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i 

89–515 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–122] 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 25, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATIE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, July 25, 2014, Amphibious Fleet Requirements ...................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, July 25, 2014 ............................................................................................... 21 

FRIDAY, JULY 25, 2014 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Aucoin, VADM Joseph P., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Warfare 

Systems (N9) ........................................................................................................ 7 

Paxton, Gen John M., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine 

Corps ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Stackley, Hon. Sean A., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition ....................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 25 

Stackley, Hon. Sean A., joint with Gen John M. Paxton, Jr., and VADM 

Joseph P. Aucoin ........................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET REQUIREMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Friday, July 25, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Today the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on amphibious ship requirements. I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses and appreciate your time and efforts to this 

most important issue. Specifically, I want to welcome the Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development and Acquisition. Mr. Stackley, thank you so much for 

your service to the country, and thank you for continuing briefing 

this committee and testifying and giving us the benefit of your expertise. 

General John M. Paxton, Jr., Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. General, thank you for your service and all the Marines 

do for us. 

And Admiral Joseph P. Aucoin, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Operations Warfare Systems. Admiral, 

thank you so much for all that you do. 

We thank you all for being with us today on this very important 

hearing. And as we continue what many of us believe to be the dismantling of the world’s greatest fighting force, it is worth considering the critical role played by the U.S. Marine Corps in protecting and sustaining national interests far from our shores. 

Alongside the other elements of American naval power—dominant surface and submarine forces, and the world’s most mobile 

and lethal form of airpower—the Marines represent a middleweight force designed to project land power from the sea. 

I continue to have reservations about the direction of the capacity and capabilities of our fleet, and specifically our amphibious 

power-projection capabilities. I would note that the Navy and Marine Corps have both agreed that the amphibious fleet of 38 ships 

is necessary to support two Marine Expeditionary Brigades, but because of fiscal constraints, this administration is planning to acquire 33 amphibious ships. 

I would further note Secretary Stackley stated earlier this year 

before this subcommittee that a plan for 33 ships introduces some 

risk in terms of being able to provide the total lift for a major com-
2 

bat operation. The Navy and Marine Corps have agreed that that 

is an acceptable risk. 

I think that we need to provide the capabilities that our combatant commanders need and look forward to better understanding 

the risk that our Nation is accepting in not providing this full complement of amphibious ships. 

I also understand that the Navy and Marine Corps team wants 

to build 11 LX(R) amphibious ships to replace the 12 Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry-class Dock Landing Ships. An analysis of 

alternatives to consider various options is ongoing. I agree with 

Secretary Stackley that this next class of ships needs to be developed within an affordable budget top line, and look forward to better understanding the various options that the Navy is considering 

and the timeline for finalizing this newest class of ships. 

Finally, I want to highlight that our committee authorized for ap- propriations $800 million and provided incremental funding authority to start construction of LPD–28 [landing platform/dock]. As 

I noted before, I think the amphibious fleet is an important capability for national security, and it appears that three of the four defense committees supported this effort. I look forward to understanding how the Department intends to move forward with this 

important project and take advantage of the incremental funding 

authority that appears to be provided by the Armed Services Committee. 

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the challenges that 

the entire shipbuilding account will have with the development of 

Ohio-class replacement submarines that will be coming online concurrent with the LX(R) class ships. We need to work to see the development of the Ohio-class replacement submarine funded as a 

national strategic asset by the Department of Defense so that it 

does not crowd out important shipbuilding capabilities like the amphibious program. 

With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague and the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you 

gentlemen for your service to our country and for being with us on 

an early Friday morning, and taking the time to come share with 

us your thoughts on the topics today. 

I know today we will be hearing testimony, Mr. Chairman, from 

both the Navy and Marine Corps, and as we look at the amphibious fleet, I want our gentlemen to know we want to know how we 

can best support the mission, that Congress can support what you 

are doing with our amphibious fleet. The Marine Corps represents 

our Nation’s response force that does enable us to respond anywhere around the world on short notice, and there is no question 

that the Marines have been critical to our forces in our presence 

in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
3 

We also want to make sure the Marines are not being seen as 

a second land force, but rather an amphibious-based expeditionary 

force true to the mission of the Marines. And in doing so, we want 

to carefully examine what that force should look like, whether the 

appropriate number of amphibious ships are available, and what is 

the most capable platform for moving marines ashore. 

It has been established the Marine Corps requires 38 amphibious 

ships to conduct the two Marine Expeditionary Brigades’ forcible 

entry mission. The Navy and Marine Corps have agreed they can 

meet this requirement with 33 ships with acceptable risk. What I 

would like to know is whether or not there are other ways to mitigate the risk of a smaller amphibious fleet? Does the Joint High 

Speed Vessel or Mobile Landing Platform help in that regard, or 

will the different design options for future amphibious ships have 

an impact on that number? 

We know that there is support for a 12th LPD–17. It is important for this committee to have a clear understanding of how an 

additional LPD procurement may affect other shipbuilding programs. 

We also want to understand the acquisition strategy for the 

LX(R) program and whether existing ship designs could meet that 

requirement while also reducing the overall cost, or if a completely 

new design is the best approach. It is important to maintain competition, and I am encouraged to see that the plan for the LX(R) 

program as well as the next LHA [Landing Helicopter Assault]. 

Whether it is a crisis response, or a disaster, or humanitarian relief, or forward presence, we know that our Navy and Marine Corps 

amphibious capability is a vital asset for the United States and one 

that we must continue to maintain. And I know the chairman and 

I share in our commitment to do everything we can to make sure 

you are provided with the equipment and the resources and the 

ships that you need to be able to fulfill that mission and do the 

great job that the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps do. 

Thank you for being here today. We look forward to hearing your 

testimony, and may God bless you and your families for their sacrifice and your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mike. 

And, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding you are going to start 

us off. So we look forward to your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN A. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Forbes, Representative McIntyre, Representative 

Palazzo, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 

to address Navy and Marine Corps amphibious fleet requirements. 

