United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-8313.

Eugene E. POWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Joyce Marie POWELL; John Dalton, Secretary of the Navy,

Defendants-Appellees.

April 15, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Georgia. (No. 7:94-00110-CA-VAL), Wilbur D. Owens, Jr.,

Judge.

Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior

Circuit Judge.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Pursuant to the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection

Act (the "FSPA"), 10 U.S.C. § 1408, a state court awarded part of

Eugene Powell's naval retirement pay to his ex-wife, Joyce Powell,

as alimony. Instead of appealing that award, Mr. Powell filed a

complaint in federal district court against Mrs. Powell and John

Dalton, who is Secretary of the Navy, contending that the FSPA is

unconstitutional as applied to him, because it amounts to an

unconstitutional taking of his property.

The district court entered summary judgment against Mr.

Powell, holding that the FSPA is not unconstitutional as applied to

him, and, alternatively, that he was barred from bringing his

action under principles of res judicata. The court did not address

the Secretary's Rooker-Feldman defense. Nonetheless, for the

reasons stated below, we hold that under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
 1

Because of our Rooker-Feldman holding, we need not address

the other issues raised on appeal. 

Mr. Powell's complaint.1 Accordingly, we vacate the district

court's judgment and remand to that court with instructions to

dismiss the complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1974, Eugene Powell signed his last re-enlistment contract

with the Navy, which, like his prior contracts, promised that he

would receive certain benefits including retirement pay. He

retired from the Navy in 1975, after honorably serving for

approximately twenty-four years.

On June 26, 1981, the Supreme Court ruled in McCarty v.

McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 232, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2741, 69 L.Ed.2d 589

(1981), that "the application of community property principles to

military retired pay threatens grave harm to "clear and

substantial' federal interests," and therefore that the application

of community property principles is federally preempted. Although

the McCarty Court spoke in terms of the application of community

property principles to military retirement pay, the Court's

reasoning appeared to apply equally to the application of equitable

distribution principles to such pay. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 224-

28, 101 S.Ct. at 2737-39 (holding that, under federal law, military

retirement pay is a "personal entitlement" and that Congress

intended that military retirement pay reach the veteran and no one

else). When it acted to override the McCarty decision, Congress

assumed that that decision applied to community property and

equitable distribution states alike.
 In 1982, Congress enacted the FSPA, to reverse the effect of

McCarty and allow the application of both community property and

equitable distribution principles to military retirement pay. See

Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 584 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 2026 n.

2, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) (stating that the FSPA "covers both

community property and equitable distribution States"). The FSPA

allows state courts to treat military retirement pay "for pay

periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of

the [retiree] or as property of the [retiree] and his spouse in

accordance with the law of the jurisdiction." 10 U.S.C.A. §

1408(c) (West.Supp.1995). The FSPA created a payment mechanism,

whereby the spouse who is awarded a portion of the ex-spouse's

military retirement pay in the state court may seek direct payment

of it through the Secretary of the concerned armed forces branch.

Id. at § 1408(d)(1).

Eugene Powell and Joyce Powell, who were married during

nineteen of Mr. Powell's twenty-four years of military service,

were divorced in a Georgia trial court in 1993 after almost

thirty-seven years of marriage. In their divorce trial, the jury

awarded Mrs. Powell $480.00 per month of Mr. Powell's naval

retirement pay, which constituted forty percent of that pay.

Pursuant to a provision in the FSPA, the Secretary of the Navy has

taken that amount out of Mr. Powell's retirement pay each month and

paid it directly to Mrs. Powell. The jury declined to award Mrs.

Powell any of Mr. Powell's other retirement pay, which came from

his employment with a private corporation.

Mr. Powell never raised in the Georgia trial court any issue
 2

Although Mr. Powell made several other claims in his

complaint before the district court, he did not appeal the

district court's judgment rejecting those other claims, and we do

not address them here. 

about the FSPA being unconstitutional as applied to him. Nor did

Mr. Powell seek review of the trial court's judgment before the

Georgia appellate court, the Georgia Supreme Court, or the United

States Supreme Court.

Instead, Mr. Powell filed this action in the federal district

court against the defendants, Mrs. Powell and the Secretary of the

Navy. In his complaint, Mr. Powell claimed that the FSPA is

unconstitutional as applied to him because it amounts to an

unconstitutional taking of his property.2 Mr. Powell sought to

enjoin the Secretary from distributing his naval retirement pay to

Mrs. Powell, and to have the FSPA declared unconstitutional as

applied to him and others similarly situated. Mrs. Powell filed an

answer to the complaint, and the Secretary moved to dismiss the

complaint on the grounds that the district court was without

jurisdiction under three theories: (1) Younger abstention; (2)

Barber abstention; and (3) Rooker-Feldman. The Secretary argued

alternatively that even if the district court had jurisdiction,

there was no unconstitutional taking.

The district court treated the Secretary's motion to dismiss

as one for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the FSPA

was not unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Powell. In the

alternative, the district court held that Mr. Powell's claim was

barred under principles of res judicata. The court did not address
the Secretary's Rooker-Feldman defense. Mr. Powell filed this

appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Powell argues that his claim is not barred under

principles of res judicata, and that the FSPA is unconstitutional

as applied to him. However, before reaching either of those

issues, we first address whether the district court had subject

matter jurisdiction over Mr. Powell's claim. That inquiry requires

us to decide if, as the Secretary contends, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars Mr. Powell's claim from federal court.

