Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement for 

Continued Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Final Report 

Public Comments 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

NUREG-2157 

Volume 2 
NRC Reference Material 

As of November 1999, you may electronically access 

NUREG-series publications and other NRC records at 

NRC’s Public Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. Publicly released 

records include, to name a few, NUREG-series 

publications; Federal Register notices; applicant, 

licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence; 

NRC correspondence and internal memoranda; bulletins 

and information notices; inspection and investigative 

reports; licensee event reports; and Commission papers 

and their attachments. 

NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRC 

regulations, and Title 10, “Energy,” in the Code of

Federal Regulations may also be purchased from one 

of these two sources. 

1. The Superintendent of Documents 

 U.S. Government Printing Office 

 Mail Stop SSOP 

 Washington, DC 20402–0001 

 Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov 

 Telephone: 202-512-1800 

 Fax: 202-512-2250 

2. The National Technical Information Service 

Springfield, VA 22161–0002 

www.ntis.gov 

1–800–553–6847 or, locally, 703–605–6000 

A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is 

available free, to the extent of supply, upon written 

request as follows: 

Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

 Office of Administration 

 Publications Branch 

 Washington, DC 20555-0001 

E-mail: DISTRIBUTION.RESOURCE@NRC.GOV

Facsimile: 301–415–2289 

Some publications in the NUREG series that are 

posted at NRC’s Web site address 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs 

are updated periodically and may differ from the last 

printed version. Although references to material found on 

a Web site bear the date the material was accessed, the 

material available on the date cited may subsequently be 

removed from the site. 

Non-NRC Reference Material 

Documents available from public and special technical 

libraries include all open literature items, such as books, 

journal articles, transactions, Federal Register notices, 

Federal and State legislation, and congressional reports. 

Such documents as theses, dissertations, foreign reports 

and translations, and non-NRC conference proceedings 

may be purchased from their sponsoring organization. 

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a 

substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are 

maintained at— 

The NRC Technical Library 

Two White Flint North 

11545 Rockville Pike 

Rockville, MD 20852–2738 

These standards are available in the library for reference 

use by the public. Codes and standards are usually 

copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating 

organization or, if they are American National Standards, 

from— 

American National Standards Institute 

11 West 42nd Street 

New York, NY 10036–8002 

www.ansi.org 

212–642–4900 

 

AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS 

IN NRC PUBLICATIONS 

Legally binding regulatory requirements are stated only 

in laws; NRC regulations; licenses, including technical 

specifications; or orders, not in NUREG-series 

publications. The views expressed in contractorprepared publications in this series are not necessarily 

those of the NRC. 

 

The NUREG series comprises (1) technical and 

administrative reports and books prepared by the staff 

(NUREG–XXXX) or agency contractors (NUREG/CR–

XXXX), (2) proceedings of conferences (NUREG/CP–

XXXX), (3) reports resulting from international 

agreements (NUREG/IA–XXXX), (4) brochures 

(NUREG/BR–XXXX), and (5) compilations of legal 

decisions and orders of the Commission and Atomic and 

Safety Licensing Boards and of Directors’ decisions 

under Section 2.206 of NRC’s regulations (NUREG–

0750). 

DISCLAIMER: This report was prepared as an account 

of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. 

Government. Neither the U.S. Government nor any 

agency thereof, nor any employee, makes any warranty, 

expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or 

responsibility for any third party’s use, or the results of 

such use, of any information, apparatus, product, or 

process disclosed in this publication, or represents that 

its use by such third party would not infringe privately 

owned rights. 
Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement for 

Continued Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Final Report 

Public Comments 

Manuscript Completed: August 2014 

Date Published: September 2014 

Waste Confidence Directorate 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 

NUREG-2157 

Volume 2 

COVER SHEET 

Responsible Agency: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards 

Title: NUREG–2157, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel – Final Report, Volumes 1 and 2 

For additional copies or questions about this Generic Environmental Impact Statement, contact: 

 Sarah Lopas 

 NEPA Communications Project Manager 

 

Phone: 1-800-368-5642, extension 287-0675 

Email: Sarah.Lopas@nrc.gov 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

Waste Confidence Directorate 

Mail Stop 3WFN 14-C64 

11555 Rockville Pike 

Rockville, Maryland 20852 

September 2014 iii NUREG௅2157 

Abstract 

This Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel

(GEIS) generically determines the environmental impacts of continued storage, including those 

impacts identified in the remand by the Court of Appeals in the New York v. NRC decision, and 

provides a regulatory basis for a revision to 10 CFR 51.23 that addresses the environmental 

impacts of continued storage for use in future NRC environmental reviews. In this context, “the 

environmental impacts of continued storage” means those impacts that could occur as a result 

of the storage of spent nuclear fuel at at-reactor and away-from-reactor sites after a reactor’s 

licensed life for operation and until a permanent repository becomes available. The GEIS 

evaluates potential environmental impacts to a broad range of resources. Cumulative impacts 

are also analyzed. 

Because the timing of repository availability is uncertain, the GEIS analyzes potential 

environmental impacts over three possible timeframes: a short-term timeframe, which includes 

60 years of continued storage after the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation; an 

additional 100-year timeframe (60 years plus 100 years) to address the potential for delay in 

repository availability; and a third, indefinite timeframe to address the possibility that a repository 

never becomes available. All potential impacts in each resource area are analyzed for each 

continued storage timeframe. 

The GEIS contains several appendices that discuss specific topics of particular interest, 

including the technical feasibility of continued storage and repository availability as well as the 

two technical issues involved in the remand of New York v. NRC—spent fuel pool leaks and 

spent fuel pool fires. Finally the GEIS contains NRC’s responses to public comments on the 

draft GEIS and proposed Rule and in doing so provides additional technical background on, and 

explanation of, the GEIS’s analyses and conclusions. 

The GEIS also discusses the NRC’s Federal action—the adoption of a revised Rule, 

10 CFR 51.23, to codify (i.e., adopt into regulation) the analysis in the GEIS of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel—and the options the NRC could 

take under the no-action alternative. 

September 2014 v 185(*௅

Contents 

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... iii 

Figures ....................................................................................................................................... xix 

Tables......................................................................................................................................... xxi 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ xxiii

Abbreviations/Acronyms ....................................................................................................... lxvii

Units of Measure ...................................................................................................................... lxxi

1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 History of Waste Confidence .................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 Scope of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement .......................................... 1-4

1.3 Purpose of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement ....................................... 1-

1.4 Proposed Federal Action .......................................................................................... 1-

 Purpose of and Need for the Proposed Action ......................................................... 1-6

1.6 Alternatives ............................................................................................................... 1-6

1.6.1 No-Action Alternative .................................................................................... 1-6

1.6.1.1 Site-Specific Review Option........................................................... 1-

1.6.1.2 GEIS-Only Option .......................................................................... 1-8

1.6.1.3 Policy-Statement Option ................................................................ 1-8

1.6.2 Alternatives Considered but Eliminated ........................................................ 1-9

1.6.2.1 Cessation of Licensing or Cessation of Reactor Operation ........... 1-9

1.6.2.2 Implementing Additional Regulatory Requirements ..................... 1-10

1.6.3 Comparison of Reasonable Alternatives .................................................... 1-10

 Public and Agency Involvement ............................................................................. 1-11

 Scoping Process ......................................................................................... 1-11

 Public Comments Received on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule .......... 1-12

 Cooperating Agencies ................................................................................ 1-12

1.8 Analytical Approach ................................................................................................ 1-12

1.8.1 Approach to Impact Assessment ................................................................ 1-12

1.8.2 Timeframes Evaluated ................................................................................ 1-13

1.8.3 Analysis Assumptions ................................................................................. 1-

1.8.4 Other Environmental Analyses ................................................................... 1-18

 Significance of Environmental Impacts ....................................................... 1-23
Contents 

185(*௅ vi September 2014 

1.8.6 Issues Eliminated from Review in this GEIS .............................................. 1-24

 GEIS Contents ............................................................................................ 1-24

1.9 Other Applicable Federal Requirements ................................................................ 1-

1.10 References ............................................................................................................. 1-

2.0 Generic Facility Descriptions and Activities ............................................................... 2-1

2.1 Generic Facility Descriptions .................................................................................... 2-1

2.1.1 At-Reactor Continued Storage Site Descriptions ......................................... 2-2

2.1.1.1 General Description of Single-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Site ........ 2-2

2.1.1.2 General Description of Multiple-Unit Nuclear Power Plant 

Sites ............................................................................................... 2-

2.1.1.3 Reactor and Fuel Technologies ..................................................... 2-6

2.1.2 Onsite Spent Fuel Storage and Handling ................................................... 2-11

2.1.2.1 Spent Fuel Pools ......................................................................... 2-11

2.1.2.2 At-Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ........... 2-13

2.1.3 Away-from-Reactor ISFSIs ......................................................................... 2-18

2.1.4 Dry Transfer System ................................................................................... 2-20

2.2 Generic Activity Descriptions .................................................................................. 2-24

2.2.1 Short-Term Storage Activities ..................................................................... 2-24

2.2.1.1 Decommissioning Activities during Short-Term Storage .............. 2-

2.2.1.2 Activities in Spent Fuel Pools ...................................................... 2-

2.2.1.3 Activities at At-Reactor ISFSIs ..................................................... 2-29

2.2.1.4 Activities at Away-from-Reactor ISFSIs ....................................... 2-30

2.2.2 Long-Term Storage Activities ..................................................................... 2-31

2.2.2.1 Construction and Operation of a DTS .......................................... 2-31

2.2.2.2 Replacement of Storage and Handling Facilities ......................... 2-34

2.2.3 Indefinite Storage Activities ........................................................................ 2-

2.3 References ............................................................................................................. 2-36

3.0 Affected Environment .................................................................................................... 3-1

3.1 Land Use .................................................................................................................. 3-1

3.2 Socioeconomics ....................................................................................................... 3-4

3.2.1 Employment and Income .............................................................................. 3-

3.2.2 Taxes ............................................................................................................ 3-6

3.2.3 Demography ................................................................................................. 3-6

3.2.4 Housing ........................................................................................................ 3-

 Public Services ............................................................................................. 3-
Contents 

September 2014 vii 185(*௅

3.2.6 Transportation .............................................................................................. 3-

3.3 Environmental Justice .............................................................................................. 3-8

3.4 Climate and Air Quality ........................................................................................... 3-11

3.4.1 Climate ....................................................................................................... 3-11

3.4.2 Greenhouse Gases .................................................................................... 3-12

3.4.3 Criteria Pollutants ....................................................................................... 3-13

 Geology and Soils .................................................................................................. 3-14

3.6 Surface-Water Quality and Use .............................................................................. 3-16

 Groundwater Quality and Use ................................................................................ 3-

3.8 Terrestrial Resources ............................................................................................. 3-19

3.8.1 Upland Vegetation and Habitats ................................................................. 3-20

3.8.2 Lowland and Wetland Vegetation and Habitats .......................................... 3-21

3.8.3 Wildlife ........................................................................................................ 3-21

3.9 Aquatic Ecology ...................................................................................................... 3-22

3.9.1 Aquatic Habitats ......................................................................................... 3-23

3.9.1.1 Freshwater Systems .................................................................... 3-23

3.9.1.2 Estuarine Ecosystems ................................................................. 3-24

3.9.1.3 Marine Ecosystems ..................................................................... 3-

3.9.2 Aquatic Organisms ..................................................................................... 3-

3.9.2.1 Fish .............................................................................................. 3-

3.9.2.2 Aquatic Macroinvertebrates ......................................................... 3-26

3.9.2.3 Zooplankton ................................................................................. 3-

3.9.2.4 Single-Celled Algae ..................................................................... 3-

 Other Aquatic Invertebrates and Vertebrates .............................. 3-

3.9.2.6 Aquatic Macrophytes ................................................................... 3-

3.10 Special Status Species and Habitats ..................................................................... 3-28

3.11 Historic and Cultural Resources ............................................................................. 3-30

3.12 Noise ...................................................................................................................... 3-33

3.13 Aesthetics ............................................................................................................... 3-34

3.14 Waste Management ............................................................................................... 3-34

3.14.1 Low-Level Radioactive Waste .................................................................... 3-34

3.14.2 Mixed Waste ............................................................................................... 3-36

3.14.3 Hazardous Waste ....................................................................................... 3-36

3.14.4 Nonradioactive, Nonhazardous Waste ....................................................... 3-

 Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization ............................................ 3-
Contents 

185(*௅ viii September 2014 

 Transportation ........................................................................................................ 3-38

3.16 Public and Occupational Health ............................................................................. 3-38

3.16.1 Radiological Exposure ................................................................................ 3-39

3.16.1.1 Regulatory Requirements for Occupational Exposure ................. 3-39

3.16.1.2 Regulatory Requirements for Public Exposure ............................ 3-40

3.16.2 Radiological Exposure from Naturally Occurring and Artificial Sources ..... 3-40

3.16.3 Occupational Hazards ................................................................................ 3-42

 References ............................................................................................................. 3-42

4.0 Environmental Impacts of At-Reactor Continued Storage of Spent Fuel ................ 4-1

4.1 Land Use .................................................................................................................. 4-3

4.1.1 Short-Term Storage ...................................................................................... 4-4

4.1.2 Long-Term Storage ...................................................................................... 4-

4.1.3 Indefinite Storage ......................................................................................... 4-6

4.2 Socioeconomics ....................................................................................................... 4-6

4.2.1 Short-Term Storage ...................................................................................... 4-6

4.2.2 Long-Term Storage ...................................................................................... 4-

4.2.3 Indefinite Storage ......................................................................................... 4-9

4.3 Environmental Justice .............................................................................................. 4-9

4.3.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-11

4.3.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-12

4.3.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-14

4.4 Air Quality ............................................................................................................... 4-14

4.4.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-14

4.4.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-16

4.4.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

 Climate Change ...................................................................................................... 4-18

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-18

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-19

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-20

4.6 Geology and Soils .................................................................................................. 4-20

4.6.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-20

4.6.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-21

4.6.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-21
Contents 

September 2014 ix 185(*௅

 Surface-Water Quality and Use .............................................................................. 4-22

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-22

 Spent Fuel Pools ......................................................................... 4-22

 ISFSIs .......................................................................................... 4-23

 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-23

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-23

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-24

4.8 Groundwater Quality and Use ................................................................................ 4-

4.8.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.8.1.1 Spent Fuel Pools ......................................................................... 4-

4.8.1.2 ISFSIs .......................................................................................... 4-

4.8.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-

4.8.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.8.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-28

4.9 Terrestrial Resources ............................................................................................. 4-29

4.9.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-29

4.9.1.1 Spent Fuel Pools ......................................................................... 4-29

4.9.1.2 ISFSIs .......................................................................................... 4-32

4.9.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-33

4.9.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-33

4.9.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

4.10 Aquatic Ecology ...................................................................................................... 4-36

4.10.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-36

4.10.1.1 Spent Fuel Pools ......................................................................... 4-36

4.10.1.2 ISFSIs .......................................................................................... 4-42

4.10.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-43

4.10.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-43

4.10.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-44

4.11 Special Status Species and Habitat ....................................................................... 4-44

4.11.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-44

4.11.1.1 Spent Fuel Pools ......................................................................... 4-44

4.11.1.2 ISFSIs .......................................................................................... 4-46

4.11.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-

4.11.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-48

4.11.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-49

4.12 Historic and Cultural Resources ............................................................................. 4-49
Contents 

185(*௅ x September 2014 

4.12.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.12.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.12.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

4.13 Noise ...................................................................................................................... 4-

4.13.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.13.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.13.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

4.14 Aesthetics ............................................................................................................... 4-

4.14.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.14.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.14.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

 Waste Management ............................................................................................... 4-

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

 Low-Level Radioactive Waste...................................................... 4-

 Mixed Waste ................................................................................ 4-60

 Nonradioactive Waste .................................................................. 4-61

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-61

 Low-Level Radioactive Waste...................................................... 4-62

 Mixed Waste ................................................................................ 4-63

 Nonradioactive Waste .................................................................. 4-64

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

 Low-Level Radioactive Waste...................................................... 4-

 Mixed Waste ................................................................................ 4-

 Nonradioactive Waste .................................................................. 4-

4.16 Transportation ........................................................................................................ 4-66

4.16.1 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-66

4.16.2 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

4.16.3 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-69

 Public and Occupational Health ............................................................................. 4-69

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-69

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... 4-

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... 4-

4.18 Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents .................................................... 4-

4.18.1 Design Basis Events ................................................................................... 4-

4.18.1.1 Design Basis Events in Spent Fuel Pools .................................... 4-
Contents 

September 2014 xi 185(*௅

4.18.1.2 Design Basis Events in Dry Cask Storage Systems .................... 4-81

4.18.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-84

4.18.2 Severe Accidents ........................................................................................ 4-84

4.18.2.1 Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools ......................................... 4-

4.18.2.2 Severe Accidents in Dry Cask Storage Systems and DTSs ........ 4-88

4.18.2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 4-90

4.19 Potential Acts of Sabotage or Terrorism ................................................................ 4-91

4.19.1 Attacks on Spent Fuel Pools ...................................................................... 4-92

4.19.2 Attacks on ISFSIs and DTS ........................................................................ 4-94

4.19.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 4-

4.20 Summary ................................................................................................................ 4-

4.21 References ............................................................................................................. 4-99

5.0 Environmental Impacts of Away-From-Reactor Storage ............................................ -1

 Land Use .................................................................................................................. -

 Short-Term Storage ...................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage ...................................................................................... -6

 Indefinite Storage ......................................................................................... -8

 Socioeconomics ....................................................................................................... -8

 Short-Term Storage ...................................................................................... -8

 Long-Term Storage ...................................................................................... -9

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -10

 Environmental Justice ............................................................................................ -10

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -11

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -14

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -1

 Air Quality ............................................................................................................... -

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -18

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -18

 Climate Change ...................................................................................................... -19

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -19

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -21

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -21
Contents 

185(*௅ xii September 2014 

 Geology and Soils .................................................................................................. -21

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -21

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -22

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -23

 Surface-Water Quality and Use .............................................................................. -23

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -23

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -24

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -

 Groundwater Quality and Use ................................................................................ -

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -26

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -26

 Terrestrial Resources ............................................................................................. -

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -28

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -29

 Aquatic Ecology ...................................................................................................... -29

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -29

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -30

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -31

 Special Status Species and Habitats ..................................................................... -31

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -31

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -33

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -34

 Historic and Cultural Resources ............................................................................. -

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -40

 Noise ...................................................................................................................... -41

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -41

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -42

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -43
Contents 

September 2014 xiii 185(*௅

 Aesthetics ............................................................................................................... -43

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -43

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -44

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -

 Waste Management ............................................................................................... -

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -46

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -48

 Transportation ........................................................................................................ -49

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -49

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -

 Public and Occupational Health ............................................................................. -

 Short-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Long-Term Storage .................................................................................... -

 Indefinite Storage ....................................................................................... -

 Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents .................................................... -

 Potential Acts of Sabotage or Terrorism ................................................................ -

 Summary ................................................................................................................ -

 References ............................................................................................................. -60

6.0 Cumulative Impacts ....................................................................................................... 6-1

6.1 Methodology for Assessing Cumulative Impacts ...................................................... 6-1

6.2 Spatial and Temporal Bounds of the Cumulative Impacts Assessment ................... 6-3

6.3 Past, Present, and Reasonably Foreseeable Actions .............................................. 6-3

6.3.1 General Trends and Activities ...................................................................... 6-4

6.3.2 Other NRC-Regulated or Spent Fuel-Related Activities during 

Continued Storage ........................................................................................ 6-8

6.3.2.1 Final Reactor Shutdown Activities Prior to Decommissioning ....... 6-8

6.3.2.2 Decommissioning of the Reactor Power Block (including the 

spent fuel pool), DTS, and ISFSI ................................................... 6-9

6.3.2.3 Activities to Prepare the Spent Fuel for Transportation to a 

Repository for Final Disposal ......................................................... 6-9

6.3.2.4 Transportation of Spent Fuel from an At-Reactor or AwayFrom-Reactor Storage Facility to a Repository for Disposal ........ 6-10
Contents 

185(*௅ xiv September 2014 

6.4 Resource-Specific Analyses ................................................................................... 6-10

6.4.1 Land Use .................................................................................................... 6-10

6.4.1.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-10

6.4.1.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-11

6.4.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-12

6.4.2 Socioeconomics ......................................................................................... 6-12

6.4.2.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-13

6.4.2.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-13

6.4.2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

6.4.3 Environmental Justice ................................................................................ 6-

6.4.3.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-16

6.4.3.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-

6.4.3.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-18

6.4.4 Air Quality ................................................................................................... 6-18

6.4.4.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-19

6.4.4.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-19

6.4.4.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-20

 Climate Change .......................................................................................... 6-21

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities and from Other NRC-Regulated or Spent FuelRelated Activities ......................................................................... 6-21

 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-23

6.4.6 Geology and Soils ...................................................................................... 6-23

6.4.6.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-23

6.4.6.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-24

6.4.6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

 Surface-Water Quality and Use .................................................................. 6-

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-26
Contents 

September 2014 xv 185(*௅

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-26

 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

6.4.8 Groundwater Quality and Use .................................................................... 6-28

6.4.8.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-28

6.4.8.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-29

6.4.8.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-30

6.4.9 Terrestrial Resources ................................................................................. 6-30

6.4.9.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-31

6.4.9.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-32

6.4.9.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-33

6.4.10 Aquatic Resources ..................................................................................... 6-34

6.4.10.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-34

6.4.10.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-

6.4.10.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-36

6.4.11 Historic and Cultural Resources ................................................................. 6-

6.4.11.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-38

6.4.11.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-38

6.4.11.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-39

6.4.12 Noise .......................................................................................................... 6-40

6.4.12.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-41

6.4.12.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-41

6.4.12.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-42

6.4.13 Aesthetics ................................................................................................... 6-43

6.4.13.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-43

6.4.13.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-44

6.4.13.3 Conclusions ................................................................................. 6-
Contents 

185(*௅ xvi September 2014 

6.4.14 Waste Management ................................................................................... 6-

6.4.14.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-46

6.4.14.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-

6.4.14.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

 Transportation ............................................................................................ 6-

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-

 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

6.4.16 Public and Occupational Health ................................................................. 6-

6.4.16.1 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-

6.4.16.2 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-

6.4.16.3 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

 Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents ........................................ 6-

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from General Trends and 

Activities ....................................................................................... 6-

 Potential Cumulative Impacts from Other NRC-Regulated or 

Spent Fuel-Related Activities ....................................................... 6-

 Conclusion ................................................................................... 6-

6 Summary ................................................................................................................ 6-

6.6 References ............................................................................................................. 6-

7.0 Cost-Benefit Analysis .................................................................................................... -1

 Assumptions ............................................................................................................. -2

 New Reactor Applications ............................................................................ -4

 Reactor License Renewal ............................................................................. -6

 ISFSI Licensing ............................................................................................ -

 Estimated Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Action ............................................. -8

 Estimated Costs and Benefits of the Site-Specific Review Option ........................... -9

 Estimated Costs and Benefits of the GEIS-Only Option ........................................ -10

 Estimated Costs and Benefits of the Policy-Statement Option .............................. -12

 Comparison of Alternatives .................................................................................... -14

 Final Analysis and Final Recommendation ............................................................ -
Contents 

September 2014 xvii 185(*௅

 References ............................................................................................................. -

8.0 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued Storage ..................................... 8-1

8.1 Summarized Environmental Impacts of Continued Storage ..................................... 8-2

8.2 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts of Continued Storage ....................... 8-4

8.3 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources Associated with 

Continued Storage ................................................................................................... 8-

8.4 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Environment for Continued 

Storage and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity .......... 8-8

 References ............................................................................................................... 8-9

9.0 List of Preparers............................................................................................................. 9-1

10.0 Index .............................................................................................................................. 10-1

11.0 Glossary ........................................................................................................................ 11-1

Appendix A – Scoping Comments ........................................................................................ A-1

Appendix B – Technical Feasibility of Continued Storage and Repository Availability .. B-1

Appendix C – Outreach and Correspondence ..................................................................... C-1

Appendix D – Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule Comment Summaries and Responses .... D-1

Appendix E – Analysis of Spent Fuel Pool Leaks ................................................................ E-1

Appendix F – Spent Fuel Pool Fires ....................................................................................... F-1

Appendix G – Spent Fuel Storage Facilities ......................................................................... G-1

Appendix H – Estimated Costs of Alternatives .................................................................... H-1

Appendix I – High-Burnup Fuel ............................................................................................... I-1

September 2014 xix 185(*௅

Figures 

ES-1 Three Storage Timeframes Addressed in this GEIS ........................................................ xxx 

1-1 Continued Storage Timeframes ..................................................................................... 1-14

1-2 NEPA Analyses for NRC Activities ................................................................................ 1-19

2-1 Dry Storage of Spent Fuel ............................................................................................. 2-14

2-2 Licensed/Operating ISFSIs by State .............................................................................. 2-16

2-3 Conceptual Sketches of a Dry Transfer System ............................................................ 2-22

2-4 Continued Storage Timeline .......................................................................................... 2-

3-1 Map of NRC Regions Showing Locations of Operating Reactors ................................... 3-2

September 2014 xxi 185(*௅

Tables 

ES-1 Affected Resource Areas for At-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage ...................................... xxxiv 

ES-2 Affected Resource Areas for Away-From-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage ........................ xxxv 

ES-3 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued At-Reactor Storage .......................... xlvii 

ES-4 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Away-From-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage ............. lix 

ES- Summary of Cumulative Effects for Continued Storage of Spent Fuel .............................. lx 

1-1 List of NEPA Documents Used in Preparation of this GEIS .......................................... 1-20

2-1 U.S. Pressurized Water Reactors with Shared Spent Fuel Pools ................................... 2-6

2-2 Stainless-Steel-Clad Fuel at Decommissioning Plants .................................................... 2-

3-1 Land Area Characteristics of Operating Nuclear Power Plants with Site-Specific 

ISFSI Licenses................................................................................................................. 3-4

3-2 Occupational Dose Limits for Adults Established by 10 CFR Part 20 ........................... 3-40

3-3 Average Annual Effective Dose Equivalent of Ionizing Radiation to a Member of 

the U.S. Population for 2006 .......................................................................................... 3-41

4-1 Reference Plant Withdrawal Rates and Heat Loads ..................................................... 4-30

4-2 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued At-Reactor Storage ......................... 4-98

-1 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued Away-from-Reactor Storage ........... -

6-1 General Trends and Human Activities Occurring at or near Storage Facilities ............... 6-

6-2 Comparison of Annual Carbon Dioxide Emission Rates ............................................... 6-22

6-3 Summary of Incremental Impacts from Continued Storage on Waste Management ..... 6-46

6-4 Summary of the Cumulative Impacts from Continued Storage When Added to 

Other Federal and Non-Federal Activities ..................................................................... 6-

-1 Estimated Costs of the Proposed Action ......................................................................... -9

-2 Constant and Discounted Estimated Costs of the Site-Specific Review Option .............. -9

-3 Constant and Discounted Estimated Costs of the GEIS-Only Option ........................... -11

-4 Constant and Discounted Estimated Costs of the Policy-Statement Option ................. -13

- Summary of Constant and Discounted Estimated Costs for the Proposed Action 

and NRC’s Potential Options in the Case of No Action (in millions of 2014 dollars) ..... -

-6 Summary of Unquantified Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Action and NRC’s 

Potential Options in Case of No Action .......................................................................... -16

8-1 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued At-Reactor Storage ........................... 8-2

8-2 Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued Storage at an Away-fromReactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ..................................................... 8-3

8-3 Summary of the Cumulative Impacts from Continued Storage When Added to 

Other Federal and Non-Federal Activities ....................................................................... 8-4

9-1 List of Preparers—NRC ................................................................................................... 9-2

9-2 List of Preparers—CNWRA ............................................................................................. 9-

9-3 List of Preparers—PNNL ................................................................................................. 9-6

September 2014 xxiii 185(*௅

Executive Summary 

This summary describes the contents of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 

Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (GEIS). 

It briefly discusses the proposed action (a rulemaking), alternatives to the proposed action, and 

the NRC’s recommendation to the Commission. It also describes the NRC’s determinations 

regarding the environmental impacts of at-reactor and away-from-reactor continued storage of 

spent nuclear fuel (spent fuel) over short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes, including 

the NRC’s analysis of spent fuel pool leaks and fires. 

ES.1 What is Waste Confidence? 

Historically, Waste Confidence has been the NRC’s generic 

determination regarding the technical feasibility and 

environmental impacts of safely storing spent fuel beyond 

the licensed life for operations of a nuclear power plant. The 

Commission incorporated the generic determination in its 

regulations at Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR) ZKLFKVDWLVILHGWKH15&¶Vobligations under 

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA), with respect to the 

continued storage of spent fuel for commercial reactor licenses, license renewals, and spent 

fuel storage facility licenses and license renewals. 

ES.2 Why Did the NRC Change the Name of the Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement and Rule? 

During the public comment period on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule, the NRC asked four 

specific questions, one of which was, “Should the title of the rule be changed in light of a GEIS 

being issued instead of a separate Waste Confidence Decision?” The NRC received an 

overwhelming number of comments in favor of changing the name of the Rule; therefore, the 

title of the Federal Register Notice for the rulemaking has been changed to “Continued Storage 

of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” Further, the title of the GEIS has been changed to, “Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel” to be consistent 

with the title of the rulemaking. Appendix D contains summaries of the public input received on 

the four specific questions on the proposed Rule and other comments received on the draft 

GEIS and proposed Rule as well as the NRC’s responses to those comments. 

Continued Storage applies to the 

storage of spent fuel after the end 

of the licensed life for operations of 

a nuclear reactor and before final 

disposal in a permanent repository. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxiv September 2014 

ES.3 Why Has the NRC Developed a Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement? 

Since the Waste Confidence Rule was originally developed in 1984, the NRC has periodically 

updated the Rule, with the last update completed in 2010. A number of parties challenged the 

2010 Waste Confidence Rule in court, and in June 2012, the Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit ruled that the 2010 Waste Confidence rulemaking did not satisfy the NRC’s 

NEPA obligations. The Court of Appeals identified deficiencies in the 2010 Waste Confidence 

rule related to the NRC’s environmental analysis of spent fuel pool fires and leaks, and the 

environmental impacts should a repository not become available. 

In response to the Court of Appeals' ruling, 

the Commission decided that the NRC would 

not issue any final licenses that relied upon 

the Waste Confidence Rule until the NRC 

addressed the deficiencies identified by the 

Court of Appeals (Commission Order CLI–

12–16). The Commission separately directed 

the staff to develop an updated Waste 

Confidence decision and Rule supported by an environmental impact statement (SRMCOMSECY-12-0016). The staff has prepared this GEIS to satisfy its NEPA obligations 

regarding the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel in an efficient manner. 

The GEIS provides a regulatory basis for the revision of the Rule. Chapter 1 of the GEIS 

provides a more detailed discussion of the history of the Waste Confidence rulemaking. 

ES.4 What is the Proposed 

Action Being Addressed 

in this GEIS? 

The proposed Federal action is the adoption of a 

revised rule—10 CFR —that codifies the 

analysis in the GEIS of the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. 

To comply with The National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) Federal agencies: 

x assess the environmental impacts of major 

Federal actions, 

x consider the environmental impacts in making 

decisions, and 

x disclose the environmental impacts to the public.

Why is the NRC evaluating continued 

storage on a generic basis? 

The NRC considers the continued storage of 

spent fuel an activity that is similar for all 

commercial nuclear power plants and storage 

facilities. Therefore, a generic analysis is an 

appropriate, effective, and efficient method of 

evaluating the environmental impacts of 

continued storage. Other examples of NRC 

generic environmental evaluations include the 

License Renewal GEIS (NUREG௅WKH

Decommissioning GEIS (NUREG௅DQG

the In-Situ Leach Uranium Milling Facilities 

GEIS (NUREG௅1910).
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxv 185(*௅

ES.5 What is the Purpose and Need for the Proposed 

Action? 

The need for the proposed action is to provide processes for use in NRC licensing to address 

the environmental impacts of continued storage. Historically, the NRC and license applicants 

KDYHUHOLHGRQ&)5WRFRQFOXVLYHO\DGGUHVVWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHG

storage in environmental reports, environmental impact statements (EISs), environmental 

assessments (EAs), and hearings. The purpose of the proposed action is to preserve the 

efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the environmental impacts of 

continued storage. 

ES.6 Could the NRC Pursue Options Other Than This 

Rulemaking? 

Yes. As discussed in Section 1.6 of the GEIS, the NRC considered several different 

approaches for evaluating the environmental impacts of continued storage. The NRC looked at 

the three options that it could have pursued LILWFKRVHQRWWRDGRSWDUHYLVHG&)5. 

1. The Site-Specific Review Option. The NRC would take no action to generically address the 

environmental impacts of continued storage and, instead, would address the environmental 

impacts of continued storage in individual, site-specific licensing reviews. 

2. The GEIS-Only Option. The NRC would rely on the GEIS to analyze the environmental 

impacts of continued storage, which would then support site-specific licensing reviews. 

There would be no Rule, so site-specific EISs or EAs would incorporate the GEIS by 

reference or adopt the conclusions in the GEIS. 

 The Policy-Statement Option. The Commission would issue a policy statement that 

expresses the Commission's intent to either adopt or incorporate the environmental impacts 

in the GEIS into site-specific NEPA actions or to prepare a site-specific evaluation for each 

NRC licensing action. 

The NRC determined that the environmental impacts of these three options, in the case of no 

action, are essentially the same because they are merely different administrative approaches to 

addressing the environmental impacts of continued storage. Further, in both the proposed 

action and all of the NRC’s options in the case of no action, the NRC would analyze the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. The NRC’s conclusion is to adopt a revised 

10 &)5EHFDXVHRIWKHHIILFLHQFLHVWKDWZRXOGEHJDLQHGLQUHDFWRUDQGVSHQWIXHOVWRUDJH

facility licensing reviews. Adopting a revised Rule minimizes expenditures on site-specific 

reviews, limits the potential for lengthy project delays, and has the same environmental impacts 

as the NRC’s options in case of no action. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxvi September 2014 

During the scoping period and draft GEIS and proposed 

Rule comment period, the NRC received many 

suggested alternatives to the rulemaking, including calls 

for halting NRC licensing activities and shutting down 

operating reactors or imposing new requirements on 

nuclear power plants, such as storing spent fuel in 

special hardened onsite storage, reducing spent fuel 

pool density, and accelerating the transfer of spent fuel 

from pools to dry casks. The NRC determined that 

halting NRC licensing and closing nuclear reactors 

would not meet the purpose and need of the proposed 

action. The NRC also determined that additional 

requirements on spent fuel storage would not meet the purpose and need. Further, the GEIS is 

a NEPA review and does not authorize the initial or continued operation of any nuclear power 

plant, nor does it authorize storage of spent fuel; therefore, this GEIS would not be the 

appropriate activity in which to mandate new spent fuel storage requirements. 

ES.7 What is Covered in the GEIS? 

The GEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. The NRC has 

looked at the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of continued storage for three timeframes—

short-term, long-term, and indefinite. These timeframes are defined below and are discussed in 

more detail in Section 1.8.2 of the GEIS. The analyses contained in this GEIS provide a 

regulatory basis for the proposed revisions to 10 &)5 Appendix B addresses the 

technical feasibility of repository availability and continued safe storage of spent fuel while 

Appendices E and F address the consequences of spent fuel pool leaks and fires, respectively. 

ES.8 What is Not Covered in the GEIS? 

The NRC is evaluating the continued storage of commercial spent fuel in this GEIS. Thus, 

certain topics are not addressed because they are not within the scope of this review. These 

topics include: 

x noncommercial spent fuel (e.g., defense waste), 

x commercial high-level waste generated from reprocessing, 

x greater-than-class-C waste, 

x foreign spent fuel stored in the United States, 

x nonpower reactor spent fuel (e.g., test and research reactors, including foreign generated 

fuel stored in the United States), 

This rulemaking does not authorize 

the initial or continued operation of 

any nuclear power plant, nor does it 

authorize storage of spent fuel. It 

does not permit a nuclear power plant 

or any other facility to operate or store 

spent fuel. Every nuclear power plant 

or specifically licensed spent fuel 

storage facility must undergo an 

environmental review as part of its sitespecific licensing process.
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxvii 185(*௅

x need for nuclear power, and 

x reprocessing of commercial spent fuel. 

ES.9 Did the NRC Involve the Public or Governmental 

Organizations? 

The NRC announced that it was planning to develop an EIS and requested comments on the 

proposed scope of the GEIS in a Federal Register Notice that was published on October 

)5Publication of this notice EHJDQD-day public comment period for 

scoping. The NRC also issued press releases, sent scoping letters to Tribal governments and 

State liaisons, and sent e-mails to approximately 1,VWDNHKROGHUVZKRKDGSUHYLRXVO\

expressed interest in matters related 

to high-level waste. The NRC 

conducted four public scoping 

meetings that were all accessible via 

Internet and telephone, so people from 

all over the country could participate 

and give their comments on the scope 

of the Waste Confidence GEIS. In 

November 2012, the NRC met with 

representatives of the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) to discuss the Waste 

Confidence rulemaking. The NRC 

also held a government-to-government 

meeting with the Prairie Island Indian 

Community in June  There are 

no formal cooperating agencies 

identified in this environmental review. 

2Q6HSWHPEHUthe EPA published a notice of availability in the Federal Register

 FR VWDUWLQJWKH-day comment period on the draft GEIS. In response to the 

2FWREHUJRYHUQPHQWVKXWGRZQ, which caused the agency to reschedule several public 

PHHWLQJVWKH15&H[WHQGHGWKHFRPPHQWSHULRGWR'HFHPEHU FR The 

NRC also issued press releases, sent letters to Tribal governments and State liaison officers, 

produced a YouTube video, held multiple teleconferences, and sent e-mails to approximately 

VWDNHKROGHUVZKRKDGH[SUHVVHGLQWHUHVWLQWKLVSURMHFW During the comment period the 

15&KHOGSXEOLFPHHWLQJVWKURXJKRXWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHUHZHUHDSSUR[LPDWHO\

1,400 total participants at those meetings. Overall, the NRC received approximately 

$WWKHHQGRIWKH-day scoping period, the NRC 

summarized what it heard and responded to public 

comments in its Scoping Summary Report, which can be 

accessed at 

KWWSSEDGXSZVQUFJRYGRFV0/0/$SGI. 

A separate document at 

KWWSSEDGXSZVQUFJRYGRFV0/0/$SGI

lists the scoping comments the NRC received, organized 

by category. 

At the end of the draft GEIS and proposed Rule comment 

period, the NRC summarized the public comments and 

provided responses in Appendix D of this final GEIS. 

A separate document at 

KWWSSEDGXSZVQUFJRYGRFV0/0/$SGI

lists the comments the NRC received on the draft GEIS 

and proposed Rule.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxviii September 2014 

100 pieces of correspondence (e.g., e-mails, letters, postcards, etc.) from the public and 

recorded over 1,600 pages of transcripts. 

GEIS 6HFWLRQ and Appendices A, C, and D discuss public and agency involvement in this 

environmental review and rulemaking. The Scoping Summary report provides information about 

the NRC’s scoping activities and what the NRC heard during the scoping process. Appendix D 

provides the NRC’s responses to comments received on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule as 

well as Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) accession 

numbers for public meeting summaries and transcripts. 

The ADAMS electronic public reading room is available at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. If you encounter issues accessing ADAMS, call the NRC at 1-800--4209 or 

--RUVHQGDQ e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 

ES.10 What Type of Comments Did the NRC Receive on the 

Draft GEIS? 

The NRC transcribed approximately 1,600 pages of comments from QHDUO\meeting 

participants GXULQJWKHSXEOLFPHHWLQJVDQGreceived approximately 100 written submittals 

during the comment period. The most common topics were general opposition to nuclear 

power, feasibility of safe storage and disposal, and alternatives. Other high-interest topics 

included spent fuel pool fires and leaks, institutional controls, high-burnup fuel, accidents, 

terrorism and security, expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage and hardened onsite 

storage of fuel, and general opposition to the Rule and GEIS. Detailed information on all 

correspondence, including authors and ADAMS accession numbers for submissions, is 

contained in a separate document titled, Comments on the Waste Confidence Draft Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement and Proposed Rule, which is located in ADAMS under 

Accession No. 0/$. Appendix D provides comment summaries and the NRC’s 

responses to comments. 

ES.11 What Were the Changes to the Final GEIS? 

As stated earlier, the NRC received thousands of comments on the draft GEIS and proposed 

Rule. The NRC made changes to the final GEIS and proposed Rule to address some of the 

concerns raised in those comments. The NRC also added a glossary (Chapter 11). Some of 

the changes to the final GEIS are listed below. 

High-Burnup Fuel. Because of interest from the public, the NRC added a new appendix 

(Appendix I) that provides background information on the licensing, storage, and transportation 

of high-burnup fuel. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxix 185(*௅

Institutional Controls. Because of the volume of public comment on institutional controls, the 

NRC added additional information in Appendix B. 

Purpose of GEIS, Proposed Federal Action, Purpose and Need, and Alternatives. In response 

to public comments regarding the structure of the GEIS and the rulemaking, the NRC has 

revised several sections of Chapter 1. The purpose of the GEIS (see 6HFWLRQhas been 

simplified to more clearly focus on determining the environmental impacts of continued storage 

and determining whether those impacts can be generically addressed. The proposed Federal 

action (in Section 1.4) is the adoption of a revised Rule that codifies, or adopts into regulation, 

WKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHUXOHPDNLQJLQ6HFWLRQ

is to preserve the efficiency of NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the environmental 

impacts of continued storage, and the need DOVRLQ6HFWLRQLVWRSURYLGHSURFHVVHVIRUXVH

in NRC licensing to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. Because only the 

proposed action preserves the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the 

environmental impacts of continued storage, the NRC’s alternatives analysis (in Section 1.6) 

focuses on the processes—or options—that the NRC could use in the case of no action. These 

options include all of the approaches to considering the impacts of continued storage that the 

NRC considered as alternatives in the draft GEIS. Finally, the NRC has clarified that the NRC’s 

proposed action and its options in the case of no action are all different administrative 

approaches to addressing the environmental impacts of continued storage, and as such, their 

environmental impacts are not significant. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis. The NRC updated its cost-benefit analysis so that it contains current—

and reduced—costs for NRC staffing, as well as discounting that starts from a 2014 baseline 

LQVWHDGRIDEDVHOLQH$OOcost-benefit information is now presented in 2014 dollars. In 

addition, the cost-benefit analysis identifies costs associated with GEIS-development and 

rulemaking as past (or sunk) costs, but it retains them in the analysis to provide a complete 

picture of the costs associated with each activity. In addition, the NRC changed the 

DUUDQJHPHQWRIVHFWLRQVLQ&KDSWHUWRUHIOHFWWKHrevised approach to alternatives. 6HFWLRQ

now contains the proposed action, while subsequent sections (Sections DQGHDFK

contain NRC’s options in the case of no action. 

Cost of Continued Storage. Due to the large number of comments received on this topic the 

NRC added cost information for continued storage activities and facilities in Chapter 2. 

Technical Feasibility of Safe Storage. Additional information was provided in Appendix B on the 

role of a regulatory framework and institutional controls during continued storage. 

Substantive changes to the final GEIS are indicated by “change bars” in the margins of pages. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxx September 2014 

ES.12 How did the NRC Evaluate the Continued Storage of 

Spent Fuel in this GEIS? 

The NRC looked at potential environmental impacts of continued storage in three timeframes: 

short-term storage, long-term storage, and indefinite storage (see Figure ES-1). The short-term 

and long-term storage timeframes include an assumption that a permanent geologic repository 

becomes available by the end of those timeframes. The indefinite storage timeframe assumes 

that a repository never becomes available. For a detailed discussion of the three timeframes, 

see Section 1.8.2. 

The NRC has analyzed three timeframes that represent various scenarios for the length of 

continued storage that may be needed before spent fuel is sent to a repository. The first, most 

likely, timeframe is the short-term timeframe, which analyzes 60 years of continued storage after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation. The NRC acknowledges, however, that the 

short-term timeframe, although the most likely, is not certain. Accordingly, the GEIS also 

analyzed two additional timeframes. The long-term timeframe considers the environmental 

impacts of continued storage for an additional 100 years after the short-term timeframe for a 

total of 160 years after the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation. Finally, although the 

NRC considers it highly unlikely, the GEIS includes an analysis of an indefinite timeframe, which 

assumes that a repository does not become available. 

 

Figure ES-1. Three Storage Timeframes Addressed in this GEIS 

Short-Term 

Storage

ͻTimeframe is 60 years beyond licensed life for reactor operations.

ͻAssumes a repository becomes available by the end of this timeframe.

Long-Term 

Storage

ͻTimeframe is for 100 years beyond the short-term storage timeframe.

ͻAssumes a repository becomes available by end of this timeframe.

Indefinite 

Storage

ͻAssumes no repository becomes available.

ͻIndefinite storage and handling of spent fuel. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxxi 185(*௅

To guide its analysis, the NRC also relied on certain 

assumptions regarding the storage of spent fuel. A detailed 

discussion of these assumptions is contained in Section 

1.8.. Some of these assumptions are listed below: 

x Institutional controls would remain in place. 

x Spent fuel canisters and casks would be replaced 

approximately once every 100 years. 

x Independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) and 

dry transfer system (DTS) facilities would also be 

replaced approximately once every 100 years. 

x A DTS would be built at each ISFSI location for fuel 

repackaging. 

x All spent fuel would be moved from spent fuel pools to 

dry storage by the end of the short-term storage 

timeframe (60 years). 

x In accordance with NEPA, the analyses in the GEIS are based on current technology and 

regulations. 

The NRC used previous environmental evaluations and technical reports to help inform the 

impact determinations in this GEIS. Chapter 1 includes a list of NEPA documents used in the 

development of the GEIS, and the end of each chapter includes a complete list of references. 

References are publicly available, and most are available in ADAMS. 

ES.13 What Facilities and Activities are Addressed in the 

GEIS? 

Chapter 2 describes typical facility characteristics and activities that the NRC used to assess the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. The GEIS looked at spent fuel 

storage at single- and multiple-reactor nuclear power plant sites, in spent fuel pools, at-reactor 

ISFSIs, and away-from-reactor ISFSIs. In addition to existing reactor designs and conventional 

spent fuel, the NRC also considered reactor and fuel technologies such as mixed oxide fuel 

(MOX) and small modular reactors. 

Section 2.2 describes the activities related to the storage of spent fuel that are expected to 

occur during the three storage timeframes (short-term, long-term, and indefinite). 

An ISFSI is a facility designed and 

constructed for the interim storage 

of spent fuel. Typically, spent fuel is 

stored in dry cask storage systems. 

NRC requirements state that dry 

cask storage must shield people 

and the environment from radiation 

and keep the spent fuel inside dry 

and nonreactive. 

DTSs would be built at ISFSI sites 

(at-reactor or away-from-reactor) in 

the long-term storage timeframe. A 

DTS would enable retrieval of spent 

fuel for inspection or repackaging 

without the need to return the spent 

fuel to a spent fuel pool.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxxii September 2014 

x The short-term storage timeframe (60 years beyond the 

licensed life for operation of the reactor) includes routine 

maintenance and monitoring of the spent fuel pool and 

ISFSI and transferring spent fuel from pools to dry cask 

storage. Because decommissioning is required to be 

completed within 60 years after a reactor shuts down 

(unless additional time is necessary to protect public 

health and safety), the NRC assumes that all spent fuel 

will be moved from spent fuel pools to dry cask storage 

by the end of the short-term storage timeframe. For an 

away-from-reactor ISFSI, this timeframe includes 

construction and operation, including routine 

maintenance and monitoring, at the facility. 

x The long-term storage timeframe (100 years beyond the 

initial 60-year [short-term] storage timeframe) includes 

activities such as continued facility maintenance, 

construction and operation of a DTS, and replacement of ISFSI and DTS facilities, including 

casks. 

x The indefinite storage timeframe (no repository becomes available) assumes that the 

activities associated with long-term storage continue indefinitely, with ISFSI and DTS 

facilities being replaced at least once every 100 years. 

The NRC also looked at ongoing regulatory activities that could affect the continued storage of 

spent fuel, including regulatory changes resulting from lessons learned from the September 11, 

2001 terrorist attacks and the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami that damaged the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi plant in Japan. Appendix B discusses a number of ongoing regulatory 

program reviews that ensure the safety and security of spent fuel storage and transportation. 

ES.14 How did the NRC Describe Environmental Impacts? 

NRC used terms from other NEPA documents, such as those for license renewal or new 

reactors, to define the standard of significance for assessing environmental issues.

SMALL—Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they will 

neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. 

MODERATE—Environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to 

destabilize, important attributes of the resource. 

MOX fuel is a type of nuclear 

reactor fuel that contains plutonium 

oxide mixed with either natural or 

depleted uranium oxide, in ceramic 

pellet form. This fuel differs from 

conventional nuclear fuel, which is 

made of pure uranium oxide. 

Small modular reactors are 

nuclear power plants smaller in 

VL]HHJ0:HWKan current 

generation baseload plants (e.g., 

1,000 MW(e) or higher). These 

compactly designed reactors are 

factory-fabricated and can be 

transported by truck or rail to a 

nuclear power plant site.
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxxiii 185(*௅

LARGE—Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize 

important attributes of the resource. 

For risk-based determinations (such as in the NRC’s analyses of severe accidents such as 

spent fuel pool fires), the probability of occurrence as well as the potential consequences have 

been factored into the determination of significance. 

ES.15 What Environmental Resource Areas did the NRC 

Consider? 

&KDSWHUGLVFXVVHVWKHHQYLURQPHQWWhat exists at and around the facilities where spent fuel is 

stored in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. This description of resources provides 

information that is incorporated into the analyses of environmental impacts of continued storage 

in Chapter 4 (at-reactor impacts) and Chapter 6 (cumulative impacts). The License Renewal 

GEIS (NUREG௅ZDVWKHSULPDU\VRXUFHRILQIRUPDWLRQLQ&KDSWHUThe NRC also 

referenced information from site-specific environmental reviews, such as those for initial and 

renewal ISFSI licenses, the renewal of operating licenses, and combined licenses for new 

reactors. The affected resource areas and attributes discussed in the GEIS are listed in 

Table ES-1. 

The affected environment and potential impacts of continued storage at an away-from-reactor 

,6)6,DUHGLVFXVVHGLQ&KDSWHUDZD\-from-reactor impacts). The analysis of away-fromUHDFWRUVSHQWIXHOVWRUDJHLQ&KDSWHULVEDVHGLQJHQHUDORQWKHGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHDIIHFWHG

HQYLURQPHQWSURYLGHGLQ&KDSWHU+Rwever, some aspects of those discussions would not be 

applicable, or would not be applicable in the same way, for an away-from-reactor ISFSI. This 

generic analysis is based, in part, on the siting evaluation factors in &)53DUW6XESDUW(, 

which the location selected for the away-from-reactor ISFSI must meet. Further, for the analysis 

of continued storage at an away-from-reactor ISFSI, the term ISFSI refers to all of the original 

facilities that would be built (i.e., storage pads, casks, and canister transfer building). 

7KHDIIHFWHGUHVRXUFHDUHDVDQGDWWULEXWHVGLVFXVVHGLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6DUHOLVWHGLQ

Table ES-2. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxxiv September 2014 

Table ES-1. Affected Resource Areas for At-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage 

Affected 

Resource Area Attributes 

Land Use Site areas and land requirements for operating nuclear power plants; land 

requirements for at-reactor ISFSIs; general land characteristics and coverage; 

land use in the vicinity of nuclear power plants; locations of nuclear power plants 

Socioeconomics Regional social, economic, and demographic conditions around nuclear power 

plant sites, including employment, taxes, public services, housing demand, and 

traffic 

Environmental 

Justice 

Human health and environmental effects; minority and low-income populations; 

subsistence consumption of fish and wildlife 

Climate and Air 

Quality 

Local and regional climate and air quality, including criteria pollutants and 

greenhouse gases 

Geology and Soils The physical setting of nuclear power plants and associated geologic strata and 

soils; different physiographic provinces in the United States 

Water Resources Surface-water and groundwater use and quality; existing radioactive leaks at 

nuclear power plants and tritium contamination of groundwater 

Ecological 

Resources 

Terrestrial and aquatic resources, including varied habitat such as wetlands and 

floodplains, wildlife, aquatic organisms, and threatened, endangered, and 

protected species and habitat 

Historic and Cultural 

Resources 

Historic and cultural resources that could be present at nuclear power plant sites 

Noise Ambient noise levels around existing spent fuel storage sites 

Aesthetics The existing scenic quality of spent fuel storage sites, including viewsheds with 

water bodies, topographic features, other visual landscape characteristics 

Waste Management Wastes generated by continued storage of spent fuel, including low-level 

radioactive waste, hazardous waste, mixed waste, nonradioactive/nonhazardous 

waste; pollution prevention and waste minimization; capacity of disposal facilities 

Transportation Transportation characteristics of reactor sites; workers involved in transportation 

activities; local, regional, and national transportation networks; populations that 

use them 

Public and 

Occupational Health 

NRC requirements for radiological protection of the public and workers from the 

continued storage of spent fuel; public radiation doses from natural and artificial 

sources; regulatory framework for occupational hazards 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxxv 185(*௅

Table ES-2. Affected Resource Areas for Away-From-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage 

Affected 

Resource Area Attributes 

Land Use Site areas and land requirements for an away-from-reactor ISFSI to store 

40,000 MTU; general land characteristics and coverage 

Socioeconomics Regional social, economic, and demographic conditions, including employment, 

taxes, public services, housing demand, and traffic 

Environmental 

Justice 

Human health and environmental effects; minority and low-income populations; 

subsistence consumption of fish and wildlife 

Climate and Air 

Quality 

Local and regional climate and air quality, including criteria pollutants and 

greenhouse gases 

Geology and Soils The physical setting and associated geologic strata and soils; the different 

physiographic provinces in the United States 

Water Resources Surface-water and groundwater use and quality 

Ecological Resources Terrestrial and aquatic resources, including varied habitat such as wetlands and 

floodplains, wildlife, aquatic organisms, and threatened, endangered, and 

protected species and habitat 

Historic and Cultural 

Resources 

Historic and cultural resources that could be present at an away-from-reactor 

ISFSI site 

Noise Ambient noise levels around general construction sites 

Aesthetics The existing scenic quality, including viewsheds with water bodies, topographic 

features, or other visual landscape characteristics 

Waste Management Wastes generated by continued storage of spent fuel, including low-level 

radioactive waste, hazardous waste, mixed waste, nonradioactive/nonhazardous 

waste; pollution prevention and waste minimization; capacity of disposal facilities 

Transportation Transportation characteristics; workers involved in transportation activities; local, 

regional, and national transportation networks and populations that use them 

Public and 

Occupational Health 

NRC requirements for radiological protection of the public and workers from the 

continued storage of spent fuel; public radiation doses from natural and artificial 

sources; the regulatory framework for occupational hazards 

ES.16 What are the Environmental Impacts of Continued 

Storage? 

Chapter 4 addresses potential environmental impacts of at-reactor continued storage in spent 

fuel pools and at-UHDFWRU,6)6,V&KDSWHUDGGUHVVHVLPSDFWVDWDZD\-from-reactor ISFSIs. 

As applicable for each resource area, impact determinations were made for each of the three 

spent fuel storage timeframes: short-term, long-term, and indefinite. The following pages 

provide a short synopsis of impacts, followed by summary tables (Tables ES-DQG(6-4). 

At-reactor impacts of continued storage are addressed first, followed by away-from-reactor 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxxvi September 2014 

impacts. For some resource areas, the impact determination language is specific to the 

authorizing regulation, executive order, or guidance. 

ES.16.1 Environmental Impacts of At-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage 

ES.16.1.1 Land Use 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Continued at-reactor storage in a spent fuel 

pool or ISFSI would not require disturbance of any new land or result in operational or 

maintenance activities that would change land use. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Long-term storage at an at-reactor ISFSI 

would not result in operational or maintenance activities that would change land-use conditions. 

Construction of a DTS and replacement of an ISFSI and a DTS after 100 years would impact a 

small fraction of the land committed for a nuclear power plant. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to long-term impacts—

a small fraction of land would be impacted and land-use conditions would not change. Older 

ISFSIs and DTS facilities would be demolished, and that land would be reclaimed or reused as 

part of the cyclic replacements. 

ES.16.1.2 Socioeconomics 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. A small number of workers would be required 

to maintain and monitor spent fuel pools and an at-reactor ISFSI, tax payments to local 

jurisdictions would continue, and there would be no increased demand for housing and public 

services. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. The construction of a DTS would take about 

1 to 2 years and the size of the construction and ISFSI replacement and operations workforce 

would be small. Tax payments would continue and would remain relatively constant at postreactor operations levels. Additionally, there would be no increased demand for housing and 

public services. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those described for 

long-term storage. The workforce required for monitoring and replacement of DTS facilities and 

ISFSIs would be small. Property tax revenue would continue as long as spent fuel remains 

onsite. 

 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxxvii 185(*௅

ES.16.1.3 Environmental Justice 

Short-Term Storage. Continued maintenance and monitoring of spent fuel pools and at-reactor 

ISFSIs would have minimal human health and environmental effects on all populations including 

minority and low-income populations. Overall human health and environmental effects from 

continued short-term spent fuel storage would be limited in scope and SMALL for all 

populations. Therefore, minority and low-income populations are not expected to experience 

disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects from the continued 

short-term storage of spent fuel. 

Long-Term Storage. Continued maintenance and monitoring of spent fuel in at-reactor ISFSIs 

would have minimal human health and environmental effects on all populations including 

minority and low-income populations near these storage facilities. Overall human health and 

environmental effects from continued long-term spent fuel storage would be limited in scope and 

SMALL for all populations, except for historic and cultural resources, which would be SMALL to 

LARGE. Therefore, minority and low-income populations are not expected to experience 

disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects from the continued 

long-term storage of spent fuel. 

Indefinite Storage. Indefinite maintenance and monitoring of spent fuel in at-reactor ISFSIs 

would have minimal human health and environmental effects on all populations including 

minority and low-income populations near these storage facilities. Overall human health and 

environmental effects during indefinite storage of spent fuel would be the same as those 

described for long-term storage, except for the effects of nonradioactive waste generation and 

disposal, which would be SMALL to MODERATE. Therefore, minority and low-income 

populations are not expected to experience disproportionately high and adverse human health 

and environmental effects from the indefinite storage of spent fuel. 

ES.16.1.4 Air Quality 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Air emission impacts from spent fuel storage 

activities from spent fuel pools and ISFSIs during short-term storage would be substantially 

smaller than air emissions during power generation. Air temperature changes near dry casks 

would be indistinguishable from temperature changes that occur naturally. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of a DTS, ongoing operation and 

maintenance of the storage facilities, and replacement of an ISFSI and DTS after 100 years 

would result in minor and temporary air emissions. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those for long-term 

storage ISFSI and DTS operations, and replacement activities would result in minor and 

temporary air emissions. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xxxviii September 2014 

ES.16.1.5 Climate Change 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. The 

annual level of greenhouse gases generated during 

continued storage is a small percentage of the annual 

levels generated in the United States. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to short-term 

impacts, and greenhouse gas emissions would be a small fraction of the overall level in the 

United States. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Greenhouse gas emissions would continue to 

be similar to long-term impacts; they would be a small fraction of the overall level in the 

United States. 

ES.16.1.6 Geology and Soils 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Continued spent fuel pool operation is not 

expected to increase impacts to soil and geology. Impacts to soil from small spills and leaks 

during operation and maintenance of ISFSIs would be minor because of monitoring and 

environmental protection regulations. No new land would be disturbed for continued operation 

of spent fuel pools and ISFSIs. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction, operation, and replacement of 

the DTS and ISFSI would have minimal impacts to soils on the small fraction of land committed 

for the facilities, including soil compaction, soil erosion, and potential leaks of oils, greases, and 

other construction materials. Ongoing operation and maintenance of ISFSIs and DTSs would 

not be expected to have any additional impacts above those associated with construction. No 

impacts to geology would be expected. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those for long-term 

storage. Replacement of ISFSIs and DTS facilities would occur on previously disturbed land 

and would minimize impacts to soils and geology. 

ES.16.1.7 Surface-Water Quality and Use 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Although unlikely, groundwater contamination 

could affect surface-water quality (see discussion in Appendix E of the GEIS). Potential impacts 

to surface-water quality and consumptive use from the continued operation of spent fuel pools 

and ISFSIs would be less than for normal plant operations. 

Greenhouse gases are gases that trap 

heat in the atmosphere. The most 

common greenhouse gases are carbon 

dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and 

fluorinated gases. Greenhouse gases 

contribute to global climate change. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xxxix 185(*௅

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Potential consumptive-use and surface-water 

quality impacts from construction and operation of a DTS would be minor, and replacement of 

the DTS and ISFSI would be less intense than assumed for initial construction of these facilities. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those for long-term 

storage. Replacement of ISFSIs and DTS facilities once every 100 years would result in 

temporary and minimal impacts to surface-water quality and use. 

ES.16.1.8 Groundwater Quality and Use 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Groundwater use would be significantly less 

than that used during reactor operations. Continued storage of spent fuel could result in 

nonradiological and radiological impacts to groundwater quality. In the unlikely event a spent 

fuel pool leak remained undetected for a long period of time, contamination of a groundwater 

source above a regulatory limit could occur (e.g., a Maximum Contaminant Level for one or 

more radionuclides). Appendix E of the GEIS contains additional supporting analysis of the 

environmental impacts from spent fuel pool leaks. The analysis concludes that (1) there is a low 

probability of a leak of sufficient quantity and duration to affect offsite locations and (2) physical 

processes associated with radionuclide transport, site hydrologic characteristics, and 

environmental monitoring programs ensure that impacts from spent fuel pool leaks would be 

unlikely. Impacts to groundwater from continued storage in ISFSIs would be minimal because 

ISFSI storage requires minimal water and produces minimal, localized, and easy-to-remediate 

liquid effluents on or near ground surface. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of a DTS would require minimal 

groundwater use. With regard to storage facility-replacement activities, groundwater 

consumptive use and quality impacts would be similar to those for initial construction of the 

facilities, and would be minor and temporary. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those for long-term 

storage. Once every 100 years, groundwater would be required for demolishing and replacing 

the ISFSI and DTS facilities. Consumptive use of groundwater and water-quality impacts would 

be minor and temporary. 

ES.16.1.9 Terrestrial Resources 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts associated with the operation of spent 

fuel pools would likely be bounded by the impacts analyzed in the License Renewal GEIS for 

those issues that were addressed generically in the License Renewal GEIS. For the issue of 

water-use conflicts with terrestrial resources at plants with cooling ponds or cooling towers using 

makeup water from a river, the NRC determined that the impacts from operating the spent fuel 

pool during the short-term storage timeframe would be minimal, because the water withdrawal 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xl September 2014 

requirements for spent fuel pool cooling are considerably lower than those for a power reactor. 

Impacts associated with operating an at-reactor ISFSI would be minimal and similar to those 

described in EAs reviewed for preparation of the GEIS (see Table 1-1). 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction, repackaging, and replacement 

activities for the ISFSI and DTS would have minimal impacts on terrestrial resources. Normal 

operations and replacement of DTS and ISFSI facilities would not generate significant noise, 

would not significantly affect the area available for terrestrial wildlife, and would not adversely 

impact terrestrial environments or their associated plant and animal species. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to long-term storage 

impacts. Replacement of the ISFSI and DTS facilities would occur on land near the existing 

facilities and could be sited on previously disturbed ground and away from terrestrial species 

and habitat. 

ES.16.1.10 Aquatic Ecology 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts associated with the operation of spent 

fuel pools would likely be minimal and bounded by the impacts analyzed in the License Renewal 

GEIS because of the lower withdrawal rates, lower discharge rates, and smaller thermal plume 

for a spent fuel pool compared to an operating reactor with closed-cycle cooling. Impacts from 

operation of onsite ISFSIs would be minimal because ISFSIs do not require water for cooling, 

and ground-disturbing activities would have minimal impacts on aquatic ecology. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction, repackaging, and replacement 

activities for the ISFSI and DTS would have minimal impacts on aquatic resources. The ISFSI 

and DTS would not require water for cooling, would produce minimal gaseous or liquid effluents, 

and would have minimal impacts on aquatic resources. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Activities and impacts to aquatic resources 

would be similar to those described for long-term storage, although complete repackaging would 

occur once every 100 years. Replacement of ISFSI and DTS facilities would occur on land near 

existing facilities and could be sited on previously disturbed ground and away from sensitive 

aquatic features. 

ES.16.1.11 Special Status Species and Habitat 

Short-Term Storage. If continued operation of an ISFSI or spent fuel pool could affect Federally 

OLVWHGVSHFLHVRUGHVLJQDWHGFULWLFDOKDELWDWDQGLIWKHFULWHULDDUHPHWLQ&)5Part 402 for 

initiation or reinitiation of (QGDQJHUHG6SHFLHV$FW(6$6HFWLRQ consultation, the NRC 

ZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWRLQLWLDWHRUUHLQLWLDWH(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKHNational Marine 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xli 185(*௅

Fisheries Services (NMFS) or U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service (FWS). With regard to spent 

fuel pools, impacts on State-listed species and 

marine mammals would most likely be less than 

those experienced during the licensed life for 

operation of the reactor because of the smaller 

size of the spent fuel pool’s cooling system and 

lower water demands when compared to those 

of an operating reactor. With regard to dry cask 

storage of spent fuel, given the small size and 

ability to site ISFSI facilities away from sensitive 

ecological resources, the NRC concludes that 

continued storage of spent fuel in at-reactor ISFSIs would likely have minimal impacts on Statelisted species, marine mammals, migratory birds, and bald and golden eagles. 

Long-Term Storage. In addition to routine maintenance and monitoring of ISFSIs, impacts from 

the construction of a DTS and replacement of the DTS and ISFSIs on special status species 

and habitat would be minimal because of the small size of the ISFSI and DTS facilities and 

because no water is required for cooling. The NRC assumes that the ISFSI and DTS facilities 

could be sited to avoid listed species and critical habitat because of the small size of the 

construction footprint and sufficient amount of previously disturbed areas on most nuclear power 

plant sites. Therefore, the NRC concludes that construction of a DTS and the replacement of 

the DTS and ISFSI would likely have minimal impacts on State-listed species, marine mammals, 

migratory birds, and bald and golden eagles. In the unlikely situation that the continued 

operation of an ISFSI could affect Federally listed species or designated critical habitat, and if 

WKHFULWHULDDUHPHWLQ&)5Part IRULQLWLDWLRQRUUHLQLWLDWLRQRI(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ

then WKH15&ZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWRLQLWLDWHRUUHLQLWLDWH(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKH

NMFS or FWS. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts from indefinite storage on State-listed species, marine mammals, 

migratory birds, and bald and golden eagles would be minimal. The same consultation and any 

associated mitigation requirements described for the long-term storage timeframe would apply 

to the construction of the DTS and replacement of the DTS and ISFSI facilities during indefinite 

storage. In the unlikely situation that the continued operation of an ISFSI could affect Federally 

OLVWHGVSHFLHVRUGHVLJQDWHGFULWLFDOKDELWDWDQGLIWKHFULWHULDDUHPHWLQ&)5Part 402 for 

initiation or rHLQLWLDWLRQRI(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQWKH15&ZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWRLQLWLDWHRU

UHLQLWLDWH(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKH10)6RU):6

Endangered Species Act, Section 7, called 

"Interagency Cooperation," is the mechanism by 

which Federal agencies ensure that the actions 

they take, including those they fund or 

authorize, do not jeopardize the existence of 

DQ\OLVWHGVSHFLHV8QGHU6HFWLRQWKH15&

must consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service or National Marine Fisheries Service 

when any action the NRC carries out, funds, or 

authorizes (such as through a permit) may affect

a listed endangered or threatened species.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xlii September 2014 

ES.16.1.12 Historic and Cultural Resources 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Because no ground-disturbing activities are 

anticipated during the short-term storage timeframe, impacts to historic and cultural resources 

associated with continued operations and maintenance would be SMALL. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to LARGE. Impacts from continued operations 

and routine maintenance are expected to be SMALL during the long-term storage timeframe, 

similar to those described in the short-term storage timeframe. NRC authorization to construct 

and operate a DTS and to replace a specifically licensed at-reactor ISFSI and DTS would 

constitute Federal actions under NEPA and would require site-specific environmental reviews 

and compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) before making a 

decision on the licensing action. For generally licensed ISFSIs, impacts could be avoided, 

minimized or mitigated if the licensee has management plans or procedures that require 

consideration of these resources prior to ground-disturbing activities. The NRC assumes that 

the replacement of the at-reactor ISFSI and DTS would be constructed on land near the existing 

facilities. As discussed below, the NRC recognizes that there is uncertainty associated with the 

degree of prior disturbance and the resources, if any, present in areas where future grounddisturbing activities (i.e., initial and replacement DTS and replacement ISFSI) could occur. The 

NRC cannot eliminate the possibility that historic and cultural resources would be affected by 

construction activities during the long-term timeframe because the initial ISFSI could be located 

within a less-disturbed area with historic and cultural resources in close proximity. Further, 

resources may be present that would not have been considered significant at the time the initial 

facilities were constructed, but could become significant in the future. Therefore, the potential 

impacts to historic and cultural resources would be SMALL to LARGE. This range takes into 

consideration routine maintenance and monitoring (i.e., no ground-disturbing activities), the 

absence or avoidance of historic and cultural resources, and potential ground-disturbing 

activities that could impact historic and cultural resources. In addition, the analysis considers 

uncertainties inherent in analyzing this resource area over long timeframes. These 

uncertainties include any future discovery of previously unknown historic and cultural resources; 

resources that gain significance within the vicinity and the viewshed (e.g., nomination of a 

historic district) due to improvements in knowledge, technology, and excavation techniques; and 

changes associated with predicting resources that future generations will consider significant. If 

construction of a DTS and replacement of the ISFSI and DTS occurs in an area with no historic 

or cultural resource present or construction occurs in previously a disturbed area that allows 

avoidance of historic and cultural resources then impacts would be SMALL. By contrast, a 

MODERATE or LARGE impact could result if historic and cultural resources are present at a 

site and, because they cannot be avoided, are impacted by ground-disturbing activities during 

the long-term timeframe. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xliii 185(*௅

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to LARGE. Impacts regarding the replacement of 

the ISFSI and DTS would be similar to those described in the long-term storage timeframe. The 

NRC assumes that replacement at-reactor ISFSI and DTS would be constructed on land near 

the existing facilities. As stated in Section 1.8, the NRC assumes that the land where the 

original facilities were constructed will be available for replacement facility construction; 

however, the NRC cannot eliminate the possibility that historic and cultural resources would be 

affected by construction activities during the indefinite timeframe because the initial and 

replacement ISFSIs and DTS could be located within a less disturbed area with historic and 

cultural resources in close proximity. Further, resources may be present that would not have 

been considered significant at the time the initial or replacement facilities were constructed, but 

could become significant in the future. Impacts to historic and cultural resources would be 

SMALL to LARGE. This range takes into consideration routine maintenance and monitoring 

(i.e., no ground-disturbing activities), the absence or avoidance of historic and cultural 

resources, and potential ground-disturbing activities that could impact historic and cultural 

resources. The analysis also considers the uncertainties inherent in analyzing this resource 

area over long timeframes. These uncertainties include any future discovery of previously 

unknown historic and cultural resources; resources that gain significance within the vicinity and 

the viewshed (e.g., nomination of a historic district) due to improvements in knowledge, 

technology, and excavation techniques, and changes associated with predicting resources that 

future generations will consider significant. If construction of a DTS and replacement of the 

ISFSI and DTS occurs in an area with no historic or cultural resource present or construction 

occurs in previously a disturbed area that allows avoidance of historic and cultural resources 

then impacts would be SMALL. By contrast, a MODERATE or LARGE impact could result if 

historic and cultural resources are present at a site and, because they cannot be avoided, are 

impacted by ground-disturbing activities during the indefinite timeframe. 

ES.16.1.13 Noise 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Spent fuel pool and dry cask storage noise 

levels, noise duration, and distance between noise sources and receptors would generally not 

be expected to produce noise impacts noticeable to the surrounding community. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of the DTS and replacement of 

the DTS and ISFSI, although temporary and representing a small portion of the overall time 

period for spent fuel storage, would generate noise levels that exceed EPA-recommended noise 

levels. Noise from dry cask storage operations would be infrequent and at lower levels than for 

construction or replacement activities. Generally, for spent fuel storage, the noise levels, noise 

duration, and distance between the noise sources and receptors would not be expected to 

produce noise impacts noticeable to the surrounding community. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xliv September 2014 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Most noise would be generated by construction 

equipment associated with the replacement of the ISFSI and DTS facilities; impacts would be 

similar to those during the long-term storage timeframe. 

ES.16.1.14 Aesthetics 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. No changes to the visual profile are likely to 

occur as a result of the continued operation and maintenance of the existing spent fuel pool and 

at-reactor ISFSI. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Periodic construction, replacement, and 

operation activities would not significantly alter the landscape of an ISFSI. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to long-term storage 

and would not significantly alter the landscape of an ISFSI. 

ES.16.1.15 Waste Management 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Continued at-reactor storage of spent fuel 

would generate much less low-level, mixed, and nonradioactive waste than an operating facility, 

and licensees would continue to implement Federal and State regulations and requirements 

regarding proper management and disposal of wastes. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. 

The replacement of the ISFSI, repackaging of spent 

fuel canisters, and construction, operation, and 

replacement of the DTS would generate a fraction of 

the low-level waste (LLW) generated during reactor 

decommissioning, and LLW would continue to be 

managed according to Federal and State 

regulations. The quantity of mixed waste generated 

from long-term storage would be a small fraction of 

that generated during the licensed life of the reactor. 

Although large amounts of nonradioactive waste 

would be generated by replacement of dry cask 

storage facilities, it would still be less than the waste 

generated during reactor decommissioning and 

would not likely have a noticeable impact on local or regional landfill capacity and operations. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. It is expected that sufficient LLW 

disposal capacity would be made available when needed. A relatively small quantity of mixed 

waste would be generated from indefinite storage and proper management and disposal 

Low-level waste is a general term for a 

wide range of items that have become 

contaminated with radioactive material or 

have become radioactive through exposure 

to neutron radiation. The radioactivity in 

these wastes can range from just above 

natural background levels to much higher 

levels, such as seen in parts from inside the 

reactor vessel in a nuclear power reactor. 

Mixed waste contains two components: 

low-level radioactive waste and hazardous 

waste, as defined in EPA regulations. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xlv 185(*௅

regulations would be followed. The amount of nonradioactive waste that would be generated 

and impacts to nonradioactive waste landfill capacity are difficult to accurately estimate for the 

indefinite storage timeframe and therefore could result in SMALL to MODERATE impacts. 

ES.16.1.16 Transportation 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. A low volume of traffic and shipping activities 

is expected with the continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. There would be small workforce requirements 

for continued storage and aging management activities (relative to the power plant workforce) 

and a low frequency of supply shipments and shipments of LLW from DTS activities, continued 

dry cask storage operations, and ISFSI and DTS replacement activities. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. There would be no significant changes to the 

annual magnitude of traffic or waste shipments that were identified for long-term storage. 

ES.16.1.17 Public and Occupational Health 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Annual 

public and occupational doses would be maintained below 

the annual dose limits established by 10 CFR Part IRU

the public and 10 CFR Part 20 for occupational personnel. 

Licensed facilities would also be required by the above 

regulations to maintain an as-low-as-is-reasonablyachievable (ALARA) program, which would likely reduce 

the doses even further. Appendix E of the GEIS provides additional information to support the 

environmental impact determination with respect to leaks from spent fuel pools on public health. 

Public health regulatory limits could be exceeded in the unlikely event a spent fuel pool leak 

remained undetected for a long period of time. Preventive maintenance activities would be 

conducted in accordance with Occupational Safety and Health Agency requirements and risks 

to occupational health and safety would be infrequent and minor. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. 

Public and occupational doses would be maintained 

well below the dose limits established by 10 CFR Part 

IRUWKHSXEOLFDQG&)53DUWIRURFFXSDWLRQDO

personnel. Licensed facilities would also be required 

by these regulations to maintain an ALARA program 

to ensure radiation doses are maintained as low as is 

ALARA is an acronym for "as low as 

(is) reasonably achievable," which 

means making every reasonable 

effort to maintain exposures to 

ionizing radiation as far below the 

dose limits as practical.

10 CFR Part 20 contains the NRC’s 

radiation protection regulations. 

10 CFR Part 72 contains the NRC’s 

regulations for licensing storage facilities 

for spent fuel and other radioactive waste.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xlvi September 2014 

reasonably achievable. Construction activities for the DTS would be conducted in accordance 

with Occupational Safety and Health Agency requirements, and once in operation, ISFSI 

preventive maintenance would be infrequent and minor. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts to public and occupation health are 

expected to be similar to those from long-term spent fuel storage activities. 

ES.16.1.18 Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents 

Because the accident risks for spent fuel pool storage only apply during the short-term 

timeframe and the accident risks for dry cask storage are substantially the same across the 

three timeframes, the GEIS does not present the various accident types by timeframe, but 

rather by accident type (i.e., design basis and severe) and storage facility type (i.e., spent fuel 

pool and dry cask storage system).

Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools. Impacts 

would be SMALL. The postulated design basis 

accidents considered in this GEIS for spent fuel pools 

include hazards from natural phenomena, such as 

earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes; hazards 

from activities in the nearby facilities; and fuel handlingrelated accidents. In addition, potential effects of climate 

change are also considered. Based on the assessment 

in Section 4.18, the environmental impacts of these postulated accidents involving continued 

storage of spent fuel in pools are SMALL because all important safety structures, systems, and 

components involved with the spent fuel storage are designed to withstand these design basis 

accidents without compromising the safety functions. 

Design Basis Accidents in Dry Cask Storage Systems and Dry Transfer Systems. Impacts 

would be SMALL. All NRC-licensed dry cask storage systems are designed to withstand all 

postulated design basis accidents without any loss of safety functions. A DTS or a facility with 

equivalent capabilities may be needed to enable retrieval of spent 

fuel for inspection or repackaging. Licensees of DTS facilities are 

required to design the facilities so that all safety-related structures, 

systems, and components can withstand the design basis accidents 

without compromising any safety functions. Based on the 

assessment, the environmental impact of the design basis accidents 

is SMALL because safety-related structures, systems, and 

components are designed to function in case of these accidents. 

Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools. Probability-weighted impacts would be SMALL. A spent 

fuel pool may encounter severe events, such as loss of offsite power or beyond design basis 

earthquakes. Although it is theoretically possible that these events may lead to loss of spent 

A design basis accident is a 

postulated accident that a nuclear 

facility must be designed and built to 

withstand without loss to the systems, 

structures, and components necessary 

to ensure public health and safety.

A severe accident is a 

type of accident that may 

challenge safety systems 

at a level much higher 

than expected.
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xlvii 185(*௅

fuel pool cooling function resulting in a spent fuel pool fire, the likelihood of such events is 

extremely small. Additional discussion about spent fuel pool fires can be found in Appendix F. 

Severe Accidents in Dry Cask Storage Systems. Probability-weighted impacts would be 

SMALL. Although some handling accidents such as a postulated drop of a canister could 

exceed NRC’s public dose standards, the likelihood of the event is very low. Therefore, the 

environmental impact of severe accidents in a dry storage facility is SMALL. 

ES.16.1.19 Potential Acts of Sabotage or Terrorism 

Although the NRC believes that NEPA does not require such an analysis and that it is only 

required for facilities within the Ninth Circuit, the NRC finds that even though the environmental 

consequences of a successful attack on a spent fuel pool beyond the licensed life for operation 

of a reactor are large, the very low probability of a successful attack ensures that the 

environmental risk is SMALL. Similarly, for an operational ISFSI or DTS during continued 

storage, the NRC finds that the environmental risk of a successful radiological sabotage attack 

is SMALL. 

Table ES-3. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued At-Reactor Storage 

Resource Area Short-Term Storage Long-Term Storage Indefinite Storage 

Land Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Socioeconomics SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Environmental Justice Disproportionately high and adverse impacts are not expected. 

Air Quality SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Climate Change SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Geology and Soils SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Surface Water 

 Quality SMALL SMALL SMALL 

 Consumptive Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Groundwater 

 Quality SMALL SMALL SMALL 

 Consumptive Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Terrestrial Resources SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Aquatic Ecology SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Special Status Species 

and Habitat 

Impacts for Federally listed threatened and endangered species and 

Essential Fish Habitat would be determined as part of the consultations 

for the ESA and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ xlviii September 2014 

Table ES-3. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Continued At-Reactor Storage (cont’d) 

Resource Area Short-Term Storage Long-Term Storage Indefinite Storage 

Historic and Cultural 

Resources SMALL SMALL to LARGE SMALL to LARGE 

Noise SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Aesthetics SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Waste Management 

 Low-Level Waste SMALL SMALL SMALL 

 Mixed Waste SMALL SMALL SMALL 

 Nonradioactive Waste SMALL SMALL SMALL to MODERATE 

Transportation SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Public and Occupational 

Health SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Accidents SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Sabotage or Terrorism SMALL SMALL SMALL 

ES.16.2 Environmental Impacts of Away-From-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage 

No away-from-reactor ISFSIs of the size considered in ChapWHU metric tons uranium) 

have been constructed in the United States. For the analysis of environmental impacts in 

&KDSWHU, the NRC assumes that construction and operation of an away-from-reactor ISFSI 

would be similar to that proposed for the Private Fuel Storage Facility on the Reservation of the 

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians in Tooele County, Utah. The NRC previously analyzed 

the environmental impacts of constructing and operating the Private Fuel Storage Facility in 

NUREG௅ For the analysis of continued storage at an away-from-reactor ISFSI, the term 

ISFSI refers to all of the original facilities that would be built (i.e., storage pads, casks, and 

canister transfer building). 

ES.16.2.1 Land Use 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of an ISFSI would change the 

nature of land use within the site boundary and along access corridors. While this change could 

be qualitatively substantial (e.g., from agricultural to industrial), the land parcel is assumed to be 

sufficiently remote and small that no quantitatively significant impact would occur. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of a DTS would disturb a small 

portion of the land committed for an away-from-reactor storage facility. To minimize land-use 

impacts from replacement of the ISFSI and DTS facilities, the replacement facilities would likely 

be constructed on land near the existing facilities, and the old facilities would likely be 

demolished and the land reclaimed. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 xlix 185(*௅

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Only a small portion of the total land committed 

for development of an away-from-reactor ISFSI is required to support continued operations, 

including periodic maintenance or replacement of equipment and repackaging of fuel. 

Replacement of the away-from-reactor ISFSI and DTS every 100 years would likely occur on 

land near the existing facilities. 

ES.16.2.2 Socioeconomics 

Short-Term Storage. Adverse impacts would be SMALL. Based on the small workforce 

required for construction and operations of an away-from-reactor facility, and any associated 

indirect impacts to public services and housing, the impacts of construction and operation of a 

storage facility on those resources would be minor. Beneficial impacts to the economy could be 

LARGE in some rural economies. 

Long-Term Storage. Adverse impacts would be SMALL. Construction of a DTS would require a 

workforce smaller than the workforce required for construction of an away-from-reactor ISFSI. 

The labor force required for maintenance and replacement activities of an ISFSI and DTS would 

not be expected to exceed the labor force required for construction of the storage facility as a 

whole. Beneficial impacts to the economy could be LARGE in some rural economies. 

Indefinite Storage. Adverse impacts would be SMALL. If no repository becomes available, 

operational and replacement activities would continue, beneficial impacts to the economy could 

be LARGE in some rural economies. 

ES.16.2.3 Environmental Justice 

Short-Term Storage. The process of siting an away-from-reactor ISFSI would be expected to 

ensure that environmental justice concerns are addressed prior to licensing. Overall human 

health and environmental effects from construction of the ISFSI and from continued storage 

during the short-term timeframe would be limited in scope and SMALL for all populations, 

except for air quality, terrestrial resources, aesthetics, historic and cultural resources, and 

socioeconomic and traffic conditions. Minority and low-income populations are not expected to 

experience disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects from 

the construction and operation of an away-from-reactor ISFSI. Should the NRC receive an 

application for a proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI, a site-specific NEPA analysis would be 

conducted, and that analysis would include consideration of environmental justice impacts. 

Long-Term Storage. The impacts from constructing the DTS within the ISFSI protected area 

would be within the envelope of impacts from the construction of the away-from-reactor ISFSI. 

Overall human health and environmental effects of storing spent fuel during the long-term 

timeframe would be limited in scope and SMALL for all populations, except for aesthetics, 

historic and cultural resources, socioeconomic, and traffic conditions. Given the passive nature 

of storage operations, the short amount of time required for DTS construction and replacement 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ l September 2014 

of the ISFSI and DTS and the ongoing monitoring and maintenance, minority and low-income 

populations are not expected to be experience disproportionately high and adverse human 

health and environmental impacts. 

Indefinite Storage. Overall human health and environmental effects of storing spent fuel during 

the indefinite timeframe would be the same as those described for long-term storage, except for 

nonradioactive waste generation and disposal. Based on this information, minority and lowincome populations are not expected to experience disproportionately high and adverse human 

health and environmental effects from the operation and replacement of the ISFSI and DTS. 

ES.16.2.4 Air Quality 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. Construction of an away-fromreactor ISFSI would result in minimal emissions, but construction of the rail spur could produce 

temporary and localized impacts that would be noticeable. ISFSI operations generate minor 

levels of air emissions but not enough to be classified as a “major stationary source” of 

emissions as defined in Federal air quality regulations. Locomotives transporting spent fuel to 

an away-from-reactor ISFSI would emit exhaust pollutants in a distributed manner along the 

transport route. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Operational activities are expected to be of 

relatively short duration and limited in extent. The DTS is a relatively small facility, and the air 

quality impacts associated with construction would be less than those associated with the 

original construction of the ISFSI. Replacement of the DTS and ISFSI and maintenance of the 

rail spur would involve only a fraction of the air emissions associated with initial construction of 

an ISFSI. Exhaust from vehicles would not be expected to noticeably affect air quality for the 

region. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Indefinite storage would consist of the same 

short-duration and limited-extent activities and would result in the same impact magnitudes as 

described for long-term storage except that they would continue indefinitely into the future. 

ES.16.2.5 Climate Change 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Average annual greenhouse gas 

emissions associated with building and operating an ISFSI as well as transportation 

(e.g., commuters, supplies, waste materials, and spent fuel) would be equivalent to the 

annual emissions from about 1,640 passenger vehicles. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of a DTS, replacement of dry 

casks and pads, and maintenance activities would likely involve only a fraction of the 

greenhouse gas emissions associated with the original construction of the ISFSI. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 li 185(*௅

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Greenhouse gas emissions would continue to be 

similar to long-term impacts. 

ES.16.2.6 Geology and Soils 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. The land required to construct an ISFSI would 

be relatively small, and soil erosion controls would minimize impacts. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction of a DTS would have minimal 

impacts to geology and soil because of the small size of the facility. Replacement of the ISFSI 

pads and supporting facilities would likely occur on land near the existing facilities. The old 

facilities would likely be demolished, and the land would likely be reclaimed. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be similar to long-term storage, SMALL. Replacement of 

ISFSI and DTS facilities would occur on previously disturbed land and would minimize impacts 

to soils and geology. 

ES.16.2.7 Surface-Water Quality and Use 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Best management practices would be 

implemented during construction of an ISFSI to address stormwater flows, soil erosion, and 

siltation. Stormwater control measures would be required to comply with State-enforced waterquality permits. Construction and operation of an ISFSI would require very little consumptive 

use of water. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Given the relatively smaller size of a DTS as 

compared to an ISFSI, much less water would be required to build a DTS. Consumptive use 

and surface-water quality impacts would be no greater than those identified for initial 

construction of the storage facilities. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those for long-term 

storage. Replacement of ISFSIs and DTS facilities once every 100 years would result in 

temporary and minimal impacts to surface-water quality and use. 

ES.16.2.8 Groundwater Quality and Use 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Methods necessary to control impacts to 

groundwater quality during construction and operation of an ISFSI are well understood and 

State-issued permits typically require the implementation of such controls. Construction and 

operation of an ISFSI would require very little consumptive use of water. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts on groundwater from a DTS would be 

no larger than those considered for construction of the ISFSI. Likewise, the impacts of replacing 

portions of the ISFSI over time would be no more than the impacts of the initial construction of 

the facility, and would likely occur over a longer period of time. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lii September 2014 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those for long-term 

storage. Once every 100 years, groundwater may be required when demolishing and replacing 

the ISFSI and DTS facilities. Consumptive use of groundwater and water-quality impacts would 

be minor. 

ES.16.2.9 Terrestrial Resources 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. Land area permanently 

disturbed for construction of an away-from-reactor dry cask storage facility would be relatively 

small, and any impacts to wetlands would be addressed under the Clean Water Act. However, 

construction could have some noticeable impacts to terrestrial resources, such as habitat loss, 

displacement of wildlife, and incremental habitat fragmentation. ISFSI operations would have 

minimal impacts on terrestrial resources. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts from construction of a DTS would be 

significantly less than those impacts expected from construction and operation of an ISFSI. 

Because of its relatively small construction footprint, the DTS could be sited on previously 

disturbed ground and away from sensitive terrestrial resources. Impacts from operational 

activities would be minor. Replacement activities would occur once about every 100 years, and 

would likely occur near existing facilities. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Replacement activities are not expected to add 

additional impacts beyond those impacts expected for initial construction of the away-fromreactor ISFSI and DTS. Operation of away-from reactor ISFSIs would not require any additional 

land use beyond that set aside for original construction of the facility. 

ES.16.2.10 Aquatic Ecology 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction and operation of an away-fromreactor ISFSI would require limited water supplies, and effluents, if any, would be limited to 

stormwater and treated wastewater. Impacts to aquatic resources would tend to be limited by 

certain factors, including the land area permanently disturbed would be relatively small; water 

use for the construction and operation of the site would be limited; and any impacts from 

discharges to water bodies would need to be addressed under the Clean Water Act, which 

requires licensees to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit for any 

discharges to water bodies. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Building a DTS, and transferring, handling, and 

aging management of spent fuel at an away-from-reactor ISFSI could result in ground-disturbing 

activities that would have impacts similar to or less than impacts associated with the original 

construction of the ISFSI. Replacement activities would likely occur near existing facilities, and 

aquatic disturbances would result in relatively short-term impacts and aquatic environs would 

recover naturally. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 liii 185(*௅

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Activities associated with demolishing old 

facilities and building replacement facilities about once every 100 years could result in minimal, 

short-term impacts to aquatic resources. Impacts associated with ISFSI operation and 

maintenance would also be small. 

ES.16.2.11 Special Status Species and Habitat 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts from the initial construction and ongoing operation and 

maintenance of dry cask storage facilities to State-listed species, marine mammals, migratory 

birds, and bald and golden eagles would range from minimal to noticeable, which would be 

similar to those described for terrestrial and aquatic resources, with any noticeable impacts 

resulting from the construction of the ISFSI. An away-from-reactor ISFSI could be sited to avoid 

adversely affecting special status species and habitat. The NRC would assess the impacts to 

Federally listed species and designated critical habitat from an away-from-reactor ISFSI and 

DTS in a site-specific review before the facility is initially constructed and afterwards if an activity 

PHHWVWKHFULWHULDLQ&)5IRULQLWLDWLRQRUUHLQLWLDWLRQRI6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ

Long-Term Storage. During the long-term storage timeframe, initial construction of the DTS and 

replacement of the casks, pads, and the DTS would result in impacts that would be less than 

initial construction impacts because replacement activities would occur within the facility’s 

operational area near existing facilities. The NRC would assess the impacts to Federally listed 

species and designated critical habitat from an away-from-reactor ISFSI and DTS in a sitespecific review before the facility is initially constructed and afterwards if an activity meets the 

FULWHULDLQ&)5Part 402 for initiation or reinitiDWLRQRI6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ

Indefinite Storage. Impacts to special status species and habitat from continued operation of 

away-from-reactor ISFSIs if a repository never becomes available would be similar to those 

described for the long-term storage timeframe. The same operations and maintenance 

activities would occur repeatedly because the spent fuel remains at the facility indefinitely. The 

NRC would assess the impacts to Federally listed species and designated critical habitat from 

an away-from-reactor ISFSI and DTS in a site-specific review before the facility is initially 

FRQVWUXFWHGDQGDIWHUZDUGVLIDQDFWLYLW\PHHWVWKHFULWHULDLQ&)5Part 402 for initiation or 

reinitiation RI6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ

ES.16.2.12 Historic and Cultural Resources 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to 

LARGE. Impacts to historic and cultural resources would 

vary depending on what resources are present, but could 

be minimized because (1) the land area disturbed would 

be relatively small, (2) site selection and placement of 

facilities on the site could be adjusted to minimize or 

Section 106 of the National Historic 

Preservation Act of 1966 requires 

Federal agencies to take into account 

the effects of their undertakings on 

historic properties.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ liv September 2014 

avoid impacts to historic and cultural resources because the facility does not depend on 

VLJQLILFDQWZDWHUVXSSO\DQGKDVOLPLWHGHOHFWULFDOSRZHUQHHGVDQGSRWHQWLDOimpacts could 

also be minimized through development of agreements, license conditions, and implementation 

of the licensees’ historic and cultural resource management plans and procedures to protect 

known historic and cultural resources and address inadvertent discoveries. Additionally, should 

the NRC receive an application for a proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI, the NRC would 

conduct a site-specific assessment of potential impacts to historic and cultural resources under 

Section 106 of the NHPA. Impacts from continued operations and routine maintenance during 

the short-term timeframe would be small because no ground-disturbing activities are expected; 

therefore, impacts would be SMALL. In most, but not all instances, placement of storage 

facilities on the site can be adjusted to minimize or avoid impacts on any historic and cultural 

resources in the area. However, the NRC recognizes that this is not always possible. 

Therefore, the NRC concludes that the potential impacts on historic and cultural resources could 

range from SMALL to LARGE, depending on site-specific factors. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to LARGE. Impacts from continued operations, 

routine maintenance, replacement of the facilities at an away-from-reactor ISFSI, and potential 

construction, operation, and replacement of a DTS would vary depending on what resources are 

present, proposed land disturbance, and if the licensee has management plans and procedures 

that are protective of historic and cultural resources. Additionally, the construction of a DTS and 

replacement of an ISFSI and the DTS would be Federal actions that would require the NRC to 

conduct a site-specific assessment of potential impacts to historical and cultural resources 

under Section 106 of NHPA. The NRC assumes that the replacement of the ISFSI and DTS 

would be constructed on land near the existing facilities. The NRC recognizes that there is 

uncertainty associated with the degree of prior disturbance and the resources, if any, are 

present in areas where future ground-disturbing activities could occur. The NRC cannot 

eliminate the possibility that historic and cultural resources would be affected by construction 

activities because the initial ISFSI could be located within a less-disturbed area with historic and 

cultural resources in close proximity. Further, resources may be present after initial construction 

of the away-from-reactor ISFSI that would not have been considered significant at the time the 

initial or replacement facilities were constructed, but could become significant in the future. This 

range takes into consideration routine maintenance and monitoring (i.e., no ground-disturbing 

activities), the absence or avoidance of historic and cultural resources, and potential grounddisturbing activities that impact historic and cultural resources. The analysis also considers 

uncertainties inherent in analyzing this resource over long timeframes. These uncertainties 

include any future discovery of previously unknown historic and cultural resources; resources 

that gain significance within the vicinity and the viewshed (e.g., nomination of a historic district) 

due to improvements in knowledge, technology, and excavation techniques; and changes 

associated with predicting resources that would be significant to future generations. If 

construction of a DTS and replacement of the ISFSI and DTS occurs in an area with no historic 

or cultural resource present or construction occurs in previously a disturbed area that allows 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 lv 185(*௅

avoidance of historic and cultural resources then impacts would be SMALL. By contrast, a 

MODERATE or LARGE impact could result if historic and cultural resources are present at a 

site and, because they cannot be avoided, are impacted by ground-disturbing activities during 

the long-term timeframe. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to LARGE. Impacts would be similar to those 

described for the long-term storage timeframe. The NRC assumes that the replacement of the 

ISFSI and DTS would be constructed on land near the existing facilities. As stated in Section 

1.8, the NRC assumes that the land where the original facilities were constructed will be 

available for replacement facility construction; however, the NRC cannot eliminate the possibility 

that historic and cultural resources will be affected by construction activities during the indefinite 

timeframe because there is uncertainty associated with the degree of prior disturbance and 

what resources, if any, are present in areas where future ground-disturbing activities (e.g., initial 

and replacement DTS and replacement ISFSI) could occur. Further, significant resources may 

be present that were not considered significant at the time the initial or replacement facilities 

were constructed. Potential impacts to historic and cultural resources during the indefinite 

storage timeframe would range from SMALL to LARGE. This range takes into consideration 

routine maintenance and monitoring (i.e., no ground-disturbing activities), the absence or 

avoidance of historic and cultural resources, and potential ground-disturbing activities that could 

impact historic and cultural resources. The analysis also considers uncertainties inherent in 

analyzing this resource area over long timeframes. These uncertainties include any future 

discovery of previously unknown historic and cultural resources; resources that gain significance 

within the vicinity and the viewshed (e.g., nomination of a historic district) due to improvements 

in knowledge, technology, and excavation techniques; and changes associated with predicting 

resources that future generations would consider significant. If construction of a DTS and 

replacement of the ISFSI and DTS occurs in an area with no historic or cultural resource 

present or construction occurs in previously a disturbed area that allows avoidance of historic 

and cultural resources then impacts would be SMALL. By contrast, a MODERATE or LARGE 

impact could result if historic and cultural resources are present at a site and, because they 

cannot be avoided, are impacted by ground-disturbing activities during the indefinite timeframe. 

ES.16.2.13 Noise 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Noise impacts for an away-from-reactor ISFSI 

could exceed EPA-recommended levels during some portions of construction and operation; 

however, noise impacts would be short in duration and intermittent. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Noise impacts from continued operation and 

routine maintenance of an away-from-reactor ISFSI would be minimal. Impacts from 

construction of a DTS and replacement of the DTS and ISFSI would be similar to those for initial 

construction of an ISFSI. These construction and replacement activities would be intermittent 

and short in duration, and noticeable noise levels would be limited to the nearest receptors. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lvi September 2014 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Impacts would be similar to those associated 

with the long-term storage timeframe. Ongoing operation, maintenance, and replacement 

activities would have minimal noise impacts. 

ES.16.2.14 Aesthetics 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. Potential impacts to aesthetic 

resources would include visibility of facility buildings, dry storage pads and canisters, and the 

rail line and trains from across scenic water bodies, roadways, or from higher elevations. 

Lighting of the facility would increase visibility. If constructed in an area with no prior industrial 

development, the ISFSI could impact the local viewshed, and scenic appeal of the site would be 

noticeably changed when viewed from various locations. Impacts could be minimal if the ISFSI 

is built in a previously disturbed area. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. Aesthetic impacts from 

transferring and handling spent fuel and aging management activities at an away-from-reactor 

ISFSI are anticipated to be similar to the impacts for initial construction and short-term operation 

of the ISFSI. Periodic construction, demolition, and operation activities required for aging 

management would not significantly alter the pre-existing impacts on aesthetic resources. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. The same operations and 

maintenance activities that are described for the long-term storage timeframe occur repeatedly 

because the spent fuel remains at the facility indefinitely. 

ES.16.2.15 Waste Management 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Construction activities would generate 

excavation and construction debris, vegetation debris, and backfill. Operation of an away-fromreactor ISFSI would involve limited waste generating activities. Small quantities of LLW may be 

generated during routine operation and maintenance. Little to no mixed waste generation would 

be expected. Small quantities of nonradioactive waste would be generated. All wastes would 

be managed and disposed of according to regulatory requirements. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Routine maintenance would generate minimal 

quantities of waste. Construction and operation of a DTS and replacement of ISFSI and DTS 

facilities at an away-from-reactor ISFSI would generate LLW and nonradioactive waste. 

Although the exact amount of LLW and nonradioactive waste depends on the level of 

contamination, the quantity of LLW generated from the replacement of the ISFSI and DTS is 

expected to be comparable to the LLW generated during reactor decommissioning, which was 

determined to have a SMALL impact in the License Renewal GEIS. Although a large amount of 

nonradioactive waste would be generated by replacement of the ISFSI and DTS, it would not 

likely have a noticeable impact on total nonradioactive waste disposal capacity. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 lvii 185(*௅

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. LLW, mixed waste, and 

nonradioactive waste would continue to be generated indefinitely, and there could be noticeable 

impacts on the local and regional landfill capacity for nonradioactive waste disposal. 

ES.16.2.16 Transportation 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to 

MODERATE. The environmental impacts of 

transportation include impacts to regional traffic from 

commuting workers, supply shipments, shipments of 

spent fuel to the ISFSI, and shipments of nonradioactive 

and radiological waste. Impacts to traffic from workers 

commuting to and from the away-from-reactor storage 

site depend on the size of the workforce, the capacity of 

the local road network, traffic patterns, and the availability 

of alternative commuting routes to and from the facility. 

The majority of impacts would be associated with the 

traffic during the initial construction of the ISFSI. 

Shipment of spent fuel from nuclear power plants to the 

ISFSI would be required to comply with NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation 

regulations. Radiological impacts to the public and workers from spent fuel shipments from a 

reactor have previously been evaluated by the NRC (in Table S-4 of 10 &)52) and were 

found to be small. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. Construction of a DTS would 

require a smaller workforce than the initial construction of the ISFSI, so transportation impacts 

from workers commuting would be less, but may still be noticeable. Shipments of LLW 

generated by maintenance and replacement activities would be regulated by NRC and 

Department of Transportation requirements and impacts to traffic and to public and worker 

radiological and nonradiological safety would be minimal. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. Annual transportation activities 

and associated environmental impacts would be similar to that analyzed for the long-term 

storage timeframe. 

ES.16.2.17 Public and Occupational Health 

Short-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Nonradiological health impacts from the 

construction of an away-from-reactor ISFSI include normal hazards associated with 

construction, such as pollutants (e.g., dust), and fatal and nonfatal occupational injuries (e.g., 

falls and overexertion). Impacts would be minor and similar to an industrial facility of similar 

size. Public and occupation radiological doses would be maintained significantly below the 

Table S௅4 in 10 CFR 51.52

summarizes the environmental 

impacts of transportation of fuel and 

waste to and from a nuclear power 

plant. Data supporting the 

determinations in Table S௅4 is 

contained in the NRC’s Environmental 

Survey of Transportation of 

Radioactive Materials to and from 

Nuclear Power Plants, WASH௅

'HFHPEHUDQG6XSS

NUREG௅$SULO
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lviii September 2014 

GRVHOLPLWVHVWDEOLVKHGE\&)53DUWDQG&)53DUW/LFHQVHGIDFLOLWLHVZRXOGDOVR

be required by those regulations to maintain an ALARA program, which would likely reduce the 

doses even further. 

Long-Term Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. Nonradiological health impacts associated with 

replacement activities would be similar those for the original construction of the facility, although 

replacement activities would take place over a longer period of time. Public and occupational 

radiological doses would be maintained significantly below the dose limits established by 

10 &)53DUWDQG&)53DUWIn addition, the dry cask storage facility would be required 

to maintain an ALARA program that would likely further reduce radiological doses. Operation of 

the DTS would involve increased doses to works and a very small increase in dose levels at the 

site boundary; however, the licensee would still be required to comply with regulations limiting 

dose. 

Indefinite Storage. Impacts would be SMALL. For the indefinite storage timeframe, the types of 

activities (construction, operation, and replacement) and associated health impacts would 

remain the same as those for the long-term storage timeframe. 

ES.16.2.18 Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents 

Impacts would be SMALL. Consideration of accidents at an away-from-reactor ISFSI for all 

three storage timeframes is similar to those for at-reactor ISFSIs (described in Chapter 4). The 

postulated accident analysis in the GEIS is applicable for all three timeframes (short-term, longterm, and indefinite). The 15&UHJXODWLRQVLQ&)53DUWUHTXLUHWKDWVWUXFWXUHVV\VWHPV

and components important to safety will be designed to withstand the effects of natural 

phenomena (such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes) and human-induced events 

without loss of capability to perform those safety functions. The NRC siting regulations also 

require applicants to take into consideration, among other things, physical characteristics of 

sites that are necessary for the safety analysis or that may have an impact on plant design 

(such as the design basis earthquake). All these factors are considered in determining the 

acceptability of the site and design criteria of a proposed dry cask storage facility. The GEIS 

analysis considered an accident scenario in which wind-borne missiles damage the concrete 

overpack of a dry cask. This accident would result in only slightly higher occupational doses 

and only negligible increases in radiological doses at the boundary of the site. The analysis 

also considered an accident resulting in a dry cask leaking, and determined that radiological 

doses would still be below the limits in 10 CFR Part 20 and &)53DUW

ES.16.2.19 Potential Acts of Sabotage or Terrorism 

The consideration of acts of sabotage or terrorism at an away-from-reactor ISFSI for all three 

storage timeframes are similar to those for at-reactor ISFSIs (described in Chapter 4). The 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 lix 185(*௅

probability and consequences of a successful attack on an away-from-reactor ISFSI or DTS are 

low; therefore, the environmental risk is SMALL. 

Table ES-4. Summary of Environmental Impacts of Away-From-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage 

Resource Area 

Short-Term 

Storage 

Long-Term 

Storage 

Indefinite 

Storage 

Land Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Socioeconomics SMALL (adverse) to 

LARGE (beneficial) 

SMALL (adverse) to 

LARGE (beneficial) 

SMALL (adverse) to 

LARGE (beneficial) 

Environmental Justice Disproportionately high and adverse impacts are not expected. 

Air Quality SMALL to MODERATE SMALL SMALL 

Climate Change SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Geology and Soils SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Surface-Water Quality and Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Groundwater Quality and Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Terrestrial Resources SMALL to MODERATE SMALL SMALL 

Aquatic Ecology SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Special Status Species and 

Habitat 

Impacts for Federally listed threatened and endangered species and 

Essential Fish Habitat would be determined as part of the consultations 

for the ESA and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act. 

Historic and Cultural Resources SMALL to LARGE SMALL to LARGE SMALL to LARGE

Noise SMALL SMALL SMALL

Aesthetics SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to 

MODERATE 

SMALL to MODERATE 

Waste Management 

 Low-Level Waste SMALL SMALL SMALL 

 Mixed Waste SMALL SMALL SMALL 

 Nonradioactive Waste SMALL SMALL SMALL to MODERATE 

Transportation 

 Traffic SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to 

MODERATE 

SMALL to MODERATE 

 Health SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Public and Occupational Health SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Accidents SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Sabotage or Terrorism SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lx September 2014 

ES.17 Did the NRC Look at Cumulative Impacts? 

In Chapter 6, the NRC examined the incremental 

impact of continued storage on each resource area in 

combination with other past, present, and reasonably 

foreseeable actions. The introductory sections of 

Chapter 6 discuss the NRC's methodology for 

assessing cumulative impacts, including the spatial and temporal bounds on which the NRC 

based its analyses, and provide a table that describes national, regional, and local trends that 

informed the NRC’s consideration of reasonably foreseeable future actions. Trends that the 

NRC examined include increased energy demand, continued use of radiological materials, 

increased water demand, population growth and demographic shifts, increased urbanization, 

transportation, and other activities and environmental stressors. The spatial boundaries for the 

cumulative impact assessment are unique to each resource area and defined in resourcespecific analyses in Section 6.4. Each geographic area of analysis includes the area 

surrounding a single continued storage site and extends to where the resource would be 

affected by continued storage and could have overlapping impacts with other past, present, and 

reasonably foreseeable future actions. The temporal boundary for the cumulative effects 

analysis includes activities that could occur through decommissioning of at-reactor or awayfrom-reactor storage facilities. 

Table ES-SURYLGHVDVXPPDU\RIWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQVPDGHLQ&KDSWHU7KHVHFRQGDQG

WKLUGFROXPQVOLVWUHVRXUFHLPSDFWGHWHUPLQDWLRQVPDGHLQ&KDSWHUVDQG7hese impacts are 

combined with the past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions discussed in Chapter 6. 

The last column lists the cumulative impacts to resource areas. Discussions about impact 

differences resulting from cumulative effects can be found in Chapter 6. 

Table ES-5. Summary of Cumulative Impacts for Continued Storage of Spent Fuel 

Resource Area 

Incremental 

Impact from AtReactor Storage 

Incremental Impact 

from Away-fromReactor Storage 

Cumulative Impact from 

Continued Storage and 

Other Federal and NonFederal Activities 

Land Use SMALL SMALL SMALL to MODERATE 

Socioeconomics SMALL SMALL (adverse) to 

LARGE (beneficial) 

SMALL to LARGE 

Environmental Justice Disproportionately high and adverse impacts are not expected 

Air Quality SMALL SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to MODERATE 

Climate Change SMALL SMALL MODERATE 

Geology and Soils SMALL SMALL SMALL to MODERATE 

Surface-Water Quality and Use SMALL SMALL SMALL to LARGE 

Cumulative impacts result when the 

effects of an action are added to or 

interact with other effects in a particular 

place and within a particular time.
Executive Summary 

September 2014 lxi 185(*௅

Table ES-5. Summary of Cumulative Impacts for Continued Storage of Spent Fuel (cont’d) 

Resource Area 

Incremental 

Impact from AtReactor Storage 

Incremental Impact 

from Away-fromReactor Storage 

Cumulative Impact from 

Continued Storage and 

Other Federal and NonFederal Activities 

Groundwater Quality and Use SMALL SMALL SMALL to LARGE 

Terrestrial Resources(a) SMALL SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to MODERATE 

Aquatic Ecology(a) SMALL SMALL SMALL to LARGE 

Historic and Cultural Resources SMALL to LARGE SMALL to LARGE SMALL to LARGE 

Noise SMALL SMALL SMALL to MODERATE 

Aesthetics SMALL SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to MODERATE 

Waste Management SMALL to 

MODERATE 

SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to LARGE 

Transportation SMALL SMALL to MODERATE SMALL to MODERATE 

Public and Occupational Health SMALL SMALL SMALL 

Accidents SMALL SMALL SMALL 

(a) Cumulative impacts to Federally listed threatened and endangered species and Essential Fish Habitat would be 

determined as part of consultations for the ESA and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 

Act. 

ES.18 What is the Purpose of Chapter 8 of the GEIS? 

Chapter 8 provides a summary of the environmental impacts and consequences of continued 

at-reactor and away-from-reactor storage. In addition, Chapter 8 addresses the following 

NEPA elements for use in future site-specific environmental reviews: (1) unavoidable adverse 

environmental impacts of continued storage; (2) irreversible and irretrievable resource 

FRPPLWPHQWVRIFRQWLQXHVWRUDJHDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVKRUW-term uses of the 

environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. 

ES.18.1 What are the Unavoidable Adverse Impacts of Continued Storage? 

Unavoidable adverse environmental impacts are those potential impacts of continued storage 

that cannot be avoided because of constraints inherent in using at-reactor and away-fromreactor spent fuel storage facilities for continued storage. The unavoidable adverse 

environmental impacts associated with continued storage would include impacts of (1) shortterm storage in a spent fuel pool, as well as (2) short-WHUPVWRUDJHORQJ-term storage, 

and (4) indefinite storage in at-reactor and away-from-reactor ISFSIs. These impacts are 

summarized in Table ES-DQG7DEOH(6-4. 
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lxii September 2014 

ES.18.2 What are the Irreversible and Irretrievable Resource Commitments of 

Continued Storage? 

An irreversible resource commitment is a commitment of environmental resources—to a 

particular action—that cannot be restored. An irretrievable commitment of resources refers to 

a commitment of material resources that, once used, cannot be recycled or restored for other 

uses by practical means. Impacts on land use, terrestrial ecology, aquatic ecology, aesthetics, 

historic and cultural resources, and waste management would all result in irreversible 

commitments of resources. Replacement of ISFSI components and transportation would result 

in irretrievable commitments. 

ES.18.3 What is the Relationship between Short-Term Uses of the Environment and the 

Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity? 

The NRC recognizes the relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the 

maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity that occurs from continued storage, 

which may be authorized by future licensing actions. The local short-term use of the human 

environment is summarized in terms of the unavoidable adverse environmental impacts and 

irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources. The long-term productivity period is the 

time period beyond continued storage. 

Decisions regarding dismantlement and decommissioning affect this relationship. The 

maximum long-term impact on productivity would result when an at-reactor or away-fromreactor ISFSI is not immediately dismantled at the end of storage operations, or, as with the 

indefinite storage timeframe, it remains in operation indefinitely. Consequently, the land 

occupied by an ISFSI would not be available for any other uses. By contrast, when site 

decommissioning is complete, and an NRC license is terminated, a site would be available for 

other uses. 

Other potential long-term impacts on productivity include the commitment of land and 

consumption of disposal capacity necessary to meet waste disposal needs. In addition, 

because loss of historic and cultural resources would constitute irreversible impacts, any loss 

of historic and cultural resources during continued storage would persist as long-term impacts. 

A small contribution to greenhouse gas emissions would add to the atmospheric burden of 

emissions that could contribute to potential long-term impacts. 
Executive Summary 

September 2014 lxiii 185(*௅

ES.19 How did the NRC Address Spent Fuel Pool Fires and 

Leaks? 

The NRC assessed the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool fires and leaks as part of the 

analysis in the GEIS. Appendix E describes the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool leaks 

during the short-term storage timeframe, and Appendix F describes the environmental impacts 

of a spent fuel pool fire during the short-term storage timeframe. In the GEIS, the NRC 

assumes that all spent fuel being stored in spent fuel pools will be transferred to dry casks by 

the end of the 60-year (short-term) storage timeframe. 

ES.19.1 Spent Fuel Pool Leaks 

A variety of factors work together to make it 

unlikely that a spent fuel pool leak would result in 

noticeable offsite environmental impacts during 

continued storage. These include the 

combination of spent fuel pool design and 

maintenance, operational and regulatory practices 

(e.g., leakage monitoring, NRC oversight, and 

groundwater monitoring), site hydrogeologic 

characteristics, and radionuclide transport 

properties. 

For impacts to groundwater resources, though 

unlikely, it is possible that a leak of sufficient quantity and duration could occur, resulting in 

noticeable, but not destabilizing impacts to groundwater resources. The factors that could lead 

to a significant leak are many and varied. These factors include the magnitude and duration of 

the leak, the radiological constituents of the leak, the hydrologic conditions of the site, and the 

distance to the offsite groundwater resource. All these factors, in addition to the assessment of 

past leaks and the promulgation of regulations requiring subsurface surveys to determine the 

presence and extent of subsurface contamination, leads NRC to conclude that the 

environmental impacts of a spent fuel pool leak during continued storage would be SMALL. 

Public health concerns would be related to groundwater contamination and would be limited to 

private wells nearest the site. In the event of uncontrolled and undetected discharges 

associated with long-term spent fuel pool leaks to nearby surface waters, the annual discharge 

would be comparable to normal discharges associated with operating reactors, and would likely 

UHPDLQEHORZOLPLWVLQ&)53DUW$SSHQGL[,If, in the unlikely event that a pool leak 

remained undetected for a long period of time, public health regulatory limits (i.e., EPA drinking 

water standards) could potentially be exceeded, and the public health impacts could be 

noticeable, but not destabilizing. However, it is unlikely that a leak of sufficient quantity and 

Tritium is a radioactive isotope of 

hydrogen. Water containing tritium is 

normally released from nuclear power plants 

under controlled, monitored conditions that the 

NRC mandates to protect public health and 

safety. The NRC evaluates abnormal releases 

of tritium-contaminated water. More 

information about tritium from nuclear power 

plants can be found at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/tritium-radiation-fs.html.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lxiv September 2014 

duration could occur without detection, or that a leak would not be impeded by the inherent 

hydrologic characteristics typical at spent fuel pool locations. Therefore, based on the low 

probability that a long-duration leak exceeding effluent limits would go undetected and affect 

offsite groundwater sources to the extent that a public health limit would be exceeded, the NRC 

concludes that impacts during the short-term storage timeframe would be SMALL. 

ES.19.2 Spent Fuel Pool Fires 

The spent fuel pool fire environmental impacts 

described in Appendix F are based upon a summary 

of spent fuel pool fire risk studies the NRC has 

completHGVLQFH:KLOHPRVWRIWKHHDUOLHU

studies were concerned with spent fuel pool fire risk 

during the operating life of a reactor, the Technical 

Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG–

completed in 2001, examined the risk of spent 

fuel pool fires during the reactor decommissioning 

period, which is the same storage timeframe of continued storage of spent fuel on which this 

GEIS is focused. The GEIS assumes that all fuel will be removed from the spent fuel pool by 

the end of the 60-year decommissioning period, which corresponds to the end of the short-term 

timeframe. 

The conservative estimates used to assess spent fuel pool fire accidents, based on the NRC’s 

previous analyses, result in probability-weighted population doses and economic consequences 

that are comparable to the values calculated for a severe reactor accident, as estimated in the 

1996 DQGLicense Renewal GEIS. Furthermore, mitigation measures implemented by 

licensees as a result of NRC Orders and regulations have further lowered the risk of this class 

of accidents. As a result, the NRC finds that the environmental impacts from spent fuel pool 

fires are SMALL during the short-term timeframe. 

ES.20 Does the GEIS Address Costs? 

&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6DQDO\]HVDQGFRPSDUHVWKHEHQHILWVDQGFRVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH

SURSRVHGDFWLRQDGRSWLQJDUHYLVHG&)5DQGWKH15&¶VRSWLRQVLQWKHFDVHRI

no action (site-specific review, GEIS-only, and policy statement). The no-action options do not 

alter the environmental impacts of continued storage that the NRC addresses in Chapters 4, 

DQG,QVWHDGWhe options considered provide different administrative approaches that the 

NRC could apply to future licensing reviews to satisfy the agency’s responsibility to consider the 

potential environmental impacts of continued storage in deciding whether to issue certain new 

DQGUHQHZHGOLFHQVHV6HFWLRQLncludes assumptions about financial costs and current and 

The NRC’s determination of SMALL for 

the environmental impacts of a spent fuel 

fire is based on a probability-weighted 

consequence. This means that the risk 

of a spent fuel fire informed the impact 

determination of SMALL. 

The risk of a spent fuel fire is low because 

even though the consequences would be 

high, the probability is extremely low.
Executive Summary 

September 2014 lxv 185(*௅

future licensing reviews that are the bases for the cost analysis, while the NRC addresses 

unTXDQWLILHGFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVWKURXJKRXW&KDSWHU

6HFWLRQVXPPDUL]HVDQGFRPSDUHVWKHHVWLPDWHGFRsts and benefits of the proposed action 

and the potential options in the case of no action. The cost for the proposed action (adopting a 

UHYLVHG&)5is significantly lower than the cost for any of the no-action options. This 

occurs primarily because the NRC does not undertake site-specific reviews of the continued 

storage issue in the course of individual licensing proceedings as part of the proposed action. 

In general, the potential options in the case of no action are more costly than the proposed 

action. 

The NRC provides cost information about continued storage facilities and activities in Chapter 2 

in response to a large number of public comments on the draft GEIS that requested this 

information. 

ES.21 What is the NRC’s Recommendation? 

Section RIWKH*(,6SURYLGHV15&¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQWKDWWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQLVWKH

preferred alternative. The NRC recommendation is based on (1) the NRC’s analysis of the costbenefit balance of the proposed action and the options in the case of no action as presented in 

&KDSWHUWKH15&¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRISXEOLF-scoping and draft GEIS comments in the 

development of the final *(,6WKHODFNRIHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHLWKHUWKH

proposed action or the NRC’s options in the case of no action; and (4) the determination that the 

environmental impacts of continued storage analyzed in the GEIS are unaffected by the NRC’s 

choice of a particular administrative approach for considering the environmental impacts of 

continued storage in NRC licensing processes. 

ES.22 How is the GEIS Related to the Rule? 

This GEIS provides a regulatory basis for the NRC’s revised Rule, &)5 

Appendix B of the GEIS contains detailed information about the previous Waste Confidence 

proceedings, and addresses two relevant topics from Waste Confidence proceedings: (1) the 

technical feasibility of continued safe storage and (2) repository availability. NRC’s conclusions 

regarding these topics continue to undergird the agency’s environmental analysis. 

The NRC recommendation is to select the proposed action—adopting a 

revision to &)5WKDWFRGLILHVWKHLPSDFWGHWHUPLQDWLRQVIURPWKH

GEIS—as the preferred alternative.
Executive Summary 

185(*௅ lxvi September 2014 

ES.23 Are There Any Areas of Controversy in the GEIS? 

There were two areas of controversy raised in the Court of Appeals’ remand of the 2010 Waste 

Confidence Rule. These areas of controversy are described below. 

1. The NRC has included detailed analyses of spent fuel pool leaks and spent fuel pool fires. 

Historically, the NRC has devoted considerable attention to these topics, and there has 

been intense public interest in these issues, as evidenced by comments received during the 

litigation on the 2010 Waste Confidence update, during the scoping period, and during the 

comment period on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule. The NRC therefore prepared 

separate appendices to provide additional detail regarding the studies and analyses that 

underlie the analyses of spent fuel pool fires and leaks. 

2. The NRC has included indefinite storage as one of the three timeframes analyzed in this 

GEIS. The NRC has devoted considerable attention to this timeframe in response to the 

intense public interest in this issue, as evidenced by comments received during the litigation 

on the 2010 Waste Confidence update, during the scoping period, and during the comment 

period on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule. Although the NRC believes it is likely that a 

repository will be available by 60 years after the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation, 

it recognizes that the availability of a repository is a controversial issue and has included an 

analysis of indefinite storage in the GEIS. 

ES.24 Are There Any Remaining Issues to be Resolved? 

For the purposes of successfully completing the GEIS while meeting NEPA requirements, the 

NRC believes there are numerous sources of the requisite technical data and information 

available; therefore, there are no remaining issues that require resolution. In the reference 

section of each chapter, the NRC has listed technical documents and reports on pertinent 

issues that are used to support the analyses in the GEIS. The NRC relied on accurate and 

high-quality information to ensure the GEIS contains a thorough and rigorous environmental 

impact analysis. The NRC will continue to review health and environmental effects of spent fuel 

storage as part of its ongoing licensing, oversight, and research activities. Any new information, 

such as the performance of spent fuel during lengthy periods of time, will be used to update and 

improve the NRC's regulatory requirements as appropriate. 

ES.25 How Can I Obtain a Copy of the GEIS and Rule? 

The final GEIS can be accessed online at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/ or in ADAMS under Accession No. ML14198A440. The draft GEIS can 

be accessed in ADAMS at ML$. The final Rule will be published in the Federal 

Register and at www.regulations.gov. 
September 2014 lxvii NUREG௅2157 

Abbreviations/Acronyms 

ACHP Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

AEA Atomic Energy Act 

AEC U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable 

ANDRA French National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management 

ANS American Nuclear Society 

ANSI American National Standards Institute 

APA Administrative Procedure Act 

APS American Physical Society 

ASLBP Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

ATRI American Transportation Research Institute 

B billion 

BEIR biological effects of ionizing radiation 

BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 

BMP best management practice 

BWR boiling water reactor 

CEDE committed effective dose equivalent 

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CNWRA Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses 

CO2 carbon dioxide 

CoC certificate of compliance 

COL combined license 

CPB U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CPI Consumer Price Index 

D.C. District of Columbia 

dBA decibel(s) (acoustic) 

DBT design basis threat 

DBTT ductile-to-brittle transition temperature 
Abbreviations/Acronyms 

NUREG௅2157 lxviii September 2014 

DEC Department of Environmental Conservation 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 

DTS dry transfer system 

EA Environmental Assessment 

EFH essential fish habitat 

EIS environmental impact statement 

EMF electromagnetic field 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 

ESA Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended 

ESP early site permit 

FEIS final environmental impact statement 

FONSI finding of no significant impact 

FR Federal Register

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report 

FTE full-time equivalent 

FWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GCRP U.S. Global Change Research Program 

GEH General Electric-Hitachi 

GEIS Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

GHG greenhouse gases 

GTCC greater than class C 

HLW high-level waste 

HOSS hardened onsite storage 

HSM horizontal storage modules 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

INL Idaho National Laboratory 

iPWR integral pressurized water reactor 

ISFSI independent spent fuel storage installation 

LLW low-level waste 

LWR light water reactor 
Abbreviations/Acronyms 

September 2014 lxix NUREG௅2157 

M million 

MACCS MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 

MCL maximum contaminant level 

MEI maximally exposed individual 

MOX mixed oxide 

MTU metric tons of uranium 

NA not applicable 

NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards 

NAS National Academy of Sciences 

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended 

NHPA National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended 

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Services 

NMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council 

NRHP National Register of Historic Places 

NWPA Nuclear Waste Policy Act 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

PAG protective action guide 

PFS Private Fuel Storage, LLC 

PFSF Private Fuel Storage Facility 

PM particulate matter 

PM10 particulate matter with a diameter of 10 microns or less 

PM2.5 particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 microns or less 

PRA probabilistic risk assessment 

PWR pressurized water reactors 

QA quality assurance 

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended 

REMP radiological environmental monitoring program 
Abbreviations/Acronyms 

NUREG௅2157 lxx September 2014 

SAMA severe accident mitigation alternatives 

SKB Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company 

SMR small modular reactor 

SOC Statement of Considerations 

TEDE total effective dose equivalent 

TMI-2 Three Mile Island Unit 2 

TN Transnuclear Inc. 

TRU transuranic (waste) 

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

USC United States Code 

USCB U.S. Census Bureau 

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
September 2014 lxxi NUREG௅2157 

Units of Measure 

Metric Prefixes 

tera (T-) 1012 

giga (G-) 109 

mega (M-) 106 

kilo (k-) 103

hecto (h-) 102 

deci (d-) 10௅1 

centi (c-) 10௅2 

milli (m-) 10௅3 

mirco (μ-) 10௅6 

nano (n-) 10௅9 

pico (p-) 10௅12 

Radiological Units 

μCi/ml microcurie(s) per milliliter 

Bq becquerel(s) 

Ci curie(s) 

Ci/L curies per liter 

Ci/yr curie(s) per year 

mrem millirem 

mSv millisievert(s) 

pCi picocurie(s) 

pCi/L picocurie(s) per liter 

R roentgen 

rad special unit of absorbed 

dose 

rem roentgen equivalent man 

(a special unit of radiation 

dose) 

S siemens 

Sv sievert 

Length/Distance 

cm centimeter(s) 

ft foot or feet 

in. inch(es) 

km kilometer(s) 

m meter(s) 

mi mile(s) 

mm millimeter(s) 

yd yard(s) 

Volume 

m3 cubic meter(s) 

yd3 cubic yard(s) 

ft3 cubic foot(feet) 

L liter(s) 

gal gallon(s) 

gpd gallon(s) per day 

gpm gallon(s) per minute 

oz ounce(s) 

Area 

ha hectare(s) 

ac acre(s) 

ft2 square foot(feet) 

mi2 square mile(s) 

m2 square meter(s) 

Units of Time 

hr hour(s) 

mo month 

s second(s) 

yr year(s) 

min minute 

Ryr reactor year(s) 
Units of Measure 

NUREG௅2157 lxxii September 2014 

Units of Temperature 

°C degree(s) Celsius 

°F degree(s) Fahrenheit 

Units of Concentration 

ppm parts per million 

ppt parts per thousand 

Units of Speed 

mph mile(s) per hour 

Units of Weight 

MT metric ton(s) (or tonne[s]) 

MTU metric ton(s) of uranium 

T ton(s) 

Units of Power 

Btu British thermal unit(s) 

GWd gigawatt-day(s) 

MW megawatt(s) 

MW(e) megawatt(s) electrical 

Ci/L curies per liter 

L/d liter(s) per day 

L/min liter(s) per minute 

ml or mL milliliter(s) 
Appendix D 

–

Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

Comment Summaries and Responses 

September 2014 D-1 185(*௅

Appendix D 

Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

Comment Summaries and Responses 

This appendix contains comment summaries and responses. Separately, the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a document containing the text of all identified unique 

comments, Comments on the Waste Confidence Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

and Proposed Rule, which is located in Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) under Accession No. 0/$. 

D.1 Public Comment Process for the Waste Confidence Draft 

Generic Environmental Impact Statement and Proposed 

Rule 

The NRC distributed NUREG–WKHdraft Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement (GEIS) along with the associated proposed rulemaking amending NRC regulations at 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations &)53DUW)5), to Federal and State 

government agencies and organizations; American Indian Tribes; environmental interest groups 

and non-governmental organizations; members of the NRC’s e-mail distribution list (i.e., 

WCOutreach@nrc.gov), and other members of the public who requested copies of the draft 

GEIS and proposed Rule. The public comment period on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule ran 

from September 13, 2013, through December 20, 2013. As part of the process to solicit public 

comments on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule, the NRC took the following actions: 

x announced the upcoming publication of the draft GEIS and proposed Rule in monthly status 

update teleconferences held in August and September 2013 (NRC 2013a, NRC 2013b); 

x placed a copy of the draft GEIS and proposed Rule Federal Register Notice into ADAMS, on 

the NRC’s website, and on the Federal rulemaking website (www.regulations.gov) under 

Docket NRC-2012-

x sent either an electronic document, compact disc, or hard copies of the draft GEIS and 

proposed Rule to members of the public, environmental interest groups and nongovernmental organizations, representatives of American Indian Tribes, Federal and State 

government agencies, State governmental associations (e.g., the Western Interstate Energy 

Board, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the National Governors 

Association), and State environmental information clearinghouses; 

x published a request for comment on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule in the Federal 

Register on September 13, )5); 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-2 September 2014 

x established several methods for submission of comments on the draft GEIS and proposed 

Rule, including through the Internet via an e-mail address and on www.regulations.gov; 

x announced (via press releases, e-mails, status update teleconferences, Federal Register 

notices, and NRC blog, YouTube channel, and Twitter feed) and held public meetings in (1) 

Rockville, MD; (2) Denver, CO; (3) Chelmsford, MA; (4) Tarrytown, NY&KDUORWWH1&

2UODQGR)/2DN%URRk, IL5RFNYLOOH0'&DUOVEDG&$; (10) San Luis 

Obispo, CA; (11) Perrysburg, OH; (12) Minnetonka, MN; and (13) Rockville, MD (public 

teleconference only); 

x published a Federal Register 1RWLFHRIH[WHQVLRQWRWKHFRPPHQWSHULRGIURPWRGD\V

which ended the comment period on December 20, 2013 ()5 

x issued press releases announcing issuance of the draft GEIS and proposed Rule, the public 

meetings, instructions on how to comment on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule, and 

extension of the public comment period; and 

x used the NRC’s Waste Confidence website to aid public review of the draft GEIS and 

proposed Rule, including posting preliminary versions of the draft documents that were 

provided to the Commission for their review in June 2013, followed by posting trackedchanges versions of the draft documents that showed changes made as a result of the 

Commission’s review, and providing hyperlinks to references in the draft GEIS and 

proposed Rule. 

Additional information on the NRC’s public outreach efforts can be found in Appendix C. 

D.1.1 Public Meetings 

'XULQJWKH-day public comment period, the NRC conducted 13 public meetings. The public 

meetings in Rockville, MD, on October 1, 2013, and November 14, 2013, featured a live 

webcast and moderated teleconference line to accommodate remote participants. The meeting 

RQ'HFHPEHU, was a teleconference-only meeting to ensure that stakeholders unable to 

participate in the 12 previous public meetings were afforded a final opportunity to present oral 

comments. Approximately 1,400 people attended or participated in the 13 public meetings, and 

DSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKRVHSDUWLFLSDQWVSURYLGHGRUDOFRPPHQWV$FHUWLILHGFRXUWUHSRUWHU

recorded oral comments and prepared written transcripts of all 13 meetings, and the NRC 

prepared meeting summaries with a list of participants for each meeting. Meeting summaries 

and transcripts can be found in ADAMS under the accession numbers listed in Table D-1. 

Notices for public meetings were placed in the Federal Register ()5)5

 )5), on the NRC’s public meeting notification website 

(http://meetings.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg), and on www.regulations.gov. Further, the NRC e-mailed 

meeting notices to the WCOutreach@nrc.gov distribution list and issued press releases 

regarding the meetings (NRC 2013c; NRC 2013d; NRC 2013e); NRC 2013f; NRC 2013g; 

NRC 2013h). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-3 185(*௅

Table D-1. Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule Public Comment Meeting Summaries and Transcripts 

Meeting Date Meeting Location 

Meeting Summary 

(Accession No.) 

Meeting Transcript 

(Accession No.) 

October 1, 2013 Rockville, Maryland 0/$ 0/$

October 3, 2013 Denver, Colorado 0/$ 0/$

2FWREHU Chelmsford, Massachusetts 0/% 0/%

October 30, 2013 Tarrytown, New York 0/% 0/$

November 4, 2013 Charlotte, North Carolina 0/$ 0/%

1RYHPEHU Orlando, Florida 0/$ 0/%

November 12, 2013 Oak Brook, Illinois 0/$ ML13330C033 

November 14, 2013 Rockville, Maryland 0/$ 0/%

1RYHPEHU Carlsbad, California 0/$ 0/$

November 20, 2013 San Luis Obispo, California 0/$ 0/$

December 2, 2013 Perrysburg, Ohio 0/$ 0/$

December 4, 2013 Minnetonka, Minnesota 0/$ 0/%

'HFHPEHU Teleconference 0/& 0/%

Due to the lapse in appropriations and subsequent shutdown of the Federal government in 

October 2013, the NRC postponed and rescheduled the Oak Brook, IL, Carlsbad, CA, San Luis 

Obispo, CA, Perrysburg, OH, and Minnetonka, MN public meetings. The NRC also extended 

the original FORVHRIWKHSXEOLFFRPPHQWSHULRGIURP1RYHPEHUWR'ecember 20, 2013 

()5DQGDGGHGDILQDOSXEOLFFRPPHQWWHOHFRQIHUHQFHRQ'HFHPEHU,QWKH

days preceding the government shutdown, the NRC communicated the status of public 

meetings to stakeholders through e-mail, press releases, and social media (i.e., the NRC Blog 

and Twitter account). 

D.1.2 Public Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

During the public comment period for the draft GEIS and proposed Rule, the NRC received 

approximately 33,100 written comment submissions in addition to the comments contained in 

WKHSDJHVRISXEOLFPHHWLQJWUDQVFULSWV$OOFRPPHQWFRUUHVSRQGHQFHLVDYDLODEOHLQ

ADAMS and on www.regulations.gov under docket ID NRC-2012-

Approximately 32,000 of the written submissions were form letters. The NRC identified 12 form 

letter templates; the majority of form letters were sponsored by the Sierra Club (0/$) 

and Nuclear Information and Resource Service (0/$). Identical comments contained 

in form letters were captured only once; however, if form letters contained additional comments 

on the proceeding, these were treated as unique comments on the rulemaking. Authors and 

ADAMS accession numbers for form letter submissions are contained in a separate document 

titled, Comments on the Waste Confidence Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement and 

Proposed Rule, which is located in ADAMS under Accession No. 0/$. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-4 September 2014 

Some comments addressed topics and issues outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

Examples of out-of-scope issues include comments on operating reactor issues, Yucca 

Mountain and spent fuel disposal impacts, requests for additional spent fuel storage 

requirements, and opposition to and support for nuclear energy. Out-of-scope comments are 

DGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQV'through '. 

D.1.3 Disposition of Comments 

At the conclusion of the comment period the NRC reviewed the 13 public meeting transcripts 

and each piece of written correspondence received related to the draft GEIS and proposed 

Rule. Late-filed comments were considered as practicable. As part of this review, the NRC 

identified statements that it believed were related to the draft GEIS or rulemaking, and recorded 

these statements as comments. Each piece of comment correspondence was given a unique 

correspondence identifier (i.e., a comment identification number), allowing each set of 

comments from a commenter to be traced back to the transcript, letter, or e-mail in which the 

comments were submitted. 

Table D-3 in Section D.3 provides a list of commenters who provided unique comment 

submissions (i.e., non-form letter submissions). Unique commenter authors are identified by 

name, affiliation (if given), ADAMS accession number of their comment correspondence, and the 

comment correspondence identification (ID) number. Each of the 12 form letters is included in 

Table D-3, and the authors are noted as “Commenters, Multiple” under the Commenter column. 

Each comment was assigned to a specific subject area (see Table D-2 for the list of comment 

categories), and similar comments were further grouped together and summarized. Finally, 

responses were prepared for each comment summary. This appendix contains comment 

summaries and the NRC responses to these summaries. Separately, the NRC published a 

document containing the text of all identified unique comments, Comments on the Waste 

Confidence Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement and Proposed Rule, which is located 

in ADAMS under accession number 0/$. This separate document provides 

individual comments organized by comment category, and comment author tables including, as 

noted above, a table of form letter authors. 

When comments resulted in a change to the text of the GEIS or Rule, the corresponding 

response refers readers to the appropriate section of the GEIS or Rule where the change was 

made. Throughout the final GEIS—with the exception of this new Appendix D, the new 

Appendix I on high-burnup fuel, and the glossary in Chapter 11—substantial revisions to the text 

from the draft GEIS are indicated by vertical lines (change bars) in the margin beside the text. 

