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i 

88–450 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–105] 

RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND 

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 8, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 8, 2014, Russian Military Developments and Strategic Implications ....................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 8, 2014 ............................................................................................ 37 

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014 

RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Chollet, Hon. Derek, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 4 

Pandolfe, VADM Frank C., USN, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy 

(J–5), Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Chollet, Hon. Derek .......................................................................................... 45 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 41 

Pandolfe, VADM Frank C. ............................................................................... 51 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Washington Post editorial, ‘‘John Kerry’s Departure from Reality’’ ............ 59 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Dr. Wenstrup .................................................................................................... 63 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIC 

IMPLICATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning, 

ladies and gentlemen. 

The committee meets to receive testimony on ‘‘Russian Military 

Developments and Strategic Implications.’’ Immediately following 

this hearing, Members will receive a classified briefing by representatives from our intelligence community. 

Joining us today are Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Derek Chollet and Joint Staff Director for 

Strategic Plans and Policy Vice Admiral Frank Pandolfe. 

Thank you both for being here today and for your service to our 

Nation. 

Before we get started, I would like to welcome Congresswoman 

Tulsi Gabbard to the committee. Congresswoman Gabbard brings 

a wealth of experience and unique perspective, having served our 

Nation as an enlisted soldier and officer. With Tulsi and Colleen 

Hanabusa, the service men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command and in the great State of Hawaii are well represented. 

We look forward to working with you. 

The events unfolding in Ukraine are deeply troubling, from Russia’s invasion and occupation of a sovereign country to its amassing 

of tens of thousands of troops along Ukraine’s borders and further 

north under the ruse of conducting snap exercises. Just this past 

weekend, we saw reports that Russia is provoking further unrest 

in eastern Ukraine, attempting to create a reason to invade. 

Yet these actions are only the most recent and perhaps most aggressive of a broader campaign to challenge the West and to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in Europe. 

Mr. Putin is directing a multidimensional military modernization 

effort. Russia is re-arming at an alarming rate, with military 

spending up roughly 30 percent. It stands in flagrant violation of 

a major nuclear arms control treaty and, under the New START 

[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, is building up its nu-
2 

clear forces by over 100 warheads since the last declaration, while 

the U.S. reduces its own forces. 

As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently wrote in an 

op-ed, and I quote, ‘‘Mr. Putin is playing a long game, and the West 

must also play a strategic long game. Yet the administration’s policies have rested largely on reset, cooperation, and further nuclear 

cuts.’’ 

Just last week, Deputy Under Secretary Christine Wormuth, testifying on the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], stated that they 

‘‘probably would have added some additional sentences about Russia, given recent developments.’’ That is hardly a reexamination of 

our Nation’s policy towards Moscow. 

And while the QDR states that our military is sized to and capable of effectively deterring aggression, there are serious concerns 

about our ability to do just that, especially with a near-peer competitor. 

Our friends, as well as our adversaries, are watching our every 

move. It should come as no surprise that senior Japanese officials 

raised this issue with Secretary Hagel during his recent visit, as 

they seek to understand what our policy with regard to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea signals for our commitments to our allies. 

This hearing is an opportunity to examine the strategic implications of Russia’s military developments and recent actions. Secretary Chollet and Admiral Pandolfe, I hope you can also discuss 

how these developments are influencing any reexamination of U.S. 

policy towards Russia, including our force posture in Europe, how 

we reassure our allies and partners, and our defense investments. 

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before our committee, and 

I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, welcome our witnesses today, look forward to their testimony and their expertise on 

this issue. 

And I want to join you in welcoming Congresswoman Gabbard to 

the committee. It is great to have her here. Obviously, Hawaii is 

a critical piece of our national security strategy and Department of 

Defense activities in Asia and beyond, so it is great to have that 

expertise there. And with her, I believe, 11 years of service, now 

as a captain in the Army National Guard, her service in Iraq, I 

think that expertise is going to serve the committee very, very well. 

And I thank you for being here. Welcome to the committee. 

This is an incredibly important hearing, as we try to confront the 

challenges that the chairman, I think, described very well. What 

Russia has done in the Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law, a blatant violation of all manner of different treaties 

which Russia has signed, and is something that we in the U.S. and 

I believe every other nation in the world must do all we can to dis-
3 

courage and to send the message that it won’t be tolerated and that 

type of behavior is outside of the international norm. 

Because it can potentially lead to destabilization in many places. 

If it becomes accepted that you can simply decide to take over another country and annex parts of them, it does not contribute to 

the international order. 

Now, this is a difficult situation. It is easy to say that we should 

not tolerate that; much more difficult to do. I don’t think anybody 

on this committee wants to go to war with Russia over the 

Ukraine. But we do want to find a way to stop them from further 

aggression. And I think there are options. 

And, overall, this is a very unfortunate choice that President 

Putin has made, and it is not in the best interests of Russia. Once 

the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a real opportunity for Russia 

to move in and become one of the partner of nations, a great power 

that could participate with other great powers in building a more 

peaceful, prosperous, and stable world. They had that option. 

President Putin has chosen not to take that. He has chosen to 

further isolate Russia and find further conflict. I think this is a 

huge mistake. We have already seen the impact on the Russian 

economy. If Russia had been more willing to embrace the West and 

work with us, I think it would have led to greater economic opportunity and greater prosperity. 

The Russian population is in a very bad place right now. They 

have an aging population; they have an economy that is in trouble, 

rampant with corruption. It is not going to help them, to further 

destabilize their very own region and further turn the international 

community against them. 

I very much agree with President Obama, who said these actions 

by Putin are more a sign of weakness than they are a sign of 

strength. The question is, what do we do in response? I think initially we have to take whatever steps we can to try and economically isolate them. We have begun that process; I think we should 

continue it. 

But key to all of this will be NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the EU [European Union]. Whatever amount of business we do with Russia, whatever our economic leverage over Russia is, the EU has at least 10 times that. They can make decisions 

to show Russia that this type of behavior won’t be tolerated much 

more easily than we can. 

So I am very interested to hear from our witnesses about what 

our best approach is to working with our partners in Europe and 

to get full-scale cooperation in not just condemning Russia’s actions 

but to make them pay a price for it that will make them think that 

this is not in their best interests. 

This is not easy. Regrettably, in many, many countries throughout the world, we have found that we cannot simply force them to 

behave in ways that we would like them to. But we have to try to 

alter this behavior, certainly condemn it, but try to find ways to 

hopefully make sure it does not happen in the future and to defuse 

the ongoing situation in the Ukraine. There is continuing concern 

that it will spread beyond Crimea into the eastern Ukraine and become even more of a problem. 
4 

So, very curious to hear from our witnesses today about how we 

can contain that and respond to the Russian aggression in the 

Ukraine in a way that will not make the situation worse but hopefully will change Putin’s calculations in the future. 

With that, I yield back and look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Congressman Smith, members of the committee, for this hearing today. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak with you on U.S. 

policy and actions in the wake of Russia’s incursion in the Ukraine 

and how the Department of Defense has worked with our allies and 

international partners to address this issue. 

Russia’s unlawful military intervention against Ukraine challenges our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. It changes 

Europe’s security landscape, it causes instability on NATO’s borders, and it is a challenge to the international order. 

Since the outset of this crisis, the United States has pursued 

three courses of action: first, demonstrating support to Ukraine’s 

transitional government; second, reassuring allies and deterring 

Russia from further military threats to Europe; and third, imposing 

costs on Russia for its illegal actions. 

The Department of Defense has an important role in achieving 

these objectives in all three areas. First, to support Ukraine, the 

United States has worked with partners like the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the U.N. [United Nations], the EU, the 

G–7 [Group of Seven], to provide Ukraine with political backing 

and economic assistance, including an $18 billion package from the 

IMF. 

For our part, the Department of Defense is working with 

Ukraine to review, prioritize, and grant its defense assistance requests for materials and supplies that would serve to support 

Ukraine without taking actions that would escalate this crisis militarily. 

The initial round of this process was completed last week, with 

the delivery of 300,000 MREs [meals ready-to-eat] to support 

Ukrainian forces in the field. This is the support that they had 

asked for. We have maintained senior-level defense dialogues with 

Ukrainian counterparts throughout this crisis. And we have led efforts at NATO to offer Ukraine greater access to NATO exercises, 

invite Ukraine to participate in the development of military capabilities, and provide capacity-building programs to the Ukrainian 

military. 

The second course of action is reassuring U.S. allies and deterring Russia from further military action in Europe. As President 

Obama said recently during his trip to Brussels and his meeting 
5 

with the NATO Secretary General there, the NATO alliance is, 

quote, ‘‘the bedrock of America’s security as well as European security.’’ And just last week, NATO celebrated its 65th anniversary. 

Reassurance measures so far include augmenting NATO’s peacetime Baltic air policing mission; deploying air assets and personnel 

to Poland to supplement the U.S.-Poland aviation detachment, or 

AVDET, training rotation; and extending the USS Truxtun stay in 

the Black Sea to conduct exercises with Romanian and Bulgarian 

naval forces. We will also send another ship to the Black Sea within a week. 

NATO has also established orbits of Airborne Warning and Control System, or AWACS, aircraft over Poland and Romania, both to 

serve as additional assurance to allies that border Ukraine and to 

enhance NATO’s situational awareness of activities in the region. 

The third course of action is imposing costs on Russia. Russia’s 

violations of its own agreements and international law require a 

vigorous, coordinated response, and the United States has led the 

international community in isolating Russia diplomatically. 

Along with the European Union, Canada, and Australia, the U.S. 

has imposed visa restrictions and comprehensive sanctions on a 

growing list of Russian officials, one Russian bank, and members 

of Putin’s inner circle, along with Ukrainians who played a role in 

undermining that country’s sovereignty and misappropriating 

Ukrainian assets. As the President has made clear, the sanctions 

we have imposed to date are not the end of what we can do. 

At the Department of Defense, we have put on hold all militaryto-military engagements with Russia, including exercises, bilateral 

meetings, port visits, and planning conferences. Although we have 

worked hard over two decades to try to build a cooperative, transparent defense relationship with Russia, the violations of international law and the undermining of stability in Europe mean that 

we cannot proceed with business as usual. 

