UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4977

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL GENE TERRELONGE,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00229-RJC-DCK-1)

Submitted: March 7, 2013 Decided: April 10, 2013

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sandra J. Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Gene Terrelonge appeals his criminal convictions

and sentence. We affirm.

I

Terrelonge was indicted on one count of conspiracy to 

commit bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 371), three counts of armed 

bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113), and three counts of brandishing 

and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence

(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Shortly before trial was scheduled to 

begin, Terrelonge’s court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw, 

and Terrelonge moved for substitute counsel. The magistrate 

judge assigned to conduct pretrial proceedings denied the 

motions.

Following a trial continuance, the magistrate judge held a 

second hearing to consider counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw. 

At this hearing, Terrelonge indicated that he wished to 

represent himself. The magistrate judge denied the motion to 

withdraw and ruled that Terrelonge had not clearly and 

unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation.

Terrelonge appealed the issue of self-representation to the 

district court, which held a hearing on the matter and 

thereafter allowed Terrelonge to represent himself with his 

counsel serving in a standby capacity.
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Terrelonge proceeded to trial pro se, and the jury 

convicted him on all counts. Thereafter, the district court 

sentenced Terrelonge (who was again represented by counsel) to 

744 months in prison. The sentence is comprised of 60-month 

concurrent terms for the conspiracy and bank robbery counts, a 

mandatory consecutive sentence of 84 months for the first § 924 

firearm count, and 300-month consecutive mandatory sentences for 

both of the other § 924 firearm counts.

II

In challenging his convictions, Terrelonge argues that (1) 

the magistrate erred by denying his pretrial request for 

substitution of counsel and (2) the district court erred by 

finding that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 

counsel. For the following reasons, we find that Terrelonge is 

not entitled to relief under either of these theories.

We review the denial of a motion for substitute counsel for 

abuse of discretion, focusing on three factors: (1) the 

timeliness of the motion; (2) the adequacy of the court’s 

inquiry into the defendant’s request; and (3) whether the 

attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in 

total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense, 

United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 2011).

Having reviewed the record in this light, we are satisfied that 

the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion. First, 
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Terrelonge’s request for substitute counsel, made just days 

before trial was scheduled to begin, was untimely. Second, the 

magistrate judge’s inquiry into Terrelonge’s complaint about his 

counsel – which involved an ex parte examination of Terrelonge 

and his counsel - was more than adequate. Finally, we find no 

error in the magistrate judge’s determination that Terrelonge 

was able to prepare an adequate defense with his counsel. On 

this latter point, we note that the magistrate judge 

acknowledged that there was “significant conflict” between 

Terrelonge and his court-appointed counsel, J.A. 499, but held, 

applying the appropriate legal standard, that the situation did 

not constitute a total lack of communication preventing an 

adequate defense, Supp. J.A. 2.

We review a district court’s determination regarding waiver 

of the right to counsel de novo, while reviewing the findings of 

historical fact underlying that determination for clear error. 

United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005). In 

determining whether a defendant has properly exercised the right 

to self-representation and waived the right to counsel, we 

ascertain, among other things, whether the assertion of the 

right to self-representation is (1) clear and unequivocal, and 

(2) knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Id. at 271. Applying 

this standard, we find no error.
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Although the magistrate judge ruled initially that 

Terrelonge’s request for self-representation was not clear and 

unequivocal, Terrelonge clarified his request in subsequent 

representations to the district court. Specifically, Terrelonge 

appealed the magistrate judge’s ruling, stating that he no 

longer intended to condition the assertion of his right to selfrepresentation on his demand for another lawyer and that he 

“unequivocally wishe[d] to represent himself.” J.A. 63. 

Moreover, after advising Terrelonge of the risks of proceeding 

pro se, the district court sought to resolve any prior ambiguity 

by asking Terrelonge “very simply” whether he wished to 

represent himself, to which Terrelonge unequivocally responded 

“yes.” J.A. 50. Further, based on its interactions with 

Terrelonge and its review of the record, the district court made 

sufficient findings to support its conclusion that Terrelonge’s 

assertion of the right to self-representation was knowing and 

intelligent.

III

Terrelonge also challenges his sentence, primarily 

contending that the district court procedurally erred by 

imposing consecutive mandatory sentences for each of his § 

924(c) convictions. Generally, we review a sentence for 

procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. 

Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 2012). Procedural 
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reasonableness evaluates the method used to determine a 

sentence, and substantive reasonableness examines the totality 

of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused 

its discretion in concluding that the chosen sentence satisfies 

the standards set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Hargrove, 701 

F.3d at 160-61. Because Terrelonge did not object to his 

sentence on this basis, our review is for plain error. United 

States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576-77 (4th Cir. 2010).

Terrelonge is mistaken in his basic contention that the 

§ 924(c) sentences should not run consecutively. As we have 

explained: “There is no ambiguity in section 924(c). It states 

that whenever a person commits a crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime and uses or carries a gun, the person shall be 

sentenced to a prison term that runs consecutive to the person’s 

sentence for the underlying crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime and consecutive to all other sentences.”

United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1991); see 

also United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 

2005) (holding that district court erred by running multiple 

§ 924(c) sentences concurrently).

Because Terrelonge was convicted of three counts of 

possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime 

of violence based on three separate armed bank robberies, he was 

subject under § 924(c) to a mandatory seven-year sentence for 
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the first § 924(c) conviction followed by two consecutive 

twenty-five year mandatory sentences for the remaining § 924(c) 

convictions, all to run consecutively to each other and to any 

other sentence imposed. Accordingly, the district court did not 

err, much less plainly err, by imposing consecutive sentences 

for each of Terrelonge’s § 924(c) convictions.

IV

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Terrelonge’s convictions 

and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED