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COUNTERING ISIS: ARE WE MAKING PROGRESS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 10, 2014

Serial No. 113–234

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Brett McGurk, Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the 

Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. Department of State ........................... 3

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Brett McGurk: Prepared statement ............................................. 7

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

Written responses from the Honorable Brett McGurk to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable William Keating, a Representative in 

Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ....................................... 65

(1)

COUNTERING ISIS: ARE WE MAKING 

PROGRESS? 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

I am going to ask the members and those in the audience to take 

their seats at this time. 

This morning we welcome back Ambassador McGurk for an update on the critical effort to counter ISIS. And the Ambassador was 

one of the few in the administration sounding the ISIS alarm early 

on, as you did with this committee. We were holding hearings last 

February, speaking about this problem and the need to use air 

power to turn back ISIS. 

After 4 months of the U.S.-led air campaign in Iraq and in Syria, 

ISIS still controls essentially the same amount of territory that it 

did in the summer. And one of the reasons for this, in my opinion, 

is the limited nature of this effort. We have conducted only about 

1,000 air strikes to date. 

Now, if you compared that to when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the response on the part of the United States, back then 

we had 1,000 sorties per day. So you get an idea in terms of the 

response and how minimal it is compared to what we have seen in 

the past to deter an entity like this. Moreover, the committee is 

concerned by reports that targeting has been micromanaged from 

the White House. This clearly has been an issue within the Pentagon. But even with this flawed air campaign, Kurdish and Iraqi 

security forces have pushed ISIS out of specific key infrastructure 

areas, such as Mosul and the Haditha dams. They have done that 

without the heavy equipment that they need. They have done that 

at great loss, the shedding of a lot of their blood. And, frankly, 

more coalition air attacks would mean more ISIS defeats. 

Another pillar of the administration effort is to provide training 

and weapons to U.S. partners on the ground in Iraq and in Syria. 

But when we look at that program in Syria, U.S.-backed groups 

have seen no increase in support in the past several months. In 

fact, the Syrian groups have suffered from dire ammunition shortages in the last several weeks. We had meetings with their representative recently. They are out of ammunition. In addition to 

2

not being supplied with the heavy weapons they need to fight ISIS 

and at the same time as they are fighting ISIS, for example, on the 

border there, Aleppo has ISIS on one side and 30, 40 air strikes 

a day barrel bombs being dropped from the Assad regime on their 

forces while they are trying to fight ISIS. 

In Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga remain the most effective fighting force against ISIS, but the administration and Baghdad have 

refused thus far to supply them with anything more than light 

weapons as they go up against ISIS’s tanks and artillery and 

Humvees and other heavy weapons. 

There was a tragic event a couple of weeks ago, where you had 

a small squadron of Peshmerga trying to take on 10 tanks—or 10 

armored personnel carriers, 10 pieces of armor, that were put into 

play by ISIS against them. They only had small arms and, as a 

consequence, they called in for air strikes, but after 21⁄2 hours—and 

it took a quite considerable time for those air strikes to come in—

they had been wiped out on the ground. 

This is why we have heard from the foreign minister that the situation for the Peshmerga with their need for armor and for artillery, for long-range mortars, for antitank missiles—that unmet 

need has had very real consequences for them. I am hopeful that 

the recent accord announced between Baghdad and Erbil, which I 

appreciate the administration has helped engineer, will speed support for the Kurds. If not, the ranking member and I have legislation to do just that. 

Although the administration notes that 60-plus countries have 

joined the anti-ISIS campaign, some key partners continue to perceive the administration’s strategy as misguided. Turkey, for one, 

has withheld use of its air base, involvement of its ground forces 

and other resources. And the Saudis and other Arabs don’t see how 

allowing Assad to pummel those on the ground from the air in 

Aleppo makes any sense. 

Instead, they push, of course, for a no-fly area along the Kurdish 

border, where they suggest they and Jordan can patrol that long 

term to keep from having the Free Syrian forces hit from the air 

by Assad at the very time they are trying to fight against ISIS. 

Meanwhile, there are grave security consequences to allowing 

ISIS to control a territory of the size of western Iraq and eastern 

Syria. Clearly, as of September, there were already over 15,000 foreign fighters within ISIS and, reportedly, ISIS has been recruiting 

1,000 new fighters per month. 

This is part of the problem of not turning back ISIS, is that, on 

social media, they use the argument that they are on the advance, 

they are carrying out their jihad, and, of course, this resonates 

with certain young men who enlist in their cause. This is why we 

would argue that a more effective strategy that would roll them 

back would hurt their recruiting effort. And these fighters, particularly with western passports, have the potential to attack us at 

home. 

As members may remember, when Secretary Kerry testified here 

in September, he said it is time for the defensive strategy we and 

our international partners have pursued thus far to transition to 

an offensive strategy. 

3

Ambassador McGurk, with a lackluster air campaign, severely 

under-supplied partners on the ground, and key allies with deep 

concerns about the President’s strategy, I just don’t see how, you 

know, this is a credible offense, and we would like to talk to you—

I would like to ask you about that. 

And, of course, next Congress, this committee expects to consider 

a new authorization for use of military force to support this effort, 

and that is something we will do under a timeframe that is befitting of the gravity of the issue. And the committee also expects 

that the Commander in Chief will come to Congress with his request and work in a bipartisan way to garner maximum support. 

Before turning to the ranking member, I would like to note that 

this is the last full committee hearing of the 113th Congress, and 

we have accomplished a lot in the last 2 years, for which I would 

like to recognize all the members for their contribution. 

And for those members who will not be returning, we wish you 

well. 

And I was going to turn to Mr. Engel at this time, whose longheld observations on Syria have proven prophetic. He has seen 

things as they really were on the ground, frankly, before—before 

many and suggested a strategy to engage ISIS before this committee some 2 years ago. 

While we wait for the ranking member, my suggestion then 

would be that we go, Ambassador, to your testimony. And after you 

conclude, he will make his opening statement. 

Ambassador McGurk. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by Brett McGurk, the 

Ambassador who was recently tapped to serve as the Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, 

working alongside General Allen. 

He concurrently serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Iraq and Iran. He was previously Senior Advisor to Ambassadors 

Ryan Crocker, Christopher Hill, and James Jeffrey in Baghdad. 

Without objection, the witness’s full prepared statement will be 

made part of the record. Members will have 5 calendar days to submit statements and questions and extraneous material for the 

record. 

And, Ambassador, if you would please summarize your remarks. 

Thank you for being with us. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRETT MCGURK, DEPUTY 

SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY FOR THE GLOBAL COALITION TO COUNTER ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ms. RosLehtinen, and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear 

again before this committee to provide an update on the global 

campaign to degrade and defeat ISIL. 

Before discussing the state of the campaign and where we are 

going, I would like to reflect briefly on how far we have come in 

the 6 months since the city of Mosul in Iraq fell. 

I was in northern Iraq on June 10th, 6 months ago today, when 

Mosul collapsed. Over the next 72 hours, ISIL formations poured 

through the Tigris Valley, multiple cities fell, entire army divisions 

4

collapsed, and ISIL threatened the northern approaches to Baghdad. 

To the west, a lesser noted, but equally devastating, offensive 

took place from across the Syrian border with ISIL capturing the 

strategic Iraqi border city of al Qaim. ISIL then poured down the 

Euphrates Valley, threatening the western approaches to Baghdad. 

In Baghdad during this period, just 6 months ago this week, 

there was a growing panic within the population, the Government, 

security services, and the diplomatic community. At the Embassy, 

we prepared for the worst-case scenario and evacuated 1,500 people, moving them to Amman, Kuwait, or Erbil. We also prepared 

to help the Iraqis fight back. 

Within 72 hours of Mosul’s collapse, the President ordered four 

initiatives to hold the line and set the conditions for a possible 

counteroffensive. 

First, we surged intelligence over the skies of Iraq. We went from 

flying one platform per month to 60 per day, gaining a more granular picture of the ISIL network, which is essential to any military 

campaign. 

Second, we established joint operation centers in Baghdad and 

Erbil, restoring critical relationships with Iraqi and Kurdish commanders and gaining new insight into their capabilities and needs. 

Third, we deployed special forces teams to assess Iraqi and Kurdish security formations with a focus on the defense of Baghdad. 

And, finally and perhaps most importantly, we supported the 

Iraqis as they worked to stand up a new and more inclusive Government following national elections. 

Throughout the summer months, we worked these four tracks simultaneously, learning more about ISIL, its locations, its movement, and leadership patterns, restored relationships with Iraqi 

commanders, and learned more about the deficiencies within their 

security services while supporting Iraqi political leaders as they 

stood up a new Government. 

For all of these reasons, on August 8th, when the President first 

ordered U.S. military forces to conduct air strikes in Iraq, we were 

able to act with precision and efficacy. 

On September 8th, 1 month later, the Iraqi Parliament inaugurated a new Iraqi Government with a new prime minister and new 

and very different leaders across nearly every key cabinet position, 

including oil, finance, and defense. 

This new Government, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, 

represents a bulwark against ISIL and a significant break from the 

past in three key respects. 

First, its governing philosophy is decentralization or a functioning federalism with authorities and resources delegated to 

provinces and regions within the constitutional structure of Iraq. 

Last week’s historic oil accord with the Kurdistan region is an outgrowth of this new policy. 

Second, the new Government has committed to significant security reforms, including a smaller, more agile army, strengthen security forces at the local level, including tribal forces, and, ultimately, provincial-based national guards. 

Third, the new Government is committed to a policy of restoring 

relations with regional capitals and maintaining Iraq’s strategic 

5

independence and regional balance. Even in its first 100 days, the 

new Government has made or exchanged breakthrough visits with 

UAE, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. 

Nonetheless, despite this progress, the challenges of this new 

Government are truly enormous. ISIL has thousands of fighters 

controlling territory in three major cities in Iraq where state structures have collapsed. 

The Iraqi economy, which had been growing at 4 percent per 

year, is now predicted to contract due to falling oil prices. This new 

Government, despite the promise, simply cannot defeat ISIL and 

stabilize Iraq on its own. It will need the support of the United 

States and of the world. That is why we have established a global 

campaign to prosecute a comprehensive effort against ISIL. 

Last week in Brussels, Secretary Kerry chaired a historic conference that brought together 60 coalition partners to affirm a common and shared commitment across five lines of effort. This conference, for the first time, formalized the global coalition to defeat 

and degrade ISIL. 

The lines of effort include military support to our partners, countering foreign fighters, countering ISIL financing, humanitarian 

support, and delegitimizing ISIL’s ideology and messaging. 

We are now seeing progress along each of these lines of effort. 

On the military side, there are now seven countries flying combat 

air missions over Iraq and five doing the same over Syria. To date, 

we have conducted over 1,200 air strikes against ISIL terrorists. 

As a result of these strikes, ISIL’s offensive has been halted, its 

ability to amass and maneuver forces degraded, its leadership sales 

pressure are eliminated, its command and control supply lines severed. 

In the past 60 days alone, Iraqi forces have retaken ground at 

Mosul Dam, Erbil border, and Baiji Refinery in southern Baghdad. 

They have also held the line at Haditha Dam, Ramadi, and Amerli. 

Efforts to generate additional forces, specifically 12 new brigades, 

including three Kurdish Peshmerga brigades, will soon begin at 

multiple sites across Iraq with cooperation from our coalition partners. 

In Syria, Kurdish and Arab fighters at Kobani, under the cover 

of our air strikes, implemented a massive ISIL assault, leading to 

significant attrition of ISIL fighters. They are now losing more 

than 100 fighters per week, including top commanders and top foreign fighters. Moderate opposition forces ares also holding their 

ground against ISIL north of Aleppo. 

On combating foreign fighters, we now have in place a Chapter 

VII Security Council resolution calling on all member States to 

stem the flow of foreign fighters to Syria. Members of the coalition 

are increasingly criminalizing foreign fighter-related activities. In 

the past month alone, foreign fighter networks have been broken 

up in Austria and Malaysia and foreign fighters prosecuted in Germany, Australia, and the UK. 

On counter-finance, we are working with partners to cut the avenues of revenue and we are destroying ISIL’s refining capacity, denying its main source of revenue from oil trade. These efforts are 

now having an impact. 

6

On the humanitarian front, much has been done, but far more 

is needed, and this was the key focus of our conference in Brussels 

last week. 

Finally, on countering ISIL’s message, we have begun an aggressive campaign led primarily by our partners in the Middle East region. We have seen fatwas issued from top religious leaders in 

Egypt and Saudi Arabia declaring ISIL a direct threat to Islam, 

and other coalition partners are working to establish operations 

rooms to combat ISIL’s social media presence and messaging campaign in real time. 

As President Obama’s envoys to the anti-ISIL coalition, General 

John Allen and I have visited 16 capitals over the past few months 

to discuss cooperation across these lines of effort. We have found 

the coalition strongly and firmly united, particularly when it comes 

to the way forward in Iraq. 

The situation in Syria is more complex and our tools, for the moment, more limited. General Allen and I hear a common set of 

questions about the best way forward in Syria and, also, a divergence on how to proceed. 

Many of our coalition partners do not envision themselves as 

having signed up to bring about a political transition in Syria 

through military force, considering such a transition potentially 

even more destabilizing than the situation we face now. At the 

same time, other coalition partners are urging strikes against the 

Assad regime, considering the regime a central source of instability 

in the region. 

Our message to all these partners has been clear. We believe 

there must be a political transition in Syria through a negotiated 

political process. We are firm in our commitment that any future 

government cannot include Bashar al-Assad, who has forfeited any 

claim of legitimacy to govern and remains a magnet for terrorism 

in the region. 

A political transition will also require a strong counterweight to 

extremists like ISIL. That is why the Department of Defense is 

leading an effort to train and equip moderate opposition forces, 

subject to authorization and funding from Congress. 

This process, of course, will take time, and throughout we will 

constantly assess how we can best ensure the moderate forces in 

the field are able to protect themselves against multiple threats, including ISIL, the Nusra Front, and the Syrian regime. 

In conclusion, looking back from 6 months ago at this very hour, 

we have indeed begun to make progress against ISIL. But I want 

to emphasize this will be a long-term, multi-year campaign. We are 

now in the earliest phases of Phase 1. And as we move into a new 

phase, it will require a global effort in addition to the ongoing support from this Congress. 

So I am honored to be here to discuss with you today the state 

of the campaign, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador McGurk follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I think I will start with my questions and then, when Eliot arrives, he can give his opening statement and ask his. And then we 

will go down the line. 

But, Ambassador, as you know, the Syrian city of Aleppo is the 

last major city there, the last refuge of the Syrian middle class, 

that is under the partial control of the moderate Syrian opposition 

as it is pushed by ISIS. 

This is an absolutely critical city for the opposition for both symbolic and strategic reasons. It is through this city that most foreign 

humanitarian and military assistance to the people of northern 

Syria and the moderate opposition flows. 

Yet, over the past year, as the moderate opposition has struggled 

to maintain its defense of this city, as better resourced fighters 

from ISIS, as, you know, as many as 40 air strikes a day from the 

Assad regime hit them, they have had to contend with Assad’s use 

of Hezbollah fighters against them. 

And so you see a situation where ISIS has gradually captured an 

increasing portion of the city as have other—as have those who 

want to extinguish this last representation of the Syrian middleclass efforts to hold on. And they are encircled, and they are defending it from within. And most observers agree that, if Aleppo 

falls out of moderate control, it will have catastrophic consequences 

for the Free Syrian Army. 

So they are already on the ropes after years of anemic support. 

When we meet with them, we hear the same thing that you hear 

from them. They can’t get the equipment that they need to fight 

back against ISIS. 

So in late August, a team of State Department briefers met with 

committee staff, which had requested a briefing on the situation in 

Aleppo. The State Department officials said it was a question not 

of when it would fall, but—it was a question of when, not if, Aleppo 

would fall. I use their words. A question of when, not if, Aleppo 

would fall. 

When our staff asked if the administration viewed preventing the 

fall of Aleppo as a strategic priority, the State Department said 

that the administration was still trying to decide if it was, which 

sounded like diplomatic speak for no. 

And as events have played out over the past few months, it 

seems clear that that was the case. ISIS continues to advance on 

Aleppo. The barrel bombs continue to drop on the city. And this is 

now on a daily basis. 

So, Ambassador, if we are serious about combating ISIS in Syria, 

we cannot let Aleppo fall. It is far more strategically important 

than Kobani and far more lives are at stake, yet nearly all of our 

air strikes are focused not in that area, but up in Kobani. 

If Aleppo falls, it is likely that yet another massive wave of displaced people and refugees would result, and what is left of the opposition around the Syrian middle class will all but be destroyed. 

So I will just ask you: Is preventing the fall of Aleppo an administration priority? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me address that question a few ways. And we are very focused on the situation in Aleppo. 

23

I first—I want to be clear on what our authorities are to conduct 

military action in Syria. Right now we are acting pursuant to requests from the Iraqi Government to the United Nations Security 

Council to protect them against ISIL. 

So all of our kinetic operations in Syria are focused on ISIL. 

Where ISIL is operating in these areas, I can assure you that my 

DoD colleagues are looking very closely at what we can do against 

ISIL. 

On the Aleppo situation, we are very focused on what we can do. 

That is why General Allen and I have made about four trips to 

Turkey over the last couple of months and the focus of the conversation with the Turks is how we might be able to work together 

to begin to improve the situation there. 

We are obviously doing a number of things with the moderate opposition in these areas, which I can’t discuss here. But all I can do 

is assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we are very focused on this situation and looking at ways to allow them to hold the line. 

ISIL is north of Aleppo, kind of just south of the Turkish border. 

Within the city of Syria—within the city of Aleppo itself and surrounding areas, it is not so much ISIL. 

But what we are focused on in terms of kinetic action, it is ISIL 

targets. They can be very hard to find. But we are looking at it 

very closely, and our conversation with Turkey is specifically focused on this question. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, that calls into question the fact that they 

are fighting al-Qaeda units as well, as you know. It calls into question our policy in the safe zones. 

But my worry about the dithering on this is that we had these 

dialogues back in February on ISIS at a time—frankly, we began 

this dialogue before ISIS even took Fallujah, when we were calling 

for air strikes and action against ISIS before they managed to pull 

that off. 

And then city by city by city the call went out from Members of 

Congress and by others who have experience that, if ISIS wasn’t 

hit while their columns were on the ground, that Mosul itself 

would fall. And it did. And they took the central bank. 

Still no action. Still discussion. Still dithering. And now we are 

at the point where we see the last major stronghold for the Syrian 

middle class trying to hold off ISIS and hold off al-Qaeda on one 

front and hold off the barrel bombs, and we still can’t seem to see 

any policy that will rescue the city. 

And when our—when we directly ask whether it is a strategic objective to try to hold against the fall of that city, the response we 

get is, ‘‘We are still trying to decide.’’

We can be still trying to decide after we have lost the ability to 

reverse what is going on in Syria, just as we lost that ability to reverse what was going on in western Iraq, because we didn’t hit the 

targets prior to them taking Mosul. 

So I—anyway, my time is expired. And we will now go to Mr. 

Sherman of California. We will return to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, interrupt me if I have got this 

wrong. But you are not saying that the U.N. Resolution or the request to the Iraqi Government gives the administration legal auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:24 Jan 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\121014\91843 SHIRL
24

thority under American law to deploy troops. You are relying on 

the various authorization to use military force. 

It is also my understanding that the interpretation is that they 

authorized the efforts that you have taken against al-Qaeda in 

Syria, that you have taken against ISIS, which is a splinter—arguably, a continuing splinter of one of the many streams of al-Qaeda. 

Do I have that right as to your legal position? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Our international basis for operating in 

Syria now——

Mr. SHERMAN. I wasn’t asking about your international basis. 

That is not legally binding. What is legally binding is the laws of 

Congress. 

And you are not claiming that the U.N. Actions or the Iraqi actions give you authority under the War of Powers Act? 

Ambassador MCGURK. No. I am saying that the situation in 

Aleppo is a very confused one. Our ability to look closely at what 

is happening there is limited by the fact that we are flying all the 

way from the Gulf. So our loiter time in these areas is limited. 

And our focus right now is on ISIL. As you know, we are——

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, I was asking you a question about 

the legal position of the administration, its authorization to use 

force, and you are telling me about how difficult it is to bomb 

based—you are not going to answer my questions. I want to go on 

to another—another question. 

We have been pushed around by this Iraqi Government. We 

saved it. You have pointed out, I believe, that they would have 

taken Baghdad—or might well have taken Baghdad if it hadn’t 

been for us. 

They are terrorizing the folks at Camp Liberty without—in clear 

violation of not only U.S. preferences, but international law. They 

have allied themselves with Iran, with the Iranian Air Force carrying out attacks—operations over Iraq and Iranian ground forces 

operating on the ground in conjunction with Iraqi forces. 

And sometimes folks at the upper levels of the State Department 

don’t focus that much on the money of U.S. taxpayers. We are giving all this—a tremendous amount of aid to Iraq; whereas, it is my 

understanding that Iraq is still paying and still acknowledges its 

debt to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for tens of billions of dollars borrowed by Saddam Hussein. 

Have you bothered—is Iraq still making payments to Kuwait and 

Saudi Arabia on that debt? And does that, therefore, put them in 

a position where, instead of paying for what we give them, often 

we have to give it to them for free? 

Ambassador MCGURK. As I mentioned briefly in my opening testimony, the Iraqis face a very serious fiscal crisis. They are facing 

a $40 billion——

Mr. SHERMAN. They face that fiscal crisis, in part, because they 

honor the debts to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait run up by Saddam 

Hussein. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, it is a very good——

Mr. SHERMAN. Have—and I have brought this up at hearings for 

the last 5 years in this room. I have never gotten a straight answer 

out of the State Department. I figured I would try it at——

25

Ambassador MCGURK. No. I will give you a straight answer, Congressman. 

The payments to Kuwait are mandated by a Chapter VII U.N. Security Council resolution. They come to about $1 billion a month. 

Iraq is obligated to pay those funds. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Those are payments on Saddam Hussein’s debt? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, they are payments of the 1990–1991 Gulf War reparations, but they are about $1 billion a quarter. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, that is the—no. I am not talking about the 

reparations. I am talking about the money Saddam borrowed to 

carry on his war against Iran, the promissory notes and bonds. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Right. No. The Iraqis resist paying, as you 

know, the debts of Saddam Hussein because the new Iraqi Government considers themselves also a victim of Saddam Hussein, which 

is true. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But they haven’t renounced those debts. We 

haven’t urged them to renounce those debts. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, we have. We have urged over the 

last decade all the debt holders from the Saddam era to renounce 

those debts. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, not—you have asked the debt holders to, but 

you haven’t had—urged Iraq to refuse to pay. It is one thing to ask 

the creditor, ‘‘Oh, please tear up the note.’’ It is another thing to 

stand behind the debtor saying, in effect, ‘‘We don’t owe the money. 

We are not going to pay.’’

Ambassador MCGURK. We are doing anything we can to help the 

Iraqis preserve their fiscal resources right now. That is why we are 

working with——

Mr. SHERMAN. Except stand up to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and 

void this debt, money they lent Saddam Hussein to carry on a war 

against Iran. 

Ambassador MCGURK. If I can just—it is a slightly different 

issue. But, with Kuwait, we are actually in very good discussions 

with them. The Secretary of Defense just saw the Emir. I saw the 

Emir with General Allen about a month ago about relieving those 

payments. So we are——

Mr. SHERMAN. You are talking—you are talking about completely 

different payments, sir. I am talking about the debt run——

Ambassador MCGURK. They come from the same pot. They come 

from the same pot. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They do? 

Ambassador MCGURK. The Iraqis are limited in terms of their 

ability to fund these things. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. And I hope for the record you will brief us 

on what you have done to push the Iraqi regime to honor its obligations to the residents of Camp Liberty and Camp Ashraf. 

Ambassador MCGURK. I would be happy to come up and give you 

a briefing on that. And we are working very hard on the issue. 

And, of course, the new Iraqi Government has been in place for 100 

days, and it is much different than the previous Government. And 

I think we are making some progress on these issues. But I would 

happy to—I would be happy to come brief you on that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you. 

26

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to the ranking member, Mr. Eliot 

Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you. Thank you for your good work. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing on 

the fight against ISIS. 

Though our military operation against ISIS is focused in the 

Middle East, the threat posed by these terrorist groups spans the 

globe. Recent reports indicate that ISIS is recruiting more than 

1,000 foreign fighters every month. These fighters are streaming 

into Syria and Iraq from Europe, North Africa, the Gulf, the U.S., 

and other nations. Most troubling, some of them are returning to 

their home countries, armed with the knowledge of how to sow terror. 

Just as the threat spans the globe, so must the coalition be responding to this threat. And the good news is more than 60 countries have joined the anti-ISIS coalition. 

Together we are cracking down on terrorist financing, stemming 

the flow of foreign fighters, discrediting ISIS’s false and violent ideology, providing military support to our partners, and addressing 

the grave humanitarian crisis that has left hundreds of thousands 

without homes or families. 

And a significant number, including several European countries—Australia, Canada, and a number of regional partners—have 

worked alongside the U.S. Military to target ISIS and impede its 

growth. 

We are making progress, but we are nowhere near to stamping 

out this threat. And today I hope we can discuss what strategy will 

get us closer to that goal. 

I wanted to say, Mr. Ambassador, there are a few areas I think 

are especially critical. 

Firstly, while we need a global coalition, it is critical that we engage closely with local partners: Iraqi and Syrian, Arab and Kurd. 

Such cooperation is essential to stop the spread of ISIS and to ensure that the U.S. does not bear a disproportionate share of the 

burden in this fight. 

For years, I have supported a program to train and equip the 

moderate Syrian opposition which can serve as boots on the ground 

in Syria. Congress voted overwhelmingly to get this program off 

the ground. And I look forward to hearing about the status of this 

effort. 

Secondly, we need to state clearly that there is no future for 

Assad in Syria and seeing Assad go remains a top priority and that 

the interests and the goals of the United States simply don’t align 

with Assad or with Iran. 

Assad is a brutal dictator responsible for the deaths of tens of 

thousands of Syrians. We all saw the horrific pictures smuggled out 

of Damascus by ‘‘Caesar,’’ a photographer, a Syrian Army defector. 

Assad is also a magnet for extremism. The conflict in Syria and 

Iraq will never end as long as he remains in power, courtesy of 

Iran and its terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. 

Lastly, we must determine and understand that the U.S. plays 

a unique role in this situation. Our capabilities are unmatched. I 

understand that the American people are uneasy about getting 

27

more involved in another conflict halfway around the globe. I feel 

the same way. 

We are tired of war. We want to bring our men and women 

home, which is another reason why working with local partners is 

so important. It will help prevent future escalation of American involvement. 

But we must not forget that, in so many places around the world, 

freedom, dignity, and justice are under constant attack. And I firmly believe that, if the U.S. does not lead the way as a champion of 

these values, no one else will. 

We believe in a world in which all people are free to decide their 

own futures, and there are times when defending and advancing 

that vision requires difficult choices and sacrifice. 

