1

Filed 10/5/23 In re S.B. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re S.B. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.E.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E080777

(Super.Ct.No. SWJ2200100)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael J. Rushton, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Marisa L.D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Irene A.E. (Mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court finding that she 

possessed several firearms in violation of a restraining order. She argues that (1) the 

court erred by admitting certain evidence and (2) the finding that she had firearms in her 

immediate possession or control is not supported by substantial evidence. (Fam. Code, 

§ 6322.5, subd. (a).) We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition

Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) received referrals 

in late 2021 and early 2022 alleging that 10-year-old K.B. and 13-year-old S.B. were at 

risk of abuse or neglect. Israel B. (Father) and Mother had joint legal custody of the 

children, but Father had sole physical custody of them, and they had occasional weekend 

visits with Mother. According to the referrals, Father and his former partner, Kimberly 

A., fought frequently, Father was an alcoholic and drove the children while under the 

influence, and S.B. had recently hit her head on a window sill during a fight with Father. 

Mother disclosed prior domestic violence incidents with Father, and she said that she had 

used methamphetamine and alcohol in the past but was currently sober.

DPSS filed a petition alleging that S.B. and K.B. were persons described by

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). At the detention hearing 

in March 2022, the court detained both children from Father, detained K.B. from Mother, 

and placed S.B. in Mother’s home. DPSS placed K.B. with paternal aunt. 

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in May 2022, the court found true

allegations that both parents had a history of substance abuse, Father engaged in acts of
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violence in the presence of the children, and both parents had a history of substantiated 

child welfare referrals and had failed to benefit from previous services. The court 

removed the children from the custody of both parents and ordered reunification services

for both parents. DPSS placed S.B. with K.B. in paternal aunt’s home.

II. Six-Month Review and Father’s Request for a Restraining Order

In October 2022, Mother was arrested and charged with first degree burglary, 

contempt of court, and violating a protective order. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 166, subd. 

(c)(1), 273.6, subd. (a).) According to Father, Mother broke into his home and stole his 

security cameras. The court in Mother’s criminal case issued a protective order 

protecting Father from Mother.

DPSS reported that Father had successfully completed most of his services. He 

had progressed to unsupervised overnight visits with the children, and they were eager to 

return to his care. DPSS recommended an extended 30-day visit with Father before 

transitioning to placement in his home with family maintenance services. 

At the six-month review hearing in December 2022, the court authorized the 

30-day visit with Father and continued the hearing. That same day, Father filed a request 

for a restraining order protecting him and the children from Mother, so the court 

addressed that request as well. Father’s papers stated that the criminal protective order 

already in place protected him but not the children, Mother had recently been released

from custody, and Father hoped the children would soon be in his care. The court issued 

a temporary restraining order protecting Father and the children. The court questioned 

both parents under oath regarding firearms. Father stated that to his knowledge, Mother 
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did not own, possess, or have access to firearms. Mother likewise stated that she did not 

own, possess, or have access to firearms. The court informed Mother that as a restrained 

party, she could not own or possess any firearms.

In preparation for the continued review hearing, DPSS reported that the extended 

visit with Father had gone well. Mother supported returning the children to Father’s care.

The court continued reunification services for both parents at the continued review 

hearing. The court also authorized the extended visit with Father to continue for another 

30 days and gave DPSS the authority to place the children in his home with family 

maintenance services. 

At the same hearing, the court granted Father’s request for a permanent restraining 

order. The court again questioned Father under oath about Mother’s access to firearms, 

and he again said that to his knowledge, Mother did not own, possess, or have access to 

firearms. Mother was not present at the hearing. The court then asked whether anyone in 

the audience had information on the topic, and paternal aunt responded. According to 

paternal aunt, roughly one year earlier, Mother posted photos of firearms on Facebook. 

The court stated that it had run a search on CLETS (California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System), and there were no firearms registered to Mother. But in 

light of the information from paternal aunt, the court set a hearing to determine whether 

Mother had firearms within her “immediate possession or control.” (Fam. Code, 

§ 6322.5, subd. (a).)
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III. Firearms Hearing

The court held the firearms hearing several days later in January 2023. Paternal 

aunt, Father, and Mother’s friend, John R., testified.

