94th Congress COMMITTEE PRINT 2d Session f

THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE

PROBLEM OF SECURITY

REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 1976

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

77-634 0 WASHINGTON : 1976
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts H UGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

BIRCH BAYJI, Indiana STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

Q UENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia

JOHN V. TUNNEY, California

JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota

SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL

SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

BIRCH BAYII, Indiana WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia

RICHARD L. SCHULTZ, Chief Counsel

CAROLINE M. COURBols, Assistant to the Chief Counsel

ALFONsO L. TARABOCHIA, Chief Investigator

ROBERT J. SHORT, Senior Intestigator

MARY E. DOOLEY, Research Director

DAVID MARTIN, Senior Analyst

RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the In/ernal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, That the report entitled, "The Panama Canal and the Problem of

Security" be printed and made available for the use of the Committee on the

Judiciary.

JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Chairman.

Approved: September 24, 1976.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,

CO-M- TrEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,

Washington, D.C., July 7, 1976.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,

Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Judiciary Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 2241, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Earlier this year you requested that I visit

Panama for the purpose of making an appraisal for the Subcommittee

of the internal security problems affecting the Zone and the Panama

Canal itself.

I have the honor to submit herewith my report entitled, "The

Panama Canal and the Problem of Security".

With every best wish,

Sincerely,

HAROLD E. HUGHES.

Enclosure.

(1)
Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2013

http://archive~org/detaiIs/panaprobI00unit
THE PANAMA CANAL

and the

PROBLEM OF SECURITY

A report submitted to

Honorable James 0. Eastland,

Chairman

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee

by

Harold Hughes

Special Assistant to the Chairman

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INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the directive of Senator

James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate

Subcommittee on Internal Security, the

Honorable Harold Hughes, Special Assistant

to the Chairman, former member of the U. S.

Senate and Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief

Investigator for the Subcommittee, visited

Panama in early March to conduct an investigation into certain related matters that

might pose a threat to the security of the

Panama Canal. In Panama, they had extensive

conversations with the Governor of the Canal

Zone, the Honorable Harold R. Parfitt, with

the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, the Honorable

William Jordan, with the Deputy Commander

of the Southern Command, General J. Breedlove,

with Mr. William Le Brun, the Internal Security Chief for the Canal Zone, and with

other officials. This on-the-spot investi-

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6

gation was the culmination of several years

of research and fact-gathering by the Subcommittee staff, bearing on the problem of

the security of the Canal.

Aware of the fact that the negotiations

between Panama and the United States are at

a very delicate stage, the Subcommittee established prior contact with the State Des

partment, the Panama Canal Zone Administration, and the military authorities of

the Southern Command, and it made it clear to

them that the proposed investigation would be

limited to areas falling within the mandate

of the Subcommittee.

The report that follows has been submitted to the Chairman of the Subcommittee by

Mr. Hughes.
THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

There are few issues of international policy that have produced sharper differences in

Congress and among the American people than

the issue of the Panama Canal.

There are many members of Congress who feel

that it would be in our national interest to

abandon the claim to sovereign powers "in perpetuity" which is written into the original

Panama Canal Treaty. They argue that insistence on the status quo would constitute a

dangerous irritant to our relations not only

with Panama but with the whole of Latin America; and that our national security could best

be served by agreeing to transfer sovereignty

over the Canal Zone to the Panamanian government after a stated period of years, and full

operational and military control over the

Canal after a further period of years.

There are other members of Congress who

believe just as strongly that we cannot afford

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7. 2
S

to turn the control of the Canal over to the

Panamanian government because they feel that

so small a country could not guarantee the

security of the Canal - that it might fall

prey at any time to Soviet-Castro infiltration leaving the control of the Canal in hands

completely hostile to the United States. They

therefore argue that we must not retreat from

the language of the original treaty, which,

they say, ceded the Canal Zone to the United

States "in perpetuity".

It is not the function of the Subcommittee

to come up with findings designed to resolve

this dispute in one direction or the other.

In the final analysis, this will be the responsibility of the Administration and of

Congress.

What is clear, however, is that, no matter

what the course or the outcome of the current

negotiations, the United States will retain

responsibility for the operation and the defense of the Canal for a very long time. As

long as it retains this control, it will have

to confront an array of problems that have a
9

bearing on the security of the Canal Zone and

the Canal.

The interest of the Subcommittee is justified by the fact that the foreseeable threats

to the security of the Canal fall primarily

under the heading of internal security. There

is little or no danger that any nation will

seek to seize the Canal through overt military action because such a challenge would

almost certainly be regarded as a casus belli

by any administration. Among the foreseeable

threats to the security of the Canal are:

(1) The continuing danger that Castroite

elements and other extremists could seize on

some incident to incite anti-American riots

in the Canal Zone, similar to the riots of

1964;

(2) The possibility of terrorist actions

directed against the locks of the Canal, or

against the retaining dams;

(3) The possibility - hopefully remote 

that the Castro government would seek to take

control of the Panamanian government by infiltration and subversion - or by means of a coup
10

on the style of the attempted subversive coup

in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Some General Observations:

Americans in the Canal Zone, with whom

we discussed Panamanian Nationalism, from

Governor Parfitt on down, told us that all

Panamanians - conservative and middle-ofthe-road as well as radical - are united in

the desire to reassert Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone sometime in the

not-too-distant future, and that this is a

simple fact of life with which we must reckon

in our policy decisions.