That is what makes the United States the world’s one 

indispensableNation. We didn’t ask for this conflict, but we cannot 

ignore it. So I look forward to hearing the questions and the answers and the testimony. And I want to ask as my first question 

a question about Iran. 

Iran also wants to defeat ISIS, but reports indicated that Iranian 

fighter jets were targeting ISIS in Iraq. What involvement does 

Iran have in Iraq both in the air and on the ground? What is their 

involvement with the Shia militias? And how are the Shia militias 

involved in the fight against ISIL? How can we prevent out best 

intentions in Iraq from empowering Iran? That has already happened once. We don’t want it to happen again. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you. 

Let me—there is no question that Iran is playing a role in Iraq. 

ISIL is a threat to Iran. And we have said that every country in 

the world has a role to play in defeating ISIL. 

The question for the Iranians is whether they are going to do it 

in a constructive way that respects Iraqi sovereignty or in a destructive way that undermines Iraqi sovereignty. 

Some of what we are seeing right now in terms of Iranian militias is not only problematic to—in terms of what we are seeing, it 

is also problematic, I know, to the new government and, also, to 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who has spoken out against any armed 

group operating outside the structures of the Iraqi state. 

And the Iraqi Government has made a commitment that was reaffirmed before 60 countries last month in Brussels to ensure that 

all armed groups are operating under the structures of the Iraqi 

state, and that is something that the Government will be working 

on. 

But in the total security collapse we had this summer, there is 

no question that militias and some armed groups filled that vacuum, that Iran has played a role in that, and it is something that 

the new Government will have to—will have to—have to begin to 

work on. 

Mr. ENGEL. I just think—I just think—and then I will yield 

back—that we need to be very wary of Iran. It is not simply the 

enemy of my enemy is my friend. And I think we need to be very, 

very careful not to—not to stumble down that path. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

28

We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the Middle East subcommittee. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to have you back, Ambassador. 

Following up on Mr. Engel’s questions regarding Iran, the Secretary has stated quite clearly that the United States is not coordinating with Iran on Iraq and on the fight against ISIL. And, in addition, in your 15-page testimony, you don’t mention Iran even a 

single time, yet the regime clearly has a role that it is playing in 

Iraq, as you just stated. Prime Minister Abadi has claimed no 

knowledge of the recent air strikes, but Iran has confirmed that it 

did carry them out. 

So who currently controls the air space in Iraq, given that the 

Iraqis don’t have sufficient capabilities to maintain their own air 

sovereignty? And if no coordination had taken place and the Iranians did, indeed, take this action into their own hands without coordinating, didn’t Iran violate Iraqi air space? Will there be any repercussions from that? 

As we continue our nuclear talks with Iran, we ignore multiple 

violations that Iran continues to make as the talks take place. Will 

this be yet another violation of Iran that we turn a blind eye to? 

The Secretary has called—called possible Iranian action in Iraq 

against ISIL as positive despite the fact that Tehran’s incessant 

meddling in Baghdad and its stoking of sectarian tension in Iraq 

and in Syria has played a large part in the rise of ISIL. 

Is it the administration’s view that having a Shiite Iran, the 

world’s foremost supporter of terrorism, in spite of our nuclear 

talks, invade Iraqi air space to attack Sunni ISIL—does the administration view this as a positive development? 

And, on Syria, you testified that it is our goal, not that it is an 

absolute necessity, to find a future in Syria that does not include 

ISIL or Assad, as you stated in your testimony, and that we are 

relying on moderate rebels to defeat them both and usher in a political settlement. 

Will the Assad regime being supported by Iran and Russia as 

they are and with ISIL being so well financed—how will a group 

of rebels be able to defeat them both? And what would they need 

in order to accomplish that goal? 

The administration doesn’t have a comprehensive policy to deal 

with all of the threats in Iraq and Syria and Iran, nor does it seem 

to want one. These aren’t realistic plans that can truly destroy 

ISIL, can defeat al-Nusra, and defeat the Assad regime. We haven’t 

even begun the train-and-equip mission, and we are about a year 

away from even standing that minimal force up, if ever at all. 

Is that the case? Where are we with that mission, sir? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Let me address your questions briefly. 

First, in my testimony, I did focus on the concern about the militias and Prime Minister Abadi’s commitment in Brussels to begin 

to rein those in, all armed groups within the structures of the 

state. 

I also focused on the desire of this new Government to have strategic independence in the region, and that gets to his outreach his 

Arab neighbors and, also, the important outreach to Ankara, which 

29

is happening now, which was not happening over the past few 

years. 

That is very important. Iran is a fact in Iraq. You just have to 

look at a border—at a map to see that with a 1,500 kilometer border. And as we speak right now, there is 500——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excuse me, sir. 

Would you say that Iran violated Iraqi air space? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I would have to defer to some of my DoD 

colleagues about what exactly happened there. I know that was 

a——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If they did, would there be any consequences 

for that violation, one of many? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, it is up to the Iraqi Government to 

control its own air space. But, as you said, they lack the assets and 

resources to do that. 

I would mention on that score the F–16 program is moving forward. The Iraqis have allocated funds for it. The pilots are in training. And we are working with Jordan, actually, to house those F–

16s on a temporary basis before the bases in Iraq are ready. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And, if I could in just the few seconds we 

have left, on Syria, what is the latest with the train-and-equip mission? It doesn’t seem that we have come very far. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, as you know, that is a Title 10 DoD 

program, and my DoD colleagues can give you a very substantial 

briefing on that. 

General Allen and I have been to the—some of the host countries, such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, about the progress 

in getting the sites up and running. 

We hope, with the progress that Congress is making this week, 

that we can get those programs moving as early as March with the 

training to begin. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And is it the administration’s view still, as 

you stated, that Assad must go? Does that mean that he must be 

removed from power or are you just saying he should not have a 

future in Syria? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, we are focused on a political transition process. And there are two political tracks going on right now. 

One is led by Staffan de Mistura. 

The U.N. Special Representative is looking at a bottom-up approach, getting to the chairman’s question on Aleppo. He is very focused on freezing the situation in Aleppo. We very much support 

that initiative. 

And, also, Secretary Kerry has been in conversations with key 

stakeholders in the region about regenerating a new political track. 

But clearly nobody believes that Bashar al-Assad can govern that 

state and bring it to any sense of stability——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Do you think that the rebels are going to remove him from power? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Excuse me? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Will the rebels remove him from power? Who 

is going to remove Assad from power? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Again, my DoD colleagues could discuss 

the military situation. But we do not see a situation in which the 

30

rebels are able to remove him from power. It will have to be a negotiated diplomatic process. 

Chairman ROYCE. Just regarding the Syria train-and-equip program, it is unfortunate that the DoD did not make available—was 

unable to make—to provide a witness today. We had made the request. 

We go now to Mr. Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this important hearing. 

And thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here. 

You know, as I am sitting listening to your testimony and listening to the questions that are being asked, I understand that this 

is a complicated situation. It has been since we have been here. It 

is not easy. People have relationships in that region, some for decades, some for centuries, against one another, different interests, 

and we are trying to navigate all of that. This is not a simple scenario. 

I can recall being at this hearing—in this hearing room before 

where, for many of us, it was easy for us to be up here to think 

that it is simple. We thought it was simple to get rid of Saddam 

Hussein. We said that it would take just a few days. In fact, we 

got on a ship and said mission accomplished a few days after shock 

and awe. 

I am glad we are not being that simplistic about this. The administration has been honest to say that it will take years to get this 

done and to get it done right, not based upon emotion, not based 

upon trying just to get us together so that we can say rah-rah, but 

based on trying to get together with our allies in the region, those 

that got complicated relationships, so that we can try to figure out 

once and for all how do we get this thing done without it just being 

stuck on just the United States and everybody then turning back 

against us. 

So it is complicated. It is going to take some time. We have got 

to figure this out. We have had some problems. That is what happens with complicated situations. It is not easy. If it was easy, anybody could do it. And so it is not easy for the United States of 

America. And when you look at this world that is smaller, you 

know, we got to deal with our—all of our other allies in the region 

who have their interests, also. 

And in today’s world, they are not just saying, ‘‘Oh, we are going 

to just do what the United States says against our own self-interest.’’ They have their self-interest, also. And we got to figure out 

how we weigh that in so that we can knit and weave and put this 

thing together so that we don’t have an artificial result that only 

lasts for a short period of time. So I understand that it is difficult. 

And so my first question is going toward what has been difficult 

with the Iraqi Government—past Government. And I know there 

has just been an agreement with Baghdad and Erbil. And so my 

question is: How is that? 

Because I know that, you know, when you look at Kurdistan—

and that is, you know, a difficult situation there, et cetera, historically—and we—and the Maliki government, we—you know, they 

were not doing the right thing so that the—Kurdistan was getting 

some of the dollars that it needed from the central government. 

31

So could you tell me, how is this landmark agreement that was 

reached—I think it was just reached last week, again, between the 

central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. 

You know, what is their—what is the likelihood that it will hold? 

And how will payments be made to the Kurds so that we could try 

to fix this scenario that has been also, historically, something that 

has been a problem in the past? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you for your excellent question. 

And you are absolutely right. This is an extremely complicated 

situation. It is viewed differently from every capital we go to. It is 

viewed differently from different groups within the countries that 

face—in the conflict zone. 

And the Middle East right now is going through a historic transformation. It is up to us to define American interests very acutely 

and then protect and advance those interests, which we are working to do with our coalition partners. 

The oil deal is really significant because it is something we have 

worked on for almost 10 years. We almost got there back in March. 

The terms of the deal that was reached last week was the same 

deal that was on the table in March, but simply couldn’t get over 

the line with the Government that was in place back then. 

The new Government, as I mentioned in my testimony, is totally 

different across the board, more pragmatic actors, and people are 

able to get together around a table and actually figure it out, and 

they figured out a win-win solution. 

And under this solution, the Kurdistan region will export about 

550,000 barrels a day, 300,000 barrels coming from Kirkuk. And if 

you know Iraq, that is a very controversial part of the landscape. 

But taking oil from those fields and exporting it through the north, 

through the Kurdistan region and then to Ceyhan in Turkey, about 

300,000 barrels from Kirkuk. All of that revenue will come into the 

central account, and 17 percent of it will go to the Kurdistan region. It is a breakthrough accord. And another part of it is $1 billion within the new budget will 

go to the Kurdish Peshmerga. So for the first time, the Iraqi Government is very clearly saying, ‘‘We will fund our brave Kurdish 

Peshmerga fighters who are fighting alongside us against ISIL.’’ 

This is a big deal. It is a breakthrough. 

Now, will there be problems in implementation as we move forward? Yes. And we will have to work through those, and the Iraqis 

will work through those. But it is a significant sign that they got 

this done. It is a very hopeful moment. 

And I was on the phone with the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad, 

with the Kurdish leadership in Erbil, very shortly after, and there 

was really a mood of tremendous optimism, something I have not 

heard in some time, and I have worked on this specific issue for 

a period of years. 

So I think your question is a very insightful one. And I think the 

oil agreement is just indicative of where we are in Iraq and the 

foundation that we have built, given where we were 6 months ago 

today. It was hard to see back then where we might be today, but 

it really gives us some hope for the future. 

But, again, Iraqis will have to work out the details. It will be difficult. There will be setbacks, as you said. There is never anything 

32

lingering here. Nothing is easy. It is complex. But it is a—it was 

a significant breakthrough and a testament to the Iraqi leadership 

to really get it done. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Royce, for your determined 

leadership. And, Chairman Royce, thank you also for your early 

warnings of the threat of ISIS to American families. 

And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for being here 

today. 

The American people need to know the threat of the murderous 

ideology of ISIS. Last week ABC News reported an ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, called upon followers in the U.S. 

and Europe to attack members of the military. 

He went on to say, ‘‘Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not 

seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the disbeliever, whether he is a civilian 

or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. Both of them are considered to be waging war.’’

This is a grotesque ideology that we face and our coalition partners face, and I believe it is important that we never forget how 

grotesque it is. Additionally, we need to know that jihadists carry 

signs in English that are very clear, ‘‘Death to America,’’ ‘‘Death to 

Israel.’’ Their creed of mass murder is, ‘‘We believe in death more 

than you value life.’’

Having that in mind again, you have got quite a challenge, but 

we do have allies. And I am particularly grateful. The Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq has been a success story of economic development for its people and as opposition to extremists. The American no-fly zone saved thousands of lives. 

The administration claims the Kurdish Peshmerga are our primary U.S. partners in the efforts against the Islamic state; yet, as 

of mid-October, the administration has only provided rifles, small 

arms, ammunition, mortars, and RPGs to the Kurdish forces. 

I am really concerned that the President’s actions don’t match 

the threat. Does the administration intend to be more robust in 

equipping the Kurdish forces to commence offensive operations 

against ISIS? And under what timeline? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Let me discuss the situation of arming the 

Peshmerga because I have been involved in it. And I think we have 

worked out with them two detailed lists, one in August and one in 

September, and then with this Government of Iraq. And we have 

delivered everything on those lists. 

And, again, I just want to go back to the fact that we have a new 

Government now. Every request for weapons systems from the 

Kurdistan region has been approved by the new Government. 

We have a new Minister of Defense. He is a Sunni Arab from 

Mosul. One of his first trips was going up to Erbil to see President 

Barzani, and he has committed to getting the supplies to the Kurds 

that they need. 

I was just in Berlin last week. The Germans are supplying the 

Peshmerga, with the consent of the Government of Iraq, significant 

antitank munitions. 

33

So we are very focused on this. We are acutely focused on it. But 

what is important is that, unlike some of the tension we had with 

the last Government, we have very strong cooperation now. 