The NRC categorized and consolidated comments according to subject area. Table D-2 lists 

WKHFRPPHQWFDWHJRULHV (i.e., subject areas) and the page where each category begins. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-2. Comment Categories 

D.2.1 Comments Concerning Rule Questions .................................................................................. D-

D.2.2 Comments Concerning the Rulemaking Process ................................................................. D-13

D.2.3 Comments Concerning the Rule Language .......................................................................... D-22

D.2.4 Comments Concerning Miscellaneous Issues ...................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning the NEPA Process .......................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning Public Participation .......................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning the Scope of the GEIS .................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning Site-Specific Issues ......................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning the Proposed Action & Purpose and Need ..................................... D-

D.2.10 Comments Concerning Alternatives – General ..................................................................... D-

D.2.11 Comments Concerning Alternatives – No Action/Site-Specific ............................................. D-

D.2.12 Comments Concerning Alternatives – GEIS Only .............................................................. D-

D.2.13 Comments Concerning Alternatives – Policy Statement .................................................... D-111

D.2.14 Comments Concerning Alternatives – Considered but Eliminated ..................................... D-113

' Comments Concerning Alternatives – Costs ...................................................................... D-121

' Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions and Analysis .................................................. D-

' Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions – Dry Transfer System ................................... D-

' Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions – Timeframes ................................................. D-

' Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions – Institutional Controls ................................... D-

D.2.20 Comments Concerning Site and Activity Descriptions ........................................................ D-

D.2.21 Comments Concerning Land Use ....................................................................................... D-

D.2.22 Comments Concerning Socioeconomics ............................................................................ D-

D.2.23 Comments Concerning Environmental Justice ................................................................... D-

D.2.24 Comments Concerning Air Quality ...................................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning Climate Change ............................................................................ D-211

' Comments Concerning Geology and Soils ......................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning Hydrology ...................................................................................... D-223

' Comments Concerning Ecology .......................................................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning Historic and Cultural Resources ................................................... D-

D.2.30 Comments Concerning Noise ............................................................................................. D-

D.2.31 Comments Concerning Aesthetics ...................................................................................... D-

D.2.32 Comments Concerning Waste Management ...................................................................... D-

D.2.33 Comments Concerning Transportation ............................................................................... D-

D.2.34 Comments Concerning Public and Occupational Health .................................................... D-300

' Comments Concerning Accidents and Natural Events ....................................................... D-313

' Comments Concerning Security and Terrorism .................................................................. D-

' Comments Concerning the Feasibility of Geologic Disposal .............................................. D-

' Comments Concerning the Feasibility of Safe Storage and Regulatory Framework ......... D-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

' Comments Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Fires .................................................................... D-

D.2.40 Comments Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Leaks .................................................................. D-

D.2.41 Comments Concerning Cumulative Impacts ....................................................................... D-

D.2.42 Comments Concerning the Cost of Storage ....................................................................... D-

D.2.43 Comments Concerning Decommissioning .......................................................................... D-

D.2.44 Comments Concerning Emergency Planning ..................................................................... D-

' Editorial Comments on the Federal Register Notice ........................................................... D-

' Editorial Comments on the GEIS ........................................................................................ D-

' Comments Concerning Opposition to Rule or GEIS ........................................................... D-

' Comments Concerning Support for Rule or GEIS .............................................................. D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – General.................................................................................... D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – HOSS and Expedited Transfer ............................................... D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – Reactor Accidents ................................................................... D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – Fukushima ............................................................................... D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – Yucca Mountain ...................................................................... D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – Opposition to Nuclear Power .................................................. D-

' Out-of-Scope Comments – Support for Nuclear Power ...................................................... D-

D.2 Comments and Responses 

The following pages summarize the comments received on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule 

and discuss their disposition. Parenthetical numbers after each comment refer to the 

Correspondence ID number and the comment number. Comments can be tracked to the 

commenter and the source document through the Correspondence ID numbers listed in 

Table D-3 in Section D-3. 

D.2.1 Comments Concerning Rule Questions 

D.2.1.1 – COMMENT: In the proposed Rule, the NRC specifically invited comment on whether 

the timeline for repository availability should be included in the Rule text (Issue 1). Commenters 

were requested to comment on whether specific policy statements regarding the timeline for 

repository availability should be removed from the proposed Rule text. A total of 13 

commenters responded. 

Commenters who responded to Issue 1 generally expressed support for removing a statement 

regarding the repository availability timeline from the Rule. Reasons for this support varied, but 

commonly included a lack of NRC control over repository timelines and previous failures to 

predict when a repository would become available. Other commenters stated that repository 

siting is impossible; that the timeline adds nothing and does not inspire confidence; that 

including a timeline was imprecise and misleading; that it is unnecessary to provide a repository 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

timeline in an environmental impact statement (EIS); that inadequate basis exists for any 

particular timeline; that a timeline is not required under the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA); that inclusion is an NRC overreach as the timeline is not within the authority of the 

NRC; and that including a statement about repository availability ties the United States to 

repository disposal of spent fuel to the exclusion of reprocessing or other options. One 

commenter stated that instead of including a timeline in the Rule, the Statement of 

Considerations (SOC) should include a plan for updating the GEIS that would reflect the current 

status of a repository. 

One commenter, while supporting removal of the timeline for a repository, suggested that the 

NRC include a statement providing a timeframe on how long spent fuel can be safely stored, 

especially in dry storage systems (casks). 

The few commenters who expressed support for retaining a statement regarding the timeline for 

repository availability either provided no rationale for its retention or indicated that the timeline is 

an important element of the contract the public has with the nuclear industry. One commenter 

expressed the belief that the availability of a repository is the most critical issue affecting longterm dry cask storage and that inclusion of a statement regarding repository availability in the 

Rule indicates the importance the Commission places on this key assumption of the GEIS. One 

commenter stated that a more general “when necessary” finding is more appropriate for the 

Rule than a specific timeframe. The commenter noted that while there is no legal requirement 

to include a timeline or prediction, the timeline should be retained because these findings are 

useful in framing the agency’s assessment of the safety and environmental impacts of continued 

storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees with the comments that recommend removing the timeline for a repository from the Rule 

text. While the earlier Waste Confidence rulemakings included predictions of repository 

availability, the revised Rule and GEIS represent a change in the format from past Waste 

Confidence proceedings. An analysis of environmental impacts of spent fuel storage for longterm and potentially indefinite timeframes is now provided in the GEIS as the regulatory basis 

for the Rule, which was not the case in past Waste Confidence proceedings. Consequently, the 

relationship between repository availability and the consideration of environmental impacts from 

continued storage has changed. In previous Waste Confidence Rules, the date of future 

repository availability was the end point of the temporal scope of the NRC’s analysis of the 

environmental impacts from continued storage. In this Rule, there is no end point to the 

temporal scope of the NRC’s analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage, 

although the Commission continues to believe that a repository is most likely to become 

available by the end of the short-term WLPHIUDPH\HDUVEH\RQGWKHOLFHQVHGlife for operation 

of a reactor). Further, the NRC agrees with the comments that there is no legal requirement to 

include a timeline in the Rule. Although future repository availability remains an important 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

consideration because it provides an eventual disposition path for spent fuel, it is no longer 

needed to provide a time limit for the environmental impacts analysis. To support the analysis 

in the GEIS, the NRC has determined that a repository is technically feasible and that it is 

technically feasible to safely store the spent fuel. Further, the GEIS recognizes the uncertainty 

inherent in predicting when a repository will become available. It therefore contains an analysis 

of two additional timeframes: a long-term timeframe that contemplates an additional 100 years 

of storage and an indefinite timeframe that looks at the environmental impacts that could occur if 

a repository never becomes available. 

The Commission’s removal of a timeframe from the Rule language does not mean that the 

Commission is endorsing indefinite storage of spent fuel. The United States national policy 

remains disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository, and, as stated in the GEIS, the 

Commission believes that the most likely scenario is that a repository will become available by 

the end of the short-term timeframe. 

For the above reasons, the statement regarding a timeframe for the availability of a repository 

has been removed from the Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of these 

comments. 

-----14---------

D.2.1.2 – COMMENT: In the proposed Rule, the NRC specifically invited comment on the issue 

of including statements regarding the safety of continued spent fuel storage in the Rule text 

(Issue 2). Commenters were requested to comment on whether specific policy statements 

regarding the safety of continued spent fuel storage should be made in the Rule text given the 

expansive and detailed information in the GEIS. A total of 13 commenters provided responses 

to the specific question on this subject. 

In general, commenters who responded to Issue 2 expressed support for making a policy 

statement regarding safety of continued storage in the Rule text. However, their reasons varied 

widely. Some commenters indicated that including a statement about safety enhanced 

openness and transparency, or supported the language because storage is, in fact, safe. Other 

commenters indicated that it should be included because safety determinations are more 

important to NRC decisions and to members of the public than environmental issues in spent 

fuel matters, because the public should have the benefit of the NRC’s determination that spent 

fuel may be stored for extended periods with reasonable assurance of safety, because a safety 

statement would facilitate opposition to nuclear power, because it is consistent with the longstanding approach to addressing continued storage, and because it addresses legal 

precedents. One commenter who expressed support for the policy statement indicated that the 

statement could appear in the SOC rather than in the Rule text. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Commenters who opposed a policy statement regarding safety of continued storage in the Rule 

text asserted that a statement is unnecessary to the Rule, that the GEIS is unable to support a 

statement, or that it is not possible to project the future safety of spent fuel storage. 

Commenters indicated that statements related to safety of spent fuel storage are entirely 

unrelated and unnecessary to the intended purpose of the Rule and that there are too many 

unknowns and open issues related to storage that must be resolved before any statement 

regarding safety can be made. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees with the comments that supported removing the statement from the Rule text. The 

generic conclusion that spent fuel can be stored safely beyond the operating life of a power 

reactor has been a component of all past Waste Confidence proceedings. However, this 

continued storage rulemaking proceeding is markedly different from past proceedings. Unlike 

earlier proceedings, the NRC has prepared a GEIS that analyzes the impacts of continued 

storage of spent fuel, and the GEIS provides the regulatory basis for the Rule. Further, 

Appendix B of the GEIS discusses the technical feasibility of continued safe storage. 

It is important to note that in this GEIS and Rule, the NRC is not making a safety determination 

under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to allow for the continued storage of spent fuel. AEA safety 

determinations would be made as part of individual licensing actions. See Section D.2.4.1 of 

this appendix for a broader discussion of the distinction between the generic safety conclusion 

in Waste Confidence proceedings and the AEA’s requirement that the NRC make safety 

determinations in licensing proceedings. There is not, however, any legal requirement for the 

NRC to codify this generic safety conclusion in the Rule text. 

The NRC has retained the discussion of the technical feasibility and regulatory framework that 

supports continued safe storage in Appendix B of the GEIS. The NRC also discusses the safety 

of continued storage in the Federal Register Notice for the final Rule. However, it is not 

necessary to include any conclusions related to safe storage in the Rule itself. By not including 

a safety decision in the Rule, the NRC does not imply that spent fuel cannot be stored safely. 

To the contrary, the analysis documented in this GEIS is predicated on the ability to store spent 

fuel safely over the short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes. This understanding is 

based upon the technical feasibility analysis in the GEIS and the NRC’s decades-long 

experience with spent fuel storage, which has provided substantial technical knowledge about 

storage of spent fuel. Further, spent fuel is currently being stored safely at reactor and storage 

sites across the country, which supports the NRC’s conclusion that it is feasible for spent fuel to 

be stored safely for the timeframes considered in the GEIS. No changes were made to the 

GEIS as a result of these comments. 

--14----31--12-------

-2-----13) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-10 September 2014 

D.2.1.3 – COMMENT: In the proposed Rule, the NRC specifically invited comment on the issue 

of streamlining the SOC (Issue 3). Commenters were specifically requested to comment on 

whether the Discussion portion of the SOC should be streamlined by removing content that is 

repeated from the draft GEIS to improve clarity of the discussion. A total of 13 commenters 

provided responses to the specific question on this subject. 

Commenters who responded to Issue 3 provided both support and opposition for streamlining. 

Commenters who supported streamlining did so most frequently because it would improve 

clarity or because it would reduce redundancy. Other reasons included that lengthy Federal 

Register notices are burdensome to search and that streamlining could remove anachronisms. 

Commenters who opposed streamlining most commonly did so because the information in the 

Discussion section supports the Rule or provides a plain-language explanation of matters in the 

Rule. Other commenters opposed streamlining because it would introduce changes upon which 

the public has not been able to comment; because, in the commenters’ view, the Federal 

Register Notice for the Rule should address findings that the NRC historically included as part of 

the Waste Confidence Decision; and because the Federal Register is more readily available to 

the public and is easier to search than the GEIS. Commenters indicated that the SOC should 

contain enough information that it can be used as a stand-alone document. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with comments that recommended streamlining the Federal 

Register Notice for the Rule. After considering the comments and looking at ways to be more 

concise in presenting the information, the NRC has decided to streamline the Federal Register

Notice for the Rule where it is appropriate to do so without removing text necessary to explain 

the action that the NRC is taking. As noted in the comments, the Federal Register Notice for 

the Rule must contain enough information to explain the matters in the Rule; however, it does 

not need to be a stand-alone document. The GEIS provides the regulatory basis for the Rule 

and not everything in the GEIS needs to be addressed in the Federal Register Notice for the 

Rule. Some redundancy between the Rule and GEIS remains to ensure adequate information 

is present in the Federal Register Notice for the Rule to explain the nature and intent of the 

Rule. Removing duplicative text from the Federal Register Notice for the Rule does not change 

the information that the public had an opportunity to comment on as this information was in the 

proposed Rule and the draft GEIS. After streamlining, the Federal Register Notice for the Rule 

still contains sufficient information in plain language to provide the reader with an understanding 

of the nature and intent of the Rule. Some redundancy remains in the Federal Register Notice 

for the final Rule due to the required content and format of a rule. For additional discussion on 

the inclusion of issues that previous Waste Confidence Rules addressed in the Findings, see 

Sections ', and D.2.4.4 and Appendix B of the GEIS. No changes were made to the 

GEIS as a result of these comments. 

--14-------31-------4) 

---------14) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-11 185(*௅

D.2.1.4 – COMMENT: In the proposed Rule, the NRC specifically invited comment on changing 

the Rule title (Issue 4). Commenters were specifically requested to comment on whether the 

title of the Rule should be changed in light of a GEIS being issued instead of a separate Waste 

Confidence Decision. A total of 13 commenters provided responses to the specific question on 

this subject. 

Commenters who responded to Issue 4 expressed near-unanimous support for changing the 

title of the Rule. Reasons for support, however, varied widely. Commenters indicated an array 

of reasons to support changing the Rule name, including that the name is an anachronism, that 

the title is misleading and provides no useful description of the revised Rule’s purpose or intent, 

that the title shows a lack of transparency, that historical findings of confidence have proven 

erroneous, that confidence does not exist, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit (Court of Appeals) invalidated confidence as a basis for the Rule, that the title 

should be changed to reflect the evolving rulemaking process (no separate Waste Confidence 

Decision and reliance on the GEIS), and that confidence requires transfer of all fuel to dry casks 

and a defined and available endpoint. Many other commenters—who did not expressly respond 

to this issue—expressed views that “waste confidence” is a confusing term or that it conveys a 

confidence that does not exist. 

Only one commenter who responded to this issue expressed opposition to revising the title. 

The commenter was opposed because waste confidence is what the rulemaking has been 

about historically and the Rule should still be about confidence that a repository will be 

available. 

Commenters noted that with a clearer title, the purpose and limited application of the Rule would 

be more evident to members of the public who are not aware of the historical basis for the term 

“waste confidence.” Commenters suggested that the title should more accurately reflect the 

true Federal action of licensing and relicensing of reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installations (ISFSIs) and should accurately reflect the purpose of the analysis, evaluation, and 

conclusions of the study. Suggestions included “Storage of SNF [Spent Nuclear Fuel] after 

Licensed Term of Operations” and “Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel for the Period After License 

Term of Reactor Operation.” 

RESPONSE: After considering the comments, the NRC has decided to change the title of the 

Rule. The title of a rule should convey the nature and content of the rule. This Rule represents 

a change in the format from past Waste Confidence proceedings. Because of the decades of 

experience with safely storing spent fuel and the fact that the Commission has issued a GEIS to 

support the Rule, which provides a detailed analysis of the environmental impacts associated 

with continued storage, the nature of the Rule has changed and the need for a separate Waste 

Confidence Decision no longer exists. The current Rule primarily codifies the environmental 

impact of continued storage of spent fuel beyond the licensed life for operation of a reactor. 

The Rule is used in reactor and ISFSI licensing and relicensing proceedings to address the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-12 September 2014 

environmental impacts of storage of spent fuel for the period after the licensed life for operation 

of the reactor and before disposal. Including “waste confidence” in the title of the proposed Rule 

was intended to bridge past rulemakings on the topic to the current effort recognizing that there 

is no separate Waste Confidence Decision included in the current proceeding. However, it is 

clear from the comments that using the historical term “waste confidence” in the title has caused 

some confusion. The Commission agrees that a title that more accurately reflects the Rule 

content is more appropriate. Therefore, the NRC has changed the title of the Rule to 

“Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” The title of the GEIS was also changed 

accordingly. 

------14---------1--

-------1----11) 

D.2.1.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern with the use of the term “waste 

confidence.” Commenters stated that the term is an oxymoron, and a way for the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE) and the industry to compensate for not solving the back end of the 

nuclear fuel cycle. Commenters objected to the arrogance of the NRC to claim that it has 

confidence and stated that the NRC is putting the solution off for future generations, which 

allows nuclear plants to continue producing spent nuclear fuel (spent fuel) without a scientifically 

proven solution for its safe disposal. One commenter stated that the NRC mischaracterizes 

waste confidence by defining it solely as a storage issue, that the issue is really a geologic 

repository issue, and that the NRC should declare that there is no longer a basis for waste 

confidence. 

Commenters indicated that they have no confidence in the current waste plans proposed by the 

NRC. Commenters expressed no confidence that there will ever be an adequate solution to 

permanent storage (disposal) of spent fuel because there is no way to guarantee containment 

for hundreds of thousands of years. Commenters noted that the experience with Yucca 

Mountain and the changing timelines for repository availability shows that nobody can have 

confidence in the availability of geologic storage. One commenter indicated that confidence is 

at least implicitly required because without such confidence it would be immoral to continue 

making nuclear waste. Commenters stated that no definition of “waste confidence” is provided 

and that usage of the term is twisted from its normal uses. 

One commenter expressed the view that the term is a historical artifact from the NRC’s policy 

determination addressed in the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) petition for 

rulemaking and the subsequent court decision. The commenter stated that the term fails to 

transparently capture the purpose of the proposed Rule, which relates primarily to the storage of 

spent fuel after the end of a reactor’s licensed operating life, and encouraged the NRC to 

discontinue use of the term. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-13 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the skepticism expressed in many of the comments. 

Many years have passed since the original date for repository availability and no repository is 

available. The term “waste confidence” has historically indicated the Commission’s belief or 

“confidence” that a repository would be available for the disposal of spent fuel and that spent 

fuel could be safely stored without significant environmental impacts until disposal. As 

discussed in the GEIS, the Commission continues to believe that a repository is likely to 

EHFRPHDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHHQGRIDUHDFWRU’s licensed life for operation. The 

analysis in the GEIS acknowledges the uncertainty inherent in this prediction regarding 

repository availability and presents two additional timeframes: 100 years of additional storage 

and indefinite storage. Further, as discussed in Appendix B, the Commission believes that it is 

technically feasible to safely store spent fuel. For the reasons given in the response to Issue 4, 

the NRC has removed “waste confidence” from the title of the GEIS and the Rule. 

(30-1-1) (30-11-1) (30-21-10) (30-13-3) (30-1-4) (30--4) (30-1---1) (112-11-2) (112--

3) (112--4) (112---11--14--24--------

-------11---3-------1) 

-11-------0---1--

---1----13) 

D.2.2 Comments Concerning the Rulemaking Process 

D.2.2.1 – COMMENT: One commenter encouraged the NRC to carefully consider the 

economic impact of regulations on spent fuel storage and transportation. 

RESPONSE: It is not clear whether the comment was referring to this rulemaking in particular 

or regulations in general. A regulatory analysis describes the cost and benefits to licensees of 

implementing any given rule and looks at the cost and benefits of alternatives. Although the 

NRC does prepare a regulatory analysis for rules that impose requirements on licensees, it did 

not prepare a regulatory analysis for this Rule because the Rule does not impose any 

requirements on licensees. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

--2) 

D.2.2.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed support for the Court of Appeals 

decision, which led to the start of this rulemaking effort. One commenter indicated that the only 

reason the public is having an opportunity to comment is that the Court of Appeals vacated the 

2010 Waste Confidence Rule. Other commenters noted the origin of the current proceeding 

being the Court of Appeals decision on the 2010 Rule. Commenters supported those that 

brought the 2010 Rule to court and the Court of Appeals decision. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-14 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments in part. During development of the 2010 

Waste Confidence Rule, the public was provided an opportunity to provide comments on the 

proposed Rule and draft Waste Confidence Decision. Comments received on those documents 

were reflected in the final documents for the 2010 Rule (NRC 2010a). While it is correct that the 

NRC would not have issued the proposed Rule and the draft GEIS at this time, the NRC has 

KLVWRULFDOO\UHHYDOXDWHG:DVWH&RQILGHQFHHYHU\WR\HDUV,QIDFWWKH15&ZDVLQYROYHGLQ

pre-scoping activities related to continued storage when the Court of Appeals vacated the 

decision and the NRC initiated this rulemaking. The NRC notes the support for the Court of 

Appeals decision made by various commenters and no further response is provided. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30---------2) 

D.2.2.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters requested that the Commission reverse the NRC’s 

decision on the alternatives considered in the GEIS. The commenters stated that the 

Commission should treat the scoping document and decision on alternatives under the 

standards established for interlocutory review by the Commission in 10 CFR 2.341(f)(2). The 

commenters further stated that the Waste Confidence rulemaking proceeding should be 

FRQVLGHUHGDQDGMXGLFDWLRQZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI86&6HFWLRQJLYHQWKDWWKHUHVXOWRI

the rulemaking proceeding will be an Order by the Commission that directly affects ongoing 

licensing proceedings and future licensing proceedings. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As explained by Chairman Allison 

Macfarlane in the Commission’s letter responding to the petition (NRC 2013i), “[t]he NRC has 

determined that the notice-and-comment process, rather than reliance on adjudicatory briefings, 

is the appropriate means to ensure there is ample opportunity for public participation in the 

Waste Confidence matter. As in other rulemakings, the Commission does not plan to solicit 

briefs and issue merits decisions on the staff’s scoping report or other specific issues, and no 

NRC rule or notice contemplates petitions for Commission review of NRC staff scoping 

documents.” No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1----

D.2.2.4 – COMMENT: Some commenters expressed concern with the NRC rulemaking 

process. Commenters stated that the NRC’s rulemaking process is vague because it uses 

complex terminology, and is contradictory, obtuse, demoralizing, futile, and a sham. 

Commenters expressed concern about the integrity and independence of the NRC’s rulemaking 

process. One commenter stated that the NRC decisionmakers hide in the anonymity of the 

Commission process knowing that they will never be held personally accountable. Commenters 

expressed concern about the NRC’s compliance with the intention and spirit of relevant Federal 

laws governing the processes of regulatory agencies, including NEPA and the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Commenters stated that if members of the public make comments or criticisms, technical 

arguments, or point out design flaws, the comments disappear into the rulemaking process. 

Commenters noted that issues moved to rulemaking take years to complete. Commenters 

indicated that the NRC is not transparent and there is no real opportunity for the public to have 

any meaningful input into how reactors are run or how spent fuel is stored. Commenters 

asserted that anything that falls outside of the question being asked in the Rule is not 

considered and therefore, the nature of the dialogue itself limits inquiry and intelligent 

discussion. Commenters stated that the NRC should put safety ahead of industry profit in 

considering the rulemaking. 

One commenter expressed concern over the “revolving door” between the nuclear industry, the 

regulatory agency, and the pro-nuclear academic departments and institutions—thus leading 

the commenter to believe that the NRC is an “industry-captured,” biased regulator with a 

reassuring front end (website) and a structurally compromised back end. Another commenter 

supports redesigning the entire legal basis for the NRC’s regulatory enforcement. 

RESPONSE: The NRC generally disagrees with the comments. The NRC’s rulemaking 

process is straightforward and well-established. In accordance with the APA, which provides 

the basis for rulemaking across the Federal government, the NRC prepares a proposed rule that 

is published for public comment. After carefully evaluating the public comments, the NRC 

prepares and publishes the final rule, addressing the public comments in the accompanying 

SOC. Public comments provide many useful insights and suggestions, resulting in changes to 

regulatory actions as appropriate. The Commission itself is the decisionmaker at the NRC for 

most rulemakings, including this one; the contents of rules and responses to public comments 

are determined by a majority vote of the five Commissioners. The votes and individual views of 

all Commissioners are made public. 

The comment is correct that significant rulemakings are typically not completed quickly. To 

ensure appropriate public input and a sound regulatory basis, the process necessary for 

developing a well-supported rule does take time. Rulemakings typically take about two years to 

complete after development of the basis or rationale for the rule. For highly technical 

rulemakings, the regulatory basis for a rule can take many additional years to develop before a 

rulemaking proceeding commences. However, the process can be completed sooner with the 

application of additional resources, as was done for this Rule and GEIS. The comment is also 

correct that items beyond the scope of any particular rulemaking are not considered in that 

rulemaking. 

Terminology used by the NRC is sometimes unique to the NRC and the nuclear energy 

community and may not reflect common usage and definitions. The NRC has included a 

glossary of commonly used terms in the GEIS. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The NRC is an independent regulator that oversees the safety and security of nuclear facilities 

and materials. The NRC’s mission does not include promotion of nuclear power. Throughout 

this rulemaking process, the NRC has developed documents that comply with its statutory 

obligations under the AEA, the APA, and NEPA, and NRC’s regulations implementing those 

statutes. 

The public can use several methods to provide input into how NRC-licensed facilities are 

operated and spent fuel is stored. The public can keep abreast of the NRC’s regulatory 

activities through a large number of public meetings, including Commission meetings, advisory 

committee meetings, adjudicatory hearings, and NRC staff meetings. The latter include most 

technical meetings with licensees, trade organizations, and public interest groups. Information 

on open meetings is available on the NRC’s website at http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/publicmeetings.html. Members of the public can also provide comments on proposed rules and 

policies, licensing actions, and draft technical documents, including draft regulatory guidance 

and draft EISs. Documents available for public comment are posted on the NRC’s website at 

http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment.html. 

Members of the public can submit a petition requesting enforcement action against specific 

licensees if they believe the licensee is not in compliance with regulatory requirements. The 

petition process described in &)5 is the primary mechanism for the public to request 

enforcement action by NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition the 

NRC to take enforcement action related to NRC licensees or NRC-regulated activities. 

'HSHQGLQJRQWKHUHVXOWVRILWVHYDOXDWLRQRID6HFWLRQSHWLWLRQWKH15&PD\PRGLI\

suspend, or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to 

resolve a problem. The Section SURFHVVSURYLGHVDPHFKDQLVPIRUDQ\RQHWRUHTXHVW

enforcement action and obtain the NRC’s thorough and objective evaluation of the petitioner’s 

concerns. More information on requesting enforcement actions and reporting safety concerns 

can be found in the NRC’s brochures on the Public Petition Process and Reporting Safety 

Concerns to the NRC. Information on how to request enforcement actions is available on the 

NRC’s website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/petition.html. 

Members of the public can also submit petitions for rulemaking to request the NRC to develop, 

change, or rescind any RILWVUHJXODWLRQV6HFWLRQRI&)5&)5GHVFULEHV

the petition for rulemaking process. This process allows anyone to petition the NRC to revise 

the regulations. Depending on the results of its evaluation of the request, the NRC may modify 

existing regulations, add new regulations, or rescind a regulation. Information on submitting a 

petition for rulemaking is available on the NRC’s website at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html. Issues related to the NRC’s regulatory enforcement 

are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(112-31-3) (112-31--------1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.2.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed general concern on the rulemaking 

process, how the Rule would be used in licensing actions, and the public’s due process. 

Commenters stated that the proposed Rule obfuscates and circumvents the public’s due 

process in addressing the adverse environmental impacts created from continued storage of 

spent fuel. Commenters stated that the NRC is using the rulemaking as a means of cutting out 

the public. Commenters felt that it is misleading for the NRC to state the rulemaking is not a 

licensing action because it has been used by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to reject 

spent fuel-related contentions in a legal proceeding regarding license extensions and that the 

Rule provided the basis for licensing. Commenters objected that the Rule results in the public 

being prevented from raising and litigating issues regarding the environmental impacts of 

continued storage during licensing actions for either power reactors or ISFSIs. Commenters 

stated that the NRC action would effectively block any future public or State government 

interventions regarding continued storage in future licensing proceedings. Commenters 

indicated that this attempt to bar waste disposal issues in license extension proceedings 

reinforces public suspicion that the NRC is untrustworthy in its commitment to transparency 

and to public health and safety. 

Commenters stated that the GEIS would serve as a pre-ordained license approval for all future 

licensing actions, at least insofar as the generation of spent fuel, its storage, and its ultimate 

disposition is concerned without any further processing, hearings, intervention, or critical sitespecific review. Commenters stated that the Rule allows for indefinite onsite storage of spent 

fuel by stating that onsite storage is safe without site-specific environmental review and public 

hearing rights to address the question of whether generation of additional spent fuel is justifiable 

in the absence of a repository. Commenters stated that adopting the GEIS at any existing 

facility should require a license amendment process because the original license did not 

contemplate that spent fuel may exist at the site indefinitely, and that the license term has 

effectively been extended indefinitely, thereby circumventing the normal license amendment 

procedures. One commenter stated that the GEIS results must be incorporated into every 

license using an amendment process that would include opportunity to intervene and request 

a hearing by members of the public. 

Commenters complained that issues on the possible environmental consequences, possible 

mitigation, the manner that spent fuel is stored, or the timeframe for continued storage may not 

be considered in deciding whether to allow spent fuel generation or storage to continue. 

Commenters stated that the GEIS fails to provide the necessary environmental analysis 

sufficient to justify eliminating consideration of spent fuel disposal or storage impacts from every 

licensing proceeding as proposed in the Rule. Commenters stated the GEIS provides no 

mechanism for integrating costs and impacts into site-specific licensing decisions, and that this 

failure is contrary to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC.
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

A commenter indicated that because of the Rule Congress has lost any sense of urgency in 

solving the nation’s nuclear waste issues. Another commenter stated that the GEIS and Rule 

may serve to facilitate, accommodate, and encourage continued delays toward spent fuel 

disposal. 

One commenter stated that if the Commission desires to promote nuclear energy, the 

responsible approach would be to strengthen, not weaken, the requirements for the prompt and 

safe disposal of spent fuel. The commenter stated that instead of accommodating the 

detachment of spent fuel disposal responsibilities from nuclear energy generation and 

development, the Commission should maintain the integral connection between the generation 

of spent fuel and the proper and timely spent fuel disposal. 

One commenter stated the Commissioners must compile evidence and make decisions and 

then tell the public what the decisions are and why they were made. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. In this proceeding the NRC has 

prepared a GEIS that analyzes the environmental impacts of continued storage and provides a 

regulatory basis for the Rule. As required by the APA and NEPA, the NRC solicited public input 

on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule. 

Adopting the impact determinations in the GEIS by Rule does not authorize the production or 

storage of spent fuel, nor do the GEIS or Rule amend or extend the term of any license. The 

GEIS and Rule do not apply to already completed licensing actions. NEPA does not require an 

agency to reexamine major Federal actions already taken. The GEIS and Rule are applicable 

only to future NRC licensing actions. The GEIS and Rule will be used in licensing and 

relicensing reviews for power reactors and ISFSIs to address the NRC’s NEPA obligation to 

assess the environmental impacts of storage for the time between the end of the licensed life for 

operations and disposal of the spent fuel. The GEIS and Rule will not be used to address the 

impacts of spent fuel storage during a proposed license term. The impacts of storage during a 

proposed license term, as distinct from the timeframes of continued storage covered by the 

Rule, would be subject to the safety and environmental review as part of that review. Finally, 

NEPA does not require the NRC to reopen previously issued licenses to consider the results of 

the GEIS. Under NEPA, the environmental reviews for those facilities were sufficient at the time 

the NRC issued the license. 

In New York v. NRC, the Court of Appeals approved this preclusive effect for rules with 

conservative bounding assumptions, but invalidated the NRC’s generic Rule because of three 

deficiencies. The NRC acknowledges, as the Court of Appeals observed, that there may be 

some site-specific characteristics that warrant a departure from a generic process like this 

rulemaking. Thus, the Commission has provided for these situations through its regulations in 

&)5ZKLFKDOORZVSDUWLHVWRDGMXGLFDWRU\SURFHHGLQJVWRSHWLWLRQIRUWKHZDLYHURI or 

an exception to a Rule in a particular proceeding. For more information on waivers, see Section 

' of this appendix. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

As an independent regulatory agency with delegated responsibility under the AEA and other 

statutes, the NRC takes no position on the wisdom of nuclear power. The NRC does not create 

national policy for disposal of spent fuel. That responsibility lies exclusively with Congress and 

the President. The NRC is responsible for implementing national policy set by Congress and 

the President as delegated to the NRC by statute. The NRC’s primary responsibility is to 

ensure that the production and utilization of nuclear materials provides adequate protection for 

the public health and safety and the common defense and security. The NRC is also obligated 

under NEPA to evaluate the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of its licensing 

actions. In the GEIS, the NRC has evaluated the environmental impacts of continued storage of 

spent fuel, including the impacts from an unlikely scenario in which a geologic disposal facility 

does not become available. The NRC also analyzed whether it is feasible to store spent fuel 

safely over these timeframes and concluded that it is. However, the NRC does not set national 

policy on the ultimate disposal of spent fuel, and therefore cannot decide the term for which 

spent fuel will be stored at reactor sites. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

(221--32--13--14-------1--1--

-----1-------

--2----1--1--1--1--1--1-

D.2.2.6 – COMMENT: One commenter submitted a petition for rulemaking as part of his or her 

comments. The petition requested that the NRC revise and integrate is regulations regarding 

spent fuel storage and disposal in a cohesive and consistent way. The commenter stated that 

the revision should include Table S-3, Table B-DQG&)5FDQGG

RESPONSE: The petition has been docketed as PRM--30 and was noticed on April 21, 2014 

)57KHSHWLWLRQZLOOQRWEHDGGUHVVHGLQWKLVUXOHPDNLQJDQGQRFhanges were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--20) 

D.2.2.7 – COMMENT: Many commenters requested the timely completion of the Rule and 

GEIS. Commenters stated that timely resolution of the rulemaking is important and that the 

rulemaking should remain a priority and be completed in a quick and efficient manner. 

Commenters indicated that the NRC used a transparent, open, and efficient effort with ample 

opportunity for public involvement. Commenters noted that it is important to complete the 

rulemaking so that progress on both plant licensing and spent fuel management can continue. 

The commenters noted that licensing decisions are essential for long-term power planning and 

other business decisions, such as schedules for capital improvements, and that this essential 

decision-making will remain disrupted and inefficient until licensing decisions resume. 

Commenters noted that the rulemaking will enhance the efficiency in individual licensing reviews 

by using the GEIS to satisfy the NEPA requirements with regards to continued storage of spent 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-20 September 2014 

fuel, which are the same or similar at each site. One of the commenters stated that because the 

NRC has now established a clear path and is well along the way to generic resolution of the 

remanded issues, the staff should promptly recommend to the Commission options for 

resumption of adjudicatory reviews. 

Commenters praised the NRC for its handling of the rulemaking process. Commenters noted 

that the rulemaking satisfied the Court of Appeals’ remand criteria. One commenter stated that 

the rulemaking should serve as a benchmark for other significant NRC activities because 

extended schedules have become the rule. Another commenter noted that some of the 

environmental reviews for licensing actions have slipped as resources have become diverted to 

support the GEIS effort and that those resources should promptly be returned so that further 

delay in adjudicatory proceedings or licensing issuances is avoided. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees in part. As evidenced 

in the Commission’s staff requirements memorandum (SRM-COMSECY-12-0; NRC 2012a) 

directing the NRC to complete this rulemaking in 24 months, this rulemaking has been a high 

priority for the Commission and the NRC. With the completion of this rulemaking, the NRC has 

satisfied the Commission’s directions in CLI-12-15&2012b) and SRM-COMSECY-12-00

(NRC 2012a) and completed a NEPA review of continued storage that can be used in future 

site-specific licensing actions. However, two things must occur before final licensing decisions 

can be made: (1) the Rule must become effective, which normally occurs 30 days after 

publication of the final Rule and (2) the Commission must issue an Order to lift the stay on the 

issuance of final licensing actions that it imposed in CLI-12-15&2012b). Once these 

actions occur, and assuming no other impediments to the issuance of a final decision exist, the 

NRC will be able to proceed toward final decisions on licenses and license renewals. 

The NRC notes the support for the rulemaking and no further response is required. Resource 

allotment for other NRC activities is beyond the scope of this GEIS and Rule. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30--1) (30-3-2) (30--2) (30-23-3) (30--3) (30-20-4) (30--4) (30-23----14--

--4--4) (112-21----------3) 

(212---3) (244-11-1) (244-2-4) (244--4) (244-4--1-----

-12----1--20--14--21--24----

--14--32------------

----4-4) -13-----3) (400---

------------2) 

-1--1--1--1--1--1--1----

D.2.2.8 – COMMENT: Several commenters addressed the inadequacy of the 2-year timeframe 

for completing the Rule. Commenters noted that the NRC had previously indicated that the 

analysis of long-WHUPVSHQWIXHOVWRUDJHLPSDFWVZRXOGWDNHXQWLODQGWKHUHIRUHWKe NRC 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-21 185(*௅

would not be able to gather the necessary information in 2 years. Commenters stated that an 

(,6JHQHUDOO\WDNHV\HDUVDQGLVEHLQJMDPPHGLQWR\HDUV&RPPHQWHUVVWDWHGWKDWWKH

rushed process is a scheme and a fraud perpetrated on the taxpayers and the rate payers. 

Commenters indicated that the schedule was unrealistic, imprudent, and arbitrary. Commenters 

stated that the NRC should take into account the thousands of people opposed to the 2-year 

schedule. Commenters stated that typos and grammatical errors contained in the documents 

are an indication of the rush to complete the EIS. 

Several commenters indicated that the NRC was rushing through the process to industry and 

that the public will suffer as a consequence. Commenters stated that the reason for pushing the 

GEIS and Rule is to overturn the NRC’s forced moratorium on reactor licensing and relicensing. 

One commenter noted that the NRC’s goals are to protect the people and the environment and 

not to promote nuclear energy production or ensure its profitability. 

Commenters indicated that the NRC should take whatever time is necessary to study continued 

storage of spent fuel. Commenters noted that in New York v. NRC, the Court of Appeals 

ordered the NRC to conduct a full analysis of the potential environmental effects of storing spent 

fuel onsite at nuclear plants on a permanent basis. Commenters stated that the NRC must 

resolve the many technical issues such as long-term integrity, vulnerability, deterioration, and 

accidents before going forward with the Rule. One commenter suggested that the NRC extend 

the time for completing the GEIS and involve an appropriate spectrum of stakeholders to 

develop a meaningful and substantive GEIS. 

One commenter stated that the NRC should not continue with the Rule until the National 

Academies finished its quality assurance review to determine the adequacy of the NRC’s safety 

regulations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC is an independent regulator 

that does not promote nuclear energy. The Rule and GEIS are considered a top priority for the 

agency, and resources and energy were put into this effort to complete a technically sufficient 

assessment in the 2-year timeframe directed by the Commission. Further, the NRC routinely 

completes EISs in about 2 \HDUV7KH-year timeframe that the comments reference relates to 

a different project that was intended to provide a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of 

issues related to spent fuel transportation and storage that goes well beyond the knowledge 

necessary to assess the environmental impacts of continued storage. 

For this rulemaking, the NRC has concluded that sufficient information exists to perform a 

generic environmental analysis of the continued storage of spent fuel after a reactor’s licensed 

life for operation. It is not necessary for the NRC to resolve all of the safety issues that might 

arise during continued storage before conducting the analysis. A more detailed discussion of 

the feasibility of safe storage is available in Appendix B. Further, NEPA requires the NRC to 

consider the information available at the time of its environmental analysis, which the NRC has 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-22 September 2014 

done in preparing the GEIS and Rule. The NRC is aware that future research and scientific 

advancements, like the ongoing study of the Fukushima accident by the National Academy of 

Sciences, could someday challenge the conclusions in the GEIS. If that were to occur, the NRC 

would revisit this assessment to ensure that the relevant decisionmakers continue to have an 

understanding of the environmental impacts of continued storage. 

The NRC acknowledges that there were typos and other typographical errors in the draft GEIS 

and proposed Rule. The NRC strives to produce high-quality documents with few errors, but in 

any document of this size there are likely to be a few typos that are not captured by the NRC’s 

editorial process. The NRC has reviewed the final documents to minimize typos and other 

typographical errors. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30-12-1) (30-22--11-1) (222-10) (222------2--11--

-------13) (443--1------

3--4-14) 

D.2.3 Comments Concerning the Rule Language 

D.2.3.1 – COMMENT: One commenter argued that the language in the proposed Rule 

LQGLFDWHVWKDWLWLVIHDVLEOHWRKDYHDPLQHGJHRORJLFUHSRVLWRU\ZLWKLQ\HDUVIROORZLQJWKH

licensed operation of a reactor, is inconsistent with and not supported by Appendix B of the 

GEIS and was not justified in Appendix B. The commenter noted that the GEIS indicates that in 

recognition of the uncertainty in reaching a national consensus on repository selection, the third 

timeframe assumes that a repository never becomes available. The commenter stated that the 

GEIS deals primarily with technical feasibility not social or political feasibility. 

Another commenter agreed that it is reasonable to assume that a repository will be available 

ZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHHQGRID reactor’s operating life. The commenter noted that although case 

law does not require the inclusion of a timeframe for repository availability, prior Waste 

Confidence rules have included a timeframe. The commenter suggested rule language that 

would express the Commission’s reasonable assurance that a mined geologic repository can be 

available “when necessary.” The commenter stated that this approach would acknowledge the 

inherent predictive nature of conclusions regarding repository availability and is consistent with 

the description of the Commission’s repository availability finding provided in NRDC v. NRC. 

The commenter stated that this approach would not run afoul of the 2012 remand as the agency 

has now fully met its NEPA obligations by assessing the impacts of a failure to establish a 

repository in the GEIS, and therefore, the NRC can continue to find (based on its expert 

evaluation) that a repository will be available when necessary. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The language 

LQWKHSURSRVHG5XOHUHJDUGLQJWKHIHDVLELOLW\RIKDYLQJDUHSRVLWRU\ZLWKLQ\HDUVLVVXSSRUWHG
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-23 185(*௅

by and is consistent with Appendix B of the GEIS. The GEIS analyzes three scenarios for 

repository availability: the short-term tiPHIUDPH\HDUVEH\RQGWKHOLFHQVHGOLIHIRU

operations of a reactor), the long-term timeframe (an additional 100 years), and the indefinite 

timeframe (no repository is sited). The GEIS identifies the short-term timeframe as the most 

likely scenario. TKH15&GLVDJUHHVWKDWWKH-year timeframe for repository is not supported 

by Appendix B. As stated in Appendix B, the NRC continues to believe that a repository can be 

sited, licensed, and constructed within the short-term timeframe. Appendix B acknowledges 

that societal and political issues surrounding repository selection could influence the process. 

However, the United States national policy remains that spent fuel is to be disposed of in a 

geologic repository and the NRC has concluded that the construction of a repository is 

technically feasible. 

The NRC disagrees with the recommendation that the Rule language state that the Commission 

has reasonable assurance that a repository can be available “when necessary.” The NRC 

agrees that there is no legal requirement to include a timeframe in the Rule language. As 

explained in Section D.2.1.1 of this appendix, the Commission has decided not to include a 

timeframe in the Rule language. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

---2) 

D.2.3.2 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested substitute language for the Rule that would 

read as follows: “The Commission will ensure that an EIS be developed analyzing the 

environmental impacts of storage of spent fuel beyond the licensed life for operation of a reactor 

jointly and cooperatively with those state, regional and municipal agencies situated in the area 

where the reactor is sited and which are charged with land use and environmental and 

socioeconomic concerns.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC has determined in the GEIS 

that the environmental impacts of continued storage beyond the licensed life for operations of a 

reactor can be analyzed generically. The NRC believes that a generic approach is appropriate 

because the GEIS makes impact determinations that apply to all reactors and spent fuel storage 

sites. The NRC’s confidence in these determinations about continued storage is supported by 

numerous environmental reviews of spent fuel storage. Spent fuel storage during the period of 

operations has been considered in site-specific licensing of new reactors, ISFSIs, and license 

UHQHZDO)LQDOO\FRQFHUQHGSDUWLHVZKRVDWLVI\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVDW&)5IRUDZDLYHU

will be able to raise issues related to continued storage in site-specific license application 

proceedings. 

The environmental impacts of a nuclear plant or spent fuel storage facility must be considered 

during the site-specific licensing review for that particular facility. In this respect, this GEIS 

satisfies only a small portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations related to the issuance of a reactor 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-24 September 2014 

or spent fuel storage facility license by generically evaluating the environmental impacts of 

spent fuel storage beyond the facility’s license term. Prior to the completion of a facility 

licensing action, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and document the 

results of this review in an Environmental Assessment (EA)/finding of no significant impact 

(FONSI) or EIS. Whether for a power reactor or ISFSI, that site-specific environmental review 

will address, among other things, the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage during the 

OLFHQVHWHUP,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)53DUW6WDWHDQGORFDODJHQFLHVZRXOGKDYHWKH

opportunity to provide input in the site-specific environmental reviews. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2) 

D.2.3.3 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the NRC establish a set of rules and 

policies predicated on the possibility that no safe permanent solution to the problem of spent 

fuel will be demonstrated or available in the foreseeable future. The commenter stated that the 

Rule must specify that spent fuel must not be subject to abandonment under any 

circumstances, but must be fully retrievable and subject to continual monitoring at all times, until 

a scientifically verifiable, safe, and permanent solution to the nuclear waste problem has been 

“demonstrated beyond doubt.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC already has regulations in 

place that address the safe storage of spent fuel: GU\VWRUDJHLVDGGUHVVHGLQ&)53DUW

DQGSRROVWRUDJHLVDGGUHVVHGLQ&)53DUWVDQG6WRUDJHLQERWKVSHQWIXHOSRROs and 

dry casks is “retrievable” storage. Licensees are responsible for the safe storage of spent fuel 

and are not allowed to abandon the spent fuel. Further, the NRC considered a scenario in this 

GEIS where spent fuel must be stored onsite or at away-from-reactor sites for the indefinite 

future. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-3) 

D.2.3.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters suggested that the NRC include language in the 

Rule that requires transfer of spent fuel to a temporary location within 1 year, expedited transfer 

of spent fuel from pools, closure of pools at closed plants, and discontinue authorization of the 

use of pools out in the open for storage. Commenters suggested that the NRC include 

language to require that spent fuel be handled and stored using the absolute safest methods 

available regardless of what a cost-benefit analysis shows, require that all casks and pools 

withstand magnitude 11.0 earthquakes, require that pools and storage areas be able to 

withstand a total lack of cooling capabilities, and require that spent fuel transportation be done 

with full prior knowledge and agreement of all communities that the shipment transits through. 

A commenter suggested that the NRC must: (1) develop a program for low-rate property 

insurance to cover private citizens from radiation and nuclear damages from the NRC’s storage 

of nuclear fuel, similar to current United States flood insurance, and that the NRC must provide 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

insurance subsidies for homeowners to cover the actual cost of this insurance plan; (2) amend 

the Affordable Care Act to provide full health and medical care to all persons damaged by 

accidental release of radiation from spent fuel storage; and (3) make ‘whole’ all persons and 

properties damaged by nuclear spent fuel accidents, including property buy out at full value and 

all relocation costs. The commenter also requested that the NRC: (1) keep manual and 

automatic radiation monitoring devices at all nuclear spent fuel storage locations and provide full 

public release of the data from those devices via the Internet; and (2) provide round-the-clock 

human monitoring of each fuel storage location with hourly logging of events and video 

recording that would be available to the public via the Internet. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. These suggested items for inclusion in 

the Rule are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. As explained in 6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, the GEIS and Rule do not propose or impose safety requirements for the storage of spent 

fuel. The GEIS and Rule consider only the continued storage of spent fuel in accordance with 

present NRC requirements and assess the environmental impacts accordingly. Issues related 

to type of insurance program requested are not within the NRC’s authority under the AEA. 

Members of the public can submit petitions for rulemaking to request that the NRC develop 

UHJXODWLRQVRUFKDQJHRUUHVFLQGRQHRILWVUHJXODWLRQV6HFWLRQRI&)5&)5

GHVFULEHVWKHSHWLWLRQIRUUXOHPDNLQJSURcess. This process allows anyone to petition the 

NRC to revise the NRC’s regulations. Depending on the results of its evaluation of the request, 

the NRC may modify existing regulations, add new regulations, or rescind a regulation. 

Information on submitting a petition for rulemaking is available on the NRC website at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

------

D.2.3.5 – COMMENT: One commenter requested clarification on whether the Rule applies to 

early site permit (ESP) applications. The commenter stated that previous waste confidence 

decisions and rules did not apply to ESPs and that the SOC and GEIS did not mention ESPs. 

The commenter requested that an affirmative statement be added to the GEIS and SOC to 

clarify that ESPs are not included. The commenter suggested text for inclusion. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that clarification of the scope of the proposed 

Rule change is appropriate. The NRC recognizes that neither the current language of the Rule, 

nor the proposed revision to that section, expressly addresses whether the Rule applies to ESP 

reviews. However, the NRC disagrees with the comment that ESPs are not covered by the 

Rule. The clear purpose of the regulation was to preclude the need for a site-specific analysis 

of the environmental impacts of continued storage for all power-reactor-related and ISFSIrelated licensing actions, including spent fuel generated by new reactors. This purpose is 

evident from the Commission’VLQWHQWLRQLQSDVW:DVWH&RQILGHQFHSURFHHGLQJVDQGWKH
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

rulemaking on 10 CFR 3DUWWRHQFRPSDVVZDVWHSURGXFHGE\DQHZJHQHUDWLRQRI

reactors—including those licensed under the 10 CFR 3DUWUHJLPHZKLFKLQFOXGHV(63V

)5)5)57KDWWKHUHJXODWLRQGLGQRWH[SUHVVO\LQFOXGH(63VLQ

the list of reactor licensing actions under 10 CFR 3DUWVDQGIRUZKLFKDVLWH-specific 

analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage is not necessary, coupled with the 

absence of an explanation as to why ESPs were not included in the regulation, is evidence that 

this was an oversight on the part of the NRC. Not including ESPs would also lead to the 

anomalous result—again, unexplained by the NRC—of precluding site-specific consideration of 

the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel in licensing actions that result in 

the production of spent fuel, but at the same time allowing such site-specific consideration at an 

earlier licensing stage—the ESP—which never results in the production of spent fuel. 

Accordingly, the NRC has consistently interpreted the Rule to include ESPs within the generic 

reach of that Rule as regards discussion of continued storage impacts in environmental 

analyses, and in the same manner applicable to those licenses explicitly listed in the Rule. This 

interpretation has been approved by several Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards. See e.g., 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site) (NRC 2004a) and 

Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site) (NRC 2004b). 

For these reasons, the language of the Rule has been revised to clarify that ESPs fall within the 

reach of the Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

-----

D.2.3.6 – COMMENT: One commenter noted that the revision in the proposed Rule to 10 CFR 

3DUW6XESDUW$$SSHQGL[%7DEOH%-1 “Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License 

Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants” was not consistent with the NRC’s policy on conversion to 

the metric system. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. The revision to Table B-1 has been updated 

so that the international unit (mSv) is shown first. No changes were made to the GEIS as a 

result of this comment. 

-2) 

D.2.3.7 – COMMENT: One commenter argued that the NRC has not clarified in its regulations 

that certain spent fuel issues not addressed in the GEIS may be addressed in individual 

licensing proceedings, thus requiring the NRC to supplement the GEIS to ensure that all issues 

are properly addressed, which will result in additional delays to the completion of the 

rulemaking. The commenter asserted that the GEIS should include guidance on which issues 

will be allowed to be considered on a site-specific basis following issuance of the GEIS. The 

FRPPHQWHUUHTXHVWHGWKDWWKH15&FRQVLGHUDPHQGPHQWVWR&)5EFRU

FWRDOORZVLWH-specific issues related to continued storage to be raised in licensing 

proceedings. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that its regulations require consideration of a supplement to the GEIS under certain 

circumstances—namely, if there are substantial changes in continued storage relevant to 

environmental concerns, or if there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to 

environmental coQFHUQVDQGEHDULQJRQWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQRULWVLPSDFWV&)5DQG

 

However, the NRC disagrees with the concerns expressed in the comment about the NRC’s 

implementation of regulations in 10 CFR Part 5HYLVHG.23 precludes only challenges to 

the impact determinations in the GEIS. The scope of the GEIS includes only impacts of spent 

fuel related to its continued storage. Operational impacts associated with spent fuel, including 

impacts of fuel storage during the licensed life for operation (e.g., during the 40-year-term of a 

reactor operating license), are not covered by the Rule. Participants in individual licensing 

proceedings would be free to raise spent fuel storage issues related to operations in those 

proceedings to the extent permitted by applicable regulations. Accordingly, the NRC disagrees 

that any change to the scope of the GEIS is necessary. 

Further, based on the analysis in the draft GEIS, and as confirmed in the final GEIS, the NRC 

has determined that a generic assessment of environmental impacts for each resource area is 

possible and appropriate. Therefore, the NRC does not believe that the environmental impacts 

of continued storage for any resource areas in the GEIS should be subject to a site-specific 

review. In addiWLRQWKH15&GHWHUPLQHGWKDWDPHQGPHQWVWR&)53DUWWRDGGUHVVWKH

concerns raised in the comment are not necessary at this time. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1-10) (1----30) (1-4) 

D.2.3.8 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should either include a limit in the 

Rule on how long the spent fuel can remain in the spent fuel pool or should analyze the impacts 

of pool storage for the long-term and indefinite timeframes. The commenter expressed the view 

that without a time period for storage in the Rule, it is reasonably foreseeable that storage in 

pools could be indefinite and the GEIS wrongly assumes that spent fuel will only be stored in the 

SRROVIRU\HDUV

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Based upon the current regulatory 

framework, the GEIS reasonably concludes that spent fuel will likely be stored in spent fuel 

pools for no more than \HDUVEH\RQGWKHOLFHQVHGOLIHIRURSHUDWLRQRIDUHDFWRUWKDWLV, by 

the end of the short-term timeframe. In accordance with the license-termination requirements 

IRUSRZHUUHDFWRUVLQ&)5DDQGFGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJZLOOEHFRPSOHWHG

ZLWKLQ\HDUVRISHUPDQHQWFHVVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQV7KLVUHTXLUHPHQWDSSOLHVHTXally to the 

VSHQWIXHOSRROVDWSRZHUUHDFWRUV$OWKRXJKWKHUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5Dand 

Fallow the Commission to extend the time allowed to complete decommissioning and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

“unavailability of waste disposal capacity” is one of the factors to be considered, the 

Commission will only approve the request when necessary to protect public health and safety. 

Therefore, a time limit on storage is unnecessary in the Rule. Accordingly, the NRC disagrees 

that the GEIS should include an analysis of spent fuel pool storage beyond the short-term 

timeframe because the NRC has provided a reasonable basis for its analytical assumption that 

the spent fuel will be moved from the pools by the end of the short-term timeframe. See Section 

' of this appendix for additional information on the assumption that all spent fuel will be 

UHPRYHGIURPWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROVZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHFHVVDWLRQRIUHDFWRURSHUDWLons. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---4---

D.2.3.9 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC has no valid analysis on which it 

can rely for an evaluation of spent fuel disposal impacts. The commenter stated that 10 CFR 

3DUW6XESDUW$$SSHQGL[%7DEOH%-1 “Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License 

Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants” depends on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) standard for Yucca Mountain and an actual analysis and the review of the Yucca 

Mountain application is not complete so it is not clear that Yucca Mountain would meet the 

required standard. The commenter expressed the view that the existence of a standard does 

not provide any assurance or indication of the actual performance of a site. The commenter 

also pointed out the EPA standard only applies to Yucca Mountain and that the status for Yucca 

Mountain is uncertain. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part. The comment is correct that the 

NRC has not completed its analysis of the Yucca Mountain repository application and that the 

status of Yucca Mountain remains uncertain. The NRC disagrees that no reliance can be 

placed on the existence of the EPA standard. The DOE developed and submitted a license 

application that purports to demonstrate that the proposed facility meets NRC requirements, 

including the requirements that implement the EPA standards. The NRC would not license a 

repository that did not meet the applicable NRC regulatory requirements. As for the EPA 

standard only applying to Yucca Mountain, while that is correct, it is reasonable to believe that a 

comparable standard would be issued for other repository sites, if needed. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-4----1-

D.2.4 Comments Concerning Miscellaneous Issues 

D.2.4.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters argued that the NRC is required under the AEA to 

make reasonable assurance “safety” findings that spent fuel can be safely stored after the 

licensed life of the reactor and the availability of a permanent repository for spent fuel disposal. 

Another commenter disagreed and argued, as found in NRDC v. NRC, that safety findings 

about repository availability are not required under the AEA. One commenter noted that the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

15&DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKHVHUHDVRQDEOHDVVXUDQFHILQGLQJVDUHUHTXLUHGE\ODZFLWLQJFR 

Q)XUWKHUWKHFRPPHQWHUDUJXHGWKDWWKH15&GRHVQRWKDYHVXIILFLHQWWHFKQLFDO

understanding of the risks of continued storage to support these AEA safety findings and no 

study has attempted to predict the environmental impacts of indefinite or long-term continued 

storage. The commenter also noted that the NRC had started a long-term waste confidence 

project, but the commenter contended that this project is not yet ready to support the NRC’s 

required AEA safety findings. The commenter requested that the NRC withdraw the proposed 

Rule until it has a basis for the reasonable assurance safety findings regarding continued 

storage. 

Another commenter argued that without these safety findings, which cannot be part of the GEIS, 

the NRC has no authority to issue licenses or license renewals. Another commenter argued 

that compliance with NRDC v. NRC requires the NRC to assess (a) the availability of sufficient 

and safe spent fuel disposal capacity when it is necessary and (b) the safety of spent fuel 

storage in the meantime. This commenter also argued that the safety findings must 

demonstrate a technical basis for a reasonable level of “confidence” that reactor fuel will be 

isolated from humans and the environment as long as it remains radioactive, citing 44 FR at 

)LQDOO\WKHFRPPHQWHUDUJXHVWKDWQRWKLQJLQNew York v. NRC, can be read to 

eliminate the NRC’s obligations to make AEA safety findings under NRDC v. NRC and 

Minnesota v. NRC. 

Another commenter stated that AEA reasonable assurance safety findings must be supported 

by factual predictions based on technical evidence, and cannot be simple policy statements. 

Several commenters stated that the NRC has acknowledged that it has no confidence that a 

facility will be available by any specific date, if ever. 

One commenter asserted that the GEIS and Federal Register Notice provide ample support for 

the NRC to make reasonable assurance findings and requested that findings be included in the 

rule. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that any decision to issue a license must be predicated on a Commission determination 

that the licensed activity can be performed in a manner adequate to protect public health and 

safety. This determination is based on technical analyses and judgment. However, this 

determination is made in accordance with the specific licensing process and is not part of the 

Commission’s NEPA obligations. 

The comments conflate reasonable assurance findings made in past waste confidence 

proceedings with AEA safety determinations made in the licensing process. The NRC typically 

refers to these safety findings as “reasonable assurance” ILQGLQJVVHH6HFWLRQRIWKH$($

but for the purposes of this discussion they will be referred to as safety determinations that the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-30 September 2014 

Commission makes in licensing facilities and activities. These AEA safety determinations 

should not be confused with environmental analysis under NEPA. While specific reasonable 

assurance findings were historically included in the waste confidence proceeding, those findings 

are not appropriate for this GEIS and are not necessary. Circumstances have evolved 

FRQVLGHUDEO\VLQFHWKHLQFHSWLRQRIWKHZDVWHFRQILGHQFHSURFHHGLQJLQWKHHDUO\V6LQFH

then, decades-long experience with the storage of spent fuel either in spent fuel pools or ISFSIs 

has demonstrated that spent fuel can be safely stored beyond the operating life of a reactor so 

long as that storage remains under the licensing and inspection processes currently in place. 

Minnesota v. NRC 

As noted in the comments, the Federal Register Notice associated with the proposed Rule and 

draft GEIS ()5FRQWDLQVDIRRWQRWHUHIHUHQFLQJMinnesota v. NRC, in which the Court 

of Appeals held that the NRC must consider: 

whether there is reasonable assurance that an offsite storage solution will be 

DYDLODEOHE\WKH\HDUV-WKHH[SLUDWLRQRIWhe plants’ operating licenses, 

and if not, whether there is reasonable assurance that the fuel can be stored 

safely at the sites beyond those dates. 

As Minnesota v. NRC explained, this remand was intended to “inquir[e] into the basis of those 

assurances of confidence” ,GDW,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHZDVWHFRQILGHQFHSURFHHGLQJ

that responded to the Court of Appeals inquiry, the term “confidence” referred to the 

Commission’s policy that it would not continue to issue licenses if it did “not have reasonable 

confidence that wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely” ,GDW7KH15&

WKHQXSGDWHGWKH:DVWH&RQILGHQFH5XOHLQ)5DQG)5WKH

latter resulting in the Court of Appeals’ remand in New York v. NRC. The actions taken by NRC 

in response to the remand conform to the AEA, NEPA, and other applicable legal requirements. 

The NRC is meeting its NEPA obligations with respect to continued storage with a GEIS. AEA 

obligations, including safety determinations, will continue to be met through the licensing 

process. As explained below, the AEA and the NRC’s regulatory regime ensure that stored 

waste will continue to be governed under the license and regulatory controls after the end of a 

facility’s current license, relying on the experience gained over the past 30 years and the current 

regulatory framework to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. Further, the 

technical feasibility of continued storage over the three timeframes analyzed in the GEIS, and 

the conclusion regarding technical feasibility and timeframe of availability of a repository, 

undergirds the NRC’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of continued storage activities. 

Appendix B of the GEIS analyzes the technical feasibility of a geologic repository and the 

availability of sufficient repository capacity. It does so by evaluating both international and 

domestic progress on siting a geologic repository and the development of the scientific and 

technological tools necessary to the determination that a geologic repository is technically 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-31 185(*௅

feasible (see Sections B.2.1 and B.2.2 of the GEIS). This analysis provides the basis for the 

NRC’s determination of technical feasibility; however, as stated by the Commission in the 

Federal Register Notice associated with the 2010 revision to the Rule: “[b]ecause the 

Commission cannot predict when [the necessary] societal and political acceptance will occur, it 

is unable to express reasonable assurance in a specific target date for the availability of a 

repository.” In the GEIS, the NRC conducted an evaluation of the technical and scientific 

possibility of siting, developing, and operating a geologic repository. However, the 

determination of technical feasibility is distinct from the more-difficult-to-quantify effects that 

societal or political factors may have on the progress toward (and exact timing of) availability of 

a repository. As stated in the GEIS, although the prediction of a particular date when a geologic 

repository will become available is uncertain, the NRC believes that the timeframe needed to 

GHYHORSDUHSRVLWRU\LVDSSUR[LPDWHO\WR\HDUVDQGWKDWDUHSRVLWRU\LVOLNHO\WREHFRPH

available by the end of the short-term timeframe (see Section B.2.2 of the GEIS). 

The GEIS also analyzes the technical feasibility of both wet and dry storage in spent fuel pools 

and casks, respectively for continued storage. The analysis considers proven storage 

methodologies, practical operating experience and the regulatory oversight provided by the 

current regulatory framework, allowing the NRC to determine that it is technically feasible to 

safely store spent fuel in either wet or dry storage for the short-term timeframe with only routine 

maintenance (see Section B.3 of the GEIS). For dry cask storage in the long-term and indefinite 

timeframes, the analysis considers the same factors analyzed in the short-term timeframe, 

along with aging management techniques, ISFSI construction, and cask replacement. 

AEA safety determinations 

The NRC regulations that govern licensing of storage facilities and those that govern licensing a 

geologic repository set criteria and standards by which these facilities must be designed, 

constructed, and operated. Implicit in these regulations is the confidence that they will be 

complied with and that sufficient enforcement tools will be available to prevent and address 

noncompliance. No person may store or possess special nuclear material, including spent fuel, 

ZLWKRXWDQ15&OLFHQVHVHH6HFWLRQRIWKH$($). For instance, the regulations in 10 CFR 

3DUWVDQGWKDWDSSO\WRFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRIUHDFWRUVSHQWIXHOSRROVDQG

ISFSIs establish stringent safety requirements for these facilities. The source of the NRC’s 

determination that the licensed activity, once the license is granted, will not endanger public 

health is the fact that these facilities will remain under license after the end of the facility’s period 

of operation, and therefore will still need to meet these safety standards, which are found in 10 

&)53DUWRUIRUUHDFWRUVDQGWKHLUVSHQWIXHOSRROVDQG&)53DUWIRU,6)6,V6RPH

of the provisions for reactor safety bear directly upon the safe storage of spent fuel after 

licensed life for operation (see, for example, 1&)5EEDQG&)53DUW$SSHQGL[

$&ULWHULRQZKLFKUHTXLUHVWKDWVSHQWIXHOVWRUDJHV\VWHPVEHGHVLJQHGWRDVVXUHDGHTXDWH

safety under normal and postulated accident conditions). In addition, the Commission recently 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-32 September 2014 

declined to restrict WKHQXPEHURIWLPHVDVSHFLILF,6)6,OLFHQVHPD\EHUHQHZHGVHH)5

). ISFSI renewal applications will be subject to all applicable regulatory requirements to 

justify safe operation during the requested license term, including appropriate aging 

management activities. Based on the expectation that the current, or even a more stringent, 

regulatory framework will continue to exist, and on the decades-long experience resulting in 

substantial technical knowledge about storage of spent fuel, the NRC concludes that spent fuel 

can be stored safely for the short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes (see Appendix B of 

the GEIS). 

Comments regarding delay of other NRC projects and disposal 

With respect to the long-term project on the regulatory basis for extended storage and 

transportation of spent fuel, see “Plan for the Long-Term Update to the Waste Confidence Rule 

and Integration with the Extended Storage and Transportation Initiative” (NRC 2011a). 

However, the comment is also correct that the NRC started that project, but it has since been 

deferred to allow the agency to address the remand from New York v. NRC. The NRC does not 

have to wait for the completion of that long-term project, or any other technical study, to issue 

the GEIS. NEPA requires that an agency conduct its environmental review based on the 

currently available scientific and technical information. NEPA does not require that the NRC 

wait until undeveloped information matures into something that later might affect the review (see 

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council). Finally, the NRC disagrees with the comment’s 

suggestion that NRC must demonstrate a technical basis for confidence that spent fuel will be 

isolated from humans and the environment as long as it remains radioactive. Isolation of the 

spent fuel occurs with permanent disposal; in contrast, the Rule codifies the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel, not its permanent disposal. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1-----1--1--1--1--1----1) 

-----------------1-1) 

-2--2--2--2--2--4----1--2-

---1--1--1--2--2----2--4-

-1--1----1-

D.2.4.2 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the NRC consider explaining that it 

currently cannot provide “assurance that SNF can be managed safely into the indefinite future,” 

but that this is a problem that must be solved by Congress and other Federal agencies. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees with the comment that nuclear waste policy is the province of the Congress and the 

President, and that that policy responsibility has been delegated to the DOE, not the NRC. 

However, the NRC does not agree that spent fuel cannot be safely stored and managed for the 

indefinite future. The GEIS presents the NRC’s analysis of how safe storage would likely be 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-33 185(*௅

managed over the short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes, and the NRC has concluded 

that safe storage is technically feasible (see Appendix B of the GEIS). In addition, the NRC 

notes that geologic disposal is a waste-management approach that would provide a permanent 

solution, and again, the NRC has concluded that geologic disposal remains technically feasible. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.4.3 – COMMENT: One commenter claimed that the NRC has said that the Federal courts 

cannot rule on the NRC’s actions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Under the AEA and the Hobbs Act, final 

rulemaking and licensing actions of the Commission are subject to judicial review in the U.S. 

Courts of Appeals. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(112-1-

D.2.4.4 – COMMENT: A few commenters asserted that the GEIS and Rule represent a 

departure from past Waste Confidence decisions. One commenter asserted that the GEIS fails 

to assess key aspects of continued storage and thus fails to provide a regulatory basis for the 

Rule. The commenter believes that the statement of purpose in the GEIS is a fundamental 

departure from the previous waste confidence findings and that the NRC should acknowledge 

that there will no longer be waste confidence findings. This commenter noted that in contrast to 

the previous Rule, the proposed Rule finds only that it is feasible to safely store the spent fuel 

DQGWKDWDUHSRVLWRU\ZLOOEHDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUV$QRWKHUFRPPHQWHUDOVRQRWHGWKDWLQD

GHSDUWXUHIURPHDUOLHUYHUVLRQVRI&)5WKHQHZ5XOHGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\LQFRUSRUDWHD

finding that sufficient capacity will be available. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

acknowledges that the approach reflected in the GEIS and Rule differs from past Waste 

Confidence proceedings. For example, prior Waste Confidence proceedings included an EA 

and a FONSI, while this proceeding is structured around a GEIS. By going forward with a GEIS, 

the NRC has thereby gained the benefits of EIS preparation of providing the public with a more 

conventional and understandable format in discussing the environmental impacts associated 

with the continued storage of spent fuel as well as the availability of a repository for ultimate 

disposal. Further, the GEIS provides a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage than would be included in an EA and FONSI. The 

underlying assumptions in the GEIS address the issues assessed in the previous Waste 

Confidence findings as conclusions regarding the technical feasibility and availability of a 

repository and conclusions regarding the technical feasibility of safely storing spent fuel in an atreactor or away-from-reactor storage facility. As a result of preparing its environmental analysis 

of continuing storage impacts in the GEIS, the NRC found it no longer necessary to have a 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-34 September 2014 

separate Waste Confidence Decision with findings (see, generally, Waste Confidence—

&RQWLQXHG6WRUDJHRI6SHQW1XFOHDU)XHO)5SURSRVHG6HSWDQG

Appendix B of the GEIS). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result to these 

comments. 

--1--4-11) 

D.2.4.5 – COMMENT: Some commenters expressed a concern that the GEIS and Rule 

constitute an abandonment of the NRC’s prior Waste Confidence policy. These commenters 

argued that the NRC’s statement in the GEIS that, absent Congressional direction, it “may not 

deny a reactor license unless it determines that a license applicant has not met the NRC’s 

regulatory standards for issuance of a license” is inconsistent with its statement that it “would 

not continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can and 

will in due course be disposed of safely.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC continues to believe that 

spent fuel can and will, in due course, be removed to a repository. As stated in the GEIS, the 

15&EHOLHYHVWKDWDUHSRVLWRU\LVOLNHO\WREHFRPHDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHHQGRID

reactor’s licensed life for operations. Furthermore, the policy of the Federal government 

continues to be disposal of spent fuel in a deep geologic repository (see BRC 2012). As 

discussed in Appendix B of the GEIS, the NRC believes spent fuel can be stored safely until a 

repository becomes available. Nothing in the statement regarding Congressional direction is 

inconsistent with the NRC’s views about repository availability or feasibility. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---11-4) 

D.2.4.6 – COMMENT: A commenter argued that the NRC cannot rely on any statements or 

analyses from the 2010 Waste Confidence update because that rule was vacated wholesale for 

being arbitrary and capricious. The commenter argues therefore that reliance on those 

statements or analyses is per se arbitrary. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The Court of Appeals vacated the 2010 

:DVWH&RQILGHQFH5XOH)5DQGEA for three identified deficiencies requiring further 

analysis, but did not invalidate the underlying analyses supporting adoption of the rule (see New 

York v. NRC). Substantial resource savings have been achieved by building on the earlier 

research and analysis regarding continued storage impacts, rather than starting from scratch; 

NEPA does not require otherwise. Rather, NEPA requires agencies to use high-quality and 

reliable information. In this case, that includes the research and analysis developed for the 2010 

:DVWH&RQILGHQFHXSGDWH)50RUHRYHUWKH15&KDVYHULILHGWKDWDQ\GDWDDQG

analyses extracted from the 2010 EA used in preparing the GEIS remain valid and appropriate 

for use in the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.4.7 – COMMENT: Commenters argued that the NRC’s waiver provisions are inadequate to 

meet a requirement in New York v. NRC to give stakeholders an opportunity to raise sitespecific issues during licensing proceedings. The commenters argued that the Court of Appeals 

conditioned the NRC’s continued use of a generic analysis on the “Commission’s use of 

conservative bounding assumptions and the opportunity for concerned parties to raise sitespecific differences at the time of a specific site’s licensing.” Citing a recent Commission 

adjudicatory opinion, the commenters further argued that the waiver provisions in 10 CFR Part 2 

are inadequate to allow for these site-specific opportunities because the NRC is unlikely to 

grant, and has never granted, a waiver. Commenters further argued that this waiver provision 

shifts the burden to identify site-specific issues to petitioners, which is ineffective and results in 

the NRC shedding its NEPA responsibilities by asking interested stakeholders to identify issues 

that NEPA requires the NRC to address. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The GEIS and Rule assess only 

generic issues, and appropriate site-specific impacts, like the impacts during facility operations 

for initial licensing reviews, will continue to be considered in the environmental reviews of 

individual licensing proceedings. In the development of the GEIS and the notice-and-comment 

rulemaking, the NRC has provided an opportunity for members of the public, Tribal 

governments, State governments, and various other organizations to raise site-specific 

considerations that might indicate that certain analyses or impact determinations cannot be 

generically resolved. Indeed, the comments received have led the NRC to make clarifying 

changes and add additional discussion to some portions of the GEIS and Rule. However, the 

NRC is not aware of, and the comments have not raised, any information that would cause the 

NRC to conclude that any of the generic impact determinations would be invalid at any 

particular site. Accordingly, if a participant in an NRC proceeding later seeks to revisit these 

generic analyses in an individual licensing proceeding based on asserted site-specific 

differences, it is appropriate to require the petitioner to satisfy the waiver requirements in the 

NRC’VUHJXODWLRQVVHH&)5

The GEIS and Rule fully comply with NEPA and the NRC’s NEPA implementing regulations. 

The process undertaken for this GEIS is not significantly different from the process for any other 

EIS: the NRC used a scoping process; issued a draft GEIS for comment; and has considered, 

responded to, and made appropriate changes in light of the comments received. The GEIS and 

Rule have benefitted greatly from consideration of the diverse and detailed public comments 

submitted. 

While some commenters expressed frustration with the NRC’s waiver provisions, the NRC 

disagrees that these provisions are inadequate to permit site-specific challenges in appropriate 

situations. The NRC’VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ15&SURFHHGLQJVWR

request that a rule not be applied, or be waived, in a particular proceeding because special 

circumstances are present that would prevent the application of the rule from satisfying the 

purpose of the rule. A participant may be able to support a petition for waiver upon a showing 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

that, due to site-specific special circumstances, the GEIS would not satisfy the NRC’s NEPA 

obligation to evaluate the impacts of continued storage. For the reasons stated in the GEIS and 

Rule, including careful consideration of diverse public comments, the NRC has concluded that 

the impacts of continued storage can and should be resolved generically. However, the waiver 

process ensures that participants have opportunity to raise any site-specific circumstances that 

may arise in the future. 

In this regard, the NRC does not agree that the Court of Appeals’ discussion in New York v. 

NRC of site-specific considerations implied any view on the NRC’s waiver provisions, as neither 

WKHYDOLGLW\QRUDSSOLFDWLRQRI&)5ZDVEHIRUHWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOVLQWKDWFDVH7R

the extent that 10 &)5LPSRVHVa responsibility to justify a waiver that is the natural effect 

of any agency rule prohibiting a challenge to its regulations in hearings. The NRC has 

discretion to transact its business broadly, through rulemaking, or case-by-case, through 

adjudication. When the NRC engages in rulemaking, the NRC is resolving issues generically, 

rather than in adjudication. NRC rules, like those of other agencies, represent the product of 

substantial specialized analysis and resource commitment in often lengthy rulemaking 

proceedings. Where an agency has chosen to proceed generically through rulemaking, it is not 

obliged to continually litigate and re-litigate those issues. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---13-11) 

D.2.4.8 – COMMENT: 6RPHFRPPHQWHUVTXHVWLRQHGDVWDWHPHQWLQ6HFWLRQRIWKHGUDIW

GEIS where the NRC stated that it cannot revoke existing licenses without the existence of a 

threat to public health and safety or the common defense and security. The commenters 

asserted that “we” (which the NRC interprets in the context to mean the American people, and 

not the NRC) can implement a policy change with respect to nuclear power and shut down 

existing nuclear power plants. One commenter noted that the NRC does have the authority to 

revoke a license if a plant is found to be unsafe, regardless of a licensee’s vested interest in the 

facility. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments. Under the AEA and the Energy 

5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ$FWRIWKH15&KDVEURDGDXWKRULW\WRJUDQWVXVSHQGUHYRNHRUDPHQG

licenses for utilization facilities (e.g., nuclear power reactors) and to grant, suspend, revoke, or 

amend materials licenses, including licenses to store spent fuel at ISFSIs based on the NRC’s 

consideration of, among other factors, public health and safety. 

In addition, the NRC notes that the agency was created and is overseen by Congress and the 

President. Should Congress and the President determine that the best interests of the United 

States would be served by a change in nuclear energy policy, Congress and the President have 

the authority to change that policy in any direction they believe appropriate, limited only by the 

Constitution. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

As a result of these comments, the discussion in Section 1. has been revised to state more 

clearly the NRC’s authority to act on the basis of public health and safety (or common defense 

and security) considerations. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--2-23) 

D.2.5 Comments Concerning the NEPA Process 

D.2.5.1 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the GEIS considers and announces a new 

national program—including options and alternatives—for the storage and disposition of spent 

fuel. The commenter then asserted that the NRC must prepare a programmatic EIS to address 

this new program. The commenter further asserted that the GEIS is designed to address issues 

generic to storage and disposal of spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS considers the environmental 

impacts of continued spent fuel storage and alternatives to the issuance of a new Rule. The 

GEIS does not announce any new program or policy. Rather, it provides the analysis to satisfy 

a portion of the NRC’s obligations in licensing proceedings. The NRC’s approach to the 

HQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHKDVEHHQODUJHO\VLPLODUVLQFHDQGWKLV

generic approach was affirmed by the Court in the 2012 decision that vacated and remanded 

the 2010 Waste Confidence update (NRC 2010a). Further, the GEIS and Rule do not modify 

the national policy that calls for disposal of spent fuel in a deep geologic repository. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-13) 

D.2.5.2 – COMMENT: Two commenters asserted that it is inappropriate for NRC to describe 

nuclear waste management as “a small piece of the puzzle.” Over time, the commenters assert 

that nuclear waste management will become the most expensive aspect of nuclear power. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees with the comments in 

part. The NRC agrees that nuclear waste management is a significant issue that is more than a 

small piece of the puzzle. However, the comments misconstrue the NRC’s action in this 

proceeding. The GEIS and Rule address continued storage of spent fuel, rather than all forms 

of nuclear waste management. Further, the GEIS and Rule have a limited effect in future 

licensing proceedings: they satisfy the NRC’s NEPA obligations to analyze the environmental 

impacts of continued storage. Other matters to be considered in any given licensing proceeding 

will be addressed outside of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of these comments. 

(---
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.5.3 – COMMENT: The commenter asserted that the NRC would adopt “small” conclusions 

in site-specific licensing environmental reviews. The commenter also expressed concern that 

the NRC would not consider alternative ways to store spent fuel or alternative durations for 

spent fuel storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS includes some impact 

determinations that are greater than SMALL. These determinations will be included within the 

decision-making process for environmental reviews during site-specific licensing. Site-specific 

licensing will govern the manner and duration of spent fuel storage, including potential mitigation 

of storage impacts, during the licensed life of the facility. The duration of the license and any 

renewals will be appropriate to the facility under the applicable NRC regulations. No sitespecific licensing will result in indefinite spent fuel storage. Moreover, the NRC requires new 

safety and environmental reviews for each new or renewed license application. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.5.4 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the NRC must show that site-specific 

evaluations of environmental impacts would not result in results different from those in the 

GEIS, but the NRC failed to do so. The commenter asserted that the GEIS “assumes away” the 

differences between sites rather than demonstrating that differences between sites are either 

captured in the GEIS or are not sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment. The 

commenter also asserted that the GEIS does not indicate how different storage scenarios can 

be considered at different sites in later reviews. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. In developing the GEIS, the NRC 

considered site-specific characteristics at existing reactor and ISFSI sites to determine whether 

the environmental impacts could be generically resolved for each resource area. As part of this 

analysis, the NRC considered whether site-specific factors could result in different impact levels 

at different sites. In several resource areas in the long-term and indefinite storage timeframes, 

the NRC acknowledged that future site-specific factors could result in varying impact levels, 

thus, the GEIS assigns a range of impacts to address the uncertainty. 

Regarding storage scenarios, the GEIS considers three storage timelines for both onsite and 

away-from-reactor storage. The first two timeframes, both the short-WHUPXSWR\HDUVDIWHU

licensed reactor life) and long-WHUPXSWR\HDUVDIWHUOLFHQVHGUHDFWRUOLIHWLPHIUDPHV

assume that spent fuel will go to a repository during or at the conclusion of those timeframes. 

The third timeframe, indefinite storage, assumes that a repository may never become available. 

The short-term timeframe, moreover, addresses the impacts of continued storage in both spent 

fuel pools and dry casks, while the long-term and indefinite storage timeframes rely on storage 

in dry casks. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-12--12--12-4) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.5.5 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that a GEIS is not compatible with NEPA. 

Another commenter asserted that the decision to conduct a GEIS does not comply with NEPA 

because a GEIS cannot address site-specific differences. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Under, NEPA, agencies are permitted to 

develop generic environmental review documents when appropriate. In developing the GEIS, 

the NRC considered site characteristics at existing reactor and ISFSI sites. In evaluating 

environmental impacts, the NRC considered whether site-specific factors could result in different 

impact levels at different sites. In a few resource areas in the long-term and indefinite storage 

timeframes, the NRC acknowledged that future site-specific factors could result in varying 

impact levels, so the NRC assigned a range of impacts to address the uncertainty. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--

D.2.5.6 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed a concern that the NRC’s actions will 

foreclose future NEPA challenges related to generation, storage, or disposal of spent fuel based 

on the analysis in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As required under NEPA and the APA, 

the NRC has provided an opportunity for the members of the public to review and provide 

comments on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule. In addition, the GEIS and Rule address the 

environmental impacts of continued storage only. The GEIS and Rule do not address the 

environmental impacts of spent fuel generation, storage during a reactor’s licensed life for 

operations, or disposal. Those impacts are addressed in other proceedings, including sitespecific reactor licensing proceedings. Moreover, these reviews will take into account the 

conclusions from the GEIS as codified in &)5. In addition, the NRC’s regulations at 

&)5DOORw participants in NRC proceedings to request that a rule, including 10 CFR 

QRWEHDSSOLHGRUEHZDLYHGLQDSDUWLFXODUSURFHHGLQJEHFDXVHVSHFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV

are present that would prevent the application of the rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. 

For more information on waivers, see discussion in Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-4) 

D.2.5.7 – COMMENT: Several commenters asserted that the NRC impermissibly relied on an 

ongoing proceeding (e.g., the “Rulemaking Revising Security Requirements for Facilities Storing 

SNF and HLW [high-level waste]”) in the GEIS. Commenters asserted that relying on a 

proceeding that is not yet final violates Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance on 

developing timely and efficient NEPA reviews. The commenters also submitted comments on 

the NRC’s proposed Rule to update the security requirements for facilities storing spent fuel and 

+/:)5
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-40 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS is a stand-alone document 

that relies upon multiple sources of information, all of which are cited in the references at the 

end of each chapter. The pendency of any other rulemaking is not a factor in the completeness 

of the GEIS itself. 

The rulemaking described by the comments, “Draft Technical Basis for Rulemaking Revising 

Security Requirements for Facilities Storing SNF and HLW,” )5LVFLWHGLQSection 

RIthe GEIS as an example of an ongoing rulemaking that could result in additional 

regulatory requirements that cannot be imposed by the current rulemaking to revise the Rule. 

The GEIS merely notes, for informational purposes, that the NRC is undertaking this rulemaking 

effort and provides a reference to a Federal Register Notice that describes this effort. The 

revised security requirements rulemaking is therefore unrelated to impact determinations in the 

GEIS, and the instant rulemaking need not await its completion. Moreover, the NRC has not 

used the ongoing nature of any other rulemaking to avoid analyzing environmental impacts in 

the GEIS, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the environmental impacts of continued 

storage. To the extent that the comments discuss the substance of another rulemaking, the 

comments are not within the scope of this proceeding. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1---11-12) 

D.2.5.8 – COMMENT: Commenters asserted that the NRC should review health and 

environmental effects of spent fuel storage on an ongoing basis. These commenters expressed 

concern that the GEIS is a snapshot of environmental impacts and, thus, cannot capture future 

findings or the changing nature of radioactive materials. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. NEPA only requires Federal agencies 

to consider the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts based on currently available 

information at the time of the decision. NEPA reviews are necessarily based on current 

information so that the results of environmental reviews can inform agency decisions. NEPA 

does not obligate Federal agencies to update environmental reviews past the point of 

implementing the proposed action. Nonetheless, the NRC has accumulated substantial 

practical operating experience with proven storage methodologies of wet and dry storage 

resulting from decades of licensed storage and regulatory oversight under the current regulatory 

framework. This experience provides a sound and reliable technical basis for predicting spent 

fuel performance in spent fuel pools and ISFSIs as reflected in the GEIS. Beyond the 

preparation of the GEIS and codification in the Rule, the NRC will continue to review health and 

environmental effects of spent fuel storage as part of its ongoing licensing, oversight, and 

research activities. Any new information, such as the performance of spent fuel during lengthy 

periods of time, will be used to update and improve the NRC’s regulatory requirements as 

appropriate. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-41 185(*௅

D.2.5.9 – COMMENT: One commenter asked when the GEIS would be updated and stated that 

a document published in 2014 should not be the final word on environmental impacts into the 

distant future. The commenter suggested that the GEIS should include a discussion regarding 

the NRC’s plans for its updating. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with this comment. The NRC will review the GEIS and Rule for 

possible revision when warranted by significant events that may call into question the 

appropriateness of the Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-1-

D.2.5.10 – COMMENT: Several commenters challenged statements made in the NRC’s 

Scoping Process Summary Report for the GEIS. The commenters expressed concerns that the 

NRC’s response to scoping comments suggested that the NRC would publish a deficient GEIS. 

One commenter urged the Commission to take action to correct the asserted deficiencies and 

proposes a schedule by which the Commission could conduct a formal adjudicatory process; 

the same commenter asserts that the NRC must take action to mitigate impacts that may occur 

“forever,” and that the NRC failed to provide an adequate basis for rejecting comments. One 

commenter asserted that the NRC ignored its scoping comments. Another commenter 

expressed concerns that it did not receive an opportunity to respond to the Scoping Process 

Summary Report. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The scoping for the GEIS performed by 

WKH15&FRPSOLHVZLWKWKHVFRSLQJUHJXODWLRQVLQ&)5–  The “Waste 

Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process Summary Report” (NRC 

2013j) provides the scoping determinations and conclusions made by the NRC. The Report 

also summarizes comments received during the public scoping period and provides the NRC’s 

responses. A separate document, Scoping Comments on the Waste Confidence Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement, lists the scoping comments organized by comment category 

(NRC 2013k). The NRC considered all scoping comments and responded to them in the 

Scoping Summary Report. As a practical matter, most of the scoping disagreement centers on 

a basic misunderstanding by commenters of the nature of the proposed action. Here, the NRC 

is preparing a GEIS to analyze continued storage impacts and then codifying the GEIS results 

by adoption of a revised Rule rather than licensing nuclear power reactors, as commenters 

claim. It is the licensing process, not this rulemaking, through which alternatives to a licensed 

facility and mitigation of construction and operational impacts at a proposed facility are 

considered. The comment period following issuance of the draft GEIS has provided the public 

an additional opportunity to comment on scoping, and no further review, including an NRC 

adjudicaWRU\KHDULQJLVZDUUDQWHGRURWKHUZLVHDYDLODEOHXQGHU3DUWSURFHGXUHV1R

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1-1) (1-31) (1-----1-4) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-42 September 2014 

D.2.5.11 – COMMENT: Two commenters asserted that the GEIS supported the 2010 Waste 

Confidence update (NRC 2010a) that the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded in 2012. 

One commenter further claimed that the GEIS is of poor quality, and that future legal challenges 

will occur as a result. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC’s 2010 Waste Confidence 

update (NRC 2010a) contained an EA that reached a FONSI. It did not rely upon a GEIS. In 

September 2012, the Commission determined (NRC 2012a) that the NRC would develop a new 

rule supported by a GEIS in response to the Court of Appeals’ June 2012 decision that vacated 

and remanded the 2010 Waste Confidence update (New York v. NRC). Regarding the quality 

of the GEIS, the NRC has worked to ensure that the GEIS meets all applicable requirements. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--14) 

D.2.5.12 – COMMENT: A commenter asserted that the NRC failed to comply with its own 

regulations that require it to use plain language in EISs by citing to a vacated Federal Register 

Notice. The commenter asserts that the NRC Inspector General has faulted the NRC for this 

practice and asserts that the GEIS should provide as much information as possible for its 

sources. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. While the NRC has no “plain-language” 

regulations, the NRC strives to publish documents in plain, easily understood English. Also, the 

GEIS index allows rapid searching of the text, and the NRC posted all draft GEIS reference 

materials to the NRC’s public website for easy access during the public comment period. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.5.13 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the GEIS should contain a discussion of 

the impacts if the NRC decides not to proceed with the rulemaking. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. In its discussion of the “no-action” 

alternative, the GEIS addresses the impacts that would occur if the rulemaking does not 

proceed. The no-action alternative may result in the NRC’s pursuing one of several options to 

address the environmental impacts of continued storage. These options include a site-specific 

review option, a GEIS-only option, and a policy-statement option. The NRC discusses the noaction alternative—and the various options in the case of no action—LQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, and it considers the costs and benefits of the proposed action and NRC’s potential 

RSWLRQVLQWKHFDVHRIQRDFWLRQLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,67KH15&QRWHVLQ6HFWLRQ

however, that neither the proposed action nor the NRC’s potential options in the case of no 

action have significant environmental impacts because all of them are different administrative 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-43 185(*௅

approaches for addressing the environmental impacts of continued storage in NRC licensing 

processes. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(244-4-2) 

D.2.5.14 – COMMENT: Two commenters noted that NEPA is a procedural statute. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--2-

D.2.5.15 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS is premature or expressed 

concerns that the NRC should conduct additional research, gather updated information, or 

simply include other information sources in the GEIS. One commenter stated that the majority 

of references within the draft GEIS are NRC evaluations and assessments, in contrast to 

technical studies. This commenter also asserted that references were submitted with their 

scoping comments, but were not used in the draft GEIS. One commenter stated that NEPA 

does not require that an agency delay action until better or other information becomes available. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees with the comment that asserts that an agency need not delay action until additional 

information becomes available. In a recent case reviewing the licensing of a nuclear power 

plant, a Court of Appeals held there was no need to delay an action because currently 

unavailable information might come to light in the future, Massachusetts v. NRC. 

The NRC disagrees with the comments that assert that the GEIS is premature, that it must wait 

for new information or additional studies, or that it must incorporate studies that have not yet 

been completed. 

NEPA only requires that Federal agencies use currently available information at the time of 

decision-making. Further, regarding information sources relied upon in the GEIS, NEPA guides 

agencies to employ technical knowledge and expertise to undertake a reasoned and accurate 

analysis of the available information. In developing the GEIS, NRC scientists and engineers 

reviewed available information and relied upon those materials that the NRC found to be highquality and reliable. 

For an example of a response in which the NRC evaluates an information source identified in 

comments, but not relied upon in the GEIS, see Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-3--3-1) (144------2---2-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-44 September 2014 

D.2.5.16 – COMMENT: One commenter claimed that the NRC did an inadequate and legally 

insufficient analysis of the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage. The commenter 

asserted that the NRC started its analysis by assuming licensing instead of conducting an 

analysis that the decisionmaker could use to decide whether a facility should be licensed in the 

first place, before any waste is produced. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The purpose of this GEIS was to 

evaluate the impacts of continued storage. In so doing, the NRC did not assume licensing, but 

restricted its analysis to the impacts from continued storage that could result if a license were 

granted. The decision to issue a license will be made in future licensing proceedings. The 

NRC’s licensing processes will continue to include environmental reviews of specific sites to 

help the decisionmaker determine whether licenses should be issued for facilities. Site-specific 

reviews will rely on the codified results of the GEIS to address the environmental impacts of 

continued storage. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(30-2-2) 

D.2.5.17 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern about whether the NRC would 

respond to public comments on the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: As a factual matter, the NRC responds to all public comments received on the 

draft GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.5.18 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that NEPA is the basis for the GEIS and then 

provided a series of summaries or quotes from, and citations to NEPA cases from the Supreme 

&RXUWDQGWKH86&RXUWVRI$SSHDOVIRUWKHWKDQGWK&LUFXLWV7KHFRPPHQWHUDOVRFLWHGWR

a NEPA-implementation regulation promulgated by the CEQ. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment insofar as the NRC prepared the GEIS 

pursuant to NEPA. The NRC neither agrees nor disagrees with the comment insofar as it 

summarizes, quotes from, or cites to NEPA-related cases or regulations. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-4) 

D.2.5.19 – COMMENT: A commenter asserted that the NRC has used and continues to use 

rulemaking procedures and generic treatment to place matters beyond NEPA reviews and to 

block public participation. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC's efforts to address some 

environmental issues generically or through rulemaking comply with NRC's NEPAimplementation regulations, which are consistent with the CEQ's NEPA-implementation 

regulations. Regarding public participation, for this proceeding, the NRC has considered all 

FRPPHQWVLWUHFHLYHGE\-DQXDU\DOWKRXJKWKHFRPPHQWSHULRGIRUPDOO\FORVHGRQ

December 20, 2013), and the NRC specifically invited and welcomed members of the public and 

a wide range of stakeholders, groups, governments, and other parties to participate in multiple 

stages of this rulemaking. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-1) 

D.2.5.20 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS is inadequate because it fails 

to take a hard look at environmental impacts or fails to make information available to the public 

and decisionmakers. Another commenter stated that NRC has not conducted a thorough 

environmental analysis of repository siting or lengthy onsite storage. One commenter 

expressed concern that the analysis in the GEIS failed to take a hard look by limiting its generic 

DQDO\VLVWRRQO\\HDUVWKHFRPPHQWHUDVVHUWHGWKDW15&PXVWH[SODLQZK\D-year 

timeframe is reasonable for analysis, or expand the timeframe to a period that reasonably 

reflects the availability of permanent waste storage. One commenter asserted that the NRC 

failed to take a hard look at impacts at U.S. reactor sites. Finally, one commenter noted that the 

NRC’s NEPA review is subject to a “rule of reason,” and so it need not consider remote-andspeculative impacts or worst-case scenarios. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

agrees with comments that NRC’s NEPA reviews are subject to a “rule of reason” and need not 

consider worst-case or remote-and-speculative scenarios. 

The NRC disagrees with the comments that the NRC has failed to take a hard look at 

environmental impacts of continued storage. The NRC has carefully complied with its NEPAimplementation regulations and the case law governing EIS preparation in the course of 

developing the GEIS. Further, the NRC provided complete public access to information related 

to the draft GEIS and Rule by posting all draft GEIS references on the NRC's public website 

during and prior to the public comment period, by conducting multiple public meetings 

throughout the United States, by conducting periodic status update teleconferences, and by 

disseminating information through an e-mail listserve. Those comments asserting that the NRC 

should have considered siting a geologic repository are beyond the scope of this proceeding 

because continued storage (i.e., the period after a reactor’s licensed life, but before spent fuel is 

shipped to a repository) does not include repository-based disposal activities. The NRC will 

address impacts from such activities during the site-specific licensing process for a repository. 

Regarding the duration of onsite storage in the three timeframes considered in the GEIS, the 

NRC has framed its analysis in terms of environmental impacts that would result from continued 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

storage over a short-WHUPSHULRGXSWR\HDUVDIWHUOLFHQVHGOLIHORQJ-WHUPSHULRGXSWR

years after licensed life), and an indefinite period, because those timeframes correspond to 

reasonable alternative times when a repository might become available. Therefore, the NRC 

KDVQRWOLPLWHGLWVDQDO\VLVWR\HDUVRUIDLOHGWRFRQVLGHUOHQJWK\RQVLWHVWRUDJe. In addition, 

the NRC disagrees with comments that indicate that it failed to take a hard look at storage 

impacts at U.S. reactor sites; in fact, the NRC’s assessment of potential impacts is based on 

experience with reactor sites throughout the United States. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-3----11) (324-1) (432-----1--1--3-

-1-

D.2.5.21 – COMMENT: A commenter referred to the 2003 CEQ NEPA Task Force Report on 

Modernizing NEPA Implementation (CEQ 2003). The commenter recommended that the NRC 

consider incorporating adaptive management and monitoring strategies for each of the storage 

timeframes. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. In general, adaptive management and 

monitoring programs in the NEPA context are most appropriately applied when an agency 

directly manages natural resources. Resource-management agencies can monitor the 

environmental effects of the actions they take on the resources they manage, and then modify 

management approaches to reach their desired aims if existing practices do not yield the results 

an agency sought or assumed at the time it conducted its NEPA analysis. Licensing agencies, 

like the NRC, however, are typically less able to take advantage of adaptive management 

approaches because doing so would require the NRC to exercise additional oversight over 

licensees or introduce new license requirements, conditions, or inspections, any of which may 

exceed NRC’s regulatory authority. Nonetheless, aspects of NRC’s existing oversight and 

regulatory processes are inherently adaptive insofar as the NRC’s regulations often make use of 

performance standards that give licensees the flexibility to decide how they will meet the 

standard. Finally, the NRC’s ongoing activities to protect public health and the environment also 

include a robust research program that regularly provides new information to NRC’s regulatory 

mission. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-12-

D.2.5.22 – COMMENT: A commenter quoted portions of a 2013 report from the NRC Office of 

the Inspector General, which concluded, in pertinent part, that NRC’s NEPA documents are 

lengthy or complex and do not clearly present important NEPA information. The commenter 

also quoted a finding that suggests that the NRC should present NEPA information in a format 

that allows people to readily understand how an action may affect them. The commenter then 

argued that the GEIS embodies the same failures. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As explained in Section D.2.4.4 of this 

appendix, the NRC has determined that the format for its analysis of what has been traditionally 

known as its Waste Confidence Decision should be changed to the more familiar and better 

understood format of an EIS. This change to the more recognizable EIS format will enhance 

public understanding of the GEIS. Also, consistent with the Office of the Inspector General’s 

recommendations, the GEIS contains a brief executive summary in a readily accessible, 

question-and-answer format that explains key elements of the GEIS to the interested public 

while minimizing complexity. This summary explains how continued storage will affect people 

and the environment. The GEIS also contains an index, consistent with the Office of the 

Inspector General’s findings, to help interested parties find specific information in the GEIS. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--10) 

D.2.5.23 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns regarding risk assessment in the 

GEIS. One commenter stated that it may be inappropriate to assess spent fuel hazards over a 

span of decades in an EIS. Another commenter stated that the GEIS framework may not be 

adequate or appropriate for nuclear risk assessment. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Insofar as the GEIS contains riskrelated information, it does so in an effort to understand, address, and explain the potential 

environmental impacts of events that, in many cases, have very low probabilities of occurring, 

yet have high potential consequences. In this regard, risk information is an important element of 

providing an accurate picture of environmental impacts in the GEIS. To the extent that the 

document relies on risk information, it is information that the NRC has developed as part of the 

NRC’s ongoing licensing, oversight, and research activities. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(431--1) 

D.2.5.24 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the GEIS fails to consider the worst-case 

scenario at Indian Point and therefore, the GEIS cannot be relied upon as comprehensive. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. NEPA does not require agencies to 

consider worst-case scenarios. Instead, NEPA requires agencies to address the reasonably 

foreseeable impacts of their actions, which the NRC has done in the GEIS. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.5.25 – COMMENT: Commenters criticized the NRC’s impact determination terminology 

(small, moderate, and large impact levels) as inappropriate or failing to comply with NEPA 

because those terms are vague and do not quantify the impacts. One commenter stated that 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

there could be no “small” or “moderate” dangers because nuclear waste is highly dangerous 

and suggested that NRC delete this terminology. The commenters also questioned how the 

majority of impacts could be SMALL for the short-term and long-term timeframes when 

information presented by commenters indicates that there are large environmental impacts at a 

specific nuclear power plant. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. To guide its assessment of 

environmental impacts for a proposed action or alternative actions, the NRC established 

standards of significance for environmental impacts using the CEQ terminology for “significantly” 

VHH&)58VLQJWKLVDSSURDFKWKH15&HVWDEOLVKHGWKUHHOHYHOVRIVLJQLILFDQFH

for potential impacts—SMALL, MODERATE, and LARGE—that provide a common framework 

for each of the resource areas assessed in this GEIS. The NRC has relied on these impact 

levels to evaluate impact significance in other environmental rulemakings, such as the generic 

evaluation of license renewal impacts foURSHUDWLQJUHDFWRUVLQ&)53DUW$SSHQGL[%

Table B-1. These significance levels provide a comparison tool that allows decisionmakers and 

interested parties to grasp the relative significance of various environmental impacts. Each 

impact level assigned in the GEIS is supported by substantial NRC analysis. Contrary to one 

comment, the GEIS addresses impacts to various environmental resources rather than 

assigning a single level of significance to nuclear waste. Finally, the NRC has evaluated 

available information for all existing sites, including information presented by comments, in 

reaching its impact conclusions. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

(20--10--10--10--10--3--2) 

D.2.5.26 – COMMENT: A commenter noted that the NRC had not identified any cooperating 

agencies and that no agencies had requested to cooperate on the GEIS. The commenter 

asserted that the DOE should have been involved in the GEIS as a cooperating agency as a 

result of its role in developing a repository for HLW, its role in managing nuclear waste facilities 

and sites, and its activities in identifying data gaps related to spent fuel storage and 

transportation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. As the 

comment noted, the NRC did not identify potential cooperating agencies, and no agencies—

including DOE—requested to participate as a cooperating agency in developing the GEIS. 

Furthermore, NEPA does not require the NRC to involve agencies that do not wish to 

participate. The data gaps identified by DOE are known to the NRC; in fact, DOE’s identification 

of data gaps is based in part on NRC-developed information. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-2) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.5.27 – COMMENT: Two commenters expressed concerns about NEPA segmentation. 

One commenter asserted that NRC failed to consider relationships among spent fuel storage 

and reactor licensing actions, that the NRC divided actions into arbitrary time periods, that the 

NRC illogically separated continued storage impacts from disposal impacts, and that the NRC 

has improperly tiered from existing information sources. Another commenter asserted that the 

NRC’s reliance on future licensing actions to approve a dry transfer system provides inadequate 

information. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC recognizes that continued 

storage of spent fuel is an integral part of reactor licensing. In particular, the NRC 

acknowledges the holding in New York v. NRC, that the NRC’s application of its generic 

environmental analysis and the Rule constitutes a stage in reactor licensing. However, the 

Court did not find that NRC’s environmental review of continued storage impacts in that stage 

constitutes improper tiering or segmentation under NEPA. Also, the Court did not require the 

NRC to consider the environmental impacts of ultimate disposal in that framework. 

7KHWLPHIUDPHVIRUDQDO\]LQJFRQWLQXLQJVWRUDJHLPSDFWV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,S) were not 

selected arbitrarily. Rather, the three timeframes reflect short-term storage, long-term storage, 

and indefinite storage scenarios that reasonably represent the periods over which continued 

storage impacts might occur, depending on the availabLOLW\RIDSHUPDQHQWUHSRVLWRU\7KH-

year duration of the short-term timeframe is based on two factors. First, the NRC 

decommissioning regulations—&)5DQG—require that reactor 

GHFRPPLVVLRQLQJEHDFFRPSOLVKHGZLWKLQ\HDUVDIWHUFHVVDtion of licensed operations. 

Second, in Section 1.2 and Appendix B.2.2 of the GEIS, the NRC has determined that it is 

IHDVLEOHWRKDYHDPLQHGJHRORJLFUHSRVLWRU\DYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUVDIWHUWKHOLFHQVHG

operating life of a nuclear power plant, based in part on DOE’s stated intention to provide 

UHSRVLWRU\FDSDFLW\E\ The long-term timeframe, which the NRC views as a less likely 

outcome, provides a sensitivity case that demonstrates the impacts of storage for an additional 

100 years, if a repository is not available. Both the short-term and long-term timeframes end 

when spent fuel is disposed of in a repository, which is consistent with national policy. The NRC 

has determined that the indefinite storage timeframe is the least likely scenario, but has been 

included the indefinite timeframe to meet the agency’s obligations to consider any impact whose 

occurrence is not “...so remote and speculative as to reduce the effective probability of its 

occurrence to zero,” thus complying with the remand in New York v. NRC. 

Although the NRC has not licensed a dry transfer system (DTS), the design, construction and 

operation of a DTS is well understood based on current engineering concepts as discussed in 

Section 2.1.4 of the GEIS. Proposed facilities known to the NRC thus provide a reasonable 

basis for predicting the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts likely to result from 

construction and operation of a DTS facility. In addition, any proposed DTS facility would be 

subject to then-current licensing requirements based on accumulated knowledge and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

experience from other licensing actions. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-12-------

D.2.5.28 – COMMENT: Some commenters indicated that NEPA requires consideration of all 

reasonably foreseeable impacts, and that a reactor licensing decision requires a determination 

about whether power generation is worth the costs, risks, and impacts. The commenters 

asserted that the NRC, in the GEIS, assumed that licensing would take place, and the NRC 

then provided inadequate information about the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage. 

The commenters also asserted that the NRC fails to provide enough information to determine 

whether to license a reactor. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that NEPA requires consideration of reasonably foreseeable 

impacts in the context of licensing decisions, but the NRC disagrees with the assertions that the 

GEIS must address all impacts and provide enough information to make a licensing decision. It 

is important to note that this GEIS satisfies a portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations related to 

the issuance of a reactor or spent fuel storage facility license by generically evaluating the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. Prior to the completion of an individual licensing 

action, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and consider reasonably 

foreseeable impacts to inform a decision as to whether the costs, risks, and impacts support a 

licensing decision according to applicable NRC regulations. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(34--3-12) 

D.2.5.29 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the NRC must consider expedited 

transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry casks as a mitigation measure or an 

alternative in the GEIS. The commenter asserted that doing so would be superior to using 

another process, such as backfit, to determine whether to require expedited transfer so it can be 

assessed for all plants. The commenter also asserted that NRC should expressly explain any 

reliance on the “Spent Fuel Pool Study” (SECY-13-0112, NRC 2013l) and that a supplemental 

draft GEIS would be required if NRC wished to incorporate the conclusions from the study. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC is not considering new 

regulatory requirements in the *(,6VHH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHissue of expediting 

transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry casks has been separately considered by the 

Commission in another proceeding (see SRM-COMSECY-13-0030, “Staff Requirements – 

COMSECY-13-0030 – Staff Evaluation and Recommendation for Japan Lessons-Learned Tier 3 

Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel” [NRC 2014a]), and it will not be considered in this 

proceeding. Regarding SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l), the NRC has reviewed it and determined 

that it does not change any conclusions in the GEIS. The NRC now includes SECY-13-0112 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

(NRC 2013l) as a reference in the GEIS. Because the document is consistent with the NRC’s 

existing analysis and conclusions, the NRC does not consider the inclusion of this reference to 

be a significant change. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-11--11-

D.2.5.30 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed support for the notion that the NRC would 

prepare site-specific environmental analyses prior to future licensing actions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC neither agrees nor disagrees with the comment, which is an expression 

of support. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.5.31 – COMMENT: $FRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDWWKH15&FODLPHGLQLWV:DVWH

Confidence Decision that permanent nuclear waste disposal was technically feasible, which 

enabled the NRC to license and renew reactor licenses without considering public concerns 

about the effects of “extended” waste storage. The commenter also provided license renewal 

and expiration dates for reactors in Wisconsin. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

DJUHHVWKDWWKH:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQ()5) and subsequent updates, like 

this rulemaking, have found that disposal of spent fuel is technically feasible. The NRC 

disagrees, however, that these issuances have not considered public concerns about the effects 

of “extended” storage. Each time the NRC issued a new or updated Rule—LQFOXGLQJLQ—it 

has provided an opportunity for the public to express concerns in the form of public comments. 

The NRC has considered and responded to all public comments received in these proceedings, 

including those comments concerned with “extended” storage. The NRC agrees that the 

operating and licensing dates for the named reactors are correct. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1) 

D.2.5.32 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the NRC must update the information it 

considered in NUREG–SXEOLVKHGLQ15&DQGSURYLGHDVLPLODUVFRSHRI

review to NUREG–LQWKHFXUUHQW*(,6

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The current rulemaking proceeding and 

its predecessors have addressed the environmental impacts of continued storage. NUREG–

15&was a broader, programmatic analysis of spent fuel storage, both during and 

after operations, that informed NRC decisions on spent IXHOVWRUDJHWKURXJKRXWWKHVZKHQ
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

many spent fuel storage programs, including dry cask storage, were first under consideration for 

widespread application in the United States. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-----10-3) 

D.2.5.33 – COMMENT: One commenter raised procedural and substantive concerns about the 

NRC’s licensing review process for the Private Fuel Storage Facility. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment because it raises issues that were 

resolved in the course of the Private Fuel Storage licensing proceeding, and NEPA does not 

require the NRC to revisit a past action, even when similar issues are being considered in a 

later action. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-12) 

D.2.5.34 – COMMENT: Three commenters offered their own interpretations of New York v. 

NRC. One commenter asserted that the NRC must examine what would happen if spent fuel 

remained unprotected at reactor sites indefinitely. Another commenter asserted that the Court 

of Appeals held that spent fuel pools and temporary storage casks currently in use pose an 

undue risk to public health and safety. A third commenter argued that the Court of Appeals 

found that the NRC should not allow the creation of more waste unless it can guarantee that the 

waste will be taken care of or demonstrate that the environmental impacts of waste storage will 

not be significant. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The Court of Appeals in New York v. 

NRC vacated the 2010 Waste Confidence uSGDWH)5 While the Court of Appeals 

endorsed the NRC’s generic approach to making environmental findings in support of the Rule, 

it required the NRC to provide additional analysis in three specific areas to support its finding 

that there would be no significant impacts from the continued storage of spent fuel after a 

reactor’s licensed life for operations. In particular, the Court of Appeals identified three defects 

in the NRC’s analysis: the impacts from spent fuel pool leaks and spent fuel pool fires, and the 

possibility that a repository would never become available. 

The Court of Appeals’ opinion did not include any finding that spent fuel pools or dry casks are 

unsafe, and it did not require the NRC to assess the impacts of leaving fuel unprotected. Nor 

did the Court of Appeals find the 2010 Waste Confidence uSGDWH)5GHILFLHQWLQDQ\

area other than those specifically identified above. By directing the NRC to prepare a generic 

environmental impact analysis of the impacts of continued storage, the Commission has, 

however, exercised its discretion to perform a comprehensive environmental analysis that 

encompasses more than the three specific considerations identified by the Court of Appeals. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(244-3--2--
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.5.35 – COMMENT: Several commenters questioned how the revised Rule would affect 

plants that have already been licensed. Commenters were specifically concerned with plants 

that were licensed or issued renewed licenses based on the 2010 Waste Confidence uSGDWH

)5$QRWKHUFRPPHQWHUDUJXHGWKDWH[LVWLQJOLFHQVHVDQGUHQHZHGOLFHQVHVWKDWUHOLHG

RQWKH)5DQG)5:DVWH Confidence Rules should be 

revoked. The commenter asserted that the licenses and license renewals dependent upon the 

2010 Rule are based on a condition that would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a 

license on an original application, and they should therefore be revoked. Further, the 

FRPPHQWHUDUJXHGWKDWWKH:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQSUHGLFWHGWKDWDUHSRVLWRU\ZRXOG

EHDYDLODEOHE\ZKLFKLVQRZLPSRVVLEOH7KHUHIRUHWKHFRPPHQWHUDUJXHGWKDWWKH

licenses and license renewals were issued based on a false premise and should be revoked for 

YLRODWLQJ86&6HFWLRQGDQG&)5D

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. NEPA requires that the NRC provide 

a reasonable estimate, based on the information available at the time of decision, of the 

reasonably foreseeable impacts of the NRC’s proposed action. NEPA does not require the 

NRC to revoke existing licenses simply because reasonable predictions in the agency’s 

environmental impact analyses did not, in certain respects, come to pass as expected. 

Similarly, NEPA does not require that the NRC withdraw an issued license solely because an 

aspect of the environmental review is subsequently vacated. However, New York v. NRC does 

not permit the NRC to grant licenses for any still-pending applications whose environmental 

reviews rely on Waste Confidence until the NRC prepares its revised analysis of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage, either on a site-specific basis or with a new generic 

analysis as is being done in the GEIS and revised Rule. For these reasons, while licenses 

granted before the Court of Appeals vacated the 2010 Waste Confidence uSGDWH)5

remain valid, the NRC has not finalized any licensing actions that rely on Waste Confidence 

since that decision was issued (See NRC 2012b). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of these comments. 

-4--1--1--14) 

D.2.6 Comments Concerning Public Participation 

D.2.6.1 – COMMENT: Commenters requested an extension of the comment period on the draft 

GEIS and proposed Rule or stated that the comment period should have been extended 

(especially in light of the government shutdown). One commenter wanted assurance that the 

meeting transcripts would be available a week before the comment deadline. 

Commenters stated that time limits for oral comments imposed at the public meetings were too 

short. Conversely, another commenter stated that the NRC should have shortened the oral 

comment time limits to ensure that everyone would be given a chance to present their 

comments in-person at the public meetings. A commenter developed a video for their 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

comment, provided a link to the video, and requested that the NRC play the comment video at 

the start of the first public meeting in Rockville, Maryland. 

Commenters had a number of concerns about the accessibility of the public meetings. A 

commenter stated that the NRC should make transcripts or recordings available of all of the 

public meetings. Other commenters requested that all public meetings on the draft GEIS and 

proposed Rule be webcast and include a teleconference line to increase public participation. 

One commenter noted that the NRC should also consider that many people may not have the 

technology to access webcast meetings. Several commenters requested that meetings that 

were cancelled due to the government shutdown be rescheduled. Another commenter noted 

that the NRC would not have held a public meeting if it had not been ordered by the court, and 

stressed the importance of having more meetings. 

Commenters stated that the NRC is not listening to their concerns. Some commenters were 

unhappy that the GEIS will be finalized after the public meetings and wanted to know whether 

there would be an opportunity to comment on the final GEIS and Rule. Another commenter said 

the NRC should allow for more interaction and discussion, especially given the importance of 

the topic. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The comment period on the draft GEIS 

and proposed Rule wDVRULJLQDOO\VFKHGXOHGIRUGD\VKRZHYHUGXHWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW

shutdown and subsequent postponement and rescheduling of five public meetings, the 

FRPPHQWSHULRGZDVH[WHQGHGWRGD\VDQGHQGHGRQ'HFHPEHU7KH-day 

public comment period was longer than typical rulemaking and NEPA comment periods for 

other agency actions. Further, draft versions of the documents were made available on the 

NRC’s Waste Confidence website in late June 2013 so members of the public could begin to 

familiarize themselves with the documents prior to the start of the comment period in 

September. Upon publication of the draft GEIS and proposed Rule for comment, the NRC 

posted “tracked-changes” versions of the documents to allow commenters to quickly identify any 

changes between the June 2013 versions and the published drafts for public comment. Further, 

the NRC considered comments received after December 20, 2013 if it was practical to do so. 

However, only comments received prior to the deadline were guaranteed consideration in the 

NRC’s revision of the GEIS and Rule. 

The NRC attempted to maximize public participation in the rulemaking by holding 13 public 

meetings, 10 of which were regional meetings spread across the United States, and 3 of which 

were held at the NRC’s headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. The NRC conducted 1-hour open 

houses prior to the start of the meetings where members of the public could talk personally with 

NRC staff and contractors who authored the GEIS and Rule. The three meetings at NRC 

headquarters featured a facilitated teleconference so participants unable to attend the regional 

meetings could call in and provide their comments over the phone. Two of these NRC 

headquarters meetings were webcast so participants could view the meetings remotely. The 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

ILQDOKHDGTXDUWHUVPHHWLQJRQ'HFHPEHUZDVDWHOHFRQIHUHQFH-only meeting, and the 

sole purpose of that meeting was to ensure that members of the public had a final chance to 

speak their comments on the record. Further, submitting comments orally was just one way in 

which comments were accepted. The NRC also accepted comments online by e-mail and at 

www.regulations.gov, and by mail and fax. Comments were given equal consideration 

regardless of how they were submitted, whether orally or in writing. 

The NRC understands that many people travel long distances to attend public meetings inperson, so the NRC used the expertise of an independent contractor to facilitate the public 

meetings. Effective facilitation of the meetings included placing time limits on oral comments to 

ensure that everyone that wanted to make a comment could do so. When necessary, the NRC 

went beyond the 10:00 P.M. scheduled meeting end time so everyone that wanted to make a 

comment could do so. The NRC also collected any written testimony or supporting information 

that members of the public handed in at the public meetings and this material was added to the 

docket and considered as comments on the rulemaking. 

The NRC acknowledges concerns regarding technological accessibility of webcasts; 

accordingly, the NRC provided moderated teleconferences and made available official 

transcripts of the meetings. In addition to providing meeting summaries and official transcripts 

for all the meetings, the NRC provided archived audio and video of the two NRC headquarters 

meetings, archived video of the two California meetings, and archived audio of the NRC 

headquarters teleconference. The NRC regrets that it was unable to accommodate requests to 

play videotaped comments at public meetings due to time constraints and efforts to ensure that 

everyone physically present could speak their comments. 

The NRC disagrees with comments stating that the NRC does not listen. The NRC collected over 

SDJHVRIWUDQVFULEHGZULWWHQWHVWLPRQ\IURPDSSUR[LPDWHO\VSHDNHUVDQGUHFHLYHG

approximately 33,100 written comment submissions (approximately 32,000 of these were form 

letters). The NRC catalogued, reviewed, and responded to all unique comments. Consistent with 

NRC rulemaking and NEPA procedures, the GEIS and Rule were revised as needed in response 

WRSXEOLFFRPPHQWVUHFHLYHGGXULQJWKH-day public comment period, and final versions of the 

rulemaking documents will not be issued for public comment upon their publication. 

More information regarding the NRC’s public outreach efforts and the comment period can be 

found in Section D.1 of this appendix and in Appendices A and C of the GEIS. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-10-1) (30-22-1) (30--1) (30-10-2) (30--3) (112-11-1) (112-24-----3-

-1) (312---1--11--11------23-1) 

-14-----1) (420----2---

-----------4) 

-----4------1) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.6.2 – COMMENT: Commenters provided criticism regarding the locations and accessibility 

of the Waste Confidence public meetings. Commenters requested that meetings be held in 

every reactor community, in locations along transportation routes, or in specific locations such 

as Atlanta, Georgia, areas of Virginia, and areas served by the Tennessee Valley Authority. A 

commenter questioned the NRC’s citing of a lack of resources as one reason why a meeting 

was not held in Atlanta; the commenter observed that the NRC’s Region 2 office is located in 

Atlanta. Commenters also criticized the NRC for not adequately advertising the public meetings 

and not providing sufficient notice for the rescheduled meetings in California. Commenters 

questioned why local or mainstream media did not publicize or cover the Waste Confidence 

meetings. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments criticizing the meeting locations and 

announcement of those meetings. The NRC attempted to maximize public participation in the 

rulemaking by holding 13 public meetings, 10 of which were regional meetings spread across 

the United States, and 3 of which were held at the NRC’s headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. 

The NRC chose the locations for the regional public meetings by considering: comments on 

suggested meeting locations received during the scoping period; the geographic location of 

scoping participants and participants in NRC status update teleconferences; past NRC 

experience in conducting public meetings for nationally applicable rulemakings; and relative 

proximity to air and rail transportation hubs. 

The NRC publicized the public meetings by issuing press releases, meeting notices, and 

Federal Register Notices; sending e-mails to its WCOutreach@nrc.gov distribution list; providing 

announcements during its August, September, and October status update teleconferences; and 

by posting to social media, including the NRC Blog and Twitter account. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-12--11-2) (230--3--43------2--3-1) 

-13------------4) 

D.2.6.3 – COMMENT: Commenters generally criticized the Waste Confidence public meetings, 

meeting facilities, and public participation opportunities. Commenters expressed their belief that 

the NRC would not incorporate their comments into the GEIS and Rule, and therefore providing 

comments would be a futile exercise. One commenter requested that the NRC outline how it 

organized and considered all public comments pursuant to the Government Performance and 

5HVXOWV$FWRI6RPHFRPPHQWHUVH[SUHVVHGKRSHWKDWWKH15&ZRXOGWUXO\OLVWHQWRDQG

consider the public’s comments and reiterated that public participation was vitally important to 

the rulemaking process. Other commenters provided concerns and suggestions to the NRC 

regarding public participation efforts and meeting procedures and facilities. One commenter 

noted that none of the five NRC Commissioners were present at the meetings and criticized the 

limitation of questions during the meetings. Comments also touched upon the behavior of 

members of the public that were seen as either pro- or anti-nuclear. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments providing criticism of and suggestions 

regarding its public participation opportunities, public meeting procedures, and meeting facilities. 

The NRC disagrees with comments stating that public comments will not be considered. The 

15&FROOHFWHGRYHUSDJHVRIWUDQVFULEHGZULWWHQWHVWLPRQ\IURPDSSUR[LPDWHO\

speakers, and received approximately 33,100 written comment submissions (approximately 

32,000 of these were form letters). The NRC catalogued, reviewed, and responded to all 

unique comments. In accordance with NRC rulemaking and NEPA procedures, the GEIS and 

Rule were revised DVQHHGHGLQUHVSRQVHWRSXEOLFFRPPHQWVUHFHLYHGGXULQJWKH-day public 

comment period. Requirements of the *RYHUQPHQW3HUIRUPDQFHDQG5HVXOWV$FWRI, 

which provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the 

Federal government, are not applicable to the NRC’s consideration of public comments and are 

outside the scope of this rulemaking. More information on the NRC’s public outreach efforts can 

be found in Section D.1 of this appendix and in Appendix C. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(112-22-----2) (204----22----34--

------1) (314--24--24--21-----

---3--42--44----33------

----21--32--31--32--2) (3-3) (410--3) 

------------

-3--3---------10) 

------------1) 

------------1) 

------------

-2----------1-4) 

-1--10) 

D.2.6.4 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed gratitude, appreciation, and support for the 

NRC’s public participation and outreach efforts related to the rulemaking. One commenter 

praised the NRC’s process, but noted that in spite of traveling a long way to the Charlotte, North 

Carolina meeting, the commenter had to leave before being called on to present a comment. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments supporting the rulemaking public 

participation opportunities. The NRC regrets that one commenter had to leave before the 

meeting closed and therefore was unable to present an oral comment, however the NRC is 

appreciative of the commenter’s written submission. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30--1) (30-20-1) (30-23-1) (30-3-1) (30--1) (30-3-4) (30------1) (112-

-3) (122----------1) (201-1) (212-2) (244-14-1) 

(244--1) (244--1) (244-11-14) (244--2) (244-11-3) (244-1--2-----1) 

-44--34--12--20--14--3-------
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

-----------32-----

---1) (303--13--------32--13-

-22--24------------1--

--1--2----1--10--1) (421----

------1--1-----4) 

-----3) 

D.2.6.5 – COMMENT: A commenter questioned whether money from the Nuclear Waste Fund 

was used for the Waste Confidence public meetings. 

RESPONSE: Funding for the NRC's public meetings came from the NRC’s general budget and 

did not come from the Nuclear Waste Fund. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-3) 

D.2.6.6 – COMMENT: A commenter noted the absence of a staff member from Congressman 

Issa’s office at the Waste Confidence public meeting in Carlsbad, California, and questioned 

whether the NRC had any interactions with Congressman Issa regarding the rulemaking. 

RESPONSE: The NRC keeps Congress fully and currently informed of the agency’s regulatory 

activities. The NRC’s Office of Congressional Affairs is the main conduit for NRC 

communications with Congress. Members of the Commission and NRC senior staff regularly 

work with the NRC’s Office of Congressional Affairs to provide information to Congress and 

reply to inquiries from various committees of the House and the Senate and to Members of 

Congress who are interested in aspects of NRC responsibilities. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-31-1) 

D.2.7 Comments Concerning the Scope of the GEIS 

D.2.7.1 – COMMENT: The NRC received comments asserting that the scope of the GEIS failed 

to include certain topics. One comment stated that the GEIS fails to address public safety and, 

because the scope is too narrow, the GEIS failed to effectively analyze the impacts on human 

health and the environment. The comment also claimed the GEIS failed to evaluate the indirect 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. Another commenter claimed that the NRC failed to 

address the environmental, political, and economic challenges associated with the continued 

production and accumulation of long-lived radioactive waste. The comment also stated that the 

NRC does not have a strategy for the long-term management of these wastes. Another 

comment indicated that, in general, not all of the framework for the management of spent fuel 

was in place. Two other comments asserted that the NRC should include the environmental 

impacts of spent fuel disposal within the GEIS. One comment claimed that the NRC is incorrect 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

to claim that the environmental impacts of spent fuel disposal are irrelevant to the GEIS. That 

same comment cited language used in the License Renewal GEIS that stated the environmental 

impacts of spent fuel disposal could not be resolved until the waste confidence EIS was 

completed. Another comment stated that by evaluating only the impacts of spent fuel storage, 

the NRC is excluding a major part of the nuclear fuel cycle. In particular, whether or not a 

repository is available will affect the impacts for both storage and disposal. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. In the GEIS, the NRC has addressed 

the potential impacts to human health and the environment from the continued storage of spent 

fuel. For example, the GEIS includes evaluations of the impacts of normal releases and of 

accidents. The comment regarding indirect impacts provides insufficient information to 

understand what was expected in the GEIS. However, the GEIS does address indirect impacts, 

such as socioeconomic impacts (see, for example, the discussion in Section 4.2 of the GEIS). 

The long-term plan for the disposal of spent fuel is within the purview of the President and 

Congress; the current plan established by Congress is codified in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 

(NWPA). While the NRC recognizes that the implementation of the current plan faces political 

and societal challenges, it is not the NRC’s role to set policy in this area. 

7KHLPSDFWVRIGLVSRVDOLQDUHSRVLWRU\DUHDGGUHVVHGHOVHZKHUHLQ&)53DUWDQGDUH

beyond the scope of the current action. One comment argued that a footnote in the License 

Renewal GEIS implied that the Waste Confidence GEIS must address the impacts of spent fuel 

disposal. That interpretation of that footnote is incorrect. The footnote indicates that the work 

on the Rule was needed to provide information regarding the feasibility of a repository and the 

possible timing for the availability of a repository. This portion of the license renewal table was 

included in the proposed rulemaking Federal Register Notice ()5SDJH), and 

the NRC is including amendments to the license renewal table as part of the final rulemaking for 

this proceeding. 

Finally, the GEIS specifically addresses how environmental impacts could be affected by 

delayed repository availability through the analysis of impacts in the three timeframes: shortterm, long-term, and indefinite. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-12--1--1----4-24) 

D.2.7.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters suggested issues that they believe should have 

been within the scope of this GEIS. One commenter stated that the GEIS should have 

considered the complete safety of the environment and all living and interdependent organisms 

in the environment, economic impact to tax payers on prior mishandling, and a study of the 

industry and its liability for unforeseen consequences. Another commenter said the GEIS must 

consider various storage methods for spent fuel (e.g., hardened onsite storage [HOSS] and 

expedited transfer). The commenter also stated that the GEIS should have considered the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

storage and transport of high-burnup fuel. One commenter requested that the NRC seek input 

from the public about the confidence in reclaiming “orphaned” sites and the fairness of living 

near storage facilities. Another commenter stated that the GEIS should be about more than just 

continued onsite storage, it should also more thoroughly address transportation, final disposition 

in a repository, and away-from-reactor storage. Another commenter stated that to satisfy EPA 

requirements, the GEIS should consider each reactor site separately and evaluate all costs 

involved. Another commenter stated that the NRC should consider alternatives for onsite and 

offsite storage of waste during and after the period of extended operation, offsite impacts during 

continued operation, long-term impacts and safety of the generation and storage of radioactive 

waste, comparative impacts of storage in pools versus dry storage, implications of storage on 

decommissioning, effects of storage and disposal if a repository is delayed, and alternatives and 

mitigations for these impacts. The commenter also stated that these issues are not generic and 

should be evaluated on a site-specific basis and the GEIS should therefore be tiered off of in 

subsequent site-specific EISs. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The scope 

of the GEIS is limited to the impacts of continued storage. Issues outside this scope, such as 

industry liability, selecting a specific dry storage approach (e.g., HOSS), and transportation 

outside of the period of continued storage are, therefore, not addressed in the GEIS. Additional 

information on other fuel storage options is provided in Section D.2.14.2 of this appendix. The 

evaluation in the GEIS addressed impacts to all resources that might be affected by the 

continued storage of spent fuel. With regard to spent fuel burnup, Chapter 2 of the GEIS 

explains that for purposes of environmental impact analysis, the NRC relies on the larger 

lifetime amount of spent fuel discharged at low burnups. However, as discussed in Section 

'RIWKLVDSSHQGL[LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI low-burnup, high-burnup and 

mixed-oxide (MOX) fuels has been added to the GEIS in Appendix I to help clarify the 

similarities between these fuel types. Regarding site-specific analyses, this document is, by its 

nature, a generic evaluation. Prior to the completion of an individual licensing action, the NRC 

will conduct a site-specific environmental review and document the results of this review in an 

EA and FONSI or EIS. For more information regarding the generic evaluation of impacts, see 

Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. 

Comments that address activities that occur during plant operations (including the generation of 

the waste) are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

The NRC included the impacts of both pool and dry cask storage in its evaluation, but did not 

compare them to each other in the GEIS. As discussed in the GEIS, a spent fuel pool will 

already exist at each site and its impacts to the environment in the period of continued storage 

are minor. The NRC assumes that all fuel will have been moved from the pool to casks by the 

end of the short-term timeframe. Therefore, both wet and dry storage are a necessary part of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

the storage of the fuel during continued storage and a comparison of them is not necessary. 

For additional information, see Section ' of this appendix. 

The GEIS addresses the cumulative impacts of continued storage and decommissioning (in 

&KDSWHUDQGWKHLPSDFWVRIDUHSRVLWRU\EHLQJGHOD\HGRUQRWDYDLODEOH&KDSWHUVDQG

For additional information regarding decommissioning, see Section D.2.43.1 of this appendix. 

$OWHUQDWLYHVDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6—these are (as NEPA requires) 

alternatives to the proposed action (revising the Rule). In general, the NRC will address 

mitigation in site-specific licensing reviews. Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix provides 

additional insight into this approach. However, the GEIS does discuss mitigation related to 

aging, damaged, or degraded fuel (see Section 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS and Section ' of this 

appendix for additional information regarding this issue). Any determinations by the NRC about 

whether to require mitigation measures of any type will occur on a site-specific basis during 

facility licensing or during the course of ongoing NRC oversight. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(11-2) (30-21--11-11) (112---32---1--1-

D.2.7.3 – COMMENT: The NRC received a comment requesting the NRC clarify that ESPs are 

not included within the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The commenter stated that because ESPs do 

not authorize the generation or storage of spent fuel, NEPA does not require consideration of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel for ESP applications. The commenter 

also provided numerous conforming revisions to the GEIS to clarify that waste confidence does not 

apply to ESPs, in particular the cost-EHQHILWDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHUDQGLQ$SSHQGL[+

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that clarification of the scope of the proposed 

Rule change is appropriate. The NRC recognizes that neither the current language of the Rule, 

nor the proposed revision to that section, expressly addresses whether the Rule applies to ESP 

reviews. 

However, the NRC disagrees with the comment that ESPs are not covered by the Rule. The 

clear purpose of the regulation was to preclude the need for a site-specific analysis of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage for all power-reactor-related and ISFSI-related 

licensing actions, including spent fuel generated by new reactors. This purpose is evident from 

the Commission’VLQWHQWLRQLQSDVW:DVWH&RQILGHQFHSURFHHGLQJVDQGWKHUXOHPDNLQJRQ

3DUWWRHQFRPSDVVZDVWHSURGXFHGE\DQHZJHQHUDWLRQRIUHDFWRUV—including those 

OLFHQVHGXQGHUWKH3DUWUHJLPHZKLFKLQFOXGHV(63V)5)5DQG)5

7KDWWKHUHJXODWLRQGLGQRWH[SUHVVO\LQFOXGH(63VLQWKHOLVWRIUHDFWRUOLFHQVLQJDFWLRQV

XQGHU3DUWVDQGIRUZKLFKDVLWH-specific analysis of the environmental impacts of 

continued storage is not necessary, coupled with the absence of an explanation as to why ESPs 

were not included in the regulation, is evidence that this was an oversight on the part of the NRC. 

Not including ESPs would also lead to the anomalous result—again, unexplained by NRC—of 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

precluding site-specific consideration of the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent 

fuel in licensing actions that result in the production of spent fuel, but at the same time allowing 

this site-specific consideration at an earlier licensing stage—the ESP—which never results in the 

production of spent fuel. Accordingly, the NRC has consistently interpreted the Rule to include 

ESPs within the generic reach of that Rule as regards discussion of continued storage impacts in 

environmental analyses, and in the same manner applicable to those licenses explicitly listed in 

the Rule. This interpretation has been approved by several Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards 

(NRC 2004a; NRC 2004b). For additional information, see Section ' of this appendix. 

For these reasons, the language of the Rule has been revised to clarify that ESPs fall within the 

reach of the Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

--------

D.2.7.4 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments concerning certain waste types. 

These commenters stated that reprocessing, Department of Defense waste, and “greater-thanclass-C” (GTCC) low-level waste should have been within scope of the GEIS and Rule. One 

commenter suggested that the NRC conclude that the GEIS analysis also applies equally to 

GTCC waste since there is the possibility of GTCC waste sharing the same disposal path as 

spent fuel. Another commenter questioned what the NRC is doing about Department of 

Defense waste. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The scope of this action is limited to 

the impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel from commercial nuclear power reactors. 

Wastes from the Department of Defense are not within the regulatory control of the NRC and 

are not within the scope of this GEIS. Reprocessing is one potential path for the eventual 

disposition of the spent fuel, not unlike disposal in a geologic repository. But either approach for 

the disposal of the fuel, by definition, occurs after the period of continued storage. It is, 

therefore, also outside the scope of the current action. Finally, GTCC low-level waste, while 

often handled in a manner similar to spent fuel, is not spent fuel and its handling and disposal 

are also outside the scope of the current action. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of these comments. 

--4----1) 

D.2.7.5 – COMMENT: One commenter requested that the NRC make site-specific 

recommendations for moving spent fuel from closed nuclear facilities. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The GEIS evaluates the environmental 

impacts during the period of continued storage. Any policy established by the Commission for 

the treatment of spent fuel at closed nuclear facilities would be addressed through rulemaking 

or, for site-specific issues, through the licensing process. The recommendation requested by 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

the comment is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1) 

D.2.7.6 – COMMENT: One comment requested the NRC provide an analysis evaluating the 

role of nuclear power in the commercial energy sector in the distant future in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The scope of this action is limited to the 

impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel. That analysis is unaffected by the extent to 

which nuclear power is used in the future to meet the energy needs in the United States, 

because licensing decisions will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the 

NRC is not responsible for promoting the use of nuclear power or setting national policy on its 

use. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.7.7 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC must include a planning 

component in the GEIS. The commenter suggested that the planning component would have 

five elements: 

x Execution (which would include full, phased environmental site evaluations of shutdown and 

operating storage facilities before licensing actions are taken, as well as an adaptive, 

phased management plan); 

x Analysis and application (which would be looking at various studies [e.g., the effects of 

uprated burnup fuels and the three engineering studies conducted for the DOE Yucca 

Mountain no-action alternative]); 

x Initiation (which would entail developing items [e.g., guidance documents] for institutional 

controls); 

x Adoption (e.g., adoption of minimum standards for long-term at-reactor ISFSI storage); and 

x Direction (e.g., direct utilities to do long-range planning specifying what will be needed to 

ensure complete replacement every 100 years). 