A. Evidence at the Hearing

Mother had a business called A. Cleaning Services.1 The business name was also 

the name of Mother’s Instagram account. Paternal aunt did not follow Mother on 

Instagram, but Kimberly, Father’s former partner, followed Mother. Kimberly and 

paternal aunt were friends. 

Paternal aunt gave Father’s counsel copies of three screenshots reflecting posts on

Instagram. Two of the screenshots depicted posts from an account named

“_blanket_girl4” (blanket girl). Paternal aunt did not know whether the blanket girl

account belonged to Mother. One of the blanket girl posts depicted a flyer for a gun 

show in San Bernardino. The second blanket girl post depicted firearms in the back of 

Mother’s car; paternal aunt and Father both identified the car as belonging to Mother. 

The third screenshot depicted a post from the A. Cleaning Services account. That 

post was the same photo of firearms in the back of Mother’s car that the blanket girl 

account had posted. The caption on the A. Cleaning Services’ post stated, “My toys.” 

Paternal aunt saw the actual Instagram posts reflected in the screenshots, and the 

screenshots showed the posts. Kimberly showed paternal aunt the posts and took all of 

the screenshots. Paternal aunt and Kimberly worked together to write notes on the 

1 The business name includes Mother’s first surname. We use the initial “A.” in 

place of the surname to protect the anonymity of the children. 
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screenshot exhibits. Their notes on each exhibit documented the dates of the posts.

Above the screenshot of the A. Cleaning Services post, they noted: “December 8, 

2020—[Mother] posted the picture again this time labeling the Guns as ‘My toys.’”

Paternal aunt also gave Father’s counsel screenshots of text messages about selling 

guns. She could not explain how the text messages were connected to Mother, but 

Kimberly could explain that. Kimberly gave paternal aunt those screenshots. Paternal 

aunt saw only the screenshots and not the text messages themselves.

John had known Mother for five to six years. They were friends and did not

currently have a romantic relationship, but they had talked about getting married after 

Mother obtained a divorce. John helped Mother financially. He had recently spent 

$4,000 to bail her out of jail in November 2022. John recognized the photo of the gun 

show flyer posted by the blanket girl account—the photo depicted a display at his 

workplace. He was not familiar with the blanket girl account and had never known 

Mother to go by that social media handle. But he knew that the A. Cleaning Services 

account belonged to Mother. 

John also recognized the photo of the firearms in the back of a car. He took the 

photo and texted it to Mother. The firearms belonged to him and were registered to him, 

and the photo showed them in the back of Mother’s car. The photo showed three 

firearms, but he had at least 12 of them in the car. He borrowed Mother’s car to relocate 

the firearms. He had a pickup truck, but he did not have room for the firearms in the cab, 

and he wanted to transport them in a covered vehicle. John took the photo because 

Mother was curious about what firearms he had. He still owned them and had a third 
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party storing them in a secure location. That third party was a police officer, but he was 

not a federal firearms licensee, and the firearms were not stored at a law enforcement 

facility. John did not want to say who had the firearms because he did not want to get 

that person “involved in this.” Mother was not with him when he relocated the firearms,

and she did not know where they were located. Mother did not currently possess the 

firearms, she never had access to his firearms, and as far as he knew, she did not have any 

firearms. He would never allow Mother to borrow one of his firearms. He did not know 

why Mother would have referred to the firearms as her toys.

B. Court’s Ruling

After the close of evidence, Mother objected on hearsay grounds “to the evidence 

that was submitted by father’s counsel.” She also argued that statements by paternal aunt 

were double hearsay in that they were “based on statements of others,” including 

Kimberly. She further objected on due process grounds because “the other person 

mentioned” by paternal aunt did not testify and was not made available for crossexamination. And she argued that the screenshots lacked authentication because 

Kimberly provided them, Kimberly did not testify, and paternal aunt lacked personal 

knowledge.

The court admitted both screenshots of the blanket girl posts (the photo of the gun 

show flyer and the photo of the guns in the back of the car), but none of the notes on the 

exhibits. The court explained that although the identity of blanket girl had not been 

established, John’s testimony had sufficiently authenticated the photos in the posts. The 

court admitted the screenshot of the A. Cleaning Services post, as well as the notes on the 
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exhibit. The court described that post as the “most damning piece of evidence.” The 

court declined to admit or consider the screenshots of the text messages.