The secrecy surrounding the current negotiations on the Panama Canal has - perhaps

inevitably - generated speculation and apprehension. Convinced that this was having an

impact on the morale of the employees under

his jurisdiction, Governor Parfitt told us

that he had sought the assistance of the U.S.

Embassy in an effort to allay the anxiety of

his employees. Apparently because secrecy

is regarded as essential to the conduct of
11

the negotiations, Governor Parfitt said that

he had been unable to obtain specific answers

to many pressing questions - with the result

that those who had expressed concern on one

ground or another still continue to do so.

Economic and Social Problems and Their

Bearing on Security:

The security of the Canal Zone is clearly

linked to the morale and loyalty of the work

force, both American and Panamanian. This is

an exceedingly delicate situation because the

Panamanian employees, quite understandably,

insist on complete equality of treatment with

the American employees, and on the elimination

of certain inequities that are a heritage from

the past and smack of colonialism.

Governor Parfitt has approached this situation with courage, tact and understanding.

He frankly concedes that Panamanians in the

-Canal Zone have had many legitimate grievances, and that there has been a tendency on

the part of U.S. Canal employees to look down

upon the Latin American employees and to seg-
12

rebate them socially. He says that this

mentality is now being overcome, despite the

lingering suspicions of the Panamanians. He

admits, however, that many American employees

are strenuously opposed to any improvements in

the living standards, educational or employment benefits for non-American employees, if

these improvements are to be achieved, as

they perceive the matter, at their own expense.

In an attempt to deal with this situation,

Governor Parfitt has recently taken a number

of initiatives dealing with Canal Zone schools,

employment policies, housing policies, and security positions.

In the case of the school system, Governor

Parfitt has recommended the termination of separate schools for Latin American students.

While these schools were well-intentioned in

the beginning, the Governor now says candidly

that today this separate school system is unanimously rejected by the Panamanians. American

employees of the Canal Zone strongly protest

that the proposed integration of the school
13

system will drastically affect the quality

of the schools. To this, the Governor has

replied that it is his intention to fully

protect the quality of the schools.

Under Governor Parfitt's proposed plan,

the Latin American schools in the Canal

Zone would be phased out in two stages. In

phase one, the Latin American students entering grades K-4 in March 1976 would be given

a choice of attending the U.S. schools in the

Canal zones or in schools in Panama. If they

elect to go to schools in Panama, the school

costs, including transportation, would be

taken care of by the Panama Canal Company and

the Canal Zone government. However, if they

elect instead to go to U.S. schools in the

Canal Zone, they would be given four months

of transitional training from April through

July of 1976, and in August they would be

assigned to a U.S. elementary school. In the

second phase of the plan, terminating in December 1979 and December 1980, students in

higher grades would also be given the option

of attending Canal Zone U.S. schools, or going
14

to school in Panama, or, if they so desired,

they could continue to attend Latin American

high schools in the Canal Zone until the last

of the current student body graduates in December 1979 or December 1980.

The proposal also stipulates that Latin

American teachers qualified under the Canal

Zone U.S. schools certification requirements

will be transferred to the U.S. schools.

Governor Parfitt has also recommended

greater job opportunities for Panamanians and

enhanced opportunities for advancement. This

has resulted in apprehension among the American work force that the new policy will result in fewer job opportunities and promotion

opportunities for Americans in the Zone.

Tension has been reduced somewhat on this score

by assuring American employees that no individual will lose his job, and that changes

will be effected only as jobs are vacated

through retirements, promotions, and so on.

The effect of the new employment policy on the

mix of U.S. and non-U.S. employees will be
15

minimal for years to come.

Opportunities for advancement for Panamanians have in the past been seiously restricted by the stipulation that only Americans could fill the many so-called "security"

positions, which have traditionally included

a majority of all positions, as well as all

senior positions in the police force, fire

force, and Canal security force. It is Governor Parfitt's position that this requirement is an anachronism. He believes that the

non-U.S. citizens are rightfully proud of the

part they play in the Panama Canal team and

that they are resentful of any challenges to

their loyalty. They are, in consequence,

disposed to regard the limitation on security

positions as a strategem for assuring that

all the better paid positions go to U.S. citizens, in violation of treaty commitments

calling for equality of employment opportunity.

I would be inclined to agree.

In the revised security criteria he has

proposed, Governor Parfitt has made certain

recommendations designed "to achieve a balance
16

between providing upward mobility for Panamanian employees and maintaining an adequate

level of security." In the case of the approximately 185 positions now designated as

"security" because they involve access to

classified information, the proposed new

security criteria says that "an effort will

be made to reduce the number of such security

positions to the lowest number possible, commensurate with safeguarding national security

information." The Governor's paper agrees

that any individual having access to classified information must possess an appropriate

security clearance. It points out that this

is not the same thing as designating the

position a "security position", which has had

additional restrictive implications.

