NIST Special Publication 800-33

Nisr

National Institute of Standards

and Technology

Technology Administration

U.S. Department of Commerce

Underlying Technical Models

for Information Technology

Security

Recommendations of the National

Institute of Standards and Technology

Gary Stoneburner

COMPUTER SECURITY
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NisT Special Publication 800 33 Underlying Technical Models for

Information Technology Security

Recommendation of the

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Gary Stonebumer

COMPUTER SECURITY

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

December 2001

U.S. Department of Commerce

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

Technology Administration

Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary ofCommercefor Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director
Reports on Information Security Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement

and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept

implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information

technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and

management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified

information in Federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research,

guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government,

and academic organizations.

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in

order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not

intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and

Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-33

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-33, 27 pages (December 2001)

CODEN: NSPUE2

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Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction 1 2.0 Security Goal and Objectives 2

3.0 Security Services Model 5

3.1 Service Definitions 6

3.2 Achieving Security Objectives 7

4.0 Implementing Security Objectives - Distributed Systems 13

4.1 Distributed Security Services 13

4.2 Security Domains 15

4.3 Network Views 16

5.0 Risk Management 18

6.0 Definitions 20

APPENDIX A: References 24

Table of Figures

Figure 2-1 Security Objective Dependencies 3

Figure 3-1 Security Services Model 5

Figure 3.2-1 Primary Availability Services 8

Figure 3.2-2 Primary Integrity Services 9

Figure 3.2-3 Primary Confidentiality Services 10

Figure 3.2-4 Primary Accountability Services 11

Figure 3.2-5 Primary Assurance Services 12

Figure 4.1-1 Distributed Security Services 13

Figure 4.2-1 Overlapping Security Domains 15

Figure 4.3-1 Distributed Intranet 16

Figure 4.3-2 Compartmented Intranet 16

Figure 4.3-3 "External" Transactions 17

Figure 4.3-4 Detect and Contain 17

Figure 5-1 Basics of Risk Mitigation - "Attacks" 18

Figure 5-2 Basics of Risk Mitigation - Errors/Mistakes 19

1.0 Introduction

Authority

This document has been developed by NIST in furtherance of its statutory responsibihties (under

the Computer Security Act of 1987 and the Information Technology Management Reform Act of

1996, specifically 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3(a)(5)). This is not a guideline within the meaning of (15

U.S.C. 278 g-3 (a)(3)).

This document is recommended for use by Federal organizations which process sensitive

information,' and is consistent with the requirements of 0MB Circular A- 130, Appendix m.

The recommendations herein are not mandatory and binding standards. This document may be

used by non-governmental organizations on a voluntary basis. It is not subject to copyright.

Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory

and binding upon Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under his statutory authority.

Nor should these recommendations be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing

authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,

or any other Federal official.

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a description of the technical foundations, termed

"models," that underlie secure information technology (IT).

The intent is to provide, in a concise form, the models that should be considered in the design

and development of technical security capabilities. These models encompass lessons learned,

good practices, and specific technical considerations.

Audience

The intended audience consists of both government and private sectors including:

IT users desiring a better understanding of system security,

Engineers and architects designing/building security capabilities, and

Those developing guidance for others to use in implementing security capabilities.

' The Computer Security Act defines the term "sensitive information" as: any information, the loss, misuse, or

unauthorized access to or modification ofwhich could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of

Federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under section 552a oftitle 5, United States Code

(the Privacy Act), but which has not been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order

or an Act ofCongress to be kept secret in the interest ofnational defense orforeign policy.

SP 800-33 Page 1 December 2001
2.0 Security Goal and Objectives

Security Goal

The goal of information technology security is to:

Enable an organization to meet all of its mission/business objectives by implementing

systems with due care consideration of IT-related risks to the organization, its partners and

customers.

Security Objectives

The security goal can be met through the following security objectives:

1 . Availability (of systems and data for intended use only)

Availability is a requirement intended to assure that systems work promptly and service is not

denied to authorized users. This objective protects against:

• hitentional or accidental attempts to either:

- perform unauthorized deletion of data, or - otherwise cause a denial of service or data.

• Attempts to use system or data for unauthorized purposes

Availability is frequently an organization's foremost security objective.