NATO and many allies have likewise suspended military cooperation engagements with Russia, while maintaining the channels for dialogue that can serve to deescalate this crisis. And while 

we do not seek military confrontation with Russia, its actions in 

Europe and Eurasia may require the United States to reexamine 

our force posture in Europe and our requirement for future deployments, exercises, and training in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, members of the committee, 

let me conclude by saying that Russia’s unlawful actions in 

Ukraine have dire implications for international and regional security. This has caused a paradigm shift in our relations with Moscow. And this crisis is not one that has been generated by the West 

or the United States; it is a crisis of choice pursued by Russia to 

further what I believe is a distorted view of its own interests, 

which will only lead to its further isolation. 

Finally, I want to thank the Congress for passing the Support for 

the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of 

Ukraine Act of 2014. This act is closely aligned with the Administration’s objectives. It demonstrates solidarity with Ukraine, helps 

to reassure our allies, and imposes further costs on Russia for its 

actions. 
6 

Since the stakes are high and the international principles are so 

fundamental, it is important that the United States speak with one 

voice during this crisis, and I appreciate that we are doing so. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Chollet can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Vice Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR 

FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J–5), JOINT STAFF, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Good morning, Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith, and distinguished committee members. Good morning, and thank you for this opportunity to update you on Russian 

military developments. 

You just heard a review of actions taken by the United States, 

the NATO alliance, and the international community in response 

to Russia’s unlawful military intervention in Ukraine. Russia’s seizure of Crimea is a flagrant violation of international law, and it 

reintroduces into Europe the threat of external aggression. By 

doing so, Russia has set back decades of international progress. 

The United States military and the wider NATO alliance have 

supported our response to this unwarranted intervention. We have 

given support to Ukraine by way of material assistance, defense 

consultations, and the offer of enhanced training. We are reassuring our NATO allies, with whom we have Article 5 security 

guarantees, by sending additional air power to the Baltic States 

and Poland, increasing our surveillance over Poland and Romania, 

and sending naval ships into the Black Sea. 

And we are helping to impose costs on Russia by halting all bilateral military-to-military interaction. However, as noted by Mr. 

Chollet, we are keeping open channels for senior-leader communications to help deescalate the crisis. 

I now would like to widen the focus of my remarks beyond 

Ukraine to discuss the evolution of Russian conventional military 

power, thereby providing context to today’s events. 

At the height of its military power, the Soviet Union was truly 

a global competitor. With millions of people under arms, vast numbers of tanks and planes, a global navy, and an extensive intelligence-gathering infrastructure, the Soviet military machine posed 

a very real and dangerous threat. 

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, that arsenal 

fell into disrepair. Starved of funding and fragmented, Russian 

military capabilities decayed throughout the 1990s. 

From the start of his term in office in 2000, President Putin 

made military modernization a top priority of the Russian Government. When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, a number of shortcomings were noted in its military performance. This led the Russian Government to further increase investment in its military 

services. 

Since 2008, those efforts have had some success. Russian military forces have been streamlined into smaller, more mobile units. 
7 

Their overall readiness has improved, and their most elite units 

are well-trained and equipped. 

They now employ a more sophisticated approach to joint warfare. 

Their military has implemented organizational change, creating regional commands within Russia. These coordinate and synchronize 

planning, joint service integration, force movement, intelligence 

support, and the tactical employment of units. 

Finally, the Russian military adopted doctrinal change, placing 

greater emphasis on speed of movement, the use of special operations forces, and information and cyber warfare. As noted, they instituted snap exercises. These no-notice drills serve the dual purpose of sharpening military readiness while also inducing strategic 

uncertainty as to whether they will swiftly transition from training 

to offensive operations. 

Today, Russia is a regional power that can project force into 

nearby states, but it has very limited global power projection capability. It has a military of uneven readiness. While some units are 

well-trained, most are less so. It suffers from corruption, and its 

logistical capabilities are limited. Aging equipment and infrastructure, fiscal challenges, and demographic and social problems will 

continue to hamper reform efforts. 

The United States, in contrast, employs a military of global reach 

and engagement. The readiness of our rotationally deployed forces 

is high, and we are working to address readiness shortfalls at 

home. 

And we operate within alliances, the strongest of which is NATO. 

Composed of 28 nations, NATO is the most successful military alliance in history. Should Russia undertake an armed attack against 

any NATO state, it will find that our commitment to collective defense is immediate and unwavering. 

Russia’s military objectives are difficult to predict, but it is clear 

that Russia is sustaining a significant military force on Ukraine’s 

eastern border. This is deeply troubling to all states in the region 

and beyond, and we are watching Russian military movements 

very carefully. 

I spoke with General Breedlove, the Commander of U.S. European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, last Friday. He is formulating recommendations for presentation to the 

North Atlantic Council on April 15th. These recommendations will 

be aimed at further reassuring our NATO allies. As part of this effort, he will consider increasing military exercises, forward-deploying additional military equipment and personnel, and increasing 

our naval, air, and ground presence. And he will update Members 

of Congress on those recommendations at the earliest opportunity. 

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity to address 

your committee. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Pandolfe can be found in the 

Appendix on page 51.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Chollet and Admiral Pandolfe, as I mentioned in our 

opening statement, at our QDR hearing last week, Deputy Under 

Secretary Wormuth commented that, in light of recent events, they 

would have added some additional sentences on Russia in the 
8 

QDR. I would think that a more comprehensive policy review is 

necessary. 

Can you please describe specific steps that the Department is 

taking to reexamine U.S. policy towards Russia and our posture in 

Europe? Additionally, what immediate steps is the Department 

taking to provide assistance to Ukraine to reassure other allies and 

partners in the region and to deter further Russian aggression? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Mr. Chairman, I will begin. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have taken some 

very important steps immediately for our NATO partners, with the 

Baltic air policing mission, which is adding 6 F–15s, and then also 

the 12 F–16s to the Polish aviation detachment, which has been 

very warmly welcomed in both Poland and in the Balts, as well. 

We have also been in very close touch with our Ukrainian colleagues. And this goes back to when this crisis was first unfolding 

earlier this year, when Secretary Hagel had multiple phone calls 

with the Ukrainian Defense Minister at the time, at that point urging the Defense Minister not to get involved in the Ukrainian crisis. And to the Ukrainian military’s great credit, they did not get 

involved in the crisis as it was unfolding. 

Since then, we have worked very closely with the Ukrainians to 

try to understand their needs and to try to address those as quickly 

as possible. So there was a team in Kiev last week, a team from 

the Department of Defense as well as EUCOM [U.S. European 

Command] representation, what is called the Bilateral Defense 

Commission, to meet with Ukraine to talk with them about their 

urgent needs but also the strategy that they are seeking moving 

forward. 

And we are working through some of those requests, as I mentioned in my opening statement. We have worked through what 

they saw as the most urgent, which is to get them some MREs, because their forces have been in the field for a very long time and 

need those supplies. 

In terms of your question, sir, about the QDR, it wouldn’t surprise you to hear that I concur with my colleague’s comments that 

she made last week to this committee. We clearly would have 

changed some of the tone, perhaps, of the QDR, given what has 

transpired over the last several weeks and Russia’s egregious violation of international law. 

That said, I think the fundamental strategy of the QDR still 

holds. And things like the commitment to maintaining a strong 

technological edge, the importance and the reaffirmation of the 

transatlantic alliance and working with our strong partners, the 

commitment to build partner capacity and institute policies to pursue that objective, those are all things that we were doing before 

this crisis and we are going to certainly continue to do in the days 

ahead. 

And then, finally, as Admiral Pandolfe mentioned, General 

Breedlove has been tasked by the North Atlantic Council [NAC], 

NATO’s governing body, to come up with a variety of new ideas 

about ways that we may reassure our NATO allies moving forward, 

and those are things that he is working through right now. And he 

is due to present those to the NAC—and then, as the Admiral said, 

as soon as possible to you—next week. 
9 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Sir, I would agree with what Mr. Chollet 

says. 

The process of assessing our relationship with Russia is ongoing. 

We continually review our strategic relationships within the Pentagon as a matter of course, quite frankly, every year, as we build 

the next set of plans, the next set of budgets, the next set of strategy documents. 

And, clearly, the actions the Russians have taken, described I 

think quite accurately as a paradigm shift, are causing us to look 

very hard at some of the assumptions which underlay the planning 

and prescriptions of the past. 

And not just in the United States, either. NATO is undertaking 

a very similar process of assessing where the Russians are going 

and where we will go as a collective alliance with the Russians in 

the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Vice Admiral, you said in your statement, ‘‘Today 

Russia is a regional power that can project force into nearby states 

but has very limited global power projection capability.’’ I think 

that is basically the same words the President used last week. 

By your definition, what would be a power or a nation—what nation would you consider has power to project, the ability to project 

power globally? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, sir, one important caveat is my statement was focusing on conventional Russian military power. I think 

it is important to note that the Russian nuclear arsenal is intercontinental in reach and does have, at that level of the employment 

of force, extreme range. 

Regarding the employment of conventional military power on a 

global scale, I would argue that the United States is really unique 

in our ability to operate globally. And that is largely a function of 

the alliances of which I spoke. We have the support, in terms of 

basing and cooperative training and operations, of a host of other 

nations who share our values and our vision for the international 

order. 

And not just our military technologies or people, but that systems of alliances and basing is what really allows the Western 

forces, with the United States at the center, to operate on a global 

scale. 

The CHAIRMAN. So the United States would be the only country 

that, take away nuclear capability, has the ability to operate globally? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Again, I would think, on a regular basis, on 

a routine basis, in a significant level of force, I think that is an accurate statement, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. How many ships do we have in our Navy right 

now? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, last time I checked, it was 287. I am 

not exactly sure what it is today. 

The CHAIRMAN. And how many does Russia have? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I would have to go back and check that, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I saw something last week that they had 300 

ships just in the Black Sea. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, numbers of ships is certainly one factor, but you also, as you well know, sir, have to look at the tonnage 
10 

of the ships, the capabilities of the ship, whether they are oceangoing global ships or whether they are, quite frankly, littoral, regional ships with much shorter ranges and capabilities that are 

geared towards shorter-range missions. 

The United States Navy today really is unique in its ability to 

operate globally and project power globally. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get that number back to us on the 

record, how many ships, comparing apples to apples, Russians have 

compared to our Navy? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we look at the specifics of the crisis right now, how would you 

assess the risk of Russia going further into the Ukraine, most likely, obviously, into the eastern Ukraine? That is where they have 

amassed troops, where we have heard in recent days that there are 

Russian nationalists within Ukraine that have seized government 

buildings and, you know, committed other actions. What do you 

think the calculation is? 

