NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ROXANNE DENISE LEMONS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0192 

 1 CA-CR 19-0197

 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-108925-001

 CR2009-005598-001

(Consolidated)

The Honorable Erin O’Brien Otis, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Gracynthia Claw

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jesse Finn Turner

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-19-2020
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 In her 2017 case, Roxanne Lemons appeals her convictions 

and sentences for 26 counts related to crimes including forgery, theft, 

identity theft, and aggravated identity theft. The superior court neither 

abused its discretion in denying Lemons’s proposed jury instructions, nor 

did it err when it denied Lemons’s motion to dismiss the allegation of a 

sentence enhancement. This court, therefore, affirms Lemons’s 2017 case 

convictions and the sentence in Lemons’s consolidated 2009 case in which 

the superior court revoked her probation and imposed a consecutive, 

presumptive prison term. This court, however, amends the sentencing 

order in the 2017 case to reflect the superior court’s imposition of a 

presumptive sentence on each of the 26 counts with two years added under 

A.R.S. § 13-708.D. See State v. Stevens, 173 Ariz. 494, 496 (App. 1992) (“Upon 

finding a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and a 

minute entry, a reviewing court must try to ascertain the trial court’s intent 

by reference to the record.”).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court considers the facts and all reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions. State v. Tucker, 205 

Ariz. 157, 160 n.1 (2003). Sometime before November 2016, P.C., Lemons’s

cousin, noticed her driver’s license and some personal cards were missing.

P.C. assumed she misplaced her wallet, so she replaced her driver’s license 

and other cards without further thought. Police later discovered these cards 

in Lemons’s possession.

¶3 Lemons was charged with 26 counts related to identity theft 

and forgery. The State alleged Lemons used P.C.’s personal information on 

three different occasions. The indictment alleged on November 7, 2016, and 

November 14, 2016, Lemons used P.C.’s identity to rent an apartment and 

to sign supporting documents. On November 21, 2016, the indictment 

alleged Lemons used P.C.’s identity to finance furniture purchased from 

Conn’s furniture store. P.C. testified she did not complete or participate in
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

3

these transactions, though her identity was used, and she did not give 

Lemons permission to use her identity for these purposes.

¶4 At trial, several witnesses testified, including Jessica 

Castaneda. Castaneda was the apartment manager for an apartment 

complex in the Phoenix area. Castaneda identified Lemons as the person 

who presented P.C.’s identification and signed several lease documents as 

P.C. to begin the process of leasing an apartment from her complex. 

Castaneda stated Lemons signed the documents in her presence.

¶5 Before the case was given to the jury to deliberate, Lemons 

requested several jury instructions not in the Revised Arizona Jury 

Instructions (RAJIs), including a definition of “defraud” for the forgery

instructions. Lemons’s proposed definition came from Black’s Law 

Dictionary: “To cause injury or loss to a person or organization by deceit in 

order to get money” (Dictionary Instruction). Lemons also proposed 

adding language from State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234 (1968). Her proposed 

instruction said “[a]n intent to deceive is not alone sufficient to constitute 

the crime” (McFall Instruction). See McFall, 103 Ariz. at 237 (discussing

A.R.S. § 36-1017 (Repealed by Laws 1979, Ch. 103, § 14, eff. July 1, 1981)).

The superior court denied both requests.

¶6 The superior court ultimately instructed the jury based on the 

RAJIs as follows: “The crime of forgery requires proof that the defendant, 

with the intent to defraud, falsely made, completed or altered a written 

instrument.” During jury deliberations, the jury asked, “what is the legal 

definition of defraud?” Lemons then urged the superior court to include the 

Dictionary Instruction, the McFall Instruction, or both. The superior court 

again declined to give a definition. The superior court instead instructed 

the jury to rely on their common sense, logical reasoning, and experience as 

to the meaning of the word defraud. 

