popular sentiments and concerns inside Japan about 

reinterpreting that particular piece of Japan’s Constitution. 

Thank you. 

Dr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, I would just say, we should be concerned only if it does not go through. I think that it is an extraordinarily important step for Japan that is part of moves that have 

been undertaken by both the Democratic Party, when it was in 

power, and now under Mr. Abe, which is, for example, buying the 

F–35s and the increase in their abilities in ballistic missile defense, 

as we have seen. 

Allowing for a reinterpretation of the right to the exercise of collective self-defense will only help Japan become an exporter of 

security, and that is something we want to see. We want to see 

Japan not be as isolated as it has been for many of its neighbors, 

but to—as much as it has done work on things like counterterrorism and antiterrorism, on—its Coast Guard is active around the 

region. This is an extraordinary opportunity for Japan to become 

truly engaged with its neighbors in a way that removes ambiguity 

about its commitment to stability in the region. And so, anything 

that we can do to encourage this or encourage the process within 

the structures of the alliance, I think we should be doing. 

Thank you. 

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Senator CARDIN. Well, once again, thank both of you for your 

very helpful testimony before the subcommittee. And I will look forward to reading the report that you have submitted for our review. 

We are going to keep the committee record open until close of 

business Friday, in the likelihood that members may have questions that they would like to submit for the record. If you are the 

recipient of those questions, we ask that you try to respond as 

promptly as possible. 

And, with that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF DAVID F. HELVEY TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY

Question. The relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa has 

been a thorn in the side of the alliance for over 15 years, although the Okinawan 

Governor’s landfill permit approval late last year was an important milestone that 

should allow for more progress with this project. You stated that the realignment 

and movement of troops to Guam is ′′on-track.′′ 

♦ Is the Department of Defense confident that Japan and the United States are 

on the same page when it comes to the sequencing and funding for the Futenma 

Replacement Facility and the movement of troops to Guam? 

♦ Are the stakeholders in this process prepared to make timely decisions and take 

care of their own responsibilities efficiently? 

Answer. The Department has closely coordinated with the Government of Japan 

to ensure that we have a common plan for sequencing and funding of the realignment initiatives on Okinawa and Guam, including the Futenma Replacement Facility. This multifaceted effort is regularly reviewed to take into account both actual 

and anticipated changes occurring in the implementation of this plan. 

As part of this review process, working together with our GoJ counterparts, and 

taking into account variables such as available funding, construction capacity and 

sequencing, and collateral construction requirements, we have and will continue to 

make adjustments to the plan in as efficient and timely a manner as possible. 

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT ‘‘A SINO-JAPANESE CLASH IN THE EAST

CHINA SEA’’ SUBMITTED BY DR. SHEILA A. SMITH

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