Because, obviously, the next escalation of this crisis would involve that. And that, I mean, certainly there is the long-term, you 

know, how do we build our relationship with Russia, how do we 

contain, you know, any global threat. But right now, you know, 

keeping the crisis from spreading is all about keeping them out of 

the eastern Ukraine. 

You know, how do you see the likelihood of Russia making that 

decision? And what can we and our allies do to try to discourage 

that action? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, Congressman, I know we have a closed 

session later, and our intelligence colleagues can perhaps provide 

a little more granularity. 

But what I would say to that is we are very concerned about 

Russia’s buildup on Ukraine’s eastern border. We have been very 

clear at all levels of our government, from the President on down, 

that this is a worrying development and that we want to see Russia deescalate and move forces out of that area. 

The events of the weekend, as you mentioned, have been very 

concerning. As the White House said yesterday, there is strong evidence that some of the actions taking place inside Ukraine, the 

folks were perhaps paid by the Russians. These aren’t spontaneous 

demonstrations, we believe. And a move into eastern Ukraine 

would clearly be a very serious escalation of this crisis. 

Mr. SMITH. What do we do? 

Secretary CHOLLET. So, what we can do. Well, first, at every opportunity we have, we are—including yesterday Secretary Kerry 

talked to Foreign Minister Lavrov again—making clear that their 

behavior is unacceptable and that there will be consequences for 

their actions. We have shown that there already have been consequences for the actions they have taken, and there are more to 

come if they were to continue along this course. 
11 

So punishing Russia is clearly one avenue. The second is to reassure our partners and allies. We have been very clear, the President when he was in Europe several weeks ago made this very 

clear, our commitment to Article 5, NATO’s collective defense commitment, is ironclad. And we are not just saying that, we are trying to demonstrate through our actions, whether it is the Baltic air 

policing or the Polish aviation rotation, that we mean what we say 

along those lines. 

So this is a very delicate situation. It is very concerning. I don’t 

want to try to sugarcoat it at all, because Russia has a tremendous 

amount of capability right now deployed on Ukraine’s border. And 

we are watching it very, very closely. 

Mr. SMITH. Let’s say—just one final question, because most of 

the questions I have would be better for the classified session. 

Let’s say that Russia goes into the eastern Ukraine. In essence, 

we wind up, you know—Ukraine winds up probably being split in 

half, or some things that are somewhat similar, although on a 

grander and more problematic scale than what happened in Georgia in 2008, where you have two provinces that are now effectively 

part of Russia. Now you have a situation where you would have a 

much larger country, effectively, part of that. What do you think 

Putin’s long-term vision is beyond that? 

I know we are very concerned—I met with a consul from Lithuania back in Seattle over the past week. You know, they are very 

concerned about what Russia would do there. What do you think 

Russia—because, obviously, it is a whole different step when you 

go into a NATO country. I mean, that would basically mean war. 

Do you think Putin understands that and would be limited to the 

Ukraine? Do you think there is a risk that there are other places? 

And are there other places, other than the Baltic nations, that Russia may have designs on that we need to be worried about? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, sir, I always hesitate to try to put myself in Putin’s head, but what I can say is that Russia’s behavior 

clearly seems to be motivated by a sense—and I believe it is a distorted view of their own interests—that they are better off having 

client states around them that are completely beholden to Moscow. 

We don’t have that view. We believe that it is up to the countries 

around Russia itself to decide their own destiny. Russia clearly has 

interests, legitimate interests, in its neighborhood, but the way it 

is seeking to pursue those interests is deeply counterproductive, I 

believe, to what I think is its own interests, but also a clear violation of international law and absolutely unacceptable. 

So how far this goes, I don’t want to speculate. That is why what 

we are doing is to make very clear to Mr. Putin and to his entire 

leadership that their behavior is unacceptable, their actions are unacceptable, and that there will be consequences for actions they 

have already taken or any further actions they may take. 

Mr. SMITH. What are the most important consequences, do you 

think, that would show that Russia is paying a price for this that 

we have taken or will take? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I think, sir, the main are economic. And that 

is why we have focused so much on the sanctions initially. The 

Russian economy is distorted, itself, mainly through petrochemicals. And we have both tried to target particular individuals, obvi-
12 

ously, but also the President now, through Executive order, has the 

ability to look at sectoral sanctions. 

Now, as he said in his statement about 2 weeks ago on this subject, when we get into that neighborhood of actions, those are 

things that could affect us. And we want to be sure that we are 

smart about the way forward and that we aim before we shoot 

when it comes to sanctions. But I think, clearly, that is the pressure point that will have the greatest effect on Russian perceptions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I want to pursue, kind of, what the chairman was talking about: how big a deal this is, essentially. 

And your responsibility is plans and policies for the Department 

of Defense across the whole world. I think most people assume that 

we didn’t really have to worry much about a European war anymore, that the economic integration had made that a thing of the 

past. 

You answered the chairman saying something about a paradigm 

shift, at least with our relations to Russia. But can you expound 

a little bit about how big a change this is or is not, related to our 

national security interests when you look at it worldwide? How big 

a paradigm shift is this for us? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, this is a big deal. I mean, the presumption of our relationship with Russia in the post—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, can you speak right into the microphone, please? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I said this is a big deal. The presumption of 

our relationship with Russia, the foundation of our relationship 

with Russia, was that they were a cooperative, emerging power 

that was buying into the international order, to include the laws 

which govern behavior within the integrated economic and legal 

system. 

Their actions, both in Georgia and most recently in Crimea, have 

clearly indicated that they have limits to the degree to which they 

are willing to accede those rules. And they are challenging the 

international order, which most nations rely on for their security 

and for their prosperity. 

So, clearly, it is a paradigm shift, as the words have been used 

by a number of leaders. And to Chairman McKeon’s point, we are 

reassessing the way forward with the Russians. 

I do think, however, we have to keep it in global perspective, as 

well. As noted, Russia is an important country and it is a regional 

power, but we have other interests throughout the world which we 

also must continue to pay attention to. And we must balance our 

energies to maintain security and stability not just in Europe but 

in the Middle East and the Far East, as well. And, quite frankly, 

I think, working with our allies, that is exactly what we are doing. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. But wouldn’t you also agree that, in those 

other parts of the world, they are watching to see what happens 

here, how we handle this? So if you are North Korea or Iran or 

China, you are watching to see how the United States responds to 
13 

this Russian incursion. And the potential is that those other places 

in the world are going to get more dangerous, not less, if they think 

we have an anemic response, right? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I think others are watching, and they are 

watching not just the response of the United States but the response of NATO, the response of the European Union, the response 

of the United Nations, and the entire system of international 

states, as is threatened by the actions of, in this case, Russia. And 

they are looking to see that the cost that we are threatening to— 

that we have imposed thus far and we are threatening to impose 

further should this aggression continue. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I guess that leads me to wonder whether 

adding a few sentences to the QDR is enough of a reassessment. 

If it really is a paradigm shift, if it is that big a change, isn’t it 

more logical that we need to make a bigger reassessment of our 

own capabilities, how much we spend, what our own approach to 

these security issues are? 

Again, I think of it, especially from your view, not only what happens in Ukraine, but what happens in North Korea and Iran and 

the South China Sea and all these other places around the world. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Sir, as I mentioned in my first answer, the 

process of assessing risk, of allocating forces, and investing in relationships is an ongoing process. It never stops. It is shaped in each 

and every day by the actions in the world around us. And, clearly, 

the actions of Russia of late will impact our assessments as we 

move forward in those assessments. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, my last question is, do you think our 

process of reassessment is keeping up with the pace of events 

around the world? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I do. I think that we have a concerted and 

disciplined effort to try to measure risk. And we work very hard 

at it with the intelligence communities, with our colleagues, the 

State Department, the Office of Secretary of Defense. 

And I think, as I mentioned a moment ago, it is a continuous 

process. We adjust as we go. But I think, fundamentally, the strategy as prescribed in the QDR is correct and that they have done 

a very nice job of looking around the world at the contending interests and values. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you very much for your testimony 

today and your service to our Nation. 

I would like to start by going back to the chairman’s question 

about Russian ability to project global power. And what is the current status of their aircraft carriers and their battle groups? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I would like to start by saying, in the closed 

session in an hour or so, there will be an intelligence official whose 

specialty is this kind of question. 

My understanding, having operated in 6th Fleet up until about 

6 months ago, is that the Kuznetsov, which is their last remaining 

carrier, is operational. It has a limited air wing of a few airplanes, 
14 

if I remember correctly, something less than a dozen, and that it 

has periodically deployed to the Mediterranean and then come back 

to its northern Russian bases. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, Admiral. 

Let me turn to something else. In January, Director Clapper 

stated that, and I quote, ‘‘Following the measured improvements to 

Russian military capabilities in the past year, it is setting its sights 

on the long-term challenges of professionalization and rearmament. 

The military in the past year has taken an increasingly prominent 

role in out-of-the-area operations, most notably in the eastern Mediterranean but also in Latin America, the Arctic, and other regions, 

a trend that will probably continue,’’ end quote. 

He also stated, again I quote, ‘‘Moscow is negotiating a series of 

agreements that would give it access to military infrastructure 

across the globe,’’ end quote. 

Could you provide any additional details about Russia’s ambitions in these out-of-the-area operations and infrastructure access 

initiatives, and particularly whether and how those have changed 

after Russian occupation of the Crimea? And, again, further, what 

should be the United States’ response? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, sir, I can start. And as the Admiral 

said, I know in the closed part of this hearing today, our intelligence colleagues can provide a little bit more in terms of what Director Clapper was talking about. 

Again, as the Admiral said in his opening statement, the Russians have embarked on a military modernization effort. It is something we have watched very closely. It is something that they started after the 2008 Georgia war and the shortcomings that they perceived in their military at that time. 

I think we have seen some of the effect of that modernization, 

clearly, in Ukraine, particularly the special forces at work. And 

Russia has been, as you noted and as Director Clapper was quoted 

as saying, has been working to broaden out as much as it can, but 

still within a region. And I think its power projection is not global 

right now, but whether it is in the Arctic or whether it is in the 

Med, they are clearly trying to expand out. 

That said, they are limited in what they can do. Despite their 

modernization efforts, they have tremendous challenges in their 

military in terms of the professionalization of the military and in 

terms of the demographics in their country, as well. 

So, as I said, it is something we watch closely and we don’t take 

lightly and we are focused on. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir, I would agree with that. 

From the reports I have read on their efforts toward 

professionalization and rearmament are that they have had some 

success, but it has been also mixed success in terms of the larger 

force. The force has gotten smaller; it has been streamlined. But 

as I understand it, the readiness is uneven, and the degree to 

which they have professionalized their military is incomplete. 

Nonetheless, they continue to work toward those goals. And they 

are long-term goals, as I understand it, for the Russian military. 

In terms of out of area of operations, my observation is that they 

are relatively limited. They have operated heavily in the eastern 

Mediterranean in support of the Syrian Government, but, beyond 
15 

that, I think that I would describe them as periodic and limited in 

scope. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Turning to NATO, how have interactions within NATO changed 

since Russia’s invasion of the Crimea? And with the show of aggression by the Russians, do you feel that it is more likely that 

more NATO member countries are going to begin to meet their 

treaty obligations for defense expenditures? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, the NATO consultations have been very 

intense. I don’t know that—I wouldn’t characterize it as a change. 

I would describe it more as an intensification of NATO meetings 

and engagements, in addition to, as I mentioned, more exercises. 

So I think that this has shown, this whole crisis has shown, the 

value of the strong transatlantic alliance and the investment we 

have made over many, many decades into NATO. 

I hope—and we have a NATO summit coming up in Wales this 

September—I hope that this crisis is a proof point and will provide 

an impetus for those members who are not spending the kind of 

resources we would like to see on defense to spend more. But this 

has been an ongoing challenge we have faced for many years, in 

terms of getting more European governments to step up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I am like most Members here in this committee; I have listened to testimony for the last 3 months from the 

service chiefs about all the problems facing our military, and this 

is going to bring me to my question in just one moment. 

Mr. Putin obviously has been listening to the testimony by our 

service chiefs, as well. And even Secretary of Defense Hagel, who 

I have great respect for, has made comments that we are going to 

have to change the way that we organize our military and their 

functions and their responsibilities. 

My concern—and I hear this back in my district, which is eastern North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base and 

a couple of other bases—is that here we go again. The Nation—we 

are what is called a debtor nation. We have to borrow money, primarily from China, to fund our debt. And under George Bush, we 

raised the debt ceiling seven times in the 8 years that he was 

President of the United States. Under President Obama, we have 

raised the debt ceiling five times—seven times in 5 years. 

This is the point I am trying to make. I hope in your discussions 

with primarily the Germans and the French and the Brits, I don’t 

think that they have been as concerned or as engaged publicly— 

and maybe you can reassure me that I am wrong—in the fact that 

this primarily is their fight. 

Now, I understand that we have these treaties, and I understand 

the role of NATO. And I do support NATO, by the way. But here 

we go again in trying to take the lead, so to speak, on this problem 

in Europe. And I think that, quite frankly, sometimes, instead of 

being the leader, we should be supporting these other nations, let 

them take the lead, let them be the ones that say to Putin, if you 

go any further, you are going to see the German troops or the 

French troops or the Brits. 
16 

Can you respond and give us any inside feelings, if not policy, 

but inside feelings, that they understand that this is their responsibility more than it is America’s responsibility? And we want to be 

a team player, but we don’t want to be captain of the team. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, great question. 

First, I would like to say, I believe U.S. leadership remains indispensable. NATO is a collective security alliance; there are 28 partners. But we are the most consequential and important partner of 

that alliance. 

But, second, I would say the Europeans clearly have close interests in what is happening in Ukraine and Russia’s behavior. It is 

just in their neighborhood, it is much closer. 

And the Europeans have stepped up in this crisis. Chancellor 

Merkel, for example, of Germany has been on the phone constantly 

with Putin and other senior Russian officials to make the very 

same arguments we have been making about the unacceptability of 

their actions. The EU, like the United States, the EU has stepped 

up in terms of sanctions, sanctioning Russian officials and other 

close allies of Putin in Moscow. 

That is absolutely critical, because the ties between Europe and 

Russia are much stronger than the ties between the United States 

and Russia. So for any sanction to be meaningful, in terms of trying to get the attention of Russian officials, Europe has to be absolutely involved. 

That is why, when President Obama was in Europe several 

weeks ago, he had a G–7 meeting on the margins of the Nuclear 

Security Summit and also very important talks in Brussels and 

then later in Rome about this crisis. 

So I think that you are absolutely right, Europe has to be a part 

of this. I wouldn’t say it is more their concern than ours. I would 

say it is our collective concern. 

And Europeans are stepping up. I can provide for you—I don’t 

have it off the top of my head. I have listed for you several examples in which the United States is contributing capabilities in Poland or the Balts to help reassure those NATO partners. The Europeans are doing so, as well. And we can provide you with some specifics on what other countries are doing to help reassure those 

countries that are most concerned about Russia’s behavior. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, before I close—I got 29 seconds—I 

hope that the Administration—we were surprised, as Members of 

Congress, when we took military action against Libya. And I hope 

that if the Russians cross any line that would be of great concern 

to our country, that the President and his representatives would 

come to Congress and enlighten us as to what they are concerned 

about. 

So I ask you, sir, to make sure that that message is passed back 

to the Administration. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the opportunity to hear your insights on this, especially understanding that what has gone on in Ukraine is clearly 

not just about Ukraine and that we strategically really need to look 
17 

at this with what Putin’s end state is and that it is something far 

broader. 

Mr. Chollet, you mentioned the biggest consequence—or the biggest cost that we can affect for Russia is its economy. But given 

the fact that, really, over a long period of time, strategically, they 

have distributed their energy supplies and really gotten to a point 

where they have a lot of leverage, what kind of consequence, realistically, can we set in the short term that will be meaningful and 

get a strong message to Putin without having unintended negative 

consequences on us? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, as you mentioned at the end, that balance between ensuring we can have a consequence, particularly in 

the economic realm, that would be meaningful to Russia but not 

blow back on the United States is tricky sometimes. 

I think that the economic sanctions we have already announced 

are going to have an effect. I think, as the President has outlined, 

we could do more along those lines if Russia’s behavior continues 

along the course it has been on. 

Third, I would not underestimate the impact of Russia’s diplomatic isolation. As we saw just several months ago with the Winter 

Olympics, Mr. Putin very much enjoys the international spotlight. 

And he was planning this summer to host the G–8 [Group of Eight] 

leaders in Sochi. That meeting will not happen. And Russia is finding itself more and more alone in the world. And that will have an 

effect, as well. 

So I think that there are steps we can take, there are steps, as 

I mentioned in the previous question, that our European allies can 

take and have taken to ensure that Russia feels the pinch economically and the consequences for its behavior but also is isolated in 

the world. 

Ms. GABBARD. With regard to the military capabilities that you 

discussed, Russia’s developments and really looking towards a 

more mobile special-force type operation, what can be done for 

Ukraine and possibly other bordering countries? 

Knowing that a tank-to-tank kind of direct, one-on-one type of 

conflict is not realistic in any circumstance, how can we assist 

Ukraine to better defend itself using some of these similar unconventional means? 

Secretary CHOLLET. We have had a pretty modest defense rela- tionship with Ukraine over the years. It is a little over $4 million 

per year in FMF [Foreign Military Financing] that we have provided them. So the baseline we are working from is relatively 

small. 

That said, as I mentioned earlier, we have had ongoing consultations with the Ukrainians, not just about the urgent crisis of today 

but their needs of tomorrow and how they are working to reform 

and modernize their own military. That starts mainly in the nonlethal space, and it is things like helping with logistics. IMET 

[International Military Education and Training] has been very important for them, the education and exchanges, as they have tried 

to professionalize their military. 

So there are ways that we can help. And we are actively working 

through those ideas with them, understanding that we are starting 

from a pretty modest baseline of defense support for them. 
18 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I would like to concur with that. Defense 

consultations were held in Kiev last week, and they looked at, 

amongst other things, you know, strengthening their defense establishment and building a program of training and exercises to help 

provide the kind of skills that you are referring to. 

Ms. GABBARD. Good. I look forward to hearing more about that 

and, also, really, what kind of timeline is being looked at, considering what is happening, kind of, the updates on a minute-tominute basis in eastern Ukraine. MREs are great and necessary 

and helpful, I am sure, but I am sure there are also many other 

ways that we could be of assistance in helping them or empowering 

them to be able to defend themselves. 

Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank both of you for being here today. 

I have visited Russia a number of times, and I have been encouraged by the advance of free enterprise, of what I saw to be a level 

of democracy, but it is sad to see this extraordinary culture reverting to one-man control. 

The benefits of economic freedom for Russia and its citizens are 

being undermined by isolating itself from being a law-abiding nation which is not trustworthy at home or abroad, with uncontrolled 

corruption destroying jobs. 

With that in mind—and, again, it is really disappointing, because 

I just had such high hopes. And, indeed, we have a significant Russian-American population in my community that is truly in distress 

that things are going so badly at home with corruption. 

With that in mind, what are our NATO allies doing in Central 

and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, reacting to Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine? What are we doing to assure our allies and 

partners that the United States and NATO remain committed to 

deter aggression and preserve territorial integrity, in particularly 

the Baltic republics? What are we doing? 

For each of you. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, first, I would just, on your opening comment, just to comment on that, I agree with you that Russia is not 

the Soviet Union—— 

Mr. WILSON. No. 

Secretary CHOLLET [continuing]. And Russia has made great 

strides as a country and as a people over the last 20 years since 

the end of the Cold War. And we can see the great potential of that 

society. And that is why the events of the last several months are 

so disappointing and so alarming. 

On to the question specifically about reassuring our partners, our 

close NATO allies, Poland and the Baltics, are very concerned 

about what is happening in Ukraine. This is something that—this 

is a nightmare unfolding for them. 

And they are asking for our help. And that is why we have taken 

the steps we have already taken, in terms of deploying some assets 

there for exercises and training, to both send a message but also, 

on the ground, help the capabilities of our partners. That is why 
19 

General Breedlove has been tasked by NATO to look at further 

measures that we, as an alliance, can take, not just the United 

States but the United States and our NATO partners can take, to 

further reassure our allies. 

And we have also stayed in very close touch at very high levels. 

The Vice President was in Poland and the Baltics several weeks 

ago for important consultations. Secretary Hagel, Secretary Kerry, 

the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs have all been in touch with their 

counterparts in the respective NATO countries. Secretary Kerry 

was in Brussels last week for an important NATO session. Secretary Hagel will be going to NATO again in June for another important session. 