The commenter also states that the scope of the GEIS is too narrow and must be expanded to 

include the indirect impacts of continued storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The types of activities described in the 

comment might be appropriate as part of a site-specific licensing action, for example for the 

licensing of an away-from-reactor ISFSI. However, that is not the action currently under 

consideration by the NRC. Therefore, this type of plan is not included in the GEIS. Regarding 

the inclusion of indirect impacts, the NRC did address indirect impacts, as defined in 40 CFR 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

DVVociated with continued storage. See, for example, the discussion of socioeconomic 

impacts in Section 4.2. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.7.8 – COMMENT: The NRC received one comment that requested that the NRC include 

the previous five findings in the GEIS and include a discussion of whether the five findings are 

any more relevant to an examination of the comparative safety of various modes of radioactive 

waste storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The five findings that are mentioned in 

the comment are discussed in detail in the Background section (Part II) of the Federal Register

Notice for the rulemaking )5SDJHV-. As discussed in Appendix B to 

the GEIS and the Discussion section (Part III) of the Federal Register 1RWLFH)5

SDJHVDQG), the NRC has determined that it is no longer necessary to make five 

findings as part of this proceeding. The issues that were previously addressed in the five 

findings are discussed in more detail in Appendix B to the GEIS and in Section D.2.4.1 of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-24) 

D.2.7.9 – COMMENT: The NRC received comments that stated that the GEIS cannot rely on 

Table S–3, which provides the environmental impacts of the uranium fuel cycle, because the 

analysis that supports the table presumed a repository would be available. One comment 

argued that the NRC cannot rely on Table S–3 to cover the impacts of the uranium fuel cycle in 

the indefinite timeframe because it does not evaluate the environmental impacts of failing to 

have a geologic repository. Another commenter stated that the Court of Appeals objected to the 

NRC depending on Table S–3 in support of the Rule. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Activities covered by &)53DUW

Table S–3 are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Table S–3 covers impacts that are not 

caused by continued storage (see Figure 1-2 of the GEIS). The references to Table S–3 in the 

GEIS were included to provide readers with information about activities outside the scope of the 

direct and indirect impact analyses of continued storage. The GEIS itself in no way relies on the 

analyses in Table S–3 for the evaluation of the direct and indirect impacts of continued storage 

LQ&KDSWHUVDQG

Impacts addressed by Table S–3 could overlap in time and geographical extent with the impacts 

of continued storage. Therefore, the impacts addressed in Table S–3 could contribute to 

cumulative impacts. In its evaluation of the cumulative impacts of continued storage (see 

&KDSWHUWKH15&GRHVQRWUHO\GLUHFWO\RQ7DEOH6–3. However, the NRC does provide an 

HVWLPDWHRIWKHFDUERQGLR[LGHHPLVVLRQVRIDUHDFWRULQFOXGLQJWKHIXHOF\FOHLQ7DEOH-2 of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

the GEIS. That estimate is based, in part, on the data that supports Table S–3. As discussed in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH/LFHnse Renewal GEIS (NUREG–15&a), the use of modern 

fuel cycle equipment is expected to reduce the power needed by the fuel cycle, and thus reduce 

emissions. Therefore, the estimate of emissions shown in this GEIS is conservatively high. 

The NRC aOVRPHQWLRQVLPSDFWVUHODWHGWRWKHIXHOF\FOHLQ6HFWLRQVDQGLQ

relation to waste-management and transportation impacts. These discussions reference 

Section 4.12 of the 2013 revision to NUREG–NRC 2013m). As discussed in that section, 

DQGLQWKHYHUVLRQRINUREG–WKH15&FRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHDVVXPSWLRQVDQG

methodology used in preparing Table S–3 were conservative enough that the impacts described 

by the use of Table S–3 would still be bounding. The NRC is not aware of any new information 

that has been discovered since 2013 that would cause it to revisit these conclusions regarding 

Table S–3. 

Therefore, to the extent that Table S-LVXVHGLQGLUHFWO\LQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6WKH15&

concludes that this use is appropriate for the purposes of the cumulative impacts evaluation for 

continued storage. 

Another comment asserted that the Court of Appeals objected to the NRC’s reliance upon Table 

S–3 in the 2010 Waste Confidence proceeding (New York v. NRC). The NRC did not “rely” on 

Table S–3 in the 2010 Waste Confidence proceeding. In New York v. NRC, the Court of 

Appeals held that Table S–3 presumes the existence of a geologic repository, and therefore 

“cannot explain the environmental effects of a failure to secure a permanent facility”. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not suggest that the analysis in Table S–3 is no longer 

reliable. Table S–3 was approved by the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. 

NRDC. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3----3) 

D.2.7.10 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments about the uranium fuel cycle. 

Commenters stated that the NRC should have considered the environmental impacts of the 

entire uranium fuel cycle, including costs, in the GEIS. One commenter believes the 

environmental footprint of the nuclear fuel cycle should be evaluated and compared to the 

footprint of renewable energies. Other commenters requested that a financial accounting of the 

costs of the uranium fuel cycle be completed, including industry subsidies. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The scope of this action is limited to 

the impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel. The environmental impacts of the uranium 

fuel cycle were SUHYLRXVO\HYDOXDWHGE\WKH15&DQGFRGLILHGLQ&)5$Q\FRPPHQWV

on those impacts should be raised in a petition for rulemaking. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-21---2--1--
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.7.11 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments that stated that the NRC should 

have included an analysis of the environmental impacts of a consolidated interim storage facility 

in the GEIS. One comment noted that including a consolidated interim storage facility would 

help the NRC prove that it is not endorsing indefinite storage. Another comment took issue with 

statements made by an industry organization about how the NRC would prepare an EA for a 

consolidated interim storage facility application; the comment indicated that such an EA would 

be less thorough than an EIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS was prepared by the NRC to 

support the rulemaking regarding the continued storage of spent fuel. The evaluation of impacts 

for any specific facility, including a consolidated interim storage facility, will be addressed in a 

site-specific licensing proceeding for that facility. However, as part of the impacts analysis in 

the GEIS, the NRC has analyzed the impacts of the possible construction and operation of a 

hypothetical away-from-reactor storage facility. The NRC included this analysis because it is 

reasonably foreseeable that spent fuel from a new or relicensed reactor could someday be sent 

to an away-from-reactor storage facility prior to disposal in a repository (see also Section 

' of this appendix. If an applicant submits a request to the NRC to license a 

consolidated interim storage facility, then the NRC’s review of that application would include an 

appropriate environmental review. In the only example of such a request, for the Private Fuel 

Storage Facility (PFSF), the NRC prepared and published an EIS. Further, as clarified in the 

Federal Register Notice for the Rule )5, an applicant for an away-from-reactor 

storage facility would not be able to rely on the GEIS or the Rule to avoid the consideration of 

the environmental impacts of constructing and operating that away -from-reactor storage facility. 

The analysis in this GEIS would only apply to any necessary environmental analysis of the 

environmental impacts of storing the spent fuel after the end of the facility’s license term. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--

D.2.7.12 – COMMENT: The NRC received multiple comments on the inclusion of small 

modular reactors (SMRs) in the GEIS. These commenters did not agree that fuel from SMRs 

should be included in the GEIS. The commenters gave various reasons for why these fuels 

should not be included such as SMR technology is not fully developed. One commenter 

asserted that since we have existing technical challenges with current spent fuel, the NRC 

should not use the same standards for “new” fuel types. Another commenter requested that the 

NRC address nuclear plants used for tritium production and reference existing environmental 

analyses in the final GEIS and confirm it is bounded by the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC has not included all SMR 

spent fuel within the scope of the GEIS. The only in-scope spent fuel from SMRs is spent fuel 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

from integral pressurized water reactors. These advanced reactor designs are small light water 

reactors that would use nuclear fuel that is substantially similar to that already in use in current 

U.S. light water reactors. 

The analysis in the GEIS does encompass spent fuel from light water reactors used for tritium 

production. As discussed in the comment letter, Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 1 is authorized to 

operate with fuel assemblies that have been modified to support tritium production. Section 

2.1.1.3 of the GEIS makes clear that such fuel is included in the GEIS analysis. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(23--2--11) 

D.2.7.13 – COMMENT: Some commenters provided a reply to a prior comment that the “NRC 

need not assess the environmental impacts of nuclear plant operation more generally, in order 

to fulfill the requirements of the Waste Confidence Decision.” The commenters stated that 

assessing environmental impacts of nuclear power plants more generally is implicitly required 

because there is no waste confidence, and stated that it is immoral to continue to generate 

nuclear waste. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC evaluates the environmental 

impacts of power plant operation during NEPA reviews associated with licensing actions (e.g., 

combined license or license renewal applications). The environmental impacts addressed 

within the scope of this GEIS relate only to continued storage. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---1) 

D.2.7.14 – COMMENT: The NRC received comments expressing general support for the 

current scope of the GEIS. One commenter agreed that the Yucca Mountain application review 

is appropriately outside the scope of the GEIS. Other commenters agreed that the scope is 

appropriate and foreign spent fuel, need for nuclear power, and reprocessing are therefore 

correctly classified as out-of-scope. One commenter stated that the GEIS addresses the issues 

raised by the Court of Appeals, specifically spent fuel pool leaks, spent fuel pool fires, and the 

no-repository scenario. One commenter agreed that the analysis in the GEIS should include 

sabotage, terrorist acts, and current and future spent fuel pool leaks. Another commenter noted 

understanding of the need to address transportation, storage, and disposal of used nuclear fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with these comments. The comments are general in nature 

and, therefore, no changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-3-------2--2--3) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.8 Comments Concerning Site-Specific Issues 

D.2.8.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed concerns related to particular nuclear 

power plants or spent fuel storage facilities, including DOE sites. Commenters raised issues 

including the performance histories of specific sites, radioactive releases and leaks, security, 

evacuation procedures, seismic risks, the potential for an accident like the one at Fukushima 

Dai-ichi, and NRC oversight and enforcement. Commenters expressed the belief that spent fuel 

should not be stored onsite at particular sites or in their communities. The commenters stated 

that individual sites should be closed, are at risk of accidents, or have a poor safety history and 

that the NRC should improve oversight. Other comments raised concerns about plants 

currently undergoing decommissioning. Some commenters implied that the GEIS should 

analyze the issues at individual plants on a site-specific basis. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that the environmental impacts of a nuclear plant or specifically 

licensed spent fuel storage facility must be considered during the site-specific licensing review 

for that particular facility. In this respect, this GEIS satisfies only a small portion of the NRC’s 

NEPA obligations related to the issuance of a reactor or specific spent fuel storage facility 

license by generically evaluating the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage beyond the 

facility’s license term. During the review of a facility licensing action, the NRC will conduct an 

environmental review and document the results of this review in an EA and FONSI or EIS. 

Whether for a power reactor or specifically licensed ISFSI, that site-specific environmental 

review will address, among other things, the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage during 

the license term. Any findings of the environmental review that are not precluded from 

challenge by Rule may be challenged by a petitioner during initial licensing of a facility and at 

license renewal. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, 

Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI--15&a). An individual may also 

request that a rule not be applied in a particular proceeding when special circumstances exist. 

For a more detailed discussion on waivers see Section ' of this appendix. Taken 

together, the GEIS and other environmental reviews provide the decisionmaker with a complete 

environmental analysis of the impacts associated with the operation of a nuclear power facility 

and spent fuel storage facility. 

The GEIS makes impact determinations that apply to all reactors and spent fuel storage sites. 

While the comments discussed site-specific characteristics to show why a generic approach 

should not apply to one or more particular facilities, their information did not justify changing the 

generic impact determinations in the GEIS. Further, none of the comments demonstrated that 

the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage in the continued storage period would differ 

from the impacts during the licensed period of operations, which will be assessed in the sitespecific licensing review for each facility. For additional comments and NRC responses 

regarding the generic approach to the rulemaking see Section D.2.11 of this appendix. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Many comments requested that spent fuel be moved from spent fuel pools to dry casks, or 

moved from a particular site and stored or disposed of elsewhere. As explained in the GEIS, 

spent fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools and ISFSIs (where available) at all 

commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. Spent fuel will likely continue to be 

stored at existing nuclear power plant sites after reactor shutdown and decommissioning. 

Additional comments concerning expedited transfer of spent fuel into dry casks are addressed 

in Section '.1 of this appendix. 

To the extent that commenters raised issues unrelated to the environmental impacts of 

continued storage of spent fuel (e.g., operating issues at particular plants), these issues are 

beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC addresses issues at operating plants 

through a combination of regulatory requirements; licensing; safety oversight, including 

inspection, assessment of performance, and enforcement; operational experience evaluation; 

and regulatory support activities. More information about reporting safety concerns involving a 

nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel facility, or radioactive materials can be found at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html. Additional comments 

regarding reactor accidents are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(22---11------3-----1) 

-1) (102--1) (112-14-1) (112-23-1) (112--1) (112-13-2) (112--3) (112-10---

-4) (121-1) (131-------32--34--

----------42--33-----3) 

-33--33----20------2) (214--

--1) (220-3) (230-1) (231-2) (232-2) (233---3) (243-1) (244-3--

10-1-13----13--------23---

--------20------

-----------4) 

----2) (301-1) (311---21----10--

12--24--3----12--14-------1) 

-10--4------20--23-------

-4--43----10----10--11--10--

--10--2----10--12--13--3--4--

--13--23--20---1) (344-----1) 

---4--3--3--4--3--3--4-13) 

-4--3--3--3--4--3--4--4--

1--4--4----4----4--3--4--3-

-4--3---------2) (434--1-

--------1) ----1) 

---3--2--2-------

-----------2) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

-----2--1--1-----

------------

---1--1--1-----1--1) 

-4) ----------

---------1----1-

---1----1----2--4-2-4-3) 

-1--1---------1) 

D.2.8.2 – COMMENT: Commenters raised general concerns about specific nuclear power 

plants and waste sites, including DOE sites and a Canadian proposed low-level waste site. 

Commenters primarily expressed general opposition to local plants and their owners, including 

opposition to proposed and approved new reactors and reactor license renewals. Many 

commenters requested that plants be shut down. Commenters were generally concerned about 

the safety of their local plant, citing risks of accidents similar to Fukushima Dai-ichi, poor safety 

history, insufficient NRC oversight, radioactive leaks into local waters, poor emergency planning 

procedures, and health impacts of radiation. A few commenters expressed support of local 

plants, their continued safe operation, and the NRC. 

RESPONSE: These comments are unrelated to the environmental impacts of continued 

storage of spent fuel and are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC addresses 

issues at operating plants through a combination of regulatory requirements; licensing; safety 

oversight, including inspection, assessment of performance, and enforcement; operational 

experience evaluation; and regulatory support activities. More information about reporting 

safety concerns involving a nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel facility, or radioactive materials can be 

found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html. Additional 

comments regarding reactor accidents are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1) (30--2) (30-22-3) (30----12----12-----1) 

-1) (112--1) (112--2) (112-2-2) (112-24-2) (112--2) (112-22----3) 

-2) (120-2) (120-4) (120---3) (121-4) (121----1) --

---13--4------20------

--32----32----4) (223-1) (230-14) (244-3--

----------- -20-----1) 

-22--3--42--------3) (312-3) 

-----14--------21----33-

-43----33-3) (-34---------4) 

---20--22----20--------34-

------4) (334---1) (413-2) (421--1) (442--

----3--------1) 

--------2----
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

------------

--------4) 

D.2.8.3 – COMMENT: One commenter raised concerns regarding the scope and sufficiency of 

WKH15&¶V'UDIW6XSSOHPHQWWRWKH)LQDO3ODQW6SHFLILF6XSSOHPHQWWRWKHGeneric 

Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants for Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Units 2 and 3. The commenter asserted that the NRC had insufficiently responded 

to its scoping comments, that the draft supplement to the final supplemental environmental 

impact statement did not sufficiently address the commenter’s concerns regarding offsite 

decontamination and environmental restoration in the event of a nuclear accident, that the NRC 

failed to clarify whether the Price-Anderson Act ensured funding for these cleanup efforts, and 

that the NRC failed to clarify which Federal agency would be responsible for these cleanup 

efforts. The commenter also raised concerns regarding the adequacy of the NRC’s analysis of 

severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA), purported to provide new and significant 

information stemming from the Fukushima nuclear accident relevant to the NRC’s SAMA 

analysis, and requested additional information regarding the NRC’s examination of potential 

aqueous releases following a severe accident. 

RESPONSE: These comments are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule because they do 

not raise concerns regarding the generic analysis of continued storage in the GEIS. Rather, 

they raise concerns regarding the sufficiency of a site-specific NEPA analysis for reactor license 

renewal and the impact of nuclear accidents during reactor operation. For a general discussion 

of the Price-Anderson Act and its applicability to continued storage, see Sections D.2 and 

' of this appendix. For a discussion of the Fukushima nuclear accident as it relates to 

continued storage in spent fuel pools, see Sections ' and ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

------------3) 

D.2.9 Comments Concerning the Proposed Action & Purpose and Need 

D.2.9.1 – COMMENT: Commenters asserted that the NRC inaccurately framed the purpose 

and need for the proposed Federal action and, as a result, has not properly evaluated the likely 

environmental impacts of the proposed action or considered reasonable alternatives and 

appropriate mitigation measures. These commenters asserted that the correct purpose and 

need for the proposed action are to meet the NRC’s obligations under the AEA; NEPA; 

Minnesota v. NRC; and New York v. NRC, in determining whether the NRC will continue 

licensing or relicensing nuclear power reactors and allow continued operation of currently 

licensed reactors. Some commenters asserted that New York v. NRC ordered the NRC to 

prepare the GEIS. Some commenters argued that the NRC’s statement of purpose and need of 

the proposed action is too vague to satisfy NEPA’s goal of informing the public or allowing 

meaningful comment. Other commenters asserted that the GEIS and Rule violate NEPA 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

because they have predetermined that the NRC would continue to license reactors and storage 

facilities. Some commenters asserted that the GEIS and Rule amount to a licensing action, 

such that the no-action alternative is not to license. 

Some commenters asserted that the NRC’s improper statement of purpose and need for the 

proposed action skewed the NRC’s assessment of alternatives to the proposed action. These 

commenters asserted that the alternatives considered should have included new licensing 

requirements for continued storage, suspending reactor licensing, shutting down reactors, and 

other alternatives to reduce the environmental impacts of reactor operation and spent fuel 

storage until a repository becomes available. These alternatives would also include prohibiting 

the use of high-burnup fuel, requiring expedited transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to 

casks, and implementing HOSS. Some commenters argued that the GEIS should have 

included a cost-benefit analysis that compares continued storage to these alternatives because 

that analysis would favor ceasing reactor licensing. According to these commenters, the GEIS 

improperly limits the purpose and need of the proposed action to efficiency or paperwork 

reduction, and that the selection of alternatives is similarly limited to paperwork. 

Some commenters asserted that the NRC would have to return to the scoping phase or reissue 

the GEIS to correct these deficiencies. One commenter asserted that NRC regulations require 

the NRC to address the potential environmental impacts of spent fuel storage during operations 

and after a plant shuts down as well as alternatives to mitigate those potential impacts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. These comments have confused the 

purpose of the GEIS with the purpose of the proposed Federal action. Some comments also 

confuse the proposed action here with a final licensing decision. As a result, these comments 

have erroneously concluded that a GEIS that analyzes continued storage impacts is itself a 

licensing action requiring consideration of alternatives to licensing. 

7KHSURSRVHG)HGHUDODFWLRQLVWKHLVVXDQFHRIDUHYLVHG&)5QRWSUHSDUDWLRQRIWKH

GEIS (see Section 1.4 of the GEIS). Issuance of the Rule has a purpose distinct from the 

purpose of the GEIS. Thus, the proposed Federal action is not to perform the substantive 

analysis of continued storage presented in the GEIS, but rather to issue a revised Rule, 10 CFR 

, that codifies the generic impact analysis in the GEIS by regulation, eliminating the “need 

to separately consider the environmental impacts of continued storage” in future reactor and 

ISFSI licensing actions (see Section 1.4 of the GEIS). Because the rulemaking—the 

FRGLILFDWLRQRIWKH*(,6LQ&)5—is the proposed Federal action, the purpose and 

need for the proposed action correctly focus on the rulemaking, not the GEIS. The purpose of 

the rulemaking is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. 

The purposes of the GEIS are defined by its scope and usage. In scope, the GEIS generically 

“assesses the environmental impacts of continued storage” (see Section 1.2 of the GEIS) with 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

regard to the various resource categories and three timeframe scenarios under stated analytical 

DVVXPSWLRQVVHH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6the NRC’s 

generic analysis encompasses all direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of continued storage, 

including those issues identified by the Court of Appeals for further analysis in New York v. 

NRC. As a result, the GEIS addresses the full range of impacts required by NEPA and the 

Court of Appeals’ remand. In usage, the GEIS provides a regulatory basis for the NRC’s 

DPHQGPHQWWR&)5see Section 1.4 of the GEIS). This generic consideration of 

continued storage is consistent with the NRC’s practice of the past 40 years. 

The NRC acknowledges the binding interpretation of NEPA by the Court of Appeals that 

reliance upon generic findings concerning the environmental impacts of continued storage 

constitutes a stage in licensing decisions requiring NEPA analysis (New York v. NRC). Indeed, 

the Commission restated its adherence to this principle when it suspended the completion of 

reactor licensing and relicensing proceedings pending resolution of the Court of Appeals’ 

remand. Calvert Cliffs 3 Nuclear Project, LLC (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3), CLI12-15&VOLSRS. at 4)(“Waste Confidence undergirds certain agency licensing 

decisions, in particular new reactor licensing and reactor license renewal....[I]n recognition of 

our duties under the law, we will not issue licenses dependent upon the Waste Confidence 

Decision or the Temporary Storage Rule until the court’s remand is appropriately addressed.”) 

(NRC 2012b). 

7KHVWDWHGSXUSRVHRIWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQIRUPVWRWKHGHFLVLRQ

of the Court of Appeals in New York v. NRC. The issue before the Court of Appeals was 

“whether the [Waste Confidence Decision] itself,” not the licensing of a nuclear power reactor, 

“constitute[d] a major federal action”. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that “the rulemaking at 

issue here constitutes a major federal action”. The rulemaking, as the Court of Appeals held, 

“will be used to enable licensing decisions based on its findings”. Therefore, the NRC’s reliance 

upon generic environmental findings in licensing decisions does not equate to a licensing 

GHFLVLRQ,QIDFWWKHILQGLQJVLQ&)5ZLOOFRQVWLWXWHRQO\DSRUWLRQRIthe environmental 

analysis and findings by the NRC in licensing actions (e.g., a specific license for a spent fuel 

storage facility or a combined license for a nuclear power reactor). Accordingly, the purpose 

and need for the proposed action, as stated in 6HFWLRQ of the GEIS, are consistent with the 

Court of Appeals’ characterization of the rulemaking in New York v. NRC which found the 

rulemaking at issue to constitute a major Federal action. 

Given the stated need for the proposed action—to provide processes for use in NRC licensing 

to address the environmental impacts of continued storage—alternatives considered under 

NEPA will necessarily focus on processes that address environmental impacts of continued 

storage, and specifically, on alternatives to the rulemaking, rather than alternatives to licensing. 

Given the purpose of the proposed action—to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing 

processes with respect to the environmental impacts of continued storage—the alternatives 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

considered in this GEIS (i.e., site-specific environmental review of continued storage, 

preparation of a GEIS without adopting a rule to codify the GEIS, or reliance upon a policy 

statement that expresses how the NRC intends to use the GEIS in site-specific licensing) are 

considered as options the NRC could pursue under the no-action alternative because the 

proposed action is the only action that preserves the efficiency of NRC’s licensing processes 

VHH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6 Alternatives suggested by commenters that focus on licensing 

actions (e.g., cessation of licensing or reactor operations) (6HFWLRQof the GEIS) or 

implementing new regulatory requirements (6HFWLRQof the GEIS), are beyond the scope 

of the proposed action. The merits of these proposals would have to be evaluated in separate 

rulemaking proceedings apart from this one. Nonetheless, the NRC acknowledges that certain 

“alternatives” suggested by commenters have been seriously considered by the NRC in other 

contexts, and the NRC has responded to those suggestions separately in Sections D.2.14.1 and 

' of this appendix. 

Contrary to some comments, the NRC’s rulemaking here does not predetermine future licensing 

decisions. Rather, the GEIS analysis of continued storage is limited to the impacts that would 

result if a power reactor or spent fuel storage facility were licensed. Requirements for reactor 

licensing under the AEA DUHVHWIRUWKLQ&)53DUWVDQGDQGOLFHQVHUHQHZDOXQGHU

&)53DUW5HTXLUHPHQWVIRULQGHSHQGHQWVSHQW fuel storage facility licensing under the AEA 

DUHVHWIRUWKLQ&)53DUW(YHU\DSSOLFDWLRQIRUDUHDFWRURUVSHFLILF,6)6,OLFHQVHRU

license renewal is published with a notice of an opportunity to intervene and request a hearing 

in the licensing proceeding under NRC hearing rules in 10 CFR Part 2, and interested parties 

who meet NRC standing and contention-admissibility requirements may challenge the 

applicant’s compliance with NRC license application requirements. 

Finally, the GEIS and Rule do not and need not address the potential environmental impacts of 

spent fuel storage during facility operations or after facility shutdown but before the end of the 

licensed life of the facility. Those impacts and mitigation alternatives will have already been 

evaluated and considered in licensing the facility. Impacts of storage that occur after the 

licensed life of the facility, on the other hand, are “continued storage” impacts evaluated by the 

GEIS and codified by &)5. 

The NRC has made changes to SHFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6LQUHVSRQVHWR

comments to clarify the description of the purpose of the GEIS, proposed action, purpose and 

need, and alternatives, respectively. In particular, the discussion of the alternatives has been 

reorganized to clarify the relationship between the Federal action here and the options 

considered by the Commission in response to COMSECY-12-15&c). No changes 

were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1-13) (1----22) (1---3) (30-4------1-

-4--2--11----11--11----11--

----------11--14--3---3) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

--3---11----11--12------11-

---11----11----1--1----

----2--1--1--1--2-1-1-

-2--1--2--1--2--1--1--1--2-

-2---1--3--3--1--2--1--3-

-1------3- -3--3--1--

3--3--3--1--3--1--1----2-2) 

-2--3--2--2--3--3--3--3--3--

2----

D.2.9.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters disagreed with the stated purpose and need in the 

GEIS because they do not agree that the NRC should facilitate licensing or focus on efficiency 

of licensing and reviews. In addition, one commenter stated that the GEIS does not address the 

deficiencies identified by the Court of Appeals. Another commenter stated that the NRC should 

be pursuing safety, not efficiency. Two commenters noted that efficiency may benefit industry, 

but that the GEIS does not provide a real assessment of environmental impacts from continued 

storage. One commenter stated that the proposed purpose of the GEIS appeared to promote 

nuclear power and force continued use of nuclear power. Another commenter stated that the 

GEIS indicates consideration of a change in licensing while avoiding the scrutiny of the licensing 

process. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The 

increased efficiency of this generic approach will enhance the ability of the relevant NRC 

adjudications to focus on site- or proceeding-specific issues. The resolution of generic issues 

related to continued storage in a generic proceeding, rather than in site-specific proceedings, 

will allow the participants in these adjudications, including public interest groups, the nuclear 

industry, State, local, and Tribal governments, and the NRC, to focus resources on addressing 

issues raised about a specific site or in a specific proceeding. 

The NRC does not agree that the GEIS serves to promote nuclear power or that the agency’s 

preparation of the GEIS for regulatory efficiency comes at the expense of safety. The NRC’s 

mission is to protect public health, safety, and the environment, and this mission remains the 

agency’s sole focus. The NRC does not promote nuclear power. Rather, the NRC’s robust 

regulatory regime, which includes site-specific licensing reviews and ongoing inspection and 

enforcement programs, ensures that NRC licensees continue to meet the NRC’s safety 

standards. Further, the NRC does not agree that the GEIS forces the continued use of nuclear 

power. The analysis in the GEIS will be incorporated by the NRC in future licensing actions to 

satisfy the NRC’s NEPA responsibilities to analyze the environmental impacts of continued 

storage. However, the GEIS does not represent or direct an NRC decision on any pending or 

future licensing action, nor does it have any effect on the current operation of licensed facilities. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The NRC does not agree that efficiency is an improper purpose for NRC NEPA reviews. The 

NRC is obligated under NEPA to conduct reviews of all environmental impacts reasonably likely 

to result from licensing actions. Historically, the NRC has fulfilled its NEPA obligations through 

generic or site-specific analyses, or some combination of both as appropriate. Where the 

impacts are susceptible to generic analysis, a GEIS or other document results in substantial 

benefits, because it analyzes those impacts through a rigorous and transparent public process 

while avoiding wasteful and repetitive reconsideration of these issues in numerous individual 

proceedings. For more discussion of NEPA’s information requirements see Section ' of 

this appendix. 

Finally, as stated in Section 1.2 of the GEIS, the NRC’s generic analysis encompasses all 

direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of continued storage, including those issues identified by 

the Court of Appeals for further analysis in New York v. NRC. As a result, the GEIS addresses 

the full range of impacts required by NEPA and the Court of Appeals’ remand. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----14----4---

D.2.9.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated their understanding that the purpose of the 

document is to ensure consistency of licensing in future licensing actions, and asked if the final 

GEIS will be as soft on facts and science as the draft GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that the GEIS and Rule provide consistency in the licensing process for addressing the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. However, the NRC disagrees that the 

GEIS is “soft” RQIDFWVDQGVFLHQFH$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&’s 

methodology and approach to evaluating the environmental impacts of continued storage 

follows the guidance in NUREG–“Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions 

Associated with NMSS Programs: Final Report,” where applicable (NRC 2003a). In 

accordance with NEPA, the GEIS takes into account available information to analyze the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel for each of the resource areas 

GHVFULEHGLQ&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6)XUWKHULQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK15&DQG&(4

regulations, the GEIS incorporates, by reference, information from many other sources into the 

analysis. The NRC invited commenters to submit additional information for consideration in the 

GEIS during the scoping and draft comment periods, and has addressed those comments in 

this GEIS. This factual and scientific information, which is the basis for the analysis, is sufficient 

to make the impact determinations in the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of this comment. 

-1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.9.4 – COMMENT: Two commenters raised issues concerning Section 1.3 of the draft 

GEIS, which describes the purpose of the GEIS. One commenter disagreed with the 

statements that the environmental impacts of nuclear power plant operation are well 

understood, and the environmental impacts of continued storage can be reasonably predicted. 

The commenter expressed concern that there is excessive confidence in what is known about 

environmental impacts, and the GEIS applies generic determinations instead of complex sitespecific evaluations. The other commenter noted that past site-specific licensing decisions did 

not have an EIS for long-term impacts of storage, but rather relied on an assumption from the 

old Waste Confidence Rule that continued storage was safe. The commenter expressed hope 

that the GEIS would be updated to avoid this flaw. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that past site-specific licensing actions did not include an EIS for impacts of continued 

storage. The NRC is not reconsidering prior licensing decisions as part of this rulemaking. The 

proposed action is to issue a revised Rule that adopts into regulation the NRC’s generic 

environmental analysis of continued storage. Further, the revision would state that because the 

impacts of continued storage have been generically assessed in this GEIS and codified in a 

Rule, the NRC will incorporate the impact determinations from the GEIS into the NEPA reviews 

for individual licensing actions. The NRC disagrees that the environment around spent fuel 

storage facilities is not well understood. Each licensed facility undergoes a site-specific 

licensing process that encompasses an assessment of the environmental conditions and the 

environmental impacts of operation for that particular site. The response to the concerns about 

applicability of a generic analysis to site-specific concerns can be found in Section D.2.11.1 of 

WKLVDSSHQGL[7KH15&KDVPDGHFKDQJHVWR6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6LQ

response to comments to clarify the description of the purpose of the GEIS, proposed action, 

purpose and need, and alternatives, respectively. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(210--2-2) 

D.2.9.5 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that it is unclear why licensing efficiency is 

included in the scope of the GEIS if each licensing action is still required to have its own EA or 

EIS. 

RESPONSE: An important distinction exists between different terms in the GEIS and Rule that 

is clarified here in light of this comment. The scope of the GEIS is defined in Section 1.2 of the 

GEIS as the analysis of environmental impacts of continued storage. As Section 1.2 further 

states, that analysis provides a regulatory basis for the revised Rule. Licensing efficiency, on 

the other hand, is unrelated to the scope of the GEIS. Rather, licensing efficiency is one of the 

VWDWHGSXUSRVHVRIWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGWKHSURSRVHG

action is in turn defined in Section 1.4 of the GEIS as the rulemaking to adopt the revised Rule. 

Thus, efficiency in licensing is achieved by the generic analysis of continued storage impacts 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

and the codification of the results of the generic analysis in the revised Rule, but this efficiency 

is unrelated to the scope of the GEIS. 

Although the NRC will be required to perform a site-specific NEPA review for future licensing 

actions for a power reactor or specifically licensed ISFSI, the use of a GEIS and Rule to 

generically analyze the impact of continued storage does facilitate efficiency in these licensing 

proceedings. The GEIS is not intended to resolve all of the environmental impacts associated 

with site-specific licensing actions. Under NEPA, the NRC must analyze the environmental 

impacts associated with initial licenses and license renewals for any reactor and specifically 

licensed ISFSI. Many of the impacts associated with the construction and operation of a facility 

are analyzed on a site-specific basis. Other environmental impacts that are substantially the 

same at any site (e.g., the environmental impacts of continued storage) can be generically 

resolved by the NRC so they do not need to be revisited in each licensing review. This generic 

analysis produces efficiency in NRC proceedings by resolving the environmental impacts that are 

expected to be substantially similar at any reactor or specifically licensed ISFSI site. The Rule 

improves the efficiency of the NRC’s proceedings by obviating the need to revisit the same issue 

in each proceeding. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-

D.2.9.6 – COMMENT: Two commenters stated that the purpose of the GEIS should be to 

address deficiencies that the Court of Appeals identified. One commenter argued that the GEIS 

should address spent fuel pool leaks and fires and impacts of failure to secure a repository. 

Another commenter stated that an additional purpose should be to analyze the human 

environment for impacts of storage of spent fuels after license expiration. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments that the purpose of the GEIS includes a 

response to the Court of Appeals' remand of the Waste Confidence Rule. As stated in Section 

1.3 of the GEIS, the purpose of the GEIS is two-fold: (1) to determine the environmental impacts 

of continued storage, including those impacts identified in the remand by the Court of Appeals in 

the New York v. NRC decision; and (2) to determine whether those impacts can be generically 

analyzed. The first point addresses the comment's concerns about evaluation of environmental 

effects of continued storage on the environment, as well as inclusion of spent fuel pool leaks 

and fires and failure to secure a repository. The analyses of spent fuel pool leaks and fires can 

be found in Appendices E and F, respectively, and the impacts of indefinite storage can be 

IRXQGWKURXJKRXW&KDSWHUVDQG7KH*(,6UHIOHFWVODQJXDJHFODULILHGIURPWKHGUDIW*(,6

regarding the purpose and need and proposed action. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

--3-11) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.9.7 – COMMENT: Commenters argued that the proposed Federal action goes beyond 

simply analyzing the environmental impacts of continued storage and codifying that analysis by 

rule. One commenter asserted that the proposed Rule would also codify the following: 

x *HQHULFILQGLQJVLQ&)5RQWKHIHDVLELOLW\RIVDIHVWRUDJHDQGDUHSRVLWRU\

x An environmental finding in Table B-1 that spent fuel disposal impacts would not be large 

enough to require that the option of extended operation under &)53DUWVKRXOGEH

eliminated; and 

x A finding in Table B-1 that the NRC has not assigned a single level of significance for the 

impacts of spent fuel and HLW disposal. 

Commenters also stated that it is inappropriate to describe the proposed Federal action and the 

alternatives as administrative in nature because the GEIS still must satisfy Minnesota v. NRC

and “determine whether there is reasonable assurance that an offsite solution [for spent fuel] will 

be available by the expiration of the plants’ operating licenses, and if not, whether there is 

reasonable assurance that the fuel can be safely stored at the sites beyond those dates.” One 

commenter stated that the NRC’s assertion that the GEIS is not a licensing action and is 

separate from the licensing decisions that it enables are directly contradicted by New York v. 

NRC, and, therefore, that the proposed Federal action cannot be considered administrative in 

nature. 

Commenters also indicated that the alternatives analysis in the GEIS violates NEPA. 

First, commenters stated that neither of the two alternatives analyzed would achieve the GEIS’s 

efficiency purpose because without a rule codifying the findings in the GEIS those findings 

would still be subject to challenge in site-specific proceedings. 

Second, commenters argued that the alternatives presented in the GEIS are circular and not 

true alternatives to the proposed action. One commenter asserted that the no-action alternative 

is flawed because it does not represent the “environmental status quo,” because it has not been 

the NRC’s practice to consider the impacts of continued storage in individual licensing 

proceedings. The commenter argued that the GEIS both purports to assess alternatives to 

preparing a generic analysis and presents the results of a generic analysis that had already 

been prepared. Further, the commenter argued that even in the case of the no-action 

alternative, the GEIS asserts that a generic analysis would still be prepared, just in another 

form. Thus, the commenter argued the no-action alternative is not a true no-action alternative 

because the GEIS assumes that a generic analysis is inevitable. 

Finally, commenters argued that the GEIS violates NEPA because the alternatives, as 

described, are irrelevant to the environmental impacts of the proposed action. Commenters 

suggested that the GEIS should have assessed whether choosing between a generic or site-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

specific environmental analysis could affect the quality and level of analysis in a way that could 

change decision-making. Commenters also argued that the NRC should have considered 

different alternatives (e.g., alternate rule texts) that could have resulted in different 

environmental outcomes. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. 

Scope of the Rulemaking 

One comment confused the scope of the proposed action—the codification of the conclusions 

IURPWKH*(,6LQ&)5—with the scope of the revisions to the CFR that will be included 

in this rulemaking. As a result of the proposed action to codify the conclusions from the GEIS in 

&)5WKH15&ZLOOQHHGWRPDNHDQXPEHURIFRQIRUPLQJDQGFODULI\LQJFKDQJHVWR

other sections in the NRC’VUHJXODWLRQVLQFOXGLQJ&)53DUW6XESDUW$$SSHQGL[%—

Table B-1 (“Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License Renewal of Nuclear Power 

Plants”). These changes to Table B-DQGRWKHUVHFWLRQVLQ3DUWVLPSO\PDNHDSSURSULDWH

FRQIRUPLQJFKDQJHVWRDFKLHYHFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKWKHUHYLVLRQVWR&)5

Minnesota v. NRC and New York v. NRC

Several comments asserted that the NRC’s discussion of the purpose and need for the 

proposed action, and the associated analysis of alternatives, fails to comport with the court 

decisions in Minnesota v. NRC and New York v. NRC. The NRC disagrees with these 

comments. Insofar as the comments address the history of the Waste Confidence proceeding, 

including the “findings” structure that the NRC developed in response to Minnesota v. NRC, 

these matters are discussed in detail in Section D.2.4.1 of this appendix. The NRC disagrees 

with the comments’ assertion that the Court of Appeals in New York v. NRC found that the 

Waste Confidence proceeding is itself a licensing action. In that case, the Court of Appeals held 

that “the [Waste Confidence] rulemaking at issue here constitutes a major federal action” 

requiring NEPA review ()GDW). The current rulemaking to prepare the GEIS and 

codify its findings corresponds to the Waste Confidence rulemaking determined to be a major 

Federal action in New York v. NRC. Accordingly, the NRC has correctly identified the proposed 

action in the current rulemaking as the adoption of a Rule codifying the impact determinations of 

the GEIS, rather than a licensing action, as comments asserted. While the Court of Appeals 

further held that the Waste Confidence proceeding “is a predetermined ‘stage’ of each licensing 

decision” (id.), the Court of Appeals did not equate the Waste Confidence proceeding itself with 

a licensing action. Nothing the NRC has stated in the current rulemaking proceeding is 

inconsistent with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that, like the earlier Waste Confidence 

Decision and previous 10 C)5WKH*(,6DQGUHYLVHG&)5VLPLODUO\FRQVWLWXWHD

“stage” in licensing. In addition, like the earlier Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, the GEIS 

and revised Rule fulfill the purpose of and need for an environmental analysis that conclusively 

satisfies that portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations pertaining to continued storage while 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

preserving the efficiency inherent in NRC’s historical practices. The proposed Federal action in 

this case—a rulemaking to codify the agency’s generic conclusions regarding continued storage 

impacts—simply provides the same efficiency in NRC’s licensing proceedings with respect to 

the environmental impacts of continued storage achieved earlier by the Waste Confidence 

Decision and rule, which the Court of Appeals recognized as the “major federal action” requiring 

NEPA compliance. 

No-Action Alternative 

The NRC disagrees with the comment that the no-action alternative cannot consider sitespecific environmental reviews of continued storage because the “status quo” is a generic 

consideration of continued storage. This assertion misstates the status quo. The Waste 

Confidence Decision and rule were vacated by the Court of Appeals in New York v. NRC, 

leaving a procedural gap in NRC’s consideration of environmental impacts in licensing actions. 

$EVHQWDUHSODFHPHQWIRUWKHYDFDWHG&)5WKH15&ZRXOGKDYHWRFKRRVHDGLIIHUHQW

means for considering the environmental impacts of continued storage in connection with 

individual licensing decisions. However, the NRC recognizes that, in the absence of an existing 

process for these NEPA reviews, the Commission would be able to choose from several options 

if it decided not to issue the revised Rule. In fact, the alternatives considered in the GEIS are 

contained in the options and tracks presented to the Commission in COMSECY-12-NRC 

2012c) and acknowledged by the Commission in CLI-12-NRC 2012b). 

7KH15&KDVUHRUJDQL]HG6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WRH[SODLQKRZWKHDYDLODEOHDOWHUQDWLYHVDUH

in effect, all options that could be considered in the case of no action (i.e., if the proposed Rule 

was not adopted). This reorganization better reflects the relationship between the no-action 

alternative and the alternatives described in the GEIS, which are better understood as different 

options within the no-action alternative. However, the environmental impacts of these options 

and the various levels of efficiency they could provide have not changed, and this reorganization 

does not otherwise affect the NRC’s consideration of reasonable alternatives. The 

reorganization is intended solely to clarify for commenters and the public how the NRC 

considers these options in relation to the proposed action. 

Alternatives Considered in the Draft GEIS 

The NRC disagrees with the comments that assert that the alternatives analysis in the draft 

GEIS violates NEPA because the alternatives would not achieve the same degree of efficiency 

as the rulemaking (See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC). However, the NRC 

agrees that the efficiency gains provided by the alternatives considered in the draft GEIS are 

different in kind and extent than the efficiencies provided by the Rule; specifically, the 

alternatives considered in the draft GEIS would not preclude challenge to the environmental 

impacts from continued storage in adjudicatory proceedings. The NRC has made clarifying 

FKDQJHVWR6HFWLRQof the GEIS as described above in response to these comments. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

These comments point out that the alternatives considered in the draft GEIS would not codify 

the GEIS by Rule and would therefore allow continual challenges to the environmental 

conclusions in site-specific proceedings. Nonetheless, because the no-action options would still 

produce certain advantages in regulatory efficiency and clarity—although not to the same extent 

as, and without the conclusive effect of, the proposed action—they represent reasonable 

options that the NRC may pursue if it decides not to implement the proposed action. These 

options would, to a lesser degree than the proposed action, fill some of the gaps left by the 

YDFDWHG&)5E\SURYLGLQJDPHDQVIRUWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHULQ15&OLFHQVLQJ

proceedings to consider the environmental impacts of continued storage. In addition, under any 

of these options, the NRC and the participants in NRC proceedings would gain a better 

understanding of these generic issues over time, likely reducing duplicative litigation of these 

generic issues. 

As explained in 6HFWLRQRIWKH GEIS, even in the event that the NRC chose to satisfy its 

NEPA obligations through site-specific reviews, the nature of the issues related to the 

environmental impacts of continued storage is sufficiently generic that after a few initial, 

complete site-specific analyses, future EISs would likely incorporate those analyses with only 

minor variations. That is the normal course for an agency (e.g., the NRC) in identifying 

environmental impacts that do not vary significantly from site to site and are not addressed by a 

generic analysis (e.g., a GEIS). Even where an agency makes a policy decision not to evaluate 

impacts through a single generic review, NEPA does not require the agency to expend 

resources reanalyzing issues once they have proven to be generic in nature. 

Finally, by proposing to codify the conclusions from the GEIS in &)5, the NRC has 

provided members of the public with an opportunity to challenge the generic conclusions during 

this proceeding. This allows the agency to take immediate advantage of the issues and 

information presented and to gain additional efficiency, instead of waiting to explore the generic 

issues through individual NRC licensing proceedings. 

Consideration of Reasonable Alternatives 

The NRC disagrees that the alternatives are invalid because the environmental impacts of the 

alternatives are the same. The alternatives considered in an EIS, including the no-action 

alternative, allow agencies to consider the full array of options for achieving the agencies’ goals 

and the potential environmental impacts of those options. In the case of the proposed action, a 

procedural rulemaking to determine the environmental impacts of continued storage, the full 

array of options includes the proposed action and site-specific reviews for each licensing action. 

Because the proposed action serves an administrative purpose and need, it necessarily follows 

that the other reasonable options to serve that need would also be administrative in nature and 

have similarly insignificant environmental impacts. While the environmental and financial costs 

RIWKHRSWLRQVYDU\VHH&KDSWHU of the GEIS, none of the reasonable options to serve the 

NRC’s purpose and need has environmental impacts greater than SMALL (i.e., environmental 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

effects are not detectable or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter 

any important attribute of the resource). Thus, the NRC has concluded that none of the 

reasonable options for meeting the purpose and need for the proposed action has significantly 

greater or smaller environmental impacts than the others. 

The NRC also disagrees with comments asserting that the NRC’s alternatives analysis should 

have considered whether different methods of review could have affected the quality of the 

analysis. The quality of the NRC’s environmental analysis of continued storage is not 

dependent on whether the NRC prepares a site-specific or generic analysis. Whatever method 

an agency chooses to examine environmental impacts, its analysis must satisfy NEPA’s “hardlook” requirement. In this proceeding, the NRC took the required hard look when it reviewed the 

environmental impacts of continued storage and, because the impacts were found to be 

sufficiently common across the sites to which the analysis would apply, determined that the 

impacts could be assessed generically in a GEIS. Moreover, in conducting this generic 

analysis, the NRC employed assumptions that are sufficiently conservative to bound the 

impacts such that any variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in 

environmental impact determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. As a 

result, the NRC’s analysis in the GEIS rigorously addresses the environmental impacts of 

continued storage while it avoids replication of approximately the same analysis for each site. 

7KH15&KDVPDGHFKDQJHVLQ6HFWLRQ of GEIS to clarify the relationship between the 

alternatives discussed in the GEIS and the Federal action. No changes were made to the Rule 

as a result of these comments. 

-1--1--1--1--1--2--2--2--2-

-3--3--1-

D.2.9.8 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments related to NEPA segmentation 

and a comprehensive review of spent fuel issues, including an update to NUREG–Final 

Generic EIS on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel 15&

Several commenters argued that the NRC has segmented the NEPA analysis of spent fuel 

management among several separate documents. Commenters argued that the GEIS and Rule 

improperly segment the NRC’s environmental analysis of spent fuel issues by, for example, 

improperly relying on Table S-3. 

Commenters argued that the NRC should review the environmental impacts of spent fuel 

storage, both during and after operations, along with the impacts of spent fuel disposal and 

mitigation alternatives, to provide a complete picture of the environmental impacts of spent fuel 

management. One commenter asserted that because the NRC has failed to do so, the NRC 

has allowed inconsistencies between the various analyses to persist. Commenters submitted a 

petition for rulemaking requesting that the NRC conduct a comprehensive review and update of 

its environmental studies and regulations and incorporate its update into a new regulatory 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

framework. Commenters also drew the NRC’s attention to NUREG–15&ZKLFK

they consider to be a legally sufficient, albeit outdated, NEPA document. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. 

Segmentation 

The NRC has not segmented the NEPA analysis of continued spent fuel storage from its overall 

reactor and ISFSI licensing analyses, nor has the NRC segmented the environmental analysis 

of continued storage itself. Under CEQ regulations, segmentation refers to instances where a 

Federal agency splits a project into smaller components to avoid the NEPA requirement to 

prepare an EIS for the project, or where an agency does not consider related actions in a single 

EIS (&)5). Here, the NRC has prepared an EIS to provide a complete analysis of 

the generic impacts of continued storage, an approach that improves the efficiency of 

environmental reviews by generically resolving issues that are not substantially different from 

one proceeding to another, while still ensuring those impacts are considered in subsequent 

licensing actions. The Supreme Court has explicitly approved NRC’s methodology in 

generically analyzing one aspect of reactor licensing impacts that can be used for all reactor 

licensing proceedings, which is the same approach employed here in the GEIS for analyzing the 

impacts of continued storage (see Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC). 

For a given future licensing action that relies on the GEIS and Rule, the NRC will prepare a 

NEPA analysis that will incorporate the environmental impacts presented in the GEIS into the 

overall licensing decision. The NRC’s NEPA review for each individual licensing action will thus 

fully account for the reasonably foreseeable impacts of that action, including, where applicable, 

the impacts from continued storage that have been analyzed generically in the GEIS. The NRC 

has updated the relevant paragraph of the final Rule to clarify how the NRC will consider the 

generic analysis in this GEIS as part of future licensing actions. 

The NRC disagrees with comments asserting that the NRC’s current practices improperly divide 

environmental reviews into separate rulemakings like Table S-3, Table B-1, and this proceeding, 

and that these practices result in in inconsistencies and incomplete analyses. The NRC notes 

that Table S-3 and the approach taken by the NRC in using Table S-3 data in licensing 

proceedings were approved by the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC. The 

current continued storage proceeding merely continues the NRC’s historic, judicially approved 

practice of generically addressing spent fuel storage impacts. The NRC is aware of differences 

between this Continued Storage GEIS and other NRC generic environmental reviews (see 

Section D.2.11.10 of this appendix). However, to the extent that comments assert than any 

differences may represent inconsistencies, the comments have not explained how those 

inconsistencies make the GEIS insufficient to satisfy the NRC’s NEPA obligations to determine 

the environmental impacts of continued Storage. Further, comments on any NRC review 

outside of continued storage are beyond the scope of this proceeding. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Comprehensive Review and NUREG–0575 

The NRC disagrees with the assertion that a broader analysis of spent fuel storage and 

mitigation alternatives to include storage during licensed life of a reactor is required in this 

proceeding. The GEIS and proposed revisions to the Rule relate exclusively to continued 

storage. Because this proceeding concerns only the impacts of continued storage, and those 

impacts are comprehensively examined in the GEIS, the GEIS suffices for its purpose. Prior to 

making a decision on a site-specific license application, the NRC will incorporate the impact 

determinations from the GEIS into the NEPA reviews for individual licensing actions. 

In particular, some comments argued that the NRC should have prepared an update to or 

modeled this comprehensive analysis on NUREG–15&DQHDUOLHU(,6WKDW

provided a higher-level analysis of the environmental impacts of the handling and storage of 

spent fuel. The GEIS is a stand-alone document that, while referencing numerous supporting 

authorities, includes all information necessary for the NRC to generically evaluate the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. Accordingly, the NRC is not required to update or 

revise NUREG–15&RURWKHUZLVHXQGHUWDNHDFomprehensive review of licensed 

life spent fuel storage impacts that occur during the licensed life of a facility) in the GEIS. 

The NRC has also docketed, as PRM--30, a petition for rulemaking, which was submitted 

with the comments, that requests a comprehensive analysis of spent fuel storage and new 

regulatory framework (NRC 2014b). The issues associated with the petition are not considered 

in this GEIS. 

The NRC has not prepared a separate safety decision or safety finding for the GEIS or Rule, but 

the issues related to the safety decision are discussed in the Federal Register Notice. For more 

information on how the NRC addresses Minnesota v. NRC, the case that prompted the 

reasonable assurance findings, see Section D.2.4.1 of this appendix. No changes were made 

to the GEIS as a result of these comments. 

----1--1-20) 

D.2.9.9 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed general agreement with the proposed 

action in the GEIS. Two commenters expressed support for addressing Waste Confidence 

generically through rulemaking, rather than on a site-specific basis, to increase efficiency and 

limit budgetary expenditures. One commenter noted that the proposed action and amendment 

to the Rule adequately incorporate the issues identified by the Court of Appeals. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments in support of the proposed action. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-31---3--1--3) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.10 Comments Concerning Alternatives – General 

D.2.10.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed that the choice of alternatives in the 

GEIS was inadequate because the stated alternatives do not allow an adequate comparison of 

environmental consequences of continued storage, or include ways to substantially mitigate the 

potential adverse effects of continued storage. Some commenters asserted that the inclusion of 

other alternatives (e.g., cessation of licensing) must be considered in the absence of a 

repository, and that doing so would present a different picture of the environmental 

consequences. Other commenters stated that impacts of storage of additional spent fuel, if 

generated, could be mitigated by alternatives such as requiring dry cask storage after five years, 

which would substantially reduce accident risks. 

One commenter noted two concerns with the NRC’s scoping decision: (1) exclusion of the 

existence of viable mitigation alternatives and (2) that exclusion of those mitigation alternatives 

implies that they should be considered and evaluated as part of a site-specific EIS. The 

commenter stated that during scoping, the commenter requested an analysis of SAMA for 

continued storage at the Indian Point Energy Center, which would identify site-specific 

environmental impacts and potential alternatives to mitigate those impacts. The commenter 

cited NRDC v. NRC, to point out that the Court of Appeals rejected NRC’s reliance on a GEIS 

as legally insufficient because in that instance a GEIS did not consider alternatives and special 

hazards to the public health, safety, and welfare which are vital to any impact statement. The 

commenter went on to say that this GEIS will also be legally insufficient unless it fully considers 

all alternatives to the long-term use of spent fuel pools. 

Similarly, another commenter stated that the selection of alternatives and appropriate mitigation 

opportunities for adverse environmental consequences is one of the hallmarks of NEPA, and 

this requirement allows decisionmakers to confront and publicly evaluate adverse impacts of the 

final agency action rather than confirming or insulating previous agency choices. The 

commenter stated that the NRC is obligated to consider mitigation measures as part of the 

NEPA review, per the Commission’VUHJXODWLRQDW&)5D7KHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHG

that (1) NRC is obligated to take all practicable measures to minimize environmental harm from 

the alternative selected or otherwise provide an explanation and (2) ensure that a legally 

sufficient analysis of spent fuel pool SAMA has been completed. 

One commenter noted that the GEIS includes a statement that cessation of licensing may lead 

to environmental impacts from development of required alternate energy sources, but does not 

state what those consequences might be. Another commenter stated that a discussion should 

be included about how waste from high-burnup fuel affects consequences during the various 

phases of reactor life, storage, and decommissioning. Finally, one commenter stated that the 

NRC must consider how to mitigate the environmental impact of there being no solution to the 

storage of waste. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that an analysis of mitigation measures 

and SAMA should have been considered as part of the NEPA review. The GEIS provides a 

generic analysis of the environmental impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel, and the 

proposed action and options under the no-action alternative (the site-specific review, GEIS-only, 

and policy-statement options) include various ways the NRC could use a generic assessment of 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel in its licensing actions. The GEIS 

does, however, discuss mitigation related to aging, damaged, or degraded fuel. See Section 

' of this appendix and Section 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS for additional information regarding 

this issue. Any determinations by the NRC about whether to require mitigation measures of any 

type will occur on a site-specific basis during facility licensing or during the course of ongoing 

NRC oversight. 

The comments also raise concerns about requirements for SAMA, which are addressed in 

Section ' of this appendix and alternate storage requirements (e.g., spent fuel pool 

thinning, expedited transfer, and safety-grade spray systems), which are addressed in Section 

D.2.14.2 of this appendix. The NRC considered and eliminated cessation of licensing as an 

alternative (sHH*(,66HFWLRQDQGUHVSRQVHVWRFRPPHQWVDERXWFHVVDWLRQRIOLFHQVLQJDV

an alternative are found in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. Further, the 

concerns in the comments with regard to generic consideration of issues rather than on a sitespecific basis are addressed in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1-11) (1-12) (1--4-------2--1-

-1--

D.2.10.2 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that NRC must thoroughly review the 

environmental impacts of onsite storage and consider safer alternatives to nuclear during 

licensing decisions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. To fulfill its obligations under NEPA, the 

NRC considers environmental impacts of onsite storage at a nuclear power plant or spent fuel 

storage site for the licensed term as part of the facility’s licensing review. This GEIS considers 

the environmental impacts of onsite storage during the continued storage period after the 

licensed life for operations and before disposal in a repository. Alternatives to nuclear power 

production are considered in the NEPA analyses supporting licensing decisions for nuclear 

power plants. Safety of nuclear power plants is also considered in licensing decisions. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(143--3-

D.2.10.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS must consider a reasonable 

range of feasible alternatives to adequately review the possible set of risks and environmental 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

impacts of spent fuel storage and satisfy NEPA. Two commenters stated that the GEIS should 

consider all reactor sites and site-specific risks in its analysis. Another commenter stated that it 

is unwise to do a generic analysis, that this particular analysis cannot be done in the posited 24-

month timeframe, and that the GEIS must address the original agency action that caused the 

production of spent fuel: licensing nuclear reactors. One commenter stated that because of the 

assumptions relied on in the GEIS, the NRC did not analyze realistic alternatives or realistic 

future conditions or their environmental consequences. Finally, one commenter stated that the 

GEIS must posit an alternative that is feasible; economically, politically, and ethically viable; and 

that protects people and the environment. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the GEIS does not reflect an 

adequate range of alternatives to address the purpose and need and assess the environmental 

impacts of continued storage. The proposed action is to issue a revised Rule that adopts into 

regulation the NRC’s generic environmental conclusions for continued storage of spent fuel. 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VWDWHVWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQLVWRSUHVHUYHWKH

efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes, and the need for the proposed action is to provide 

processes for use in NRC licensing to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. 

Therefore, for this rulemaking, the proposed action and options under the no-action alternative 

to the proposed action concern how and whether a generic analysis is used in site-specific 

licensing reviews, rather than methods of continued storage. Continued storage may occur no 

matter which alternative the NRC selects in this proceeding, and the environmental impacts 

from continued storage do not vary among the proposed action, a rulemaking, and the NRC’s 

potential options in the absence of this rulemaking. Moreover, because the proposed action 

serves an administrative purpose and need, it necessarily follows that the NRC’s options to 

serve that need would also be administrative in nature and have similarly insignificant 

environmental impacts. 

The NRC addressed a number of the concerns raised in these comments elsewhere in this 

document. The NRC believes that the 24-month timeframe is adequate to complete a 

comprehensive GEIS and Rule update (see Section ' of this appendix). Comments 

regarding the production of spent fuel (initial reactor licensing and reactor license renewal) as 

the reason for this rulemaking are addressed in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 

The concerns raised in the comments about inclusion of site-specific information in a generic 

analysis are addressed in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. The concern about the need to 

include costs of continued storage is addressed in Section D.2.42 of this appendix. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(222----3--20) 

D.2.10.4 – COMMENT: One commenter provided suggestions for additional alternatives that 

the commenter claims should be evaluated in the GEIS. The proposed alternatives are based 

on the commenter’s consideration of factors that the commenter claims affect the environmental 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

impacts of future licensing actions that would authorize continued production and surface 

storage of spent fuel for extended periods, including over the indefinite timeframe. These 

factors include relevant timescales, alternative storage modes and configurations, the safetyrelevant classes of spent fuel requiring continued storage, storage cask technology options, and 

reliance on versus erosion of institutional controls over time. Based on evaluation of variants of 

these factors, the commenter formulated four unique alternatives (in addition to a no-action 

alternative). The unique alternatives included license extension only, near-term nuclear growth, 

constant nuclear market share scenario, and major nuclear growth. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the GEIS should consider the 

suggested alternatives. The proposed action is to issue a revised Rule that adopts into 

regulation the NRC’s generic environmental analysis of continued storage of spent fuel. Section 

RIWKH*(,6VWDWHVWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQLVWRSUHVHUYHWKHHIILFLHQF\RI

the NRC’s licensing processes, and the need for the proposed action is to provide processes for 

use in NRC licensing to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. Therefore, 

the proposed action and options under the no-action alternative (the site-specific review, GEISonly, and policy-statement options) include various ways the NRC could use a generic 

assessment of environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel in its licensing actions 

rather than in terms of timescales of spent fuel production, alternative storage modes and 

configurations, the safety-relevant classes of spent fuel requiring continued storage, storage 

cask technology options, or other factors suggested in the comments. Continued storage may 

occur no matter which alternative the NRC selects in this proceeding, and the environmental 

impacts from continued storage do not vary among the proposed action, a rulemaking, and the 

NRC’s potential options in the absence of this rulemaking. Moreover, because the proposed 

action serves an administrative purpose and need, it necessarily follows that the other options to 

serve that need would also be administrative in nature and have similarly insignificant 

environmental impacts. 

The comments also raise the issue of consideration of loss of institutional controls. Comments 

on this topic are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2--2--2--2--2-

D.2.10.5 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that before Waste Confidence can be assured, 

there needs to be a full EIS of any waste storage alternative (e.g., interim storage sites and 

transportation). 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that prior to the completion of an individual licensing action, including interim storage 

facilities, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and document the results of 

this review in an EA and FONSI or an EIS. However, the NRC disagrees that the environmental 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel cannot be assessed without a full EIS for every 

storage site, including interim storage sites. The GEIS generically addresses the environmental 

impacts of continued storage and would be used in site-specific reviews. Alternatives to spent 

fuel storage or alternate methods of spent fuel storage are considered as appropriate in sitespecific reviews. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.10.6 – COMMENT: One commenter agreed with the three alternatives put forth in the 

GEIS. Two commenters stated overall agreement with the GEIS’s proposed action, 

alternatives, and elimination of consideration of two alternatives (i.e., cessation of reactor 

licensing and imposition of additional requirements). One commenter agreed with the definition 

of the proposed action, which is promulgation of a Rule that generically addresses the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. Another commenter stated 

agreement that the GEIS does not need to discuss alternatives deemed remote and speculative 

and that viable alternatives must meet the purpose and need and proposed action. This 

commenter also stated agreement that the Rule would not have any “cumulative effect” and is 

not a licensing action, and that the environmental effects will not differ whether evaluated 

generically or in site-specific reviews. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments in agreement with the proposed action, 

alternatives, and elimination of some of the alternatives from consideration. However, in 

UHVSRQVHWRRWKHUFRPPHQWVWKH15&KDVPDGHFKDQJHVWRVHFWLRQVDQGWR

clarify the description of the purpose of the GEIS, proposed action, purpose and need, and 

alternatives, respectively. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30--1) (30---1----1-

D.2.10.7 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the GEIS proposes indefinite 

aboveground storage, and has therefore abandoned geologic storage, which should have been 

treated as an alternative and analyzed. The commenter states that the failure to treat geologic 

disposal as an alternative shows that there is no safe way to manage spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Disposal of spent fuel in a geologic 

repository remains the national policy, and feasibility of a repository is discussed in Appendix B 

of the GEIS. In accordance with the NWPA and recent court decisions, the NRC is continuing 

its evaluation of the DOE’s license application for a disposal facility at Yucca Mountain. 

Because the purpose of the proposed action is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing 

processes, and the need for the proposed action is to provide processes for use in NRC 

licensing to address the environmental impacts of continued storage, spent fuel disposal is 

outside the scope of this analysis. The proposed action and options under the no-action 

alternative (the site-specific review, GEIS-only, and policy-statement options) include various 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

ways the NRC could use a generic assessment of environmental impacts of continued storage 

in its licensing actions. The comment's concerns regarding safe storage of spent fuel are 

addressed in detail in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

--3) 

D.2.10.8 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that because the GEIS considers timeframes 

that extend far into the future, it should include an alternative that does not include a binding 

Rule, because a binding Rule could limit future public participation. The commenter also 

recommended that the purpose and need should be expanded to give equal importance to 

facilitation of public involvement in future decisions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that public involvement is important in licensing decisions and that the analysis should 

consider an alternative, or in this case, an option under the no-action alternative, that does not 

include a binding Rule. The GEIS-only option under the no-action alternative, described in 

6HFWLRQ1.2 of the GEIS, and the policy-statement option, described LQ6HFWLRQ1.3 of the 

GEIS, do not include a binding Rule. These options under the no-action alternative were not 

selected because they would reduce the efficiencies that NRC would gain through a binding 

Rule, resulting in considerable expenditure of public, NRC, and applicant resources. However, 

the NRC disagrees that future licensing decisions will not include appropriate opportunities for 

public participation. The NRC’s detailed response to concerns regarding public participation in 

future licensing proceedings can be found in Sections ' and D.2.11.2 of this appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--

D.2.10.9 – COMMENT: One commenter reasserted issues raised during the scoping period in 

a letter (Fettus et al. 2012) sent to NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane shortly after the issuance 

of the GEIS scoping notice. The commenter stated that the NRC scoping for the draft GEIS 

lacked sufficient detail to generate meaningful public input on the proposed action and 

alternatives and that the scoping notice failed to meet NRC requirements by not providing a 

description of the proposed action and possible alternatives. The commenter further stated that 

the lack of information in the scoping notice was misleading to commenters who could view the 

action as a generic analysis of methods for storage, and that the truncated scope of alternatives 

fails to address the underlying action, which is reactor licensing. The comment also asserts that 

WKHVFRSLQJQRWLFHIDLOHGWRFRPSO\ZLWK15&UHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)5D

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. NRC Chairman Macfarlane responded on 

behalf of the Commission to the letter referenced in the comment (NRC 2012d). As noted in the 

response letter, the scoping notice )5describes that the action being proposed and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

the Federal action under consideration, is an update to the Waste Confidence Rule. The scoping 

notice requested public comment on the scope of an EIS that would analyze the generic 

environmental impacts of continued storage to support the update to the Waste Confidence Rule. 

The scoping notice description provided sufficient information to generate meaningful public input 

on the proposed action and for commenters to suggest alternatives. As the Chairman noted in 

the response letter, the Waste Confidence Rule does not authorize the initial or continued 

operation of any nuclear power plant, and it does not authorize storage of spent fuel. A separate 

NRC safety and environmental review is required before a reactor is licensed and before fuel can 

be stored after the expiration of a reactor’s license at a specific site. 

ReJDUGLQJZKHWKHUWKHVFRSLQJQRWLFHFRPSOLHGZLWK15&UHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)5D

the response letter noted that the NRC did not base the scoping notice for this GEIS on 10 CFR 

7KHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)5UHJDUGLQJWKHFRQWHQWRIVFRSLQJnotices apply only 

WRVFRSLQJQRWLFHVSUHSDUHGXQGHU&)5 (i.e., when NRC determines that an EIS 

should be prepared). In this case, the NRC did not determine that an EIS should be prepared; 

instead, the Commission exercised its discretionary authoULW\XQGHU&)5DWRGLUHFW

the NRC to prepare an EIS to support an update to the Waste Confidence Rule. Nonetheless, 

the notice described that the action being proposed as an update of the Waste Confidence 

Rule, which provides sufficient information for commenters to suggest alternatives. No changes 

were made to GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-3) 

D.2.10.10 – COMMENT: One commenter requested that NRC convene a panel of scientific and 

engineering experts, non-governmental organizations, and concerned members of the public to 

discuss permanent and safe storage options for nuclear waste. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS provides a generic analysis of 

the environmental impacts from the continued storage of spent fuel, and the proposed action 

and options under the no-action alternative (the site-specific review, GEIS-only, and policystatement options) include various ways the NRC could use a generic assessment of 

environmental impacts of continued storage in its licensing actions. Therefore, convening a 

panel of experts to discuss alternatives to spent fuel storage is outside the scope of this 

analysis. Responses to comments with concerns about the safe storage of fuel are found in 

Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-4) 

D.2.10.11 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that nuclear power plants were not originally 

designed to host unlimited quantities of spent fuel, but rather that the spent fuel would be 

reprocessed and therefore the problem has become continuation of production of spent fuel. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that fuel storage facilities were not originally designed to host unlimited quantities of 

spent fuel. The amount of fuel that can be stored onsite at any fuel storage location is 

considered in site-specific licenses. Irrespective of whether fuel was originally intended to be 

reprocessed, the NRC disagrees that because disposal or reprocessing is not currently 

available, that production of spent fuel should cease. Comments addressing cessation of 

nuclear power production are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-

D.2.10.12 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that use of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

should have been considered as an alternative in the GEIS. The commenter provided 

information about Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and noted that because it is already in use as a 

storage site for transuranic wastes, some of the barriers to its use as a geologic repository may 

not be present. The commenter asserted that the use of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as an 

alternative would have required site-specific considerations, but its already well-known 

characteristics would have facilitated the analysis. The commenter stated that the assumptions 

in the GEIS preclude the use of such an alternative, as well as a purpose and need study, but 

that a geological storage alternative should have been included. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS provides a generic analysis of 

the environmental impacts from the continued storage of spent fuel, and the proposed action is 

to issue a revised Rule that adopts into regulation the NRC’s generic environmental conclusions 

for continued storage. The options under the no-action alternative to the proposed action, as 

GLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6include other ways the NRC could address the 

environmental impacts of continued storage in its licensing actions, although they do not satisfy 

the purpose for the proposed action. Therefore, alternatives to spent fuel storage (e.g., disposal 

in a site such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) are not considered in this analysis. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--1--3-

D.2.10.13 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the spent fuel storage issue should be 

made a military issue and nationalized. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Under the AEA and the Energy 

5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ$FWRIWKHNRC has the authority to regulate civilian use of radioactive 

materials, which includes storage of spent fuel. Changes to national laws regarding regulatory 

authority are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

--3) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.10.14 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the GEIS consider the benefits of a 

kind of bacteria or fungus discovered in the reactor buildings at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

power plant. The commenter suggested that Japan and others dealing with the aftermath of the 

accident consider whether the bacteria or fungus might eat spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The proposed action and options under 

the no-action alternative (the site-specific review, GEIS-only, and policy-statement options) 

include various ways the NRC could use a generic assessment of environmental impacts of 

continued storage in its licensing actions. Alternative strategies for storing or disposing of spent 

fuel, including using bacteria or fungus to consume spent fuel, are outside the scope of this 

GEIS and Rule. Mitigation strategies for the consequences of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 

are also outside the scope of this GEIS and Rule, as explained in Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(244-13--24-2) 

D.2.11 Comments Concerning Alternatives – No Action/Site-Specific 

D.2.11.1 – COMMENT: Numerous commenters expressed concern regarding the NRC’s use of 

a generic analysis in the GEIS. These commenters requested that site-specific reviews be done 

instead, or that the EIS be re-written to include site-specific data. Many of these comments 

noted a site or site-specific issue of concern, such as earthquakes; proximity to coastal locations 

or waterways; proximity to sensitive, unique, or important ecosystems and protected areas; 

proximity to fisheries; differences among plant and dry cask storage designs; population density 

concerns, such as transportation and evacuation routes; or construction activities contributing to 

erosion at plants located near the coast. Some comments also expressed concern that the 

GEIS would preclude site-specific evaluation of spent fuel storage. One commenter expressed 

concerns about potential required modifications to existing power plant infrastructure, such as 

construction of large structures, and the related impact on cask storage space. Several 

commenters noted that the NRC treats all sites alike, without differentiating between sites with 

different physical characteristics. Other commenters noted concerns with cumulative effects, 

including proximity to DOE sites, which the commenters believe should be considered on a siteby-site basis. One commenter stated that the generic analysis does not adequately address 

concerns in New York v. NRC regarding future dangers and key consequences. One 

commenter argued that supplemental EISs will be required for each site. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC has determined in the GEIS 

that the direct and indirect environmental impacts of continued storage at reactors can be 

analyzed generically. This means that, for each of the resource areas analyzed in the GEIS, the 

NRC has reached a generic determination (i.e., SMALL, MODERATE, LARGE, or a range), that 

is appropriate for all sites. These impact determinations are not expected to differ from those 

that would result from individual site-specific reviews for the continued storage period. The 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC has codified these generic impacts in the revised Rule. Under the revised Rule, the NRC 

will incorporate the impact determinations from the GEIS into the NEPA reviews for individual 

licensing decisions. These generic determinations need not be revisited at the time of a specific 

license application. However, the NRC’VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ15&

proceedings to request that a rule, including 10 CFR QRWEHDSSOLHGRUEHZDLYHGLQD

particular proceeding because special circumstances are present that would prevent the 

application of the rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. More information about the waiver 

process is discussed in Section '. 

It is important to note that the GEIS satisfies a portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations related to 

the issuance of a reactor or spent fuel storage facility license by generically evaluating the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. Prior to the completion of a licensing action, the 

NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and document the results of this review in 

an EA/FONSI or EIS. The site-specific environmental review will address, among other things, 

the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage during the license term. The findings of the 

site-specific environmental review may be challenged by a petitioner during the initial licensing 

of a facility and at license renewal. Taken together, the GEIS and the site-specific 

environmental review will provide the decisionmaker in a licensing proceeding with a complete 

environmental analysis of the impacts associated with spent fuel storage prior to disposal in a 

geologic repository. 

The NRC’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of continued storage builds upon 

substantial operating experience over the licensed life of the reactor. As mentioned above, the 

environmental impacts associated with spent fuel storage during the licensed life for operation 

are addressed during the NRC’s review of license applications and license renewal applications. 

These analyses capture the characteristics that most obviously vary from site to site, such as 

seismic activity, land use, ecosystem, and local population variations. In these site-specific 

licensing reviews, the NRC will consider and, as warranted, implement site-specific mitigation of 

impacts. During operation, facility operators, and the NRC gain significant additional experience 

with site-specific issues, including those related to issues of site configuration and maintenance 

history. During the licensed life of a facility, many factors ensure that operational impacts, 

including those from accidents or off-normal releases, are within regulatory limits at any given 

site. These factors include the plant’s operating experience, licensee compliance with NRC 

regulations, site-specific mitigation and controls informed by the licensing reviews, and ongoing 

regulatory oversight and enforcement actions. 

During the continued storage period, the environmental impacts related to storage of spent fuel 

are not expected to vary beyond the range experienced during operations. The continued 

storage of spent fuel would also not create any new effect on property values beyond what has 

already been experienced. Changes in the environment during the continued storage periods 

examined in the GEIS are expected to be gradual and predictable. There are inherent 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

uncertainties in determining impacts for long-term and indefinite timeframes, and, with respect 

to some resource areas, those uncertainties could result in impacts that, although unlikely, could 

be larger than those that are expected at most sites and have therefore been presented as 

ranges rather than as a single impact level. These uncertainties exist, however, whether the 

impacts are analyzed generically or on a site-specific basis. Because the impacts of continued 

storage are not expected to vary significantly across sites, despite variations in site-specific 

characteristics, a generic analysis is capable of determining and expressing the reasonably 

foreseeable environmental impacts that may result from continued storage. 

,QUHPDQGLQJWKH:DVWH&RQILGHQFH5XOH)5WRWKH15&IRUDGGLWLRQDO

analysis, the Court of Appeals continued the long history of Federal courts approving a generic 

approach to the analysis of the environmental impacts of nuclear power reactor operation. In 

New York v. NRC, the Court of Appeals endorsed the NRC’s generic approach, stating that 

there is “...no reason that a comprehensive general analysis would be insufficient to examine 

onsite risks that are essentially common to all plants.” The NRC believes that a generic 

approach is appropriate because the GEIS makes impact determinations that apply to all 

reactors and spent fuel storage sites. The reasonableness of NRC’s determinations regarding 

continued storage is supported by numerous environmental reviews of spent fuel storage. 

Spent fuel storage during the period of operations has been considered in NRC’s site-specific 

licensing of new reactors, ISFSIs, and license renewal. Further, some comments expressed 

site-specific concerns about safety at nuclear power plants and of continued storage of spent 

fuel. The safe operation of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools and at-reactor 

ISFSIs is dealt with on an ongoing basis as a part of the current licenses. As described in 

Appendix B, Section B.3.3.4 of the GEIS, safety issues and concerns are addressed by the 

NRC on an ongoing basis at every nuclear power plant and ISFSI. The NRC will continue its 

regulatory control and oversight of spent fuel storage at both operating and decommissioned 

UHDFWRUVLWHVWKURXJKERWKVSHFLILFDQGJHQHUDO&)53DUWOLFHQVHV,IWKH15&ZHUHWR

find noncompliance with these requirements or otherwise identify a concern with the safe 

storage of the spent fuel, the NRC would evaluate the issue and take whatever action or change 

in its regulatory program that is necessary to protect the public health and safety and the 

environment. While the comments asserted reasons why a generic approach was 

inappropriate, or why a generic approach should not apply to one or more particular facilities 

they mentioned, the comments did not justify changing the generic impact determinations in the 

GEIS. In particular, none of the comments demonstrated that the environmental impacts of 

spent fuel storage in the period of continued storage would be greater than the impacts during 

the licensed period of operations, which will be assessed in the site-specific licensing review for 

each facility. 

Additional information about comment concerns regarding accidents can be found in Section 

' of this appendix, and emergency planning concerns are addressed in Section D.2.44.2 

of this appendix. Additional information addressing comment concerns regarding spent fuel 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

pool leaks are addressed in Sections D.2.40.2 and D.2.40.3 of this appendix. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-12-4) (30---21--11-----1) (112-13-1) (112-2-1) (112--

2) (112-13-3) (112-31--34-----40--42--1-2) 

-20----1--22----22--2--22--

-1) (200-2) (203-1) (210-----1) (230--3) (244--1) (244-

-3) (244-3--14--31----10------2-

-1------------1-----

-----------13) (303-

--11--20--23-1) (3-----31-----

-12--------------11---

-11----------12------

3--12-3) (-14----32--23------3-

-1) (340--------3--1--1-

-------11) (421--3) (431--1--2--1) 

---------13----2-

---13--1--1--2--2--1--2--4) 

----2--2--- -1----1-14) 

-1--1--1--1-------11) 

----------2--4-

-1--2--1-4) -1--4--3--4----

-----------3) 

----------1--2-

-1--1--1--1--1------2) 

------------

-----------

------------

------------------

-------11) -----1--

-----------2) 

D.2.11.2 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed their concern that the public or interested 

parties would be precluded from raising issues regarding spent fuel storage in future licensing 

actions or for existing plants. Some commenters stated that interested parties would be unfairly 

burdened by having to go through a waiver process, and that new information may not be 

considered. Two commenters asserted that the Commission is abrogating due process by 

abandoning the responsibility of allowing the public to participate, and one commenter also 

stated that a generic determination should be accompanied by very detailed site-specific 

analyses at every site. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that adequate opportunity for public 

participation has not been, or will not be, provided. Under the GEIS and Rule approach the 

NRC has adopted here, only the environmental impacts of the continued storage period are 

considered. The GEIS and Rule do not assess the environmental impacts of storage during the 

licensed life for operation, and members of the public may raise issues pertaining to spent fuel 

storage during licensed life for operation in site-specific licensing proceedings. Development of 

this GEIS and Rule has included a robust public comment process throughout the scoping and 

draft-stage public comment periods during which interested parties have had the ability to raise 

concerns regarding storage of spent fuel during the continued storage period. The NRC 

acknowledges the importance of meaningful public participation, and by providing these 

opportunities both in this process and in site-specific license reviews, the NRC has fulfilled its 

public participation obligations. Further, WKH15&¶VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZ

participants in NRC proceedings to request that a rule, including 10 CFR QRWEHDSSOLHG

or be waived, in a particular proceeding because special circumstances are present that would 

prevent the application of the rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. For more information 

on waiver, see discussion in Section ' of this appendix. The NRC disagrees that the 

generic analysis should be accompanied by a site-specific analysis at every site because to do 

so would not improve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing process. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(222--30----22-------24---2) 

--------3--

D.2.11.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the framing of the alternatives is 

unreasonable and diminishes the benefits of a site-specific assessment, or that the GEIS should 

include an analysis of the benefits of site-specific assessments. One commenter stated that the 

structure of the alternatives around the efficiency of a generic assessment reduces the 

comparison of alternatives to a comparison of administrative efforts. The commenter stated that 

the GEIS does not sufficiently support the conclusion that there is no benefit to the more 

comprehensive information in site-specific reviews, which the commenter believes can provide 

more and better information on the relative risk of high-consequence events and appropriate 

mitigation strategies across sites. Commenters stated that the current inclusion of long-term 

and indefinite timeframes and discussion of high-consequence events is ineffectual and plays 

no role in real analysis. The commenter also stated that because the conclusion in the GEIS is 

that environmental impacts are not affected by performing a generic versus a site-specific 

analysis, the inclusion of site-specific information that would allow for an adequate review is 

“assumed away.” Further, the commenter stated that the GEIS does not provide evidence for 

the assertion that the impacts do not vary across alternatives and provide for the same level of 

protection. The commenter goes on to say that the Court of Appeals’ standard for acceptability 

of a generic evaluation is based on risk, not on a comparison of fuel handling, as the GEIS 

describes. The commenter stated that postulated accidents or catastrophic events vary across 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

sites due to site-specific concerns, but are calculated in the GEIS according to the magnitude of 

the population exposed; however, populations residing near individual plants receive limited 

discussion in the GEIS. The commenter notes that if these factors were considered on a sitespecific basis, they may lead to different impact determinations (MODERATE or LARGE rather 

than SMALL) and therefore different outcomes. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The Federal action in this proceeding is 

the issuance of a rule, whose consequences—and thus its environmental impacts—are 

primarily administrative in nature. For a more detailed discussion of comments on whether the 

NRC has properly framed the Federal action see Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 

In addition, the NRC has not determined—and NEPA does not require the NRC to consider—

whether one method of analysis would provide a better environmental review than another. 

Nonetheless, LQ&KDSWHU the NRC acknowledges that some view a site-specific review to be 

superior to a generic approach. For each of the resource areas analyzed in the GEIS, the NRC 

has reached an impact determination (SMALL, MODERATE, LARGE, or a range) that is 

appropriate for all sites. The assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to 

bound the impacts such that variances that may occur between sites are unlikely to result in 

environmental impact determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. 

Although a site-specific review might produce more details for analysis, the NRC has concluded 

that the activities and potential impacts during continued storage are sufficiently similar at all 

sites that a conservative generic analysis is capable of providing the “hard look” required by 

NEPA. It is important to note that this GEIS satisfies only a portion of the NRC’s NEPA 

obligations related to the issuance of a reactor license or spent fuel storage facility license by 

generically evaluating the environmental impacts of continued storage. Prior to the completion 

of an individual licensing action, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and 

document the results of this review in an EA with a FONSI or in an EIS. For each site-specific 

ISFSI license (new, amended, or renewed) an EA is prepared. 

The concerns raised in these comments regarding use of a generic analysis are discussed in 

more detail in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. The concerns raised in these comments 

regarding use of a generic analysis for accidents, including consideration of mitigation, are 

discussed in Sections ' and D. of this appendix. Further, NRC’s regulations at 10 

&)5DOORZSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ15&SURFHHGLQJVWRUHTXHVWWKDWDUXOHLQFOXGLQJWKHQHZ5XOe, 

not be applied—or be waived—in a particular proceeding because special circumstances are 

present that would prevent the application of the rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. 

For more information on waivers, see the discussion in Section ' of this appendix. 

Under the GEIS and Rule approach the NRC has adopted here, only the environmental impacts 

of the continued storage period are considered. The efficiencies gained through the resolution 

of generic issues related to continued storage in the GEIS, followed by codification of GEIS 

conclusions in &)5 will allow the participants in NRC adjudications—including public 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-100 September 2014 

interest groups, the nuclear industry, State, local, and Tribal governments, and the NRC—to 

focus limited resources on addressing site- or proceeding-specific issues of concern. Further 

concerns about the use of the GEIS as a means to improve the efficiency of the licensing 

process are considered in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. Because the 

proposed action and options under the no-action alternative to the proposed action vary in terms 

of whether or how to use the GEIS in site-specific license reviews, rather than in terms of 

production or storage of the spent fuel, the environmental impacts of those applications do not 

vary among the alternatives. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-4--1--1--1--1--

D.2.11.4 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that because a site-specific review would be 

required for a permanent disposal site, site-specific reviews should be required for permanent 

onsite storage as well. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. There are important differences between 

the analysis of indefinite continued storage in the GEIS and the analysis of the environmental 

impacts of a permanent disposal facility in a site-specific EIS. Section 1.1 of the GEIS includes 

an analysis of the impacts of indefinite storage because the Court of Appeals held that the 

Commission must evaluate the environmental impacts of continued storage assuming the 

Federal government fails to site a permanent disposal facility (New York v. NRC). This analysis 

of indefinite storage in the GEIS does not mean that the Commission endorses indefinite 

storage or that the Commission believes that disposal is not feasible, but rather reflects the 

Commission’s need to develop an analysis that assesses the environmental impacts of 

continued storage in a manner that addresses the Court’s remand. Further, the Rule does not 

authorize indefinite storage at any site, and a site-specific NRC environmental review is required 

before a reactor is licensed or before fuel can be stored onsite. The licensing process for the 

disposal of spent fuel falls under NRC regulations at 1&)53DUWVDQGDQGWKH

UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUHQYLURQPHQWDOUHYLHZIDOOXQGHU3DUW This GEIS and Rule do not support a 

license application for permanent disposal at any site or sites. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-22) 

D.2.11.5 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that a comprehensive analysis of safety data 

from all reactor sites, along with interactions of all elemental isotopes, structures, and other 

components, including cumulative impacts, must be analyzed. The commenter stated that 

without these elements, a generic analysis is incomplete and inadequate and leads to distortion 

and suppression of site-specific facts. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-101 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that a generic environmental analysis is 

incomplete and inadequate without comprehensive site-specific safety data from all reactor 

VLWHV7KHFRXUWVKDYHVXSSRUWHGDJHQHULFHYDOXDWLRQRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHVLQFHWKHODWHV

(Minnesota v. NRC), and in 2012, the Court of Appeals noted that a generic assessment is an 

acceptable way to evaluate the environmental impacts of continued storage (New York v. NRC). 

Examples of other NRC generic environmental impact statements include nuclear power plant 

decommissioning (NUREG–15&a), nuclear power plant license renewal (NUREG–

15&m), and uranium recovery in-situ leach facility licensing (NUREG–15&

a). 

Under the GEIS and Rule approach the NRC has adopted here, only the environmental impacts 

of the continued storage period are considered. The Rule does not authorize the initial or 

continued operation of any nuclear power plant, and it does not authorize storage of spent fuel. 

A separate NRC action is required before a reactor is licensed and before fuel can be stored 

after the expiration of a reactor’s license at a specific site. For site-specific licensing actions, the 

NRC conducts both a technical review of the safety aspects of a proposed facility and an 

environmental review in compliance with the provisions of NEPA. Site-specific factors are taken 

into account during these individual licensing reviews, including, as appropriate, the physical 

environment and the interaction of the facility with this environment both independently and 

cumulatively. Safety aspects, such as the topics raised in the comments, are the focus of the 

technical review. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.11.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the analysis in the GEIS must bound 

site-specific issues in order for the NRC to analyze those issues generically. One commenter 

stated that some issues can be considered generically, but others cannot, so a bounding 

analysis is necessary for each type of impact. Another commenter stated that the NRC should 

enumerate which site-specific issues are excluded, or demonstrate that the analysis for each 

type of impact is bounding, especially for long-term and indefinite timeframes. The commenter 

listed several examples of needed bounding estimates, including cancers attributable to a 

radionuclide release, damage to riverine or other ecosystems, loss of agricultural land and 

production, and property damage. The commenter requested that these estimates be projected 

into the future to include accumulations of spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that the GEIS analysis must be adequately inclusive of the characteristics of sites and 

resource areas considered for a generic determination to be applied. However, the NRC does 

not agree that the analysis was not adequately bounding in the GEIS, or that the bounding 

estimates in the analysis must be specifically enumerated in the GEIS. The assumptions used 

in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that variances that may 

occur between sites are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations greater than 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-102 September 2014 

those presented in the GEIS. In complying with the requirements of NEPA, the NRC developed 

what it views as reasonable conclusions regarding the environmental impacts. In accordance 

with NEPA, the NRC developed what it views as reasonable conclusions regarding the 

environmental impacts. In accordance with NEPA, the GEIS takes into account available 

information to analyze the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel for each of 

WKHUHVRXUFHDUHDVGHVFULEHGLQ&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,67KLVLQIRUPDWLRQZKLFKLVWKH

basis for the analysis, is sufficient to make the impact determinations in the GEIS, which NRC 

concludes are neither worst case, nor underestimated. Additional concerns regarding use of a 

bounding analysis are discussed in Sections and ' and ' of this appendix. 

As further detailed in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix, the NRC has determined in the GEIS 

that the direct and indirect environmental impacts of continued storage at reactors can be 

analyzed generically. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--------

D.2.11.7 – COMMENT: Many commenters requested clarification in the GEIS regarding what 

types of issues or resource areas would be covered or excluded under site-specific reviews 

compared to the generic assessment. 

One commenter stated that during scoping, numerous participants expressed concern about the 

need for site-specific treatment of certain issues, and that the NRC recognized that some such 

issues may exist; however, the scoping decision did not provide criteria for site-specific 

consideration, and without amendments to 10 CFR EFDQGF

participants in NRC adjudicatory proceedings must go through a laborious and uncertain waiver 

process to raise site-specific issues. The commenter stated that without these criteria, public 

participation is severely limited. 

A commenter stated that the GEIS appears to conclude that although site-specific concerns can 

be considered later, no site-specific reviews will be required for continued storage. The 

commenter also asserted that the GEIS fails to demonstrate that the impacts identified in sitespecific environmental reviews would not differ from the impacts identified in the GEIS, which is 

required if no areas are called out as needing site-specific review. Another commenter advises 

the NRC to use caution when determining which issues will be eliminated from future licensing 

considerations based on the commenter’s experience with the PFSF in Utah. 

One commenter expressed concern about the coverage of the Rule for the ISFSI at the Pilgrim 

nuclear power plant, asking whether the site-specific concerns such as vulnerability to sea-level 

rise and other climate change effects are being addressed with a site-specific EIS, or whether 

there are aspects of the GEIS that would apply to Pilgrim to cover those concerns. Another 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-103 185(*௅

commenter cited San Onofre transportation concerns and requested enumeration of how the 

GEIS adequately addresses those concerns. 

Another commenter stated concern that if site-specific reviews are not required to take into 

account long-term storage concerns, as covered by the GEIS, then new information will not 

have an opportunity for consideration. 

Last, a commenter stated concern that where the GEIS does leave opportunity for site-specific 

reviews, the review may be an EA (rather than an EIS), which the commenter indicates is less 

thorough. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The Rule codifies the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel, which the NRC determined it was able to assess 

generically in the GEIS. 7KH15&¶VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ15&

SURFHHGLQJVWRUHTXHVWWKDWDUXOHLQFOXGLQJQRWEHDSSOLHGRUEHZDLYHGLQDSDUWLFXODU

proceeding because special circumstances are present that would prevent the application of the 

rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. For more information on the waiver, see discussion 

in Section ' of this appendix. Concerns in these comments about the use of a generic 

analysis, including whether it is appropriate for addressing climate change and transportation, 

are discussed in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. Concerns about the adequacy of public 

participation for issues related to continued storage are addressed in Section D.2.11.2 of this 

appendix. Further, as explained in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix, the NRC has determined 

that the environmental impacts of continued storage can be analyzed generically and that the 

differences among specific sites did not render a generic analysis impossible or inappropriate. 

This means that, for each of the resource areas analyzed in the GEIS, the NRC has reached a 

generic determination (SMALL, MODERATE, LARGE, or a range) that is appropriate for all 

sites. The assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts 

such that variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in environmental impact 

determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. 

The NRC developed the analysis of the away-from-reactor ISFSI in the GEIS to provide readers 

a reasonable estimate of the impacts of this type of facility, which could possibly play a role in 

the continued storage of spent fuel. The analysis for an away-from-reactor ISFSI did not 

assume any specific location, and thus comments regarding any specific site are not applicable. 

If the NRC receives an application to license an away-from-reactor ISFSI, it will prepare a siteVSHFLILF(,6IRUWKDWDFWLRQDVUHTXLUHGE\&)5EDGGressing all of the 

environmental impacts of building, operating, and decommissioning the ISFSI. Regarding the 

consideration of new information, the NRC will review the GEIS and Rule for possible 

revision when warranted by significant events that may call into question the appropriateness of 

the rule. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-104 September 2014 

Regarding the concern about allowance of EA reviews instead of EISs in site-specific reviews, 

adoption of the GEIS and Rule does not differ from the current licensing framework, which also 

allows either type of review for licensing actions, depending on the expected impacts. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1--3--1--1--1----1--2--3) 

-------3--1--

D.2.11.8 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that in site-specific license renewal cases, the 

NRC does not consider energy conservation as part of the no-action alternative. The 

commenter states that the NRC’s regulatory system does not provide a method for evaluating 

the effects of spent fuel storage and disposal costs on the choice of the no-action alternative in 

these site-specific reviews. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The selection of the no-action alternative 

in site-specific license renewal proceedings is outside the scope of this GEIS. The GEIS 

provides a generic analysis of the environmental impacts from the continued storage of spent 

fuel, while the proposed action and options under the no-action alternative include ways the 

NRC could address the environmental impacts of continued storage in its licensing actions. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--14) 

D.2.11.9 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed their support for the use of a GEIS to 

evaluate the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. Some commenters cited 

the Court decision in New York v. NRC as supporting a generic determination or the efficiency 

of a generic assessment. Other commenters stated that site-specific reviews during individual 

licensing actions adequately consider alternatives to licensing, that a generic analysis 

adequately bounds site-specific concerns, and that the use of a GEIS is preferable to the noaction alternative. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the supportive comments. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30--3) (112---2) (244-11-----1--1--1-14) 

-1--1-

D.2.11.10 – COMMENT: Commenters argued that the GEIS is inconsistent with both court 

decisions and the NRC’s practice of evaluating certain issues on a site-specific basis. 

Commenters questioned why the NRC is treating some issues, like severe accidents, differently 

during a plant’s operating life and during continued storage. Some commenters noted that the 

License Renewal GEIS treats issues like severe accidents as site-specific issues, while this 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

GEIS addresses these issues generically. Further, the commenters noted that the NRC has 

stated in the past that certain aspects of spent fuel storage are inherently site-specific and 

require site-specific consideration. The commenters asserted that under Limerick Ecology 

Action v. NRC, the NRC is required to conduct a site-specific analysis of mitigation of severe 

accident risk and that the court excluded spent fuel storage from that requirement only because 

a repository would be available in the near future. The commenters contended that a sitespecific analysis of severe accident risk for spent fuel storage is now required for each plant 

because the spent fuel pools contain more potential source term than the reactors, they are not 

within containment, and a repository is less likely now than when the Limerick court reached its 

decision. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. First, the NRC 

agrees that the treatment of storage issues in the GEIS and Rule is different than in other NRC 

documents and proceedings. However, these differences do not represent a flaw or 

inconsistency in NRC regulations and technical analysis. 

With regard to generic versus site-specific analysis, the comments mistake a policy decision for 

a NEPA obligation. In the License Renewal GEIS, the NRC elected to treat only a subset of 

issues generically: those for which the NRC was able to determine a single level of impacts that 

would occur at each site. However, in this GEIS, the NRC has determined either a range of 

impact levels or a single bounding impact level for each of the environmental resource areas. 

The NRC’s analysis concluded that no site-specific analysis would result in an impact 

determination greater than those disclosed in the GEIS, although it is possible that impacts 

could be smaller. As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, NEPA does not require the 

NRC to perform site-specific reviews merely because a site-specific review could result in a 

more specific impact determination. Rather, NEPA requires that an agency analyze, disclose, 

and consider environmental impacts before deciding whether to proceed with a proposed action. 

The NRC has analyzed and determined the environmental impacts of continued storage as 

described in the GEIS, and these impacts will be incorporated or considered in licensing actions 

DVGHVFULEHGLQ&)5

To accommodate site-specific variation in future licensing actions that will rely on the Continued 

Storage GEIS, the NRC employed assumptions that are sufficiently conservative to bound 

impact determinations at various sites such that any differences that may exist between sites 

are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations that are greater than those 

presented in the GEIS, including in the analysis of severe accident likelihood and 

consequences. 

Second, the NRC agrees that no site-specific analysis of SAMAs (and in particular, those 

SAMAs that may be associated with continued storage) has been performed by the NRC or 

described in the GEIS or Rule. However, Limerick does not require the NRC to consider 

SAMAs in conjunction with codifying its generic determination of the environmental impacts of 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

continued storage. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Limerick that the NRC 

cannot by policy statement generically exclude SAMAs from consideration in site-specific 

reactor licensing proceedings. The Court of Appeals did not require any special or different 

consideration for SAMAs bearing upon spent fuel storage, nor was it asked to decide that issue. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-13--13-----2) 

D.2.11.11 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the no-action alternative should be 

revised to encompass the environmental consequences of continued storage of spent fuel 

generated pursuant to past and existing NRC licenses, including the minimum amount of spent 

fuel storage that would continue as a result of already licensed activities, types of spent fuel, 

current practices for transferring spent fuel from pools to dry casks, and currently available 

technologies required to manage spent fuel under existing licenses and allowable amendments. 

The commenter stated that the no-action alternative should also project types of fuel that would 

be produced over time, as well as mitigation options that may emerge, and that the NRC should 

consult with other agencies to describe the range of reasonably foreseeable impacts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Under NEPA, alternatives to the 

proposed action necessarily focus on other means to achieve the purpose of and satisfy the 

need for the proposed action. Section RIWKH*(,6VWDWHs that the purpose of the proposed 

action is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the 

environmental impacts of continued storage, and the need for the proposed action is to provide 

processes for use in NRC licensing to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. 

Here, the proposed action satisfies the purpose and need for the proposed action by issuing a 

revised Rule that adopts into regulation the NRC’s generic environmental conclusions for 

continued storage that NRC will consider with regard to continued storage in future licensing 

actions (See GEIS Section 1.4). 

The no-action alternative here, including the options NRC could pursue in case of no action, is 

strictly related to the proposed action of issuing a Rule codifying the GEIS, rather than a new 

regime of regulatory actions imposing new obligations upon licensees. As explained in Section 

RIWKH*(,6DOWHUQDWLYHVUHODWHGWRFXUUHQWVSHQWIXHOPDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFHVRU

technologies, as well as future technologies are beyond the scope of the proposed action. 

Additional concerns that the comments raise regarding alternate options for spent fuel storage 

practices, such as expedited transfer, are addressed in Section D.2.14.2. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--2-

D.2.11.12 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the no-action alternative presented in 

the draft GEIS should not rely on the no-action alternative analysis in the Yucca Mountain EIS 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

because the commenter believes the DOE deliberately underestimated the environmental 

impacts. The commenter also stated that even without a generic Waste Confidence Rule, there 

may not be sufficient information to resume site-specific licensing decisions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The Commission directed the NRC to 

incorporate by reference, as appropriate, existing studies and documents, including the noaction alternative addressed by DOE in the Yucca Mountain EIS '2(, in the 

development of the GEIS (NRC 2012a). Although the analysis of the no-action alternative in the 

Yucca Mountain EIS, which considers disposal of spent fuel, differs substantially from the 

assumptions and scenarios pertinent to continued storage as analyzed in the GEIS, the NRC 

has included information from the DOE analysis to describe the relative magnitude of the 

consequences that might occur should institutional controls be lost. This discussion will ensure 

that a decisionmaker will be adequately informed of the potential consequences of the total loss 

of institutional controls. Further information about NRC’s consideration of loss of institutional 

controls can be found in '. 

Regarding whether sufficient information exists to resume site-specific licensing, the NRC would 

conduct analyses to satisfy its NEPA obligations with respect to continued storage for reactor 

and storage facility licensing proceedings, regardless of the alternative selected. These 

analyses would use the best available information to satisfy NEPA and to address the concerns 

regarding continued storage that caused the Commission to halt final licensing decisions in CLI12- (NRC 2012b). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-10) 

D.2.11.13 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed support for the no-action alternative, 

or for site-specific reviews as an alternative, and provided several reasons for their support. 

Some commenters expressed concern that a less expensive option does not equal lower risk, or 

that concerns for issues such as wildlife habitats, land use, or socioeconomic circumstances 

must be considered on a site-specific basis. Two commenters stated that transparency and 

maximum input from the public is needed during site-specific reviews. One commenter stated 

that they disagree with the statement in the GEIS that the no-action alternative is not consistent 

with CEQ guidance on achieving efficiency and timeliness under NEPA. Another commenter 

stated that a generic analysis allows judgment to be used rather than factual analysis. In the 

context of their comments on the no-action alternative, one commenter stated a need for NRC 

to understand that sometimes consequences are so severe that even a small risk is 

unacceptable. Another commenter cited concern about the use of the pool fires study in the 

GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments in support of the no-action alternative or 

site-VSHFLILFUHYLHZVDVDQDOWHUQDWLYH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6ZDVXSGDWHGWRSURYLGH

clarification of site-specific reviews as one option under the no-action alternative (not issuing a 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

rule) to the proposed action (rulemaking). SHFWLRQRIWKH*(,6LQFOXGHVDGLVFXVVLRQRIKRZ

the various options under the no-DFWLRQDOWHUQDWLYHZRXOGEHLPSOHPHQWHGZKLOH&KDSWHU

addresses the costs of each option. The proposed action and each option under the no-action 

alternative provide a means for the NRC to address, in its environmental review documents, the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. The NRC has determined that a generic analysis 

of the environmental impacts of continued storage is possible despite site-specific differences, 

and the environmental impacts do not vary among the alternatives presented in the GEIS. 

Further, the NRC has determined that the most efficient means for fulfilling its NEPA obligations 

with respect to continued storage is to implement the proposed action, which is to issue a 

revised Rule that adopts into regulation the NRC’s generic environmental conclusions in the 

GEIS. 

The NRC acknowledges the benefits of and is committed to securing meaningful public 

participation. Concerns about the level of public participation associated with the proposed 

action and a preference for site-specific reviews to increase public input opportunities is 

discussed in Section D.2.11.2 of this appendix. 

As previously noted, the environmental impacts of continued storage are essentially the same—

not significant—for the proposed action and each of the options under the no-action alternative. 

The distinctions among the proposed action and the various options in the case of no action, as 

described in the cost-EHQHILWDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6UHODWHWRFRVWVDQGWLPHOLQHVV

Based on those two factors, the site-specific review option is not consistent with CEQ guidance 

(CEQ 2012) regarding efficiency and timeliness in NEPA reviews. 

The concern that the GEIS substitutes judgment for factual analysis speaks to the information 

basis for the GEIS. The NRC’s analysis of the impacts of continued storage builds upon 

substantial experience and knowledge concerning siting reactors and spent fuel storage 

facilities and regulating storage facilities. Therefore, the NRC is able to reasonably describe 

typical spent fuel storage facility characteristics and activities in Chapter 2 and the affected 

environment in Chapter 3 of the GEIS. The NRC has concluded that sufficient information 

exists to perform a generic environmental analysis of the impacts of continued storage. 

A response to concerns that sometimes consequences are so severe that even a small risk is 

unacceptable can be found in Section ' of this appendix. Regarding comments that 

certain information must be considered on a site-specific basis, the NRC discussed these 

concerns in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. Concerns or dissatisfaction with the studies 

referenced in the pool fires analysis in the GEIS is discussed in Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30----3-3) (112---------1--

-2---
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.11.14 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that site-specific reviews are necessary to 

ensure that Fukushima lessons-learned are adequately incorporated, citing the NRC Near-Term 

Task Force report, that states, “the licensing bases, design and level of protection from natural 

phenomena differ among the existing operating reactors in the U.S., depending on when the 

plant was constructed and when the plant was licensed for operation.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that the Near-Term Task Force reviews were considered and conducted on a sitespecific basis. However, the NRC disagrees that the generic analysis in the GEIS is inadequate 

because it does not explicitly incorporate lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event. 

Section 2.1.2.1 of the GEIS describes the NRC’s responses to lessons learned from the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident. The NRC established a task force of senior agency 

experts (i.e., the Near-Term Task Force). In response to the Near-Term Task Force’s 

recommendations, the NRC issued multiple orders and a request for information to all of its 

operating nuclear power plant licensees on March 12, 2012 (NRC 2012e). The NRC will use 

the information collected to determine whether to update the design basis and systems, 

structures, and components important to safety, including spent fuel pools. However, because 

the NRC has not yet received all responses to the request for information and has not decided 

whether any license needs to be modified, suspended, or revoked, the NRC assumes for 

purposes of analysis in this GEIS that the existing regulatory framework remains unchanged. 

Also, the NRC has determined that lessons-learned from Fukushima about reactor accidents do 

not apply to decommissioning nuclear power plants that have spent fuel in continued storage in 

either spent fuel pools or dry casks. However, as any new lessons-learned arise, the NRC will 

consider whether they should be applied to facilities with spent fuel in continued storage. 

The GEIS describes the environmental impacts of postulated accidents during continued 

VWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHO7KLVLQFOXGHVERWKGHVLJQEDVLVDFFLGHQWVLQ6HFWLRQ of the GEIS 

and severe or beyond-GHVLJQEDVLVDFFLGHQWVLQ6HFWLRQ%HFDXVHWKH*(,6LPSDFWV

analysis is based on the existing regulatory framework and considers beyond design-basis 

accidents, consideration of the outcome of the Fukushima Dai-ichi lessons-learned is not 

needed for the GEIS analysis. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-2--2-1-4-

D.2.12 Comments Concerning Alternatives – GEIS Only 

D.2.12.1 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed disapproval that the GEIS-only alternative 

allows for EA reviews instead of more thorough site-specific EIS reviews. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-110 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC has clarified in the final GEIS 

that the no-action alternative to the rulemaking would be not to conduct a rulemaking, that is, 

not to codify the impact determinations from the GEIS. Further, the NRC has clarified that the 

GEIS-only alternative described in the draft GEIS is an option that the NRC could pursue under 

the no-action alternative. If NRC were to pursue the GEIS-only option under the no-action 

alternative, then allowance of EA reviews instead of EIS would not differ from the current 

licensing framework or from the proposed action, which also allow either type of review for 

licensing actions, depending on the expected impacts. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

-21) 

D.2.12.2 – COMMENT: One commenter requested clarification about the GEIS-only alternative; 

specifically, whether it includes an analysis of failure to secure a permanent disposal site, as 

mandated by the Court of Appeals, and the manner in which site-specific issues will be 

addressed. The commenter stated that the GEIS process could serve as a beneficial starting 

point to scope and establish parameters for addressing site-specific issues. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that the GEIS can be a beneficial starting 

point for addressing site-specific issues and issues regarding continued storage of spent fuel. 

The GEIS provides a generic assessment of environmental impacts of continued storage. The 

NRC will incorporate the impact determinations from the GEIS into the NEPA reviews for 

individual licensing actions. In response to the comment's request for clarification, this GEIS, 

whether prepared for either the proposed action or under the GEIS-only no-action alternative 

option, does include an analysis of impacts resulting from failure to secure a permanent 

disposal site (the indefinite storage scenario), as mandated by the Court of Appeals. The NRC 

has clarified in the final GEIS that the no-action alternative to the rulemaking would be not to 

conduct a rulemaking, that is, not to codify the impact determinations from the GEIS. Further, 

the NRC has clarified that the GEIS-only alternative described in the draft GEIS is an option that 

the NRC could pursue under the no-action alternative. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

-12-2) 

D.2.12.3 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed support for the GEIS-only alternative, 

because it would serve as a guidance document, may prevent the GEIS from becoming an 

impediment to decision-making, planning, and mitigation strategy implementation, and does not 

prevent filing of contentions or challenges. The commenter stated that the GEIS-only 

alternative provides a “middle ground” of efficiency, and would allow the GEIS to serve as a tool, 

not a Rule. Another commenter also expressed support for the GEIS-only alternative, but 

VWDWHGWKDWFXUUHQWQXFOHDUZDVWHVWRUDJHIDFLOLWLHVDUHQRWVDIHHQRXJKIRUXVHDIWHUWKH-year 

decommissioning period, at which point canisters should be transported offsite for disposal. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-111 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC has clarified in the final GEIS 

that the no-action alternative to the rulemaking would be not to conduct a rulemaking, that is, 

not to codify the impact determinations from the GEIS. Further, the NRC has clarified that the 

GEIS-only alternative described in the draft GEIS is an option that the NRC could pursue under 

the no-action alternative. Although the GEIS-only option under the no-action alternative would 

satisfy the NRC's NEPA obligations, the use of this option without an accompanying rule would 

result in the constant litigation of identical issues in multiple proceedings. The NRC has decided 

to codify the GEIS findings and conclusions of the GEIS in a rule to allow for the more efficient 

conduct of its proceedings, and to allow licensing boards and parties to focus limited resources 

on site-specific issues. ,QDGGLWLRQWKH15&¶VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ

NRC proceedings to request that a rule, including 10 CFR QRWEHDSSOLHGRUEHZDLYHG

in a particular proceeding because special circumstances are present that would prevent the 

application of the rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. For more information on waiver, 

see Section ' of this appendix. With respect to mitigation strategies, these issues will 

generally be considered in site-specific environmental reviews. The GEIS does, however, 

discuss mitigation related to aging, damaged, or degraded fuel (see Section ' of this 

appendix). Any determinations by the NRC about whether to require mitigation measures will 

occur on a site-specific basis during facility licensing or during the course of ongoing NRC 

oversight. TKHFRPPHQW
VFRQFHUQVUHJDUGLQJVDIHVWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHOEH\RQGWKH-year 

decommissioning period are addressed in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----3--3--1-

D.2.13 Comments Concerning Alternatives – Policy Statement 

D.2.13.1 – COMMENT: Some commenters did not support the policy-statement alternative, as 

specified in the draft GEIS. Two commenters disagreed with the policy-statement alternative 

because they believe it would circumvent public oversight. One commenter stated that the 

policy statement would allow nuclear waste operations to persist on a permanent basis. Several 

commenters stated that a policy-statement alternative would inappropriately allow use of the 

GEIS to avoid addressing site-specific issues. One commenter did not support the policystatement alternative because it would result in a costly and inefficient review process. The 

commenter supported the proposed action. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC has 

clarified in the final GEIS that the no-action alternative to the rulemaking would be not to 

conduct a rulemaking, that is, not to codify the impact determinations from the GEIS. Further, 

the NRC has clarified that the GEIS-only alternative described in the draft GEIS is an option that 

the NRC could pursue under the no-action alternative. The NRC acknowledges and agrees 

with the comments' support for not choosing the policy-statement alternative in the draft GEIS 

(clarified as an option under the no-action alternative in this final GEIS). However, the NRC 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-112 September 2014 

disagrees that the policy-statement option would circumvent public oversight. In fact, the policystatement option would open the GEIS determinations to litigation in each site-specific licensing 

proceeding. In contrast, binding rules—OLNHWKHSURSRVHGXSGDWHWR&)5—are 

generally not subject to litigation in a site-specific licensing action, absent a waiver. The NRC’s 

UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ15&SURFHHGLQJVWRUHTXHVWWKDWDUXOH, 

LQFOXGLQJQRWEHDSSOLHGRUEHZDLYHGLQDSDUWLFXODUSURFHHGLQJEHFDXVHVSHFLDO

circumstances are present that would prevent the application of the rule from satisfying the 

purpose of the rule. For more information on waiver, see Section ' of this appendix. In 

addition, the NRC disagrees that the GEIS would be inappropriately applied to avoid sitespecific issues or that it allows for nuclear waste operations to persist on a permanent basis. 

Under the GEIS and Rule approach adopted by the Commission, participants in site-specific 

proceedings can request a waiver for those issues where they can demonstrate that special 

circumstances exist for their proceeding. Finally, the GEIS only provides a generic analysis of 

the environmental impacts from the continued storage of spent fuel and licensees still need to 

obtain a license to construct and operate a facility; the GEIS does not permit permanent 

operations of any facility. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-1---2--3--22) 

D.2.13.2 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed support for the policy-statement alternative 

as specified in the draft GEIS because the GEIS could be incorporated into future licensing 

actions, and a policy statement would allow for consideration of site-specific facts and filing of 

contentions while eliminating rehearing of generic issues. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC has clarified in the final GEIS 

that the no-action alternative to the rulemaking would be not to conduct a rulemaking, that is, 

not to codify the impact determinations from the GEIS. Further, the NRC has clarified that the 

GEIS-only alternative described in the draft GEIS is an option that the NRC could pursue under 

the no-action alternative. The policy-VWDWHPHQWRSWLRQDVVWDWHGLQ*(,66HFWLRQZRXOG

not preserve the efficiency of NRC’s licensing processes like a binding Rule would, resulting in 

considerable expenditure of public, NRC, and applicant resources. Under the policy-statement 

option, the Commission would still have the choice to apply the environmental impact 

conclusions determined in the GEIS in site-specific NEPA analyses for a specific proceeding, 

but that determination could be subject to litigation in each proceeding. In contrast, binding 

rules—OLNHWKHSURSRVHGXSGDWHWR&)5—are generally not subject to litigation in a 

site-specific licensing actiRQDEVHQWDZDLYHU15&¶VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DOORZ

participants in NRC proceedings to request that a rule, including 10 CFR QRWEHDSSOLHG

or be waived, in a particular proceeding because special circumstances are present that would 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-113 185(*௅

prevent the application of the rule from satisfying the purpose of the rule. For more information 

on waiver, see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of this comment. 

-4) 

D.2.14 Comments Concerning Alternatives – Considered but Eliminated 

D.2.14.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC should consider, as an 

alternative in the GEIS, a requirement that licensees transfer spent fuel from spent fuel pools to 

dry cask storage on an expedited basis. Some commenters stated that the NRC did not provide 

proper reasoning for eliminating this alternative. Several commenters stated that the NRC 

should consider expedited transfer as a mitigation measure. Several commenters also 

requested hardened onsite storage (also known as HOSS) and stated that HOSS is a safer 

alternative. One commenter disagreed with the NRC’s finding that spent fuel can be stored in 

pools safely over the short term, and two commenters cited multiple papers supporting the 

HQYLURQPHQWDOEHQHILWVRIPRYLQJIXHOPRUHWKDQ\HDUVROGLQWRdry cask storage to reduce 

potential risks (e.g., spent fuel pool fires). Several commenters stated that the NRC did not 

properly consider the dangers or consequences of crowded spent fuel pools. One commenter 

stated that the NRC expedited transfer study (COMSECY–13–0030) is not directly applicable to 

continued storage because it did not consider transfer of fuel at plants that are not operating 

and assumed that the fuel may be able to be immediately shipped rather than stored in dry 

casks onsite. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As explained in 6HFWLRQof the 

GEIS, expedited transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry cask storage systems is 

outside the scope of this rulemaking proceeding, for the following reasons. First, the suggested 

alternative does not meet the purpose and need for the proceeding. Second, neither the GEIS 

nor the Rule proposes or imposes new requirements for the storage of spent fuel (e.g., 

expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks for dry storage). The GEIS, which 

provides a regulatory basis for the Rule, assesses the reasonably foreseeable environmental 

impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel in accordance with current NRC requirements. 

The impacts of expedited transfer and the use of hardened dry storage are not within the scope 

of this proceeding because the NRC does not currently require these actions. Further, the 

Commission evaluated a staff assessment of this issue in a separate process and issued its 

decision on May 23, 2014 (NRC 2014a) not to pursue further evaluation of the expedited 

transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry storage. 

Additional comments concerning expedited transfer are addressed in Section ' of this 

appendix. Some comments raised other issues in addition to expedited transfer. Comments 

concerning HOSS are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. Comments concerning risk 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-114 September 2014 

of spent fuel pool fires are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1---------2--2---2-

D.2.14.2 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments that challenged the NRC’s 

selection of alternatives in the GEIS and requested consideration of alternatives for storage of 

spent fuel. Specifically, these comments argued that the NRC should have assessed other 

reasonable alternatives that reduce the environmental impacts of reactor operation and spent 

fuel storage, such as requiring spent fuel to be moved from spent fuel pools to dry casks as 

soon as possible (expedited transfer) and suspending the operation of nuclear power plants 

until a repository becomes available. Several commenters suggested that the NRC require the 

use of HOSS, reduce spent fuel pool density, and move casks to safer or consolidated 

locations. Several commenters cited studies that address spent fuel pool risks, including a 

Sandia National Laboratories study on the reduction of spent fuel storage volume, which a 

commenter stated was new and significant information requiring the NRC’s consideration under 

NEPA; studies by Robert Alvarez (Alvarez et al. 2003; Alvarez 2011) recommending a return to 

open-rack configurations in spent fuel pools; and a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study 

1$6UHFRPPHQGLQJWKDWVSDFHSHUPLWWLQJHPSW\VORWVLQVSHQWIXHOSRROVEHDUUDQJHG

throughout the pool to promote air cooling in the event of a complete pool drainage. One 

commenter also stated that the NRC Fukushima Near-Term Task Force failed to follow the 

advice of the Blue Ribbon Commission to the NAS to analyze the advantages and 

disadvantages of moving fuel into dry storage to reduce pool density as part of the Near-Term 

Task Force report. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. 6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6VWDWH

that the proposed action is to issue a revised Rule that adopts into regulation the NRC’s generic 

environmental conclusions for continued storage, and the purpose is to preserve the efficiency 

of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the environmental impacts of continued 

storage, and the need for the proposed action is to provide processes for use in NRC licensing 

to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. The NRC considered a number of 

the alternatives suggested by the comments; however, these suggestions were eliminated 

because they failed to address the purpose and need for the proposed action. Considered-buteliminated alternatives include the cessation of licensing or reactor operation and the 

implementation of additional regulatory requirements, such as the expedited transfer of spent 

fuel from pools to casks and the use of HOSS. Alternatives such as denials of operating 

licenses or renewals of licenses are considered during the site-specific environmental reviews of 

individual license applications. Additional discussion of these issues can be found in Section 

RIWKH*(,6

Secondly, as detailed in 6HFWLRQRIthe GEIS, the GEIS does not propose or impose 

safety requirements for the storage of spent fuel, such as those suggested by the comments. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The GEIS assesses the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of the continued storage 

of spent fuel in accordance with current NRC requirements. The impacts of the suggested 

alternatives are not within the GEIS scope because the NRC does not currently require these 

actions. 

Finally, the comments raise additional concerns addressed in further detail in this GEIS. 

Comments regarding stopping NRC licensing activities and halting any further production of 

spent fuel are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. Additional information regarding 

comments related to expedited transfer can be found in Section D.2.14.1 of this appendix. The 

NRC’s consideration of spent fuel pool fires is detailed in Appendix F of the GEIS; comments 

concerning spent fuel pool fires are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1--1) (222--12-------2--3-1) 

-2--2--2--3-24) 

D.2.14.3 – COMMENT: 2QHFRPPHQWHUGLVDJUHHGZLWKDVWDWHPHQWLQ6HFWLRQRIWhe 

draft GEIS, which states that “the Commission has already established criteria that provide 

reasonable assurance of public health and safety and due consideration of environmental 

impacts in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, including facilities for 

continuing storage of spent fuel.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC sets forth its siting and safety 

UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUQXFOHDUUHDFWRUVLQ&)53DUW5HDFWRU6LWH&ULWHULD&)53DUW

(Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities), DQG&)53DUW/LFHQVHV

&HUWLILFDWLRQVDQG$SSURYDOVIRU1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, additional measures for mitigation include the NRC’s reactor site criteria in 10 CFR Part 

100 that require nuclear power plant sites to have (1) certain characteristics that reduce the risk 

to the public and the potential impacts of an accident and (2) emergency preparedness plans 

and protective actions measures for the site and environs. The safety features, measures, and 

SODQVHVWDEOLVKHGLQ&)53DUWDQG&)53DUWVDQGUHIOHFWWKHGHIHQVH-in-depth 

philosophy used by the NRC to protect the health and safety of the public and environment. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment; however, Sections 1.3, 

DQGRIWKH*(,6KDYHEHHQXSGDWHGWRSURYLGHFODULILFDWLRQWRWKHGHVFULSWLRQVRI

the purpose of the GEIS, proposed action, purpose and need, and alternatives, respectively, 

and the statement to which the comment refers has been revised for clarity. 

-

D.2.14.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters suggested that the NRC should have considered 

HOSS as an alternative. The commenters stated that many environmental groups have 

advocated for HOSS, and that HOSS appears to be the safest alternative until final disposal is 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

ready. One commenter stated that the NRC should disclose the differences between surface 

storage and deep geologic disposal in a safety context. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with tKHFRPPHQWV$VH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, requiring HOSS is outside the scope of this rulemaking proceeding for the following 

reasons. First, the suggested alternative does not meet the purpose and need for the 

proceeding. Second, neither the GEIS nor the Rule proposes or imposes safety requirements 

for the storage of spent fuel. The GEIS, which provides a regulatory basis for the Rule, 

assesses the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of the continued storage of spent 

fuel. The impacts of requirements or use of hardened dry storage are not within the scope of 

this proceeding because the NRC does not currently require these actions. Ongoing NRC 

actions regarding the use of HOSS are described in Section D of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-33----2--

D.2.14.5 – COMMENT: Many commenters disagreed with elimination of Cessation of Licensing 

or Cessation of Reactor Operation as an alternative in the GEIS, or stated that the NRC did not 

give these alternative due consideration. Several commenters stated that the NRC must 

analyze these alternatives to comply with NEPA, that the Court of Appeals in New York v. NRC 

has already identified this alternative as a reasonable alternative, and that failure to include 

these alternatives in the GEIS is arbitrary and capricious. Another commenter stated that the 

NRC inappropriately defined the purpose and need of the GEIS to restrict the alternatives that 

must be analyzed to comply with NEPA, including eliminating the option to cease licensing and 

operations. One commenter pointed to Section 103.d of the AEA, which prohibits the NRC from 

issuing a license if issuance would be “inimical” to public health or if the NRC does not have 

“reasonable assurance,” further stating that the “essence” of the Court of Appeals’ decision in 

New York v. NRC was that spent fuel is a danger to public health and safety, and that there is 

no reasonable assurance that a repository will ever be available, thus requiring the NRC to 

consider ceasing nuclear power production as an alternative. One commenter stated that the 

generic approach is inadequate to meet the NEPA requirements for licensing decisions. One 

commenter stated that because licensing decisions cannot be made absent a Waste 

Confidence Rule, cessation of licensing must be considered under the no-action alternative. 

Two commenters stated that the argument against termination of licensing is circular because 

the NRC states that it already has regulations in place to provide reasonable assurance of 

public health and safety, but part of the regulatory basis providing this assurance is the 

Continued Storage Rule. These commenters also noted that the NRC has authority to revoke 

RUGHFOLQHWRLVVXHOLFHQVHVXQGHU&)5LQFOXGLQJLIRUZKHQRSHUDWLRQLVLQLPLFDOWR

public health and safety, or if or when the Commission has no reasonable assurance of safe 

operation. Another commenter stated that the NRC must reject all license renewal applications 

whose proceedings are currently held in abeyance. One commenter requested consideration of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

a scenario in which there is no way to safely store waste, which would then require the 

shutdown of reactors. Other commenters stated that because a permanent repository still does 

not exist, licensing should not continue. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC considered and rejected 

cessation of reactor licensing or cessation of reactor operations as alternatives to the revised 

Rule, as detailed in 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6. The stated purpose and need for the 

rulemaking proceeding are not satisfied by cessation of reactor licensing or reactor operations. 

The alternative of not issuing or not renewing a nuclear power plant license is considered during 

the site-specific review of an individual license application. Through the AEA, Congress has 

mandated that the NRC establish criteria to allow the licensing of nuclear power plants. 

Therefore, without Congressional direction to do so, the NRC may not deny a reactor license 

unless it determines that a license applicant has not met the NRC’s regulatory standards for 

issuance of a license. Further, unless a threat to the public health and safety or the common 

defense and security exists, the NRC has no authority to deprive current licensees of their 

vested interest in licenses already issued in compliance with those regulatory standards. 

Although cessation of nuclear power plant licensing and operations would halt the future 

generation of spent fuel, the environmental impacts of continued storage would not cease until 

sufficient repository capacity becomes available to dispose of the spent fuel already amassed. 

Regarding the comment that licensing decisions cannot be made absent a Waste Confidence 

Rule, the NRC has suspended issuance of final licenses until the Court of Appeals’ remand is 

addressed (CLI-12-, NRC 2012b). However, as an option under the no-action alternative, 

absent a GEIS, consideration of impacts from continued storage of spent fuel would be 

addressed in site-VSHFLILFOLFHQVLQJUHYLHZVDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

The comments raise several other issues that are discussed elsewhere in this document. 

Comments regarding the adequacy of a generic approach are addressed in Section D.2.11.1 of 

this appendix. Concerns regarding reasonable assurance of safety are addressed in Section 

'. Comments regarding assurance of repository availability are addressed in Section 

' of this appendix. Additional comments regarding concerns with alternatives are 

addressed in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(1-24) (1-3) (30-12-11) (30-12--11---2-3) (222-22) (222--32--

--13--4--4--4--4------

----------

-----1--2------

3----2--2--1) 

D.2.14.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters requested that licensing and relicensing of 

nuclear reactors or production of nuclear waste should not continue until such time that a 

permanent solution for nuclear waste (e.g., a geologic repository) is available. One commenter 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

requested that the current moratorium on licensing continue until an interim storage facility has 

been sited and licensed. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the NRC should continue the 

licensing moratorium or cease licensing or relicensing of nuclear reactors until a permanent 

solution (e.g., a repository) or an interim storage facility is available. As stated in Section 

RIthe GEIS, the cessation of licensing or licensed operations was considered but 

eliminated as an alternative because it would not satisfy the purpose and need for the proposed 

action. As further discussed in 6HFWLRQRIthe GEIS, the NRC has no authority under the 

AEA to deny a license if the applicant has met the NRC’s licensing requirements, or to suspend 

a license on grounds other than noncompliance with legal requirements. 

Regarding the request that the current moratorium on licensing continue until interim storage 

facilities are sited or disposal is available, licensing decisions are not dependent on siting, 

licensing, or operation of interim storage facilities or disposal sites. Further information about 

concerns regarding the NRC’s authority to license in the absence of a repository are addressed 

in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

-----2--1------2) 

----1) (1004-2) 

D.2.14.7 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that use of nuclear power, production of 

nuclear waste, or licensing and relicensing of nuclear power plants should cease. The 

commenters did not expressly request that this be considered as an alternative to the Rule, but 

the comments related to the GEIS or GEIS analysis. Some requested licensing cease until it 

can be proven that waste can be stored safely, or expressed concern that current waste storage 

is unsafe. Others requested that other energy sources be used instead of nuclear power or 

analyzed as an alternative to nuclear power. Some commenters expressed concern about the 

age of the reactors and the safety of the aging fleet. Other commenters called for HOSS, 

cleanup of existing sites, or transfer of fuel from pools to casks. Some commenters also stated 

that leaving nuclear waste for future generations to deal with is an intergenerational injustice. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the GEIS should have considered 

cessation of licensing, or shutting down nuclear power plants, in greater depth as an alternative 

in the GEIS. The NRC considered and rejected cessation of reactor licensing or cessation of 

UHDFWRURSHUDWLRQVDVDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKH5XOHLQWKH*(,6DVGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS. The cessation of reactor licensing or reactor operations does not satisfy the stated 

purpose for this proceeding, which is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing 

processes, or the need for the GEIS, which is to provide processes for use in the NRC’s 

licensing process to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. For this 

rulemaking, the proposed action and options under the no-action alternative to the proposed 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

action concern how and whether to use a generic analysis in site-specific licensing reviews, 

rather than alternative methods of power production or ceasing production of spent fuel. The 

alternatives of not renewing or not issuing a nuclear power plant license or use of alternate 

sources of energy generation can be considered in a site-specific review. 

The NRC acknowledges the concerns reflected in the comments regarding continued nuclear 

power plant operation, but issues involving reactor operations, generation and storage of spent 

fuel during the licensed life of a reactor, and the ultimate disposal of spent fuel are beyond the 

scope of the GEIS and Rule, which concerns the environmental impacts of continued storage of 

spent fuel. Further, the NRC is an independent regulator that does not promote nuclear or other 

types of energy. 

The comments also raised additional concerns that are addressed elsewhere in this document. 

Concerns about the safe storage of spent fuel are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. 

Comments requesting additional regulatory requirements for storing spent fuel are addressed 

Section D.2.14.2 of this appendix. Comments with concerns about intergenerational justice are 

addressed in Section D.2.23.1 of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of these comments. 

(30-12--11-10) (244-14------------

------32---4) (402-----

-1---------2--1) 

-3) 

D.2.14.8 – COMMENT: Several commenters requested that the GEIS consider, as an 

alternative, cessation of licensing, relicensing, or production of nuclear waste until a permanent 

repository is available. Some commenters stated that the NRC does not have the authority to 

license production of more waste until safe isolation of waste from the environment is proven, 

and one commenter stated that this position was found reasonable by the Court of Appeals in 

New York v. NRC. Commenters also raised the issue of regulatory capture. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC considered and rejected 

cessation of reactor licensing or cessation of reactor operations as an alternative in the GEIS, 

DVGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6The cessation of reactor licensing or reactor 

operations does not satisfy the stated purpose for this proceeding, which is to preserve the 

efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the environmental impacts of 

continued storage, or the need for the GEIS, which is to provide processes for use in the NRC’s 

licensing process to address the environmental impacts of continued storage. For this 

rulemaking, the proposed action and NRC’s potential options under the no-action alternative 

concern how and whether a generic analysis is used in site-specific licensing reviews, rather 

than alternative methods of power production or ceasing production of spent fuel. The 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-120 September 2014 

alternative of not renewing or issuing a nuclear power plant license is considered in individual 

site-specific licensing reviews. 

The comments also raise additional concerns that are addressed elsewhere in the GEIS. 

Concerns about the NRC’s ability to regulate in an unbiased way are addressed in Section 

' of this appendix. Comments regarding the authority for licensing in the absence of a 

repository are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-21--1) (143-4) (330------

D.2.14.9 – COMMENT: Several commenters requested that the GEIS include an analysis of 

alternative sources of energy, including their feasibility, “cradle to grave” environmental impacts, 

and a comparison of the costs from nuclear energy and other energy sources. Some of the 

commenters requested an end to nuclear power based on this analysis. One commenter cited 

numerous sources with information about replacement of nuclear power with renewable energy 

generation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments insofar as they request an analysis of 

alternative energy sources. As noted in 6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6, the proposed action 

is to issue a revised Rule that adopts into regulation the NRC’s generic environmental 

conclusions for continued storage, and the purpose is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s 

licensing processes with respect to the environmental impacts of continued storage, and the 

need for the proposed action is to provide processes for use in NRC licensing to address the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. For this rulemaking, the proposed action, as well 

as NRC’s potential options under the no-action alternative to the proposed action, concern how 

and whether a generic analysis is used in site-specific licensing reviews, rather than alternative 

methods of power generation, such as renewable energy. Alternative methods of power 

generation and the costs of those alternatives will be evaluated in site-specific nuclear power 

plant licensing reviews. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(3----------20) 

D.2.14.10 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated support for continued nuclear power 

generation, or stated that the GEIS correctly eliminated cessation of licensing and cessation of 

reactor operation as alternatives. One commenter stated that delay in continued and expanded 

use of nuclear power would result in public health effects related to use of fossil fuels for power 

generation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments. Because the GEIS assesses the 

environmental impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel, the impacts from the use of either 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-121 185(*௅

nuclear power or fossil fuels for power generation are outside the scope of this analysis. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30------

D.2.15 Comments Concerning Alternatives – Costs 

D.2.15.1 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the cost-benefit analysis in the GEIS is 

meaningless because the cost difference is limited to administrative costs, which are not 

typically the focus of NEPA analysis. Further, the commenter noted that the method of 

evaluating the administrative costs is inappropriate, in part because it includes “sunk” costs of 

developing the GEIS for the three action alternatives. The commenter stated that these sunk 

costs can no longer be avoided and thus should not be included. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment with respect to the meaningfulness of the 

cost-benefit analysis and the exclusion of sunk or past costs in the cost-benefit analysis. The 

DQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHULVDSSURSULDWHEHFDXVHLWIRFXVHVRQWKHFRVWDQGEHQHILWGLstinctions 

between the proposed action and the options under the no-action alternative (i.e., the sitespecific review, GEIS-only, and policy-statement options) rather than the similarities. The 

comparison of the proposed action and options under the no-aFWLRQDOWHUQDWLYHLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS includes the unquantified costs and benefits and the quantified costs, which the 

comment refers to as administrative costs. 

Because the proposed action serves an administrative purpose (i.e., to preserve the efficiency 

of the NRC’s licensing processes with respect to the environmental impacts of continued 

storage) and an administrative need (i.e., to provide processes for the NRC to use in NRC 

licensing to address the environmental impacts of continued storage), it necessarily follows that 

any alternatives would also be administrative in nature. Moreover, only a binding rule preserves 

the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes. However, the NRC includes other processes 

that the NRC could use to address the environmental impacts of continued storage as options 

that the NRC could pursue in the case of no action. Each of these options would result in 

insignificantly different environmental impacts. IQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&QRWHVWKDW

the environmental impacts of the proposed action and NRC’s options under the no-action 

alternative—which, as the comment notes, are all administrative in nature—are not significant. 

The comment does not express disagreement with the reasons the NRC did not address the 

HQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVLQWKHDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHUEXWLQVWHDGFKDUDFWHUL]HV

the resulting analysis as atypical. The 15&EHOLHYHVWKDWWKH&KDSWHUDQDO\VLVLVDSSURSULDWH

for capturing and comparing the costs and benefits of alternatives associated with this 

rulemaking because NEPA requires a balancing of the benefits and costs of the proposed action 

and alternatives, and because the differences between the proposed action and the NRC’s 

options in the case of no action are not environmental in nature. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-122 September 2014 

:LWKUHVSHFWWRSDVWRUVXQNFRVWVWKHFRPPHQWFRUUHFWO\SRLQWVRXWWKDW6HFWLRQRIWKH

draft GEIS stated that the NRC projects the costs of each alternative (note that in the final GEIS, 

the draft GEIS alternatives are now characterized as the NRC’s options in the case of no action) 

IURPILVFDO\HDUWRDQGWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQDQGWKH15&¶VRSWLRQVLQWKHFDVHRI

no action, excepting the site-specific review option, include development of the GEIS, which is 

schHGXOHGWREHDFFRPSOLVKHGSULRUWR7KH15&GLVDJUHHVWKDWWKHFRVWVRIGHYHORSLQJ

the GEIS should not have been included in the analysis because including the costs provides a 

transparent and complete disclosure of the relative costs of the proposed action and the NRC’s 

options in the case of no action. Because not including the 2013 and 2014 costs would give the 

appearance of no cost for the proposed action, inclusion of these in the cost comparison of 

$SSHQGL[+DQG&KDSWHUSURYLGHVDPRUHFRPSOete estimate. While the 2013 and 2014 costs 

are, in effect, sunk costs, development of the GEIS and Rule in response to the Court of 

Appeals’ remand does not preclude the Commission from selecting any of the options under the 

no-action alternative. Most importantly, inclusion of costs that have already been incurred 

would not result in the NRC reaching a different conclusion than it would if it removed those 

costs; inclusion of previously incurred costs merely reduces the net financial benefit that the 

proposed action provides over all of the NRC’s potential options in case of no action. However, 

to address the comment’s concern, the GEIS has been revised to include additional text in 

&KDSWHUDQG7DEOHV+-4 to clarify where 2013 and 2014 costs may be considered previously 

incurred costs. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-12) 

D.2.15.2 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments on the considerable costs of 

litigation related to nuclear waste storage and disposal, many of which recommended inclusion 

of the costs of litigation in the GEIS cost considerations. One commenter noted the significant 

sums associated with cost recovery of continued at-reactor storage, asserting that further 

litigation and awards would result in even higher sums. Two commenters noted the costs of 

supplemental EISs in addition to litigation. A commenter stated the belief that “costs” of 

litigation do not justify dismissal of the no-action alternative, because the licensee will pass the 

costs of application review and litigation onto the ratepayers, who are not necessarily aware of 

how the decisions made by the licensee or how the Rule affects their community. The 

commenter stated that the ratepayers expect their fees to fund a repository and thorough sitespecific reviews, and that the cost savings of the proposed action should not serve as legal 

shield to prevent site-specific litigation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments regarding 

litigation costs related to waste storage and disposal. The NRC recognizes the concerns about 

the current and future burden placed on taxpayers that results from DOE’s failing to remove 

spent fuel from reactor sites as specified in DOE’s contracts with power plant owners and 

operators. In addition, the NRC recognizes that some taxpayers and ratepayers would prefer 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-123 185(*௅

that the collected funds be spent to fund a repository rather than to reimburse licensees for 

storage costs. However, until DOE satisfies its contractual obligations, these burdens will exist 

irrespective of which alternative is selected. Therefore, the NRC disagrees with the comment 

that the expenses associated with cost recovery should be included in the GEIS. 

&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6LQFOXGHVVRPHRIWKHFRVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKsite-specific litigation of 

generic continued storage issues (although not, for the reasons stated in the previous 

paragraph, the cost-recovery issues raised in the comment) along with the costs of 

supplemental EISs and inclusion of continued storage in ongoing and new site-specific reviews. 

However, the comments correctly note that all site-specific litigation costs are not included in the 

quantitative cost estimates. Moreover, because all litigation costs are not quantified, Section 

RIWKH*(,6LQFOudes site-specific litigation costs as part of the unquantified costs. The GEIS 

notes that these costs may be large and are difficult to quantify because they vary significantly 

and are case- and fact-dependent. The GEIS includes a quantitative assessment of the cost of 

supplemental, existing, and new reviews, which includes some litigation support costs, within 

the context of the 30-year timeframe of the cost-benefit analyses. 

As described in &KDSWHU, the cost-benefit analysis is only one of the factors that informs the 

NRC’s decision regarding which alternative to implement. The NRC has identified that one of 

the benefits of the proposed action is efficiency—and attendant cost savings—that would be 

gained from a generic, rule-based approach rather than site-specific reviews. The analysis in 

&KDSWHUIRFXVHVRQWKHFRVWDQGEHQHILWGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQDQGWKH

options under the no-action alternative regardless of who bears the burden of this cost, and the 

cost of site-specific litigation is one such distinction. Therefore, the NRC disagrees with the 

comment’s suggestion that the cost of site-specific litigation is not an important factor in 

considering whether to implement the proposed action or an option under the no-action 

alternative because the licensee will pass this and other costs onto the ratepayers. The NRC 

acknowledges that some ratepayers believe that the money should be spent on site-specific 

reviews of continued storage rather than on a GEIS. The NRC considers this a statement in 

support of the options under the no-action alternative, each of which allows for site-specific 

reviews. The NRC’s responses addressing comments on the various no-action alternative 

options are discussed in Section D.2.11 of this appendix. In addition, the NRC acknowledges 

that despite its best efforts, some ratepayers may not be aware of how the Rule affects their 

communities. The NRC’s public involvement efforts included, but were not limited to, scoping 

as described iQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DORQJZLWKWKHSXEOLFFRPPHQWSHULRGIRUWKHGUDIW

GEIS and proposed Rule as described in Section D.1 of this appendix and also in Appendix C. 