The court observed: “In this case, there is, frankly, compelling evidence that at 

one point in time mother was in possession of a number of firearms based on the 

photograph that she described as her toys, and I quote ‘My toys.’ [¶] The [A.] Cleaning 

Services post is extremely compelling.” The court also noted that it did not find John “to 

be a very compelling witness.” It explained: “So then I get [John] that comes in here

. . . . He seems like a guy, on the hope of this romantic relationship, that would do or say 

anything for mother, including to his own detriment. I mean, the $4,000 that he bailed 

her out is, let’s face it, more than a token gesture. [¶] Why he would take photos of guns 

that he—what makes more sense to you, that mom took photos of guns that she was 

transporting in her vehicle, or for some nonsensical reason [John] took photos of guns 

that he was transporting in the back of mom’s vehicle and sent her photographs. [¶] So 

the more logical and compelling outcome or answer to the Court is that she took the 

pictures of the weapons in her car.”

The court found that Mother had firearms in her possession, explaining: “Mom 

describes them as ‘My toys.’ I don’t have any information that I find believable that she 

is no longer in possession of her toys; therefore, I’m going to be making the firearms 

finding against her.” 

The court amended the permanent restraining order to find that Mother had

prohibited items, namely, “numerous” firearms “purportedly registered to John [R.].” 

The court also sent notice to the relevant law enforcement agencies and the Riverside 
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County District Attorney’s Office that Mother had firearms in violation of a restraining 

order. (Judicial Council Forms, form DV-830 [Noncompliance with Firearms and 

Ammunition Order, or Warrant].) Mother filed a notice of appeal from the amended 

restraining order.

DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Challenges

Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting the screenshots of 

the Instagram posts. (See People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 (Goldsmith)

[trial court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion].) She 

asserts that (1) paternal aunt lacked personal knowledge of the screenshots, (2) the 

screenshots were not authenticated, (3) one of them constituted inadmissible hearsay, and 

(4) their admission violated her right to due process. The arguments lack merit.

1. Personal Knowledge

The “testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless 

he [or she] has personal knowledge of the matter.” (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) The 

witness’s personal knowledge “may be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence,” 

including the witness’s own testimony. (Id., § 702, subd. (b).) Personal knowledge 

means “‘a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the 

[witness’s] own senses.’” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 356.)

Mother argues that the screenshots lacked an adequate foundation because paternal 

aunt lacked personal knowledge of the Instagram accounts, the account owners, and the 

posts. But paternal aunt testified that she observed the posts themselves—not just the 
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screenshots of the posts—when Kimberly showed her the posts.

2

 Paternal aunt therefore 

had personal knowledge of the posts and whether the screenshots accurately represented 

the posts. Paternal aunt also said that the A. Cleaning Services account belonged to 

Mother. But even if paternal aunt had not so testified, John’s testimony established that 

the A. Cleaning Services account belonged to Mother, and Mother does not challenge 

John’s personal knowledge of that fact. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion 

by overruling any personal knowledge objection to the A. Cleaning Services post. 

As for the two blanket girl posts, none of the witnesses knew who owned that 

account. However, even if the court erred by admitting the blanket girl posts, Mother 

fails to show that any error was prejudicial. One of those posts was merely the same 

photo posted by the A. Cleaning Services account. Because that blanket girl post was 

duplicative of other evidence, there is no reasonable probability that exclusion of the post 

would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Mother. (People v. Watson (1956) 

46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1117 (Rodrigues) 

[admission of cumulative evidence did not prejudice the defendant].) And Mother does 

not explain how she was prejudiced by admission of the second blanket girl post 

depicting the gun show flyer. The court admitted it for “whatever evidentiary value” it 

had, but the court did not appear to assign any value to the post. The court did not rely on 

2 Mother asserts that paternal aunt did not see the Instagram posts. That is an 

incorrect description of paternal aunt’s testimony. The testimony that Mother cites 

concerned the screenshot of a text message conversation. Paternal aunt said that she saw 

only screenshots of the text messages. The court did not admit the exhibits depicting text 

message conversations.
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the post in its oral ruling. In contrast, it described the A. Cleaning Services post as the 

“most damning piece of evidence.” We see no reasonable probability that the court 

would have changed its firearms finding if it had excluded the gun show flyer post.