So we are trying to have a constant, ongoing dialogue with them 

about hearing their concerns, hearing their needs, and trying to address those as fast as possible. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir, I would like to just build on that. 

So, in the most immediate sense, we have sent additional fighter 

aircraft to the Baltic States to reinforce those that were there previously. We have done the same with Poland. So there are additional aircraft flowing to both of those locations. There has been additional tanker support sent to provide greater coverage. There are 

NATO AWACS aircraft flying orbits over Romania and Poland to 

provide greater situational awareness and support for those nations, as well. So these are the concrete steps that have been taken 

thus far to reassure our NATO allies. 

And, as mentioned, the Foreign Ministers, when they met last 

week in Europe, directed General Breedlove to now formulate the 

next set of proposals to build on those actions and to come back to 

the NAC on the 15th. And he is doing that. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Admiral, are the borders of the Baltic republics and Poland well-defined and -defended? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. My understanding is they are well-defined. 

I would rather defer discussions of defense preparedness for the 

closed session. 

Mr. WILSON. And I just can’t imagine how important that will be. 

But, Mr. Secretary, again, the American people need to know—— 

Secretary CHOLLET. Right. 

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. That, with the drawdown of the American military in Europe, I am concerned that this is giving encouragement to Russia on its aggression. 

I am equally concerned, the last month, not only have we had 

this but we have had missile testing by North Korea. We have had 

Iran continue their enrichment of nuclear weapons and announce, 

in a visit by the Foreign Minister in Tokyo, that it is an illusion 

that they would stop. And we have had missiles being sent to 

Hamas in Gaza to threaten Israel, all in the last month. And, plus, 

China has expanded its air defense zone to threaten our allies in 

the Pacific. 

All of this, I think, is an indication of weakness. And we know: 

Peace through strength. 

Thank you very much. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Sir, before I would conclude my last answer, 

I want to reiterate that we do have Article 5 defense guarantees, 
20 

security guarantees, with the Baltic States. That is clearly understood. And we will stand by those. 

Mr. WILSON. And Poland. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. And Poland, yes, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, the Russian military is still largely conscript. 

I am all the way over here on stage left, all the way to your 

right, the lonely person all the way over here. 

The Russian military is largely still conscript-based. Have we 

seen any changes—although they have been trying to move towards a more professional military, an all-volunteer force, they 

have yet to do that. 

Have we seen any increase in the size of the conscript call-ups? 

Or have there been any moves towards the mobilization of reserve 

forces? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. The Soviet military was about 4.3 million 

people. The current Russian military is less than 1 million. My understanding is that there are some conscripts still in that force, but 

there are also a number of volunteers now. 

So there is not as much—I am not even—I don’t even believe it 

is a majority conscript force any longer. So they have changed the 

complexion of the force. 

As mentioned earlier, their efforts towards professionalization of 

the force have had some success, yet, not total success, because 

they do still rely on conscripts as well. 

To the best of my knowledge—and we could have this followed 

up in the next session—I don’t know of any changes in their callups of late. 

Mr. ENYART. It is my understanding that Russia had been somewhat cooperative in regard to negotiations with Iran. 

How is that progressing? Do you see a deterioration in that relationship? 

Secretary CHOLLET. We have not yet, sir. Russia has played a 

role in the P5+1 [Five permanent members of the U.N. Security 

Council plus Germany] process with Iran. Russia also, as you 

know, has been a part of the effort to get Syria’s chemical weapons 

out of that country. 

And, so far, we have not seen any appreciable impact on those 

efforts as a result of our deep differences over this Ukraine crisis. 

Mr. ENYART. I just had, immediately prior to walking into this 

hearing, I had three Polish officers come visit me in my office. And 

they were veterans of Afghanistan, and several of them had served 

with soldiers that I used to command in the Illinois National 

Guard in Afghanistan. 

And I am certainly glad to hear you saying that we will stand 

by our NATO commitments, and I would anticipate that we would 

stand by our NATO commitments, because I assured them that, 

just as they have stood by us in Iraq and in Afghanistan for the 

last dozen years, that we would stand by our NATO commitments. 
21 

As we draw out of Afghanistan, do you see that this will free up 

our hand, that is, give us greater logistics capacity, to otherwise respond in Central Europe or around the world, as need be? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, first on Poland, I just want to reiterate 

that Poland is a terrific partner of ours. We have very, very close 

defense relations. 

Poland is one of the European countries that is stepping up and 

spending a significant amount of resources on its own defense and 

seeking to modernize its military, and that is an effort that we are 

helping them with. 

I was with Secretary Hagel in Warsaw several months ago for a 

visit, and we are looking forward to hosting the Defense Ministry 

here in Washington soon. So we are in very close touch with our 

Polish partners. 

In terms of how retrograde out of Afghanistan may help us, you 

know, that is something that we are sorting through in terms of 

having that material be freed up. 

One of the discussions we have ongoing—it is not related to the 

Ukraine crisis, but it is related to the Afghanistan point—is many 

countries around the world, not just in Europe, talked to us about 

perhaps acquiring some of that equipment as excess defense articles, as they are seeking to modernize and replenish their militaries. 

So that is something we are taking a close look at as part of this 

ongoing reassessment that the admiral discussed that we are constantly doing as a result of this crisis. 

Mr. ENYART. Just one final comment, as I am almost out of time. 

But when I was frequently in Central Europe during my previous 

occupation, I frequently told our NATO friends that, in my view, 

when we have peace in Central Europe, we have peace, relatively 

speaking, in the world. And so I think this clearly is a very critical 

situation that we have to deal with. 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [presiding]. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander for 

Europe, was in town about a week ago meeting with Members. Loretta Sanchez and I hosted a bipartisan briefing that he participated in. Carol Shea-Porter was with us. 

And the commander publicly released to us that there were 

80,000 troops that constituted—that had been mobilized by Russia 

on the border of Ukraine that constituted an invasion-ready force. 

In classified setting, he went over how he gets to that number 

and what it was constituted of, which, of course, I won’t go into 

today, but he described to us, disclosed to us, how that number was 

derived. 

There are a number of other numbers that are being circulated. 

Ukraine says 80- to 100,000. The State Department began to say 

40-. Now the Department of Defense is saying 40- seems to be a 

wild range of what those numbers are. 

Quite frankly, I trust the Supreme Allied Commander General 

Breedlove to know what he is facing, and he has publicly said it 

is 80-. 
22 

But regardless of the wide swing of the number, Admiral, I 

would appreciate it if you would give us some description or understanding of the magnitude of that force. I think, quite frankly, that 

there has not been enough public discussion, and certainly it is 

something that we can discuss publicly. Google Earth can tell you 

a lot about what we are seeing. 

What is the magnitude of that force’s capabilities? Breedlove is 

describing it as an invasion-ready force. What do you see when you 

look at the type of equipment capabilities that are being amassed 

on the border of Ukraine? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, like you, I spoke with General 

Breedlove about this, and I will leave the numbers and how we get 

to different sets of numbers for the next session, where the intelligence experts can walk us through that. 

But what General Breedlove made clear is it is a substantial 

force. It is a very large force. It is extraordinarily capable, in our 

estimation. 

It is a combined armed force. So you have fixed-wing and rotorwing aircraft. You have armored units. You have artillery. You 

have light infantry. 

And we have seen, as part of results of the modernization of the 

Russian military, their ability to employ these different elements of 

military power in a synchronized and integrated manner. 

So it is a threat which we are taking very seriously. General 

Breedlove, Secretary General of NATO, and others have been very 

clear about this, and we are watching it very closely. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Secretary, the—there are a number of voices that say that we are 

not doing enough, Washington Post being one. This is an editorial 

from the Washington Post. It says, ‘‘President Obama’s foreign policy is based on fantasy.’’ 

The walk-off line of the editorial is, ‘‘As Mr. Putin ponders 

whether to advance further into Eastern Ukraine, say, he will 

measure the success of U.S. and allied actions, not their statements.’’ 

This is not a partisan statement. This is the Washington Post. 

I ask that this editorial be entered into the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. TURNER. Sending MREs is basically expanding our school 

lunch program. That is the equivalency. It certainly isn’t strong actions. I am very concerned that we are not doing enough to actually 

assist the Ukrainians in giving military advice and assistance. 

If Russia does go into Ukraine and the Ukraines decide and desire to defend themselves, certainly our advice and—both as to 

what they are facing and as to their military configuration would 

be important. Many people have called for that. 

We definitely see a Russia that has changed course. We now 

have a standing use of—authorizing use of force to Putin by his 

parliament that includes areas of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, because he said all Russians that are in nonRussian territory. 
23 

In looking at your background and working with the Dayton 

Peace Accords and Holbrooke and Talbott and being from Dayton, 

I have a high regard for your background and expertise. 

Shouldn’t we be doing more? And what else can we be doing besides just MREs? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, thanks for your question. 

First, I think we are doing a lot to support Ukraine. What 

Ukraine really needs badly is help with its economy. That is why 

the IMF decision was very important. That is why—— 

Mr. TURNER. Sir, just a second. 

With all due respect, their economy is going to be irrelevant if 

we wait a few more weeks. Right? Because they are just going to 

be—— 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, they need urgent help. And I think 

that the assistance we can provide, the Europeans can provide— 

and we are grateful to the Congress for the assistance that you 

have decided on—is very important, number one. 

Mr. TURNER. Don’t you think military assistance is what they 

really need if they are going to be facing an invasion, advice, a description as to what is coming over the hill? 

Secretary CHOLLET. So, as we discussed earlier, we had a team 

in Kiev last week for defense consultation talks, a joint civilianmilitary team to talk through both what they need for this urgent 

crisis and what they need for the future. 

And they have prioritized. Nonlethal assistance first. And the 

MREs are very urgent for them. It is something that they need. 

They had troops in the field who needed it because they needed resupply. So that is meaningful to them that they are getting this. 

And we are talking through with them further requests for support, and that is something we will be working through in the coming days. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The time of the gentleman is expired. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Many of the questions that—I have already been asked. I guess, 

again, I want to reiterate the point that, in our QDR, there was 

very little focus on Russia. 

If there is a rewrite of the QDR, what focus do you expect in that 

document would be placed on Russia? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, Congressman, we are not planning a 

rewrite of the QDR. That said, I think that it is—as we have acknowledged, if we were to rewrite it at this moment, there would 

be some—certainly some language changes because the world is dynamic and it is always changing and what has happened over the 

last several weeks since the QDR was put to press is very significant. 

