DOT/FAA/AM-10/14

Office of Aerospace Medicine

Washington, DC 20591

OK-11-0024-JAH

L. Sarah Peterson,1 Loran A. Haworth,2

Robert C. Jones,2 Richard L. Newman,2

Robert J. McGuire,3 Anthony A. Lambregts,2

Tom McCloy,4 Thomas R. Chidester1

1

FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

Oklahoma City, OK 73125 

2

FAA Transport Airplane Directorate

Renton, WA 98057

3

FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center

Atlantic City, NJ 08405

4

FAA Research & Technology Development Office

Washington, DC 20500

October 2010

Final Report

An International Survey of Transport

Airplane Pilots’ Experiences and

Perspectives of Lateral/Directional 

Control Events and Rudder Issues in 

Transport Airplanes (Rudder Survey)

Federal Aviation

Administration
NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship 

of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest 

of information exchange. The United States Government 

assumes no liability for the contents thereof.

___________

This publication and all Office of Aerospace Medicine 

technical reports are available in full-text from the Civil 

Aerospace Medical Institute’s publications Web site: 

www.faa.gov/library/reports/medical/oamtechreports
i

Technical Report Documentation Page 

1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 

DOT/FAA/AM-10/14 

4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date 

An International Survey of Transport Airplane Pilots’ Experiences and October 2010 

Perspectives of Lateral/Directional Control Events and Rudder Issues in 

Transport Airplanes (Rudder Survey) 

6. Performing Organization Code 

 

7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. 

Peterson LS,1 Haworth LA,2 Jones RC,2 Newman RL,2 McGuire RJ,3

Lambregts AA,

2

 McCloy T,

4

 Chidester TR1

 

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS) 1

FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 

Oklahoma City, OK 73125 

3

FAA William J. Hughes Technical 

Center 

Atlantic City, NJ 08405 

2

FAA Transport Airplane Directorate 

Renton, WA 98057 

4

FAA Aviation Research & Technology 

Development Office 

Washington, DC 20591 

 

11. Contract or Grant No. 

 12. Sponsoring Agency name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered 

 

 

 

Office of Aerospace Medicine 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Ave., S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 14. Sponsoring Agency Code 

15. Supplemental Notes 

Project was performed in conjunction with the Transport Airplane Directorate, Renton, WA; the William J. Hughes 

Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ; and the Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC

 

16. Abstract 

Following the AA587 accident, the National Transportation Safety Board requested that the FAA explore certain elements 

of transport aircraft and rudder usage, including but not limited to awareness that sequential full, opposite-rudder inputs 

(rudder reversals), even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed, may result in structural loads that exceed those 

addressed by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 25, § 25.1507. The Transport Directorate initiated a 

Web-based survey developed in conjunction with the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute to survey the population of 

Transport Category Airplane Pilots’ (TCAP) understanding of the use of rudder and their experiences with rudder, both as 

the pilot flying and as the pilot not flying. The survey also explored TCAP’s experiences with upset, including magnitude 

and recovery. The survey further explored TCAP’s experience with rudder training, unusual attitude recovery training, and 

their perceptions of additional training needed. Additionally, the survey explored the issue of maneuvering speed and 

movement of rudder, aileron, and elevator controls. 

Survey results indicated: 1) Rudder is reported to be used more than the Rudder Survey Team expected; 2) Rudder is 

reported to be used or considered for use in ways not always trained and in ways not recommended by the manufacturers; 

3) Erroneous and accidental inputs occur, and it is reasonable to believe that this will continue in the future; 4) Some 

respondents reported making pedal reversals (cyclic rudder-pedal commands); 5) Some respondents are not clear on 

appropriate use of rudder, and many felt they needed more training; 6) Wake vortex encounters were reported to be the 

most common initiator of upset; these were most likely to be reported in the approach phase; and 7) Respondents did not 

seem to be concerned with differences among control system designs across aircraft. Given these findings, a set of 

recommendations is suggested to guide further research. 

 

17. Key Words 18. Distribution Statement 

 

 

Transport Airplane, Upset(s), Rudder, Lateral/Directional 

Control Events, Upset Recovery Training Aid, Unusual Attitude 

Recovery Training, Simulator Training, Maneuver Speed, Wake 

Vortex, Sequential Opposite Rudder Input, Rudder Reversal

Document is available to the public through the 

Defense Technical Information Center, Ft. Belvoir, VA 

22060; and the National Technical Information 

Service, Springfield, VA 22161 

19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price 

Unclassified Unclassified 45 

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized 

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The authors express their appreciation to the following individuals for their contributions to the Rudder Survey: 

Eugene Arnold, Flight Test Pilot, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD); 

Steve Boyd, Assistant Manager, TAD; Archie Dillard, FAA, retired; Mike Goodfellow, International Air Transport 

Association; Paul F. Hawkins, TAD, retired; Ronald A. Hess, University of California, Davis; John Illson, Project 

Team Manager, Mitre Corp; John LaPointe and Xiaogong Lee, FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center; Wes Ryan, 

FAA, Manager Aviation Safety, Aircraft Certification Service; Don Stimson, Airplane Performance and Handling 

Qualities Specialist, TAD; Bryan L. Watson, TAD, Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group, Operations; and the entire 

Flight Standards Service staff at Renton, WA. 

Research reported in this paper was conducted under the Flight Deck Program Directive/Level of Effort Agreement between the FAA Headquarters Human Factors Research and Engineering Group (AJP-61) and the FAA Civil 

Aerospace Medical Institute Aerospace Human Factors Division (AAM-500).

v

Contents

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

METHOD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Survey Development Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Survey Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Survey Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Survey Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Survey Development Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

RESULTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Respondent Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Pilot Demographics and Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Experience With Upsets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Rudder System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Control Input Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Turbulence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Intentions to Use Rudder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

DISCUSSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Areas of Concern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Control Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Monitoring controls by the non-flying pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Aircraft Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

APPENDIX A: Rudder Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1

APPENDIX B: Participating Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B1

APPENDIX C: Survey Purposes and Question Cross-Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C1

1

An International Survey of Transport Airplane Pilots’ Experiences

and Perspectives of Lateral/Directional Control Events and

Rudder Issues in Transport Airplanes (Rudder Survey)

On November 12, 2001, American Airlines (AA) flight 

587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, crashed into a New 

York City neighborhood shortly after takeoff from John F. 

Kennedy International Airport (National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB, 2004a). The flight had departed 

in visual meteorological conditions. While accelerating 

to approximately 255 knots during initial climb, it twice 

experienced turbulence consistent with encountering wake 

vortices from a Boeing 747(B747) that had departed 

ahead of them. The B747 and the A300-605R (AA 587) 

were approximately 5 statute miles and 90 seconds apart 

at the time of the vortex encounters.

The flight data recorder (FDR) of AA 587 indicated 

several large rudder pedal and surface movements to full 

or nearly full- available rudder deflection in one direction, 

followed by full or nearly full-available rudder deflection 

in the opposite direction. During this time, the airplane 

experienced a series of yaw oscillations that ended with 

in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of 

forces beyond the aircraft’s ultimate load capability. This 

accident focused international attention on how pilots 

apply rudder controls and industry-wide pilot training 

of rudder usage in transport airplanes.

More broadly, accidents resulting from a loss of airplane control have been, and continue to be, a major 

contributor to fatalities in the worldwide commercial 

aviation industry. NTSB data show that between 1994 and 

2003, there were at least 32 worldwide airline accidents 

attributed to airplane upset, resulting in more than 2,100 

fatalities. Upsets have been attributed to environmental 

factors, human factors, and aircraft anomalies (Upset 

Recovery Industry Team, 2008). 

The NTSB issued a safety recommendation on February 8, 2002, urging the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) ensure that all manufacturers and operators of 

transport-category airplanes implement enhanced pilot 

training programs. Recommendations included that 

programs: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transportcategory airplanes; (2) explain that a full or nearly full 

rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or 

nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, 

or certain combinations of sideslip angle and opposite 

rudder deflection, can result in potentially dangerous 

loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below the 

design maneuvering speed; and (3) explain that, on some 

aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light 

pedal forces and small pedal deflections (NTSB, 2004b). 

On February 15, 2002, the FAA issued Notice 

N8400.28, Transport-category Airplanes—Rudder and 

Vertical Stabilizer Awareness.

1

 This notified Principal 

Operations Inspectors (POIs) of air carriers operating 

transport-category airplanes about the operational use 

of rudder pedals and the potential, subsequent effects 

on the vertical stabilizer. The notice directed POIs to be 

certain that transport-category air carriers were aware 

that sequential full, opposite rudder inputs (rudder 

reversals), even at speeds below the design maneuvering 

speed (VA), may result in structural loads that exceed those 

addressed by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations 

(CFR) Part 25, § 25.1507. The NTSB also noted, based 

upon interviews after the AA587 accident, that pilots 

may have the impression that the rudder travel limiter 

systems installed on most transport-category airplanes 

prevent sequential full opposite rudder deflections from 

damaging the structure. However, the regulations did 

not take into account that sequential opposite rudder 

inputs, even when a rudder limiter is in operation, can 

produce loads higher than those required for certification 

and may exceed the structural capabilities of the airplane 

(even at speeds below VA).2

Following publication of Notice N8400.28, the FAA 

developed a survey to document pilot experience with 

lateral control events. This Rudder Survey had two goals: 

(1) to assess understanding among responding pilots of 

the guidance and limitations communicated after the 

AA587 accident, and (2) to document pilot experiences 

1 This notice was cancelled and superseded by the Airplane Upset Recovery 

Training Aid (Upset Recovery Industry Team, 2008), developed by an 

aviation industry working group and the FAA. The first version of this guide 

was published in 1998, and Revision 1 was published in August 2004. The 

Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2, published in 2008, includes 

a new supplement called “High Altitude Operations.” The complete training 

aids, including the supplement, can be downloaded using links listed in the 

references section. 

2 FAA-certified transport-category airplanes meet the airworthiness standards 

in 14 CFR 25, Subpart C, pertaining to the airplane structure, including 

Section 25.351, titled, Yaw Maneuver Conditions. This section requires that the 

airplane be designed for loads resulting from the following series of maneuvers 

in unaccelerated flight, beginning at zero yaw: (1) full rudder input resulting 

in full rudder deflection (or as limited by the rudder system); (2) holding this 

full rudder deflection input throughout the resulting over-swing and steady 

state sideslip angles; and (3) while the airplane is at the steady state sideslip 

angle, a release of this rudder input and the return of the rudder to neutral. 

Resulting loads do not approach those encountered with full reversal of rudder, 

which may exceed the ultimate load capability of the aircraft.
2 

with airplane upsets (that may or may not have included 

unusual attitudes), their use of rudder controls in such 

events, and future intentions for control usage in response 

to an upset event or unusual attitude.3

 The survey included 

sections asking specific questions about pilots’ experiences 

in rudder training and unusual attitude training before 

and after February 2002, when FAA Notice N8400.28 

was published. It also provided opportunities for pilots 

to provide details of their flight experiences.

The Rudder Survey defined upsets as “unintentional 

conditions describing an airplane motion that a pilot 

believed required immediate corrective action.” This is a 

broader definition than that appearing in the Upset Recovery Training Aid (Upset Recovery Industry Team, 2008):

• Pitch attitude greater that 25 degrees nose up 

• Pitch attitude greater than 10 degrees nose down 

• Bank angle greater than 45 degrees 

• Within the above parameters but flying at airspeeds 

inappropriate for the conditions. 