2. Authentication

“Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to 

sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) 

the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 1400.) A photo qualifies as a writing. (Id., §§ 100, 250.) 

“A photograph or video recording is typically authenticated by showing it is a fair 

and accurate representation of the scene depicted.” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 

p. 267.) “This foundation may, but need not be, supplied by the person taking the 

photograph or by a person who witnessed the event being recorded. [Citations.] It may

be supplied by other witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, content and location.” 

(Id. at p. 268.) All that is required for admissibility “is a prima facie case. ‘As long as 

the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing is admissible. The fact 

conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight 

as evidence, not its admissibility.’” (Id. at p. 267.) 

Evidence Code section 1553 supplies a means to authenticate printed images in 

part. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Under that section, a “printed 

representation of images stored on a video or digital medium is presumed to be an 

accurate representation of the images it purports to represent.” (Evid. Code, § 1553, 

subd. (a).) The presumption operates “to establish, at least preliminarily, that errors in 
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content have not been introduced in the course of printing the images and accompanying 

data.” (Goldsmith, at p. 269.) If a party offers evidence that the printed image “is 

inaccurate or unreliable,” then “the party introducing the printed representation into 

evidence has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the printed 

representation is an accurate representation of the existence and content of the images

that it purports to represent.” (Evid. Code, § 1553, subd. (a).) But in the absence of 

contrary evidence, the presumption supports a finding that the printed versions of images 

are accurate representations of the images and data stored on a device. (Goldsmith, at 

p. 269.) 

First, under Evidence Code section 1553, the printouts of the screenshots were 

presumptively accurate representations of the screenshots stored on Kimberly’s device. 

Mother did not introduce any contrary evidence. Second, given that paternal aunt 

observed the actual Instagram posts, her testimony was sufficient to sustain a finding that 

the screenshots depicted the posts by the blanket girl and A. Cleaning Services accounts. 

Third, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that two of the posts depicted 

firearms in the back of Mother’s car. John claimed to have taken the photo and 

recognized the firearms and Mother’s car, and paternal aunt and Father also recognized 

Mother’s car in the photo. Fourth, John’s testimony was sufficient to sustain a finding 

that the third post depicted a gun show flyer at his workplace. Sufficient evidence thus 

supported a finding that the screenshots were accurate representations of the Instagram 

posts, two of the posts were accurate representations of firearms in Mother’s car, and the 

third post was an accurate representation of the gun show flyer. 
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Mother contends that the screenshots were not properly authenticated because 

there was no evidence that she owned the blanket girl account, and while John testified 

that the A. Cleaning Services account belonged to her, there was no evidence about who 

had the authority to post to that account. To the extent that the blanket girl posts were not 

properly authenticated, Mother has not shown that their admission prejudiced her, as 

already explained. And to the extent that proper authentication required a showing that 

Mother posted the photo to the A. Cleaning Services account, the evidence gave rise to 

that reasonable inference. There was no dispute that she had a business called A. 

Cleaning Services or that the Instagram account belonged to her. The post depicted 

Mother’s car, and the caption of the post referred to “My toys.” (See Goldsmith, supra, 

59 Cal.4th at pp. 268, 271 [contents of photos may be considered in determining whether 

photos were authenticated].) Given that the post showed Mother’s car, the poster referred 

to objects in Mother’s car as “My toys,” and the account belonged to Mother, the court 

could reasonably infer that Mother posted the photo. The evidence was sufficient to 

establish a “prima facie case” of authenticity supporting admission of the post. (Id. at 

p. 267.) 

3. Hearsay

Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while 

testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid. 

Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) The general rule that hearsay is inadmissible is subject to 

numerous exceptions, including one for statements of a party. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) 

“The hearsay rule does not bar statements when offered against the declarant in an action 
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in which the declarant is a party.” (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898.) 