¶7 The jury found Lemons guilty on all 26 counts. Then, the State 

alleged three aggravating circumstances: (1) the offenses caused emotional 

and financial harm to the victim; (2) Lemons was on release for a felony in

case number CR2016-005479-001 when she committed the offenses; and (3) 

Lemons was on probation in case number CR2009-005598-001 when she 

committed the offenses. Because Lemons was on felony release and 

probation when she committed the offenses in the 2017 case, the superior 

court had to add two years to any sentence it imposed and could not impose 

less than the presumptive sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-708.A, .D.
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 During the aggravation phase, the State called Officer Gary 

Gratz to testify as to his knowledge of Lemons’s release status. Officer Gratz 

stated Lemons was on release for case number CR2016-005479-001, a felony 

matter, when Lemons committed the acts alleged in the 2017 case. The State 

also introduced certified copies of the indictment, an arraignment minute 

entry, and a release order, all pertaining to case number CR2016-005479-

001.

¶9 After the close of evidence in the aggravation phase, Lemons 

moved for dismissal of the second and third sentence enhancement 

allegations under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(a)(2), claiming the 

aggravators were not proven by substantial evidence. The superior court 

denied the Rule 20 motion. The jury found the aggravating circumstances 

alleged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶10 At sentencing, the superior court found Lemons had four 

historical prior felony convictions. On count 1, the superior court sentenced 

Lemons to a presumptive term of 11.25 years plus two years for being on 

felony release at the time of the offense, for a total of 13.25 years. On counts 

2 through 24 and 26, the superior court sentenced Lemons to a 10 year

presumptive sentence plus two years for being on felony release at the time 

of the offenses for a total of 12 years on each count. On count 25, to a 3.75 

year presumptive term plus two years for being on felony release at the time 

of the offense for a total of 5.75 years. All terms of imprisonment in the 2017 

case are concurrent. Lemons was given 757 days of presentence 

incarceration credit on the concurrent sentences.

¶11 In the 2009 case, the superior court sentenced Lemons to a 2.5 

year presumptive sentence with credit for 32 days served before her arrest 

and incarceration in the 2017 case. Lemons must serve the sentence in the 

2009 case consecutive to the sentences in the 2017 case because she was on 

probation when she committed the offenses in the 2017 case.

¶12 Though the parties do not raise any concern about the 

sentencing order, this court notes during the sentencing hearing on March 

22, 2019, the superior court was clear it was imposing presumptive terms 

on each of the counts in the 2017 case. At a bench conference before the 

sentencing hearing began, the following exchange occurred:

Mr. Mangum: Just asking for the presumptive.

The Court: Okay. That’s my intent to do.
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 After the bench conference, the superior court explained the 

bench conference as follows:

The Court: So what I chatted with the lawyers about is 

obviously, under the circumstances, you are facing a 

considerable amount of time based on your jury verdicts. So I 

wanted to let everyone know that I did not intend to go over 

the minimum of what’s required under the law, which is the 

presumptive. I think the only distinction between what the 

State’s going to be asking for versus what your lawyer is 

going to be asking for is on the probation violation because 

I’m required to give you no less than 11.25 plus 2, which is 

what I intend to do. That’s the minimum. And then the State’s 

asking for the presumptive on the probation violation. Your 

lawyer will be asking for the bare minimum, so that’s the only 

area of contention probably at this point. Would you agree 

that that is the summary of what was discussed up at the 

bench?

Mr. Hermes: Yes, Your Honor.

Mr. Mangum: Yes.

¶14 The sentencing hearing continued. When the time came for 

the superior court to pronounce sentence orally in open court, the superior 

court spoke consistent with the above, specifically saying:

. . . I’m going to go ahead and start with Count 1, not 

just because it’s Count 1 but because it’s the one that has the 

highest punishment attached to it. As we discussed earlier, 

the minimum that the Court can give you for that count is 11 

and a quarter years plus two for the being on release. I don’t 

have any discretion to go below that, and the Court does find 

that the minimum presumptive plus two is appropriate for 

you for this count. So it is the judgment and sentence of the 

Court that you be imprisoned for Count 1 in the Arizona 

Department of Corrections for 13 and a quarter years.