The broader definition in the survey was designed to 

capture as many pilot experiences as possible, for several 

reasons. First, the research team believed upsets to be 

very rare events and that the more stringently they were 

defined, the fewer events we would learn about from 

pilots. Second, we did not believe that pilots were likely 

to remember precise rudder displacements experienced 

in an upset event; their attention would be appropriately 

focused on regaining control. Third, the team believed it 

important to understand those experiences where pilots 

believed they must make inputs, regardless of whether 

the airplane was in an unusual attitude of defined magnitude. Fourth, we believed that pilots may sense and 

respond to accelerations and perceive an upset prior to 

making any excessive displacements.4,5 We also collected 

information on the magnitude of each reported upset 

that would allow interpretation in light of more specific 

definitions. This paper reports the results of the survey 

and discusses them in the context of guidance provided 

by the FAA and industry groups (listed in Appendix B) 

in response to the NTSB recommendations to address 

the issue of rudder usage and airplane upset. 

3 In 2008, research and discussion within the commercial aviation industry 

indicated it was necessary to establish a descriptive term and definition. 

These terms included but were not limited to “unusual attitude,” “advanced 

maneuver,” “selected event,” “loss of control,” and “airplane upset.” “Airplane 

upset” is the industry and FAA convention. However, other upset recovery 

terminology may be found in the body of the survey. 

4Note that American 587, for example, did not meet the Upset Recovery Training 

Guide definition of an upset until after rudder inputs were applied by the First 

Officer, although they did experience unusual accelerations during the event.

5 Lambregts, Nesemeier, Wilborn, and Newman (2008) proposed a new 

definition of aircraft upsets that incorporates acceleration parameters.

Method

Survey Development Team

The group referred to as the Rudder Survey Team

was compromised of the following organizations: the 

FAA Transport Airplane Directorate (which defined 

the research requirement), Seattle, WA; the William J. 

Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ; the Civil 

Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK; FAA 

Headquarters, Washington, DC; and the International 

Air Transport Association (IATA) Safety Department, 

Montreal, Canada. They jointly developed the Webbased survey.

Survey Deployment 

The Rudder Survey was deployed via the Internet and 

hosted by IATA, an international trade organization 

representing more than 230 airlines and comprising 93% 

of scheduled international airline traffic. IATA invited 

all transport-category pilots to participate in the survey 

through publication (broadcast e-mails, newsletters, and 

notices), summits, symposiums, and safety seminars.

Survey Development 

Survey development proceeded in four steps: 

(1) development of questions by experts based on objectives (See Appendix C), 

(2) testing and refinement among FAA pilots, 

(3) “beta” testing by pilots from 10 international airlines, 

and 

(4) refinement of items based upon responses from these 

groups. 

Following Bureau of Transportation Statistics and Office of Management and Budget approvals (required under 

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995), the survey was 

launched in April 2006 to coincide with IATA’s Global 

Operations Forum in Singapore. The survey remained 

available online until December 31, 2006.

Survey Organization 

The Rudder Survey consisted of 52 questions divided 

into six parts: 

• Flight Background Information, 

• Experience With Upsets, 

• Rudder System Characteristics, 

• Training and Experience, 

• Maneuver Speed, and

• Demographics (see Appendix A). Mapping of survey 

questions to survey objectives appears in Appendix C.
3

The Flight Background section asked about:

• pilot certificates, 

• flight hours, 

• transport airplane models, 

• crew positions, 

• type of employment, and 

• country of primary employment. 

Background questions were used to assess the representativeness of our sample relative to the worldwide 

pilot population.6

The Experience With Upsets section asked about 

yaw/roll upsets, including the following elements of a 

particular yaw/roll upset: 

• airplane model, 

• phase of flight, 

• pilot flying, 

• cause of upset

» including initial conditions, 

» triggering event, 

» rate and sequence of events, and

» recovery techniques used in the upset. 

This section also asked about the magnitude of the 

upset, including: 

• pitch attitude reached, 

• bank angle reached, 

• air speed reached, 

• G-load reached, 

• altitude lost, 

• duration, and

• yaw angle reached. 

The Rudder System Characteristics section contained 

questions about:

• unexpected rudder system characteristics, 

• rudder system malfunctions resulting in yaw/roll upsets, 

• automatic systems making inappropriate rudder inputs, 

• auto throttle inputs, 

• sequential opposite rudder pedal inputs (rudder reversals), 

• over-controlling or wrong-direction roll or pitch control inputs,

• unintentional or accidental application of rudder, 

• how pilots monitor rudder pedal when acting as the 

monitoring pilot (or non-flying pilot),7

6 These questions may also be used to explore differences in upset training, 

experiences, and recovery intentions, but were deferred for future analyses.

7 Airlines vary in how they describe the roles of pilot flying, who makes flight 

control inputs, and the monitoring or non-flying pilot, who manages configuration 

and systems, accomplishes checklists, communicates externally, and monitors the 

flight performance of the aircraft. Note that this differs from the terms pilot in 

command or captain versus second- in -command, co-pilot, or first officer. Captains 

typically delegate flying responsibilities to first officers on about half of all flights 

and serve as the monitoring pilot during those flights. Pilot-in-Command 

responsibilities for the safe conduct of the flight always reside with the captain.

• applying rudder pedal longer than necessary,

• under what circumstances and during which phases of 

flight pilots believe that the rudder pedal should be used, 

• pilots’ reactions to yaw/roll incidents.

The Training and Experience section of the survey 

asked about: 

• unusual attitude- recovery training, 

• including airplane, simulator, and classroom instruction, 

• and the axes (roll, pitch, and yaw) covered in training. 

• instructed use of rudder pedals for: 

» upset recovery, 

» engine failure, 

» countering light turbulence, 

» countering turbulence in excess of moderate turbulence,

» during crosswind conditions, 

» passenger comfort, 

» turn coordination, 

» yaw damper hardovers or other malfunctions, and

» Dutch roll after a yaw damper failure. 

We requested information about:

• additional training in rudder-usage before and after 

February 2002, 

• recurrent training, 

• acrobatic training, 

• and rudder usage topics covered in training: 

» aerodynamics,

» airplane systems, 

» mechanical/hydraulic, 

» input-output characteristics, 

» limitations of rudder/flight control systems, and

» maximum design maneuvering airspeed.

The Maneuver Speed section asked (for periods both 

before and after guidance responsive to NTSB recommendations were published) about: 

• their understanding of rudder, 

• maneuver speed, and

• structural overload.

We inquired about: 

• moving the rudder, aileron, and elevator controls within 

their full range of motion and back again or to the opposition position. 

We also asked about: 

• foot force and pedal displacement at high and low speeds. 
4 

Finally, the Demographics section asked pilots: 

• to report their age category, 

• gender, and

• to voluntarily list their E-mail addresses to clarify 

information provided in the survey. When provided, 

E-mail addresses were held in confidence on the IATA 

Web server and were unavailable to the FAA. 

Survey Development Limitations

The survey approach provided a useful exploration of 

issues but had several methodological limitations. Though 

the survey was made available to a large population of 

pilots around the world, participation was voluntary and 

optional, so our sample cannot be characterized as being 

random. To claim a random sample, we must be able to 

assert that each member of the population had an equal 

chance of being represented. That does not apply to this 

sample because the respondents were volunteers, and we 

did not directly contact either all transport pilots or a 

controlled, stratified sample to request participation. To 

the good, more than 90% of the population of transport 

category pilots could have chosen to respond; however, 

less than 1% did respond. We cannot assume respondents 

were representative of the population of air transport 

pilots or that their results generalized to the population. 

A random sample, with analysis of characteristics of 

respondents and nonrespondents, is necessary to assure 

that statistics among a sample generalize more broadly. 

We may have received responses only from pilots who 

were motivated to report, potentially over-representing 

the frequency or magnitude of their reported events, 

training experiences, or future intentions. In contrast, 

a random sample, such as in most political polls in the 

United States, allows one to place a confidence interval 

around the parameters (e.g., candidate preferences or 

issue positions) measured. The Rudder Survey team cannot claim, for example, that a specific percentage of all 

airline transport pilots have experienced an aircraft upset, 

within a specified margin of error. Additionally, we face 

issues of reliability of memory of events in asking about 

events occurring over the career of a pilot. These limitations were recognized during analysis of the survey data.

Nonetheless, we can assess the representativeness of 

respondents relative to characteristics of the pilot population by reference to statistical characterizations of the 

population. That is, we assess whether our sample included 

proportions of specific aircraft types and categories and 

regions of pilot residence statistically similar to the pilot 

population at large. As a result, we will use inferential 

statistics only in comparing our sample to the reference 

population, focusing on whether a particular fleet or group 

of pilots was over- or under-represented in responses to 

particular items. 

We also attempt throughout our analyses to assess 

whether aircraft models are over-represented in the events 

reported in this survey. In analyses in which counts of 

events associated with an aircraft model are examined, 

some effort must be made to assess the frequency by 

which such reports would be expected at a proportional 

rate in normal operations. Otherwise, we might infer a 

problem with an aircraft based upon report frequency, 

when this might be due solely to the relative number of 

pilots who have flown the aircraft. One difficulty with 

doing this analysis accurately is that events reported by 

survey respondents were not identified by date, making it 

difficult to determine the number of each aircraft model 

in operation at the time of the event. Given this limitation, 

the distribution of aircraft in the fleet and respondents’ 

current aircraft model flown at the time of the survey are 

used as rough approximations of the distribution over the 

reporting period. Where fleet over- or under-representation was found, it will be described in the analysis. If 

no differences were found, fleet comparisons will not be 

discussed. In these analyses, aircraft models not specifically mentioned appeared in their statistically-expected 

proportion. Care must be taken in interpreting trends 

of over- and under-representation. Over-representation 

in these analyses may identify a known and explainable 

characteristic of an aircraft model, an unconsidered issue, or a methodological or statistical anomaly. (See the 

Discussion section for further comments).

Additionally, the survey addresses events that should 

not or we would prefer not happen at all (upsets) and 

recovery techniques that the industry, regulatory agencies, and the public expect to be well-understood. When 

upsets are reported, they are a concern. When reported 

intentions for future recovery actions depart from guidance, our collective job is not complete.

The Rudder Survey Team deemed this approach appropriate for the limited goals of the survey – an initial 

assessment of understanding of the guidance and limitations communicated after the AA 587 accident, exploration of pilot experiences with unusual attitudes, use of 

rudder controls in such events, and future intentions for 

control usage. These goals are somewhat independent of 

normative documentation. 
5

Results

Respondent Characteristics 

The survey was hosted on the IATA Website from 

April through December of 2006. Seventy-eight percent 

of the respondents accessed the survey during the first 

three months, April to June. Total survey traffic was 2,179 

with 992 participants completing a portion of the survey, 

434 participants completing at least 75% of the survey, 

and 184 participants completing every question on the 

survey. Analyses were limited to pilots who reported: 

• flying a transport-category aircraft within the last 5 years, 

• the number of civil or military transport hours in a 

transport-category aircraft, 

• the airplane model they flew and the crew positions 

held (pilot, copilot, instructor/check pilot), and

• current type(s) of flying. 

After screening respondents on these variables, surveys for 914 pilots were available for further statistical 

analysis. As not all pilots completed all questions on the 

Rudder Survey, the number of respondents varied and 

is documented for each item. For comparison, 141,935 

active pilots held airline transport pilot ratings in the 

United States in 2006 (FAA, 2008).