There has been about 40 cargo flights. They land in Baghdad 

first, but then they immediately go into Erbil to supply the 

Peshmerga with the weapons and the support that they need. So 

we are working on this every day. 

We have our joint operation centers set up in the Kurdistan region. I have been to them. I went to Dohuk to see President 

Barzani when he was commanding some of his units in an offensive 

near the Erbil border crossing. 

And we are working with them every day. But we worked 

through this, and our military colleagues worked through, ‘‘What 

are the requirements? What do you need? How do we get them?’’

We have went around the world to source getting T–62 tank 

rounds to make sure that the 100 tanks that the Kurds have, Soviet air tanks, which are pretty devastating against ISIL, are fully 

resourced with the ammunition that they need. 

So this is an ongoing day-to-day activity, and we are fully seized 

of it. 

Mr. WILSON. And do you anticipate that the Peshmerga would be 

on offensive operations and not just defensive? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, they are on offensive operations, 

Congressman. They have taken back nearly all the territory that 

was seized from ISIL when ISIL launched its offensive in August, 

the one exception being Sinjar, and we think that that will kick off 

after the winter season. 

And the Peshmerga—importantly, they are working very closely 

with Iraqi forces to take back the Mosul Dam. The Kurdish—the 

Iraqi Government’s counterterrorism service was working side by 

side with the Peshmerga to take back the Mosul Dam. And the operation at the Erbil border crossing was done in coordination with 

Sunni Arabs tribes in that area. 

So it is a significant development. Again, given where we were 

6 months ago and given where we were after ISIL moved into the 

Kurdistan region, the Kurds have pushed back very effectively. 

They have taken hundreds of casualties, as have the Iraqi security 

force, and you have remember that. 

And we are working with them in our joint operation centers to 

help plan and conduct operations and, when they mount their operations, we provide them with air cover and air support. 

Mr. WILSON. And I want to join with my colleague from Queens, 

actually a native of South Carolina, and point out how pleased I 

am that there has been an agreement in regard to oil between Iraq 

and the Kurdish Regional Government. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Albio Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, 

and thank you for being here with us and always being straightforward with us. 

You know, as I sit here in these hearings and we talk about retraining and training—and I just read a report about 2 or 3 weeks 

ago where they had—the Iraqis had 50,000 soldiers that were on 

34

the payroll that never showed up. I mean, to me, this is what we 

are going to try to retrain again and spend billions of dollars and 

maybe not be as effective as they were. 

The other thing is, you know, we talk about a new Government 

being more pragmatic. I think it is just the reality that has hit 

them that, if they really don’t work and change their ways, they 

are going to lose their country. 

I mean, people have poured billions of dollars into this country 

to try to straighten them out and, well, now they become pragmatic. I think it is just a reality that has hit them that they have 

to. 

And, you know, implementation of some of these accords—I was 

concerned with the Kurdish getting all the weapons that they needed, but they had to go through Baghdad. So it was difficult for 

them to get it to the Kurdish. I mean, these are the kind of things. 

And the last thing I will just talk about is spreading the conflict 

in the area. I read some articles where Lebanon was concerned 

that there was activity in Lebanon and they are asking for more 

arms, you know, and more support. So could you speak to that also. 

Thank you very much. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, Lebanon was a participant at the—

at the conference we had in Brussels last week, at the Coalition 

Ministerial chaired by Secretary Kerry. They were at the table 

with their foreign minister, as were the other neighbors. 

Turkey, for example, has 1.8 million refugees from Syria. And we 

have to remember that the burden that that is taking on Turkey 

and Lebanon and Jordan is a tremendous toll. So we are doing all 

we possibly can to help shore them up, but it is extremely difficult. 

And, again, the Lebanese are very concerned about this, in particular, the inroads that ISIL is making into some of its border regions and the al-Nusra Front, which is holding some Lebanese soldiers and tragically executed one of them last week. 

So all of our partners in the region, the countries neighboring 

Syria—Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan—are central to the efforts of this coalition, and what we heard in Brussels around the 

table, 60 different members of the coalition, countries from all 

around the world, talking about the fact that we need to help our 

friends who are suffering from this crisis. 

So we are very focused on it. And I can come follow up with a 

more detailed briefing, particularly on Lebanon or other neighbors. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, I am happy you raised the issue with Jordan because I understand that they are getting more aggressive—more 

active in demonstrations and aggressive activities. 

Can you talk a little bit about that. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, you know, Jordan is also a frontline 

state and, as you know, the refugees that they have taken in has 

really taken a toll on their resources. 

King Abdullah was just here. I think it was last week. General 

Allen and I saw him in Oman about a month ago working very 

closely with Jordan both on the security side about shoring up the 

defenses of their border and, also, in trying to limit the extremist 

presence in southeast Syria. 

There is a lot of focus on the Aleppo pocket in northern Syria, 

which is a focus of the Turks and us and everyone. But Jordan is 

35

very focused on the other regions of Syria on their border where 

ISIL has a tremendous presence, and we need to help them. 

But Jordan is a frontline state, and that is where we are providing them substantial security assistance and, also, humanitarian assistance to deal with the refugee crisis. 

But, again, our friends in the region—Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, 

Iraq—are just impacted by this crisis every day, and that is why 

part of the President’s central policy in this counterterrorism support and building partner capacity is focused on this very issue, the 

neighbors of Syria and making sure that they can withstand this 

crisis the best they can. 

Mr. SIRES. Can you talk a little bit about Camp Liberty and any 

of the abuses by the Iraqis. I know you are on the discussion. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, I get a briefing on this every single 

day, and I get reports from both the residents and, also, from the 

United Nations. And, as you know, the United Nations monitoring 

teams confirms to us about humanitarian supplies and the overall 

situation at the camp. We look at it every single day. 

My colleague Jonathan Winer, who is our senior advisor on the 

MEK resettlement, he is in Albania today with a team—interagency team with DHS represented as well. And we have gotten 

about 600 residents of Camp Liberty out of Camp Liberty and out 

of Iraq to safety over the past year, and we are looking to increase 

that number this year. 

And Albania has been very helpful in this regard. And Jonathan 

Winer has really done a tremendous, heroic, courageous job at getting this moving. And I think the new Government will be more 

cooperative. 

And we want to get all of the residents of Camp Liberty that testified here before out of Iraq to safety. That is our goal. And we 

are working with partners around the world to try to achieve that 

goal. 

And right now Albania has been extremely cooperative, and we 

should thank them for taking in hundreds of residents. And the 

residents are assimilating quite well in Albania. 

But Jonathan, my colleague, Mr. Winer, is there now discussing 

this issue, and I am sure he would be happy to come follow up with 

you. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Per that issue, I would just point out when 

Senator Kerry was here, we raised this issue of, you know, on supporting the Kurds, not selling them the heavy weapons, the heavy 

equipment, and the armor they needed, the antitank missiles, the 

NED. I quote from his testimony. He said, ‘‘You said the administration is responsible for sending all these weapons through Baghdad. No. We are not. You are. We are adhering to U.S. law passed 

by Congress. If you want to change it, fix it, we invite you.’’

I would just point out that I put out bipartisan legislation to 

change that to allow us to directly sell the weapons they needed 

to the Kurds, and then the administration opposed the legislation 

that we had been invited to put in to change it. So just for the 

record, I would raise the point that the argument has changed. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman, I feel your pain on Crimea, too. 

36

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. It is a moving target and a moving argument. 

We go now to Judge Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chairman. 

There is no question about it that ISIS, as I call them, they are 

a bunch of bad people who just commit murder, and we are doing 

battle with ISIS. The United States has been in the Middle East 

with boots on the ground for a long time. 

Ambassador, would you say that the United States is at war with 

ISIS or not? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Congressman, having seen it up close, I 

would say we are at war with ISIS, yes. 

Mr. POE. It seems to me that our strategy is twofold at this 

point, or maybe threefold. Send aid to different groups, countries. 

They are 60 something nations that I understand are in the coalition to fight ISIS. One is to do air strikes. As the chairman has 

mentioned, the success of those air strikes depends on who you are 

talking to. I do not believe they have been quite as successful as 

we had hoped they would be. The other is to take Syrian moderate 

rebels, vet, train, and equip them to go back to Syria and defeat 

ISIS. 

How many of those people have been vetted, trained, and 

equipped and sent back to Syria to fight ISIS? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Congressman, again, I have to—it is a 

DoD program and they can——

Mr. POE. It is none. Isn’t it correct, Ambassador? I mean, you are 

the Ambassador. You represent the State Department of the 

United States. We are a war with this country—or at war with 

ISIS. You can’t tell me politically whether we have armed—vetted, 

armed and trained anybody yet and sent them back to Syria to 

fight ISIS? You can’t give that answer? 

Ambassador MCGURK. No. I can answer that question. I think I 

did answer it. The answer right now is no, and——

Mr. POE. So none. 

Ambassador MCGURK [continuing]. It was designed—it was designed to be a long-term program, and we hope——

Mr. POE. I understand, Ambassador. No. You wait a minute. I 

am asking the questions. You give the answer. 

The answer is we have not trained any and none of them are 

back over there. Meanwhile, ISIS is beheading people and committing all kinds of atrocities, but our plan, if I understand our strategic plan, it is to help aid, it is to drop bombs, it is to train mercenaries to go back and fight ISIS in Syria, none of which have been 

trained. 

How long is it going to take before we get all those people that 

are being trained in Saudi Arabia back in Syria to fight? How long 

do you think it will take? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, Congressman, the program is to 

train 5,000 per year, and the training, we hope, will start in 

March. So——

Mr. POE. So a year from March? 

Ambassador MCGURK. And the program is to build——

Mr. POE. A year from March? 

37

Ambassador MCGURK. About 5,000 by then. We have to be 

very——

Mr. POE. Excuse me, Ambassador. I am not clear. 

Will it be 5,000 in March that will be trained. Or will it be a year 

from March 2016 before we have those 5,000 fighters that we send 

back to Syria? 

Ambassador MCGURK. It is 5,000 trained per year, and part of 

the reason is because of the vetting standards and that we are 

being very careful about this, but we are not sitting on our hands 

watching——

Mr. POE. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador. Answer the question. 

Is it 5,000 in 2016 in March where we hope that is our plan to 

have them trained by then? 

Ambassador MCGURK. The training, we hope, will begin in 

March. So it is——

Mr. POE. But it will take a year to train 5,000 people. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Yes. That is right. 

Mr. POE. So March 2016, then we have a plan; then we have 

fighters; then we send them to Syria. There is no telling what ISIS 

can do in that year and however many months it is. 

Does the United States have some other strategic plan other 

than arming these folks that aren’t going to show up until 2016, 

dropping bombs that are marginal whether they have been successful and helping with military aid to some of these coalition countries? Is there a strategic plan overall that you know about in the 

State Department? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Yes. The train and equip program is one 

small element in an overall campaign, and this is a multiyear campaign, and phase 1—phase 1 is Iraq. What we are doing in Syria 

right now is degrading ISIL’s capacity, and every time we have had 

a local force on the ground that we can work with, and Kobani is 

a good example of this, we are working with free Syrian——

Mr. POE. Reclaiming my time. 

What are we doing in Syria right now? I mean, people are dying 

in Syria, and the calvary isn’t showing up until 2016, the way I understand it. Is that correct? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Those trained and equipped units are not 

the only units on the field that we can work with in Syria, Congressman. 

Mr. POE. Who else are we working with in Syria. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, we are working right now in Kobani 

with a number of units, and we are killing about 100 fighters——

Mr. POE. Who are these people we are working with? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, thanks to 

a deal we worked out with the Turks to open up a corridor from 

the Kurdistan region, and they——

Mr. POE. Are they working in Syria or are they working in Iraq? 

Ambassador MCGURK. In Syria. We brought Iraqi Kurdish 

Peshmerga from Iraq into Kobani. 

Mr. POE. Last question. I am sorry. I am out of time. 

Last question: Are we going to put more boots on the ground, 

American military, in the Middle East to defeat ISIS? 

Ambassador MCGURK. The President’s policy is not to put combat 

forces on the ground in Iraq, but we have advisors, trainers——

38

Mr. POE. Be careful right now. Middle East. I am not going to 

talk about Iraq. In the Middle East, are more Americans going over 

to the Middle East to defeat and fight ISIS? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, we have about 30,000 troops in the 

region now. 

Mr. POE. Are more Americans going over to the Middle East to 

defeat and fight ISIS, other than what is already there? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Again, right now, I think we have a pretty 

large substantial force deployment in the Middle East. I don’t see 

the need for more right now, but, again, I have to defer to my DoD 

colleagues——

Mr. POE. DoD because you don’t know. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Gentleman from Fairfax, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, certainly I think most of us wish success in 

your endeavor, but I have to confess to you, listening to you makes 

one, you know, feel that one is in a scene in the Wizard of Oz 

where we are being counseled to pay no attention to that man behind the curtain, meaning the previous Iraqi Government, which 

we supported way too long, in terms of Maliki and the damage he 

did in absolutely severing relations between the Shia and the 

Sunni, which contributed mightily to the rise of ISIS and, frankly, 

to the loss of moderates, not only in Iraq but spill over in Syria. 

I mean, you said to us, you know, pay attention to the fact that 

we have a new government. Yeah. It is kind of relatively new, but 

when one looks at measures of progress, one despairs, frankly, Ambassador McGurk. I mean, I am fixated on what constitutes 

progress. We have used metrics in the past about how many Iraqi 

troops we trained. Well, how did that work out for us? They melted 

away, and now we have ISIS as one of the best-funded, bestequipped terrorist organizations on the planet, thanks to U.S. assistance—not because we intended it but because our ally in Iraq 

collapsed comprehensively. 