But, to repeat, I think the fundamental strategy outlined in the 

QDR and the budget that the Secretary and the chairman have 

outlined before you is one that will fulfill our interests and help us 

respond to this crisis. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me ask, then. It seems that a lot of the focus— 

and you keep going back to the economy and our friends over there 

in needing economic support. There is also a way to hurt the Russians right now. 
24 

I mean, their economy depends on the price of a barrel of oil in 

many cases. And, you know, you have—the President refuses to 

sign the Keystone Pipeline bill that, quite honestly, would drop the 

price of a barrel of oil and potentially hurt Putin. 

Has that played into these discussions in any way, shape, or 

form? I mean, is—the ability to drop the price of a barrel of oil and 

what that would do to the Russians? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Not at the Pentagon. That conversation has 

not come up, although the discussion of how we might further impact the Russian economy in terms of any response to what Russia 

may do here on out is something that has come under discussion. 

And the President has publicly announced that he is—has the 

authority to have sectorial sanctions, which could include the Russian energy industry. 

But I want to be clear that those are not necessarily cost-free exercises in terms of our own interest. So we want to be very careful 

with how we execute on something like that, but Russia’s behavior 

could lead us to that. 

Mr. SCOTT. But sending F–16s and MREs—really, dropping the 

price of a barrel of oil would do more to—in response to the Russian’s actions than sending F–16s and MREs, wouldn’t it? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, the F–16s and MREs are more about 

reassuring our partners and showing them, in deed as well as 

word, that we have got their back, that we are committed to Article 

5 and we are committed to working with them. 

Clearly, Russia has been riding its energy industry for many 

years now. So anything we might be able to do to impact its energy 

sector would have an impact. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, what do you think—you know, what do you 

think Putin thinks belongs to him? I mean, is he trying to put the 

whole motherland back together? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Again, I always hesitate to try to get into 

Putin’s head. He has said publicly that the collapse of the Soviet 

Union was a great historical tragedy. 

That is obviously something I think certainly this Administration, all of the American people, most of the world, disagree with. 

And Russia’s actions seem to indicate a view that having client 

states around its periphery is in its interest. We have a very different view. 

We do not believe that decisions can be made about those countries without those countries involved. The Ukrainian people 

should have a choice for their own destiny. 

We don’t deny that Russia has legitimate interests and a long 

history with Ukraine. It is the cradle of Russian civilization, after 

all. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. But—— 

Secretary CHOLLET. But there is a right way and a wrong way 

to go about addressing this. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Isn’t the key question whether or not 

Putin stops or he has to be stopped? 

Secretary CHOLLET. We believe that Russia’s behavior at this 

point, its actions in Crimea, absolutely unacceptable, and there 

have been consequences. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you think it stops—— 
25 

Secretary CHOLLET. Further actions, so far, we have been very 

concerned about his build-up of troops on the border. So far, those 

have not moved, but we are watching that very closely and making 

it clear that, if his actions continue, that there will be consequences. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are they moving supply lines in, though? 

I mean, obviously, when you put your troops forward, you have 

got to put supply lines in for fuel and for food and for other things. 

Are they pushing supply lines forward so that they can keep 

those troops that are at the front supplied? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, if I could, I would like to bring that to 

the closed part of the session to get a greater description of what 

is going on on the eastern border. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to our witnesses for being here today. 

I want to, Admiral, if I could with you, delve into the whole issue 

of intelligence gathering. 

The recent developments with the Russian military in the 

Ukrainian crisis I think bring up some very serious questions 

about how we get information that allows us to take appropriate 

action and be out in front of things. 

So I would like to ask for your perspective, Admiral, on the importance of intelligence gathering and how it helps develop our 

strategy when a crisis such as the annexation of Crimea occurs. 

As you may know, I represent Fort Huachuca in southern Arizona. It is home to Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, which 

is an important aspect in our human intelligence capabilities. And 

many of the soldiers that come through Fort Huachuca play a critical role in DOD’s [Department of Defense’s] intelligence gathering. 

However, it seems to me that much of the current focus on intelligence, Admiral, revolves around technical capabilities, such as 

surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and cyber capabilities. 

Human intelligence, however, has long been a staple of our collection capabilities, accessing populations and information that 

technical approaches cannot reach. 

So given the focus on tactical human intelligence, or HUMINT, 

for the past 13 years in Afghanistan and Iraq, are the current 

HUMINT assets in the European Command’s area of responsibility 

sufficiently prepared or resourced for an Eastern European mission 

set? 

And can you tell me, Admiral, how critical a role do these assets 

have in the particular situation we are here to talk about today between Ukraine and Russia as it continues to develop? Admiral. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, it is very difficult to talk about the specifics of intelligence in an open hearing. I would be happy, again, 

to take this further in the closed hearing. 

Writ large, however, clearly intelligence at all levels—strategic, 

tactical—of all types—technical, human—is very, very important 

and it has to be worked into a holistic view of not only what is happening, but what will happen next. And that is an art as well as 

a science. And we work at it very hard. 
26 

So I will leave it at that, but I think we can pick this theme up 

again later and give you more details of—that answer your specific 

questions. 

Mr. BARBER. Yeah. I really would like to have that further briefing. I understand that some of this cannot be discussed in an open 

meeting—or an open hearing. 

But, you know, there have been a lot of criticisms. Did we know 

what was going on? Did we know that troops were amassing? What 

did we try to do? Were we positioning ourselves? And if we could 

get to that in another setting, that would be very helpful. 

And I guess the final question, Admiral, is: Do you think the 

DOD budget cuts, as a main concern of all of us, the services’ personnel reductions, our Nation’s strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific 

region, and the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan—could they, do 

you believe, have a negative effect on our ability and our missions 

for HUMINT collections capabilities for the Eastern European area 

or perhaps could they enhance it? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. That is a very specific question regarding the 

impact of a wide set of efficiencies on a specific area. I don’t know 

of how these cuts would necessarily impact that particular area in 

a negative way. 

I can research that for you, however, and come back—take that 

for the record and come back with a more focused answer. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. BARBER. If you could, that would be helpful. 

I am concerned, as I think many Members are, that it doesn’t— 

a month doesn’t go by that we don’t have another front, it seems, 

opening up. 

You know, we have been dealing with Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, 

the Middle East, of course. And now we are dealing with Russia 

and the Russian Federation, apparently, Putin’s ambition to rebuild the Soviet Empire. 

And now our attention has to—must turn to the European theater and the European region and how we staff it on many levels 

not only in terms of troops on the ground and air assets and Navy 

assets, but how we inform ourselves about what next move this empire builder might have. 

So it would be helpful if we could get a sense of where you are 

headed, given what has happened in Crimea, which I think most 

people 6 months ago would not have imagined would have been 

going on. 

So how are we positioning ourselves to deal with his future ambitions would be helpful to know. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir. I will get back to you on that. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Chollet, the Russians are flagrantly in violation of the 

Budapest Memorandum concerning Ukraine. Russia is a serious, 

strongest supporter and a consistent ally of Iran. 
27 

President Obama immediately after his election cancelled the 

third site missile defense plan with Poland and the Czech Republic, 

which pleased Putin. 

How could President Obama’s and Secretary Hillary Clinton’s 

highly touted Russian reset have failed so spectacularly? What did 

you do wrong? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, I think even though we are very disappointed with where we are with Russia today, we saw some tangible impact of our policies in the first several years of this Administration under a different Russian leadership with President 

Medvedev, but the work with them on Iran, for example, was something that was very important. We also codified a new arms reduction agreement on nuclear forces, which was very significant. 

And even since then, we have seen Russian cooperation in other 

areas, for example, on Syria in the chemical weapons destruction 

process, which continues. Even despite the turbulence of this crisis 

and the U.S.-Russian relationship, we have been able to maintain 

our cooperation on that very, very important issue. 

So while, I think, even the President and everyone involved in 

the U.S.-Russian relationship over the last several years are not 

happy with where we are today, we do believe that we had some 

successes early on in this Administration. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I would really question a lot of that assessment. 

And let’s talk about the New START Treaty. According to recent 

press reports and open sources, the Russian Federation is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF, 

which this Administration has known about for some time, but has 

chosen to remain quiet about. 

Why is the Administration covering up Russian INF treaty violations? Is it an attempt to protect the deeply flawed New START 

Treaty? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, we have—we take our treaty obligations 

very seriously and we expect all of our—those who enter into a 

treaty to take their obligations very seriously. So the INF issue is 

something we have been studying very closely. 

I know that colleagues of ours have been talking to the Congress 

throughout this process, and I know that the State Department, 

which is the lead in our interagency for this effort, will be issuing 

a report on this matter soon. 

And perhaps some of the specifics you have referred to we can 

get into in the closed session later today. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I hope that what you did wrong wasn’t to 

think that authoritarian regimes respond to reason rather than to 

strength. I think they respond to strength better than to reason. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank you so much for being here, gentlemen. 

I am a little concerned about our allies’ contributions in NATO 

itself. NATO clearly has a significant role to play in this crisis. But 

I am concerned about its ability to leverage its limited capabilities 

that it has. 
28 

In 2013, I believe, only three European nations—Estonia, Greece, 

and the United Kingdom—contributed the required 2 percent or 

more of their GDP [gross domestic product]. 

Another three nations—France, Turkey, and Poland—each gave 

1.9 and 1.8 percent, respectively. We contribute approximately 70 

percent of the NATO budget. 

Could you explain for us the current state of our NATO allies’ 

military and the current role they are playing in the Ukrainian crisis and whether they can respond decisively, given these levels of 

commitment? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Ma’am, you have highlighted a great concern 

of ours and something we have been working on for many years, 

as you know, trying to work with our European partners to spend 

at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense and to try to spend 

that—spend those resources wisely. 

As I mentioned in a previous question—and some specifics we 

can follow up with you on after this—it is not only the United 

States that have been contributing some capability to theater in 

the past several weeks in response to the Ukraine crisis as a way 

to reassure our partners. Other countries—the Brits, the Germans, 

the French, the Poles themselves—have as well. And we can give 

you some of the specifics on that as part of followup. 

But it doesn’t—it doesn’t obviate the basic point that you made, 

which is there is a capabilities gap that is widening. It is something that many Secretaries of Defense, going back at least to Secretary Gates, have talked about. And it is one of the big pieces of 

business we are going to try to address this summer—or this fall, 

in September, at the Wales NATO Summit, how, moving forward, 

we can ensure that the NATO alliance collectively, each member in 

its own way, can be stepping up meaningfully to deal with security 

threats as they come our way. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. One of the components of this is the relationship through the State Partnership Programs, something that has 

been incredibly important and something that EUCOM commander, AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] commander, Special 

Forces, have all said has been a vital part of their operations. Especially in the case of Poland, the State of Illinois has been in the 

State Partnership Program with Poland for almost 25 years now. 