Pilot Demographics and Statistics 

Responding pilots were 96% male and 4% female with:

• 8% under age 30

• 26% ages 30 and 39, 

• 31% ages 40 and 49, 

• 28% ages 50 and 59, 

• 7% age 60 or older, and

• Three-fourths were between the ages of 30 and 59. 

Most pilots reported current employment by civil airlines (90%,) with 88% of the total serving as line pilots 

and 25% serving as training or check pilots. The examination of pilots’ total flight time revealed 20% reported 

flying less than 4,900 total hours, 40% less than 7,900 

hours, 60% less than 10,500 hours, and 80% less than 

14,700 hours. Less than 1% reported flying more than 

28,000 hours. Civil flight time was similarly distributed, 

with 20% reporting less than 3,500 hours, 40% less than 

6,200 hours, 60% less than 9,000 hours, and 80% less 

than 13,000 hours. Fewer than 1% reported flying more 

than 24,500 flight hours. Military flight time was distributed very differently with 78% of respondents reporting 

having no military flight time. Hours reported by pilots 

with military time ranged from less than 100 to 10,000 

hours; the median was 2,000 hours.

We compared respondents’ current aircraft to worldwide and U.S. fleet distributions (Flight International, 

2007). Distributions were available for the current 

aircraft flown by 816 of the responding pilots. Analyses 

revealed the sample to be representative of turbojet operations but not of turboprops. Turboprops are 19% of 

worldwide transport aircraft, but only 38 (4%) current 

pilots of turboprops responded to the survey, resulting 

in every fleet and all turboprops being under-represented 

(binomial probability <.01). For turbojets, only current 

B-767 pilots were statistically over-represented among 

respondents (10.3% of sample versus 4.7% worldwide, 

p < .01). In contrast, pilots of B-737 (17.9% vs. 24.6%), 

CRJ (2.2% versus 6.7%), ERJ-145 (.7% vs. 4.6%), 

and MD-80/90/95 (1.6% vs 6.9%) pilots were underrepresented among respondents (p<.01). Additionally, we 

received no responses from pilots of ERJ-170/190 (1.4% 

worldwide) and F-28 (.5% worldwide) aircraft. Pilots of 

other aircraft manufacture (e.g., Airbus) and model (e.g., 

A-320) participated in proportions that would be statistically expected for their numbers in the worldwide fleet.

The survey attracted responses from pilots around 

the world. Country of employment was stated by 908 

respondents. Reported geographic regions included: 

Africa (28), the Americas (Central, North, and South 

America) (327), Asia (84), Australia and New Zealand 

(18), Caribbean (5), EurAsia (2), Europe (367), Middle 

East (67), the Pacific Islands (7), and Other (3). The 

fewest responses were from Africa and the Pacific region. 

Given our Web-based methodology, we have a reasonable, 

non-random sample of world-wide turbojet operations. 

Experience With Upsets 

This survey defined “upset” as an airplane motion that 

a pilot believed required immediate corrective action. A 

total of 283 pilots provided the number of upsets they 

had experienced in their careers. Seventy-seven percent 

of those reporting an upset event had experienced three 

or fewer events. When asked to describe upsets by make, 

model, magnitude, cause, and phase of flight, 278 pilots 

reported experiencing a total of 405 aircraft upsets on 

up to four aircraft types or models. Comparison of the 

distribution of aircraft on which the 405 upsets were 

reported to the distribution of aircraft currently flown by 

respondents suggested that the B-727 (6.9% of reported 

upsets vs.2.2% of sample), DC-9 (6.2% vs.1.2%) and 

MD80/90/95 (6.7% vs.1.6%) were over-represented 

in upset reports (p<.01). In contrast, the A-320 (7.6% 

of reported upsets vs.13.6% of sample), A-330 (0.74% 

vs.4.5%), A-340 (0.74% vs.5.9%), B-747 (3.2% vs. 

7.6%), B767 (3.5% vs.10.3%), and B-777 (0.49% 

vs.3.7%) were under-represented (p<.01) in upset re-
6 

ports. Fleets over-represented in reported upsets were 

narrow-body aircraft; however, the B-737, the most 

common narrow-body aircraft, was neither under- nor 

over-represented. With the exception of the A-320, underrepresented fleets were wide-body aircraft. 

Respondents described the phase-of-flight of occurrence for up to four reported upsets. Thirty-four percent 

of pilots reported upsets had occurred during approach, 

18% during cruise, 13% during takeoff, 13% during 

climb, and 11% during landing. Eighty-three percent of 

respondents were serving as the pilot flying for the first 

upset they reported. 

Respondents described the perceived cause of up to 

four reported upsets. Sixty-two percent were attributed to 

wake vortex encounters; 21% to atmospheric disturbances; 

5% to unintended control inputs, 4% to a mechanical 

systems fault, 1% to a high-speed upset, and 1% to an 

autopilot fault (6% did not select a perceived cause).8

See IATA (2008) for an analysis of textual discussion 

provided by responding pilots.

Respondents described the parameters of up to four 

reported upsets (Table 19

). 

In addition, respondents reported experiencing:

• minimum g-loading for 52 events, with 23% reporting 

less than 1 g.10

• maximum g loading for 80 events, with 53% reporting 

no incremental g loading, 35% between 1 and 2 g, and 

12% reporting more than 2 g.

8 Reasons for not selecting a perceived cause are unclear and represent a 

methodological limitation. It may be that the respondents did not know or 

recall the cause, did not notice the request to select a perceived causal category, 

or that the list of selections did not adequately describe what occurred. See 

IATA (2008) for analysis of comments associated with this item, which almost 

exclusively described wake and atmospheric turbulence events.

9 Note that respondents were not asked to report accelerations, as it was not 

reasonable to expect they could measure or estimate their parameters.

10 Respondents also were asked and reported minimum and maximum speed 

values during upsets. However, it was not possible to interpret reported values 

statistically. Instead, examination of individual events to break down the phase 

of flight and speed regime in which the upset occurred was required, making 

each value event-unique and not meaningful on average. 

Reported upsets were predominately roll events, which 

is consistent with 62% having reported wake vortex 

encounters.

As discussed in the method section, the Rudder Survey

defined upsets as “unintentional conditions describing an 

airplane motion that a pilot believed required immediate corrective action” because we wanted to understand 

the circumstances where pilots believed they had to take 

immediate action. Survey responses can be contrasted 

with the definition used in the Upset Recovery Training 

Aid (URTA): an aircraft pitch attitude greater than 25 

degrees nose-up, greater than 10 degrees nose-down, or 

bank angle greater than 45 degrees. Only 179 (44%) of the 

reported events exceeded nose-up (15 events), nose-down 

(39 events), or bank (125 events) attitudes, as defined by 

the URTA. However, because of our definition, all of the 

reported events were understood as requiring immediate 

corrective action by the pilots on the scene.

Rudder System Characteristics 

Unexpected rudder characteristics. A total of 118 

pilots reported encountering 155 unexpected rudder 

characteristics on up to four aircraft types; 90% of these 

pilots reported unexpected rudder characteristics concerning two or fewer aircraft. Comparison of the distribution 

of aircraft for which unexpected characteristics were encountered to the distribution of aircraft currently flown 

by respondents revealed that the DC-9 and MD-80/90/95 

were statistically over-represented. 

Of the 118 pilots reporting an unexpected rudder 

characteristic, 37% reported an unexpected force, 31% 

reported an unexpected motion, 43% reported a lack 

of response, and 40% reported an unexpected input 

sensitivity.11

11 In retrospect, “input sensitivity” left ambiguity of definition. Pilots may 

have interpreted it as input forces too light, displacements too short, or output 

greater than expected.

Table 1 

Characteristics of Reported Upsets, by Dimension of Deviation 

Dimension Number 

of 

reported 

upsets

Mean of 

dimension

value 

Lowest 

quartile 

Highest 

quartile 

Nose-up (degs) 142 8.4 2 15 

Nose-down (degs) 135 4.2 0 10 

Bank (degs) 306 39 20 45 

Yaw (degs) 115 6.9 0 10 

Alt. loss (ft) 262 461 200 1000 

Duration (s) 322 5 2 5 
7

Malfunctions. Sixty pilots reported a total of 66 

rudder-system malfunctions that resulted in a yaw or 

roll upset. 

Inappropriate automatic system inputs. Twenty 

pilots reported 21 events in which an automatic system 

made an inappropriate rudder input in response to a 

yaw or roll upset. 

Autothrottle inputs. Eighteen pilots reported 18 

events in which an auto throttle input caused a problem 

in recovering from a yaw or roll upset. 

Control Input Issues

Sequential opposite pilot inputs to rudder. Thirtyseven pilots reported a total of 38 events in which they 

made sequential opposite-rudder pedal inputs. 

Pilot over-control or wrong-direction inputs. One 

hundred forty-eight pilots reported 150 events in which 

they over-controlled12 or made inputs in the wrong direction that had to be neutralized or reversed. Seventy-five 

percent of these events involved over-control; 25% were 

wrong-direction. Fifty-three percent of wrong-direction 

inputs involved yaw, 50% involved roll, and 10% involved pitch. 

Unintentional crossed controls. A total of 41 pilots 

reported they had unintentionally commanded uncoordinated rudder-pedal and control-wheel or sidestick 

commands on up to three aircraft models. 

Inadvertent rudder inputs. A total of 174 pilots 

reported making inadvertent, or accidental, inputs. 

Comparison of the distribution of aircraft on which accidental rudder inputs were reported to the distribution 

of aircraft currently flown by respondents revealed that 

A-320 (4% of reported upsets vs.13.6% of sample) and 

A-340 (0.6% vs. 5.9%) aircraft were under-represented, 

while MD-80/90/95 aircraft were over-represented (5.2% 

vs. 1.6%), (p<.01) in accidental inputs. Pilots explained 

these inadvertent inputs as stretching/yawning/sneezing 

(39%), adjusting seat position (29%), turning in the seat 

(23%), and reaching (9%). Additional explanations by 

individual respondents included turbulence, making a 

seat change, getting out of the seat, picking up a dropped 

item, and testing the brakes.

The magnitude of deviations resulting from inadvertent 

rudder was small, except for bank and yaw angle. Only 

seven pilots described nose-up pitch, all of less than 5 

deg. Only one pilot described nose-down pitch (3 deg). 

Only 12 described any g-loading. Most (85%) of the 

events had a duration of 3 s or less. However, respondents 

described bank angle for 75 events ranging from 0 to 20 

degrees (mean = 2.7 deg); 48% reported zero bank angle 

and 29% more than 15 degrees. Sixty-eight respondents 

12 “Over-controlled” in the survey meant the pilot’s perception that a greater 

than required input was applied.

described yaw ranging from 0 to 20 degrees (mean = 4.5 

degrees); and 60% between 1 and 5 degrees.

Application of rudder longer than required. Eighty 

five pilots reported applying or holding rudder longer than 

required. Respondents described 70 situations in which 

this occurred, mainly engine out-operations and crosswind 

takeoffs and landings. Several described encountering this 

in training and learning from the experience.

Observed PF confusion. Ninety-one pilots reported 

observing another pilot apparently confused by aircraft 

reaction to an upset. Comparison of the distribution of 

aircraft on which confusion was reported to the distribution 

of aircraft currently flown by respondents revealed that 

only the B-757 was over-represented (12.07% vs. 3.39%).