In the case of the Police Department, the

Fire Department, and the Canal Protection

Department, the proposed new security criteria, in the interest of upward mobility,

establishes maximum percentages of security

positions for the different grades. In the
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case of the Fire Department, for example,

only 25% of the class 4 positions - (class 4

positions are sergeants) - will be considered

"security"; 75% of the class five positions 

(lieutenants) - will be considered "security";

and 100% of the class 7 - (captains) - will be

so classified. Roughly similar percentages

are suggested for the Police Department and

Canal Protection Department.

The new criteria would certainly help to

improve the lot of Panamanian employees of

the Canal Company and the Canal Zone government. However, they could be regarded by the

Panamanian employees as a continuation, at a

lower level, of the discrimination to which

they have been subjected in the past. Regardless of this, the new criteria represent

a major step in the right direction.

Acknowledging that some of his proposals

are highly controversial, Governor Parfitt

underscores the fact that they were the subject of prolonged and painstaking deliberations.

He believes we must seek to avoid any lengthy
is

open confrontations between Americans residing

in the Zone and Panamanians. He points out

there is no possible way in which the relatively small number of American employees

could independently operate the Canal efficiently for a prolonged period of time. "We

must depend," he says, "on the earned loyalty

and support of all of our employees during

times of distress and disturbances."

The willingness of the American employees

of the Panama Canal to accept an upgrading

of Panamanian employees that may be partly at

their expense has been adversely effected by

certain planned economies in the operation of

the Canal. The proposed economies have been

justified on the ground that the Canal has been

losing money for the past two years. According

to the Canal Zone local of the American Federation of Government Employees, these economies

include the elimination of the 15% tropical pay

differential for Panama Canal employees, certain

reductions in the generous leave system heretofore in force, and cuts in personnel and services in areas of community life, including
19

the schools and health services.

Instead of cutting back on operating costs

in this manner, the local urges that serious

consideration be given to increasing Panama

Canal tolls. They point out that more than

half the ships using the Canal are foreign

flag vessels, that the cost of Canal tolls is

a very small percentage of the total cost of

carrying goods by sea, and that, despite a

20% toll increase in 1974, the overall increases, compared to a 1950 base, lag far

behind price increases in other sectors.

They say that, in effect, this puts the Panama Canal employees in the position of having

to subsidize shipping.

In arguing in the favor of maintaining

the privileged salary and leave systems of the

past, the Union points out:

"The U.S. citizen employees of the Panama

Canal Company are, in a sense, captive employees. The Personnel Director of the Company has

stated that Company policy is to hire individuals for a career, not for a job, and that he
20

looks for someone who will stay with the Company throughout his working life. The multitude of specialized jobs required by the

Canal take training and time to learn, and

don't provide the kind of varied experience

that would permit an employee to easily transfer back to the States. Making a career with

the Panama Canal Company has traditionally

required commitment, and the recruitment incentives of the tropical pay differential,

the leave system, and a stable community life

provide the necessary attraction for making

that commitment."

The facts set forth above will help to

illustrate how delicate and complicated the

situation is. A policy designed to satisfy

the essential aspirations of the non-American

employees in the Canal Zone has produced concern and some resistance in the ranks of the

American employees. But despite the resistance he has encountered, Governor Parfitt

feels - quite rightly, in my opinion - that

we have to move, with all deliberate speed,
21

towards a policy of equality. He believes

this to be morally right and essential to the

tranquility and security of the Canal Zone.

Security and the Need for Restraint:

The security of the Panama Canal Zone

can be adversely effected by statements and

actions on either side reflecting a lack of

restraint.

Because of this, inflammatory rhetoric

or inflammatory actions can be difficult to

manage. The situation was not helped, for

example, when General Omar Torrijos, Supreme

Revolutionary Leader of Panama, exhorted his

people, on the occasion of anti-Imperialist

week, in these terms:

"The present North American negotiators

have told us that now we have come up with

the business of sovereignty that has never

been reaffirmed before with so much vehemence

and that they have never been told here was

a people that was ready to make a sacrifice

in order to have its flag flying over this

territory of ours.
22

"Apparently this is a language to which

they are not used. It appears that we have

taken them by surprise, because our country

is not talking to them about financial benefits but is telling them that the Canal

problem is a sentimental problem and that

we give much more importance to the flag

than to any economic benefit.

"Undoubtedly the economic benefits have

to come to us by force of gravity because

the Canal is a necessary passageway that the

world has used and a property through which

the whole of humanity benefits. And if the

whole of humanity benefits, it is also logical that the country that gave its entrails

for the construction of this passageway has

to receive economic benefits."

And then Torrijos made it clear what the

intentions of his government were with the

regard to the peaceful flow of communications

between the government of Panama and the

United States:

"Because if there is no satisfactory
23

treaty for our nation and for our people,

there is something inevitable that is going

to happen. It will come by internal combustion and it will be an explosion of the

Panamanian people. The National Guard has

two alternatives. There are two alternatives left to Omar Torrijos as a head of the

National Guard - to suppress this patriotic

rebellion of the people, or to lead it. And

I will not suppress it."