2. Integrity (of system and data)

hitegrity has two facets:

• Data integrity (the property that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner

while in storage, during processing, or while in transit), or

• System integrity (the quality that a system has when performing the intended function

in an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation).

Integrity is commonly an organization's most important security objective after availability.

3. Confidentiality (of data and system information)

Confidentiality is the requirement that private or confidential information not be disclosed to

unauthorized individuals. Confidentiality protection applies to data in storage, during

processing, and while in transit.

For many organizations, confidentiality is frequently behind availability and integrity in terms

of importance. Yet for some systems and for specific types of data in most systems (e.g.,

authenticators), confidentiality is extremely important.

SP 800-33 Page 2 December 2001

J
4. Accountability (to the individual level)

Accountability is the requirement that actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to that

entity.

Accountability is often an organizational policy requirement and directly supports nonrepudiation, deterrence, fault isolation, intrusion detection and prevention, and after-action

recovery and legal action.

5. Assurance (that the other four objectives have been adequately met)

Assurance is the basis for confidence that the security measures, both technical and

operational, work as intended to protect the system and the information it processes. The

other four security objectives (integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability) have

been adequately met by a specific implementation when:

• required functionality is present and correctly implemented,

• there is sufficient protection against unintentional errors (by users or software), and

• there is sufficient resistance to intentional penetration or by-pass.

Assurance is essential; without it the other objectives are not met. However, assurance is a continuum; the amount of assurance needed varies between systems.

Security Objective hiterdependencies

The five security objectives are interdependent. Achieving one objective without consideration

of the others is seldom possible. This is depicted in Figure 2-1 and discussed below.

(confidentiality

(

Integrity )

(

Availability ^

^ > A ^ (confidentiality (

Integrity )

(

Integrity )

t

(confidentiality

(Accountability^

( confidentiality (

Integrity ^

c

I

Assurance

Figure 2-1 Security Objective Dependencies

SP 800-33 Page 3 December 2001
The Figure 2-1 shows the following dependencies:

Confidentiality is dependent on Integrity, in that if the integrity of the system is lost, then

there is no longer a reasonable expectation that the confidentiality mechanisms are still valid.

Integrity is dependent on Confidentiality, in that if the confidentiality of certain information

is lost (e.g., the superuser password), then the integrity mechanisms are likely to be by-passed.

AvailabiUty and Accountability are dependent on Confidentiality and Integrity, in that:

• if confidentiality is lost for certain informadon (e.g., superuser password), the

mechanisms implementing these objectives are easily by-passable; and

• if system integrity is lost, then confidence in the validity of the mechanisms implementing

these objectives is also lost.

All of these objectives are interdependent with Assurance. When designing a system, an

architect or engineer establishes an assurance level as a target. This target is achieved by both

defining and meeting the functionality requirements in each of the other four objectives and

doing so with sufficient "quality." Assurance highlights the fact that for a system to be secure, it must not only provide the intended functionality, but also ensure that undesired actions do not

occur.

SP 800-33 Page 4 December 2001
3.0 Security Services IVIodel

The underlying technical security services model is depicted in Figure 3-1 which shows the

primary services and supporting elements used in implementing an information technology

security capability, along with their primary relationships. The model also classifies the services

according to their primary purpose as follows:

• Support. These services are generic and underlie most information technology security

capabilities.

• Prevent. These services focus on preventing a security breach from occurring.

• Recover. The services in this category focus on the detection and recovery from a security

breach.

Protected Communications

(safe from disclosure, substitution, modification, & replay)

Identification (and Naming)

Crj'ptograpliic Key Management

Security Administration

System Protections

(least privilege, object reuse, process separation, ct(^.)

Figure 3-1 Security Services Model

Section Roadmap - This section contains the following information:

• definition for each of the services listed in the model; and

• breakout of the model for each of the five security objectives, giving the primary services for

implementing each objective.

SP 800-33 Page 5 December 2001
3.1 Service Definitions

Supporting:

Supporting services are, by their very nature, pervasive and inter-related with many other

services. The supporting services are:

• Identification (and naming) In order to implement many of the other services, it is essential

that both subjects and objects be identifiable. This service provides the capability to uniquely

identify users, processes, and information resources.

• Cryptographic key management Cryptographic keys must be securely managed when

cryptographic fimctions are implemented in various other services.