It is one of the first in the Nation to do that. 

That is a very special relationship. That is, you know, I watched 

my Polish counterparts grow up as I grew up in the military together. And I was—I would think that, as nations like Poland are 

starting to step up to take the lead among NATO allies with what 

is happening in the Ukraine and in that region of the world, that 

that State Partnership Program would be even more important as 

we move forward. 

Can you speak a little bit to the program and how you see it 

changing or growing or its role in this crisis. 

Secretary CHOLLET. The State Partnership Programs we have 

with Poland—and I am very familiar with Illinois’ great cooperation with Poland over many years—but throughout Central and 

Eastern Europe have paid great dividends over the years, and 

these are extremely important relationships to our partner countries. 
29 

Every single Defense Minister that comes into the Pentagon that 

Secretary Hagel sees will mention the importance of the State 

Partnership Program that they have, and often, as you know, these 

Defense Ministers, when they visit Washington, will also visit the 

State where they have a partnership. 

And it is not just something that—where they have helped with 

training and exercises, but they have deployed in the field together 

in places like Afghanistan. 

So I think it was with a great vision and foresight several decades ago that the State Partnership Program was established. It is 

something that we deeply believe in, and work to augment and 

support in any way we can. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

What type of missions are our allies, the NATO allies, performing right now? And are they adequately equipped to perform 

these missions effectively in this region as part of NATO and how 

are our allies forces—— 

Secretary CHOLLET. And this is in terms of the Ukraine crisis? 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, as I said, we can get you some specifics 

on exactly what every country is contributing in their own way. 

And I guess I will stress in their own way. They are capable with 

what they are contributing. I think, overall, we would like to see 

more capability within the alliance across the board. 

But it is not just the United States that has been stepping up 

in the last several months. Other of our closest partners, the Brits 

and the Germans in particular, have been working in their own 

way, but also along the similar lines of us. It is about exercises. It 

is about training and working with the Balts and the Poles in particular to try to reassure them. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Admiral Pandolfe, thank you for your 35 years, I think now, of 

service to the cause of freedom. 

Supreme Allied Commander General Breedlove recently stated in 

regard to the Russian violation of Intermediate Range and Nuclear 

Forces Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise missile—and he 

said, ‘‘This is a militarily significant development. Weapon capability that violates the INF that is introduced into the greater European landmass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt 

with. It can’t go unanswered.’’ 

The recently released QDR mentions cooperation with Russia 10 

times to include further reductions in our nuclear deterrent. While 

it obviously was drafted before the events unfolded in Ukraine, it 

was drafted with full knowledge of the Russian INF treaty violations. 

And, further, the Administration has succumbed to Russian objections that halted the missile defense field planned for Poland 

and a radar site in the Czech Republic. 
30 

And given all of the present events, I mean, I am wondering 

what plans or capability this Administration has, Mr. Chollet, to 

counter this Russian—I mean, other than perhaps threatening to 

do to the Russian economy what they have done to ours. I mean, 

that is a little drastic. 

But what, in terms of military capability, do we have arrayed 

there that would be any deterrent to the Russian efforts there, 

again, given these comments I have just made? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, Congressman, we have significant military capability in the European theater, but, also, capability elsewhere that could be surged to the European theater in case we 

were in a situation where we were implementing our Article 5 commitment to the NATO alliance, the collective defense commitment 

that we take as a member of NATO. 

So—and we have been very clear with the Russians that we take 

Article 5 seriously, that we are unwavering in our support for our 

European partners. 

And we have tried to demonstrate that unwavering support 

through several of our actions, including the deployment of some 

aircraft to the Baltics and Poland in particular, which is very significant for those countries and has been warmly welcomed and 

has gotten a lot of attention. 

And we are considering further steps we may take to reassure 

those partners and other Central and Eastern European partners, 

and that is an effort that General Breedlove has undertaken. And 

we expect in the next week or so he will have some more concrete 

ideas that he can share with us. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I won’t count on that except to say that it appears that Mr. Putin hasn’t gotten the memo. 

Prior to the invasion of Crimea, Russian forces were obviously 

very prepared. They were trained. They were ready for the mission. 

And, meanwhile, NATO forces were not. 

Has this Administration arrayed forces that would be the kind 

of deterrent to Russia in that region that—sort of a follow-on to the 

question. 

But, more importantly, how has the budgetary limitations that 

may be affecting our force posture in the EUCOM—how have you 

proposed to try to address that? 

Secretary CHOLLET. And, sir, I would say it wasn’t as though we 

were unprepared. Ukraine, of course, is not a member of NATO. 

But the NATO alliance—— 

Mr. FRANKS. But we have that little Budapest agreement with 

them. I mean, you know, it is not like—I am sort of astonished that 

we have stepped back from that. I mean, of course, Russia has 

done so in an even more dramatic fashion. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Yeah. And it wasn’t an Article 5 agreement 

where there is a commitment—— 

Mr. FRANKS. So it really wasn’t that big a deal. Right? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Oh, no. It was a very big deal. And the fact 

that Russia has violated every letter of that agreement is a huge 

concern for us. 

But we have been working very closely with our NATO partners 

to ensure that they have the capability that they need and that, 
31 

if necessary, we augment that capability with our own to make 

clear that the Article 5 commitment holds. 

The budget environment has clearly had an impact around the 

world on the U.S. military. That is no secret. And that is why we 

have sought to try to do some innovative things, for example, these 

rotational deployments that we launched several years ago in Poland where F–16s and C–130s will rotate through Poland, will exercise with our Polish partners, will train with them, and then rotate out. 

It is not a permanent presence, but it is something that, particularly in this budgetary environment, pays great dividends moving 

forward. 

So we have augmented that as a result of this most recent crisis, 

and we are exploring ways to further develop exercises along those 

lines. 

Mr. FRANKS. Admiral Pandolfe, would you give us just your best 

insight as to what this committee and the country’s response 

should be related to the Ukraine crisis. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I think the courses of action laid out by Mr. 

Chollet make great sense. I mean, clearly, we want to continue to 

provide assistance to Ukraine, and we are doing that primarily by 

economic avenues. 

But we are also considering—‘‘we’’ being the Administration— 

other requests that they have. We are reinforcing our NATO allies 

to assure them of their security, and we are making clear to the 

Russians that their actions are going to cost them and their people 

and their future significantly. 

I mean, their economy is now intertwined in the global economy. 

It is not the Soviet Union. Their stock market is down significantly. 

They can’t get investment into their energy fields, which is how 

they generate their income. They can’t get people to buy their debt. 

I mean, the future of Russia is going to suffer because of the actions of this government. 

We have made that clear and we have made clear that there is 

more to come—much more to come of a more serious nature should 

they continue this aggressive action contrary to their promises and 

to international law. 

Mr. FRANKS. I yield back. 

Mr. NUGENT [presiding]. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. Smith is recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to explore a little bit this option—or this notion that, 

you know, there must be something more that we could do that 

could cause Putin to change his mind, because I think we all share 

that frustration. 

He is making decisions that, as you have stated, do not appear 

to be in the best interest of his own country, certainly threatens 

stability. We wish we could just make him stop. 

So I have a little bit of a preamble here, but then I have a question about, you know, what more could we be doing. Because I do 

want to challenge a little bit this notion that somehow, you know, 

aggression always responds better to aggression than appeasement. 

I think that is what has led to many, many wars, is the notion 

that we always have to ramp it up in order to show the other side 
32 

that we are serious and then, of course, the other side is thinking, 

‘‘Well, we have to ramp it up, too, in order to show we are serious’’ 

and pretty soon you are at war. 

I mean, you can look at World War I and that is exactly what 

happened. Nobody wanted to appease anybody and, at the end of 

the day, they said, ‘‘Well, we have made this commitment. So we 

just got to do it’’ and millions of people died and there was a horrific impact on Europe. 

And then, of course, after World War I, you know, we could not 

possibly have been more aggressive with Germany after they were 

defeated. You know, we sort of pounded them economically and in 

all manner of different ways and we all saw how that turned out. 

So this notion that, if we are somehow just tough enough with 

an irrational adversary, that will lead to good things, is one that 

I always want to make sure does not stand unchallenged because 

it can lead to some very, very bad results. 

Now, further, in dealing with Russia specifically, many of the 

Russia experts that I talked to back in the 1990s at the University 

of Washington and elsewhere felt that our decision to expand 

NATO was one of the things that made Russia feel insecure and 

sort of pushed them towards Putin and made Putin’s argument 

easy. ‘‘See, the West is coming for us.’’ 

Now moving into Eastern Europe and sort of caused that backlash of the strength we showed in expanding NATO and then, to 

some degree, arming some of the former Soviet satellite states, you 

know, led to the reaction of Putin and his leadership. 

Now, I am not suggesting that there is any sort of easy way to 

do that. I just want to counter the notion that somehow, if you just 

show strength, this all goes away. There is very, very little historical precedent for that being true. 

So with that as sort of a preamble, what would we do right now? 

You know, there is frustration on the panel and everyone else. 

‘‘We need to do more. If we just did more, if we showed we were 

serious, then Putin would turn back around.’’ 

I do always like to remind everybody that, you know, the U.S. 

military was never stronger than it was in 2008. We—you know, 

$700 billion a year we were spending. I think, at that point, we 

were spending more money on our defense than the entire rest of 

the world combined. 

We had just invaded two countries and deposed their leadership, 

and Putin went in and basically annexed two parts of Georgia in 

the midst of that. So, obviously, strength alone is not the answer 

in there. It comes with considerable risk. 

So as you are looking at the options here, you know, and people 

are saying, ‘‘Do more,’’ what would ‘‘do more’’ look like? 

And I have heard your answer, and I tend to agree with it, that, 

basically, we are showing the Russian people that Putin’s actions 

are hurting them, that their economy is going down when it wasn’t 

that high to begin with and, eventually, that begins to have an impact. 

But if we were to sort of, you know, step back for a moment and 

say, ‘‘Let’s accept this notion that somehow, if we just appeared to 

be strong enough, Putin would for some reason abandon all of his 

perceived interests,’’ what would that look like? What is it that we 
33 

would do to show that we were ‘‘being stronger’’ to change his calculus? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, Congressman, I very much appreciate 

your comment and agree with almost everything you have said. 