Insofar as the comment asserts that some ratepayers may not be aware of how decisions made 

by licensees affect their communities, these matters are outside the scope of this rulemaking. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----1-10) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-124 September 2014 

D.2.15.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS does not include a discussion of 

the intergenerational impacts of accidents and the associated discounting methods over the 

long-term and indefinite timeframes. The commenter notes that because the GEIS does not 

account for costs of environmental impacts of accidents or high-consequence events, it does 

not include discussion of discounting impacts to estimate a present value over time. The 

commenter states that the GEIS discount rates are consistent with the U.S. Office of 

Management and Budget recommendations over the short timeframe, but that the Office of 

Management and Budget recommends lower discount rates over intergenerational timeframes 

due to consideration of the well-being of future generations and uncertainty. The commenter 

stated that not using a declining discount rate calls into question how the NRC concludes that 

environmental impacts are SMALL across all alternatives, scenarios, and sites. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments about the 

inclusion of the intergenerational impacts of accidents and the associated discounting methods 

over the long-term and indefinite timeframes in the GEIS. The NRC agrees that comparing 

benefits and costs across generations can vary from other types of cost-benefit analyses. The 

NRC disagrees that the GEIS cost-benefit analysis should include the intergenerational impacts 

RIDFFLGHQWV7KHDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHUIRFXVHVRQWKHFRVWDQGEHQHILWGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQ

the proposed action and the options under the no-action alternative over a 30-year time span, 

rather than over intergenerational periods. Moreover, the proposed action and the NRC’s 

options in the case of no action are administrative approaches to considering the environmental 

impacts of continued storage and therefore do not differ in terms of impacts that may result from 

accidents. 

6HFWLRQRIWKLV*(,6H[SODLQVWKDWWKHDQDO\VLVGRHVQRWLQFOXGHWKHFRVWVRUEHQHILWVRIWKH

environmental impacts of continued storage, which includes accidents, because continued 

storage is an activity that may occur regardless of the process that the NRC selects to consider 

the environmental impacts of continued storage. Under each of the no-action options and under 

the proposed action, the NRC considers in its licensing reviews an analysis of the environmental 

impacts of continued storage. Because the proposed action serves an administrative purpose 

and need, it necessarily follows that the other reasonable options to serve that need would also 

be administrative in nature and have similarly insignificant environmental impacts. 

,Q6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&GHVFULEHVWKH-year timeframe that it used for the costbenefit analysis based on the example provided in guidance from the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB 2003), which is the same as the approximate cumulative period for which all 

previous versions of the Rule existed. Insofar as the comment states that the approach used by 

the NRC is consistent with best management practices for Federal agencies as described by 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB 2003), the NRC acknowledges the statement. 

Because the cost-benefit analysis in the GEIS examines a 30-year timeframe and because 

environmental impacts of the proposed action do not differ from those of NRC’s options under 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

the no-action alternative, the GEIS does not need to include the types of discussion and 

analysis suggested by the comment (e.g., discussing discounting impacts to estimate a present 

value over time or using lower or declining discount rates) to address the environmental impacts 

of accidents over the long-term and indefinite timeframes. 

Insofar as the comment questions how the NRC concludes that environmental impacts are 

SMALL across all alternatives, scenDULRVDQGVLWHV6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6

address the environmental impacts of accidents including NRC’s impact magnitude conclusions. 

The NRC response to requests to include cost in the accident impact magnitude determination 

in the GEIS is discussed in Section ' RIWKLVDSSHQGL[,QDGGLWLRQ6HFWLRQV

DQGRIWKH*(,6DGGUHVVHQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFH7KH15&UHVSRQVHWRrequests to include 

intergenerational equity in the GEIS is discussed in Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2--2--2-4) 

D.2.15.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters disagreed with the use of public-perception costs 

and benefits in the GEIS. Citing examples of how viewpoints might differ, the commenters 

stated that public perception should not be included because the costs and benefits are 

speculative, subjective, and different among stakeholders. Two of the commenters noted that 

avoidance of such speculation is consistent with the approach in the DOE Yucca Mountain EIS. 

One commenter stated that public perception is too far removed from the physical environment 

to be an appropriate consideration in NEPA reviews. Two commenters stated that it is 

inappropriate for the NRC, as a regulatory body, to speculate on public perception and for the 

NRC to decide which group’s perception is credited with a cost or benefit. These commenters 

also stated that public opinion surveys reveal that a majority of the public favors nuclear power 

as one of the ways to produce electricity. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments about the 

inclusion of public-perception costs and benefits in the GEIS. The NRC agrees with the 

comments that costs and benefits should be discussed in the GEIS in a manner that (1) 

provides a basis for the factors included in the analysis, (2) avoids speculation regarding public 

opinion, DQGDFNQRZOHGJHVYDU\LQJVWDNHKROGHUSHUVSHFWLYHV$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, the proposed action and options under the no-action alternative for this GEIS do not vary 

in environmental impacts, but rather in the approach that NRC could apply to future licensing 

activities to address potential environmental impacts of continued storage. As described in 

6HFWLRQDQG7DEOH+-RIWKH*(,6WKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQGLIIHUVIURPWKHRSWLRQVXQGHUWKH

no-action alternative in that the proposed action conclusively addresses the environmental 

impacts of continued storage without site-specific reviews of continued storage and precludes 

the ability to challenge an applicant's or the NRC's consideration of the impacts of continued 

storage without a waiver, which is a well-documented topic of concern to some members of the 

public, as discussed elsewhere in Section '. Public perception is included as an 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

unquantified cost in the cost-benefit analyses because—contrary to assertions that public 

perceptions are speculative—there is a substantial record of public interest and concern 

throughout scoping and in the comments on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule regarding how 

site-VSHFLILFUHYLHZVZLOOEHDGGUHVVHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDELQGLQJUXOH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

acknowledges that perceptions vary among stakeholders regarding whether use of the GEIS 

and Rule to improve efficiency in reviewing environmental impacts of continued storage in sitespecific licensing actions or being able to challenge the consideration of these impacts without a 

waiver are classified as costs or benefits. However, the NRC recognizes that the presentation 

of this information LQ7DEOH-FRQYH\VWKHPRVWFRPPRQSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKLVWRSLF&KDSWHU

of the GEIS has been updated to indicate that NRC received alternative perspectives. 

&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6DGGUHVVHVZKHWKHUVLWH-specific reviews for continued storage will be 

conducted and whether the impact conclusions can be challenged without a waiver in the 

summary of unquantified costs and benefits. For some who commented on the GEIS, the 

absence of the ability to challenge impact conclusions without a waiver was a cost. For others, 

this was a benefit, although it is a benefit that is consonant with efficiency, a factor that the NRC 

considered throughout its cost-benefit analysis. 

The NRC disagrees with one comment’s statement that public perception should not be 

included in NEPA reviews based on a court case in which alleged psychological impacts were 

considered too far removed from the physical environment of a nuclear facility to require 

consideration under NEPA. Here, the sections of the GEIS to which this comment relates are 

not associated with alleged impacts—as occurred in the court case—but with whether 

consequences of selecting among alternatives are classified as either costs or benefits. 

One comment cited public support for nuclear power as an electricity generation option as a 

benefit of the proposed action, but the purpose of the GEIS is to determine the environmental 

impacts of continued storage and determine whether impacts can be generically analyzed. The 

purpose is not to analyze various means of electricity generation, an issue that can be 

addressed in site-specific licensing proceedings for new-reactor licensing and reactor license 

renewal (see Section ' of this appendix for the NRC’s response to comments that assert 

that the NRC should address the environmental impacts of other forms of power generation in 

the GEIS). 

To address the concerns expressed in these comments and to acknowledge the varying 

perspectives of VWDNHKROGHUVDFODULILFDWLRQZDVPDGHLQ7DEOH-RIWKH*(,6WRQRWHERWK

perspectives6HFWLRQVand  of the GEIS have been revised to reflect the 

change in language. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

----
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.16 Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions and Analysis 

D.2.16.1 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that a draft NRC report related to an earlier 

NRC study about the assumptions for an EIS related to a long-term waste confidence update 

should be withdrawn because it violates NEPA and because the NRC’s decision to issue it 

without publishing a notice in the Federal Register is inconsistent with the agency’s own policy 

on open government. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The comment relates to a report 

published by the NRC in 2011 (NRC 2011b) as part of a long-term effort to develop a basis for a 

future update to the Rule. This report is not part of the current proceeding, was not considered 

by the NRC in preparing the GEIS, and is outside the scope of the current action. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1) 

D.2.16.2 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the description of the affected environment 

in the GEIS needs to be expanded. The commenter expressed concern regarding potential 

downstream impacts resulting from accidental releases of irradiated nuclear fuel to air or water. 

The commenter asserted that both water and air impacts could travel large distances, impacting 

the food chain, and would persist for many generations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The GEIS provides a thorough 

description of potentially affected resources, including ground and surface waters, terrestrial and 

aquatic species and habitats, and sources of public radiation dose due to natural and artificial 

sources other than spent fuel. The draft GEIS provided an assessment of public health impacts 

of storage facilities from both routine operations and accidents. The draft GEIS concluded that 

public health impacts from routine operations are being maintained well below regulatory dose 

limits and can be maintained below dose limits throughout the short-term, long-term, and 

indefinite storage timeframes. The draft GEIS analysis of accidents concluded that storage 

systems are designed to withstand all postulated design basis accidents with no loss of safety 

functions and that the risk from severe accidents in storage systems is small. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-4-

D.2.16.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should clarify which impacts 

would not be considered as part of a site-specific evaluation of an away-from-reactor ISFSI 

license application. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. An EIS for the licensing of an away-fromreactor ISFSI would evaluate the environmental impacts of building and operating the facility, 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

including the impacts of moving spent fuel from reactors to the away-from-reactor ISFSI. See, 

as an example, the EIS for the PFSF (NUREG–, NRC 2001a). The analysis would 

incorporate the impacts of continued storage of spent fuel beyond the licensed life of the awayfrom-reactor ISFSI as determined in the GEIS (NUREG–6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6KDV

been revised to provide this clarification. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-

D.2.16.4 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC could have used various methods 

to better forecast future conditions and alternatives, including the case study method and 

general morphological analysis. The commenter stated that an array of analysis techniques 

would be more likely to be valid and reliable compared to a generic methodology. The 

commenter stated that the GEIS could have examined future alternatives by using the case 

study method to extrapolate from similar cases, using actual data, and then applying that data at 

other locations. The commenter acknowledged that the NRC tried to apply this approach in the 

GEIS by relying on existing environmental studies; however, the commenter claimed that NRC 

used a complete abstraction of the available information in developing the GEIS analysis. The 

commenter identified a number of advantages of the case study method and cited a number of 

claimed deficiencies in the NRC’s conduct of its analysis. The commenter identified general 

morphological analysis as another analytical approach that could have been used for predicting 

future impacts of spent fuel storage. The commenter described the key aspects of this 

technique. The commenter stated that the NRC could have used this technique to assess 

various timeframes and institutional controls. The commenter asserted that better results could 

be achieved using two or more methodologies, where each methodology could cover the 

shortcomings of the others. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. While the comments describe other 

approaches to the analysis that could have been used, and indicate perceived weaknesses in 

the approach used by the NRC, the comments do not show that the approach used by the NRC 

resulted in a deficient analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage. Further, the 

NRC’s approach has been used successfully in previous GEISs. The NRC continues to find 

that the approach it used in the analysis is valid and that the results achieved provide 

decisionmakers with a reasonable characterization of the impacts of continued storage over the 

three timeframes. 

For additional information related to institutional controls, see Section ' of this appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--1--1--1--1--3-30) -3-31) 

D.2.16.5 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS does not describe information 

and data gaps and their importance to the environmental analysis. The commenter stated that 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

critical data gaps could result in meaningful uncertainty, which should be explicitly identified in 

the analysis results. The commenter stated that the GEIS failed to evaluate the consequences 

of these gaps on the analysis and conclusions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC acknowledges that the GEIS 

should identify significant unknowns, and the GEIS does so. One significant unknown is when a 

repository will become available. This issue is addressed in the GEIS using the three 

WLPHIUDPHV2WKHUXQNQRZQVDUHDGGUHVVHGXVLQJDVVXPSWLRQVVHH6HFWLRQDnd Chapter 

RIWKH*(,67KH15&PDNHVDVVXPSWLRQVWKDWLWFRQVLGHUVUHDVRQDEO\FRQVHUYDWLYH—in 

other words, the assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the 

impacts such that variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in 

environmental impact determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. The 

assumptions made by the NRC address the unknowns that could have a measurable effect on 

the outcome of the analyses. 

In some cases, even with the use of assumptions, significant uncertainties remain. For 

example, site-selection for an away-from-reactor ISFSI creates uncertainty for many resource 

areas. However, there is also some uncertainty associated with predicting impacts that occur in 

the distant future. This is particularly true for the evaluation of the impacts to historic and 

cultural resources in the long-term and indefinite timeframes. The NRC recognizes that there is 

uncertainty associated with the degree of prior disturbance and the resources, if any, present in 

areas where future ground-disturbing activities (e.g., initial and replacement DTS and ISFSI) 

could occur. The NRC cannot eliminate the possibility that historic and cultural resources would 

be affected by construction activities during the long-term and indefinite timeframes because the 

initial ISFSI could be located within a less-disturbed area with historic and cultural resources in 

close proximity. Further, resources may be present that would not have been considered 

significant at the time the initial or replacement facilities were constructed, but could become 

significant in the future. As a result, the impacts to these resources are shown as SMALL to 

LARGE for the long-term and indefinite timeframes for at-reactor ISFSIs and for all timeframes 

for the away-from-reactor ISFSIs. These conclusions reflect the fact that the resources that 

might be affected are unknown at this time. For additional information related to this issue, see 

Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

this comment. 

-2-

D.2.16.6 – COMMENT: A commenter argued the NRC did not follow the Court of Appeals’ 

decision in New York v. NRC by not developing a bounding analysis for spent fuel fires. The 

commenter noted that by failing to account for the differences between spent fuel pool sites and 

the effects of those differences on the impacts of an accident, the GEIS failed to perform a 

conservative bounding analysis. The commenter argued that administrative convenience or 

tradition did not justify use of obsolete or inapplicable information. They commenter suggested 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-130 September 2014 

site-specific characteristics for the configuration of spent fuel pool and seismicity were also 

crucial to a conservative bounding analysis and should be corrected in the GEIS. 

The commenter also noted the Court of Appeals found that a comprehensive general analysis of 

risks was sufficient; however, the commenter asserted the NRC failed to employ conservative 

bounding assumptions in examining the impacts of spent fuel pool leaks. As an example, the 

commenter noted that the GEIS conclusion that groundwater impacts would be SMALL rests on 

the NRC finding that hydrologic characteristics associated with typical nuclear power plant 

settings would act to impede the offsite migration of future spent fuel pool leakage. The 

commenter argued that reliance on the characteristics of typical nuclear plants did not result in a 

conservative estimation of the impacts of leaks. The commenter argued such an analysis 

provided no sense of the groundwater impacts at a plant lacking typical hydrologic 

characteristics. The commenter suggested that while the NRC stated that leaks at sites with 

different hydrological conditions could have the potential to affect nearby groundwater users, the 

GEIS concluded that in the unlikely event that contamination exceeded maximum contaminant 

level for a groundwater source, the EPA could take emergency action under the Safe Drinking 

Water Act. The commenter suggested the GEIS did not state which plants lack the typical 

hydrologic characteristics, what combination of hydrologic characteristics could lead to 

groundwater contamination, or what the expected groundwater impacts could be (aside from 

exceeding drinking-water standards). The commenter argued the NRC must conduct a 

conservative bounding analysis that takes a detailed look at the impacts at plants lacking typical 

hydrologic characteristics (e.g., plants where there are nearby groundwater users of shallow 

groundwater aquifers). 

The commenter offered similar arguments as to why the examination of surface-water impacts 

in the GEIS lacked conservative bounding assumptions. The commenter noted that while the 

GEIS acknowledged that a leak could result in indirect effects on surface-water quality due to 

groundwater contamination, the analysis concluded that the effects would be SMALL because 

the contaminated groundwater would be diluted by the large volume of surface water. The 

commenter argued that contrary to the NRC’s approach, impacts to surface waters should be 

bounded by sites that are different in character. For example, the commenter cited Vermont 

Yankee’s upstream location from a dam where the commenter believed contaminated sediment 

accumulated. The commenter noted the GEIS also stated that even if a pool leaked into 

surface waters continuously, the quantities of radioactive material would be comparable to 

quantities associated with permitted, treated effluent discharges from plants. However, the 

commenter asserted that the NRC failed to examine the combined impact of a leak and effluent 

discharges on sensitive surface waters, including whether State or Federal water-quality 

standards could be violated. 

The commenter also argued the GEIS did not employ conservative bounding assumptions to 

determine the impacts of leaks on soils. They suggested such an analysis would have looked at 

the impacts at sites in agricultural areas. The commenter recommended, at a minimum, that the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-131 185(*௅

NRC must include such conservative bounding assumptions if it is to conduct a generic analysis 

of the risks of spent fuel pool leaks; however the commenter further noted that the findings of 

the GEIS indicated that generic analysis is not appropriate for spent fuel pool leaks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The assumptions used by the NRC in 

the GEIS provide reasonable predictions to support the NRC’s analysis of the environmental 

impacts associated with the continued storage of spent fuel. The assumptions used in the 

analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that variances that may occur 

from site to site are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations that are greater 

than those presented in the GEIS. 

The NRC performed its analysis of the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool leaks and fires 

by considering the impacts at both typical and atypical locations. For example, Section E.2.1 of 

the GEIS discusses the typical hydrologic characteristics at nuclear power plant sites. In most 

cases, contamination from a spent fuel pool leak would remain onsite, or be directed to a nearby 

surface waterbody. Although unlikely, contamination from a spent fuel pool leak could impact 

an offsite groundwater receptor. Section E.2.2 addresses the impacts of leaks, including such 

an unlikely scenario. 

For its analysis of leaks, the NRC assumed the existence of a nearby waterbody of sufficient size 

to provide the amount of cooling water required by a nuclear plant. Because a plant must have 

such a cooling-water source, the assumption is reasonable and provides the basis for the NRC’s 

analysis of impacts. In addition, the NRC Groundwater Task Force concluded that the NRC is 

accomplishing its mission of protecting public health, safety, and the environment through its 

UHVSRQVHWRJURXQGZDWHUOHDNVDQGVSLOOV15&a). That Task Force evaluation included 

leaks that had occurred at plants surrounded by agricultural areas. On the issue of combined 

impacts of effluents and spent fuel pool leaks, as discussed in Section E.2.2.2, in the unlikely 

event that a spent fuel pool leak were to flow continuously to a local surface waterbody, the 

quantities of radioactive material discharged would be comparable to permitted, treated effluent 

discharges from operating nuclear power plants, which are typically well below Federal and State 

regulatory limits. Routine effluent discharges to a surface waterbody would stop once a reactor 

has shut down. Further, the impacts of contamination discharged to a surface waterbody after 

shutdown are expected to be non-detectable (NRC 2002a). As a result, the combined impacts of 

a spent fuel pool leak and effluents discharged to a surface waterbody would not be expected to 

exceed any Federal or State water-quality standards. For additional information on issues 

related to spent fuel pool leaks, see Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 

Appendix F of the GEIS provides a detailed discussion of spent fuel pool fires. Section F.1.2 

contains a number of reasons why the NRC’s analyses are conservative in nature. For 

additional information regarding spent fuel pool fires, see Sections ', ', ', 

', and ' of this appendix, and for additional information regarding accidents and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-132 September 2014 

natural events, see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-13----13-----

D.2.16.7 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that aging management for the spent fuel pool 

should be an ongoing process and should be continued into the short-term timeframe to ensure 

early detection and repair of leaks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that activities to ensure the integrity of the 

spent fuel pool should be carried out both during facility operation and during the short-term 

timeframe. As noted in Appendix E of the GEIS, under the Maintenance Rule (i.e., 10 CFR 

OLFHQVHHVDUHUHTXLUHGWRPRQLWRUWKHSHUIRUPDQFHor condition of structures, systems, 

and components associated with the storage, control, and maintenance of spent fuel in a 

manner sufficient to give reasonable assurance that structures, systems, and components are 

capable of fulfilling their intended functions. Further, licensees are required to take appropriate 

corrective action when the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component does 

not conform to established goals. All licensees have specific aging management programs to 

inspect, monitor, detect, and trend the aging of spent fuel pool structures. These requirements 

are applicable throughout the life of the facility license, from operation through 

decommissioning. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2) 

D.2.16.8 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern about the assumption of 

repackaging spent fuel every 100 years. One commenter raised concerns regarding the costs 

of repeatedly replacing dry casks. One commenter stated that there is no basis for assuming 

that fuel can be transferred without damaging embrittled fuel cladding or that technology will be 

available to safely transfer fuel over extended timeframes. One commenter asserted that the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi accident showed that spent fuel will degrade with age and will cause 

degradation of the storage canisters and stated that this degradation makes the assumption 

regarding periodic replacement of storage systems deficient. One commenter cited problems 

experienced with existing spent fuel storage containers at a nuclear plant site as evidence that 

the assumption of a 100 year replacement interval is unrealistic. Another commenter supported 

specific safety requirements for dry cask storage. These proposed requirements included 

locating casks at higher elevations to avoid flooding and exposure to corrosive elements, 

outfitting casks with temperature and radiation monitors, placing casks in buildings for protection 

from storms and attacks, and requiring offsite emergency planning. This commenter also stated 

that the assumption of a 100-year replacement interval for the casks was inconsistent with cask 

license and renewal timeframes. Two commenters stated that the NRC should not assume that 

after 100 years an ISFSI will be replaced, but should instead assume the spent fuel is moved to 

another location. They state that ISFSIs should not continue to operate for more than 100 years 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-133 185(*௅

and the canisters should instead be transported to a more appropriate area. One commenter 

stated that the GEIS needed to demonstrate that replacement functions could actually be 

performed, and that the costs for such replacement functions be specified and accounted for. 

Another commenter stated that the NRC should have referred to manufacturers’ analysis or 

warranty on the useful life of the casks to support the conclusions in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC believes the 100-year 

replacement interval represents a reasonably conservative assumption such that the variances 

in the environmental impacts of replacement that may occur between sites are unlikely to result 

in environmental impact determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. 

Appendix B of the GEIS describes the design of storage casks and national and international 

experience that supports the assumptions about longevity of dry storage casks. Current 

information supports low degradation rates for dry cask storage systems. The NRC considered 

the experience with dry cask storage systems, information related to certification and regulatory 

oversight of dry cask storage systems, and monitoring and maintenance of dry cask storage 

systems to provide an informed basis for understanding the behavior of these systems and 

estimating an assumed replacement interval for the GEIS. 

The operating experience referenced and considered in the GEIS includes problems 

encountered with existing dry cask storage systems and subsequent corrective actions to 

address these issues. Regarding licensing terms, as noted in Appendix B, the current 

regulatory framework for dry storage of spent fuel allows for multiple license renewals. The 

NRC does not believe that consideration of manufacturers’ analyses or warranties would add 

further significant information beyond what has already been considered for estimating the 

behavior and longevity of dry cask storage systems. The NRC is unaware of any information 

related to the Fukushima accident that raised issues with respect to spent fuel or storage 

canister degradation. 

The GEIS and Rule do not impose any additional regulatory requirements with respect to dry 

casks. Rather, the Rule codifies the NRC’s analysis of the generic environmental impacts of 

continued storage to satisfy a portion of the agency's NEPA obligations. 

Damaged fuel issues are addressed in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 

Further information regarding fuel degradation rates is provided in Sections ' and 

' of this appendix. Comments related to demonstrating that replacement functions can 

actually be performed are addressed in Section ' of this appendix. Additional 

information regarding safety, hardened storage, and emergency planning for dry cask storage is 

located in Sections ', ', and D.2.44.2 of this appendix. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-4-2) (30-4----11--20-------1) 

-4--2--1--3---3-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-134 September 2014 

D.2.16.9 – COMMENT: Three commenters stated they disagreed with the assumption in the 

GEIS that an ISFSI of sufficient size to hold all spent fuel generated by a reactor will be 

constructed during the reactor’s licensed life for operation. Two commenters referred to the San 

Onofre nuclear plant, which did not have an ISFSI of sufficient size when the owners decided to 

cease operation, as an example of why the assumption is invalid. The commenters suggested 

that the NRC change the assumption to read, “An ISFSI of sufficient size to hold all spent fuel 

generated will be constructed during the licensed life for operation and decommissioning time 

\HDUV ́7KHFRPPHQWHUVDOVRTXHVWLRQHGWKHQHHGIRUWKLVDVVXPSWLRQ

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC considers this assumption to 

be a reasonable representation of the timing for the construction of the ISFSI that will be needed 

to store the fuel generated by a future reactor during its lifetime. As used in the GEIS, the term 

“licensed life for operation” of a reactor or ISFSI is the period running to the end of the operating 

license term for a reactor or the end of the license term for an ISFSI (including any license 

renewals). As pointed out in some of the comments, Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station were shut down early (in 2013). However, the operating licenses for these 

two units do not expire until 2022. As the term “licensed life for operation” is defined in the 

GEIS, the end of licensed life for operation for these two units is 2022. 

In the GEIS, the NRC assumes that the licensed life for operation for a reactor includes a 40-

year operating license and two 20-year license renewal terms. As discussed in the GEIS, 

6HFWLRQWKH15&H[SHFWVWKDWVRPHIXHOZLOOQHHGWREHPRYHGIURPWKHVSHQWIXHOSRRO

into casks before the end of the initial 40-year license because of the limited capacity of the 

pools. Therefore, casks and pads will be constructed over a period of time to accommodate the 

spent fuel and the NRC believes the full ISFSI (i.e., pads) will be in place by the end of licensed 

life. 

Section 1.0 of the GEIS was modified as a result of these comments to clarify the meaning of 

the term “licensed life for operations”. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

----40) (-2--2-14) 

D.2.16.10 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that it was incorrect for the NRC to assume that 

all spent fuel will be removed from the spent fuel pool and the pool decommissioned by the end 

of the short-term timeframe. The commenter stated that the UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5D

allow the Commission to extend the time allowed to complete decommissioning, with 

“unavailability of waste disposal capacity” being one of the factors to be considered when 

reviewing such a request. The commenter argues that, with no repository currently available, it 

is likely that some licensees would seek approval to delay decommissioning, including the 

option to maintain an existing spent fuel pool. The commenter, referencing the discussion of 

decommissioning options in the Decommissioning GEIS, further stated that the NRC has 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

previously contemplated storage in spent fuel pools for up to 100 years after shutdown in the 

context of the ENTOMB decommissioning option. Further, the commenter stated that the draft 

GEIS ignored the ENTOMB option and only considered DECON and SAFSTOR for spent fuel 

pools. The commenter stated that the NRC should include an analysis of storage in a spent fuel 

SRROEH\RQGWKH-year short-term timeframe, or revise the Rule language to “limit the 

SUHGLFWLRQRIHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVWRRQO\\HDUV ́

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. While the 

FRPPHQWLVFRUUHFWWRQRWHWKDWWKHUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DDOORZWKH&RPPLVVLRQWR

extend the time allowed to complete decommissioning and that “unavailability of waste disposal 

capacity” is one of the factors to be considered, requests will only be granted on a case-by-case 

basis, and only after licensees have demonstrated that an extended decommissioning is 

necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC disagrees with the comment’s position 

that it is incorrect to assume that all spent fuel will be removed from the spent fuel pool prior to 

the end of the short-term timeframe. Further, the NRC disagrees that the GEIS should include 

an analysis of spent fuel pool storage beyond the short-term timeframe. 

The comment is correct to note that the NRC considered timeframes of up to 100 years after 

shutdown in its consideration of the ENTOMB decommissioning option. However, the comment 

is incorrect that the NRC contemplated storage in a spent fuel pool for up to 100 years. As 

described in NUREG–6XSSOHPHQW, the NRC considered two ENTOMB scenarios, 

designated ENTOMB1 and ENTOMB2, designed to “envelope a wide range of potential options 

by describing two possible extreme cases of entombment” (NRC 2002a). As explained in 

NUREG–6XSSOHPHQW, both options assumed that spent fuel “would be removed from 

the facility and either transported to a permanent HLW repository or placed in an onsite ISFSI” 

(NRC 2002a). Further, while the industry has expressed interest in having ENTOMB as a 

decommissioning option, as noted in SECY-02-QRlicensees have committed to using it 

(SECY-02-, NRC 2002b). 

The NRC disagrees that the draft GEIS ignored the ENTOMB option and only considered 

DECON and SAFSTOR for spent fuel pools. The ENTOMB decommissioning option is 

described in Section 2.2.1.1. While the NRC disagrees with this comment, the discussion of 

decommissioning options in Section 2.2.1.1 was revised to provide additional information, 

including the status of the spent fuel pool, for the ENTOMB option. In addition, Section 2.2.1.2 

of the GEIS was revised to clarify that spent fuel would be removed from the pool, regardless of 

the decommissioning option selected. 

Finally, the NRC disagrees with the comment that, with no repository currently available, it is 

likely that some licensees would seek approval to delay decommissioning, including the option 

to maintain an existing spent fuel pool. Historically, all licensees of permanently shutdown 

reactors that are not colocated with an operating reactor have transferred, or are in the process 

of transferring, all spent fuel to an ISFSI. More recently, the licensees for the Kewaunee and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Crystal River reactors have submitted decommissioning plans indicating their intent to have all 

spent fuel transferred to an ISFSI within approximately seven years of permanent cessation of 

operation (DEK 2013a; DEF 2013). The NRC expects that this will continue to be the case in 

the future, as licensees balance regulatory and financial incentives to decommission facilities in 

a timely manner. 

With the exception of revisions to Section 2.2.1 as noted above, no changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-12------4---

D.2.16.11 – COMMENT: Two commenters contested the lack of site-specific information 

related to any operating nuclear power plant in the GEIS and the lack of forecasts of the impacts 

of indefinite storage at specific geographic locations near any nuclear power plant. One 

commenter claimed that the GEIS failed to assess any genuine condition of the environment 

and did not assess impacts due to failure to site a repository. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS satisfies a portion of the 

NRC’s NEPA obligations related to the issuance of a reactor or spent fuel storage facility license 

by generically evaluating the environmental impacts of continued storage. Prior to the 

completion of an individual licensing action, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental 

review and document the results of that review in an EA and FONSI or EIS. The GEIS also 

specifically addressed the potential impacts if a repository is delayed (the long-term timeframe), 

or is never built (the indefinite timeframe). These impacts would occur at the reactor sites or at 

the site of any away-from-reactor storage facility that might be built. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--3-

D.2.16.12 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated either that the NRC needed to evaluate 

the environmental consequences of failing to site a repository, or that the NRC’s evaluation of 

the consequences of failing to site a repository was inadequate. Some commenters pointed out 

that there is no repository currently available and expressed the belief that the availability of a 

repository was not reasonably foreseeable. One commenter stated that the NRC should 

evaluate the consequences of the case that a repository was unable to “effectively contain 

radioactivity.” One commenter stated that the NRC should evaluate the likelihood that a 

repository will be successfully sited and then evaluate the consequences of accidents related to 

the repository. One commenter expressed concern that long-term storage could exceed the 

viability of the human species. Another commenter contended that onsite or away-from-reactor 

ISFSIs could become de-facto permanent surface storage facilities. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. While a repository is not currently 

DYDLODEOHWKH*(,6H[SODLQVWKDWWKH15&EHOLHYHVWKDWVLWLQJDUHSRVLWRU\ZLWKLQ\HDUVLVWKH

most likely scenario. 

The GEIS also addresses the environmental impacts of a failure to site a repository in its 

evaluation of the indefinite timeframe. Attempting to evaluate the likelihood that a repository will 

be successfully sited, as suggested in one of the comments, would serve no purpose that is not 

already served by the consideration of the three timeframes. The comment that long-term 

storage could exceed the viability of the human species is outside the scope of the GEIS and 

Rule. 

At-reactor and away-from-reactor storage facilities would have to remain in operation until the 

fuel can be transferred to a repository. If a repository is never built (i.e., the indefinite 

timeframe), then the spent fuel would be stored indefinitely either in at-reactor or away-fromreactor ISFSIs. The impacts of such storage have been evaluated in the GEIS. 

Finally, potential issues related to the performance of a repository are outside the scope of the 

GEIS because the GEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of continued storage, not the 

environmental impacts of, the performance of, or the consequences of potential accidents at a 

repository. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--1---3-

D.2.16.13 – COMMENT: Three commenters question the ability of the NRC to make generic 

determinations about spent fuel when the types of fuel being used are so variable. In particular, 

one commenter referred to DOE’s Inventory and Description of Commercial Fuels in the U.S. 

(DOE 2011a) which showed how fuel types and storage differ from site to site; and asserted that 

it indicated potential environmental impacts would vary. As an example, the commenter cited 

tritium issues resulting from high-burnup fuel at reactor sites. The commenter asserted that the 

NRC’s generic assumption makes no sense because the time spent fuel is stored in pools and 

casks varies from one reactor to the next. Another commenter stated that some fuels require 

special consideration in a prolonged storage scenario (e.g., aging effects). 

One commenter stated that the NRC mistakenly projects uniformity in parameters such as heat 

load, aging, fissile material content, and overall biological effectiveness for various types of fuel 

that have different levels of burnup, decay, and damage. In addition, the commenter stated that 

the NRC failed to factor in the changing characteristics of waste over time. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC considered the various fuel 

types and determined that they are sufficiently similar, following discharge from the reactor, 

such that separate environmental impacts based on fuel type are not necessary. Information on 

the characteristics of low-burnup, high-burnup and MOX fuels (e.g., radionuclide inventories and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

thermal outputs) has been added to the GEIS in Appendix I to help clarify the similarities 

between these fuel types. For those assessments that did consider high-burnup fuel, the GEIS 

describes how high-burnup fuel is considered in the analysis. The NRC knows that the fuels are 

not uniform and the characteristics of the various fuels (e.g., decay heat and radioactive 

isotopes) are considered in the licensing of each storage facility. The NRC regulatory approach 

to the licensing of spent fuel storage casks (e.g., limited license period) also address concerns 

UHODWHGWRWKHHIIHFWVRIDJLQJRQIXHOLQWHJULW\6HHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVDW&)53DUW

6XESDUWV&DQG/DQG&)5DLQSDUWLFXODU

The NRC also knows that the time that spent fuel will spend in a pool before being moved into a 

cask will vary. However, the fuel cannot be moved into a cask until it meets the conditions 

specified in the certification for that cask. Therefore, the environmental impacts of the fuel 

stored in the cask will be within the bounds of the impacts assessed by the NRC in the 

certification of the cask. 

The NRC requires physical protection of the spent fuel, regardless of its age or storage location. 

Therefore, even if the radiation levels around the stored fuel have been reduced over time, 

access tRWKHIXHOLVUHVWULFWHG6HH&)5DQG6HFWLRQ' of this appendix. 

For additional information regarding the analysis in the GEIS of various fuel types, see Section 

' of this appendix. 

As discussed above, information has been added to the GEIS in Appendix I to clarify the 

similarities between the various fuel types. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

-1--2--

D.2.16.14 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed general disagreement with the 

assumptions made in the GEIS or with the analysis of environmental impacts in the GEIS. 

Commenters stated that assumptions used in the GEIS analysis, including assumptions 

regarding repository availability, institutional controls, replacement of storage casks, funding, 

and staffing, were unreasonable, unsupported by analysis or evidence, unrealistic, or 

oversimplified. Commenters stated that the GEIS analysis relied on unsupported assumptions 

and incorrect information, did not consider site-specific factors, understated certain factors, did 

not adequately describe impacts, did not provide a complete analysis of potential impacts, and 

did not provide a sufficient basis for supporting claims of small environmental impacts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. These general comments are related 

to the assumptions used by the NRC to support the GEIS analysis, or are related to the GEIS 

analysis itself. Many of the comments are general in nature, while other comments broadly 

question the basis for various assumptions or various attributes of the analysis. The issues 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

raised generally in these comments were also raised in greater detail in other comments 

received by the NRC. The specific issues raised are addressed in responses to those 

comments throughout this appendix. For example, comments on repository availability, 

institutional controls, safety of spent fuel storage, and contentions that the GEIS does not meet 

NEPA requirements are addressed, respectively, in Sections ', ', ', and '

of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(23----21--33-----1) (244--1) (244-14--14-

--------3-----2) (341-1--1-

(402-1) (431---1--1----11-1--2--1-

-2-----2--1-----30) 

-2---1--4-----2---4) 

--3--2--1-14) (-2--2-----

---------2--3--

3--3--3--3--3--3--3--1--3-32) 

-2--3) --1----2---2--1-

---2) 

D.2.16.15 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concerns about the assumptions 

used in the GEIS. These commenters asserted a variety of concerns, including that (1) 

evidence or experience demonstrated that the assumptions used were faulty or lacked 

substantiating evidence, (2) that the assumptions were incomplete or lacked an appropriate 

foundation (i.e., technical or otherwise), (3) that future uncertainties render the assumptions 

meaningless, and (4) that the assumptions failed to account for external events and conditions 

as well as possible internal conditions (e.g., degradation of spent fuel). Some commenters 

simply disagreed with the assumptions used, asserted that the scope of the GEIS was 

insufficient, or claimed that the use of assumptions conflicted with the NWPA. Several 

commenters stated that the GEIS did not contain the full analysis ordered by the Court of 

Appeals in New York v. NRC. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC reviewed the assumptions 

in the GEIS and concluded that the assumptions, based on current law, regulatory practices and 

the body of scientific and technical knowledge from which the NRC has drawn the assumptions, 

are reasonable. As pointed out in some of the comments, assumptions do not equate to 

certainty. Many of the comments raised the issue of the uncertainty of what will actually occur 

in the future. 

7KHDVVXPSWLRQRID-year period of short-term storage is based on the NRC’s 

decommissioning rules as well as the NRC’s technical judgment that spent fuel pools will be 

GXUDEOHDQGUHOLDEOHIRUDWOHDVW\HDUVEH\RQGWKHOLFHQVHGOLIHIRURSHUDWLRQRIWKHUHDFWRU

VHH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6,WLVUHDVRnable for the NRC to draw upon its extensive licensing 

and regulatory experience with nuclear power reactor spent fuel pools and ISFSIs in predicting 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-140 September 2014 

how those facilities will continue to perform. Because NEPA analyses are by their nature 

forward-looking, it would be impossible to perform such analyses without making a set of 

reasonable assumptions. For that reason, the NRC has historically prepared its environmental 

review documents by formulating assumptions of future conditions, where necessary, based on 

the best available information. The courts have approved this methodology as NEPA-compliant 

(see Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC). 

The NRC acknowledges that the GEIS forecast of future storage cask performance, for 

example, might vary somewhat from actual performance. For example, individual casks may 

not require replacement for over 100 years, while some might require replacement before 100 

years. However, the NRC has concluded that a timeframe for replacement of about 100 years 

is reasonable, based on its knowledge of the materials and physical processes affecting cask 

performance. Other assumptions in the GEIS are similarly based upon the NRC’s technical 

knowledge and regulatory experience. Further, the NRC will continue to gain practical 

experience in its oversight of the spent fuel management and will apply any “lessons learned” to 

adjust its activities (e.g., inspection and other oversight) as safety and protection of the 

environment warrant. 

Some comments questioned the ability to repackage spent fuel because of potential 

degradation of the fuel over time. Historical evidence shows that licensees have dealt with 

damaged fuel in the past. In the most extreme example, the damaged fuel from the core of 

Three Mile Island, Unit 2 was removed and put into storage. If this type of fuel can be 

successfully moved and managed, it is reasonable to assume that damaged spent fuel in casks 

can also be handled if necessary. 

One comment indicated that the “assumption” that fuel could be stored safely onsite indefinitely 

conflicts with the NWPA. Although the NRC continues to believe that spent fuel can and will, in 

due course, be removed to a repository (see Appendix B of the GEIS), the GEIS describes the 

impacts of continued storage. Until a repository becomes available, spent fuel would continue 

to be stored at existing nuclear power plant sites after reactor shutdown and decommissioning 

and potentially at away-from-reactor ISFSIs. The NRC has concluded that spent fuel could be 

safely stored in spent IXHOSRROVIRUXSWR\HDUVDIWHUDUHDFWRU’s licensed life, if necessary, 

and in ISFSIs during all three of the timeframes used in the GEIS. Indefinite ISFSI storage 

would result only if a repository does not become available and would not result from NRC’s 

licensing actions or environmental review. However, the NRC has considered continued 

storage impacts if a repository did not become available in response to the Court of Appeals’ 

remand in New York v. NRC. 

The NRC also concludes that the analysis performed in the GEIS is responsive to the Court of 

Appeals’ decision in New York v. NRC. In the GEIS, the NRC considered the environmental 

impacts of short-term, the long-term, and indefinite storage. As stated above, the NRC used 

reasonable assumptions to perform that analysis. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-141 185(*௅

For issues related to the potential loss of institutional controls, see Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---3-3) (244-----22-----2--10) 

(430---1--1--2---3--1----

----2-14) 

D.2.16.16 – COMMENT: Some commenters contested another commenter’s statement that 

other NRC EISs cover the basic question of whether it is logical to continue to generate waste 

when there is no place to dispose of the waste. These commenters claim NRC and DOE EISs 

assume the waste problem will be solved and relegate the dangers of continued operation and 

mining of uranium to issues resolved by probabilistic risk assessment. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The national policy remains disposal in 

a geologic repository. As explained in the GEIS, spent fuel is currently being stored in spent 

fuel pools and ISFSIs (if available) at all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. 

Although the NRC continues to believe that spent fuel can and will, in due course, be removed 

to a repository, the GEIS describes the impacts of continued storage. Until a repository 

becomes available, spent fuel would continue to be stored at existing nuclear power plant sites 

after reactor shutdown and decommissioning and potentially at away-from-reactor ISFSIs. 

Issues related to reactor operations and to mining of uranium are outside the scope of the direct 

and indirect impacts of continued storage. The NRC will continue to regulate the storage of 

spent fuel and will make regulatory changes, if and as needed, to ensure that such storage is 

performed safely. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.16.17 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern about the NRC’s assumption 

WKDWIXHOZLOOEHPRYHGIURPWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROZLWKLQ\HDUVDIWHUOLFHQVHGOLIHHQGV

Commenters stated that NRC regulations do not require transfer of spent fuel from fuel pools to 

dry casks in any specific timeframe. One commenter considered the assumption that licensees 

will voluntarily move spent fuel from pools to casks to be unrealistic, both due to the cost and to 

NRC statements that both spent fuel pools and dry casks provide adequate protection of public 

health and safety. One commenter stated that spent fuel should be moved to dry casks as soon 

DVUHDVRQDEOHDQGLQQRFDVHVKRXOGVSHQWIXHOUHPDLQLQSRROVIRUPRUHWKDQ\HDUV$QRWKHU

commenter stated that the details of and schedule for decommissioning are left up to the plant 

owner. Further, commenters also stated that NRC regulations permit licensees to request 

H[HPSWLRQVIURPUHTXLUHPHQWVWRFRPSOHWHGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJZLWKLQD-year timeframe, 

resulting in the potential for spent fuel to be stored in wHWVWRUDJHSRROVORQJHUWKDQWKH-year 

short-term timeframe. As a result, commenters stated that there is no basis for limiting the 

analysis of long-term effects to dry storage. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-142 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The assumption in Section RIWKH

*(,6WKDWVSHQWIXHOZLOOEHWUDQVIHUUHGWRFDVNVZLWKLQ\HDUVDIWHUWKHOLFHQVHGOLIHRIWKH

facility is based upon actual operating experience to date, as well as licensees’ announced 

intentions for decommissioning facilities. Licensees of permanently shutdown reactors not 

colocated with an operating reactor have transferred, or are in the process of transferring, all 

spent fuel to an ISFSI. All shutdown reactors co-located with operating facilities have 

completed transfer of spent fuel from the fuel pools, or have submitted plans to complete 

transfer within the short-term timeframe. More recently, the licensees for the Kewaunee and 

Crystal River reactors have submitted decommissioning plans indicating their intent to have all 

spent fuel transferred to an ISFSI within approximately seven years of permanent cessation of 

operation (DEK 2013a, DEF 2013). The NRC expects that this will continue to be the case in 

the future, as licensees balance regulatory and financial incentives to decommission facilities in 

a timely manner. 

$OVROLFHQVHHVDUHUHTXLUHGE\&)5EEWRVXEPLWZULWWHQQRWLILFDWLRQWRWKH

Commission for review and preliminary approval of the program by which the licensee intends to 

manage and provide funding for the management of all irradiated fuel at the reactor following 

licensed operations. In this submittal, the licensee must demonstrate that the elected actions 

“will be consistent with NRC requirements for licensed possession of irradiated nuclear fuel and 

that the actions will be implemented on a timely basis,” LQFOXGLQJWKH-year deadline for 

GHFRPPLVVLRQLQJLQ&)5D7KLVSURYLVLRQVWDWHVWKDWH[WHQVLRQVZRXOGRQO\EH

granted after licensees have demonstrated that an extended decommissioning period is 

necessary to protect public health and safety. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

----12------2--

D.2.16.18 – COMMENT: Some commenters questioned the NRC’s assumptions about future 

continued storage activities, citing concerns relating to continued availability of sufficient 

funding, staffing, and equipment. One commenter was concerned about the availability of 

knowledgeable employees after the nuclear power plant is shut down. Other commenters 

expressed similar concerns about the NRC’s assumption that there will be money, equipment, 

and available expertise to support activities in the long-term and indefinite storage timeframes, 

especially because the utility will no longer be obtaining income from the plant and may even no 

longer exist. 

A commenter stated that while there may be money, equipment and expertise available to 

transfer fuel while plants are still operating, the GEIS lacks analysis to demonstrate that fuel can 

be transferred from wet storage to dry cask storage within the short-term timeframe. The 

commenter also stated that it is inappropriate to assume that the NRC would continue to exist 

with adequate funding and noted that NRC funding is derived from fees paid by operating 

nuclear power plants; thus, the NRC is subject to the economic whims of energy production. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-143 185(*௅

Further, a commenter asserted that the NRC may not function and could be replaced by another 

agency or that Congressional budget constraints would limit the funds available to fully operate 

the NRC or its successor to the same extent as now available. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. A license holder for an ISFSI is required 

to comply with the requirements of NRC regulations for the duration of the license, including 

requirements for the monitoring of the ISFSI, training of personnel, and requirements to 

maintain a decommissioning fund for the facility. The NRC has legal authority to take 

enforcement action against a licensee if it fails to comply with the regulations. The AEA 

prohibits transfer of the license without prior NRC authorization and approval of the entity to 

which the license is being transferred. 

The NRC does, by law, recover most of its appropriated funds for operations through fees 

charged to applicants and licensees. These fees come from all types of applicants and 

licensees, including power reactors, ISFSIs, and medicaOIDFLOLWLHVVHH&)53DUWVDQG

7KHVHIHHVDUHDGMXVWHGSHULRGLFDOO\WRHQVXUHWKH15&LVUHFRYHULQJDGHTXDWHIXQGV

The NRC will not speculate as to whether Congress will limit the NRC’s budget to such an 

extent that the agency is no longer capable of fulfilling its statutorily mandated regulatory 

functions or replace the NRC with another agency. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume 

that the Federal government will continue to fulfill its responsibilities to regulate and oversee the 

storage of spent fuel. See Section ' of this appendix for additional information regarding 

institutional controls. Comments regarding the transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry 

cask storage within the short-term timeframe are addressed in Sections ', ', 

and '. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-24--2-11) (-2--2--2--2--3-

D.2.16.19 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should have evaluated a scenario 

in which Yucca Mountain was completed and accepting waste, and stated that it is unclear how 

the NRC can ignore this alternative. The commenter asserted that the Yucca Mountain 

alternative would have the least cumulative environmental impacts compared to those analyzed 

in the GEIS. The commenter stated that a comparison should be made within the impacts 

assessment that illustrates the difference in cumulative impacts between a Yucca Mountain 

scenario and those analyzed in the GEIS. The commenter asserted that the comparative 

analysis should recognize that without Yucca Mountain or some other repository in the near 

term, multiple transportation campaigns would be required. In addition, the commenter stated 

that without Yucca Mountain, all spent fuel will have to be repackaged for ultimate repository 

disposal after it is put into dry cask storage. By including the Yucca Mountain scenario, the 

commenter stated that a significant portion of the spent fuel would be loaded by the utilities in 

transportation, aging, and disposal canisters and disposed directly without repackaging. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-144 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The proposed action is the adoption of a 

UHYLVHG5XOH&)5WKDWFRGLILHVRUDGRSWVLQWRUHJXODWLRQWKH15&¶VJHQHULFDQDO\VLV

of environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. Because the purpose of the 

proposed action is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing processes, and the need for 

the proposed action is to provide processes for use in NRC licensing to address the 

environmental impacts of continued storage, alternatives to continued storage of spent fuel—

such as immediate disposal in Yucca Mountain—are outside the scope of this analysis. Both 

the short-term and long-term timeframes evaluated in the GEIS include the assumption that a 

geologic repository is available before the end of those timeframes. Disposal of spent fuel in a 

geologic repository remains the national policy, and feasibility of siting and the expected date of 

availability of a repository are discussed in Appendix B of the GEIS. The analysis of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage during the timeframes considered in the GEIS is not 

dependent on any specific site of a geologic repository, including Yucca Mountain. Further, a 

comparison between the environmental impacts of continued storage and disposal is not 

necessary because the environmental impacts of disposal are outside the scope of this GEIS 

and Rule. The GEIS evaluated the impacts of continued storage at both at-reactor and awayfrom-reactor facilities for up to an indefinite timeframe. 

Regarding the assertion that multiple transportation campaigns would be needed in the absence 

of a geologic repository, the NRC evaluated the impacts of transportation of spent fuel to an 

away-from-UHDFWRUVWRUDJHIDFLOLW\LQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KH*(,6UHDVRQDEO\

assumes that transportation of spent fuel from a reactor site to an away-from-reactor storage 

facility would occur during the short-term timeframe. The analysis concludes that the magnitude 

of the increase in dose and risk from this transportation would be low and therefore the 

radiological impacts would continue to be SMALL. Transportation of spent fuel to a geologic 

repository, whether directly from a reactor site or from an away-from-reactor storage facility, is 

outside the scope of the GEIS; however, the impacts of this transportation are considered in the 

FXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6,PSDFWVRIWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRIVSHQW

fuel are addressed further in Sections D.2.33.2, ', and '. The comment’s 

concern regarding repackaging of spent fuel is addressed in Section ' of this appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-12) 

D.2.16.20 – COMMENT: One commenter argued that the GEIS does not appropriately consider 

the disparity in economic impacts of accidents at plants (e.g., Indian Point Energy Center) and 

the sites used by the NRC in the documents used to support the GEIS (e.g., Peach Bottom 

Atomic Power Station and Surry Power Station). 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC recognizes that the 

consequences of a severe accident in an area of higher population density would involve higher 

consequences. However, the probability of such an event remains very low and, because of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

this, the risk (which is a product of the probability of an accident and the consequences of that 

accident) remains low. The NRC concludes that impacts related to the risk from these events 

are SMALL. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-13-

D.2.16.21 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS should include new proposed 

and reasonably foreseeable storage technologies and their implications on long-term surface 

storage safety and environmental impacts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS analysis relies on information 

regarding existing storage technologies. Any reasonably foreseeable future technologies would 

have to meet the associated NRC regulations and, therefore, the impacts associated with such 

technologies would be similar to or less than the impacts of the existing technologies. The NRC 

rulemaking for the certification of each cask design involves both a safety and an environmental 

review. However, the NRC concludes that the specific cask design plays essentially no role in 

the evaluation of the environmental impacts of continued storage. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-23) 

D.2.16.22 – COMMENT: One commenter questioned the NRC’s assumption that the spent fuel 

pool would reach capacity after 30 years of licensed life and therefore require fuel to be 

transferred from the pool to dry cask storage. The commenter stated that the use of higher 

burnup fuel could affect operational choices such as storage, transfer, and the integrity of the 

fuel itself. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Longer fuel cycles and running fuel to 

higher burnups means that fuel is transferred to the spent fuel pools at a slower rate. Therefore, 

the 30-year value stated in the GEIS is conservatively low. Regardless, at some time before the 

end of a reactor’s licensed life the NRC expects that each licensee will have transferred some 

fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry cask storage. The exact amount of fuel transferred over time 

does not affect the outcome of the analysis. In general, fuel can generally be transferred into 

GU\FDVNVWRUDJHDIWHULWKDVEHHQRXWRIWKHUHDFWRUIRUPRUHWKDQ\HDUV7KHROGHVWIXHO is 

typically transferred first, which means fuel has generally been out of the reactor for over 10 

years when it is transferred. For issues specific to high-burnup fuel, see Section ' of 

this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.16.23 – COMMENT: A number of commenters expressed various concerns about the 

NRC’s use of current technology and regulations as a basis for the analysis in the GEIS. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Commenters expressed concern that current technological and regulatory levels might not be 

sustainable over the timeframes analyzed, that this use avoids the use of rigorous and scientific 

study in the GEIS, that current technology and regulations would not be sufficient to accomplish 

the activities described in the GEIS, and that current technology has substantial limitations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The GEIS analysis is based on 

current technology and legal standards under the NRC’s organic statute and implementing 

UHJXODWLRQVVHH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DVZLWKDQ\RWKHU(,6SUHSDUHGE\D)HGHUDO

agency under NEPA. NEPA requires agencies to conduct environmental analyses based on 

current technology and the available scientific information. It is reasonable to assume that 

science, engineering, and technology will advance with time and that the increased knowledge 

available to the NRC and industry can only improve continuing storage safety and mitigate 

storage environmental impacts. Accordingly, the use of current laws and technology as a 

baseline in forecasting the environmental impacts of continued storage is reasonable. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(303-----2--2-

D.2.16.24 – COMMENT: Commenters asserted that the GEIS did not meet expectations for 

necessary and sufficient information to support impact analyses. Specifically, commenters said 

the GEIS should have included (1) a summary of the final EIS documents for each nuclear 

power plant, (2) tables and charts showing the remaining capacity of spent fuel pools, (3) 

identification of facilities using dry casks, (4) guidelines for best practices that underlie the GEIS 

DQDO\VLVDVVXPSWLRQVDGGLWLRQDOGHWDLOVRQWKHUREXVWQHVVRIGU\VWRUDJHFDVNVDQGDQ

analysis to demonstrate the availability of land sufficient for dry cask storage of \HDUVRI

irradiated fuel at every reactor site. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The information requested by the 

comments is either included in the GEIS in a form that was readily useable for the analysis or is 

not within the scope of the GEIS. Although the NRC did not include a summary of the final EIS 

documents for each nuclear power plant in the GEIS, the NRC presented information in the 

GEIS necessary to characterize the environment and environmental impacts during reactor 

operations to establish the baseline affected environment at the beginning of continued storage 

as the basis for analyzing impacts. This information, presented in Chapter 3 (Affected 

Environment) of the GEIS was obtained largely from the License Renewal GEIS (NRC 2013m), 

which in turn summarized information from nuclear plant-specific EISs. 

The licensed and operating ISFSIs in the United States are identified in Figure 2-2 of the GEIS. 

The NRC provided information related to the amount of fuel typically stored in dry casks in 

Section 2.1.2.2 of the GEIS and the amount of fuel typically stored in spent fuel pools in Section 

2.1.2; the information is not presented separately for each ISFSI or spent fuel pool. Section 

2.1.1.3 of the GEIS provides the amount of spent fuel anticipated to be generated (based on 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

IXHOW\SHGXULQJ\HDUVRISODQWRSHUDWLRQ5HJDUGLQJWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIODQGDWHDFKUHDFWRU

VLWHWRKRXVH\HDUVRIVSHQWIXHOIRUHDFKUHDFWRURQVLWH6HFWLRQSURYLGHVWKHUDQJH

in area for existing nuclear plant sites and Section 2.1.2.2 provides the total acreage required 

for different types of ISFSIs. Additional information concerning spent fuel storage facilities 

located at operating and decommissioned reactor sites is provided in Appendix G of the GEIS. 

A comment indicated an expectation for information in the GEIS related to best practices and 

guidelines for safe storage of fuel. As discussed in the introduction to the GEIS, the scope of 

the GEIS is to analyze the environmental impacts of continued storage and provide a regulatory 

basis for the revision to the Rule. The NRC provides guidance related to spent fuel storage in 

regulatory guides, interim staff guidance, and other guidance documents, which can be found 

on the NRC website, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/regs-guides-comm.html. 

A comment requested additional details regarding the robustness of storage casks. Section 

B.3.2.2 of the GEIS discusses the robust design of dry cask storage systems. It indicates that 

“[t]o date, the NRC and licensee experience with ISFSIs and cask certification indicates that 

spent fuel can be safely and effectively stored using passive dry cask storage technology. 

There have not been any safety issues with dry cask storage.” Further, Section B.3.2.2 of the 

GEIS discusses the characteristics of the dry cask that contribute to the low risk from accidents 

and indicates that dry casks have withstood significant challenges such as the earthquake at 

Mineral, Virginia (2011) and the earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan in March 2011. 

Neither of these events resulted in significant damage or release of radionuclides from dry cask 

storage containers. 

Because the information requested in these comments is either already contained in the GEIS, 

or in the case of best practices and guidelines for safe storage of fuel, is contained in NRC 

guidance, as appropriate, no changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--31----

D.2.16.25 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns about the analysis of risks in the 

GEIS. Several commenters claimed that the NRC used an insufficient or inappropriate risk 

analysis methodology. Specifically, commenters criticized the use of probability determinations 

to conclude that high-consequence events may be assigned low environmental risk levels. One 

commenter cited perceived inadequacies in the treatment of climate change and seismic risks 

as examples of shortcomings in the risk analysis methodology. One commenter asserted the 

risk analysis in the GEIS ignored historical nuclear accidents and incidents. Another commenter 

stated that the results of the risk analysis were inconsistent with public concerns about the risks 

of indefinite onsite storage of waste. One commenter stated that the GEIS did not provide 

details to explain how event probabilities were derived. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC’s analysis of the 

environmental impacts of severe accidents for at-reactor continued storage of spent fuel is 

SURYLGHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHDVVHVVPHQWDSSURSULDWHO\FRQVLGHUVULVN

information, which is an important element in providing an accurate assessment of the 

environmental impacts of low probability events. This formulation of the assessment of the 

environmental impact of severe accidents is based on the NRC’s policy on reactor severe 

DFFLGHQWVLQ1(3$UHYLHZVVHH)5“Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations 

8QGHUWKH1DWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\$FWRI”) This approach was cited with approval 

by the Court of Appeals in its 2012 remand (New York v. NRC). The assessment of 

environmental impacts included consideration of external events, such as seismic events, and 

climate change. The studies relied on to derive event probabilities are summarized and 

UHIHUHQFHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6$GGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHWUHDWPHQWRIORZ

probability events in the environmental review is discussed in Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-14) (341-2-1) (341-2-2) (341-2--12) (431---4-

D.2.16.26 – COMMENT: Several commenters requested that more detailed information 

supporting the conclusions in the GEIS be provided. One commenter requested that 

engineering calculations and computer source code be made available. Another commenter 

requested that additional information supporting impact level determinations be provided. 

Another commenter suggested that providing additional technical information supporting the 

GEIS conclusions would ease public concerns about spent fuel storage. One commenter 

requested that extensive data, assumptions, and calculations regarding climate impacts to a 

specific river network and the resulting effects on the GEIS assumptions be provided. Two 

commenters requested that more information, including EISs and EAs supporting prior fuel 

storage licensing and cask design analyses, be provided in the GEIS. One commenter stated 

that NRC reviews of spent fuel storage and handling operating experience did not appear to be 

provided in any official document. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. NRC and CEQ regulations encourage 

incorporation of material by reference when the effect will be to cut down on bulk without 

impeding review of the action. In accordance with the direction provided by the Commission in 

SRM-COMSECY-12- (NRC 2012a), this GEIS and Rule rely on numerous technical reports 

and documents on related issues to support the analysis of potential impacts. Each chapter in 

the GEIS and selected appendices (e.g., Appendix E), provide lists of references identifying the 

technical reports and environmental review documents supporting the data and analyses 

summarized in the GEIS. Table 1-1 of the GEIS provides a list of environmental review 

documents that the NRC relied on, including EISs and EAs supporting prior fuel storage 

licensing. These references and review documents are available through ADAMS, the NRC 

public website, public and special technical libraries, or the originating organizations. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The potential effects of climate change are discussed relative to their effects on the accident 

DQDO\VHVLQ6HFWLRQDQGWRWKHLUHIIHFWVRQFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVIRUUHOHYDQWUHVRXUFHVLQ

&KDSWHU$QDQDO\VLVRIWKHHIIHFWRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVSURYLGHGLQ

6HFWLRQ

The NRC routinely inspects spent fuel pool and dry cask storage operations as part of the 

agency’s inspection program, and considers reports about spent fuel storage handling issues for 

generic applicability as part of the agency’s operating experience and generic issues programs. 

Copies of NRC inspection reports and generic communications are available in ADAMS and on 

the NRC public website. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30-14------3--3---31) 

D.2.16.27 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC has failed to address the 

environmental impacts of constructing and operating a spent fuel pool island, including 

economic costs and vulnerability to accidents and malevolent acts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The NRC expects that the structure of 

the existing spent fuel pool would remain as it is during reactor operation, except that the 

cooling and other support systems would be isolated from other portions of the plant, allowing 

the rest of the plant to be decommissioned. The licensee would be unlikely to construct a new 

spent fuel pool, and no licensee for a decommissioning plant to date has done so. Therefore, 

the environmental impacts of creating the “spent fuel pool island” would be negligible. Because 

this activity would occur as part of the decommissioning of the reactor, even those negligible 

LPSDFWVZHUHRQO\FRQVLGHUHGXQGHUFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,67KHVSHQW

fuel pool would remain subject to applicable security requirements. These requirements are 

GHVLJQHGWRSURYLGHDGHTXDWHSURWHFWLRQRISXEOLFKHDOWKDQGVDIHW\6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

evaluates the impacts of accidents in spent fuel pools and of potential acts of sabotage or 

terrorism. In addition, Sections ' and ' of this appendix address related issues. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.16.28 – COMMENT: Several commenters suggested that the GEIS did not properly identify 

the starting point for the continued storage period. These commenters asserted that the 

timeframe for the analysis of storage impacts should begin when the spent fuel is initially 

produced, or when it is placed in wet or dry storage. One commenter cited as an example a 

two-UHDFWRUQXFOHDUSODQWWKDWEHJDQVWRULQJVSHQWIXHOLQGU\FDVNVLQEXWWKHUHDFWRrs will 

not cease operating until 2033 and 2034. The commenter argued that applying the timeframes 

in the GEIS for replacement of casks would result in some casks being over 140 years old 

before replacement, and stated that this would be inconsistent with the GEIS assumption that 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

casks would be replaced every 100 years. Another commenter stated that adopting this later 

starting point excluded from consideration significant environmental impacts that arise in earlier 

phases of the life of a fuel assembly. One commenter stated that radioactive waste at operating 

and decommissioning facilities can have similar characteristics. Another commenter asserted 

that the baseline for evaluating impacts should begin before construction and operation of the 

reactor facility. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The environmental impacts of spent fuel 

storage during the period of licensed life for reactor operations are addressed in the EIS 

prepared for the licensing or license renewal of the reactor. The proposed action—the revision 

to the Rule—specifically addresses the impacts of continued storage. In terms of the baseline 

FRQVLGHUHGLQWKH*(,6WKHLPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ&KDSWHUVDQG,Q

&KDSWHUWKH15&HYDOXDWHGWKHFXPXlative impacts, which adds the impacts considered in 

&KDSWHUVDQGWRWKHLPSDFWVRIRWKHUSDVWSUHVHQWDQGUHDVRQDEO\IRUHVHHDEOHDFWLRQVWKDW

affect the same resources. This includes any appropriate impacts associated with the reactor 

that generated the spent fuel. 

As the comment indicated, it is possible that the first casks that are loaded at a plant could be 

over 100 years old before the end of the short-term timeframe. Using the example cited in the 

FRPPHQWLIDFDVNZDVORDGHGLQDQGWKe reactor license expired in 2034, the GEIS would 

XVHWKH\HDUDVWKHHQGRIWKH\HDUVKRUW-term timeframe. At that point the oldest cask 

ZRXOGEH\HDUVROG7KLVLVVXHLVDGGUHVVHGLQWKHILUVWEXOOHWRI6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

where the NRC stated, “For an ISFSI that reaches 100 years of age near the end of the shortterm storage timeframe, the NRC assumes that the replacement would occur during the longterm storage timeframe.” In other words, because the 100-year timeframe for replacement is an 

assumption, and not a regulatory requirement, the NRC assumed that replacement could be 

delayed a few years until after the short-term timeframe. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--1--1--4--32) 

D.2.16.29 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments either expressing disagreement 

ZLWKRUDVNLQJIRUFODULILFDWLRQRIWKHVXPPDU\RIHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVSUHVHQWHGLQ&KDSWHU

of the GEIS. Specifically, some commenters disagreed with the NRC’s determination that there 

would be no irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources during continued storage 

for most resources. One commenter stated that the resources affected are significant and that 

the use of resources during continued storage precludes their use for renewable energy 

development. One commenter stated that indefinite storage of spent fuel should be analyzed as 

an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources. One commenter asked whether an 

irreversible and irretrievable commitment of a resource meant an acceptance of permanently 

sacrificed land. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that the GEIS identifies specific resource areas for which there would be irreversible and 

irretrievable resource commitments resulting from continued storage. The NRC notes, however, 

that the proposed action in this case is a rulemaking to update the Rule; and that there are no 

irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources associated with this proposed action. 

However, to provide a complete picture of the environmental impacts of continued storage, the 

NRC is providing an analysis of the irreversible commitment of resources associated with 

continued storage. The NRC revised 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WRFODULI\WKDWWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQ

is a rulemaking and to note why the NRC is providing a more detailed discussion of the 

irreversible and irretrievable commitments of impacts associated with continued storage. 

Regarding the impact of resource commitments on renewable energy development, the 

resources that would be committed to continued storage represent a very small fraction of those 

resources available to support residential, commercial, and industrial development, including 

renewable energy projects. 

$VQRWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,61(3$UHTXLUHVWKDWDQ(,6LQFOXGHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH

relationship between short-term uses of the environment and maintenance and enhancement of 

long-term productivity. The purpose of this analysis is to assess and disclose whether any 

XQDYRLGDEOHDGYHUVHLPSDFWVDVVXPPDUL]HGLQ6HFWLRQDQGLUUHYHUVLEOHDQGLUUHWULHYDEOH

FRPPLWPHQWVRIUHVRXUFHVIURPFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHDVLGHQWLILHGLQ6HFWLRQZRXOGSHUVLVWDV

impacts beyond the period of continued storage and therefore affect “the maintenance and 

enhancement of long-term productivity” as described in NEPA. The terms “short-term uses” and 

“long-term productivity” are different than the GEIS timeframes of short-term, long-term, and 

indefinite. 6HFWLRQGHVFULEHVKRZWKH*(,6LPSDFWDQDO\VLVFRQFOXVLRQVIRUWKHWKUHH

timeframes fit within the short-term use and long-term productivity analysis framework required 

by NEPA. 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6KDVEHHQUHYLVHGWRFODULfy the discussion of irreversible and 

irretrievable resource commitments. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--11---12) 

D.2.16.30 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed general support for the assumptions 

made LQWKH*(,6UHJDUGLQJWUDQVIHURIVSHQWIXHOIURPVSHQWIXHOSRROVWRGU\FDVNVZLWKLQ

years of reactor operation and about the activities associated with the storage of fuel in casks 

during the long-term and indefinite timeframes. The commenters stated that some assumptions 

are conservative (e.g., requiring fuel to be transferred to new casks every 100 years and 

rebuilding the entire ISFSI every 100 years). One commenter stated that the NRC should be 

clear that because these assumptions are so conservative they should be characterized as 

ERXQGLQJDQGWKDWDOOWKHDVVXPSWLRQVOLVWHGLQ6HFWLRQVKRXOGVWDWHWKHFRQVHUYDWLYHRU

bounding nature of the assumption. Two commenters stated that the assumption of a 100-year 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

replacement interval is conservative. Another commenter stated that cask systems would 

continue to be licensed well beyond 100 years. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that the assumptions provide reasonable predictions to support the NRC’s analysis of 

the environmental impacts associated with the continued storage of spent fuel. The 

assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that 

variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in environmental impact 

determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. In complying with the 

requirements of the NEPA, the NRC based its environmental impact analysis on reasonable 

assumptions so that the impacts, as evaluated in the GEIS, are neither worst case, nor 

underestimated. For further information regarding the assumption about repackaging of fuel, 

see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

(30-------11-2) (244-11--20--10-4) (-3--2-13) 

-3--2--2--1--2--1--1--1--2-

--2) 

D.2.16.31 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the timing and movement of spent fuel to an 

away-from-reactor ISFSI cannot be assessed generically because it is site-specific. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. In the GEIS, the NRC evaluated, on a 

generic basis, the impacts of transporting spent fuel from reactor sites to an away-from-reactor 

ISFSI, and the NRC continues to consider such an analysis reasonable under NEPA. This is 

because the impacts associated with transportation of spent fuel (e.g., doses to workers and 

public, and traffic impacts) are well understood and have been addressed in a number of reports 

and in 10 CFR 3DUW7DEOH6-4. The comment did not provide any specific objection to such 

analyses. The timing of such shipments does not affect the analyses, and thus is not included 

as a factor in the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-2-

D.2.16.32 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS failed to demonstrate that 

the generic analysis in the GEIS is bounding, and that a GEIS is not as protective as a sitespecific analysis. One commenter stated that the flawed structuring of alternatives avoided 

developing solutions to the hazards and consequences associated with continued storage. In 

addition, the commenter asserted that the generic approach only facilitates licensing and avoids 

site-specific analysis, thus subverting the purpose and utility of NEPA. The commenter argued 

that each site is unique and the GEIS does not provide an accurate assessment of the sitespecific environments and impacts. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Another commenter asserted that the NRC failed to sufficiently demonstrate that a generic 

assessment “provides for the same level of environmental protection as the other alternatives.” 

The commenter stated that benefits gained from a generic analysis accrue predominantly to 

private and corporate stakeholders and cited tKHFRVWDQDO\VLVSURYLGHGLQ&KDSWHURIWKH

GEIS which stated that it could cost approximately $24 million to address continued storage 

impacts in site-specific proceedings. The commenter stated that this cost, though not small, is 

minor compared to the cost of constructing a new nuclear power plant. 

Another commenter stated that the generic approach of the proposed Rule and draft GEIS were 

fundamentally misguided because the practical, technical, and logistical challenge of 

responsibly managing spent fuel distributed across the United States necessitates a structured 

and regulatory approach that is site-specific. The commenter asserted that the NRC has not 

demonstrated that the technical process of continued storage is generic rather than site-specific. 

Another commenter asserted that there was an insufficient basis to assume that an at-reactor 

ISFSI or DTS could be built at every site. 

One commenter asserted that a generic analysis is insufficient to provide the “hard look” 

required by NEPA. This commenter argued that the site-specific affected environments vary too 

much to be adequately described generically. The commenter called the description of the 

affected environment in the GEIS cursory, and asserted that it was inadequate for an action as 

large in magnitude as storage over the long-term and indefinite timeframes. The commenter 

asserted that there could be a meaningful examination of environmental impacts at a sitespecific level or at least a regional level where the NRC can evaluate a diverse range of 

alternatives in terms of the amount of spent nuclear, storage configurations, spent fuel classes, 

cask options and institutional control scenarios. The commenter stated that the cursory 

descriptions of resource areas in Chapter 3 of the GEIS illustrate the need for a tiered process 

on a site-specific or at least regional level to adequately inform decisionmakers. 

One commenter stated that the GEIS contains a deficiently generic analysis of the impacts 

associated with continued storage during the long-term and indefinite timeframes to support a 

Rule that would preclude site-specific NEPA analyses in future licensing actions. Further, the 

commenter asserted that the GEIS failed to identify and assess critical site-specific concerns 

related to the impacts of onsite continued storage, and as a result does not take the “hard look” 

required by NEPA. The commenter stated that the GEIS is fundamentally flawed, and that the 

NRC should require site-specific review of the impacts of future spent fuel pool leaks, and the 

risk and consequences of pool fires in all licensing proceedings. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the view stated in the comments that the differences 

between sites render a generic analysis inappropriate. 

The NRC has determined in the GEIS that the direct and indirect environmental impacts of 

continued storage can be analyzed generically. This means that, for each of the resource areas 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

analyzed in the GEIS, the NRC has reached a generic determination (SMALL, MODERATE, or 

LARGE, or a range) that is appropriate for all sites. The assumptions used in the analysis are 

sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that variances that may occur from site to 

site are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations that are greater than those 

SUHVHQWHGLQWKH*(,6,QDGGLWLRQLQUHPDQGLQJWKH:DVWH&RQILGHQFH5XOH)5

WRWKH15&IRUDGGLWLRQDODQDO\VLVWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOVFRQWLQXHGWKHORQJKLVWRU\RI

Federal courts approving a generic approach to the analysis of common environmental impacts. 

In New York v. NRC, the Court of Appeals stated that the NRC could assess the impacts of 

continued storage generically, indicating that there is “...no reason that a comprehensive 

general analysis would be insufficient to examine onsite risks that are essentially common to all 

plants... given the Commission’s use of conservative bounding assumptions and the opportunity 

for concerned parties to raise site-specific differences at the time of a specific site’s licensing.” 

It is important to note that this GEIS satisfies a small portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations 

related to the issuance of a reactor or spent fuel storage facility license by generically evaluating 

the environmental impacts of continued storage. Prior to the completion of an individual 

licensing action, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and document the 

results of this review in an EA and FONSI or EIS. The site-specific environmental review will 

address, among other things, the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage during the license 

term. In these site-specific licensing reviews, NRC will also consider site-specific mitigation 

measures. Taken together, the GEIS, which assesses spent fuel storage impacts during 

continued storage, and the site-specific environmental review, which assesses spent fuel 

storage impacts during the period of licensed operations, will provide the Commission with a 

complete environmental analysis of the impacts associated with spent fuel storage prior to 

disposal in a geologic repository. These environmental analyses will also provide the 

Commission with the information necessary to properly consider protection of the environment 

in its licensing decisions, as intended by NEPA. 

The suggestion of a “regional” analysis would not address the perceived shortcomings of the 

generic analysis because this type of analysis would still not be site-specific. However, as 

discussed above, the environmental impacts of each facility will be addressed by a site-specific 

environmental analysis for the licensed period and the GEIS for the continued storage period. 

Having concluded that the impacts of continued storage can be addressed generically, and that 

the combination of the GEIS and site-specific reviews will meet the requirements of NEPA, the 

use of the GEIS alternative, with its lower cost compared to other alternatives, is appropriate. 

(DFKRIWKHDOWHUQDWLYHVFRQVLGHUHGE\WKH15&LQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6ZRXOGVDWLVI\WKH

NEPA requirement for a hard look at the environmental impacts of the action. Therefore, any of 

the alternatives could be chosen. The use of a GEIS and Rule enables the NRC to satisfy its 

NEPA obligations with respect to continued storage in the most efficient manner while still taking 

the requisite hard look at environmental impacts. While applicants (and their ratepayers) will 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

benefit from the lower cost of the alternative chosen, the key point is that the alternative first had 

to enable the NRC to meet the requirements of NEPA. 

The NRC does not believe that it must perform a site-by-site review and prove that every reactor 

site could host an ISFSI and a DTS as part of the GEIS. Every licensee that has chosen to 

EXLOGDQRQVLWH,6)6,WRGDWHVLWHVKDVEHHQDEOHWRORFDWHWKH,6)6,VXLWDEO\2QVLWHVSDFH

exists for an ISFSI given that every reactor site must include an exclusion area (see 10 CFR 

100.3, 100.11(a)(1), and 100.21(a)). The NRC reasonably expects that future licensees will 

also be able to provide space for an ISFSI and a DTS on their sites. 

The GEIS evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage. Safe management of 

spent fuel is achieved by the licensee’VFRPSOLDQFHZLWK15&UHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)53DUWV

DQGIRUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRIVSHQWIXHOSRROVDQG,6)6,V7KH15&

periodically updates to those rules, (e.g., the improvements to safety in response to the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the Fukushima accident, and ongoing NRC inspection 

and enforcement activities). 

For additional information regarding the use of generic analyses, see Section D.2.11.1 of this 

appendix. For additional information on the matter of institutional controls, see Section '

of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--12----4---4-24) 

D.2.16.33 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns about the use of the Private Fuel 

Storage, LLC (PFS) FEIS (NRC 2001a) as an example of an away-from-reactor storage facility 

in the GEIS. Commenters opposed its use as a model for away-from-reactor storage. One 

commenter asserted that it was wholly inappropriate to incorporate the site-specific details of 

the PFS FEIS into a GEIS and suggested an earlier version of the Waste Confidence Rule had 

prevented the consideration of any environmental impacts for continued storage beyond the 

storage licensing period in the PFS FEIS. They asserted that without an adequate explanation 

for the basis of incorporating portions of the PFS FEIS findings into the final GEIS, it was 

circular logic to rely on an analysis that did not consider the impacts of continued storage when 

the stated purpose of the GEIS was to “address the environmental impacts of continuing to 

store spent fuel...at an away-from-reactor storage facility, after the end of a reactor’s licensed 

life for operation until final disposition in a geologic repository (‘continued storage’).” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with tKHVHFRPPHQWV$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, the PFSF was used primarily to establish a reasonable set of parameters for a possible 

away-from-reactor ISFSI. So, for example, the NRC used the physical size of the PFSF, its 

facilities, and its workforces (construction and operation) as parameters in the analyses. But the 

NRC also assumed construction and operation of a DTS, and eventual replacement of facilities 

and storage pads to address storage over periods longer than that addressed for the PFSF. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The NRC also did not make any specific assumption regarding the location of the away-fromreactor ISFSI, and more specifically, did not assume it was at the location proposed for the 

PFSF, and did not assume the environmental impacts of an away-from-reactor ISFSI would be 

the same as those for the PFSF. The NRC concludes that the GEIS provides an adequate 

explanation of how information regarding the PFSF was used in the analysis. The analysis in 

the GEIS for an away-from-reactor ISFSI also does not stop at the end of the initial licensed 

period, but continues through the three timeframes discussed in the GEIS. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(410----4-

D.2.16.34 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should discuss when at-reactor 

storage would not be appropriate and away-from-reactor storage would be preferable. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS and Rule satisfy the NRC’s 

NEPA responsibilities by analyzing the environmental impacts of continued storage in at-reactor 

or away-from-reactor storage sites. The SOC in the Rule and Appendix B of the GEIS support 

the conclusion that it is technically feasible to safely store spent fuel at either at-reactor or awayfrom-reactor sites. It is up to licensees to determine whether they will use at-reactor or awayfrom-reactor storage facilities until DOE takes possession of the fuel. Therefore, a discussion of 

whether and when at-reactor or away-from-reactor storage would be appropriate or preferable is 

not necessary to the analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-13) 

D.2.16.35 – COMMENT: Two commenters noted that the NRC is required to provide an 

analysis of the public health, safety, and environmental impacts of continued storage before 

allowing continued storage activities to occur. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. Before any license or license renewal can 

be issued, the NRC must determine that the license application complies with the NRC’s 

regulations for protection of the public health and safety. As part of this review, the NRC will 

also conduct an appropriate NEPA review that will consider the environmental impacts of the 

proposed action. However, the analysis in this GEIS does not authorize any licensed activities; 

rather, this GEIS satisfies a portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations related to the evaluation of a 

reactor or spent fuel storage facility license application by generically evaluating the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. The NRC further notes that the storage of spent 

fuel by existing licensees must meet the NRC’s safety requirements and remains subject to 

ongoing NRC inspection and enforcement. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

For more information on the NRC’s role in licensing a repository see Sections ' and 

' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-14--11-2) 

D.2.17 Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions – Dry Transfer System 

D.2.17.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters questioned the reliance in the GEIS on a DTS and 

long-term dry cask storage because no DTS has ever been licensed and the technology is 

uncertain. The commenters asserted that the assumption of a DTS violates the stated reliance 

on existing technology and regulations. Many commenters asserted that the GEIS provided 

insufficient detail about the DTS and how it would operate, and others asserted that DTSs are 

too uncertain to be relied upon in the long-term and indefinite timeframes. One commenter 

indicated that the conceptual design of a DTS cited in the GEIS was not a realistic or adequate 

basis for developing a reference design or for evaluating impacts. One commenter requested 

the NRC clarify what is meant by the phrase “DTS or equivalent” in the DTS assumption. 

Another commenter concluded that although a solution to spent fuel pool storage will be 

needed LQWKH-year timeframe, none is contemplated in the GEIS. Commenters also 

questioned the NRC’s impact analyses involving references to the Transnuclear-EPRI DTS 

described b\'2('2(DQGWKH15&(,6IRUWKHSURSRVHG,GDKR6SHQW)XHO)DFLOLW\

(NRC 2004c) asserting that these documents likely do not reflect advancements in science, 

engineering, and operational experience and that these DTSs were conceptually less complex 

than the DTS described in the GEIS. Several commenters requested that the NRC provide 

more detailed information about the DTS, including (1) whether the DTS would be inside a 

containment building, (2) what skill level of workers would be required to operate the DTS, (3) 

the minimum level of institutional controls needed at each DTS and ISFSI, (4) the 

FRQVHTXHQFHVRI'76IDLOXUHWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRI'76FRQVWUXFWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQ

DQGWKHFRVWVRIFRQVWUXFWLQJDQGRSHUDWLQJD'76

Commenters also raised questions about the inspection and monitoring of dry casks. 

Commenters requested that the NRC provide additional information about (1) the circumstances 

that would affect the feasibility of repackaging in the DTS, including fuel, cladding, and storage 

system degradation; (2) how likely these issues are to arise; (3) how inspections and 

remediation would be implemented; (4) whether fuel inspections during repackaging would be 

SHUIRUPHGLQDLUXQGHUZDWHURULQDQLQHUWDWPRVSKHUH) potential damage to fuel from 

LQVSHFWLRQVDQGWKHSRWHQWLDOUDGLRORJLFDOHQYLURQPHQWDODQGSXEOLFKHDOWKFRQVHTXHQFHV

of these operations. 

In light of the technological uncertainty, commenters requested that the NRC assess the 

impacts of not having a DTS in the long-term and indefinite timeframes including evaluation of 

storage options. One commenter requested an explanation of what would be done to address 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

damaged casks and fuel in the time before a DTS could be constructed. Further, some 

commenters asserted that because the DTS is unlikely, the NRC cannot rely on the assumption 

that all spent fuel would be transferred to dry casks by the end of the short-term timeframe. 

Other options suggested by commenters include wet transfer in new or existing fuel pools and 

overpacking. 

Some commenters requested additional clarification on the regulatory status of the DTS. One 

commenter requested that the GEIS state that a DTS is necessary based on GEIS assumptions 

and to allow transfer of spent fuel stored in casks that are not approved for transportation. 

Several commenters asserted that the GEIS could not rely on the DTS unless NRC regulations 

would require one to be built. Other commenters asked the NRC to explain what current 

regulations address the DTS. 

One commenter requested additional detailed discussion of the reference facilities, including (1) 

an explanation of the reasons why these facilities have not yet been constructed; (2) a 

discussion of how that may affect any assumptions; (3) a discussion of the technical and 

regulatory challenges that have hindered the development of such systems; (4) whether these 

facilities were licensed to retrieve, inspect, and repackage fuel, including high-burnup fuel, after 

SURORQJHGVWRUDJHDQGWKHSRWHQWLDO for these challenges to be encountered in future efforts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

considers the assumption regarding the future use of DTS to be reasonable, as discussed in 

Section ' of this appendix. Because NEPA analyses are, by their nature, forwardlooking, it would be impossible to perform such analyses without making a set of reasonable 

assumptions. For that reason, the NRC has historically prepared its environmental review 

documents by formulating assumptions of future conditions, where necessary, based on 

available information and the agency’s technical and scientific expertise. The courts have 

approved this methodology as NEPA-compliant. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC. In 

this case, the NRC used available information regarding future facilities for handling spent fuel, 

drawing from previous reviews performed by both DOE and NRC. 

The NRC agrees with the comment that there could be other options available in the future to 

meet the same objectives as having a DTS at each spent fuel storage installation. Because 

such facilities would be needed several decades into the future and would be the subject of 

separate future NRC licensing actions, a comparison of spent fuel transfer technology options in 

the GEIS now would not inform the decision to license or renew the license of a power plant atreactor ISFSI or away-from-reactor ISFSI because the NRC believes that the DTS option 

reasonably bounds the other options that may be available. 

Regarding inspections of dry cask storage systems, as described in Section B.3.3.3 of the 

GEIS, after the end of the reactor’s licensed life for operation, the licensee would continue to 

store spent fuel onsite under either a general or specific &)53DUWOLFHQVH'XULQJWKLV
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

time, the licensee would remain under the NRC’s regulatory control and NRC inspections and 

oversight of storage facilities would continue. The NRC monitors the performance of ISFSIs (at 

both decommissioned and shutdown reactor sites and operating reactor sites) by conducting 

periodic inspections. 

The opportunity to inspect spent fuel that has been placed into dry cask storage would occur 

during repackaging of the fuel. During the short-term timeframe, repackaging would occur, if 

needed, in the spent fuel pool. In the long-term and indefinite timeframes, repackaging would 

occur in the DTS. In addition, as described in Section 2.2.1.3 of the GEIS, in accordance with 

&)5,6)6,OLFHQVHUHQHZDODSSOLFDWLRQVPXVWLQFOXGHDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVWLPHlimited aging analyses that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components important to 

safety will continue to perform their intended safety function for the requested period of 

extended operation and (2) a description of the aging management program for management of 

issues associated with aging that could adversely affect structures, systems, and components 

important to safety. Similar aging analysis and management requirements apply to general 

ISFSI licensees as part of storage cask certificate of compliance (CoC) renewals, for more 

LQIRUPDWLRQVHH6HFWLRQ'RIWKLVDSSHQGL[These requirements enhance confidence 

that spent fuel, including bare fuel, fuel in canisters, or damaged fuel that has been canned and 

stored in dry casks could be retrieved for repackaging, if needed. Finally, historical evidence 

shows that licensees have dealt with damaged fuel in the past. In the most extreme example, 

the damaged fuel from the core of Three Mile Island, Unit 2, was removed and put into storage. 

If this type of fuel can be successfully moved and managed, then it is reasonable to assume that 

damaged spent fuel in casks can be handled if necessary. 

For additional information regarding the cost of spent fuel storage, see Section D.2.42.2 of this 

appendix. Additional descriptions of spent fuel degradation and damaged fuel handling were 

added to Appendix B in response to this and other comments. No changes were made to the 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-34---12--12--12--12--1-20) -12-21) 

--2--1--1----3--2--2--

------2--3--2--2-

----------3--4-10) 

-4---2--2--2--3--2--1-

D.2.17.2 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that experience suggests that the installation of 

a DTS at every ISFSI location is not likely to be necessary, and that should repackaging 

become necessary, it is more likely that industry would consider portable systems or overpacks. 

This commenter also stated that it is likely that advances in technology over the centuries would 

provide for improved repackaging methods with smaller environmental impacts. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that there might be other options available in 

the future to meet the same objectives as having a DTS at each spent fuel storage installation. 

The GEIS assumed a DTS at each storage site as a conservative assumption for the purpose of 

evaluating potential environmental impacts of continued storage. As with all NEPA analyses, 

the assumptions in the GEIS in no way approve actions or constitute requirements. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-1) 

D.2.17.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that there will be unspecified difficulties, 

costs, spills, and accidents stemming from transfers of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry 

casks, and from dry casks to other dry casks. One commenter stated that there may not be 

room on the existing sites to construct the necessary DTSs and ISFSIs. In addition, one 

commenter asserted that no generic environmental impacts assessment can be made because 

of site-specific variations in the condition of spent fuel pools, canisters, and casks; the existence 

of multiple types of dry storage systems; and the unverified performance of the reference DTS. 

Another commenter asserted that the GEIS discussion of effluent radiation monitoring is an 

admission that there will be radiological releases from the DTSs over time. One commenter 

expressed general skepticism about the reliability of the NRC’s DTS and dry cask assumptions 

because the NRC’s assessments of the technical capabilities of dry casks “keep expanding and 

improving as time progresses and the prospect of an available repository diminishes.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Because continued storage activities 

involving a DTS are assumed to occur in the long-term timeframe after the operating license of 

a power reactor expires, the DTS activities evaluated in the GEIS would occur many decades 

LQWRWKHIXWXUHLHEH\RQG\HDUVSDVWWKHWHUPRIWKHRSHUDWLQJOLFHQVH7KHUHIRUe, some 

uncertainty exists regarding the specific methods and equipment that would be used. For the 

purpose of evaluating environmental impacts in the GEIS, the NRC conservatively assumed 

DTSs would be employed based on existing technology and regulations. This assumption is 

conservative because constructing, operating, and replacing DTS facilities would have greater 

environmental impacts than other plausible future options for addressing at-reactor transfer 

needs (e.g., use of overpacks that would not require bare fuel handling). In addition, industry 

has decades of operating experience with wet transfer of new fuel and spent fuel, which 

involves some spent fuel handling equipment and procedures similar to what would be used in a 

DTS. Based on these factors, the NRC considers the assumption regarding the future use of 

DTSs to be reasonable. Additional details about the design, operation, and safety of the DTS 

concept are provided in the supporting references in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS. 

While spent fuel transfer operations can present challenges to operators (e.g., working with 

damaged fuel [see Section ' of this appendix for more information]), as described in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6RSHUDWLRQRID'76ZRXOGEHVLPLODUWRWKHRSHUDWLRQVFRQGXFWHGDW

current reactor sites with licensed ISFSIs where spent fuel is loaded in dry storage cask 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

systems. These operations routinely maintain public and occupational doses well within existing 

requirements. This is done despite variations in the facilities and equipment and the 

characteristics of the spent fuel being transferred. While these characteristics may vary, the 

safety regulations do not; therefore, the variation in equipment and fuel characteristics do not 

present insurmountable challenges or preclude a generic approach to analysis of impacts. In 

addition, the NRC requires that facilities and equipment are maintained to ensure safety 

functions and are not compromised. Further, the NRC inspects operating facilities to verify 

compliance with requirements. 

The impacts from accidents, including those involving transfer operations, are evaluated in 

6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6Although the consequences of an accident could 

be high, the impacts were found to be SMALL based on the low likelihood and, therefore, low 

risk (see Section ' of this appendix for more information). As described in Section 

RIWKH*(,6D'76ZRXOGEHOLFHQVHGE\15&XQGHUWKHUHJXODWLRQVLQ&)53DUW

Therefore, future licensing of site-specific DTSs would undergo thorough NRC safety and 

environmental reviews that would consider potential accidents and evaluate in detail how each 

proposed facility operator would maintain safety in transfer operations involving the specific fuel 

pool, transfer equipment, and type of dry storage system (including canisters and casks) for that 

facility. 

Radiation monitoring is conducted at all NRC-licensed facilities to comply with the radiation 

protection program requirements in 10 CFR Part 20. Radiation monitoring verifies that 

licensees are maintaining control of radioactive materials and not exceeding worker and public 

dose limits. Any planned radioactive effluents from a DTS would be documented in detail during 

a site-specific licensing of a transfer facility. An applicant for an NRC license would need to 

demonstrate how applicable standards for worker and public safety would be met by proposed 

operations (see Section D.2.34.11 of this appendix for more information). 

Regarding the availability of land area to accommodate the construction of a DTS or an ISFSI, 

as described in Section 3.1 of the GEIS, most U.S. power plants are sited on large tracts of land 

that have available areas where a DTS or ISFSI could be located. Table 3-1 of the GEIS 

provides a comparison of the small amount of land required for an ISFSI with the total site area 

at various power plant sites. If a power plant site with limited available land area did not have 

sufficient land area to construct a DTS or ISFSI then the licensee would have to pursue other 

options (e.g., arranging for storage at an away-from-reactor storage facility). The impacts of 

continued storage at an away-from-UHDFWRUVWRUDJHIDFLOLW\ZHUHHYDOXDWHGLQ&KDSWHURIWKH

GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-34------1---4-12) 

D.2.17.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that NRC has not described how damaged 

spent fuel transfer operations can be carried out. The commenters believe significant 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

uncertainty exists about the technology to transfer even undamaged fuel and asserted that at 

least some spent fuel and casks have already degraded, or will inevitably degrade, as they age 

or otherwise be damaged such that transfer operations cannot be carried out safely or smoothly. 

2QHFRPPHQWHUFLWHGD%HFKWHO6$,&VWXG\%HFKWHODQGWHVWLPRQ\WRWKH%OXH5LEERQ

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC 2012) for estimates that 10 percent of the fuel 

arriving at a future repository will be damaged. These commenters criticized the draft GEIS for 

failing to adequately address the potential consequences and costs of damaged fuel affecting 

DTS operations. Another commenter asserted that the radiological risks of packaging spent fuel 

will vary by fuel type and volume and, therefore, that a generic assessment might not be 

appropriate in light of that variability. 

2QHFRPPHQWHUFLWHGD3DOLVDGHV1XFOHDU3ODQWVLWXDWLRQDVUHDVRQWRGRXEWWKDWWKH

technology to address damaged fuel or casks exists. As the commenter described it, 

Consumers Energy, the plant’s operator, discovered weld flaws in a fuel cask and initially 

SODQQHGWRXQORDGWKHLUUDGLDWHGIXHOLQWKHFDVNKDYLQJRQO\D-hour window of time in which 

to accomplish the task; however, insurmountable technical difficulties prevented the operator 

from unloading that cask. The commenter suggested that this damaged cask and dozens more 

of the same type (VSC-24) remain in use. Other commenters asserted that the likelihood of 

damage is even greater for high-burnup fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments that suggested the GEIS did not describe 

damaged spent fuel transfer operations and costs. The NRC also acknowledges the uncertainty 

associated with the technology that could be used, as well as challenges presented by transfer 

of damaged fuel. However, the NRC disagrees with the comments that damaged fuel cannot be 

transferred safely, that the GEIS did not evaluate the consequences of damaged spent fuel 

transfer, and that variability in spent fuel characteristics precludes a generic analysis of 

environmental impacts from transfer operations. Although technically the costs of such 

operations are outside the scope of the GEIS, the NRC has added information throughout 

Chapter 2 regarding the costs related to the DTS and other activities associated with continued 

storage. For additional information related to the cost of continued storage, see Sections 

D.2.42.1 and D.2.42.2 of this appendix. 

The reference DTS was described in Section 2.1.4 of the GEIS and its construction and 

operation in Section 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS. These sections did not describe damaged fuel. 

Because the topic of damaged fuel is relevant to the description of DTS operations in Section 

2.2.2.1 of the GEIS, in response to the comments, the NRC has added information within 

Section 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS describing damaged fuel in the context of DTS operations, including 

GHVFULSWLRQVRIPHWKRGVIRUKDQGOLQJGDPDJHGVSHQWIXHO,QDGGLWLRQ6HFWLRQ of the 

GEIS addresses the environmental impacts of handling damaged fuel in the DTS. 

In addition, the NRC acknowledges in Section 2.1.4 of the GEIS that there are no DTSs at U.S. 

nuclear power plants. Although exact design specifications for dry transfer facilities are not yet 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

established, the NRC’s previous review of the Transnuclear-EPRI DTS design found the 

concept had merit. Given this review combined with decades of industry operating experience 

with wet transfer of new fuel and spent fuel, the NRC has reasonably concluded that DTSs are 

technically feasible. 

While the possibility of damaged fuel presents challenges for transferring fuel, various methods 

for safely handling damaged fuel have been reviewed in the literature. See for example 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Management of Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel, 

IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NF-T- ,$($, and IAEA, Management of Severely 

Damaged Nuclear Fuel and Related Waste, Technical Report Series No. 321 (IAEA 7KH

NRC requires spent fuel that has been classified as damaged for storage be protected during 

storage (e.g., placed in a can designed for damaged fuel, referred to as a damaged fuel can or 

GDPDJHGIXHOFRQWDLQHUVHH&)5KDQG,QWHULP6WDII*XLGDQFH6)67-ISG-1 

(15&E). A damaged fuel can is designed to ensure that the fuel-specific or systemrelated functions continue to be met (i.e., when a spent fuel assembly is placed in a damaged 

fuel can, one or more of the necessary safety functions, depending on the type of can, is 

SHUIRUPHGE\WKHFDQLQVWHDGRIWKHVSHQWIXHODVVHPEO\,$($$GDPDJHGIXHOFDQZLOO

confine fuel particles, debris, and damaged spent fuel to a known volume in a cask; ensure 

compliance with criticality safety, shielding, thermal, and structural requirements; and permit 

normal handling and retrieval of spent fuel from a cask. Therefore, damaged fuel that was 

placed in a damaged fuel can prior to dry storage or transportation to a repository for disposal 

would be transferred to a storage or disposal cask in the same manner as undamaged fuel with 

comparable consequences. Descriptions of mechanisms for spent fuel degradation during 

continued storage including those associated with high-burnup fuel are provided in Appendix B 

of the GEIS. Finally, the fuel transfer case study example raised by one commenter involving 

the need for corrective actions at a facility to address flaws in cask closure welds was resolved 

through the implementation of changes to closure welding practices and inspection procedures. 

Its occurrence does not cast doubt on the conclusions of the GEIS regarding the technical 

feasibility of DTS operations. 

The long history of spent fuel handling provides a basis to conclude that spent fuel variability by 

age and volume do not preclude a generic analysis of fuel transfer impacts. The public and 

occupational health impacts of operating a DTS are HYDOXDWHGLQ6HFWLRQ of the GEIS. 

The operation of a DTS would be similar to the operations conducted at current reactor sites 

with ISFSIs. At those sites, spent fuel is loaded into dry storage cask systems that maintain 

public and occupational doses within existing NRC requirements. This is routinely 

accomplished despite the variety of spent fuel characteristics encountered. While the fuel 

characteristics may vary, the safety regulations governing public and occupational exposures do 

not vary. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

In response to comments about damaged fuel, NRC has added information within Section 

2.2.2.1 of the GEIS describing damaged fuel in the context of DTS operations, including 

descriptions of methods for handling damaged spent fuel. No other changes were made to 

GEIS and no changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

(2--22---------3--2-20) 

-2--4-11) 

D.2.18 Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions – Timeframes 

D.2.18.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters provided comments on the likelihood of the 

indefinite timeframe and the NRC’s statement that the short-term timeframe is the most likely 

timeframe. Commenters questioned the NRC’s statements in the draft GEIS that the indefinite 

timeframe was highly unlikely and stated that it was unreasonable to assume a repository would 

be available within the short-term timeframe. 

In contrast, other commenters expressed support for repository availability in the short-term 

timeframe. One commenter stated a no-repository scenario is contrary to current law and is 

remote and speculative and represents a worst case, which is not required by NEPA. 

RESPONSE: Geologic disposal remains the national strategy for the disposition of spent fuel 

under the NWPA and the Federal government, through the DOE, is continuing its work on a 

disposal solution for spent fuel. Based on these factors and the technical feasibility of a 

geologic repository (discussed in Appendix B of this GEIS), the NRC has concluded that siting, 

constructing, and licensing of a repository within the short-term timeframe is the most likely 

outcome. Consequently, the NRC believes that the indefinite timeframe is the least likely of the 

three timeframes. However, sufficient uncertainty remains in the timing of the effort to open a 

repository that the NRC cannot completely rule out the possibility that a repository will not be 

available by the end of the short-term timeframe. Therefore, the NRC has prepared an analysis 

of an additional 100 years of continued storage (i.e., the long-term timeframe) and, in 

accordance with the direction of the Court of Appeals, has assumed that a repository never 

becomes available (i.e., the indefinite timeframe). 

In addition, a number of comments were submitted that expressed concern regarding both the 

costs and responsibilities of continued storage (see Section D.2.42 in this appendix). DOE has 

estimated that future liabilities, should the U.S. Government not take custody of spent fuel, will 

WRWDODERXWELOOLRQWKURXJKDQGPD\FRVWDERXWPillion each year after that 

(GAO-12-GAO 2012). Furthermore, the NRC acknowledges that, because of delays in the 

siting and licensing of a repository, the Federal government bears an increasing financial 

responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and it may become responsible for paying all the 

costs associated with spent fuel storage at some time in the future. Financial liabilities of this 

magnitude support the NRC’s view that the short-term timeframe is the most likely outcome. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Appendix B in the GEIS has been revised to provide further clarification of the basis for the 

Commission’s conclusions concerning the feasibility of geologic disposal. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-10) (112-20----2) (222-13) (244-11---4) (431---

---2---1---2--2----4-

-

D.2.18.2 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns regarding the adequacy of the 

evaluation of future impacts in the GEIS. Although some commenters questioned the credibility 

of the estimates of future impacts for the short-term timeframe, the majority of comments 

expressed concern regarding the long-term and indefinite timeframes. These concerns were 

mainly attributed to uncertainty in how conditions may evolve in the future. Commenters stated 

that the impacts, including costs, during the indefinite period need to be analyzed, and that, 

based on the impact determinations of SMALL in the draft GEIS, the analysis of costs appears 

inadequate. In contrast, one commenter stated that with proper maintenance and monitoring 

spent fuel could be indefinitely stored in pools or dry casks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that evaluation of future environmental impacts are uncertain 

due to uncertainties in future conditions, however, the presence of uncertainty does not 

invalidate nor preclude the development of reasonable determinations of potential 

HQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVLQWKH*(,66HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6SUHVHQWVDVVXPSWLRQVused for 

evaluating environmental impacts that provided appropriate and reasonable bounds for 

projecting future conditions and activities related to continued storage (e.g., see response to 

comments in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 

The NRC does not agree that the adequacy of the GEIS should be based on the impact 

determinations being SMALL. The GEIS fully describes the evaluations and impact 

determinations for each resource area and each timeframe. The NRC has responded to 

comments for each resource area, including postulated accidents and climate change, made 

any necessary changes to the GEIS, and determined the GEIS evaluations are appropriate (see 

&KDSWHUVDQGfor at-reactor and away-from reactor storage impacts. 

The suggestion that costs of continued storage be considered in the GEIS is addressed in 

Section ' of this appendix. Except for the changes made to the GEIS discussed in 

Section D.2.42.1, no changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(112-20----12--24-------14--

---------3) ------21--

-4) (341-1--1--10) (402--10) (431--1----

--1------4--2--2-3) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.18.3 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that the GEIS timeframes are too long or 

expressed confusion about them. Some commenters suggested that the GEIS use shorter 

timeframes and not include the consideration of long-term storage. Other commenters 

considered long storage times to be permanent storage or “de-facto” disposal, which they assert 

is contrary to the NWPA. Some commenters also expressed support for the reasonableness of 

the timeframes. 

2QHFRPPHQWVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH15&DGGWH[WWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WRFODULI\WKDWWKH

timeframes presented are just one analytical approach that ensures all spent fuel is analyzed for 

the entire period before geologic disposal and that other analytical approaches would have 

worked just as well. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments in support of the timeframes selected, 

and agrees with the comment that NRC could have used different analytical approaches (i.e., 

different time periods) to analyze the environmental impacts of continued storage. However, the 

NRC disagrees that consideration of long-term storage should not be included in the GEIS. 

Regardless of the number and length of specific timeframes, the GEIS needs to evaluate and 

disclose the impacts of continued storage. However, sufficient uncertainty remains in the timing 

of the effort to open a repository that the NRC cannot completely rule out the possibility that a 

repository will not be available by the end of the short-term timeframe. The NRC has therefore 

prepared an analysis of an additional 100 years of continued storage (the long-term timeframe) 

and, in accordance with the direction of the Court of Appeals, has analyzed the indefinite 

timeframe. 

The timeframes selected for the GEIS conform to the GEIS assumption that dry cask storage 

systems would be replaced every 100 years. The NRC believes the replacement period 

provides reasonable increments of time for evaluating environmental impacts because the 

replacement of dry cask storage systems is likely to be more environmentally significant than 

routine storage operations. In addition, replacement activities provide a distinct period of time to 

analyze. Although the GEIS evaluates the impacts of storage activities for all three timeframes, 

it does not authorize storage during these timeframes. Authorization for storage, if it were 

ultimately pursued, would require separate licensing actions with requisite environmental 

analysis. 

The NRC notes that some comments expressed confusion regarding the timeframes and their 

relationship to licensed facility life. As explained in tKH*(,6LQFOXGLQJ6HFWLRQWKH

environmental impacts considered in the GEIS are for the time period “after” the licensed life for 

reactor operations. At that time, the licensee would no longer be authorized to operate a 

reactor, but would continue to store spent fuel onsite under either its &)53DUWRU3DUW

license, or D&)53DUWOLFHQVH. During this time, the licensee would remain under the 

NRC’s regulatory control and NRC inspections and oversight of storage facilities would 

continue. The NRC monitors the performance of ISFSIs (at both decommissioned and 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

shutdown reactor sites and operating reactor sites) by conducting periodic inspections. As 

discussed in Section 'UHYLVLRQVWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6KDYHEHHQPDGHWR

provide further context for the evaluation of the impacts after licensed life that also provide 

clarity for the timeframes considered. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

---43--2--2------1-11) 

-1------------3-4) 

D.2.18.4 – COMMENT: Some commenters stated that the timeframes in the GEIS, which begin 

at the date the plant ceases operations, do not account for casks that have been loaded and are 

sitting for years prior to the cessation of plant operations. Commenters requested that the 

consideration of storage run from the date that the spent fuel is put into a cask, not the date that 

the plant ceases operations. One commenter noted that the 100-year timeframe for cask 

replacement does not take into consideration any information from the manufacturer of the 

casks, such as a warranty or statement on the useful life of the cask. 

One commenter stated that the NRC should delete any reference to the storage timeframe 

including operations of the plant (i.e., text starting on page 1-12 and continuing to 1-13 in 

SHFWLRQRIWKHGUDIW*(,6WRPDNHFOHDUWKDWFRQWLQXHGRSHUDWLRQRIWKHSODQWLVVHSDUDWH

and distinct from storage times for dry casks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. In general, the 

NRC agrees with commenters that the consideration of continued storage needs to consider the 

age of storage facilities in place at the beginning of the continued storage period; however, the 

NRC disagrees with the assertions that the environmental impacts of storage of spent fuel 

during reactor operations should be included in the GEIS. 

Prior to the completion of an individual licensing action (e.g., review for a combined license), the 

NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental review and document the results of this review in 

an EA and FONSI or EIS. The environmental impacts of storing spent fuel at reactor facilities 

during the licensed life for reactor operations will be evaluated during that review. Though those 

impacts are assessed separately, they will be considered in conjunction with the impacts in the 

GEIS at the time of licensing, and thus do not need to be considered as part of the GEIS. 

$VH[SODLQHGLQWKH*(,6LQFOXGLQJ6HFWLRQWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVFRQVLGHUHGLQWKH

GEIS are for the time period after the licensed life for reactor operations and the age of the 

storage facilities are considered in the analysis. For example, the GEIS assumption that 

replacement of the entire ISFSI would occur over the course of each 100-year interval, starting 

at the beginning of the long-WHUPVWRUDJHWLPHIUDPHVHH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VSHFLILHV

the beginning of the long-term storage timeframe because: (1) a typical spent fuel pool reaches 

its licensed capacity limit about 30 years into the licensed life for operation of the reactor after 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

which some spent fuel would need to be removed from the spent fuel pool and transferred into a 

GU\FDVNVWRUDJHV\VWHPIRUDUHDFWRUWKDWLVDVVXPHGWRRSHUDWHIRU\HDUVWKHVSHQWIXHO

that was first placed in dry casks ZRXOGKDYHEHHQVWRUHGRQWKHRUGHURI\HDUVDWWKH

beginning of the short-term timeframe; and (3) the beginning of the long-term timeframe, which 

RFFXUV\HDUVDIWHUWKHHQGRIUHDFWRURSHUDWLRQVUHSUHVHQWVDSHULRGRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\

years of dry cask storage for the spent fuel that was initially placed into dry cask storage, which 

is the time period over which it is assumed a dry cask storage system would be replaced. Thus, 

the consideration of replacement of dry cask storage systems at the beginning of the long-term 

storage timeframe explicitly accounts for the assumed lifetime of the dry cask storage system. 

7KH15&KDVUHYLVHG6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6WRFODULI\WKHDSSURDFKLQWKH

GEIS for evaluation of cask lifetimes in the context of evaluating impacts after licensed life for 

reactor operations. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

The consideration of “warranty” type information, as suggested by the commenter, is not 

expected to add further significant information beyond what has already been considered for 

estimating the behavior and longevity of dry cask storage systems. Appendix B of the GEIS 

describes the design of storage casks as well as national and international experience with 

storage casks in support of the longevity of dry casks (e.g., current understanding for slow 

degradation rates of dry storage casks). The GEIS assumes casks will be replaced every 100 

years as a conservative assumption to facilitate the NRC’s environmental analysis. For 

example, this assumption results in increased land use and generation of concrete waste. The 

NRC notes that the 100-year replacement interval is not intended to convey that dry casks and 

facilities need to be replaced every 100 years to maintain safe storage. The NRC considered 

experience with dry cask storage systems, information related to certification and regulatory 

oversight of dry cask storage systems, and monitoring and maintenance of dry cask storage 

systems to provide an informed basis for understanding the behavior of dry cask storage 

systems and estimating a replacement interval for the GEIS that is considered conservative 

(i.e., replacement times would most likely be longer than 100 years). 

-2--3-1--2---2-

D.2.18.5 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern that the assumptions in the GEIS 

regarding the longevity of storage casks and pools are based on NRC experience with spent 

fuel storage for shorter durations than the lifetimes of up to 140 years for spent fuel pools and 

100 years for spent fuel casks projected in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

agrees that spent fuel is currently stored in spent fuel pools and dry casks for less time than the 

NRC assumes could occur in the GEIS (i.e., the GEIS assumes a spent fuel pool is operational 

for up to 140 years and dry casks are in service for 100 years). The NRC disagrees with the 

comments’ concerns that the experience with spent fuel storage does not support the storage 

times considered in the GEIS because the assumed GEIS storage times are longer than the 

current storage duration. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Appendix B of the GEIS provides the technical basis for the NRC’s conclusions that it is feasible 

that spent fuel may be safely stored in spent fuel pools and dry casks for the periods projected 

in the GEIS. This analysis in Appendix B includes support for the robust structural design and 

construction of spent fuel pools and dry cask storage, their slow rate of degradation, and 

programs for monitoring and maintenance at storage facilities. In response to public comments, 

the NRC has revised Appendix B to add additional information regarding the role of monitoring 

and maintenance programs for collecting operational experience. No changes were made to 

the Rule as a result of these comments. 

--3--2--2--24) 

D.2.18.6 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the GEIS could be developed around 

scenarios that present the expected impacts on the environment at each of the timeframes used 

in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that the GEIS could present the environmental impacts using a 

‘scenario’ approach as suggested by the comment. However, the NRC has decided to use its 

well-established format for EISs; the GEIS is organized to present the environmental impacts for 

each timeframe according to the specific resource areas of the affected environment. The 

comment did not suggest the GEIS approach was inappropriate. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-

D.2.18.7 – COMMENT: One commenter raised concerns with quality assurance violations 

related to the design and manufacture of dry casks and questioned how the NRC could have 

confidence in indefinite dry cask storage when significant quality assurance issues exist. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment’s assertion that past quality assurance 

issues undermine confidence in the safety of dry cask storage systems. Although there have 

been isolated instances involving dry cask storage system design or operational issues, the 

extent of the issues identified have not called into question the safety of dry cask storage 

systems. Further information on monitoring and maintenance of dry cask storage systems is 

provided in Section '. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-10-3) 

D.2.18.8 – COMMENT: Commenters questioned the technical and factual basis for the 

DVVXPSWLRQVWKDWSRROVWRUDJHZRXOGHQG\HDUVDIWHUWKHOLFHQVHGOLIHIRURSHUDWLRQRIWKH

reactor, (2) storage facilities (i.e., dry casks) would be replaced every 100 years, and (3) the 

amount of spent fuel considered in a timeframe was appropriate. Some commenters stated that 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

storage assumptions need to be based on regulatory requirements, others asserted that 

experience did not challenge the GEIS assumptions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that assumptions made in the GEIS for evaluating environmental consequences are not 

always based on regulatory requirements; however, the NRC disagrees with statements in the 

comments that the assumptions in the GEIS need to be based on regulatory requirements. 

The NRC has made reasonable assumptions that support the analysis of the environmental 

LPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHLQWKH*(,67KHFHVVDWLRQRISRROVWRUDJH\HDUVDIWHUWKH

licensed life of the reactor is reasonable because (1) there is no need to cool spent fuel in a pool 

IRUPRUHWKDQ\HDUVDIWHUDUHDFWRUVWRSVRSHUDWLQJRSHUDWLRQDOFRVWVassociated with 

pool storage exceed dry cask storage costs; and (3) experience with decommissioning of 

nuclear power plants indicates that spent fuel pools are decommissioned before the end of the 

-year period. No dry cask storage systems have reached a 100-year service time; however, 

current information supports low degradation rates for dry cask storage systems (see Appendix 

B of the GEIS and Sections ' and ' of this appendix for further details). 

The NRC is not aware of information that would suggest that dry cask storage systems would 

need to be replaced after 100 years of service. However, the NRC believes that the 100-year 

replacement period provides a reasonable timeframe for the routine replacement of dry storage 

systems, and that actual storage facility replacement will be needed less frequently than 

assumed in the GEIS. The conservative nature of this assumption ensures that the 

environmental impact determinations in the GEIS are unlikely to underestimate the actual 

environmental impacts, should continued storage be necessary. 

The GEIS considers the environmental impacts from continued storage for an at-reactor site 

and an away-from-reactor ISFSI. The amount of spent fuel considered for each site is 

FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHRSHUDWLRQDOYROXPHRIDVLQJOHIDFLOLW\LHmetric tons of uranium 

[MTU] of spent fuel for the at-reactor site and 40,000 MTU for an away-from-reactor ISFSI). No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--1--3) (244-14-3) (244-14--10--12--12--11-

---12--12--2-4----2--2-2) 

-3-

D.2.19 Comments Concerning GEIS Assumptions – Institutional Controls 

D.2.19.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters questioned the reasonableness of the draft GEIS 

assumption that effective institutional controls will continue indefinitely into the future. Some of 

these commenters argued that the NRC could not support a conclusion that loss of institutional 

controls is remote and speculative. Other commenters believe that the NRC's conclusions 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

regarding institutional controls are arbitrary and capricious. These commenters argue that the 

NRC must analyze the environmental impacts of continued storage, including indefinite storage, 

without effective institutional controls. Some commenters requested that the NRC analyze the 

total loss of institutional controls and provided examples of how the effectiveness of institutional 

controls is limited in time for evaluating disposal of radioactive materials. They also asserted 

that many existing authorities, including the National Research Council, have concluded that 

long-term waste and remediation policy should be based on the assumption that institutional 

controls will eventually fail (e.g., the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reported that 

"institutional controls will fail" in its study on buried and tank waste (NAS 2000). Commenters 

recommended that the NRC consider using the DOE Yucca Mountain EIS '2(, which 

evaluated the loss of institutional controls after 100 years, as a starting point for the NRC’s 

evaluation of the loss of institutional controls. Some commenters identified what they 

considered to be limitations in the DOE’s analysis of loss of institutional controls. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. As 

described below, the NRC agrees with comments that there are limitations in the DOE’s 

DQDO\VLVRIWKHORVVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWUROVIRUWKH<XFFD0RXQWDLQ(,6'2(7KH15&

disagrees with comments that requested additional detailed analysis of the loss of institutional 

controls in the GEIS; to the extent that the comments requested a qualitative discussion of the 

loss of institutional controls, the NRC has provided this discussion here and in revisions to the 

GEIS. In the GEIS, the NRC’s approach to institutional controls is based on: (1) an evaluation 

of reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of continued storage requires an assumption 

that institutional controls will be maintained; (2) the most reasonable assumption is that 

institutional controls will continue; (3) accidents provide a helpful surrogate for analysis of a 

temporary lapse of institutional controls, including perspectives on the environmental 

implications of such a lapse; and (4) although too remote to calculate meaningfully, a permanent 

loss of institutional controls would likely have catastrophic consequences. Detailed discussions 

of these topics are provided below. 

An evaluation of reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts in the GEIS requires an 

assumption that institutional controls will be maintained 

In New York v. NRC, the Court of Appeals held that because the NRC had not demonstrated 

that the unavailability of a repository was “remote and speculative,” NEPA required the NRC to 

analyze the environmental impacts of continued storage in the absence of a repository (D.C. 

Cir. 2012). The NRC believes that, if geologic disposal were not possible, national spent fuel 

policy would change but would not default to relying on the storage facilities as they currently 

exist—the design of facilities and the regulations governing those facilities would change to 

accommodate the new policy. Further, the NRC is not in a position to predict how the policy 

would change or what technical advancements would become available to serve a new national 

policy if geologic disposal were not feasible or achievable by consensus. Analyzing the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

consequences of failing to secure a repository requires assumptions about what indefinite 

continued storage would encompass. Because the current methods of continued storage 

employ institutional controls, the NRC considered whether it was reasonable to assume that 

institutional controls would remain in place in the timeframes being considered, and as 

explained below, concluded that the assumption is reasonable for the purposes of this GEIS. 

While the NRC does not believe that the indefinite storage scenario described in the GEIS is 

likely, the NRC has analyzed this scenario in the GEIS to provide a conservative picture of the 

environmental impacts should a repository not become available by the end of the long-term 

timeframe. 

As stated in Chapter 1 of this GEIS, the Federal government, by national policy set forth in the 

NWPA, has assumed responsibility for the permanent disposal of HLW and spent fuel. The 

NWPA specifies that the cost of both interim storage and permanent disposal is the 

responsibility of the generators and owners of the waste. Further, the NWPA defines the 

current national strategy for disposition of spent fuel as disposal in a geologic repository and 

that the geologic repository strategy was recently reaffirmed by the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future (BRC 2012). 

In response to the Blue Ribbon Commission’s report (BRC 2012), DOE expressed its intent to 

provide repository capDFLW\E\ZKLFKLVDERXW years before the end of the short-term 

timeframe for the oldest spent fuel storage facility within the scope of this analysis (DOE 2013a). 

In this GEIS, the NRC concludes that a repository is most likely to be available by the end of the 

short-term timeframe, and failing that, likely to be available by the end of the long-term 

timeframe. In the event a repository could not be sited by the end of the long-term timeframe, 

the NRC has concluded that it is not reasonable to assume that national policy would default to 

complete inaction so as to leave spent fuel in dry casks unprotected, much less unattended or 

ultimately forgotten. However, because an alternate path forward is unknown at this point, the 

NRC has not attempted to forecast a different solution and assumes that temporary storage 

continues indefinitely. 

Should the national policy change from geologic disposal to permanent storage (i.e., on-site or 

away-from-reactor “disposal” in facilities that resemble ISFSIs), the NRC expects that planning 

and decision-making for permanent storage of spent fuel would take into account the 

appropriate balance of engineering design and institutional controls to address the challenges 

presented by permanent storage. There is no national historic precedent and, more particularly, 

no regulatory history of nuclear materials to suggest that the Federal government, including the 

NRC in its assigned role under the AEA, would not engage in planning and decision-making 

regarding changes or enhancements that would be necessary to accommodate permanent 

storage, in the unlikely event that option was adopted. Should national policy change to a policy 

of permanent storage, the NRC believes that significant regulatory changes and design 

modifications would be required to transfer spent fuel to offsite facilities or convert continued 

storage facilities to onsite permanent storage facilities. Further, even if a repository does not 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

become available, the NRC believes that, based on the factors discussed in the next section, 

institutional controls will be maintained as long as the spent fuel needs to be stored. 

With respect to costs, the NRC acknowledges that, because of delays in the siting and licensing 

of a repository, the Federal government bears an increasing share of the financial responsibility 

for storage costs, and it may become responsible for paying all costs associated with spent fuel 

storage at some time in the future. Although the annual costs for continued storage are 

manageable, cumulative costs will continue to increase. The Federal government has 

estimated it will pay a total of approximately $20 billion in damage awards and settlements by 

the year 202DQGPLOOLRQSHU\HDUDIWHUthat, if DOE does not accept fuel by 2021 and 

spent fuel continues to accumulate at reactor sites (GAO 2013). Thus, the escalating costs of 

continued storage provide incentive for the Federal government to implement the national policy 

for disposal of spent fuel in a deep geologic repository. 

The assumption that institutional controls will continue enables an appropriate and reasonable 

evaluation of the environmental impacts of continued storage over an indefinite timeframe. 

Absent the stability and predictability that follows from institutional controls, including but not 

limited to NRC licensing and regulatory controls, few impacts could be reliably forecast. The 

“hard look” required by NEPA would quickly become unfocused, highly speculative, and illdefined. Analyzing the impacts that might result from a permanent and total loss of institutional 

controls would require NRC to reach unsupportable conclusions about how and when our nation 

and its government, institutions, and social cohesiveness might degrade or even collapse. Such 

speculation would preclude meaningful calculations of impacts for the timeframes envisioned in 

the GEIS. 

The assumption that institutional controls continue is reasonable 

Consistent with NEPA’s rule of reason, which provides that agencies conduct an analysis 

according to the usefulness of the information to the decisionmaker and full disclosure to the 

public of predictable benefits and impacts, this GEIS assumes that institutional controls at any 

storage site are maintained. This assumption is reasonable for two reasons: First, in any 

timeframe it would be illogical for any government at any level to abandon the storage facilities, 

given the particular hazards of the fuel. Continued storage is designed to allow the eventual 

transport of the spent fuel to a repository, not to permanently sequester the material from the 

environment without continued active oversight and maintenance. Second, these highly visible 

storage facilities are much less likely than geologic repositories to simply be forgotten. 

Spent fuel is highly hazardous, requiring robust containment structures to minimize exposure 

risks. Spent fuel in storage facilities on the surface of the earth presents a visible hazard that 

requires active oversight to ensure safety and security measures are maintained and functioning 

as designed. Storage facilities remain under license and have aging management programs to 

support their maintenance and monitoring. Thus the visibility of storage facilities and the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

hazards of spent fuel strongly support the reasonableness of assuming the continuation of 

institutional controls throughout all of the timeframes analyzed in the GEIS. While changes may 

occur over time to governments or society, highly visible, hazardous facilities are unlikely to be 

left abandoned or forgotten. As a result, it is a reasonable assumption that any government 

would, in the interest of its citizenry, ensure appropriate oversight (e.g., monitoring, 

maintenance, replacement of facilities as needed) remains in place, consistent with radiation 

protection principles and regulatory restrictions, until final disposition of the spent fuel occurs. 

Accordingly, the NRC has determined that the assumption of continued institutional controls is 

reasonable in each of the timeframes considered in the GEIS. 

In contrast, consideration of the loss of institutional controls in the context of disposal of spent 

fuel HJDVLQ'2(¶V<XFFD0RXQWDLQ(,6>'2(@is not directly applicable to storage—

NRC regulations for deep geologic disposal of spent fuel recognize there is a point when the 

repository ceases operation, is permanently closed, and the license terminated. After 

permanent closure, regulations specify institutional controls (e.g., the requirements to place 

markers to identify what is buried deep below the surface of the earth and to maintain records 

regarding the hazard). However, these institutional controls are part of a defense-in-depth 

approach to disposal; the facility design is not permitted to rely on those institutional controls to 

meet post-closure safety requirements. 

Additionally, as identified in the public comments for this proceeding, a repository applicant is 

required to prepare a stylized calculation to evaluate the consequences should humans 

inadvertently disrupt the repository VHH&)5 These requirements for disposal 

address the situation where human activities could occur at a disposal site that is no longer 

recognizable at the earth’s surface following waste burial, permanent closure of the facility, and 

license termination. However, in contrast to underground disposal facilities, storage installations 

are not designed to be abandoned and will remain highly visible on the earth’s surface. As 

explained previously, the visibility and purpose of temporary storage facilities differ significantly 

from those of permanent disposal facilities, supporting the reasonableness of assuming that 

institutional controls over cask storage will be maintained. 

The NRC recognizes information presented by the National Academies National Research 

Council and others regarding the durability of institutional controls (i.e., Technical Bases for 

Yucca Mountain Standards, NAS DQGLong-Term Institutional Management of U.S. 

Department of Energy Legacy Waste Sites, NAS 2000). The NRC is also aware of international 

reports that discuss the durability of institutional controls (e.g., The Roles of Storage in the 

Management of Long-Lived Radioactive Waste, NEA and Disposal of Radioactive 

Wastes, Specific Safety Requirements [SSR-@IAEA 2011a). However, this commentary does 

not conclude that a permanent loss of institutional controls is likely or that effective government 

and governmental oversight of continued storage will cease in the distant future. Rather, these 

documents focus on developing plans and strategies regarding what should be done today to 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

address future uncertainty due, in part, to institutional controls. For example, the Board on 

Radioactive Waste Management, in its study on long-term institutional management, stated: 

“No plan developed today is likely to remain protective for the duration of the hazards. Instead, 

long-term institutional management requires periodic, comprehensive reevaluation of those 

legacy waste sites still presenting risk to the public and the environment to ensure that they do 

not fall into neglect and that advantage is taken of new opportunities for their further 

remediation.” (NAS 2000). While regulations may need to be updated over time, the NRC does 

not view possible future regulatory updates as an impediment to a current understanding of 

likely environmental impacts of continued storage. Further, future regulatory development 

would be expected to be undertaken to enhance and/or improve the effectiveness of regulatory 

oversight. 

Accident analysis provides a perspective on the environmental impacts of a temporary 

lapse of institutional controls 

The GEIS considers the environmental impacts of accidents during continued storage (e.g., 

certain cask drop events) LQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHVHDFFLGHQWVIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLV

NEPA analysis may serve as a surrogate or proxy for the temporary loss of institutional controls, 

and the impacts of these accidents are representative of impacts from a temporary loss of 

institutional controls. An accident condition approximates a limited period during which 

institutional controls are less than effective, after which the NRC expects that institutional 

controls and oversight would resume. Consequences from accidents resulting in small releases 

represent a lapse in more routine maintenance tasks, whereas accidents resulting in significant 

radioactive releases constitute a reasonable surrogate to evaluate consequences that might 

result from hypothetical acts of radiological sabotage or terrorism in the indefinite timeframe. 

Consideration of accident consequences thereby provides a reasonable basis for understanding 

the consequences of continued storage should institutional controls prove temporarily 

ineffective. 

Given the physical characteristics of spent fuel, in most cases, the level of institutional controls 

necessary for safety would diminish over time and the consequences associated with accidents 

made possible by lapses in institutional controls would be expected to decrease with the 

passage of time. The thermal output of spent fuel decreases by approximately a factor of ten in 

the first 100 years after it is removed from the reactor, which means that maintenance activities 

and related institutional controls could be adjusted, as appropriate, to account for lower thermal 

loads. Therefore, the consequences of ineffective institutional controls will diminish over time 

because lower thermal loads should reduce the need for maintenance activities to maintain 

safety and lower radioactivity should reduce the consequences of releases of spent fuel. In 

contrast, institutional controls with respect to security may not diminish. As discussed in Section 

RIWKH*(,6because spent fuel radiation levels will decrease over time, spent fuel could 

become more susceptible to theft or diversion (i.e., a more attractive target to individuals with 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

malevolent intent). For this reason, additional security requirements may be necessary in the 

future if spent fuel remains in storage, to ensure that risk posed due to theft or diversion remains 

very low. 

A permanent loss of institutional controls could have catastrophic impacts 

Some comments recommended that the NRC consider the evaluation of the loss of institutional 

controls based, in part, on DOE’s Yucca Mountain EIS '2(ZKLFKLQFOXGHGDQDQDO\VLV

for the loss of institutional controls for storage facilities under the no-action alternative. The 

NRC notes that DOE’s proposed action in that instance was the construction of a repository and 

that, as a result, analysis of the no-action alternative was required by NEPA. Permanent 

disposal of spent fuel is a DOE responsibility, and DOE’s analysis was designed to evaluate the 

environmental impacts of not meeting that responsibility. DOE evaluated the storage of the total 

volume of HLW LH078WKDWZRXOGEHGLVSRVHGDWWKHUHSRVLWRU\ and, as a means of 

evaluating what would happen if it took no action, it considered the consequences of a 

simultaneous ORVVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWUROVDWFRPPHUFLDODQG'2(VWRUDJHVLWHV,Q

contrast, this GEIS considers the environmental impacts of continued storage at a single 

generically profiled commercial facility. While the DOE analysis may have sufficed for DOE’s 

Yucca Mountain EIS, the NRC does not believe that the passive scenario assumed as part of 

the no-action alternative there provides a meaningful method of analyzing the consequences of 

indefinite storage for purposes of analyzing continued storage in this GEIS. 

DOE’s analysis evaluates degradation of the storage structures in the absence of human 

intervention (i.e., that neither government nor local residents, or even malevolent forces, would 

respond to the degradation in any fashion over a 10,000-year period). DOE did not state that its 

analysis of the loss of institutional controls represents the reasonably foreseeable impacts of 

permanent aboveground storage. To the contrary, DOE stated that neither of the no-action 

scenarios is likely to occur (DOE 2002). However, DOE’s Yucca Mountain EIS '2(

concluded that the consequences of the potential loss of institutional controls could be 

“catastrophic” in some resource areas. 

As discussed previously, merely assuming loss of institutional controls in the distant, but 

undefined, future is not enough for the NRC to reasonably foresee when and how the loss of 

institutional controls might occur, and the consequences of that loss, with the kind of detailed 

and scientifically supportable analysis of resource impacts that the GEIS provides in every other 

respect for decision-makers and the public. Rather, the NRC would need to hypothesize the 

extent to which controls must fail before spent fuel would be effectively abandoned. The 

difficulty in predicting future consequences is further compounded by the lack of any credible 

way to foresee the combination of human and natural forces that might act on abandoned 

storage casks and cause a release. In addition, the baseline human environment becomes 

increasingly unpredictable the further out in time projections are made. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Nevertheless, the NRC can state broadly that, if institutional controls should be lost through a 

gradual dissolution of government or an apocalyptic event, unmitigated physical deterioration of 

spent fuel casks and cladding over decades, if not centuries, would eventually expose 

radionuclides to the environment. While the consequences—as explained above—are 

unpredictable, the NRC can state qualitatively that the consequences of such a catastrophe to 

the environment and public health could be similar to the impacts DOE analyzed for the noaction alternative (scenario 2—permanent loss of institutional controls) in its Yucca Mountain 

EIS (assuming a similar number of facilities were considered). Thus, in the event of a 

permanent loss of institutional controls, the resulting consequences to the environment across 

nearly all resource areas would be clearly noticeable and destabilizing. 

As a result of comments, NRC has revised SHFWLRQand Appendix B of the GEIS to clarify 

its assumptions on institutional controls. 

(2-3) (4-1) (30--1) (30----------1) (112--1) (112-20-3) 

(112-----2----34-----4) (244--

3) (244-3----43--3--43------4--

22--33------------13---

-34--40--------------

14--30--4--30--20--10----4---1) 

-12--3----2--1--11----11--12-

-32---2-11) (341-2-13) (341-1-21) (341-1-22) (341-2---10) 

----2) (421---2------

--2------2--2-04---

------1------

-2--2--2--2--2--2--3--3--1-

--3--4--3--3--3--3--3--3-2) 

-2--3--3--3--3--3--3--4--3-

-3-----1--1--1--2---

--24---------

-----1--3--3--2---3) 

----2--2--2---3--1--1-

-2--1--2----3--3----3--3-21) 

-1--4--3--3--3--3--3--3--3-

-3----3--3--4--3-----

-4--4--1--4--4--3--4--3---1-

-1--2--2--2--2--2------4) 

-1------1) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.20 Comments Concerning Site and Activity Descriptions 

D.2.20.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters described current spent fuel storage practices. 

The commenters discussed the safe and robust designs of spent fuel pools and dry storage 

systems, explained how certain nuclear facilities store and transfer spent fuel from pools to dry 

casks, and described how the pools and dry storage systems are managed. One commenter 

QRWHGWKDWWKHQXFOHDULQGXVWU\KDVVDIHO\ORDGHGPRUHWKDQGU\VWRUDJHV\VWHPVRYHUWKH

past 30 years, with no releases. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that spent fuel is being stored safely in spent fuel pools and dry 

casks. The NRC will continue its regulatory control and oversight of spent fuel storage. 

Decades of operating experience and ongoing NRC inspections demonstrate that the NRC 

ensures that reactor and ISFSI licensees continue to meet their obligation to safely manage 

VSHQWIXHOLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)53DUWVDQG1RFKDQJHV

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-13--13-----14--3--3-

D.2.20.2 – COMMENT: Some commenters expressed the belief that NRC has not adequately 

described in the GEIS how spent fuel is transferred between canisters or casks, and that 

therefore the public is unable to assess the risk of spent fuel transfer. One commenter 

questioned how, if canisters are hermetically sealed, the casks and storage pads could become 

contaminated and create additional LLW. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment that the GEIS does not contain sufficient 

details regarding transfer and management of spent fuel in canisters and casks. Chapter 2 of 

the GEIS provides details regarding the design of dry casks and transfer of spent fuel that are 

appropriate for evaluating the environmental impacts. This chapter includes both descriptions of 

the canisters and casks as well as conceptual sketches of a DTS. In addition, references are 

provided for the information discussed if a reader wishes to examine details further. Section 

2.2.2.1 (Construction and Operation of a DTS) has been revised to provide additional detail 

regarding the handling of damaged fuel (also see Section ' of this appendix). 

With regarGWRWKHFRQWDPLQDWLRQRIVWRUDJHFDQLVWHUV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VWDWHVWKH

following: “Because storage canisters come into direct contact with spent fuel, it is possible that 

the metal components could become contaminated or activated and require disposal as LLW 

(EPRI 2010a).” Decontamination of potentially contaminated components is expected to 

remove surface contamination, and activation of metal components is expected to result in a 

small amount of radioactive material. Thus, the GEIS assumes there would be some 

radioactive material generated during cask replacement, including portions of the casks and 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

storage pads, that would be managed and disposed of as LLW. No changes were made to the 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(410--4-2-20) 

D.2.20.3 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern about the nature of spent fuel and 

stated that the fuel is not actually spent. One of the commenters described the process of 

fission and the resulting generation of daughter elements. The commenter stated that the 

products of fission (e.g., plutonium, cesium, strontium) are radioactive and dangerous, and that 

nuclear waste should not be considered to be “spent” in the same manner as, for example, a 

burned log. Another commenter added that spent fuel rods stored in pools generate an 

enormous amount of heat and create radioactive water. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that spent fuel is still thermally hot and highly radioactive. The 

NRC refers to the fuel as “spent” because the fuel’s fission process has slowed and the fuel is 

no longer efficient in creating electricity. The NRC agrees that spent fuel can create radioactive 

water, and this is discussed further in Section E.2.1 of the GEIS, which identifies the 

radionuclides of concern in spent fuel pool water. 

A glossary has been added as an appendix to the GEIS that includes a definition of spent fuel. 

No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

----44-2) 

D.2.20.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters suggested editorial or substantive revisions, 

clarifications, and corrections to the text and tables in Chapter 2 of the GEIS. These 

suggestions are summarized by subject matter below: 

x A commenter believed the NRC should make it clear in this chapter that Federal law 

prohibits the construction and operation of an interim storage facility and that the NRC’s 

termination of the Yucca Mountain licensing review was illegal. 

x Commenters requested clarifications about the inclusion of MOX fuel in this GEIS. One 

commenter wanted it noted that MOX fuel is “hotter” and more radioactive than typical fuel 

and therefore would require more shielding and time to cool. Another commenter believed 

the language in the GEIS and Rule regarding MOX fuel should be bolstered by analysis in 

the Yucca Mountain EIS. 

x A commenter listed various text sections that should be updated to reflect data and values 

from the nuclear power industry’s records, such as the annual rate of generation of spent 

fuel and the annual discharge of spent fuel per reactor. The commenter stated that the 

GEIS estimate of high-burnup fuel is likely too low and that a figure of 22 MTU per year 

should be used. This commenter also clarified the conditions for making changes to 

programs supporting reactor operation, stating that the NRC should recognize that 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

decommissioned reactors may have the option of keeping spent fuel in pools until it is 

collected for transport offsite. The commenter suggested clarifying the language concerning 

the management of confinement boundary material (to prevent a loss of confinement). 

x $FRPPHQWHUUHTXHVWHGFODULILFDWLRQDERXWZKHWKHURUQRW&)53DUWFRYHUVWKH

licensing of dry transfer and repackaging systems. 

x A commenter noted that the Crystal River Nuclear Plant and Kewaunee Power Station have 

shut down, and that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and Vermont Yankee 

Nuclear Power Station have announced that they will shut down by the end of 2014. 

x A commenter stated that “Private Fuel Storage Environmental Impact Statement” should be 

capitalized. The commenter also noted that the extension of the ISFSI initial license term 

from 20 to 40 years represents a decrease in oversight. 

RESPONSE: The NRC has reviewed each of these specific comments and made changes to 

Chapter 2 of the GEIS as appropriate and described below. 

The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments about the Yucca Mountain 

licensing process. The NWPA states that long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste or 

spent fuel in a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility is an option for providing safe and 

reliable management of such waste or spent fuel, and that such a facility would be owned and 

operated by the Federal government. The NWPA provides limitations on where an MRS facility 

can be located and that construction of such a facility may not begin until the Commission has 

issued a license for the construction of a repository. Federal law, however, does not prohibit the 

construction of privately owned ISFSIs. Concerning the Yucca Mountain repository license 

application review, see Sections ' and ' of this appendix for discussions regarding 

the status of the NRC’s review. In addition, text has been added to Appendix B of the GEIS to 

provide more information about this issue. 