And joining me today are General Paxton, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Vice Admiral Aucoin, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. With the permission of the subcommittee, I would propose to keep opening remarks brief and submit a formal statement for the record. 
4 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, all of the written remarks will be 

made a part of record. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Today 99 ships, about one-third of our fleet, and over 75,000 sailors and marines are deployed around the world. Another 63 ships 

are underway conducting local operations, testing, training, and 

preparing to deploy. Five of our big-deck amphibious assault ships 

are underway, including the Navy’s newest ship in the first of her 

class, the America. The sixth big-deck is forward-deployed in 

Japan, and 4,600 marines of the 22nd and 31st Marine Expeditionary Units are deployed aboard amphibious ships operating off 

coasts from Africa to Japan, conducting air operations, ship-toshore operations, supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, building partnerships, deterring enemies, and responding to crises and 

contingencies. 

They place in the hands of our Nation’s leaders tools and options 

to respond to today’s world events and shape future events. And to 

say that they are the best at what they do doesn’t do them justice, 

for amongst the world’s fighting forces, none other can do what 

they do. 

It is our responsibility to Congresses and the Departments to 

place in their hands the best weapons this Nation can produce to 

shape, deter, defeat, and deny our enemies. Accordingly, the seamless maneuver of marines from the sea to conduct operations 

ashore, whether for training, humanitarian assistance, or combat, 

remains a key priority as the Department of the Navy shapes its 

future force. And to this end, from the STOVL [short take-off and 

vertical landing] version of the Joint Strike Fighter to modernized 

attack and utility helicopters, to the development of the heavy-lift 

helicopter CH–53K, we are recapitalizing critical Marine aviation 

capabilities. 

From the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to the Amphibious Combat 

Vehicle and upgrades to the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle, we 

are modernizing the Marine Corps’ tactical vehicles. We have extended the service life of our landing craft and are developing the 

next ship-to-shore connectors, and we are fielding the next generation of Marine Corps expeditionary command, control, and communications capabilities, the G/ATOR [Ground/Air Task Oriented 

Radar] radar, Common Aviation Command and Control System, 

and Global Communication Support System. 

Underpinning this expeditionary capability is our effort to sustain and build our force of amphibious ships. Our amphibious fleet 

requirements are defined in a report submitted to the Congress by 

the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant in 2009 stating, ‘‘The force structure to support 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift is 38 amphibious assault ships.’’ Understanding this requirement, and in light of the fiscal constraints with which the 

Navy is faced, the Department of the Navy will sustain a minimum 

of 33 amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This 33-ship force 

accepts risk in the arrival of combat support and combat service 

support elements of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, but has 

been adjudged to be adequate in meeting the needs of the naval 

service within today’s fiscal limitations. 
5 

With the recent deliveries of the Somerset and the America, today’s amphibious force stands briefly at 32 ships: 10 big-deck 

amphibs [amphibious assault ships], 12 LSD 41/49 [Landing Ship, 

Dock] ships, and 10 LPD-class [Amphibious Transport Dock] ships. 

Numerically, with the retirement of the LPD–4 and LHA–5 in 

2015, and delivery of ships currently under construction, LPDs 26 

and 27, and LHA–7, we will reach 33 amphibs in 2018. However, 

a shortfall in big-deck amphibs will persist until we deliver LHA– 

8, which does not start construction until 2017 and delivers in 

2024. 

The LHD class and future LHA class are the backbone of the amphibious force, providing the capacity and command and control 

critical to the expeditionary group commander for ship-to-shore air 

and surface operations. The new LHA–6 and future LHA–7 add 

significant aviation capability to the force, appropriate to the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter. Flight I to the LHA–6 class, 

commencing with LHA–8, will strike a greater balance between 

vertical and horizontal lift capabilities. 

As you would expect, by every measure, lift, command and control, mobility, survivability, and quality of life, the LPD–17 class is 

vastly superior in capability to the LPD–4 class she replaces, and 

more so the LSD–41 class that the Navy is drawing plans to replace commencing in the 2020s. 

Whether conducting missions in peacetime or combat, LPD–17 

provides greater employment options to the operational commander, and now a requirement for 11 of these ships, 1 per amphibious ready group, provides the group commander greater flexibility to split these ships out to operate independently. 

Meanwhile, we are currently evaluating alternatives for the future amphibious ship, LX(R), which we need to build in the decade 

of the 2020s and 2030s, in order to replace the LSD–41/49 class. 

In doing so, we are carefully weighing the lift capacity the force 

needs, arguably greater than the lift capacity of the LSD–41/49 

class due to increased weight of today’s more-armored vehicles; the 

combat capability the ship will require; and the cost with which the 

future Navy can realistically bear during a period that we all understand will bring great pressure to our shipbuilding budget. 

And so when we weigh these factors, we are also mindful of the 

health of our industrial base and the pressures on our ship construction and modernization accounts. The fact is amphibious shipbuilding is in a valley during the gap between completion of the 

LPD–27 and start of construction of the LX(R). And as we struggle 

today with unfunded core requirements, issues well familiar to this 

subcommittee, the Navy does not have the headroom during this 

period of budget downturn to place ships above core on order to address the industrial base concerns. 

That said, shipbuilding is a top priority for the Navy, and we, the 

Navy and Marine Corps, hope that in working with the Congress, 

which alone has the authority to provide and maintain a Navy, 

that our budget requirements, our operation requirements, and our 

industrial-base requirements will be carefully weighed as you consider the impact of the Budget Control Act caps on the future force. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. We look forward to answering your questions. 
6 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, General 

Paxton, and Admiral Aucoin can be found in the Appendix on page 

27.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, thank you so much. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, and Congressmen 

Palazzo and Peters, thank you and all of the members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to address the Department of the 

Navy amphibious fleet requirements as it relates to your United 

States Marine Corps in our enduring requirement to remain our 

Nation’s forward-deployed crisis response force. Sir, I will keep my 

remarks very brief given that we have a written statement that 

you have graciously accepted, and we thank you for that, sir. 

So today, as always, your Marine Corps is committed to providing a balanced air-ground logistics team with the requisite 

qualities of responsiveness, scalability, and self-sustainment. Inherent in these traits is a synergy that is created from being both amphibious and expeditionary as components of a naval force. 

