J-S42005-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JASON WALKER,

Appellant No. 3204 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 14, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012793-2012

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2015

Appellant, Jason Walker, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on November 

14, 2013, following a bench trial. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

Complainant Kendra Devine testified that on June 30, 

2012, she entered into an agreement with a third party simply 

identified as Sharrief[1]to “scheme the bank” the following day. 

Ms. Devine testified her scheme required her to purchase stolen 

checks from a third party, and acquire ATM cards and pin 

numbers linked to valid bank accounts of a separate party. She 

would then forge a check, deposit it into the account via ATM 

machine, and if the bank transferred all or a portion of the funds 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 While the trial court spells “Sharief” variously as “Sharrief,” the notes of 

testimony establish “Sharief” as the correct spelling. N.T., 5/10/13, at 22.
J-S42005-15

- 2 -

to the account automatically, withdraw the amount made 

available. At approximately 1 pm the next day, July 1, 2012, 

Ms. Devine met Sharieff on the corner of 78th and Elmwood. 

Sharieff was accompanied by [Appellant] and the co-defendant 

Henry Clay.[2]

Ms. Devine entered the vehicle and the group proceeded to 

the TruMark Bank at 18th and Market St. Ms. Devine left the car 

with the ATM card and pin number of an account belonging to a 

female acquaintance of the co-defendant. She approached the 

bank alone, while the other members of her party remained a 

distance away. After depositing a forged check into the account, 

she was able to immediately withdraw $460 from the ATM, but 

concealed this fact from the others by hiding the money in her 

shoe.

The group next proceeded on foot to Chase Bank, located 

several blocks away, where [Appellant] had an account. Ms. 

Devine’s attempt to withdraw money from this second account 

was unsuccessful. When she re-entered the vehicle, she did so 

voluntarily as she believed she was being brought back to her 

home for the day. But the car drove past the exit to Ms. 

Devine’s home, at which time [Appellant] and his associates 

immediately accused Ms. Devine of withdrawing and concealing 

money from the TruMark ATM. From this time forward, Ms. 

Devine testified she was held against her will. After 

approximately five minutes of driving, the car came to a stop 

near Spring Garden Street, where Ms. Devine testified she was 

squeezed around the neck and hit until she conceded the money 

at issue was hidden in her shoe. Ms. Devine testified that after 

the discovery of the money she was punched by the codefendant and [Appellant] and as a result, she got a busted lip.

The parties resumed driving and Ms. Devine began to 

secretly dial 9-1-1 from the cellphone she kept in her pocket. 

Because 9-1-1 calls are recorded, much of the subsequent 

exchanges between Ms. Devine and the defendants were 

captured on tape over the course of multiple 9-1-1 calls. Ms. 

Devine was later played these tapes, and identified [Appellant] 

____________________________________________

2

 The notes of testimony establish the co-defendant’s name as Horace Clay. 

N.T., 5/10/13, at 1.
J-S42005-15

- 3 -

and his accomplices as the other voices on the 9-1-1 recordings, 

a transcript of which was entered into evidence as exhibit C-3. 

The recordings support Ms. Devine’s testimony that she was told 

she would get home safe if the money from her second bad 

check was placed in [Appellant’s] account by 9 pm. The group 

also made references to violence being done to Ms. Devine. On 

Page 11 of the 9-1-1 transcript the party identified as Sharieff 

says[,] “I’m going to say, ‘yeah, I hit her but’—‘yeah she robbed 

us.’” The co-defendant states on Page 10 of the transcript[,] “I 

ain’t even going to put my hands on you no more.”

After approximately thirty minutes, the car came to a stop 

at 19th Street and Montgomery Avenue. At this time, the party 

identified as Sharieff exited the vehicle and entered a home on 

the corner of the block. Ms. Devine testified that Sharieff 

returned with a gun. This testimony was supported by the 

transcript of the 9-1-1 calls, which recorded Ms. Devine’s 

exclamation[,] “You just got a gun!” and Sharieff’s response[,] 

“I’m definitely strapped. Four pound and everything.” Ms. 

Devine testified that “strapped” refers to carrying a gun and 

“four pound” means .45 semiautomatic handgun. [Appellant] 

subsequently advised Ms. Devine multiple times that her safe 

return home hinged on the successful transfer of money to 

[Appellant’s] account. “If that money on there[,] I’m going to 

make sure you get home safe;” “If that money ain’t on there 

then you lost out here.”

After roughly fifteen to twenty minutes stopped at 19th 

Street and Montgomery Avenue, Sergeant Vincent Morris of the 

Philadelphia Police Department arrived on the scene in response 

to a 9-1-1 report of a woman screaming. Sergeant Morris 

approached the group to check if they were okay. At this time 

Ms. Devine mouthed the words “help me.” Investigating further, 

Sergeant Morris testified Ms. Devine had a bloody lip and was 

shaking. In response, Sergeant Morris detained [Appellant] and 

the other members of his group.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 5–7 (internal citations to record omitted).

Appellant was arrested on July 1, 2012, and charged with robbery, 

kidnapping, conspiracy, possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), 

terroristic threats, simple assault, and false imprisonment. Appellant waived 
J-S42005-15

- 4 -

a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial on May 10, 2013. The trial court 

found Appellant not guilty of robbery, kidnapping, conspiracy, and PIC, and 

guilty of terroristic threats, simple assault, and false imprisonment. On 

August 8, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one to five years of 

imprisonment for terroristic threats and consecutive terms of one to two 

years each for simple assault and false imprisonment, for an aggregate 

sentence of three to nine years.

On August 14, 2013, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the 

trial court granted in part and denied in part on November 14, 2013. N.T., 

11/14/13, at 18. The trial court denied Appellant’s claims relating to the 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence but amended Appellant’s sentence for 

terroristic threats to one to two years, for a new aggregate sentence of three 

to six years of imprisonment. Id. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on 

November 18, 2013. Pursuant to trial court order, Appellant filed a timely 

statement pursuant Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 

FINDING OF GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ON 

THE CHARGES OF TERRORISTIC THREATS AND FALSE 

IMPRISONMENT.

II. THE FINDING OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGES OF THE 

EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF 

GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE CHARGES 

OF SIMPLE ASSAULT, TERRORISTIC THREATS AND FALSE 

IMPRISONMENT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE.
J-S42005-15

- 5 -

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (verbatim).

Appellant’s first issue relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. In 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the 

evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, 

were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119 (Pa. 2013). It is within 

the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to 

each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–793 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the 

crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 985 

(Pa. 2014). Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. 

Commonwealth v. Rogal, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 PA Super 148 (filed July 7, 

2015).

The trial court held that Appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim 

was too vague to permit the trial court to conduct meaningful review. Trial 

Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 3–4. In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, 

Appellant merely averred that “[t]he evidence was insufficient to sustain a 

finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of terroristic 
J-S42005-15

- 6 -

threats and false imprisonment.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 11/26/13, 

at 1. The trial court determined that Appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

claim was waived due to the vagueness of the Rule 1925 statement and its 

failure to identify any argument, thereby requiring the trial court “to guess” 

as to the basis for the issue. Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 4.

Rule 1925 requires that an appellant “concisely identify each ruling or 

error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify 

all pertinent issues[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “When a court has to guess 

what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful 

review.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 969 A.2d 1236, 1239 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (“When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner 

the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its 

preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.”).

Specifically, we have stated that “[i]n order to preserve a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

statement must state with specificity the element or elements upon which 

the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth 

v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013). The Court further 

explained that “[s]uch specificity is of particular importance in cases where, 

as here, the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which 

contains different elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 344. Failure to identify what specific elements 
J-S42005-15

- 7 -

the Commonwealth failed to prove at trial in a Rule 1925(b) statement 

renders an appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim waived for appellate 

review. Id.

Here, Appellant was convicted of three different crimes, each of which 

involved different elements. Appellant’s 1925(b) statement questioned 

whether the Commonwealth put forth sufficient proof to support two of his 

three convictions, but failed to state with specificity any particular elements 

of the crimes the Commonwealth failed to prove. Thus, the trial court was 

forced to speculate about the possible errors because Appellant did not 

identify them. Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency claim is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Veon, 109 A.3d 754 (Pa. Super. 2015) (sufficiency-ofevidence issue waived where Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement “is sweeping and 

generalized [in that it] maintains that the evidence was insufficient, but 

utterly fails to pinpoint any . . . specific element of [the appellant’s] 

convicted crimes that lacked sufficient evidence”) (citing Garland, 63 A.3d 

339).

Furthermore, even if not waived, Appellant’s sufficiency claim would 

afford him no relief. In his appellate brief, Appellant lists specific reasons 

why he believes the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. 

Appellant’s Brief at 13–16. He bases his sufficiency argument relating to 

false imprisonment on the contention that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

that Appellant restrained Ms. Devine’s liberty. Appellant’s Brief at 13. 
J-S42005-15

- 8 -

Relating to his conviction for terroristic threats, Appellant maintains the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that he made any threats to Ms. Devine. 

Id. at 14.

In pertinent part, the Crimes Code provides that a person commits 

false imprisonment, a misdemeanor of the second degree, “if he knowingly 

restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2903(a). Furthermore, “A person is legally accountable for the 

conduct of another person when he is an accomplice of such other person in 

the commission of the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(3). A person is an 

accomplice if he “aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in 

planning or committing” an offense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c)(2).

The trial court, addressing the merits in the alternative, stated:

The facts found at trial clearly fit the elements of False 

Imprisonment as Ms. Devine was held against her will for over 

half an hour, and transported several miles away. First, 19th 

and Montgomery Avenue, the location where Sergeant Morris 

found the complainant, is more than three miles from the 

location of the Chase Bank ATM, where Ms. Devine testified she 

was first held against her will. Additionally, the 9-1-1 tapes 

capturing this trip span more than thirty minutes. Further, the 

transcript of the 9-1-1 calls reveal[s] the parties were fully 

aware they were keeping Ms. Devine in the car against her will. 

Captured on the transcript are several statements where Ms. 

Devine was told she would get home safe[ly] if the money from 

her second check was placed in the account by 9 pm. (N.T., 

5/10/13 pg. 62).

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 9.

Appellant suggests that as a backseat passenger, he was not in control 

of the vehicle and “did nothing in any way to restrain Devine.” Appellant’s 
J-S42005-15

- 9 -

Brief at 13. Appellant fails to note that as co-defendant Horace Clay drove 

the vehicle, Appellant was positioned in the back seat of the vehicle strongarming the victim and hitting her. N.T., 5/10/13, at 38. While the men 

were driving Ms. Devine and assuring her that they would return her to the 

pick-up location, they drove past the exit whereupon Appellant put the 

victim “in a headlock” and choked her. Id. at 34. This restraint on Ms. 

Devine’s liberty is sufficient to prove false imprisonment. See 

Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 391 A.2d 662 (Pa. Super. 1978) (victim’s 

wife’s testimony that she saw her husband being assaulted by several men 

in back seat of car, including defendant, and that car was then driven away 

with her husband inside it and still being assaulted, was sufficient to prove 

defendant’s guilt of false imprisonment); In re T.G., 836 A.2d 1003, 1009 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (evidence that the appellant grabbed the victim by her 

arm, took her inside a house with the door closed, pulled her hair, and would 

not permit her to leave was sufficient evidence of false imprisonment). 

Thus, we would find the evidence sufficient to prove false imprisonment.

The crime of terroristic threats is defined as:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of terroristic 

threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, 

a threat to:

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to 

terrorize another;

(2) cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly 

or facility of public transportation; or
J-S42005-15

- 10 -

(3) otherwise cause serious public inconvenience, or 

cause terror or serious public inconvenience with 

reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror 

or inconvenience.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a). The trial court found Appellant guilty of subsection 

(a)(1). Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 9. Referring to the statement from 

the 9-1-1 recordings,3the trial court noted that there “were clearly threats 

of harm . . . to Ms. Devine if she did not get them money by a set deadline.” 

Id. Males in the vehicle are heard stating, “If that money on [sic] there 

then I’m gonna make sure you get home safe. . . . If that money ain’t on 

[sic] there then you lost out here.” N.T., 5/10/13, at 116. Appellant and 

his co-horts beat Ms. Devine in the back seat of the car while the vehicle 

was driven around for thirty minutes, threatening her safety unless she 

produced the money. Id. at 36–39. When they removed her from the 

vehicle, Appellant and the other two men surrounded her, telling her she 

would not be harmed if she provided the money by 9:00 p.m. Id. at 64. 

When Sergeant Morris came upon the group as a result of the 9-1-1 calls, 

____________________________________________

3

 Both Appellant and the Commonwealth, in addition to the trial court, refer 

to a transcript from the 9-1-1 tapes, which was admitted into evidence at 

trial. N.T., 5/10/13, at 63, 134. That transcript is not in the record certified 

to us on appeal. The appellant “has the duty to ensure that the record is 

complete for purposes of appellate review, Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 

A.3d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2013),” and therefore, we could have found this 

issue waived on this basis as well. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 

711, 725 (Pa. Super. 2015). We rely on the testimony relating to the 9-1-1 

transcript in addressing this portion of the sufficiency claim in the 

alternative.
J-S42005-15

- 11 -

Ms. Devine, who was shaking and had a bloody lip, mouthed the words, 

“Help me.” Id. at 125–126.

In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction of 

terroristic threats, this Court has stated as follows:

The harm sought to be avoided is the psychological distress that 

follows an invasion of the victim’s sense of personal security. 

See [Commonwealth v. Tizer, 454 Pa.Super. 1, 684 A.2d 597, 

600 (1996)] id. Consequently, “neither the defendant’s ability 

to carry out the threat nor the victim’s belief that it will be 

carried out is an essential element of the crime.” Id.; see also 

Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 400 Pa.Super. 79, 582 A.2d 

1352, 1358 (1990). Similarly, “it is unnecessary for an 

individual to specifically articulate the crime of violence which he 

or she intends to commit where the type of crime may be 

inferred from the nature of the statement and the context and 

circumstances surrounding the utterance of the statement.” Id. 

Thus, “a direct communication between the defendant and the 

victim is not required to establish the crime.” In re L.A., 853 

A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 976 A.2d 1184, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009), aff’d 

in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 30 A.3d 1105 (Pa. 2011). We find 

the evidence of record sufficient to support the conviction for terroristic 

threats.

Appellant also challenges the weight of the evidence supporting the 

verdict. The trial court will award a new trial only when the jury’s verdict is 

so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 213 (Pa. Super. 2015). “In 

determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited 

to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly exercised, and relief will 
J-S42005-15

- 12 -

be granted only where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 

2008). Thus, “the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on a 

weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.” 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (Pa. 2009).

Initially, we note that while the weight claim was preserved in 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion, our discussion regarding the vagueness of 

the Rule 1925(b) statement is applicable, in whole, to this issue as well. 

Thus, we find the weight-of-the-evidence issue waived.

Even if not waived, the issue has no merit. In short, Appellant’s 

weight claim contends that Ms. Devine was an incredible witness. This Court 

has stated that a new trial is not warranted based on a mere assertion of “a 

reassessment of the credibility of witnesses.” Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 724 

(citing Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 665 (Pa. Super. 2007)). 

The trial court, as finder of facts, credited Ms. Devine’s testimony. After 

careful review, we would not find the verdicts so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J-S42005-15

- 13 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2015