The NRC agrees in part with the comments about MOX fuel and disagrees in part. The NRC 

agrees that MOX spent fuel is generally thermally hotter and more radioactive than other typical 

light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel, assuming similar burnup or time in the reactor. The NRC 

does not agree that it is appropriate for the GEIS to reference the statement in Section 

$RIWKH<XFFD0RXQWDLQ(,6'2(ZKLFKVWDWHV“[b]ecause of the 

similarities in the two fuel types, impacts to the repository would be small.” The NRC agrees 

that the fuel types are similar and that the differences in impacts from these fuel types would not 

be significant. However, this statement is not appropriate for use in the GEIS’s discussion of 

the impacts from continued storage because it is referring to impacts on a repository and 

because it does not compare the differences in impacts between MOX and other typical light 

water reactor fuels. Section ' of this appendix provides additional information 

regarding the analysis in the GEIS of various fuel types. In addition, an Appendix I has been 

added to the GEIS to provide more information on the various fuel types. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Concerning the several comments providing data and information about nuclear power plant 

operation and spent fuel generation, the NRC has reviewed each of these comments and made 

changes in Chapter 2 of the GEIS, as appropriate. 

&RQFHUQLQJWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI&)53DUWWRGU\WUDQVIHUDQGUHSDFNDJing operations, 10 

&)53DUWUHJXODWLRQVGRDSSO\WRWKHVHDFWLYLWLHV Section 2.1.4 of the GEIS describes how 

the NRC has already licensed a facility with substantially similar capabilities (i.e., the Idaho 

Spent Fuel Facility [see NRC 2004d and NRC’s Safety Evaluation Report for this facility (NRC 

2004e)]). Clarifying text has been added to Section 2.1.4 concerning the applicability of 10 CFR 

3DUWWRDDTS and repackaging activities. 

The NRC agrees with the comment about closed power plants. Appendix G of the GEIS notes 

that the Crystal River and Kewaunee plants have ceased operations. Chapter 2 of the GEIS 

has been updated to reflect the status of these plants, as well as the San Onofre and Vermont 

Yankee plants. Appendix G of the GEIS has been updated to reflect the status of the San 

Onofre and Vermont Yankee plants. 

The NRC agrees with the editorial comment concerning PFS and has made the change as 

noted. The NRC disagrees that extending the initial license period to 40 years represents a 

decrease in oversight. Regardless of the period of operation of the license, operators still must 

meet certain requirements and standards, conduct inspections, and develop aging management 

programs as necessary. Further information about the NRC’s oversight of dry cask storage is 

provided in Sections ', ', ', and ' of this appendix. No changes 

were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

---2-------------

------------ ---3--3-13) 

-4-4) 

D.2.20.5 – COMMENT: Referring to text in Chapter 4 of the draft GEIS, a commenter 

expressed concern that fuel from the damaged Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (TMI-2) 

reactor core is still generating hydrogen that must be vented from the dry storage system 

(NUHOMS-12T). The commenter wanted to know if venting is required to prevent gas pressure 

damage or explosion. The commenter also wanted to know if the hydrogen gas is tritiated, if 

other radionuclides, including noble gases, are released when the hydrogen is released, and 

what their decay products are. The commenter asked about the potential impacts of these 

releases on Idaho residents downwind of the Idaho National Laboratory location where the 

TMI-2 fuel is stored. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Most of the fission products from the 

TMI-2 fuel debris were vented in accordance with NRC limits during the first several years of 

storage. Any fission products remaining in the canister are entrained within the fuel debris and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

would only be vented in the unlikely occurrence of high temperatures or pressures. Any venting 

of these remaining fission products would be at trace levels, well below NRC limits for the 

protection of public health and safety. This also applies to any hydrogen gas, including tritiated 

hydrogen, that may have been generated as a result of radiolysis (from water trapped in the 

spent fuel debris at the time the debris was initially placed in the canisters). No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.21 Comments Concerning Land Use 

D.2.21.1 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern about land-use, economic, and 

aesthetic impacts caused by the continued long-term storage of spent fuel at decommissioned 

nuclear power plants. One commenter noted that communities with decommissioned reactors 

no longer receive the significant financial benefits experienced during reactor operations. The 

commenter stated that this economic loss should be considered in determining an appropriate 

use of the land at the decommissioned reactor site including land that might be used for the 

continued storage of spent fuel. 

Another commenter stated local, regional, and state-wide economic and land use impacts were 

not adequately addressed in the draft GEIS and argued that the effects of long-term spent fuel 

dry cask storage would not be small. This commenter asserted that continued spent fuel 

storage at decommissioned reactor sites inhibits alternate economic development of the land. 

The continued storage of spent fuel ties up the land and decreases its availability to generate 

additional property-tax revenue and employment; it also reduces the appraised value and limits 

the use of surrounding land because of the radiological effects of spent fuel, security 

requirements, and visual impact. The commenter also stated that the NRC offers no guidance 

or regulation regarding land requirements pertaining to the safe storage of spent fuel. Without a 

specific rule or regulation, the commenter believes that it is not possible to generically determine 

land-use impacts. 

The commenter noted that costs of managing spent fuel at a nuclear reactor site or a 

decommissioned reactor are generally reimbursable by the DOE, but costs that are not 

reimbursable must be paid from another source such as a limited decommissioning trust fund or 

the ratepayers of a regulated utility. The commenter asserted that DOE has not made any 

determination regarding a generic level of property taxes that will be reimbursable for shortterm, long-term, or indefinite storage. Without this determination, the commenter believes it is 

not possible to evaluate economic value of the use of a generic site for spent fuel storage 

relative to the value of alternative uses and thus believes it is not possible to determine that 

socioeconomic impacts would be small. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The commenter uses the Maine Yankee and Vermont Yankee sites as examples. Both sites 

have existing infrastructure (e.g., rail lines, barge slips, switchyards, transmission lines, and 

municipal and sewer systems) that currently are unavailable for productive economic use. 

The commenter goes on to assert the NRC does not regulate the amount of land needed to 

store and secure spent fuel, and has made no meaningful effort to calculate the lost value of the 

land needed to store and secure spent fuel, or value of land that will be left fallow to buffer an 

ISFSI. Neither the NRC nor DOE have established a standard property-tax assessment for 

spent fuel or the surrounding land. Without clear regulatory guidance regarding the required 

size of an ISFSI and reimbursable property tax, it is simply not possible to make a generic or 

specific determination regarding the land-use and socioeconomic impacts of the more than 100 

nuclear plants in the United States. Because the NRC does not require movement of spent fuel 

from wet to dry storage, it is not possible to make a generic assessment of impact of dispersed 

onsite storage of spent fuel by focusing primarily on dry storage. Absent these essential 

determinations, the Waste Confidence Rule is built upon a false premise, and should be 

rejected. 

Another commenter stated that it is disingenuous to consider spent fuel as similar to any other 

industrial land uses because nuclear waste lasts forever, and the stigma associated with 

continued storage will “psychologically limit” future uses of any site. The commenter stated that 

the land must be considered a “sacrifice zone” from the start with no pretense that it will ever be 

reclaimed for general use. 

Two commenters raised concerns about the aesthetics associated with “fuel mausoleums” that 

many see as inherently grotesque or problematic and the conversion of valuable sites into a 

wasteland. One commenter suggested that the best type of onsite storage has three 

characteristics: a low visual signature, berms, the best casks (e.g., triple-top German model) 

that are built to withstand seismic events. 

RESPONSE: NRC partly agrees and partly disagrees with the comments that state that 

continued spent fuel storage at decommissioned reactor sites would inhibit alternate economic 

development of the land. The economic impacts of reactor shutdown and decommissioning are 

described in the Decommissioning GEIS (NRC 2002a) and summarized in the License Renewal 

GEIS (NRC 2013m). The economic impact of reactor shutdown and decommissioning is also 

GLVFXVVHGDORQJZLWKRWKHUFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVLQ&KDSWHURIWKHGUDIW*(,6$VGLVFXVVHGLQ

Section 3.2 of the GEIS, continued storage of spent fuel at decommissioned reactors would 

require fewer workers and a small amount of land. Storage of spent fuel would only require 20 

WRZRUNHUV3URSHUW\-tax payments would continue to provide revenue as long as spent fuel 

is stored oQVLWH$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6LPSDFWVIURPWKHORVVRUUHGXFWLRQRI

tax revenue because of the termination of reactor operations and power plant shutdown on 

community services could range from SMALL to LARGE. Urban and semi-urban communities 

with a large or growing tax base near publicly owned and property-tax-exempt nuclear power 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

plants, or fully depreciated power plants, would not likely experience many changes in overall 

socioeconomic conditions. The shutdown and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant in 

rural areas could create a greater socioeconomic effect. 

One comment noted that the DOE is responsible for reimbursing the costs of continued storage 

at nuclear power plant sites. The NRC believes that this comment is referencing a series of 

recent cases where utilities have successfully sued the DOE for costs related to the ongoing 

storage of spent fuel. See, e.g., So. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States; Maine Yankee 

Atomic Power Co. v. United States. In at least one of these cases, DOE reimbursed a utility for 

property taxes incurred due to construction of a dry storage facility (Consolidated Edison Co. of 

N.Y. v. United States). The determinations by DOE as to which costs are reimbursable are 

beyond the scope of this GEIS and Rule; however, the NRC does not believe that a generic 

analysis of land-use impacts is dependent on knowing the identity of the party ultimately 

responsible for payment of property taxes incurred due to continued storage. 

Land used for the ISFSI will not be available for redevelopment as long as spent fuel remains in 

storage. However, once power plant decommissioning activities are completed, the licensee 

PD\DPHQGLWV3DUWRU3DUWJHQHUDOlicense to reduce the amount of land covered by the 

license to only include the land used for the ISFSI. It is the licensee’s responsibility to operate 

the ISFSI in accordance with NRC regulations, including NRC-approved and monitored 

programs for security, emergency planning, radiological monitoring, and quality assurance. 

With the exception of the ISFSI, land within the decommissioned power plant site could be 

released for unrestricted use and would be available for redevelopment. For example, after 

GHFRPPLVVLRQLQJWKH0DLQH<DQNHH3DUWJHQHUDOOLFHQVH ZDVDPHQGHGLQWRFRYHU

only the approximately 3.2-KD-ac) Maine Yankee ISFSI site. During the decommissioning of 

0DLQH<DQNHHRQ%DLOH\3RLQWLQ:LVFDVVHW0DLQHKDDFRIWKHSRZHUSODQWVLWH

was sold to a developer and is now undergRLQJHFRQRPLFUHGHYHORSPHQW$QRWKHUKD

(200 ac) of the power plant site was donated to the Chewonki Foundation for conservation, 

public access, and environmental education as part of a Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission settlement agreement. 

In addition, a nuclear plant site would likely remain in industrial use after reactor shutdown and 

decommissioning. Most of the site infrastructure would remain (including electrical transfer 

stations, cooling towers, intake and discharge structures, and other improvements). As noted in 

the comment, the Maine Yankee and Vermont Yankee sites still have existing infrastructure 

(e.g., rail lines, barge slips, switchyards, transmission lines, and municipal water and sewer 

systems). Given the capital investment in infrastructure, a power plant owner or operator may 

want to continue to generate and sell electricity by constructing or installing another type of 

power generating facility at the site (e.g., coal, gas, wind, and solar). The utility also has a 

trained workforce and holds a number of Federal, State, and local permits. The nuclear power 

plant site will likely remain an industrial site for many years following the termination of reactor 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

operations, either as the site of a decommissioned nuclear plant, or as a decommissioned 

nuclear plant together with an operating non-nuclear power generating facility. 

Given the likelihood that the nuclear plant site would remain an industrial site for many years, 

surrounding land use and property values would not likely be affected by the continued storage 

of spent fuel. Any attempt to estimate when the site would convert from industrial to some other 

land use and the impacts on offsite land and property values as a result of such conversion 

would be both remote (in time) and speculative. 

Regarding the commenter’s concerns about the visual impact of continued spent fuel storage, 

LQGLYLGXDOVWRUDJHFDVNVJHQHUDOO\KDYHDORZSURILOHPD[LPXPKHLJKWRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\P>

ft]) (see Section 2.1.2.2 of the GEIS). As described in Sections 4.14.2 and 4.14.3 of the GEIS, 

construction and operation of a DTS during long-term and indefinite storage would have a 

OLPLWHGYLVXDOLPSDFW$'76DERXWP>IW@WDOOLVOLNHO\WRKDYHDODUJHUYLVXDOSURILOHWKDQ

other ISFSI structures; however, it would not be expected to provide a significant visual contrast 

to the surrounding landscape. In addition, the ISFSI facility and concrete pads for the storage 

casks would take up a small amount of land area in comparison to the total site area of the 

nuclear power plant (see Table 3-1 of the GEIS). Although not required, berms have been 

FRQVWUXFWHGDURXQGVRPH,6)6,V)RUH[DPSOHD-P-ft) tall earthen berm surrounds the 

Prairie Island ISFSI (NRC 2013o). The berm was designed for radiation shielding but also limits 

the visual profile of the ISFSI. Therefore, given the industrial appearance of decommissioned 

nuclear reactor sites, continued spent fuel storage would not have a noticeable aesthetic 

impact. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(112--------21) (431--

D.2.21.2 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern about potential land-use impacts 

should a spent fuel pool fire occur. In particular, the commenter stated that the GEIS should 

analyze the potential consequences of a spent fuel pool fire and the resulting land 

contamination and costs associated with evacuation of the surrounding population and 

abandonment of land. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The impacts and consequences of a 

spent fuel pool fire are provided in Appendix F of the GEIS. As noted in Section F.1 of the 

GEIS, the NRC’s current judgment concerning the impacts from a spent fuel fire during the 

short-term storage timeframe is derived from NUREG–“Technical Study of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” (NRC 2001b). In Section 

F.1.1 of the GEIS, the potential consequences of a spent fuel pool fire and the resulting land 

contamination and cost associated with evacuation of the surrounding population and 

abandonment of land were analyzed in terms of the economic consequences arising from the 

actions taken to avoid human exposure. The economic consequences take into account 

various costs, including offsite and onsite property damage resulting from the release of 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

radioactive material and the resulting land contamination. Offsite property damage would 

include evacuation costs, relocation costs for displaced persons, property decontamination 

costs, and loss of use of contaminated property through interdiction, crop, and milk losses. 

Onsite property damage costs include onsite cleanup and decontamination, repair of the spent 

fuel pool, and removal of fuel. The NRC estimated the total onsite and offsite economic 

GDPDJHYDOXHVWREHEHWZHHQDQGELOOLRQSHUHYHQW15&aa), when 

adjusted to 2010 dollars (see Table F-1 in the GEIS). As discussed in Section F.1.1 of the 

GEIS, the economic impacts of a spent fuel pool fire would vary for different facilities. For 

example, high relocation costs would result from higher total population or population density 

and land use (e.g., whether land is used as farmland or not) would impact decontamination and 

condemnation costs. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-3--3-

D.2.21.3 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that, if context is not provided, the discussion of 

land-use requirements for dry cask storage is significantly misleading. The commenter 

suggested that it is the permanent, dangerous nature of spent fuel that must be addressed, 

regardless of the small acreage needed for dry casks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment that the discussion of land-use 

requirements for dry cask storage is misleading. Section 3.1 of the GEIS accurately describes 

the affected environment with respect to land use associated with continued storage. Table 3-1 

of the GEIS provides comparisons of land area needed for ISFSIs at various nuclear power 

plants in contrast to the total land area of power plant sites. The information in Table 3-1 

indicates that land-use requirements for at-reactor ISFSIs are small in comparison to the total 

power plant site area. As presented, this information does not imply that, because land 

requirements for at-reactor ISFSIs are small, the environmental impacts of continued storage 

are likewise small. 

The NRC recognizes that, regardless of the amount of land required for continued storage, 

spent fuel from reactors is highly radioactive and potentially harmful. Nonetheless, as stated in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DW-reactor storage will continue in the same manner as during the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor, and because continued storage represents but a fraction 

of operational activities at a reactor, public and occupational doses would continue to be within 

UHJXODWRU\OLPLWV/LNHZLVHWKHGLVFXVVLRQLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VKRZVWKDWSXEOLFDQG

occupational doses at away-from-reactor storage facilities also would be within regulatory limits. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.21.4 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern that Section 4.1 does not consider 

radiological impacts. The commenter believes that the land-use section should consider 

radiological impacts, not just the physical use of the land because radiological contamination 

could preclude other future uses of the land. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The purpose of the land-use section is to 

describe potential impacts on land-use from activities associated with routine activities 

associated with continued storage. It is not the purpose of the land-use analysis to address the 

UDGLRORJLFDOLPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH5DGLRORJLFDOLPSDFWVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQV

DQG$SSHQGL[(DQG)RIWKH*(,6

The NRC recognizes that radiological contamination from an accidental release could impair, 

limit, or preclude the use of the land for other purposes. Potential radiological contamination of 

the land from continued storage most likely would occur from accidents that result in the release 

of radioactivity to the surrounding environment. However, the likelihood of such an event is 

extremely small for both spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems. As stated in the GEIS, 

the probability-weighted impacts from a severe accident involving spent fuel pools and dry cask 

storage systems would be SMALL. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

this comment. 

--10) 

D.2.21.5 – COMMENT: Two commenters expressed concern regarding the conclusion in the 

GEIS and Rule that land-use and socioeconomic impacts of continued storage would be 

SMALL. In particular, the commenters asserted that no reasonable basis was provided for 

these conclusions; therefore, the Rule should be rejected. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that there is no reasonable basis 

provided for the conclusions in the GEIS that land-use and socioeconomic impacts of continued 

storage would be SMALL. The bases for the conclusions that land-use and socioeconomic 

impacts from continued storage would be SMALL are summarized in Sections ES.13.1.1 and 

ES.13.1.2 and detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the GEIS for continued storage at at-reactor 

VLWHVDQGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6IRUFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHDWDZD\-from-reactor sites. 

In assessing land-use impacts, the NRC evaluated attributes such as land requirements for 

constructing and operating continued storage facilities, operational and maintenance activities 

that would change land use, and mitigation measures that would reduce land-use impacts. In 

assessing socioeconomic impacts, the NRC evaluated factors such as size of the workforce 

needed to construct and operate continued storage facilities, tax payments, and the demand for 

housing and public services. Based on an assessment of these factors, NRC concluded that 

the potential environmental impacts on land-use and socioeconomic conditions from continued 

storage for all the timeframes considered would be SMALL. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--3) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.21.6 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS should provide the rationale behind 

siting nuclear power plants and cited concerns about other land uses (e.g., leasing land). The 

commenter referenced the discussion in Section 3.1 of the GEIS, and stated that the reason for 

siting nuclear power plants in undeveloped, sparsely populated areas near water sources is to 

create a buffer zone, so densely concentrated populations are not exposed to routine and offnormal (e.g., accidental) radioactive releases. In addition, the commenter expressed concern 

over power plant owners leasing land for other uses (e.g., agricultural, forestry, cemetery and 

historical site access, and recreation) and questioned if these activities pose any security or 

radiological risks. The commenter also expressed concern about radioactive contamination in 

food, drinking water, and fish from nuclear power plants. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As stated in Chapter 3 of the GEIS, the 

affected environment is the environment that exists at and around facilities that store spent fuel 

after the reactor ceases operations. The NRC requires that nuclear power plants be both safe 

and secure. Safety refers to operating the plant in a manner that protects the public and the 

environment. The selection of nuclear power plant sites is made by private business interests 

along with State, local, and public utility officials. The NRC does not participate in site-selection 

decisions. The impacts of such decisions are outside the scope of the Rule and GEIS. 

As explained in the GEIS, spent fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools and, in many 

cases, ISFSIs at all commercial nuclear power plants. Until a repository becomes available, 

spent fuel would be stored at existing nuclear power plant sites after reactor shutdown and 

decommissioning. The continued storage of spent fuel would not result in operational or 

maintenance activities that would change land-use conditions beyond those currently being 

experienced. 

All NRC licensees are required to assess the impact from facility operations on the environment 

in their radiological environmental monitoring programs (REMPs). Samples are collected from 

aquatic pathways (e.g., fish, surface water, and sediment) and terrestrial pathways (e.g., soils, 

airborne particulates, radioiodine, milk, food products, crops, and direct radiation). Once reactor 

operations cease, the REMP would be modified to consider only the potential sources of 

radiation and radioactivity that might be released from a spent fuel pool or at-reactor ISFSIs. As 

discussed in Section 3.3 of the GEIS, REMP reports indicate contaminant concentrations 

around nuclear power plants are usually quite low (i.e., at or near the threshold of detection) and 

are seldom above background levels. In addition, operating nuclear power plants are required 

to implement security measures for the protection of stored spent fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste and to have comprehensive REMPs to assess the impact of reactor and storage 

operatLRQVRQWKHHQYLURQPHQW15&UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5HVWDEOLVKVHFXULW\

requirements for the protection of stored spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste at nuclear 

power plants. The NRC does not believe that these additional activities pose any additional 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

security risks for nuclear power plants. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-4--4-

D.2.21.7 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that future land use cannot be assessed 

generically and does not agree with the NRC’s assumption that land used for a future ISFSI pad 

and DTS would be reclaimed after the facilities are demolished and used again in the next 100-

year replacement cycle. The commenter also asserted that the NRC does not have special 

expertise. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. In developing the land-use impacts of 

continued at-reactor storage in a spent fuel pool or ISFSI (Section 4.1 of the GEIS) and 

continued storage at an away-from-UHDFWRU,6)6,6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&compiled 

and evaluated information and data from published EISs, site-specific monitoring data, and 

publicly available literature to make an impact determination. 

$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&FRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHODQGXVHGIRUWKH,6)SI 

pads and DTS could be reclaimed after the facilities are demolished and, therefore, could be 

used again in the next 100-year replacement cycle. This conclusion is reasonable because land 

has already been disturbed and the environmental review for the original ISFSI and DTS would 

have already determined that the land was suitable for ISFSI and DTS design and construction. 

The comment disagrees with this assumption, but provides no contrary basis for eliminating the 

reuse of the land in the next 100-year replacement cycle. Further, the NRC disagrees with the 

comment’s assertion that the NRC does not have special expertise. To complete the GEIS, the 

NRC employed a highly qualified team of scientists and engineers with requisite expertise in the 

affected resource areas, including land use. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-2-11) 

D.2.21.8 – COMMENT: Three commenters expressed support for the land-use conclusions 

presented in the draft GEIS. One commenter stated that the NRC appropriately relied upon a 

precedent set by prior EAs to conclude that operation of an at-reactor ISFSI would require no 

new or additional maintenance activities that would affect current land use. The commenter 

also provided excerpts from the Trojan ISFSI EA, which resulted in a FONSI. Two commenters 

stated that they agreed with the conclusions in Section 4.1 of the GEIS that land-use impacts 

would be SMALL because continued storage would only affect a small fraction of land 

committed for a nuclear power plant. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the supportive comments and the information relating to 

land-use impact determinations from a prior ISFSI EA. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--2--4---

D.2.21.9 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that continued storage sites should not be located 

in close proximity to facilities that process radioactive materials (e.g., location of NewGreen 

Legacy Services, LLP near Perry Nuclear Power Plant). The commenter is concerned that 

colocating continued storage facilities with facilities that process radioactive materials could 

mask or interfere with the continued storage facility’s radiological environmental monitoring 

program. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Licensees of spent fuel storage facilities 

are required to measure radiological effluent from facilities and to maintain environmental 

monitoring programs to provide data on measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials 

in the environment. These programs are designed to ensure that licensees control, monitor, 

and perform radiological evaluations of all releases and document and report all radiological 

effluents discharged into the environment. The programs are designed to ensure that the 

radiation or radioactive material measured can be attributed to the licensed activities for which 

monitoring is conducted. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-21) 

D.2.22 Comments Concerning Socioeconomics 

D.2.22.1 – COMMENT: One commenter noted that the GEIS did not appear to evaluate the 

increases in population since reactors were originally licensed, which could affect emergency 

response and evacuation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. While populations have changed since 

reactors were originally licensed, the purpose of the socioeconomic impacts section is to 

describe the potential socioeconomic impacts caused by continued storage operations. To the 

extent that the comment was focused on emergency planning for reactor events, such events 

are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule, which concerns the evaluation of the 

environmental impacts of the continued storage of spent fuel, not reactor operations. In 

addition, the likelihood of an accident requiring an evacuation is extremely small for both spent 

IXHOSRROVDQGGU\FDVNVWRUDJHV\VWHPV$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&

has examined the risk of severe accidents in spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems in 

several studies over the years. Based on these assessments, the NRC concludes that the risk 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

of severe accidents in spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems is SMALL. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3-

D.2.22.2 – COMMENT: A commenter asserted that long-term or permanent storage at reactor 

sites represents a new use of land that should be subject to tax reassessment and a premium 

tariff levied by the State. The commenter cited Indian Point Nuclear Generating Plant as an 

example of a facility that has been paying a reduced property-tax rate for years. The 

commenter also cited the Price-Anderson Act and expressed concern that there are not enough 

funds to cover the costs of continued storage. Further, the commenter stated that NRC has not 

established guarantees for ongoing funding to protect nuclear waste now and into the future. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment that continued storage represents a new 

use of land. Nuclear power plant sites are industrial sites, and storage of spent fuel will occur 

during the licensed life for operations of the plant; thus, no change in land use will occur during 

continued storage. If anything, the area of land used by the facility will decrease during 

continued storage because the licensee will decommission most of the site during the shortterm timeframe, with the last fuel being transferred from the pool sometime before the end of the 

short-term timeframe. In addition, any future construction activities (e.g., ISFSI and DTS 

replacement) during the long-term and indefinite timeframes would most likely occur on land 

previously used for industrial purposes. 

Licensees of nuclear power plants pay taxes to local and State governments. After termination 

of reactor operations, property-tax payments would continue to provide revenue to State and 

local governments, albeit at a reduced rate. As long as a licensee continues to store spent fuel 

on land it owns, the licensee will have to pay some form of property taxes and associated fees 

to local and State governments. Also, the NRC has no role in the decisions of State and local 

tax and utility officials in determining what is taxed, how taxes are collected, and how tax 

revenue is allocated. In addition, potential replacement of the at-reactor ISFSI and construction, 

operation, and subsequent replacement of the DTS during the long-term and indefinite storage 

timeframes could be viewed as property improvements by local tax assessors, which could 

cause property-tax payments to increase. 

The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act; 42 USC 2210), 

ZKLFKEHFDPHODZLQZDVGHVLJQHGWRHQVXUHWKDWDGHTXDWHIXQGVZRuld be available to 

satisfy liability claims of members of the public for personal injury and property damage in the 

event of a nuclear accident. The Price-Anderson Act is not the source of funds to pay for 

continued storage of spent fuel as implied by the comment. 

The costs of continued storage are discussed in Sections D.2.42.2 and D.2.42.3 of this 

appendix. NRC regulations contain provisions to determine and remain current on the financial 

TXDOLILFDWLRQVRILWVUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVLQ&)5IDQGWRUHHYDOXDWHWKHVHTXDOLILFDWLRQV
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

within 2 years following permanent FHVVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQVRIWKHUHDFWRURU\HDUVEHIRUH

H[SLUDWLRQRIWKHUHDFWRUOLFHQVHXQGHU&)5EE3DUDJUDSKEEUHTXLUHV

licensees to submit written notification to the Commission for its review and approval of the 

program by which the licensee intends to manage and provide funding for the management of 

all irradiated fuel at the reactor following permanent cessation of operation of the reactor until 

title to the irradiated fuel and possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy. 

Therefore, the financial plan and financial burden of continuing spent fuel storage is analyzed 

within the NRC’s regulatory framework. However, the NRC acknowledges that, because of 

delays in the siting and licensing of a repository, the Federal government bears an increasing 

financial responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and it may become responsible for paying all 

costs associated with spent fuel storage at some time in the future. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.22.3 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the GEIS underestimated the impacts of 

continued storage on future land uses and local economic development. In particular, one 

commenter stated that the NRC’s socioeconomic analysis placed undue attention on the 

“benefits” derived from hosting an ISFSI, and asked why the negative economic consequences of 

continued storage are not considered. For example, communities such as Red Wing, Minnesota 

find themselves in the untenable position of having to host spent fuel for an indefinite period of 

time, which could affect Red Wing’s economy and potential development. The perceived negative 

effect of continued storage could impact Red Wing’s ability to attract new businesses and 

maintain existing businesses. The commenter asserted that the Blue Ribbon Commission 

recognized the chilling effect of continued spent fuel storage on communities such as Red Wing. 

The commenter stated that the description and analysis of land-use and socioeconomic impacts 

SUHVHQWHGLQWKH([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\DQG&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6LVWRRQDUURZDQG

the analysis does not weigh the effect that continued storage has on public safety services nor 

its negative chilling impact on development and economic growth in the surrounding area. As 

an example, the commenter noted that continued spent fuel storage at the Prairie Island 

Nuclear Generating Plant would negatively impact commercial activity and potential 

development in Red Wing, Minnesota in both the short-term and long-term timeframes. 

Specifically, the commenter stated that land-use and socioeconomic impacts in Section 4.20 

DQG6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VKRXOGEHPRGLILHGIURP60$//RU02'(5$7(WR/$5*(DQG

these tables should also indicate that the impact is site-specific. 

In addition, the commenter asserted that an appropriate analysis should not be limited to direct 

impacts (e.g., the number of workers at the storage facility), but should include indirect impacts 

as well (e.g., the chilling effect on land development in the area which in turn would impact 

employment and income, taxes, demography, and housing). Further, the commenter stated that 

continued storage would not provide sufficient taxes needed to support public safety services. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The commenter also believed that cumulative land-XVHLPSDFWVSUHVHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS, should be amended from SMALL or MODERATE to LARGE and that the productivity 

DQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6EHH[SDQGHGWRLQFOXGHDQHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHORQJ-term 

impact of indefinite storage on economic productivity. The commenter stated that there is an 

indirect impact or chilling effect that continued storage will have on the natural development of 

the area surrounding the storage facility. The commenter noted that costs associated with 

PDLQWDLQLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVZHUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGLQWKH6HFWLRQDQDO\VLVDQG

urged that these costs be factored into the cost-EHQHILWDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6

Another commenter questioned the SMALL land-use impact conclusion for the indefinite storage 

timeframe citing safety, security, health, and environmental risks of storing spent fuel which 

would preclude other uses of the land that is “hosting” the ISFSI. The commenter believed that 

a perceived “radioactive stigma” could prove significant and the commenter cited the lack of 

development at the decommissioned Big Rock Point site as an example. The commenter noted 

that residents attending the Kewanee Power Station End of Cycle Meeting in June 2013, 

expressed concern about spent fuel remaining onsite and could not foresee any alternative use 

of land, much less an economic benefit for the area. Overall, the commenter stated that NRC’s 

examination of economic benefits is not sufficient given the shallow analysis of the risks 

associated with generating spent fuel, storage, and disposal in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees that the GEIS underestimates the impacts of continued 

storage on future land-use and economic development. The NRC used currently available 

information to predict the impacts of continued storage on economic development from sitespecific and generic environmental reviews (e.g., EAs for ISFSIs and EISs for the renewal of 

existing and new reactors). The comments refer to the socioeconomic analysis presented in the 

&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,67KHDIIHFWHGHQYLURQPHQWGLVFXVVLRQLQ&KDSWHULVQRWD

description of the economic benefits of spent fuel storage; rather, it is a general description of 

the dynamic socioeconomic system that supports and is supported by storage facility 

operations. The communities supply the people, goods, and services required to operate and 

maintain storage facilities. Storage operations, in turn, supply wages and benefits for people 

and dollar expenditures for goods and services. The measure of a community’s ability to 

support storage operations depends on its ability to respond to changing environmental, social, 

economic, and demographic conditions. This discussion also identifies the socioeconomic 

factors that have the potential to be directly or indirectly affected by changes in storage 

operations over time at a storage facility. 

Another comment expressed the belief that the storage of nuclear material at an existing 

nuclear power plant would have a chilling effect or stigma on future development of the area. In 

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, the Supreme Court concluded there 

must be a “reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical environment 

DQGWKHHIIHFWDWLVVXH ́,GDW7KHHOHPHQWRISHUFHLYHGULVNLQWKLVFDVHWKHFKLOOLQJHIIHFW
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

or stigma of continued storage, lengthens the “causal chain” such that the connection between 

continued storage and diminished future economic development is tenuous. Therefore, the 

NRC concludes that perception-based chilling effects and stigma-related impacts are uncertain 

or speculative and do not need to be considered in this GEIS. 

As explained in the GEIS, spent fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools and ISFSIs 

(where available) at all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. Until a geologic 

repository becomes available, spent fuel would continue to be stored at existing nuclear power 

plant sites after reactor shutdown and decommissioning. The continued storage of spent fuel 

would not create any new effect on property values beyond what has already been experienced. 

With regard to socioeconomic impacts, the proposed action would not require any additional 

employees to maintain or monitor an existing ISFSI. With no new employment expected and no 

additional burden on the community to provide housing and public services, an increase to the 

tax base is not anticipated. Based on this information, no change (direct or indirect) to the local 

economy would result from the continued storage of spent fuel and socioeconomic impacts 

would be SMALL. In addition, it is the licensee’s responsibility to operate the ISFSI in 

accordance with NRC regulations including NRC approved and monitored programs for 

security, emergency planning, radiological monitoring, and quality assurance. 

Continued storage of spent fuel at a reactor site after reactor shutdown and decommissioning 

would not create any new effect on offsite land use beyond what is currently being experienced. 

Because land-use conditions would not change at an existing reactor site, the NRC concluded 

that the impacts from the proposed action on land use would not be significant. The NRC 

agrees that the land used for the at-reactor ISFSI will not be available for redevelopment as long 

as spent fuel remains in storage. However, once power plant decommissioning activities are 

FRPSOHWHGWKHOLFHQVHHPD\DPHQGLWV3DUWRU3DUWOLFHQVHWRUHGXFHWKHDPRXQWRIODQG

covered by the license to only include the land used for the ISFSI. With the exception of the 

ISFSI, land within the decommissioned power plant site could be released for unrestricted use 

and would be available for redevelopment. For example, during decommissioning the NRCapproved Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company’VUHTXHVWWRDPHQGLWV3DUWOLFHQVHWRRQO\

include the land used for the ISFSI and the licensee sold a large parcel of land to a developer 

for economic redevelopment. In addition, a smaller parcel of land was donated for 

conservation, public access, and environmental education as part of a Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission settlement agreement. 

$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKHPDJQLWXGHRIFXPXODWLYHODQG-use impacts resulting 

from general trends near a storage facility would depend on current land-use patterns and 

proposed land-use changes, the number and density of actions, and the extent to which these 

actions (e.g., facilities or projects) employ mitigation measures to reduce impacts. Based on its 

assessment of general trends and activities near at-reactor and away-from-reactor storage 

facilities and the likely future trends of these activities using projections prepared by Federal, 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

State, and local agencies, the NRC concluded that cumulative impacts could range from 

minimal (e.g., minor changes from limited development in the area, [NRC 2011d (NRC 2011c)]) 

to noticeable (e.g., construction and operation of a new coal-fired power plant, new transmission 

lines, and climate change in the area [NRC 2011a]) (NRC 2011d). 

The NRC believes it has adequately and appropriately assessed the impacts of continued 

storage on future land uses and economic development, including cumulative impacts, and that 

the comment does not provide an adequate basis for amending the land-use and 

socioeconomic impact conclusions iQ&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6IURP60$//RU

MODERATE to LARGE. In assessing the cumulative impacts on future land-use and economic 

development, the NRC also evaluated the incremental effects of land-use activities occurring 

near at-reactor and away-from-reactor storage facilities and the future trends of these activities 

XVLQJSURMHFWLRQVSUHSDUHGE\)HGHUDO6WDWHDQGORFDODJHQFLHVVHH7DEOH-1 of the GEIS). 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--3--3--1--3--2--3--2- -

3--2--3--3---------

D.2.22.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters argued that the NRC should have included an 

analysis of the environmental impact of continued storage on property values as part of the 

analysis of land use in the GEIS. One commenter stated that the GEIS did not consider the 

socioeconomic impacts of continued storage on property values and business development. 

The commenter also noted that declines in property values affect tax revenues. Another 

commenter stated that spent fuel pool leaks and the associated cleanup may also affect 

property values, especially if a utility is financially unable to clean up leaks from spent fuel pools 

\HDUVLQWRWKHIXWXUH$QRWKHUFRPPHQWHUFRQWHQGHGWKDW without an analysis of the impacts 

of continued storage on property values, the analysis in the GEIS cannot support a conclusion 

that the environmental impacts for land use are SMALL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Any impact to property values would 

have occurred prior to or during the construction of the nuclear power plant and would be 

factored into existing property values when the continued storage period begins. As explained 

in the GEIS, spent fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools and ISFSIs (if available) at all 

commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. Although the NRC continues to believe 

that spent fuel can and will, in due course, be removed to a repository, the GEIS describes the 

impacts of continued storage. Until a repository becomes available, spent fuel would continue 

to be stored at existing nuclear power plant sites after reactor shutdown and decommissioning 

and potentially at away-from-reactor ISFSIs. The continued storage of spent fuel would not 

create any new effect on property values in the vicinity of existing nuclear power plants beyond 

what has already been experienced. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

A power plant site will remain in industrial use for many years following the termination of 

reactor operations and decommissioning while continuing to store spent fuel. However, given 

the substantial investment in power plant infrastructure and the continued demand for electricity, 

a power plant owner or operator may opt to continue generating electricity at the site after the 

termination of reactor operations with a non-nuclear power plant. 

With respect to a licensee’s financial stability, NRC regulations contain provisions to determine 

and remain current on the financial qualifications of its reactor licensees in 10 C)5IRU

&)5DQGWRUHHYDOXDWHWKHVHTXDOLILFDWLRQVZLWKLQ\HDUVIROORZLQJSHUPDQHQW

FHVVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQVRIWKHUHDFWRURU\HDUVEHIRUHH[SLUDWLRQRIWKHUHDFWRUOLFHQVHXQGHU

&)5EE$Q\VLJQLILFDQWUDGLRDFWLYLW\LGHQWLILed by licensees, including that resulting 

from a spent fuel pool leak, must be addressed during the decommissioning process to meet 

the license-termination requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E. The NRC has determined 

that reasonable assurance of decommissioning funding is necessary to ensure the adequate 

protection of public health and safety. Decommissioning funding is an obligation that is taken 

RQE\DOLFHQVHHZKHQDQ15&OLFHQVHLVLVVXHG8QGHU&)5EDUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHLV

required to provide decommissioning funding assurance by one or more of the methods 

GHVFULEHGLQ&)5HDVGHWHUPLQHGWREHDFFHSWDEOHWRWKH15&,QDGGLWLRQWKH15&

has a comprehensive, regulation-based decommissioning funding oversight program in place to 

provide reasonable assurance that sufficient funds will be available for decommissioning and 

radiological decontamination for each U.S. commercial nuclear facility to meet NRC standards 

and regulations. However, given that a power plant site would remain an industrial site for many 

years, any impacts on property values as a result of industrial activity, including leaks and spills, 

would be negligible compared to the impacts that occurred when the power plant was 

constructed and commenced operation. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-----3---14) 

D.2.22.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters questioned whether tax payments for storage 

facilities would continue after plant operations cease. One commenter stated that no historic 

justification exists for the property owner (licensee) to continue tax payments into the long-term 

and indefinite storage timeframes. Rather, the commenter believes that the Federal 

government would purchase or take control of sites that store spent fuel to ensure continued 

safety. Other commenters asserted that the socioeconomics analysis in the GEIS did not 

account for the impact of reduced tax payments on local municipalities and their ability to 

maintain and provide necessary public safety services to respond to an incident at the facility 

during the continued storage period. Another commenter stated that the burden of a host 

community has and will continue to be shifted to other taxpayers through increased property 

taxes. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

One commenter stated that the GEIS cumulative effects analysis should reference the negative 

impact associated with continued storage in the trends and activities section. In addition, the 

commenter expressed concern that there does not appear to be any reference to costs 

associated with emergency preparedness, a decrease in taxes, the inability to develop land 

around a spent fuel storage facility, and the cost to develop infrastructure and public services. 

The commenter believes that these issues need to be considered in the NRC’s analysis. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As discussed in Section 3.2 of the 

GEIS, licensees of nuclear power plant sites pay taxes to State and local governments as well 

as other taxing jurisdictions. While the Federal government bears an increasing financial 

responsibility for spent fuel storage costs—as a result of delays in the siting and licensing of a 

repository—judgments or payments from the Federal government to licensees to defray storage 

costs do not change ownership of storage sites. As long as licensees own the land on which 

spent fuel is stored, they will continue tRSD\WD[HV,QDGGLWLRQXQGHUEEWKH15&

requires licensees to submit written notification to the Commission for review and approval of 

the licensee’s plan for spent fuel management plan following cessation of reactor operations. If 

the Federal government were, however, to take possession of a spent fuel storage facility to 

ensure public safety, it is possible that some form of tax compensation would continue. 

The impacts of terminating reactor operations and the associated potential impacts of reduced 

tax payments and the ability to maintain and provide necessary public safety services until 

reactor decommissioning are outside the scope of this GEIS. These impacts would occur 

separately from the impacts of continued storage and are mentioned in the GEIS only as a point 

of comparison. Impacts of terminating reactor operations and the effects associated with the 

potential reduction in tax payments are discussed in greater detail in NUREG–Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (NRC 2013m). The 

impacts from decommissioning nuclear plants are discussed in greater detail in NUREG–

“Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities: Supplement 

1, Regarding the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors” (NRC 2002a). No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--2--3--1--2--1-

D.2.22.6 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC does not have adequate support 

or justification for its decision to incorporate the findings from the 2001 PFS EIS (NRC 2001a) 

into the GEIS. The commenter asserted that the GEIS failed to consider the negative impacts 

of continued storage on local and State economies, including the potential loss of economic 

development projects in a community. The commenter questioned whether the owner of the 

property and spent fuel storage facility (e.g., Native American or Federal), would pay local and 

state property taxes. The commenter also asserted that the GEIS failed to consider potential 

local and State infrastructure impacts, which should be assessed in a site-specific review. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The commenter noted that the GEIS stated that the PFS EIS designated proposed payments 

made by PFS to the Skull Valley Band of Indians as a large benefit. In addition, the commenter 

asserted that the GEIS failed to discuss the consent agreements with PFS and why the PFS 

EIS found them to be beneficial. 

In addition, the commenter stated that the GEIS failed to justify the assumption that away-fromreactor storage facilities would be sited in “sparse population” areas similar to PFSF. The 

commenter argued that the NRC should compare PFS demographics to GEH Morris or other 

proposed storage sites in the GEIS. The commenter also asserted that the NRC failed to 

consider the impact of continued storage on jurisdictions with limited local law enforcement and 

emergency facilities as was discussed in the proposed PFS EIS. 

The commenter noted that the GEIS does not address transportation infrastructure or safetyrelated infrastructure impacts caused by heavy construction vehicles, heavy-haul trucks, and 

local impacts related to highway maintenance. 

In addition, the commenter stated that away-from-reactor storage facilities may negatively 

impact regional and state economics, separate and apart from any environmental justice issues. 

The commenter believes that NRC should acknowledge in the GEIS that these impacts would 

be evaluated on a site-specific basis. Finally, the commenter stated that the GEIS cannot 

support a conclusion that the socioeconomic benefits at an unknown site are large because the 

host community has yet to negotiate the terms of any consent agreements. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC did not incorporate findings 

from the PFS FEIS into the GEIS. The NRC used the PFSF characteristics (e.g., physical size 

and workforce) to evaluate the impacts of an away-from-reactor facility. However, the 

conclusions in the GEIS do not result from the incorporation of the PFS FEIS conclusions. For 

example, the PFS FEIS concluded that the impacts to terrestrial resources would be SMALL. 

However, because of the uncertainty associated with an unknown location, the NRC concluded 

that the impacts to terrestrial resources would be SMALL to MODERATE. 

The GEIS and Rule do not authorize the storage of spent fuel at an away-from-reactor storage 

facility. Before authorizing the construction and operation of any future away-from-reactor 

ISFSI, the NRC would perform a site-VSHFLILF1(3$UHYLHZDVUHTXLUHGE\&)5E

As stated in the Commission's “Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice 

Matters in NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions,” )5“EJ [environmental justice], 

as well as other socioeconomic issues, are considered in all site-specific EISs.” The NRC 

collects demographic and economic information on local communities potentially affected by 

proposed new nuclear facilities during the environmental review process. Socioeconomic 

impacts would be determined during the site-specific NEPA review process for that licensing 

action, including specific concerns attributable to the special conditions within a community. As 

stated in the Commission’s policy statement, should the NRC receive an application for a 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI license, a site-specific NEPA assessment would be 

conducted, and this analysis would include the consideration of environmental justice, 

socioeconomics, and transportation impacts. Clarifying changes have been made to Sections 

DQGRIWKH*(,6LQUHVSRQVHWRWKHVHFRPPHQWV1RFKDQJHV were made to the Rule as 

a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.22.7 – COMMENT: A commenter agreed with the NRC’s estimated staffing needs in 

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the GEIS, provided the estimates include security personnel. However, 

the commenter questioned the rationale for the difference in the number of workers for dry 

storage versus wet storage, stating that it is not clear. The commenter believed the lower end 

of the range would be the same. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the commenter. The NRC is unaware of any particular 

reasons for the differences in staffing needs between wet and dry storage. However, the 

estimates are derived from data on multiple existing sites, and the NRC has no reason to 

believe that data presents an inaccurate picture of the staffing needs for those forms of storage. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.23 Comments Concerning Environmental Justice 

D.2.23.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern regarding the Environmental 

Justice Sections in the GEIS, citing the limits of a generic analysis. A commenter stated that 

([HFXWLYH2UGHU)5) mandates that Federal agencies identify and address 

potential disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority and low-income populations 

because these populations have historically been disregarded in environmental decisionmaking. The commenter indicated that the GEIS should consider local and intergenerational 

environmental justice to ensure that future generations are not disproportionately affected. In 

addition, the commenter believes that the environmental justice analysis in the GEIS could 

potentially be flawed and incorrect. Another commenter would prefer a more detail-oriented 

environmental justice discussion in the GEIS and questioned how impacts could be forecasted 

for a potential future away-from-reactor ISFSI. 

One commenter stated that the 2010 Waste Confidence draft GEIS needs to be revised and 

that it was unreasonable for the NRC to claim that a survey of human health and environmental 

effects on a “generic” minority and low-income community provides a level of analysis that 

satisfies NEPA. The commenter asserted that environmental justice is site-specific, and stated 

that an impact analysis in a GEIS is insufficient for NEPA purposes. Another commenter 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-200 September 2014 

argXHGWKDWWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFHLPSDFWGHWHUPLQDWLRQVLQWKHWDEOHVLQ&KDSWHU of the 

GEIS DUHQRWVXSSRUWHGE\WKHDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHUVDQG of the GEIS. 

One commenter expressed concern that a member of the public could be precluded from raising 

an issue in a site-specific licensing action after impacts are determined for continued storage. 

The commenter further stated that the GEIS analysis is an attempt to foreclose any 

consideration of site-specific environmental justice issues (e.g., human health effects), 

especially those related to the long-term and indefinite timeframes (i.e., failure to secure a 

geologic repository). 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees in part. The NRC 

DJUHHVWKDW([HFXWLYH2UGHU )5GLUHFWV)HGHUDODJHQFLHVWRLGHQWLI\DQG

address, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 

effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income populations. The 

environmental justice impact analysis performed for the GEIS was conducted in accordance 

with the Commission’s “Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in 

15&5HJXODWRU\DQG/LFHQVLQJ$FWLRQV ́)5ZKLFKVWDWHV37KH&RPPLVVLRQLV

committeGWRWKHJHQHUDOJRDOVVHWIRUWKLQ(2()5), and strives to meet those 

goals as part of its NEPA review process.” The GEIS considers the potential human health and 

environmental effects from continued storage of spent fuel on minority and low-income 

populations. 

Per the Commission’s policy statement, the NRC considers environmental justice issues in all 

licensing and regulatory actions primarily by conducting an environmental review and fulfilling its 

NEPA responsibilities for these actions. Environmental justice-related issues and demographic 

conditions (i.e., potentially affected minority and low-income populations) differ between sites 

and environmental justice issues and concerns usually cannot be resolved generically. 

Consequently, environmental justice impacts are normally considered in site-specific 

HQYLURQPHQWDOUHYLHZV)5IRU“underlying licensing actions for each particular 

facility.” However, the NRC has determined that a generic analysis of the human health and 

environmental effects of continued storage on minority and low-income populations is possible. 

As explained in the GEIS, spent fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools and ISFSIs 

(where available) at all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. Until a geologic 

repository becomes available, spent fuel would continue to be stored at existing nuclear power 

plant sites after reactor shutdown and decommissioning. The continued storage of spent fuel 

would not create any new effect on minority and low-income populations beyond what is 

currently being experienced. 

As discussed in Chapter 4 of the GEIS, the overall human health and environmental effects 

from the continued storage of spent fuel in existing spent fuel pools and ISFSIs would be limited 

in scope and SMALL for all populations. Therefore, minority and low-income populations are 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-201 185(*௅

not expected to experience disproportionately high and adverse human health and 

environmental effects from the continued storage of spent fuel. In addition, there would be no 

new, added, or increased human health or environmental effects from existing spent fuel 

storage beyond what is currently being experienced during reactor operations. As indicated in 

the Commission’s policy statement, environmental justice impacts would also be considered 

during site-specific environmental reviews for specific licensing actions. Based on this 

information, the NRC disagrees with the commenter that the environmental justice analysis in 

the GEIS is incorrect. However, the NRC clarified the discussion in Section 4.3 of the GEIS as 

a result of these comments. 

Another comment is incorrect in assuming a draft of the GEIS was issued in 2010. The 

environmental analysis supporting the 2010 Waste Confidence rulemaking was an EA. To the 

extent that the comment intended to reference the draft GEIS, those concerns are addressed in 

this response. In addition, the NRC does not agree with the comment that stated that sitespecific environmental justice issues could not be raised once a determination is made in the 

GEIS that the environmental effects of continued storage are “SMALL.” Members of the public 

will have the opportunity to raise environmental concerns regarding environmental impacts 

during the license term, including environmental justice, in site-specific NEPA reviews. 

The NRC agrees with one comment regarding the environmental justice summary statements in 

6HFWLRQDQG7DEOHV--DQG-3 of the GEIS. The environmental justice summary 

statements in Tables ES-3, ES-4, ES------DQG-3 of the GEIS have been 

revised for consistency with the environmental justice impact determinations presented in 

Chapter 4 of the GEIS to read, “[d]isproportionately high and adverse impacts are not 

expected.” In addition, environmental justice summary discussions in the Executive Summary 

DQG&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6KDYHEHHQsimilarly revised. No changes were made to 

the Rule as a result of these comments. 

---4) (244--4) (244--------

D.2.23.2 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that while claiming compliance with Executive 

2UGHUZKich would necessitate a site-specific environmental analysis, NRC clearly 

indicates that there is no licensing action planned as part of this GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the commenter that there is no licensing action planned as 

part of this GEIS and rulemaking. The GEIS and Rule analyze and codify the environmental 

impacts of continued storage but do not license or authorize storage at any particular site or 

facility. The environmental justice analysis presented in this GEIS combined with the 

consideration of environmental justice during site-specific environmental reviews for specific 

licensing actions, as indicated in the Commission's policy statement, demonstrates the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-202 September 2014 

&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWK([HFXWLYH2UGHU)51RFKDnges were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3-20) 

D.2.23.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern that spent fuel storage sites 

would be located in minority or low-income communities. One commenter stated that ISFSIs 

are de-facto nuclear waste dumps, and that the Rule is based on finding one or more waste 

sites located in economically stressed communities. The commenter stated that potential sites 

would be in the Southeast, at sites such as the Savannah River Site or on Native American land 

(e.g., Yucca Mountain). The commenter believes this is fundamentally unjust. Another 

commenter stated that centralized interim storage is an environmental injustice to any 

community residing near a proposed repository. One commenter stated that shipping waste 

from an area which benefitted from the electricity to a poorer region who received no benefit is 

an environmental justice violation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As explained in the GEIS, spent fuel is 

currently being stored in spent fuel pools and ISFSIs (where available) at all commercial nuclear 

power plants in the United States. Although the NRC continues to believe that spent fuel can 

and will, in due course, be removed to a repository, the GEIS describes the impacts of 

continued storage. Until a repository becomes available, spent fuel would continue to be stored 

at existing nuclear power plant sites after reactor shutdown and decommissioning. The 

continued storage of spent fuel would not create any new effect on minority and low-income 

populations beyond what is currently being experienced. 

In addition, the GEIS and Rule do not authorize the continued storage of spent fuel. Should the 

NRC receive an application for an away-from-reactor ISFSI or a geologic repository, a sitespecific NEPA analysis would be conducted, which would include consideration of all 

HQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVLQFOXGLQJHQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFH$VVWDWHGLQ&KDSWHU of the GEIS, if 

the away-from-reactor ISFSI can be located in a remote area far enough away from any people, 

the storage of spent fuel would not likely have high and adverse impacts to minority and lowincome populations. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(222--1----31) 

D.2.23.4 – COMMENT: The commenter disagreed with the inclusion of a reference to potential 

MODERATE or LARGE historic and cultural resource impacts in Section 4.3.2 of the GEIS, 

which analyzes the environmental justice impacts of long-term storage. The commenter stated 

that this reference is inappropriate and unnecessary. While the commenter believed that the 

environmental justice determination was correct, the commenter stated that impacts to historic 

and cultural resources would likely be avoided at decommissioned reactor sites where future 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-203 185(*௅

construction could occur on previously disturbed lands. In addition, the commenter noted that 

historic and cultural resource impacts were not included in the discussion of away-from-reactor 

HQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFHLPSDFWVGLVFXVVHGLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. As discussed in 

Section 3.3 of the GEIS, a disproportionately high and adverse environmental impact refers to 

an impact or risk of an impact on the natural or physical environment in a low-income or minority 

community that appreciably exceeds the environmental impact on the larger community. Such 

effects may include cultural impacts. In assessing cultural environmental impacts, impacts that 

uniquely affect minority or low-income populations or American Indian tribes are considered. 

Based on this information, the reference to historic and cultural resources is appropriate and 

necessary. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

The NRC agrees with the portion of the comment that states the away-from-reactor ISFSI can 

be sited to avoid significant historic and cultural resources. In most instances, placement of 

away-from-reactor storage facilities can be adjusted to minimize or avoid impacting historic and 

cultural resources, but NRC recognizes that this is not always possible. However, the NRC 

disagrees with the comment’s assertion that reference to historic and cultural resource impacts 

in the away-from-UHDFWRUHQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFHGLVFXVVLRQLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6ZRXOGEH

inappropriate and unnecessDU\7KHHQYLURQPHQWDOHIIHFWVDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQKDVEHHQ

revised to include an appropriate discussion of the possible impacts to historic and cultural 

resources at an away-from-reactor ISFSI. No other changes were made to the Rule as a result 

of this comment. 

-4-

D.2.23.5 – COMMENT: A commenter suggested nuclear energy could provide a zero-emission 

energy source that would benefit minority and underserved communities. The commenter cited 

a column written by Luz Weinberg, the City Commissioner of Aventura, Florida and VicePresident of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. The column 

stated that minority communities including those with health conditions are best served by 

clean-air energy such as nuclear power. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments regarding the benefits of nuclear energy 

and clean air for minority and underserved and underprivileged communities. The comments 

are supportive of nuclear power and general in nature. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

(244--

D.2.23.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that minority and low-income populations 

have historically been disproportionately affected by nuclear energy production. Two 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-204 September 2014 

commenters stated that the GEIS should consider who bears the burden and reaps the benefits 

of continued storage. Seven commenters stated that Native peoples, people of color, and those 

in poor communities have historically been disproportionately impacted by the uranium fuel 

cycle (mining to disposal) and will continue to be impacted into the future. Another commenter 

stated that there has been a history of environmental racism associated with uranium extraction 

around the world. 

Another commenter objected to the statement that “socioeconomic conditions affected by 

continued storage of spent fuel as they relate to minority and low-income populations living near 

nuclear power plants would remain unchanged.” The commenter believes that continued 

storage is a continued disproportionate impact on these populations who have “hosted” a 

QXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWIRUWR\HDUV7KHFRPPHQWHUDVVHUWHGWKDWWKLVUHSUHVHQWVD“nuclear 

sacrifice zone attitude” by the NRC and cited the Prairie Island Indian Community as an 

example. The commenter does not believe that “acceptable” or “permissible” releases from 

spent fuel storage at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant comport with environmental justice 

principles, and stated that the Prairie Island Indian Community should not continue to be 

burdened with spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges that it is possible that minority and low-income 

populations could have historically been disproportionately affected by “nuclear energy 

production.” As explained in the GEIS, spent fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools 

and ISFSIs (where available) at all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The 

continued storage of spent fuel would not create any new effect on minority and low-income 

populations beyond what is currently being experienced. 

([HFXWLYH2UGHU“Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority 

Populations and Low-Income Populations” )5ZDVLVVXHGLQ)HEUXDU\ZHOO

after all currently operating commercial nuclear power plants had been constructed, except 

:DWWV%DU8QLWZKLFKEHJDQRSHUDWLRQVLQ7KHUHIRUHPLQRULW\DQGORZ-income 

populations could have been disproportionately affected by the construction and operation of a 

QXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWSULRUWR([HFXWLYH2UGHU+RZHver, the selection of a nuclear power 

plant site and the location of a uranium fuel cycle facility, including mining and disposal facilities, 

are made by private business interests along with State, local, and utility officials. The NRC 

does not participate in site-selection decisions. Rather, the NRC reviews the characteristics of 

the site selected to ensure that it satisfies any applicable regulatory requirements. The impacts 

of site-selection decisions are outside the scope of this GEIS. The NRC is responsible for 

addressing the environmental impacts from the continued storage of spent fuel in this GEIS. 

The NRC considers environmental justice impacts during NEPA assessments for all regulatory 

and licensing actions per the Commission’s “Policy Statement on the Treatment of 

Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions” )5

Potential human health and environmental effects on minority and low-income populations are 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

determined during the NEPA review process, including impacts unique to the special character 

of minority, low-income, and American Indian communities. 

As explained in Chapter 4 of the GEIS, the overall human health and environmental effects from 

the continued storage of spent fuel in existing spent fuel pools and ISFSIs would be SMALL for 

all populations. Therefore, minority and low-income populations are not expected to experience 

disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects from the continued 

storage of spent fuel. Based on this information, the NRC disagrees with the commenter that 

the continued storage is a continued disproportionate impact on populations who have "hosted" 

a nuclear power plant. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30-21-----22----------

-

D.2.23.7 – COMMENT: The commenter expressed disbelief that environmental justice impacts 

have been fully evaluated in the GEIS. The commenter stated that the rulemaking is not a 

licensing action, but asserted that the Rule allows for long-term and indefinite storage by virtue 

of conclusions presented in the GEIS. Referencing the ongoing license renewal review of the 

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ISFSI, the commenter questioned whether the storage 

term would be limited to 40 years, given the status of the geologic repository. The commenter 

asserts that the 40-year renewal is an arbitrary timeframe, based on nothing more than the hope 

that a repository becomes available. The commenter stated that the Prairie Island Indian 

Community will continue to be impacted by the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ISFSI 

long after the GEIS is finalized, and that generations of their descendants will have to keep 

fighting to remove spent fuel from the Tribe’s homeland. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The GEIS and 

Rule do not authorize the continued storage of spent fuel. As discussed in Chapter 4 of the 

GEIS, the overall human health and environmental effects from continued storage would be 

SMALL for all populations. Therefore, minority and low-income populations are not expected to 

experience disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects. In the 

interim, spent fuel will continue to be stored at existing nuclear power plant sites after reactor 

shutdown and decommissioning and away-from-reactor ISFSIs. The continued storage of spent 

fuel at existing reactor sites would not create any new effect on minority and low-income 

populations beyond what is currently being experienced. As indicated in the Commission’s 

policy statement “Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC 

Regulatory and LicHQVLQJ$FWLRQV ́)5HQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFHLPSDFWVDUHFRQVLGHUHG

during the site-specific environmental assessments for specific licensing actions. Based on this 

information, the NRC disagrees with the commenter that the environmental justice impacts have 

not been fully evaluated in the GEIS. However, the NRC clarified the discussion in Section 4.3 

of the GEIS as a result of these comments. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

With regard to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ISFSI license now under 

consideration, that review is outside the scope of this GEIS and rulemaking. If approved, the 

license renewal for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ISFSI would allow for up to an 

additional 40 years of storage. Any future requests for license renewal would be reviewed in 

DFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)53DUWPer the Commission’s policy statement, the NRC considers 

environmental justice issues in all licensing and regulatory actions by conducting an 

environmental review and fulfilling its NEPA responsibilities for these actions. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.23.8 – COMMENT: Six commenters disagreed with the use of the PFSF as the basis for 

determining impacts from an away-from-reactor storage facility due to environmental justice 

concerns. The commenters questioned NRC’s commitment to observe environmental justice 

principles and cited the NRC’s issuance of a license to PFSF as a violation of those principles. 

One commenter disputed the proposed location of the PFSF site in relation to the Skull Valley 

Band’s Reservation and stated that the NRC’s approval of that license was a violation of 

environmental justice and should not be relied upon as proof that away-from-reactor storage 

can be licensed. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the commenters. The NRC used the PFS EIS as a 

model in the GEIS to describe the physical characteristics of a hypothetical away-from-reactor 

ISFSI. It is important to note that the GEIS and rulemaking are not licensing actions and do not 

authorize the storage of spent fuel at an away-from-reactor ISFSI. Should the NRC receive an 

application for a proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI, a site-specific NEPA analysis would be 

conducted, and that analysis would include consideration of environmental justice impacts per 

WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSROLF\VWDWHPHQW)51RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU5XOH

as a result of these comments. 

(2--3) (142--------3--3-

D.2.23.9 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern that a statement within Section 4.3 of 

the draft GEIS could be misinterpreted. The commenter believed that the following statement: 

“human health and environmental effects from continued storage would be small compared to 

the impacts that are normally experienced during reactor operations” is unnecessary and could 

be interpreted to mean that reactors have large health effects. The commenter stated that it is 

sufficient to conclude that impacts would be SMALL without making a comparison to reactors. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that comparing human health impacts from 

continued storage to human health impacts normally experienced during reactor operations is 

unnecessary. As explained in the GEIS, the continued storage of spent fuel would not create 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

any new effect on minority and low-income populations beyond what is currently being 

experienced during reactor operations. 

The environmental justice discussion in Section 4.3, has been revised to read, “A generic 

determination of the human health and environmental effects during continued storage is 

possible because the NRC has evaluated how environmental effects change when a nuclear 

power plant site transitions from reactor operations to decommissioning. Based on this 

knowledge, the NRC can provide a generic assessment of the potential human health and 

environmental effects during continued storage.” Based on this information, the original 

statement identified by the comment has been removed because it is unnecessary and could be 

misinterpreted. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

--21) 

D.2.23.10 – COMMENT: A commenter disputed the environmental justice impact findings 

within the draft GEIS, stating that environmental justice impacts would be LARGE, not SMALL, 

citing the displacement of indigenous peoples from their ancestral homelands. In particular, the 

commenter cited the displacement of the Northern Chumash Tribe and Mdewakanton Dakota 

(Prairie Island Indian Community) as examples. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As discussed in Chapter 4 of the GEIS, 

the overall human health and environmental effects from the continued storage of spent fuel in 

existing spent fuel pools and ISFSIs would be limited in scope and SMALL for all populations. 

Therefore, minority and low-income populations are not expected to experience 

disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects from continued 

storage. In addition, continued storage would not create any new, added, or increased human 

health or environmental effects beyond what is currently being experienced at operating reactor 

sites. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.24 Comments Concerning Air Quality 

D.2.24.1 – COMMENT: A State recommended that vehicles used in construction activities meet 

relevant EPA emissions standards and use designated routes to minimize impacts on 

residential and sensitive areas. The State also expressed concern about the health risks of 

diesel exhaust emissions and noted the regulatory requirements that apply to the use of diesel 

construction vehicles. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the State’s recommendation and comments. Based on 

its limited statutory authority under the AEA, the NRC cannot impose mitigation measures or 

standards that are not related to public health and safety from radiological hazards or common 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

defense and security. Any mitigation measures would be discussed in site-specific NEPA 

documents prepared to support a site-specific licensing action before the NRC, such as for the 

licensing of an away-from-reactor ISFSI. Further, licensees are required to comply with all 

applicable Federal, State, and local permit requirements relevant to their activities. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--

D.2.24.2 – COMMENT: The NRC received one comment that stated, with respect to a 

statement on the applicability of the EPA’s General Conformity regulations, that the NRC should 

follow the general conIRUPLW\SURYLVLRQVLQ&)5IRUDFWLYLWLHV3SUHVXPHGWRFRQIRUP ́

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC does not need to make a 

general conformity determination for this Federal action because determinations are not 

required for rulemakings; and, even if a determination analysis were prepared for continued 

storage, a conformity determination would not be necessary because any emissions due to 

continued storage would either not be an increase from the emissions during operations or 

would be a de minimis emissions increase. 

As a rulemaking, this Federal action is not subject to the requirements in 40 CFR 

FLLLDQGWKH15&GRHVQRWQHHGWRPDNHDFRQIRUPLW\GHWHUPLQDWLRQDWWKLVWLPH

Prior to the issuance of a site-specific reactor or ISFSI license, the NRC will determine whether 

a general conformity determination is required. If a conformity determination is required, the 

NRC will make the conformity determination prior to the issuance of a site-specific license. 

Even if SDUDJUDSK&)5FLLLGLGQRWDSSO\KHUHWKH15&ZRXOGQRWEHUHTXLUHGWR

PDNHDFRQIRUPLW\GHWHUPLQDWLRQLQWKLVUXOHPDNLQJSURFHHGLQJ8QGHU&)5FLL

a conformity determination is not necessary for continuing activities that are similar to current 

activities and that result in no emissions increase or a de minimis emissions increase. As noted 

in Section 4.4 of this GEIS, the NRC anticipates that the continued storage of spent fuel in 

existing spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs would result in no increase in emissions. The 

NRC also evaluates the potential impacts of constructing replacement at-reactor ISFSIs and 

DTS facilities in support of long-term storage in Section 4.4.2 of this GEIS. The NRC estimates 

that emissions of air pollutants during ISFSI replacement and construction, operation, and 

UHSODFHPHQWRID'76IDFLOLW\ZRXOGDOVREHZHOOEHORZGHPLQLPLVOHYHOVLQ&)53DUW

)XUWKHU6HFWLRQSUHVHQWVWKHDLUTXDOLW\LPSDFWVDQDO\VLVIRUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRn of an awayfrom-reactor ISFSI of sufficient size to store 40,000 MTU fuel. Using the air emissions analysis 

previously performed by NRC for the proposed PFSF, the NRC concludes that annual 

emissions from construction of an away-from-reactor ISFSI of similar size would be below the 

prescribed de minimis levels. Nevertheless, the NRC would address the need for a general 

conformity determination as part of the environmental review and NEPA analysis performed in 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

support of any site-specific licensing actions, such as for licensing of a reactor or an away-fromreactor ISFSI. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.24.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the draft GEIS did not provide a specific 

measure of how much or which substances are associated with fugitive dust emissions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As discussed in the GEIS, the fugitive 

dust analyzed in the GEIS is limited to soil particulates that have been suspended in the air by 

ground-disturbing activities and vehicular traffic during site construction for an away-fromreactor ISFSI. The NRC determined that the fugitive dust emissions could result in SMALL to 

MODERATE impacts on air quality, terrestrial life, and transportation. These impacts are 

DQDO\]HGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6DQGVXPPDUL]HGLQ6HFWLRQ(6

These impact determinations are based on the NRC’s assessment of fugitive dust emissions 

and traffic associated with construction of an away-from-reactor ISFSI and its associated road 

and railway infrastructure. The NRC’s impact determination that fugitive dust from these 

activities would have SMALL to MODERATE impacts is based on the localized nature of the 

impacts and relatively short duration of the construction period. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(244--

D.2.24.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern about the discussion in the 

GEIS of radiological releases into the air. One commenter questioned why the GEIS did not 

contain a discussion of how the NRC would judge air quality and an analysis of the human 

health impacts of inhaling the radioactive releases. Another commenter noted that the GEIS 

should consider radiological releases to the air from accidents, including explosions and fires, or 

successful terrorist attacks. Finally, one commenter stated that the GEIS should have 

addressed leakage of radioactivity from one or more ISFSIs during the indefinite timeframe. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments with respect to air quality impacts. 

Section 4.4 describes the potential air quality impacts resulting from continued storage in spent 

fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs during routine (normal) facility operations. The potential 

environmental consequences from accidents, including releases to the air, are discussed in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHKXPDQ health impacts of continued storage are discussed in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6)XUWKHUDOO15&-licensed facilities must keep releases of radioactive 

material into the environment as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA), as required by 10 

&)5DDQG&)5 Radiological releases, either normal permitted discharges in 

accordance with NRC regulations or inadvertent releases, are governed by NRC regulations 

and are part of the NRC’VLQVSHFWLRQSURJUDP$VGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-210 September 2014 

15&UHJXODWLRQVLQ&)5LGHQWLI\FULWHULDIRUUDGLRDFWLYHPDWHULDOVLQHIIOXHQWVDQG

direct radiation from an ISFSI. 

The loss of institutional controls, which was raised in one comment as being an issue with 

respect to air quality, is addressed in more detail in Section ' of this appendix and in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,61RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU5XOHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVH

comments. 

-------

D.2.24.5 – COMMENT: One commenter questioned why p. 4-OLQHRIWKHGUDIW*(,6

states that testing requirements may be reduced or eliminated for emergency diesel generators 

once the reactor is permanently shut down. The commenter stated that emergency diesel 

generators may be needed to maintain spent fuel pool cooling. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment with respect to the operation of emergency 

generators. The NRC did not intend to imply that safety systems, including emergency diesel 

generators, would be entirely eliminated; rather the NRC only meant to state that testing for 

systems no longer necessary to maintain or restore reactor core or spent fuel cooling could be 

reduced or eliminated. Following the termination of reactor operations, spent fuel would continue 

to be subject to the NRC’s regulatory oversight under either a possession-only 10 &)53DUW

OLFHQVHRUD&)53DUWOLFHQVH7KHWH[WLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6KDVEHHQUHYLVHGWR

clarify the intended meaning. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.24.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters questioned the NRC’s statements in the GEIS 

WKDWVWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHOLQ,6)6,VZRXOGFDXVHDPELHQWWHPSHUDWXUHLQFUHDVHVRI&)

DWNPPLWR&)DWNPPLIURPWKHVLWH$QRWKHUFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDW

these impacts are significant, that they are equivalent, on a local level, to the impacts of global 

warming, and that the impacts of global warming and local warming from ISFSIs should be 

considered together. An industry organization noted that they were unable to identify any 

instances of ISFSI operation causing ambient temperature increases. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the commenters’ concerns about these statements in the 

GEIS. As redrafted, the GEIS predicts a less significant thermal impact. The NRC used 

incorrect temperature-change scaling factors in the draft GEIS, which resulted in predicted 

increases of ambient temperature that were much greater than the NRC expects to occur at 

ISFSI sites. Specifically, the cited predictions in the draft GEIS of local atmospheric heating 

ZHUHGHULYHGIURPDUHIHUHQFHPRQLWRUHGUHWULHYDEOHVWRUDJH056LQVWDOODWLRQVWRULQJ

metric tons of HLW and spent fuel. The cited study provides temperature-change scaling 

factors per metric ton stored. In the draft GEIS, the NRC incorrectly used the temperatureFKDQJHVFDOLQJIDFWRUVDSSOLFDEOHWRVWRULQJPHWULFWRQVRIZDVWHLQVWHDGRIWKH
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-211 185(*௅

metric tons for an at-reactor ISFSI. The NRC has used the correct factors to revise its 

estimates in the final GEIS, which results in localized DWPRVSKHULFKHDWLQJRI&)DW

NPPLIURPWKHVLWH7KHWH[WLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6KDVEHHQUHYLVHGWRUHIOHFW

these corrections. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

----21) 

D.2.25 Comments Concerning Climate Change 

D.2.25.1 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that sea-level rise is not occurring at a rate that 

would compromise the ability of those who manage ISFSIs to continue to assure their safety. 

The commenter, citing a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, stated that 

even the most extreme scenarios postulated that sea-level rise will occur at a pace of less than 

10 mm/year. At this rate, the commenter stated that ISFSI licensees will have ample 

opportunity to prepare and take necessary mitigative actions (including the movement of casks 

to higher ground, if necessary). The commenter stated that such measures will be addressed, 

as required by NRC regulations, in license renewal applications that will be submitted every 20 

to 40 years for as long as the casks are in service. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that the rate of sea-level rise provides time for the NRC to require corrective actions to 

ensure storage of spent fuel continues with minimal impacts. As discussed in Section '

of this appendix, the NRC revised the GEIS to identify specific corrective actions in response to 

sea-level rise, including the movement of casks to higher ground. The NRC disagrees with the 

comment that the mechanism used to implement corrective actions occurs during license 

renewal. 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6specifies that ongoing regulatory oversight (e.g., 10 CFR 

3DUW$SSHQGL[%6HFWLRQ;9,DQG&)5UHTXLUHVFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVWRLGHQWLI\DQG

correct conditions adverse to safety. Text in Sections DQG

of the GEIS has been added in response to the comment. No changes were made to the Rule 

as a result of this comment. 

-4-2) 

D.2.25.2 – COMMENT: The NRC received comments in favor of continuing nuclear power to 

reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and other comments that the U.S. and the rest of the World 

should end its reliance on nuclear power in light of the increased environmental hazards 

associated with climate change. Some commenters cited the findings of a United Nations’ 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report to support continuing nuclear power. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges these general comments. The suitability of nuclear 

power as an energy source in light of global climate change is outside the scope of the GEIS 

and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-212 September 2014 

(30--1) (30--4) (30---4) (112-12-1) (112--1) (112-4-2) (112-12----

--23--21--10----24---3) (410-

D.2.25.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should consider the combined 

global effects of radiological releases from the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

nuclear power plant and climate change. Specifically, the commenter described the combined 

effects of sea-level rise and diminishing food supplies from the Pacific Ocean on global food 

supply. The commenter noted that sea-level rise will also reduce available living space and 

result in chaos and societal degeneration. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The environmental consequences of the 

accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant following the March 2011 earthquake 

and subsequent tsunami are considered outside the scope of this GEIS as discussed in Section 

' of this aSSHQGL[$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&DFNQRZOHGJHV

that climate change may have impacts across several resource areas. The GEIS also states 

that the discussion of impacts from climate change on the environment will focus on the climate 

change impacts that affect continued storage of spent fuel. This approach is consistent with the 

)HEUXDU\CEQ memo, “Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of 

Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” that was issued to Federal departments and 

agencies (CEQ 2010). The NRC considers the types of changes associated with sea-level rise 

as identified by the comment (i.e., food supply, living space, and societal chaos and 

degeneration) to be beyond the focus of the GEIS climate cKDQJHDQDO\VLV,Q6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS, the NRC refers readers to the U.S. Global Change Research Program report Climate 

Change Impacts in the United States (GCRP 2014) for a more comprehensive description of 

potential climate change impacts on the environment. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.25.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS should have considered the 

effects of global climate change on the safety of continued storage of spent fuel. The 

commenters also argued that the GEIS should be updated to consider the possible reduced 

availability and higher temperatures of surface water required for spent fuel cooling and the 

effects of more frequent and severe natural events, such as high winds from storms and 

flooding from both rising sea levels and storm surges. Many commenters expressed concern 

that rising sea levels will affect coastal and low-lying facilities, which could result in 

environmental impacts not considered in the GEIS. For example, some commenters claim that 

the rise in sea level predicted in the GEIS will place a number of facilities under water. The 

commenters believe that the GEIS should be updated to consider this possibility. Some 

commenters also note that the NRC’s predicted sea-level rise does not consider the entire 

continued storage period. These commenters argue that the NRC must consider how sea level 

ZLOOFKDQJHRYHUKXQGUHGVRI\HDUVQRWEHWZHHQQRZDQGDVDQDO\]HGLQWKH*(,62QH
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-213 185(*௅

commenter argued that the NRC must consider climate change impacts for all three timeframes. 

Commenters expressed other safety concerns related to climate change, including less reliable 

offsite electricity supplies, coastal erosion, ocean acidification, and increased potential for 

wildfires. One commenter stated that the GEIS should have considered climate change impacts 

on infrastructure that facilities rely on, including roadways and hospitals. Two commenters 

suggested that the NRC should have performed an analysis of the worst-case scenario for 

climate change impacts. 

Many commenters argued that the uncertainties associated with climate-change-related 

phenomena, such as sea-level rise and increased surface-water temperature, make a generic 

analysis of continued storage inappropriate. These commenters believe that the site-specific 

differences in the environment and facilities analyzed in the GEIS require the NRC to prepare a 

site-specific analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage. For example, some 

commenters challenged the NRC’s use of a global average in sea-level rise. The commenters 

believe that a more accurate and realistic model would use regional or local predictions of sealevel rise. Another commenter stated that climate models predict that b\,OOLQRLVLVOLNHO\WR

have the climate of East Texas. In this case, the commenter claims, the volumes and flow rates 

of rivers will be reduced significantly, which would undermine the NRC’s assumptions regarding 

dilution of groundwater contaminants. Finally, one commenter noted that the NRC should use 

the Surging Seas tool to model sea-level rise. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that the GEIS should include additional information on climate change, including the 

findings of the most recent National Climate Assessment by the U.S. Global Change Research 

Program. The GEIS contains the following revisions related to climate change: 

x 6HFWLRQQRZLQFOXGHVZDWHUDYDLODELOLW\DQGTXDOLW\LH., temperature) among the 

hazards associated with climate change. 

x 6HFWLRQFODULILHVWKHWLPHIUDPHXVHGLQWKHDQDO\VLV

x 6HFWLRQQRZGLVFXVVHVSRVVLEOHFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVIRUFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHIDFLOLWLHVWKDW

could be threatened by rising sea level. 

x 7KH*(,6KDVDOVREHHQUHYLVHGWRUHPRYHWKHGDWHIRUVHD-level rise and now 

addresses a range of projections for sea-level rise as discussed in Section ' of this 

appendix. This, combined with the corrective actions for climate change impacts on 

continued storage, responds to comments that some coastal facilities may not be viable fuel 

storage facilities. 

Safety concerns related to climate change can be addressed through the current regulatory 

processes and the corrective actions added to the GEIS text. Regarding ocean acidification 

impacts on casks, oceans can become corrosive in areas where there is enough carbon dioxide 

present, however, the NRC ensures cask integrity by requiring corrective actions under 10 CFR 

3DUW
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-214 September 2014 

Regarding climate change impacts on infrastructure, the GEIS analysis of impacts from climate 

change on the environment focuses on impacts affecting the safety of continued storage. As 

GHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQV DQG2.2 of the GEIS, in the event of 

climate change-induced sea-level rise, the NRC would require licensees to implement corrective 

actions to identify and correct conditions adverse to safety. The NRC requires licensees to take 

these corrective actions regardless of the mechanism creating the condition adverse to safety. 

Revisions of the GEIS in response to other comments concerning sea-level rise and the 

associated impact analysis are discussed in Section ' of the appendix. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these specific comments. 

The NRC disagrees that a worst-case scenario should be analyzed for climate change impacts. 

NEPA does not require agencies to conduct a worst-case analysis, but rather to assess the 

reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of the proposed action. 

The NRC disagrees that a generic analysis of climate change cannot be performed, instead of a 

site-specific analysis, for a number of reasons as outlined in Section ' of this appendix. 

The NRC disagrees that the impacts of climate change invalidate its conclusion that sufficient 

VXUIDFHZDWHUZLOOEHDYDLODEOHWRGLOXWHJURXQGZDWHUFRQWDPLQDQWV$VRXWOLQHGLQ6HFWLRQ

and in Appendix E (Analysis of Spent Fuel Pool Leaks), the NRC assumes that all spent fuel 

has already been moved from the spent fuel pool to dry cask storage by the end of the shortterm storage timeframe. Appendix E describes the various hydrologic and chemical processes 

that could reduce the environmental impacts of radionuclides associated with leaked spent fuel 

pool water. In addition, Table E-2 demonstrates that the radioactivity associated with spent fuel 

pool leaks is comparable to that of normal operating power plant releases. Appendix E states 

that surface waterbodies in the vicinity of nuclear power plants (e.g., oceans, lakes, or rivers) 

are large enough to meet reactor cooling requirements, and a large volume of surface water is 

usually available, which would dilute any groundwater contaminants that flow into them. The 

NRC disagrees that the specific summertime, high emissions scenario for Illinois referenced in 

the comment invalidates the findings in the GEIS regarding spent fuel pool leaks. 

The NRC disagrees with the use of the Surging Seas tool for the GEIS analysis because that 

tool includes storm surge along with sea-level rise, and projections of sea-level rise and storm 

surge differ from the U.S. Global Change Research Program (GCRP). The NRC’s review of 

impacts caused by climate change relies principally on the GCRP report from 2014. 

Consideration of using sea-level rise projections from sources other than GCRP 2014 and the 

adequacy of the GEIS analysis associated with these projections is discussed in Section 

' of this appendix. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-21----1) (112--2) (112--2) (112--3) (112--3) (112----

40--1) (233-4) (244--2) (244-14--11---------3) 

-11--31--31---4) (303----11--24-1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

------------1--1--1-

--1------4--4--4--4-

-4------2------

----11) (1001-1) 

D.2.25.5 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS nowhere references revisions to the 

design basis flood that may have occurred since facilities were initially licensed. The 

commenter stated that the GEIS should also evaluate the increased likelihood of potentially 

climate-change-induced beyond-design-basis events, like Superstorm Sandy, and additional 

adaptation measures to respond to such events. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment in part. As part of the Japan lessons-learned 

activities resulting from the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, the NRC has used its 

UHJXODWRU\DXWKRULW\XQGHU&)5WRUHTXHVWIORRGUHevaluations of existing nuclear 

power plants. Licensees of operating nuclear power plants have been asked to reevaluate the 

flooding hazards that could affect their sites using present-day information. These newly 

reevaluated hazards, if worse than what the plant had originally calculated upon initial licensing, 

will be analyzed to determine whether plant structures, systems, and components need to be 

updated to protect against the new hazards. The initial flood design basis is discussed in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(IS LQWKH)ORRGVVXEVHFWLRQ7H[WKDVEHHQDGGHGWR6HFWLRQ.1 

of the GEIS that discuss subsequent flood design basis considerations. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.25.6 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the draft GEIS neglected to evaluate the 

effects of climate change on drinking-water security. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, the NRC acknowledges that climate change may have impacts across several resource 

areas. This includes water resources, a subset of which is drinking-water security or the 

availability of drinking water in terms of both quality and amount. However, as stated in Section 

RIWKH*(,6WKHGLVFXVVLRQRILPSDFWVRIFOLPDWH change on the environment will focus 

on those climate change impacts that affect continued storage. This approach is consistent with 

WKH)HEUXDU\CEQ memo, “Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of 

Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (CEQ 2010), issued to Federal departments 

and agencies. The NRC considers climate change impacts related to drinking-water supply and 

quality to be outside of the scope of the GEIS climate change analysis. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1--2-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.25.7 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS should include the results of 

an investigation of the carbon effects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including plant 

decommissioning, as well as the environmental effects of Freon releases from converting 

uranium to fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The cumulative impact analysis for 

climate change in 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6considered the contribution of the uranium fuel 

cycle WRJUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQV6SHFLILFDOO\7DEOH-2 of the GEIS incorporated the 

uranium fuel cycle, including decommissioning, in the estimate of annual greenhouse gas 

emissions from a nuclear power plant. 

Freon 114, a greenhouse gas, is released from the uranium fuel cycle; however, in the EPA’s 

JUHHQKRXVHJDVHQGDQJHUPHQWILQGLQJ)5WKH(3$IRXQGWKDWVL[ORQJ-lived and 

directly emitted greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide [CO2], methane [CH4], nitrous oxide [N2O], 

hydrofluorocarbons [HFCs], perfluorocarbons [PFCs], and sulfur hexafluoride [SF]) taken in 

combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare of current and future 

generations. The EPA did not include chlorofluorocarbons like Freon-114 as part of the 

endangerment finding. The NRC’s uranium fuel cycle emissions total does not include Freon, 

consistent with the EPA’s finding. 7KH15&FRQVLGHUVWKHJUHHQKRXVHJDVIRRWSULQWLQ7DEOH-

2 to be appropriately conservative. The greenhouse gas emissions estimates for the dominant 

component (uranium fuel cycle) are based on 30-year old enrichment technology assuming that 

the energy required for enrichment is provided by coal-fired generation. Different assumptions 

related to the source of energy used for enrichment or the enrichment technology that would be 

just as reasonable could lead to a significantly reduced footprint. 

Additional discussion of the NRC’s use of Table S-3 for uranium fuel cycle impacts is provided 

in Section ' of this appendix. Because the GEIS already considers the impacts of 

greenhouse gas emissions from fuel cycle activities in the cumulative impact analysis, no 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-12--11--1-

D.2.25.8 – COMMENT: $FRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VKRXOGFRQVLGHU

that indefinite emissions of small amounts of greenhouse gases could result in adverse impacts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUV

JUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQVRYHUWKHLQGHILQLWHWLPHIUDPH$VH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQ

emission levels during the indefinite period would be the same as those during the long-term 

timeframe, but would occur on an ongoing basis over a longer period of time. Annual 

emissions, similar to the long-term timeframe, would continue to be small relative to global 

HPLVVLRQV6HFWLRQDGGUHVVHVWKHFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVRIJUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQVDQG
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

7DEOH-2 compares annual CO2 emission rates from various sources. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.25.9 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that in addition to static sea-level rise, the GEIS 

should have examined other hazards to spent fuel storage facilities, including increased storm 

surges, erosion, shoreline retreat, inland flooding, and land subsidence of coastal areas. 

Another commenter stated that the analysis of sea-level rise should have considered 

uncertainties in sea-level rise projections and how sea-level rise could affect the frequency and 

severity of flooding. This commenter suggested that the NRC consider more recent projections 

of sea-OHYHOULVHWKDQZHUHFLWHGLQWKH:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQDQG5XOH)5

LQFOXGLQJWKHPRVWUHFHQWGUDIWRIWKH1DWLRQDO&OLPDWH$VVHVVPHQWSUHYLRXVO\

found at http://www.globalchange.gov), which states that in the context of risk-based analysis, 

some decisionmakers may wish to use a wider range of scenarios for sea-level rise—IURPLQ

WR ft. The commenter also noted that the draft report states that the high end of these 

scenarios may be useful for decisionmakers with a low tolerance for risk. In the opinion of the 

commenter, nuclear waste storage epitomizes an area where there is a low tolerance for risk. 

The commenter also stated that sea-level rise is not uniform and will vary considerably among 

different regions, citing a report of the New York City Panel on Climate Change. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. Text was 

DGGHGWR6HFWLRQ of the GEIS to address a range of projections for global sea-level rise 

from the GCRP 2014 report. In addition, 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6has been revised to 

discuss corrective actions for fuel storage that could be affected by rising sea level and 

increased storm surges. These corrective actions would be applicable to the other climate 

change impacts mentioned by the commenter. 

The NRC disagrees with the use of the recent 2013 draft National Climate Assessment 

previously located at http://www.globalchange.gov. The Global Change Research Act requires 

that, every four years, the GCRP prepare and submit to the President and Congress a National 

Climate Assessment of the effects of climate change in the United States. The NRC’s review of 

LPSDFWVFDXVHGE\FOLPDWHFKDQJHLQWKH*(,6UHOLHVSULQFLSDOO\RQWKH*&RP report, 

Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States *&53ZKLFKZDVWKHFXUUHQWILQDO

version of the National Climate Assessment at the time the draft GEIS was prepared. This 

report synthesizes the work of the Federal government on climate change. The GCRP reports 

and peer-reviewed assessments from GCRP were suggested as sources of the best scientific 

LQIRUPDWLRQDYDLODEOHRQWKHUHDVRQDEO\IRUHVHHDEOHFOLPDWHFKDQJHLPSDFWVLQWKH)HEUXDU\

2010 CEQ memo, Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CEQ 2010), issued to Federal departments and agencies. The 

GEIS does not reference the 2013 draft National Climate Assessment because at the time the 

draft GEIS was prepared, the 2013 report was still in draft form and therefore subject to change. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

However, the GCRP released the final version of the new National Climate Assessment (GCRP 

2014) in May 2014. The GEIS was updated for consistency with the final version of the new 

National COLPDWH$VVHVVPHQWLQFOXGLQJFKDQJHVLQ6HFWLRQFRQFHUQLQJQHZVHD-level 

ULVHSURMHFWLRQVWKDWDUHJUHDWHUWKDQWKHSURMHFWLRQVLQWKH*&53UHSRUW

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DVVHVVHVWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRIVHYHUHDFFLGHQWVLQFOXGLQJ

consideration of climate change, during continued storage of spent fuel. The GEIS analysis did 

not specify a numeric value for sea-level rise that results in a severe accident. However, by 

examining severe accidents in the GEIS, the NRC analyzes instances where changes in sealevel rise, regardless of the specific value, challenge the safety of continued storage. Therefore, 

the NRC believes that the GEIS analysis addresses potential impacts for instances where sealevel rise is greater than that identifieGLQWKH*&53UHSRUWVXFKDVWKRVHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH

2014 National Climate Assessment. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

------

D.2.26 Comments Concerning Geology and Soils 

D.2.26.1 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that NRC did not evaluate the impacts of geology 

on continued storage. The commenter stated that consideration of the impacts of geology on 

continued storage would include considering any new theories, data collection, mapping of the 

local and regional geology around a facility and how that would impact the original estimations 

of the potential severity of natural disasters such as landslides, earthquakes or sinkholes at a 

IDFLOLW\5HIHUULQJWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6ZKLFKGHVFULEHVWKHJHRORJ\ and soils that may be 

affected by continued storage of spent fuel, the commenter stated that the NRC should use 

more modern interpretations of the local or regional geology based on modern geologic 

mapping, and review changes in seismic hazard ratings based on data obtained since earlier 

plants were built. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The potential environmental 

FRQVHTXHQFHVRISRVWXODWHGDFFLGHQWVVXFKDVHDUWKTXDNHVDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS; an examination of accident analyses, including earthquakes, for existing facilities is 

outside the scope of this rulemaking and GEIS. Further, as part of an initial site-specific 

licensing or relicensing action, the NRC considers site-specific geologic and soil conditions for 

each nuclear power plant and associated ISFSI. The conclusions reached in previous licensing 

actions are not being revisited in this GEIS, and the commenter did not provide any additional 

information that would cause the NRC to reconsider these site-specific licensing actions. This 

GEIS does not replace the site-specific NEPA analysis required for any individual site-specific 

licensing action. As necessary, these issues are addressed by the NRC on an ongoing basis at 

all licensed nuclear facilities. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The issues raised by the commenter are addressed by license applicants and the NRC at the 

initial licensing stage. All currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants were sited using 

geologic and seismic criteria set forth in 10 CFR Part 100; these facilities were designed and 

FRQVWUXFWHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)53DUW7KHUHJXODWLRQVUHTXLUHWKDWSODQWVWUXFWXUHV

systems, and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural 

phenomena, including earthquakes and other natural phenomena, without loss of capability to 

perform safety functions. Site-specific design bases for seismic protection are prescribed by a 

nuclear power plant’s Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)/Updated Final Safety Analysis 

Report and by applicable technical specifications. Further, nuclear power plants licensed after 

-DQXDU\DUHVXEMHFWWRWKHPRUHULJRURXVJHRORJLFDQGVHLVPLFVLWH-acceptability and 

GHVLJQFULWHULDHVWDEOLVKHGLQ&)5DQGDQG&)53DUW$SSHQGL[6$OO

safety-related structures (i.e., Seismic Category I structures) at nuclear power plants are 

founded either on competent bedrock, engineered compacted strata, concrete fill, and/or 

structural backfill to ensure that no safety-related facilities are constructed in potentially unstable 

materials. 

As referenced above, the NRC has a process in place to address the changing state of 

knowledge in various scientific disciplines. When new information about natural phenomena 

that could affect the safety of operating nuclear power plants becomes available, such as 

information related to seismic hazards, the NRC evaluates the new information, through the 

appropriate regulatory program—such as the reactor oversight program—to determine if any 

changes are needed at these plants. The NRC does not wait until a specific rulemaking action 

or specific licensing action is under consideration. For example, the NRC took regulatory action 

after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. 

As described in Section 2.1.2.1 of this GEIS, the NRC issued multiple orders and a request for 

information to all of its nuclear power plant licensees on March 12, 2012. These orders included 

a formal request to all licensees for information to assist the NRC in reevaluating seismic as well 

as flooding hazards at operating reactor sites. This process is ongoing, and, if necessary, the 

NRC will use the information collected to determine whether to update the design basis and 

systems, structures, and components important to safety, including spent fuel pools. Section 

DQG$SSHQGL[)RIWKLV*(,6SURYLGHIXUWKHUGHWDLOVUHJDUGLQJWKH15&’s orders and 

requests for information in response to the Fukushima events. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---32) 

D.2.26.2 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS should consider the impacts that 

varying soil types would have on the long-term stability—and therefore the risk for a potential 

accident—at a plant’s ISFSI. For example, the commenter pointed to sandy soil types reported 

at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-220 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Although site conditions including 

JHRORJ\DQGVRLOVDUHJHQHULFDOO\GLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG of the GEIS with respect to 

the at-reactor-site continued storage of spent fuel, site-specific geologic and soil conditions, as 

they relate to accidents, do not need to be considered for this generic analysis. Site-specific 

geologic and soil conditions were, however, considered for each nuclear power plant and 

associated ISFSI when the facilities were first licensed. These site-specific issues will be 

considered for new-facility license applications and license renewal applications. The 

conclusions reached in those earlier licensing actions are not being revisited in this GEIS. The 

potential environmental consequences from postulated accidents involving the continued 

VWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHODUHGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,61RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHto the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-3) 

D.2.26.3 – COMMENT: 2QHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDWWKHFRQFOXVLRQLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

(i.e., that the environmental impact of spent fuel pool leaks to offsite soils would be SMALL) 

does not take into account specific leaks identified in Table E-4 of Appendix E of the GEIS. In 

addition, the commenter also stated that documented spent fuel pool leaks at the Brookhaven 

National Laboratory and Yankee Rowe facilities should be included in Table E-4 and considered 

in the analysis for their contribution to groundwater and soil contamination. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKH

potential environmental impacts on geology and soils caused by the continued onsite storage of 

VSHQWIXHODQG6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6HYDOXDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRQJURXQGZDWHU

quality from the storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools during the short-term timeframe. As 

described in Section E.2.2.3 of the GEIS, the extent of soil contamination is influenced by 

several factors, including soil type, direction of groundwater flow, and leak size. Because of the 

radionuclide-transport processes discussed in Section E.2.1.2 of the GEIS, most radionuclides 

in spent fuel pool water are likely to be absorbed onto the concrete structure of the spent fuel 

pool, or soils surrounding the leak location. Further, because the hydrogeological conditions at 

most sites are such that contamination will either remain onsite, or be directed to a nearby 

surface waterbody, it is unlikely that offsite soil contamination would occur. 

Continued storage in spent fuel pools could result in radiological impacts on groundwater 

OHDGLQJWRVRLOFRQWDPLQDWLRQDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQV(DQGE.2.2.3 of the 

GEIS. However, the NRC believes that it is unlikely that a leak during the short-term timeframe 

would remain undetected for a significant period and impact offsite groundwater receptors. 

6HYHUDOIDFWRUVVXPPDUL]HGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6LQIRUPWKLVDVVHVVPHQW

First, and as detailed in Sections E.1.1 and E.2.1.1 of the GEIS, spent fuel pool design (e.g., 

stainless-steel liners and leakage-collection systems) and operational controls (e.g., monitoring 

and surveillance of spent fuel pool water levels) make it unlikely that a leak will remain 

undetected for a significant period of time and impact offsite groundwater receptors. Second, 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-221 185(*௅

the hydrologic characteristics associated with typical nuclear power plant settings (see Section 

E.2.1.3 of the GEIS) act to impede the offsite migration of future spent fuel pool leakage. Third, 

licensees at current and future spent fuel pool sites are required to have routine REMPs in place 

to detect subsurface contamination, including contamination in groundwater. Any detections 

would likely result in additional monitoring and subsurface characterization. 

,QDGGLWLRQOLFHQVHHVDUHUHTXLUHGE\&)5DWRFRQGXFWVXEVXUIDFHVXUYH\VWR

identify and characterize contamination. As described in Section E.1.2 of the GEIS, licensees 

have implemented groundwater monitoring programs in accordance with the industry’s voluntary 

industry-ZLGHLQLWLDWLYH1(,ZKLFKVDWLVILHVWKHLQWHQWRI&)5D3HUIRUPLQJ

onsite groundwater monitoring throughout the short-term timeframe, in conjunction with other 

onsite and offsite radiological monitoring required of licensees, will serve as an important 

mechanism to detect radiological contamination in the event of a spent fuel pool leak, and 

should facilitate timely detection of a leak. Should the hydrogeologic characteristics of the site 

change during the short-term timeframe, licensees would need to update onsite and offsite 

monitoring programs, as necessary, to ensure any potential exposure pathways are 

appropriately monitored. 

Table E-4 of Appendix E of the GEIS, lists suspected and confirmed reactor spent fuel pool 

leaks and provides a representative baseline for NRC’s analysis of future impacts from leaks. 

Table E-4 has been updated to include additional leak examples, as further described in Section 

' of this appendix. The leaks associated with the Brookhaven National Laboratory 

IDFLOLW\DQG<DQNHH5RZHIDFLOLWLHVZHUHFRQVLGHUHGE\WKH15&LQLWV/LTXLG5DGLRDFWLYH

5HOHDVH/HVVRQV/HDUQHG7DVN)RUFH)LQDO5HSRUW15&a), which is cited in the GEIS as 

a primary source in preparing Appendix E. 

The Brookhaven National Laboratory is a DOE-owned High Flux Beam Reactor research facility 

that was not licensed by NRC and that does not store commercial spent fuel. As this is neither 

a commercial nuclear power reactor nor an away-from-reactor ISFSI, its activities are not within 

the scope of this GEIS and Rule. Unlike NRC-licensed reactors, the Brookhaven National 

Laboratory facility’s spent fuel pool lacked lining and a tell-tale drain system. Owing to these 

crucial differences, the Brookhaven National Laboratory facility was not included in Appendix E 

as a representative leak example. 

As discussed in Section B.3.3.3 of the GEIS, the decommissioned Yankee Rowe reactor site 

QRZFRQVLVWVRQO\RIDQ,6)6,VXEMHFWWRD&)53DUWOLFHQVHDQGD&)53DUW

general license. After removal of spent fuel from the pool and pool drainage was completed in 

JURXQGZDWHUPRQLWRULQJLQGHWHFWHGWULWLXP7KH15&GRHVQRWLGHQWLI\

Yankee Rowe’s spent fuel pool as the source of tritium to groundwater, and this occurrence was 

originally omitted from Table E-4 in Appendix E of the GEIS. Most or all of the contamination at 

Yankee Rowe is suspected to have come from a series of leaks from the ion exchange pit, as 

further described in Section D.2.40 of this appendix. However, because a spent fuel pool leak 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-222 September 2014 

at Yankee Rowe cannot be ruled out, the NRC has updated Table E-4 of the GEIS to include 

leak information from Yankee Rowe. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--3) 

D.2.26.4 – COMMENT: Two commenters stated that the GEIS dismisses the effect of leaking 

storage facilities on the migration of radiological contaminants in soils. According to the 

commenters, this migration involves soil biota and biota all the way up the predatory scale. 

They stated the GEIS should consider the history of contamination through biological pathways 

at the Hanford Site. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As noted in Section 4.3 of the GEIS, 

with respect to environmental justice and consideration for contaminant uptake, all NRC 

licensees are required to assess the impact of facility operations on the environment through a 

REMP. REMPs assess the effects of site operations on the environment that could affect 

special pathway receptors. Special pathways take into account the levels of contamination in 

native vegetation, crops, soils and sediments, surface water, fish, and game animals on or near 

power plant sites to assess the risk of radiological exposure through (1) subsistence 

consumption of fish, native vegetation, surface water, sediment, and local produce; (2) the 

absorption of contaminants in sediments through the skin; and (3) the inhalation of airborne 

particulate matter. REMPs provide a mechanism for determining the levels of radioactivity in 

the environment. REMP implementation allows licensees and regulators to ensure that any 

accumulation of radionuclides released into the environment will not become significant. With 

respect to DOE’s Hanford site, the experience at the site does not cause the NRC to doubt the 

effectiveness of a REMP in preventing contamination from NRC-licensed facilities. Even once 

reactor operations cease, a REMP would be required to consider the potential sources of 

radiation and radioactivity that may be released from a spent fuel pool or at-reactor ISFSIs in 

DFFRUGDQFHZLWK15&UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5&)5Appendix A, Section VI; and 

&)5G1RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU5XOHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVHFRPPHQWV

--

D.2.26.5 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS could not make a generic 

determination that environmental impacts on geology and soil would be SMALL because the 

determination requires consideration of site-specific factors, including soils present at each 

location (and general geomorphology for coastally sited plants), the site’s vulnerability to 

erosion, the amount of fuel stored in pools, and the type of storage facility being planned. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS presents a generic analysis of 

the potential environmental impacts on geology and soils and other resources associated with 

continued storage. The NRC has determined in the GEIS that the environmental impacts of 

continued storage can be analyzed generically. While the NRC used some site-specific 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-223 185(*௅

information to inform its analysis, this GEIS does not replace the site-specific NEPA analysis 

that would be conducted for individual site-specific licensing actions. The analysis in this GEIS 

applies to future NRC licensing actions, which will consider recent developments in science and 

engineering as part of the license application review process. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-1) 

D.2.27 Comments Concerning Hydrology 

D.2.27.1 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the GEIS did not contain an analysis of the 

potential for groundwater impacts over time. One commenter noted that the Union of 

Concerned Scientists has documented that 100 reactors in the United States already have leaks 

that threaten or have already caused groundwater contamination and that the GEIS does not 

recognize long-WHUPLVVXHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKORFDWLQJRYHUPHWULFWRQVRIKLJKO\

radioactive spent fuel on top of groundwater for an unbounded period of time. The commenter 

further stated it is a NEPA violation to fail to address groundwater impacts at each specific site, 

and that the Rule could deny the public the opportunity to address groundwater contamination 

issues in specific licensing actions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the GEIS does not address the 

potential impacts on groundwater associated with the storage of spent fuel over time. The GEIS 

generically evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage, but the environmental 

impact analyses presented are informed by the wide range of environmental conditions at 

existing reactor sites. This means that, for each of the resource areas analyzed in the GEIS, 

including surface water and groundwater, the NRC has reached a generic determination 

(SMALL, MODERATE, LARGE, or a range) that is appropriate for all sites. The assumptions 

used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that variances that 

may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations greater 

than those presented in the GEIS. 

While the NRC used some site-specific information to inform its analysis, the GEIS does not 

replace the site-specific NEPA analysis that would be conducted for individual site-specific 

licensing actions. The analysis in the GEIS applies to future NRC licensing actions, which will 

consider recent developments in science and engineering as part of the license application 

UHYLHZSURFHVV7REHVSHFLILF6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6EURDGO\FKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHJURXQGZDWHU

systems at existing nuclear power plant sites that may be relevant to continued storage in spent 

fuel pools and at-UHDFWRU,6)6,V6HFWLRQHYDOXDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRQJURXQGZDWHU

use and quality of continued storage of spent fuel in pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. Section 

RIWKH*(,6HYDOXDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRQJURXQGZDWHUTXDOLW\IURPFRQWLQXHG

short-WHUPVWRUDJHZKLOH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6HYDOXDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRQ

groundwater quality from operating an ISFSI, which are limited to the infiltration of stormwater 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-224 September 2014 

runoff carrying grease and oil, and spills from operating equipment that supports the dry cask 

VWRUDJHIDFLOLW\$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&FRQFOXGHVWKDWWKH

impacts on groundwater quality and consumptive use associated with the long-term storage of 

spent fuel in an at-reactor ISFSI would be SMALL. 

With respect to spent fuel pool leakage, continued storage could result in radiological impacts 

on groundwater as described in Sections DQG(RIWKH*(,6+RZHYHUDVIXUWKHU

detailed in Section ' of this appendix, a variety of factors act to minimize the effects of a 

spent fuel pool leak to the environment. These include spent fuel pool design (e.g., stainlesssteel liners and leakage-collection systems) and operational controls (e.g., monitoring and 

surveillance of spent fuel pool water levels). In addition, the site hydrologic characteristics 

associated with typical nuclear power plant settings (see Section E.2.1.3 of the GEIS) act to 

impede the offsite migration of spent fuel pool leakage, should the leakage reach the 

environment. The combination of these factors makes it unlikely that a leak will reach the 

environment, or remain undetected for a significant period such that it would impact offsite 

groundwater receptors. 

Spent fuel pool leaks have caused radioactive liquid releases to the environment, as detailed in 

Section E.3 of the GEIS. According to available data, radiological contamination from spent fuel 

pool leaks has remained onsite within each licensee’s owner-controlled area or traveled to a 

nearby surface waterbody, and none of these releases have affected the health of the public or 

are known to have resulted in contamination of drinking water. The NRC’s impact assessment 

and significance determination with respect to soil and groundwater contamination are informed 

by the lessons learned and knowledge gained from these historical spent fuel pool and related 

inadvertent releases. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--

D.2.27.2 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that storage of spent fuel at away-from-reactor 

ISFSIs is “projected to have significant adverse long-term impacts on the groundwater, which 

ultimately impacts other bodies of water.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. ChapteURIWKH*(,6SUHVHQWVWKH

projected environmental impacts of continued away-from-reactor storage of spent fuel in an 

,6)6,6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRQVXUIDFH-water quality 

and use and groundwater quality and use, respectively, associated with construction and 

operation of an away-from-reactor ISFSI. To support spent fuel repackaging into new canisters 

under the long-term storage scenario, the NRC has assumed that a DTS would also be required. 

For construction and operation of the away-from-reactor ISFSI and DTS, the NRC concludes that 

the overall impacts on both surface-water and groundwater use and quality would be SMALL. As 

VSHFLILFDOO\VWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&FRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHLPSDFWVRn 

groundwater use and quality of long-term storage of spent fuel at an away-from-reactor ISFSI 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

would also be SMALL. These conclusions are based on the fact that once constructed, the 

away-from-reactor ISFSI would be in a passive state. Routine activities would be limited to 

storage cask emplacement and site maintenance with very little water use. Operation of the 

ISFSI would result in no routine release of gaseous or liquid radiological effluents, as noted in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHWH[WLQ6HFWLRQZDVUHYLVHGIRUFODULW\ZLWKUHVSHFWWR

this issue. Effluents would be limited to stormwater runoff and treated sanitary wastewater 

GXULQJQRUPDORSHUDWLRQVDVLQGLFDWHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6,QDGGLWLRQWKH

licensee of an away-from-UHDFWRU,6)6,ZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGE\&)5GWRLPSOHPHQW

an environmental monitoring program to ensure compliance with technical specifications for 

effluents. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3-2) 

D.2.27.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters indicated that existing reactor and spent fuel 

storage operations have already impacted groundwater, and that the GEIS incorrectly 

concludes that impacts on surface-water quality will be SMALL. A commenter indicated that 

many reactor sites have groundwater contamination from routine operations, and that many of 

those sites are located on drinking-water aquifers. One commenter stated that the GEIS 

completely excludes the Plymouth-Carver Sole Source Aquifer, which is vulnerable to 

contamination from spent fuel storage, from its analysis of groundwater quality and use, and 

also noted that the leaks from the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station are occurring into the 

Plymouth-Carver Sole Source Aquifer, which supplies drinking water for individual residences 

and several southeastern Massachusetts towns. The commenter further stated that a fuel pool 

at Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York had leaked tritium into a drinking-water aquifer 

for 12 years. Another commenter indicated that dry casks at several facilities around the world, 

including the United States, have leaked into underlying water tables. One commenter 

indicated that nuclear storage in North Carolina and the Northwest could lead to a major 

problem with groundwater. One commenter identified concerns with potential impacts to natural 

resources associated with long-term spent fuel storage, particularly contamination of surfacewater and groundwater resources, and that these impacts could be severe, long-term, and 

difficult to mitigate. One commenter noted that factors involved in groundwater assessments 

vary at each groundwater contamination incident and that site-specific assessments would have 

to be done to determine the real potential impacts of contamination of groundwater on use and 

quality. One commenter indicated that despite surface-water capacity to dilute radiological 

contamination migrating from contaminated groundwater sources, nuclear isotopes persist and 

move up the marine food chain as evidenced in marine life near the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident. Another commenter stated that the NRC’s conclusion that environmental impacts to 

surface waterbodies is SMALL relies inappropriately on analytic assumptions. Citing Section 

RIWKH*(,6RQHFRPPHQWHUDVVerted that the NRC’s analysis of water-resource impacts 

from continued storage of spent fuel are unacceptable. The commenter questioned how the 

NRC can reach a determination that the impacts from continued storage will be SMALL based 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

on a comparison of the impacts of continued storage to the impacts of operations. Further, the 

commenter argued that the NRC’s analysis relies on flawed assumptions that dry cask 

replacements will proceed smoothly for an infinite period. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the conclusions in the GEIS are 

incorrect or do not have an adequate basis and that the groundwater impacts of continued 

storage cannot be analyzed generically. The GEIS generically evaluates the environmental 

impacts of continued storage, but the environmental impact analyses presented are informed by 

the wide range of environmental conditions at existing reactor sites. This means that, for each 

of the resource areas analyzed in the GEIS, including surface water and groundwater, the NRC 

has reached a generic determination (SMALL, MODERATE, LARGE, or a range) that is 

appropriate for all sites. The assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to 

bound the impacts such that variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in 

environmental impact determinations greater than those presented in the GEIS. 

While the NRC used some site-specific information to inform its analysis, the GEIS does not 

replace the site-specific NEPA analysis that would be conducted for individual site-specific 

licensing actions. The analysis in the GEIS applies to future NRC licensing actions, which will 

consider recent developments in science and engineering as part of the license application 

review process. Regarding general concerns for impacts on water use and quality from 

FRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKHSRWHQWLDOHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRQ

surface-ZDWHUTXDOLW\DQGXVHIURPFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, cooling-water demand would be significantly reduced after reactor operations have 

ceased and would result in undetectable or very minor impacts on surface-water consumptive 

use from the continued storage of spent fuel in pools. 

The GEIS specifically addresses the potential for surface-water contamination from continued 

storage in spent fuel pools. $VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQDQGGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQ(

both of which have been revised in the GEIS, the NRC concludes that the resulting radiological 

impacts of any spent fuel pool leak release to offsite receiving waters would be comparable to 

levels observed with permitted cooling and service-water effluent discharges from operating 

nuclear power plants. The NRC’s assessment is based on known reactor operational data and 

spent fuel pool releases to date. 

6SHQWIXHOVWRUDJHLQ,6)6,VDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GRHVQRWUHTXLUHWKH

consumption of water because ISFSIs are passive, air-FRROHGVWRUDJHV\VWHPV6HFWLRQ

of the GEIS concludes that because short-term storage of spent fuel would use less surface 

water and have fewer activities that could affect surface-water quality than an operating reactor, 

which was previously determined to have a SMALL impact, the impacts on surface-water quality 

and consumptive use during the short-term storage timeframe would also be SMALL. For the 

long-term timeframe, the GEIS also concludes that the potential consumptive-use impacts from 

continued ISFSI operations would be minimal, as projected activities involving replacement 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

facility construction and operation would involve amounts of water that are a small fraction of 

water use during reactor operations. 

With respect to spent fuel pool leaks impacting groundwater, continued storage in spent fuel 

pools could resuOWLQUDGLRORJLFDOLPSDFWVRQJURXQGZDWHUDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG

E.2.2.1 of the GEIS. However, the NRC believes that it is unlikely that a future leak during the 

short-term timeframe would remain undetected for a significant period of time and impact offsite 

groundwater receptors. Several factors inform this assessment as summarized in Section 

)LUVWDQGDVGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQV(DQG(RIWKH*(,6VSHQWIXHOSRROGHVLJQ

(e.g., stainless-steel liners and leakage-collection systems) and operational controls (e.g., 

monitoring and surveillance of spent fuel pool water levels) make it unlikely that a leak will 

remain undetected for a significant period of time and impact offsite groundwater receptors. 

Second, the hydrologic characteristics associated with typical nuclear power plant sites (see 

Section E.2.1.3 of the GEIS) act to impede the offsite migration of future spent fuel pool 

leakage. Third, licensees at current and future spent fuel pool sites are required to have routine 

REMPs in place to detect subsurface contamination, including contamination in groundwater. 

Any detection of contamination would likely result in additional monitoring and subsurface 

characterization. 

,QDGGLWLRQOLFHQVHHVDUHUHTXLUHGE\&)5DWRFRQGXFWVXEVXUIDFHVXUYH\VWR

identify and characterize contamination. As described in Section E.1.2, licensees have 

implemented groundwater monitoring programs in accordance with the industry’s voluntary 

industry-ZLGHLQLWLDWLYH1(,ZKLFKVDWLVILHVWKHLQWHQWRI&)5D3HUIRUPLQJ

onsite groundwater monitoring throughout the short-term timeframe, in conjunction with other 

onsite and offsite radiological monitoring required of licensees, will serve as an important 

mechanism to detect radiological contamination in the event of a spent fuel pool leak, and 

should facilitate timely leak-response actions. Should the hydrogeologic characteristics of the 

site change during the short-term timeframe, licensees would need to update onsite and offsite 

monitoring programs, as necessary, to ensure any potential exposure pathways are being 

appropriately monitored. The NRC’s impact assessment and significance determination with 

respect to soil and groundwater contamination are informed by the lessons learned and 

knowledge gained from historical spent fuel pool and related inadvertent releases. 

Table E-4, in Appendix E of the GEIS, lists suspected and confirmed reactor spent fuel pool 

leaks. It provides a representative baseline for the NRC’s analysis of future impacts from leaks. 

Table E-4 has been updated to include additional leak examples. However, as further detailed 

in Section ' of this appendix, the Brookhaven National Laboratory facility to which the 

comment refers is a DOE-owned High Flux Beam Reactor research facility that was not licensed 

by the NRC and does not store commercial spent fuel. As this is neither a commercial nuclear 

power reactor nor an away-from-reactor ISFSI, its activities are not within the scope of the GEIS 

or Rule and it has not been included in Appendix E as a representative leak example. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table E-LQ$SSHQGL[(of the GEIS, lists the known maximum tritium contamination detected 

onsite and at offsite locations from the identified spent fuel pool leakage events. As noted in 

Section E.3 of the GEIS, none of the identified spent fuel pool leakage events listed in Table E-

are known to have resulted in the contamination of drinking water. The nature and extent of 

leaks at Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Site are further described in Section D.2.40.2 of this 

appendix. 

The NRC also disagrees with the comments regarding the NRC’s conclusions on surface and 

groundwater resources impacts of long-term and indefinite storage at ISFSIs and the 

assumptions made. As noted in Section RIWKH*(,6,6)6,VIXQFWLRQDVSDVVLYH

systems during operations, do not require the consumption of water, and generate minimal 

effluents. For example, during its evaluation of the application to renew the Calvert Cliffs ISFSI 

license the NRC determined that both direct and indirect impacts on water resources would be 

SMALL. This analysis included an evaluation of cask-loading operations and stormwater runoff 

carrying grease, oil, and spills from operating equipment that support the ISFSI. For long-term 

storage, NRC notes that ISFSI operating impacts would be similar to those for short-term 

continued storage. However, the GEIS assumes that ISFSI pads, spent fuel canisters, and 

casks would need to be replaced during the long-term timeframe, and DTS facilities would need 

to be constructed and then replaced at least every 100 years. Appendix B of the GEIS 

describes the design of storage casks and national and international experience that supports 

the assumptions about longevity of dry storage casks. Current information supports low 

degradation rates for dry cask storage systems. No changes were made to the Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

(23------2--2--2--2--2--3) 

-----1) 

D.2.27.4 – COMMENT: A commenter disagreed with a statement in the GEIS that localized 

spills of hazardous substances are relatively easy to remediate, except for substances like 

diesel fuel. The commenter stated that, in New Jersey, groundwater contamination by 

hydrocarbons has typically been the easiest to remediate, while other groundwater 

contaminants have proven more difficult to address. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. The cited sentence in the draft GEIS 

referred to surface spills, not subsurface or groundwater contamination. The text in Section 

RI the GEIS has been revised for clarity as follows: “Except for a few substances (e.g., 

diesel fuel), surface spills of hazardous substances that might lead to groundwater 

contamination are often localized, quickly detected, and relatively easy to remediate (NRC 

2002b)” (NRC 2002a). No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.27.5 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns with the ultimate fate and transport 

of contaminated groundwater. One commenter stated that consideration of surface-water 

impacts from plant discharges should consider migration and uptake of contaminants in biota, 

not just the dilution that occurs in large nearby surface waterbodies. The commenter also 

stated that where surface waterbodies are not large, they would be more vulnerable to the 

effects of drought; that the GEIS acknowledges uncertainties related to rates of leakage from 

spent fuel pools, direction and rate of groundwater flow, and distance to offsite waters and that it 

is not possible to predict future risks with any confidence if all of nature’s pathways are not 

known. Another commenter indicated that it is only a matter of time before offsite migration of 

groundwater contamination occurs and that to dismiss offsite migration is a failure in the 

analysis. The commenter further noted that scientific analysis requires the information for each 

leaked isotope to be plotted into a future timeline based on all known factors that might impact 

the migration. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC’s analyses in the GEIS do 

consider the potential for the migration of contaminants to surface water and groundwater from 

continued storage, including the migration, uptake, and accumulation of radionuclides in biota. 

6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRQVXUIDFH-water quality and 

use and groundwater quality and use, respectively, associated with the continued storage of 

spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. Specific to the potential for surface-water 

quality impacts from spent fuel pool leaks and concerns for dilution potential, the NRC has 

UHYLHZHGDQGUHYLVHGLWVDQDO\VLVZKLFKLVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQDQGGHWDLled in Section 

E.2.2.2. The GEIS concludes that the impact of spent fuel pool leaks on surface water remains 

SMALL. This finding is based on the determination that the radiological impact of a spent fuel 

pool release to offsite receiving waters would be comparable to levels observed with permitted 

cooling and service-water effluent discharges from operating nuclear power plants. The NRC’s 

assessment is based on known reactor operational data on spent fuel pool releases to date. 

See Sections ' and ' of this appendix for additional information on this issue. 

)XUWKHU6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6DGGUHVVWKHLVVXHRIELRORJLFDOXSWDNHRI

radionuclides introduced into the environment. These sections have been expanded to describe 

the NRC’s review process for assessing the impacts related to the exposure of biota to 

radionuclides. As detailed in Section ' of this appendix, licensing reviews performed by 

the NRC have included an analysis of impacts from the operation of spent fuel pools. These 

assessments determined that exposure of aquatic and terrestrial organisms to radionuclides 

near nuclear power plants was sufficiently less than the DOE’s and the IAEA’s guidelines for 

radiation dose rates from environmental sources. As a result, the GEIS concludes that the 

potential impacts from radiological doses to biota would be SMALL during continued storage. 

With respect to contaminant migration and offsite groundwater-quality impacts, spent fuel pool 

leakage cRXOGUHVXOWLQUDGLRORJLFDOLPSDFWVRQJURXQGZDWHUDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQV
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-230 September 2014 

and E.2.2.1 of this GEIS. Section ' of this appendix for further details that a variety of 

factors act to prevent and minimize the effects of a spent fuel pool leak to the environment. 

These include spent fuel pool design (e.g., stainless-steel liners and leakage-collection 

systems) and operational controls (e.g., monitoring and surveillance of spent fuel pool water 

levels) that make it unlikely that leaked spent fuel pool water will migrate to the environment, or 

remain undetected long enough for the leak to adversely affect the offsite groundwater 

receptors. In addition, the hydrologic characteristics of a typical nuclear power plant site (see 

Section E.2.1.3 of the GEIS) act to impede the offsite migration of spent fuel pool leakage. In 

addition, groundwater monitoring programs implemented as part of the Groundwater Protection 

Initiative, in conjunction with other onsite and offsite radiological monitoring required of 

licensees, will serve as an important mechanism to detect radiological contamination in the 

event of a spent fuel pool leak, and will facilitate timely detection of a leak soon enough to 

prevent offsite migration at levels that could exceed Federal and State dose and drinking-water 

requirements. 

The GEIS further addresses the ultimate fate of potential contaminants and consideration of 

environmental pathways. Specifically, as noted in Section 4.3 of the GEIS, with respect to 

environmental justice and consideration for contaminant uptake, all NRC licensees are required 

to assess the impact of facility operations on the environment through a REMP. In short, a 

licensee’s REMP provides a mechanism for determining the levels of radioactivity in the 

environment, as further described in Section ' of this appendix. 

The NRC disagrees that the analysis of spent fuel pool leaks in the GEIS needs to include a 

time-step plot of contamination concentrations. However, the NRC’s analysis of potential 

LPSDFWVRQJURXQGZDWHUDVGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG(LVLQIRUPHGLQSDUWE\

operational data from historical spent fuel pool leaks. The NRC has assumed for the purposes 

of analysis in the GEIS that the potential for spent fuel pool leaks would be limited to the shortterm timeframe. By the end of that timeframe, the NRC assumes that all spent fuel will have 

been moved from spent fuel pools to dry cask storage. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rules as a result of these comments. 

--41) 

D.2.27.6 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that NRC should consider off-normal operating 

FRQGLWLRQVLQLWVDVVHVVPHQWLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKDWGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWTXDOLW\LPSDFWV

to surface waterbodies would be SMALL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC describes the environmental 

impacts of postulated accidents involving the continued storage of spent fuel, including those 

associated with abnormal operating conditions initiated by natural phenomena, in SectLRQ

RIWKH*(,6$VGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQVDIHW\IHDWXUHVLQWKHGHVLJQFRQVWUXFWLRQDQG

operation of nuclear power plants and ISFSIs, which are the first line of defense, are intended to 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-231 185(*௅

prevent the release of radioactive materials. Additional measures are designed to mitigate the 

consequences of failures in the first line of defense. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.27.7 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that leakage from some sites may reach and 

contaminate groundwater more quickly due to unique vulnerabilities in the environment (e.g., 

very high water tables, proximity to streams and lakes, proximity to groundwater, vulnerability to 

flooding, and risks of tsunamis and high waves). In addition, the commenter stated that a good 

scientific analysis would attempt to quantify probability ranges for each type of significant impact 

with differing characteristics, including drinking-water sources for humans and wildlife. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment in part and disagrees in part. The NRC 

agrees that hydrologic conditions at a diversity of sites should inform the analysis in the GEIS. 

The NRC disagrees that its environmental impact analysis, including for groundwater, should 

use probability ranges in describing environmental impacts. NEPA does not require that 

agencies assign probability ranges to environmental impacts in their EISs. CEQ and NRC 

UHJXODWLRQVIRULPSOHPHQWLQJ1(3$&)5GRUHTXLUHWKDWXQFHUWDLQW\EHFRQVLGHUHG

in evaluating the significance of potential environmental impacts. 

The GEIS generically evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage, but the 

environmental impact analyses presented are informed by the wide range of environmental 

conditions at existing reactor sites. This means that, for each of the resource areas analyzed in 

the GEIS, including surface water and groundwater, the NRC has reached a generic 

determination (SMALL, MODERATE, LARGE, or a range) that is appropriate for all sites. The 

assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that 

variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in environmental impact 

determinations greater than those presented in the GEIS. 

In developing the GEIS, the NRC considered characteristics of all existing reactor and ISFSI 

sites, and the NRC considered whether site-specific factors could result in different impact 

levels at different sites. Overall, in several resource areas in the long-term and indefinite 

timeframes, the NRC acknowledges that future site-specific factors could result in varying 

impact levels, and so the NRC assigned a range of impacts to address the uncertainty. The 

presence of uncertainty does not invalidate nor preclude the development of reasonable 

determinations of potential environmental impacts in the GEIS, including for groundwater. 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6SUHVHQWVDVVXPSWLRQVXVHGIRUHYDOXDWLQJHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVWKDW

provided appropriate and reasonable bounds for projecting future conditions and activities 

related to continued storage. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-232 September 2014 

1HYHUWKHOHVVDVGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&FRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHLPSDFWV

on groundwater quality associated with continued storage would be SMALL for all timeframes. 

Specific to spent fuel pool leakage, continued storage could result in radiological impacts on 

JURXQGZDWHUDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG(RIWKH*(,6+RZHYHUWKH15&

believes that it is unlikely that a future leak during the short-term timeframe would remain 

undetected for a significant period of time and impact offsite groundwater receptors, as further 

detailed in 6HFWLRQ'RIWKLVDSSHQGL[

Regarding the impacts that leaks could have on humans and the environment as a whole, all 

NRC licensees are required to assess the impact of facility operations on the environment 

through a REMP, as noted in Section 4.3 of the GEIS. REMPs assess the effects of site 

operations on the environment that could affect special pathway receptors. Special pathways 

take into account the levels of contamination in native vegetation, crops, soils and sediments, 

surface water, fish, and game animals on or near power plant sites to assess the risk of 

radiological exposure through (1) subsistence consumption of fish, native vegetation, surface 

water, sediment, and local produce; (2) the absorption of contaminants in sediments through the 

skin; and (3) the inhalation of airborne particulate matter. REMPs provide a mechanism for 

determining the levels of radioactivity in the environment. REMP implementation allows 

licensees and regulators to ensure that any accumulation of radionuclides released into the 

environment will not become significant. After reactor operations cease at a site, a REMP 

would still be required to consider the potential sources of radiation and radioactivity that may 

be released from a spent fuel pool or at-reactor ISFSIs in accordance with NRC regulations at 

&)5&)5Appendix A, Section VI; and &)5G

Finally, the potential environmental consequences of postulated accidents associated with 

QDWXUDOSKHQRPHQDHJIORRGLQJRUVHYHUHZHDWKHUHYHQWVDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-32) 

D.2.27.8 – COMMENT: In comments on page 4-OLQHVDQG-RIWKHGUDIW*(,6D

commenter stated that the NRC should have considered whether dust or runoff created during 

ISFSI demolition is radiologically contaminated. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6SUHVHQWVWKH

NRC’s analysis of the potential environmental impacts on surface-water quality and use caused 

by the continued storage of spent fuel. These impacts have been assessed for normal 

operations. As described in Section 4.FRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHZRXOGQHFHVVLWDWHWKHGHPROLWLRQ

decontamination, and replacement of storage and support facilities over the long term. In 

addition to the use of water sprays for dust abatement during demolition and replacement facility 

construction, potential environmental impacts from onsite activities would be expected to be 

limited to the infiltration of stormwater runoff carrying grease and oil and spills from operating 

equipment that supports the dry cask storage facility, as discussed in SecWLRQ,QDOO
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-233 185(*௅

FDVHVDQGDVUHIHUHQFHGLQ6HFWLRQDQG$SSHQGL[%RIWKH*(,6DOOIDFLOLW\OLFHQVHHVDUH

UHTXLUHGE\&)5WRFRQGXFWIDFLOLW\RSHUDWLRQVWRPLQLPL]HWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIUHVLGXDO

radioactivity into the site, including the subsurface, in accordance with the NRC’s existing 

radiation protection requirements under 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart B. Licensees are also required 

WRSHUIRUPUDGLRORJLFDOVXUYH\VLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)5D7KHVHUHJXODWLRQVDUH

designed to help safeguard against the inadvertent contamination of environmental media, 

including soils, surface water, and groundwater, by requiring licensees to establish operational 

practices to minimize or eliminate any environmental impacts as part of decommissioning 

planning. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.27.9 – COMMENT: 5HJDUGLQJ6HFWLRQRIWKHGUDIW*(,6DFRPPHQWHUDVNHG15&WR

explain why consumptive water losses are higher at sites using mechanical draft cooling towers 

than at sites using once-through cooling systems. 

RESPONSE: For the purposes of characterizing a generic single-unit nuclear power plant site, 

where continued storage will occur in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs, Section 2.1.1.1 of 

the GEIS generally describes cooling towers and their use at operating nuclear power plants. 

The NRC offers the following additional information for the commenter’s information. 

There are two major types of cooling systems for operating nuclear power plants: once-through 

cooling and closed-cycle cooling. In a once-through cooling system, circulating water for 

condenser cooling is obtained from a nearby source of water (e.g., a lake or river) passed 

through the plant’s condenser system, and returned at a higher temperature to the same 

waterbody. The waste heat is dissipated to the atmosphere mainly by evaporation from the 

receiving waterbody itself; little water is directly consumed or lost in the process. In a closedcycle system, cooling water is recirculated through the condenser after the waste heat is 

removed by dissipation to the atmosphere typically by circulating the water through cooling 

towers. Recirculating cooling systems consist of natural draft or mechanical draft cooling 

towers, cooling ponds, lakes, reservoirs, or canals, or some combination. As the predominant 

means of cooling in closed-cycle systems is evaporation, much of the water withdrawn from a 

surface water source for cooling is consumed (lost to the atmosphere primarily due to 

evaporation) and is not returned to the water source. Simply put, for once-through cooling 

systems, the consumption rate is much less than for closed-cycle cooling systems because 

water is returned directly to the surface waterbody and undergoes less evaporation than in a 

cooling tower. However, the withdrawal rate from a surface waterbody for once-through cooling 

systems is much greater. Several nuclear plants also use a combination of once-through and 

closed-cycle cooling elements that may be used in different configurations, especially on a 

seasonal basis. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--4) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-234 September 2014 

D.2.27.10 – COMMENT: Several commenters raised issues with the analysis in the GEIS of 

cumulative impacts to groundwatHU2QHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

which addresses Cumulative Impacts to Groundwater Quality and Use, violates NEPA by failing 

to mention or integrate information about existing groundwater contamination at 42 sites that 

have had significant leaks or spills involving tritium. The commenter also asserted that the 

analysis fails to assess the combined impacts of future spent fuel pool leaks and leaks of 

radioactive water from other plant systems that may increase the levels of groundwater 

contamination at reactor sites around the country. Another commenter noted that although the 

NRC states that there is likely little or no hydraulic connection between shallow aquifers and 

deeper regional groundwater flow systems due to impermeable shales or massive unjointed 

carbonate strata, the NRC has not addressed the interplay between fracking and the new risks 

to irradiated nuclear fuel storage this activity represents. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the cumulative impacts analysis for 

groundwater is flawed and otherwise fails to address site-specific aspects of past leaks at 

operating nuclear power plants. 

The NRC’VJHQHULFFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVDQDO\VLVIRUJURXQGZDWHUDVSUHVHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQ

of the GEIS includes the incremental impact of the continued storage of spent fuel at existing 

reactor sites when added to the impacts stemming from other past, present, and reasonably 

foreseeable future actions at existing reactor sites, in accordance with NEPA and with CEQ and 

NRC UHJXODWLRQV&)53DUWHWVHT. aQG&)53DUWUHVSHFWLYHO\ZKLFK

implement NEPA. Integral to the cumulative impacts analysis presented in 6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS for groundwater TXDOLW\DQGXVHLVWKHDQDO\VLVSUHVHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWhe GEIS, 

which evaluates the potential impacts on groundwater use and quality of continued storage of 

spent fuel in pools and at-UHDFWRU,6)6,V6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VWDWHVWKDWthe NRC’s 

DQDO\VLVSUHVHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHLPSDFWVRn groundwater quality associated 

with continued storage of spent fuel in fuel pools during the short-term timeframe and in atUHDFWRU,6)6,VRYHUDOOWLPHIUDPHVZRXOGEH60$//6HFWLRQGLVFXVVHVKLVWRULFVSHQW

fuel pool leaks to groundwater, with Appendix E cited for more detailed information. For 

example, Table E-LQ$SSHQGL[(OLVWVWKHPD[LPXPWULWLXPFRQWDPLQDWLRQGHWHFWHGRQVLWHDQG

at offsite locations from identified spent fuel pool leak events. This information is considered 

and used in the cumulative impacts analysis for groundwater presented in the GEIS. 

)XUWKHUDVVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGEDVHGLQSDUWRQWKH/LFHQVH5HQHZDO

GEIS (NRC 2013m), the NRC’s generic analysis and cumulative impacts conclusion considers 

groundwater-quality degradation that has occurred beneath individual nuclear power plant sites 

due to spills and leaks from spent fuel pools and other inadvertent releases. The License 

Renewal GEIS generically evaluates the environmental impacts of continued operations of 

nuclear power plants across the United States. The License Renewal GEIS incorporates 

information gained from previous site-specific operating reactor license renewal environmental 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

UHYLHZVSHUIRUPHGE\WKH15&6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6Dlso references several sitespecific environmental reviews performed by the NRC and considered in assessing other trends 

and site activities bearing on cumulative impacts on the quality and quantity of groundwater. 

These include the site-specific supplements to the License Renewal GEIS prepared for the 

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Crystal River Unit 3, and Columbia Generating Station. 

The NRC also disagrees with the comments that the GEIS needs to address hydraulic fracturing 

(fracking) with respect to contLQXHGVWRUDJH6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6EURDGO\FKDUDFWHUL]HVWKH

groundwater systems at existing nuclear power plant sites with respect to continued storage in 

spent fuel pools and ISFSIs. Nothing in the comments regarding fracking challenges the NRC’s 

gHQHULFFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIWKHJURXQGZDWHUV\VWHPVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQ

Activities associated with drilling and hydraulic fracturing are not regulated by the NRC and are 

outside the scope of this GEIS. The underground injection of the wastewater produced as a 

byproduct of the hydraulic fracturing process is regulated by the EPA via Underground Injection 

Control regulations. The discharge of wastewater to surface water is regulated under the 

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit regulations pursuant to the 

Clean Water Act. These regulations, along with permitting of hydraulic fracturing operations, 

are generally administered by the States. 

Regardless, the safe operation of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools and at-reactor 

ISFSIs is dealt with on an ongoing basis as a part of the current licenses. As described in 

Section B.3.3.4 of the GEIS, safety issues and concerns are addressed by the NRC on an 

ongoing basis at every nuclear power plant and ISFSI. The NRC will continue its regulatory 

control and oversight of spent fuel storage at both operating and decommissioned reactor sites. 

If the NRC were to find noncompliance with or otherwise identify a concern with the safe storage 

of the spent fuel, the NRC would evaluate the issue and take whatever action or change in its 

regulatory program necessary to protect the public health and safety. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.27.11 – COMMENT: A commenter stated tKDW15&¶VVWDWHPHQWVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS paint an overly optimistic picture of licensee responses to hazardous material spills, rather 

than a conservative, protective, precautionary approach to risks. The commenter pointed to 

spills at Braidwood and Fermi 1 as reasons to doubt the NRC’s optimism. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The cited text in the GEIS refers 

specifically to surface spills, not subsurface or groundwater contamination. The text in Section 

RI the GEIS has been revised for clarity as follows: “Except for a few substances (e.g., 

diesel fuel), surface spills of hazardous substances that might lead to groundwater 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

contamination are often localized, quickly detected, and relatively easy to remediate (NRC 

2002b)” (NRC 2002a). 

In the GEIS, the NRC has based its assessment and impacts determinations on the lessons 

learned and knowledge gained from previous releases and their associated impacts, as well as 

the regulatory environment that is in place. The NRC has no statutory or regulatory authority 

over matters that fall under the Clean Water Act, including the NPDES permit program; Safe 

Drinking Water Act; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as may be delegated to 

the states. The NRC properly defers to the EPA or delegated State agencies for the regulation 

RIQRQUDGLRORJLFDOKD]DUGRXVVXEVWDQFHVDVUHIHUHQFHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

Regardless, every NRC licensee must comply with all health, safety, and environmental 

requirements contained within its license as well as with all other Federal, State, and local 

requirements for continued operation. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

--13) 

D.2.27.12 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS should take into account that 

decisions about water intake and outflow to surface waters is a matter for States under the 

NPDES. The commenter stated that States can curtail reactor operations or grant permit 

exemptions for thermal discharge into State waters during severe drought. These decisions can 

affect river temperatures, chemical and biological activity, evaporation rates, recharge, and 

other factors that could impact the amount of dilution available for radiological discharges. 

Another commenter suggested several VSHFLILFFKDQJHVWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6LQSDUWLFXODU

the discussion on the NPDES. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that it has no statutory or regulatory authority over discharge permits under the Clean 

Water Act. The NRC reviews an operating nuclear power plant’s NPDES permit as part of its 

review of an application for license renewal; however, such reviews are limited to an evaluation 

of the potential environmental impacts of license renewal for the purposes of NEPA. In addition, 

the NRC conducts environmental reviews for initial licenses, license renewal, and proposed 

license amendments for operating nuclear power plants. In all cases, licensees must comply 

with all applicable laws and regulations, including the Clean Water Act requirement to obtain an 

NPDES permit prior to discharging effluents offsite. For example, some of these environmental 

reviews occur when a licensee proposes a significant change in the types or significant increase 

in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. These proposals separately 

require review and possible modification of the plant’s NPDES permit by the permit-issuing 

authority, including review of possible health effects. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

As relevant here, the GEIS generically evaluates the environmental impacts of continued 

storage, but the environmental impact analyses presented are informed by the wide range of 

HQYLURQPHQWDOFRQGLWLRQVDWH[LVWLQJUHDFWRUVLWHV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FKDUDFWHUL]HVWKH

surface-water systems and governing regulatory environment at existing nuclear power plant 

sites as may be relevant to the continued onsite storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and atUHDFWRU,6)6,V6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6SUHVHQWV15&’s analysis of the potential environmental 

impacts on surface-water quality and use caused by the continued onsite storage of spent fuel, 

which has been revised for clarity in the GEIS. 