The key phrase in this statement seems

to be "if there is no satisfactory treaty for

our nation"; but in view of past occurrences

affecting the Panama Canal Zone, one must

examine this statement and its implications

carefully.

The Incidents Involving the Panamanian

National Guard:

Certain actions taken by the Panamanian

-National Guard in late December 1975 and early

January of this year also had a highly destabilizing effect. At the very least, President Torrijos must have had knowledge of
24

these actions. Before discussing these incidents, it might be useful to say a few words

about the structure, role, and history of

the Panamanian National Guard.

As a military organization, the Panamanian

National Guard, which is also Panama's law

enforcement agency, is not large numerically;

nor is it well-equipped. It has a logistical

system which is not capable of maintaining

a line of supply and communications for more

than a few days at a time. Translated into

practical terms, it has a reserve of fuel

and food supplies for approximately 76 hours

for most of its posts.

The most important role of the Panamanian National Guard is riot control, a role

for which it is very well-trained and has

demonstrated its capabilities in the past.

We have had good cooperation with them most

of the time, but should there be a decision

not to cooperate, the effect could be quite

troublesome. This is a fact that cannot be

overlooked when the internal security of the
25

Canal Zone is at stake.

During the 1964 riots, the Panamanian

National Guard abstained from intervening

at the initial stages of the riots, thus

allowing the ringleaders to take over a

situation that could have been otherwise

managed by a joint effort of the Panama

Canal Zone police and the Panamanian

National Guard. When it finally intervened, the riots stopped almost instantly.

This erratic performance on the part of the

Panamanian National Guard has several times

characterized its handling of demonstrations

against the United States.

Because of the career and promotion

system, the officer cadre supports General

Torrijos and thus represents the support

base for the government. Most of the high

ranking officers of the Panamanian National

Guard are the product of training in U.S.

military schools in the Panama Canal Zone

and are intimately familiar with methods

used by the U.S. military.
26

The series of incidents involving activities of the Panamanian National Guard within the Canal Zone was described in a lengthy

newsletter put out by the Police Union in

early January 1976. For some reason, these

events were not carried by the American press.

According to this newsletter, Captain Ferrufino

of the Panama National Guard, on December 23,

1975, presented a formal written request that

the Republic of Panama be allowed to post

Panama National Guards within the boundary

areas of the Canal Zone. On the following

morning, December 24th, while Governor Parfitt

and other Canal Zone officials were meeting

to discuss the request, the Panama National

Guard, acting unilaterally, posted 10 to 14

of its traffic patrolmen along a border road

which is in the Canal Zone. A short while

later, the PNG patrolmen started issuing

"courtesy" citations and parking tickets to

passing motorists and to Canal Zone vehicles

legally parked within the Zone. According

to the Police Union newsletter, the PNG had
27

arranged to have photographers on hand to

take pictures of the citations being issued.

When Major Gordon of the Canal Zone

Police Division met later that morning with

Major Garrido, Chief of the Panama Traffic

Section, he strongly protested the intrusion

of the members of the Panama National Guard

and he asked Major Garrido to remove his

men from the Canal Zone. Major Garrido, in

reply, agreed that his men had overreacted,

but he told Major Gordon that he could not

comply with the request for removal - although

he did remove some of his men. Major Garrido

said that the Panama National Guard had information that leftist Panamanian students were

planning demonstrations in the area, between

Christmas and January 9, 1976, and that the

National Guard would like to have "observers"

on the Canal Zone side of the border during

that period of time only.

The matter was taken up with Governor

Parfitt, and the Governor agreed that,

beginning December 24th through January 9th,
28

two National Guard patrolmen would be permitted to accompany Canal Zone policemen

in their patrol cars as "observers".

According to the Police Union newsletter, the two Panama National Guardsmen

assigned as observers engaged in several

provocative actions. (For more details,

the Police Union newsletter is attached as

an appendix.) These incidents generated a

good deal of tension at the time, but

thanks to Governor Parfitt's firm but diplomatic handling of the situation, things

never really got out of hand - and it is

my understanding that there has been no

repetition of such incidents since January.

The Canal Zone Police and the Question

of Security:

The Canal Zone Police are the first line

of defense against the possibility of violent

demonstrations, originating in the Canal

Zone or on the Panama side.

In conversation with the Internal Security Chief of the Panama Canal Zone, Mr.
29

William Le Brun, regarding the employment

of the Panama Canal Zone police, the following information was obtained.

At present there are 262 policemen

employed by the Panama Canal Company. A

breakdown of the positions is attached,

divided by U.S. and non-U.S. citizens and

their location of employment. Because the

new proposals for the integration of the

Panama Canal Police force are discussed

extensively in the proposals of Governor

Parfitt, this section will cover only the

operational activities of the Panama Canal

police as it relates to riot control.

