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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

State of California 

XAVIER BECERRA 

Attorney General 

: 

OPINION : No. 17-702 

: 

of : April 27, 2018 

: 

XAVIER BECERRA : 

Attorney General : 

: 

CATHERINE BIDART : 

Deputy Attorney General : 

: 

THE HONORABLE ASSEMBLY MEMBER ANNA M. CABALLERO has 

requested an opinion on the following question: 

Does the power of referendum apply to a resolution by the City of Hollister 

approving the execution of an agreement to sell real property for development, pursuant to 

an approved long-range property management plan for disposing a dissolved 

redevelopment agency’s property? 

CONCLUSION 

The City of Hollister’s resolution approving the execution of an agreement to sell 

real property for development, pursuant to an approved plan for disposing a dissolved 

redevelopment agency’s property, is not subject to referendum. 

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ANALYSIS 

Background 

The question here arises from the Legislature’s 2011 dissolution of redevelopment 

agencies and redirection of their assets to fund core local governmental services.1 For 

decades, the Legislature authorized local governments to create such agencies to redevelop 

areas of blight under the Community Redevelopment Law.

2 When an area was 

redeveloped and its property values increased, the resulting increase in property tax 

revenue was attributed to the redevelopment, and the increased revenue (known as “tax 

increment”) was used to fund the agency.3 

In 2011, however, facing a fiscal crisis, the Legislature dissolved redevelopment 

agencies and instituted a process for “successor agencies”4 to expeditiously wind down the 

1 See 2011 Cal. Stat., 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 5 (eff. Jun. 29, 2011); see also 2012 

Cal. Stat., ch. 26 (eff. June 27, 2012). Our prior opinions arising from the dissolution of 

redevelopment agencies include 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 67 (2016) and 97 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 75 (2014). 

2 Health & Saf. Code, §§ 33000 et seq.; see 1963 Cal. Stat., ch. 1812, pp. 3677 et seq. 

(reorganizing Community Redevelopment Law); 1951 Cal. Stat., ch. 710, § 1, pp. 1922 et 

seq. (renaming and codifying Community Redevelopment Act as Community 

Redevelopment Law in Health and Safety Code sections 33000 et seq.); 1945 Cal. Stat., 

ch. 1326, pp. 2478 et seq. (enacting Community Redevelopment Act); see also 

Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 169 (explaining 

main purpose of “Community Redevelopment Law was ‘to expand the supply of low- and 

moderate-income housing, to expand employment opportunities for jobless, 

underemployed, and low-income persons, and to provide an environment for the social, 

economic, and psychological growth and well being of all citizens’ . . . through the 

elimination of blight,” quoting Health and Safety Code section 33071 and citing id. 

sections 33030, 33035-33039). 

3 Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 16; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 33670 et seq.; California 

Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 246-247; Redevelopment 

Agency v. County of San Bernardino (1978) 21 Cal.3d 255, 259. 

4 Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34171, subd. (j) (“‘Successor agency’ means the successor 

entity to the former redevelopment agency as described in Section 34173”), 34173, subd. 

(b) (“Except for those provisions of the Community Redevelopment Law that are repealed, 

restricted, or revised pursuant to the act adding this part, all authority, rights, powers, 

duties, and obligations previously vested with the former redevelopment agencies, under 

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former redevelopment agencies’ affairs and to redirect tax revenues to local core 

government services.5 These winding-down activities take place under the direction of an 

oversight board, generally comprised of representatives for various entities that receive 

local property tax revenue.

6 The process requires a successor agency to submit a longrange property management plan to its oversight board for approval, and then to the state’s 

Department of Finance for its approval.7 

the Community Redevelopment Law, are hereby vested in the successor agencies”). 

5 See Health & Saf. Code, § 34177, subd. (h); California Redevelopment Assn. v. 

Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 241, 251, 262; Macy v. City of Fontana (2016) 244 

Cal.App.4th 1421, 1431-1432; see also 12 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 

2017) Real Property, § 869 (“The county auditor-controllers for each county must 

determine the amount of property taxes that would have been allocated to the 

redevelopment agencies had they not been dissolved ([Health & Saf. Code, § 34182, subd. 