• Security administration The security features of the system need to be administered in order

to meet the needs of a specific installation and to account for changes in the operational

environment.

• System protections Underlying the various security fiinctional capabilities is a base of

confidence in the technical implementation. This represents the quality of the

implementation firom both the perspective of the design processes used and the manner in

which the implementation was accomplished. Some examples of system protections are: residual information protection (also known as object reuse), least privilege, process

separation, modularity, layering, and minimization of what needs to be trusted.

Prevention:

These services can prevent the security breach from ever happening.

• Protected communications In a distributed system, the ability to accomplish security

objectives is highly dependent on trustworthy communications. The protected

communications service ensures the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information

while in transit. In most situations all three elements are essential requirements, with

confidentiality being needed at least for authentication information.

• Authentication Ensuring that a claimed identity is valid is extremely important. The

authentication service provides the means to verify the identity of a subject.

• Authorization The authorization service enables specification and subsequent management

of the allowed actions for a given system.

• Access control enforcement When the subject requesting access has been validated for access to particular processes, enforcing the defined security policy s still necessary. The

access control enforcement service provides this enforcement, and firequently the enforcement

mechanisms are distributed throughout the system. It is not only the correctness of the access

control decision, but also the strength of the access control enforcement that determines the

level of security obtained. Checking identity and requested access against access control lists

is a common access control enforcement mechanism. File encryption is another example of

an access control enforcement mechanism.

SP 800-33 Page 6 December 2001
• Non-repudiation System accountability depends upon the ability to ensure that senders

cannot deny sending information and that receivers carmot deny receiving it. Nonrepudiation is a service that spans prevention and detection. This service has been placed

into the prevention category because the mechanisms implemented prevent the ability to

successfully repudiate an action. As a result, this service is typically performed at the point

of transmission or reception.

• Transaction privacv Both government and private systems are increasingly required to

maintain the privacy of individuals using these systems. The transaction privacy service

protects against loss of privacy with respect to transactions being performed by an individual.

Detection and Recovery:

Because no set of prevention measures is perfect, it is necessary to both detect security breaches

and to take actions to reduce their impact.

• Audit The auditing of security relevant events is a key element for after-the-fact detection of

and recovery from security breaches.

• hitrusion detection and containment Detecting insecure situations is essential in order to

respond in a timely manner. Also, detecting a security breach is of little use if no effective

response can be initiated. The intrusion detection and contairmient service provides these

two capabilities.

• Proof of Wholeness hi order to determine that integrity has been compromised, the ability

must exist to detect when information or system state is potentially corrupted. The proof of

wholeness service provides this ability.

• Restore "secure" state When a security breach occurs, the system must be able to return to a

state that is known to be secure. That is the purpose for this service.

3.2 Achieving Security Objectives

The figures below show those services that are most important in achieving the following

security objectives:

Figure 3.2-1 - Availability

Figure 3.2-2 - Integrity

Figure 3.2-3 - Confidentiality

Figure 3.2-4 - Accountability

Figure 3.2-5 - Assurance

SP 800-33 Page 7 December 2001
User

or Process

<- -^j^Authorizationj

A

Access Control

k Enforcement

intrusion Detection

and Containment

Proof of ]^

Wholeness J

Restore

"Secure" State

Protected Communications

(safe from disclosure, substitution, modification, & replay)

Identification (and Naming)

Cryptographic Key Management

Prevent

Recover

Resource

w

Figure 3.2-1 Primary Availability Services

The primary availability services are those that directly impact the ability of the system to

maintain operational effectiveness. One aspect of maintaining effectiveness is protection from

unauthorized changes or deletions by defining authorized access and enforcing this definition.

Mission effectiveness is also maintained by detecting intrusions, detecting a loss of wholeness,

and providing the means of returning to a secure state.

SP 800-33 Page 8 December 2001

I
User

or Process

-^^Authorizatioi^

Access Control

Enforcement

Intrusion Detection

and Containment

Proof of

Wholeness

Restore

"Secure" State

Protected Communications

(safe from disclosure, substitution, modiflcation, & replay)

Prevent

Recover .

Resource

Identification (and Naming)

Cryptographic Key Management

Figure 3.2-2 Primary Integrity Services

The services that provide for availabihty also provide for integrity. This is because maintaining

or restoring integrity is an essential part of maintaining availability. Although availability is only

concerned with changes (or deletions) that impact mission availability, the practical reality is that

the applicable security mechanisms do not differentiate between purposes for the unauthorized

access nor between impacts of loss of wholeness.

