Filed 4/27/21 Biasi v. Nielson CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

ANGELA DAWN BIASI ET 

AL.,

 Appellants,

v.

LINDSAY F. NIELSON,

 Respondent.

2d Civ. No. B306279

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-

00526430-PR-LA-OXN)

(Ventura County)

Douglas Biasi, Sr. died intestate in 2019. His estate 

consisted of a one-half interest in a successful business, Roy’s 

Towing, as well as several commercial and residential properties 

he purchased with business partner Roy Conn. Disputes between 

the estate’s administrators and Conn ensued. This prompted the 

probate court to appoint a receiver sua sponte to control the dayto-day operations of Roy’s Towing and to facilitate Conn’s buyout 

of the estate’s interest in the company. The court later expanded 

the receivership to include all the estate’s real property assets. 

Appellants challenge both orders.
2

We conclude appellants failed to timely appeal the original 

order appointing a receiver. While they timely appealed the 

second order, we conclude the probate court acted within its 

discretion when it expanded the receivership. The record also 

fails to disclose how, if at all, appellants have been damaged by 

the order.

1 Judgment is affirmed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Douglas Biasi, Sr. and Roy Conn were longtime business 

partners who each owned a one-half interest in Roy’s Towing. 

The two also co-owned several houses, commercial properties, 

and vacant lots in Thousand Oaks and Newbury Park. Biasi died 

intestate in February 2019. His four children inherited his 

assets: Douglas Biasi, Jr. and appellants Angela Biasi, Tony 

Biasi, and Chad Biasi. 

The probate court appointed professional fiduciaries Jason 

Rubin and Maya Rubin as co-administrators of Douglas Sr.’s 

estate in June 2019. A dispute arose when Conn would not 

provide them full access to the finances and company records of 

Roy’s Towing. The Rubins eventually petitioned the court to 

appoint two provisional directors to assume control over the 

business’s day-to-day operations. Conn objected to the petition 

and denied accusations that he was obstructing the 

administrators. 

The probate court heard the petition on December 12, 2019. 

The Rubins asserted Conn’s stonewalling prevented them from 

valuing the business and exercising the estate’s shareholder 

rights. Conn’s counsel described the administrators’ demands as 

1 At oral argument, appellants’ counsel could not describe 

what remediation was needed at the properties in receivership.
3

unreasonable and decried their interference with the company’s 

day-to-day operations. Douglas Jr.’s counsel expressed concern 

that hiring two provisional directors would only further erode the 

estate’s dwindling assets. Appellants, who were then selfrepresented, received notice of the hearing but did not to attend. 

The court described the situation as “intractable” and told 

the parties it intended to appoint a receiver to facilitate Conn’s 

buyout of Roy’s Towing. Respondent Lindsay Nielson, who sat in 

the courtroom’s audience during the hearing, agreed to serve in 

this role. Conn’s counsel confirmed he had previously spoken to 

Nielson about the matter and agreed to his appointment. The 

court revoked the administrator’s special powers to manage the 

company’s day-to-day operations and appointed Nielson as 

receiver. 

Nielson appeared ex parte on December 18, 2019 to clarify 

whether the receivership extended to the estate’s real estate

interests. This included two properties owned by Douglas Sr. and 

several others he co-owned with Conn. The administrators 

opposed expanding the receivership beyond Roy’s Towing and 

claimed the parties’ dispute did not involve the estate’s real 

properties. Conn’s counsel favored placing everything into the 

receivership because he anticipated his client might assert an 

interest in Douglas Sr.’s solely-owned properties as well. Nielson

was already familiar with the estate, Conn’s counsel explained, 

and he could help untangle the many unwritten informal 

agreements his client and Douglas Sr. made over the years. The 

court agreed and appointed Nielson receiver over all the estate’s 

real property interests in addition to Roy’s Towing. 

Nielson sought court approval to sell one of the jointly 

owned properties in February of 2020. Conn agreed to the sale 
4

price and signed the purchase agreement. No party opposed 

Nielson’s request or appealed the order authorizing him to 

complete the sale. Appellants did not attend the hearing. 