(c)]) and must reallocate those funds, through the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund, 

to local agencies and school entities and to successor agencies for making payments on 

debts ([Health & Saf. Code, § 34183])”). 

For further background on the dissolution of redevelopment agencies, see Cuenca v. 

Cohen (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 200, 210-212; 8 Miller & Starr (4th ed. 2017 supp.) California 

Real Estate, § 30:1. We note that, to a limited extent, redevelopment has been reauthorized. 

For an overview of the relevant legislation, see 8 Miller & Starr, supra, § 30:2 

(summarizing post-dissolution legislation that authorizes local governments to: 

(1) remediate blighted property, without using tax-increment funding [Health & Saf. Code, 

§§ 25403-25403.8], (2) enhance infrastructure using funding that includes tax increment 

from consenting taxing agencies, but not schools [Gov. Code, §§ 53398.50-53398.88], 

(3) promote economic development using public funds [Gov. Code, §§ 52200-52203], and 

(4) form community revitalization authorities that create community revitalization plans 

and address unemployment, crime, infrastructure, and affordable housing, using funding 

that includes tax increment from consenting taxing agencies, but not schools [Gov. Code, 

§§ 62000-62208]). 

6 The oversight board is a seven-member board of appointees who “have fiduciary 

responsibilities to holders of enforceable obligations and the taxing entities that benefit 

from distributions of property tax and other revenues.” (Health and Saf. Code, § 34179, 

subd. (i); id. subds. (a), (b) & (j) [prescribing composition of oversight board].) The 

oversight board’s duties include, among other things, directing the successor agency to 

dispose of the dissolved redevelopment agency’s assets and property, as specified. (Health 

& Saf. Code, § 34181.) 

7 Health & Saf. Code, § 34191.5, subd. (b). 

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We are informed that the City of Hollister passed Resolution 2017-139 on June 5, 2017, 

authorizing its city manager to enter into a Disposition and Development Agreement for 

the sale and development of real property (known as the “400 Block property”), which 

would implement the long-range plan8 approved by the oversight board and by the 

Department of Finance.9 The parties to the agreement include the City, Del Curto 

Brothers Group, and the Community Foundation for San Benito County.10 The resolution 

8 The plan directs the use of “a disposition and development agreement or development 

agreement as a tool to assure that disposition of the 400 Block property facilitates 

development of the site as a keystone property in Downtown Hollister to support economic 

development.” (Resolution No. 2014-02 OB [attaching City of Hollister Long Range 

Property Management Plan, filed October 3, 2013, amended January 2, 2014, p. 32, 

available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/Programs/Redevelopment/Long_Range_Property_ 

Management/LRPMPC_Plans/documents/Hollister_LRPMP.pdf [as of March 26, 2018].) 

The plan directs the successor agency to negotiate with the City a first-option agreement 

to buy the property within an 18-month period. (Ibid.) The goal of that agreement is to 

allow non-profit activities to continue on the property until a commercial or mixed-use 

development agreement is negotiated. (Ibid.) The plan further provides that, if the 

negotiation with the City does not result in a property transfer to the City, the successor 

agency itself must issue a request for qualifications to enter into a development agreement 

for a mixed-use or all-commercial building of 30,000 to 40,000 square feet, designed to 

conform to specified guidelines, with proceeds of the sale to be distributed and used as 

provided by the redevelopment dissolution law. (Id., pp. 32-33.) 

9 See City of Hollister Resolution 2017-139, June 5, 2017; Resolution No. 2014-02 OB, 

supra, pp. 4-5 [oversight board’s approval of disposing properties as set forth in plan]; 

Department of Finance Letter to City of Hollister Successor Agency, Feb. 21, 2014, 

http://www.dof.ca.gov/Programs/Redevelopment/Long_Range_Property_Management/L 

RPMPC_Letters/documents/Hollister_LRPMP_Letter.pdf [as of April 6, 2018] 

(Department of Finance’s approval of disposing properties as set forth in plan). 