The police force is organized in tenman riot squads, equipped with riot control

equipment. The use of firearms is authorized only in extreme situations and by the

Governor. It is obvious from the numbers

available and the size of the territory

that the Panama Canal Zone police could not

secure the borders of the Zone in the event

of a crisis. For this reason, there is a
30

special contingency plan to be implemented

in time of emergency. Under Panama Canal

Zone law it is the responsibility of the

Governor to call for assistance from the

military command, which would be placed on

alert and the primary operational responsibility would be turned over to the military while the civil forces picked up

support roles. In the Governor's absence,

his duties would be taken over by the Lt.

Governor.

According to the operational plans,

the police are prepared to respond immediately, and a simultaneous alert can be

implemented in 5 to 10 minutes when there

is available intelligence regarding impending disorders. This reaction time is

lengthened to 1 to 2 hours when there is

no intelligence. It should be pointed out

that we consider our intelligence systems

to be adequate.

Great emphasis is placed on training,

and the military forces to be utilized have
31

had daily exercises to familiarize themselves

with the locale and installations because

the Governor can ask the military to supply

guards for the Canal installations. Some

military personnel are presently utilized

as guards at locks and power stations.

The operational plan by both the Canal

Zone police and the military is obviously

sound, and is based on an excellent system

of intelligence, supported by daily contact

with the intelligence community. There is

a Joint Intelligence Committee which includes

the Ambassador, the Governor, and the planning officer of the Southern Command. It

is chaired by the intelligence officer of

the Zone.

The Question of Cuba and the Security of

the Panama Canal:

Castro Cuba has the capability of posing

.the principal threat to the security of the

Panama Canal. This is so because of Castro's

continuing hostility to the United States,

because of his continuing commitment to rev-
32

olution throughout Latin America, because of

his training programs for Latin American

guerrillas and terrorists, and because of

his recently demonstrated willingness to

project Cuban revolutionary power thousands

of miles across the ocean for the purpose

of installing a pro-Communist regime in

Angola.

The Senate Subcommittee on Internal

Security has received information since the

early 60's on Castro infiltration in Panama.

The Subcommittee's files contain numerous

reports and items of information on this

subject which are available to the Chairman.

The inordinate interest displayed by

the Cuban government in the Panamanian

situation finds another expression in the

fantastically inflated size of the Cuban

Embassy in that country, which is now

reported to be operating with a personnel

of approximately 60 staff members. It must

be assumed that many of these are members

of the DGI and that their real activities
33

have little to do with their diplomatic

status. There is also a continuing flow of

travelers from Cuba to Panama and vice versa.

President Torrijos is certainly not a

Castroite; he has even expelled from Panama

certain leftist radical elements he considered

too extreme. The relationship between President Torrijos and the Communist left~is probably

aptly summarized in the following paragraphs

from the U.S. Communist Party organ, "Peoples

World", of January 17, 1976:

"Torrijos' government is regarded by

Panama's Marxist-Leninist party, the Peoples

Party of Panama (PPP) as 'petty bourgeois

in composition and nationalist in essence."

"The new government took on an antiImperialist stand under the pressure of

democratic forces,' Galdomero Gonzales, a

leading member of the PPP, wrote in the June

*World Marxist Review'."

The Subcommittee has evidence that a

significant number of men holding important

positions in the government have, over the
34

years, either been involved with the political left in Panama, or have been involved

in the disturbances of 1959, 1964 and 1965,

or have openly professed their sympathies

for Castro Cuba.

The Subcommittee has evidence that at

least three officers of the Cuban General

Directorate of Intelligence were invited by

Colonel Manuel Noriega Moreno, Assistant

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to act as

advisors to the Panamanian National Guard for

a period of two months in 1973.

With Panamanian nationalism as such,

an accomodation acceptable to both sides

seems possible. It seems highly questionable, however, that the Castroite elements

in Panama would be prepared to settle for

any solution that the United States would

find acceptable.

Most responsible Panamanians - and these

are by far the majority - seek to achieve

their objectives primarily through peaceful

methods and negotiations - but it would be
35

prudent to anticipate that the Castroite

elements, many of whom may have been

trained in the Cuban schools for guerrillas and terrorists, may be committed

to the course of violence.

I believe most Panamanian nationalists

desire a continued American presence to be

worked out through peaceful negotiations.

Any Castro influence, on the other hand,

in Panama will be committed to the total

eviction of the American presence - economic,

political and military - from Panama.

American policy should therefore strive

to help the moderate Panamanian nationalists

extricate themselves from the embrace of the

Castroites who masquerade under the guise of

nationalism. There is reason to believe

that this can be done.
*36

SUMMARf OF FINDINGS:

1. I believe that Governor Parfitt has

made excellent judgements in recommending

changes in the areas of schools, housing,

and job opportunities for our Panamanian

employees in the Zone. Though this creates

tensions within the American community, it

should relieve tensions between nationalist

Panamanians and the Zone authorities.

2. Our intelligence community there has an

excellent grasp of what is taking place overall, and we can have confidence in their

capacities.

3. Overall, there is an attitude of cooperation in controlling any Zone border disturbances. In the case the cooperation is

lacking, the U.S. has more than adequate

capacity to respond to any need ultimately.