$VQRWHGLQ6HFWLRQRQFHUHDFWRURSHUDWLRQVKDYHFHDVHGFRROLQJ-water demand for 

continued onsite storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs would be 

significantly reduced, so surface-water withdrawals for cooling would not substantially contribute 

to any reductions in the dilution potential of offsite receiving surface waters. Thus, even 

assuming a continuous and unabated spent fuel pool leak, the GEIS analysis of a leak on 

receiving water quality sufficiently bounds the variability in surface-water flow at storage sites 

and limits that a state may impose on surface-water withdrawals and effluent discharge. The 

NRC’s assessment is based on known reactor operational data on spent fuel pool releases to 

GDWH$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQDQGGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQ(ZKLFKKDYHEHHQUHYLVHG

in the final GEIS, the NRC concludes that the resulting radiological impact of any spent fuel pool 

leak release to offsite receiving waters would be comparable to levels observed with permitted 

cooling and service-water effluent discharges from operating nuclear power plants. No changes 

were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-13) 

D.2.27.13 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that storage should not occur at sites where 

known natural resources may negatively affect the ability of the disposal site to meet the 

performance objectives. The commenter further noted that a prospective site must be welldrained and free of flooding or frequent ponding and that the disposal site should be located far 

enough above the water table to prevent groundwater intrusion. The commenter expressed 

particular concerns for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant and Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 

VLWHVZKLFKGUDLQWR/DNH(ULH7KHFRPPHQWHUUHIHUUHGWRDRFFXUUHQFHUHSRUWFODLPLQJLW

describes radioactive contamination in a stream near the Perry Nuclear Power Plant site that 

went undetected for three years. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS evaluates the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel on a generic basis; the environmental impact 

analyses in the GEIS are informed by the wide range of environmental conditions at existing 

reactor VLWHV6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRIFRQWLQXHG

storage on surface-water quality and use and groundwater quality and use, respectively. The 

potential environmental consequences of postulated accidents associated with natural 

SKHQRPHQDHJIORRGLQJDUHGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Further, the analysis in the GEIS applies to future NRC licensing actions. Future licensing 

actions will consider recent developments in science and engineering as part of the license 

application review process. As described further below, for existing facilities that are not the 

subject of an ongoing relicensing review, the NRC has a separate process that allows it to 

consider the development of new knowledge in various disciplines, including surface water and 

groundwater hydrology. In addition, as part of an initial site-specific licensing or relicensing 

action, the NRC considers site-specific hydrologic conditions for each nuclear power plant and 

associated ISFSI. This is the case for the ongoing license renewal environmental review for the 

Davis-%HVVH1XFOHDU3RZHU6WDWLRQDVGRFXPHQWHGLQ6XSSOHPHQWWRWKH/LFHQVH5HQHZDO

GEIS, issued in February 2014 (NRC 2014c). 

The issues raised by the comment are addressed by license applicants and the NRC at the 

initial licensing stage. All currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants were sited using 

geologic and seismic criteria set forth in 10 CFR Part 100; these facilities were designed and 

constructed in accordance with 10 C)53DUW7KHUHJXODWLRQVUHTXLUHWKDWSODQWVWUXFWXUHV

systems, and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural 

phenomena, including flooding, without loss of capability to perform safety functions. Sitespecific design bases for flood protection are prescribed by a nuclear power plant’s Final Safety 

Analysis Report or Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and by applicable technical 

VSHFLILFDWLRQV)XUWKHUQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVOLFHQVHGDIWHU-DQXDU\DUHVubject to the 

more rigorous geologic and hydrologic site-acceptability and design criteria established in 10 

&)5DQGDQG&)53DUW$SSHQGL[6

As referenced above, the NRC has a process in place to address the changing state of 

knowledge in various scientific disciplines. When new information about natural phenomena 

that could affect the safety of operating nuclear power plants becomes available (e.g., 

information related to seismic or flooding hazards), the NRC evaluates the new information, 

through the appropriate regulatory program (e.g., the reactor oversight process or program) to 

determine if any changes are needed at these plants. The NRC does not wait until a specific 

rulemaking action or specific licensing action is under consideration. For example, the NRC 

took regulatory action after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

nuclear power plant. As described in Section 2.1.2.1 of the GEIS, the NRC issued multiple 

orders and a request for information to all of its nuclear power plant licensees on March 12, 

2012. These orders included a formal request to all licensees for information to assist the NRC 

in reevaluating seismic as well as flooding hazards at operating reactor sites. This process is 

ongoing and the NRC will use the information collected to determine whether to update the 

design basis and systems, structures, and components important to safety, including spent fuel 

SRROV6HFWLRQDQG$SSHQGL[)RIWKH*(,6SURYLGHIXUWKHUGHWDLOVUHJDUding the NRC’s 

orders and requests for information in response to the Fukushima events. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

In addition, as part of the aforementioned reactor oversight process, the NRC conducts 

individual plant inspections to ensure each nuclear power plant complies with NRC regulations 

on radioactive discharges (routine and inadvertent) and is appropriately monitoring the 

environment for radioactivity. The inspection looks at the potential impacts from radioactive 

effluent releases to ensure those releases are within the dose limits to members of the public 

and that radioactive material from the plant is not building up in the environment beyond what 

was evaluated at the time the plant was originally licensed. The inspection also reviews each 

plant’s groundwater protection program to ensure it is effectively monitoring the groundwater 

that would most likely receive any radioactive liquid from a leaking pipe or component. It is 

through the inspection process that the NRC ensures continuous protection of the public from 

radioactive effluents. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

---

D.2.27.14 – COMMENT: A commenter disagreed with the assessment in the GEIS that the 

impacts of continued storage on groundwater use and quality would be SMALL and stated that it 

is not possible to assess the impacts on groundwater during continued storage without using 

any up-to-date data along with current geologic interpretations of the local geology and 

groundwater evaluations. As an example, the commenter asserted that groundwater usage 

around the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has vastly increased over time, which has 

contributed to a change in the flow of groundwater in New Jersey. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The analysis in the GEIS applies to future 

NRC licensing actions. Future licensing actions will consider recent developments in science 

and engineering as part of the license application review process. For existing facilities that are 

not the subject of an ongoing relicensing review, the NRC has a separate process that allows it 

to consider the development of new knowledge in various disciplines, including geology, 

hydrogeology, and water use. For the GEIS, the NRC based its analysis on a reasoned and 

accurate review of currently available information, consistent with the requirements of NEPA. 

The NRC response to comments regarding the need to consider changes in groundwater usage 

near nuclear power plants in New Jersey, including Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, is 

included in Section D.2.40.10 of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.27.15 – COMMENT: One commenter noted that changes in geologic interpretations affect 

how a groundwater system may be interpreted and that modern geologic mapping completed 

VLQFHWKHVFDQSURGXFHDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVXEVXUIDFHWKDQHDUOLHUJHRORJLFDQG

groundwater reports, including hydraulic communication between shallow and deeper 

groundwater units. The commenter noted that modern demographics and groundwater use 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-240 September 2014 

should be considered when assessing the impacts to offsite public wells. The commenter 

described the unexpected discovery of tritium in deep aquifers at the Oyster Creek Nuclear 

Generating Station and the Salem Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey as examples of how 

early geology and groundwater reports did not reflect either the actual groundwater flow 

systems at these plants or the potential for changing demographics (i.e., higher populations and 

increased groundwater use). The commenter also indicated that, although it would not alter the 

ultimate conclusions of the GEIS with regard to impact determinations, the NRC should describe 

how nuclear power plant construction and operation can create downward pathways through 

confining layers to deeper aquifers. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS generically evaluates the 

environmental impacts of continued storage, but the environmental impact analyses presented 

are informed by the wide range of environmental conditions and operating experience at 

H[LVWLQJUHDFWRUVLWHV6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFts on 

surface-water quality and use and groundwater quality and use, respectively, associated with 

the continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. 

Continued storage in spent fuel pools could result in radiological impacts on groundwater as 

GHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG(RIWKH*(,6+RZHYHUWKH15&EHOLHYHVWKDWLWLV

unlikely that a future leak during the short-term timeframe would remain undetected for a 

significant period of time and impact offsite groundwater receptors. Several factors inform this 

assessment, as summarized in 6HFWLRQDQGDVIXUWKHUGHWDLOHGLQ6HFWLRQ'RI

this appendix. 

The NRC is not reconsidering prior licensing decisions as part of this rulemaking. The analysis 

in the GEIS applies to future NRC licensing actions. Future licensing actions will consider 

recent developments in science and engineering as part of the license application review 

process. 

As part of an initial site-specific licensing or relicensing action, the NRC considers site-specific 

hydrologic conditions for each nuclear power plant and associated ISFSI. In the NRC’s review 

of an application for license renewal, although the NRC’s review is narrower than for the initial 

license, the NRC completes a review of all the potential environmental impacts of license 

renewal. For example, the NRC completed its license renewal environmental review for Oyster 

&UHHN1XFOHDU*HQHUDWLQJ6WDWLRQDQGSXEOLVKHGWKHUHVXOWVLQ6XSSOHPHQWWRWKH/LFHQVH

Renewal GEIS, issued LQ-DQXDU\15&c). Likewise, the results of the NRC’s 

environmental review for license renewal of Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2, 

ZHUHSXEOLVKHGLQ6XSSOHPHQWWRWKH/LFHQVH5HQHZDO*(,6LVVXHGLQ0DUFK15&

2011e). The conclusions reached in previous licensing actions are not being revisited in this 

GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-241 185(*௅

D.2.27.16 – COMMENT: Commenters stated concerns about the amount of water being used 

to cool nuclear reactors. One commenter noted that reactors need to be shut down during 

periods of heavy drought. Another commenter stated that the GEIS does not address water 

consumption issues. The commenter provided several examples of plants or events in which 

water consumption issues were involved, including the stress placed on the Catawba River by 

the Catawba Nuclear Station and McGuire Nuclear Station, the October 24, 2012 shutdown of 

Unit 3 at the Oconee Nuclear Station, and the proposed William States Lee III Nuclear Station 

on the Broad River. One commenter noted that the GEIS did not address the impacts related to 

the temperature of water being discharged from reactor sites, the cooling of reactors, or water 

usage and noted that at 'RPLQLRQ¶V1RUWK$QQD3RZHU6WDWLRQWKHVLWH¶VRXWIORZLV)

hotter than its inflow. A commenter expressed the view that the GEIS should address water-use 

impacts resulting from reactor need for water. The commenter expressed specific concerns 

regarding the large amounts of water used in once-through cooling systems at California plants, 

and the scarcity of water in many parts of the United States. The commenter also noted the 

negative effect of climate change on river and lake levels needed to cool reactors. One 

commenter stated that the NRC had appropriately determined that the impacts on surface-water 

consumption use from continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools will not be detectable 

or will be so minor that they would not be destabilizing. The commenter noted that water usage 

data from the recently shut down Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3 showed water usage related 

to cooling in the spent fuel pool was 2,000 gpm or 0.3 percent of the total water usage during 

UHDFWRURSHUDWLRQVJSP

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

disagrees with the comments that the GEIS should address reactor cooling at operating nuclear 

power plants. The NRC agrees with the comment stating that the impacts on surface-water 

consumptive use from the continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools will not be 

detectible or be so minor that they would not be destabilizing. 

The GEIS generically evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage, not reactor 

operation, but the environmental impact analyses are informed by the wide range of 

HQYLURQPHQWDOFRQGLWLRQVDWH[LVWLQJUHDFWRUVLWHV6SHFLILFDOO\6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHV

the potential environmental impacts on surface-water quality and use caused by the continued 

RQVLWHVWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHO$VVSHFLILFDOO\QRWHGLQ6HFWLRQFRROLQJ-water demand would 

be significantly reduced after reactor operations have ceased, resulting in undetectable or very 

minor impacts on surface-water consumptive use from the continued storage of spent fuel in 

SRROV6SHQWIXHOVWRUDJHLQ,6)6,VDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GRHVQRWUHTXLUH

the consumption of water as ISFSIs are passive, air-cooled storage systems. 

Topics related to water use, cooling-water temperatures, and drought conditions during an 

operating reactor’s licensed life are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. For initial licensing 

of nuclear power plants, the NRC evaluates the potential impacts of facility construction, 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-242 September 2014 

operation, and shutdown on surface water and groundwater use and quality in its environmental 

UHYLHZV$VQRWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&KDVJHQHULFDOO\HYDOXDWHGWKH

environmental impacts of continued operations of nuclear power plants in the License Renewal 

GEIS (NRC 2013m). In addition, as part of license renewal environmental reviews, changes in 

plant operating parameters or new and significant information pertinent to an evaluation of 

impacts are considered during preparation of plant-specific supplements to the License 

Renewal GEIS. Further, major changes in cooling-water system operations (e.g., those 

affecting a particular plant’s licensing basis and triggering a license amendment) would require 

a separate environmental review. Similarly, changes in the thermal or chemical quality of 

effluents discharged to surface waters from operating nuclear power plants would separately 

require review and possible modification of a plant’s NPDES permit by the permit-issuing 

authority, including review of possible environmental and health effects. 

The NRC disagrees with the comments regarding the safe operations of nuclear power plants 

as bearing on cooling-water supplies. The scope of the GEIS and Rule is limited to the impacts 

of continued storage. As such, the regulatory safety oversight of operating reactors is outside 

the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Nevertheless, the safe operation of nuclear power plants is 

dealt with on an ongoing basis as a part of the current operating licenses. Safety inspections 

are, and will be, conducted throughout the operating life of the plant, whether during the original 

or renewed operating license term. If safety issues are discovered at a nuclear power plant, 

they are addressed immediately, and any necessary changes are incorporated into the current 

operating license. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-21----------

D.2.27.17 – COMMENT: A State commented that the NR&¶VDVVHVVPHQWLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS does not take into account site-specific groundwater impacts. The State cited the 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and noted that, upon the plant shutting down to be 

decommissioned, groundwater pumping will stop and the local groundwater-to-surface-water 

flow system will change so that groundwater will flow toward pumping centers outside the plant 

boundary. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC used 

site-specific groundwater factors to inform the generic analysis in the GEIS. As part of this 

generic analysis, the NRC evaluated a range of site-specific characteristics as part of the 

impacts analysis for each resource area considered. As specifically described in Section 

RIWKH*(,6WKH15&’s analysis clearly acknowledges that cumulative impacts on 

groundwater at storage sites could occur from offsite groundwater demands, groundwater 

quality degradation, changes in land surface, and climate change leading to changes in 

groundwater flow rates and reversal in groundwater flow directions at or near the storage site. 

The NRC disagrees that cumulative impacts cannot be determined generically. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-243 185(*௅

The NRC has determined in the GEIS that the direct and indirect environmental impacts of 

continued storage at reactors can be analyzed generically. This means that, for each of the 

resource areas analyzed in the GEIS, the NRC has reached a generic determination (SMALL, 

MODERATE, LARGE, or a range) that is appropriate for all sites. These impact determinations 

are expected to bound the impact determinations that would result from the consideration of 

continued storage in site-specific NEPA reviews. The GEIS evaluates the environmental 

impacts of continued storage, but the environmental impact analyses are informed by the wide 

range of environmental conditions at existing reactor sites. 

6SHFLILFDOO\6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRQJURXQGZDWHUTXDOLW\DQG

use associated with the continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor 

ISFSIs. The conclusions of these impact analyses on groundwater were incorporated, by 

UHIHUHQFHLQWRWKH&KDSWHUFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWDQDO\VHVDVSUHVHQWHGLQWKH*(,6

The analyses presented in ChDSWHUDVLQWKHUHVWRIWKH*(,6SURYLGHDJHQHULFDQDO\VLVWKDW

will be used to support NRC’s decisions regarding requests to license or relicense a reactor site 

or site-specific ISFSI. The analysis in the GEIS applies to future NRC licensing actions. Future 

licensing actions will also consider recent developments in science and engineering as part of 

the license application review process. For existing facilities that are not the subject of an 

ongoing relicensing review, the NRC has a separate process that allows it to consider the 

development of new knowledge in various disciplines, including surface-water and groundwater 

hydrology. In addition, as part of an initial site-specific licensing or relicensing action, the NRC 

considers site-specific information, including hydrologic conditions, for each nuclear power plant 

and associated ISFSI. The NRC reviews groundwater use and quality conditions of an 

operating nuclear power plant as part of its review of an application for license renewal; 

however, this review is limited to an evaluation of the potential environmental impacts of license 

renewal. For example, the NRC completed its license renewal environmental review for Oyster 

Creek Nuclear Generating Station and published the results in Supplement WRWKH/LFHQVH

5HQHZDO*(,6LVVXHGLQ-DQXDU\15&c). The conclusions reached in previous 

licensing actions are not being revisited in the GEIS, and the comment did not provide any 

additional information that would cause the NRC to reconsider these site-specific licensing 

actions. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.27.18 – COMMENT: A commenter asserted that New York State Department of 

Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations require that groundwater beneath the Indian 

Point Energy Center be suitable for potable water supply and further “...must not be impaired for 

use as drinking, culinary, or food processing water, notwithstanding whether the groundwater is 

actually used for such purposes.” 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-244 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part with the comment and disagrees in part. In accordance 

ZLWK1HZ<RUN6WDWH'(&UHJXODWLRQVFRGLILHGXQGHU7LWOH1HZ<RUN&RGHV5XOHVDQG

5HJXODWLRQV3DUWV“Classifications-Surface Waters and Groundwater” DQG“Surface 

Water and Groundwater Quality Standards and Groundwater Effluent Limitations,” all fresh 

groundwater in the State is designated as Class GA with a desired best use as a source of 

SRWDEOHZDWHUVXSSO\7KH15&QRWHVWKDW3DUWRI'(&’s regulations set forth a narrative 

standard that groundwaters not be impaired for their best usages. The NRC also notes that the 

DEC has established numeric criteria for radioactivity (i.e., gross alpha and gross beta emitters) 

consistent with the health-based Maximum Contaminant Levels and derived concentrations for 

annual dose equivalent under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Every NRC-licensed nuclear power 

plant must comply with all health, safety, and environmental requirements contained within its 

license as well as with all other Federal, State, and local requirements for continued operation. 

Those requirements are subject to enforcement by the relevant agencies. However, the NRC 

does not have the statutory or regulatory authority to enforce compliance with the Federal Safe 

Drinking Water Act or Clean Water Act, or State-delegated programs with respect to the setting 

of surface-water quality or groundwater-quality standards. However, the NRC offers the 

following additional information to explain the NRC’s regulations and oversight for radiological 

groundwater issues. 

The NRC provides continuous oversight of nuclear power plants through its reactor oversight 

process to verify that they are being operated in accordance with NRC regulations. This 

oversight includes having full-time NRC inspectors performing periodic safety inspections. The 

inspections look at the potential impacts from radioactive effluent releases to ensure those 

releases are within the dose limits to members of the public and that radioactive material from 

the plant is not building up in the environment beyond what was evaluated at the time the plant 

was originally licensed. It is through the inspection process that the NRC ensures continuous 

protection of the public from radioactive effluents. In addition, the NRC reviews groundwater 

use and quality conditions of an operating nuclear power plant as part of its review of an 

application for license renewal. For example, the NRC performed its license renewal 

environmental review for Indian Point Units DQGDQGSXEOLVKHGWKHUHVXOWVLQ6XSSOHPHQW

to the License Renewal GEIS, issued in December 2010 (NRC 2010b). Most recently, the NRC 

SXEOLVKHGDVXSSOHPHQWDOUHSRUWDV9ROXPHWR6XSSOHPHQWLQ-XQH15&p). 

The conclusions reached in previous licensing reviews are not being revisited in the GEIS, and 

the comment did not provide any additional information that would cause the NRC to reconsider 

these site-specific findings. At this time, the license renewal review for Indian Point Units 2 and 

3 is ongoing. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.27.19 – COMMENT: $FRPPHQWHUVXJJHVWHGVHYHUDOVSHFLILFFKDQJHVWR6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS, in particular the discussion on the NPDES. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees ZLWKWKHFRPPHQW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6ZDVUHYLVHGWR

incorporate the suggested text changes. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-12) 

D.2.27.20 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the permit issued under the NPDES for 

the PilgrLP1XFOHDU*HQHUDWLQJ6WDWLRQLV\HDUVRXWRIGDWHZKHUHDV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

VWDWHVWKDW13'(6SHUPLWWHUPVPD\QRWH[FHHG\HDUV7KHFRPPHQWHUIXUWKHUQRWHVWKDWWKH

GEIS does not address how Clean Water Act regulations are applied throughout the country at 

other nuclear facilities and that there does not appear to be adequate information on water 

usage following cessation of reactor operations that would allow for the conclusion in the GEIS 

that the impacts on surface-water resources are SMALL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Topics specifically related to NPDES 

permit administration and compliance during an operating reactor’s licensed life are outside the 

scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC has no statutory or regulatory authority over matters 

concerning discharge permits or compliance with the Clean Water Act. However, the NRC 

offers the following additional information. 

The GEIS evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel on a generic 

basis. SHFWLRQRIWKH*(,6EURDGO\FKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHVXUIDFH-water systems and governing 

regulatory environment at existing nuclear power plant sites as may be relevant to the continued 

onsite storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. The NRC reviews an 

operating nuclear power plant’s NPDES permit as part of its review of an application for license 

renewal; however, this review is limited to an evaluation of the potential environmental impacts 

of license renewal for the purposes of NEPA. The NRC completed its license renewal 

environmental review for Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station and published the results in 

6XSSOHPHQWWRWKH/LFHQVH5HQHZDO*(,6LVVXHGLQ-XO\15&d). 

Section 402 of the Clean Water Act establishes the NPDES permit program that controls water 

pollution by regulating the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States, including 

cooling-water discharge from electricity-JHQHUDWLQJSODQWV6HFWLRQERIWKH&OHDQ:DWHU

Act requires that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling-water intake 

structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing impingement and entrainment of 

aquatic organisms and is also regulated under the NPDES program. NPDES permit terms may 

not H[FHHG\HDUVDQGWKHSHUPLWKROGHUPXVWUHDSSO\DWOHDVWGD\VSULRUWRWKHSHUPLW

expiration date. Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station’V13'(6SHUPLWH[SLUHG$SULO

However, Entergy as the NPDES permit holder and operator of Pilgrim Nuclear Generating 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Station, submitted its initial NPDES permit renewal application to the EPA, Region 1 on October 

%HFDXVH(QWHUJ\VXEPLWWHGDWLPHO\DSSOLFDWLRQIRUUHQHZDORI3LOJULP1XFOHDU

Generating Station’V13'(6SHUPLWWKHSHUPLWUHPDLQs valid and in effect until the EPA 

issues a new or modified NPDES permit, or decides not to do so. A valid NPDES permit is 

considered to be one that is either current (i.e., within its current effective date) or one that has 

expired but has been “administratively continued” by the permitting authority upon the timely 

VXEPLVVLRQRIDQDSSOLFDQWIRUUHQHZDOSXUVXDQWWRWKHSURYLVLRQVRI&)5)XUWKHU

Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station’VSHUPLWUHPDLQVHQIRUFHDEOHE\WKH(3$DQGWKH

Commonwealth of Massachusetts with respect to their shared authority for administering the 

NPDES permit program in Massachusetts. 

The NRC has adequately supported the generic impact conclusion in the GEIS with respect to 

water use associated with the continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor 

,6)6,V6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKHSRWHQWLDOHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRQVXUIDFH-water 

quality and use caused by the continued onsite storage of spent fuel. As specifically noted in 

6HFWLRQ1.1 of the GEIS, cooling-water demand would be significantly reduced after reactor 

operations have ceased and resulting in undetectable or very minor impacts on surface-water 

consumptive use from the continued storage of spent fuel in pools. Spent fuel storage in ISFSIs, 

DVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GRHVQRWUHTXLUHWKHFRQVXPSWLRQRIZDWHUDV

ISFSIs are passive, air-FRROHGVWRUDJHV\VWHPV7KH15&FRQFOXGHVLQSDUWLQ6HFWLRQ

of the GEIS that because short-term storage of spent fuel would use less surface water and have 

fewer activities that could affect surface-water quality than an operating reactor, which was 

previously determined to have a SMALL impact, the impacts on surface-water quality and 

consumptive use during the short-term timeframe would each be SMALL. For long-term storage, 

the NRC also concludes that the potential consumptive-use impacts from continued ISFSI 

operations would be minimal, as projected activities involving replacement facility construction 

and operation would involve amounts of water that are a small fraction of water use during 

reactor operations. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--2-

D.2.27.21 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the Columbia River must be safeguarded 

from contamination and that existing contamination in the Columbia River and all rivers with 

nuclear sites must be cleaned up. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. The NRC agrees that public waterways like 

the Columbia River should be protected from radiological contamination. The potential for 

radiological contamination was considered in the GEIS, which evaluates the environmental 

impacts of continued storage. Topics related to the remediation of any contamination at existing 

sites during an operating reactor’s licensed life are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

However, as noted in Section 4.3 of the GEIS with respect to environmental contamination, all 

NRC licensees are required to assess the impacts of facility operations on the environment 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

through a REMP. REMPs assess the effects of site operations on the environment that could 

affect special pathway receptors. Special pathways take into account the levels of 

contamination in native vegetation, crops, soils and sediments, surface water, fish, and game 

animals on or near power plant sites to assess the risk of radiological exposure through (1) 

subsistence consumption of fish, native vegetation, surface water, sediment, and local produce; 

(2) the absorption of contaminants in sediments through the skin; and (3) the inhalation of 

airborne particulate matter. REMPs provide a mechanism for determining the levels of 

radioactivity in the environment. REMP implementation allows licensees and regulators to 

ensure that any accumulation of radionuclides released into the environment will not become 

significant. After reactor operations cease at a site, a REMP would still be required to consider 

the potential sources of radiation and radioactivity that may be released from a spent fuel pool 

or at-UHDFWRU,6)6,VLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK15&UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5&)5

Appendix A, Section VI; and 1&)5G1RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU5XOHDV

a result of this comment. 

-1) 

D.2.28 Comments Concerning Ecology 

D.2.28.1 – COMMENT: Seven commenters expressed concerns about the potential effects 

from the exposure of aquatic and terrestrial organisms to radionuclides. One commenter 

referred to tests that found detectable amounts of strontium-LQILVKLQWKH+XGVRQ5LYHUQHDU

a power plant. Another commenter stated that, with respect to migration of spent fuel pool leaks 

to surface waters, the focus on meeting EPA safe drinking-water standards ignored potential 

impacts to aquatic ecology. This commenter asserted that the assessment of potential leaks to 

surface waters must consider factors that may lead to radioactive material bioaccumulation in 

the aquatic environment. The commenter also stated that the NRC’s restricted consideration of 

impacts to surface waters, which contains no meaningful analysis of how spent fuel pool leaks 

may impact aquatic habitats and organisms, is precisely what the Court of Appeals in New York 

v. NRC deemed insufficient. Another commenter stated that the NRC must analyze the impacts 

of radioactive wastes over time on other important aquatic species including cephalopods, 

marine mammals, sea turtles, and reptiles. Four commenters expressed concerns about risks 

to wildlife, plants, and other biota due to prolonged exposure at and near continued storage 

facilities. One commenter also indicated potential loss of institutional controls could worsen the 

risk. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with these comments in part and disagrees with these 

FRPPHQWVLQSDUW$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGLQWKH*(,6VSHQWIXHOSRRODQG,6)6,

operations can result in the exposure of aquatic and terrestrial organisms to radionuclides. 

These sections have been expanded to describe the NRC review process for assessing the 

impacts related to the exposure of biota to radionuclides. For example, the NRC reviewed the 

findings in the License Renewal GEIS as well as site-specific assessments that were conducted 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

during application reviews for operating licenses, combined licenses, and license renewals. 

These reviews inherently included an analysis of impacts from the operation of spent fuel pools. 

These assessments determined that exposure of aquatic and terrestrial organisms to 

radionuclides near nuclear power plants was sufficiently less than the DOE’s and the IAEA’s 

guidelines for radiation dose rates from environmental sources. Given that the License 

Renewal GEIS and site-specific analyses bound the effects of continued storage on aquatic and 

terrestrial resources and that NRC did not identify any foreseeable additional effects during 

continued storage, the NRC concludes in the GEIS that the potential impacts from radiological 

doses to biota would be SMALL during continued storage. 

Topics specifically related to a specific radioactive release during an operating reactor’s 

licensed life are outside the scope of this GEIS. However, the NRC offers the following 

additional information. As described in the License Renewal Supplemental EIS for Indian Point, 

Strontium-ZDVGHWHFWHGLQWKH+XGVRQ5LYHUDQGILVKQHDUWKH,QGLDQ3RLQWNuclear Power 

Plant LQ15&b). The NRC determined in the Supplemental EIS that the Strontium-

OHYHOVLQILVKQHDUWKH,QGLDQ3RLQW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWS&LNJ%TNJZHUHQR

higher than in those in fish collected from background locations across the State of New York. 

Additionally, the NRC concluded that residual radioactivity from atmospheric weapons tests and 

naturally occurring radioactivity were the predominant sources of radioactivity in the water 

VDPSOHVFROOHFWHGQHDU,QGLDQ3RLQWLQ. For additional information regarding environmental 

impacts from Strontium-QHDU the Indian Point Plant, see the License Renewal Supplemental 

EIS for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, NUREG–6XSSOHPHQW

(NRC 2010b). 

Also see Section D.2.40.4 of this appendix for a discussion of the sufficiency of the spent fuel 

pool leaks analysis. See Section ' of this appendix for a discussion of a large loss of 

water from the spent fuel pool. See Section ' of this appendix for a discussion of the 

ultimate fate and transport of contaminated water. For issues related to the potential loss of 

institutional controls, see Section ' of this appendix. 

In response to these comments, 6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6KDYHEHHQUHYLVHGWR

include an expanded discussion of exposure of aquatic and terrestrial organisms to 

radionuclides, including fish, cephalopods, marine mammals, sea turtles, and reptiles. No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--1--3----------21) 

D.2.28.2 – COMMENT: Two commenters raised issues regarding the use of operating plant 

impacts in the GEIS to discuss and bound the impacts to aquatic resources. One commenter 

asserted that impacts to aquatic ecology due to water use at a specific operating plant have not 

been properly assessed because the review process for the NPDES permit was based on 

limited and older data. Another commenter stated that some of the information about 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

experience with impingement and entrainment for operating a power plant cooling system was 

not relevant to assess the impacts of operating a cooling system for a spent fuel pool. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As described in Section 4.10 in the 

GEIS, the NRC reviewed the findings in the License Renewal GEIS (NRC 2013m) and sitespecific assessments for new and operating reactors, which included an analysis of impacts 

from the operation of spent fuel pools. These analyses examined direct effects that could result 

from water withdrawal and discharge during operation of a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., 

impingement, entrainment, heat shock, and other effects relevant to the Waste Confidence 

GEIS). The License Renewal GEIS determined that impacts to aquatic resources would be 

SMALL for closed-cycle plants primarily based on withdrawal and discharge rates, as well as a 

historical review of site-specific effects at operating reactors. Given that the withdrawal and 

discharge rates would be smaller to operate the cooling system for a spent fuel pool as 

compared to a nuclear power plant, the conclusions of the License Renewal GEIS bound the 

impacts of continued storage in spent fuel pools on aquatic resources. Therefore, the NRC 

concludes that the potential environmental impacts on aquatic resources would be SMALL. 

Topics specifically related to NPDES permit administration and compliance during an operating 

reactor’s licensed life are outside the scope of this GEIS. The NRC has no statutory or 

regulatory authority over matters concerning discharge permits or compliance with the Clean 

Water Act. See Section ' of this appendix for a general overview of the NPDES permit 

program as it relates to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and this GEIS. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3---24) 

D.2.28.3 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed concerns about the impacts to aquatic 

organisms drawn into cooling systems. The commenter stated that impacts include exposure to 

chemicals used to maintain cooling-water flow, radioactive materials, and heat. The commenter 

described the role of aquatic organisms in sequestering carbon from the global carbon cycle. 

The commenter expressed concern about the effect of cooling systems on global warming due 

to discharge of excess heat to the environment and impingement and entrainment of aquatic 

organisms available to sequester carbon. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&DJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW6HFWLRQLQWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKH

ecological role of aquatic organisms, including carbon sequestration or fixation, or converting 

carbon dioxide to organic materials via photosynthesis. Section 4.10 in the GEIS describes 

potential impacts to aquatic organisms, including entrainment into the cooling system, exposure 

to chemicals, radioactive doses to biota, and thermal stresses from discharge effluents. 

Sections 4.DQGLQWKH*(,6GHVFULEHWKHLQFUHPHQWDOLPSDFWVIURPFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHRQ

FOLPDWHFKDQJHLQWHUPVRIHPLVVLRQVRIJUHHQKRXVHJDVHV6HFWLRQLQWKH*(,6

describes potential cumulative impacts of climate change on aquatic resources. Minor changes 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

LQ6HFWLRQZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6EDVHGRQWKLVFRPPHQWWRIXUWKHUGHVFULEHWKHUROHRI

aquatic organisms in sequestering carbon dioxide. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

(410-

D.2.28.4 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC does not understand the extent of 

cumulative effects on aquatic resources at a specific nuclear power plant. The commenter 

listed several potential cumulative impacts that could occur (e.g., climate change, discharges 

from other facilities, and impingement and entrainment). The commenter also mentioned a lack 

of regulatory compliance and proper consultations at a specific nuclear power plant, including 

consultation under the Endangered Species Act and the NPDES permitting process. The 

commenter concluded that aquatic impacts from long-term storage of spent fuel will be 

“UNACCEPTABLE LARGE.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment in part. As described by the commenter and 

LQ6HFWLRQLPSDFWVIURPFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGRWKHUIXWXUHDFWLRQs identified in the 

cumulative impacts analysis can have substantial impacts on aquatic resource and special 

status species. The NRC’s knowledge of the extent of those impacts includes a degree of 

uncertainty that generally increases with time into the fuWXUH6HFWLRQKDVEHHQ

expanded to include some of the future actions identified by the commenter. 

$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVRQDTXDWLFUHVRXUFHVFRXOGEH/$5*(DW

some sites that experience many cumulative effects such as those listed by the commenter. 

The NRC’s impact categories are defined by regulation as “SMALL,” “MODERATE,” or 

“LARGE.” These categories do not include an “UNACCEPTABLE LARGE” category. 

Therefore, the conclusion remains “SMALL to LARGE” for cumulative impacts to aquatic 

UHVRXUFHVLQ6HFWLRQ

Topics specifically related to NPDES permit administration and compliance with other statutes 

(e.g., the Endangered Species Act) during an operating reactor’s licensed life are outside the 

scope of this GEIS. In addition, the NRC has no statutory or regulatory authority over matters 

concerning discharge permits or compliance with the Clean Water Act. However, Section 

' discusses WKH(QGDQJHUHG6SHFLHV$FWRIDVDPHQGHGESA) 6HFWLRQ

consultations related to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and this GEIS. Section '

provides a general overview of the NPDES permit program as it relates to the Pilgrim Nuclear 

Power Station and this GEIS. 

6HFWLRQZDVH[SDQGHGWRGHVFULEHWKHFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVPHQWLRQHGLQWKLVFRPPHQW

In addition, ChaSWHUZDVXSGDWHGWRIXUWKHUGHVFULEHXQFHUWDLQW\UHODWHGWRUHDVRQDEO\
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

foreseeable future action and how uncertainty increases with time into the future. No changes 

were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3-

D.2.28.5 – COMMENT: One commenter objected to the GEIS statement that “[t]he significance 

of potential impacts on plants and animals and their habitats depends on the importance or role 

of that plant or animal within the ecological community that is affected.” The commenter stated 

that no species is insignificant and should not be treated as such. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. As described in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&’s methodology and approach to evaluating the environmental 

impacts of continued storage follows the guidance in NUREG–Environmental Review 

Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs: Final Report (NRC 2003a), 

where applicable. NUREG–GHILQHVLPSRUWDQWVSHFLHVDVWKRVHWKDWDUHUDUHVXFKDV

Federally listed threatened or endangered species under the Endangered Species Act; or 

species proposed for listing as threatened or endangered, or as a candidate for listing under the 

Endangered Species Act; or species State-listed as threatened, endangered, or species of 

concern. NUREG–IXUWKHUGHILQHVRWKHULPSRUWDQWVSHFLHVWRLQFOXGHFRPPHUFLDOO\RU

recreationally valuable species, species that are essential to the maintenance and survival of 

species that are rare and commercially or recreationally valuable (as defined previously), 

species that are critical to the structure and function of the local terrestrial and aquatic 

ecosystems, and species that may serve as biological indicators to monitor the effects of the 

facilities on the terrestrial and aquatic environments. While all species play a role within the 

ecological ecosystems surrounding continued storage facilities, the NRC followed the guidance 

in NUREG–WRKLJKOLJKWSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVWRLPSRUWDQWVSHFLHVDVDPHWKRGWRIRFXVWKH

analysis on those species that are rare, commercially or recreationally valuable, have a large 

role in ecosystems functions, or provide an indication on the overall health of the ecosystem. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--14) 

D.2.28.6 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that it was speculative to conclude that an awayfrom-reactor spent fuel storage facility would be located in an environment similar to the PFSF. 

Another commenter stated that it was speculative to conclude that an away-from-reactor spent 

fuel storage facility would be located in an area away from sensitive habitats. The commenter 

referred to GEIS statements that in some cases avoiding impacts to sensitive features may not 

be possible. The commenter noted that the PFSF was proposed to be located in close proximity 

to a wildlife management area and the Great Salt Lake, potentially affecting migratory birds (the 

NRC is interpreting this comment to refer to the intermodal transfer facility, which was a support 

facility for the PFSF that was proposed to be located near the noted management area and the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Great Salt Lake). Both commenters asserted that, as a result, a generic conclusion for the 

impacts of an away-from-reactor storage facility could not be supported. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

used the PFSF as a model in the GEIS to describe the physical characteristics, ecological 

resources, and sensitive habitats near a hypothetical away-from-reactor ISFSI. As described in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&PDNHVQRDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWZKHQWKH,6)6,PLJKWEHEXLOW

However, the NRC assumes that any proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI would likely be similar 

WRWKHDVVXPHGJHQHULFIDFLOLW\GHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQIURPWhe standpoint of the size, 

RSHUDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGORFDWLRQRIWKHIDFLOLW\,Q6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&

states it is likely that an away-from-reactor storage facility would be located in an area away 

from sensitive perennial and wetland habitats to satisfy environmental regulations and statutes. 

However, in some locations sensitive terrestrial features may be unavoidably affected. Based 

RQWKHVHDVVXPSWLRQVDQGWKHDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQLQWKH*(,6WKH15&FRQFOXGHGWKDW

construction of the away-from-reactor ISFSI could have SMALL to MODERATE impacts on 

terrestrial resources because construction of the project could have some noticeable, but not 

destabilizing, impacts on terrestrial resources, depending on what terrestrial resources are 

affected. 

$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&ZRXOGHYDOXDWHWKHVLWH-specific impacts of 

the construction and operation of any proposed facility as part of that facility’s licensing process. 

Therefore, should the NRC receive an application for a proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI, a 

site-specific NEPA analysis would be conducted, which would include consideration of impacts 

to terrestrial and aquatic resources and special status species and habitats. As stated in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6Foordination with other Federal and State natural resource agencies 

would further encourage ISFSI operators to take appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate impacts 

on State-listed species, migratory birds, habitats of concern, and other protected species and 

habitats. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.28.7 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed concerns with respect to variations in the 

presence of special status species and habitats near nuclear plant sites and compliance with 

HQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQUHJXODWLRQVDQGDFWVVXFKDVWKH(QGDQJHUHG6SHFLHV$FWRIDV

amended (ESA). The commenter cited several incidents of alleged noncompliance with 

environmental statutes at the Pilgrim nuclear plant site, such as violations of Section 402 of the 

Clean Water Act, which establishes the NPDES permit program. The commenter stated that 

post-shutdown impacts could vary among nuclear plant sites depending on individual state 

efforts to enforce compliance with environmental statutes. As a result, the commenter asserted 

that the generic approach taken in the GEIS is inappropriate. Another commenter asserted that 

GEIS assumption of future compliance with the requirement to reinitiate special status species 

consultations under certain circumstances is flawed. To support this statement, the commenter 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

described consultations associated with a nuclear plant license renewal proceeding and stated 

that subsequent observation of a special status species in the vicinity of the nuclear plant should 

have necessitated reinitiation of consultation; however commenter stated that consultation was 

not reinitiated. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As described in Section 4.11 of the GEIS, 

the NRC would reinitiate consultation with National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) or Fish 

and Wildlife Service (FWS) during the period of continued storage if an activity meets the criteria 

LQ&)5Part IRULQLWLDWLRQRUUHLQLWLDWLRQRI6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ. The NRC follows the 

regulations and guidance regarding the (6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQSURFHVVWKDWDUHSURYLGHGLQ

 CFR Part 402 and in the Endangered Species Consultation Handbook (FWS/NMFS 

Topics specifically related to NPDES permit administration and compliance with other statutes 

(e.g., the ESA) during an operating reactor’s licensed life are outside the scope of this GEIS. 

However, the NRC offers the following additional information. 

This GEIS evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel on special 

status species and habitats near reactors. Section 4.11 broadly characterizes the governing 

regulatory environment at existing nuclear power plant sites as may be relevant to the continued 

onsite storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs. The NRC evaluates 

impacts to Federally listed threatened and endangered species, and where appropriate, 

FRQGXFWV(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQDVSDUWRILWVUHYLHZRIDQDSSOLFDWLRQIRUOLFHQVHUHQHZDO

The NRC completed its license renewal environmental review for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

DQGSXEOLVKHGWKHUHVXOWVLQ6XSSOHPHQWWRWKH/LFHQVH5HQHZDO*(,6LVVXHGLQ-XO\

15&d). As required under the ESA, the NRC completed consultations with NMFS and 

FWS, as summarized in the Atomic Safety Licensing Board’s memorandum and order denying a 

petition for intervention and request to admit a new contention concerning an endangered 

species at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (NRC 2012f). 

Section 4.11 of the GEIS states that the NRC would reinitiate consultation when appropriate, 

such as if new information reveals effects of the action that may affect listed species or critical 

habitat in a manner or to an extent not previously considered. The NRC made this statement 

because it follows the requirements of the ESA and because the NRC would continue to follow 

the same procedures as during the operation of power plants, whereby the NRC evaluates new 

information, as appropriate, to determine whether UHLQLWLDWLRQRI(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQLV

ZDUUDQWHG)RUH[DPSOHDIWHU(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZDVFRPSOHWHGIRUWKH3LOJULP

Nuclear Power Station license renewal, the NRC received a letter from, Earthrise Law Center, 

on behalf of Jones River Watershed Association, dated March 22, 2013, to describe the 

occurrence of a mother-calf pair of right whales near Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in January 

2013 (Earthwise Law Center 2013). The letter further requested that the National Marine 

Fisheries Service (NMFS) DQG15&UHLQLWLDWH(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ+RZHYHUERWKWKH

NRC and NMFS determined that the information provided in Earthrise Law Center’s letter did 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

QRWSUHVHQWLQIRUPDWLRQZDUUDQWLQJUHLQLWLDWLRQRI(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ15&q; 

NMFS 2013). As required by the ESA, NRC would continue to evaluate all situations when 

reiniWLDWLRQRI(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQLVDSSURSULDWHGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH

The NRC has no statutory or regulatory authority over matters concerning discharge permits or 

compliance with the Clean Water Act. See Section ' of this appendix for additional 

information regarding a general overview of the NPDES permit program as it relates to the 

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and this GEIS and the generic approach to NRC’s evaluation of 

surface-water impacts for this GEIS. See Section ' of this appendix for a discussion of 

how ecological impacts were assessed generically for this GEIS, rather than on a site-specific 

basis. 

Changes were made in Section 4.11 of the GEIS to further clarify when reinitiation of ESA 

6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZRXOGRFFXUGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH1RFKDQJHVZHUH

made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--3-

D.2.28.8 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that aquatic and terrestrial resources, including 

special status species and habitats, differ considerably among nuclear power plant sites 

depending on the quality and diversity of the ecosystems and habitats surrounding individual 

nuclear power facilities. Commenters cited specific examples of special status species and 

habitats in the vicinity of specific operating nuclear plants. Commenters contended that these 

variations necessitated preparation of site-specific assessments of impacts to aquatic and 

terrestrial resources and special status species and habitats. Another commenter supported his 

or her assertion of unique resources for a specific site by describing state standards that provide 

for the protection of ground and surface waters near a specific nuclear power plant due to the 

water’s suitability as aquatic habitat and for recreational uses. The commenter further stated 

that site-specific assessments should include consideration of impacts of postulated accidents 

on special status species and habitats. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees with the comments in 

part. The NRC recognizes that Cape Cod Bay, Hudson River, and other riverine, estuarine, and 

terrestrial ecosystems are ecologically rich and valuable. As described in Section 4.10 of the 

GEIS, the NRC reviewed the findings in the License Renewal GEIS and site-specific 

assessments for new and operating reactors, which included an analysis of impacts from the 

operation of spent fuel pools. The License Renewal GEIS determined that impacts to aquatic 

and terrestrial resources would be SMALL for closed-cycle plants primarily based on withdrawal 

and discharge rates, as well as a historical review of site-specific effects at operating reactors 

(NRC 2013m). Given that the withdrawal and discharge rates would be smaller to operate the 

cooling system for a spent fuel pool as compared to a nuclear power plant, previous EISs for 

power reactors have conclusions that bound the effects of continued storage in spent fuel pools 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

on aquatic and terrestrial resources. For ISFSI operations, impacts would be similar to previous 

ISFSI EAs described in Section 4.11 of the GEIS because of the small size of ISFSIs and 

minimal liquid or gaseous effluents that would be generated during normal operations. The 

NRC did not identify any foreseeable additional effects from continued storage not described in 

the site-specific reviews or the License Renewal GEIS. Therefore the NRC concludes that the 

potential environmental impacts on aquatic and terrestrial resources for spent fuel pools and atreactor ISFSIs would be SMALL. 

As described in Section 4.11 of the GEIS, the impacts from spent fuel pool operations on 

Federally listed threatened and endangered species would be determined as part of ESA 

6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKRULJLQDOOLFHQVLQJRIWKHSRZHUSODQWOLFHQVHUHQHZDOand 

for any other agency action as defined by the ESA that could affect listed species. Following 

the conclusion of an LQLWLDOFRQVXOWDWLRQ CFR GLUHFWV)HGHUDODJHQFLHVWRUHLQLWLDWH

consultation in circumstances where discretionary Federal involvement or control over the 

action has been retained or is authorized by law and where (1) the amount or extent of taking 

specified in the incidental take statement is exceeded, (2) new information reveals effects to 

Federally listed species or designated critical habitats that were not previously considered, 

(3) the action is modified in a manner that causes effects not previously considered, or (4) new 

species are listed or new critical habitat is designated that may be affected by the action, as 

described in Section 4.11.1.1 of the GEIS. 

When the NRC reviews an application for a specifically licensed ISFSI, a site-specific 

environmental review will be conducted to determine site-specific impacts on aquatic and 

terrestrial ecology and special status species and habitats using the best available information. 

Although the Commission has exercised its discretion under 10 &)5DWRGHYHORSD

GEIS, this proceeding does not itself authorize any action that would affect the environment. 

Therefore, this Federal action is not subject to the consultation requirements of the ESA or the 

Magnuson-Stevens Act and the NRC does not need to consult with FWS or NMFS at this time. 

Prior to the issuance of a site-specific reactor or ISFSI license, the NRC will determine whether 

consultation is required. If consultation is required, the NRC will initiate consultation prior to the 

issuance of a site-specific license. 

In addition, NRC and licensee coordination with other Federal and State natural resource 

agencies would further encourage licensees to take appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate 

impacts on special status species, habitats of conservation concern, and other protected 

species and habitats (e.g., those protected under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 

Coastal Zone Management Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 

and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act). NRC and licensee coordination with other 

Federal and State natural resource agencies would likely result in avoidance or mitigation 

measures that would minimize impacts on protected species and habitats. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Also see Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix for a discussion of why the NRC has determined it 

can conduct a generic analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage and Section 

' of this appendix for a discussion of impacts to the environment from postulated 

accidents. 

The NRC made changes in Section 4.11 to further clarify when initiation and reinitiation of ESA 

6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZRXOGRFFXUGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--3--3--3--4) 

D.2.28.9 – COMMENT: One commenter questioned the conclusion that special status species 

and habitat consultations would need to be conducted for spent fuel pool cooling systems, in 

light of the conclusion that ISFSI operations are not likely to adversely affect special status 

species and habitats. This commenter observed that the draft GEIS found that spent fuel pool 

cooling system impacts would likely decrease in comparison to the impacts of water withdrawals 

and discharges at an operating plant. The commenter therefore concluded that a finding of not 

likely to affect special status species and habitats should be equally applicable to spent fuel pool 

cooling systems and ISFSIs. The commenter generally agreed that consultations would help to 

avoid and mitigate impacts to protected species. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment in part and disagrees with the comment in 

part. $VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRSHUDWLRQRIDVSHQWIXHOSRROKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWR

have greater impacts on aquatic species and habitats as compared to operation of an ISFSI 

because operation of a spent fuel pool requires water for cooling, whereas an ISFSI does not 

require water for cooling. As described in Section 4.11, the impacts from spent fuel pool 

operations to Federally listed threatened and endangered species would be determined as part 

RI(6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKRULJLQDOOLFHQVLQJRUOLFHQVHUHQHZDORIWKHSRZHU

SODQWDQGDIWHUZDUGVLIDQDFWLYLW\PHHWVWKHFULWHULDLQ&)5Part 402 for initiation or 

reiniWLDWLRQRI6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQ In addition, the NRC would continue to follow the 

regulations and guidance regarding the (6$6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQSURFHVVWKDWDUHSURYLGHG

 CFR Part 402 and in the Endangered Species Consultation Handbook (FWS/NMFS 

When the NRC reviews an application for a specifically licensed ISFSI, a site-specific 

environmental review will be conducted to determine site-specific impacts on aquatic and 

terrestrial ecology and special status species and habitats. 

As described in Section 4.11 of the GEIS, NRC and licensee coordination with other Federal 

and State natural resource agencies would further encourage licensees to take appropriate 

steps to avoid or mitigate impacts on special status species, habitats of conservation concern, 

and other protected species and habitats (e.g., those protected under the Fish and Wildlife 

Coordination Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Migratory 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Bird Treaty Act, and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act). NRC and licensee coordination 

with other Federal and State natural resource agencies would likely result in avoidance or 

mitigation measures that would minimize impacts on protected species and habitats. 

The NRC made changes in Section 4.11 to further clarify when initiation and reinitiation of ESA 

6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZRXOGRFFXUGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-4-3) 

D.2.29 Comments Concerning Historic and Cultural Resources 

D.2.29.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters disagreed with the NRC’s historic and cultural 

resource impact determinations for the long-term and indefinite storage timeframes for both atreactor and away-from-reactor ISFSIs. The commenters asserted that historic and cultural 

resource impacts would likely be avoided or be SMALL for all continued storage scenarios. The 

commenters stated that construction of a replacement ISFSI or DTS could occur on lands 

previously disturbed by decommissioning activities; therefore, these facilities could be situated 

to avoid historic and cultural resources. In addition, the commenters asserted that National 

+LVWRULF3UHVHUYDWLRQ$FWRIDVDPHQGHG1+3$DQG1(3$UHTXLUHPHQWVDQG15&

regulations provide further assurance that unavoidable impacts would be mitigated during sitespecific licensing actions and, thus, the impacts would be SMALL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As discussed in Section 3.11 of the 

GEIS, only areas within and immediately surrounding the power block were extensively 

disturbed during initial power plant construction and less-developed portions of a power plant 

site could still contain unknown historic and cultural resources. Many existing at-reactor ISFSIs 

were constructed outside of the power block in less-developed or disturbed areas. 

For away-from reactor ISFSIs, the NRC assumed that the replacement of the ISFSI and initial 

and replacement DTS would be constructed on land near the existing ISFSI. In most, but not all 

instances, placement of storage facilities on the site can be adjusted to minimize or avoid 

impacts (mitigation as the result of consultation) on any historic and cultural resources in the 

area. 

The NRC recognizes that there is uncertainty associated with the degree of prior disturbance 

and what resources, if any, are present in areas where future ground-disturbing activities (e.g., 

initial and replacement DTS and replacement ISFSI) could occur. Further, resources may be 

present that would not have been considered significant at the time the initial or replacement 

facilities were constructed, but could become significant in the future. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQWKH15&DVVXPHVWKDWWKHODQGZKHUHWKHRULJLQDOIDFLOLWLHVZHUH

constructed would be available for replacement facility construction; however, the NRC cannot 

eliminate the possibility that historic and cultural resources would be affected by construction 

activities during the indefinite timeframe because the initial ISFSI could be located within a lessdisturbed area with historic and cultural resources in close proximity. 

The magnitude of adverse effects on historic properties and impacts on historic and cultural 

resources largely depends on where the facilities are sited, what resources are present, the 

extent of proposed land disturbance, if the area has been previously surveyed to identify historic 

and cultural resources, and whether the licensee has cultural resource-management plans and 

procedures in place. Even a small amount of ground disturbance (e.g., clearing and grading) 

could affect a significant resource. Accordingly, the NRC has concluded that the impacts on 

historic and cultural resources for the long-term and indefinite timeframes would be SMALL to 

LARGE. This range takes into consideration routine maintenance and monitoring (i.e., no 

ground-disturbing activities), the absence or avoidance of historic and cultural resources, and 

potential ground-disturbing activities that could impact historic and cultural resources. The 

analysis also considers the uncertainties inherent in analyzing this resource area over long 

timeframes. These uncertainties include any future discovery of previously unknown historic 

and cultural resources; resources that gain significance within the vicinity and the viewshed 

(e.g., nomination of a historic district) due to improvements in knowledge, technology, and 

excavation techniques; and changes associated with predicting what types of resources would 

be considered significant to future generations. Sections 3.11, 4.12DQG of the GEIS were 

clarified in response to these comments. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

-3--3--2--2--2--4--4--4--4-

-

D.2.29.2 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern over potential LARGE impacts on 

historic and cultural resources and urged NRC to monitor the potential impacts to these 

irreplaceable resources because these resources could be changed forever. Another 

commenter noted the impact range used in the long-term and indefinite timeframes and asked if 

this range of impacts indicated that the NRC did not actually know the impact. 

RESPONSE: The scope of the GEIS is to generically analyze the environmental impacts of 

continued storage of spent fuel to support the Rule. For historic and cultural resources, the 

magnitude of impact largely depends on where on a site the facilities are sited, what resources 

are present, the extent of proposed land disturbance, whether the area has been previously 

surveyed to identify historic and cultural resources, and whether the licensee has management 

plans and procedures that are protective of historic and cultural resources. Even a small 

amount of ground disturbance (e.g., clearing and grading) could affect a small but significant 

resource. This range takes into consideration routine maintenance and monitoring (i.e., no 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

ground-disturbing activities), the absence or avoidance of historic and cultural resources, and 

potential ground-disturbing activities that could impact historic and cultural resources. The 

analysis also considers the uncertainties inherent in analyzing this resource area over long 

timeframes. These uncertainties include any future discovery of previously unknown historic 

and cultural resources; resources that gain significance within the vicinity and the viewshed 

(e.g., nomination of a historic district) due to improvements in knowledge, technology, and 

excavation techniques; and changes associated with predicting what types of resources would 

be considered significant to future generations. A moderate to large impact could result if 

historic and cultural resources are present at the site and, because they cannot be avoided, are 

impacted by ground-disturbing activities related to the continued storage of spent fuel. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---3) 

D.2.29.3 – COMMENT: Two commenters stated that environmental justice and historic and 

cultural impacts cannot be addressed in a generic analysis and that effects will be addressed in 

site-specific licensing actions for short-term, long-term, and indefinite storage. One commenter 

stated these impacts must be addressed in site-specific EISs, and this should be made clear in 

the GEIS. The commenter is concerned that EIS development would simply adopt the findings 

of the GEIS and would fail to conduct a site-specific analysis for environmental justice and 

historic and cultural impacts. The commenter also asserted that impact determinations of 

“SMALL, MEDIUM, or LARGE” for historic and cultural resources shows that it cannot be 

addressed in a generic analysis. In addition, based on this conclusion, the commenter 

questioned the validity of the NRC’s statement in ChaptHUWKDW3>W@KHYDOXHRIUHYLHZLQJ

continued storage in site-specific NEPA analyses is difficult to quantify; however, a site-specific 

analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage would likely not reveal any new 

information that cannot be addressed in a generic analysis.” 

RESPONSE: NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

disagrees that the differences between sites render a generic analysis inappropriate. The 

environmental justice impact analysis performed for the GEIS was conducted in accordance 

with the Commission’s “Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in 

NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions” VHH)5ZKLFKVWDWHV“[t]he Commission is 

committed to the general goals set forth in EO  )5, and strives to meet those 

goals as part of its NEPA review process.” The GEIS considers the potential human health and 

environmental effects from continued storage of spent fuel on minority and low-income 

populations through the analysis of environmental justice impacts. The GEIS also evaluates the 

potential impacts to historic and cultural resources that could be important to minority or lowincome populations. 

Per the Commission’s policy statement, the NRC considers environmental justice issues in all 

licensing and regulatory actions, primarily by conducting an environmental review and fulfilling 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

its NEPA responsibilities for these actions. Environmental justice-related issues and 

demographic conditions (i.e., potentially affected minority and low-income populations) differ 

from site to site, and environmental justice issues and concerns usually cannot be resolved 

generically with regard to specific NRC licensing actions. Consequently, environmental justice 

impacts are normally considered in site-specific environmental reviews for “underlying licensing 

actions for each particular facility” )5 However, as explained Sections D.2.23.1 

and D.2.11.1 of this appendix, the NRC has determined that a generic analysis of the human 

health and environmental effects of continued storage on minority and low-income populations 

and historic and cultural resources is possible. 

As explained in the GEIS, spent nuclear fuel is currently being stored in spent fuel pools and 

ISFSIs (where available) at all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. One 

option considered in the GEIS is the use of at-reactor storage until a geologic repository 

becomes available. The continued storage of spent fuel at these existing sites would not create 

any new effect on minority and low-income populations and historic and cultural resources 

beyond what is currently being experienced. 

This rulemaking does not authorize the initial or continued operation of any nuclear power plant, 

and it does not authorize storage of spent fuel. Environmental justice, as well as impacts on 

socioeconomic and historic and cultural resources, are considered in all site-specific 

environmental reviews for specific licensing actions. Further, should the NRC receive an 

application for a proposed away-from-reactor ISFSI, a site-specific NEPA analysis would be 

conducted, which would include consideration of environmental justice. Additionally, because 

WKH*(,6GRHVQRWLGHQWLI\VSHFLILFVLWHVIRU15&OLFHQVLQJDFWLRQVD1+3$6HFWLRQUHYLHZ

has not been performed. 7KH15&FRPSOLHVZLWK1+3$6HFWLRQDQGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ

&)53DUWLQVLWH-specific NEPA licensing actions (e.g., new reactor licensing, reactor 

license renewal, away-from-reactor ISFSIs, specifically licensed at-reactor ISFSIs, and DTSs). 

The NRC agrees with the comments regarding the validity of the statement, “The value of 

reviewing continued storage in site-specific NEPA analyses is difficult to quantify; however, a 

site-specific analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage would likely not reveal 

any new information that cannot be addressed in a generic analysis.” This statement has been 

revised to read, “The value of reviewing continued storage in site-specific NEPA analyses is 

difficult to quantify.” No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.29.4 – COMMENT: A commenter concurred with the GEIS findings regarding at-reactor 

and away-from-reactor ISFSIs as they relate to impacts on historic and cultural resources. 

However, the commenter disagreed with the statement that the entire power block is “extremely 

disturbed” with no possibility for any surviving pockets of archaeological sensitivity, unless 

supporting documentation supports such an assumption within the area of potential effect. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC’s 

evaluation of the environmental impacts of continued storage builds upon substantial operating 

experience over the licensed life of the reactor. Section 3.11 of the GEIS contains information 

EDVHGRQH[SHULHQFHIURPDSSUR[LPDWHO\UHDFWRUOLFHQVHUHQHZDOUHYLHZVDQGESP and 

combined license environmental reviews. During these reviews, the NRC examined historic and 

cultural resource survey reports and aerial photographs (depicting sites prior to, during, and 

post-power plant construction) and consulted with State Historic Preservation Officers or 

appropriate Tribal Historic Preservation Officer, Tribal representatives, and other interested 

parties and determined that the land within and immediately surrounding the power block is 

extensively disturbed. 

The term “power block” refers to the buildings and components directly involved in generating 

electricity at a power plant. At a nuclear power plant, the components of the power block vary 

with the reactor design, but always include the reactor and turbine building, and usually include 

several other buildings that house access, reactor auxiliary, safeguards, waste processing, or 

other nuclear generation support functions. Nuclear power block buildings require significant 

excavation of existing material, followed by placement of structural fill for a safe and stable 

base. Building excavations are extensive, and the area of excavation is larger than the as-built 

power block and reactor containment. Section 3.11 of the GEIS does acknowledge that some 

developed and less-developed portions of a power plant site, including areas not extensively 

disturbed (e.g., construction laydown areas), could still contain unknown historic and cultural 

resources. As a result of this comment, the NRC has clarified the text within Section 3.11. No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.29.5 – COMMENT: A commenter objected to the NRC’s assumption that away-fromreactor ISFSIs could be situated to avoid historic and cultural resources. The commenter stated 

that because the NRC noted that avoiding impacts may not be possible, the NRC cannot reach 

a generic impact determination for these resources. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees that a generic finding for continued storage cannot be made 

for historic and cultural resources. The scope of the GEIS is to analyze the generic 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel to support an update to the Rule. The 

NRC considered a range of potential adverse effects to historic properties or impacts on historic 

and cultural resources in the GEIS to account for varying scenarios. This range takes into 

consideration routine maintenance and monitoring (i.e., no ground-disturbing activities), the 

absence or avoidance of historic and cultural resources, and potential ground-disturbing 

activities that could affect historic and cultural resources. The analysis also considers 

uncertainties inherent in analyzing this resource area over long timeframes. These 

uncertainties include any future discovery of previously unknown historic and cultural resources; 

resources that gain significance within the vicinity and the viewshed (e.g., nomination of a 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

historic district) due to improvements in knowledge, technology, and excavation techniques; and 

changes associated with predicting what types of resources would be considered significant to 

future generations. The analysis concluded an impact range from SMALL to LARGE. A 

potential moderate or large impact could result if historic and cultural resources are present at a 

site and, cannot be avoided, are impacted by ground-disturbing activities related to the 

FRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHO$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,615&DXWKRUL]DWLRQWR

construct and operate an away-from-reactor ISFSI would constitute a Federal action under 

NEPA and would be an uQGHUWDNLQJXQGHUWKH1+3$,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)53DUWWKH

15&ZRXOGFRQGXFWDQ1+3$6HFWLRQUHYLHZWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUKLVWRULFSURSHUWLHVDUH

present in the area of potential effect, and if so, whether construction and operation of the 

proposed ISFSI would result in any adverse effects on such properties. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

+RZHYHUWKH15&GRHVDJUHHWKDWWKHDVVXPSWLRQLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6LHWKDWDZD\-

from-reactor ISFSIs could be situated to avoid historic and cultural resources) needs to be 

clarified and caveated. In most, but not all instances, placement of facilities on a proposed site 

could be adjusted to minimize or avoid impacts on historic and cultural resources in the area, 

but the NRC recognizes that this is not always possible. Because an away-from-reactor ISFSI 

does not depend on a significant water supply and has limited electrical power needs, an 

applicant may have more flexibility in how it chooses to place facilities on a site and, therefore, 

have a greater chance of avoiding historic and cultural resources in the area. The NRC revised 

WKHWH[WLQ6HFWLRQLQUHVSRQVHWRWKLVFRPPHQW1RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH5XOHDVD

result of this comment. 

-10) 

D.2.29.6 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern regarding the analysis of impacts to 

historic and cultural resources from ISFSI and DTS construction. Citing Prairie Island Nuclear 

Generating Plant as an example, the commenter asserted that reliance on original licensing 

documents is not a guarantee that all resources are documented or no longer present. The 

commenter stated that potential exists for deeply buried prehistoric archaeological sites to be 

present, even within disturbed areas of the site. In addition, the commenter noted that not all 

ISFSIs are located within the original footprint of power plant construction and cited the 

generally licensed Point Beach ISFSI as an example. 

The commenter also asserted that the GEIS should discuss how the environmental impacts of 

generally licensed ISFSIs would be evaluated before the reactors are decommissioned. The 

commenter noted that NUREG–Information Handbook on Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installations 15&b) states that because generally licensed ISFSIs are restricted 

WRSODQWVRSHUDWLQJXQGHU&)53DUWDXWLOLW\PXVWDSSO\IRUDVLWH-specific license when 

the plant is decommissioned. The commenter expressed concern that once these generally 

licensed ISFSIs go through the more rigorous site-specific licensing process it will be too late, 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

and noted that any potential historic or cultural resources would already have been destroyed by 

the initial construction of the generally licensed ISFSI. In addition, the commenter stated that it 

is not clear how future dry transfer facilities will be evaluated for the purposes of NEPA. The 

commenter asked if the NRC environmental review would be conducted using NUREG–

Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs: Final 

Report (NRC 2003a) or some other guidance. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. As discussed 

in Section ' of this appendix, areas within and immediately surrounding the power block 

were extensively disturbed during initial power plant construction. The GEIS acknowledges in 

Sections 3.11 and 4.12 that some developed and less-developed portions of a power plant site, 

including areas that were not extensively disturbed (e.g., construction laydown areas), could still 

contain unknown historic and cultural resources. Sections 3.11 and 4.12 of the GEIS have been 

revised to clarify the extent of previous ground-disturbing activities in the footprint of the power 

plant. 

The NRC agrees that reliance on original licensing documents is not a guarantee that all 

resources are either documented or no longer present. During site-specific licensing reviews, 

the NRC reviews previous historic and cultural resource survey reports along with new and 

updated reports and aerial photographs (depicting sites prior to, during, and post-power plant 

construction), and consults with State Historic Preservation Officers, Tribal Historic Preservation 

Officers, Tribes, and interested parties including the public. In addition, the NRC performs 

updated literature reviews and site file searches to identify any new information onsite and 

within the surrounding environs. 

$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&DVVXPHVWKDWDW-reactor ISFSIs are 

constructed onsite under a general or site-specific license during the term of reactor operations. 

Therefore, the impacts associated with the initial construction of a generally licensed at-reactor 

ISFSI are outside the scope of this GEIS. The environmental impacts of construction and 

RSHUDWLRQRIJHQHUDOO\OLFHQVHG,6)6,VZHUHDQDO\]HGLQDVSDUWRIWKH&)53DUW

rulemaking. The EA (15&E UHVXOWHGLQD)216,VHH)5page 7KH

NRC does not require licensees to convert general licenses to specific licenses once reactor 

decommissioning plans are announced. Impacts associated with eventual reactor 

decommissioning would be considered when a licensee submits its post-shutdown 

GHFRPPLVVLRQLQJDFWLYLWLHVUHSRUWIRUUHYLHZXQGHU&)5DRU &)5G

and its license-WHUPLQDWLRQSODQIRUUHYLHZDQGDSSURYDOSHU&)5DRU&)5

L,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)53DUWDVSHFLILF,6)6,OLFHQVHHZRXOGVXEPLWLWV

GHFRPPLVVLRQLQJSODQIRUUHYLHZDQGDSSURYDOXQGHU&)515&DXWKRUL]DWLRQRID

final decommissioning plan or license-termination plan would constitute Federal actions under 

NEPA and would be undertakings under the NHPA, thus requiring site-specific reviews of 

impacts to historic properties and historic and cultural resources. In addition, as stated in 

Section 4.12 of the GEIS, many reactor licensees have conducted surveys to identify historic 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

and cultural resources and developed and implemented historic and cultural resourcemanagement plans and procedures for reactor license and reactor license renewal applications. 

These plans and procedures address inadvertent discoveries and require consideration of 

resources prior to engaging in ground-disturbing activities. 

Should the NRC receive an application for a DTS, a site-specific environmental and safety 

review, including an NHPA Section UHYLHZZRXOGEHFRQGXFWHGLQaccordance with 10 CFR 

3DUWDQGDSSOLFDEOHJXLGDQFHDVGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6$VHSDUDWHVLWHspecific NHPA Section UHYLHZZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGIRU,6)6,UHSODFHPHQWDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQ

operation, replacement of a DTS, or construction of an away-from-reactor-ISFSI. At that time, a 

review to determine the level of environmental impact and to identify specific historic and 

cultural resources and appropriate mitigation or protection measures would be performed and 

implemented. Clarifying FKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DVDUHVXOWRI

these comments; no changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--1--1-20) 

D.2.29.7 – COMMENT: Two commenters expressed concern that the GEIS did not adequately 

analyze the consequences of a spent fuel accident or act of sabotage on Indian Tribes. The 

commenters stated that a generic analysis is inappropriate because only the Prairie Island Indian 

Community is at risk of its homeland being rendered uninhabitable by a spent fuel accident. 

One commenter stated that the GEIS failed to adequately consider and weigh the long-term 

viability of the Prairie Island Reservation as a homeland for the Tribe against the risks of 

continued storage of spent fuel. The commenter stated that the impacts resulting from a spent 

fuel accident or an act of sabotage would have a devastating socioeconomic impact on the 

Tribe. Additionally, the commenter noted that relocating the Tribe would invoke a long, 

cumbersome, and uncertain land acquisition process with the United States government. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS adequately analyzes the 

generic consequences of spent fuel accidents and acts of sabotage. As discussed in the 

Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix, the NRC’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of 

continued storage builds upon substantial operating experience and site-specific analyses 

conducted as part of every licensing review. For design basis accidents, all licensees must 

show that storage facilities will either withstand the physical conditions of an accident, thus 

preventing a release, or that the radiation dose caused by a release will not exceed NRC dose 

limits. For severe accidents, the NRC has concluded, after consideration of the probability and 

consequences of events and regulatory corrective actions, that the NRC’s review of both manmade and natural causes of accidents during initial licensing or license renewal, as well as 

regulatory oversight, will address site-specific factors (e.g., natural phenomena hazards and 

nearby population density). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Further, the safe operation of spent fuel pools and at-reactor ISFSIs will continue to be 

regulated by the NRC. As described in Section B.3.3 of the GEIS, safety issues and concerns 

will be addressed by the NRC on an ongoing basis at every spent fuel storage facility. Section 

RIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWRIVHYHUHDFFLdents, including economic 

consequences. As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the NRC believes that a 

generic approach is appropriate for a terrorism analysis because the GEIS makes impact 

determinations that apply to all spent fuel storage sites. 

The comments do not explain how the risk of an event that would lead to relocation would be 

unique to continued storage or would be inadequately addressed in a site-specific licensing 

review. Further, the analysis in Appendix F of the GEIS considers the costs of relocation due to 

a spent fuel pool fire or other severe accident. See also Sections ' and ' of 

this appendix for additional information related to costs in the event of a severe accident. While 

the NRC acknowledges that the Tribe would have to follow the process articulated in the Indian 

Reorganization Act for relocation, that issue is beyond the scope of this GEIS and Rule. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1---

D.2.29.8 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC failed to clarify why it stated in the 

GEIS that historic and cultural resources are not likely to be present within heavily disturbed 

areas. The commenter stated that NRC should state that this is because the damage is already 

done and that any resources located in those areas were destroyed. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Section 3.11 of the GEIS explains why it 

is unlikely for sites to be located within and immediately surrounding the power block. Although 

WKH1+3$ZDVSDVVHGLQWKHSURFHVVIRUFRPSO\LQJZLWKWKHODZZDVGHYHORSHGGXULQJ

WKHVDQGVDIWHUPDQ\RIWKHVHIDFLOLWLHVZHUHFRQVWUXFWHG7KHOLNHOLKRRGIRUKLVWRULF

and cultural resources to be found within the power block is low as construction of the nuclear 

power plant resulted in deep (extensive) soil disturbance. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--21) 

D.2.29.9 – COMMENT: A commenter provided historical background information for the Santa 

Ynez Band of the Chumash Indians, located 120 km (PL) south of the Diablo Canyon Power 

3ODQWLQ$YLOD&DOLIRUQLD7KHFRPPHQWHUDOVRUHIHUHQFHGWKH1+3$(2V)5

DQG)5WKH)HGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW’s Tribal Trust Responsibility, United 

Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Advisory Council on Historic 

3UHVHUYDWLRQUHJXODWLRQVDW&)53DUWZKLFKUHTXLUHFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWK7ULEHVSULRUWR

proceeding with Federal undertakings. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC appreciates the comments provided by the Santa Ynez Band of 

Chumash Indians describing the Federal requirements for government-to-government 

consultation. The NRC recognizes that the Federal government owes a general trust 

responsibility to Federally recognized Indian Tribes. The NRC also recognizes that there are 

specific government-to-government consultation responsibilities regarding interactions with 

Federally recognized Tribal governments due to their status as dependent sovereign nations. 

As such, the NRC offered Federally recognized Tribes the opportunity for government-toJRYHUQPHQWFRQVXOWDWLRQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHVLQ([HFXWLYH2UGHU“Consultation 

and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments” issueG1RYHPEHU)5

during the scoping and draft GEIS comment periods. 

As discussed in the GEIS, the rulemaking does not authorize the initial or continued operation of 

any nuclear power plant, nor does it authorize storage of spent fuel. Because the rulemaking 

does not identify specific sites for NRC licensing actions, this proceeding cannot facilitate an 

1+3$6HFWLRQRU([HFXWLYH2UGHU)5UHYLHZ7KH15&ZLOOFRPSO\ZLWK

1+3$6HFWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVDQGRWKHUDSSURSUiate laws and orders when an applicant 

submits a request for a site-specific license (e.g., new reactor licensing, reactor license renewal, 

away-from-reactor ISFSIs, specifically licensed at-reactor ISFSIs, and DTSs). No revisions 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--2) 

D.2.29.10 – COMMENT: One commenter provided statements in opposition to the license 

renewal of Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Diablo Canyon), as well as continued 

onsite storage of spent fuel at that site. In particular, the commenter stated that Native people 

have not granted permission to move forward with the relicensing of Diablo Canyon, continued 

onsite storage of spent fuel, or the GEIS. The commenter asserts that the land that Diablo 

Canyon occupies is owned by the Northern Chumash Tribe because the Treaty of Guadalupe 

Hidalgo was never ratified by the U.S. Government. 

RESPONSE: The comments express opposition to the relicensing and continued storage of 

spent fuel at Diablo Canyon and the GEIS and Rule. The NRC recognizes the comment’s 

opposition to the GEIS and Rule. Similar comments that expressed general opposition to the 

GEIS and Rule can be found in Section ' of this appendix. With respect to the 

commenter’s specific concerns related to Diablo Canyon and its license renewal, the NRC 

considers these portions of the comment to be beyond the scope of the Rule and the analysis in 

the GEIS. As stated in the GEIS, this rulemaking does not authorize the initial or continued 

operation of any nuclear power plant, and does not authorize storage of spent fuel. In addition, 

neither the GEIS or rulemaking identify specific sites for NRC licensing actions that would 

WULJJHU6HFWLRQFRQVXOWDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWDUHQRUPDOO\FRQGXFWHGGXULQJVLWH-specific 

licensing reviews. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The NRC is aware of the historic and cultural significance of the land surrounding Diablo 

Canyon and is committed to working with Tribes, groups, or individuals with a vested interest in 

the area during its review of the environmental effects of continued operation. At the request of 

the Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the environmental review of the license renewal application 

for Diablo Canyon has been delayed pending completion of seismic testing. A schedule for 

completing the environmental review will be developed after submittal of the seismic evaluation 

report by Pacific Gas & Electric Company. At this time there is no projected schedule for 

resuming the project activities, but the NRC will be in contact with the Northern Chumash Tribe 

when the license renewal environmental review resumes. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-2) 

D.2.29.11 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that petitions to intervene by Don’t Waste 

Michigan and Nuclear Information and Resource Service in the Palisades Nuclear Plant license 

renewal review proceeding led to the NRC bringing in special expertise to address allegations of 

significant potential historic and cultural resources that could be impacted. The commenter 

believed that environmental intervention and public comment made a significant difference for 

the better. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the importance of public participation throughout the 

NEPA process and is committed to open public participation and conducts Tribal consultation 

during all environmental reviews. This comment is specific to the Palisades Nuclear Plant 

OLFHQVHUHQHZDOUHYLHZDQGLWV1+3$6HFWLRQUHYLHZ7KH15&FRPSOLHGZLWK1+3$

6HFWLRQWRHQVXUHFRQVLGHUDWLRQDQGSURWHFWLRQRIKLVWRULFDQGFXOWXUDOUHVRXUFes at the 

Palisades Nuclear Plant. As this is a site-specific comment, it is considered outside the scope 

of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--20) 

D.2.29.12 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that reactor sites vary in proximity to historic and 

cultural resources. The commenter noted that the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station is located 

near Boston, Massachusetts, which is renowned for its rich cultural and historic institutions and 

asserted that impacts on these resources would be far greater than for a reactor located in a 

remote rural area. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. As stated in Section 4.12 of the GEIS, 

the magnitude of impact to historic and cultural resources depends on not only what resources 

are present, but the extent of proposed land disturbance, whether the area has been previously 

surveyed to identify historic and cultural resources, and whether the licensee has management 

plans and procedures that are protective of historic and cultural resources. The types of historic 

and cultural resources that exist at reactor sites across the United States are as diverse as the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

environments they exist in; including rural and semi-urban areas. For these reasons, the NRC 

considered a range of potential adverse effects on historic properties or impacts on historic and 

cultural resources in the GEIS to account for varying scenarios. The analysis concluded an 

impact range from SMALL to LARGE. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of this comment. 

-1-21) 

D.2.30 Comments Concerning Noise 

D.2.30.1 – COMMENT: A commenter asked if gunfire exercises, conducted by security 

personnel during power plant operations, would continue to be a source of noise into the future 

at nuclear fuel storage sites. 

RESPONSE: Spent fuel storage facilities are required to meet the physical protection 

UHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)53DUWVDQGZKLFKLQFOXGHDUHTXLUHPHQWWRKDYHWUDLQHGVHFXULW\

personnel. To the extent that security training at some sites might include the use of outdoor 

onsite practice ranges, it is possible that security training may result in occasional noise. 

However, these activities would be infrequent. Therefore, these activities would not change the 

SMALL impact determination for any timeframe considered in the GEIS. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--1) 

D.2.31 Comments Concerning Aesthetics 

D.2.31.1 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that aesthetic impacts for an away-from-reactor 

ISFSI are site-specific, and cited concerns about light pollution at the PFSF as an example. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the commenter. The NRC used the PFSF as a model in 

the GEIS to describe the physical characteristics of a hypothetical away-from-reactor ISFSI. As 

stated in SeFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VKRXOGWKH15&UHFHLYHDQDSSOLFDWLRQIRUDSURSRVHGDZD\-

from-reactor ISFSI, a site-specific NEPA analysis would be conducted; this analysis would 

include consideration of aesthetic impacts. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-

D.2.32 Comments Concerning Waste Management 

D.2.32.1 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC failed to consider waste generated 

from producing nuclear fuel, underestimated the amount of waste that would be generated from 

continued storage, and assumed that all of the spent fuel to be stored is homogeneous. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The impacts associated with the 

management and disposal of waste generated from the production of nuclear fuel are not within 

the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC addresses the environmental impacts associated 

with the production of nuclear fuel as part of the individual licensing actions for uranium 

enrichment, fuel fabrication, and other fuel cycle facilities. With regard to the comment that the 

GEIS treats all spent fuel as homogeneous, the GEIS considers a range of spent fuel 

characteristics including spent fuel type (e.g., boiling water reactor [BWR] and pressurized water 

reactor [PWR]), burnup, and age after service in reDFWRU6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6

describe the amount of waste that would be generated from the continued storage of spent fuel. 

The comment provides no information to support the assertion that the analysis underestimates 

the amount of waste that would be generated. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-

D.2.32.2 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern that the GEIS does not address 

Class C low-level or GTCC radioactive waste. The commenter asked how such waste would be 

transported to the Waste Control Specialists LLW site in Andrews, Texas, noting that en route 

from California it would need to pass through several states and many towns. The commenter 

also asked about the disposition of pipes, valves, and other wastes, as well as Class A and B 

LLWs. The commenter wanted information about the effects of LLW on human fetuses, infants, 

and children. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees that the GEIS needs to address GTCC wastes. GTCC waste 

is not generated as a result of storing spent fuel in pools or in dry storage. Therefore, this waste 

type is not within the scope of the GEIS and Rule, which focus on the impacts of storing 

commercial spent fuel during the continued storage period. Section 3(b)(1)(D) of the Low-Level 

5DGLRDFWLYH:DVWH3ROLF\$PHQGPHQWV$FWRIVSHFLILHVWKDW*7&&UDGLRDFWLYHZDVWH

disposal is a Federal responsibility, and is to be disposed of in a facility that is adequate to 

protect public health and safety and is licensed by the NRC in accordance with the requirements 

LQ&)53DUW7KHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKGLVSRVDORI*7&&LLW are 

currently being assessed by the DOE in its Draft EIS for the Disposal of Greater-Than-Class C 

(GTCC) Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) and GTCC-Like Waste (DOE/EIS-'DOE 

2011b). Consequently, assessing the environmental impacts associated with disposal of GTCC 

LLW is outside the scope of analysis for the GEIS and Rule. 

The amount of waste transported to Waste Control Specialists LLW site in Andrews, Texas, or 

any other LLW disposal facility, is evaluated as part of licensing actions for individual sites. 

These evaluations consider the amount, type, and timing of waste generated and transportation 

routes to potential waste disposal facilities. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The environmental impacts associated with the management and disposal of any LLW, 

including Class C waste, that is generated as a result of the storage of spent fuel is discussed in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KLVHYDOXDWLRQLQFOXGHVDQ\PDWHULDOWKDWKDVEHFRPHUDGLRDFWLYHO\

contaminated and activated metals, including pipes, valves, and rubble. LLWs are also 

discussed in Section D.2.32.3 of this appendix. 

The NRC based its dose limits and calculations on a descriptive model of the human body 

referred to as “standard man,” but has always recognized that these limits must be informed and 

adjusted in some cases for other factors (e.g., age and gender). More information about how 

the potential effects of radiation on human fetuses, infants, and children are considered in the 

calculation of doses and in setting dose limits is provided in Section ' of this appendix. 

Additional information is also available on the NRC’s website, at www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/radiation/rad-health-effects.html. 

The text box in Section 3.14 of the GEIS has been updated to include LLWs. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-31-4) 

D.2.32.3 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that LLW can contain the same long-lived species 

present in HLWs, and that the GEIS should include information on the types and concentrations 

of radionuclides present in LLWs that are generated when casks are replaced. The 

commenters wanted this information to account for all types of casks and geographic locations 

of the spent fuel storage facilities. One commenter questioned the assumptions and impact 

conclusions in the GEIS regarding LLW, stating that the GEIS should not consider LLW impacts 

to be small. In describing the types of materials included as LLW, the commenter cited a 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) document (under letterhead of the former GAO title 

“General Accounting Office”), Radioactive Waste: Answers to Questions Related to the 

Proposed Ward Valley Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility *$2SRLQWLQJ

specifically to a description of the materials and radionuclides found in LLW and the effects of 

human exposure under certain conditions to a quantity of cesium-

The commenters also stated that LLW disposal sites across the nation have leaked and that 

these risks and impacts should be analyzed. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that LLW can contain the same radionuclides present in spent fuel. The NRC disagrees 

with the comments stating that the GEIS needs more detail concerning the types of LLWs 

generated and questioning the GEIS’s impact conclusions. The environmental impacts 

associated with the management of LLW produced by spent fuel repackaging are evaluated in 

6HFWLRQDQGRIWKH*(,6/LW is a general term for a wide range of items that 

have become contaminated with radioactive material or have become radioactive through 

exposure to neutron radiation. Thus, such wastes can contain the same radionuclides that are 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

present in spent fuel. LLW LVFODVVLILHGLQ&)5DFFRUGLQJWRWKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQVRI

specific radionuclides present. All LLW must be managed and disposed of in accordance with 

NRC or Agreement State requirements. The GEIS evaluates the environmental impacts of 

storing and disposing of LLWs generated from spent fuel storage that accounts for all of the 

radionuclides present in these wastes. Further, the GEIS considers the environmental impacts 

associated with the types of casks and storage systems certified by the NRC for the storage of 

spent fuel. Because LLW management would continue to be subject to Federal and State 

regulations and enforcement and because the NRC expects disposal capacity for LLW to be 

available when needed, the NRC determined the impacts from LLW management and disposal 

would be SMALL. Site-specific environmental impacts associated with LLW disposal, including 

potential leaks from disposal facilities, are evaluated for each disposal site as part of the NRC or 

Agreement State licensing process under 10 &)53DUWRUWKHFRUUHODWLQJ$JUHHPHQW6WDWH

regulations. These site-specific environmental impacts are outside the scope of this GEIS and 

Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---11) 

D.2.32.4 – COMMENT: Commenters stated their belief that the impacts for managing 

nonradioactive wastes for the indefinite period would be SMALL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The SMALL to MODERATE impact 

determination reflects the potential for noticeable impacts on local and regional landfill capacity 

caused by the relatively large volumes of demolition wastes from replacement of the DTS, 

casks, canister transfer building, and pads. The comments provide no information to support 

the conclusion that the environmental impacts for waste management of nonradioactive waste 

would be SMALL for indefinite storage. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-3--2-11) 

D.2.32.5 – COMMENT: Two commenters noted that the GEIS analyzes low-level radioactive 

wastes generically, but that some nuclear power plants do not have access to LLW disposal 

facilities, and low-level waste generated at reactors without access to disposal facilities will 

present environmental concerns different from those of reactors having access to disposal 

facilities. One commenter also pointed out that boiling water reactors generate about twice as 

much LLW as pressurized water reactors. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. As stated in Section 3.14.1 of the 

GEIS, the EnergySolutions LLW disposal facility in Clive, Utah, can accept Class A LLW from 

any state. The Waste Control Specialists, LLC, site in Andrews County, Texas, can accept 

waste for disposal from individual generators within the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal Compact as well as generators outside the Compact, after receiving permission from 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

the Compact. Therefore, while some reactors, (e.g., the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station), 

are located in states that are not part of a LLW disposal compact, disposal facilities are 

available for LLW produced by these reactors. The NRC acknowledges that the amount of LLW 

waste varies by reactor type and design. This variability is accounted for in the GEIS evaluation 

of environmental impacts associated with waste management. More information about the 

generic treatment of issues in the GEIS is provided in Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix. 

Clarifying text has been added to Section 3.14.1 of the GEIS concerning LLW disposal 

availability for sites not located in compact states. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-1--3-

D.2.32.6 – COMMENT: A commenter wanted to know how much LLW would be generated as a 

result of repeated repackaging. The commenter also wanted to know how long repackaging 

would need to continue (i.e., how long does the spent fuel remain hazardous). 

RESPONSE: Estimates of the amount of LLW generated from repackaging of spent fuel are 

provided in the GEIS. The estimates for the amount of LLW generated by repackaging spent 

fuel during at-reactor continued storage are provided in 6HFWLRQ. The volume of LLW 

generated by repackaging spent fuel during away-from-reactor continued storage is provided in 

6HFWLRQThe GEIS assumes that this repackaging would need to occur every 100 years. 

Regarding the indefinite timeframe over which storage (and possible repackaging) would occur, 

see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of this comment. 

-

D.2.32.7 – COMMENT: Commenters indicated the NRC may not have a basis to state that 

sufficient LLW disposal capacity will be available when needed, stating that the assumption in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6PD\EHLQFRUUHFW2QHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDWWKH15&LQFRQFOXGLQJ

that the incremental impacts of LLW would be SMALL, is ignoring the fact that most radioactivity 

is from the irradiated fuel and that there may not be a disposal site available to accept LLW. 

The commenter stated that the NRC ignores the history of radioactive waste disposal sites in 

the United States, and that the GEIS has no basis to support a conclusion that sufficient LLW 

disposal capacity will be available when needed. Another commenter stated the NRC should 

analyze the possibility that a disposal facility might not be available unless the Federal 

government ensures one is available. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

One commenter stated that the GEIS neglects to mention that the Waste Controls Specialists 

LLW disposal facility in Texas “threatens the Ogallala Aquifer” with radionuclide contamination. 

Commenters also stated the GEIS needs to address the increasing costs of LLW disposal. In 

questioning the GEIS assumptions concerning LLW disposal availability and the costs of 

disposal, one commenter referenced NUREG–Report on Waste Burial Charges: 

Changes in Decommissioning Waste Disposal Costs at Low-Level Waste Burial Facilities (NRC 

2013r), stating that the report indicates that some facilities do not have access to disposal for 

their LLWs and that the report must account for the costs associated with this lack of access. In 

addition, the commenter noted that LLW disposal fees increased by 12 percent from 2010 to 

2012, and that the GEIS needs to acknowledge such inflationary increases. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments asserting that there may not be a basis 

for the assumption that sufficient LLW disposal capacity will be available when needed. As 

stated in the GEIS, the NRC expects that market demand will result in the development of 

additional LLW disposal capacity if present capacity is exceeded. Further, operators may store 

LLW onsite as long as they retain their NRC licenses. In the event that disposal capacity is not 

available to a licensee at some time in the future, the licensee could store the waste onsite until 

a disposal pathway is identified. 

The environmental impacts from the management and disposal of LLW are addressed in 

6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6IRUDW-reactor and away-from-reactor continued storage, 

respectively. These sections describe estimates of LLW volumes that would be generated 

during all three timeframes considered in the GEIS and demonstrate that environmental impacts 

of LLW management and disposal would be SMALL. 

One comment noted that NUREG–15&2013r) indicates that some facilities do not have 

access to LLW disposal facilities. The analysis for NUREG–ZDVSHUIRUPHGSULRUWRDQG

does not reflect the opening of the Texas compact waste disposal facility at the Waste Control 

6SHFLDOLVWV//&VLWHLQ$QGUHZV&RXQW\7H[DVRQ$SULO012. The facility can accept 

waste for disposal from individual generators outside the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal Compact states of Texas and Vermont. Clarifying text has been added to Section 

3.14.1 of the GEIS concerning LLW disposal availability for sites not located in compact states. 

The NRC disagrees with the comment stating that the NRC should analyze the possibility that a 

disposal facility might not be available unless the Federal government ensures one is available. 

The GEIS currently evaluates the environmental impacts from LLW waste management and 

disposal associated with the continued storage of spent fuel for short-term, long-term, and 

indefinite timeframes. The private or government ownership of LLW disposal facilities would not 

affect the environmental impact determination in the GEIS. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Concerning the comment about potential impacts on the Ogallala Aquifer by the LLW disposal 

facility operated by Waste Control Specialists, LLC: The Texas Compact Waste Facility 

disposal site is owned and licensed by the State of Texas (an Agreement State). Information 

related to the licensing of this facility is available at 

http://www.tceq.texas.gov/permitting/radmat/licensing/wcs_license_app.html/#licenseandamend 

and the environmental analysis (labeled as draft, because a final version had not been 

published as of May 2014) that was developed as part of the State’s licensing process can be 

found here: http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/permitting/rad/wcs/final_draft_ea.pdf. 

Because this comment relates to the impacts of a specific low-level waste disposal facility, and 

not to the impacts of LLW storage at reactor sites or at away-from-reactor spent fuel storage 

sites, it is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

The NRC recognizes that there are costs associated with management and disposal of LLW. 

Chapter 2 of the GEIS has been updated to include information about the costs of continued 

storage, including the costs of replacing storage and handling facilities (see Section 2.2.2.2 of 

the GEIS). 

--2--3--1--2--3--3-

D.2.32.8 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS needs to provide more information 

about the onsite management of LLW, specifically noting that any onsite compaction activities 

and onsite storage of such wastes need to be addressed. The commenter stated that the NRC 

does not have a sufficient basis to say that LLW disposal capacity will be available when needed 

and that wastes would need to be stored onsite longer than anticipated in the GEIS. The 

commenter cited failed LLW disposal compacts and the time needed to site and license a new 

disposal site. The commenter stated that the NRC should reassess the public and occupational 

health impacts to be consistent with the expanded discussion of onsite LLW management. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As stated in the GEIS, the environmental 

impacts from the management and disposal of LLW and the associated public and occupational 

health impacts during continued storage would be SMALL. For this short-term timeframe, the 

NRC based its analysis on the evaluation in the License Renewal GEIS (NRC 2013m) where 

the impacts for an additional 20 years of operation were determined to be SMALL during normal 

reactor operation. The evaluation in the License Renewal GEIS (NRC 2013m) included impacts 

from the management and onsite storage of LLW. The amount of LLW generated annually 

during the short-term timeframe is expected to be a small fraction of the LLW generated 

annually by normal operation and refurbishing activities at a reactor site during the licensed 

period of operation. Therefore the impact associated with the continued onsite management 

and storage of LLW during the short-term timeframe would also be SMALL. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

During continued storage in the long-term and indefinite timeframes, the NRC estimated the 

amounts of LLW that would be generated by replacement of spent fuel storage facilities, which 

is assumed to occur once every 100 years. The LLW generated by replacing at-reactor storage 

facilities would be a small fraction of the LLW generated during reactor decommissioning, which 

was determined to have a SMALL impact in the License Renewal GEIS (NRC 2013m). The 

LLW generated by replacing the larger away-from-reactor storage facilities would be 

comparable to the LLW generated during reactor decommissioning. Therefore, the impact 

associated with the continued onsite management and storage of LLW during the long-term and 

indefinite timeframes would also be SMALL. 

The NRC disagrees that the availability of LLW disposal capacity is uncertain because the NRC 

believes that sufficient LLW disposal and storage capacity will become available when needed. 

For more detail see Section ' of this appendix. 

&ODULI\LQJWH[WKDVEHHQDGGHGWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQFHUQLQJWKHRQVLWHVWRUDJHRI

LLW. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-11) 

D.2.32.9 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that waste of any kind must be handled in 

accordance with requirements at the Federal, State, and local levels in order to protect air and 

water resources. The commenter stated also that radioactive waste has received little attention 

and that elected and appointed officials need to find a solution for storing these wastes. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that all wastes need to be properly managed so that exposure to the public and 

environment is minimized. However, the NRC does not agree that a solution for storing 

radioactive wastes still needs to be found, because the NRC currently regulates radioactive 

waste storagHWRHQVXUHWKDWLWSURYLGHVDGHTXDWHSURWHFWLRQ$VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS, all wastes, including radioactive wastes, generated at NRC-regulated facilities are 

required be handled, stored, transported, and disposed of according to local, State, and Federal 

requirements. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1) 

D.2.32.10 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern about how scrap metal and other 

materials containing residual amounts of radioactivity may be released and could be used to 

manufacture new goods. One of the commenters noted that large quantities of metal generated 

from the decommissioning of nuclear power plants will be decontaminated and released for use 

in making new products. Another commenter stated that, at Big Rock Point Nuclear Power 

Plant in Michigan, LLW was disposed of in a local municipal landfill. The commenter stated that 

such “clearance level” or “below regulatory concern” exemptions permitted by the NRC are 

unacceptable. A third commenter referred to a 2012 incident in which items such as bicycle 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

baskets, tissue holders, and pet food bowls were manufactured overseas using radioactive 

metals, distributed in the U.S., and subsequently pulled from the U.S. market. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part with the comments and disagrees in part. NRC 

regulations are in place to ensure that NRC licensees maintain adequate control over NRClicensed radioactive material. Specifically, the regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 (Standards for 

Protection against Radiation) contain requirements for controlling radioactive material to limit the 

potential exposure to workers, members of the public, and the environment. The regulations 

also require the additional limitation of those exposures to levels that are ALARA. 

Nuclear power plant licensees that want to dispose of radioactively contaminated materials 

(e.g., concrete, metals, soil, equipment, and trash) as a result of decommissioning or other 

activity must comply with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. In general, 10 CFR Part 20 does not 

provide for the release of materials from nuclear power plants for unrestricted use or recycling 

that are known to be contaminated with licensed radioactive material. Instead, the NRC’s policy 

on releasing potentially contaminated material is addressed in several guidance documents, 

and the NRC conducts detailed case-by-case reviews of all proposals by nuclear power plant 

licensees to dispose of radioactively contaminated materials. An overview of the NRC’s policy 

on releasing materiDOVLVFRQWDLQHGLQ6HFWLRQRI185(*–9RO5Hv. 2 (NRC 

b). As stated in NUREG–UHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVW\SLFDOO\IROORZDQDSSURDFKWKDWZDV

established in two documents: 2IILFHRI,QVSHFWLRQDQG(QIRUFHPHQW&LUFXODU-“Control of 

Radioactively Contaminated Material” 15&DGGUHVVHVWKHFRQWURORIVXUIDFH

contamination and the sensitivity of detection equipment used in performing surveys and 

,QIRUPDWLRQ1RWLFH-“Survey of Wastes before Disposal from Nuclear Reactor Facilities” 

15&FRQWDLQVJXLGDQFHRQZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVDJRRGUDGLDWLRQPRQLWRULQJSURJUDP No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

The Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant reactor decommissioning process, which is outside the 

scope of this proceeding, provides an illustration of how a licensee may receive NRC approval, 

in a manner consistent with the process described above, to dispose of licensable material in a 

facility other than a LLW facility. In the case of Big Rock Point, the plant licensee requested 

NRC approval in 2001 to dispose of potentially contaminated demolition debris at a Michiganlicensed landfill in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002 (which provides that a licensee may apply 

to the NRC for approval to dispose of licensed material in a manner not otherwise authorized in 

NRC’s regulations). The NRC approved the request in 2002 and an update to that request in 

7KHOLFHQVHH’s activities to ensure compliance with NRC requirements included survey 

processes using highly sensitive detection equipment at the site; monitoring of onsite activities 

by an independent, certified health physicist; ensuring strict control over the movement of trucks 

carrying debris from the site; and using a detector at the receiving landfill. More information 

about this specific example is provided in the NRC’s EA for this action (NRC 2001c). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The comments also expressed concern about radioactively contaminated consumer products. 

This topic is not within the scope of the GEIS because it is not related to the continued storage 

of spent fuel. However, the NRC understands the sensitivity of this issue and is providing a 

response to these comments. The NRC only issues licenses for legitimate uses of radioactive 

material in consumer products (e.g., watches with tritium dials). The NRC does not issue 

licenses for any use of radioactive material where there is no apparent legitimate reason or 

benefit from the product containing radioactive material. Regarding foreign manufacture, the 

NRC has no regulatory authority over the manufacture of foreign products. The U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security is the Agency 

responsible for detecting these products at the border. More information about this topic can be 

found at the CBP’s website: http://www.cbp.gov/ and in the CBP fact sheet: 

http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/japan_fact_sheets_2.pdf. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-22--12) ---2) 

D.2.32.11 – COMMENT: $FRPPHQWHUUHIHUUHGWRDVHQWHQFHLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

that states, “Waste-minimization techniques employed by the licensees may include source 

reduction and recycling of materials either onsite or offsite.” The commenter expressed concern 

about this statement with regard to hazardous wastes, asking what form the recycled hazardous 

wastes would take, what the risks to people and the environment would be, and whether the 

motivation for recycling hazardous wastes is to save money on disposal costs. 

RESPONSE: The techniques, products, and motivations for the recycling of waste materials 

are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The statement of concern in the GEIS applies to 

all wastes. This includes hazardous wastes (e.g., used oil and solvents) and non-hazardous 

wastes (e.g., paper, cans, and bottles). As stated in the GEIS, waste generators must manage 

hazardous wastes in accordance with applicable Federal and State regulations, including 

shipment of the waste offsite for disposal or recycling at licensed facilities. Further, as the GEIS 

states, the establishment of a waste-minimization program is a requirement for managing 

hazardous wastes, specifically under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--3) 

D.2.33 Comments Concerning Transportation 

D.2.33.1 – COMMENT: A commenter noted the GEIS combines a large number of 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQVWXGLHVRIYDULRXVNLQGVLQFOXGLQJDQDO\VHVIURPDQG The commenter 

VXJJHVWHGWKH$(&DQG15&DDQDO\VHVQHHGWREHXSGDWHGEHFDXVH

the Interstate Commerce Commission has been replaced by the Surface Transportation Board. 

The commenter also disagreed with assumptions about institutional controls and compliance with 

transportation regulations and requested a reexamination. Past transportation incidents were 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

described to support assertions that regulations are inadequate or not being followed. These 

incidents included a radioactive maWHULDOVWUXFNRQ,QWHUVWDWHGULYLQJGXULQJLF\FRQGLWLRQV

which the commenter claimed was a violation of regulations. The commenter referenced the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (part of the U.S. Department of Transportation) 

stating that judgments about weather conditions are left to professional truck drivers, State, and 

ORFDORIILFLDOV7KHFRPPHQWHUDOVRGHVFULEHGD1RYHPEHUDFFLGHQWLQ1HEUDVNDLQYROYLQJ

a tractor trailer carrying two nuclear warheads that overturned in icy conditions. The commenter 

asserted State officials raised concerns about DOE compliance with protocols for advanced 

notice of shipments and about the remote location of the route. The commenter alleged the DOE 

had removed radiation monitors from the shipment prior to the accident. The commenter 

suggested these events show lax enforcement of transportation regulations that contradicts the 

assumption in the draft GEIS of compliance with regulations. Another commenter claimed 

transportation regulations were not protecting the public. The commenter described the case of 

an August 22, 2013 fire on a truck carrying radioactive materials. The commenter claimed the 

fire was not required to be reported to the NRC and asserted that other such unreported 

incidents could be occurring. Other transportation anecdotes were provided by a commenter 

concerned about eliminating the risk of accidents, terrorism, and release of radioactive material 

during transport. In one case the commenter had witnessed a truck carrying radioactive cargo 

that had no visible security or escort. Another case involved a radioactive material truck 

shipment that the commenter claimed “sprang a leak” during re-fueling and no security or escort. 

The commenter was not specific about what had leaked from the truck. Another case involved 

claims that radiation was measured at the roadside by citizens with Geiger counters from 

passing trucks carrying waste from a decommissioned power plant. The commenter also 

mentioned the widely reported case of a truck stolen in Mexico that was carrying a sealed source 

and claimed there was no security. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. While a number of prior NRC or NRCsponsored transportation analyses are referenced in the GEIS, the cited studies collectively 

represent a large body of technical work that supports the conclusions in the GEIS. Because 

later analyses build on earlier works, it is appropriate and relevant to cite the applicable prior 

studies rather than just the most recent analyses. In general, the later analyses of 

transportation risks have confirmed that earlier studies were conservative and overestimated 

risks. The most recent GEIS reference to an NRC-sponsored analysis of spent fuel 

transportation risks involved current methods and data and concluded that risks are SMALL. 

Regarding comments that the GEIS assumptions about regulatory compliance with 

transportation regulations are invalidated by alleged noncompliance or accidents, the NRC finds 

the information provided by commenters insufficient to support these claims. Accidents 

involving radioactive materials shipments are rare and the NRC, in cooperation with the U.S. 

Department of Transportation (DOT), takes compliance with its regulations seriously through the 

implementation of regular inspection and, as needed, enforcement actions. In addition, some of 

the examples of incidents provided by commenters do not appear to have any particular 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

relevance to continued storage transportation activities or the GEIS (e.g., shipments of nuclear 

warheads, radioactive materials transportation in Mexico, and a mechanical truck fire that did 

not cause a traffic accident or affect the payload of unspecified radioactive materials). 

A wide variety of radioactive materials are shipped in the United States each year. The 

transportation regulations have been developed to match the level of hazard presented by the 

material to be shipped. In this regard, both the NRC and DOT packaging and transport 

UHJXODWLRQV&)53DUWVDQG&)5— —DVDSSURSULDWHWRWKH

mode of transport) become more stringent as the potential risk of the shipped material 

increases. This approach helps to ensure the radiation dose from any accident would not pose 

a serious health risk. Additional information on the safety of radioactive material transportation 

is provided in Section D.2.33.21 of this appendix. In addition, the use of physical protection 

during shiSPHQWVDVUHTXLUHGE\&)53DUWLVOLPLWHGWRWKHVPDOOSURSRUWLRQRI

radioactive material shipments that warrant such protection, such as spent fuel shipments. 

Therefore, it would not be unusual to observe a truck shipment that was labeled radioactive that 

did not have a special security escort. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-3--3--3---34--2--

D.2.33.2 – COMMENT: A few commenters expressed concern about the GEIS assumptions 

used to support the conclusions about the risks of radioactive material transportation. One 

commenter stated that radiological doses in the GEIS seem to be based on an assumption that 

there will be only external exposures to radioactive materials and that there would be no 

contamination, for example, on the outside of a shipping container. Another commenter 

expressed the view that NRC ignored dangerous and costly transportation risks including 

loading and unloading; health, environmental, and financial risks onsite and along the route; as 

well as train and truck accidents and, in particular, accidents involving fire from fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The concern expressed in the comment 

that the GEIS only considers external exposures has misinterpreted the GEIS transportation 

impact analysis. The GEIS transportation analysis is not based only on the stated assumptions 

described in the comment. The GEIS analysis is based on applicable and significant exposure 

pathways for both incident-free (normal conditions; no accidents) and accident transportation 

conditions. 

The referenced dose analyses that supported the evaluation of transportation conditions when 

accidents do not occur, assume compliance with all applicable regulations. Under these 

conditions, the only radiation exposure to the public and workers from transportation of spent 

fuel would be direct radiation from the package because there would be no release of 

radioactive materials. The referenced analyses of accident conditions involving spent fuel 

shipments consider accidents of varying severity, weighted by their probability of occurrence, to 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

calculate risk. Rare but severe accidents in these analyses result in modeled releases of 

radioactive material from the package and public dose from released material in air and 

deposited to the ground surface. Accident risk calculations consider direct radiation from the 

packaged spent fuel that would occur from loss of package shielding. The scenario suggested 

by the comment assuming radiological contamination on the outside of the package under 

normal transport conditions is considered unlikely. NRC licensees are required to conduct 

surface radiation surveys prior to shipment. These surveys would detect external radiation that, 

if identified, would be removed prior to shipment. Section RIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVWKH

populations that would be affected by radioactive materials transportation including members of 

the public that could be exposed to radiation emitted from the packaged material during normal 

transportation and workers that are involved in transportation activities. Referenced 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQDQDO\VHVLQ&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUH[SRVXUHVWRZRUNHUV

involved in package handling; the consequences and risks of train and truck accidents, including 

land contamination; cost of cleanup; and consideration of accidents involving fire from fuel. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3---

D.2.33.3 – COMMENT: One commenter referred to a May 2013 report by the American 

7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWHWKDWVWDWHGWKDWLQWKHUHZHUHODUJHWUXFN

accidents in the United States. The commenter stated that if 0.001 percent of these accidents 

were trucks transSRUWLQJVSHQWIXHOWKHUHZRXOGEHDFFLGHQWVSHU\HDU7KHFRPPHQWHU

further noted that just one worst-case accident involving a spent fuel package breach, fire, and 

subsequent release of radioactive material would contaminate land, streams, animals, and 

people, including those in traffic along the route. The commenter added that such an accident 

would be deadly and cause the accident location to be uninhabitable for decades. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Because the likelihood of getting into an 

accident is proportional to the number of vehicle miles traveled, it is important to consider 

accident rates that include miles traveled. The most recent transportation risk analysis 

referenced in the GEIS (NUREG–, NRC 2014d) considered accident frequency data as 

recorded by the DOT and reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for large truck 

DFFLGHQWVDQGIUHLJKWUDLODFFLGHQWVIURPWKURXJK7KHUHVXOWLQJDFFLGHQWUDWHVZHUH

DFFLGHQWVSHUODUJHWUXFNNLOometers (0.0031 accidents per 1,000 large truck miles) 

DQGDFFLGHQWVSHUUDLOFDUNLORPHWHUVDFFLGHQWVSHUUDLOFDUPLOHV

However, only a subset of all accidents would have significant consequences and were 

therefore of interest in the analysis. The analysis of the effects of probable accidents on truck 

transportation packages resulted in no releases of spent fuel. A subset of severe rail accidents 

that LQFOXGHGFROOLVLRQVZLWKKDUGURFNRUHTXLYDOHQWDWLPSDFWVSHHGVJUHDWHUWKDQNSK

mph) sufficient to cause a release of radioactive material. The calculated conditional probability 

of a radioactive materials release from impact was calculated using common event tree 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

methods for a specific rail FDVNDV(-10. Whether these accidents happen depend on the 

likelihood (conditional probability) of the accident scenario as well as on accident frequency, 

which would be weighted by the estimated vehicle miles traveled for the spent fuel shipments. 

Therefore, the chance of a spent fuel transportation accident of sufficient severity to cause a 

release is very small and results in low calculated accident risks. Using the previously 

mentioned accident rate for rail (0.00011 accidents per 1,000 railcar kilometers) and the 

FRQGLWLRQDOSUREDELOLW\RIWKHDFFLGHQWLQYROYLQJUHOHDVHRI(-10, the chance of having such 

DQDFFLGHQWZRXOGEHWKHSURGXFWRIWKHVHQXPEHUVRU(-14 per 1,000 railcar kilometers 

traveled. These details were not included in the GEIS because they were adequately described 

in the referenced report. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

--4) 

D.2.33.4 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concerns about transportation accidents 

involving fire or terrorist attacks. The commenter stated that fire can mobilize and transport 

radioactive material in the air causing downwind inhalation exposures that could cause cancer 

or genetic defects. Specifically, the commenter expressed concern about the potential for spent 

fuel to self-ignite and burn uncontrollably. The commenter mentioned that numerous scientific 

experts have expressed concern about the effect of a burning fire on zircaloy cladding resulting 

in an exothermic reaction. The commenter noted shipping containers are designed for a 30-

PLQXWHILUHDWDWHPSHUDWXUHRI)7KH\UHIHUUHGWR1XFOHDU(QHUJ\,QVWLWXWH1(,

SDFNDJHWHVWLQJLQYROYLQJD)ILUHIRUPLQXWHVDVLQDGHTXDWHQRWLQJWKDWUDLOILUHV can 

burn for hours and can burn hotter. The commenter described a case on August 22, 2013, 

where a truck carrying radioactive material in Ohio caught fire and therefore suggested that 

radioactive material transportation is not safe. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment’s concern about the risks of a 

transportation accident involving a fire for the reasons stated below. Comments concerning 

environmental impacts of terrorist attacks are addreVVHGLQ6HFWLRQ'RIWKLVDppendix.

The GEIS transportation impact analyses reference a recent NRC transportation risk analysis, 

NUREG–15&2014dLQ6HFWLRQVDQG185(*–15&2014d) 

includes a detailed analysis of the risks of spent fuel transportation including analyses of the 

impacts of postulated fire conditions on various transportation casks. This study used computer 

codes capable of modeling both fire behavior and the thermal responses of casks engulfed in or 

adjacent to those fires to analyze the response of the transportation casks to three different fire 

configurations. The fire configurations included those based on NRC cask test criteria and fuel 

spill fires engulfing the cask or with the cask at various distances from the fire. To estimate the 

duration of the fires, all of the fuel in a rail tank car or tanker truck was released and assumed to 

form a pool with the dimensions of a regulatory pool fire for the casks analyzed. None of the fire 

accidents investigated in this study resulted in a release of radioactive material. NUREG–
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

(NRC 2014d) also provides additional information that addresses the differences between 

maximum fire temperatures in a real fire with non-uniform heating and the uniform heating that 

is considered in regulatory tests. 

The comment did not provide sufficient information for the NRC to understand what conditions 

involving the transportation of spent fuel were expected to cause spent fuel cladding to catch 

fire. The circumstances involving the potential for spent fuel to undergo this type of runaway 

exothermic oxidation reaction during storage in spent fuel pools are evaluated in Appendix F of 

the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.33.5 – COMMENT: Commenters asked whether transportation of radioactive waste 

establishes away-from-reactor storage sites for spent fuel and thus initiates transportation of 

tens of thousands of casks of dangerous spent fuel on roads and railways for the benefit of the 

nuclear power industry while endangering health and safety of millions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments that the transportation of radioactive 

waste establishes away-from-reactor storage sites. An away-from-reactor storage facility similar 

WRWKHW\SHRIIDFLOLW\HYDOXDWHGLQ&KDSWHURIthe GEIS would have to be proposed by an 

applicant seeking a license from the NRC. The NRC would only grant a license for that facility 

after completing a thorough licensing review that evaluates compliance with NRC regulations 

and satisfies NRC’s NEPA obligations. An away-from-reactor commercial spent fuel storage 

facility would need an NRC license prior to receiving shipments of spent fuel for storage. The 

safety of radioactive material transportation is addressed in Section D.2.33.21 of this appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of the comments. 

--30-1) 

D.2.33.6 – COMMENT: A number of commenters expressed concerns with the condition of 

transportation infrastructure including railroads, bridges, and roads. Potentially hazardous road 

conditions (e.g., sharp turns) on local roads were also mentioned as potential contributors to 

accidents. Commenters were concerned that degraded infrastructure and generally hazardous 

road conditions would increase the risk of accidents to unacceptable levels and therefore 

expressed the view that transportation of nuclear waste should not be allowed. One commenter 

claimed that degraded infrastructure made accidents inevitable. Other commenters cited 

Pennsylvania as an example, and noted that the governor said roads and bridges in the state 

are crumbling. Commenters noted press reports indicating two of every five Pennsylvania 

bridges are structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. One commenter referred to an 

American Society of Civil Engineers report that reported half of Pennsylvania major urban roads 

in poor or mediocre condition. In addition, lack of funding in Pennsylvania for infrastructure 

improvements was noted as a related concern. A commenter asked what would happen if 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

radioactive waste transportation were involved in past bridge collapse events. Another 

commenter recommended track inspections prior to rail shipments of radioactive materials. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC is aware of and understands 

concerns about aging transportation infrastructure, which have been widely reported. While 

challenges remain in addressing specific parts of the nation’s aging infrastructure, the NRC has 

reasonably concluded that radioactive materials can be transported safely based on existing 

safety practices and regulations. Railroads, for example, have track-maintenance and 

inspection programs necessary for continued economic viability and therefore, the NRC has 

reasonably concluded that it is unlikely that the rail infrastructure would be allowed to degrade to 

a point where safety would be significantly affected. 

In the unlikely event an accident does occur, the layered system of NRC and DOT safety 

UHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)53DUWVDQG, DQG&)5Parts ——DV

appropriate to the mode of transport (e.g., testing and approval of packaging, proper placarding 

and labeling, limiting the dose rate from packages and conveyances, approved routing for 

shipments of spent fuel, safeguarding, and incident reporting [See Section D.2.33.21 of this 

appendix]) provide additional protection of the public to limit the potential consequences. The 

transportation risk analyses referenced in the GEIS, use state-of-the-art methods to account for 

the probability of accidents of different severities and the response of the package under 

modeled accident conditions. Regarding potential infrastructure effects, the most recent 

transportation risk analysis (i.e., NUREG–>15&2014d]) which is referenced in the GEIS, 

evaluates the consequence of an elevated highway collapsing directly on a spent fuel 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQSDFNDJH7KLVDFFLGHQWZDVVLPLODUWRFRQGLWLRQVH[SHULHQFHGGXULQJWKH

San Francisco earthquake. The analysis assumed that the cask was lying directly on the 

roadway (negating the cushioning effect of the trailer and impact limiters) and a main beam of 

the elevated freeway fell and hit the middle of the cask. Stresses in the cask and damage to the 

beam were evaluated and no loss of containment was observed for this scenario. These and 

other analyses referenced in the GEIS consistently show that the accident risks from 

transportation of spent fuel are extremely low. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(30-14-----3--3--2-4) 

D.2.33.7 – COMMENT: One commenter noted that the GEIS does not discuss transportation of 

high-burnup fuel or how this fuel would be transported to offsite locations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The referenced 

risk analyses supporting the traQVSRUWDWLRQLPSDFWFRQFOXVLRQVRIWKH*(,6LQ&KDSWHUVDQG

considered the impacts of transporting high-burnup spent fuel. For example, the referenced 

transportation risk analysis in NUREG/CR–Sprung et al. 2000) quantitatively evaluated 

the risks RIWUDQVSRUWLQJVSHQWIXHOZLWKEXUQXSVXSWR*:'078 The referenced 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

transportation risk analysis in NUREG–15&2014d) also included a general discussion of 

the effect higher burnup rates would have on the results of the quantitative analyses that were 

based on low-burnup spent fuel. That discussion explained that high-burnup spent fuel would 

likely be cooled for longer periods and would have to meet the same external dose rate limits, 

so thermal and dose rate properties would not change. In addition, NUREG–(NRC 2014d) 

stated that the forces involved in the modeled severe accidents were sufficient to fail cladding 

regardless of burnup; therefore, the modeled loss of confinement functions of cladding when 

subjected to severe accident forces would exist regardless of burnup. Some radionuclides in 

the inventory were expected to increase in high-burnup spent fuel although data were limited to 

evaluate the release fractions for high-burnup fuel. Overall, based on the expected changes to 

inventory alone, NUREG–15&4d) noted the transportation accident radionuclide 

releases for high-burnup spent fuel would increase relative to the low-burnup fuels that were 

evaluated quantitatively in the study; however, the increase was not considered sufficient to 

alter the conclusions of the study that radiological impacts from spent fuel transportation 

conducted in compliance with NRC regulations are low. The NRC’s current understanding is 

that additional information on the mechanical properties of cooled high-burnup fuel would be 

needed to accurately quantify the accident fuel-rod-to-package release fractions and the 

resulting effect on transportation accident risks and NRC continues to monitor technical 

developments in this area of research. While there is uncertainty regarding these fuel rod-topackage release fractions, the NRC-certified package, which must comply with the same 10 

&)53DUWSDFNDJHDSSURYDOVWDQGDUGVZKHWKHUXVHGIRUKLJK- or low-burnup spent fuel, is 

the primary barrier against the release of radioactive material in the event of a transportation 

accident. In addition, as described in NUREG–WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWDQDFFLGHQWZRXOG

occur with sufficient force to damage a transportation package and cause a release is very low 

and the corresponding transportation accident risk is also low. The details of these referenced 

risk assessments were not described in the GEIS because they were adequately described in 

the source documents. 

In response to this and other comments about high-burnup fuel, additional information about 

high-burnup fuel, including how it is transported, is provided in the GEIS as a new Appendix I. 

No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.33.8 – COMMENT: A commenter noted that SectioQRIWKH*(,6ZKLFKLVD

subsection of the description of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions for the 

cumulative impact assessment, briefly describes transportation of spent fuel for disposal and 

assumes that it would occur. The commenter expressed the view that because no dry cask is 

currently licensed to transport high-burnup fuel, the GEIS must discuss any potential licensing 

challenges for high-burnup fuel and the possibility that this fuel might never leave its storage 

location. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC has certified packages for 

transportation of high-burnup fuel, therefore, the recommended revisions to the GEIS are not 

needed. The NRC approves designs only after a full safety review. Based on these reviews, 

the NRC has certified package designs to transport high-burnup fuel currently in storage at 

ISFSIs. Examples of packagings are the NAC-806-+,-67$5-DQG

MP--ZKLFKDUHFHUWLILHGWRWUDQVSRUWhigh-burnup fuel that is currently being 

stored. Tables G-4 and G-LQ$SSHQGL[*RIWKH*(,6KDYHEHHQUHYLVHGWRLQFOXGHWKH

associated transportation package, and to indicate whether systems are approved for use with 

high-burnup spent fuel. Additionally, a new Appendix I has been added to the GEIS to provide 

more information on high-burnup fuel, including transportation and casks that have been 

certified for transportation of high-burnup fuel. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of 

this comment. 

-2-3) 

D.2.33.9 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed the view that the GEIS does not 

adequately assess transportation impacts after long-term storage of spent fuel. They suggested 

the transportation impact assessment is limited primarily to a generic assessment of the 

inconsequential impacts associated with the construction of DTSs and replacement of dry cask 

storage facilities. The commenter described the GEIS as relying on previous studies to 

evaluate the impacts from spent fuel transportation; however, the commenter noted that many 

RIWKHVWXGLHVDUHGDWHGHJWKH$(&DQG15&DDQDO\VHVDQGGLGQRWFRQVLGHU

spent fuel degradation issues (e.g., stress-corrosion cracking, embrittlement, and swelling of 

fuel pellets) identified in an NRC report on information needs for long-term storage assessment. 

They expressed the view that the integrity of cladding and components of the spent fuel 

assemblies are important for ensuring safety of transportation. Another commenter stated that 

the evaluation of transportDWLRQLPSDFWVDSSURDFKGHIHUVWRJHQHULFILQGLQJVLQ&)5

Table S-4, additional NRC risk analyses completed subsequent to Table S-4, and analysis done 

for the PFS Site in Utah. The commenter expressed the view that the cited studies were 

finalized after consideration of public comments. The commenter added that there is no basis 

to reconsider the determinations documented in Table S-4. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. While additional studies may be issued 

in the future on spent fuel degradation issues, NEPA only requires an agency to use currently 

available information in its environmental analyses. The GEIS transportation impact analyses 

were based on several referenced transportation risk assessments. The earliest analysis 

supSRUWHGWKHJHQHULFILQGLQJVLQ&)57DEOH6-4. These generic findings were 

incorporated by reference into the GEIS where applicable and this use does not entail any 

reconsideration of the determinations documented in Table S-4 as suggested by a comment. 

The most recent transportation risk analysis referenced in the GEIS was completed in 2013 

(NRC 2014d). That study did not evaluate long-term spent fuel degradation but did consider 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

unlikely severe accidents that would be sufficient to cause a release of radioactive material. 

Overall, the conclusions from these risk assessments indicate that transportation risks and 

impacts are SMALL. 

The GEIS impact analyses also assume that aging management programs would be maintained 

over the long-term and indefinite storage timeframes (when fuel is expected to be stored in dry 

cask systems) prior to transportation. As described in Section 2.2.1.3 of the GEIS, in 

DFFRUGDQFHZLWK&)5,6)6,OLFHQVHUHQHZDODSSOLFDWLRQVPXVWLQFOXGHDPRQJRWKHU

things: (1) time-limited aging analyses that demonstrate that structures, systems, and 

components important to safety will continue to perform their intended safety function for the 

requested period of extended operation and (2) a description of the aging management program 

for management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect structures, systems, 

and components important to safety. Similar aging analysis and management requirements 

apply to general ISFSI licensees as part of storage cask CoC renewals, for more information 

VHH6HFWLRQ'RIWKLVDSSHQGL[These requirements enhance confidence that spent fuel 

including bare fuel, fuel in canisters, or damaged fuel that has been reinforced by canning or 

end-capping and stored in dry casks could be retrieved for repackaging, if needed, or for 

transportation. Additional information about aging management programs and transportation is 

provided in Section D.2.33.10 of this appendix. Discussion of issues related to handling 

damaged fuel are located in Section ' of this appendix. Additional clarifications to 

descriptions of spent fuel degradation and aging management programs were added to Section 

B.3.2.1 of the GEIS in response to this and other comments. No changes were made to the 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

------

D.2.33.10 – COMMENT: One commenter repeated comments submitted during scoping that 

requested that the NRC integrate the systems components of the nuclear power industry, 

including its nuclear wastes and components of the spent fuel transportation system, into the 

GEIS to produce a useful and meaningful analysis. An example of this integration was 

considering that some sites may not have space to build a DTS or a dry cask replacement 

facility. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS analyses are based on an 

integrated understanding of the systems related to management of spent fuel including wastes 

and components of the spent fuel transportation system. For example, the DTS assumption 

was incorporated, in part, to address the need to transfer fuel from storage-only casks into 

transportation-approved casks. The availability of land area to accommodate the construction 

of a DTS or an ISFSI is addressed in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.33.11 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the analysis of transportation impacts of 

away-from-UHDFWRUVWRUDJH3PLVVHVWKHPDUN ́FLWLQJ6HFWLRQ(6RIWKH*(,67KH

commenter suggested including an analysis of the associated risks including but not limited to a 

discussion of the various canisters that are to be used for such transportation, the transfer into 

those casks, and the risks of the transport. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The public and occupational health and 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQLPSDFWDQDO\VHVLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6UHVSHFWLYHO\LQFRUSRUDWH

the results of prior impact analyses that assess the impacts of fuel cask handling and transfer 

operations as well as incident-free and accident impacts of spent fuel transportation. The cask 

handling impact analysis was based on using a specific cask and canister system that is 

expected to provide a reasonable representation of the handling doses to workers. The most 

recent transportation impact analysis referenced in the GEIS is NUREG–15&2014d). 

This analysis evaluated a variety of available cask designs, then selected three specific designs 

for use in the detailed risk analyses. The detailed analysis considered rail and truck casks, two 

of which involved inner welded canisters with fuel and one with no inner canister around the 

fuel. While the results of the risk analysis varied depending on the cask that was used, all casks 

resulted in low risks that were protective of public health and safety. The transportation risk 

results from NUREG– (NRC 2014dDQGRWKHUVWXGLHVZHUHUHIHUHQFHGLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS. The details of these supporting analyses were not repeated in the GEIS because the 

information was adequately described in the referenced documents. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-1-

D.2.33.12 – COMMENT: A commenter noted that spent fuel is easier to transport if its 

WHPSHUDWXUHLVDERYH&)EHFDXVH]LUFRQLXPFODGGLQJLVPRUHGXFWLOHDERYHWKDW

temperature. However, they further nRWHGWKDWWUDQVSRUWLQJIXHOWKDWLVDERYH&)

would be more damaging because it would also have higher radioactivity when compared to 

older fuel that has allowed some time for radioactive decay to reduce radioactivity. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees, in general, that higher temperatures would increase the ductility of cladding. In addition, 

the NRC is aware of concerns regarding potential detrimental effects of hydride reorientation on 

zirconium cladding behavior as high-burnup fuel cools. These effects include reduced ductility 

which makes cladding more brittle. Should spent fuel cladding become more brittle, greater 

care could be required during handling and transportation. An important factor with this process 

that relates to the comment about temperature is the ductile-to-brittle transition temperature 

(DBTT) which has been previously described by the NRC (2012h). That report noted cladding 

with radial hydrides will undergo a ductile-to-brittle transition somewhere in the temperature 

UDQJHRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\WR&WR) The actual temperature would depend on 

the stress and temperature under which the radial hydrides were formed, the particular cladding 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

alloy, and its initial cold work state. While additional investigation is needed, the NRC 

determined that the effects are not evident if the material remains above the DBTT (NRC 

2012hZKLFKLVZHOOEHORZWKH&)WHPSHUDWXUHFLWHGLQWKHFRPPHQW7KHUHIRUH

the concerns of the comment about ductility apply to a lower temperature range than cited in the 

comment. 

As described in Section 2.2.1.2 of the GEIS, the temperature of spent fuel decreases over time 

during pool storage prior to being transferred into dry cask storage. NRC guidance regarding 

GU\FDVNVWRUDJHUHFRPPHQGVDPD[LPXPFODGGLQJWHPSHUDWXUHRI&)DQGDGU\

inert atmosphere to reduce the potential for significant degradation. This dry cask storage 

maximum cladding temperature is well DERYHWKH'%77UDQJHRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\WR&

WR)7KHSURMHFWHGFODGGLQJWHPSHUDWXUHIRUKLJK-burnup spent fuel in dry storage casks 

UHPDLQVDERYH&)EH\RQG\HDUVRIVWRUDJH(35,a). Therefore, the 

temperature of fuel transported after years of continued storage would be bounded by this 

PD[LPXPYDOXHRI&)DQGZRXOGUHPDLQDERYHWKHUHSRUWHG'%77UDQJHIRUat least 

several decades. If the spent fuel needs to be stored long enough that the cladding 

temperature would be within the DBTT range, then degradation would be possible. During 

storage, required aging analyses and management programs (see Section ' of this 

appendix) would be conducted to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components 

important to safety will continue to perform their intended safety functions. If these analyses 

concluded that spent fuel safety functions would not be met, the NRC could require corrective 

actions to maintain the fuel-specific safety functions (e.g., handling as damaged fuel, which the 

NRC addresses in Section ' of this appendix and in revisions to Section 2.2.2.1 of the 

GEIS). In addition, a description of research involving the effects of hydride reorientation on the 

ductility of cladding is included in the new Appendix I on high-burnup fuel. 

-

D.2.33.13 – COMMENT: Two commenters noted that Chapter 3 of the GEIS (Affected 

Environment) did not sufficiently identify site-specific issues that should be addressed on a 

case-by-FDVHEDVLV7KH\SURYLGHGDQH[DPSOHRIGUDIW*(,6WH[WIURP6HFWLRQ

(Transportation) that states “Local and regional transportation networks in the vicinity of nuclear 

power plant sites may vary considerably depending on the regional population density, location, 

and size of local communities, nature of economic development patterns, location of the region 

relative to interregional transportation corridors, and land surface features, such as mountains, 

rivers, and lakes.” The commenters noted this text was an example of an impact where generic 

treatment was insufficient. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. While the affected environment for 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQPD\YDU\DWVSHFLILFVLWHV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WUDQVSRUWDWLRQDFWLYLWLHVWKDW

DUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHDUHOLPLWHGDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGof the 

GEIS. Therefore, the direct and indirect transportation impacts of continued storage are 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

generally SMALL (MODERATE in the case of away-from-reactor storage facility construction) 

regardless of the location. There are uncertainties regarding future conditions at sites during 

continued storage; nevertheless, because the activities associated with transportation are 

limited and well-understood, a generic analysis of the impacts of transportation is possible. In 

addition, the cumulative impact analysiVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUVWKHHIIHFWRI

past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions in the vicinity of power plants based, in 

part, on conditions surrounding power plant sites and concludes SMALL to MODERATE 

transportation impacts. Based on inherent temporal uncertainties that exist whether the 

continued storage analyses were conducted site-specifically or generically, the NRC expects 

that a site-specific continued storage cumulative impact analysis would be unlikely to result in 

impact conclusions with different ranges than determined in the GEIS cumulative impact 

analysis as described further in Section D.2.41.1 of this appendix. Therefore, a generic 

approach to evaluating the cumulative transportation impacts of continued storage is also 

appropriate. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--3-2) 

D.2.33.14 – COMMENT: A commenter recommended that the 15&UHPRYH&KDSWHURIWKH

GEIS (Environmental Impacts of Away-from-Reactor-Storage) because this storage option does 

not satisfy the NRC’s ALARA standard. The commenter claimed the risks from the additional 

transportation that would be needed (i.e., transport of spent fuel from power plant to storage and 

from storage to disposal rather than direct transport from power plant to disposal) are 

unnecessary. The additional risks were described as including traffic accidents, theft, and 

contamination of virgin land. The commenter claimed transportation was not well controlled and 

provided an example where radiation emitted from a passing truck was measured in Amarillo, 

Texas at several hundred counts-per-minute as the truck passed and expressed concern for 

public exposures along the route. The commenter acknowledged that there could be 

circumstances where maintaining the safety of spent fuel would require that the fuel be moved; 

however, that commenter recommended each case be evaluated separately for risks and 

benefits. The commenter further expressed the view that fuel should not be moved merely for 

the convenience of the plant operators. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As described in Section 1.3 of the GEIS, 

the GEIS assesses and discloses the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel, 

but does not authorize storage of spent fuel. The impact analysis for away-from-reactor 

FRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHLQ&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6SURYLGHVLQVLJKWVLQWRWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRIDZD\-

from-reactor storage, including risks of transportation accidents; however, any future license 

applications for away-from-reactor facilities would involve additional site-specific NRC safety 

and environmental reviews. ALARA is defined in 10 CFR 20.1003 and is incorporated into the 

NRC radiation protection regulations applicable to NRC licensees. In reviewing any future 

proposed away-from-reactor storage facility, the NRC would consider whether the proposed 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

activities would comply with the applicable 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for maintaining 

exposures in accordance with ALARA. The results of these site-specific safety and 

environmental reviews would be considered in making any future licensing decision for an 

away-from-reactor storage facility. 

With respect to the comment that transportation of radioactive materials is not adequately 

regulated, and the accompanying example cited (i.e., measuring radiation from a passing 

radioactive materials shipment), insufficient information was provided for the NRC to evaluate 

whether the specific information reported was accurate. However, the DOT radioactive 

materials regulations limit the allowable radiation dose rate from a truck carrying radioactive 

materials to a level that is above the ambient background radiation dose rate. Therefore, it 

would not be unusual for a person to measure an increased dose rate for the instant that a truck 

compliant with existing regulations passes a point. Because, in this example, the duration of the 

exposure is low (on the order of a few seconds) the total dose received is still low despite the 

elevated dose rate coming from the truck. The transportation risk analyses referenced in 

6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6LQFRUSRUDWHWKHVHUHJXODWRU\OLPLWVLQWRFDOFXODWLRQV

of public doses for various shipping scenarios and these analyses consistently conclude that the 

resulting doses are low and the regulations are protective of public health and safety. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(410-24) 

D.2.33.15 – COMMENT: Two commenters expressed concerns about transportation cask 

integrity under accident conditions. A commenter expressed concerns about the effects of 

underwater submersion of a loaded spent fuel transportation cask on the integrity of the cask 

and the potential for release of radioactive material to waterways that are a source of drinking 

water. Specifically, the commenter expressed concern about the potential for criticality if the 

cask were submerged or overheating if a cask were buried in river sediments. The commenter 

cited an unspecified document that describes the potential for criticality in a submerged dry cask 

DQGQRWHGWKDWWKH'2(KDGSUHYLRXVO\SODQQHGWRXVHEDUJHVKLSPHQWVDVSDUWRIWKH

proposed transportation of spent fuel from power plants to a proposed HLW repository at Yucca 

0RXQWDLQ7KHFRPPHQWHUVXSSRUWHGWKHFULWLFDOLW\FRQFHUQVE\UHIHUULQJWRD6HSWHPEHU

criticality accident at a nuclear fuel factory in Japan that caused fatalities and public and worker 

radiation doses. The commenter also expressed concerns about the adequacy of NRC 

transportation package design criteria and required tests. The commenter asserted the required 

package tests were inadequate because they did not require full-scale tests. Regarding water 

submersion tests, the commenter noted a damaged cask was required to be submerged in 

m (3 ft) RIZDWHUIRUKRXUVDQGDQXQGDPDJHGFDVNVXEPHUJHGLQIWRIZDWHUIRUKRXU

The commenter questioned the extent of package damage assumed for tests and the relevance 

of the test conditions to expected accident conditions, in particular, whether it would take more 

than 1 hour to retrieve a submerged cask from a river bottom. The commenter also noted that 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

WKHGHSWKRI/DNH0LFKLJDQH[FHHGVWKHIWUHTXLUHGE\WHVWVDWORFDWLRQVQRWIDUIURP'2(-

proposed shipping routes. Another commenter provided a brief statement about the irony of 

package testing. The NRC interpreted the statement to mean that the commenter was 

suggesting that transportation package testing for accident conditions—including tests required 

by the NRC (e.g., free drop, water immersion, crush, and high-temperature tests) do not meet 

the commenter’s expectations for actual accident conditions. The commenter also mentioned 

high-speed crashes of packages into concrete barriers do not meet expectations for actual 

accident conditions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Transportation of spent fuel by barge is 

an uncommon method of transportation that is applicable to a small number of reactor sites 

where spent fuel would be stored. Therefore, the GEIS did not explicitly evaluate or describe 

the impacts of barge transportation. However, the impacts of barge transportation, including 

accidents, were evaluated in NUREG–15&WKHJHQHULFLPSDFWDQDO\VLV

supporting Table S-DQGFLWHGLQ&)5DQGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH

GEIS. NUREG–IRXQGEDUJHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQLPSDFWVWREHOHVVWKDQWKHLPSDFWV

calculated for both rail or truck transport. Additional description of the multiple layers of 

requirements that directly address credible safety-related concerns including accidents is 

provided in D.2.33.21. 

Regarding concerns about potentially hazardous transportation route conditions, DOT 

regulations allow States or Tribes to review and approve routing for spent fuel shipments. A 

State has to approve shipment routes before the route can be used, which ensures routes for 

spent fuel transportation avoid locations where unsafe conditions of travel could be 

encountered. In addition, depending on whether the spent fuel is shipped by an NRC licensee 

or the DOE, the NRC or the DOE would inspect the shipping plans and equipment to verify 

compliance with applicable regulations. Regarding the criticality concerns, spent fuel 

transportation casks are certified by the NRC based, in part, on an analysis that demonstrates 

they would remain subcritical if flooded with unborated water. Comments on the adequacy of 

NRC regulations are beyond the scope of the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

---1-

D.2.33.16 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that spent fuel currently stored in dry casks 

cannot be transported because most of the canisters are not licensed for transportation. 