We received informal input, from a law firm retained by the referendum proponents, 

asserting that the City acted improperly by not announcing it was acting as the successor 

agency, a separate public entity (see Health & Saf. Code, § 34173, subd. (g)), when it 

passed the resolution (the City Council members also serve as the successor agency). An 

alleged impropriety, however, is not challengeable by referendum. (See Memorial 

Hospitals Assn. v. Randol (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1311 [“Simply put, unlawful action 

is addressed in the courts, not in the voting booth”].) Because an alleged impropriety in 

passing the resolution does not speak to the availability of referendum, we decline to 

address it further. 

10 City of Hollister Resolution 2017-139, supra, p. 4. 

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13 

recites several preceding resolutions, including ones that authorized a request for 

proposals; accepted the Del Curto Brothers’ proposal in partnership with Community 

Foundation for San Benito County to construct a mixed-use development; approved the 

proposal as conforming to the long-range plan; and authorized an exclusive negotiating 

agreement.11 

We have been asked whether Hollister’s Resolution 2017-139 is subject to 

referendum. To determine the answer to this question, we must look to the principles 

governing the power of referendum, discussed below. 

Referendum Power 

The power of referendum refers to an electorate’s authority to reject a recent 

enactment by a legislative body. Referendum allows voters to veto statutes and local 

ordinances and resolutions before they become effective.12 If a referendum petition 

challenging an ordinance or resolution is timely filed and certified to be sufficient, its 

effective date is suspended and the enacting legislative body must reconsider the ordinance 

or resolution.

13 If the body does not repeal the act, it must be submitted to the voters.14 

The act then does not go into effect unless a majority votes in its favor.

15 If the voters 

instead reject the act, or if the legislative body repeals the act without submitting it to the 

voters, the same act cannot be reenacted for at least one year from the date of its rejection 

or repeal.16 

11 Id. at pp. 2-3. 

12 City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 34, 39; Yesson v. San Francisco 

Municipal Transportation Agency (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 108, 122 (“any legislative act 

may be . . . subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an 

‘ordinance’ or ‘resolution,’” quoting DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 787, 

fn. 9). 

Elec. Code, §§ 9237, 9239; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 

Cal.App.3d 765, 774, 776, 779 (noting that statute governing referendum procedure of 

ordinance is silent on resolution, and determining such procedure shall also apply to 

referendum of resolution). 

14 Elec. Code, § 9241. 

15 Elec. Code, § 9241. 

16 Elec. Code, § 9241. 

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Although the California Constitution vests legislative power in the Legislature, “the 

people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.”17 The Constitution 

expressly recognizes that referendum power extends to voters at the level of a city and 

county,18 which “is generally co-extensive with the legislative power of the local governing 

body.”19 The legislative decisions of a city council or board of supervisors are thus 

presumed to be subject to referendum unless there is a showing of contrary legislative 

intent.20 

Still, there are some limits on the referendum power.21 For instance, the 

Constitution provides that the power does not apply to “urgency statutes, statutes calling 

elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses 

of the State.”22 Further, the power does not apply to administrative acts, only to legislative 

ones.23 Courts therefore look to whether an act is “legislative” or “administrative” to 

determine whether referendum applies.24 The “legislative-administrative dichotomy 

reflects a determination to balance the ideal of direct legislation by the people against the 

17 Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1. The initiative power is identical in purpose and function to 

referendum power, however, an “initiative is drafted by its proponents and is the very law 

whose enactment is sought, whereas a referendum seeks to set aside a law that has been 

drafted by others.” (Lin v. City of Pleasanton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 408, 418-419.) 

18 Cal. Const. art. II, § 11, subd. (a). 

19 City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 40, quoting DeVita v. 

County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776. 

20 See DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776; Geiger v. Board of 

Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 839; Fishman v. City of Palo Alto (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 

506, 509. 

21 55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 383, 385-388 (1972) (explaining limits on scope of local 

initiative and referendum powers). 

22 Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a); Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of 

Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 778 (constitutional limits on state referendum power 

also apply to local referendum power). 

23 San Bruno Committee for Economic Justice v. City of San Bruno (2017) 15 

Cal.App.5th 524, 530, review denied (Jan. 10, 2018); Redevelopment Agency v. City of 

Berkeley, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 167 [“It is plain that only ordinances of a municipality 

which involve an exercise of the legislative prerogative are subject to the initiative and 

referendum”]. 