. . . .

As it relates to Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 

14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26, those are all Class 

4 felonies with the prior felony convictions. The minimum the 

Court can give you for those counts is ten years plus two. So 
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

6

for all those counts that I just identified, it is the judgment and 

sentence of the court that you be imprisoned in the Arizona 

Department of Corrections for the presumptive sentence plus 

two of 12 twelve years.

. . . .

I will then go ahead to Count 25, which I am on now, 

and the minimum I can give you for that is the presumptive 

sentence of 3.75 years plus 2. Again, the Court does believe 

that that is appropriate. It is therefore the judgment and 

sentence of the Court that you be imprisoned in the Arizona 

Department of Corrections for that presumptive sentence 

plus two, which is 5.75 years. 

¶15 The sentencing order in the 2017 case, however, does not 

reflect the imposition of presumptive sentences plus two years for being on 

felony release at the time of the offenses. Instead, for count 1, the minute 

entry shows the superior court imposed “[a] less than Maximum term of 

13.25 years . . . .” For counts 2 through 24 and count 26, the minute entry 

shows the superior court imposed “[a] Maximum term of 12 years . . . .” For 

count 25, the minute entry shows the superior court imposed “[a]n 

Aggravated term of 5.75 years . . . .” The sentencing minute entry further 

makes no reference to the two-year enhancement based on Lemons’s status 

of being on felony release when she committed the offenses.

¶16 Lemons filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the forgery 

convictions and sentences. This court has jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1, 13-4031,

and 13-4033.A. 

ANALYSIS

I. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Lemons’s requested jury instructions.

¶17 This court reviews the denial of a requested jury instruction 

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 12 (2006). “Where 

the law is adequately covered by the instructions as a whole, no reversible 

error has occurred.” State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 65, ¶ 35 (1998).

¶18 “The primary test for jury instructions is whether the 

instructions considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury on the 

proper rule of law.” State v. Bridgeforth, 156 Ariz. 60, 64 (1988). An 
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

7

instruction need not be given if other instructions, which are given, state 

the law adequately. See id. at 65. A trial court need not define each word or 

phrase in a jury instruction when they are used in their ordinary sense and 

are commonly understood. See State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 564-65,

¶ 82 (2014).

¶19 The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Lemons’s requests to include the Dictionary Instruction. Lemons argues the 

superior court should have given the Dictionary Instruction defining

defraud as “caus[ing] injury or loss to a person or organization by deceit in 

order to get money.” Lemons argues the jury’s request for a legal definition 

of defraud during deliberations proves her point, saying the jurors needed 

the definition of defraud from her Dictionary Instruction.

¶20 Simply put, “defraud” is a commonly used word. Because the 

RAJI instruction was sufficient, adding the Dictionary Instruction was 

unnecessary. See Forde, 233 Ariz. at 564-65, ¶ 82. Further, adding the 

proposed Dictionary Instruction would have added the incorrect and likely 

confusing “in order to get money” concept to the definition. See State v. 

Bedoni, 161 Ariz. 480, 486 (App. 1989) (holding the “intent to defraud” 

requirement of the Arizona forgery statute is satisfied by showing the 

defendant obtained a “benefit or advantage”). Therefore, the Dictionary 

Instruction would have misled the jury.

¶21 The superior court also did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Lemons’s requests to include the McFall Instruction. Lemons’s

proposed McFall Instruction said, in part, “[a]n intent to deceive is not alone 

sufficient to constitute the crime.” See McFall, 103 Ariz. at 237. To begin, 

Lemons did not provide adequate reasoning to give the McFall instruction 

in addition to the RAJI instruction. Further, the McFall instruction 

unnecessarily complicated the intent element of forgery. 

¶22 The RAJI adequately defined the elements of forgery under 

Arizona law, including the intent element of forgery. The instructions 

provided definitions for “intentionally,” “with intent to,” and “intentinference.” The proposed additional language from the McFall instruction, 

therefore, had the potential to mislead or confuse the jury and offered 

nothing to assist the jury’s understanding of the law.
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

8

II. Substantial evidence shows Lemons was on felony release when 

she committed the 2017 offenses.