Another commenter recommended that Section 2.1.2.2, pages 2-14, lines 1-RIWKHdraft GEIS 

should state that the NRC has not designated any casks for transportation. Accordingly, the 

commenter requested that prior to transportation the NRC require licensees to transfer all spent 

fuel to transportation casks. Another commenter asserted that casks approved by the NRC for 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

onsite storage are not safe for transportation and therefore are not safe under environmental 

conditions that require moving casks from the onsite location to a more secure location (e.g., 

sea-level rise, severe flooding). 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As discussed in Section 2.1.2.2 of the 

GEIS, spent fuel may be stored in casks and canisters that are licensed for storage only or for 

both storage and transportation. Both types of cask certification are acceptable for storage 

provided they meet NRC requirements. $VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6SULRUWR

transportation, spent fuel stored in casks approved only for storage must ultimately be 

transferred into casks approved for transportation. Section 2.1.4 of the GEIS describes how a 

DTS or equivalent capability would facilitate reconfiguration of the spent fuel to meet 

transportation requirements. The NRC has certified specific cask and canister systems for both 

storage and transportation. An example of this is the Holtec Hi-Star 100 rail cask that was 

included in the NUREG–15&2014dWUDQVSRUWDWLRQULVNDVVHVVPHQWFLWHGLQ&KDSWHUV

DQGRIWKH*(,67KHFDVNLVFXUUHQWO\EHLQJXVHGIRUGU\VWRUDJHDQGLVFHUWLILHGIRU

transportation. Changes in the design of storage systems (that do not require NRC approval 

under existing storage certification requirements) after a CoC for transportation is issued by 

NRC or the need to meet specific conditions of the transportation compliance certification may 

require additional NRC reviews prior to use of a specific cask or canister for transportation. 

Regarding the assertion that storage-only casks are not safe because they cannot be moved in 

the event of flooding or sea-level rise, the impacts of climate change including flooding were 

HYDOXDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGWKH15&FRQFOXGHGEDVHGRQWKHUHODWLYHO\VORZ

rate of changes in flood risk over time, that any regulatory action that may be necessary will be 

taken in a timely manner to ensure the safety of dry cask storage systems. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--30--2-

D.2.33.17 – COMMENT: Two commenters provided comments on national transportation 

impacts. One commenter noted that the GEIS transportation analyses considers transportation 

only within the vicinity of the reactor or interim storage sites, for example, commuting workers 

and supply shipments. The commenter suggested the limited scope of the analysis is the 

reason for concluding impacts would be SMALL to MODERATE. For shipments in the vicinity of 

a site, the commenter asserted that the impacts of an overweight truck or large-load rail 

shipments, in particular traveling on sub-par infrastructure, are not considered. In addition, the 

commenter noted that the short-term and long-term timeframe analyses presume eventual 

large-scale transportation of spent fuel; however, the commenter claimed the analyses appear 

to ignore the major impacts of national-scale transportation of spent fuel from all reactor sites. 

The commenter asserted that large-scale national transportation of spent fuel is the result of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

many site-specific licensing decisions and that it has not been demonstrated in the United 

States. Therefore, the commenter noted, the formulation of the GEIS does not warrant ignoring 

this impact. 

Another commenter noted that a generic analysis misses the transportation-related issues 

associated with a real-world facility. Examples provided included a site with no rail access 

having to use heavy-haul trucks to transport spent fuel; and site-specific geographic barriers 

that limit use of heavy-haul trucks and increase transportation links, modes, and facilities 

required to move spent fuel. The commenter noted these types of site-specific transportationrelated barriers require specific planning and need to be sufficiently described to evaluate the 

impacts on the environment, social structures, politics, and socioeconomics (e.g., costs). The 

commenter added that risks for such shipments rise as the number of transfers increase and the 

failure to recognize these site-specific realities is a critical mistake in the use of a generic 

analytical approach. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The affected environment and impact 

analysis in the GEIS consider impacts from transportation activities that include local, regional, 

and national geographic areas of influence. Traffic impacts, for example, have a localized area 

of influence. For radiological impacts, the affected environment for the GEIS transportation 

LPSDFWDQDO\VLV6HFWLRQLQFOXGHVZRUNHUVDQGPHPEHUVRIWKHSXEOLFOLYLQJDORQJUHJLRQDO

and national routes, using these transportation routes, and using stops that are within range of 

exposure to radiation emitted from the packaged material during normal transportation activities. 

This analysis also includes people that could be exposed in the unlikely event of a severe 

accident involving release of radioactive material. 

Transportation risk assessments referenced in the GEIS impact analysis evaluate exposure 

scenarios consistent with the affected environment and the scope of the analysis. Because the 

GEIS will support individual licensing actions for power reactors, the focus of the impact 

analysis is on the continued storage transportation impacts associated with an individual facility 

and not a larger population of facilities (e.g., national scale) as recommended by the comment. 

7KHGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWLPSDFWDQDO\VHVLQ6HFWLRQVDQG of the GEIS is limited to 

transportation activities associated with continued storage. For example, the at-reactor analysis 

does not consider transportation of spent fuel, but does consider workers commuting and limited 

operational waste shipments. In contrast, away-from-reactor storage would require spent fuel 

shipments to a storage facility; therefore, the GEIS evaluates impacts of cross-country 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQIURPUHDFWRUVWRDVWRUDJHIDFLOLW\7KHUHIHUHQFHGULVNDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS applies a representative route approach using conservative assumptions that bound 

the potential variation in impacts associated with evaluating different site-specific mode 

configurations (e.g., heavy-haul truck with intermodal rail transfer). The rail accident analysis 

assumes four casks per train with each cask conservatively assumed to simultaneously 

experience the same accident forces during an accident. This is conservative because rail car 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

spacing between cask cars would place casks at different locations in the train. The cumulative 

DQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUVDGGLWLRQDOXUDQLXPIXHOF\FOHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ

impacts and the impacts from the reactor’s cross-country shipments of spent fuel to a repository 

for disposal. Therefore, the transportation impact analyses in the GEIS evaluate impacts 

beyond a localized area of influence. In addition, conservative assumptions and methods in 

some analyses broadly encompass the variability in impacts expected from site-specific 

transportation options consistent with a generic impact analysis approach. 

The comment’s suggestion to evaluate spent fuel transportation impacts from all reactors on a 

national scale goes beyond the scope of the GEIS based on the individual reactor licensing 

focus that is described in Section 1.0 of the GEIS. In addition, a comment response addressing 

degraded transportation infrastructure issues is provided in Section ' of this appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--3-

D.2.33.18 – COMMENT: Various commenters expressed the view that a national spent fuel 

repository would create new and complex transportation safety problems for the nation. They 

noted opening a national repository would result in tens of thousands of spent fuel and other 

waste shipments across the United States. These and other commenters expressed concerns 

about accidents or terrorism in states where spent fuel would be transported. A few 

commenters referred to transportation of spent fuel to a repository as “mobile Chernobyl” in 

reference to a historic nuclear reactor accident involving large radioactive material releases in 

Ukraine. Some commenters asked whether the emergency evacuation plans required for 

nuclear power plants should also be applied to transportation corridors. They further asked 

whether the increased threat to national security is worth the cost or risks to public safety. 

One commenter questioned the effectiveness of transportation security and described a case 

where a train carrying nuclear waste was boarded by escaping prison inmates. The commenter 

claimed the largest casks carry 200 Hiroshima bombs of “radiological equivalent”. The 

commenter was concerned that armed terrorists could board a train and cause problems. The 

commenter expressed concerns about the potential for shipments to be attacked by planes filled 

with jet fuel, missiles, or bombs that could cause fires that could facilitate radioactive material 

releases. The commenter noted that U.S. Army testing has demonstrated that transportation 

casks can be penetrated by missile attack but did not reference any specific reports. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. National-scale impacts from spent fuel 

transportation to a repository are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule, which evaluate the 

continued storage impacts applicable to an individual reactor licensing action. In addition, the 

GEIS cumulative impact analysis considers the additional impacts of reasonably foreseeable 

past, present, and future actions that would overlap in both space and time and accumulate with 

the impacts from continued storage at an individual storage facility. Therefore, the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

transportation impacts from shipping the stored fuel from the individual power plant site or awayfrom-UHDFWRUVWRUDJHIDFLOLW\WRDUHSRVLWRU\DUHFRQVLGHUHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6$V

GHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKHHQYLURQPHQWDO impacts of a specific geologic 

repository will be addressed in the EIS that the DOE is required to submit for any geologic 

repository application that it submits. 

5HJDUGLQJWKHVDIHW\RIVSHQWIXHOWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ15&DQG'27UHJXODWLRQVLQ&)53DUW

provide for rigorous standards for the design and construction of shipment casks to ensure safe 

and secure transport of their hazardous contents. Casks must meet extremely demanding 

standards to ensure their integrity in the most severe conditions. In addition, after September 

11, 2001, the NRC issued Orders to licensees requiring increased security in the transportation 

of specific types of radioactive materials, including spent fuel shipments. These Orders and 

other additional security requirements weUHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRDUXOHPDNLQJ)5) 

that amended the NRC regulations for the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit 

LQ&)53DUW 15&DQG'27UHJXODWLRQVLQ&)53DUWVDQGDQG&)5

——as appropriate to the mode of transport require spent fuel shippers to use 

approved routing, apply safeguarding measures, including the use of armed escorts and 

emergency response plans. The transportation risk analyses referenced in the GEIS 

consistently show that the accident risks from transportation of spent fuel are extremely low. 

Additional information about the safety of radioactive material shipments is provided in Section 

D.2.33.21 of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--10---14-------2--

-1) 

D.2.33.19 – COMMENT: A commenter provided for NRC consideration a bibliography of 

publications that provide information and analysis related to the transportation topics evaluated 

in the draft GEIS. The list includes Transportation of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: 

Regulatory Issues Resolution (EPRI 2010b); Criticality Risks During Transportation of Spent 

1XFOHDU)XHO5HYLVLRQ(35,)XHO5HORFDWLRQ(IIHFWVIRU7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ3DFNDJHV

(35,E6SHQW-fuel Transportation Applications, Normal Conditions of Transport (EPRI 

D6SHQW)uel Transportation Applications—Assessment of Cladding Performance (EPRI 

F$VVHVVPHQWRI$FFLGHQW5LVNIRU7UDQVSRUWRI6SHQW1XFOHDU)XHOWR<XFFD0RXQWDLQ

8VLQJ5$'75$1(35,D6XPPDU\RIWKH1$65HSRUWGoing the Distance? The 

Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States

(35,EDQG6SHQW1XFOHDU)XHO7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ—An Overview (EPRI 2004a). 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part with the comments. The NRC has evaluated the 

references identified in the comment and found no information that would change the impact 

conclusions of the transportation impact analyses in the GEIS. The reports referenced in the 

comment provide additional relevant supplemental information on a wide variety of topics 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

related to transportation that are addressed in the GEIS. The transportation impact analyses 

are already supported by a several referenced analyses, the NRC did not identify any need for 

this additional information, and the commenter did not identify or suggest that any specific 

additional information was needed in the GEIS in the comment. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.33.20 – COMMENT: A commenter asserted property values would decline along spent fuel 

transportation routes and that such impacts have been documented in several states including 

New Mexico, Colorado, Tennessee, Washington, and Ohio. In particular, they noted residents 

that live along routes would be exposed to frequent shipments of large amounts of spent fuel 

transported to away-from-reactor storage facilities. They mentioned a recent DOE study that 

HVWLPDWHGRYHUDGXOWFDQFHUIDWDOLWLHVIURPUDGLDWLRQHPLWWHGIURPtrucks. They further 

asserted that homeowners insurance does not cover radiological incidents or accidents in most 

cases and suggested there is uncertainty regarding who would reimburse parties affected by a 

nuclear waste transportation accident. Specific concerns included widespread loss of property 

and livelihood from the release of radioactive materials from an accident or terrorist attack. The 

commenter cited unspecified studies by DOE and NRC to support a claim that a severe 

transportation accident could contaminate an area of 42 mi2

 for a year at an economic cost of $2 

billion. The commenter further noted several issues of concern (i.e., the industry would not be 

responsible for damages after the spent fuel leaves the power plant site; inadequate State 

budgets; the Price-Anderson Act does not cover nuclear waste transportation accidents; and the 

current Congress is unlikely to pay damages [citing the experience with Hurricane Sandy 

emergency aid]). They further suggested that health insurance may not cover some illnesses 

related to long-term radiological-related illness caused by a transportation accident. They 

expressed concern about the economic consequences of a release of radioactive material from 

a transportation accident. An additional concern was expressed that local rights of States are 

being challenged regarding their ability to oppose nuclear waste transportation through their 

communities. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Several transportation risk analyses 

referenced in the GEIS have concluded that the accident risks from transportation of spent fuel 

are extremely low. Additional information about the safety of radioactive material transportation 

under incident-free and accident conditions is provided in Sections ' and D.2.33.21 of 

this appendix. The comment refers to the results of unspecified DOE and NRC analyses 

asserting transportation impacts involving widespread dispersal of radioactive materials without 

providing any context for the information provided. Contrary to the position taken in the 

comment, liability claims from members of the public for personal injury and property damage in 

the event of a severe accident or terrorist attack involving transportation of spent fuel or nuclear 

waste from a licensed reactor are covered by the Price-$QGHUVRQ$FW Funds provided to 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

pay Price-Anderson Act claims come from annual premiums paid by all reactor licensees. If 

these funds were depleted after a nuclear incident occurred, then Congress would determine 

whether additional disaster relief is required. Additional information about the Price-Anderson 

Act is provided on the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/funds-fs.pdf. 

Regarding the potential for economic effects including a decline in property values along 

transportation routes, the GEIS did not address any public stigma-related socioeconomic 

impacts related specifically to the transportation of radioactive materials. In addition, as 

described further in Section D.2.22.3 of this appendix, the NRC concludes that perceptionbased chilling effects and stigma-related impacts are uncertain or speculative and do not need 

to be considered in this GEIS. While the potential for stigma-related socioeconomic impacts is 

more plausible in the unlikely event of a severe accident involving a release of radioactive 

materials, the risk of a severe transportation accident that would cause a release is very low, 

and therefore the risks associated with any impacts conditional on that accident occurring are 

also low. 

The comment also raised concerns about the passage of State laws affecting local 

municipalities’ ability to oppose nuclear waste transportation through their communities. These 

matters are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--3--2--2--2--2-

D.2.33.21 – COMMENT: Commenters provided concerns and opinions about (1) the safety of 

radioactive material transportation including the potential for accidents and release of 

radioactive materials, (2) how radioactive waste should be shipped to a disposal or storage site 

or (3) whether such shipments should be allowed at all. 

Regarding safety concerns, commenters expressed the view that transportation risks were 

greater than onsite storage risks and noted transportation of spent fuel is subject to error, 

accidents, collisions, terrorism, mechanical breakdowns, degraded infrastructure, spills, 

inadequate security, and inexperienced hazardous material personnel and limited emergency 

response capabilities in remote areas. Some commenters referred to thousands of shipments 

on roads, rails, and waterways that would be needed as unnecessary and irresponsible. They 

objected to shipping spent fuel to temporary offsite storage facilities claiming it would require 

more transportation than moving spent fuel directly to a disposal facility. They noted this 

additional transportation would involve additional radiation exposures to people along the 

routes, increased risks, increased accidents, and increased financial risks including cost to 

taxpayers. A number of commenters were concerned about new and unique local 

transportation risks to various locales such as Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, the 

District of Columbia, and the Savannah River Site. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Commenters expressed concerns about accidents from various causes including earthquakes 

and severe weather such as tornadoes, hurricanes, high temperatures, and snow and ice. 

Other commenters noted the number of annual traffic fatalities or accidents, unspecified prior 

NRC or DOE transportation risk studies, or asserted a history of accidents that indicate a lack of 

safety for transporting waste. One commenter, citing unspecified studies, argued that the 

number of accidents would increase with the number of shipments. They noted thousands of 

shipments would cause hundreds of accidents resulting in high and potentially lethal doses, 

HOHYDWHGFDQFHUULVNVODQGFRQWDPLQDWLRQRIDODUJH-mi) area, and large economic 

FRQVHTXHQFHVFLWLQJDILJXUHRIELOOLRQIURPDQXQVSHFLILHG'2(UHSRUW7KH

commenter claimed the fact that accidents would occur during transportation refutes NRC 

studies that claim transportation is safe. Another commenter was concerned that an increase in 

fracking from natural gas development would increase earthquakes and affect transportation. 

Commenters were concerned that transporting large volumes of waste during an earthquake 

would have catastrophic consequences. One commenter asserted that even without accidents, 

radioactive elements are not being contained by the equipment used to ship materials. Another 

commenter suggested even a low-speed accident could cause a release of radioactive material. 

Commenters also noted terrorist attacks with planes, missiles, or bombs could ignite transport 

vehicles, causing fires that release radiation. Some commenters claimed that even undamaged 

transportation casks could present significant risks because they lack shielding to prevent 

gamma and x-ray radiation from escaping. 

Other commenters expressed assurance of the safety of transportation. One commenter 

described the experience of participating in a spent fuel shipment and noted the care and skill 

demonstrated in conducting the shipment and coordination with State and local lawenforcement authorities. Another commenter noted that 3,000 spent fuel shipments covering 

RYHUPLOOLRQPLKDGEHHQVDIHO\FRPSOHWHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV

Commenters provided numerous recommendations on how radioactive wastes can be 

transported, (e.g., using lead-lined containers and limiting shipments to short distances). One 

objected to the secrecy involved in transporting nuclear waste. Other commenters 

recommended limiting risks to the public by funding dedicated transportation infrastructure for 

radioactive waste, revising regulations, using military escorts for fuel shipments, or requiring an 

EIS and opportunity for public comment for all spent fuel transportation. 

Some commenters objected to spent fuel being transported through their cities, states, and 

major metropolitan areas. Other commenters requested prohibiting spent fuel transportation 

altogether (favoring onsite storage). Another commenter suggested waste should not be 

transported until a capability for immediate emergency response is available. Another 

commenter requested prohibiting transportation of radioactive waste on rivers. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. 

The NRC agrees with the comments that an away-from-reactor storage facility requiring 

additional transportation, and therefore additional radiation doses and risks relative to at-reactor 

storage, would result in increases in doses and risk, however, as indicated by the transportation 

LPSDFWDQDO\VLVUHVXOWVIRUDVXFKDIDFLOLW\UHSRUWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKHPDJQLWXGH

of the increase would be low and therefore the radiological impacts would continue to be small. 

The NRC disagrees with the comments asserting that transportation of radioactive materials is 

unsafe or that applicable regulations are inadequate and should be revised. As described in 

6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6WKHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRIUDGLRDFWLYHZDVWHDQGVSHQWIXHOPXVW

FRPSO\ZLWK15&DQG'27UHJXODWLRQV7KHVHUHJXODWLRQV&)53DUWVDQG, DQG

&)5––DVDSSURSULDWHWRWKHPRGHRIWransport) protect public and worker 

safety by applying multiple layers of detailed requirements that directly address the credible 

safety-related concerns expressed in the comments including radiation exposures from normal 

transportation, accidents and their consequences, security and safeguards including terrorism, 

and emergency response. The requirements address safety through testing and approval of 

packaging to withstand normal and accident conditions during transport; proper placarding and 

labeling; limiting the dose rate from packages and conveyances; use of approved routing for 

shipments of spent fuel; safeguarding shipped materials, and incident reporting. 

As the comments have noted, there are a wide variety of potential causes of transportation 

accidents. However, the likelihood of an accident that includes forces sufficient to breach a 

certified spent fuel transportation cask is very low and therefore the overall accident risk is low. 

Several prior NRC transportation risk analyses cited in the SeFWLRQVDQGRI

the GEIS include detailed transportation risk assessments that conclude the risks of transporting 

a reactor’s radioactive waste and spent fuel under normal and accident conditions are small and 

that the regulations are adequate to ensure safety. In addition, regarding terrorist threats, the 

design of casks would make a release of radioactive materials from a terrorist attack extremely 

unlikely. After September 11, 2001, the NRC issued Orders to licensees to increase security in 

the transportation of specific types of radioactive materials, including spent fuel shipments. 

These Orders and other additional security requirements were incorporated into a 2013 

UXOHPDNLQJ)5) that amended the NRC regulations in 10 CF53DUWIRUWKH

physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. 

Imposing additional controls, as suggested by the comments (e.g., more prescriptive routing 

restrictions and imposing distance limits on shipments) would require changes to national policy 

or existing regulations. Changes to the national policy for disposal of spent fuel or regulations 

governing waste disposal or transportation are separate actions that are beyond the scope of 

the GEIS and Rule. The comments expressing concerns about national-scale impacts of spent 

fuel transportation from all reactors goes beyond the scope of the GEIS based on the individual 

reactor licensing focus that is described in Section 1.0 of the GEIS. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-300 September 2014 

Regarding comments about limited local emergency response capabilities and resources, 

emergency response in the unlikely event of an in-transit radioactive material transportation 

accident is a State responsibility, although first responders to accidents normally include local 

police or fire department. States will be notified by police and State representatives and in 

almost all cases will respond to emergencies. Therefore, response to accidents involves local 

responders but is not completely reliant on those responders to protect the health and safety of 

the public. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2) (12-2) (23--3----1) (143----20---

--------30--13-2-13---

----11----1------21--

--12--21--24--3----3--3---2-

-2--1--2--1-4-2--2-----

2----1---------

-----------1) 

-1) (1000-2) 

D.2.34 Comments Concerning Public and Occupational Health 

D.2.34.1 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the draft GEIS did not explain the direct 

radiation hazards posed by spent fuel. The commenter stated that the GEIS should include 

descriptions of the types of spent fuel, the amount of radionuclides contained in spent fuel, and 

the half-life of the contained radionuclides. The commenter believed this would support the 

assessment of radiological impacts over the different timeframes considered in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The GEIS does discuss public and 

occupational dose impacts related to the radiation hazards posed by the continued storage of 

VSHQWIXHOVSHFLILFDOO\LQ6HFWLRQVDQG'HVFULSWLRQVRIWKHVSHFLILFW\SHVRIVSHnt fuel 

considered in the GEIS are found in Section 2.1. For the reasons noted in that section, the 

NRC did not consider other types of spent fuel in this analysis. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(244--2) (244--

D.2.34.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that leaks of radioactive waste into the 

environment can cause environmental damage and human health effects. Commenters 

disagreed with the NRC’s assumption that surface waterbodies near nuclear power plants are 

usually sufficiently large to ensure dilution of liquid effluents containing radioactive material. 

These commenters stated that radionuclides can become concentrated in biota far above levels 

present in the water. Some commenters stated that radioactive material released to the 

environment can result in environmental build-up over time. One commenter stated that 

scientific practices do not permit radioactive contamination leaks to continue unabated, but such 

unacceptable leaks are happening onsite at every reactor site in the country. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-301 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. Although the GEIS does not explicitly 

consider the radiological impacts from environmental build-up in biota, the NRC believes that 

the radiation protection standards for humans, coupled with the monitoring of effluents, 

foodstuffs, and biota, are protective to non-human organisms. Several of the comments 

concerned with human health effects are addressed in Section D.2.34.11 of this appendix. 

Comments concerned with contamination due to leaks are addressed in Section D.2.40.1 of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-------1------2) 

D.2.34.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the contribution of skyshine (i.e., radiation 

scattered by the atmosphere) to radiation exposures near ISFSIs should have been considered 

in the draft GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with this comment. The contribution of skyshine to radiation 

H[SRVXUHVZDVFRQVLGHUHGDVSDUWRIWKHDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,61R

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.34.4 – COMMENT: One commenter described the internal dosimetry and radiation health 

effects of tritium as the basis for why he believed that micro-dose calculation is important for 

assessing the carcinogenic potential of tritium decay in the human body. Another commenter 

described tritium as a special safety concern that the NRC has not dealt with sufficiently and 

stated that this is causing adverse health effects in people drinking water contaminated with 

tritium. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. A discussion of tritium leaks from spent 

fuel pools during continued storage can be found in Section D.2.40.1 of this appendix. 

The NRC has taken steps to address issues raised by tritium leaks from nuclear power plants. 

Nuclear power plants routinely and safely release dilute concentrations of tritiated water. These 

authorized releases are closely monitored by licensees and reported to the NRC. Information 

about these releases is made available to the public on the NRC's website. Recently, several 

instances of unintended, abnormal releases of radioactive liquids to the environment were 

identified. The NRC believes that all available information about those releases shows no threat 

to the public. In response to concerns about tritium in groundwater, nuclear power plants have 

instituted programs to minimize the potential for tritium leakage and have put in place more 

extensive groundwater monitoring programs. More information about tritium leakage can be 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-302 September 2014 

found at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/grndwtr-contam-tritium.html. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(410--

D.2.34.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that NRC requirements do not consider the 

susceptibility of children, elderly, women, including pregnant women, and other sensitive groups 

to radiation-related disease. Among the other sensitive groups specifically mentioned by one 

commenter were people with hemochromatosis, a genetic defect in iron metabolism, and people 

with ataxia telangiectasia, an immunodeficiency disease. One commenter stated that the GEIS 

should not rely on the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 

report (UNSCEAR 2013) because it only utilized the probable effect of radiation released in the 

first week of the Fukushima meltdown. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC has based its dose limits 

and dose calculations on a descriptive model of the human body referred to as “standard man.” 

However, the NRC has always recognized that dose limits and calculations based on “standard 

man” must be informed and adjusted in some cases for factors such as age and gender. For 

example, the NRC has different occupational dose limits for pregnant women workers once they 

have declared (i.e., made known) they are pregnant because the rapidly developing human 

fetus is more radiosensitive than an adult woman. NRC dose limits are also much lower for 

members of the public, including children and elderly people, than for adults who receive 

radiation exposure as part of their occupation. Finally, NRC dose calculation methods have 

always included age-specific dose factors for each radionuclide in order to consider the varied 

sensitivity to radiation exposure by infant, child, and teen bodies, which are also generally 

smaller than adult bodies. In addition, the calculation methods have always recognized that the 

diets (amounts of different kinds of food) of infants, children, and teens are different from those 

RIDGXOWV6HH15&b). 

The amount of radioactive material released from nuclear facilities is well measured, well 

monitored, and known to be very small. The doses of radiation that are received by members of 

the public as a result of exposure to nuclear facilities are so low (i.e., less than a few millirem) 

that resulting cancers attributed to the radiation have not been observed and would not be 

expected. Finally, the NRC uses many sources of scientific study to ensure its regulations are 

protective. The NRC will not focus strictly on any one report such as the United Nations 

Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation report (UNSCEAR 2013) mentioned by 

one commenter. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--31--------1---
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-303 185(*௅

D.2.34.6 – COMMENT: A commenter asked whether aging management inspections and 

required corrective actions that are currently performed in spent fuel pools will be performed at 

onsite DTSs, and will these corrective actions impact public and occupational health impacts 

described in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The aging management and corrective action programs currently required at 

licensed facilities will continue to be required of future licensees for onsite dry transfer and 

storage systems. A separate site-specific NEPA review will be conducted prior to the issuance 

of a license for a DTS. The environmental impacts from operations will be analyzed as part of 

that review. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--2-10) 

D.2.34.7 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that consolidated (away-from-reactor) storage 

would increase worker radiation exposures at the power plant, during transportation, and at the 

consolidated storage site. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. Radiation dose to workers at a future 

away-from-reactor facility will be monitored at that facility, at the originating reactor, and during 

transportation, in accordance with the NRC’s dose requirements. Worker dose is regulated in 

accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 Standards for Radiation Protection. These requirements will 

continue to be enforced to maintain worker dose within limits and include ALARA requirements 

to maintain radiation exposures ALARA. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-

D.2.34.8 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concerns about the EPA’s March 2013, 

Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents: Draft for Interim 

Use and Public Comment (EPA DQXSGDWHWR(3$¶V3$*0DQXDO,QSDUWLFXODUWKH

commenter expressed a view that the updated PAG Manual has jettisoned the EPA’s allowable 

risk values of 1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000. Another commenter, citing Japanese and U.S. 

Food and Drug Administration standards for radioactive material in food, stated that the U.S. 

allows certain levels of radioactive material in food that becomes contaminated as a result of 

leaking waste. 

RESPONSE: The EPA’s March 2013 draft protective action guides (EPA 2013) and standards 

by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration have no bearing on and are beyond the scope of the 

GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30---21-2) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-304 September 2014 

D.2.34.9 – COMMENT: A commenter provided a detailed description of the movement of 

radionuclides in the environment. The commenter described the transport of radionuclides from 

the point of release through food and drinking-water pathways, and stated that NRC risk 

estimates are based almost entirely on the external gamma and beta radiation, distributed 

uniformly over large areas, and largely ignore the multitude of specific risks due to in-situ 

radionuclide incorporation. The commenter also stated that NRC uses an artificially inflated 

QXPEHURIP5SHU\HDUIRUQDWXUDOEDFNJURXQGUDGLDWLRQWRFRPSDUHZLWKPDQ-made causes 

of radiation dose. The commenter stated that NRC should add the natural background dose to 

the dose from man-made sources before reaching a conclusion on health effects. The 

commenter stated his view that there is no threshold for a safe dose of radiation so any 

additional level of exposure can be expected to cause additional damage to health. 

This commenter also disagreed with an assumption in the GEIS that MOX fuel is “substantially 

the same” as that from uranium fuel and stated that this assumption shows that the NRC has 

ignored the isotope composition of the spent fuel in its risk estimations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. Many of these comments are 

addressed in Section D.2.34.11 of this appendix—in particular the comments that relate to 

health effects and no threshold for safe dose. The NRC has determined that MOX fuel is 

appropriately considered within the scope of the GEIS. MOX fuel has been used in commercial 

nuclear reactors and is substantially similar to existing uranium oxide fuel for light water 

reactors. Therefore, the NRC’s analysis of the environmental impacts from continued storage of 

uranium oxide fuel also applies to MOX fuel. Section 2.1.1.3 of the GEIS discusses the fuels 

considered in the NRC analysis, including MOX fuel and fuel for integral pressurized water 

reactors. 

With respect to the analysis in the GEIS, the NRC did consider the natural background dose 

and the dose from man-made sources in its analysis. Table 3-3 of the GEIS lists the annual 

average dose received by an individual from all sources of radiation including background 

radiation. The annual average dose received from nuclear fuel cycle operations is a very small 

percentage (approximately 0.1 percent) of the total background radiation. The NRC 

acknowledges that the natural background dose can vary greatly from one location to the next, 

but for analytical purposes the NRC uses a number that is close to the average annual 

exposure from natural background radiation. 

With respect to how the NRC establishes it risk estimates, these comments are addressed in 

Section D.2.34.11 of this appendix—in particular the comments that relate to cancer studies, 

health effects, and no threshold for safe dose. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(410---4) (410-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.34.10 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS did not consider 

“epigenetics,” the tendency for negative genetic health effects from radiation exposure to skip a 

generation, and then become permanent in successive generations. 

Other commenters stated that the “ace in the hole” for the nuclear energy industry is the 

incubation period of radiation exposure, or the latency period between radiation dose and 

certain health effects. One commenter believes that the latency period ensures that one cannot 

prove that radiation health effects were caused by a nuclear power plant. 

A few commenters expressed concern about the cumulative effect of radioactive effluents on 

human evolution and the human genome. One commenter questioned whether the NRC will 

calculate how much background radiation will increase from storing spent fuel as opposed to 

disposing of it in a geological repository. 

Two commenters stated that continued storage is dangerous to future generations and should 

not be permitted. One commenter stated that the waste remains extremely dangerous for the 

next seven generations. Another commenter stated that the radionuclides contained in the 

waste are the most toxic substances on earth that create slow and long-term illness and 

mutated genes. This commenter stated that NRC has a duty to protect future generations and 

the environment from these effects and believes NRC does not take that duty seriously. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. Genetic effects and the development 

of cancer are the primary health concerns attributed to radiation exposure. Genetic effects are 

the result of a mutation (DNA damage) produced in the reproductive cells of an exposed 

individual (male or female) that are passed on to their offspring. These effects may appear in 

the exposed person’s direct offspring, or may appear several generations later, depending on 

whether the altered genes are dominant or recessive. 

Although radiation-induced genetic effects have been observed in laboratory animals (given 

very high doses of radiation), no evidence of genetic effects has been observed among the 

children born to atomic bomb survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Based on extensive 

studies of the atomic bomb survivors, no evidence of the phenomenon mentioned in the 

comment has been reported. The risk estimates presented in BEIR VII report (National 

5HVHDUFK&RXQFLO) show that “at low or chronic doses of low linear energy transfer 

irradiation, the genetic risks are very small compared to the baseline frequencies of genetic 

diseases in the population.” The doses of radiation that are received by members of the public 

as a result of exposure to nuclear power facilities are so low (i.e., less than a few millirem) that 

resulting genetic effects attributed to the cumulative effects of the combination of man-made 

and background radiation over many years have not been observed and would not be expected. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The NRC takes very seriously its responsibility under the AEA to protect the health and safety of 

the public in regulating the U.S. nuclear power industry. The NRC’s mission is to protect the 

public health and safety and the environment from the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, 

materials, and waste facilities. The NRC’s regulatory limits for radiological protection are set to 

protect workers and the public from the harmful health effects (i.e., cancer and other biological 

impacts) of radiation on humans. The limits are based on the recommendations of standardssetting organizations. Radiation standards reflect extensive scientific study by national and 

international organizations. The NRC actively participates and monitors the work of other 

organizations to keep current on the latest trends in radiation protection. If the NRC determines 

that there is a need to revise its radiation protection regulations, it will initiate a rulemaking. 

Members of the public who believe that the NRC should revise or update its regulations may 

request that the NRC do so by submitting a petition for rulemaking. More information about the 

petition for rulemaking process can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(30-14--10--23--2---2) (430----4) 

---

D.2.34.11 – COMMENT: Citing a number of national and international scientific authorities and 

reports, including the NAS, the International Commission on Radiological Protection, and the 

NRC, several commenters stated that the best science on radiation protection supports 

continued use of a linear no-threshold theory of radiation health effects. Many commenters, 

referring to the NAS report, BEIR VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing 

Radiation, stated that there is no threshold below which exposure to ionizing radiation has no 

effect on living cells. Many of these commenters also stated that these authorities support the 

view that there is no safe level of radiation dose. One commenter stated that the consequence 

of no safe level of radiation dose is that the radioactive material that was ejected from the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi spent pool fire, which commenters contend leaked into groundwater and 

spread around the region in both the atmosphere and ocean currents, has created a genetic 

legacy on marine and human life in Japan that will continue as long as life exists. 

One commenter cited unspecified studies conducted a couple of decades ago that stated that 

any exposure to ionizing radiation harms people. The types of harm that the commenter 

described include changing the structures of blood cells, changing complete blood counts, 

fatigue, reduced cognitive sharpness, thyroid cancer, leukemia and other illnesses. The 

commenter also described genetic effects that do not appear until the third or fourth generation 

beyond exposure. The commenter is unaware of what fraction of these diseases are 

attributable to radiation dose, but believes that impacts and observed changes at any exposure 

level are observable in blood cell membranes and complete blood count. The commenter 

expressed the concern that ignoring these impacts on human health may have led to larger 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

impacts on biota, and recommends that environmental monitoring results be made available to 

any researcher. Another commenter stated concerns about transporting and storing spent fuel 

because he had observed health effects in veterans as a result of long-term radiation exposure. 

Several commenters described severe detrimental health effects that they believe resulted from 

radiation exposure associated with working on nuclear reactors in the past or living near nuclear 

reactors and nuclear waste storage sites. Some commenters described cancer occurring years 

after small exposures and such injuries as birth defects, bleeding gums, and separated teeth. 

Many commenters expressed general concerns about radiation doses and radiation health 

effects from continued storage of spent fuel, including one commenter who stated public and 

occupational health impacts should be changed from SMALL/MODERATE to LARGE for all 

timeframes. One commenter asked for a plain English explanation of the AEA phrase that 

requires the NRC to enforce standards that provide an adequate level of protection for public 

health and safety and the environment. 

A number of commenters cited various reports and studies by individuals, the U.S. Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, and the New York State Cancer Registry Data that they claim 

support findings of increased rates of radiation-related disease around nuclear power plants. 

These reports and studies indicate higher rates of cancer incidence (e.g., myelogenous 

leukemia) around the Pilgrim and Indian Point nuclear power plants. One commenter stated 

that uranium mining creates cancer clusters and environmental degradation, including climate 

change, citing Crownpoint, New Mexico as an example. Another commenter, citing BEIR VII 

and unspecified previous nuclear worker studies, stated that the additional years of radiation 

exposure from continued storage in communities near formerly operating nuclear power plants 

will harm an already damaged population. Another commenter stated that the NRC should not 

move forward until the NAS completes a study on health impacts of radiation exposure. One 

commenter stated NRC failed to disclose controversial or opposing views from unspecified 

radiation and health studies that contradict NRC’s conclusions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC’s 

mission is to protect the public health and safety and the environment from the effects of 

radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. The development of these 

responsibilities beginning with the AEA can be found on the NRC website at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html. The NRC’s regulatory limits for radiological 

protection are set to protect workers and the public from the harmful health effects (i.e., cancer 

and other biological impacts) of radiation on humans. The limits are based on the 

recommendations of standards-setting organizations. Radiation standards reflect extensive 

scientific study by national and international organizations. The NRC actively participates in and 

monitors the work of these organizations to keep current on the latest trends in radiation 

protection. If the NRC determines that there is a need to revise its radiation protection 

regulations, it will initiate a rulemaking. Members of the public who believe that the NRC should 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

revise or update its regulations may request that the NRC do so by submitting a petition for 

rulemaking. More information on the petition for rulemaking process can be found at: 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html. The models recognized 

by the NRC for use by nuclear power reactors to calculate dose incorporate conservative 

assumptions and account for differences in gender and age to ensure that workers and 

members of the public are adequately protected from radiation. The NRC is currently in the 

process of updating 10 CFR Part 20 Standards for Radiation Protection and information about 

this process can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/potentialrulemaking/opt-revise.html 

BEIR VII is the seventh in a series of publications from the National Academies concerning 

radiation health effects, referred to as the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) reports. 

The BEIR VII report titled Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: 

BEIR VII – Phase 2 1DWLRQDO5HVHDUFK&RXQFLOIRFXVHVRQWKHKHDOWKHIIHFWVRIORZ

levels of low linear energy transfer ionizing radiation. Low linear energy transfer radiation 

deposits less energy in the cell along the radiation path and is considered less destructive per 

radiation track than high linear energy transfer radiation. Examples of low linear energy transfer 

radiation, the subject of this report, include X-UD\VDQGȖ-rays (gamma rays). Health effects of 

concern include cancer, hereditary diseases, and other effects, such as heart disease. The 

NRC accepts the linear, no-threshold dose-response model (see additional information at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/health-effects/rad-exposure-cancer.html). The BEIR VII 

Committee concluded that the current scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 

there is a linear, no-threshold dose-response relationship between exposure to ionizing 

radiation and the development of cancer in humans. Having accepted this model, the NRC 

believes that this model is conservative when applied to workers and members of the public 

who are exposed to radiation from nuclear facilities. This is based on the fact that numerous 

epidemiological studies have not shown increased incidences of cancer at low doses. Some of 

these studies included: WKH1DWLRQDO&DQFHU,QVWLWXWH VWXG\1&,RIFDQFHU

mortalit\UDWHVDURXQGQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI3LWWVEXUJKVWXG\WKDWIRXQG

QROLQNEHWZHHQUDGLDWLRQUHOHDVHGGXULQJWKHDFFLGHQWDWWKH7KUHH Mile Island nuclear 

power station and cancer deaths among residents, and (3) the 2001 study performed by the 

Connecticut Academy of Sciences and Engineering that found no meaningful associations from 

exposures to radionuclides around the Haddam Neck nuclear power plant in Connecticut to the 

cancers studied. In addition, a position statement entitled “Radiation Risk in Perspective” by the 

Health Physics Society (August 2004) made the following points regarding radiological health 

effects: (1) Radiological health effects (primarily cancer) have been demonstrated in humans 

WKURXJKHSLGHPLRORJLFDOVWXGLHVRQO\DWGRVHVH[FHHGLQJ-10 rem delivered at high dose rates. 

Below this dose, estimation of adverse effect remains speculative. (2) Epidemiological studies 

have not demonstrated adverse health effects in individuals exposed to small doses (less than 

10 rem delivered over a period of many years) (HPS 2004). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

A number of comments stated that, based on the BEIR VII report, there is no safe dose of 

radiation. The NRC disagrees with this assertion; the BEIR VII report (National Research 

&RXQFLOPDNHVQRVXFKDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHUHLVQRVDIHOHYHORIH[SRVXUHWRUDGLDWLRQ

Rather, the conclusions of the report are specific to estimating cancer risk. The report does not 

make any statements about “no safe level or threshold.” However, the report did note that the 

“BEIR VII Committee said that the higher the dose, the greater the risk; the lower the dose, the 

lower the likelihood of harm to human health.” Further, the report notes that “[t]he Committee 

maintains that other health effects, such as heart disease and stroke, occur at high radiation 

doses but that additional data must be gathered before an assessment of any possible dose 

response can be made of connections between low doses of radiation and non-cancer health 

effects.” Although the linear, no-threshold model is still considered valid, the BEIR VII 

Committee concluded that the current scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 

there is a linear dose-response relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the 

development of radiation-induced solid cancers in humans. Further, the Committee concluded 

“that it is unlikely that a threshold exists for the induction of cancers but notes that the 

occurrence of radiation-induced cancers at low doses will be small.” 

Although radiation may cause cancers at high doses, currently there are no reputable 

scientifically conclusive data that unequivocally establish the occurrence of cancer following 

exposure to low doses (i.e., below about 10 rem [0.1 Sv]). However, radiation protection 

experts conservatively assume that any amount of radiation may pose some risk of causing 

cancer or a severe hereditary effect and that the risk is higher for higher radiation exposures. 

Therefore, a linear, no-threshold dose-response relationship is used to describe the relationship 

between radiation dose and adverse impacts such as incidents of cancer. Simply stated, in this 

model any increase in dose, no matter how small, results in an incremental increase in health 

risk. This theory is accepted by the NRC as a conservative model for estimating health risks 

from radiation exposure, recognizing that the model probably over-estimates those risks. Based 

on this theory, the NRC conservatively establishes limits for radioactive effluents and radiation 

exposures for workers and members of the public. Although the public dose limit in 10 CFR 

Part 20 is 100 mrem (1 mSv) for all facilities licensed by the NRC, the NRC has imposed 

additional constraints on nuclear power reactors. Each nuclear power reactor has enforceable 

license conditions that limit the total annual whole body dose to a member of the public outside 

WKHIDFLOLW\WRPUHPP6Y7KHDPRXQt of radioactive material released from nuclear 

power facilities is well measured, well monitored, and known to be very small. The doses of 

radiation that are received by members of the public as a result of exposure to nuclear power 

facilities are so low (i.e., less than a few millirem) that resulting cancers attributed to the 

radiation have not been observed and would not be expected. As stated in the GEIS, the NRC 

believes the public and occupational impacts will be small as defined by remaining within the 

above limits at all licensed facilities. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-310 September 2014 

Although a number of studies of cancer incidence in the vicinity of nuclear power facilities have 

been conducted, no studies to date accepted by the scientific community show a correlation 

between radiation dose from nuclear power facilities and cancer incidence in the general public. 

The following is a list of some of the most recent radiation health studies that the NRC 

recognizes: 

,QDWWKHUHTXHVWRI&RQJUHVVWKHNational Cancer Institute conducted a study of cancer 

PRUWDOLW\UDWHVDURXQGQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVDQGRWKHUQXFOHDUIDFLOLWLHV7KHVWXG\

FRYHUHGWKHSHULRGIURPWRDQGHYDOXDWHGWKHFKDQJHLQPRUWDOLW\UDWHVEHIRUHDQG

during facility operations. The study concluded there was no evidence that nuclear facilities 

may be linked causally with excess deaths from leukemia or from other cancers in populations 

living nearby 1&,. 

In June 2000, investigators from the University of Pittsburgh found no link between radiation 

UHOHDVHGGXULQJWKHDFFLGHQWDW7KUHH0LOH,VODQGSRZHUSODQWDQGFDQFHUGHDWKVDPRQJ

nearby residents. Their study followed 32,000 people who lived within NPmi) of the plant 

at the time of the accident (Talbott et al. 2000). 

The American Cancer Society in 2001 concluded that although reports about cancer clusters in 

some communities have raised public concern, studies show that clusters do not occur more 

often near nuclear plants than they do by chance elsewhere in the population. Likewise, there 

is no evidence that links strontium-ZLWKLQFUHDVHVLQEUHDVWFDQFHUSURVWDWHFDQFHURU

childhood cancer rates. Radiation emissions from nuclear power plants are closely controlled 

and involve negligible levels of exposure for nearby communities (ACS 2001). 

In 2000, the Illinois Department of Public Health compared childhood cancer statistics for 

counties with nuclear power plants to similar counties without nuclear plants and found no 

statistically significant difference (IDPH 2000). 

The Connecticut Academy of Sciences and Engineering, in January 2001, issued a report on a 

study around the Haddam Neck nuclear power plant in Connecticut and concluded radiation 

emissions were so low as to be negligible and found no meaningful associations with the 

cancers studied (CASE 2001). 

In 2001, the Florida Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology reviewed claims that there are 

striking increases in cancer rates in southeastern Florida counties caused by increased 

radiation exposures from nuclear power plants. However, using the same data to reconstruct 

the calculations, on which the claims were based, Florida officials were not able to identify 

unusually high rates of cancers in these counties compared with the rest of the state of Florida 

and the nation (FDOH 2001). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-311 185(*௅

2Q$SULOWKH15&DQQRXQFHGWKDWLWDVNHGWKH1AS to perform a state-of-the-art study 

on cancer risk for populations surrounding nuclear power facilities (NRC 2010c). The NAS has 

a broad range of medical and scientific experts who can provide the best available analysis of 

the complex issues involved in discussing cancer risk and commercial nuclear power plants. 

More information on its methods for performing studies is available at 

http://www.nationalacademies.org/studycommitteprocess.pdf. 

7KH1$6VWXG\ZLOOXSGDWHWKHU.S. National Institutes of Health National Cancer Institute 

report, Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities 1&,7KHVWXG\’s objectives 

are to (1) evaluate whether cancer risk is different for populations living near nuclear power 

facilities; (2) include cancer occurrence; (3) develop an approach to assess cancer risk in 

geographic areas that are smaller than the county level; and (4) evaluate the study results in the 

context of offsite doses from normal reactor operations. Phase I of the NAS study report was 

SXEOLVKHGRQ0DUFKDQGLVDYDLODEOHRQWKH1$6website (http://www.nap.edu). No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----3) ----21----30--31-3) 

--2) (323--31--2------34---

-----1--1------

----3----------

-------1) 

D.2.34.12 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments regarding effluent monitoring 

and environmental surveillance. One commenter stated that the NRC should require effluent 

monitoring and environmental surveillance in every town and city within 32 km (20 mi) of spent 

fuel storage facilities, and make the monitoring data available to the public in “real-time.” 

Another commenter requested that the NRC fund a comprehensive, continuous, independent, 

citizen run radiation monitoring program. A commenter stated that the NRC should consider 

“appropriate radiological monitoring for the environment surrounding the storage facility” and 

that radiation protection standards should apply to an interim period of up to a 300 year storage 

period. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. During facility operations, the NRC’s 

requirements ensure that licensees monitor routine and inadvertent radioactive effluents 

discharged into the environment at all licensed facilities. Further, the NRC believes that these 

existing requirements and programs provide adequate protection of public health and safety and 

that no new effluent monitoring programs are required. NRC licensees are required to have a 

radiological environmental monitoring program. The radiological environmental monitoring 

program quantifies the environmental impacts associated with radioactive effluent releases from 

the licensed facility. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-31---
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-312 September 2014 

D.2.34.13 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that radiation risks from nuclear power are 

carefully studied and radiation exposure requirements are so stringent that nuclear power plants 

release less radioactive material than coal-fired plants. The commenter stated that radiation 

professionals make conservative assumptions when setting acceptable radiation dose limits and 

nuclear power plants are required to operate within those limits even in the event of an accident. 

7ZRFRPPHQWHUVVXSSRUWHGWKHVWDWHPHQWVFRQWDLQHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKDW

radiological impacts from public and occupational doses would be SMALL because the doses 

would continue to remain below the regulatory dose limits. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments supporting the current radiation dose 

limits and the determinations in the GEIS agree with these comments. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--3--2-

D.2.34.14 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS addresses public and occupational 

health in the affected environment only “when everything goes well, when any accident is one of 

those expected accidents. But not if something unexpected happens.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The impacts from postulated and severe 

DFFLGHQWVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQWKH*(,6LQ6HFWLRQVDQG)XUWKHUWKH15&

received a number of comments related to the treatment of accidents in the GEIS (see Section 

' of this appendix). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--3-3) 

D.2.34.15 – COMMENT: A commenter described the human internal dosimetry and radiation 

health effects of carbon-14 intake. The commenter stated that carbon-14 in the atmosphere 

more than doubled as a result of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, and that this is one 

likely explanation for the large increase in the cancer rate during that same timeframe. The 

commenter stated that the NRC does not state in the GEIS how much carbon-14 would be 

produced and released into the atmosphere by the air cooling of dry casks over decades or 

centuries or how this would affect future generations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The GEIS did not consider carbon-14 

releases from dry cask systems because no carbon-14 is produced from air cooling of dry 

casks. Air cooling of dry casks occurs through heat transfer from the metal surface of the 

sealed containment canister and thus there is no production or release of carbon-14 from within 

a dry storage cask system. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(410---1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-313 185(*௅

D.2.35 Comments Concerning Accidents and Natural Events 

D.2.35.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed concern that the NRC has understated 

the environmental impacts of man-made and natural phenomena hazards on both reactor 

operations and spent fuel in continued storage. Commenters disagree with the statistical 

formulation of risk (probability times consequences) and state that the qualitative low probability 

of a severe accident is either understated or unjustified. One commenter asserted that the NRC 

should have performed a detailed quantitative analysis of the consequences of an accident. 

Many commenters stated that the consequences of an accident would be so large that the 

NRC’s statistical formulation of risk should not apply and that the NRC should not continue to 

allow the use of nuclear power. Specific hazards described by commenters include 

earthquakes, high winds (hurricanes and tornadoes), flooding (sea rise, tsunamis, storm surge, 

and seiches), ice storms, “super-storms,” wave action, salt water exposure, meteors, solar 

flares, dam failure, aircraft crash, and aging infrastructure. Many commenters stated concerns 

about specific hazards at individual nuclear power plant sites. For example, one commenter 

provided aerial photos of flooding during construction of Davis-Besse, but added that elevating 

HLW to protect it against flood hazards may expose it to terrorist attack. Further, commenters 

assert that the NRC has failed to consider how these hazards will increase over time due to 

factors such as climate change, geological shifts, and solar activity. Many commenters referred 

to the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan as grounds 

for their concerns. Commenters stated that the NRC and the industry are far too comfortable 

with the potential extreme consequences of accidents, or are deliberately down-playing the 

risks, and cite the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident as the latest example of nuclear industry 

and regulators failing to accurately predict natural disasters. One commenter cited the 

combined experience with accidents at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima as reason 

to doubt the technical feasibility of accident prevention. One commenter, citing IAEA Safety 

Standards, asserted that the GEIS should have considered worst-case scenarios. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC’s consideration of the 

environmental impacts of accidents for at-reactor continued storage of spent fuel is provided in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KH*(,6LQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI6HFWLRQVWDWHVWKDW

consequences of severe accidents, should one occur, could be significant and destabilizing. 

However, the NRC makes impact determinations for these accidents based on risk, which takes 

into consideration both the low probability of these events and the potential consequences. 

Section ' of this appendix describes the NRC’s use of risk in evaluation of the 

environmental impact of postulated accidents. 

In the evaluation of the severe accident environmental risk, the NRC practice is to evaluate 

severe accidents that can reasonably be expected to occur and report probability-weighted 

consequences. Further, NEPA does not require consideration of worst-case scenarios. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-314 September 2014 

The NRC’s evaluation of potential accidents in 6HFWLRQRIthe GEIS considers the effects of 

man-made hazards and natural phenomena such as seismic events, flooding from various 

FDXVHVDQGKLJKZLQGV6HFWLRQGHVFULEHVWKH15&’s assessment of spent fuel pool 

severe accidents due to many different causes, including loss of cooling, drainage of the pool, 

and structural failure of the pool due to loss of offsite power, seismic events, heavy load drops, 

missiles, aircraft crashes, flooding and tornadoes. The NRC believes that it is reasonable to 

use a representative analysis and that the spent fuel pool fire analysis is sufficiently 

conservative to bound the impacts of spent fuel pool severe accidents, regardless of the 

initiating event or scenario. In addition, Appendix F has been updated to include information 

from the more recent analysis of a seismically initiated spent fuel pool accident in SECY-13-

0112 Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool 

for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (NRC 2013l), and the COMSECY–13–0030 regulatory 

analysis on expedited transfer of spent fuel (NRC 2013n). Both SECY-13-0112 and the 

regulatory analysis in COMSECY–13–0030 generally support the findings in NUREG–

(NRC 2001b) and NUREG–15&a) as used in the GEIS. The potential effects of 

climate change on the frequency and intensity of natural phenomena hazards such as flooding 

DQGKXUULFDQHVDUHDOVRGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DVUHODWLQJWRWKHLQLWLDWLQJ

events for accidents in spent fuel pools or spent fuel storage systems. 

With regard to the comment that aging infrastructure would expose the stored spent fuel rods at 

DIDFLOLW\6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DVVXPHVSURSHUPDLQWHQDQFHDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIWKHDJLQJ

spent fuel storage facilities in compliance with NRC requirements for aging management. 

Insofar as the comment may be referring to the aging infrastructure offsite, such as the power 

JULGWKHDFFLGHQWDVVHVVPHQWLQ6HFWLRQLQFOXGHVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIORVVRIRIIVLWHSRZHUDV

well as loss of all power. 

A few comments describe concerns with the corrosive effects of salt water exposure on the 

systems used to maintain pool cooling and integrity, either through atmospheric exposure at 

coastal sites, or through inundation. Appendix B of the GEIS describes the experience with 

storing spent fuel, including degradation processes that could impact the safety of continued 

storage. Section ' provides a more detailed discussion of how the GEIS addressed 

such degradation processes. 

The NRC responses to comments on solar flares and meteorites are provided in Sections 

' and '. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

(24--3) (30--10) (30----2) (131--21-3) (210-3) (214-2) (240-2) 

-22--------------1) 

-2) (303----34--24------42-3) (341-2-

-----4--4--1) (433---1--1-4) 

---10----10------4) 

----4---------
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

---4-----1--2---4) 

-----------2) 

-1--2---1--2----3) (1000-1) 

D.2.35.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that accident impacts at spent fuel storage 

facilities cannot be considered generically. In support of this view, commenters cited to the 

effects of global climate change, severe storms, earthquakes, malicious attack, and multiple 

equipment failures at multiple reactors. The commenters further stated that the GEIS fails to 

consider the indirect cumulative impact of Murphy’s Law and how it played out at Fukushima, in 

terms of the compounding effects of a loss of onsite and offsite power, failure to open hardened 

vents, and human error. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. In its remand of the 2010 Waste 

Confidence Rule, the Court of Appeals continued the long history of Federal courts approving a 

generic approach to the analysis of the environmental impacts of nuclear power reactor 

operation. The Court endorsed the NRC’s generic approach, stating that there is “no reason 

that a comprehensive general analysis would be insufficient to examine onsite risks that are 

essentially common to all plants..., given the Commission’s use of conservative bounding 

assumptions and the opportunity for concerned parties to raise site-specific differences at the 

time of a specific site’s licensing” (New York v. NRC). The NRC believes that a generic 

approach is appropriate for the assessment of accidents because the GEIS makes impact 

determinations that apply to any spent fuel storage site and provides a conservative bounding 

analysis for continued storage accidents. For example, Appendix F of the GEIS, which provides 

the NRC’s generic analysis for spent fuel pool fires, uses a reasonable existing generic analysis 

(NRC 2001b) to provide a basis for its quantitative estimates of the impacts, with additional 

discussion to describe the applicability of the analysis. Additionally, to account for site-related 

variability, the assumptions used in the GEIS to describe offsite environmental consequences to 

public health (i.e., public dose) include an assumption of late evacuation of the communities 

DURXQGWKHIDFLOLW\ZLWK percent HYDFXDWLRQUDWHVLQVWHDGRIWKH percent value normally 

used as a best estimate. The assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to 

bound the impacts such that variances that may occur from site to site are unlikely to result in 

environmental impact determinations that are greater than those presented in the GEIS. 

Further, the GEIS considers a range of initiating events raised by the comments, including 

DFFLGHQWVGXHWRHDUWKTXDNHVDQGRWKHUQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQD6HFWLRQDQGWHUURULVWDWWDFNV

6HFWLRQ In developing the GEIS, the NRC considered, where appropriate, the lessons 

learned from the Fukushima accident (see Section 2.1.2.1). No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--1----10) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.35.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC should have conducted a 

SAMA analysis for continued storage at spent fuel pools and dry storage systems. Some 

commenters asserted that the SAMA analyses should include multi-unit sites, cost-benefit 

analyses of mitigation, and societal risk and “societal dose acceptance criteria.” Commenters 

also objected to licensees’ use of input values for the MACCS2 code based on values in 

“Sample Problem A” in the MACCS2 code manual for site-specific SAMA analyses. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As noted in some comments, the NRC 

does not currently require SAMA analyses for spent fuel storage facilities, while NRC 

regulations do require SAMA analyses for power reactors, for example under 10 CFR 

FLL/15&UHJXODWLRQVSURYLGHDSURFHGXUHIRULQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHVWRUHTXHVWD

change to NRC regulatLRQVXQGHU&)5$QGDQ\SHUVRQPD\UHTXHVWDSURFHHGLQJWR

DGGUHVVDVSHFLILFOLFHQVHWKURXJKWKHSURFHGXUHVLQ&)5

$VGHVFULEHGLQD'HQLDORI3HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ)5WKH15&FRQVLGHUVWKH

likelihood of a spent fuel SRROILUHWREHORZHUWKDQWKDWHVWLPDWHGLQ*HQHULF,VVXH15&

a) and NUREG–15&b), which are the basis for consequence and probability 

values reported in the GEIS. Thus, the very low probability of a spent fuel pool fire means that 

the risk is less than that of a reactor accident. Therefore, a SAMA analysis would not be 

expected to have a significant impact on total risk for a site. 

In November 2013, the NRC completed a regulatory analysis that supports the earlier findings 

RIWKH'HQLDORI3HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ15&n). The regulatory analysis was 

completed in response to questions about safe storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools following 

the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan. In the 

regulatory analysis, the NRC determined that no additional study is warranted to assess 

possible regulatory action to require expedited transfer of spent fuel from nuclear power plants’ 

spent fuel pools to dry cask storage. The NRC also considered other improvements to spent 

fuel pool storage in addition to assessing whether expedited transfer is warranted. For 

H[DPSOHWKH15&FRQVLGHUHG[KLJK-density loading patterns, in which spent fuel recently 

unloaded from a reactor that still has relatively high decay heat is surrounded in the spent fuel 

pool by cooler spent fuel assemblies in each of the adjacent eight positions in a spent fuel pool 

rack. The NRC found that these alternatives would likely involve lower costs than expedited 

transfer, but that they would only provide limited safety benefit and the costs would not be 

warranted. With regard to how the GEIS considered societal risk metrics, the GEIS provides 

population risk values as a measure of societal risk. See Section ' of this appendix for 

additional information on consideration of societal risk. With regard to comments that NRC 

should consider the potential for accidents to involve more than one unit at multi-unit sites, 

SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) provides an explanation of both ongoing NRC research in this area 

and how multi-unit events were considered in that study. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

With regard to comments that object to licensees using “Sample Problem A” values as input 

values for the MACCS2 code as part of site-specific SAMA analyses, these comments are 

beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Site-specific SAMA analyses, and individual input 

values for the MACCS2 code used to calculate accident consequences in support of SAMA 

analyses, are considered in site-specific licensing proceedings for reactors. 

However, as stated in Sections ' and ' of this appendix, MACCS2 was also 

used in past studies by NRC to calculate accident consequences from a spent fuel pool fire. 

Since these studies were generic in nature, and not intended for application to specific sites, the 

NRC used input values that were consisteQWZLWKZKDWKDGEHHQXVHGLQDVWXG\RQ

reactor accident consequences, NUREG–Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for 

Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 15&NUREG–ZDVVXEMHFWWRH[WHQVLYHSHHU

review, which included review of the parameter values in the MELCOR Accident Consequence 

Code System (MACCS) model, which were also used in sample problem in the MACCS code 

manual known as “Sample Problem A.” The results of the peer review are summarized in 

NUREG/CR–Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks: Methodology for the Containment, 

Source Term, Consequence, and Risk Integration Analyses (Gorham et al. $VDUHVXOWRI

this peer review, many of the input values were found reasonable and are standard for all 

severe accident analyses. Therefore, NRC finds that the results of analysis with the MACCS2 

code using Sample Problem A input values derived from the NUREG–15&peer 

review represent the NRC’s best-estimate consequence values for inclusion in Appendix F, 

Table F-1. 

For a discussion of how the GEIS’s accident analysis can apply generically see Section 

' of this appendix. For an explanation of the alternatives considered in the GEIS see 

Section ' of this appendix. For an explanation of the GEIS’s conservative bounding 

assumptions see Sections D.2 and ' of this appendix. 

A summary of the results of the November 2013 regulatory analysis have been added to 

Appendix F of the GEIS. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-10--10--10--10--10---3---10) 

-1----3--3--3--1--3--3---4) 

-1--1--1-20) 

D.2.35.4 – COMMENT: A commenter cited an Institute for Policy Studies report (Alvarez 2011) 

on events related to continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools. The commenter cited a 

section of the Institute for Policy Studies report that describes spent fuel pool loss of water 

events, violations of NRC nuclear criticality safety requirements, effects of high-burnup fuel on 

heat loading in the pools, higher amounts of radioactive material in high-burnup spent fuel, and 

thinning and embrittlement of spent fuel cladding. The commenter stated that these points 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

support the need for a comprehensive NEPA review of a failure of temporary storage of spent 

fuel at all operating reactors. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that these issues related to continued storage 

need to be addressed. The GEIS addresses the general issues raised by the comment and 

describes the environmental impacts of continued storage. For example, the NRC addresses 

VSHQWIXHOSRROORVVRIZDWHUDQGFULWLFDOLW\HYHQWVLQ6HFWLRQDQG$SSHQGL[)7KH*(,6

also describes the use of high-burnup fuel, including the cladding embrittlement issue, in 

Chapter 2 and Appendix B. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-

D.2.35.5 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should “[d]evelop a quantitative 

health risk acceptance criteria compatible with the Commission’s Policy Statement regarding 

societal risk (in addition to the criteria for individual risk).” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The quantitative health objectives are 

given in the Commission’s Safety Goal Policy Statement which was published in the Federal 

Register RQ$XJXVW)5&RPSDULVRQof the individual latent (cancer) 

fatality risk within NP10 mi) to the qualitative health objectives for latent fatality is a 

measure related to the evaluation of societal risk. Appendix F of the GEIS discusses the NRC’s 

evaluation of spent fuel pool fires. Although the NRC does not use a different societal risk 

criterion, as requested in the comment, population risk is assessed in addition to individual risk. 

Estimates of collective dose to the public and collective early fatalities within NP0 mi), and 

collective latent fatalities within NPmi) are listed in Table F-1. Table F-2 includes 

population risk in the comparison of frequency-weighted (probability-weighted) consequences 

from spent fuel pool fires to those from reactor accidents for a specific site. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--3) 

D.2.35.6 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS includes a “few short sections 

briefly discussing potential severe accidents at spent fuel pools including spent fuel leaks, spent 

fuel pool fires, and sabotage or terrorist acts,” but that the only type of accident that is analyzed 

in detail is a spent fuel pool fire. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges this comment, with respect to a detailed analysis of 

spent fuel pool fires being provided in Appendix F of the GEIS. As the comment notes, other 

types of spent fuel pool seYHUHDFFLGHQWVZHUHGLVFXVVHGLQWKH*(,66HFWLRQ

describes the NRC’s assessment of spent fuel pool severe accidents due to many different 

causes, and based on the studies referenced in the GEIS determined that the spent fuel pool 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

fire is a representative scenario for estimating the risk from spent fuel pool severe accidents. 

This is because the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire are likely to be more significant than 

the consequences of other accident scenarios. The NRC believes that it is reasonable to use a 

representative analysis and that the spent fuel pool fire analysis is sufficiently conservative to 

bound the impacts of spent fuel pool severe accidents, regardless of the initiating event or 

scenario. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-13-

D.2.35.7 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that an NRC technical expert working on NUREG–

15&EVDLGWKDWDFDVNGURSLQD%:50DUN,VSHQWIXHOSRROZRXOGQRWEH

significantly slowed by passage through water and that a drop from as little as 4 ft from the 

bottom would result in complete cask penetration. The commenter stated that such a load drop 

would create an 11 foot diameter hole in the bottom of the spent fuel pool, crush several tons of 

spent fuel, and result in the cask dropping to ground level. Another commenter referred to a 

QDUURZO\DYHUWHGFDVNGURSLQDW3UDLULH,VODQGDQGVWDWHGWKDWFDVNPRYHPHQWLVPRUH

dangerous in some General Electric boiling water reactors because spent fuel pools are several 

stories above grade in reactor buildings. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the concerns raised in the comments about potential 

damage from a cask drop; the potential for a cask drop to cause an accident in a spent fuel pool 

was considered in SectioQ of the GEIS, as a postulated design basis accident and 

6HFWLRQDVRQHLQLWLDWLQJFDXVHIRUDVHYHUHDFFLGHQWLQWKHVSHQWIXHOSRRO$VGLVFXVVHG

in Appendix F to the GEIS, the assessment of spent fuel pool fires included consideration of 

several ways that a spent fuel pool accident could develop into a spent fuel pool fire. Dropping 

of a heavy load (such as a cask) into the spent fuel pool was among the accident initiators 

considered in the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--13) 

D.2.35.8 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS did not fully consider 

accidents in dry cask storage systems. One commenter stated that the GEIS should have 

considered dry cask fires. A few commenters stated that the GEIS should have evaluated the 

environmental impacts of accidents involving dry cask storage systems assuming safety 

systems do not work properly or fail. Commenters stated that many dry cask storage systems 

in use are not currently approved for transporting spent fuel, and these casks could not be 

moved to avoid flood hazards. A commenter stated that the GEIS did not describe accident 

impacts that postulated accidents would have on the affected environment (e.g., aquatic 

resources, special status species, terrestrial resources, etc.). 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-320 September 2014 

Another commenter stated that the NRC did not consider a 2012 flooding event at the Fort 

Calhoun nuclear power plant, in which the Missouri River nearly reached the grade level of the 

onsite ISFSI. The commenter stated that the NRC has no means to assure that this would be 

the case in future catastrophic flooding; or that Cooper Nuclear Station or Oconee Nuclear 

Station dry casks would be above flood level after a catastrophic upstream dam failure. The 

commenter stated that should ISFSI flooding occur, the lower cooling vents of the casks could 

potentially become submerged or clogged with debris that licensee personnel would not be able 

to intervene to clear, resulting in a possible cask rupture. 

Another commenter stated that the GEIS should have considered criticality accidents in dry 

casks storage systems and cited NUREG/CR–Effects of Fuel Failure on Criticality Safety 

and Radiation Dose for Spent Fuel Casks (Elam et al. 2003), in support of the comment. Other 

commenters stated that dry cask storage systems offer significant robust protection from natural 

phenomena. 

Some commenters stated that the accident in March 2011 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

power plant demonstrates that dry cask storage systems are more robust than spent fuel pools. 

Commenters described effects of the August 23, 2011 Mineral, Virginia earthquake on spent 

fuel storage facilities at the North Anna Nuclear Generating Station and stated that 

seismographs have been removed from at least one plant. A few commenters noted that the 

heavy cement dry storage casks moved 1 to 4 in. One commenter went on to point out that, 

there are earthquake faults near specific plants and that there is no proof that, after an 

earthquake, the waste will be able to be removed safely because no fuel has been removed 

from dry cask storage after a long period of time. Some commenters stated that the accident at 

Fukushima Dai-ichi and the Mineral, Virginia earthquake demonstrate that dry cask storage 

systems are robust, one commenter stated dry cask storage systems are more robust than 

spent fuel pools. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that dry cask storage systems offer significant robust protection from natural 

phenomena, as evidenced by the continued safety of storage facilities after earthquakes struck 

spent fuel storage facilities at the Fukushima Dai-ichi and North Anna nuclear power plants. 

However, the NRC disagrees that the analysis in the GEIS is deficient with respect to the 

analysis of accidents involving dry cask storage systems and disagrees that the additional 

information and documents cited by the commenters affects the analysis or conclusions in the 

GEIS. 

The NRC does not agree with the comments’ statements about the risk of spent fuel fires in dry 

cask storage systems. Dry cask storage systems are passive and robust engineered structures 

designed to withstand natural forces, such as earthquakes and wind-borne missiles. There are 

no active safety systems that could fail and thereby increase the likelihood of a release of 

radioactive material. Even in the highly unlikely event of an accidental breach of a cask, or cask 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-321 185(*௅

and canister in a dual-purpose system, the spent fuel will have sufficiently cooled before being 

placed in dry casks that a runaway zirconium oxidation reaction (fire) is no longer possible. 

Therefore, safety system failure and dry cask fire are not reasonably foreseeable. 

The NRC also does not agree that measures could not be taken to address changing flood 

risks. As stated in the GEIS, corrective actions that could be taken to address increasing flood 

hazards include the use of flood barriers and moving casks or canisters to an adjacent new pad 

constructed at a higher elevation. Movements of dry casks do not require transportation of the 

spent fuel across U.S. roads and highways. Rather, the spent fuel could be moved onsite using 

cask transporters in the same manner in which the spent fuel canisters or casks were moved to 

the ISFSI from the reactor auxiliary building. If flood risks increased to a level that made flood 

hazards likely enough to pose a safety risk, the NRC or licensee would take necessary steps to 

address the risk. Comments on the risk of upstream dam failures are addressed in Section 

' of this appendix. 

The NRC also does not agree that the GEIS should separately address the radiation impacts 

that postulated dry cask storage accidents would have on non-human species. In general, the 

NRC supports the position stated in International Commission on Radiological Protection 

3XEOLFDWLRQWKDWSURWHFWLQJLQGLYLGXDOKXPDQVWRFXUUHQWUDdiation protection standards affords 

adequate protection to non-KXPDQVSHFLHV,&537KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\WUXHIRUWKHUHODWLYHO\

small releases associated with postulated accidents involving dry cask storage systems. 

The NRC also does not agree that NUREG/CR–Elam et al. 2003), Effects of Fuel Failure 

on Criticality Safety and Radiation Dose for Spent Fuel Casks, provides a basis for estimating 

environmental impacts from continued storage of spent fuel. As stated in 6HFWLRQ of 

NUREG/CR–the studies presented in the report may be characterized as scoping in 

nature because they are based on limited knowledge of failed fuel conditions and configurations 

and include a number of assumptions in which scenarios go beyond credible conditions (Elam 

et al. 2003). The study authors recommended future work to more completely and accurately 

address the concerns related to the consequences of potential fuel failure. The authors 

expected that future work would further evaluate the most plausible scenarios by incrementally 

moving toward FUHGLEOHFRQGLWLRQV$ORQJWKRVHOLQHVLQ(35,FRPSOHWHGDUHSRUWFuel 

Relocation Effects for Transportation Packages (35,b), in which it attempted to provide 

credible estimates of the probability and maximum reactivity changes resulting from theoretical, 

“worst-case” fuel reconfiguration scenarios. EPRI found that the maximum reasonable reactivity 

increase was within safety margins allowed by NRC for scenarios involving physical changes to 

fuel assembly rod arrays and was more likely to result in a substantial reactivity decrease for 

scenarios involving fuel pellet arrays. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

(30--1) (30-4--3---30---1) (404--1--2--4-

-4--3--2----2---3--3-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-322 September 2014 

D.2.35.9 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS should have comprehensively 

analyzed all aspects of accidents involving dry cask storage and inter-cask fuel transfers based 

on sound scientific information. The commenter stated that when the information is incomplete 

or has significant uncertainties, these should have been stated. The commenter stated that if 

there are methodological studies that provide a guide to how calculations should be done, the 

guidance should be used to develop estimates. The commenter further noted that in some 

cases, the data gaps are so large, that a realistic calculation of uncertainties can be 

operationally meaningless in the sense of its usefulness for choosing among alternative courses 

of action. The commenter stated that the NRC should not have summarized the results of 

NUREG–A Pilot Probabilistic Risk Assessment of a Dry Cask Storage System at a 

Nuclear Power Plant 15&HLQWKH*(,6EHFDXVHWKHVWXG\VWDWHV3WKHPHWKRGRORJ\

developed in this study can be used as a guide for performing other similar PRAs [probabilistic 

risk assessments]. Moreover, the results of this study can be used in conjunction with the 

methodology selected to determine the need for other PRAs, improvements in data gathering 

and analysis, and additional engineering design analysis. It should be noted that the focus of 

this pilot study was solely on the methodology and its limited (i.e., case-specific) application. 

Thus, no inferences or conclusions should be drawn with regard to the study’s regulatory 

implications.” The commenter also stated that NUREG–15&HOLVWHGDQXPEHURI

uncertainties, but did not consider them in its analysis, including the dependence of release 

fractions on changes that occur in the properties of the fuel and the cladding while in-reactor. 

Another commenter stated that dry cask storage systems offer significant robust protection from 

natural phenomena and that the NRC’s citation to NUREG–15&e) was appropriate. 

The commenter suggested that the GEIS could be further strengthened by citing an 

independent PRA study conducted by EPRI (EPRI 2004b). This commenter stated that the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi and Mineral, Virginia, earthquakes demonstrate that the low risks calculated 

by these PRAs are correct. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC has 

revised Section 4RIWKH*(,6WRFite EPRI’s independent PRA results from a 2004 study 

for bolted casks containing PWR fuel (EPRI 2004b), in addition to the results from NUREG–

15&e), which examined BWR spent fuel storage in a canister-based dry cask 

storage system. The NRC disagrees with the inference by the commenter that the GEIS was 

not based on sound scientific information and did not appropriately consider uncertainties. The 

environmental impacts of accidents described in the GEIS are based on NRC’s experience with 

licensing dry cask storage systems and the industry’s experience in operating them. The 

environmental impacts of accidents are conservative and bounding, and appropriately deal with 

uncertainty, because variances that may occur between BWR and PWR fuel and from site to 

site are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations larger than those presented in 

the GEIS. For example, among the conservative and bounding assumptions used in the 

analysis in NUREG–ZHUHWKDWWKHVSHQWIXHOLVKLJK-EXUQXS GWd/MTU) BWR fuel 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-323 185(*௅

dropped up to 30 m (100 ft), causing up to 0.12 percent of the total mass of the spent fuel to 

HVFDSHWKHFDVNZKLFKLVHTXLYDOHQWWRDERXWNJOERIFUXVKHGVSHQWIXHOZKLFKLVDOO

assumed to be particles with a diameter considered breathable by humans, and no deposition of 

particles inside the reactor building. Even with these conservative assumptions, the individual 

ULVNRIODWHQWFDQFHUIDWDOLW\LVH[WUHPHO\ORZLHRQWKHRUGHURI x 10-12 for the first year of 

service, which is nearly one million times smaller than NRC’s quantitative health objectives 

VWDWHGLQWKH6DIHW\*RDO3ROLF\6WDWHPHQW)5 Further, since the environmental 

impacts of accidents for dry cask storage are essentially the same for all alternatives considered 

in the GEIS, the uncertainties in these analyses do not render these analyses useless, as 

suggested by the commenter. The NRC also disagrees that the risks of accidents for dry cask 

storage contained in NUREG–15&e) do not provide useful insights into the 

environmental impacts of severe accidents involving dry cask storage systems. As stated in 

Section 12.2, the GEIS does not impose new regulatory requirements. Therefore, the GEIS 

draws no inferences or conclusions about the regulatory implications of NUREG–15&

e). The GEIS merely reflects the environmental impacts based on the results of that study. 

As a result of these comments, the NRC has revised Section 4RIWKH*(,6to include a 

summary of EPRI’s independent PRA results from a 2004 study for bolted casks containing 

PWR fuel. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-4--1--1--1--4) 

D.2.35.10 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC did not address the 

environmental impacts of an earthquake occurring while a dry cask is being loaded and the dry 

cask is still open, and that the NRC provided no rationale for why the two accidents considered 

are in fact representative. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. During routine handling of spent fuel, 

there are no times when a cask or canister is lifted while it is still open. In the DTS, both the 

source cask and receiving cask would remain on the floor throughout spent fuel transfer 

operations. Therefore, there are no foreseeable accidents in which an open cask could be 

dropped during an earthquake. Further, while a single fuel assembly drop during spent fuel 

handling in the DTS was considered b\'2(WKHSRWential offsite radiological 

consequences from a single fuel assembly drop would be less than the radiological 

consequences of a loss of confinement barrier event that was summarized in Section 4

of the GEIS. The accidents at the DTS with larger consequences are considered representative 

of accidents because they represent a limit on the severity of environmental impacts that could 

occur. For more information on the DTS fuel transfer process, see Section 2.1.4 of the GEIS. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-14) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-324 September 2014 

D.2.35.11 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS should have evaluated 

other potential accidents in a DTS beyond the two accidents described in the GEIS. The 

commenters expressed general concerns about the potential degraded physical state of fuel in 

the future and the potential for accidents that cannot be anticipated at this time. One 

commenter noted that the DTS is not currently licensed, and inspections and repackaging 

involving multiple assembly transfers are not performed now. The additional DTS accidents that 

some commenters suggested should be considered include a partial meltdown inside the cask, 

gross structural failure of shielding and confinement barriers at the DTS, and spent fuel 

assembly and cask drops. Commenters also questioned why the postulated DTS does not 

have a containment structure. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that the GEIS did not describe how licensees would handle damaged fuel during future 

dry transfer operations. As stated in Section ' of this appendix, a discussion of handling 

operations for damaged fuel has been added to Chapter 2 of the GEIS. However, the NRC 

disagrees that the consideration in the GEIS of the environmental impacts of postulated 

accidents at a DTS is insufficient. The accidents that the NRC summarized in the GEIS were 

those analyzed by the '2(LQLWV7RSLFDO6DIHW\$QDO\VLV5HSRUW'2(WKDWFRXOGUHVXOWLQ

releases to the environment. A partial meltdown is not possible in the long-term or indefinite 

timeframes because spent fuel will have cooled well below temperatures above which runaway 

zirconium oxidation is possible. Given the passive nature of shielding at a DTS, which would be 

designed to withstand an earthquake and other natural forces, the NRC does not agree that 

gross structural failure of shielding is reasonably foreseeable. However, one of the postulated 

DFFLGHQWVFRQVLGHUHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6LVDORVVRIPDWHULDOFRQILQHPHQWFDXVHG

by failure of the DTS ventilation system, which was estimated to result in a postulated dose of 

P6YPUHPWRDQLQGLYLGXal standing 100 meters away. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----3--3-

D.2.35.12 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS did not consider human 

error as a cause of potential accidents. One commenter stated that there has been relatively 

less work on human factors risks associated with the dry cask storage of spent fuel, as 

compared to human factors risks associated with nuclear reactor operations. The commenter 

stated that if the quality of human capital declines, the risks associated with continually 

transferring and packaging the spent fuel will increase. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQWV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GLVFXVVHVWKH

environmental impacts of postulated accidents involving the continued storage of spent fuel, 

including both human-induced events and natural phenomena events (such as earthquakes, 

tornadoes and hurricanes). An example of a human-induced event would be dropping a cask 

during handling as a result of poor rigging. The initiating events that may cause accidents are 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

not described in detail in the GEIS, but human error has been considered as a factor in the 

initiation of postulated accidents summarized in the GEIS. However, the NRC has no basis to 

assume a decrease in future workforce quality, and higher human error rates, in calculating 

accident risk. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----3-

D.2.35.13 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS should explain how “a larger 

fraction of transuranics impact[s] hazard (calculated for cancer and cancer death) from a major 

reactor, fuel pool, transport or storage accident.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The comment is referring to the amount 

of transuranic elements in high-burnup light water reactor spent fuel, (i.e., spent fuel with a 

EXUQXSJUHDWHUWKDQ*:'0787UDQVXUDnic elements are radioactive elements that have 

an atomic number higher than uranium in the periodic table of elements (e.g., neptunium, 

plutonium, and americium). Section 2.1.1.3 of the GEIS describes the characteristics of the fuel 

considered in the analyses, including burnup. 

In the analysis in NUREG– (NRC 2001b), which is the basis for the NRC’s assessment of 

the severe accident impact from spent fuel pool fires, radionuclides other than isotopes of 

cesium (radiocesium), including all transuranic radionuclides, contribute a small fraction to 

environmental impacts as compared to the impacts from radiocesium alone. This is illustrated 

in Table A4-RINUREG–ZKLFKFRPSDUHVWKHUHVXOWVRIWZRDQDO\VHV - one with 

radiocesium in the modeled release and another without radiocesium. The accident 

consequences (i.e., prompt fatalities, societal dose, and cancer fatalities) with no radiocesium in 

the release are a few percent of the accident consequences with radiocesium. Further, the ratio 

of transuranic radionuclides to radiocesium does not change appreciably as spent fuel burnup 

increases (NUREG/CR-Ramsdell et al. 2001). Therefore, transuranic radionuclides in 

high-burnup fuel do not significantly contribute to the environmental impacts of accidents. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-31) 

D.2.35.14 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should reformulate the consideration 

of accidents in the GEIS to include “cliff-edge” events – those for which a small incremental 

increase in severity can yield a disproportionate increase in consequences. The commenter 

cited as support for the comment several observations from a June 2012 report by the American 

Society for Mechanical Engineering Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear 

Power Plant Events, titled Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct (ASME 2012). Excerpts from 

the American Society of Mechanical Engineers report provided by the commenter included 

statements about the nature of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (i.e., unforeseen or large natural 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

phenomena events resulting in prolonged station blackout) and the role of individual and 

collective human actions and decisions in the sequence of a severe accident. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this FRPPHQW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHV

the NRC’s assessment of spent fuel pool severe accidents due to many different causes. 

Based on studies referenced in the GEIS, the NRC has determined that a spent fuel pool fire is 

a representative scenario for estimating the risk from spent fuel pool severe accidents because 

the spent fuel pool fire analysis is sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts of spent fuel 

pool severe accidents, regardless of the initiating event or scenario. For this reason, 

consideration of other “cliff-edge” events would not identify any additional scenarios with 

consequences greater than those analyzed in the GEIS. 

The NRC generally bases regulatory decision-making on bounding or conservative values in its 

analyses to account for uncertainties in accident progression or release. As an example of the 

bounding nature of the analyses referenced in the GEIS, the evaluation of spent fuel pool 

accidents in NUREG–15&b) assumed that a spent fuel pool fire occurs for any 

accident scenario as soon as the depth of the water in the pool became as low as P3 ft) 

above the spent fuel, regardless of how long after that time or whether a spent fuel fire would be 

initiated. The modeling of the accident scenarios using this assumption reduces the potential 

time for radioactive and thermal decay to maximize both the radioactive material in the fuel and 

the heat load on the fuel to maximize the calculated release. For a discussion of the 

assumptions in studies used in the GEIS, see Section ' of this appendix. As discussed 

in Section ', the NRC chose to develop its generic analysis of the environmental 

impacts of spent fuel pool fires by selecting a reasonable existing analysis to provide a basis for 

its quantitative estimates of the impacts, and then discuss any significant uncertainties and 

whether or how these uncertainties would affect the quantitative estimates provided in that 

analysis. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(341-2-

D.2.35.15 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS should have provided an 

opportunity to address the NRC’s patchwork regulatory approach identified by the NRC’s NearTerm Task Force following the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 

plant and to address severe accidents associated with spent fuel pools. The commenter 

complained that the NRC has deferred this issue to the future and that although the NRC has 

requested additional information from licensees, it has not yet been received. 

RESPONSE: The 15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW6HFWLRQ2 of the GEIS addresses, as 

part of the “defense-in-depth” philosophy, severe accidents in spent fuel pool and dry cask 

storage systems. The discussion of a patchwork regulatory approach in the Near-Term Task 

Force report (NRC 2011f) is specific to currently operating reactors. The Task Force stated that 

the Commission has established the necessary defense–in-depth severe accident requirements 

for new reactor licensing. The Task Force does not address the regulatory framework for 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

licensing ISFSIs under 1&)53DUW$VWKH7DVN)RUFHVWDWHVXSGDWLQJWKHUHJXODWRU\

framework would be no small feat, but continued operation and licensing of reactors do not pose 

an imminent risk to public health and safety. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.35.16 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concerns with the estimates of the 

environmental impact of decontamination and waste disposal after an accident during continued 

storage. One commenter stated that the NRC’s technical bases for estimating decontamination 

costs following a spent fuel pool fire are unsupported. The commenter stated that the 

decontamination costs in Sample Problem A in the MACCS2 code manual, which are based on 

NRC’s technical report NUREG–Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. 

Nuclear Power Plants 15&DUHWUDFHDEOHWRDGUDIWXQSXEOLVKHGUHSRUW7KHFRPPHQWHU

stated that this flaw renders reliance on Sample Problem A to be unreasonable, thus requiring 

site-specific values for decontamination costs. Another commenter stated that the GEIS should 

have addressed the costs and expertise needed to complete decontamination of property after a 

radiological accident at a spent fuel storage facility. Other commenters stated that Section 3.14 

of the draft GEIS does not account for wastes generated as a result of accidents or other offnormal conditions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Although a draft report cited as a basis 

for decontamination costs values used in the MACCS computer model was not published and is 

not publicly available, the unavailability of the draft report does not render the generic 

assessment of spent fuel pool fire consequences incorrect. As explained further below, the 

NRC relied on the available information and analysis in completing the GEIS assessment of 

spent fuel accident consequences; NEPA does not require agencies to resolve all uncertainties, 

including, in this case, uncertainty associated with decontamination values used in the studies 

referenced in the GEIS. 

The NRC’s estimates of onsite and offsite property damage costs of a severe spent fuel pool 

fire, which includes the costs of decontaminating property, are provided in Table F-1 of the 

GEIS. As noted in the footnotes of Table F-1, the references for these property damage values 

are NUREG–Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, ‘Beyond Design 

Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools’ 15&DDQG185(*%5-Regulatory Analysis 

Technical Evaluation Handbook (NRC a). Each of these reports, in turn, cites 

NUREG/CR–Value/Impact Analyses of Accident Preventive and Mitigative Options for 

Spent Fuel Pools (Jo et al. ) as the source for property damage values. The authors of 

NUREG/CR–XVHGWKH0ACCS version 1.4 to estimate offsite property damage. As 

described by the commenter, the MACCS computer code was also used in NUREG–

Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 15&
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

NUREG–ZDVVXEMHFWWRH[WHQVLYHSHHUUHYLHZZKLFKLQFOXGHGUHYLHZRIWhe parameter 

values in the MACCS model used for estimating decontamination costs, including the parameter 

YDOXHVLQFOXGHGDVSDUWRI6DPSOH3UREOHP$LQWKH0$&&6FRGHPDQXDO15&7KH

results of the peer review are summarized in NUREG/CR–Evaluation of Severe Accident 

Risks: Methodology for the Containment, Source Term, Consequence, and Risk Integration 

Analyses (Gorham et al. . As a result of this peer review, the decontamination parameter 

values in Sample Problem A are standard for all severe accident mitigation analyses conducted 

for site-specific reactor licensing proceedings. Therefore, the NRC finds that the 

decontamination cost values derived from the NUREG–SHHUUHYLHZUHSUHVHQWWKH15&’s 

best-estimate values for inclusion in Appendix F, Table F-1. 

With regard to the comment’s assertion that the GEIS should address the specific expertise 

needed for decontamination activities in the event of an accident, the NRC disagrees. The 

identification of specific expertise required for decontamination and decommissioning activities 

after a postulated accident is unrelated to impact assessment and is therefore beyond the scope 

of spent fuel pool fire analysis addressed in the GEIS. 

With regard to the commenters’ assertions that Section 3.14 of the GEIS should address the 

waste volumes generated as a result of severe accidents, the NRC disagrees. Chapter 3 

describes the affected environment for the various resource areas that the NRC analyzes in 

&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6 This description presents the affected environment that the NRC 

expects to exist during normal operations of spent fuel storage facilities after the end of the 

reactor’s licensed life for operation. GEIS Section 4GHVFULEHVWKHULVNRIVSHQWIXHOSRRO

severe accidents. But the waste and contamination that could result from a severe accident 

would require remediation that cannot be meaningfully assessed now and is too far removed 

from the discussion of severe accident risk in Section 4DQGKHDOWKDQGHFRQRPLF

impacts discussed in Appendix F to provide useful information to the public and agency 

decisionmakers. In general, the amount of waste generated by cleanup activities following the 

early stages of an accident will depend on strategies that are developed at that time that take 

into account data collection, stakeholder involvement, and options analysis. Therefore, it is not 

possible to arrive at a meaningful estimate of radioactive waste volume that would be generated 

from an accident (EPA 2013). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-4---3--3-1) 

D.2.35.17 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that although the GEIS considered the 

accident risk per year at individual continued storage facilities, the GEIS does not consider the 

cumulative environmental impacts of accident risks at all continued storage facilities or all 

storage and operating facilities. As a result, these commenters assert, the NRC’s impact 

determinations are inaccurate and should be MODERATE or LARGE, rather than SMALL. The 

commenters also stated that the NRC should consider cumulative risk over time, including all 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

three continued storage timeframes. One commenter suggested that the NRC should 

incorporate the effects of fuel aging into the cumulative impacts assessment. Further, some 

said the GEIS does not consider increases in accident consequences due to changes in site 

characteristics over time, such as increases in population density or the addition of new 

operating reactors to the same site. Some commenters stated that the GEIS should have 

considered the cumulative risk of different types of accidents. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The recommendation that the GEIS 

report environmental impacts of accident risks at all continued storage facilities or all storage 

and operating facilities goes beyond the scope of the GEIS. Because the GEIS will support 

individual licensing actions for power reactors that use a spent fuel pool for continued storage 

operations, the appropriate risk metric for an accident evaluation of continued storage in spent 

fuel pools at a proposed facility is for an individual facility and not a larger population of facilities, 

as recommended by the comment. Additionally, the cumulative accident analysis in Section 

RIWKH*(,6considered the impact conclusions from 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6and further 

evaluated the additional accident risks from other continued storage activities, including power 

SODQWVWKDWFRXOGEHFORVHO\VLWHGZLWKLQNPPLRIDSURSRVHGUHDFWRU7KHFXPXODWLYH

DFFLGHQWDQDO\VLVGLGQRWFRPELQHDFFLGHQWULVNVIURPRWKHUDFWLYLWLHVEH\RQGWKHNPmi) 

radius. Broadening the geographic scope of the analysis to a national scale as one comment 

suggested would extend the affected accident area well beyond the locale likely to be affected 

by even the most severe accident and would not therefore reasonably assess cumulative 

impacts. 

The discussion of severe accident risk in 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6and Appendix F reasonably 

assumes that both the likelihood and consequences of severe accidents are constant over time 

because storage facilities and activities will remain constant for the period analyzed. The NRC 

believes this is reasonable given the decreasing fission product inventory of shorter-lived 

radionuclides due to radioactive decay and decreasing spent fuel pool decay-heat load, both of 

which reduce consequences of a severe accident. Further, only the short-term storage 

timeframe is assessed for spent fuel pool fires because spent fuel will not be stored in a spent 

fuel pool after that time. To address changing conditions at the site, SectLRQSURYLGHVD

discussion of potential cumulative accident impacts affected by the general trends and activities 

DWRUQHDUVSHQWIXHOVWRUDJHIDFLOLWLHVGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHVHJHQHUDO

trends and activities include such factors as changes in site characteristics due to climate 

change, overall United States population growth, and cumulative impact from accidents from 

QXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVDQGVSHQWIXHOVWRUDJHIDFLOLWLHVZLWKLQNPPL1RFKDQJHVZHUH

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-----1--2--1--12--4--1--

12----------3--3-23) 

-1-11) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-330 September 2014 

D.2.35.18 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should assess the hazard that 

increasing amounts of marine debris poses to the continued operation of spent fuel pool 

cooling-water intakes and ISFSI cooling vents, and suggested that the NRC conduct sitespecific assessments of the regional variation in these marine debris. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. As stated in Table 4-1 of the GEIS, the 

amount of cooling water needed during continued storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools is 

very small as compared to the normal withdrawal rates for an operating reactor. Given the 

small amounts of cooling water needed, marine debris is unlikely to block cooling-water intakes 

long enough to interfere with spent fuel pool cooling. Furthermore, during plant 

decommissioning, the safety-related function of cooling in spent fuel pools during the short-term 

continued storage can be met by means other than the normal service-water system. These 

alternative measures include adding makeup water from alternative sources directly to the pool 

to replace pool water lost by evaporation and using the atmosphere, rather than nearby surface 

waters, as the ultimate heat sink. For example, as stated in Section 2.2.1.2 of the GEIS, when 

plants begin decommissioning, the spent fuel pool is often cooled using a new spent fuel pool 

cooling system that discharges heat to the atmosphere instead of nearby surface waters. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-4-

D.2.35.19 – COMMENT: A commenter described inherent deficiencies in relying on a 

probabilistic risk assessment for reactors. The deficiencies identified by the commenter include 

large uncertainties resulting from phenomenological factors related to estimating radioactive 

release, atmospheric characteristics, and indirect consequences, and insufficient treatment of 

common mode failures. The commenter also described three reasons an idealized system 

examined in a PRA can be an incomplete representation of reality: (1) gross errors in design, 

construction, or operation; (2) no accounting for malevolent acts; and (3) inability to account for 

deficiencies in institutional culture and practice. The commenter also asserted that PRAs 

typically yield estimates of probability that are substantially lower than is implied by direct 

experience and insurers’ judgment. 

RESPONSE: As discussed in the Sections ' and ', the NRC recognizes that 

there are uncertainties in the analysis of environmental impacts in the GEIS and that a variety of 

factors can affect the actual impacts at a given plant. The NRC also recognizes that there have 

been a number of analyses that have provided quantitative estimates of the potential impact of 

accidents at spent fuel pools; several of these analyses are discussed in Section 4.3 of the 

GEIS. Further, the GEIS has been updated to include a discussion of recently published 

analyses such as SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l). The NRC notes that determination of the 

impacts from a potential spent fuel pool accident involves consideration of both likelihood and 

consequence. The GEIS uses quantitative estimates of the consequences of severe accidents 

from NUREG–15&b) and NUREG–15&a), a discussion of the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-331 185(*௅

heterogeneity and uncertainty in factors that can significantly affect quantitative estimates, and a 

reasoned evaluation of the extent to which these considerations would affect quantitative 

estimates of environmental impacts of spent fuel pool accidents to provide the impact 

determination for severe accidents. The NRC believes that this is a reasonable and adequate 

approach for evaluating the environmental impacts of severe accidents. The NRC agrees that 

factors such as population density, seismic risk, and spent fuel pool inventory are both important 

to the determination of environmental impacts and can vary across plants, and that results of 

PRAs are subject to uncertainties. Appendix F has been revised to include more discussion of 

these factors and their potential impacts on the quantitative estimates to ensure that these 

factors are fully disclosed and considered. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

-1--1--1--1--3--1--1-

D.2.35.20 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS failed to provide a detailed 

quantitative analysis of the impacts to public health and the environment that would occur in the 

event of an accidental release of radiation during spent fuel storage or transfer, and that these 

impacts could be substantial. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS describes the environmental 

impacts of accidents in Section 4RIWKH*(,66HFWLRQLQFOXGHVIRUH[DPSOHD

description of the accident dose criteria that must be met for spent fuel pool handling accidents 

UHPWRWDOHIIHFWLYHGRVHHTXLYDOHQWDQGGU\FDVNVWRUDJHV\VWHPDFFLGHQWVHJDUHP

limit on total effective dose equivalent), which bounds the offsite consequences for all facilities. 

The GEIS also describes postulated accident consequences for a reference DTS. A detailed 

explanation of the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire is also provided in Appendix F of the 

GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--14) 

D.2.35.21 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that NRC should have considered a range 

of predicted outcomes when considering the environmental impacts of accidents, instead of a 

single predicted outcome. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. As discussed in Sections '

and ', the NRC has acknowledged that a precise generic prediction of environmental 

impacts attributable to spent fuel pool accident releases is not possible because a variety of 

factors can affect the actual dose to the public in a given plant scenario. Therefore, the NRC 

believes that reliance upon the quantitative estimates derived from accident sequence analyses 

for the reference plants in generic studies like NUREG–15&b) and NUREG–

15&a) is appropriate for the GEIS. The NRC acknowledges that site variables can 

significantly affect these estimates, such as collective dose to the public and assumed 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-332 September 2014 

evacuation rates (see GEIS Table F-1), but believes that the risk data analyzed in the GEIS 

sufficiently represents a range of outcomes and is therefore a reasonable approach for 

evaluating the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool accidents. Consideration of these 

variables are discussed in the GEIS, and Appendix F has been revised to include further 

discussion of these factors and their potential impacts on the quantitative estimates to ensure 

full disclosure. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

--2) 

D.2.35.22 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS should have considered the 

effects of upstream dam failures on the safe continued storage of spent fuel. Several 

commenters described a complaint by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 

against NRC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which asked the Court to 

require the NRC to disclose records related to the effect of upstream dam failures on nuclear 

power plant safety (Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. NRC). Citing the complaint, 

the commenters expressed concern that the probability of dam failure causing an accident is 

higher than the probability of the March 11, 2011 tsunami in Japan that caused the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident. The commenters also noted that the risk of upstream 

dam failure affects three dozen U.S. nuclear power plants. The commenters also expressed 

concern that the NRC is withdrawing information about these risks from public view, and that 

NRC engineers are providing information to the public about these risks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As stated in GEIS Section 4IRU

spent fuel pools and Section 4IRUGU\FDVNVWRUDJHV\VWHPVWKH15&UHTXLUHVOLFHQVHHV

to consider flood hazards, including those caused by dam failures, in spent fuel storage facility 

design bases (e.g., see Section 2.4.2 of NUREG–15&2012h) for reactors, and Section 

2.4.4.2 of NUREG–15&IRUGU\FDVNVWRUDJHIDFLOLWLHV$VVWDWHGLQ*(,6Section 

4WKH15&KDVDOVRWDNHQDFWLRQWRDVNRSHUDWLQJUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVWRUHHYDOXDWHIORRG

hazards, including the risk of upstream dam failures and the impacts of dam failures to nuclear 

plants, including spent fuel pools and onsite ISFSIs. The NRC will review these reevaluations 

and determine whether additional regulatory action to improve flood protection is necessary. 

Any new permanent flood protection measures for spent fuel pools or ISFSIs resulting from this 

process would continue to be in place during continued storage of spent fuel. 

With respect to the comment on the NRC withdrawing information about risks from dam failures, 

NRC continues to withhold some information on specific risks to some NRC-licensed facilities 

from specific dam failures. The NRC’s policy is to protect sensitive and security-related 

information and not to hide safety issues as the commenter suggests. The NRC issued a 

5HJXODWRU\,VVXH6XPPDU\15&a), that provides procedures to be used in handling 

documents that may contain security-related sensitive information that could be useful, or could 

reasonably be expected to be useful, to a terrorist in a potential attack. More information related 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-333 185(*௅

to withholding of information is posted on the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/sensitive-info.html. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30------1-

D.2.35.23 – COMMENT: One commenter submitted a technical report that described the 

potential for inadvertent criticality in a spent fuel pool initiated by a station blackout event. The 

commenter stated that a sustained station blackout, in which both offsite power and onsite 

emergency electrical power are lost, could result in boiloff of water from the spent fuel pool, 

which would eventually lower the water level in the pool to a point below the top of the spent fuel 

assemblies. The commenter postulated that spent fuel thus exposed would heat up and 

increase the temperature of surrounding materials. Above certain temperatures, the commenter 

stated that solid neutron absorbers in spent fuel pool racks that are required for criticality safety 

would melt. The commenter stated that, under certain conditions, the use of water sprays as a 

mitigating strategy to restore spent fuel pool cooling after the neutron absorbers are damaged or 

destroyed could result in inadvertent criticality. Further, the commenter asserted that some 

studies used in the GEIS may be flawed because they fail to account for the possible presence 

of fresh fuel assemblies and aluminum racks in some spent fuel pools. Another commenter 

stated that if high-burnup fuel rods (or other spent fuel rods) were involved in a criticality 

accident as the water boiled away in the pool, any degraded thermal conductivity of such fuel 

rods would play a significant role in increasing local fuel and fuel-cladding temperatures, 

because the heat flux would be high. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. $VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, loss of offsite power was one of the events considered in NUREG–(NRC 2001b) as 

a possible cause for a spent fuel pool fire. The GEIS states that the frequency of uncovering 

fuel ranges from 1.1 x 10- SHU\HDUIRUSRZHUORVVHVFDXVHGE\VHYHUHZHDWKHUWR[-

 per 

year for plant-related and grid-related events. These frequencies were considered in Table 3.1 

of NUREG–LQWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHWRWDOIUHTXHQF\RIIXHOXQFRYHU\SHU\HDUZKLFK

UDQJHVIURP[-

 to 2.4 x 10- per year (NRC 2001b). The total frequency values are 

reported in Table F-1 of the GEIS as the probability per year of a spent fuel pool fire. Therefore, 

loss of offsite power is already considered in the GEIS as one cause of a spent fuel pool fire. 

In addition, NUREG–FRQVHUYDWLYHO\DVVXPHGWKDWWKHUHLVQRUHFRYHU\RQFHWKHZDWHU

level in the pool reaches P3 ft) above the top of the fuel (NRC 2001b). As stated in 

NUREG–WKLVVLPSOLILHGHQGVWDWHZDVXVHGEHFDXVHUHFRYHU\EHORZWKLVOHYHOJLYHQ

failure to recover before reaching this level, was judged to be unlikely given the significant 

radiation field in and around the spent fuel pool at lowered water levels. This conservative 

assumption greatly simplified the analysis in NUREG– by eliminating the need to 

accurately model the complex heat transfer mechanisms and chemical reactions that would 

occur in the fuel assemblies and pool structure as the spent fuel is slowly uncovered. This 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-334 September 2014 

conservative assumption also addresses the commenter’s concern about whether the NRC 

analyzed high-burnup fuel when considering the frequency of spent fuel pool fire events, 

because the particular decay heat and cladding properties of high-burnup fuel did not factor into 

the simplified analysis in NUREG–15&b). Therefore, consideration of additional 

accident sequences suggested by the commenter after uncovering spent fuel (i.e., loss of 

neutron absorbers by melting, adding water to the pool, causing a nuclear criticality which heats 

the fuel, which raises the cladding temperature above the runaway oxidation temperature) 

would either not change or possibly lower the accident frequencies below those estimated in 

NUREG–15&b). For this reason, the NRC finds that the analysis in the GEIS 

conservatively bounds the probability of a spent fuel pool fire. 

Further, as described in Section ' of this appendixWKH15&VWDWHGLQD'HQLDORI

3HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ)5WKDWWKHSUREDELOLW\RIVSHQWIXHOSRROILUHLVORZHUWKDQ

estimated in NUREG–15&b). This lower probability is supported by studies 

completed after the September 11, 2001 attacks, which indicate that for those hypothetical 

conditions where air cooling may not be effective in preventing a zirconium fire (i.e., the partial 

draindown scenario cited by the Petitioners), the significant time between spent fuel uncovery 

and the possible onset of a zirconium fire provides a substantial opportunity for both operatorinitiated and system-response accident mitigation. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of these comments. 

-2--2--1--2--1--1--1--1--1-

-1--1--2--1--1--1--1--1-34) 

-1--2--2-3-2--2--2---

D.2.35.24 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS needs more consideration 

of the environmental impacts of low water-resource availability on continued spent fuel pool 

cooling. The commenters stated that the GEIS should consider the impact of droughts, 

earthquakes, tsunamis, and floods on nuclear waste management. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS describes the environmental 

impacts of spent fuel pool storage during the short-term timeframe. 6HFWLRQV6XUIDFH-

:DWHU4XDOLW\DQG8VHDQG*URXQGZDWHU4XDOLW\DQG8VHVWDWHWKDWPRVWFRQVXPSWLYH

water use ceases following reactor shutdown. Therefore, the cooling-water demand in the 

timeframe analyzed by the GEIS would be significantly reduced compared to the demand during 

reactor operations, and the impacts on surface water and groundwater consumption, even 

during droughts, would be SMALL. 

In considering the impacts from natural events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and floods 

relative to spent fuel cooling, one of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

power plant accident is that the NRC has required licensees to reevaluate the design basis 

seismic and flooding protection of structures, systems, and components for each operating 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

reactor, which would also include the spent fuel pool. Licensees are now providing their 

analyses to NRC and those analyses are being evaluated. Should additional regulatory actions 

to improve design basis seismic and flooding protection of structures, systems, and components 

be identified, then appropriate actions would be taken, and any facility improvements may 

continue to remain in place during continued storage. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-21--11) 

D.2.35.25 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the GEIS should have considered the effects 

on the continued storage of spent fuel of loss of offsite power and station blackout from natural 

causes, such as coronal mass ejections, and from man-made causes, such as cyber-attack and 

electromagnetic pulse weapons. One commenter asserted that these events will be more likely 

and more severe in the future, due to the effects of climate change, and will accumulate to 

further deteriorate aging infrastructure needed to restore offsite power. Several commenters 

FLWHGWKH&DUULQJWRQ(YHQWDSRZHUIXOJHRPDJQHWLFVWRUPWKDWGLVUXSWHGWHOHJUDSK

systems and created aurorae visible around the world. The commenters also stated specific 

concerns about the effect of loss of offsite power on the safety of spent fuel transfer operations 

in a spent fuel pool. One commenter stated that a loss of offsite power event could result in a 

reactor accident at a colocated operating reactor, which could, in turn, result in releases of 

radioactive material of sufficient magnitude to preclude the implementation of mitigating 

strategies at continued storage facilities. Some commenters stated that some plants have 

insufficient capability to cope with station blackout using battery power. One commenter stated 

that the NRC does not require nuclear power plant owners to be prepared for large-scale, longterm power outages, and notes that in the event of a widespread electrical transmission system 

blackout for an extended duration (beyonGGD\VDQGXSWRVHYHUDOPRQWKVLWPD\QRWEH

possible to transport necessary offsite resources to the affected power plants in a timely 

manner. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQWV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHV

the environmental impacts of a spent fuel pool fire caused by station blackout. In the accident 

postulated in the GEIS, an extended station blackout is postulated to cause failure of active 

spent fuel pool cooling systems, followed by a rise in pool water temperature, and ultimately 

sufficient loss of pool water due to evaporation to expose spent fuel to air. Given the low 

probability of such a high-consequence event, NRC determined that the environmental impacts 

DUHVPDOO6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6DOVRGHscribes features that may be 

available during an emergency as a result of regulatory actions taken after the September 11, 

2001 terrorist attacks and the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 

plant in Japan. Therefore, the GEIS sufficiently addresses the environmental consequences of 

station blackouts on spent fuel pools. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

$VQRWHGLQD'HFHPEHUUHVSRQVHWR3HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ350--)5

WKH15&LVDOVRFRQVLGHULQJDSHWLWLRQIRUUXOHPDNLQJUHTXHVWLQJWKDWWKe NRC amend 

its regulations to require licensed facilities to assure long-term cooling and unattended water 

makeup of spent fuel pools to mitigate prolonged electricity grid failure scenarios caused by 

solar storms. 

Dry cask storage does not rely on electric power sources to ensure safe storage. Some electric 

power is used to power monitoring devices, but temporary loss of monitoring capability does not 

create a safety issue. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30-14-1) (112---12--1--1--1--1--1--1-4) 

-1-----------

------12) 

D.2.35.26 – COMMENT: One commenter criticized the NRC’s use of the MACCS2 code to 

estimate the consequences of a severe accident. Specific problems identified by the 

commenter include ignoring real health costs, assigning too low a cost to the value of human 

life, useless evacuation estimates, and NRC’s use of mean values computed by the code, 

LQVWHDGRIWKSHUFHQWLOHYDOXHV7KHFRPPHQWHUFLWHGVWDWHPHQWVE\D0$&&6FRGH

developer that the MACCS2 code was not held to the quality assurance (QA) requirements of 

NQA-$60(5DWher it was developed using the less rigorous QA guidelines of 

$16,$16$167KHFRPPHQWHUDOVRVWDWHGWKDW15&XVXDOO\DVVXPHVWKDW

accidents last only one day and never more than four days, and that MACCS2 is not capable of 

assessing the environmental impacts of releases that last more than four days. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC uses the MACCS2 code for 

analysis of economic consequences of severe accidents. Land contamination and economic 

consequence results from MACCS2 models are used as inputs in NRC’s backfit and regulatory 

analyses and in SAMA analyses, and have been reported in previous research studies (e.g., 

NUREG/CR–Travis et al. 185(*CR–Sailor et al. (FRQRPLFUHVXOWV

and some land contamination area results are dependent on user inputs. A MACCS2 user’s 

guide and code manual is available for reference in determining various parameter inputs. The 

NRC analyses referenced in the GEIS used current information at the time of each study, 

including analysis input information related to the estimation of land contamination and 

economic impact. The MACCS2 code was developed under the QA standard ANSI/ANS 10.4 

$16, which provides standard guidelines for the verification and validation of non-safetyrelated computer codes for nuclear industry applications, such as those used for environmental 

analyses. The MACCS2 code was developed for the NRC and maintained by Sandia National 

Laboratories (Sandia). In 2004 the DOE evaluated the MACCS2 code with respect to its use as 

a safety analysis code. The DOE evaluation found no evidence of programming, logic, or other 

types of software errors in MACCS2 that have led to non-conservatisms, but did recommend 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

some improvement actions for the software QA (DOE 2013b). As a result, a QA improvement 

plan was developed by Sandia and is ongoing as part of the development and maintenance of 

the MACCS code. The plan addresses software development, documentation, reviews, testing, 

tools used for the project, and configuration management. The NRC completed its latest review 

of the QA plan in 2013. 

The NRC does not have a practice to limit the assumption of accident release to less than four 

days. The spent fuel pool accident releases in NUREG–NRC 2001b), which is a study 

used as a basis for the assessment of spent fuel pool fires, assumed that the entire release 

IURPDVSHQWIXHOILUHWDNHVSODFHRYHUKRXUVZKLFKZDVDQDVVXPSWLRQXVHGWRPRGHOWKH

speed of fire propagation and fire-related fuel damage. The NRC does not believe that 

extending the length of an accident scenario is likely to result in more significant consequences 

that would affect the analysis in the GEIS. Although the MACCS2 code modeling does limit 

plume releases to assume an accident duration of up to five days, the NRC has found this time 

period to be sufficient to model releases from spent fuel pool severe accidents. 

The NRC’s policy is to use the average, or mean, results for environmental impact analyses 

using MACCS2 in order to provide a more representative impact. An NRC Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board and the Commission considered this issue in the Pilgrim license renewal 

proceeding (NRC 2012i) DQGGHFOLQHGWRRUGHUWKHXVHRIWKHWKSHUFHQWLOHRURWKHUPHWULF

Past analyses have shown that the mean result from MACCS2 weather trials is typically skewed 

WRDKLJKHUSHUFHQWLOHWKDQWKHPHGLDQHJWKHWKSHUFHQWLOHZKLFKPHDQVWKDWWKHDULthmetic 

DYHUDJHPHDQRIDOOWULDOVLVDKLJKHUYDOXHWKDQWKHFDOFXODWHGUHVXOWVIRUSHUFHQWRIWKH

trials. In other words, the NRC’s policy of selecting the mean instead of the median MACCS2 

results produces a more conservative analysis. For MACCS2 inputs that use local or sitespecific information such as evacuation estimates, health costs or economic factors, the generic 

analyses referenced in the GEIS use available information, adjusted to be reasonably bounding 

for the purpose. 

Regarding the NRC’s use of a cost value for a human life, the NRC currently uses a $2000 per 

person-rem conversion factor in its regulatory and environmental analyses to capture the dollar 

value of the health detriment resulting from radiation exposure. The NRC is currently in process 

of updating its use of the value of statistical life to align with the rest of the Federal agencies as 

part of the reassessment of the NRC’s dollar per person-rem conversion factor policy. 

(QFORVXUHWR6(&<-12-0110 provides a discussion of the NRC’s plans for this process (NRC 

2012j). The NRC will review the Continued Storage GEIS and Rule for possible revision when 

warranted by significant events that may call into question the appropriateness of the Rule. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--2--2--2-22) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.35.27 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments that disagreed with the NRC’s 

use of risk to describe the environmental impacts in the draft GEIS. Of particular concern to 

many commenters is the NRC’s formulation of risk values as the product of the probability of an 

accident and the consequences of an accident. Commenters characterized the probabilities 

presented by NRC as, for example, vanishingly small and unrealistic. Many commenters 

expressed concern about the low probabilities used by the NRC and stated that low probability 

is not a substitute for protection. Several commenters suggested that the NRC consider an 

experiential basis for probability estimates, which would consider the actual number of nuclear 

accidents that have already occurred worldwide. Along these same lines, many commenters 

stated that the GEIS failed to recognize that nuclear accidents happen with greater frequency 

than the NRC’s PRAs would predict. Some other commenters stated that probabilistic risk 

analyses do not account for multiple causes, causes related to human error, or changes in the 

frequency of natural events due to climate change. Some commenters stated the uncertainty 

inherent in a risk analysis, like the one in the GEIS, means that the NRC cannot generically 

conclude that the overall impacts are small for all sites and timeframes. Finally, several 

commenters stated that the NRC should simply disclose the consequences of an accident or 

consider that some consequences are so unacceptable that they outweigh even the smallest 

theoretical probability and even a slight chance of an accident should not be taken. 

One commenter stated that the NRC’s use of probability-weighted consequences to describe 

environmental impacts is correct, and cited Carolina Envtl. Study Grp. v. United States to 

support this view. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees with comments that state that the use of probability-weighted consequences to describe 

environmental impacts is correct. The NRC’s consideration of the environmental impacts of 

accidents for at-UHDFWRUFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHOLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KH

GEIS, in the introduction WR6HFWLRQVWDWHVWKDWFRQVHTXHQFHVRIDVHYHUHDFFLGHQWVKRXOG

one occur, could be significant and destabilizing. However, the NRC makes impact 

determinations for these accidents based on risk, which considers both the low probability of 

these events and the potential consequences. 

This formulation of the environmental impacts of severe accidents is based on the NRC’s policy 

on reactor severe accidents in NEPA reviews ()57KLVSROLF\VWDWHVWKDWDQ(,6

“shall include a reasoned consideration of the environmental risks (impacts) attributable to 

accidents at the particular facility or facilities within the scope of each such statement. In the 

analysis and discussion of such risks, approximately equal attention shall be given to the 

probability of occurrence of releases and to the probability of occurrence of the environmental 

consequences of those releases” )51). Additionally, the policy provides that “[t]he 

environmental consequences of releases whose probability of occurrence has been estimated 

shall also be discussed in probabilistic terms” )540101). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHEDODQFLQJRIFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGSUREDELOLWLHV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

states “For issues in which the significance determination is based on risk (i.e., the probability of 

occurrence as well as the potential consequences), the probability of occurrence as well as the 

potential consequences have been factored into the determination of significance.” This 

approach is supported by the Court of Appeals in its 2012 remand (New York v. NRC): 

Under NEPA, an agency must look at both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the 

consequences if those events come to pass. See, e.g., Carolina Envtl. Study Grp. v. United 

States. An agency may find no significant impact if the probability is so low as to be “remote 

and speculative,” or if the combination of probability and harm is sufficiently minimal (See, e.g., 

City of New York v. Dep’t of Transp., “The concept of overall risk incorporates the significance of 

possible adverse consequences discounted by the improbability of their occurrence.”). 

Therefore, the NRC disagrees with comments that NRC should not use risk when assessing 

environmental impacts. 

The NRC used risk assessment studies which considered both internal and external events in 

determining the probability that a severe accident at a spent fuel pool or dry cask storage facility 

ZRXOGRFFXU7KHVHVWXGLHVDUHUHIHUHQFHGLQ6HFWLRQVRIWKH*(,67KHQWRGHWHUPine 

the consequences of a severe accident at a spent fuel pool or dry cask storage facility, the NRC 

used the MACCS2 accident consequence computer code. The MACCS2 code is used by the 

NRC for severe accident consequence assessment in reactor studies and environmental impact 

assessments. Section ' of this appendix gives more information on the NRC’s use of 

the MACCS2 code. The NRC believes that this analysis process provides a reasonable 

assessment of the probability and consequences of a postulated spent fuel pool or dry cask 

storage facility severe accident. An explanation of the determination of severe accident 

probability and consequences in the referenced studies is given below. 

With respect to the consequence analysis of severe accidents for spent fuel pools, the NRC’s 

analysis relies on the spent fuel pool risk assessment from NUREG–(NRC 2001b) to 

support the conclusions in the GEIS. The NRC believes that this analysis provides a 

conservative bounding analysis of the impacts from a spent fuel pool fire during continued 

storage because the analysis in NUREG–XVHVFRQVHUYDWLYHDVVXPSWLRQVDVWKHEDVLVIRU

its analysis. In the spent fuel pooOVHYHUHDFFLGHQWVWXGLHVUHIHUHQFHGLQ6HFWLRQDQG

Appendix F of the GEIS, the NRC determined the accident probability used to weigh the 

consequences by performing a risk evaluation of potential accident initiators, both internal and 

external to the facility, and the conditional spent fuel pool fire probability. For example, Section 

3 of NUREG–GHVFULEHVWKLVULVNHYDOXDWLRQSURFHVVZKLFKSURYLGHVDFFLGHQWVFHQDULR

information and estimates the likelihood of events. The NUREG–ULVNHYDOXation included 

information from PRAs of internal events to estimate the likelihood of an initiating event, seismic 

hazard assessments from more than one source to estimate the likelihood of seismic initiators, 

human reliability assessments to determine the likelihood of keeping the spent fuel cooled, 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-340 September 2014 

thermal-hydraulic assessments of spent fuel pool loss of cooling and loss of inventory 

scenarios, and a simplifying assumption that if the water level were within P3 ft) from the 

top of the spent fuel, then a spent fuel pool fire would occur. This spent fuel pool risk 

assessment used the best available information at the time, which included visits to four 

decommissioning plants to improve the PRA modeling for spent fuel pools. NUREG–

Table 3.1 lists the frequency of fuel uncovery for each of the nine initiating events assessed. To 

estimate the consequences of spent fuel pool fires, NUREG–UHIHUVWRSUHYLRXVDQDO\VHVRI

spent fuel pool severe accidents, which showed that the consequences of a spent fuel pool 

accident could be comparable to those for a severe reactor accident (NRC 2001b). The source 

term and plume release modeling in NUREG–XVHGLQIRUPDWLRQIURPNUREG– (NRC 

, Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants, as a basis, with additional 

sensitivity studies to address concerns about ruthenium and fuel fines releases. The spent fuel 

pool fire source term and plume release assumptions were input values for the MACCS2 

accident consequence computer code, which is used in NUREG–WRHVWLPDWHWKHRIIVLWH

consequences of the spent fuel pool fire. 6HFWLRQRINUREG–GLVFXVVHVWKH15&

development of the spent fuel pool severe accident source term and consequence analysis 

(NRC 2001b). The NRC believes that this analysis provides a reasonable assessment of the 

probability and consequences of a severe accident at a spent fuel pool. 

The NRC’s analysis of severe accidents in dry cask storage systems was developed in a similar 

fashion to the analysis for spent fuel pool fires, with risk assessment studies determining both 

the likelihood and consequences of severe accident radioactive releases. 6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS discusses the NRC’s assessment of severe accidents in dry cask storage systems, 

which is based on a PRA published by the NRC, NUREG– 15&e). In addition, as 

stated in Section ' of this appendix, the GEIS has been updated to include relevant 

information from an independent study conducted by EPRI in 2004 with a PRA for bolted casks 

containing PWR fuel (EPRI 2004b). To analyze the risk, the authors of the PRAs developed a 

comprehensive list of initiating events, and evaluated the risk associated with each initiating 

event. Initiating events include dropping the cask during transfer operations, as well as external 

events during onsite storage (such as earthquakes, floods, high winds, lightning strikes, 

accidental aircraft crashes, and pipeline explosions). The PRAs considered potential cask 

failures from mechanical and thermal loads, including thermal loads caused by misloading 

events. Weather conditions and the population distribution in the vicinity of the site were also 

considered. The NRC believes that these analyses provide a reasonable assessment of the 

probability and consequences of a severe accident in a dry cask storage system. 

Further, the NRC considered the effects of changes in the frequency of natural events due to 

climate change as it affects the spent fuel pool and dry cask storage system accident 

assessments throughout Section 4RIWKH*(,6
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-341 185(*௅

Finally, the NRC recognizes the comments that supported the approach to accidents used in the 

GEIS. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-------2) (112-2-4) (112-----31-4) 

--1) (303---------21----2-3) 

(341-1--1) (410---1--1---1--1--1-

-1--10----------

-2--1--2-----4- ---

--2----------3--

1--1--1--3--1--1--1--1-3) 

D.2.35.28 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS provides only limited quantitative 

information on the probabilities and consequences of severe accidents. The commenter stated 

that the GEIS only provides quantitative assessments of risk for seismic events that initiate 

spent fuel pool fires. For other accidents (cask drops, earthquakes, floods, high winds, terrorist 

attacks, etc.), the NRC relied upon existing design criteria and safety requirements to reach a 

finding that the risks are SMALL. The commenter cited New York v. NRCSJZKLFKVWDWHV

that pointing to compliance programs is in no way sufficient to support a scientific finding that 

spent fuel pools will not cause a significant environmental impact during continued storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. In the description of severe accidents, 

where the NRC postulated the failure of passive engineered systems such as spent fuel pool 

liners and walls, and dry cask storage system casks and canisters, the NRC presented the 

environmental impacts of those releases in the GEIS. For example, the analysis results for 

accidents involving a DTS DUHSURYLGHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

As the GEIS explains, the structures, systems, and components used to protect spent fuel from 

accidents during continued storage are designed to prevent damage that could result in 

releases of radioactive material. For example, spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems 

are robust structures designed to withstand earthquakes, cask drops, floods, and high winds. 

The NRC’s analysis takes the ability of these structures to withstand these events into account 

in its analysis, but does not rely on regulatory compliance in assessing the consequences of 

accidents. Rather, the NRC relies on regulatory compliance and the NRC’s enforcement 

authority to prevent accidents from occurring. Thus, although the analysis does take into 

account the robust nature of these structures, that robustness is a standalone fact, independent 

of compliance with the NRC’s regulatory requirements. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

--1--3-12) 

D.2.35.29 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that spent fuel storage facilities should not 

be sited near areas prone to man-made and natural disasters and centers of population. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-342 September 2014 

Several commenters stated that spent fuel should be moved to safer locations. Specific 

unsuitable sites and hazards that commenters mentioned include coastal sites prone to 

tsunamis, hurricanes, storm surges, and other flooding hazards; any sites near centers of 

population; large liquid natural gas terminals; earthquake or volcano prone areas; and areas 

prone to landslides. One commenter stated that a GEIS may not be the appropriate framework 

for risk analysis because it focuses on impacts to the environment from human activities, rather 

than focusing on the impacts to plant activities from the environment. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Siting of spent fuel storage facilities is 

based on the reJXODWLRQVLQ&)53DUWVDQGIRUVSHQWIXHOSRROVDQGWKHJHQHUDO

OLFHQVHDQGVSHFLILFOLFHQVHSURYLVLRQVRI3DUWIRU,6)6,V These regulations address many 

of the commenters’ concerns, such as population density, physical characteristics of the site 

(e.g., seismology, meteorology, geology and hydrology), and the nature and proximity of manrelated hazards (e.g., airports, dams, transportation routes, military and industrial facilities). 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DOVRGLVFXVVHVWKHQHHGWRUeview nearby military, industrial, and 

WUDQVSRUWDWLRQIDFLOLWLHVWRDVVHVVWKHKD]DUGVIURPWKHVHIDFLOLWLHV,Q6HFWLRQVDQG

the GEIS does address impacts on plant activities from natural phenomena such as 

earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis and climate change. Moreover, the 

environmental impacts of any hypothetical natural disaster causing spent fuel pool damage and 

fission product release to the environment have been encompassed by the pool drainage and 

zirconium fire analysis in Appendix F of the GEIS, including the risk analysis in Table F-1. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

------11--------20) 

D.2.35.30 – COMMENT: One commenter provided comments on a super volcano located 

beneath Yellowstone. The commenter stated that all nuclear power plants in the region will 

need to be immediately shut down and decommissioned, and all nuclear material moved, 

because internal combustion engines will have a hard time running with volcanic ash in the air. 

The commenter asserted that ash from an active super volcano would also prevent reactor 

back-up diesel generators from working and would result in evacuation of plant workers. The 

commenter stated that the radioactive nuclear debris would turn what would be a planet wide 

near extinction into a complete worldwide extinction event. 

Other commenters stated that the NRC should evaluate the hazard that meteor airbursts 

(bolides) pose to nuclear facilities. The commenters provided as examples the events that 

occurred on -XQHin Tunguska, Russia and on )HEUXDU\in Chelyabinsk, 

Russia. The commenters suggested that spent fuel should be stored underground or moved 

away from earthquake and fault line zones because a meteor airburst that causes a direct hit on 

spent fuel storage will be a major radiation release event. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-343 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Owing to NRC reactor siting and design 

criteria as well as the extraordinarily low probability of super volcano or bolide events in 

sufficiently close proximity to damage either a spent fuel pool or a dry cask storage system, 

these events are not considered in facility design bases. 6HFWLRQVDQG of the GEIS 

GHVFULEH*HQHUDO'HVLJQ&ULWHULRQRI$SSHQGL[$WR&)53DUW“General Design Criteria 

for Nuclear Power Plants,” that requires that the design bases for structures, systems and 

components require appropriate consideration for the most severe of the natural phenomena that 

have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. Further, 10 CFR 100.23(c), 

Geologic and Seismic Siting Criteria, states that “the size of the region to be investigated and the 

type of data pertinent to the investigations must be determined based on the nature of the region 

surrounding the proposed site.” 7KHUHLVDVLPLODUSURYLVLRQLQ&)5

Nonetheless, to the extent NEPA warrants consideration of extraordinarily low probability 

events, the consequences of these hypothetical occurrences have been encompassed by the 

pool drainage and zirconium fire analysis in Appendix F of the GEIS, including the risk analysis 

in Table F-1. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(244-13-2) (244-13-----

D.2.35.31 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that the GEIS does not adequately consider 

the frequency, location, or severity of tsunami hazards. Commenters suggested that the NRC 

consider non-expert historical reports when assessing credible beyond-design-basis tsunamis 

RUVWRUPVXUJH&RPPHQWHUVGHVFULEHGVSHFLILFKLVWRULFDOHYHQWVVXFKDVWKHHDUWKTXDNH

WKDWVWUXFN6DQ-XDQ&DSLVWUDQRDQGDHDUWKTXDNHLQ&DOLIRUQLDRIIWKHFRDVWRI5HGRQGR

Beach. Some commenters suggested that the NRC should have considered the report of the 

IULDUVWKDWH[SHULHQFHGWKHHDUWKTXDNH2QHFRPPHQWHUVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH15&XVH

computational fluid dynamics to assess the hazard posed by beyond-design-basis tsunamis, 

which would allow licensees to develop specific mitigation plans. Several commenters stated 

that potential underwater landslides near Hawaii or Cumbre Vieja on the Isle de La Palma in the 

Canary Islands west of Africa pose risks of extreme tsunami magnitudes that should have been 

considered in the GEIS. Several commenters expressed concern about spent fuel rods being 

stored along coastlines and suggested that all spent fuel storage should be moved to high 

ground. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. SectioQVDQGRIWKH

GEIS describe how flood hazards, including floods caused by tsunamis, are considered in the 

design bases for both spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems. NRC general design 

criteria require licensees to design storage facilities to withstand the effects of natural 

phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. These design basis 

criteria also require consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been 

historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited 

accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated (see 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-344 September 2014 

&)53DUW$SSHQGL[$*'&DQG&)5D,QDQ\HYHQWWKH

environmental impacts of any hypothetical tsunami causing spent fuel pool damage and fission 

product release to the environment have been encompassed by the pool drainage and 

zirconium fire analysis in Appendix F of the GEIS, including the risk analysis in Table F-1. 

NUREG/CR–Tsunami Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United 

States of America (Prasad H[DPLQHVWVXQDPLKD]DUGVDWQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVLQWKH

United States. The study reviews offshore and onshore modeling of tsunami waves; describes 

the effects of tsunami waves on nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components; and 

develops approaches for screening sites based on tsunami effects. The study also identifies the 

repository of historic tsunami data. The NRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) 

has a comprehensive research program ongoing to look at source characterization, modeling, 

tsunami effects, and probabilistic hazard framework. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(231-1) (231-3) (244-13-3) (244-13-------12) 

D.2.35.32 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS lacks a sufficient discussion 

of the environmental impacts from severe accidents to surface water and groundwater quality 

and to aquatic resources. One commenter also criticized the NRC’s use of the MACCS2 code 

because that code does not include aqueous releases in its model of severe accidents. 

Commenters referred to the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 

plant, where contaminated cooling water continues to leak into the Pacific Ocean, as an 

example of the kinds of effects that ought to be analyzed in the GEIS. A commenter also cited a 

December 2012 meeting of the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, in which 

NRC explained that the agency is looking into wastewater management associated with 

deployment of severe accident mitigation technologies. Commenters noted that impacts on 

aquatic and terrestrial non-human biota from accidental releases of radioactive material are not 

addressed in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees in part. The 

comments are correct that the GEIS does not address direct releases of radioactive material 

released by accidents to nearby surface water or groundwater. In Appendix F of the GEIS, 

which relies on a study that used the MACCS2 model, contamination of nearby surface water is 

postulated to occur indirectly as a result of fallout from radioactive material dispersed into the 

atmosphere. When analyzing environmental impacts from severe accidents for licensing 

actions such as license renewal or new reactor licensing, the NRC does consider direct impacts 

to surface water and groundwater releases in addition to the indirect impacts calculated by 

MACCS2; however these impacts are considered minor compared to the impacts from airborne 

releases. For example, as stated in Appendix E of NUREG–5HYLVLRQWKHLPSDFWVRQ

human health from surface water and groundwater contamination from spent fuel pool accidents 

are only a small fraction of the impacts from the airborne pathway except for a few cases where 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

the impacts were comparable (NRC 2013m). Therefore, the environmental impacts resulting 

from direct releases to surface water and groundwater from postulated accidents during 

continued storage would also be small, or in a few cases the same, as compared to the 

environmental impacts described in the GEIS that were modeled using MACCS2. 

The NRC agrees the GEIS did not consider the radiological effects on non-human biota from 

accidents during continued storage. This is consistent with NRC’s approach to evaluating 

environmental impacts from accidents. In general, NRC environmental analyses of radiological 

accidents are focused on human impacts from radiological exposure and economic impacts. 

The NRC does conduct an assessment of impacts to non-human biota for normal operation for 

licensing actions such as license renewal and licensing of a new reactor. A more detailed 

discussion on environmental impacts from dose to non-human biota from normal operations can 

be found in Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-14----14--2--2--2--3--4--1-

-4----

D.2.35.33 – COMMENT: Some commenters provided comments on the financial impacts of an 

accident. One commenter stated that the GEIS underestimates the risk of accidents, which 

places significant risk on taxpayers “due to the liability issues.” The commenter stated that “one 

accident will cap the liability of $21 billion.” The commenter stated that with Congress not being 

able to allocate funding to Hurricane Sandy victims, it is not clear how Congress will provide 

sufficient funding following a nuclear disaster. Another commenter stated that there could be a 

trillion dollar accident based on what is decided for continued storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Liability resulting from a nuclear accident 

is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Under the Price-$QGHUVRQ$FWOLFHQVHHVRI

large commercial nuclear reactors must obtain the maximum amount of private nuclear 

LQVXUDQFHDYDLODEOHFXUUHQWO\,IWKDWDPRXQWLVLQVXIILFLHQWDUHWURVSHFWLYH

nuclear insurance fund, which is funded by reactor licensees as required under the PriceAnderson Act, will be used to make up the difference. As of July 2013, the maximum amount of 

the retrospective insurance fund is greater than $12 billion. Under the Price-Anderson Act, the 

private nuclear insurance and the retrospective insurance fund make up the maximum financial 

protection for damages from nuclear accidents involving large commercial nuclear reactors. If 

the damages from a nuclear accident exceed the maximum amount of financial protection 

available under the Price-Anderson Act, the Act provides that “Congress will thoroughly review 

the particular incident and will take whatever action is determined necessary and appropriate to 

protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude.” If a court determines 

that damages from a nuclear accident may exceed the maximum financial protection under the 

Price-Anderson Act, the Act requires that the President submit to Congress a report that 

estimates the costs of the accident that exceeds the maximum financial protection available 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

under the Act, makes recommendations on sources for additional funds, proposes plans for full 

and prompt compensation to those affected, and identifies any additional legislative authorities 

necessary to implement compensation plans. Therefore, the NRC disagrees with the comments 

that there are no provisions for dealing with claims above the maximum amount in the PriceAnderson fund. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----4) (410-

D.2.35.34 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS did not consider economic costs 

of accidents, and that the GEIS must include some discussion or evaluation of the 

socioeconomic impacts to communities from severe or design basis accidents. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees ZLWKWKLVFRPPHQW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GLVFXVVHVWKH

environmental impact of severe accidents and the NRC’s estimates of the environmental 

impacts of a spent fuel pool fire accident, including economic consequences, are discussed in 

Appendix F of the GEIS. Table F-1 provides economic cost estimates that reflect the onsite 

property damage and offsite relocation and property damage costs. As noted in the footnotes 

for Table F-1, the references for these property damage values are NUREG–Regulatory 

Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, ‘Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel 

Pools (NRC a), and NUREG/BR-Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation 

Handbook 15&a). Each of these reports, in turn, cite NUREG/CR–1, Value/Impact 

Analyses of Accident Preventive and Mitigative Options for Spent Fuel Pools, as the source for 

property damage values (Jo et al. 1RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU5XOHDVD

result of this comment. 

-2-1) 

D.2.35.35 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the consequences of a large release could 

include substantial political stress. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that a large airborne release of radioactive material in the 

United States resulting in a major event could have socio-political impacts. However, the 

Federal, State, and local governments regularly demonstrate their ability to deal with extreme 

natural, man-made, and terrorist events. For example, the Federal government routinely 

provides assistance to States and local communities to respond to natural disasters, such as 

earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes. In the event of the release of radioactive material from 

a spent fuel storage site, the NRC, other Federal agencies, and State and local authorities 

would use their experience and planning to provide an appropriate response to the event. See 

Sections D.2.44.2 and ' of this appendix for additional information regarding the 

response capabilities of the NRC and other authorities. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

---1-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.35.36 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS did not adequately consider 

people’s perception of risk associated with continued storage of spent fuel. The commenter 

stated that the perception of risk, whether or not it is supported by actual statistical risk, can 

have negative environmental consequences. The commenter provides examples of declining 

property values and low participation in recreational activities in areas surrounding nuclear 

facilities, which has local negative economic effects. The commenter also stated that the NRC’s 

defense-in-depth philosophy should also include “capitalizing on every opportunity to obtain sitespecific information on vulnerabilities and risks, and design appropriate management and 

mitigation strategies accordingly.” The commenter stated that a decision to “rely on a generic 

evaluation of environmental impacts and codify that no site-specific evaluation of continued 

storage is required is counter to the NRC’s own stated philosophy.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. In its remand of the 2010 Waste 

Confidence Rule, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit continued the long history of Federal 

courts approving a generic approach to the analysis of the environmental impacts of nuclear 

power reactor operation. The Court endorsed the NRC’s generic approach, stating that there is 

“no reason that a comprehensive general analysis would be insufficient to examine onsite risks 

that are essentially common to all plants” (New York v. NRC). The NRC believes that a generic 

approach is appropriate for the assessment of accidents because the GEIS makes impact 

determinations that apply to all spent fuel storage sites. With respect to the consideration of 

public fears that result in declining property values and public avoidance of the area around 

storage facilities, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, the Supreme 

Court held that NEPA does not require the NRC to consider psychological health effects 

resulting from the risk of nuclear accident because this impact was too attenuated from the 

Federal action. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3-1) 

D.2.35.37 – COMMENT: One commenter agreed with the impact assessments in the GEIS. 