Observed PF incorrect control inputs.One hundred 

eighty-eight pilots reported observing another pilot making inappropriate over-controlling or wrong-direction 

inputs that had to be neutralized or reversed on up to 

four aircraft. Most (71%) involved over-control and 29% 

involved inputs in the wrong direction. Sixty percent 

of reported events involved erroneous yaw input, 58% 

involved erroneous roll input, and 6% involved pitch. 

Comparison of the distribution of aircraft on which incorrect input was observed to the distribution of aircraft 

currently flown by respondents revealed that only the 

MD-80/90/95 was over-represented (5.9% versus 1.6%).

Observed PF application of rudder longer than 

required.One hundred thirteen pilots reported observing 

another pilot holding a rudder input longer than required 

on up to four aircraft. 

Observed PF inadvertent rudder application. One 

hundred forty-eight pilots reported observing another 

pilot accidentally making a rudder input on up to four 

aircraft. In 87% of these events, the PF recognized that 

he or she had made an inadvertent input. Comparison 

of the distribution of aircraft on which inadvertent rudder inputs were reported to the distribution of aircraft 

currently flown by respondents revealed that the A-340 

was under-represented (0% vs.5.9%).

Monitoring 

Observing other pilot’s control inputs. Four hundred sixty-nine pilots described the flight controls they 

monitor and how they monitor the flight controls during each phase of flight while serving as the non-flying 

pilot. Responses were analyzed for up to six aircraft and 

are in Table 2. Most respondents describe monitoring 

control column and wheel for most phases of flight, and 

monitoring rudder during takeoff, approach, and landing. 

Fewer respondents described monitoring sidestick pitch 

and roll across phases.
8 

Five hundred twenty-six pilots responded to additional 

items further discussing monitoring of rudder pedals when 

acting as the non-flying pilot on up to seven aircraft. 

Several respondents reported additional flight phases in 

which they monitor rudder, including during the control 

check, during climb, whenever below 10,000 ft, during 

flap extension, and during taxi. Most (84.9%) reported 

monitoring using light foot pressure on the rudder pedals, 

but 17.5% reported monitoring the rudder visually, and 

9% reported using other methods including observing the 

rudder index, control surface position, or slip displays/

indicators, and placing feet just aft of the pedals to detect 

displacements rather than pressure.

Controls that cannot be monitored. One hundred 

sixty pilots reported control inputs that they could not 

monitor on up to four aircraft they had flown during 

their career. Comparison of the distribution of aircraft 

on which monitoring difficulties were reported to the 

distribution of aircraft currently flown by respondents 

revealed that this issue was reported mostly (74%) for 

sidestick control aircraft (23% were scattered over six 

column/wheel control models). IATA (2008) analyses of 

the 141 comments associated with this question indicated 

that issues involved flight controls either on the edge of 

peripheral vision or completely out of sight (79% who 

commented said they could not see the other sidestick, 

13% could not the see rudder, and 8% could see neither).

Turbulence

Five hundred twenty pilots described encounters with 

turbulence such as wake vortices and their perception that 

airplane motion was stopping on its own or required pilot 

action to ensure passenger comfort or to maintain aircraft 

control. Most (68%) reported encountering motion that 

was stopping on its own, 47% reported pilot action was 

required for passenger comfort, and 52% reported pilot 

action was needed to maintain control. At face value, 

these percentages appear to be contradictory, but review 

of the textual descriptions suggests that many of the 

respondents had encountered multiple situations and 

selected two or more of the responses. “Stopped on its 

own” and “required intervention” appeared to be answered 

for different events. Comparison of the distribution of 

aircraft on which turbulence encounters were reported 

to the distribution of aircraft currently flown by respondents revealed that the A-340 (1% reported vs. 5.9% of 

sample) and B-777 (.5% vs. 3.5%) aircraft were underrepresented and B-737 (28.3% vs. 17.9%), DC-9 (7% 

vs. 1.2%), and MD80/90/95 (10.2% vs. 1.6%) aircraft 

were over-represented. 

With few exceptions, the 211 written descriptions 

of encounters provided can be characterized as reports 

of events that pilots perceived as requiring intervention 

(IATA, 2008).

Intentions to Use Rudder

Six hundred thirty-seven pilots described the phases 

of flight and circumstances in which they would consider 

using the rudder pedal in a transport airplane. Responses 

were analyzed for up to nine aircraft (in which only the 

B-747 was marginally over-represented, p<.05) and are 

listed in Table 3. 

Intentions were varied for upset recovery, with 57% 

considering rudder use on takeoff, about a third in climb, 

cruise, and descent, and 58% on landing. Rudder use for 

engine failure was considered by at least two-thirds in all 

phases, almost all on takeoff, and over 80% for climb 

and landing. Intentions to use rudder to counter light 

turbulence were reported by many fewer respondents, 

with about 10% on takeoff and landing, and less than 5% 

in other phases. Rudder use in crosswind was considered 

by few respondents in climb and cruise, but by 84% on 

takeoff, 18% during descent, and 82% during landing. 

Intentions for use for passenger comfort was reported by 

few respondents, except for during descent (13%) and 

landing (20%). Use for yaw damper hard-over or other 

malfunction was considered by about half of respondents 

in all flight phases. Use to control Dutch roll after a 

Table 2 

Percentage of Pilots Reporting Monitoring Controls When Acting as Pilot Not Flying, Categorized by 

Control Type and Phase of Flight 

Control Type Phase of Flight 

Takeoff Climb Approach Landing Other 

Control column 87% 58% 69% 81% 42% 

Sidestick pitch 44% 22% 29% 35% 15% 

Control wheel 79% 57% 69% 78% 44% 

Sidestick roll 41% 21% 31% 37% 16% 

Rudder pedal 85% 48% 74% 86% 40% 
9

yaw damper failure was considered by about a third of 

respondents in all flight phases. These intentions should 

be contrasted to manufacturer guidance and the Upset 

Recovery Training Aid. A cursory review suggests some 

degree of inconsistency between respondent intentions 

and published guidance, which will be examined in the 

Discussion section. 

Training

Unusual attitude recovery training. Three hundred 

ninety-two pilots reported completing unusual attitude 

training. Respondents reported up to eight courses. 

Fifty-six percent of respondents reported receiving only 

a single course, 17% reported receiving a second course, 

and 2% reported three or more courses. Of these, 25% 

received training prior to November of 2001, and 25% 

received training after December 2005. Most (80%) 

reported training in a simulator, 23% reported receiving 

training in an aircraft, and 26% reported training in the 

classroom. Comparison of the distribution of aircraft 

on which training was reported to the distribution of 

aircraft currently flown by respondents revealed overrepresentation in training on the B-737 (25.5% of the 

sample received training on this aircraft vs. 17.9% of 

the sample who are currently flying this aircraft), B-747 

(11.6% vs. 7.6%), and MD-80/90/95 (5.2% vs. 1.6%). 

Scope of simulator training. Three hundred eightyone pilots described the scope of up to nine unusual attitude recovery events in a simulator. Of these reported 

training events 77% covered yaw axis recovery, 98% 

covered roll axis, and 98% covered pitch.13 Twenty-five 

percent of these events occurred before December 2002 

and 24% after December 2005. 

13 Axis was recorded only for the first reported training event.

Instructed use of rudder – current aircraft. Four 

hundred nineteen pilots described the phases of flight 

and circumstances in which they understood training 

in their current aircraft to recommend consideration of 

using the rudder pedal. Responses were analyzed for up 

to six aircraft (Table 4).

Respondent perceptions of training recommendations 

for rudder use on their current aircraft were fairly consistent with their intentions described in section 4-6 of the 

Rudder Survey. For upset recovery, a quarter to a third 

of respondents perceived training to recommend rudder 

use; this was slightly lower than their intentions reported 

in 4.6 (third to half). Rudder use for engine failure was 

perceived as recommended by at least two-thirds in all 

phases; almost all on takeoff and roughly 80% for climb 

and landing. Rudder use to counter light turbulence was 

understood as recommended by few respondents, 6% on 

takeoff and landing, and less than 5% in other phases. 

Rudder use in crosswind was understood as recommended 

by few respondents in climb, cruise, and descent but 

by 83% on takeoff and 90% during landing. Use for 

passenger comfort was understood as recommended by 

few respondents; less than 5% for all phases. Use for yaw 

damper hard-over or other malfunction was perceived 

as recommended by about a third of respondents in all 

flight phases, which is lower than respondents’ intentions (about half). Use to control Dutch roll after a yaw 

damper failure was perceived as recommended by 20% 

to 25% of respondents in all flight phases. These perceptions should be contrasted to manufacturer guidance and 

the Upset Recovery Training Aid. A cursory review suggests some degree of inconsistency between respondent 

intentions, perceptions of training recommendations, 

and published guidance, which will be examined in the 

Discussion section.

Table 3 

Percentage of Pilots Who Would Use Rudder Input Categorized by Flight Situation and Phase of Flight 

Flight Situation Phase of Flight 

Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Landing 

Upset recovery 57% 40% 32% 34% 58% 

Engine failure 96% 80% 69% 66% 86% 

Counter light turbulence 10% 4% 3% 4% 11% 

Counter in excess of moderate turbulence 21% 2% 10% 11% 4% 

During crosswind conditions 84% 5% 3% 18% 82% 

Passenger comfort 5% 4% 4% 13% 20% 

Turn coordination 20% 17% 11% 14% 20% 

Yaw damper hard-over/malfunction 56% 52% 49% 50% 57% 

Dutch roll after yaw damper failure 30% 30% 36% 33% 30% 
10 

Instructed use of rudder – any aircraft. Three hundred and sixteen pilots described the phases of flight and 

circumstances in which they understood their training 

in any aircraft to recommend consideration of using the 

rudder pedal. Responses were analyzed for up to four 

aircraft (Table 5). 

Respondent perceptions of training recommendations 

for rudder use on any previous aircraft flown were fairly 

consistent with both recommendations of current aircraft 

(6.3a) and their intentions described in section 4-6 of 

the Rudder Survey. However, respondent perceptions for 

upset recovery rudder recommendations were higher than 

their current aircraft (by about 10%) but still lower than 

intentions reported in 4-6. Additionally, use for turn 

coordination was higher, suggesting that many had flown 

aircraft at some point in their career14 in which rudder 

input was required to maintain coordinated flight in turns. 

Rudder training. Four hundred twenty-six pilots of 

transport-category aircraft responded to items concerning 

their training involving rudder use. Thirty-four percent 

of respondents received additional training on rudder use 

in transport aircraft prior to February 2002, and 52% 

14 Review of aircraft currently flown by respondents suggests training to use 

rudder for turn coordination on those aircraft is very unlikely. Current aircraft 

flown overwhelmingly use yaw damper for turn coordination.

Table 4 

Percentage of Pilots Reporting That Training on Aircraft Currently Flown Recommended Rudder Use, 

Categorized by Flight Situation and Phase of Flight 

Flight Situation Phase of Flight 

Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Landing 

Upset recovery 36% 30% 29% 25% 35% 

Engine failure 97% 79% 66% 66% 88% 

Counter light turbulence 6% 3% 3% 2% 6% 

Counter in excess of moderate turbulence 11% 5% 6% 11% 11% 

During crosswind conditions 83% 7% 3% 5% 90% 

Passenger comfort 5% 3% 3% 3% 5% 

Turn coordination 15% 14% 12% 12% 15% 

Yaw damper hard-over/malfunction 36% 33% 33% 32% 38% 

Dutch roll after yaw damper failure 21% 21% 24% 21% 21% 

Table 5 

Percentage of Pilots Reporting Training Recommended Rudder Use Across All Aircraft Flown, 

Categorized by Flight Situation and Phase of Flight 

Flight Situation Phase of Flight 

Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Landing 

Upset recovery 46% 40% 40% 36% 43% 

Engine failure 93% 78% 66% 64% 85% 

Counter light turbulence 8% 5% 6% 4% 8% 

Counter in excess of moderate turbulence 18% 12% 11% 10% 16% 

During crosswind conditions 83% 11% 6% 9% 87% 

Passenger comfort 7% 5% 6% 5% 6% 

Turn coordination 33% 33% 28% 30% 32% 

Yaw damper hard-over/malfunction 37% 34% 35% 32% 38% 

Dutch roll after yaw damper failure 22% 23% 29% 22% 22% 
11

received additional training after February 2002 (Table 6). 

Only the B-757 was over-represented in rudder training. 

Training effectiveness. Most (89%) respondents 

described recurrent simulator training as moderately to 

greatly effective, 75% described training via safety publications as moderately to greatly effective, and 69% described 

classroom training as moderately to greatly effective. 

Additional training. A majority of respondents (58%) 

believe more rudder usage training in general would be 

beneficial. Respondents said that they would like more 

training on these topics: 

• 76% recurrent training 

• 75% rudder and flight control limitations

• 69% aerodynamics 

• 60% maneuvering speed 

• 56% input-output characteristics 

• 47% mechanical and hydraulics 

• 40% airplane systems

Four hundred twenty-seven pilots provided data about 

other specialized training they had received. Of these, 

58% reported aerobatic training (85% of those only a 

single course; 25% before 1980 and 25% since 1998). 

Facilities providing this training were widespread, as were 

aircraft models in which training was provided. Only 4% 

were graduates of a test pilot school.

Three hundred sixty-six pilots responded to questions 

about understanding of maneuvering speed limitations 

prior to February 2002, and 392 pilots responded to 

questions about understanding of maneuvering speed 

limitations after February 2002 (Table 7). 

These data indicate that a minority of respondents 

had inaccurate understanding of control limitations 

below maneuvering speed before FAA Notice N8400.28 

was released and that subsequent information transfer 

apparently reduced misunderstandings. However, up to 

one-fourth of the participants may have overestimated 

the protections offered by maneuvering speed. As discussed earlier in this report, it is possible to overstress the 

rudder below the maneuver speed by full cyclical deflections 

of the rudder, regardless of control surface deflections in 

the other axes.

Table 6 

Pilot Rudder-Use Training Percentages, Categorized by Time Frame and Type of Training 

Time Frame Type of Training 

 Recurrent 

simulator 

Recurrent

classroom 

Safety

bulletin 

Operations 

bulletin 

Aircraft 

checkout

Discussion 

with other 

Pilots 

Personal 

flying 

experience 

Pre-2002 

rudder 

training 

28% 18% 12% 12% 11% 11% 9%

Post-2002 

rudder 

training 

40% 31% 28% 28% 22% 16% 5%

Table 7 

Percentage of Agreement with Statements Concerning Rudder, Aileron, and Elevator Movements When 

Operating Below Maneuvering Speed on Transport Airplanes* 

Statement Level of 

agreement 

PreFebruary Post

February 

I can simultaneously move the rudder, the aileron and the 

elevator controls back and forth, anywhere within their full 

range of movement. 

agree

neither agree 

or disagree 

disagree

36.1% 

12.0% 

51.9% 

25.1% 

11.4% 

63.5% 

I can rapidly move the rudder control back and forth anywhere 

within its full range of movement, provided elevator and aileron 

controls remain fixed. 

agree

neither agree 

or disagree 

disagree

17.2% 

12.6% 

70.2% 

 7.9% 

11.0% 

81.1% 

I can rapidly move the rudder pedals to full deflection but not 

subsequently rapidly reverse the pedals to the full opposite 

position. 

agree

neither agree 

or disagree 

disagree

40.5% 

12.1% 

47.7% 

37.2% 

11.3% 

51.5% 

*Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. 
12 

Discussion

Although the Web-based survey resulted in a non-random but representative sampling of turbojet air transport 

operations worldwide, it was not representative of turboprop operations. Survey methodologies have a number 

of limitations, which were discussed above. However, an 

additional methodological issue limits interpretation of 

over-and under-representation of aircraft in a number of 

our analyses. We have information on aircraft that pilots 

currently operated, and we can tell how well our sample 

represents the pilot population during the period on which 

the survey was conducted. However, we do not have data 

on all the aircraft that respondents have flown during their 

career and the time periods in which they operated each 

model. Statistical differences in aircraft representation in 

upset experiences, system characteristics, and control issues 

could be due to known characteristics of an aircraft model, 

an unconsidered issue, or a methodological or statistical 

anomaly. They may be due solely to exposure – during 

their career, pilots may have flown older (at the time of 

the survey) and narrow-body aircraft, than newer and 

wide-body aircraft. Where over-representation has been 

found, it is worth examining but cannot be construed 

as having discovered an aircraft category or type problem in our data. Without these analyses, a reader might 

have, for example, cited the A-320 as the most common 

aircraft on which upsets were reported, not recognizing 

that it was simply the most common aircraft currently 

flown by respondents. We must be careful also not to 

over-interpret that B-727, DC-9, and MD-80/90/95 

were over-represented in upset reports.

Results suggested that while upsets remain rare 

events, they can reasonably be expected at some point 

in a pilot’s career. Pilots reported and quantified 405 

upset events. These events were perceived as resulting 

primarily from wake vortex encounters and atmospheric 

disturbances. Malfunctions and faults and unintended 

inputs were described for far fewer reported events. Approach was the most frequent phase of flight in which 

upsets were reported. Narrow-body aircraft appeared to 

be over-represented in upset reports. The B-727, DC-9, 

and MD80/90/95 were over-represented, but B-737s, 

A-320s, and regional jets were not. Typical upsets (approximately the central 50% of each distribution; 25th

to 75th percentiles) were 2 to 15 deg nose-up and/or 0 

to 10 deg nose- down, 20 to 45 deg of bank, and 0 to 

10 deg of yaw. These events were predominantly roll 

events, consistent with wake vortex encounters. Slightly 

less than half of reported upsets described a pitch or roll 

exceedance of one or more of the upset criteria of the 

Upset Recovery Training Aid. However, because of the 

definition used in the survey, all of the reported events 

were understood as requiring immediate corrective action 

by the pilots on the scene. This is important because it 

indicates that pilots may perceive the need to intervene 

from unexpected accelerations towards an upset event, 

rather than by observing extreme values. That level of 

awareness is desirable but underscores the need to apply 

control corrections appropriately.

Areas of Concern

The results suggested several areas of concern. 

Control Inputs

About one-sixth of pilots who reported encountering 

upsets also reported over-controlling or making opposite 

direction inputs that had to be neutralized or reversed. 

Situations included sequential opposite-rudder pedal inputs, over-controlling or wrong-direction inputs requiring 

neutralizing or reversing inputs, unintentionally applied 

crossed controls, unintentional inputs to the rudder system, and application of rudder longer than was required. 

About one-eighth of pilots reported unexpected rudder characteristics, including forces, motions, responses, 

or sensitivity, malfunctions that resulted in a yaw or roll 

upset, and inappropriate inputs by an automatic system in 

response to or during recovery from upsets. IATA (2008) 

reported respondent comments describing inappropriate inputs; these were limited to yaw damper or rudder 

control system and autothrottle anomalies. There were 

a number of reports of observing another pilot confused 

or making inappropriate control inputs. 

Analyses also suggested some degree of mismatch 

between respondents’ perceptions of training recommendations and their reported intentions to use rudder 

versus guidance provided by manufactures and the Upset 

Recovery Training Aid. For example, the Aid states:

Large, swept-wing transport aircraft are normally not 

maneuvered with the rudder, except for non-normal 

flight control conditions, takeoff and landing crosswinds, or when there are asymmetric thrust requirements (p. 3.8).

In contrast, one-third to one-half of respondents (depending upon the phase of flight) said they would use 

rudder in upset recovery, and one-third would use rudder 

to counter Dutch roll following a yaw damper failure. 

Smaller numbers describe similar intentions in other 

situations. There are some further mismatches between 

reported intentions and perceptions of training recommendations. Fewer respondents describe their training in 

their current aircraft as advocating rudder use for upset 

recovery than the number of respondents who would 

consider rudder use in those situations. An examination 

of percentages in Tables 4 and 5 allows documentation 

of inconsistency with published guidance. For example, 

the percentages of those who said they would consider 
13

rudder use for upset recovery, turbulence, and Dutch roll 

coordination are inconsistent with industry, manufacturer, 

and FAA guidance. Other percentages, such as intention 

to use rudder for crosswind correction or engine failure 

on takeoff or landing, should approach 100% but did 

not in the responses we received. These are potentially 

valuable data points for training revision or emphasis; 

they suggest that training initiatives following the AA 

587 accident have not yet produced the desired results. 

The number of sequential opposite-direction rudder 

inputs and reversed over-applications of rudder reported 

by the respondents is important. It implies that the 

AA 587 Airbus accident differs in magnitude but not 

in fundamental misinterpretation or application error 

from events reported by respondents. Pilots reported a 

number of situations, mostly erroneous inputs requiring 

neutralization or reversal, which had the potential to 

exceed certification criteria but probably did not reach 

ultimate load (Hess, 2008). This is consistent with findings reported by Hoh (2010), which found that pilots in 

a simulator experiment tended to over control and apply 

large g forces to the vertical stabilizer when attempting 

to augment aileron with rudder inputs. This indicates 

an ongoing concern.

Monitoring Controls by the Non-Flying Pilot 

While the majority of respondents reported efforts 

to monitor the controls when acting as non-flying or 

monitoring pilot in a variety of phases of flight, monitoring sidestick pitch and roll was reported by many fewer 

respondents. Respondents describe monitoring control 

column and wheel for most phases of flight, and rudder 

during takeoff, approach, and landing. However, monitoring sidestick inputs is challenging, because they are not 

yoked on the airplanes flown by survey participants, as 

are control columns, and are near the limit of peripheral 

vision.15 Monitoring the rudder was described as requiring 

light contact with the pedals or keeping one’s feet adjacent 

to the pedals to detect displacement. Visual monitoring 

of the rudder is limited to observing indices or slip indicators. A reasonable inference is that non-flying pilots 

may not be aware of small rudder inputs being made by 

the flying pilot or at least not as aware as they would be 

of a control column or wheel input.

15 Whether sidestick inputs need to be monitored and observed can be debated. 

The monitoring pilot can observe the resulting deviation or feel the resulting 

acceleration even if unable to observe the roll or pitch input via the sidestick. 

Detecting, understanding, and correcting (if needed) the result is critical. On 

control-column aircraft, the input is clearly observable. The sidestick is not 

according to responding pilots. Observability may clarify the cause of a deviation 

as a pilot or autopilot input versus an environmental condition or malfunction.

Aircraft Differences 

With one exception (observability of sidestick inputs), 

the concerns highlighted in the survey are not make, model, or manufacturer-specific issues. Individual models were 

over-represented in a small number of disparate analyses. 

Several narrow-body aircraft were over-represented and 

wide-body aircraft were under-represented in the upset 

analyses. As a result, survey responses may not appear to 

offer much guidance for equipment or control design. 

However, the degree of mismatch between intentions 

and guidance regarding rudder use requires caution for 

rudder system design and characteristics. The rudder was 

reportedly used or considered for use in ways that were not 

always trained and in ways not recommended by the various manufacturers. Some of these uses were immediately 

recognized as errors by respondents in reported events. 

Future rudder designs should consider accommodating 

common mistakes made by pilots. 

Training 

Airlines that employ responding pilots appear to 

be addressing upset recovery training. Such training 

was reported by nearly half of respondents. More than 

three-quarters who reported training described it as 

covering all three control axes. Training in the simulator 

and classroom were most frequently reported. However, 

after 2002, while simulator and classroom training were 

30% to 50% more frequent, bulletins concerning rudder 

characteristics were reported to have doubled in frequency. 

Pilots described simulator training as being most effective 

for rudder characteristics. About half of all respondents 

received aerobatic training at least once in their career. 

Importantly, however, the data reveal continuing inconsistency between respondent intentions, perceptions 

of training recommendations, and published guidance 

concerning application of rudder. Specific areas requiring 

further emphasis based upon survey responses include:

• Avoidance of over-controlling or opposite-direction 

inputs, particularly involving rudder

• Explanation and understanding of rudder characteristics, including forces, motions, responses, and sensitivity

• Efforts to bring intentions to use rudder into close 

alignment with guidance provided in the Upset Recovery 

Training Aid

The majority of pilots believe they could benefit 

from additional training and prefer receiving it in the 

simulator, rather than via classroom instruction or bulletins. The majority of pilots would also like training 

on additional topics related to the rudder, as well as 

recurrent training in rudder usage. However, there are 

real concerns raised when pursuing additional simulator 

training, because simulators have limited fidelity when 
14 

recreating upset conditions (Hess, 1997, 2002, 2004, 

2005, 2006, 2007, 2009; Hess & Stout, 1998; Mitchell & Klydt, 2001; Zeyada & Hess, 2003). Simulation 

dynamics may not accurately represent actual airplane 

dynamics, including both recovery performance and the 

forces and moments generated at high angles of attack 

(around and post-stall) and for large, sideslip angles. 

Two types of limitations are relevant to upset recovery 

training. First, simulators accurately replicate aircraft 

performance within specified envelopes of pitch, roll, 

yaw, speed, and configuration. These envelopes typically 

do not include serious upset conditions. Actions taken 

in the simulator might result in different performance 

when applied to the actual aircraft. Second, simulators 

generally cannot accurately replicate roll, yaw angle 

motion, and acceleration forces for sustained and 

large-amplitude maneuvers. The inability to replicate 

the positive and negative g forces that characterize all 

extreme attitude flight may limit a pilot’s ability to 

prepare for the kinesthetic of a real-world upset. 

Further, research resulted in mixed findings when 

examining transfer of simulator-based upset-recovery 

training to performance in an aircraft in flight. Though 

each study has limitations, appropriate upset recovery 

responses in aircraft trials were disappointingly low. 

Gawron (2002) found no recovery performance differences in a variable-stability Learjet 25, modified to 

simulate the control characteristics of an air transport 

airplane, among five groups of airline pilots with varying degrees of upset recovery training and/or aerobatics 

experience. Using the same aircraft, Kochan (2005) 

found that judgment, defined as the ability to analyze 

and learn from an in-flight upset, was a significant 

factor in successful upset recovery, especially when a 

pilot was not trained to proficiency in recovery. In a 

survey, Kochan, Breiter, Hilscher, and Priest (2005) 

found that, while pilots rated their ability to recover 

from loss-of-control situations as being greatly improved 

by upset-recovery training, most were unable to recall 

specific details about recovery maneuvers taught during their training. Pilots trained in a centrifuge-based 

flight simulator capable of generating continuous gforces were only marginally more successful than those 

trained on Microsoft Flight Simulator (Leland, Rogers, 

Boquet, & Glaser, 2009; Rogers, Boquet, Howell, & 

DeJohn, 2009). 

Findings and Recommendations

Findings 

1. Rudder is reported to be used more than the Rudder 

Survey Team expected.

2. Rudder is reported to be used or considered for use 

in ways not always trained and in ways not recommended by the manufacturers.

3. Erroneous and accidental inputs occur, and it is 

reasonable to assume that this will continue in the 

future. 

4. Some respondents reported making rudder pedal 

reversals (cyclic rudder-pedal commands).

5. Some respondents are not clear on appropriate use 

of rudder, and many felt they needed more training.

6. Wake vortex encounters were reported to be the most 

common initiator of upset events; these were most 

likely to be reported in the approach phase.

7. Respondents did not seem to be concerned with differences among control system designs across aircraft 

(no one mentioned a preference or disdain for any 

particular system).

Recommendations

1. Authorities, manufacturers, and operators should 

consider standards, designs, and operations that 

incorporate the results of this survey to ensure that 

airplanes are adequately equipped for the environments they fly in, are operated in such a way that 

wake vortex encounters are precluded, as much as 

possible, and that flight crews have the training and 

knowledge to deal with situations highlighted in this 

survey.

2. Specifically, continued emphasis on appropriate rudder use is warranted, given the frequency of reported 

events in which rudder reversal was a real possibility.

3. Future rudder designs should consider tolerance of 

common mistakes or inappropriate control inputs 

made by pilots. 

4. Research is warranted to gain better insight into pilots’ capabilities and required rudder-system design 

characteristics to effectively and safely combine continuous compensatory rudder inputs with roll control 

inputs during a variety of conditions including:

»turn coordination,

» wake vortex encounters, 

» moderate-to-high turbulence, and 

» manual damping of the airplane’s Dutch roll motion 

after a yaw damper failure.

This research may provide additional, valuable pilot 

training guidance. 
15

References

Federal Aviation Administration (2008). Administrator’s 

fact book. Office of the Assistant Administrator 

for Financial Services, Washington, DC. Retrieved 

from http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/aba/admin_factbook/

Federal Aviation Administration (2009). Design maneuvering speed limitation statement. FAA-2009-0810; 

Notice No. 09-10, RIN 2120-AJ21 Federal Register, 

74, 45777-45781. Retrieved from http://rgl.faa.

gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgNPRM.

nsf/0/8ab55a430816ade786257627004f06c6!

OpenDocument&ExpandSection=6

Flight International (2007). Flight’s annual world airliner census. Flight International, 21, pp. 35-54. 

Retrieved from http://www.flightglobal.com/

articles/2007/08/21/216126/exclusive-flightsannual-world-airliner-census-2007.html

Gawron, V.J. (2002). Airplane upset training evaluation 

report, NASA CR-2002-211405, Moffett Field, 

CA: NASA Ames Research Center. Retrieved from

http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS69667

Hess, R.A. (1997). Unified theory for aircraft handling 

qualities and adverse aircraft pilot coupling. Journal 

of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 20, 1141-1148.

Hess, R.A. & Stout, P.W. (1998). Assessing aircraft 

susceptibility to nonlinear aircraft-pilot coupling/

pilot-induced oscillations. Journal of Guidance, 

Control, and Dynamics, 21, (6) 957-964.

Hess, R.A. (2002). Pilot control. In P.S. Tang & M.A. 

Vidulich (Eds.), Principles and Practice of Aviation 

Psychology, (pp. 265-310). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Hess, R.A. (2004). Handling qualities and flight safety 

implications of rudder control strategies and systems 

in transport aircraft. Paper presented at the American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Atmospheric 

Flight Mechanics Conference, Providence, RI.

Hess, R.A. (2005). Rudder control strategies and forcefeel system designs in transport aircraft. Journal of 

Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 28, (6) 1251-

1262. doi: 10.2514/1.12632.

Hess, R.A. (2006). Certification and design issues for 

rudder control systems in transport aircraft. Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 29, (5) 

1210-1220.

Hess, R.A. (2007). Piloted simulation study of rudder 

pedal force/feel characteristics. #NNL06-AA04A; 

WBS 457280.02.07.07.03. Retrieved from 

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.

gov/20070018161_2007016816.pdf 

Hess, R.A. (2008). Flight control system design for 

inherent damage tolerance. Journal of Aircraft, 45, 

(6) 2024-2035. doi:10.2514/1.36639.

Hess, R.A. (2008). Metric for the evaluation of pedal 

force/feel systems in transport aircraft. Journal of 

Aircraft, 45 (2) 651-662. doi: 10.2514/1.32710. 

Hess, R.A. (2009) Analytical assessment of flight simulator fidelity using pilot models. Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 32, (3) 760-770. 

doi:10.2514/1.40645.

Hoh, R.H. (2010, March). Criteria to mitigate rudder 

overcontrol in transport aircraft. Paper presented 

at the Meeting of Aerospace Control and Guidance 

Systems Committee, Stateline, NV.

International Air Transport Association (2008). Survey on 

yaw/roll upsets: Data analysis final report. Contractor Report. Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ.

Kochan, J. (2005). The role of domain expertise and 

judgment in dealing with unexpected events. 

Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department 

of Psychology, University of Central Florida, 

Orlando, FL.

Kochan, J.A. Breiter, E., Hilscher, M. & Priest, J.E. (2005, 

September). Pilots’ perception and retention of inflight upset recovery training: Evidence for review 

and practice. Paper presented at the Proceedings 

of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 49th 

Annual Meeting, Orlando, FL. 

Lambregts, A.A., Nesemeier, G., Wilborn, J., & Newman, 

R.L. (2008, August). Airplane upsets: Old problem, new issues. Paper presented at the American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Modeling 

and Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit, 

Honolulu, HI.

Leland, R., Rogers, R. O., Boquet, A., & Glaser, S. 

(2009). An experiment to evaluate transfer of upsetrecovery training conducted using two different 

flight simulation devices, Technical Report, DOT/

FAA/AM-09/17, Federal Aviation Administration, 

Office of Aerospace Medicine, Washington DC. 

Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/library/reports/

medical/oamtechreports/2000s/media/200917.pdf 
16 

Mitchell, D. G.,& Klydt, D.H. (2001). Bandwidth criteria for category I and II pilot-induced oscillations. In 

M.F. Shafer,and P. Steinmetz, (Eds.). Pilot-induced 

oscillation research: Status at the end of the century. 

doi: 20010038270.

National Transportation Safety Board (2004a). In-flight 

separation of vertical stabilizer: American Airlines 

flight 587, Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, 

Belle Harbor, New York, November 12, 2001. 

Aircraft accident report NTSB/AAR-04/04, Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/

aar0404.pdf

National Transportation Safety Board. (2004b). Safety 

recommendations A-04-56 through -62. Retrieved 

from http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2004/

a04_56_62.pdf 

Rogers, R.O., Boquet, A., Howell, C., & DeJohn, C. 

(2009). An experiment to evaluate transfer of 

low-cost simulator-based upset-recovery training. 

FAA Technical Report DOT /FAA/AM-09/5, Office 

of Aerospace Medicine, Washington, DC, 20591. 

Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/library/reports/

medical/oamtechreports/2000s/media/200905.pdf

Upset Recovery Industry Team. (2008). Airplane upset 

recovery training aid, revision 2. Federal Aviation 

Administration & Airline Industry, Washington, 

DC. Retrieved from www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/

AP_UpsetRecovery_Book.pdf

Zeyada, Y., & Hess, R.A. (2003). Computer-aided assessment of flight simulator fidelity. Journal of Aircraft, 

40, (4) 173-180. doi: 10.2514/2.2836.
A1

Appendix A

Rudder Survey

Contact Us | Help | Privacy Policy | Terms of Use

Rudder and Flight Control Experience in Transport Airplanes

 

This electronic survey collects information from transport airplane pilots on the use of rudder in 

transport airplanes and on the use of flight controls during yaw/roll upsets. Yaw/roll upsets are 

generally caused by turbulence, system malfunction or pilot input. 

The information you provide on this survey will enable IATA and industry representatives to assess and 

understand the use of rudder in transport airplanes and the use of flight controls during yaw/roll upsets

based on actual pilot experience and training. 

Confidentiality Assured: All responses to survey and demographic items are confidential and 

anonymous. 

A contact information section is provided at the end of the survey. This information is strictly voluntary 

and will only be used to clarify information you provided in the survey. 

Definition: Upset - In this survey, “upset” means an airplane motion that the pilot believed required 

immediate corrective action. 

When choosing from a pull-down list, please "click-out" of the list before using the scroll wheel on your 

mouse. Scrolling while still in the pull-down list may cause the value to change unexpectedly. 

The survey will take approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete. Please complete all questions fully 

and to the best of your ability. Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 

Purpose and Rationale:

Start Survey

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A2 

 

 

 

1-1. Please indicate the Pilot Certificates you hold: (Check all that apply) 

Other Specify: ( ) 

1-2. Please indicate your flight time (flight hours) for the following 

1-3. Please indicate the transport airplane(s) in which you are qualified including the model you currently fly and for 

each indicate, your crew position or positions: 

1-4a. Please indicate your current type of employment(s): (Check all that apply) 

1-4b. Please indicate the type(s) of flying you currently do: (Check all that apply) 

1-5. Are you currently flying other airplanes (non-transport, e.g. general aviation, military reserves, etc.)? 

Commercial Pilot Certificate 

Senior Commercial Pilot Certificate 

Airline Transport Pilot Certificate 

Total All Aircraft Civil Transport Military Transport

Total Pilot-Time (PIC + CP):

Pilot-in-Command:

Simulator:

Airplane Model: Crew Position(s): 

Please select all the applicable crew positions

A: --Select-- Pilot Copilot Instructor/Check Pilot 

Click here to enter for another airplane.

Civil Airline Training Facility Military 

Manufacturer Corporate Other (Specify: )

Line Pilot Training/Checkpilot 

Maintenance Test Engineering Test 

Other Specify: ( )

Not actively flying transports 

(Last flew transport airplane in the year: )

Yes No

Please list airplane model(s): 

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A3

1-6. Country of primary employment: 

 

A: 

B: 

C: 

--Select--

Submit

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A4 

 

 

 

Reminder: In this survey "upset" means an airplane motion that a pilot believed required immediate corrective action. 

2-1. Have you ever experienced any yaw/roll "upsets" in a transport airplane either as the pilot flying (PF) or pilot-notflying (PNF)? 

Event : 1 

Please fill in the table below for each yaw/roll "upset" that you have experienced beginning with the most severe. 

Please identify all information: 

2-1a. Airplane Model: 

2-1b. Phase of Flight: 

2-1c. Were you the pilot flying or the pilot not flying? 

2-1d. Cause of "upset": 

2-1e. Please describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events in the "upset". 

2-1f. Please describe the recovery techniques that were used in the "upset". 

2-1g. Magnitude of "upset": 

Yes No

--Select--

--Select--

Pilot flying Pilot not flying

--Select--

A: Pitch attitude reached:

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A5

 

Degrees of Nose Up 

Degrees of Nose 

Down 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

B: Bank angle reached: Degrees 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

Direction: 

--Select--

C: Air speed reached: knots (minimum) 

knots (maximum) 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

D: G-Load reached: g's (minimum) 

g's (maximum) 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

E: Altitude Lost: feet 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

F: Duration (triggering event through 

recovery):

<1 second 

seconds 

G: Yaw Angle Reached: degrees 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

Enter Next Event

Submit

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A6 

 

 

 

3-1. Please indicate any unexpected rudder system characteristics you have experienced on any of the transport airplane

(s) that you have flown. Please use the accompanying table and begin with the airplane model you currently fly, or the 

last airplane model you have flown. 

3-2. In a transport airplane, have you ever experienced a rudder system malfunction that resulted in a yaw/roll upset? 

Examples of rudder malfunctions include yaw damper malfunctions, rudder autopilot malfunctions, trim runaways, or 

other failures that cause uncommanded rudder motion. 

3-3. In a transport airplane, have you ever had an automatic system make inappropriate rudder inputs in response to a 

yaw/roll upset? 

3-4. In a transport airplane, has autothrottle input ever caused a problem in recovering from a yaw/roll upset such as a 

wake vortex encounter? 

Airplane Model --Select--

Did you feel unexpected pedal force (e.g. pedal binding, encountering an unexpected control 

stop, heavy or light pedal forces)? Yes No

Did you feel unexpected pedal motion? Yes No

Did you experience no response to commanded input (e.g. sluggish)? Yes No

Did you experience unexpected sensitivity to small rudder inputs? Yes No

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Airplane Model: Description: 

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A7

3-5. In a transport airplane, in response to a yaw/roll upset have you made sequential opposite rudder pedal inputs 

(rudder reversals)? 

3-6. Pilots may have to make rapid decisions and rapid inputs within a few seconds. During such times in a transport 

airplane have you ever overcontrolled or made an input in the wrong direction (even briefly) that you then had to 

neutralize or reverse? 

 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Event 1: 

Which of the following occurred? 

Overcontrolled Controlled in the wrong direction 

Which pilot commanded control input did you inadvertently or erroneously apply? Indicate all that apply: 

Rudder/Yaw Control Roll Control Pitch Control 

Please describe the circumstances; how you or your fellow pilot discovered the over-command or wrong direction 

control input and how you or your fellow pilot neutralized it for the event 

Click here to enter another event. 

Submit

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A8 

Rudder and Flight Control Experience in Transport Airplanes 

 

 

 

4-1. In a transport airplane, have you ever been in a situation where you unintentionally commanded uncoordinated 

(cross-controlled) rudder pedal and control wheel/sidestick commands? 

4-2. Have you ever inadvertently pushed on a rudder pedal in flight in a transport airplane? 

Yes No

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Please provide airplane model and describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events, cause 

(if known) and recovery techniques for each event. 

Airplane Model: --Select--

Reason(s) for inadvertent input (Check all that apply):

Other Describe:

Turning in the seat Stretching, yawning, or sneezing 

Reaching Adjusting seat position for confort

Magnitude of event:

A: Pitch attitude reached: Degrees of Nose Up 

Degrees of Nose 

Down 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

B: Bank angle reached: Degrees 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

Direction: 

--Select--

C: Air speed reached: knots (minimum) 

knots (maximum) 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

D: G-Load reached: g's (minimum) 

g's (maximum) 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

E: Altitude Lost: feet 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

03/24/2005
A9

4-3. In transport airplanes, do you monitor the rudder pedal, when you are the pilot not flying, during any of the 

following phases of flight? Indicate all that apply for up to the last three airplanes models you have flown. 

4-4 In a transport airplane, have you ever applied rudder pedal longer than was required, for example after an engineout takeoff? 

4-5. In a transport airplane, after encountering a turbulence situation, for example wake vortices, did you perceive that 

the airplane motion, for any event, ... 

F: Duration (triggering event through 

recovery):

<1 second 

seconds 

G: Yaw Angle Reached: degrees 

Don't Know/Don't Recall 

Yes No

Airplane Model: --Select--

Phase of flight you monitored:

Other 

Takeoff Cruise Descent 

Approach Landing Don't Know/Don't Recall 

How did you monitor?

Other 

Visually 

Light Pressure 

Click here to enter another airplane model. 

Yes No

Please provide airplane model and indicate the circumstances, how you realized the unintentional commands and how 

you neutralized it for each event. 

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

...was stopping on its own: Yes No

...required pilot action to maintain control of the airplane: Yes No

...required pilot action to ensure passenger comfort: Yes No

Please provide the airplane model and describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events, 

cause (if known) and recovery techniques for each event. 

Airplane Model: Description: 

03/24/2005
A10 

4-6. Please indicate which circumstances you would consider use rudder pedal in a transport airplane during the listed 

phases of flight (e.g., to counter turbulence, for roll control, for passenger comfort). Please indicate all that apply for 

each airplane model you fly beginning with the transport airplane you currently fly or the last transport airplane model 

you have flown. 

Click here enter information for another airplane. 

 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Airplane Model --Select--

Rudder Pedal Usage Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Landing

Upset Recovery

Engine failure

Counter Light Turbulence

Counter Turbulence (In Excess Of Moderate Turbulence)

During Crosswind Conditions

Passenger Comfort

Turn Coordination

Yaw Damper Hardovers or Other Malfunctions

Dutch Roll After a Yaw Damper Failure

Submit

03/24/2005
A11

 

 

 

Please note:

The following six (6) questions are about your observations of another pilot's action in the cockpit. 

5-1. Do you, as a matter of course, directly monitor the other pilot's control inputs in the transport airplanes that you 

have flown? (e.g., visually observe or feel column, wheel, pedal, or sidestick movements). Please indicate Yes (Y) or 

No (N) for each transport airplane you fly, beginning with the transport airplane you currently fly or transport airplane 

last flown. 

5-2. If you cannot directly monitor the other pilot's control inputs in transport airplane(s), please explain why (e.g. 

sidestick out of view). 

5-3. In a transport airplane, have you observed that any of your fellow pilots ever seemed confused by the airplane's 

reaction to a yaw/roll upset? 

Airplane Model --Select--

Phase of Flight Control Column Sidestick Pitch Control Wheel Sidestick Roll Pedal

Takeoff Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Climb Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Approach Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Landing Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Other Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Click here to enter for another Airplane. 

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Did it appear that the pilot flying was making what you thought were incorrect inputs to control wheel, rudder pedal or 

throttle? 

Yes No

Please provide airplane model and describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events, cause 

(if known) and recovery techniques for the event: 

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

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A12 

5-4. As the pilot not flying in a transport airplane, have you been aware that the pilot flying incorrectly applied 

commanded control inputs either by overcommanding the control or commanding the control in the wrong direction 

that they then had to neutralize or reverse? 

Event 1:

The pilot in question: 

Overcontrol OR Control in the wrong direction? Which pilot commanded control input did they inadvertently or 

erroneously apply? Indicate all that apply: 

Please provide airplane model and describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events, cause 

(if known) and recovery techniques for the event: 

Click here to enter another event. 

5-5. As the pilot not flying in a transport airplane, have you ever been aware that the pilot flying held the rudder pedal 

in longer than was required? 

5-6. As the pilot not flying in transport airplane, have you ever been aware that the pilot flying accidentally pushed on a 

rudder pedal? 

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Rudder/Yaw Control Roll Control Pitch Control 

Airplane Model: Description: 

 --Select--

Yes No

Please provide airplane model and describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events, cause 

(if known) and recovery techniques for the event: 

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Yes No

Event 1:

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Did the pilot flying realize that he/she had accidentally made a rudder pedal input? 