In terms of what we could do more, it is along the lines of operation that we have outlined here for you this morning. General 

Breedlove is currently looking at ways we can do more to reassure 

our NATO partners and to explore ways that, in the near term, but 

over in the medium and long term, we can strengthen the ties that 

we have through NATO, improve their military capabilities, the 

interoperability that the alliance has developed over these now— 

this decade-plus of war together in Afghanistan. 

So that is more, and that is something we may do, regardless of 

whatever Putin’s next move is. 

Mr. SMITH. I agree with you. 

But specifically to the Ukraine, I mean, what you just described 

are sort of the options that are considered not enough. 

But where the Ukraine is concerned, I mean, have you seriously 

considered, you know, arming the Ukraine specifically and say, 

‘‘Hey, Russia is coming. We are going to start arming you to the 

teeth and fight a proxy war with them’’? 

Secretary CHOLLET. So our overall approach throughout this entire crisis has been we seek to deescalate tensions and that, as the 

President has been very clear about, there is not a military solution 

to the Ukrainian crisis. 

That said, we have been in very close touch with our Ukrainian 

counterparts throughout the crisis and most recently last week 

with an expert team in Kiev, talking with them about the urgent 

needs they have, but, also, their medium- to long-term plan for 

their own military modernization and reform, which has a ways to 

go. Let’s be honest. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. That is an understatement. 

Secretary CHOLLET. So there is certainly more we can do. And 

what we are doing is trying to be thoughtful and work through 

with them on what the next steps may be. 

Now, whether or not that has any effect on Mr. Putin’s mindset 

is anyone’s guess, but it also just may be the right thing to do, anyway. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. No. I think it is the right thing to do, anyway. 

But Mr. Putin’s mindset, I can’t see it having an impact. His 

mindset is based on—you know, I think has been correctly described that, basically, he wants to build a—he wants to return 

Russia to its glory, basically. 

His mistake is in perceiving how to do that. The devastating and 

economically annexing small parts of the former Soviet Union are 

not going to lead to that result. And I think what we have to do 

is convince him of that. 

Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Coffman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you so much, both of you, for your dedicated service 

to our country. 
34 

I was in the United States Army’s 1st Armored Division in the 

early 1970s, along to fill the gap in then West—the West GermanCzechoslovakian border, and it was really a great demonstration of 

peace through strength in terms of, I think, what was a very effective containment policy, containment doctrine, in terms of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. 

And it seems that we were lulled in—and justifiably so—in the 

aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union that NATO had to—NATO 

needed a new mission. NATO had to be repurposed. And so we 

looked at deploying NATO to places like Afghanistan. 

It seems like now we need to take NATO back to its original purpose of being a buffer to Russian expansion in the region. 

And so, first of all, I commend you in terms of your comment by 

saying that, you know, it is rotational forces. It is joint military exercises as opposed to the reestablishment of a large U.S. military 

permanent presence that we had in Western Europe when I was 

there. 

I think we can more effectively demonstrate our support for our 

NATO allies, but I am concerned—and this was raised earlier in 

testimony—about the commitment of our allies—our NATO allies. 

And we, in terms of exercising U.S. leadership, need to convince 

our allies that they need to step up to the plate in terms of defense 

spending, that this cannot be on—the burden, on the backs, of the 

U.S. military and U.S. taxpayers. 

And so what can we do to get our NATO allies to be the necessary force multiplier in order to be that buffer to Russian expansion by at least going to 2 percent of gross domestic—of defense— 

GDP spending, 2 percent as a minimum? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, first, thank you for your service in Europe and elsewhere. 

And you have, you know, put your finger on what is the key 

issue, and it is something that we have been working for many 

years, but, also, have been frustrated by for many years, which is 

the defense spending and capabilities of some of our NATO partners. 

And that Article 5 commitment has always remained the cornerstone of the NATO alliance. Even over the last two decades, there 

was—NATO has gone out of area, whether first in the Balkans, 

counter-piracy mission, but, of course, most notably in Afghanistan. 

So we work very closely with our partners to try to encourage 

them and, also, help them make the case to their own publics about 

spending greater resources on defense. 

We at the Defense Department try to work with our defense colleagues around NATO countries to help them make smart decisions 

about what systems to buy and how we might be able to help them 

think through that. 

I also think this is an area where the Congress and all of you 

on the committee and your counterparts in the House and over on 

the Senate side have a very important role to play as well. 

Because, as you know, these are political decisions in these 

NATO democracies, political decisions about how much money and 

resources to spend. And the European economies have been suffering as much or, in many cases, way more than the United States 

economy. 
35 

And so working with your counterparts to help make the case for 

why it is important for all 28 NATO allies, not just the United 

States and a handful of others, to maintain that 2 percent threshold and a strong robust spending on defense. 

But there is no silver bullet here. This is not something that we 

are going to be able to solve with one speech or one effort. 

It is something that we are constantly working on, whether it is 

bilaterally or whether it is the NATO summit this September in 

Wales in which capabilities will be a big theme of the summit in 

Wales. 

And I think the Ukraine crisis, if anything else—if there is a silver lining to anything that has happened here, it has helped remind everyone of the importance of the Transatlantic Partnership 

and NATO specifically, but also been a reminder to all of us and 

our European partners in particular about the importance of having a strong defense and spending the necessary resources that 

have that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I am running out of time here, but I want to make 

a statement here that I had met with the ambassador from Hungary to the United States just prior to the Russian incursion into 

Crimea. 

And what he informed me that the most important thing that the 

United States could do would be to export LNG, or liquefied national gas, to break the Russian hold on Europe in terms of its dependence on energy resources. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. NUGENT. Dr. Wenstrup is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Do you have concerns that Russia could restrict the parts that 

are needed for the helicopters that have been sold to the Afghan 

National Security Forces? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, we do. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And so how are we approaching that, if we are 

at all, to try to assure that the Afghan forces will be adequately 

taken care of? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, you are touching on an issue that we 

thought a lot about and I know we talked with you and this committee about, and that is the Russian supply of the Mi-17 helicopters, which is a critical capability for the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF] as they are seeking to develop. 

And that is why we have been very mindful and careful when we 

have gone about contemplating certain sanctions to ensure that our 

other interests, a strong ANSF in Afghanistan, are being served. 

So we have an existing contract with a Russian entity that is 

supplying those Mi-17 helicopters. We are seeking to complete that 

contract and expedite it as much as possible and, if necessary, look 

for ways to mitigate any sort of disruption in the supply. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. What is our role in that supply line? I mean, will 

they—the maintenance of these aircraft, is that coming directly 

from Russia? Is it coming through us? What is our role in that negotiation? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir—and I want to get back to you more specifically, but my understanding is our role is in support of the 
36 

ANSF, but it is the Russians who actually have the knowledge of 

how to operate these aircraft and maintain them. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, I would think certainly within our military 

we have people that are familiar with those aircraft. 

So my question is: Are we part of that supply line? Is it coming 

through U.S. means and then being delivered to the Afghans or are 

they getting it directly? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Yeah. I don’t—sir, I want to get back to you 

specifically. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Sure. 

Secretary CHOLLET. I don’t believe so. I think it is—we are not 

part of that supply line. But we could get back to you with more 

specifics on how that actually works. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 63.] 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Sure. Obviously, we have a vested interest in 

their success and being able to maintain that. 

You know, the other question I had—and maybe you can’t answer that—but, you know, we have had this dual effort with the 

space station with the Russians and especially since we have 

stopped the Space Shuttle. 

Where is that in all of this picture going on today, if you have 

any insight on that? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, if we could take that one for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 63.] 

Dr. WENSTRUP. If you would, I would appreciate it. Thank you. 

And I have no further questions. I yield back. 

Mr. NUGENT. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. No. 

Mr. NUGENT. We appreciate it. 

Gentleman, I am going to hold my questions until the classified 

briefing. But I do appreciate your time that you spent here answering questions for the committee. And with that, we adjourn. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

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APRIL 8, 2014 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 8, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 8, 2014 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP 

Secretary CHOLLET. NASA and Roscosmos will continue to work together to maintain the safe and continuous operation of the International Space Station (ISS), 

where humans have lived continuously for more than 13 years. The success of the 

ISS program depends on the mutual dependence of all partners, and reflects the 

unique contributions each partner provides in support of the program. We believe 

that it is in the interest of all the ISS partners to continue our normal operational 

and programmatic cooperation, and not to allow disruption of any of the activities 

that have maintained a continuous human presence on orbit for more than a decade. 

I defer additional questions regarding the ISS to NASA. [See page 36.] 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, I agree with you that we have a vested interest in the 

success of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); the rotary-wing capability 

we are building for them around the Mi-17 helicopter is critical to this success. 

Because the Department of Defense (DOD) is investing a substantial amount of 

Afghanistan Security Forces Funds and DOD counternarcotics funds in the procurement and sustainment of the Afghan fleet, DOD asked the Department of the Army 

to establish the Project Manager-Non-Standard Rotary-Wing Aircraft (PM–NSRWA) 

under Program Executive Office-Aviation in 2010. PM–NSRWA serves as the lifecycle manager for Afghanistan’s Mi-17s and is our lead entity for interfacing with 

the Mi-17 supply line. 

Because the Mi-17 is a Russian-made helicopter, the manufacturing is performed 

in Russia and the parts supply line originates predominantly with Russian companies. For procurements of new aircraft, PM–NSRWA contracts with Rosoboronexport 

(ROE) rather than the manufacturer because we are buying military variants, and 

Russian defense exports must go through ROE. For maintenance, spare parts procurement, and overhauls of the Mi-17s, PM–NSRWA contracts with U.S. companies, 

which then use subcontractors to buy spare parts mainly from the Russian manufacturers to ensure they obtain certified parts and to perform overhauls at Russiancertified overhaul facilities. 

Using Russian-certified parts and overhaul facilities is important to maintaining 

official Russian airworthiness certification of the aircraft, which ensures that our air 

advisors—who are crucial to developing Afghan aviation capability—are flying on 

well-maintained aircraft. To support airworthiness certification of the aircraft, PM– 

NSRWA also contracts with the Mi-17 manufacturer for engineering services to ensure the manufacturer has cognizance of the aircraft. PM–NSRWA also contracts for 

technical bulletins about the aircraft. [See page 36.] 

Æ