The Navy and Marine Corps team provides a fundamental pillar 

of our Nation’s power and security, and has done so since Thomas 

Jefferson sent marines and sailors to fight the Barbary pirates off 

North Africa in 1805, over 200 years ago. 

As we look forward to the future we all realize that sea-based 

and forward-deployed naval forces provide day-to-day engagement, 

crisis response, and assured access to our global commons. A critical component in building, training, and maintaining an expeditionary forward presence is the quantity, availability, and readiness of our amphibious ships. This necessity has been demonstrated routinely with the advent of new security challenges as 

we collectively face new challenges around the globe. 

In actuality, our need far exceeds our capacity. As testimony earlier this year indicates, our combatant commander requirements, 

as well as independent amphibious warship demands, greatly exceed the 38 ships that we have talked about as the assault element 

for the two MEBs [Marine Expeditionary Brigades], which is the 

stressing case for the operational plans. This day-to-day demand 

will not diminish. Instead we expect it will likely increase since 

amphibious ships and their expeditionary forces provide unmatched 

versatility and capability that is of much use to our combatant 

commanders. 

Realizing this, the Marine Corps created a Special Purpose 

MAGTF, [Marine] Air-Ground Task Force, and has positioned that 

in key strategic areas in the European and African littorals. These 

forces, however, right now are land based, and they are not immune to the time and space realities, or what we call the tyranny 

of distance. An example of this was for the U.S. Embassy in Juba 

last December, and we had a special mission there, and in order 

to accomplish that, we launched MV–22 aircraft from allied nations 

in Southern Europe. We actually were able to execute a mission 

and extract some U.S. personnel and assist the embassy, but the 
7 

mission took 3,270 miles and over 15 hours. That MAGTF subsequently redeployed elsewhere on the African Continent. 

While successful in the mission accomplishment, these forwarddeployed elements, however, are necessarily limited in both operational reach and sustainability once they are on the objective. As 

we gather here today, crisis response forces are literally sitting on 

their packs elsewhere around the world to launch within hours of 

a mission tasking. They are postured this way in order to mitigate 

limiting factors of both time and distance throughout those multiple geographic combatant command areas of responsibilities. 

The existence and the success of these forces, however, is a direct 

indicator of the paucity of our amphibious ships. With additional 

amphibious ship quantities and availability, the Navy and Marine 

Corps team will be able to rapidly respond to crises around the 

world, and the security will be greatly enhanced. For this reason 

we ask for continued congressional support for the Navy shipbuilding program. As Mr. Stackley said, that includes ship-to-shore 

connectors and the maintenance capability that we need to keep 

the modern fleet ready. Doing so will enable us to remain naval 

and expeditionary, and be able to project the United States power 

around the globe, and to secure our interests and the country 

whenever and wherever we need it. 

I thank all of you for your faithfulness to our Nation and request 

that our written testimony be accepted. And I look forward to your 

questions, sir. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Paxton, Secretary 

Stackley, and Admiral Aucoin can be found in the Appendix on 

page 27.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM JOSEPH P. AUCOIN, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WARFARE SYSTEMS (N9) 

Admiral AUCOIN. Chairman Forbes, Congressman McIntyre, distinguished members of the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] Seapower committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

and testify on amphibious fleet requirements. I echo what Secretary Stackley said and also the ACMC [Assistant Commandant 

of the Marine Corps], so I will keep my opening remarks short, 

only to make two points first. 

First, my job is relatively new, and my role as the Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, I am responsible to the 

Chief of Naval Operations for supporting and establishing, integrating and resourcing Navy warfighting requirements across the 

range of expeditionary, surface, undersea, and air warfare. 

Second point is just to say we thank you very much. We appreciate the support Congress has shown in supporting the amphibious force. The PB15 [President’s Budget for fiscal year 2015] plan 

represents the most responsible effort to balance resources with requirements, affordability, and the industrial base considerations. It 

attempts to balance shortfalls in amphibious warfare ships, large 

surface combatants, and attack submarines until the force structure assessment objectives are met. 

Thank you. 
8 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Aucoin, Secretary 

Stackley, and General Paxton can be found in the Appendix on 

page 27.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

First of all, I want to say that I believe you probably have staff 

represented behind you that do such a good job, and to all of them, 

we want to thank you for your work in making sure all of this continues moving in the right direction. And thank you for the hours 

you put in doing that and serving your country. 

This is an incredibly bipartisan subcommittee. We have good 

working relationships with each other. Mr. McIntyre, my ranking 

member, and I are very, very close partners in this. And so I want 

to yield to him to begin asking the questions, and I will defer my 

questions until the end. 

Congressman McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your commitment and strong leadership of this subcommittee. I 

will be brief in light of the compressed time we have on a Friday 

morning. 

Admiral, with LH–8 now being planned to include a well deck, 

can you explain some of the steps the Navy has taken to reduce 

the risks associated with a major design change like that? 

Admiral AUCOIN. Well, I will speak briefly, and I am sure Secretary—— 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, is your microphone on? 

Admiral AUCOIN. Can you hear me? 

Mr. FORBES. Yeah. Just keep that mike up kind of close. 

Admiral AUCOIN. We know, Congressman McIntyre, that the Marines want the well deck put back in there, and design efforts are 

underway right now between the shipyards to incorporate that 

along with the large aviation requirements associated with that 

flight deck. But we still have got a ways to go on those design efforts, a couple more years, before we finalize the design. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me just add several pieces to that. First 

is getting the requirements right and nailing down a technical 

baseline associated with that—those requirements that are feasible 

and you have got the right level of risk and maturity. You have got 

that balance down. And so that is what we are doing right now. 

As you go to LHA–8 what we are actually doing is we are going 

back to a well deck. So the details associated with a well deck inside of that hull format are well understood. The requirements that 

we are pinning down in further detail today are the new capabilities that come with a Flight I to this new ship class. So we are 

being very careful to ensure we don’t overreach in terms of those 

requirements, and to balance out both the aviation side and then 

the surface side, the well deck side, as we do that redesign. That 

is the requirement side. 