SP 800-33 Page 9 December 2001
User

or

Process

Transaction

Privacy

->-^Authorizatioi^

Access Control

Enforcement

Prevent

R.ecover

Protected Communications

(safe from disclosure, substitution, modiflcation, <& replay)

Identification (and Naming)

Cryptographic Key Management

Figure 3.2-3 Primary Confidentiality Services

V

Once lost, confidentiality cannot be restored. Therefore, the detection and recovery services that

can play an important role in maintaining availability and integrity do not apply to

confidentiality. The protection of communications from disclosure, the enforcement of

authorized read accesses, and the capability for privacy provide for confidentiality.

SP 800-33 Page 10 December 2001

I
User

or Process

A

Nonrepudiation

Access Control

Enforcement

Audit

Identification (and Naming)

Cryptographic Key Management

Prevent

Recover

Resource

Figure 3.2-4 Primary Accountability Services

Maintaining accountability for user actions is performed primarily by the audit and nonrepudiation services. Access control enforcement is also included as the primary generator of

records of user actions.

SP 800-33 Page 1

December 2001
Protected Communications

(safe from disclosure, substitution, modiflcation, & replay)

r

Security Administration

System Protections '

(least privilege, object reuse, process separation, etc.)

Figure 3.2-5 Primary Assurance Services

Assurance is grounds for confidence that the security objectives are met and, as indicated in

section 2.0, encompasses both correct and sufficient security capabihties. This requires

consideration of both "what" is provided and "how" it is provided (the architecture, design, and

implementation). Also, as shown in the following section 4.1, assurance spans the system both

logically and physically. Clearly assurance is pervasive and can be viewed from several

perspectives. From the perspective of specific security services, assurance is most impacted by

those services that directly impact the correct, on-going security capabilities of the system. In

this regard the nature of the authentication being performed and the strength of the access control

enforcement capability are extremely important. Additionally, the presence of an effective

restoration capability can provide significant grounds for confidence. The audit service can be of

great benefit in achieving assurance if used effectively and with recognition for its weaknesses.

Finally, good security administration and system protections are essential to an objective basis

for confidence in the security capabilities of a system.

SP 800-33 Page 12 December 2001
4.0 Implementing Security Objectives - Distributed Systems

This section describes the following aspects of distributed systems:

• Security services distributed physically and logically

• Security domains

• Network views

4.1 Distributed Security Services

Figure 4- 1 depicts the distributed security services and how services rest upon other services

because they are logically and physically distributed across the network. Additionally, the figure

shows that all services ultimately depend on operating system mechanisms, that system assurance

is a key element "surrounding" the entire capability, and that system management is another

important aspect of an effective security capability.

System Assurance

System Management

User-Application and Client-Server

Security Services

Middleware

Security Services

rz:

Lower-Layer

Security Services

Multi-Layer,

Distributed, System Security Services

(co.operating elements distributed physically across network and logically across layers)

71

Operating System

Security Services

(underlie all distributed services)

System Assurance is the grounds for confidence

(reasons to expect quality and dependability)

Figure 4.1-1 Distributed Security Services

Distributed security services depend on the foundations of system assurance and operating

system security services.

SP 800-33 Page 13 December 2001
a. System assurance. Assurance is "grounds for confidence that an entity meets its security

objectives" [1]. Assurance can also be described as the system characteristic enabUng

confidence that the system fulfills its intended purpose. A secure system implementation

must be of sufficient quality to provide confidence in the correct operation of security

mechanisms and in the system's resistance to deliberate or unintentional penetration.

Technology has been developed to produce and measure the assurance of information

systems. System assurance can be increased by:

• Applying less complex technical solutions

• Using more trustworthy components

• Architecting to limit the impact of penetrations, both by limiting the extent of a

vulnerability or by implementing detection and recovery capabilities

• Integrating technology in the context of the operational environment

• Taking advantage of non-technical countermeasures.

As depicted in Figure 4.1-1, system assurance both supports the architecture and spans it.

b. Operating system security services . Whenever such underlying services exist, system

security ultimately depends on the underlying operating system services and mechanisms. If

these underlying supports are weak, then security can be bypassed or subverted. System

security can be no stronger than the underlying operating system. The graphic depicts a separate OS security "layer" to highlight this essential concept.