4. Our military capacity is such we need

not be concerned with any military action

from the outside. Terrorist action on a

local basis against locks or dams would be
37

more difficult to control, but I believe

we have the best possible contingency

plans to cover any problem. I have confidence in our military, political, and

intelligence groups there.

5. There will be constant attempts by

Castro elements and other leftist groups

to bring pressure against the U.S. presence

in Panama. Overall, I believe the Panamanians do not want this. The negotiations

underway should work to our advantage in

this situation. However, constant alertness and awareness to what they are doing

is essential for the future.

A 1P P- EN 1)DIX

THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE

LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE

Am Box No. 1994

BALBOA, CANAL ZONE

SW 1975

OFFICE OF THE PRESI DENT

Uilliam -. Drumiond

TO; All Union -.eiibers and Presidents and delegntes of the CLU-:jTC

Lear Brothers and Sisters:

I wish to present to you my views on motion, imade by elf that has been

tabled. It is an onosite motion to a previouss one which was vote dotn.

As you know 5 the CLU resident has ocon contacted with the oroosition of

trading the treaty anne= for our sun >ort of this nronosed treaty .r at

least our non-onoosition of that treat-.

1y motion is, in effect, not to cnfage in that contact nor to make that

commitment. To add validit< to this contact, Gonrol Torrijos indicated

in his October 11, 1)75 address that he anted dialogue with the aco plo in

the Canal Zone. Purtor, t'. 1 ta:e notrtaent nas inicated that thou lill

protect the interests of the Canal done a yC ol s. It has been indicated

that this contact is not in labor nor is this an official contact. However,

on its face it apears to be a valid contact.

In order to bent cxalain a -1- positio n5 I think ,ou sneuli understand why I

am against .ng our hones to thin Labor

To begin with, there i nothing in this anne that I object to. On the

contrary, I believe it to 1c tho booz nenitien )ossiblc for the emnlo'os in

the Canal Zone.

However, as youj know I have bcon to ashingten five times in the last nine

:.onths. i)urin:: that tie I have discussed this annex with all that would

take the time to listen. I have 'ivcn thone neonle copies of the annoe to

study. I have re-contacted oanr of the sae- _ eC le, labor representatives

and Congressmen, so that I could ant a feel as to what their position was

on this subject.

Officially; most labor representatives indicao aport for this annox.

Un-officially they have indicated that this annex doesn t -, tan a chance of

getting the nocossary 1 yinlotion 1 er itc enactcant into la'-.

Officially; most Con,ressional enr.;entativen the till have to vote on the

legislation for its enactment iave cliteli indicated that it is rather

"broad" and "extonsiv". Uncfficially, -iont Con.resnional heerenentativon

have indicated that little if a of it stands a chance of being enacted

into law - even given th.t it wa annexed to the treaty.

Liko you, prior to maning those tri1c, I was convinced that if a treaty came

we would be protected because the AFL suo orted the annex and it wan included

in the 1967 treaty. Ifter 1,1 first t.o tris, and I ha recoivni the information as set out above, I was contain that the AlL-CI: sac wll an:are that

the demands in thin annex would not uc accepted by the dtate Denartmunt and

in turn they - th A L - would come out against tho treaty.

I am now convinced we ca have aaneuvered ourslves into a most dangerous

position if a treaty comna not because we sulnort the ,anox, but b:causc w,

have made it our urinary and tots Xosition.

(39)
40

T eQ vi.c.d of this for follovin ; rcsons:

1. This a.ox a_-o incudid in tho trcc.ty and still not gct the

ic'islation for its .nac .nt. To 7rovc this point t I refer to th "Komorannda. of 'ncrst~ndins" enaotX into ~ nursu-at to the 1955 Treaty. I

reaiaa -you -tnat tnc ira-s was rovc. b- both lousos of ConGrss, whilo

t'is 7-rt of tix. traty nsnc by separate legislation. 8?.L. (5-550).

I invit: yOu to r-A2 __ C T~c si o r I dIb tc on th '55 Tra-ty as well as

th. h arin- record on w. -> - ich ill furth,.r substantiate my assortion th-t yis -n >an't J: chn-\C- of eCtn on.

o 'dd o sni:, ns. 1 ot tin ot, I cischod out the '67 treaty

.ih is st i11C 17si, i -7 secrett" although published in the apers. I

o:it tat .y oco . . r ursory one, thc-rfore I do not assert that

th following is f ut r-thr something that should be investigated. I

found in thas treaty a very :bi ous reference to employoc benefits containol in Articli. :ent" or twont'-ronc. I did not find the labor anncx that

we nay; see. 1d to bliv,. is cOntaind in t*A't treaty. Again, I sim not

.sZ ;rtin- th .t is is not there - but on>' that I could not find it at the

I dictuTrbd bu:.o o:erl- lrmed about this course of events since,

.o I rve smated, ven i- it were insludod in the treaty, I havo bon led

to bcli v that it has no chanc. of in nact :dl into law.