We brought in industry into this early stage of design to help us 

go from defining the requirements to constructing what we would 

call a contract design, and that is the design that we would actually put on to contract. So we have both the two shipbuilders that 

would be competing for this at the table with us working through 

this next phase to take a look at feasibility, how best to complete 
9 

the contract design, and also how to go after some cost reduction 

initiatives in the process. 

So we think we have it about right in terms of stable, realistic 

requirements; leveraging a mature prior class design, the LHD 

class; and then bringing industry in early before we push out the 

contract design for competition. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mike. 

The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today. I want to thank 

you for your service to our Nation; also coming here, taking time 

out of your busy schedules to lend us your expertise on the amphibious force structure and to answer some of our questions. 

I also want to thank your families for their sacrifices. I know 

that is sometimes overlooked and forgotten. 

I think it is pretty clear to everybody in this room and to Congress that our intent is to fund the LPD–28, or an additional LPD– 

17-class ship. This committee authorized $800 million in multiyear procurement. I think the Senate authorizing committee did 

$650-, and the Senate Appropriations Committee did $800 million, 

so it is absolutely clear the intent is that Congress wants the 12th 

ship in the LPD–17 class. 

I think it is extremely important as well, and the Commandant 

has expressed a huge amount of interest on these ships, calling 

these ships the Swiss Army knives of the fleet. And they are capable of doing multiple things, and, you know, not only just projecting 

force, but serving as a deterrent; also being able to providing humanitarian assistance, evacuations, and the list goes on. 

So, General Paxton, could you kind of elaborate, and, in your 

view, what has the Marine Corps—what are the amphibious assault assets today, and what do you think they are going to need 

moving forward? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. And, again, great colleagues 

here beside us, so there is a good work amongst the Navy and Marine Corps team on the way ahead. 

In this particular case, we happen to be the ones who are trying 

to articulate the requirements in order to do that power projection, 

knowing full well—and I will come back to this at the end—that 

we have some fiscal constraints and caps there, and I will defer to 

Secretary Stackley to articulate what this means in terms of the 

overall shipbuilding program. 

In terms of the requirements, as I tried to allude to in the comments, 38 amphibious ships is the stressing case for the simultaneity of two operations plans, and we can talk about that in a more 

classified environment, but that represents the assault echelon of 

two expeditionary brigades, which is what we need for, again, the 

two operation plans. What we understand, though, is in the dayto-day environment, it is the currency and the simultaneity of the 

demands from the five geographic combatant commanders that 

stress our force on a day-to-day basis. So, sir, see if I can answer 

both of those. 
10 

There is a hard-fast requirement for 38 ships to do the two MEB 

assault echelon requirement. We agreed, at least in paper and as 

recently as 2009, that we can live within fiscal constraints for 33. 

Built into that, the math of that equation is a 90 percent availability of the ships; that there is always 10 percent that are in 

maintenance. 

We struggle under the existing number of ships today, and the 

Navy, despite great work, is always challenged to get ships into the 

maintenance cycle. So as we have things go on around the world, 

in Yemen, in Libya, in Syria, in the hurricanes and tornadoes and 

super typhoons, and Haiyan in the Pacific, we are repeatedly asked 

to respond to those. We are ready to do that, but it breaks the 

maintenance cycle, and that is what stresses the force. 

So when we responded last November to Super Typhoon 

Damayan in the Philippines, we had marines from the 3rd Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade on B–22s and en route to the Philippines in 

somewhere between 5 and 6 hours. But it took us several weeks 

to get two ships out of the maintenance cycle out there, and I want 

to be on the record that Admiral Harris and Admiral Thomas did 

great work to get them out of the yards and get them down there, 

but there were two others we couldn’t get there. And we knew by 

doing that, though, we were going to break the maintenance cycle 

for those ships, and that would further degrade the responsiveness 

of the 31st MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] in the Western Pacific area. 

So that is yet another case, just as the Special Purpose MAGTF 

and the move to Juba earlier that just shows the case there, the 

position now where not only the paucity in numbers, but the maintenance requirements in an aging fleet stresses the use of that. 

And consequently, the Navy and Marine team who was forward deployed and ready to do things is always challenged to get there fast 

enough, to stay long enough, and to be able to reset so that we can 

get the ships back into maintenance. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I have another question, but I will probably run 

over my time if he tries to answer. 

All right. Well, General Paxton, the recent Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan discusses the building of the LX(R). What capabilities 

do you need in this ship to best support the Marine Corps mission? 

General PAXTON. Yeah, thank you, sir. 

When we tried to articulate requirements, and I am sure all of 

the members of the committee, given your great experience and 

your fine support for us, understand, there is five fingerprints a 

lift, so we are looking about the number of individual marines you 

can put on a ship with their personal equipment, and that is fingerprint number one. We are looking at vehicle spots to get rolling 

stock on and off the ship. We are looking at cube and square for 

those vehicles and for cargo. And then, most importantly, looking 

for deck spots for aviation, for rotary-wing aircraft, and then well 

deck spots for connectors and ship-to-shore movers, whether it is 

an AAV [Assault Amphibious Vehicle] or LCU [Landing Craft Utility], LCAC [Landing Craft Air Cushioned]. 

We are trying to balance all five fingerprints of those lifts, and 

as Secretary Stackley said earlier, we have great design records 

from previous ships, and we understand the trade space between 
11 

a flight deck, a well deck, and number of people, but how we maximize those five capabilities, how we do it within existing cost constraints is the challenge for all of us. 

So as the Marine Corps, we will try to articulate what we actually need, given changes in technology, to get the marines and their 

equipment ashore. We are trying to hold down the weight of our 

vehicles, but the weight of vehicles continues to increase. We are 

trying to hold down the size of the aircraft, but the wingspan continues to increase. As we get great capability from our V–22s, we 

are now trying to make sure the V–22, like the CH–46, is detachment capable, which means you have an independent maintenance 

capability with them. 

