NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEENAN G. WILKINS, AKA Nerrah 

Brown, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16232 

D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01858-DADBAM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2019**

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. 

California state prisoner Keenan G. Wilkins, AKA Nerrah Brown, appeals 

pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action 

alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 24 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-16232 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 

1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We may affirm on 

any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th 

Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wilkins’s access-to-courts claim 

because Wilkins failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant caused 

an actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 

349-53 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and actual injury 

requirement).

The district court properly dismissed Wilkins’s equal protection claim 

because Wilkins failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant acted 

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon membership in a 

protected class. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth requirements of an equal protection claim); see 

also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se 

pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual 

allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

Denial of Wilkins’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief was proper 

because there was no claim upon which to request relief or remedies. See Mt. 

Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when 
3 18-16232 

underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary

injunctive relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore 

moot); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 

F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (in order “[t]o obtain declaratory relief in federal 

court, there must be an independent basis for jurisdiction”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.