,. In order 'or n to g;e tais ainx niacted into law we would need

t'e full forc,. c tof AFL-CI5o -h, 5tat,. D-omrtment, the Civil Scrvicu

Coraission, and no.t of 1h1e Cons;rvative snd Libcral Congressmen that

.rs a ninst this tr- t,,,,s well as those that are pro-treaty.

oncot ly asc yours if if th -,a Trouns a.r prepared to excrt the effort

n ;eaccsary to do tis. I remind 'ou that it ould tsktc the cooperation of

all of th-.: -roups to get this ainna unactcd into law.

distrust for tfl -roniis of t>e Stat. Deiartment and Panama should be

0h ,-Ias yours out of cxpnri -ncu. I am convinced that their promises

iscan mothinga

Tlv Jivil rvie com siasion. on h otlir hand h s a Groat deal to losc

:f t ia'.: wna iet d. It 1ould disrupt the wole system for the benefit

of aom' tareu tiohound .rsoloy1 van if you .xclud; the non-U.S. cmployces.

It uuuld~ et a. -oraiK - lha1 m rcedant for cvcry other Lovernment employee

Son c-ue- t not1ihntnding 11 We haV. heard of

w at 0oo1 lao. U G-m or Ki Onctment of this annex ould entail

-dti-:llion:: ov r ) rotrC t riod.

urtner, i f ac -.- t tin: aropoas i1on, w- ill hav undercut our only allies

:. thi: >robler inh thi .n-r a. ho-ic tlis 0you that you do not insult

70. r-50: ". Ina th0 ach - to 5 ort yoi 0; 01 isuk th't may have weakrad .nis mosi tin so bgin. witih. Ia myet :;ow li beral pro-treaty Congress-

*-a. to sou-ort tha , .x Igi tion, b~u I reir ad you th t this is a non-

- rti ra i:; . hr a'. r - itny -uaarv: t iv- pro-traty CongLrosormen that

A 1:ii 1 n 1:. 1Y, i 1t t t th y a lihVk the C.nai Zonk

- .Oin 5 tO b- aIioi eloniai toa. nur ccep0tanC. 1of thiS ProwOsition

can a. 17 entnht a iA 4:;ir 'b li . ny a' irs io rhve this belief.

It is 1a l. to ou -ot t tay 0e no ne.

of,. Th"'y in turn ouid hayv to

x r - r1 -. . r~ n~,tl ha. dlj hto.til. Coiigress

0 -5~V ' . Ii -- ~'~ .I f c-]d it:h otrung opposition

S rt A i t - rJ lot i "I I " 0 th i t r -t y ?

a- -. .is: -~aj u 'o t .ioll to tlii ; tria.ty?
41

At its worst :o can losc the trc,.ty annex hich, as I have stated, is a

falsc nrcmisc s a primary position anyway. Theortically, if the annox is

not included, wc ould have th. support of the AFL-CIO to add to our allies

when ratification time comis around. ven if this effort failed and the

trerat" was ratified, u ould still have -n even stron-er bas( in which to

got some Dort of legislation to orot ct ourselves. I an convinced that wo

would be in a much stronger osition without the annex than with the anne:z

loft up to the State Deuartment for suoport in its enactment.

Do we have a viable position? I believe that we do but our weakest point is

that ie have gained the r putation, true or falso, of selfish colonialists.

W thout this stignia, we would not be in the position that we are in today.

Natural as it may be to want to protect your job within the United States,

it is looked upon as gross selfishness two thousand miles away. 'e are put

at a grcat disadvantage.

I have enclosed a statmont that )uts all the arguments of the State Departmont to rest. I believe it to be a true, logical, reasonable, and just

solution which will be to the bonfit ofall parties concerned for many years

to come,

It is not based on self interest, and if this idea is adopted, the only

interests that will lose are the communist interests and the corrupt.

Lot me warn you that if this body does not take a firm -osition one way or

the other, wo are going to lose by default. The StatQ Department and the

Government of Panama are making very effort here and in the United States

to sell this proposed treaty. Seas well as the people of Panama are fast

becoming the victims. Se have the tools at our disposal with which to

counteract.

So are using one tool, a mailing campaign, but that is not nearly enough.

Another tool at your disposal is the now revised Snyder amendment. I marvel

at how little significance this body sooms to attach to that amendment, say

as compared to the Senate and House treaty Resolutions. This amendment is

the sense of the whole House and the Sonate. It must be signed by the

President. It goes a long way further than theso resolutions; locally as

can bo seen by the fact of the Torrijos'accomodation on October 11, 1975,

and this nronosition to solicit our suppn . This amendment does not just

say the Canal, it says the Canal Zone as well. This was one of the major

issues fought over between the Department of State and the Congress.

As it was, this amenclii.ent could have -'onc either way; which indicates to me,

and I am sure the State Dcopartment fels the same way, that the :'ouse is not

retreating from their position 

If that amendment could be described as being lost at all, I personally

blame this body for that loss.