24 See Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 

pp. 778-779. 

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practical necessity of freeing municipal governments from time-consuming and costly 

referenda on merely administrative matters.”25 “The plausible rationale for this rule 

espoused in numerous cases is that to allow the referendum or initiative to be invoked to 

annul or delay the executive or administrative conduct would destroy the efficient 

administration of the business affairs of a city or municipality.”26 

How then to identify whether a given act is legislative (and therefore subject to 

referendum) or administrative (and therefore not subject to referendum)? Courts have 

provided the following guidance: 

Legislative acts generally are those which declare a public purpose and make 

provisions for the ways and means of its accomplishment. Administrative 

acts, on the other hand, are those which are necessary to carry out the 

legislative policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body. . . . 

[T]he classic and often quoted test [is]: “(T)he power to be exercised is 

legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is 

administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the 

legislative body itself, or some power superior to it.” [Citation omitted.] The 

test is not precise, and there is some inconsistency of approach between the 

published decisions.

27 

Additionally, courts have identified two instances that indicate the Legislature has 

withdrawn referendum power:

28 

[F]irst, when there is a ‘definite indication’ by the Legislature that it intends 

to preempt the discretion of a local legislative body to legislate; second, when 

25 Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 509. 

26 San Bruno Committee for Economic Justice v. City of San Bruno, supra, 15 

Cal.App.5th at p. 530, quoting Lincoln Property Co. No. 41, Inc. v. Law (1975) 45 

Cal.App.3d 230, 234. 

27 Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 509; see San Bruno 

Committee for Economic Justice v. City of San Bruno, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 530 

(summarizing legislative-administrative test); Pettye v. City And County of San Francisco 

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 233, 240-243 (explaining in detail development of legislativeadministrative jurisprudence); see also City of San Diego v. Dunkl (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 

384, 402 (stating difficulty in some cases of distinguishing between legislative and 

administrative acts). 

28 See DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 776. 

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the Legislature rather than preempt local legislative action has instead sought 

to delegate legislative power so exclusively to a local governing body as to 

indicate its intent to preclude the citizens’ otherwise coextensive right of 

referendum.29 

In the first instance, referendum power is deemed withdrawn when the Legislature removes 

the decision-making authority of a local legislative body over a particular subject.

30 In the 

second instance, referendum power is deemed to have been withdrawn where the 

Legislature has specifically and exclusively delegated decision-making over a matter of 

statewide concern to a local legislative body.31 Both circumstances may be conceptualized 

as a means of identifying an administrative matter.32 

Finally, in determining whether referendum power exists as to a particular matter, 

“it is settled that consideration must also be given to the consequences of applying the 

rule.”33 For example, “[i]f essential governmental functions would be seriously impaired 

by the referendum process, the courts, in construing the applicable constitutional and 

statutory provisions, will assume that no such result was intended.”34 

Legislative-Administrative Analysis 

As we explain in more detail below, we conclude that Hollister’s Resolution 2017-

139 is administrative rather than legislative in character, and therefore not subject to 

referendum. 

The Legislature Designated Successor Agencies to Dispose of Dissolved 

Redevelopment Agencies’ Assets 

“Where the Legislature has enacted a statewide policy and has assigned to a 

29 Empire Waste Management v. Town of Windsor (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 714, 718, 

citing DeVita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th 763, 776. 

30 City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 40 (“referendum power 

[cannot] be used in areas in which the local legislative body’s discretion [is] largely 

preempted by statutory mandate,” brackets in original, quoting DeVita v. County of Napa, 

supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776). 

31 Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 779. 

32 See Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 511. 

33 Geiger v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 839. 

34 Ibid. 

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particular local body the duty to implement that policy, the Legislature thereby places 

implementation of the statewide policy beyond the reach of initiative and referendum.”35 

We think this captures what the Legislature did in assigning a successor agency, following 

approval by its oversight board and the Department of Finance, the duty to dispose of a 

dissolved redevelopment agency’s property. 