 According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a United States

District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a

state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may

be had only in [the United States Supreme Court]." District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct.

1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine has two statutory

bases: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which limits federal review of state

court proceedings to the United States Supreme Court, and (2) 28

U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that federal district courts are

courts of original jurisdiction. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The

doctrine applies not only to claims actually raised in the state

court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court

but are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's judgment.

Feldman, 460 at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16. This Court has

recognized an "important limitation" on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

when the plaintiff had no "reasonable opportunity to raise his
federal claim in state proceedings." Wood v. Orange County, 715

F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104

S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984). In that situation, we consider

that the federal claim was not "inextricably intertwined" with the

state court's judgment. Id.

 In this case, the state trial court, in accordance with

Georgia principles of equitable division, awarded $480.00 of Mr.

Powell's naval retirement pay, or forty percent of it, to Mrs.

Powell. The court made that award pursuant to authorization

contained in the FSPA. Mr. Powell's present federal claim that the

FSPA is unconstitutional as applied to him is "inextricably

intertwined" with the issue of whether the state court could award

Mrs. Powell part of his naval retirement pay. If a federal

district court were now to hold in Mr. Powell's favor on his

federal claim, that holding would "effectively nullify" the state

court's judgment that Mrs. Powell is to receive a portion of his

naval retirement pay. See Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison

County, 891 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir.1990); see also Stern v.

Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 211-12 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826,

109 S.Ct. 77, 102 L.Ed.2d 53 (1988) (holding that because district

court holding would "effectively reverse the state court judgment,"

the federal claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the state

court judgment). The result would be that the state court's

judgment, insofar as it pertains to money to be received by Mrs.

Powell, would be collaterally reviewed and reversed in federal

court, which is precisely what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine exists

to prevent.
 Mr. Powell contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is

inapplicable for several reasons. First, he argues that the

doctrine does not apply here because he seeks to challenge the

constitutionality of a federal, not a state, statute. Mr. Powell

maintains that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only "concerns subject

matter jurisdiction in cases where direct review is sought of a

state appellate court's decision involving state law." We

disagree. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has limited the

scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to state court judgments based

solely on state law. Even if the federal court collateral attack

on the state court judgment is premised on the unconstitutionality

of a federal statute, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine still applies.

It still applies for reasons that go to the heart of our system of

federalism—the dual dignity of state and federal court decisions

interpreting federal law. "In our federal system, a state trial

court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than

that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial

court is located." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113

S.Ct. 838, 846, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Moreover, the doctrine is not limited to state appellate court

judgments. A litigant may not escape application of the doctrine

by merely electing not to appeal an adverse state trial court

judgment.

Mr. Powell also contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does

not apply because he did not have a "reasonable opportunity" to

bring his claim in the state court proceeding. He argues that such

an opportunity was lacking because: (1) the Secretary was not, and
could not have been, a party to that proceeding, and (2) even if

the Secretary had been a party to that proceeding, the state court

could not have enjoined the Secretary from making the payments to

Mrs. Powell. Mr. Powell's argument is without merit. There is no

reason that he could not have challenged the constitutionality of

the FSPA as applied to him in the state court proceeding. Mr.

Powell could have raised that claim in the state trial court, and

he could have requested that court, if it agreed with his claim, to

instruct the jury not to award any of his naval retirement pay to

Mrs. Powell. Or, after the jury's verdict, he could have moved for

modification of the jury's award, insofar as it divided his naval

retirement pay. If he had raised the issue before the state trial

court, Mr. Powell could have appealed any adverse judgment

pertaining to the division of his naval retirement pay to the

Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, or the United

States Supreme Court.

The absence of the Secretary from the state court proceeding

did not deprive Mr. Powell of an opportunity to press his claim.

If Mr. Powell had prevailed on his claim, the state court would not

have awarded any of the naval retirement pay to Mrs. Powell, and

the Secretary's absence would have been immaterial.

In Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104

L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), the Supreme Court reviewed on direct appeal a

similar state court judgment, in a case in which the plaintiff

challenged the payment of Air Force retirement pay to a former

spouse. The Court had to "decide whether state courts, consistent

with the [FSPA], may treat as property divisible upon divorce
 3

Mr. Powell also seems to suggest that this case is

distinguishable from Feldman because it, unlike Feldman, involves

a general challenge to a statute, instead of a particularized

challenge. However, the essence of Mr. Powell's claim is that

the FSPA is unconstitutional as applied to him, which clearly is

a particularized challenge to the Georgia state trial court's

judgment. 

military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive

veterans' disability benefits." Id. at 583, 109 S.Ct. at 2025.

The Secretary of the Air Force was not a party to that case, and at

no time did the Supreme Court, or any of the state courts that

reviewed the case, suggest that the Secretary was a necessary

party. Just as the plaintiff in Mansell had a "reasonable

opportunity" to raise that retirement pay claim in state court in

the absence of the Secretary, so too did Mr. Powell have a

reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim regarding the

FSPA in the state court proceeding.3

Accordingly, we hold that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Powell's claim that

the FSPA is unconstitutional as applied to him. That claim could,

and should, have been raised in the state court, not in a federal

court in what amounts to a collateral attack on the state court

judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

We VACATE the judgment of the district court, and REMAND to

that court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.