While some services reside in a particular logical level of the system hierarchy, many are implemented via mechanisms that span the system both physically and logically. This is depicted

in Figure 4.1-1 by the logical levels of Application/Client-Server, Middleware, and lower layers.

Each layer can depend on capabilities supplied by lower layers or, as shown, directly on

operating system mechanisms.

Additionally, the figure shows that some distributed services do not exist at any one level, but are implemented by cooperating mechanisms at several levels. Common examples of distributed

services are identification and authentication (I&A). The user interface, typically part of

application level software (for example a Telnet client), must interact with the user to obtain the

necessary information. The information must then be passed to a process that will determine

whether the supplied data is correct. This process is likely to be running at the operating system

level, or it might be at the presentation, session, or even network levels of the Organization for

International Standardization (ISO) open system interconnect (OSI) model [3,4]. It is not

uncommon for the information to be collected on one machine and transmitted across the

network to another machine (a network authentication server for example). This I&A example

with a network authentication server results in the security services being physically distributed

across at least two machines and requiring the cooperative efforts of mechanisms residing at all

seven levels of the OSI.

SP 800-33 Page 14 December 2001
4.2 Security Domains

A foundation for IT security is the concept of security domains and enforcement of data and

process flow restrictions within and between these domains.

A domain is a set of active entities (person, process, or device), their data objects, and a common

security poHcy.

Domains can be logical as well as physical; dividing an organization's computing enterprise into

domains is analogous to building fences (various types of security barriers), placing gates within

the fences (e.g., firewalls, gateways, and internal process separation), and assigning guards to

control traffic through the gates (technical and procedural security services).

Domains are defined using factors that include one or more of the following:

• Physical (e.g., building, campus, region, etc.)

• Business process (e.g., persormel, finance, etc.)

• Security mechanisms (e.g., Microsoft NT domain, Sun Network hiformation System

(NIS), etc.)

The key elements to be addressed in defining domains are flexibility, tailored protection, domain

interrelationships, and the use of multiple perspectives to determine what is important in

information technology security.

Figure 4.2-1 Overlapping Security Domains

SP 800-33 Page 15 December 2001
4.3 Network Views

Distributed Intranets

An organization's intranet is typically dispersed physically and interconnected by circuits that are frequently not controlled by the organization. This is depicted in Figure 4.3-1

.

Intranet (Under organization's authority)

Externally controlled

dedicated leased circuits

Externally controlled

dedicated bandwidth circuits

Intranet (Under organization's authority)

Intranet (Under organization's authority)

Exterpajli^pRtrolled

Wide-area networking

Authority = can specify and enfbrce policy and procedures

j

Figure 4.3-1 Distributed Intranet

Compartmentalizing the Litranet

Internally, an organization should consider compartmenting its intranet in a manner analogous to

the watertight doors on a ship. This supports the enforcement of organizational policies and the

limitation of damage in the event of a security breach. Figure 4.3-2 illustrates this concept.

Figure 4.3-2 Compartmentalized Intranet

SP 800-33 Page 16 December 2001
"Inside" versus "Outside

"External" is no longer easy to determine. Distinctions can be made between transactions that are truly from "outside" and those that are the equivalent of being internal. As shown in Figure

4.3-3, the use of end-to-end encrypted paths is a possible solution for the latter.

Unencrypted

Figure 4.3-3 "External" Transactions

Detect and Contain

The ability to detect and to respond to a security breach is an essential part of an effective

information technology security capability. This can be achieved by incorporating detection,

analysis, and response components into the organization's intranet, as depicted in Figure 4.3-4.

Figure 4.3-4 Detect and Contain

SP 800-33 Page 17 December 2001
5.0 Risk Management

This section gives an overview of risk management for the purpose of highhghting where

teclmology capabihties are best apphed in mitigating risk. As indicated in the glossary, the

following definitions are used:

Vulnerability

Threat-source

Threat

Risk

A weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, internal controls,

etc., that could be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited and result in a

violation of the system's security policy.

Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) the situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability.

The potential for a "threat source" to exploit (intentional) or trigger (accidental) a

specific vulnerability.

