# FILED
October 17, 19 97 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

IN RE: ) MADISON REN

EE BAIRD )

) WILLIAM ALAN BROWN, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) ) Rutherfor

d Juvenile VS. ) No. 1131-C ) ) Appeal N o. MANDY RENEE BAIRD, ) 01A01-9704- JV-00148 ) Defenda nt/Appella

nt. )

APPEAL FROM THE JUVENILE COURT FOR RUTHERFORD COUNTY

THE HONORABLE DAVID LOUGHRY, JUDGE
For the Plaintiff/Appellee : For the D efendant/ Appellant : John B. Melton, III Darrel l L. Sc arlett Murfreesboro, Tennessee Murfreesboro, Tennessee



## REVERSED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. K

OCH, JR., JUDG

E-2- 

## O P I N I O N

Thi s appeal concerns a dispute over a nonmarital child’s surnam e. Approxim

ately six weeks after

the child’ s birth, th e father filed a le gitima

tion petitio n in the Rutherford County Juvenile Cou rt seeking to establish paternity, to set visitation, and to give t

he child his surnam

e. Fol lo wing a ben ch trial, the juve nile courtchanged the ch ild’s surname from her mother’s nam

e to a hyphenated name that included both parents’ surnames. On this appeal, the mother takes issue with the trial court ’s order chang ing the ch ild’s surna me. We re verse the portionof the trial court ’s order changing the

child’s surname because we have determined that the father has not carrie d his burden o f proving tha t changi ng the ch ild’s sur name is in her be st interests
.

I . Mandy Renee Baird gav e birth

to Madison Renee Baird on July 19, 1996. She declined to include t

he nam e of the c hild’s bio logical fa ther on the

birth cer tificate andappar ently re buffed the father’ s attem

pts to visit th e child. On Septe mber 3, 1996, Willia

m Al an Brown

file d a l egitim ation petit ion in the Rutherford

County JuvenileCourt requesting (1 ) that th e child’ s birth cer tificate identify him a s the biological father, (2) that the c hild’s sur name be changed

to Brown, and (3) tha

t he be awarded li beral visi tation wit h the chil d. The juvenile court conducted a hearing on November 21, 1996 during which Ms. Baird and Mr . Brown we re the only w itnesses. Mr. Br own insiste d that the child’ s surname should be changed to “Baird-Br own” in order to reflect his parentag e . Ms. Baird oppos ed this sugge stion on the gr ounds that she

had the rig ht to nam

e the childandthat giving a

child a hy phenated su

rnam e would dif

ferentia te the chil d from otherchildren and could c all attent ion to the fa

ct that she

was born o ut of

wedlock. On Decem

ber 20, 1996, the j uvenile cou rt enter ed an orde

r concludin g that it

would be in the child ’s be st i nterests t o change h er name to Madiso n Renee Baird -Brown1 The trial court also required Mr. Brown to begin paying $25 per week in child support and granted Mr. Browndefined visitation. After the case was appea led, Mr. Brown moved

to Oklaho ma to attend college, and the parties ag re ed to modify the visitation arrang ements. Accordingly , the issue origina

lly raised b y Ms . Baird

concer ning the custody arrangements is now moot and need not be consid ered on t his appea l.
2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305(b)(1) (1996) states that “[i]f the mother is not married at the timeof either conception or birth or between conception and birth, the name of the fa ther shall not be entere d on the ce

rtifica te of birt h, and the surname of the ch ild shall be

that of the

legal s urname of the mother. All information pertaining to the father shall be omitted.” -3- anddirectingthat a new

birth cer tificate be issued sh owing the c hild’s ne w nam e and that her bi ological f

ather wa s Mr. Br

own. 1
II.
The sole issue on this appeal involves the juve nile court ’s deci sion to change the child’s sur name from Baird to Baird -Brown
. Our analysis m ust start w ith the recognitio n that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305(b)(1) (1996) requires that a nonmarital chil d’s su rna me be that of its mother. 2 Therea fter, a ny per son desiringto change t he chil d’s surnam

e, includ ing th e chi ld’s biological father, has the burden of proving that changing the child’ s surnam e is in the child’s bes t interest s. See Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1988).
The amount of proof r

equired to justify

changing a chil d’s surnam e is not insubstantia

l. Minor inconvenience or embarrassment are no t enough
. See Layman v. Replogle, App. No. 01A01 -9312-CV-0 0516, 1 994 WL 228227, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May

27, 1994) ( No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appl ication filed); In re Lackey, App. No. 01A01-9010-PB-00358, 1991 WL 45394, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 5, 1991) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). Among the factors for courts to consider in cases of this sort are: (1) the child’s preference, ( 2) the change’s potential effect on the child’s relations hip with ea ch parent , (3) the length of time the child has had its present surname, (4) the degree of comm unity respect

associate d with the

present andpro pos ed s urn ame, an d (5 ) th e di ffic ult y, harassm ent, or em barrassm ent that the childmay

experience from

be aring eith er its prese nt or its p roposed s urname. See Barabas v. Rogers, 868 S.W.2d 283 ,287 (Tenn. Ct . App. 1993).
Mr. Brown presented no ev idence conce rnin g how c hang ing h is da ught er’s su rna me would benefit the child. H e stat ed on ly that he bel ieved that t he chi ld’s-4-

su rna me should“reflect his parentage” and that “ the hyp henated la st nam

e would not adversel y impact the child.” These sorts of general statem ents of bel ief or opinion are insuffici ent

to prove that a proposed name change is i n the child’ s best inter ests. See In re Schid

lmeier, 496 A.2d 12 49, 1253-54 (Pa. S uper. Ct . 1985); In re Grim es, 609 A.2d 158, 161-62 (Pa . 1992) (declining to require a hyphenated surna

me); In re M.L.P., 621 S.W .2d 430, __

_(Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Lufft v. Lufft, 424 S.E. 2d 266, ___ (W. Va. 1992)
. The record be fore us co ntains no indicati on that the chi ld ’s o rig in al s urn ame is detrimental to her or t h at t he p rop os ed h yph ena ted su rna me wo ul d b e of so me benefit. There i s no proof that the c hild’s or

iginal surna

me ha s or will h ave any

effect on he r relationship with her parents and extended family or that she will b e inconvenienced or embarrassed if she continues to be known by her original surname. Acco rdi ngl y, we find that Mr. Brown failed to carry his burden of

proof and that the record does not contain suffic ient com petent evi dence to support thejuven ile co urt’s conclusion

th at c han gi ng th e ch il d’s su rna me fr om B aird to Bai rd-Brow n is in the child’s bes t interest s.
III.
We reverse

the portion

o f the juv enile cour

t’s ju dgment

directingthat the chil d’s surnam

e be change d from

Baird to B aird-Br

own and remand t

he case f or further proceedi ngs consiste nt with this opinion. We al so tax the c osts of this appeal to William Alan Br

own for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

_________________

____________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE CONCUR:

_________________

_________________

__ HENRY F. TODD PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

_________________

_________________

__ WILLIAM H. INMAN, SENIOR JUDGE