Under that exception, the “only preliminary fact that is subject to dispute is the identity of 

the declarant.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Evid. Code § 403, subd. (a).) The 

hearsay statement “is admissible upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a 

finding that the party made the statement.” (Ibid.) Although we review the juvenile

court’s ultimate ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion, we review the court’s 

conclusion regarding preliminary facts for substantial evidence. (People v. DeHoyos

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 132.)

Mother argues that the A. Cleaning Services post was not admissible under the 

hearsay exception for statements of a party, because Father failed to establish that she

was the poster. But substantial evidence supports the finding that Mother posted the 

photo. As just discussed, the evidence showed that the Instagram account belonged to 

Mother, the post depicted Mother’s car, and the poster referred to objects in Mother’s car 

as “My toys.” The court could reasonably infer from that evidence that Mother posted 

the photo and therefore was the declarant for purposes of the hearsay exception. 

Mother also asserts that the A. Cleaning Services post was inadmissible hearsay 

because the notes submitted with the post (“December 8, 2020—[Mother] posted the 

picture again this time labeling the Guns as ‘My toys’”) were prepared by Kimberly after 

the post had occurred. None of that explains why the post itself was inadmissible 

hearsay. 

To the extent that Mother means the notes documenting the date of the post were

hearsay, she forfeited any such challenge. Mother did not object to any of the screenshot 
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exhibits on hearsay grounds when the witnesses were testifying. After the close of 

evidence, when the court asked for argument, Mother “object[ed] to the evidence that 

was submitted by father’s counsel on evidentiary grounds.” She asserted a hearsay 

objection as follows: “First, on evidentiary grounds, my objection[s] to the admissibility 

include hearsay in that the statements were created out of court in order to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted by [paternal aunt].” After the court gave the parties an indicated 

ruling on the admissibility of the screenshot exhibits, including the admissibility of the 

notes at issue, it stated that it would hear any additional arguments. Mother said that she 

had nothing to add. 

We will not reverse a ruling for claimed evidentiary error unless the appellant 

timely objected to the evidence and made “clear the specific ground of the objection.” 

(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) “The reason for the requirement is manifest: a 

specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It 

allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to 

avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional 

foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the 

prospect of reversal.” (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 187-188; Estate of

Silverstein (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 221, 225 [‘“Where inadmissible evidence is offered, 

the party who desires to raise the point of erroneous admission on appeal must object at 

the trial, specifically stating the grounds of his objection, and directing the objection to 

the particular evidence which he seeks to exclude’”].) 
16

Mother’s blanket objection to all of Father’s evidence (which included seven 

exhibits) and her hearsay objection to some unspecified statements did not preserve her

hearsay challenge to the notes on the A. Cleaning Services post. She had to direct her 

objection to the particular evidence that she wanted to exclude. Her generalized 

objections did not allow Father to cure any defects in the evidence or permit the court to 

make an informed ruling on the specific objection she now raises. (People v. Boyette

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.) She thus forfeited the hearsay challenge to the notes.

Even if Mother had not forfeited the argument, we would conclude that it lacks

merit. Paternal aunt testified that she saw the Instagram posts, she and Kimberly wrote 

the notes on the exhibits together, and their notes set forth the date of each post. Her 

testimony established that the date in the notes was the date of the post. The portion of 

the notes documenting the date thus was admissible for “the nonhearsay purpose of 

giving context” to paternal aunt’s testimony about the dates. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 

Cal.4th 482, 524.) Moreover, other evidence established everything else in the notes: 

Substantial evidence showed that Mother was the poster, and the caption of the post was 

evident from the face of the post itself. The notes were cumulative of other evidence in 

those respects, so their admission did not prejudice Mother. (Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 

at p. 1117.) Accordingly, either the notes were admissible for a nonhearsay purpose, or 

any assumed error was harmless. 

4. Due Process

“In a civil proceeding, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses derives 

from the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.” (San Diego Police
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Depart. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 574 (Geoffrey S.); see also In re

Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1244 [“parties generally have a due process right to 

cross-examine available hearsay declarants”].) Mother argues that the admission of the 

screenshots violated her right to due process, because she was denied the right to crossexamine Kimberly. Mother asserts that paternal aunt’s testimony “involved multiple 

layers of hearsay,” and Kimberly was “the source of the information.” The argument 

fails.