Yes No

Please provide airplane model and describe the initial conditions, triggering event, rate and sequence of events, cause 

(if known) and recovery techniques for the event: 

Airplane Model: Description: 

A: --Select--

 

Click here to enter another event. 

Submit

Rudder Survey

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A14 

 

 

 

6-1. Have you taken unusual attitude recovery training? 

Please complete the following, for the last three courses of training, in any airplane, not just transport airplanes. 

6-2. Have you received simulator training in unusual attitude recovery in transport airplanes? 

6-3a. In your training, for the transport airplane you currently fly OR the last transport airplane you flew, were 

you instructed to use rudder pedal control inputs for any of the following situations? Select the airplane model, usage, 

and flight phase(s) for each instruction: 

Yes No

Month Year Aiplane Model Training Type(s) 

Select all that apply:

A: --Select--

Airplane

Simulator

Classroom

Click here to enter information for another course. 

Yes No

Axes Covered 

Select all that apply: Month Year Aiplane Model Training Type(s) Select all that apply:

A:

Pitch

Roll

Yaw

--Select--

Airplane

Simulator

Classroom

Click here to enter information for another course. 

Airplane Model --Select--

Rudder Pedal Usage Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Landing

Upset Recovery

Engine Failure

Counter Light Turbulence

Counter Turbulence In Excess Of Moderate Turbulence

During Crosswind Conditions

Passenger Comfort

Turn Coordination

Yaw Damper Hardovers Or Other Malfunctions

Dutch Roll After A Yaw Damper Failure

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6-3b. In your training for any airplane (other than the one you currently fly), were you instructed to use rudder pedal 

control inputs for any of the following? Select the airplane model, usage, and flight phase(s) for each instruction: 

6-4. Is your current understanding of rudder usage in transport airplane(s) consistent with your training prior to 

February 2002? 

 

Click here to enter information for another course.

Airplane Model --Select--

Rudder Pedal Usage Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Landing

Upset Recovery

Engine Failure

Counter Light Turbulence

Counter Turbulence In Excess Of Moderate Turbulence

During Crosswind Conditions

Passenger Comfort

Turn Coordination

Yaw Damper Hardovers Or Other Malfunctions

Dutch Roll After A Yaw Damper Failure

Click here to enter information for another course.

Yes No N/A

Other (Please Specify: ) 

Recurrent Classroom Training Recurrent Simulator Training 

Personal Flying Experience Safety Bulletin 

Airplane Checkout Flight Crew Operations Bulletin 

Discussions With Other Pilots 

Submit

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A16 

 

 

 

7-1. Have you received additional training on using rudder in transport airplane(s) after February 2002? 

7-2. To what extent do you feel that the following types of rudder training methods prepared you to deal with yaw/roll 

upsets in transport airplanes: 

Please rank the preparation (if any) that each of the following types of training methods offered you, on a scale of 1 to 

5, based on the below chart: 

N/A = Do not use 

1 = No preparation gained 

2 = Limited preparation gained 

3 = Moderate preparation gained 

4 = Considerable preparation gained 

5 = Great preparation gained 

Please indicate your response to the following questions:

7-3. Have you had upset recovery classroom training for transport airplane(s) after February 2002? 

7-4. Do you feel more training in transport airplane(s) rudder usage would be beneficial to you? 

7-5. Do you feel recurrent training in transport airplane(s) rudder usage would be beneficial to you? 

Yes No

What type of training did you receive? Indicate all that apply: 

Other (Please Specify: ) 

Recurrent Classroom Training Recurrent Simulator Training 

Personal Flying Experience Safety Bulletin 

Airplane Checkout Flight Crew Operations Bulletin 

Discussions With Other Pilots 

N/A 1 2 3 4 5

Safety Publications (FCOBs):

Classroom Training:

Simulator:

Yes No

Please specify the three (3) most recent airplanes you have had training in:

A: --Select--

Click here to enter another airplane 

Yes No

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7-6. Please indicate the rudder usage topics covered in your training. Indicate all that apply: 

7-7. Have you taken acrobatic training (including military fighter/attack training)? 

7-8. Are you a graduate of Test Pilot School? 

 

Yes No

Other - Please list: 

Aerodynamics Limitations of Rudder/Flight Control Systems

Mechanical/Hydraulic Maximum Design Maneuvering Airspeed

Airplane Systems Input-Output Characteristics (pedal breakout, forces, 

displacements)

Input-Output Characteristics (pedal breakout, forces, 

displacements)

Yes No

Please complete the following for up to the last three courses of training:

Month Year Facility Airplane Model

A: 00 0000

Click here to enter another course.

Yes No

Submit

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This question applies to your experiences before February 2002.

8-1. Please indicate your agreement (by referring to the following chart) with the following statement based on your 

training prior to February 2002. 

1 = Strongly Disagree 

2 = Disagree 

3 = Neither Agree or Disagree 

4 = Agree 

5 = Strongly Agree 

At speeds below maneuver speed, VA, I can move the rudder as follows without causing structural overload: 

This question applies to your experiences after February 2002.

8-2. Based on your knowledge of VA after February 2002, please indicate your agreement (by referring to the 

following chart) with the following statements. 

1 = Strongly Disagree 

2 = Disagree 

3 = Neither Agree or Disagree 

4 = Agree 

5 = Strongly Agree 

At speeds below maneuver speed, VA, I can move the rudder as follows without causing structural overload:

 

1 2 3 4 5

A: I can simultaneously move the rudder, the aileron and the elevator controls back and forth, 

anywhere within their full range of movement.

B: I can rapidly move the rudder control back and forth anywhere within its full range of 

movement, provided elevator and aileron controls remain fixed.

C: I can rapidly move the rudder pedals to full deflection but not subsequently rapidly reverse the 

pedals to the full opposite position.

1 2 3 4 5

A: I can simultaneously move the rudder, the aileron and the elevator controls back and forth, 

anywhere within their full range of movement.

B: I can rapidly move the rudder control back and forth anywhere within its full range of 

movement, provided elevator and aileron controls remain fixed.

C: I can rapidly move the rudder pedals to full deflection but not subsequently rapidly reverse the 

pedals to the full opposite position.

Submit

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9-1. Please indicate your level of agreement (by referring to the following chart) for the last transport airplane model 

flown by you. 

1 = Strongly Disagree 

2 = Disagree 

3 = Neither Agree or Disagree 

4 = Agree 

5 = Strongly Agree 

Please select the airplane model that you have flown last: 

Part Seven: Demographics 

9-2. Please select your age category. 

9-3. Please indicate your gender. 

9-4. Please provide your e-mail address. 

(This is strictly voluntary and will be used only to clarify information you provided in the survey.) 

 

1 2 3 4 5

A: It requires the same foot force and pedal displacement to reach maximum rudder at both low and 

high speeds.

B: It requires more foot force and pedal displacement at high speed to reach maximum rudder than 

it does at low speed.

C: It requires more foot force and pedal displacement at low speed to reach maximum rudder than 

it does at high speed.

Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and up

Male Female

E-mail Address: 

Submit

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
A20 

Contact Us | Help | Privacy Policy | Terms of Use

Rudder and Flight Control Experience in Transport Airplanes

 Thank You!

Thank you very much for your time and your cooperation is very well appreciated. 

A Survey on Rudder Upset Events

Rudder Survey

03/24/2005
B1

APPENDIX B

Organizations Participating in the Development of the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid Revision 2

ABX Air, Inc.

A.M. Carter Associates

(Institute for Simulation & Training)

Air Transport Association

Airbus

Air Line Pilots Association

AirTran Airways

Alaska Airlines, Inc.

All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd.

Allied Pilots Association

Aloha Airlines, Inc.

American Airlines, Inc.

American Trans Air, Inc.

Ansett Australia

Bombardier Aerospace Training Center

(Regional Jet Training Center)

British Airways

Calspan Corporation

Cathay Pacific Airways Limited

Cayman Airways, Ltd.

Civil Aviation House

Continental Airlines, Inc.

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

Deutsche Lufthansa AG

EVA Airways Corporation

Federal Aviation Administration

FlightSafety International

Flight Safety Foundation

Hawaiin Airlines

International Air Transport Association

Japan Airlines Co., Ltd.

Lufthansa German Airlines

Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.

National Transportation Safety Board

Northwest Airlines, Inc.

Qantas Airways, Ltd.

SAS Flight Academy

Southwest Airlines

The Boeing Company

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

United Air Lines, Inc.

Upset Doamain Training Institute

US Airways, Inc.

Veridian

C1

Appendix C

Survey Purposes and Question Cross-Reference

The survey was designed to determine: 

• If and to what extent pilots recognize control upsets, their sources, and their severity

• If pilots perceive higher numbers of control anomalies or difficulties in any one particular axis

• If pilots recognize differences in external disturbances from airplane/pilot induced

• Pilot perceptions of control upsets

• Whether specific categories of airline operators exhibit more control problems than others 

• If there are specific airplane types that contribute to control problems 

• If specific background/training contribute to control problems 

• If pilots have observed fellow pilots miss-control airplanes and what circumstances contribute to miss-controls 

• If pilots recognize when the may have made incorrect control inputs

• If any particular axis is more sensitive and has a higher perceived set of control problems 

• If there are certain sets of circumstances that may trigger control issues

• Whether pilots perceive positives or negatives in various airplane control systems designs

• If pilots perceive any positive or negatives in specific pedal/rudder control system designs 

• Whether pilots are ever confused about which control to use or which direction to apply a control 

• How pilots perceive themselves controlling upsets

• From pilots’ perspectives, where in the flight envelope, upsets most frequently occur

• Under what types of conditions and circumstances pilots are taught to use rudder

• Whether pilots are familiar with pedal usage in all phases of flight

• Level of system knowledge, particularly of the rudder system

• Pilots’ perceptions of deficiencies of rudder control systems
C2 

Table C-1. Rudder Survey Purpose and Cross-References to Questions 

Survey 

Quest # 

Purpose

1

Purpose

2

Purpose

3

Purpose

4

Purpose

5

Purpose

6

Purpose

7

Purpose

8

Purpose

9

Purpose

10

Purpose

11

Purpose

12

Purpose

13

Purpose

14

Purpose

15

Purpose

16

Purpose

17

Purpose

18

Purpose

19

Purpose

20

1 X X X X X X 2 X X X X X X 3 X X X X X X 4 X X X X X X 5 X X X X X X 6 X 7 X 8 X X X 9 X X 

10 X 11 12 13 X 14 X 15 X 16 X 17 X 18 X 19 20 X 21 X X X X X 22 X X X 23 X X X X X X 24 X X 25 X X X X 26 X X X X 27 X X X X 28 X X X X 29 X X X X 30 X X X 31 X X 
C3

Table C-1. Rudder Survey Purpose and Cross-References to Questions 

Survey 

Quest # 

Purpose

1

Purpose

2

Purpose

3

Purpose

4

Purpose

5

Purpose

6

Purpose

7

Purpose

8

Purpose

9

Purpose

10

Purpose

11

Purpose

12

Purpose

13

Purpose

14

Purpose

15

Purpose

16

Purpose

17

Purpose

18

Purpose

19

Purpose

20

32 X X 33 X 34 X 35 X X 36 37 X X 38 X X X 39 X 40 X X X X 41 X 42 X 43 X 44 X X X 45 X X