The probate court approved Nielson’s request for a second 

property sale in April of 2020. A few weeks later he appeared ex 

parte to request permission to extend a $28,000 repair credit to 

the buyer. This appears to have caught appellants’ attention. In 

response, they filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the 

validity of Nielson’s appointment and requesting a stay of the 

pending property sale. (Biasi v. Superior Court, B305597.) We 

denied the petition on April 24, 2020. Appellants filed this 

appeal on June 11, 2020. 

DISCUSSION

A. Appellants Did Not Timely Appeal the December 12, 2019

Order Appointing Nielson as Receiver Over Roy’s Towing

The probate court’s December 12 appointment order was 

immediately appealable. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(7).) 

Appellants sought writ review unsuccessfully in April of 2020 but 

did not file their notice of appeal until June 11. The time to 

appeal expired on June 9 regardless of the manner they received 

notice of the December 12 order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.104(a)(1)(C) [“notice of appeal must be filed on or before the 

earliest of: . . . 180 days after entry of judgment”].) As such, we 

lack jurisdiction to consider their arguments about alleged preappointment procedural deficiencies and the probate court’s 

power to appoint a receiver sua sponte. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.104(b); Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 

106, 113.)
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B. Appellants Timely Appealed the December 18, 2019 Order 

Expanding the Receivership

Appellants appeal the probate court’s December 18, 2019 

order as well. Respondents contend this order is not separately 

appealable because it only “clarified” the first. This is partly 

correct. Authorizing Nielson to dispose of real properties used in 

connection with Roy’s Towing did not alter the scope of the 

receivership. Nielson could not achieve the court’s December 12 

mandate “to arrange for . . . the sale of the business” if he could 

not lawfully grant a purchaser title to, or some possessory 

interest in, the land on which the business stood. 

Nielson returned six days later when he discovered the 

extent to which Douglas Sr. and Conn commingled their nonbusiness assets as well. The probate court’s December 18 order 

expanded the receivership considerably by giving Nielson 

authority over properties not used in connection with Roy’s 

Towing. We consider this aspect of the order distinct from the 

December 12 order and thus separately appealable. Finding no 

service copy of the ruling in the record, we conclude appellants

preserved their challenge by filing a notice of appeal within 180 

days of that date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subds. (a)(7) & 

(a)(10); see Prob. Code, § 1300, subd. (c) [appeal may be taken 

from an order “[a]uthorizing, instructing, or directing a fiduciary, 

or approving or confirming the acts of a fiduciary”].) The claim, 

however, fails on the merits.

C. The Probate Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 

Expanded the Receivership on December 18, 2019

A court may appoint a receiver “where necessary to 

preserve the property or rights of any party.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 564, subd. (b)(9); see Rosenthal v. Rosenthal (1966) 240 
6

Cal.App.2d 927, 933 [“If jointly-owned property is in danger of 

being lost or destroyed or misappropriated, the trial court may 

appoint a receiver to protect a party’s interest in the property”].) 

“‘The rule is well established that the appointment of a receiver 

rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and that its 

action in appointing a receiver will not be disturbed by an 

appellate court in the absence of a showing of abuse of 

discretion.’” (Venza v. Venza (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 878, 883, 

quoting Goes v. Perry (1941) 18 Cal.2d 373, 381.)

The record shows Douglas Sr.’s and Conn’s successful 

towing business allowed them to diversify into real estate. This 

included at least three houses, one vacant lot, and the four 

parcels on which they operated Roy’s Towing. Their business 

relationship remained informal as it grew in complexity and 

value. They appear to have created no corporate entity or formal 

partnership to hold these assets and did not prepare succession 

plans. When Douglas Sr. died intestate, he left his four heirs 

with a sizeable but ill-defined pool of assets. The dispute 

between estate administrators and Conn over access to financial

information was only a prelude to a much broader dispute that 

threatened to consume the corpus of the estate. We conclude the 

probate court’s decision to expand the receivership on December 

18 fell within its discretion considering the estate’s composition 

and the intensifying animosity between Conn and Douglas Sr.’s 

heirs. 