The redevelopment dissolution law requires a successor agency to prepare a longrange property management plan that includes an inventory of the dissolved redevelopment 

agency’s property including specific information, such as previous development proposals 

for each property.36 After the successor agency’s long-range plan is approved by its 

oversight board and the Department of Finance, the plan governs the disposition of the 

dissolved agency’s property.37 The Legislature provided in clear terms that “the plan shall 

govern, and supersede all other provisions relating to, the disposition and use of the real 

property assets of the former redevelopment agency.”38 

The redevelopment dissolution law leaves no room for voter input on a settled longrange property plan. An approved plan may be amended, but only once, and only if the 

Department of Finance approved it before January 1, 2016, and the amendment related to 

retaining parking facilities and lots for governmental use.39 

Furthermore, the City’s resolution occurred at the tail end of the statutorily 

prescribed process for disposing of a dissolved redevelopment agency’s property. The 

successor agency’s plan is the product of that process, and the City’s resolution follows a 

string of decisions to implement that plan, further illustrating that the resolution is an 

administrative act implementing an established legislative policy and therefore not subject 

to referendum.40 

A City Implementing a Long-Range Property Management Plan Acts as an 

Administrative Agent of the State 

Our conclusion that the resolution is not subject to referendum finds additional 

35 Memorial Hospitals Assn. v. Randol, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313. 

36 Health & Saf. Code, § 34191.5, subds. (b) & (c). 

37 Health & Saf. Code, § 34191.3, subd. (a). 

38 Health & Saf. Code, § 34191.3, subd. (a). 

39 Health & Saf. Code, § 34191.3, subd. (b). 

See San Bruno Committee for Economic Justice v. City of San Bruno, supra, 15 

Cal.App.5th at p. 534. 

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support by analogizing a city’s implementation of a successor agency’s long-range 

property management plan to sell and develop property, to a redevelopment agency’s 

implementation of a redevelopment plan. 

The implementation of a redevelopment plan was never subject to referendum 

because local agencies acting in redevelopment matters were acting as administrative arms 

of the state.41 We believe it is appropriate also to characterize local agencies as 

administrative arms of the state when they act to implement redevelopment wind-up 

matters. As such, it would follow that Hollister’s resolution to sell and dispose of property 

as provided in the successor agency’s approved long-range plan is not subject to 

referendum either. 

The Potential Consequences of a Referendum Here Indicate that It Cannot Apply 

That the referendum power cannot apply here is perhaps best demonstrated by its 

potential consequences. If Hollister’s resolution were subject to referendum, the 

disposition and development of the property pursuant to the approved long-range plan 

could potentially never happen. The electorate could indefinitely prevent the sale of the 

property for development (as set forth in the approved long-range plan) by rejecting every 

attempt by Hollister to implement the plan. That would completely thwart the 

redevelopment dissolution law’s purposes to dispose of redevelopment agencies’ property 

expeditiously in order to fund core government services. It would also conflict with the 

statutory requirement that the dissolved agencies’ property be disposed of as provided in a 

long-range property management plan approved by a successor agency’s oversight board 

and the Department of Finance. 

In short, referendum would frustrate the essential goals of the redevelopment 

dissolution law.42 

41 PR/JSM Rivara LLC v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles 

(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1483; Gibbs v. City of Napa (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 148, 154 

(“When a municipal council, as here, declares a need for the redevelopment agency to 

function, the agency thereby becomes a state agency when acting in redevelopment 

matters. The council functions as an administrative arm of the state because it pursues a 

state concern and effectuates a state legislative policy. The functioning of such an agency 

is beyond the reach of, or control by, a municipal initiative or referendum election”); 

Andrews v. City of San Bernardino (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 459, 460-463 (city council acts 

as administrative arm of state in adopting resolution for redevelopment project under 

Community Redevelopment Law). 

42 Proponents of the referendum have suggested to us that the resolution is legislative 

because Hollister could have chosen a different way to implement the plan. We are not 

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Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the City’s resolution is not subject to 

referendum. 

***** 

persuaded, because even administrative acts can involve the exercise of some limited 

discretion, and the limited amount of discretion used to implement the plan is insufficient 

to characterize the resolution as a legislative act. 

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