So all of these create stressors on the design of the ship, and we 

are trying to make sure that the ability to project, launch, recover, 

and sustain the force can be done within the design capability of 

the ship and the cost that we are afforded or the moneys that we 

are given. So doing this within the challenge of Virginia and Ohioclass replacement and everything, even as marines, we understand 

the challenge the Department is under. So we are grateful for the 

support that you show. 

But I will now defer here to Secretary Stackley. We know that 

we are probably going to need more money, to be honest with you, 

above TOA [Table of Allowance Requirements] to make sure the 

amphibious ship portfolio can sustain while we are doing submarines and surface-class combatants. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. We thank the gentleman for his questions. His time 

is expired. I think that this subcommittee recognizes that that 

funding for the LPD would not have been in there without his hard 

work and also the gentleman from Virginia, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, who both worked very, very hard to make sure 

that was done. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 

minutes, Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t have a lot of questions. I just want to acknowledge that 

I appreciate the professionalism and the care you are taking to deal 

with the constraints of the financial circumstances, and I want to 

express my thanks for you doing that. 

Also, I am conscious that we have another issue coming up next 

year with sequester, and I think that that is a fundamental thing 

that this body has to deal with to give you the support you need, 

and we have to avoid that again. So I want you to know that that 

is on my mind, and I appreciate all you are doing to deal with the 

constraints that—and I hope that we will inject more rationality 

from the congressional perspective into the budgeting in the future. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Virginia, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all of our panelists today for joining us. Thank you so 

much for your service to our Nation. 
12 

Secretary Stackley, let me begin with you. I want to talk about 

the LX(R) program and get your perspective on that and how do 

we put in place both the efficiencies from a cost standpoint, but 

also operational efficiencies in making sure that we, as you stated 

earlier, put to task the lessons learned from the past. 

Would it make sense for us to use the LPD hull form in extending the LX(R) into a faster operational phase, looking at LPD–28 

as the bridge to that, and, obviously, the elements of maintaining 

the industrial base? But give me your perspective on using that as 

an existing hull form and the advantages that that would bring, or 

possibly the other challenges it might bring. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me try to wrap this all together, the advantages of reuse of the LPD hull form, the affordability issues that we are challenged with, and then the specific requirements that LX(R)—that we are drafting on LX(R). 

As the ACMC described globally in discussing the LX(R) as a replacement for the LSD–41/49 class, we have to first and foremost 

ensure that the LX(R) provides the lift capacity that the Navy and 

Marine Corps team needs. And if you look at what the LSD–41/49 

provide today, it is LCAC spots that we are going to have to replace. They bring a lot of cargo, a lot of cargo cubed, which is not 

a shortfall issue so much as vehicle square. So vehicle space, LCAC 

well deck spots, and then flight deck capacity. So if you look at 

that, that is exactly what the LPD–17 provides. 

Now, the reality is LPD–17 provides a lot more of that than the 

ship class that she would potentially be replacing. So what we have 

got to do, then, is moderate between the capacity of an LPD–17 

and the cost that comes with that, and then the true requirements 

that we need for the LX(R). And that is the debate, the tension 

that is going on right now inside the analysis of alternatives [AOA] 

is trying to temper down, temper down those capacities with cost 

in mind. 

And so we are looking at several alternatives. The first clear alternative is you have a hot production line, you have a known entity in terms of LPD–17, so can you reuse it? The answer is the 

LPD–17 class will not be the LX(R), but the hull form does provide 

a well-known baseline that we are looking at a modified LPD–17 

to see if we can drive that in the right direction in terms of affordability for the LX(R). 

We also are looking at foreign designs. There are a number of 

foreign designs that fix—fit an LX(R) mission profile. So those are 

on the table as well. This would not be to repeat those designs. 

Frankly, it would require some sort of teaming agreement between 

our industrial base and a foreign navy that owns that design to see 

if, in fact, it could be adapted. We are doing that for thoroughness. 

And then you look at clean-sheet designs. Now, the beauty of a 

clean-sheet design is you can do anything with it, and it can cost 

what you want it to cost. However, in going from that paper design 

to reality, we are very mindful of the risks that that introduces, 

and, frankly, the history that we have of underestimating the cost 

and complexity of going from a paper to digits, to steel. 

So that is the trade space in the AOA. It is bringing those clean 

set of requirements in that the Marine Corps require for the lift capability, looking at those alternatives, and figuring out across that 
13 

family of alternatives how do we drive this into an affordability box 

that we set for the program. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Paxton, let me get your perspective on 

that, too. You talked about the requirement set; that is, space on 

board, what it would be used for. And give me your overall thought 

about, just as Secretary Stackley talked about, the whole scope of 

what you are looking at, existing hull forms, new hull forms. Kind 

of give me your thought about what you believe the LX(R) ought 

to resemble when it becomes a complete design. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. 

Yeah, we are, we being the Marine Corps, are huge fans of the 

LPD–17. It has capability that we have not had before. It has capacity that we have not had before in terms of well deck, flight 

deck, marines, everything. So the opportunity to continue that hull 

form or something similar to it has great operational advantage to 

us. It gives us the ship-to-shore, sovereign launch and recovery capability that we need. It gives us maintenance capability that we 

need. It gives us command-and-control capability for disaggregated 

operations in case we have to split up that Marine Expeditionary 

Unit in two or three different locations. 

So in terms of the responsiveness, the versatility, the sustainability, the LPD–17 is a great platform. So how we capture the 

value of that platform and some of those key either forcing functions or limiting factors. For example, the Secretary and I were 

talking earlier about just command and control, and we have greatly enhanced command-and-control capability with the LPD–17 that 

we didn’t have before. So the ability to maintain that skill set and 

those capabilities on the LX(R) is important to us, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

Gentlemen, once again, thank you for being here. And, Mr. Secretary, you made a statement that I don’t think I am paraphrasing 

incorrectly that Congress alone has ability to maintain a Navy. Did 

I misstate that, and if so, correct me on that. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, what I am quoting is article I, section 

8. 

Mr. FORBES. I am not disagreeing with you. I am with you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

We can set our requirements forward to the Congress in terms 

of a budget request, but we rely on the Congress to bring the budget that—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am with you. And the reason I say that is not because I differ with you, but because I agree with you. Congress 

alone has that ability and that responsibility to maintain a Navy. 