¶23 After the jury found Lemons guilty in the 2017 case, the jury 

next had to determine if there were aggravating circumstances in the case. 

Under A.R.S. § 13-708.D,

[a] person who is convicted of committing any felony offense 

that is committed while the person is released on bond or on 

the person’s own recognizance on a separate felony offense . . 

. shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment two years 

longer than would otherwise be imposed for the felony 

offense committed while on release. 

¶24 On appeal, Lemons argues no substantial evidence was 

presented to show she was on release when she committed the 2017 

offenses. Lemons, therefore, argues the superior court should have granted 

her motion for directed verdict against the enhancement.

¶25 This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims made 

under Rule 20 de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). This court 

will not disturb a verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. 

Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). “Substantial evidence is evidence that 

reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This court 

views the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction 

and resolves any conflicts in the evidence against Lemons. See id.

¶26 Subsection 13-708.D required the State to prove Lemons 

committed the 2017 offenses while she was on release for a different felony.

The State met this burden, and the superior court did not err in denying 

Lemons’s Rule 20 motion.

¶27 At trial, Officer Gratz testified as to his personal knowledge 

of the aggravating circumstances. Officer Gratz investigated the 2017 case

as well as the earlier felony case, CR2016-005479-001—the case Lemons was 

on release for when she committed the 2017 offenses. The State further 

admitted certified copies of three documents to prove Lemons was on 

release for a separate felony offense. These documents show Lemons was 

charged with at least one felony and released on her own recognizance 

shortly before she committed the acts covered by the 2017 offenses.

Specifically, she had been released on her own recognizance three days 

earlier. These documents and Officer Gatz’s testimony are sufficient to 

show Lemons was on felony release while she committed the 2017 offenses.
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

9

III. The sentencing minute entry in the 2017 case does not accurately 

reflect the sentences imposed by the court.

¶28 The 2017 sentencing hearing transcript shows the trial court 

imposed presumptive terms on each of the 26 counts. See A.R.S. § 13-703.J. 

As required by state law, the superior court then added two years to each 

presumptive sentence because Lemons was on felony release at the time of 

the offenses. See A.R.S. § 13-708.D. Subsection 13-708.D adds to the length 

of a sentence, but it does not change the level of the sentence imposed. See 

id.

¶29 The sentencing minute entry in the 2017 case, however, does 

not reflect Lemons’s presumptive sentences. Instead, it incorrectly indicates 

the superior court imposed a “less than Maximum sentence” on count 1 and 

“a Maximum sentence” on each of the remaining counts.

¶30 Because the superior court made plain its sentences during 

the sentencing hearing, as evidenced by the sentencing transcript, this court 

need not remand for resentencing. See Stevens, 173 Ariz. at 496. This court,

therefore, amends the judgment of conviction to reflect Lemons received a 

presumptive sentence on each of the 26 counts in the 2017 case. Specifically, 

Lemons’s sentence on count 1 is a presumptive sentence of 11.25 with 2 

years added because of subsection 13-708.D, for a total of 13.25 years. 

Lemons’s sentence under counts 2 through 24 and count 26 are presumptive 

sentences of 10 years with 2 years added because of subsection 13-708.D,

for a total of 12 years. Finally, Lemons’s sentence on count 25 is a 

presumptive sentence of 3.75 with 2 years added because of subsection 13-

708.D, for a total of 5.75 years.

¶31 In all other respects, this court affirms the convictions and 

sentences imposed.
STATE v. LEMONS

Decision of the Court

10

CONCLUSION

¶32 The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Lemons’s requested jury instructions. The superior court also did not err 

when it denied Lemons’s Rule 20 motion because the State presented 

substantial evidence to prove Lemons committed the acts while on release 

for a separate felony offense. This court affirms Lemons’s convictions and 

sentences as amended in this memorandum decision.