Now we are talking about, well, maybe what we have to do is 

have a smaller, you know, fast force that can go in. We well train 

them. We won’t train hundreds of thousands. And they will do it. 

You have talked, in response to Judge Poe, about the training. 

We all hope that works, but I don’t think—I don’t know anyone 

who seriously thinks that you can train effectively, even with successful vetting, 5,000 insurgents who are moderate and maybe secular, and they are going to be reintroduced to Syria and turn the 

tide. In fact, all of the indications are the moderate, you know, part 

of the insurgency, such as it is, has collapsed in Syria, is actually 

losing ground catastrophically, almost to the point of extinction. 

And so you cited decentralization, security reforms and the fact 

that the new government is reaching out finally to regional capitals, as if that is going to turn the tide. Maybe you didn’t intend 

for that, but I guess I would like to see efficacious metrics with respect to the subject of this hearing, which is, are we making 

progress? 

How do we measure progress in an efficacious way, not a feelgood way, not a check-the-box way? How do we actually measure 

progress, given the fact that this administration has said the end 

39

goal with respect to ISIS is its destruction? Not deterring it, not 

pushing it back—its destruction. I don’t hear anything from your 

testimony, and I hear nothing in the so-called metrics of progress 

reported here today that would give me or, frankly, anyone at this 

dais confidence that we know what we are doing and that we have 

any fair chance at all to return to the Wizard of Oz and it actually 

be a powerful wizard. I just don’t see it. 

Could you please comment on the metrics we have got and the 

reason we should be confident that those metrics will lead to 

‘‘progress’’? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, it is a very good question, and we 

try to take an empirical data-driven approach as much as possible 

to what is a very complex situation. 

I mean, one data I look at every month are the suicide bombers 

coming into Iraq, and we have had about—we went from 5 to 10 

a year in 2011, 2012. It went up to 30—almost 30—5 to 10 a month 

in 2011, 2012. Went up almost to 30 a month, sometimes 50 a 

month. 

The month before the Iraqi elections in April we had 50. It is 

coming down, when I look at the indicators. I can’t tell you right 

now if that is a trend or if that is simply an anomaly, but right 

now, it is coming down. 

We are looking to see the reforms that this new government is 

making, and without an Iraqi commitment long term, we probably 

won’t succeed, but if you look at what the government has done in 

100 days: It has abolished the office of the commander in chief, 

which was an irritant to the Sunnis and also which centralized all 

security responsibility in the office of the prime minister. It has 

terminated almost three dozen problematic security commanders. 

It has identified, as it has said, 50,000 ghost soldiers on the roles, 

which is an anti-corruption mechanism. So it is taking steps that 

we wanted to have taken. 

To change the government, Congressman, we couldn’t just say, 

You know what, we have to have a new government. We had to get 

to elections. Iraqi had—they had elections on April 30th, earlier 

this year. For those elections to happen, we had to work over the 

course of 2013 to get the election system in place, to get the mechanism in place, and to have U.N. Oversight to make sure that they 

were genuine and credible. Those elections did happen on April 

30th, and they set the conditions to get to a new government. 

So this is really a multiyear process, but we have a new government now, and it is taking some measures that we find promising——

Mr. CONNOLLY. As I said, Mr. Ambassador, I want you to succeed. I hope you succeed, but just as I think some of the criticism 

of the administration with respect to Syria was very facile—and I 

single out two prominent members of the other body who are all 

too quick to say they were easy answers and the administration 

wasn’t doing enough, as if we knew who to support in Syria. But, 

similarly, we on our side cannot be overly facile either in the difficulties we face and the goals we set for ourselves, and I am very 

fearful at the end of the day that those goals are not realizable; 

they are not realistic; and we can’t really set up metrics that are 

efficacious. 

40

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Matt Salmon of Arizona over. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I apologize. I am just getting my voice back. 

You are probably going to be real thankful about that, but the fact 

is I think many members today on both sides of the aisle have expressed concerns that maybe the administration’s posture is more 

defensive than offensive, and that, as such, the ISIS controls 

roughly as much property as they did 5 months ago or territories 

they did 5 months ago. The President described the training of the 

Free Syrian Army as the tip of the spear on the ground game, and 

we are learning that they are not even going to start the training 

until March of next year. 

Now, yesterday, the Secretary left the door open for U.S. ground 

troops at the Senate Armed—or excuse me, Senate Foreign Affairs 

Committee, and for the record, that is a pivot. You have stated that 

the President has promised over and over again, we didn’t even 

need to have you say that. We have heard him say the same 

things, and I believe that ultimately U.S. Ground troops are going 

to be essential to completely defeat and not just contain ISIL, as 

I believe the current administration policy is. 

So my first question is, when can we expect the administration 

to come to Congress for an authorization for the use of military 

force, and I don’t believe that the one that was passed 10 years ago 

is adequate. This isn’t a hybrid. I do want to do everything within 

my power, as I believe other members have said, of eradicating and 

defeating ISIS and not just containing them. 

My second question is that recent reports indicate that our allies 

are concerned about the U.S. commitment to this fight, and some 

are threatening to withdraw from the coalition. What are we going 

to do to reassure them and keep them in the coalition? And what 

are we going to do to get back on the offense and not so much on 

the defense? 

Those are my questions. 

Ambassador MCGURK. On the AUMF, Congressman, as you 

know, Secretary Kerry devoted an entire session to this yesterday 

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he made clear 

that we are prepared to work very closely with the Congress. There 

is legislation being drafted in the Senate, particularly from Chairman Menendez, which the Secretary has said we are willing to 

work on and we find some very promising elements there. I think 

the Secretary was also pretty clear that the President has been 

clear that his policy is that U.S. military forces will not be deployed 

to conduct ground combat operations against ISIL. That is the policy of the administration. We also don’t want to tie the hands of 

the commander in chief given a very uncertain environment, and 

you could face an exigent situation. But this will come within the 

give and take with Congress about what the actual terminology of 

the AUMF will be. 

In terms of the coalition, this is why it was important that we 

had this conference in Brussels last week, because we brought 

every member of the coalition together. They signed a—joined a 

very detailed joint statement, which lays out the way forward, and 

I will make sure you have that if you haven’t seen it. And it is sigVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:24 Jan 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\121014\91843 SHIRL
41

nificant because it brought countries from all around the world 

around the same table focused on the same problem and about how 

to proceed. 

So that is the kind of initiative that could help keep the coalition 

together. And General Allen and I in our travels are very focused 

on this, and there is going to be a lot more over the next month 

in terms of coalition management and keeping it together, but right 

now, I would think the commitment is very firm. 

In terms of offense, I just have to say—I mean, the last time I 

testified here, we had done no air strikes. That wasn’t too long ago. 

We have now done, last I just looked, I got the most recent numbers, 1,219 air strikes; 689 in Iraq and 530 in Syria. Our coalition 

partners have done 208 of those air strikes, and what is different, 

I think, about past campaigns is that our air strikes now are focused on very precise intelligence. And we are striking with pretty 

devastating effect, and to date—and, you know, we have to be very 

careful about this, but we have been very careful about making 

sure we have no civilian casualties in these attacks, and that is 

something that—I saw General Austin in Bahrain just on Sunday 

for about an hour talking about the state of the overall campaign, 

and he is very focused on that because we want to keep the population, as much as possible, on our side, and our strikes to date 

have been very precise, very effective. And I can just tell you by 

getting the reports every morning, we are hitting the targets we 

seek to hit. We are hitting the leadership targets. We are hitting 

the mobile refineries. We have hit about 22 of them, which is really 

impacting ISIL’s ability to finance itself. We are hitting the command and control cells. 

We have completely destroyed ISIL’s ability to amass and maneuver force, and what it was able to do so effectively up until 

Mosul and up until this summer, it masses force. They would do 

these swarming maneuver tactics with heavy armored vehicles and 

basically overrun anything in its wake. It can’t do that anymore, 

and that, to me, is an empirical sign of progress that we are making, but we have to keep at it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Ambassador, you had indicated earlier that the 

deal between Prime Minister Abadi and the Kurds in Erbil was a 

big deal, that the central government in Baghdad will permanently 

resume payments to Kurdistan, representing 17 percent of the national budget, including $1 billion to pay for the salaries of the 

Peshmerga and weapons for them as well. 

And why is it important? Because, to date, there hasn’t been an 

effective countervailing fighting force in Iraq. Now there appears to 

be. The Peshmerga estimates are about 190 fighters. They have 

proven to be reliable. They are experienced, and they have also 

proven to be reliable allies to the United States in our involvement 

in Iraq. 

Iraqi officials now want to push for a winter offensive in Mosul, 

and American officials, it has been reported, are concerned that 

this schedule is a little bit too ambitious. 

Can you explain that? 

42

Ambassador MCGURK. Let me first say, on the Peshmerga, I 

think one additional point I want to make of the Peshmerga, addressing your question and about how we are kind of in a new era 

here, part of our plan is to train and equip, as you know, 12 Iraqi 

brigades. Three of those would be Kurdish Peshmerga, and those 

units will receive the same Western weapons, vehicles, equipment 

as the Iraqi units that we are training and equipping. And this is 

all done in cooperation between—between Baghdad and Erbil. So 

I think that is a significant point to put on the record. 

In terms of Mosul, again, it is an ongoing discussion we have 

with the Iraqis and our military colleagues who are in the field 

about how best to prosecute this campaign. I would just caution 

that I think we have to be very prudent in our expectations, and 

the one thing we want to do is manage expectations. I have said 

repeatedly, the President has said, the Secretary has said this will 

be a multiyear campaign, and nobody wants to rush into Mosul or 

a city that is held by ISIL before the conditions have been set. So 

it is an ongoing conversation with the Iraqis about how to proceed, 

when to proceed, when to proceed in one area and not another. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Toward the goal of managing expectations, then, 

how many ISIS fighters are in and around Mosul today? 

Ambassador MCGURK. It is hard to say. We think it is probably, 

the last I have seen, in the low thousands. The leaders in Mosul 

and Ninawa we believe we have taken off the battlefield. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Give me that number again, estimate. 

Ambassador MCGURK. The last I have seen are the low thousands. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Meaning what? 3,000? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I can’t give you a precise number, but that 

sounds about right. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. This hybrid force that you talk about between ISIL and the—or between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi National Army would represent 20,000, 25,000 fighters. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Roughly, depending on how you count the 

size of a brigade. 

Mr. HIGGINS. 20,000, 25,000 is an responsible estimate. 

Ambassador MCGURK. It is reasonable. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Pardon me? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Reasonable. 

Mr. HIGGINS. What is the size or the population of the City of 

Mosul? 

Ambassador MCGURK. It is about 1.5 million. 

Mr. HIGGINS. 1.5 million. And we don’t believe that a winter of 

offensive is advisable right now because the hybrid fighting force 

is not ready yet, hasn’t had the proper training? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, we want to set the conditions before. 

I mean, one thing we have learned is that you don’t want to move 

into——

Mr. HIGGINS. And what are the conditions? 

Ambassador MCGURK [continuing]. An urban combat environment before the conditions have been set. 

Well, you are going to work with the local population. We are 

working, in fact, with the governor of Ninawa Province and other 

local leaders in Ninawa who are now located in regions—in areas 

43

right near Mosul, but in terms of making sure that a police force 

is set and making sure that once ISIL is kicked out of Mosul, that 

there is something to maintain law and order and bring services 

and stability to the community there, which will have been suffering under ISIL’s rule for some time. 

The point is you have to get this right. You can’t just rush into 

it, and that is why I want to—that is why we have these joint operation centers and are working day after day hand in glove with the 

Iraqis to plan these operations. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Would you characterize ISIS as being on the defensive in Mosul right now? 

Ambassador MCGURK. It is hard to say. It is hard to say. It certainly——

Mr. HIGGINS. Has their momentum been broken? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I think there are signs that the tide is beginning to turn, that the population is turning on them, but——

Mr. HIGGINS. Has that hurt the recruiting efforts? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Again, it is hard to say, but there are 

enough signs that they are having a hard time in Mosul, specifically paying their fighters. They are having a hard time getting 

fuel. 

You know, the Baiji refinery, Congressman, they tried to seize 

the Baiji refinery starting in June. They needed the Baiji refinery 

for the fuel they would need to make sure that Mosul had the 

lights on. They failed in seizing the Baiji refinery. There was a very 

heroic defense put up by Iraqi fighters for 6 months in the Baiji 

refinery, and Iraqi forces just a couple weeks ago, with our help, 

were able to break that siege, and ISIL now has no chance of seizing the Baiji refinery. 

Mr. HIGGINS. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania is recognized. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome, Ambassador. It is good to see you again, and as we say 

in Pennsylvania, your position is—you are between a rock and a 

hard place here with us and the talks that are going on at the 

White House. 

I am a member of the NATO Parliamentary Alliance and routinely get comments from our members asking, is the President 

taking this seriously? Is the President taking ISIS seriously? And 

after listening to Senator Kerry’s testimony just recently, I get the 

impression—and I am just assuming you folks may be frustrated, 

too—but the President is trying to micromanage this and not listening to you and to the military personnel. I do speak up to my 

other NATO colleagues and say, ‘‘Anytime you want to join in and 

contribute, we would be more than glad to have you onboard.’’

But, with that said, you know, we didn’t attack ISIS when they 

were leaving Syria going into Iraq. I think that was—I think that 

was a major mistake, and I want to ask you—and I know what you 

talk about in the Oval Office and what you can say here, not by 

your choice, may be a little different, but we made a mistake by 

not doing that. Would you agree with me? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I—what is your question? 