Mother does not identify the specific testimony that conveyed a hearsay statement 

by Kimberly or any other specific testimony that purportedly involved multiple layers of 

hearsay. We have no duty to comb the record for testimony that might fit the description 

and develop the argument for her. (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 

1178, 1190; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) 

Assuming for the sake of argument that the court admitted hearsay statements by 

Kimberly, no one denied Mother the right to cross-examine Kimberly. The record 

contains no indication that Mother tried to subpoena Kimberly or otherwise call her as a 

witness but was prevented from doing so. There thus was no due process violation. 

(Geoffrey S., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 575 [rejecting a due process claim because the 

appellant never tried to call the hearsay declarants as witnesses].) 

In sum, we conclude that all of Mother’s evidentiary challenges are meritless.

B. Substantial Evidence Supporting the Firearms Finding

Mother argues that the juvenile court’s firearms finding is not supported by 

substantial evidence. We disagree.
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After a dependency petition has been filed, the juvenile court has exclusive 

jurisdiction to issue restraining orders protecting the children who are the subject of the 

petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.620(b),

5.630(a).) The court may also issue a restraining order protecting the children’s parent. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (a); In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 

211.) Restraining orders issued by the juvenile court prohibit the restrained party from

owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition during the term of 

the order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (g); Fam. Code, § 6389, subds. (a), (c)(1); 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(g).) When the court issues the restraining order, it must 

determine “whether the restrained person is in possession or control of a firearm or 

ammunition, as provided in Section 6322.5 of the Family Code.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 213.5, subd. (g).) 

Under Family Code section 6322.5, when the court receives information that a 

restrained person has a firearm or ammunition, the court shall “determine, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, whether the person subject to a protective order has a 

firearm or ammunition in, or subject to, their immediate possession or control.” 

(Fam. Code, § 6322.5, subd. (a).) The court may set a review hearing to make the 

determination. (Id., subd. (c)(1).) If the court determines that the restrained party has 

firearms in violation of the restraining order, then the court must report the violation to 

the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction. (Fam. Code, § 6389, subd. (c)(4).)

We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (In re

Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) We view the evidence in the light most 
19

favorable to the prevailing party “and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to 

uphold the juvenile court’s determination.” (In re Cassandra B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 210.) “We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or 

resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

Substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that Mother had firearms 

in or subject to her immediate possession or control. The evidence showed that the A. 

Cleaning Services Instagram account belonged to Mother, she posted a photo of firearms 

in her car in December 2020, and she referred to the firearms as “My toys.” John 

claimed that he was merely using Mother’s car to move his firearms and took the photo

when Mother was not present, but the court found that John lacked credibility. The court 

reasonably concluded that Mother had taken the photo herself. And on the basis of all of 

that evidence, the court reasonably inferred that Mother had the firearms in her 

immediate possession or control in December 2020. Moreover, the court reasonably 

inferred that Mother still had them in her immediate possession or control at the time of 

the hearing. John refused to specify who had the firearms currently or where they were 

located. Mother had earlier testified that she did not have any firearms, but the court was 

not required to credit Mother’s testimony. In the absence of any evidence that Mother 

had sold or in some other way relinquished possession or control of the firearms since 

December 2020, the evidence was sufficient for the court to find that Mother still had the 

firearms in or subject to her immediate possession or control. 

Apart from her substantial evidence challenge, Mother argues that the juvenile 

court applied an incorrect legal standard, namely, whether Mother had “past possession 
20

or future access” to firearms. She relies in large part on arguments of counsel and 

comments by the court regarding Mother’s “access” to firearms. But the court “‘is 

presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’” (People v. Stowell

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. On the 

contrary, the court’s ruling demonstrated that it applied the correct standard: It found that 

Mother was “in possession of a number of firearms” on the basis of her Instagram post 

and that there was no credible evidence she was “no longer in possession” of them. The 

record thus shows that the court was aware that it had to find Mother currently possessed 

firearms. 

For all of these reasons, substantial evidence supports the court’s firearms finding. 

DISPOSITION

The amended restraining order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

RAPHAEL

J.