The net mission/business impact (probability of occurrence combined with impact)

from a particular threat source exploiting, or triggering, a particular information

technology vulnerability. IT related-risks arise from legal liability or mission/business loss due to:

- Unauthorized (malicious, non-malicious, or accidental) disclosure, modification,

or destruction of information. - Non-malicious errors and omissions.

IT disruptions due to natural or man-made disasters. - Failure to exercise due care and diligence in IT implementation and operation.

Figure 5-1 shows where risk mitigation is accomplished in the face of intentional "attacks." The

term "attack" is placed in quotation marks because the issue is "intentional," not malicious. It is

relatively common for security to sometimes be intentionally "attacked" for non-malicious

purposes such as "just getting the job done."

f Vulnerability \

I

to Attack 1—

V Exists y &

UNacceptable

Risk

Figure 5-1 Basics of Risk Mitigation - "Attacks"

SP 800-33 Page 18 December 2001
The mitigation of risk from attack by technical means can be accomphshed at the following

points:

- Flaw exists. -Remedy: hnplement assurance techniques to reduce the likelihood of a

flaw.

- Flaw is exploitable. -Remedy: Apply layered protections and architectural designs to

prevent exploitability.

- Attacker's cost is less than gain -Remedy: Apply protections to increase attacker's cost

(note that non-technical choices such as limiting what is processed can significantly

reduce attacker's gain)

- Loss is too great. -Remedy: Apply design principles, architectural designs, and technical

protections to limit extent of attack, thereby reducing loss. (Again, note that non-technical

choices such as limiting what is processed may provide the most effective risk

mitigation.)

Figure 5-2 shows how risk mitigation is applied for risks arising fi-om system errors and from

user actions not intended to violate security policy. For these situations the mitigation of risk is

very similar:

- Flaw exists. -Remedy: Implement assurance techniques to reduce the likelihood of a

flaw.

- Flaw is exploitable. -Remedy: Apply layered protections and architectural designs to

prevent exploitability.

- Since the security breach is not the result of an explicit decision, there is no consideration

of cost to an attacker.

- Loss is too great. - Remedy: Apply design principles, architectural designs, and technical

protections to limit the extent of a security breach, thereby reducing loss.

Loss y Anticipated ^YES

>^ Threshold^ \

I'

^Risl^ccept^

(UNacceptable I Risk J

Figure 5-2 Basics of Risk Mitigation - Errors/Mistakes

SP 800-33 Page 19 December 2001
6.0 Definitions

TERM DEFINITION

access control Enable authorized use of a resource while preventing unauthorized use or use in an

unauthorized manner.

accountability The security objective that generates the requirement for actions of an entity to be

traced uniquely to that entity. This supports non-repudiation, deterrence, fault

isolation, intrusion detection and prevention, and after-action recovery and legal

action.

assurance

authentication

authorization

availability

confidentiality

computing security

methods

data integrity

data origin

authentication

Grounds for confidence that the other four security objectives (integrity,

availability, confidentiality, and accountability) have been adequately met by a specific implementation. "Adequately met" includes (1) functionality that performs

correctly, (2) sufficient protection against unintentional errors (by users or software), and (3) sufficient resistance to intentional penetration or by-pass.

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system.

The granting or denying of access rights to a user, program, or process.

The security objective that generates the requirement for protection against

intentional or accidental attempts to (1) perform unauthorized deletion of data or

(2) otherwise cause a denial of service or data.

The security objective that generates the requirement for protection from

intentional or accidental attempts to perform unauthorized data reads.

Confidentiality covers data in storage, during processing, and while in transit.

Computing security methods are security safeguards implemented within the IT,

using the networking, hardware, software, and firmware of the IT. This includes

(1) the hardware, firmware, and software that implements security ftmctionality

and (2) the design, implementation, and verification techniques used to ensure that

system assurance requirements are satisfied.

The property that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner. Data

integrity covers data in storage, during processing, and while in transit.

The verification that the source of data received is as claimed.

denial of service

domain

entity

The prevention of authorized access to resources or the delaying of time-critical

operations.

See "security domain."

Either a subject (an active element that operates on information or the system state) or an object (a passive element that contains or receives information).