44

Mr. MARINO. By not attacking ISIS when they were leaving, because remember, the President said in an interview with The New 

Yorker magazine that, you know, they were junior varsity basketball players. What has changed that they are not junior varsity 

anymore, and why did we not—was there an opportunity to attack 

them leaving Syria going into Iraq? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, I testified about a year ago some 

things that we were doing at that time, but all I can say, as soon 

as Mosul fell, I was in Iraq. I was on a video conference with President Obama, and we acted immediately, which my testimony laid 

out, to set the conditions for what we are doing now. And we—the 

President made decisions within the earliest hours of Mosul falling 

to get Special Forces into the field to see what was happening, to 

get our intelligence overhead, to set up joint operation centers. And 

that helped set the conditions for being able to fight back and, most 

importantly for working with the Iraqis, to get a new Iraqi Government up. The new Iraqi Government is the strategic foundation we 

have that we did not have back in June or we didn’t have, really, 

for the past year. 

Mr. MARINO. I am not going to second guess you and sit here and 

question the decisions on getting the information that we needed 

before you could go in and do what you decided to do. I mean, I 

would—just would not do that, but should we increase air strikes, 

and can we increase air strikes? I do take particular notice and 

agree with you on your urban combat situation. So could we increase air strikes and, you know, pound ISIS even more? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I think, and going to the point of how 

careful we are being, there is—I think you will see air strikes increase as Iraqi offensive operations increase, because when there 

are ongoing operations, we are able to strike targets in support of 

those operations and our limitations are not as narrow as when we 

strike targets simply by our intelligence picture. So when Iraqis are 

moving in the field and then when ISIL begins to show itself, our 

air strikes increase. So you might see an increase in the numbers, 

but, again, the numbers I just gave are pretty significant. 

I just got a report when I was coming here in the car. We have 

done—over the past couple days, we have struck targets just in 

Iraq, in Mosul, Ramadi, Al-Qa’im, Kirkuk, Baiji, Samarra. So, you 

know, we are—to say we are extremely serious about this, we are 

offensive minded, and we are taking the fight to ISIL every single 

hour. 

Mr. MARINO. Would we be in a better position, and I am playing 

Monday morning quarterback here, but would we have been in a 

better position to leave troops in Iraq instead of pulling them out? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I will let the historians sort that out. 

There is a lot that went into those decisions, but I am really focused on where we are right now. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, you pretty much answered the question for 

me, and I know you have a fine line to walk, but there is no doubt 

in my mind we left there way too soon. It was the President’s agenda, and now he realizes that we are up against—our backs are up 

against the wall here. 

So, with that, I yield back my time. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Let me say if I could just answer——

45

Mr. MARINO. Yeah. Please, go ahead. 

Ambassador MCGURK [continuing]. Real quick because it is significant to point out that we left in 2011 under an agreement in 

2008, and one issue, from the moment we invaded Iraq, is that we 

invaded Iraq. We weren’t invited into Iraq. What is significant 

about right now, and this was really apparent to me when I was 

in Iraq last month, that the Iraqis have now invited us in to help 

them. It is a totally different environment than our presence in the 

past, and it gives us kind of a new foundation in which to operate 

in Iraq is significant. Right up until the end of our presence in 

Iraq, it was always extremely controversial that we were there at 

all. But right now——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Ambassador, at this point, I, unfortunately, have to cut you off because I will recognize the remaining 

members to 4 minutes each because I know that you need to leave 

by 12:15. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador for being here today to discuss the 

implementation as it relates to our strategy to defeat ISIS and to 

also have the opportunity to say thank you for your extraordinary 

service to our country in an area of tremendous difficulty. Like you, 

I believe there is no military solution to the conflict in Iraq and 

Syria. And I have continued to have very deep reservations about 

the efficacy of the military actions that we have taken, particularly 

as it relates to the equip and train vetted Syrian rebels. And my 

concern, of course, is that this will lead to a deepening of our involvement in a sectarian civil war. And I know many of the questions I have would be better answered by DoD, but to the extent 

that you can comment on these things, it would be tremendously 

helpful. 

And the first question I have is we have—the administration has 

spoken a lot about the importance of building an international coalition to fight ISIL on a global scale. 

Could you just share some more details about the progress that 

we have made in building that coalition, what the barriers have 

been to sustaining the coalition? Particularly, as it relates to the 

train and equip programs, what kind of response have we had from 

some of the more wary countries, and, finally, how are the countries working together to share the burden of responding to this 

global threat? And I note, in your written testimony, that only the 

United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands, Canada, Australia, 

and Denmark are involved in the air strikes, so that there are no 

regional partners. And that, of course, raises a concern about kind 

of this notion of outside the region engaging in this military conflict. 

So would you talk a little bit about where we are in building a 

meaningful coalition, not just a kind of photo op, but people are 

really comitted to this effort and how they are sharing the burdens 

of this fight against ISIS. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Thank you, Congressman. 

And, look, we built this coalition from scratch; 90 days ago this 

didn’t exist at all. The conversations began in September at the 

NATO summit in Wales with the President and Secretary Kerry. 

46

Immediately after that, in Jeddah, we brought the GCC together 

and some other key partners. We had a meeting in Jeddah which 

issued a very strong communique. We then met in a broader group 

in Paris. And then in the U.N. General Assembly meetings here in 

New York, later that month in September, we began to build this 

coalition. 

In Jeddah, the focus with some of the GCC partners was in joining an air campaign in Syria, and once those air strikes started, 

you saw the regional states, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, 

and Qatar was also a part of those operations, join in that campaign. 

Since then, we have moved to really develop these 5 lines of effort with bringing countries from all around the world, and that is 

why 60 members joined in Brussels, for a cooperative effort along 

military, counter-finance, counter-foreign fighters, humanitarian, 

and delegitimization. There is a different role for every country to 

play. So with the military side, we have the air campaign. We also 

have now substantial contributions developing to support the train/

equip effort in Iraq. We have Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia supporting the train/equip effort for Syria. 

But really, most importantly also, on the other lines of effort on 

foreign fighters, President Obama chaired a pretty extraordinary 

Security Council session in September at the U.N. General Assembly, and Security Council passed a Chapter VII resolution on foreign fighters that had the most sponsors of any resolution in history, I was told. Over 100 sponsors, and we are now working—we 

go to capital after capital. I was just in Brussels addressing the EU 

Parliament, in fact, about implementing that resolution, and we 

are having some real progress. 

We are seeing countries pass legislation to cut down on foreign 

fighters. We are seeing foreign fighter cells broken up. And this 

wasn’t happening 90 days ago. 

On counter-finance, the same thing. We have had—Kuwait has 

passed new legislation. Working closely with the Kuwaitis to shut 

down some problematic channels that we had been seeing, and 

working with other partners in the Gulf. So I could go on, but the 

coalition, I think, is actually extremely meaningful, and considering 

that we built it from scratch 90 days ago, and at these key 

events—and I saw President Obama and I saw Secretary Kerry 

work this directly with the world leaders to pull this together. It 

is really extraordinary, and then with the appointment of General 

Allen, it has just boosted our efforts around the world. So we are 

going to——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. If I might just ask the 

witness to provide us maybe in a written response the status of 

those foreign fighter—the adoption of that resolution in each of the 

respective countries. Our last witness that appeared before us also 

referenced——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. CICILLINE [continuing]. And I think we would benefit from 

a real understanding of——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Duncan of South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

47

And, Ambassador, thanks for being here. 

I appreciate some of the comments made by Mr. Connolly form 

Virginia about the situation in Iraq and the collapse of the Iraqi 

army in the face of ISIS, and I just wanted to comment, maybe provide an answer for him, because I think it is the elephant in the 

room that nobody really wants to talk about, and that is fact that 

we prematurely left Iraq after the President had made a campaign 

promise to be out of Iraq by the end of his first term. And we failed 

to leave a contingency force there, even after Prime Minister Maliki 

offered immunity to U.S. troops there via Executive order because 

the President wanted to see the Iraqi Parliament cast a vote on 

that, which they did, and it failed, and so we don’t have a contingency force that we need in 2014 and 2013, in Iraq, that could have 

faced off against ISIS. 

And so, Ambassador, I am sitting here listening to this, and the 

President really fails to articulate what success in Iraq or a success 

against ISIS or ISIL looks like. So I am asking you, in a little bit 

of my time, to define success. What does success look like to you 

against ISIS? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, it is a three-phase campaign, Congressman, to degrade, dismantle, and defeat, and what we are really looking at, number one, in the first phase is helping the Iraqis 

control their sovereign space. Right now, they do not control a third 

of their country. So helping the Iraqis control their sovereign space 

is a critical test of how we are going to be doing. 

Degrading ISIL in Syria, because ISIL is controlling a huge 

swath or territory in Syria, is number two, and leading ultimately 

to a political transition in Syria, which is going to be extremely difficult. 

But in the first phase of this campaign, it is helping the Iraqis 

regain control of its sovereign territory. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Let’s shift gears here, because I think—I 

think success against ISIS is reclaiming all the land in Iraq that 

we lost so much American blood and American treasure liberating. 

I saw it as a liberating action, and then we can talk about the Syrian civil war and who may or may not be friendly there that we 

want to back, and I don’t think that has been determined yet, but 

I do know who is friendly, and that is the Kurds. They have been 

there since 1990 when we first went in the Gulf War. They have 

been there with America against the Iraqi Government in the liberation effort. So, in Iraq, when faced with ISIL, the Iraqi soldiers 

cut and run in Mosul, but who didn’t cut and run was the Kurdish 

fighters. Who didn’t cut and run in the face of a bulldozer that was 

armored in Erbil, they didn’t cut and run; they actually ran toward 

the bulldozer to try to attack it and stop it, and 25 or so Kurdish 

fighters lost their lives because they didn’t have the necessary armament and ability to stop something like that and to stop some 

of the other weapons that ISIL now has and using in theater. 

So my question to you is this: Does the administration intend to 

more robustly equip the Kurdish forces to commence the offensive 

operations? What kind of weapons other than small arms? Pistols, 

rifles, small arms; what else are we going to give our friends the 

Kurds to fight ISIL? 

48

Ambassador MCGURK. I think, Congressman, I have discussed 

this earlier, but, I mean, we are going to be giving them a lot, and 

also through cooperation of the Iraqi Government, about, you 

know——

Mr. DUNCAN. If I asked them, would they say that? 

Ambassador MCGURK [continuing]. The 25 MRAPs they are 

going to be getting, and we are going to train/equip three 

Peshmerga brigades with the same Western equipment that any 

Iraqi brigade would have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. MRAP is more a defensive posturing. What kind of 

offensive weapons do we anticipate them having? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, there is a huge list of what we are 

giving them, from RPGs to anti-tank rounds to everything else, and 

that list has been worked up with the Iraqis and the Kurds. And 

we—again, about 40 cargo flights have now come into Erbil to offload this equipment, and I agree with you that the Peshmerga 

have been very heroic fighters, and also—and I think the Kurds 

would be the first to admit this—Iraqi fighters south of the 

Kurdistan region have been extraordinarily heroic if you look at 

the defense of the Baiji refinery. That went on for 6 months. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, and, again, Mr. Ambassador, thank 

you for being here and for your service to our country. 

Let me lay out four questions you can answer here, but I would 

appreciate a more elaborate written explanation. 

But in your opening remarks, you indicated that it was going to 

take a long time to defeat ISIL. What, in your sense, is the frame, 

broadly defined, what is that long time? 

You indicated that there are different challenges in fighting ISIL 

in Iraq and in Syria. Can ISIL be defeated in one country and not 

be defeated in the other? Is this a either/or, or do we have to do 

both? 

Can ISIL be defeated in Syria without first or at least nearly simultaneous achievement of a political settlement in Syria? And 

then maybe this is a paradox; can we achieve a political settlement 

in Syria without pushing back or defeating ISIL? 

My fourth question is, what are the biggest threats to our continued progress being made against ISIL in the next 30 to 90 days, 

in the next year, and then long term? 

And, finally, what can and should Congress be doing to help you 

in your mission to push back, contain, and ultimately defeat ISIL? 

And, with that, I will leave you the remainder of the time. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Those are big questions, and I thank you 

for your offer that I can follow up with some of those in writing 

in the interest of time. I think I would be happy to do that. 

In terms of time frame, we say ‘‘years’’ for a reason. I don’t want 

to put a specific time frame on this. I think that that would be artificial, and this is going to be a multiyear challenge, so that is really 

the only way that I can really answer that. It is going to be a 

multiyear challenge. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But if I can, in the context of looking at the 12 

months from March 2015 until 2016, that is going to be the front 

49

end of the battle against ISIL that will last, in your opinion, longer 

than that? 

Ambassador MCGURK. We would like to see the Iraqis over the 

next 12 to 18 months begin to restore control over their sovereign 

territory and begin to restore control of the Iraq/Syria border. I 

mean, that process will begin over the next year, and we are working with the Iraqis on a plan for that. 

In terms of the Congress, of course, the funding authority that 

we need, which I know that you are working on and we hope to 

have done shortly, and we really want to thank you for that, will 

be critical. The DoD request for the train/equip programs in Iraq 

and Syria will immediately be put to good use because we have 

programs ready to go now just waiting for that authorization, so we 

can thank you very much for all that this committee has done to 

support those efforts. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. To the middle questions, can we defeat ISIL in 

Iraq or push them back in Iraq, give Iraq autonomy again and not 

defeat them at the same time in Syria to be effective? 

Ambassador MCGURK. No. We made a determination that to degrade ISIL’s warfighting capacity, we would have to target them in 

Syria as well. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So you have to do both. And in Syria, is it possible to push back against ISIL without simultaneously having a 

political solution and, as you said, a political solution that cannot 

and does not include Assad? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I think these things do go hand in hand, 

but in order to get a political solution, you have to have a counterweight to extremist groups like ISIL, and that is what we are doing 

with the train and equip effort and some other efforts. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right. 