I want you to stop and thin that there wcre at least 150 5rou s orking to

pass this revised amenrTent. The. original amendment was passed by the ,iouse

twice without revision. On thl third time, a twic: revised amendment no-sed

by 11 votes. This issue could have been Tecided th . other way by only Lilc

suing votes. Knowin1 he0 the u votes, I am sure that this is exactly

how th revised am7andmnt as dIecidd0 hIad wo had a man in thl Statks UJO

could convince just Six ReprOsentatives, I doubt that we would be g-ttin;

the covert contacts from our own )tate Dertment.

Yo amount of iail can ofiect this. You aust b, able to personally make eyoball contact to change situations such as the above.
42

I1 .aaD nattors worzn, you tll o_ one :.ational ilenresontativo that was evon

7:aro or nado any effort to swin; thos2 votos in thl. right direction. I

t ll -ou that thcr) !as not on-. Iosu,.s as vitally important to us as this

one~ic ar t to 2sb fut

To giv; 'ou an axcanl< of uat :a can do, I uas in th. States when this

is ue uar hruught ap tr to ,revious times. I certainly do not lay claim

t :1ianin;ts tincz, hu I now drained well, had I blcn thiro I could

avXa convnc. SiX .n to vot. o ur way. 'o on' is going to fight our battles

if d on't 1_17 fi ht tnnr ourskelvcs. It tAks money Cven if you lose.

at if you a n' t ovfn ":. ihc Oliort to tr- we arQ certainly Zoing to lose.

oya' not asacaa as our opponcnts would have us believe. But ue must use

2.; t olo '. nave a uibli to us. It is utter stupidity to think that our

or2.l ns can nit off until loriorrow.

I hav snu;ast d, on anuober of occasions 5 of sundinf a permanent lejisti::v. representative to t>e 5tate. You have answrod that by excuses

raring fr) it is not thi right time to it costs too much money. You have

All nfi: d fram tn- onvra. trion that this Union has mad e to ashington.

I had 1. nd that yon would jinalli relizQ through: thjse cxanples just how

icOOtant it i2 to 1avo-> man up thar not only to counter the enormous

1;>;n f ein nducted but also to work on current labor

proUlemn

I nv; ztar-tA a )blic infornotion corporation so that w . could combat the

diarnfcing a xat hy a' raa.:ndi iut out by the State Deartuent and Panola

oth 2.r. and in the states Ym have refused to suncort this or-anization.

Yu tan.; tan uositi > that -y pportin' this corporation -u nay alonate

a.or canccs in ransaect to t>e labor m.

Lax: around 2.u. The ;ta~t -Dart anit and those. pushin; this proposed

trato av> inundat2d th states wit. ro a;ndr' they hav; intensely

lobbi-> th. C ngress "nd .I0tional Labor for support on thcir position.

Th' have nno nt > t> Dep rtrwnt )f th Army and the Company/Government

t, z1 that :-iti n. Th, , av. solicitA th> Civic Councils and are now

co >in; to us indir'nctl.

all n:no hat result thuy hav_ or ha>v. not nchi vud in thosQ arkezas menti nad. TI . v ry fact that -i ari bning aoronched and osoecially in thl

ann r* tint an .r - r b-in:proheid should indicate a uakness in their

ailian -n Il a:. a inhxr;nt ua. anes in an; jroniss nade tc' us should

'.n -cc. ft this; aro'. nition.

Inst t:1 a mnv o. wt i le , i 2 tin truth.

I 11 1 nast y , I Ao. twnn w inar :: 1 ev-n att end the. .icetin-s. Timo

nd te ain, I have hnan t>1 that au wan't do -m1ythin, for yourself or

itpere ~ reraS t, Ad :; u rlfu 1t. al; any>'n' e-lse to take thu

cti:n for you. TP anly unt r I >va fr thin i_ the assertion that you

ar eng :al d ad mi ain: Ir ii.

I d e, t ,cet :/u to t;& :2 I O. Va. uihnt I 'Ve stated hcrein. I ur,;

1 to sakA au: Ui'r ourn if I a'r it in. lt l, ith truth of the wAttor.

Thi. iniai:n a n a I r bd b .re.e bA 1r 2tati ni, inactivity, and suspicion.

I >o ~ 2s ~ ~ A. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~- ~ ~ 0!: ~ ~ ~ ~ d _n c r . Ii . r :.:t l v - V t.tiv, !a ~aOL. lon. 1 r 0e 1 OHmv Lin -t :it down with each
43

basis for a cortain position, wich I .'i)ht ,dd, has ciluys boon for thc

bonofit of this body. I think history will b.enr io out. I wish to cr.phasizo thn-t thcr. is just not enough tim fr all of this.

I havo Dutlincd what I beliJVc to 12 tho riht -oid tho wrong thinG to do in

this matter bascd on rince. I linvo it up to you to akco your decisions.

I urgo yOu not to ract irrcs-onsibly, but rthr to rmik c'. sound, logiol

ccision or tW).

Tho Diblo says the ".io." will inherit th uc'rth, but history says th t tho

forcufuil, mnd doisivo will inhorit tho fruits of the nook.

Sincoroly yours,

hillian R. Drui.ii-ond

THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE

Box No. 1994

BALBOA, CANAL ZONE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WILLIAM R. iJRTJMMOND

09

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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111111

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