SP 800-33 Page 20 December 2001
integrity The security objective that generates the requirement for protection against either

intentional or accidental attempts to violate data integrity (the property that data

has not been altered in an unauthorized manner) or system integrity (the quality

that a system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner,

free from unauthorized manipulation).

identity Information that is unique within a security domain and which is recognized as denoting a particular entity within that domain.

identity-based security A security policy based on the identities and/or atfributes of the object (system

policy

IT-related risk

resource) being accessed and of the subject (user, group of users, process, or device) requesting access.

The net mission/business impact (probability of occurrence combined with impact)

from a particular threat source exploiting, or triggering, a particular information

technology vulnerability. IT related-risks arise from legal liability or mission/business loss due to:

1 . Unauthorized (malicious, non-malicious, or accidental) disclosure,

modification, or destruction of information.

2. Non-malicious errors and omissions.

3. IT disruptions due to natural or man-made disasters.

4. Failure to exercise due care and diligence in the implementation and operation

of the IT.

IT Security

Architecture

A description of security principles and an overall approach for complying with the

principles that drive the system design; i.e., guidelines on the placement and

implementation of specific security services within various disfributed computing

environments.

IT security objective See "security objectives."

non-computing

security methods

Non-computing methods are security safeguards which do not use the hardware,

software, and firmware of the IT. Non-computing methods include physical

security (controlling physical access to computing resources), personnel security,

and procedural security.

object A passive entity that contains or receives information. Note that access to an object

potentially implies access to the information it contains.

reference monitor The security engineering term for IT functionality that (1) controls all access, (2)

cannot be by-passed, (3) is tamper-resistant, and (4) provides confidence that the

other three items are frue.

residual risk The remaining, potential risk after all IT security measures are applied. There is a residual risk associated with each threat.

risk Within this document, synonymous with "IT-related risk."

SP 800-33 Page 21 December 2001
risk analysis

risk assessment

risk management

rule-based security

policy

security

security domain

security goal

security policy

security objectives

subject

system integrity

threat

threat source

threat analysis

traffic analysis

The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining the

probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional safeguards that

mitigate this impact. Part of risk management and synonymous with risk

assessment.

See "risk analysis."

The total process of identifying, controlling, and mitigating information technology

related risks. It includes risk analysis; cost-benefit analysis; and the selection,

implementation, test, and security evaluation of safeguards. This overall system

security review considers both effectiveness and efficiency, including impact on

the mission/business and constraints due to policy, regulations, and laws.

A security policy based on global rules imposed for all subjects. These rules

usually rely on a comparison of the sensitivity of the objects being accessed and

the possession of corresponding attributes by the subjects requesting access.

Security is a system property. Security is much more than a set of functions and

mechanisms. Information technology security is a system characteristic as well as a

set of mechanisms which span the system both logically and physically.

A set of subjects, their information objects, and a common security policy.

The IT security goal is to enable an organization to meet all mission/business

objectives by implementing systems with due care consideration of IT-related risks

to the organization, its partners, and its customers.

The statement of required protection of the information objects.

The five security objectives are integrity, availability, confidentiality,

accountability, and assurance.

An active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or device, that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state.

The quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in an

unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system, whether

intentional or accidental.

The potential for a "threat source" (defined below) to exploit (intentional) or

trigger (accidental) a specific vulnerability.

Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a

vulnerability or (2) the situation and method that may accidentally trigger a

vulnerability.

The examination of threat sources against system vulnerabilities to determine the

threats for a particular system in a particular operational environment.

The inference of information fi-om observation of traffic flows (presence, absence,

amount, direction, and fi-equency).

SP 800-33 Page 22 December 2001
traffic flow

confidentiality

vulnerability

A confidentiality service to protect against traffic analysis.

A weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, internal

controls, etc., that could be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited and

result in a violation of the system's security policy.

SP 800-33 Page 23 December 2001
APPENDIX A: References

1 . ; Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC),

Version 2.1, August 1999.

2. Stonebumer, Gary; Developing a Commercial Security Architecture, tutorial presented at the

11* Computer Security Applications Conference, New Orleans, LA, December 1995.

3. ; Open Systems Interconnect Reference Model, ISO 7498, Organization for

International Standardization (ISO).

4. Shipman, Stephen; Mr. Shipman's Network Primer, Chapter 1 "The OSI Model,"

http://personal.hartfordschools.org/~stephen/library/network_primer/ch01.html

SP 800-33 Page 24 December 2001
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