We do not, I do not, intend to lighten that responsibility. I don’t 

intend to delegate that responsibility, and I sure, by God, don’t intend to fail in that responsibility. And to do that, we realize that 

you guys oftentimes have to look at your resources, you have to 

consider alternatives, you have to evaluate risk, and then you 

make a decision over there and come over here and say, this is the 

decision we made. 

But since it is our responsibility, the reason we sometimes have 

to pound on you, as you have mentioned, like an anvil is because 

we have got to make those decisions ultimately, and we have got 
14 

to know those same risks that you evaluated, those same alternatives, those same budgetary things so that we make sure we are 

not failing in that responsibility. And so that is why sometimes we 

have to dig deep on these questions and ask them, and sometimes 

it is not a pleasant process any more than it is a pleasant process 

when you guys are having to deal with it over there. 

But in light of that, I want to come back, if I can, and, General, 

you have stated this very articulately, but just to help me understand this a little bit better, to go from the 38 to the 33, it is my 

understanding that we have acceptable risk. I don’t ever know 

what that term means, you know. And we can sometimes get 

caught in requirements and those kind of things, but it would be 

true if you had 38 of these ships, there would be times that you 

wouldn’t have enough. I mean, you know, you could have a situation where you still wouldn’t have enough. Obviously, with 33, 

there are going to be times that you won’t have enough. So that 

I can tell my colleagues and share this with them in a better picture, give me the risk that we are accepting to go from 38 to 33. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. 

It is always a challenge to articulate risk whether it is significant, moderate; whether it is acceptable or not. As I tried to say 

earlier, it is a dual challenge here. It is both—excuse me—the 

number of ships, the strict number of them, and then also their 

operational availability given the maintenance period that is in the 

yard. 

Let’s say we have accepted the requirement for 33 ships. That includes a search capability for coming out of the yards. It includes, 

as Secretary Stackley said, perhaps some new ships that may be 

in the process of commissioning or older ships decommissioning, so 

that the analogy would be sometimes we bank on seven consecutive 

miracles. So that if you do have a stressing scenario in one country, 

or, as I said earlier, the scourge of simultaneity in two countries, 

we are dependent upon getting a ship out of a maintenance cycle, 

bringing a newly commissioned ship into the fray early, keeping 

the ship that we are going to decommission longer into the fight. 

So those are the stressors on the system. And they consequently 

stress our sailors and marines to get that ship ready to go into the 

fight, or to keep its maintenance capability up if it needed a long 

and sustained period in the yards. 

So in a short answer, sir, the ships get there slower. We are not 

sure they can stay on station as long as they can. They go through 

Herculean efforts on the parts of individual marines and sailors to 

keep them operationally ready. And then there is an inherent and 

included risk that they can’t stay on that station that long; that 

they have to get back, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. That is a good synopsis. 

Mr. Secretary, we’ve talked about the LPD, and you have been 

very clear on that. I think the gentleman from Mississippi has a 

little bit of an interest in that issue, too. And as he pointed out, 

we have anticipated an additional $800 million on that. 

When does the Navy anticipate using that incremental funding 

authority if that ultimately passes both Houses, which I think it 

will, and can you address a little bit your concerns about the industrial base that we are looking at with amphibious ships now? 
15 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. It is difficult to answer that first 

question because with the—I will call it advanced procurement and 

incremental funding that has been provided by Congress, either in 

2014 or in the various versions of the bills in 2015, we are still a 

billion-plus short of the funding requirements for another LPD–17- 

class ship. And that billion-plus has to enter into a budget process 

where we have got other bills that are, frankly, higher priority. 

And I will just use the carrier. We had a hearing where we 

talked about the refueling of the carrier. We are working that inside of that budget and others that are competing for that space. 

So we have got competition to go into the budget and add these priorities at the same time we have got all of the risk associated with 

sequestration on the back end. 

So I cannot look at you today and give you a sense of confidence 

that the Navy is going to be able to budget that additional billionplus in PB16. Now, we are halfway through the process, and there 

is going to be a lot more movement between now and when the 

budget comes over to the Hill. But the challenges are huge in terms 

of being able to fund the balance, and absent that full funding, not 

necessarily 1 year, but using the incremental authority, we can’t 

move forward in terms of contracting for a ship. We have got to 

show the funding in the budget, and so that is the paradox that 

we have got today. 

So we greatly appreciate your intent and the support for the 

ship, but we are still well short of the funding required to place 

that ship under contract. 

Now, in terms of the industrial base—and here is where it is critical, because all of the points that the ACMC has made regarding 

38 versus 33 and where we are today, the reality is if we put an 

LPD–28 under contract in 2016, it wouldn’t enter the fleet until the 

2022, 2023 timeframe. So that is not a near-term fix to a present 

shortfall to the 33 amphib requirement, but it is an immediate fix 

to a valley that the amphibious shipbuilding industrial base is 

marching into during this period, as I described, between the completion of the LPD–26 and 27, the last of those two lines, and the 

start of the LX(R) replacement, which isn’t until the 2020s. So you 

are looking at a 5-, 6-, 7-year period where that industrial base is 

being drawn down to the only amphibious ships that will be in construction will be the LHA class, so specifically the LHA–7. It will 

be at its low point going back 25 to 30 years, and that is a concern 

for the Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Secretary, I appreciate your hard work in monitoring that industrial base because all too many people, you know, 

in Congress they believe this is like a faucet. We turn it on and 

turn it off whenever we want to. But if we don’t have the industrial 

base there, we can’t turn it back on if we need to down the road. 

Is that a fair statement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely. There are a couple of key points 

on this. One is the skilled labor. You have got to be concerned 

about skilled labor, losing the skilled labor during that valley and 

then imagining that it will be available when you need to climb 

back out of that valley. 

The likelihood is that we will be dealing with green labor, new 

entrants to the shipbuilding workforce. That is going to require 
16 

training, and also going to have a lot of learning curve that goes 

along with that. 

Mr. FORBES. So that can increase your cost and your time of production? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

And the other reality in terms of any major manufacturing process, facility, company is the impact on overheads. When you lose 

a business base like that, your overheads go up, and that makes 

it extremely difficult to invest back into your facilities, to recapitalize, to modernize, to go after the efficiencies that we all need. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

And I just have one more question, and I see Mr. Courtney has 

arrived, too. We know that the LX(R) is scheduled to replace some 

of our amphibious ships, and the LX(R) will have less capability 

than the LPD-class amphibs. The Navy has recently completed an 

analysis of alternatives, as I understand it, and cost is a significant 

driver in the threshold requirements for the LX(R). 

Can you just provide the subcommittee with some of the options 

that were considered in the analysis of alternatives for the LX(R) 

program, and just a short, capsulized version of the pros and cons 

associated with the various options? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. First, I wouldn’t say that the AOA 

is complete. This is an iterative process. The team has come forward with—I will call it—first pass on details. And we sit down, 

we hammer them with questions, go back for a second pass. We are 

about on the third pass right now. 

The alternatives that we looked at, as I was describing earlier, 

the first clear one is using the hot production line, and starting 

with an LPD–17 hull form, and then looking at how you can effectively descope some of the capabilities and also some of the cost 

drivers, go after the cost drivers, to get the LPD–17 hull form with 

the lift capacities that we need for LX(R) inside of affordability box 

that we have set for the program. 

The second is a clean-sheet design. All AOAs include a cleansheet design. So you would start with a list of lift capabilities that 

you need, and then other enabling capabilities, speed, commandand-control capabilities, that need to be added to the platform. And 

then now you are dealing with a more parametric approach towards determining what size, what shape, what cost you would be 

in for a new design LX(R). And that does bring with it all of the 

risks associated with a new start program in terms of how well do 

you understand the requirements that you just put down on paper? 

What does that carry forward in terms of risk regarding either the 

technology that you are planning on employing or the costs that 

come with that? 

And then the third is to take a look at other existing designs or 

concepts. And I described the foreign designs, and we are going 

through those dutifully to understand—you know, we have got all 

of the glossies. Now we are digging down into the details in terms 

of, okay, are they really designed for the level of survivability that 

we would plan on including in our future LX(R)? 

And then you have the hybrids. You start to take a look at—well, 

honestly, we took a look at does an MLP, which has incredible lift 
17 

capacity, does that potentially play for the roles and missions of an 

LX(R)? 

So there has been a very broad field of alternatives that we have 

looked at and all of the trades that go with what degree, what level 

of capability, what are the risks either in terms of operational risks 

or in terms of cost or technology that you are anticipating, and 

then what are the costs that come with that, and necking down to 

a smaller number of alternatives that we are, again, trying to drive 

into that affordability box that we have got to hit. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for being here. 

Secretary Stackley, can you clarify the intent behind the 2002 

MOU [memorandum of understanding] and the more recent 2009 

MOA [memorandum of agreement], commonly referred to as swap 

1 and swap 2, and how the procurement of LPD–28 could impact 

those two agreements? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. So in 2002, the industrial partners 

associated with the LPD–17 program were effectively split apart as 

a result of various mergers and acquisitions. So Bath Iron Works 

and Avondale Shipyard were teamed on LPD–17. Avondale was acquired by Litton, which was acquired by Northrop Grumman, and 

then all of a sudden we found ourselves with two competitors inside of one program, and it wasn’t working out well. 

So we looked at what we referred to as ‘‘the swap.’’ And with 

then Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, we swapped 

workload across contracts where Bath Iron Works permanently 

exited the LPD–17 program in exchange for the LPD–17 ships that 

it was awarded under contract and within its teaming agreement, 

which were four—they were going to build four LPD–17-class ships. 

So they permanently exited, and then there was a one-for-one 

swap. An LPD–17 would go down to Northrop Grumman, and in 

exchange a DDG–51 would go to Bath Iron Works in the simplest 

of terms. 

So in executing that swap agreement, three LPD–17s have been 

placed under contract at Avondale and Ingalls, and in exchange, an 

additional three DDG–51s went to Bath Iron Works. And the language describes that if a fourth LPD goes to—is awarded to 

Avondale Ingalls, then a fourth DDG–51 would go to Bath Iron 

Works. That is as simply as I can put it. 

In 2009, there was a separate similar type of swap agreement, 

but in that case it was reorganization of the DDG–1000 program, 

and it restated that that swap agreement did not impact the existing 2002 swap agreement. So what that would mean, frankly, is if 

another LPD–17-class ship was awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries [HII], then there is an equivalent balancer that would be 

due to Bath Iron Works. 

That agreement is between the Navy, General Dynamics, and 

HII, and if it came down to another LPD–17 being awarded, then 

we would sit down with industry to figure out how to best make 

it right. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. That is all. 
18 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you once again for being here. As 

I said in our meeting before this meeting, I want to make sure you 

get everything you need on the record. There may be some questions that you think are important to have on the record that none 

of our Members have asked at this time, or perhaps some things 

that you think might have been mischaracterized so far. So if I can 

give you what time you need to sum up in those comments now, 

and, Admiral, if you don’t mind, we will start with you and work 

our way back—give the Secretary just a minute to pause. He has 

been talking a lot here, so—— 

Admiral AUCOIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity. 

As was mentioned, there is an AOA ongoing. We are doing this 

iteratively. And it is no surprise, the LPD–17 is something the Marines would like, the Commandant’s been on the record for saying 

that, and we would like to accommodate that. But cost is a major 

driver, and the LPD–17 is cost-prohibitive at $2 billion. 

But there is money in there for advanced procurement. There is 

some money there for incremental funding. If we could use some 

of that advanced procurement to look at ways to bring down the 

cost, as seed money to help bring down the design cost, to use that 

hull form, similar to what we did with the Virginia-class submarine—we put seed money in there, and the cost and the schedule both have profited from those inputs to bring it below cost and 

on schedule for a Virginia-class submarine. If we could do that for 

this, I think it would go a long way. The CNO mentioned that 

when he was here in March, and I think that would help us a lot. 

That is all, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

General. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Chairman. Just two points if I may, 

sir. First is we talked about the 38 and 33, and I talked about the 

demand signal and the driver being the simultaneous operations 

plans. I would just like to reiterate again for the record the challenge of what we now call the new norm, which is the various hot 

spots around the world. 

The utility of any amphibious ship and in particular the LPD– 

17, as we said, the Swiss Army knife, it is even more important in 

the new norm because of the disaggregated ops and the way we ask 

either a split ARG/MEU [Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit] or a single ship steamer to go out and respond. So 

things like day-to-day and currency and improvements of command 

and control, the C2 sweep, perhaps an ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability, those are the stressors in the 

day-to-day environment. 

And using that as a segue, the second point is, and I believe it 

was Mr. McIntyre before he left talked about a use of the JHSV 

[Spearhead-class Joint High Speed Vessel] and the MLP [Mobile 

Landing Platforms], and those are great platforms with great capability, and we are amenable to taking a look at how they may be 

used in certain circumstances. But if you go back to the stressor 

and the op plan, we are fairly adamant that those are in addition 

to as opposed to in lieu of capabilities just because of their survivability and the stressors of a fight. So more than amenable to look-
19 

ing at those, and we appreciate Congress’ funding of those, but we 

are always a little bit reluctant to introduce those into a stressing 

operation plan. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. General, you also mentioned, I think, earlier about 

the COCOM [combatant command] requirements and where they 

were. And there is always a gap between our COCOM validating 

requirements and what we can meet. Is that gap growing or decreasing? 

General PAXTON. Sir, due to the nature of the world, the demand 

signal is indeed growing, and we are trying to figure out how we 

can keep pace with that. And that is, of course, one of the stressors 

on all of the services and on all of our programs of record, if you 

will. 

Mr. FORBES. If you looked at that gap, is it increasing because 

of the increased demands from the COCOM, or is it increasing because we can’t meet as many of the requirements as we were meeting before, or a combination of both? 

General PAXTON. I believe it is a combination of both, sir. As 

some of the fragile nation states devolve, and as the global war on 

terrorism increases, then there is a higher demand signal up there. 

And then in addition, as Secretary Stackley said, because of the 

age of our platforms, and because of the maintenance requirements 

in getting them back in, we are either unable to respond as quickly, or unable to stay as long. Or if we do, because we are in the 

habit of saying yes and meeting operational requirements, so if we 

go early and stay the same length, then we know we have degraded 

capability and extended our maintenance period that we are going 

to have to do later, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Secretary, once again, thank you for all your help with the subcommittee. We depend on you a great deal for your input, and we 

would love to hear any closing comments you might have. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, very briefly. We are spending a 

great deal of time on requirements today in terms of amphibious 

force requirements, but, more broadly, shipbuilding. We have three 

major programs that are going through analysis of alternatives and 

getting ready to go on to the next phase of design contract and 

leading to construction. T–AO(X) is first in the line, followed by 

LHA–8 and LX(R). That is good for the shipbuilding industrial 

base. In fact, we are balancing those programs across, frankly, our 

two major builders of amphibs and auxiliaries in a competitive environment. 

Today it is designed, we have got to get to production, but there 

is a valley in between. And of the eight Tier 1 shipyards that are 

building U.S. Navy ships, seven of the eight are going into a valley 

over that period of the next 6 to 7 years. It is straight math, and 

it is something the Members have to understand. So as we try to 

fix issues that cross from the shipbuilding program to shipbuilding 

industrial base, if it is going to be a zero sum, then we are basically using shipbuilding to fix shipbuilding, and that is a net negative. 

With regards to affordability, we have always been focused on affordability, but we do have this period of the Ohio replacement 
20 

coming our way where the total shipbuilding program is not affordable. And we have tried to describe that very clearly in report to 

Congress. 

In that period, the 2020s out to the mid-2030s, our program is 

not affordable with the Ohio replacement laid on top, and that 

gives us problems on the ‘‘eaches’’ of each of the programs. But, 

more importantly, no one today can stare at that plan and predict 

where we will be 10, 15 years from now, except that if we do not 

fix that picture, then we will be a much smaller Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, if I could just ask you one more 

elaboration not limited to the subject matter we are talking about 

today. But one of the things that I know, since you wrestled with 

this for so many years, oftentimes the public and policymakers believe we can ramp this up very quickly if we have a crisis in the 

world. 

With the Navy, what is unique about that, why that bothers you? 

Because I know you talked about the 2030s for our subs if we don’t 

continue building what we are looking at with Ohio class. What 

message would you have that we could deliver to them about the 

difficulty of ramping things up when you talk about the Navy? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. On average it takes about 5 years 

to build a ship, carriers longer, smaller ships less. But 5 years is 

a good, solid number. When you are building, say, 10 ships a year, 

it takes 30 years to build a Navy, and so you can’t—we are living 

off of the ship construction of the 1980s, we really are. That is running to the end of its service life, so we have to recapitalize ships 

that were built—in the 1980s, we were building ships at about a 

20-ship-per-year rate. Now, we are not trying to achieve the force 

level that we had in the 1980s, but to sustain a 300-ship Navy, we 

have to recapitalize at a rate near what it was built at back in the 

1980s. That is a very difficult problem financially with regards to 

the industrial base and with regards to the trades that we have got 

to make inside of our program. 

You cannot wait until you need ships to start to crank up the 

machinery. We have got to look far ahead. And, frankly, this is one 

of the beauties of the 30-year shipbuilding report that we turn in 

to the Congress. It forces everybody to look far ahead and recognize 

that decisions in shipbuilding that are 5 to 10 years away are in 

front of us today. 

We have to make those decisions today to influence events 5 to 

10 years from now. And 5 to 10 years from now is that period of 

the Ohio replacement program. If we aren’t making those decisions 

today, then the folks who are sitting in this hearing room 5 or 10 

years from now, they are going to be in an extraordinarily different 

place than we are today with regards to our force structure, our capabilities, our ability to provide presence, and our ability to respond to crises. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, General, Admiral, thank you so 

much. Thank all your staff members for their support and help 

here. With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:12 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 25, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 25, 2014 

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