With that, I will yield back my time. 

Mr. DUNCAN [presiding]. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will 

recognize Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sir, thank you for being here. I do not envy the position that you 

have to sit in right now because I am sure truthfully you probably 

have a lot of disagreements with whatis happening, but I respect 

and understand your position, and I appreciate your service. So 

don’t take any of this personally, please. 

You mentioned 25 MRAPs being given to the Peshmerga. Great 

start. I think we are giving 250 to the Iraqi Government. That is 

one MRAP per 26 miles along a 650-mile border that the Kurds 

have with ISIS. So I would like to point out, you know, 25 MRAPs 

is really a joke. I mean, honestly, and I know it is not your decision, but I think—you know, when I was in Iraq recently, I went 

on a trip, and I left in 2009, and we had the war won, and when 

I went back in 2014 to see what had transpired since I left Iraq, 

was—I mean, personally, it was devastating, and it was hard for 

me to even talk about, but, you know, when I talked to our folks 

there that say, well, we just have to teach the Kurds how to concentrate forces of fire and not—you know, like as if three machine 

guns would somehow take out an MRAP better. It was crazy. 

Also, it is kind of fun on the committee to see all these kind of 

new hawks that I remember talking 2 years ago about we are going 

50

to have to go back to Iraq, and people thought it was a joke and 

thought I was joking, and here we are. 

Let me just, on the Syrian side of things, I think our failure to 

enforce the red line has been one of the most devastating foreign 

policy decisions for a couple reasons. I remember up to the red line 

discussion, there was legitimate talk about getting Bashar al-Assad 

out of office. You know, give him money and send him somewhere 

with sanctuary, whatever, but we got to preserve the institutions 

of the state. And I think had a new leader and probably have actually solved this peacefully. 

Today there is no real discussion about Bashar al-Assad leaving 

peacefully because he has no incentive to, and that is why I am a 

supporter of enforcing a no-fly zone—of even strikes against the 

Assad regime, because it changes the calculous in his mind to have 

him now understand that maybe if his life is at threat, he is going 

to peacefully leave Syria with the institutions in place and help 

peaceful transitions. That is how you are going to defeat ISIS, because I, frankly, think that Bashar al-Assad is the incubator of 

ISIS. He is the reason they are there. You kill 200,000 of your people, at some point even a terrible group like ISIS looks better than 

the guy that killed your wife and your son, as he has done in so 

many cases. 

You mention—by the way, I have heard recent reports even that 

the FSA is complaining of us cutting funding off to them and not 

even able to pay their soldiers anymore. I hope that is not true. 

That would be devastating. As a military guy myself, I expect a 

paycheck. It doesn’t mean I am any less of a patriot; it just means 

I have to support people when I was full-time active duty. 

The one thing I do want to ask you, though, when we talk about, 

you know, for instance, strikes in Syria, you mentioned loiter time 

over Syria as having to come from the Gulf. Has there been any 

negotiations with the Turks in place to try to open up those bases? 

If so, what has been the administration’s response, because from 

what I understand, they agree to it if there is maybe an air exclusion zone which the administration, I think, is not going to accept 

because they don’t want to tick off Iran in the extra 7 months we 

have given them for negotiations. In fact, I have heard that, but 

I would like you to address that, sir, and, again, thank you for 

being here. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Congressman, again, thank you for your 

service. 

And I think everyone who still continues to work on this issue 

does it in the memory of everyone who has served and particularly 

lost their lives in Iraq. I mean, that is really something——

Mr. KINZINGER. And I appreciate that. 

Ambassador MCGURK [continuing]. Central in all of our minds 

and why we need to get this right. 

The future of Syria, we are very clear. We want a Syria without 

ISIL or Bashar al-Assad and I discussed some of the ways you 

want to go about that, but that is going to take a long time. 

I guess we are in conversations with Turkey about opening up 

some of their platforms and also about narrowing some of the areas 

of disagreement we have had with them. I think we have made 

some progress, but it is an ongoing process. 

51

Mr. KINZINGER. Let me just say, as I wrap up my time, I don’t 

see any down side in a no-fly or even an exclusionary zone above 

the FSA. If they are our allies as we are giving lip service to, 

Bashar al-Assad would be an idiot to challenge America’s air superiority, and he probably wouldn’t, but, again, thank you for being 

here, and I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Kennedy from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary service to our 

country. Thank you for coming back yet again. I think your testimony is always enlightening and thank you for the extraordinary 

amount of time, effort, energy that you have put into these issues. 

I wanted to ask you two basic areas, and I apologize if I ask you 

to repeat yourself, so gloss over quickly if I do. 

First off, with building a little bit off of what Mr. Kinzinger was 

just touching on, you mentioned in your opening statement the fact 

that we have allies in this effort that are on both sides of the Assad 

debate. Stay or go, if you will. 

Much of the testimony that we have heard before this committee 

is that the main draw for fighters into the region to begin with was 

against Assad, and you have stated that overall the end game in 

this, if you will, is the political transition of power or Assad would 

leave. 

I have hard time seeing how at this point there is any impetus 

to have Assad go, just as Mr. Kinzinger pointed out. I understand 

that you then said that this was a first phase of this effort, and 

that it is a years—potentially years long. 

What changes this calculus and how long, best estimate, sir, do 

you think it takes for an armed or moderate Syrian rebel force to 

actually be strong enough to fend off on one side ISIS and the other 

side Assad? 

Ambassador MCGURK. You hit on a key question, Congressman. 

I think if you look at the efforts of Staffan de Mistura, that is why 

he is focused on this bottom up approach, or at least freeze the conflict particularly in Aleppo, and he has discussed that with us. He 

has discussed it with Bashar al-Assad, and, again, we are fully 

supportive of those efforts, but we are also concerned because we 

don’t want to have another situation like in Homs or Yarmouk, 

where you had a ceasefire, which basically was a kneel—grew out 

of a kneel or starve campaign, which the Assad regime perpetuates 

upon its population. But when he looked at the situation and said 

the best we can do right now politically is let’s try to freeze the conflict in some of these local areas, particularly Aleppo, and, again, 

if he can make progress in that, we are fully supportive of that effort. 

And then on the trying to get another political process going, 

that is the efforts that Secretary Kerry of moving forward with 

some of the key stakeholders in the region, and that is an ongoing 

process. 

But in terms of the force being able to defend against all these 

multi threats, it is just extremely difficult. And what we are finding is that, you know, there is, you know, tens of thousands of moderate opposition fighters, and my colleague in the State DepartVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:24 Jan 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\121014\91843 SHIRL
52

ment, Daniel Rubenstein, who has discussed—talking to them 

every single day, they are very locally rooted, protecting their 

homes, protecting their neighborhoods, and we do want to make 

sure that they can protect their homes and neighbors and communities against all of these different threats, and that is why I said 

in my testimony, particularly for the units we are going to try to 

train and equip, they will be—they will be organized to fight ISIS, 

but they are also going to be able to defend themselves against the 

regime. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And, Mr. Ambassador, then if this is essentially 

the United States, and understanding the blurred lines between 

Iraq and Syria, but continuing this fight now in another Middle 

Eastern country for potentially years, I have a very hard time understanding how that there is not additional or a new authorization 

for the use of military force that is going to be necessary in terms 

of outlining what these efforts are going to be. I know Secretary 

Kerry was pushed on this a bit in the Senate yesterday. As I understand, the new Congress is going to start to outline this, and I 

think some negotiations have already started. Anything that you 

would suggest we keep in mind as we debate that authorization 

which, candidly, from my perspective, is now months overdue? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, I think I would just review the Secretary’s testimony yesterday. I mean, he did say we are prepared 

to work with the Congress very closely. We think an AUMF should 

include—we don’t think it should include a geographic limitation. 

That has been in some of the language. We also want to make sure 

that the flexibility of the commander in chief, given that we face 

a very uncertain environment is maintained, but, anyway, we are 

willing to work with you as the Secretary confirmed yesterday before the Senate. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. Sorry to ask. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentleman’s is expired. 

The Ambassador does have a meeting at the White House and 

has a hard departure time at 12:15. So any members that are willing to take less time and yield back the balance would be appreciated. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Yoho from Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGurk, thank you for being here. 

ISIS’ vision is an apocalyptic vision to destroy America. They 

want a worldwide caliphate, and in doing that, you know, they are 

looking to come here. And I know our goal was to defeat ISIS, and, 

Congressman Duncan asked you the mission, and you defined the 

mission. In order to complete a battle and have support behind you, 

you have to have a clear, defined mission. And you kind of laid that 

out in a three-phase scenario there, in the metrics—you talked 

about some of the metrics in there. 

One of the questions that I have is the coalition that we have, 

and I know we are training, and in March 2016, you are looking 

at having 5,000 fighters over there. 

How is the global coalition going? Who is on the ground right 

now? Is it the Syrian Free Rebels? Other countries? What other 

countries have people in there? Any of the Saudi Arabian countries? Any other countries? Germany? France? 

53

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, we are talking—I would leave it to 

capitals to announce their commitment, as we are talking with a 

number of partners to support the train/equip—of course the train/

equip mission in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar have been 

clear that they will host training sites. 

Mr. YOHO. But as far as boots on the ground. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, in Iraq, we are going to have a number of coalition partners subject to the approval of the Iraqi Government——

Mr. YOHO. What about right now? 

Ambassador MCGURK [continuing]. With the training. 

Well, Canada, the U.K., Australia. 

Mr. YOHO. Are they trainers or are they actual——

Ambassador MCGURK. Trainers. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. Are they engaged? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Trainers and some advise-and-assist 

units, but focused—we are not going to have units going out. 

Again, it is subject to whatever the other capitals agree to and subject to the authorization of the Iraqi Government, but we have a 

number of coalition partners, about 1,500 total, helping us with the 

train——

Mr. YOHO. But as far as boots on the ground, it is Iraqis, Syrian 

freedom fighters, the Kurds. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Our ground force against ISIL are local 

forces. That is the model. 

Mr. YOHO. In the Middle East, it is in a state of flux, and you 

said that we have to protect American interests. 

What are those? Are they defined in the State Department? 

What are those interests? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, primarily, we want to protect the 

homeland against extremist threats and al-Qaeda-borne extremist 

groups so when you see an organization with 16,000 foreign fighters from 90 different countries around the world flowing into Syria, 

flowing into Iraq, getting combat experience, and then flowing outwards to their home capitals, potentially here at home, that is a 

very significant threat. 

Mr. YOHO. And you feel it is best to fight them over there then 

here, and I agree, but the mission, the war on ISIL, is there a way 

to narrow that down, because that is kind of like the war on poverty or the war on terror. It is this big broad war that never goes 

away. The war on poverty, we have been fighting it for 50 years, 

and were are losing ground on it. 

Is there a way to streamline these, because we have the war on 

terror, we have OCO, the Overseas Contingency Operation. Is there 

a way to streamline these to maximize them so we are concentrating our resources in a specific area, and is there an end game, 

a defeat of ISIL? Is that something that is—in your mind is plausible, because you are fighting an ideology. How do you bring that 

to an end, and what is that conclusion? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, it is a good question. That is why we 

are focused on ISIL as an organization, and we want to we want 

attrite its manpower, we want to cut off its finances, we want to 

stop its foreign fighters and basically suffocate the entire organization, and that is what we are focused on doing. 

54

Mr. YOHO. Do you see—we tried that with the Taliban and alQaeda and we got to a point where we thought we had them defeated, but here they are again, and ISIL came out of that, and do 

you see if we don’t—if we don’t have a definition of completeness, 

there is going to be an ISIL part 2, and I see these forces coming 

together because their mission is to bring the caliphate over here, 

and you don’t have time to answer that, but if you could jot something down and enter it into the record, I would appreciate it, and 

you have a great——

Mr. DESANTIS [presiding]. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

Chair now recognizes the gentlemen from California, 4 minutes. 

And members are reminded if they can yield back time, we will 

get everyone in, the Ambassador has got to leave in about 20 minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, this is complicated, to say the least. 

Mr. Ambassador, you laid out the 3 planks: Degrade ISIL, dismantle ISIL, and defeat ISIL. It does look like we are in the phase 

of degrading ISIL. 

You also laid out two prongs to that degradation. The 

counterfinance operation to choke off ISIL’s funding, and then also 

breaking up and reducing the foreign fighters. 

Can you give us an update on how the counter-finance operation 

is doing drawing down ISIL’s sources of revenue and how that is 

impacting morale? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, I can give you anecdotes, and I can 

come back in a different setting and give you some figures, but we 

have taken off line about 22 mobile refineries. They had a refining 

capacity of roughly 240 barrels a day almost, which was a substantial revenue stream. We have taken most of that offline, and I can 

come give you the specific figures, and we have seen increasing reports, particularly in Ninawa and Mosul that their ability to pay 

their fighters is substantially degraded, and also that their ability 

to get fuel is also degraded, but we got to keep at this. 

Mr. BERA. Do we get a sense that those fighters that are on the 

ground with ISIL right now, are they losing some of those fighters, 

or are we——

Ambassador MCGURK. They are losing fighters at a pretty substantial clip every week based upon our air strikes, and that is 

why, again, Kobani has been significant, because they flooded hundreds of fighters into Kobani, including, we had indications, some 

of their top fighters, and we were able to deal with them quite effectively. 

Mr. BERA. And then, as the second part of the degradation mission, breaking up and reducing the inflow of foreign fighters, you 

referenced working with our alliance partners and so forth, a broad 

coalition of folks that are stepping up to reduce the influx of foreign 

fighters. 

Can you give us an update on what we may be seeing in 

those——

Ambassador MCGURK. It is difficult to measure, but ISIL’s—its 

propaganda is that it is a war of flags. It is planting its flag everywhere it goes. You can see that in its media products, and what 

we have been able to do over the last 90 days is completely reverse 

55

that notion. It is now contracting, and I think the—it was selling 

this message that if you come and join ISIS and come to Syria, you 

will basically live this utopian fantasy. I think that fantasy is now 

clearly not true. You go to Syria, you are probably going to get 

killed, and if you go home, you are probably going to get arrested 

and prosecuted. 

I was in Germany last week when they sentenced their first—

an ISIL fighter who returned to Germany was sentenced to 3 years 

in prison. So I think, you know, the tide is turning, but we need 

to—again, we just need to keep at this. 

Mr. BERA. And are we seeing our—the Muslim countries in the 

region that are coalition partners stepping up kind of the anti-propaganda, anti-messaging——

Ambassador MCGURK. Yes. They are extremely focused on that, 

and in the interest of time, I would actually—I could provide you 

a fairly detailed written account to respond to that. 

Mr. BERA. That would be great. I will go ahead and yield my 

time back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank the gentleman for that. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber, 

for 4 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Earlier you said, Ambassador McGurk, that we don’t 

want to tie the hands of the commander in chief, but if he doesn’t 

listen to his military generals and then the Congress and our wishes—i.e., Ed Royce’s and Mr. Engel’s legislation that they filed to 

allow us to sell weapons to the Kurds—is he tying our hands, tying 

the military’s hands? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Again, I am regularly in meetings with 

the President and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and it is a very 

free-flowing conversation. I have seen no indication that any hands 

are being tied. 

Mr. WEBER. Why do you suppose he has—I think—and I don’t 

want to put words in Chairman Royce’s mouth, but, you know, he 

said he filed that legislation. I guess it comes out that the admin 

is opposed to it. Why do you think that is? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I am not going to comment on pending 

legislation, but I am happy to work with the committee on legislation to advance these ideas. The draft I have seen—one of the 

preambular paragraphs talks about the need for Baghdad to begin 

to resolve these issues expeditiously, and I think we are now seeing 

that happening. So——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Let me move on from there: 50,000 ghost soldiers were on the payroll, and we discover that, and hopefully we 

are not sending that money anymore. 

Do we know who is responsible for that, and are they still in a 

position of authority? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, I think, you know, 36 commanders 

have been terminated and new commanders have been appointed. 

So——

Mr. WEBER. So we are confident that we rooted that out? 

Ambassador MCGURK. No. I don’t think we are confident it has 

entirely been rooted out. This is going to be a——

Mr. WEBER. Confident that we rooted out that corruption of those 

50,000 ghost soldiers. 

56

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, that was, and I defer to the Iraqi 

Government who made the statements about this, but that they 

found situations in which soldiers no longer were active and were 

still getting paychecks, meaning those paychecks were going to 

someone else, and that——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Let me move on really quick so try to yield 

some time. 

You said 22 mobile refineries, 240 barrels a today. At $80 a bar- rel, that is $576,000 a month. At $60 a barrel, it is $432,000 a 

month. 

How are they able to hang on to that money and disburse it? Are 

we tracking that? Are we able to get into financial institutions? 

How is that working? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Yeah. That is why we have a—that is why 

we have a line of effort focused on the counterfinance, and that is 

led by our colleagues—some of my colleagues at the State Department, also at the Treasury Department. We are taking all the tools 

in our sanctions tool kit, which are very effective and bringing it 

to bear on this problem. In terms——

Mr. WEBER. Very quickly, so I can yield some time here, who do 

we think is getting the most of that money? The banks, for example, or who is buying that oil, I guess I should say. Is it Turkey——

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, a lot of it is smuggled. It is through 

the Kurdistan region and through Turkey, but I—we haven’t seen 

any complicity by Kurdish authorities or Turkish——

Mr. WEBER. Let me yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Frankel from Florida, 4 minutes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, sir, for your testimony here today. 

And, you know, I have heard a lot of frustration, some loud 

voices, from Congress, but I just have not heard any real good 

ideas or plans put forth by the Congress. 

And I think maybe that is the reason we have not done what I 

think we should have done, which is to take up and debate this socalled war against ISIL. And we have really ducked our responsibility, which is to either authorize or not this war. 

With that said, I want to ask you a couple of questions just at 

the end of the line here. 

Are we giving supplies and money directly to the Peshmerga or 

does it go through Iraq Government? That is question number 1. 

Ambassador MCGURK. Sure. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Number 2 is: Can I—can we assume from your 

testimony that there is no ongoing conversations for any kind of political settlement in Syria? And what would be your idea as to who 

would—what the Government would look like, from a practical 

point of view, if al-Assad was not present? And if you have any 

more time, I would like to understand the general conditions in 

Syria in terms of who is providing services to what segments of the 

population. 

Ambassador MCGURK. First, in terms of supplying the Kurdish 

Peshmerga forces, it goes through—it is a cooperative collaborative 

process now with the Kurds, with us, with the central government, 

and it seems to be—I think it is working very well. If there are adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:24 Jan 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\121014\91843 SHIRL
57

ditional requests from Kurdish authorities, we sit down with them 

and will work through them, and we will continue to do that. 

Ms. FRANKEL. But you have to get permission from the Iraq Government. Is that correct? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Permission. It is a collaborative process, 

and the new—as I mentioned, the Minister of Defense has approved every single request that has come. It is just a new—we are 

in a bit of a new era here, and we need to keep it moving the right 

way. 

In terms of the situation with what the future Assad regime 

might look like, we are working on starting a political transition 

process based on the principles of the Geneva Communique from 

a couple years ago, which lays out a very clear transition process 

that the world had really united around. 

And Secretary Kerry, as I have mentioned, has been involved 

with the key stakeholders to try to get that process on track. And 

then the process with Staffan de Mistura is also ongoing, which I 

discussed. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Is anyone from Syria involved in the process right 

now? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, again, my colleague, Daniel 

Rubenstein, is in touch with Syrians every single day. I mean, not 

only is my office almost right next to his, I see him on airplanes 

in the region because we are criss-crossing the region. So he is constantly in discussion with particularly the Syrian opposition. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And then what about Mr. Assad? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, again, I think there is a consensus 

that the future of Syria with him at the helm will not be stable and 

will continue to fuel his extremism. So the process by which we 

have a transition, however, remains the long pull and intent. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I yield the rest of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentlewoman. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for 4 minutes. 

Ambassador, in terms of Iran, do you believe that they can in 

any way be a constructive force in the fight against ISIS? 

Because there has been some talk that maybe, you know, they 

have sectarian differences with them and maybe that is good for 

us. 

What is your position? And how are you conducting yourself in 

performing your duties with that in mind? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Again, we have no coordination with the 

Iranians whatsoever. We recognize that ISIL is a threat to Iran 

and, given the proximity and the border between Iraq and Iran, 

that, you know, Iran has a stake in this. But how they conduct 

themselves, whether it is in full respect with Iraqi sovereignty or 

not, remains an open question. 

And we have discussed this with multiple Iraqi leaders, and they 

are very protective of their sovereignty against any other foreign 

state, whether it is us or Iran. And Grand Ayatollah Sistani has 

also spoken to this, about the danger of unregulated militias operating on Iraqi soil. So it remains an ongoing thing. 

I just go back to my opening statement that the state structures 

of Iraq almost entirely collapsed 6 months ago today. We are rebuilding from there. It is going to be a very long process. And Iran 

58

inevitably will have a role in this. It is just an open question of 

whether they want to play a role that is constructive or destructive. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I will just say I am very—and I think a lot of my 

colleagues here on the committee are very skeptical that Iran could 

play a constructive role. I know the President wrote a letter to the 

Ayatollah several weeks ago, was reported, and I think a lot of us 

are concerned about where that may go. Iran does want to be involved in Iraq, but I think it is to sow more mischief. 

Let me ask you this about the train-and-equip mission in terms 

of the rebels in Syria. Now, we passed the McKeon—Congress 

passed the McKeon amendment, talked about what appropriately 

vetted rebels, how they could qualify to be vetted. And, basically, 

it was saying, you know, no terrorist ties or anything. 

Congress just passed last week—that was—the NDAA compromise. That was the 1,600-page bill we got put on us last week. 

Now this week is the Cromnibus. But we did have a 1,600-page 

NDAA last week. 

And I was reading through that and I noticed that the section 

about the train-and-equip for the Syria rebels—part A is substantially the same as the McKeon, and part B, though, is new. 

And it said not only do they not have to have terrorist ties—it 

says and, B, they have to show a commitment for such elements, 

groups, and individuals to promoting the respect for human rights 

and the rule of law. 

So are you aware that that provision was in the NDAA? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Again, I think our vetting standards are 

fairly consistent with similar efforts in the past. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Because I think there is a difference between just 

not being a terrorist—I mean, you could still have a desire for an 

Islamic state, a Sharia state. You could still be a sectarian fighter. 

I mean, rule of law and human rights, that means there are 

more pro-American fighters. And it didn’t seem to me that the 

groups that I saw on the ground and in the reports would really 

qualify as really great groups. It was kind of like the lesser of two 

evils. 

So is this going to change the vetting, this language, or you 

didn’t think it will? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I think, you know, General Mike Nagada, 

who is doing this full-time—and we are working to generate classes 

to fill these training sites as early as March—has focused on the 

vetting. So I defer the question to DoD. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I think it is a concern because, I mean, we are 

training these guys in Saudi. You know, Qatar is involved. And 

those are not exactly states where there is a lot of respect for 

human rights. 

But I am going to yield——

Ambassador MCGURK. We have control on them. We maintain 

control in the vetting, which is the critical criterion. 

Mr. DESANTIS. No. I understand that. 

So I will yield back the balance of my time. 

And I will now recognize Mr. Deutch for 4 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador McGurk, thanks for being here. Thanks for your 

continued good service. 

59

I want to just follow up on the chairman’s questions about Iran. 

You had said that Iran would play a role. We are concerned—there 

is some concern, obviously, about the role they are already playing. 

There were reports this week that said that Kurds force leaders 

are on the ground in Iraq. There were—there obviously have been 

reports about Iranian air strikes. 

One thing I am not sure that you have had a chance to do yet: 

Can you confirm the U.S. is still not cooperating with Iran militarily at all? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Yes. Absolutely. I can confirm that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And then I want—I would like to just circle back—

given the Iranian involvement in Iraq, I would like to circle back 

to Syria, where I think it is related. 

Because with respect to the Syrian opposition and the role that—

the role our efforts to strengthen them plays in countering ISIS, 

there has been a lot written lately about the moderate opposition 

feeling squeezed, and we have heard from some groups here that 

U.S. air strikes are seen as helping Assad in the fight inside Syria. 

So if you—if you accept that premise and you add to it the fact 

that Iran is on the ground in Syria, that the opposition used the 

Iranians as the most important player in propping up the Assad regime, which has slaughtered over 200,000 people—if you play all 

of that in, how does the effect of both our ISIS operations on Syria 

and the comments that we have made—while we are not cooperating with Iran, some positive comments about Iranian air strikes 

being beneficial in going after ISIS—how does all that play in the 

ability of the moderates in Syria to ever be able to cast off Assad? 

Ambassador MCGURK. I would—again, it is a—as one of your colleagues mentioned, it is an extremely complicated situation, and 

we are looking very closely and are concerned about any effort of 

the Assad regime to exploit the fact that, you know, we are striking 

ISIL, which is a necessary—degrading ISIL is a necessary condition to any future in Syria, which would be—which would be stable 

and prosperous for the Syrian people. 

So we are looking at this extremely closely, Congressman. It is 

extremely complicated. But right now our focus in Syria, given that 

we are at the earliest phase of Phase 1 in this campaign, is to degrade ISIL. 

At the same time, we have, in the medium term, the train-andequip effort in getting these units employed into the field, which 

will be a kind of an inkblot strategy as they begin to stabilize local 

areas and begin to provide a counterweight to extremists. And 

those units will have to be able to defend themselves against the 

regime. There is no question about that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And if the—here’s the fundamental question. For 

the opposition in Syria that has—that has looked—that has looked 

to us and others and has said, ‘‘It is now years that war has been 

waged against us. There are over 200,000 dead. There hasn’t been 

any real—aside from the political efforts, there hasn’t really been 

any effort to take action to save the lives of—or prevent the barrel 

bombs from being dropped or to provide cover for humanitarian 

aid,’’ if that is their—that is the way they view it, what do we—

what is the response to them when they now come back and say, 

‘‘And now you are involved in training some people to go after ISIS, 

60

but that still leaves open the possibility that Assad can continue 

to slaughter us with impunity’’? 

Ambassador MCGURK. Well, again, Congressman, I mean, there 

have been efforts. There are some efforts that I don’t—I obviously 

can’t discuss here. 

So there is a lot going on here with the moderate opposition 

groups that we support in a various—myriad of ways. So—but we 

have conversations with them constantly. 

But if you just look at a map of Syria, about the swath of territory through the entire Euphrates Valley that ISIL controls, having 

a coherent plan and working with local forces and working with the 

moderate opposition to degrade ISIL in those areas and begin to recover those populations from the boot of ISIL, that is a significant 

interest. 

That is in our interest and, also, in the interest of the Syrian 

people and the moderate opposition. So we are trying to find that 

intersection with them to be able to work very cooperatively together. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time’s expired. And the Ambassador has a hard stop. 

So we want to really thank you for giving us the time you have. 

And there is obviously a lot going on in this region. It is complicated. But we are going to continue to monitor it because we 

know it is important for our security interests. So thanks. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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