Appellants characterize Nielson as an “unauthorized 

representative” whose appointment usurped the administrators’ 

authority to dispose of the estate’s assets under Probate Code 

sections 10250 et seq. and 10304. They contend the “purely 

statutory” nature of probate proceedings prohibited the court 
7

from appointing a receiver to perform those functions reserved for 

personal representatives under the Code. We disagree. “[T]he 

availability of other remedies does not, in and of itself, preclude 

the use of a receivership.” (Gold v. Gold (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 

791, 807, quoting Sibert v. Shaver (1952) 113 Cal. App. 2d 19, 21.) 

Appellants do not explain why a receiver cannot operate within 

this statutory framework or how Nielson deviated from his duties 

as receiver. 

In fact, appellants do not articulate any injury apart from 

the order’s purported procedural defects. They allude to potential 

title issues but stop short of explaining how the receiver caused 

or will cause such problems. They do not challenge the orders 

approving Nielson’s subsequent sale of two estate properties or 

contend he has harmed their rights as Douglas Sr.’s heirs. No 

appeal lies for those not aggrieved by a ruling. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 902; Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947.)

D. Alleged Post-Appointment Procedural Deficiencies

Do Not Invalidate Nielson’s Initial Appointment

Appellants argue that even if the probate court properly 

appointed Nielson, the appointment lapsed by operation of law 

because the court failed to hold a confirmation hearing within 30 

days. They cite rule 3.1176(a) of the California Rules of Court as 

requiring such a hearing “[w]henever a receiver is appointed 

without notice.” Appellants ignore this rule’s context. Rule 

3.1175 dictates the circumstances in which a litigant may apply 

for a receiver on an ex parte basis. Rule 3.1176 requires a 

successful applicant to confirm an ex parte appointment by 

obtaining an order to show cause, scheduling a hearing date, and 

serving the application’s supporting documents on all adverse 
8

parties. Neither rule contains language extending these 

procedures to a sua sponte appointment by the court itself. 

Appellants identify several other post-appointment 

procedural deficiencies. This includes Nielson’s failing to take a 

receiver’s oath (Code Civ. Proc., § 567), to furnish undertakings 

(id., §§ 566, subd. (b), 567, subd. (b)), to file inventories (rule 

3.1181), or to file monthly reports (rule 3.1182). Appellants 

raised these same alleged deficiencies when petitioning for writ 

review of the December 12 and December 18 orders.2 They 

appear to have emailed a copy of the writ petition to the probate 

court clerk in April of 2020 but the memorandum accompanying 

the writ sought no ruling on the merits raised therein.3 In 

addition, the record does not indicate they sought to address 

these issues in probate court after the petition’s denial. We 

decline to consider them for the first time on appeal. (See Estate 

of Casserley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 824, 831, citing Krechuniak v. 

Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 713, 726 [reviewing court declined 

to consider standing argument not raised in probate court by 

administrator].)

2 We grant respondent’s unopposed request for judicial 

notice of appellants’ petition for writ of prohibition (Biasi v. 

Superior Court, B305597), dated December 16, 2020. 

3 We grant appellants’ motion to augment the record to 

include their “Opposition to Ex Parte Request for Instructions re: 

Credit for Repairs to 91 S. Ellis, Newbury Park,” dated February 

8, 2021. A non-conformed copy of appellants’ petition for writ of 

prohibition is attached as Exhibit “B” to that document.
9

E. Appellants’ Notice of Appeal Did Not Stay

Probate Court Proceedings

Appellants assert their appeal “stayed the operation and 

effect” of the December 12 and 18 orders pursuant to Probate 

Code section 1310, subdivision (a). The record does not show

whether appellants requested or obtained a stay from the probate 

court pursuant to this statute. It contains no ruling or briefing 

on the subject. We assume the court correctly allowed the 

receiver to continue performing his duties. (In re Marriage of 

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 [“A judgment or order of a 

lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all 

intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its 

correctness”]; see Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 

194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956; Prob. Code, § 1310, subd. (b)

[fiduciaries may exercise their duties “for the purpose of 

preventing injury or loss to a person or property . . . as if no 

appeal were pending”].) 

CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J. TANGEMAN, J.
10

Roger L. Lund, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

MacCarley & Rosen, Mark MacCarley, for Appellants.

Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy Cole Lascher and 

John A. Hribar; Law Offices of Lindsay F. Nielson, Lindsay F. 

Nielson, for Respondent.