The commenter noted that the NRC’s findings of SMALL impacts of the risks of postulated 

accidents and of potential acts of sabotage or terrorism to spent fuel pools and dry casks, from 

short-term to indefinite storage, are in agreement with the findings of the U.S. Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board, American Physical Society, and the office of Senator Feinstein. The 

commenter described the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board findings that reinforcedconcrete structures for dry storage systems can be designed with a life over 100 years and 

longer. The commenter summarized the American Physical Society position as “there are no 

technical barriers to the safe and secure interim storage of spent fuel as long as adequate 

resources and attention are devoted to maintaining storage facilities." Senator Feinstein's office 

was quoted as stating, “no technical barriers to the safe and secure interim storage of spent fuel 

as long as adequate resources and attention are devoted to maintaining storage facilities.” 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: This comment agrees with the NRC’s impact assessment related to potential 

accidents and potential acts of sabotage. Because it does not provide any specific information 

related to the environmental impacts addressed in the GEIS, no changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.35.38 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS did not consider qualitative 

factors in the analysis of accident impacts. The commenter stated that the qualitative factors 

that should be considered include human error, meteorology, future sea-level rise, 

manufacturing defects, and corrosion rates. The commenter paraphrased portions of a notation 

vote by Chairman Macfarlane on SECY-12-LQVXSSRUWRIWKHFRPPHQWLQZKLFKWKH

Chairman stated that uncertainties in attempting to quantify an accident frequency should be 

offset by prudent defense-in-depth (NRC 2012k). 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees with the concept that uncertainties should be offset by prudent defense-in-depth, and 

incorporates that balance into licensing and oversight of nuclear facilities. The NRC disagrees 

that uncertainties related to pertinent qualitative factors have not been considered in analysis of 

accident impacts. To address changing conditions at the site, SecWLRQRIWKH*(,6

provides a discussion of potential cumulative accident impacts affected by qualitative factors, 

such as the general trends and activities at or near spent fuel storage facilities discussed in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHVHJHQHUDl trends and activities include changes in site 

characteristics due to climate change, overall U.S. population growth, and cumulative impact 

from accidents from nearby nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage facilities. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-13) 

D.2.35.39 – COMMENT: Some commenters provided comments concerning earthquake 

hazards at nuclear power plants located in the western half of the United States. Commenters 

VWDWHGWKDWE\UHO\LQJRQDUHSRUW185EG–Revised Livermore Seismic Hazard 

Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains >15&D@WKH

NRC has not adequately supported its generic findings regarding earthquake risks because that 

study did not include western plants. Several commenters described specific concerns about 

seismic risk at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The comment 

is correct that NUREG–15&b) relied on the seismic hazard estimates in NUREG–

a). However, the NRC has continued to assess the safety implications of 

HDUWKTXDNHKD]DUGV,Qthe 15&LGHQWLILHG*HQHULF,VVXHLQZKLFKWKH15&

concluded that seismic design of currently operating reactor and ISFSI facilities provides safety 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

margin from new seismic hazards in the Central and Eastern United States, but that the 

likelihood of exceeding the seismic hazard values used in plant design and in previous 

evaluations may be higher than previously understood for some currently operating Central and 

Eastern United States VLWHV15&b). $VGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQ of the GEIS, 

“Design Basis Events in Spent Fuel,” WKH15&UHVROYHG*HQHULF,VVXHE\FRPSOHWLQJD

limited scope screening analysis and a safety/risk assessment. For Generic IVVXHWKH

NRC performed an assessment to determine the implications of updated probabilistic seismic 

hazards in the Central and Eastern United States RQRSHUDWLQJQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWV)URP

this assessment, the NRC confirmed that all operating nuclear power plants are safe and that 

the overall seismic risk estimates remain small for operating nuclear power plants and the 

current seismic design provides a safety margin. Also, after publication of the draft GEIS, the 

NRC issued COMSECY–13–0030, an NRC study on the potential for requiring expedited 

transfer of spent fuel from reactor spent fuel pools to dry cask storage (NRC 2013n). In the 

regulatory analysis in COMSECY–13–0030, the NRC stated that it: 

used the U.S. *HRORJLFDO6XUYH\86*6PRGHOWRHYDOXDWHVHLVPLF

hazards at Central and Eastern U.S. (CEUS) nuclear power plant sites in this 

analysis. Although the USGS model considers sites in the western United States 

(including Columbia, Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and San Onofre), the staff has 

not performed the necessary analyses for these sites to include them in this 

analysis. Considering the robust designs of spent fuel pools, especially in more 

seismically active areas in the western United States, the staff concludes that 

public health and safety are adequately protected. Upon completion of the NearTerm Task Force Recommendation 2.1 seismic reevaluation, the staff will 

confirm that the seismic risk for spent fuel pools is consistent with the risk 

assumed in this analysis. 

Appendix F of the GEIS has been updated to include the more recent information from 

COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n). Further, the consequences of a severe earthquake, with 

resulting spent fuel pool drainage and an uncontrolled zirconium fire, are encompassed by the 

pool drainage and zirconium fire analysis in Appendix F of the GEIS, including the risk analysis 

in Table F-1. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.35.40 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS did not evaluate the indirect 

impacts to the State of Connecticut of displaced individuals fleeing an accident involving highlevel nuclear waste in long-term storage at Indian Point and that the NRC is required to assess 

these indirect impacts under NEPA. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The costs of temporary relocation and 

evacuation resulting from a severe accident are included in Appendix F of the GEIS. In 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

particular, the total onsite and offsite economic impacts are described in the last column of 

Table F-1. The value of offsite property damage within NPmi) of the postulated spent 

fuel pool fire accident is included in those figures. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of this comment. 

-10-

D.2.36 Comments Concerning Security and Terrorism 

D.2.36.1 – COMMENT: Without providing specific comments on the GEIS or proposed Rule, 

several commenters stated general concerns that the GEIS either did not or did not thoroughly 

consider environmental impacts caused by terrorism. One commenter raised specific concerns 

about the risk of terrorist attacks at Indian Point. Another commenter summarized the costs of 

new NRC rules for high-caliber fully automatic weapons. 

RESPONSE: The NRC takes very seriously the security of all NRC-regulated facilities. 

Security requirements at NRC-regulated facilities are based on an analysis of the design basis 

threat (DBT) WRWKHVHIDFLOLWLHVDVVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6,QFDVHVZKHQDQHZ

WKUHDWLVGHWHFWHGDVVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKHGEIS, immediately effective security orders 

may be issued (and have been in the past) to address emerging threats. In addition, the NRC 

has a security advisory system that is able to send up-to-the-minute security information to all 

licensees and supporting government agencies. 

As stDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6EHFDXVHDFWVRIWHUURULVPZLWKLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDUH

considered to have a low probability of success, the NRC does not hold NRC-regulated facilities 

responsible for the economic impacts of terrorist attacks. However, the NRC does hold its 

regulated facilities responsible to protect against specific security scenarios related to terrorist 

attacks, which are described in NRC adversary characteristic and DBT documents. For security 

reasons these documents are not available to the public and specific security scenarios and 

regulated facilities included in these documents cannot be discussed in detail here. In general, 

however, security scenarios include land assault, vehicle assault, insider assistance mitigation, 

access authorization, cyber-attacks, and mitigation of large fires. 

The NRC coordinates with the U.S. intelligence community to perform threat assessments for 

NRC-regulated facilities and to evaluate threats to NRC and licensee staff traveling overseas. 

The NRC provides the Commission intelligence updates on a regular basis, and staff who work 

on security-related issues are provided intelligence/threat updates bi-weekly. In addition, the 

NRC performs extensive analysis of intelligence information gathered from classified and open 

sources and provides the results of this analysis, including recommendations for increasing or 

decreasing the DBT for NRC-licensed facilities, in an annual written report to the Commission. 

At this time, there is no specific threat to the nuclear energy sector in the United States. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

2Q6HSWHPEHUWKH15&SXEOLVKHG“Firearms Guidelines” for the use of firearms by 

security personnel employed by licensees. This action was taken under the Commission’s 

DXWKRULW\SURYLGHGLQ6HFWLRQ$RIWKHAEADVDPHQGHGE\WKH(QHUJ\3ROLF\$FWRI

6HFWLRQ$SURYLGHVWKH15&ZLWKQHZDXWKRULW\WKDWZLOOHQKDQFHVHFXULW\DW&RPPLVVLRQGHVLJQDWHGIDFLOLWLHV6HFWLRQ$JUDQWHGWKH15&WKHDXWKRULW\WRDllow licensees to use 

enhanced weapons to augment or increase their defensive capability. An example of an 

HQKDQFHGZHDSRQLVDPDFKLQHJXQ3ULRUWRWKHHQDFWPHQWRI6HFWLRQ$15&OLFHQVHHV

typically were prohibited under Federal law, and in some cases State law, from possessing and 

using machine guns. This enhanced weapons authority is voluntary, and licensees must apply 

to the NRC to obtain enhanced weapons authority. Requirements for the use of specific types 

of weapons are discussed in Sections DQGRIWKH*(,6 No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(100-----1-------

-1--3--1--2--1--

D.2.36.2 – COMMENT: A commenter, citing NUREG/BR-15&GSURYLGHGD

comment regarding how the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 revealed weaknesses in 

U.S. nuclear facility security. The commenter stated that the GEIS terrorism impact assessment 

does not provide a detailed description of the environmental impacts of a successful terrorist 

attack, and does not identify, discuss, and evaluate alternatives and mitigation measures. The 

commenter also stated that the GEIS fails to account for cumulative impacts, segments review, 

and does not address site-specific issues relevant to the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant and 

the New York City metropolitan area. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6GHVFULEHVERWK

the probability and consequences of potential terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool and a dry cask 

storage system. Alternatives to the proposed action are considered in the GEIS including those 

that improve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing process. Regarding mitigation, the GEIS 

describes a number of features and measures existing at nuclear facilities that are deterrents to 

terrorist attack, including spent fuel pool structural features and effective and visible physical 

security protection measures. The NRC does not believe there is any meaningful way to 

consider the cumulative risks of terrorism as suggested by the commenter and cumulative 

effects of terrorist attacks were not considered in the GEIS. The comment did not describe how 

conditions at Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant and New York City differ enough so that the 

public health and property damage consequences of the spent fuel pool fire described in 

$SSHQGL[)RIWKH*(,6DQGVXPPDUL]HGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6ZRXOGQRWDSSO\

Therefore, it is not clear what changes or additional information the comment is requesting. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-3 September 2014 

D.2.36.3 – COMMENT: A commenter provided several reasons why the environmental impacts 

of successful terrorist attacks cannot be determined generically. The commenter also stated 

that characteristics of an attack will depend on the physical constraints of the facility, the 

geography of the transportation routes, and such variables as the training and expertise of the 

local first responder community to address any radiological issue that arises. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. In New York v. NRC, the Court of 

Appeals endorsed the NRC’s generic approach to analyzing the environmental impacts of the 

continued storage of spent fuel, stating that there is “...no reason that a comprehensive general 

analysis would be insufficient to examine onsite risks that are essentially common to all plants.” 

The NRC believes that a generic approach is appropriate for a terrorism analysis because the 

GEIS makes impact determinations for spent fuel (e.g., light water reactor fuel) stored in 

accordance with common NRC requirements in similar structures at all spent fuel storage sites. 

The points raised by the comment about the geography of nearby transportation routes and the 

level of training and expertise of the local first responder community are not considerations in 

either a site-specific environmental review or the generic determination in the GEIS. In addition, 

the assumptions used in the GEIS to describe offsite environmental consequences to public 

health (i.e., public dose) would not vary whether offsite dispersal results from either a terrorist 

event or a serious accident. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-3-

D.2.36.4 – COMMENT: Many commenters express concern that the NRC has understated the 

environmental impacts of terrorist attacks and sabotage on spent fuel during continued storage. 

Commenters disagree with the statistical formulation of risk (probability multiplied times 

consequences) and state that the qualitative low probability of successful attack is either 

understated or unjustified. Many commenters stated that the consequences of a successful 

attack would be so large that the NRC’s statistical formulation of risk should not apply. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQWV$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, the NRC has found that the probability of significant release from a terrorist attack on 

spent fuel during storage is very low. The NRC’s finding is based on enhanced security 

requirements since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which include both NRC and 

national anti-terrorist measures to prevent and mitigate successful attacks; the NRC’s ongoing 

threat assessments; and the protective nature of spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems. 

The NRC is not applying a quantitative estimate of risk for security events because the 

probability is numerically indeterminable. However, the NRC has weighed both the qualitative 

probability and estimates of the consequences of a successful terrorist attack on both spent fuel 

pools and dry cask storage systems before reaching the conclusion that the environmental risk 

is SMALL. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

As noted earlier, the NRC continues to believe that sufficient measures have been taken by the 

NRC and other Federal agencies to reduce the public health and environmental risk of terrorist 

attack on spent fuel during continued storage to an acceptable level. The NRC continuously 

monitors the threat environment and makes adjustments to these measures, as necessary, to 

respond to changing threat levels. 

:LWKUHVSHFWWREDODQFLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGSUREDELOLWLHV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VWDWHV

“...for issues in which the significance determination is based on risk (i.e., the probability of 

occurrence as well as the potential consequences), the probability of occurrence as well as the 

potential consequences have been factored into the determination of significance.” This 

approach is supported by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in its 2012 remand: “Under NEPA, 

an agency must look at both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the 

consequences if those events come to pass.” (citations omitted) (New York v. NRC). For this 

reason, the NRC does not agree that it should determine a level of consequence above which 

the probability would no longer be considered in the determination of environmental impacts. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--------22----3) (441-1) (443-3) 

-1--1--1---4-----2--10) 

------3--3--3--3-11) 

D.2.36.5 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that, given the long timeframe covered by the 

GEIS, provisions should be made for periodic updating of the terrorism and sabotage analyses 

to address (1) advances in the technology of terrorism and counter-terrorism, (2) changes in 

population density near storage facilities and shipment routes, and (3) changes in 

understanding and definition of the design basis events and DBTs. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC has 

procedures to deal with a changing threat environment. The NRC undertakes an annual review 

of the threat environment and adjusts security requirements at power reactors and spent fuel 

storage facilities accordingly. To ensure that these threat statements remain a valid basis for 

the design of physical protection systems, the NRC routinely reviews and analyzes a range of 

information from the U.S. intelligence community. The NRC disagrees, however, that the GEIS 

security and terrorism analysis needs to be periodically updated. If information was received 

that called into question the adequacy of the DBT statements, the NRC would immediately 

notify the Commission, which then would consider enhancing security requirements in response 

WRFKDQJLQJWKUHDWFRQGLWLRQV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6KDVEHHQUHYLVHGWRFODULI\WKH15&’s 

practice of annually reviewing the threat environment. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-4-4) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.36.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated concerns regarding the proliferation risk of 

aged spent fuel. The commenters stated that aged spent fuel is susceptible to theft because 

shorter-lived radionuclides have disappeared, which reduces the direct and immediately harmful 

radiation levels that otherwise prevent successful theft. One commenter stated that the 

proliferation risk issue should have been addressed in the GEIS for the DTS, as well as for dry 

cask storage systems. An industry group described the design of dry casks and stated that dry 

casks will continue to provide a protective barrier and offer a robust security protection system 

relative to any terrorist attack. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. In Section 

RIWKH*(,6WKH15C acknowledges that spent fuel radiation levels will decrease over 

time, which could make spent fuel more susceptible to theft or diversion (i.e., a more attractive 

WDUJHWWRLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKPDOHYROHQWLQWHQWLQWKHIXWXUH,Q6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6the NRC 

considered both light water reactor spent fuel and non-light water reactor spent fuel, and agrees 

that, because of the increased risk from theft or diversion, additional security requirements may 

be necessary in the future if spent fuel remains in long-term storage. Therefore, the NRC 

disagrees that the GEIS did not consider changing risk of theft or diversion for spent fuel stored 

in dry casks at an ISFSI and repackaged in a DTS. The NRC agrees with comments that 

described the design of dry casks and stated that dry casks will continue to provide a protective 

barrier and offer a robust security protection system relative to any terrorist attack. These 

IHDWXUHVDUHGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,61RFKDQJHVZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU

Rule as a result of these comments. 

---11---3--2-

D.2.36.7 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the theft and diversion risk of aged spent 

fuel should have been addressed in the GEIS for the DTS, as well as for dry cask storage 

systems. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that Section 4RIWKH*(,6GLGQRW

explicitly address the theft or diversion risk during use of a DTS (i.e., a structure/system used to 

transfer spent fuel from one dry storage cask to another storage cask or to a spent fuel 

transportation package). Accordingly, the GEIS has been revised to address the risk of 

radiological sabotage and theft and diversion for a DTS. No changes were made to the Rule as 

a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.36.8 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that the GEIS did not consider the 

environmental impacts of intentional aircraft attack on either spent fuel pools or dry cask storage 

systems. Several commenters stated that General Electric boiling water reactors with Mark I 

and Mark II containment designs are particularly vulnerable to aircraft attack due to the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

elevation of the spent fuel pool in the reactor building. One commenter stated that 10 CFR Part 

33K\VLFDO3URWHFWLRQRI3ODQWVDQG0DWHULDOV ́LVGHILFLHQWEHFDXVHit does not provide for 

protection against large aircraft attacks. Several commenters also stated that PRAs are 

unreliable and that the risks and probability of an aircraft attack are higher than the GEIS states. 

One commenter stated that the risks of an aircraft attack will increase over time as advances in 

technology make hijacking easier. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC’s consideration of the 

environmental impacts of an intentional attack by aircraft is provided in Section 4.RIWKH

GEIS. In this analysis, the NRC relies on its regulatory requirements and national response 

procedures that were developed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, to describe the very 

low probability of successful attack on spent fuel pools, including attacks by aircraft. As stated 

in the GEIS, this approach is consistent with the analyses in the NRC’VGHQLDORIDSHWLWLRQ

for rulemaking by the Attorneys General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State 

RI&DOLIRUQLD)54). 6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DOVRVWDWHGWKDWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRID

very-low-probability successful attack are the large impacts described in Appendix F of the 

GEIS for a spent fuel pool fire. The NRC concluded that the environmental impact of successful 

terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool is SMALL because the risk (which weighs both the 

probability and consequences) of a successful attack with the consequences described in 

Appendix F is SMALL. With respect to whether certain plant designs are more vulnerable to 

aircraft attack, NRC’s security requirements and other factors, such as national anti-terrorist 

measures to prevent aircraft hijackings, for example, apply to all storage facilities, including 

boiling water reactors with Mark I and II containment structures and elevated spent fuel pools. 

Therefore, the determination that the impacts are SMALL applies to all storage facilities. 

As stated in Section ' of this appendix, intentional aircraft attack is not part of the DBT 

FRQVLGHUHGLQ&)5)RUDQ\DFFLGHQWVFHQDULRLQFOXGLQJDQDLUFUDIWLPSDFWWKH15&

has determined that, shortly after the start of continued storage the risk of a radiation release to 

the public is much less than the risk of a release from an operating plant and the consequences 

RIDUHOHDVHDUHLQPRVWFDVHVVLJQLILFDQWO\OHVVWKDQWKDWRIDQRSHUDWLQJUHDFWRU)5

This is because as the spent fuel ages, the generation of decay heat decreases. After a certain 

amount of time, the overall risk of a zirconium fire becomes insignificant because of two factors: 

(1) the amount of time available for preventive and mitigating actions; and (2) the increased 

probability that the fuel is air-coolable. 

For new power plant applications, the NRC requires applicants to perform a design-specific 

assessment of the effects on the facility of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft. The 

applicant is expected to identify and incorporate into the design those features and capabilities 

to show that, with reduced use of operator actions, the spent fuel cooling or spent fuel pool 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

integrity is maintained. These features and capabilities would continue to remain part of the 

plant’s safety basis even after plant shutdown and while fuel continues to be stored in the spent 

fuel pool. 

The NRC continues to believe that it and other Federal agencies have taken sufficient measures 

to reduce the public health and environmental risk of terrorist attack to an acceptable level. 

With respect to whether aircraft hijackings could become easier in the future, the NRC will 

continuously monitor the threat environment and make adjustments to required security 

measures, as necessary, to respond to changing threat levels. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-4-3) (112--2) (112-11---22--32-----

-1--1---------

D.2.36.9 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that spent fuel in storage is well-protected 

and that the probability of a successful weapon attack on dry storage systems is small. Two 

commenters stated that the rugged designs of dry cask storage systems makes the breaching 

of containment boundaries most unlikely. A commenter noted that only devices with highenergy densities or specific types of military weapons have a real opportunity of compromising 

dry casks. The commenter further stated that the probability of breaching a dry cask is 

vanishingly small because a successful breach requires that the weapon be precisely and 

closely placed. The commenter stated that even in the event of a successful breach, the 

amount of radioactive material release is extremely limited and the affected area would be 

localized. The commenter noted that the public doses would be below unregulated doses 

received by the public from non-nuclear industries. Citing a study by Mr. Robert Luna, an 

industry group also provided extensive comments regarding postulated attacks on dry cask 

storage systems. In addition to providing information on the low likelihood of successfully 

breaching a cask, the group provided information on the small environmental impacts that could 

result from successfully breaching a cask. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. In general, the 

NRC agrees that the likelihood of penetrating a dry storage cask is low, as discussed in Section 

RIWKH*(,6+RZHYHUWKH15&GLVDJUHHVWKDWthis qualitative assessment of likelihood is 

better described as “most unlikely” or “vanishingly small.” In assessing spent fuel dry storage 

systems, the GEIS relies on the NRC’s assessment of the ability of high-energy devices to 

penetrate massive and robust dry storage systems. While certain devices may have the 

capability to penetrate a cask’s confinement boundary, such breaches are not likely to cause a 

VLJQLILFDQWUHOHDVHRIUDGLRDFWLYLW\WRWKHHQYLURQPHQW,QGHYHORSLQJ6HFWLRQVDQGRI

the GEIS, the NRC relied upon a significant body of analytic and experiential spent fuel 

vulnerability studies performed at U.S. government facilities over the last 30 years. Separately, 

the NRC continues to assess the potential release consequences of a hypothetical successful 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

attack, given the multiple inherent design features that would limit the spread of radioactive 

material from such a hypothetical attack. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-----3--3--3--3--3-

D.2.36.10 – COMMENT: One commenter described in detail the potential for an attack-induced 

cask fire. In their analysis, the commenter examined the possibility of an attacker breaching a 

dry cask containing 32 pressurized water reactor spent fuel assemblies and “with a few 

additional steps,” readily initiating a cask fire. They also compared the level of effort and 

attractiveness of a dry cask attack with an attack on a spent fuel pool. The commenter 

recommended that, “...in assessing the overall impacts of storing spent fuel or HLW, the 

proposed EIS [the GEIS] should consider the implications of alternative storage options for a 

national strategy of protective deterrence.” The commenter also stated that the cumulative 

frequency of successful attacks on ISFSIs could be substantial and the consequences of a 

successful attack could be severe, and therefore, because the commenter disagrees with the 

arithmetic definition of risk, the commenter believes that the environmental impacts of attacks 

on ISFSIs are LARGE. The commenter also concluded that the cumulative frequency of 

successful attacks on pools is likely to exceed the cumulative frequency of successful attacks 

on ISFSIs. However, because the GEIS contemplates a future in which there would be ISFSIs 

and no pools, they asserted that the cumulative frequency of successful attacks on ISFSIs could 

be comparable to the currently applicable cumulative frequency of successful attacks on pools, 

if there were no change in the risk environment. Further, the commenter asserted that, whether 

or not pools coexist with ISFSIs in the future, the risk environment could become more adverse, 

leading to an increase in the cumulative frequency of successful attacks on ISFSIs. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that, given the chemical properties of the zirconium cladding containing light water 

reactor spent fuel, a theoretical possibility exists regarding the initiation of a rapid, exothermic 

zirconium oxidation reaction (i.e., a zirconium fire). Consequently, the NRC continues to study 

this phenomenon and the differences that exist between spent fuel stored in pools and spent 

fuel stored in dry storage casks to assess any potential likelihood and consequence issues. 

However, the NRC has no information to substantiate the comment’s claims on “the cumulative 

frequency of attacks” and the comment does not document the source of these statements. 

Fundamentally, the NRC has based its assessment of potential environmental impacts of 

attacks on ISFSIs as SMALL due to the massive and robust nature of storage cask confinement 

and shielding boundaries and the significant difficulties inherent in creating a self-sustaining 

zirconium oxidation reaction. 

In addition, the NRC believes that dry cask storage and current security requirements as stated 

in Section 4.1Srovide high assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety; 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

therefore, the GEIS does not need to include the implications of alternative storage options. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--3--3--3--3--3----4-

D.2.36.11 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that nuclear power plants and spent fuel are 

attractive targets for terrorists, for both radiological sabotage and theft and diversion attacks. 

Several commenters stated that spent fuel pools are more attractive than dry cask storage 

systems, and that spent fuel pools at General Electric boiling water reactors with Mark I and II 

containment structures are more attractive targets than spent fuel pools in pressurized water 

reactors, owing to the elevation of the spent fuel pools in the Mark I and II reactor buildings. 

One cRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDWWKH-XQHUXOLQJLQSan Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. 

NRC, lends credence to the proposition that onsite dry cask storage might lead to or increase 

the risk of a terrorist attack because (1) the presence of the casks would increase the probability 

of a terrorist attack on the plant, and (2) the casks themselves would be a primary target for a 

terrorist attack. Another commenter stated that some reactors are more likely targets than 

others because of their symbolic value as a target and proximity to large population centers. 

The commenter noted that the Pilgrim plant is a symbolic target, and that a successful strike 

would impact a large population. The commenter also stated that Indian Point is close to dense 

population clusters, notably New York City, and also is very close to West Point. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC continuously interacts with 

the U.S. intelligence community on the potential targeting of NRC-regulated facilities. The NRC 

has determined that a general credible threat exists regarding the potential for an attack against 

an NRC-regulated facility. However, the NRC has no information that would indicate likely 

terrorists have either a preferential desire or a preferential capability to attack NRC-regulated 

facilities, as compared to other critical infrastructure and key resources in the United States. 

Moreover, the NRC has no information that would indicate that persons with a malevolent intent 

have a preferential desire or capability to attack particular types or locations of spent fuel 

storage facilities (as posited in the comments). Consequently, the NRC views the assessment 

set forth in the GEIS as appropriate. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

(112--------3) (341-1-----1-4) 

-1---2------3--3--3-

-3---2) 

D.2.36.12 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should have included 

information from NUREG–Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling 

and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel, in its description of the environmental 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

consequences of terrorist attack in the GEIS. The commenter believes that the information in 

Appendix J of NUREG–RQPDOHYROHQWDFWVFRXOGZLWKVOLJKWDGMXVWPHQWH[SODLQKRZWR

readily initiate a pool fire. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. In Appendix J of NUREG–, Final 

Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power 

Reactor Fuel 15&WKH15&FRQVLGHUHGIRXUYDULDWLRQVPRGHVRIDQDGYHUVDU\DWWDFN

involving the placement of high explosives underwater in a spent fuel pool. The explosion is 

postulated to break spent fuel rods, which causes radioactive gases contained in the fuel to 

escape the cladding, contaminate the spent fuel pool water, bubble to the surface, and escape 

to the environment through the building ventilation system. None of these modes postulated a 

drain down of the pool and subsequent spent fuel pool fire, which has consequences that are 

PXFKODUJHUWKDQWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVUHSRUWHGLQ&KDSWHURINUREG–15&IRUWKH

sabotage events considered in Appendix J. The environmental impacts of a spent fuel pool fire 

considered in Appendix F of the GEIS are more severe than and bound the sabotage events 

considered in Appendix J of NUREG–15&7KHUHIRUHWKHUHLVQR need to include 

the analysis of less severe events described in NUREG–15&LQWKH*(,61R

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-4) 

D.2.36.13 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that according to an unspecified National 

Institutes of Health study, an attack on a nuclear reactor could result in a “...massive release of 

radioactive material.” The commenter also cited a comment by David Kyd, spokesman for the 

IAEA, stating that “[Reactors] are built to withstand impacts, but not that of a wide-bodied 

passenger jet full of fuel. These are vulnerable targets, and the consequences of a direct hit 

could be catastrophic.” 

RESPONSE: These comments are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. By focusing on 

attacks on operating reactors, including attacks using wide-bodied passenger jets, the 

comments did not address the environmental impacts of attacks on spent fuel storage facilities 

during the continued storage timeframes. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

----4) 

D.2.36.14 – COMMENT: One commenter, after describing the cumulative risk of accidental 

SODQHFUDVKDWLQGHSHQGHQWVLWHVVWDWHGWKDW3DOOWKDWQHHGEHGRQHLVWRSODFHDOORIWKH

casks in one area, and guard it carefully.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees with the comment to the extent that the NRC’s regulatory framework for dry cask storage 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

provides for licensing of away-from-reactor storage facilities at which spent fuel from a number 

of operating reactors might be consolidated. Therefore, the NRC agrees that the consolidation 

suggested by the commenter is feasible and may accrue certain benefits, such as providing 

offsite storage capacity for licensees that are either unable to construct at-reactor storage 

facilities or are approaching at-reactor storage limits. 

However, the NRC disagrees that to place all casks in one area would be more secure than 

having storage at multiple sites. In Section WKH*(,6IRXQGWKDWWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWV

from security-related events at away-from-reactor storage are similar to those for at-reactor 

storage. Therefore, the NRC disagrees that away-from-reactor storage would mitigate 

environmental impacts. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

(100-

D.2.36.15 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that it is feasible to reduce the likelihood of 

zirconium cladding fire following a loss-of-pool-coolant event using readily implemented 

measures, including reconfiguring the spent fuel in the pools (i.e., redistribution of high decayheat assemblies so that they are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies) to more evenly 

distribute decay-heat loads and enhance radioactive heat transfer; limiting the frequency of 

offloads of full reactor cores into spent fuel pools, requiring longer shutdowns of the reactor 

before any fuel is offloaded, providing enhanced security when such offloads must be made; 

and developing a redundant and diverse response system that would be capable of operating 

even if the pool or overlying building were severely damaged. The commenter suggested that 

potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attack is a plant-design issue, and that 

these vulnerabilities can be understood only by examining the characteristics of spent fuel 

storage at each plant. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that, in the highly unlikely event that an attack results in successfully draining or partial 

draining of a spent fuel pool, the mitigation measures suggested by the comment could reduce 

the likelihood of spent fuel pool fires. However, as stated in NRC’VGHQLDORIDSHWLWLRQIRU

rulemaking by the Attorneys General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of 

&DOLIRUQLD)5WKH15&KDVIRXQGWKDWWKHULVNRIDVSHQWIXHOSRRO]LUFRQLXPILUH

whether caused by an accident or a terrorist attack, is very low. The NRC relied on several 

factors that apply to all spent fuel pools in making this finding, including the physical robustness 

of spent fuel pool design to contain spent fuel under a variety of normal, off-normal and 

hypothetical accident conditions (e.g., loss of offsite power, earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, 

etc.), the physical security measures and spent fuel pool mitigation measures already in place at 

all pools, and NRC site evaluations of every spent fuel pool in the United States. Therefore, the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC believes that the mitigation measures already in place at spent fuel pools are sufficient. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.36.16 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should clarify a statement in the 

draft GEIS on page 4-OLQHV-6HFWLRQfirst paragraph) that “...emergency 

procedures and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives guidelines developed for reactor 

DFFLGHQWVSURYLGHDPHDQVIRUPLWLJDWLQJWKHSRWHQWLDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWHUURULVWDWWDFNV)5

$XJXVW ́7KHFRPPHQter stated that reactors that are shut down often scale 

back their emergency procedures programs and obtain NRC exemptions from emergency 

procedure requirements. The commenter stated that it is not clear that these mitigating 

procedures apply to decommissioning reactors and the GEH Morris away-from-reactor wet 

storage facility. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment and does not 

believe that the GEIS is unclear. The emergency procedures referred to in the first paragraph of 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DUHUHTXLUHGE\DOOUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUWKH\

have declared permanent cessation of operation. While the NRC has historically granted 

H[HPSWLRQVIURPVRPHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)5“Emergency Plans,” following permanent 

cessation of reactor operations, most of which were related to offsite emergency response 

capability, all operating and decommissioning reactor licensees with spent fuel in the spent fuel 

pool are required to continue to have onsite emergency response plans. Mitigating actions that 

would be available to licensees during reactor operations, such as portable pumps and firefighting equipment, will still be effective in mitigating loss-of-coolant accidents in the spent fuel 

pool after shutdoZQ7KH15&DJUHHVWKDWWKHDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\

address the GEH Morris wet storage facility, which is subject to the emergency plan 

UHTXLUHPHQWVFRQWDLQHGLQ&)5+RZHYHUWKHDSSOLFDEOHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)5

“Emergency Plan,” also require the development of emergency procedures that would mitigate 

the potential consequences of various types of events, including terrorist attacks. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.36.17 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the cumulative frequency of successful 

attacks on ISFSIs could be substantial and that the consequences of a successful attack could 

be severe. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC does not believe there is any 

meaningful way to consider the cumulative risks of terrorism as suggested by the comment, and 

FXPXODWLYHHIIHFWVRIWHUURULVWDWWDFNVZHUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGLQWKH*(,6$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQ

of the GEIS, cumulative impacts result from the incremental impact of an action when added to 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency or 

person undertakes such other actions. While the NRC evaluated the consequences and 

probability of a single terrorist attack on a generic facility in the GEIS, there is no past or present 

terrorist event involving spent fuel or any other special nuclear material. Further, given that 

NRC cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate where or when an attacker might attempt to 

attack other spent fuel storage installations, there are no reasonably foreseeable future actions 

upon which to base a cumulative effects analysis. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of this comment. 

--3) 

D.2.36.18 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the GEIS failed to consider cybersecurity 

issues. The commenter suggested the NRC consider Joel Brenner’s “America the Vulnerable,” a 

book that the commenter stated describes vulnerabilities at nuclear power plants and the electric 

grid. The commenter also stated that the NRC should consider the history of the Davis-Besse 

Nuclear Power Plant, citing boric acid corrosion issues, the plant’s role in a 2003 blackout event, 

and that Davis-Besse computer systems were once infected with the Slammer worm. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

DJUHHVWKDWWKH*(,6GLGQRWH[SOLFLWO\DGGUHVVF\EHUVHFXULW\DQGKDVXSGDWHG6HFWLRQWR

explain the applicable NRC requirements, which are also summarized below. However, the 

NRC does not believe that this clarification results in any changes to the impact conclusions in 

the GEIS. 

$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&LPSURYHGVHFXULW\UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUOLFHQVHG

facilities and has put in place increased security requirements including cybersecurity 

requirements at all NRC-licensed facilities since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 

Although these attacks did not have a cyber-component, the NRC included cybersecurity threat 

and vulnerability assessments in its review. To address these concerns, including concerns 

identified by the incidents at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant (although the boric acid issue 

was not cyber-related) and the 2003 Northeast electrical blackout, the NRC issued a series of 

advisories and orders requiring nuclear power plants to take certain actions, including 

enhancing the protection of their computer systems. The NRC has since replaced those interim 

measures with regulations, including adding a cybersecurity threat component to the DBT in 

,QWKH15&LVVXHGF\EHUVHFXULW\UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUOLFHQVHHVXQGHU&)53DUW

6HFWLRQ“Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks.” 

This requires licensees to provide a high assurance that digital computer and communication 

systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber-attacks, up to and including the 

'%7DVGHVFULEHGLQ&)5“Purpose and Scope.” 

For spent fuel stored in dry storage casks at ISFSIs, these storage casks do not use active 

safety systems that rely on computers, but instead rely on passive systems for cooling, 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

subcriticality, shielding, and confinement of the spent fuel (i.e., these safety functions do not rely 

on electrical power). Therefore, a cyber-attack on an ISFSI cannot have an effect on the safety 

of the spent fuel. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

(341-2-

D.2.36.19 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided examples of high-energy weapons that 

terrorists might use in attacks on spent fuel storage facilities and that the NRC should have 

analyzed the impacts of these weapons in the GEIS. One commenter suggested that security 

improvements must be approved by a panel of experts independent of the nuclear industry and 

the NRC. AnoWKHUFRPPHQWHUDVNHGWKH15&WRFRQVLGHUDWHVWDWWKH$EHUGHHQ3URYLQJ

Ground, where a hole was punched in a dry cask. This commenter suggested that terrorists 

now have access to much more powerful weapons than that used in that test. Another 

commenter stated that a similar Sandia National Laboratory test was insufficient. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC continuously evaluates 

domestic and international terrorist activities and information generated by the U.S. intelligence 

community on potential terrorist capabilities; and compares this information to the NRC’s DBT 

for radiological sabotage and its associated adversary characteristics. The NRC also conducts 

an annual formal review to assess whether the current adversary characteristics require 

revision. If so, licensees are subject to these revised adversary characteristics under the DBT 

regulations or, if necessary, immediately effective security Orders. Furthermore, as discussed 

in Section D.2. of this appendix, the NRC does not consider expert independent panels to 

be necessary. Moreover, the determination of adversary characteristics is an essentially 

government function and thus, may not be performed by an independent panel. 

With regard to ISFSIs, the NRC based the analysis in the GEIS on the NRC’s assessment of the 

ability of high-energy devices to penetrate the massive and robust dry storage systems. While 

certain devices have the capability to penetrate a cask’s confinement boundary, a breach in the 

boundary does not mean that there is an associated likelihood for a significant release of 

radioactivity to the environment. The NRC relied on a significant body of analytic and 

experiential spent fuel studies performed over the last 30 years. 

Regarding spent fuel pools, NRC regulations require licensees to be able to mitigate the 

consequences of large fires and explosions. This includes response and mitigating equipment 

both onsite and offsite. Because of the small size and massive walls of spent fuel pools (which 

are designed to withstand a design basis seismic event), the airborne delivery of explosives into 

a spent fuel pool is not considered realistic and credible. While a ground assault upon a spent 

fuel pool is possible, the likelihood of creating a rapid draindown event is considered very low. 

$WUHDFWRUVWKDWKDYHFHDVHGRSHUDWLRQV&)5DSSOLHVDQGOLFHQVHHVPXVWFRQWLQXHWR

provide adequate emergency response. Licensees must also protect the spent fuel against the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

DBT of radiological sabotage. Licensees also need to provide a strategy for addressing large 

fires and explosions in or around the spent fuel pool, regardless of ignition source. During 

operations, licensees need to maintain the ability to mitigate a radiological release from fuel 

within the spent fuel pool due to a security-initiated event. In addition, the NRC requires 

licensees to take steps to maximize spent fuel coolability during any potential security 

draindown event, which would provide sufficient time for mitigating actions to be taken before 

unacceptable fuel heating occurs. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

-----1-------2--

D.2.36.20 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that security organizations are inadequate at 

NRC-licensed facilities. One commenter cited a recent example at the Y-12 facility in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee, and Tennessee Valley Authority’s experience with both staff-based and 

contractor-based security. Another commenter stated that security improvements must be 

approved by a panel of experts independent of the nuclear industry and the NRC. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with WKHFRPPHQWV$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

the NRC improved requirements for security organizations and has implemented increased 

security requirements at all NRC-licensed facilities since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001. All licensed facilities including operating reactors, spent fuel pools, and ISFSIs improved 

their security organizations by increasing requirements for armed and trained security officers 

performing routine and random patrols; electronic alarm and surveillance systems with back-up 

monitoring; and physical security systems (e.g., fences, vehicle barriers, lighting, etc.) to protect 

against the threat of radiological sabotage, prevent the theft or diversion of special nuclear 

material or protect against the threat of loss of the facility and increased cybersecurity 

requirements. The enhanced baseline inspection program and other reviews referred to in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6LQFOXGHULJRURXVLQVSHFWLRQVE\WKH15&RQVLWHUHJLRQDODQG

headquarters staff to ensure they provide high assurance that activities involving spent fuel and 

HLW do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety. These robust 

inspections occur on a regular and routine basis and the results of these inspections are often 

made publicly available to support the NRC’s principles of good regulation, specifically 

transparency in regulatory actions. Transparency allows the public not only to learn about 

violations but offers the additional assurance that the NRC has taken action to ensure violations 

are corrected. Because of the extensive interactions the NRC staff has with the intelligence 

community, the qualifications required of NRC inspectors who monitor implementation, and the 

NRC principles of good regulation, the NRC does not agree that an independent panel is 

needed to approve or review security or security organization improvements. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(222--20--12---3--3---
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.36.21 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the continued operation of nuclear power 

plants results in an increase in nuclear materials, which undermines all efforts to increase 

nuclear security and prevent proliferation. 

RESPONSE: This comment is beyond the scope of the GEIS. The GEIS and Rule address 

continued storage of spent fuel and do not authorize the continued operation of nuclear power 

plants. Further, by focusing on the consequences of continuing to operate reactors, the 

comment did not address how the environmental impacts of continuing to store spent fuel during 

the continued storage timeframes would undermine all efforts to increase nuclear security and 

prevent proliferation. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.36.22 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS did not adequately address 

insider threats. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. In the context of spent fuel storage 

facility safeguards, an insider is a knowledgeable person working inside the facility who assists, 

in a passive or active role, well-trained and dedicated attackers armed with hand-carried 

weapons and equipment. A knowledgeable insider is considered by licensees as part of the 

security measXUHVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6DQGDSSOLFDEOHWRVSHQW

fuel pools and ISFSIs. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

---

D.2.36.23 – COMMENT: One commenter asked the NRC why the storage of both military 

and commercial nuclear waste is not a government secret. This commenter believes that it is a 

matter of national security to put nuclear waste in a few inland caverns as soon as 

possible without public debate, and without informing the enemies of the United States. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. After the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC took specific steps to ensure that facility information that was not 

already withheld and which would be useful to a potential adversary would no longer be 

available to the public. Guidance was provided to licensees in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 

-15&a), which describes the types of information to be withheld from the public. 

In general, information clearly visible from locations accessible to the public near a site is 

generally released to the public. Moreover, in enacting the AEA, as amended, Congress did not 

require the classification of the “fact of” existence of an NRC license, nor of the general location 

of the licensed facility, (i.e., to support a robust process for the public to request a hearing 

SXUVXDQWWR6HFWLRQDRIWKHAEA). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

--
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.36.24 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that NRC should consider requiring licensees 

to place dry cask storage systems inside containment structures, instead of allowing licensees 

to decommission containment buildings. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQ2.2 of the GEIS, 

imposing new regulatory requirements, such as requiring licensees to implement hardened atreactor storage systems; reducing the density of spent fuel in pools; or expediting the transfer of 

spent fuel from pools to dry cask storage, is outside the scope of this proposed action. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-31-

D.2.36.25 – COMMENT: A commenter, citing SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l), stated that it is 

inconsistent for the NRC to maintain two narratives about the threat of spent fuel pool fires. 

According to the commenter, one narrative states that the NRC must withhold security 

assessments from the public on the grounds that they contain “sensitive information that could 

be useful to an adversary.” A second narrative states that the pools are safe and secure, and 

no further action is needed to reduce the risk of a pool fire. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The complete security assessment of 

spent fuel pools includes security scenarios, potential vulnerabilities, and security measures to 

eliminate or minimize any vulnerability. This complete narrative would be considered sensitive 

information and not releasable to the public because it contains information that could be 

potentially useful to DQDGYHUVDU\$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6VSHQWIXHOSRRO

structural features, complemented by the deployment of effective and visible security measures 

provide high assurance of protection of public health and safety. Therefore, the NRC believes 

that by allowing only the conclusions of security assessments to be publicly available, 

information that informs the public and acts as an additional deterrent to an adversary is made 

available. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-

D.2.36.26 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS should address potential attacks 

on “soft targets” such as electric utility lines or electric generators. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The risk posed to spent fuel stored in 

spent fuel pools from malevolent acts by individuals against supporting infrastructure (e.g., 

offsite electrical supplies) is bounded by a facility’s design basis accident (i.e., safety) 

considerations, such as earthquakes and tornadoes. (It should be noted that sabotage or 

WHUURULVPGRQRWSRVHDQ\XQLTXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVIRUWKLVW\SHRIDWWDFN,Q6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS, the NRC discussed licensee actions that would be expected to mitigate such events. 

These licensee actions to mitigate design basis accidents envelop the issue raised by the 

commenter. For spent fuel stored in dry storage casks at ISFSIs, these storage casks do not 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

use active systems, but instead rely on passive systems for cooling, subcriticality, shielding, and 

confinement of the spent fuel, and these passive safety functions do not rely upon electrical 

power. Therefore, an attack on electrical supply systems to an ISFSI will not have an effect on 

the safety or security of the spent fuel. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of this comment. 

--

D.2.36.27 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that storage casks and pools are expensive to 

maintain due to the necessity to constantly guard them from terrorism. 

RESPONSE: NRC agrees that licensees have a continuing obligation to maintain and secure 

spent fuel pools and dry cask storage systems. As stated in Section D.2.42.3 of this appendix, 

and as summarized iQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6XQGHU&)5EEOLFHQVHHVDUH

required to “submit written notification to the Commission for its review and approval of the 

program by which the licensee intends to manage and provide funding for the management of 

all irradiated fuel at the reactor following permanent cessation of operation of the reactor until 

title to the irradiated fuel and possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy for 

its ultimate disposal in a repository.” Similarly, the NRC acknowledges that, because of delays 

in the siting and licensing of a repository, the Federal government bears an increasing financial 

responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and it may become responsible for paying all the 

costs associated with spent fuel storage at some time in the future. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-11) 

D.2.36.28 – COMMENT: A commenter indicated that the GEIS stated that the potential for theft 

and diversion of light water reactor spent fuel is not credible but the GEIS did not state whether 

or not the potential for theft and diversion of non-light water-reactor spent fuel is credible. The 

commenter indicated that “to be complete” the GEIS should characterize whether the potential 

for theft and diversion is not credible for both light water reactor spent fuel and non-light water 

reactor spent fuel, including during the long-term or indefinite storage periods, and Table 4-2 

should be updated accordingly. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comment. The NRC 

agrees that the GEIS should clearly state the environmental impacts of theft and diversion for 

both non-light water-reactor fuel and light water reactor fuel. However, the NRC disagrees that 

a specific finding regarding credibility of theft or diversion is necessary. As stated in the GEIS, 

there is a very low probability of successful theft or diversion of spent fuel from an ISFSI with the 

intent of using the contained special nuclear material for an improvised nuclear device, because 

of (1) the inherent protection afforded by the massive reinforced-concrete storage module and 

the steel storage canister; (2) the unattractive form of the contained special nuclear material, 

which would require major chemical and metallurgical processing steps before fabricating into 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

an improvised nuclear device; and (3) the immediate hazard posed by the high radiation levels 

of the spent fuel to persons not provided radiation protection. Therefore, to ensure consistent 

descriptions for LWR and non-LWR fuel, the finding on the credibility of theft and diversion of 

LWR fuel has been removed from the GEIS. To clarify that the NRC has weighed both the 

probability and consequences of this type of attack before reaching a conclusion that the 

impacts are SMALL, the 15&KDVDGGHGWR6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH

environmental consequences of theft of special nuclear material resulting in fabrication and use 

of an improvised nuclear device6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6QRWHs that additional security 

measures may be necessary in the future to ensure adequate protection of public health and 

safety and the common defense and security, and it is reasonable to assume that the NRC will 

implement such measures as necessary. 

The determination in Table 4-2 that the environmental impacts of continued at-reactor storage 

due to sabotage or terrorism are SMALL for the short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes 

reflects the very low risk of a successful terrorist attack in light of the robust nature of dry cask 

storage and the security measures established by the NRC. This determination applies to both 

light water reactor spent fuel and non-light water reactor spent fuel. Therefore, the conclusion in 

6HFWLRQRI*(,6WKDWWKHenvironmental risk is SMALL for spent fuel stored in dry storage 

applies for both acts of radiological sabotage and theft or diversion of special nuclear material. 

7KHWH[WRI6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6ZDVUHYLVHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKLVFRPPHQWDVGHVFULEHd 

above. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.36.29 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should supplement NUREG–

Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water 

Power Reactor Fuel, because new circumstances and information relevant to security and 

terrorism consideration in NUREG–KDYHEHFRPHDYDLODEOH7KHFRPPHQWHUFLWHVMarsh 

v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, which holds that Federal agencies should supplement an EIS if 

significant new circumstances or information are relevant to environmental impacts of the 

proposed action. As new information, the commenter cited the lack of a date for a permanent 

waste repository, evidence that terrorism is a credible threat to spent fuel stored at nuclear 

reactors, the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the greater possibility of more devastating 

earthquakes for sites in the upper Midwest and the Northeast, and the use of high-burnup fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel, NUREG–

15&H[DPLQHGORQJ-range policy and alternatives for the handling and storage of spent 

fuel. NUREG–VXSSRUWHGWKHRULJLQDO &)53DUW“Licensing Requirements for the 

Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).” This 

environmental review supported a rulemaking that has already occurred. Supplementation of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

an EIS is only required where the proposed action has not yet been completed. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--3) 

D.2.36.30 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should consider including an 

analysis of the potential environmental impacts of terrorism in all of its NEPA reviews for ISFSI 

licenses, regardless of whether the licensed facility is in the Ninth Circuit. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The site-specific analyses for ISFSI 

license applications are outside the scope of this GEIS and Rule, which are limited to an 

assessment of the environmental impacts of continued storage. Because it is conducting a 

generic analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage, the NRC has analyzed the 

environmental impacts of terrorism, which ensures that this analysis complies with the holding in 

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC and is therefore valid in the Ninth Circuit. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-2) 

D.2.36.31 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that countries, such as Germany, have found 

far better ways of storing their nuclear waste and the GEIS needs to consider such options. The 

commenter stated that many aspects of spent fuel storage in the United States have been 

overlooked in existing studies, such as the effects of terrorist attacks or an exchange of nuclear 

weapons in a future war. The commenter believes that present storage methods provide plenty 

of opportunities for wide-scale dispersal of enormous quantities of radioactive elements into the 

atmosphere. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW$VVWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQ2.2 of the GEIS, 

imposing new regulatory requirements, such as requiring licensees to implement hardened 

onsite storage systems, reduce the density of spent fuel in pools, or expedite the transfer of 

spent fuel from pools to dry cask storage, is outside the scope of this proposed action. 

The HQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVRISRWHQWLDOWHUURULVWDWWDFNVZHUHGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG

RIWKH*(,67KHVHLPSDFWVDUHGHVFULEHGLQWHUPVRIWKHULVNRIVXFFHVVIXODWWDFNZKLFK

takes into consideration both the probability and the consequences of such events. With 

UHVSHFWWRWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUZDU&)5VWDWHVWKDWOLFHQVHHVDUHQRWUHTXLUHGWRSURYLGH

for design features or other measures for the specific purpose of protection against the effects 

of attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of 

the United States, whether a foreign government or other person, or use or deployment of 

weapons incident to U.S. defense activities. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.37 Comments Concerning the Feasibility of Geologic Disposal 

D.2.37.1 – COMMENT: The NRC received many comments on the technical feasibility of a 

geologic repository. 

Several commenters supported the NRC’s conclusion in the GEIS and Rule that a repository is 

technically feasible. A few of these commenters noted the Blue Ribbon Commission’s support 

for a repository as the preferred approach for spent fuel disposal. Another commenter noted 

WKDWVLQFHQRWKLQJKDVHPHUJHGWKDWZRXOGOHVVHQWKH15&’s confidence in the technical 

feasibility of a repository. In fact, this commenter noted more scientific and engineering 

experience and evidence has emerged to reinforce the technical feasibility of a repository. 

Other commenters noted that geologic repositories exist today, for example at the Waste 

Isolation Pilot Project in New Mexico. Several commenters provided detailed technical 

discussions and references to support the NRC’s conclusion in the GEIS that a repository is 

technically feasible. Other commenters recommended that the NRC provide a more robust 

discussion of the technical feasibility of a repository, including references to the updated Yucca 

Mountain documents that the NRC will issue in the near future. 

Many commenters expressed concern about the technical feasibility of deep geologic disposal. 

Several of these commenters argued that there is no safe or scientifically sound way to store 

spent fuel, and that no viable solution exists for spent fuel disposal. One commenter argued 

that there have been no technological breakthroughs that would reduce or modify the health 

risks posed by spent fuel. Other commenters noted that there are no geologic disposal facilities 

anywhere in the world, and questioned how the NRC could make a feasibility finding when no 

facilities exist. Commenters questioned whether a suitable site could be found, even if the 

technology existed to safely construct a repository. Other commenters expressed concern that 

the long-lived nature of these wastes, and the uncertainty inherent in predicting the behavior of 

geologic formations (e.g., changes caused by earthquakes) over long periods of time, would 

make it impossible to construct a geologic repository. One commenter noted that even if a 

geologic formation is scientifically verified as stable, the act of digging the repository will disturb 

the formation and there is nothing that can then be done to restore the stability of the formation. 

Another commenter argued that the NRC cannot stop human intervention into a repository, and 

a separate commenter noted that there is no way to tell future generations of the hazards at a 

future repository. Several commenters also argued that the Federal government’s long history 

of failure at sites like Lyons, Kansas, and Yucca Mountain makes it difficult for the NRC to 

conclude that a repository is technically feasible. One commenter noted that the Federal 

government has considered many disposal methods, including deep geologic, seabed, and 

Antarctic disposal, none of which has resulted in a viable solution to the disposal problem. 

One commenter argued that the NRC cannot rely on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant site in New 

Mexico to support its conclusion of technical feasibility because the NRC repudiated the idea of 

a salt repository in the 2010 Waste Confidence proceeding (NRC 2010a). This commenter also 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

argued that Yucca Mountain cannot support the NRC’s conclusion of technical feasibility in 

WHUPVRIWKHQHHGWRPHHWWKHUDGLDWLRQSURWHFWLRQVWDQGDUGVIRU<XFFD0RXQWDLQLQ&)5

Further, this commenter argued that the NRC’s analysis of the environmental impacts of spent 

fuel disposal in Table S-3 is no longer valid and that an updated analysis of the environmental 

impacts of disposal is necessary to support the NRC’s feasibility determination. The commenter 

also argued that the NRC’s feasibility determination must also consider the cost of disposal, 

which is not analyzed in the GEIS. 

Another commenter noted that problems with water infiltration at the Yucca Mountain site 

showed that water supplies would eventually become contaminated with radionuclides like 

plutonium. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that the disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository is technically feasible and has 

included in Appendix B of the GEIS the technical basis for this position. The policy of the United 

States, as set forth in the NWPA, is for disposal of spent fuel in a national repository, and 

decades of scientific studies support the use of a repository for disposal of spent fuel. Federal 

responsibility for siting and building a repository remains national policy. 

The NRC acknowledges the difficulties that the United States has encountered over the years in 

siting and licensing a geologic repository, from the failed attempt to locate a repository in a salt 

mine in Lyons, Kansas, through the challenges with the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. 

Although location of a repository at Lyons, Kansas, failed due to technical difficulties at that site, 

the technical difficulties encountered had site-specific aspects (i.e., presence and location of 

existing boreholes) that do not suggest salt as a geologic media is generally unacceptable for a 

repository. The Commission remains confident that a repository will be sited. The Commission 

does not believe that accumulated spent fuel will be stored permanently at reactor sites and 

does not endorse permanent storage at reactor sites. 

The NRC has not identified any developments that would challenge the technical feasibility of 

deep geologic disposal as the ultimate resting place for spent fuel. Nothing in the recent Court 

of Appeals decision questioned the technical viability of this option. The NRC is aware, 

however, that there is political and societal uncertainty regarding the licensing of a disposal site. 

This uncertainty, along with the direction from the Court of Appeals, is one of the reasons the 

NRC included an analysis of the indefinite storage timeframe in the GEIS. 

The impacts of continued storage of spent fuel are addressed in the GEIS. Specific impacts of 

final disposal of fuel would be addressed in a separate site-specific repository EIS. The safety 

and environmental impact of any site that is chosen as a repository would be reviewed during 

that licensing process. Any repository application must be approved by the NRC. The NRC 

review would address the safety and environmental aspects of disposal in a repository during 

the licensing review. As part of that licensing review, the NRC would address how the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

repository meets applicable regulations. The NRC recognizes the comment’s concerns about 

Table S-3. A more detailed discussion of this issue can be found in Section ' of this 

appendix. 

With respect to the Yucca Mountain site, the NRC is in the process of completing its review of 

the application and will issue a safety evaluation report once that review is complete, therefore, 

the GEIS does not contain a reference to the safety evaluation report. As for contamination of 

the groundwater, DOE’s license application for Yucca Mountain evaluates releases of 

radionuclides from the proposed repository. 

Issues related to costs associated with disposal are addressed in Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-24-1) (30---1---4) (112-31-1) (112--2) (112--3) (112--4) (112-30--

34-----13----------13-

---------33--3------4) 

(310----44--1----4--------4) 

---12-------1--1--

------------

1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1---

-------1--2----1-10) (-4-

-4------4--4--1--4--

D.2.37.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters noted that more than one repository will likely be 

needed to store currently generated and future spent fuel. Many of these commenters cited to 

WKHWRQOLPLWIRUDUHSRVLWRU\LQWKH1:3$DQGQRWHGWKDWDVHFRQGRUWKLUGUHSRVLWRU\ZLOO

be needed. One commenter argued that the technical capacity at Yucca Mountain is much 

JUHDWHUWKDQWKHWRQOLPLWLQWKH1:3$

Several commenters asserted that merely because “a repository” may be “technically feasible” 

does not mean that sufficient capacity will be available to accommodate all of the spent fuel that 

has been and will be generated, and they stated that the GEIS does not consider an upper limit 

to spent fuel. One commenter also asserted that the NRC must evaluate the likelihood that 

insufficient repository capacity will be available. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NWPA 

(42 USC GRHVLQFOXGHDVWDWXWRU\OLPLWRIWRQVIRUWKHUHSRVLWRU\+RZHYHUWKLVLV

DVWDWXWRU\OLPLWWKH15&LVQRWDZDUHRIDQ\WHFKQLFDOOLPLWDWLRQRIWRQVIRUDUHSRVLWRU\

Technical limits on capacity would depend on the repository location (e.g., the DOE has 

considered the expansion of the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain). It is possible that 

more than one repository may be necessary to accommodate all of the spent fuel that has been 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

generated or may be generated in the future. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(30-23-10) (30---3) (222--14-------11--

4--2----1--3--4--4---2-14) 

-2--2--4--4--4--4--4--4--

1----3--1) 

D.2.37.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed the view that the NRC should not 

assume that a repository will be sited and available, but should instead evaluate the impacts 

related to the probability that a repository would not be sited or would leak radiation, and the 

consequences if a repository is not sited. One commenter believes the NRC has excluded a 

major part of the uranium fuel cycle by not evaluating the environmental impacts of spent fuel 

disposal. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. One of the 

scenarios addressed in the GEIS (the indefinite timeframe) assumes that no repository 

becomes available. The environmental impacts of this scenario are evaluated in the GEIS. The 

environmental impacts of disposal of the spent fuel from a reactor are documented in Table S-3. 

More information about Table S-3 can be found in Section ' of this appendix. Further, the 

impacts of operating a specific repository would be evaluated in the EIS that would be prepared 

as part of any licensing review for a repository. The national policy for disposal of spent fuel 

remains geologic disposal in a repository. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

------3-----2) 

D.2.37.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters raised concerns regarding the NRC’s failure to 

reach a permanent disposal solution and stated that the NRC must acknowledge these failures 

and its lack of confidence in reaching a disposal solution. A few commenters stated that the 

NRC has used the Waste Confidence Rule for decades to avoid difficult questions about the 

dangers of spent fuel storage and the lack of a disposal solution. Two commenters also stated 

that the Commission must be sure to not endorse indefinite onsite storage. One commenter 

stated that the NRC cannot arbitrarily and capriciously pretend that there is a disposal solution 

when in fact there is no solution. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

does not create national policy for disposal of spent fuel and has not attempted to do so in this 

GEIS and Rule. That responsibility lies exclusively with Congress and the President. The 

Commission does not endorse long-term or indefinite storage of spent fuel at the reactor site. 

The Commission continues to support timely disposal of spent fuel, but recognizes that storage 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

of spent fuel may continue safely until a repository becomes available, in accordance with NRC 

regulations. 

The Commission acknowledges the difficulties that the United States has encountered over the 

years in the selection and licensing of a repository. While it is taking longer than first envisioned 

to develop a repository for the disposal of spent fuel, the Commission remains confident that a 

repository is feasible and the Commission believes that it is reasonable to predict that a 

repository will be sited and constructed in the short-term timeframe. The GEIS and Rule do 

acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in this prediction and consider two other timeframes, 

including one where a repository never becomes available. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(143--34-2) (24-4-----3--11--4---2) 

-1) (443-----1) 

D.2.37.5 – COMMENT: A few commenters stated that the NRC had failed to fulfill its 

obligations to ensure safe storage or disposal of spent fuel or is at risk of such failure. One 

commenter stated that the NRC’s research staff appears to disregard the need for safe storage. 

Another commenter stated that the NRC has disregarded its responsibility as an “Independent 

Safety Authority in Chief” by failing to adhere to the national policy of deep geologic disposal. 

Another commenter warned that the NRC should not, by way of the GEIS or Rule, foster 

indefinite storage or “passively” establish a national policy of storage, which is contrary to the 

national policy of deep geologic disposal. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC does not create national 

policy for disposal of spent fuel and has not attempted to do so in the GEIS and Rule. That 

responsibility lies exclusively with Congress and the President. The Commission does not 

endorse long-term or indefinite storage of spent fuel at any reactor site. The Commission 

continues to support timely disposal of spent fuel, but recognizes that storage of spent fuel may 

safely continue until a repository becomes available. The NRC continues to adhere to its 

obligations under the NWPA consistent with funding provided by Congress, Court direction, and 

United States national policy regarding geologic disposal. 

The regulatory research program sponsored by the NRC is designed to improve the agency’s 

knowledge where uncertainty exists, where safety margins are not well-characterized, and 

where regulatory decisions need to be confirmed in existing or new designs and technologies. 

The NRC reviews ongoing industry and international research and existing agency efforts to 

identify activities that are likely to provide data necessary to address identified technical needs. 

Emergent technical issues identified include the corrosion of stainless-steel casks, concrete 

degradation, and the need for improved cladding and dry cask temperature profiles. The NRC 

has developed research plans for concrete degradation and temperature profiles during 

extended storage timeframes. The NRC will use the results to support the basis for any 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

additional inspection requirements or proposed mitigation actions. NRC research is developing 

the technical basis to ensure the continued safe performance of long-term dry storage systems 

for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste under extended service conditions and the 

structural integrity of spent fuel transport casks during severe accidents. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.37.6 – COMMENT: The NRC received many comments on the political and societal 

obstacles to siting a repository. Many commenters expressed concern that these political and 

societal issues would prevent the licensing of a repository. Several commenters expressed 

frustration over the closing of the Yucca Mountain facility due to politically motivated delays. 

Other commenters stated that the only thing blocking the United States from finding a repository 

is the political willpower to move ahead. Some commenters questioned whether a consentbased approach could be effective when no community wants a repository in its backyard. 

Similarly, some commenters expressed concern that it will be difficult to find a community that 

has the infrastructure, real estate, knowledgeable workforce, and educated citizens that would 

be needed for a consent-based approach to work. Another commenter indicated that for the 

United States to move forward, communities must trust the integrity of political and regulatory 

systems. Commenters also asserted that the Federal government has failed to follow the 

NWPA. One commenter asserted that this failure calls into question the ability of future host 

communities to have confidence in the government’s ability to honor and implement a repository 

program. Other commenters stated that misinformation and politics have hindered a long-term 

solution and that the government has been ignoring this difficult issue. One commenter stated 

that the predominant problem is one of public relations. 

Some commenters argued that the Commission should acknowledge that while it has 

confidence in the technical feasibility of deep repository disposal, there exist little or no grounds 

for confidence in the social and political process. Other commenters stated that the obstacles to 

any state, like Nevada, accepting a geologic repository will never disappear unless Congress 

passes legislation forcing a state to accept a permanent repository. And other commenters 

argued that the regulatory planning must account for the overwhelming uncertainty over political 

developments. Some commenters expressed concern that the GEIS and Rule do not consider 

whether sufficient societal and political support exist to support the Commission’s expected 

repository availability timeframes. Several commenters noted that DOE is responsible for siting, 

constructing, and filling a repository. Many commenters asserted that the Federal government, 

and DOE in particular, has failed to meet its responsibility to dispose of spent fuel and that 

therefore there is no reason to believe the government will follow the law in the future. 

One commenter cited a history of attempts to solve the nuclear waste problem that have failed 

due to political and technical issues. This history, the commenter asserted, demonstrates that 

there can be no basis for finding reasonable assurance that there will be sufficient mined 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

geologic repository capacity at any time. The efforts cited by the commenter include the 

following: the Lyons, Kansas repository, spent fuel reprocessing, commercial breeder reactors, 

ERDA/DOE promises to accept waste at away-from-reactor storage facilities, the Interagency 

Review Group process, the NWPA, and the Yucca Mountain repository. Further, the 

commenter expressed the belief that the process for developing a repository has been and 

continues to be rigged or substantially weakened to ensure that a proposed site would be 

licensable. Specifically the commenter suggests that DOE inappropriately narrowed the siteselection guidelines to predetermine the outcome, that Congress has reduced the statutory 

safety standards to reduce the cost of evaluating multiple sites, and that EPA has failed for 

nearly 30 years to produce radiation standards for a repository that satisfy the EPA’s 

responsibility to adequately protect public health and the environment. 

One commenter noted that NRC lacks the authority to make findings about the political activities 

that may affect spent fuel disposal in the future and that DOE might be better positioned to do 

so, but has been stopped due to political direction. Several commenters requested that the 

NRC give more consideration to these issues in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the difficulties that the United States has encountered 

over the years, from the failed attempt to locate a repository in a salt mine in Lyons, Kansas, 

through the opposition to a repository at Yucca Mountain. The Commission acknowledges the 

difficulties associated with licensing a disposal site. It will not be easy for the Federal 

government to meet the challenge of achieving political and social acceptance for the repository 

program. It will be difficult to overcome past problems and the perceived breach of trust 

between the government and the public. While it acknowledges these potential problems, the 

Commission has confidence that they can be resolved by applying the lessons learned in the 

Yucca Mountain program and in the different methodologies for achieving acceptance used in 

international programs. 

Actions of the EPA and the DOE site-selection process do not fall under the NRC’s authority 

under the AEA (42 USC 2011) and are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-1-3) (30-1--1-----4) (112-10-3) (112------

-----4--21---2) (222-14) (222-21) (244-2-2) (244-

1-3) (244-4-4) (244--4) (244-12--20----20------

10--10--------------

(313----4--13----33--1--11--

--41-----3----------13) 

-----1---1) (341-1----2---2) 

-----2) (421-2) (422-2) (431--2--2--1) 

------------

--1--------1---1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

-------4--4--4--4-

-4--4----------4) 

--1--------2---2) 

----1) 

D.2.37.7 – COMMENT: The NRC received many comments on the estimated timeframes for a 

repository to become available. Several commenters indicated that they did not believe that it 

ZDVIHDVLEOHWRVLWHFKDUDFWHUL]HFRQVWUXFWOLFHQVHDQGRSHQDUHSRVLWRU\LQWR\HDUVDV

posited in the GEIS and Rule. Commenters questioned whether a repository will be available in 

WKHQH[W\HDUVJLYHQZKDWWKH\GHVFULEHGDVWKHVFLHQWLILFSROLWLFDODQGWHFKQLFDOSUREOHPV

associated with opening a repository. Other commenters challenged the NRC’s statements that 

a repository will be available when needed, and argued that there is no scientific or technical 

basis for assuming a repository will be up and running at any time in the next few decades. One 

commenter stated that the NRC needs to complete a technical or licensing review to support its 

assumption that a repository like Yucca Mountain will become available. Other commenters 

argued that without Yucca Mountain it would be difficult to meet the repository availability 

timelines discussed in the GEIS. 

Many commenters stated that the Federal government’s inability to site a repository in the last 

\HDUVSURYLGHVOLWWOHVXSSRUWIRUWKHLGHDWKDWDUHSRVLWRU\FDQEHDYDLODEOHDORQJWKHWLPHOLQHV

considered in the GEIS or even when one is necessary. Commenters expressed concern that 

the government and industry have been unable to develop a solution to the nuclear waste 

problem despite decades of trying, which indicates that a solution will not be found. A few 

commenters opined that once a facility is available, it will take several decades to ship the spent 

fuel to the facility. Other commenters expressed concern that the NRC’s continued expansion 

RIWKHWLPHIUDPHIRUDUHSRVLWRU\WREHFRPHDYDLODEOHIURP\HDUVLQWR“when 

necessary” or indefinite storage in the GEIS, casts doubt on the timeframes for repository 

availability in the GEIS. One commenter challenged the NRC’s reliance on the term “feasible,” 

and noted that a conclusion that something is feasible, like a repository becoming available in 

\HDUVLVQRWWKHVDPHWKLQJDVEHLQJFRQILGHQWWKDWLWZLOOKDSSHQ

Other commenters argued that it is feasible to have a mined geologic repository available within 

\HDUVDIWHUWKHOLFHQVHGRSHUDWLQJOLIHRIDQXFOHDUSRZHUSOant because there are no 

technical or financial barriers that would prevent the Federal government from meeting this 

schedule. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees with the comments that it is feasible to have a mined geologic repository available within 

\HDUVDIWHUWKHOLFHQVHGRSHUDWLQJOLIHRIDQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWDQGWKDWRQFHDUHSRVLWRU\LV

open for use, it will take several decades to ship all of the spent fuel to the repository. The NRC 

otherwise disagrees with the comments. The timelines and analysis in the GEIS are based on 

the NRC’s conclusion that a safe disposal facility is technically feasible and that spent fuel can 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

be safely stored until a repository is available, as discussed in Section B.2.2 of Appendix B of 

the GEIS. In Appendix B of the GEIS, the NRC reviewed international experience with siting a 

repository, domestic experience with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and Yucca Mountain, the 

report from the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC 2012) and DOE’s 

response to the report (DOE 2013a), and the NRC’s past predictions of repository availability. 

Once the process for selecting a repository location begins, the NRC believes that it is possible 

to site, chDUDFWHUL]HFRQVWUXFWOLFHQVHDQGRSHQDUHSRVLWRU\LQWR\HDUVHYHQZLWKWKH

social and political issues associated with siting a repository. The NRC recognizes the 

uncertainty inherent in these predictions, and has therefore, at the direction of the Court of 

Appeals, prepared an analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage if a repository 

never becomes available. 

Although the United States national program for geological disposal for spent fuel is uncertain, 

the Commission remains confident that a repository is feasible, a repository location can be 

selected, and the repository can be constructed. The Commission believes that the decades of 

experience of safely storing spent fuel with minimal environmental impact demonstrates that 

potential future delays in repository capacity (i.e., beyond the short-term timeframe) will not 

result in significant safety or environmental issues associated with spent fuel storage. For the 

reasons noted in Section D.2.1.1, the Commission has decided not to include a timeframe for a 

repository in the Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30-1-2) (30-----2--11--1) (112-----4) (244-

12--42----24--23-----34--4--

----2-4) (344---------

3- -----------2-

-1--1-

D.2.37.8 – COMMENT: One commenter discussed Adaptive Phased Management. The 

commenter noted that Adaptive Phased Management is both a technical method and a 

management system, with an emphasis on adaptability, which could be used for a spent fuel 

management plan in selecting a repository. 

RESPONSE: Use of Adaptive Phased Management is beyond the scope of the rulemaking and 

GEIS. The NRC is not responsible for repository site selection. The NRC notes that its 

regulations for a geologic repository do provide for phased development and licensing decisions 

(e.g., construction authorization, license to receive and possess HLW, amendment for 

permanent closure, and decommissioning and dismantlement of surface facilities). No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.37.9 – COMMENT: A few commenters stated that a repository or a “waste dump” should 

not be sited in particular areas. One commenter stated that nuclear waste should not be left in 

the state of Illinois. Another commenter expressed concern about the possibility of a disposal 

site in the North Carolina Mountains. 

RESPONSE: Specific locations for a repository are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

The NRC is not responsible for the selection of a repository location. DOE is the Federal 

agency responsible for repository site selection. In addition to considering the environmental 

impacts of continued storage, this GEIS and Rule consider only whether a repository is 

technically feasible. The analysis in these documents does not consider specific repository 

sites. Although any specific site considered for repository siting and development may not 

ultimately be selected because of safety, environmental, or other concerns, the NRC expects 

that many sites can be found in a variety of geologic formations that are acceptable. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---1) (----3) 

D.2.37.10 – COMMENT: The NRC received many comments regarding international programs 

and the feasibility of geologic disposal. Many of these commenters noted the international 

consensus that geologic disposal is the appropriate disposition path for spent fuel. Some 

commenters noted that the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 

recognized geologic disposal as the preferred method of disposal; others noted that studies by 

the National Academies of Science and the IAEA support the feasibility of deep geologic 

disposal. The commenters pointed to international efforts to construct repositories as support 

for the analysis in the GEIS that geologic disposal is technically feasible. Specifically, some of 

these commenters noted the progress toward repository construction in other countries, like 

Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, Germany, and France. Other 

commenters noted that the United States has many sites that are suitable for geologic disposal. 

Other commenters looked to the state of international repository development to raise questions 

about the adequacy of the NRC’s conclusions in the GEIS. For example, two commenters 

noted that the site in Finland is experiencing problems, as documented in the film Into Eternity. 

One commenter stated that three of the “latest publications” for the Finnish company Posiva 

were not available on the Posiva website and that the GEIS was based on specious claims 

based on unsupported assumptions. Another commenter questioned whether the relative size 

of a repository in the United States would create additional issues, including site selection, that 

would not be problems in smaller countries like Finland and Sweden. 

Several commenters suggested that the GEIS be updated to consider the progress that is 

expected to occur in the next few years in countries like Sweden and Finland. Further, the 

commenters also recommended that the NRC consider future repository designs that are likely 

WREHGHYHORSHGLQWKHQH[WWRyears. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Many commenters acknowledged the technical feasibility of deep geologic disposal, but 

questioned the United States’ ability to overcome the unique political and societal obstacles that 

now impede the development of a repository, and which might not be a problem in other 

countries. 

Finally, a few commenters objected to the development of a LLW repository near Lake Huron in 

Canada. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC has 

determined that progress in development of repositories internationally provides useful 

experience in building confidence that the most likely scenario is that a repository can and will 

be developed in the United States in the short-term timeframe. The NRC’s discussion of the 

programs of other countries was included to show that those countries have considered various 

methodologies for securing social and political acceptance of a repository. The experiences in 

Finland and Sweden, for example, show that a focus on gaining public support can lead to 

continued progress in the development of a repository. The NRC did not purport to provide a 

complete history of all foreign repository programs. The NRC examined a number of 

international programs to inform the conclusion in the GEIS that a repository is likely to become 

available by the end of the short-term timeframe. The NRC recognizes the uncertainty inherent 

in these conclusions, and has therefore, at the direction of the Court of Appeals, prepared an 

analysis of the environmental impacts of continued storage if a repository never becomes 

available. A more detailed discussion of the international repository programs can be found in 

Appendix B of the GEIS. Appendix B has been updated to reflect the current status of programs 

in the referenced countries and expanded to reflect the progress in additional countries. 

As noted in the comments, an international consensus has developed that geologic disposal of 

spent fuel is feasible and can be conducted safely, and the NRC concurs with that conclusion. 

It is also true that other countries’ experience with their repository programs does not directly 

correlate to whether a repository will ultimately be available in the United States. These 

international programs simply provide additional data for the NRC to consider in developing its 

views regarding repository availability in the GEIS. Political and societal obstacles do not affect 

the technical feasibility of a repository, but they will shape the process for selection of an actual 

repository location in the United States. Recognizing that siting a repository has taken longer 

than originally envisioned, the GEIS postulates three possible timeframes for completion of a 

repository. The NRC believes that a repository will open within the short-term timeframe RI

years for the reasons explained in the GEIS, but has included a second, longer timeframe as 

well as the scenario that a repository will never be sited and built to account for all possibilities. 

Inasmuch as the GEIS analyzes this third “no-repository” scenario, the conclusions of the GEIS 

about the environmental impacts of long-term spent fuel storage do not depend on the 

experience of other nations in siting and building repositories. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

With respect to the comments regarding other factors that may influence site selection, the size 

of a repository has not been shown to be an issue for site selection. As noted in the comments, 

countries like Finland and Sweden are planning repositories that are smaller than that planned 

for the United States; however, some countries have been evaluating the benefits of developing 

multinational disposal options (e.g., a host country repository contains its own waste and waste 

IURPRWKHUSDUWLFLSDWLQJFRXQWULHV>,$($@

The selection of a repository site in the United States and the design of the repository are the 

responsibility of the DOE. The NRC’s role is to review any license application. The NRC is not 

involved in site selection or design, except to the extent that NRC regulations in 10 CFR Parts 

DQGSURYLGHSHUIRUPDQFHREMHFWLYHVDQGWHFKQLFDOUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUHLW disposal. Note 

WKDWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)53DUWZRXOGQHHGWREHXSGDWHGWRUHIOHFW(3$VWDQGDUGVDQG

the evolution in the capability of performance assessment methods and computer codes for 

compliance demonstration, as well as in the development of methods to quantify and propagate 

uncertainty. Experience with these techniques has altered the technical assumptions and 

estimated behavior of post-closure repository performance that formed the basis for the existing 

3DUWFULWHULD See SECY--300, “Proposed Strategy for Development of Regulations 

Governing Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Repository at Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada” 15&b). 

The publications described as unavailable in the comment about the Posiva website are not 

referenced in Appendix B and the NRC did not rely on them. The document referenced by the 

NRC is available on the website. 

The NRC has no involvement in the development of a LLW repository in Canada and any 

concerns about the siting of that repository are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30--10) (30-23-----------3) (112-----11-

--3) (222-4) (244-12-----------4) 

----------4--3-

-1) 

D.2.37.11 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC is attempting to decide how to 

address spent fuel transportation, storage, and disposal issues in isolation, which is contrary to 

the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future’s recommendation that a new singlepurpose organization be developed and be tasked with developing an integrated program to 

address these issues. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC does not create national policy 

for disposal of spent fuel and has not attempted to do so in the GEIS and Rule. That 

responsibility lies exclusively with Congress and the President. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The GEIS and Rule address the impacts of continued storage of spent fuel for the period after 

the end of a reactor’s licensed life of operation until disposal in a repository, as well as 

transportation impacts to a potential away-from-reactor storage facility. This information is used 

to comply with the requirements of NEPA for licensing and relicensing of reactors and ISFSIs. 

The GEIS and Rule do not address transport of spent fuel to a disposal facility, disposal of spent 

fuel in a repository, or impose requirements on how spent fuel should be stored. Nothing in the 

GEIS or Rule would interfere with any of the recommendations by the Blue Ribbon Commission 

on America’s Nuclear Future. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-3-3) 

D.2.37.12 – COMMENT: The NRC received many comments regarding commenters’ concern 

that a repository does not yet exist, the need for solutions to the spent fuel disposal problem, 

and potential solutions to the spent fuel disposal problem. Several commenters encouraged the 

NRC and the Federal government to make finding a permanent solution a national priority. 

Many commenters argued that it is this generation’s responsibility to deal with the spent fuel 

disposal problem and that the problem should not be passed along to future generations. 

Other commenters acknowledged the difficulty inherent in dealing with the spent fuel disposal 

problem and with siting a repository, but most did not suggest solutions. A few commenters 

cited the findings and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear 

Future in support of these comments. 

Many commenters expressed concern about the ongoing storage of spent fuel at recently 

closed and operating nuclear power plants. These commenters questioned whether a disposal 

solution would be available or whether the spent fuel would need to be stored indefinitely at 

existing and former reactor sites. Several of these commenters noted that removal and disposal 

of spent fuel was the plan when these reactors were initially licensed, not storing it onsite 

indefinitely. A few of these commenters also stated that the NRC and the nuclear industry have 

violated an underlying “contract” between the NRC, the nuclear industry, and the communities 

surrounding reactor sites that, following decommissioning, all waste would be removed and 

these sites would be available for other purposes. A few commenters also expressed concern 

regarding the length of time needed to transport spent fuel to a repository once one becomes 

available. These commenters noted that it could take decades to move all the spent fuel from 

any given reactor site. A few commenters expressed concern that any temporary solution, such 

as continued storage, would become permanent. 

A few commenters suggested that the spent fuel should be stored at the reactor sites 

indefinitely. Several commenters disagreed and argued in favor of siting and opening a deep 

geologic repository, at a site like Yucca Mountain, as soon as possible. Many of these 

commenters recommended not licensing or renewing licenses for any reactors until a repository 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

is available for the spent fuel already generated. One commenter noted that any repository 

should allow for the safe retrieval of spent fuel after disposal. One commenter suggested that 

the spent fuel be wrapped in gold or iridium. 

Several commenters argued that there is no solution to the spent fuel disposal problem and 

expressed concern that the Federal government and the industry have attempted for decades to 

find a solution and have not yet found a solution. One commenter stated that the Court of 

Appeals verified that no permanent, safe storage solution is likely to be found. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The 

Commission acknowledges the need for permanent disposal of spent fuel, and for the 

generations that benefit from nuclear energy to bear the responsibility for providing an ultimate 

disposal solution for the resulting waste. The Commission continues to support timely disposal 

of spent fuel, but recognizes that, as documented in the GEIS, storage of spent fuel may safely 

continue at reactor sites and at away-from-reactor sites until a repository becomes available. 

The NRC does not create national policy for disposal of spent fuel. That responsibility lies 

exclusively with Congress and the President. The national policy is to eventually dispose of 

spent fuel in a geologic repository. In January 2012, the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 

Nuclear Future reaffirmed the need for, and feasibility of, a geologic repository (BRC 2012). 

Selection of a particular location for the development of a repository is the responsibility of the 

DOE. The NRC is an independent regulatory agency tasked with ensuring that the repository 

meets the NRC’s regulations for protection of public health and safety and the environment by 

meeting all licensing requirements imposed by the NRC and environmental protection standards 

mandated by the EPA. 

The lack of a repository does not require that the operating reactors be shut down or new 

licenses not be issued. The NRC has licensing requirements and regulations in place to ensure 

that spent fuel remains safely stored in spent fuel storage facilities until a repository becomes 

available. Specific requirements related to disposal are beyond the scope of the GEIS and 

Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----1) (30-4-1) (30-4--------4) 

(112---1) (133--------41--21-2) 

-23--41--1-----1) (204----1) 

-10) (220----22--43--2-------

-13----------------

-----0-2--43------22---

-20--30------1) (302---1-1) 

-1--------1---------3) 

-33-4) (3---------42----14--2-

-12--1--14--4--2) (333---2) (340-1) (342-1) 

--2) (402-2) (403---4) (431-13) (431---2) (--
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

2--2--1----------

---1--2-------1-12) 

-------1) (-----2) 

-1--1--1---------

---------3---4-

---1---2-------1) 

------------

-1-----------1) 

------------3) 

-----3) 

D.2.37.13 – COMMENT: One commenter provided a bibliography of publications from the EPRI 

that the commenter believed would provide information and analysis related to the GEIS and 

requested that the NRC review the publications for potential use in preparing the final GEIS. 

The subjects of these reports include the geologic disposal of used fuel and HLW, repository 

programs in other countries, repository site selection, Yucca Mountain, dual-purpose canisters, 

performance assessment, and disposal standards. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the references suggested by the comments. The NRC 

has considered these references and updated the GEIS as appropriate. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.37.14 – COMMENT: Commenters discussed the NRC’s obligation to assess the likelihood 

of geologic repository availability. Several commenters challenged the NRC’s conclusion that a 

UHSRVLWRU\LVOLNHO\WREHFRPHDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHHQGRIDUHDFWRU¶VOLFHQVHGOLIHIRU

operation. Two commenters argued that the NRC’s and the DOE’s defiance of the NWPA is the 

reason repository availability became so uncertain that the Court of Appeals, in New York v. 

NRC, found that NEPA requires analysis of the environmental impacts of a repository never 

becoming available. One commenter requested that the NRC include a discussion of In re 

Aiken County, in the GEIS’s discussion of the case history. Some commenters cited NRDC v. 

NRC, for the proposition that the AEA does not require the NRC to cease reactor licensing until 

definitive findings on repository safety are reached. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

recognizes that there is some uncertainty regarding the NRC’s assessment that a repository is 

OLNHO\WREHFRPHDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHHQGRIDUHDFWRU’s licensed life for operation. 

The NRC is aware of this uncertainty, and has prepared additional analyses in the GEIS to 

evaluate the environmental impacts should it become necessary to continue storage after the 

end of the short-term timeframe. These timeframes contemplate an additional 100 years of 

storage before a repository becomes available (long-term timeframe) or indefinite storage 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

should a repository never become available (indefinite timeframe). The NRC recognizes the 

comment’s concerns regarding the NWPA and the Yucca Mountain proceeding, but notes that 

the 2010 Waste Confidence Update assumed, for the purposes of the analysis that supported 

the RuleWKDWWKHUHSRVLWRU\DW<XFFD0RXQWDLQZRXOGQHYHUEHFRPHDYDLODEOH)5. 

The NRC recognizes and is following the direction from the Court of Appeals in Aiken County to 

continue with the Yucca Mountain licensing process. Aiken County concerned the agency’s 

legal obligations regarding review of the DOE’s Yucca Mountain construction authorization 

application under the NWPA. In particular, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of mandamus and 

directed the NRC to “promptly continue with the legally mandated licensing process” for the 

Yucca Mountain application, “unless and until Congress authoritatively says otherwise or there 

are no appropriated funds remaining.” See DOE (High-Level Waste Repository), CLI-13-

NRC __ (2013)(slip. op. at 4)(quoting In re Aiken County) (NRC 2013s). As this discussion 

demonstrates, Aiken County is not in the direct line of cases that lead to the development of the 

GEIS and Rule. However, the NRC has updated Appendix B of the GEIS, Technical Feasibility 

of Continued Storage and Repository Availability, to include a discussion of In re Aiken County. 

The NRC agrees with the comments that the AEA does not require the NRC to cease reactor 

licensing pending the resolution of repository safety issues. In this case, however, the 

Commission directed the NRC not to make final licensing decisions because the required NEPA 

analyses would not be complete. The analysis in the GEIS provides a generic assessment of 

the environmental impacts of continued storage, which will allow the NRC to satisfy its NEPA 

obligations for these actions with respect to continued storage. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30----2) (210-1) (210-------1-11) 

D.2.38 Comments Concerning the Feasibility of Safe Storage and Regulatory 

Framework 

D.2.38.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed opposition to spent fuel storage and 

concern that spent fuel cannot be stored safely. Commenters noted that casks and spent fuel 

pools were not designed for permanent storage as no one envisioned the need to store spent 

fuel onsite for decades. Commenters expressed concern with the “dismal” record of the DOE 

and the NRC on spent fuel. In support of this position, commenters stated that (1) spent fuel 

cannot be stored safely as everything leaks eventually, (2) pools are overcrowded, (3) no viable 

methods are available for long-WHUPVWRUDJHVSHQWIXHOLVIODPPDEOHVSHQWIXHOUHPDLQV

UDGLRDFWLYHIRUKXQGUHGVRIWKRXVDQGVRI\HDUVDSRVVLEOHIRUPDWLRQRIDFULWLFDOPDVVFRXOG

PHOWWKURXJKWKHFRQWDLQHUDQGVWRUDJHLVDWR[LFDFFLGHQWZDLWLQJWRKDSSHQ&RPmenters 

expressed concern that a huge release could occur due to a breakdown in the storage system 

that would result in catastrophic consequences. Commenters stated that even with the remote 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

possibility that an accident could occur, we should not risk continued storage. Commenters 

stated that multiple acts of nature can combine in unforeseeable ways to create fires and 

uncontrolled releases into the atmosphere and aquatic systems. Commenters pointed to 

Fukushima Dai-ichi as evidence for why it is not safe to store spent fuel onsite. Commenters 

stated that the NRC cannot rely on unproven or nonexistent technology for safe storage for 

thousands of years. Commenters also indicated that because the spent fuel cannot be stored 

safely the industry should stop producing it. 

Commenters indicated that spent fuel should be stored inside a structure that is as robust as the 

reactor-containment building and that it should not be stored in high seismic zones, densely 

populated areas, tsunami zones, or on the coast. Commenters stated that nuclear waste has 

already contaminated nuclear plant sites and affected surrounding areas. 

One commenter noted that there is a big difference between a deep geologic repository and a 

nuclear waste operation, which should be described in the GEIS. The commenter noted that 

nuclear waste operations are not as safe as a repository due to possible terrorist attacks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

agrees that spent fuel pools and dry storage casks are not designed for permanent storage. 

The GEIS assumes that all spent fuel is removed from the pool by the end of the short-term 

WLPHIUDPH\HDUVDQGSODFHGLQFDVNV7KH*(,6DOVRDVVXPHVWKDWWKHGU\VWRUDJHFDVNV

are replaced every 100 years. However, as discussed in Appendix B of the GEIS, the NRC 

believes that spent fuel is, and will continue to be, stored safely in both dry casks and spent fuel 

pools. Appendix B of the GEIS supports the conclusion that it is feasible to safely store spent 

fuel in pools during the short-term timeframe and in dry casks for the short-term, long-term, and 

indefinite timeframes. Technology used to store spent fuel exists and has been proven. Spent 

fuel has been stored safely for decades using both spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. 

Technical understanding and experience continues to support the technical feasibility of safe 

storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and in dry casks, based on the physical integrity of 

pools and casks over long periods (e.g., slow degradation of spent fuel during storage in spent 

fuel pools and dry casks; and engineered features of storage pools and dry casks to safely 

withstand accidents caused by either natural or man-made phenomena). In addition, enhanced 

regulations, safety designs, and operations continue to evolve over time (e.g., security and 

safety enhancements made after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the March 2011 

Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster; and corrective actions to address spent fuel pool leaks). The NRC 

acknowledges that the potential consequences of some accidents could be serious; however, 

the risk is low because of the very low likelihood of such accidents. Potential accidents are 

DGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG$SSHQGL[)RIWKH*(,67KHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWRI

accidents and security-UHODWHGHYHQWVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6DQG

the impact is SMALL for the short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes. For information 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

on man-made and natural phenomena hazards and the probability of accidents see Sections 

' and ' of this appendix. 

The NRC has regulations in place that address the construction and operation of both wet and 

dry storage. The NRC uses these regulations to determine that the fuel will remain safe under 

anticipated operating and accident conditions. These regulations include requirements on 

topics such as radiation shielding, heat removal, and criticality. In addition, the NRC reviews 

fuel storage designs for protection against the following phenomena: 

x naturally occurring events (e.g., seismic events, tornadoes, and flooding) 

x dynamic effects (e.g., flying debris or drops from fuel handling equipment and drops of fuel 

storage and handling equipment) 

x hazards to the storage site from nearby activities. 

NRC-required spent fuel management activities focus on maintaining the integrity of the spent 

fuel so that radioactive components do not escape. 

NRC inspectors are responsible for verifying that spent fuel pools and related operations are 

consistent with a plant’s license. The NRC also performs specialized inspections to verify that 

new spent fuel cooling capabilities and operating practices are being implemented properly. 

The NRC performs inspections before and during loading of dry casks to ensure the correct fuel 

goes into the right storage systems. The NRC also inspects loaded casks every few years. 

The NRC takes safety seriously, including how nuclear waste is handled and stored. The NRC 

has decades of experience in licensing, regulating, and inspecting spent fuel storage facilities. 

Through the licensing and inspections processes, the NRC keeps its regulations up-to-date to 

ensure that storage and handling of nuclear waste continues to be managed safely and without 

significant impacts to the environment. 

The GEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of continued storage using reasonably 

foreseeable assumptions regarding the practices and storage. As explained in 6HFWLRQ

of the GEIS, the GEIS does not propose or impose safety requirements for the storage of spent 

fuel, such as expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks or into hardened dry 

storage. 

As for contamination at nuclear plant sites, leaks from spent fuel pools are addressed in 

Appendix E of the GEIS. The GEIS analyses the environmental impacts of continued storage, 

including the generation of LLW during continued storage. Contamination that might occur 

during operation of the nuclear power reactor would be addressed during operation or during 

decommissioning of the facility and is beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

As for the comment related to nuclear waste operations, the commenter is correct that onsite 

storage of spent fuel is not the same as disposal in a repository. The GEIS does not equate the 

two, nor does the GEIS analyze the impacts of disposal in a geologic repository. Nevertheless, 

any NRC-licensed facility, be it a repository or a storage facility, must comply with the NRC’s 

regulations, which provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and 

safety. The environmental impacts of security-UHODWHGHYHQWVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRI

the GEIS and the impact is determined to be SMALL for the short-term, long-term, and indefinite 

timeframes. 

The issue of generation and storage of spent fuel during the licensed life of a reactor, and 

refueling are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1) (30-13--1-1) (-12--11--------3) (110-

1) (112-31--1) (120-1) (121--------32-2) (202-4) 

---32----42----24----40-1) 

-------33-------1) 

-1--------4-3) (331-1) (333-1) (334----

---4-----1) (443----1) 

------------

------------1) 

----3) -------1--

------------

---1----2---1) (1004--1) 

D.2.38.2 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated that the spent fuel is being stored safely and 

can continue to be stored in a safe and environmentally sound manner for a long period of time, 

while the political process continues to work on a disposal solution. Commenters stated that the 

American nuclear industry is well regulated and that as long as the onsite storage continues 

under an NRC license with NRC monitoring and inspection, spent fuel can be stored safely 

onsite until a repository is available. The commenters stated that industry experience shows 

that the spent fuel is being stored safely and that industry has shown it is committed to the safe 

and secure storage of spent fuel and able to responsibly manage onsite fuel storage for as long 

as necessary. Commenters indicated that spent fuel is currently being stored onsite in welldesigned, well-protected facilities and storage casks. Commenters stated that the safety and 

security measures taken to maintain the spent fuel pools are unprecedented measures that 

include a combination of strategic design and construction, use of multiple safety systems, 

ongoing surveillance and inspection, defense-in-depth, and state-of-the-art security measures. 

Commenters stated that safety is the highest priority for utilities. Commenters noted that 

facilities have spent billions of dollars and thousands of staff-hours in improving facilities and 

structures and that the industry has taken measures to enhance safety as a result of the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the Fukushima Dai-ichi seismic event. Commenters 

noted that there has never been a single incident where spent fuel had been compromised by 

any outside individual or group. Commenters noted that the Mineral, Virginia earthquake 

showed the robustness and integrity and excellence in design of the systems that were 

deployed at North Anna Nuclear Generating Station. Commenters also noted that the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi earthquake and tsunami did not result in damage to the spent fuel being 

stored in casks and in the spent fuel pools and that the event further demonstrated the 

robustness and relative passivity of spent fuel storage. Commenters noted that storage 

continues to evolve and improve over time as we learn through scientific investigations. 

Commenters encouraged the NRC to continue to work with industry to promote innovations that 

will improve or enhance safety. Several commenters suggested adding additional information 

on the regulatory framework and lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event. Several 

commenters provided site-specific examples of how spent fuel is safely stored onsite. One 

commenter noted that France successfully reprocesses nuclear fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments that support the GEIS and agrees with 

the comments that spent fuel is being stored safely in both spent fuel pools and dry casks. The 

NRC will continue its regulatory control and oversight of spent fuel storage. Decades of 

operating experience and ongoing NRC inspections demonstrate that reactor and ISFSI 

licensees continue to meet their obligation to safely store spent fuel in accordance with the 

UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)53DUWVDQG

Reprocessing is beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. However, 

additional examples of how the regulatory framework operates and additional information on 

safe storage were added to Appendix B of the GEIS as a result of other comments. 

(30--11) (30-20-2) (30--2) (30--2) (30--3) (30--3) (30--3) (30---23--23-

-2---3) (112-21-1) (112-4-1) (112-12-2) (112-21-2) (112--2) (112--2) (112-

-4) (112-21----1) (122-2) (123------2) 

-4----11--1---------2) 

----2) (201-3) (212-3) (213-3) (244-1-1) (244-11-11) (244--3) (244--

3) (244-11-4) (244-1--11--12--20----34--40--

12--1--2--23----33--4--34--20-

-12----14----1--10--20-----

---13------4--10--13-0---

----3------41----32---3) 

----------------2) 

---2) (313--14--------14---

-3--32----------11----

12--31----10--------1) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

----2) (400--------1) 

----------3--2-23) 

-2--2--1--1--1--2-----1) 

-2--3----------3) 

--

D.2.38.3 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the GEIS include specific information 

on aging management. The commenter suggested that the GEIS include information on how 

the aging management program will provide for monitoring the integrity of dry storage system 

components and the potential emissions specific to dry storage systems during the 100-year 

storage timeframe. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that an aging management program is an important component 

of the NRC’s regulatory oversight of spent fuel storage. Applicants for specific licenses (10 CFR 

,VVXDQFHRIOLFHQVHDQGCoC UHQHZDOV&)5&RQGLWLRQVIRUVSHQWIXHO

storage cask renewal) are required to describe a program for the management of issues 

associated with aging that could adversely affect structures, systems, and components 

important to safety; structures, systems, and components that are necessary to fulfill a function 

that is important to safety; or support the function of a structure, system, or component that is 

important to safety. The NRC conducts a review of the aging management activities described 

in these applications. The NRC will only approve of the renewal application if the program is 

adequate to provide reasonable assurance that aging effects would be managed during the 

period of extended operation. 

All ISFSI sites are required to meet the GRVHOLPLWVLQ&)5&ULWHULDIRUUDGLRDFWLYH

materials in effluents and direct radiation from an ISFSI or MRS. Appropriate radiation 

monitoring and the aging management program requirements will be reflected in the terms, 

conditions, and technical specifications of the renewed CoC and thus made applicable to the 

JHQHUDOOLFHQVHHSHU&)5E)RUVSHFLILFOLFHQVHVUDGLDWLRQPRQLWRULQJDQGDJLQJ

management program requirements will be reflected in the terms and conditions of the renewed 

specific license. The NRC will monitor the general or specific licensee’s compliance with the 

terms and conditions of their license through the NRC’s inspection program. Guidance on aging 

management programs is available in Chapter 3 of NUREG–6WDQdard Review Plan for 

Renewal of Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System License and Certificates of Compliance (NRC 

2011g). 

Additional information on the aging management program has been added to Appendix B of the 

GEIS. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-10) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.38.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed the view that all spent fuel should be 

stored in dry casks. Commenters noted that dry storage does not require electricity as the 

casks are passively cooled by natural air flow, is less vulnerable to natural disaster and 

sabotage, and is a safer interim solution than storage in spent fuel pools. A couple of 

commenters indicated that the dry storage casks at Fukushima survived the earthquake. One 

commenter asked about the type of casks used at Fukushima and the distance the casks were 

from the damaged reactors. One commenter described the process for loading a cask and 

provided some information on the number of ISFSIs in the United States. One commenter 

stated that dry casks can be produced in the United States, creating jobs and increasing safety 

at an affordable cost. The commenter suggested that, if necessary, the government could 

assist the utilities by providing half the cost of the cask, but the utility should cover the cost 

because they have an obligation to decommission the reactors. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part with the comments and disagrees in part. The NRC 

agrees that the casks at Fukushima survived the earthquake. See Sections ' and 

' of this appendix for more information related to Fukushima. The NRC disagrees that 

spent fuel cannot be stored safely in spent fuel pools. As discussed in Appendix B of the GEIS, 

spent fuel has been stored safely and continues to be stored safely in both spent fuel pools and 

dry casks. Technical understanding and experience continues to support the technical 

feasibility of safe storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools and in dry casks, based on the 

physical integrity of pools and casks over long periods (e.g., slow degradation of spent fuel 

during storage in spent fuel pools and dry casks and engineered features of storage pools and 

dry casks to safely withstand accidents caused by either natural or man-made phenomena). 

Appendix B of the GEIS supports the conclusion that it is feasible to safely store spent fuel in 

spent fuel pools during the short-term timeframe and in dry casks for the short-term, long-term, 

and indefinite timeframes. The NRC acknowledges that the potential consequences of some 

accidents could be serious; however, the risk is low because of the very low likelihood of such 

DFFLGHQWV3RWHQWLDODFFLGHQWVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG$SSHQGL[)RIWKH*(,6

The environmental impact of accidents and security-related events are addressed in Sections 

DQGRIWKH*(,6DQGWKHLPSDFWLV60$//IRUWKHVKRUW-term, long-term, and indefinite 

timeframes. For information on pool fires, man-made and natural phenomena hazards, and the 

probability of accidents see Sections ', ', and ' of this appendix. 

The GEIS analyzes the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of continued storage, 

using reasonable assumptions regarding the practices and storage technology that will be used. 

$VH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQWKH*(,6does not propose or impose safety requirements for 

the storage of spent fuel (e.g., expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks). 

Information on the number ISFSIs and casks currently being used in the United States is 

provided in the GEIS. Information on the casks used at Fukushima is beyond the scope of the 

GEIS and Rule. The creation of jobs is also beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Regarding costs of storage, utilities are responsible for the cost of storage, including the cost of 

purchasing dry casks. However, in response to high public interest about costs, the NRC has 

included some cost information regarding continued storage in Chapter 2 of the GEIS. No 

changes were made to the Rule or GEIS as a result of these comments. 

(112-30-----4----------3) 

--

D.2.38.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern about spent fuel storage in dry 

storage casks. 

Commenters stated that casks need to withstand terrorism, tornadoes, floods, airplane crashes, 

underwater submersion, and severe earthquakes. To support their belief that spent fuel cannot 

be stored safely in dry storage casks for hundreds of years, commenters provided examples of 

past issues with casks (e.g., fabrication, cracking, corrosion, welds, seals, loading and 

unloading, leaking, clogged air flow vents, equipment failure, concrete storage pads, location of 

storage pads, hydrogen ignition incidents, a failed dry cask test, and quality control and 

assurance) that they believe indicate that spent fuel cannot be stored safely in dry storage 

casks for hundreds of years. One commenter stated that NRC had allowed manufacturers to 

build casks before issuance of the CoC, and another commenter stated that the NRC has 

exempted defective casks in the past. Commenters questioned how the NRC can have 

confidence in safe dry storage forever given the many documented issues and data gaps 

associated with cask storage. Several commenters expressed concern about storage of highburnup fuel in dry casks due to the limited experience with this fuel. 

$IHZFRPPHQWHUVQRWHGWKHPD[LPXPFDVNOLIHDOWHUQDWLYHO\GHVFULEHGDV\HDUV\HDUV

or 20 years) is not sufficient for indefinite storage. Commenters asked how the NRC will assure 

that the casks are replaced after their lifetime or earlier if the cask leaks and who would pay for 

any replacement. Commenters stated that there is no proof that spent fuel can be safely 

removed from casks or transported in the future as no cask has ever been unloaded. 

However, other commenters stated that casks can withstand environmental disasters as 

evidenced by Fukushima. Commenters noted that casks have been used safely for decades 

and systems have become more robust over time. Commenters noted that dry cask storage 

systems will continue to evolve in the future with enhancements that will improve safety. 

Commenters provided some examples of improvements that have been made to the casks, 

including higher capacity casks that reduce handling activities. Some commenters encouraged 

the NRC to make dry cask storage safer. 

One commenter was concerned that the NRC’s cask certification process occurs too quickly 

and locks out public involvement. The commenter stated that the process has been taken over 

by the industry and that the lack of rigorous oversight has resulted in a lack of cask design field 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

testing. Commenters noted that the casks are not approved for geologic disposal and 

requested information on when final geologic disposal casks would be available. 

Commenters encouraged the NRC to comprehensively evaluate and validate the sufficiency of 

the design life of storage systems. 

One commenter submitted a paper for a method to take advantage of the heat that comes off 

the dry storage casks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees with the comments that casks have been used safely for decades and that the designs 

continue to evolve. The NRC disagrees with the comments that indicate spent fuel cannot be 

stored safely in dry casks. Appendix B of the GEIS analyzes the feasibility of safe storage of 

spent fuel in casks. The analysis describes proven storage methodologies, practical operating 

experience, and the regulatory oversight provided by the current regulatory framework, allowing 

the NRC to determine that spent fuel can continue to be stored safely in the short-term 

timeframe with only routine maintenance and in the long-term and indefinite timeframes with 

cask replacement every 100 years. 

The NRC assures safety by requiring multiple layers of protection against radiation releases. 

The storage casks provide an important barrier and the fuel cladding provides another layer of 

protection. The design requirements imposed by regulation ensure that the casks will maintain 

shielding, confinement, and subcriticality during normal and off-normal conditions of storage, 

postulated accidents, and natural events. The NRC reviews each application for a cask CoC to 

GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHVWRUDJHFDVNGHVLJQPHHWVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVDW&)53DUW$VSDUW

of this review, the NRC performs confirmatory analysis to verify the information in the 

application. The CoC application and amendment review processes are thorough, and the 

information submitted by the applicants, the NRC questions (e.g., requests for additional 

information and requests for supplementary information), and the applicant responses are 

available for public review during the processes (with some information redacted for security or 

proprietary reasons). As part of the review, the NRC evaluates the applicant’s QA program to 

HQVXUHLWPHHWVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)53DUW

Storage cask performance is evaluated against a range of normal and off-normal conditions, 

accidents, and external events. For normal conditions of storage, the casks are evaluated for 

maximum high and minimum low ambient temperatures and must simultaneously include the 

effects of solar insolation. In addition, the NRC evaluates the operational environment that a 

cask will experience when it is being loaded, prepared for storage, and transferred to the 

storage pad. The evaluations for off-normal conditions include variations in temperatures 

beyond normal, failure of 10 percent of the fuel rods combined with off-normal temperatures, 

failure of one of the confinement boundaries, partial blockage of air vents, out-of-tolerance 

equipment performance, equipment failure, and instrumentation failure or faulty calibration. The 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

applicant is required to evaluate the storage cask for a cask drop and tipover, fire, fuel rod 

rupture, and air flow blockage (for vented storage casks). In addition to accident conditions, the 

following natural phenomena are evaluated: flood, tornado, earthquake, burial under debris, 

lightning strike, and other phenomena (e.g., seiches, tsunamis, and hurricanes), as appropriate, 

depending on the storage cask location. The Commission has determined that evaluation of 

terrorist strikes and large plane impacts, on the other hand, are beyond-design-basis events that 

do not need to be evaluated by an applicant for a license or CoC. The test (at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground) referenced in the comments, discusses perforation of a cask by an armor 

piercing missile, which is also a beyond-design-basis event analogous to a terrorist strike. 

Once the NRC review is completed, the cask design is approved by rulemaking, which provides 

the public an opportunity to comment. The NRC review process is similar for site-specific ISFSI 

OLFHQVHDSSOLFDWLRQVDQGDPHQGPHQWVXQGHU&)53DUWEXWOLFHQVLQJ,6)6,VLQFOXGHVWKH

opportunity for the public to request a hearing. 

The NRC performs regular inspections at the cask fabrication facilities for CoCs, at both 

specifically and generally licensed ISFSI sites. The NRC also performs regular inspections of 

CoCs and license holders’ QA programs. 

With respect to the comment on early fabrication of casks and exemptions, the NRC does allow 

early fabrication and exemptiRQUHTXHVWV$FFRUGLQJWR15&UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5F

“[a]n applicant for a CoC may begin fabrication of spent fuel storage casks before the 

Commission issues a CoC for the cask; however, applicants who begin fabrication of casks 

without a CoC do so at their own risk. A cask fabricated before the CoC is issued shall be made 

to conform to the issued CoC before being placed in service or before spent fuel is loaded.” If a 

storage cask does not meet the design approved by the NRC, then the CoC holder must either 

repair the non-FRQIRUPLQJSDUWSHUIRUPDQHYDOXDWLRQXQGHU&)5WRGHWHUPLQH

whether the CoC holder can deviate from the CoC without prior NRC approval, or obtain 

approval by the NRC to use the non-conforming part. Exemption applications submitted under 

&)5DUHUHYLHZHGE\WKH15&WRHQVXUHWKDWWKH\DUHDXWKRUL]HGE\ODZDQGZLOOQRW

endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public 

interest. The NRC completes both a safety review and an environmental review before 

approving any exemptions. 

The NRC follows up on potential safety issues with casks through the inspection program or, in 

some cases, through the allegation process. When concerns or issues are substantiated, the 

NRC takes appropriate follow-up actions for those with a resulting safety or regulatory concern. 

The NRC has previously addressed, or is addressing, the various concerns raised in the 

comments, many of which were identified by the NRC. For example, the NRC identified the 

potential for chloride-induced stress-corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel in 

Information Notice 2012-20 (NRC 2012l). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The NRC requires its licensees to implement monitoring and surveillance programs and 

licensees must take the necessary actions to ensure that the necessary integrity of required 

systems and components is maintained (see &)5F). Surveillance programs include 

periodic inspections of storage cask vents to ensure that debris does not block the vents. 

While it is true that no storage cask has been unloaded at an ISFSI, casks have been unloaded 

at national laboratories. Applicants provide unloading procedures as part of the CoC application 

or site-specific application and the NRC reviews the procedures as part of its review. 

With respect to the comments on transportation, some storage casks have been certified for 

both storage and transportation. Spent fuel has been safely transported for over 30 years with 

no incidents or releases of radiation. 

With respect to storage term, existing casks are certified for either 20 or 40 years, and can be 

renewed. One of the issues examined for renewals is storage of high-burnup fuel. 10 CFR Part 

FRQWDLQVERWKFODGGLQJLQWHJULW\DQGUHWULHYDELOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWV)RU&R&Uenewal applicants, 

the NRC would consider any degradation mechanisms associated with the fuel pellet itself or 

the cladding that could challenge the cladding integrity and retrievability of fuel from storage. 

Hydride reorientation that may occur in high-burnup fuel during storage, which could embrittle 

the cladding at lower long-term temperatures, is predominately a transportation issue. Under 

renewed CoCs, licensees are required to manage any effects associated with this degradation if 

it could adversely affect structures, systems, and components important to safety. The NRC 

believes sufficient data are available to project that high-burnup fuel can be safely stored and 

retrieved. Licensees must include aging management programs in their renewal applications to 

manage issues associated with aging that could adversely affect structures, systems, and 

components important to safety (including corrosion). Licensees must also include time-limited 

aging analyses that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components important to safety 

will continue to perform their intended functions for the requested period of extended operation. 

For more information on high-burnup fuel, see Appendix I of the GEIS and Section ' of 

this appendix. 

The NRC has an extended storage program evaluating extended cask storage for durations up 

to 300 years. Ongoing research into the extended storage of spent fuel is part of the NRC’s 

effort to continuously evaluate and update its safety regulations. As noted in Appendix B, the 

NRC is not aware of any deficiencies in its current regulations that would challenge the 

determination that continued safe storage of spent fuel in dry casks is feasible. 

The environmental impacts of geologic disposal are out-of-scope for this proceeding. Any 

geologic disposal casks would be evaluated and approved prior to the operation of a geologic 

disposal facility. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Recommended uses of the heat emitted from dry casks are also outside the scope of the Rule 

and GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(3-----14----24--13----

--2) (-----13------14--14-

-14--20--4--4-------3--

--------1----1-

-1---------4) 

D.2.38.6 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed concern over storage of spent fuel in 

pools. Commenters stated that the spent fuel pools were not intended for long-term storage of 

spent fuel over periods as long as decades. Rather, storage was intended only to last until the 

spent fuel had cooled for removal from the pool, and that it is irresponsible to allow continued 

pool storage. Commenters stated that the quantity of spent fuel stored in the pools exceeds the 

RULJLQDOGHVLJQEDVLVE\XSWRWLPHVDQGWKDWWKHSRROVFDQFRQWDLQXSWRWLPHVPRUH

QXFOHDUPDWHULDOWKDQUHDFWRUFRUHVDOPRVWSHUFHQWRIDOOVSHQWIXHOLVVWLOOLQWKHSRROV

Commenters stated that the pools are not protected by redundant emergency makeup and 

cooling systems and they lack robust containment structures. Commenters stated that 

overcrowding of spent fuel pools is a problem, which increases the potential for a radioactive 

release that could put the surrounding communities and the nation at risk of a potential 

catastrophic accident or terrorist event that could result in land contamination. Commenters 

stated that spent fuel pools are vulnerable to power outages, earthquakes, meltdowns, and 

terrorist attacks, which can lead to leaks and area contamination. Commenters stated that NRC 

cannot dismiss pool accidents as improbable or of low probability. Commenters indicated that 

while the dry casks at Fukushima survived, the spent fuel pools are collapsing, and thus the 

Fukushima event should be instructive to the United States and prompt removal of spent fuel 

from pools. 

Commenters expressed support for transferring spent fuel to dry cask as a national priority. 

Several commenters cited NUREG–15& 2001b), Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 

Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, to support the view that dry cask 

storage of spent fuel is safer than pool storage. 

Commenters stated that (1) reactors should not be allowed to generate additional spent fuel 

until all existing spent fuel has been removed from the pools, (2) facilities that have been shut 

down should be required to transfer all spent fuel to casks before gaining access to 

decommissioning funds, and (3) the NRC should require that any refueling event result in a net 

transfer of spent fuel to cask storage. 

Some commenters indicated that pool storage is safe and pools have safely contained spent 

fuel for over 30 years, which is equivalent to over 3,000 years of operating experience with no 

significant environmental impact. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the concerns about spent fuel storage in pools and 

agrees that this topic requires careful consideration. However, the NRC disagrees that spent 

fuel cannot be stored safely in pools. Spent fuel has been safely stored in spent fuel pools for 

many decades. As noted in Appendix B of the GEIS, technical understanding and experience 

continues to support the technical feasibility of safe storage of spent fuel in pools, based on their 

physical integrity over long periods of time (e.g., slow degradation of spent fuel during storage in 

pools; and engineered features of storage pools to safely withstand accidents caused by either 

natural or man-made phenomena). In addition, enhanced regulations, safety designs, and 

operations have continued to evolve as concerns and information have developed over time 

(e.g., security and safety enhancements made after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 

and the March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster, and corrective actions to address leaks in 

spent fuel pools). As pointed out in the comment, NUREG–15&b) states that the 

potential consequences of a pool accident could be serious; however, the risk is low because of 

the very low likelihood of such an accident. Spent fuel pool accidents are addressed in Section 

DQG$SSHQGL[)RIWKH*(,67KHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWRIDFFLGHQWVDQGVHFXULW\-related 

HYHQWVDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6DQGWKHLPSDFWVDUH60$//IRUWKH

short-term timeframe after which the NRC assumes that the spent fuel will be transferred to an 

ISFSI or sent to a repository for disposal. As indicated in Section B.3.1 of the GEIS, the NRC is 

not aware of any information that would cause it to question the low risk of a spent fuel pool 

accident. For information on man-made and natural phenomena hazards and the probability of 

accidents see Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 

The NRC acknowledges that the pools were not intended for long-term or indefinite storage of 

spent fuel, which is one of the reasons why the NRC assumes that the spent fuel will be 

removed from the pools by the end of the short-term timeframe. In accordance with the licenseWHUPLQDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUSRZHUUHDFWRUVLQ&)5DDQGF

decommissioning of the power plant, including the spent fuel pool, will be completed within 

years of permanent cessation of operations. This requirement applies equally to the spent fuel 

SRROVDWSRZHUUHDFWRUV$OWKRXJKWKHUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5DDOORZWKH&RPPLVVLRQ

to extend the time allowed to complete decommissioning and the “...unavailability of waste 

disposal capacity” is one of the factors to be considered, the Commission will only approve the 

request when necessary to protect public health and safety. Thus, the GEIS assumes that all 

spent fuel will be removed from the pooOZLWKLQ\HDUVDQGWKHUHIRUHWKHSRROVZRXOGQRWEH

used in the long-term or indefinite storage timeframes. Additional information on this 

assumption and the basis for it can be found in Section ' of this appendix. 

Concerning the amount of spent fuel stored in pools, the pool density at each reactor has been 

subject to site-specific reviews. For example, the NRC assesses the environmental impacts of 

storage of spent fuel in the pools during operations as part of the initial licensing review. Reracking to achieve higher density requires the NRC to approve a license amendment. This 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

review includes an environmental review and as assessment of the possible accidents due to 

the increased spent fuel density in the pool. 

For information on loss of offsite power see Section ' of this appendix. As discussed in 

Section 2.1.2.1 of the GEIS, in response to the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that 

damaged the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power facility in Japan, the NRC has placed additional 

requirements on nuclear power operators to ensure the continued safety of U.S. plants. These 

include measures applicable to pools, including developing mitigation strategies for severe 

events and ensuring the reliability of pool instrumentation. The NRC is not aware of any 

additional studies that would cause it to question the low risk of spent fuel pool accidents. 

However, the NRC is continuing its work in response to the accident in Japan and will use 

information it collects to determine whether to update other aspects of power plant design, 

construction, and operation, including aspects of construction and operation of spent fuel pools. 

$VH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKHGEIS does not propose or impose safety 

requirements for the storage of spent fuel, such as expediting the transfer of spent fuel from 

pools to casks. The GEIS assesses the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of 

continued storage in accordance with current NRC requirements. The impacts of expedited 

transfer are not within the scope of the GEIS because the NRC does not currently require these 

actions. The Commission evaluated a staff assessment of expedited transfer in a separate 

process and issued its decision on May 23, 2014 (NRC 2014a) not to pursue further evaluation 

of the expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry storageVHH6HFWLRQ'IRUPRUH

information. 

The issue of job creation, access to decommissioning funds, generation and storage of spent 

fuel during the licensed life of a reactor, and refueling are beyond the scope of the GEIS and 

Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(3----1) (112-31-2) (112--3) (112--3) (112-24-4) (112---10--

---22-----11----40---4) 

-------1) (303--1) (321-1) (322---2) 

---------1----20--30--

14-----4) (341-1--4------3) 

-------------

-2--1--1---------3) 

-3----1--------3) 

----------2--

-3-------4) 

D.2.38.7 – COMMENT: Several commenters raised criticality issues in connection with spent 

fuel storage. One commenter pointed out that NUREG/CR–Elam et al. 2003) did not 

consider MOX spent fuel, which has more plutonium-WKDQRWKHUVSHQWIXHODQGWKHUHIRUH

the GEIS should address criticality risks of MOX spent fuel in dry storage and during 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

transportation. One commenter stated that the “K” factor is affected by the fragility and easy 

failure of the cladding and the ease with which fuel pellets can form geometries that support 

recriticality and requested that this issue be addressed in the GEIS. A commenter mentioned 

NRC Generic LeWWHU-3%RUDIOH['HJUDGDWLRQLQ6SHQW)XHO6WRUDJH5DFNV ́15&F

to point out that reactors that use Boraflex as a neutron absorber in spent fuel pools are at risk 

of recriticality due to Boraflex disintegration and that licensees vary in attention to mitigation for 

this problem. Another commenter addressed the issue of Boraflex degradation in the spent fuel 

pool and how the industry was addressing the issue by replacing it with a different neutron 

absorber to prevent criticality in the pool. The comment did not provide any information on how 

Boraflex degradation or replacement with a different neutron absorber might present 

environmental impacts. 

One commenter suggested another example for inclusion in the GEIS of how the regulatory 

process works to assure safety. The commenter suggested adding how the NRC and the 

industry addressed the issue of Boraflex degradation. One commenter stated that vitrification 

will break down over time and the waste could achieve criticality. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. Criticality 

safety is addressed in the licensing review conducted for spent fuel dry storage cask and 

transportation package designs. MOX fuel contains uranium oxide and plutonium oxide, in 

concentrations designed such that MOX fuel assemblies have a reactivity similar to standard 

uranium oxide fuel assemblies. 

Although it is correct that spent MOX fuel will generally have more plutonium-WKDQVWDQGDUG

spent fuel assemblies, MOX will also have a greater concentration of higher actinides, which 

absorb neutrons and tend to reduce reactivity. The net result is that the reactivity of spent MOX 

fuel is not expected to be significantly different than standard uranium oxide spent fuel. 

Regardless, MOX fuel in dry storage and transportation is conservatively treated as fresh (i.e., 

unburned) fuel for purposes of demonstrating criticality safety. This differs from uranium oxide 

spent fuel, where some of the reduction in reactivity due to burning in the reactor can be 

credited. This credit can result in as much as a 30 percent reduction in keff. Note that keff is a 

measure of fissile material reactivity and its ability to support a self-sustaining fission chain 

reaction. A keff less than 1.0 means that the fissile material system is not capable of supporting 

a self-sustaining fission chain reaction. The NRC requires keff WREHOHVVWKDQXQGHUDOO

conditions for dry storage and transportation systems. 

Spent fuel dry storage and transportation designs consider fuel reconfiguration (loss of asdesigned geometry) where applicable. Structural loads under dry storage conditions are not 

expected to result in significant fuel reconfiguration. However, high-burnup fuel assemblies, for 

which the cladding structural properties are assumed to be degraded, are assumed to 

reconfigure during transportation. The configurations that result in the largest increase in keff are 

typically those with uniform pitch expansion (i.e., increased distance between fuel rods) and 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-400 September 2014 

varying numbers of missing rods. The combined effect of these configurations is typically less 

WKDQDSHUFHQWLQFUHDVHLQkeff. Note that commercial fuel assemblies are designed to have a 

reactivity that is close to optimum, meaning that fuel reconfiguration is more likely to make the 

geometry suboptimal and decrease keff. NUREG/CR–Elam et al. 2003) considered 

several non-physical scenarios (e.g., complete removal of fuel cladding combined with uniform 

pitch expansion) to determine an absolute upper bound on keff due to fuel reconfiguration. 

Criticality safety for pool storage is addressed in initial reactor licensing and in any spent fuel 

pool amendment related to spent fuel pool re-racking or otherwise altering the stored fuel design 

basis. NRC licensees use various methods to meet subcriticality requirements in the spent fuel 

SRROVSHFLILHGE\&)5RU&)5$SSHQGL[$*HQHUDO'HVLJQ&ULWHULRQ0RVW

spent fuel pools now store spent fuel assemblies in high-density racks, which incorporate 

neutron absorber materials into the rack walls. These neutron absorber materials, especially 

Boraflex, can degrade enough to lose their neutron-absorbing capabilities and challenge 

subcriticality requirements. Due to this degradation, many licensees now employ other means 

to meet subcriticality requirements (e.g., spent fuel loading patterns, fuel burnup credit, control 

rods or other neutron poisons contained within spent fuel bundles, soluble boron [B] in the pool 

water, or some combination of these methods). In some cases, a licensee will credit no neutron 

absorber material and rely entirely on other means to meet subcriticality requirements. In March 

2014, the NRC issued draft Generic Letter (GL) 2014-0040, “Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing 

0DWHULDOVLQ6SHQW)XHO3RROV ́)50DUFK7KH15&KDVGHWHUPLQHGWKDWLW

is necessary to obtain plant-specific information requested in the generic letter so that the NRC 

can determine if the degradation of the neutron-absorbing materials in the spent fuel pool is 

being managed to maintain reasonable assurance that the materials are capable of performing 

their intended safety function and if the licensees are in compliance with the regulations. After 

the final generic letter has been published in the Federal Register and licensees respond in 

writing, the NRC will evaluate the licensee responses to the generic letter and determine what 

further actions may be necessary. 

In addition to the generic letter mentioned in the comment, the NRC issued Information Notice 

,1-“Degradation of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool” to all 

RSHUDWLQJUHDFWRUVOLFHQVHHVDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQSHUPLWKROGHUVLQ2FWREHU15&E). 

The NRC continues to monitor how licensees are addressing the degradation issue. The NRC 

agrees that the issue of Boraflex degradation is an example of the successful performance of 

the NRC’VUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUN$GLVFXVVLRQRI,1-KDVEHHQDGGHGWR$SSHQGL[%RI

the GEIS. 

Spent fuel is not vitrified before storage in dry casks or for storage in the spent fuel pools. 

Therefore, issues related to vitrification are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-10--10--10---1---3-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-401 185(*௅

D.2.38.8 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns over the feasibility of storage over 

long periods due to degradation of spent fuel that would cause problems during wet and dry 

storage and during handling operations. In addition, some commenters stated high-burnup fuel 

increases degradation issues. Commenters expressed concern that degraded fuel could result 

in increased worker and public exposure and that the number of defective fuel assemblies 

varies by reactor. Commenters do not believe current experience with storage of spent fuel is 

sufficient to support the feasibility of long-term and indefinite storage given the limited 

understanding of degradation processes and the lack of uncertainty analysis in the GEIS. Some 

commenters also stated concerns with the degradation of spent fuel pools and dry cask storage 

systems. 

In contrast, some comments provided support for the feasibility of storage, citing robustness and 

degradation resistance of nuclear fuel design. Two commenters stated that the NRC 

appropriately addresses concerns being raised about stress-corrosion cracking of dry storage 

canisters in the SOC for the proposed Rule. They also cited industry efforts to address this 

concern. Some comments asked how nuclear fuel with stainless-steel cladding was accounted 

for in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The 

comments identify a number of degradation processes that could impact the safety of continued 

storage of spent fuel. Appendix B of the GEIS discusses industry and regulatory experience 

with storing spent fuel, including a discussion of degradation processes that could impact the 

safety of continued storage. The GEIS explains degradation processes and regulatory and 

industry experience and approaches for maintaining safety by (1) identifying the degradation 

processes that may affect continued storage and discussing regulatory and industry experience 

and approaches for addressing degradation concerns; and (2) describing regulatory and 

industry approaches for continued examination and evaluation of potential issues that might 

arise from longer storage periods. 

Appendix B of the GEIS contains data supporting the slow rates for degradation processes 

associated with wet and dry storage of spent fuel. Routine maintenance is currently used to 

maintain safety of spent fuel storage systems and at some future time a decision could be made 

that replacement is necessary. No method exists to determine precisely when there would be a 

need to take such a significant measure (i.e., replacement of a dry cask). The GEIS assumes 

that replacement would occur at 100 years, but Appendix B notes that precise replacement 

times would depend on actual degradation observed during continued regulatory oversight for 

maintaining safety during continued storage. Discussions on the role of regulatory oversight in 

maintaining safety and industry initiatives evaluating the performance of dry cask storage 

(including the condition of high-burnup spent fuel) have been expanded in Appendix B. As 

noted below, Appendix B was revised to improve clarity: 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-402 September 2014 

1) Dry cask storage is licensed or relicensed for a period of up to 40 years (high-burnup fuel 

storage has been licensed for 20 years). The experience gained with each licensing period will 

inform each subsequent licensing action. Additional text has been added to Appendix B to 

clarify that regulatory oversight will continue to examine the performance of storage systems to: 

(1) ensure current designs and procedures are appropriate and safe; (2) allow early discovery of 

any potential problems of storage casks or structures; and (3) allow for early mitigation if issues 

are discovered. 

2) Experience with wet and dry storage of spent fuel continues to grow both nationally and 

internationally. As experience grows, lessons learned are developed to identify good practices 

as well as discuss problems that have been encountered and potential solutions (Spent Fuel 

Storage Operation – Lessons Learned; IAEA 7(&'2&IAEA 2013). Appendix B provides 

a variety of examples of how requirements for spent fuel storage have incorporated lessons 

learned from operational experience, including information from accidents. Aging management 

programs, including monitoring, continue to be informed by operational experience. The NRC, 

DOE, other regulators, and the commercial power industry have formed the Extended Storage 

Collaboration Program. The goal of this program is to better understand the degradation 

processes that could impact the storage of spent fuel. As new information becomes available, it 

will be considered in the development of canister design criteria and aging management 

requirements for the safe storage of spent fuel. Additional text has been added to Appendix B 

to clarify that (1) should increased degradation of spent fuel cladding occur (i.e., be more brittle), 

greater care could be required during handling operations, regardless of when repackaging 

would occur, to limit the potential for damage to spent fuel assemblies that could affect easy 

retrievability of the spent fuel and complicate repackaging operations; (2) high-burnup fuel can 

be stored and transported safely if the potential degradation processes are appropriately 

considered; and (3) damaged fuel has been dealt with in the past and consideration of a 

KDQGOLQJDFFLGHQWLQYROYLQJGDPDJHGIXHOLVSURYLGHGLQ6HFWLRQ of the GEIS. 

3) Appendix B of the GEIS analyzes the feasibility of safe storage of spent fuel in spent fuel 

pools and dry storage casks. Part of the basis for concluding that spent fuel can continue to be 

stored safely is that current technology is available to address known degradation processes. 

Text has been added to Appendix B to clarify that a commercial DTS is currently not operating 

in the United States but is considered feasible. Additional discussion has been added to 

Section 2.2.2.1 (Construction and Operation of a DTS) providing further information regarding 

the technology available for handling spent fuel, including damaged fuel. 

4) Appendix B also describes government and industry initiatives that continue to evaluate 

safety of continued storage of spent fuel. Although the NRC believes that its current regulatory 

requirements for extended storage adequately protect public health and safety, and suffice to 

meet any challenge to the continued safe storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools or dry cask 

systems, it is conducting research into the extended storage of spent fuel to ensure its safety 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-403 185(*௅

regulations remain up-to-date. For example, the NRC is examining the technical needs and 

potential changes to the regulatory framework that may be needed to continue licensing of 

spent fuel storage over periods beyond 120 years: Identification and Prioritization of the 

Technical Information Needs Affecting Potential Regulation of Extended Storage and 

Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (NRC 2014e). This report considered high-burnup 

uranium R[LGHIXHOXSWRDEXUQXSRI*:G078SHDNURGDYHUDJHDQG02;IXHl. 

International efforts are also evaluating degradation mechanisms affecting handling, storage, 

and transportation of spent fuel (IAEA 2011b). As another example, EPRI is leading a multiyear research project to evaluate the safe storage of spent fuel in dry storage casks (the 

majority of funding is provided by the DOE). EPRI will design and demonstrate dry cask 

technology at full scale for evaluating the condition of high-burnup spent fuel during storage. As 

research continues, if the NRC were to identify a concern with the safe storage of spent fuel, the 

NRC would evaluate the issue and take whatever action or make whatever change in its 

regulatory program necessary to protect public health and safety. Additional text has been 

added to Appendix B providing further details on the government and industry initiatives. 

Section 2.1.1.3 of the GEIS states that a small amount of stainless-steel-clad fuel was used in 

the past and is still being stored under NRC licenses. Stainless-steel cladding may be more 

susceptible to certain degradation processes (e.g., higher corrosion rate than zirconium alloy 

cladding) and thus a higher potential for damaged fuel rods to impact handling operations. The 

GEIS does consider the environmental impacts of damaged fuel, including stainless steel and 

]LUFRQLXPDOOR\FODGIXHO7KHHYDOXDWLRQRIDFFLGHQWVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUV

the impacts from damaged fuel resulting from a handling accident in the DTS (see Section 

' of this appendix for further details). The accident analysis is based on a conservatively 

assumed release that considers the fuel inventory and is not constrained by a specific cladding 

material. As such, the evaluation is appropriate for both stainless or zirconium alloy cladding. 

Further details are provided on high-burnup fuel in Section ' of this appendix, on 

damaged fuel in Section ' of this appendix, on degradation of spent fuel pools in 

Sections D.2.40.1 and ' of this appendix, and on the DTS in Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3) (112--4) (112-----3) -12--31-----2) 

---14--------1-12) (341-1-14) (410--1-

-1--------4--4--2--

--1--1--3--2--2--

D.2.38.9 – COMMENT: One commenter raised concerns regarding fuel failure and how it could 

affect the safety and environmental risk of continued storage. The commenter stated that the 

draft GEIS only mentioned failed fuel in spent fuel pools. The commenter noted that if fuel 

failure occurs after dry storage commences, some fuel pellets could be exposed to the 

environment during transfer of cask contents and the draft GEIS fails to address this issue. The 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-404 September 2014 

commenter believes that the issue will be of greater concern with high-burnup fuel. The 

commenter questioned the statement in the draft GEIS that the NRC was not aware of any 

studies that would cause it to question the technical feasibility of continued safe storage of spent 

fuel in dry cask in light of the NRC’s statement in its own report, Identification and Prioritization 

of the Technical Information Needs Affecting Potential Regulation of Extended Storage and 

Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (NRC 2014e), that hydriding, creep, and stress-corrosion 

cracking can lead to failed fuel in certain conditions and that the level of knowledge regarding 

these phenomena is low. The commenter believes that this undermines the credibility and 

integrity of the GEIS. The commenter stated that the NRC’s failure to address the effects of 

failed fuel on safety and environmental risk is remarkable in the context of the NRC’s own 

DGPLVVLRQLQDSHWLWLRQUHVSRQVH>&)53DUW>'RFNHW1R350--4]: Prairie Island 

Coalition; DenLDORI3HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ)5@WKDWLWGRHVQRW\HWNQRZKRZLWZLOO

transfer failed fuel and has not developed procedures to address failed fuel transfer. The 

commenter believes that this issue is material to the environmental impacts that NRC must 

assess. 

The commenter also stated that the NRC has no basis in data or experience in estimating how 

much additional damage could be done to failed fuel by transferring it between casks. The 

commenter stated that the NRC has ignored the fact that failed spent fuel bundles are already 

stored in dry casks but have never undergone inter-cask transfers. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that fuel failure could affect the safety and 

environmental impact of continued storage but disagrees with the comment that fuel failure was 

not considered in the GEIS. The GEIS considers design basis events for dry cask storage 

systems, including an accident at the DTS involving damaged fuel and an open cask. This 

accident involves a loss of confinement event that evaluates a release of volatile radionuclides 

from damaged fuel assuming the high-efficiency particulate air filters are inoperable (Section 

 

The draft GEIS explained degradation of spent fuel could result in conditions (e.g., more brittle 

spent fuel cladding) that may require greater care in handling operations. In discussing 

potential degradation mechanisms in the GEIS, the intention was not to dismiss degradation of 

spent fuel or imply there was no concern for damaged fuel. The intention was to discuss 

degradation processes and regulatory and industry experience and approaches for maintaining 

safety by presenting (1) the current understanding of degradation processes that may affect 

continued storage, (2) regulatory and industry experience and approaches for addressing 

degradation concerns, and (3) regulatory and industry approaches for continued examination 

and evaluation of potential issues that might arise from longer storage periods. Appendix B of 

the GEIS has been revised to clarify the discussion of degradation processes and regulatory 

and industry experience and approaches. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

In addition, the NRC has added text to the GEIS that describes damaged fuel in the context of 

DTS operations including the methods for handling damaged spent fuel. See Section '

of this appendix for additional information on repackaging damaged fuel. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-4--4--4--2--2--2--2--2-

-2-

D.2.38.10 – COMMENT: Some commenters requested that the GEIS contain a comparison of 

the variety of possible methods for storing the spent fuel, particularly dry cask storage compared 

to high-density pool storage. One of the commenters noted that a release of radiation due to a 

spent fuel pool fire would be much more severe than a release from a dry cask. Another 

commenter stated that the comparison of storage methods should include HOSS. 

One commenter noted that the GEIS does not say that storage in spent fuel pools and dry casks 

is equally safe, only that these storage methods provide “adequate protection.” The commenter 

requested a definition of adequate protection. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS contains a discussion on the 

storage of spent fuel in both spent fuel pools and in dry casks. The GEIS supports the 

conclusion that it is technically feasible to safely store spent fuel in either pools or dry casks 

following the licensed life for operation of a reactor. A comparison of storage methods is not 

necessary to determine the environmental impacts of continued storage. Neither the GEIS nor 

Rule states that storage in spent fuel pools and dry casks is equally safe and determining 

whether one method is safer than another is not necessary to an analysis of the environmental 

impacts of continued storage. See Section ' of this appendix for information on 

inclusion of HOSS. 

The AEA, as amended, establishes “...adequate protection of public health and safety” as one of 

the standards governing NRC rulemaking and licensing. This adequate-protection standard 

undergirds the Commission’s regulations. While the agency has historically declined to quantify 

the adequate-protection standard, the Commission’s regulations and guidance nonetheless give 

meaning to “adequate protection” through application of the agency’s scientific and technical 

judgments. The agency has stated that compliance with Commission regulations and guidance 

gives rise to a presumption of adequate protection of public health and safety in any particular 

proceeding. For example, in its final rule on the backfitting process for power reactors, the 

Commission stated that Congress did not define adequate protection in the AEA, Congress did 

not command the Commission to define the term, and that the Commission declined to define 

the term. Nevertheless, the Commission stated that it “...can still make sound judgments about 

what ‘adequate protection’ requires, by relying upon expert engineering and scientific judgment, 

acting in the light of all relevant and material information.” Further, the Commission stated that 

compliance with the Commission’s regulations and guidance “...should provide the level of 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

safety sufficient for adequate protection...under the AEA,” Revision of Backfitting Process for 

3RZHU5HDFWRUV)LQDO5XOH)5-XQH,QUnion of Concerned 

Scientists v. NRC, the Court of Appeals declined to define the term “adequate protection” and 

upheld the Commission’s approach to interpreting and applying the adequate-protection 

standard “...through case-by-case applications of [the NRC’s] technical judgment rather than by 

mechanical verbal formula or set of objective standards.” No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2) (112-2-3) (143--2--3) 

D.2.38.11 – COMMENT: Many commenters addressed consolidated interim storage. Some 

commenters thought that NRC’s proposal to transfer spent fuel to temporary facilities was not a 

good idea. Some commenters expressed general opposition to consolidated interim storage 

and indicated that (1) rather than interim solutions for the storage of spent fuel, we need a 

permanent solution and (2) interim indefinite storage is not an option. Commenters stated that 

the risks are increased with consolidated interim storage locations resulting in more targets for 

potential problems from natural disasters or terrorist activities. Some of the commenters were 

opposed to consolidated interim storage because it put the communities hosting the facility at 

risk and no state would want to locate a consolidated interim storage facility in their state, while 

other commenters cited a concern that relocation of the spent fuel increased the risk of a 

transport disaster. Others stated that this would transfer cost to the public, result in increased 

cost, and would allow utilities to place additional spent fuel onsite. Commenters stated that the 

spent fuel should be moved once and stored near where it is produced until a repository is 

available. Commenters felt that siting a consolidated interim storage facility would be 

problematic like the failed attempts to site a repository. 

Some commenters stated that the NRC is hiding the problem by transporting the spent fuel to 

temporary sites around the country and that these temporary sties could become de-facto 

permanent sites if there are not enough repositories to handle the material. Commenters stated 

that progress on locating a repository needs to be made. One commenter noted that an interim 

facility financed by the Federal government is not allowed under current law. 

Other commenters supported the use of interim storage facilities because it would allow locally 

stored spent fuel to be safely removed to a single or regional location controlled and protected 

by our national government. Commenters stated that consolidated storage presents an overall 

safer storage environment and a more economical approach to the storage problem because it 

would eliminate duplication of costly construction of a DTS at each reactor site. Commenters 

also stated that consolidated storage would reduce the added burden to State and local 

governments supporting the long-term activities. Commenters stated that interim sites in 

remote locations had many advantages (e.g., removal of spent fuel from tsunami and 

earthquake prone areas, storage far from population centers, storage in secure areas away 

from public access, and a reduction in the terrorist threat). A couple of commenters indicated 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

that an interim facility should use hardened and earthen covered or buried arrays to make them 

less vulnerable to attack. Some commenters stated that we must act now and move on 

developing interim facilities as recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 

Nuclear Future as a necessary part of the nation’s waste management strategy so that a facility 

LVDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUV2QHFRPPHQWHUQRWHGWKDWDQ\FRPPXQLW\WKDWDJUHHVWREHWKH

location for an interim facility needs to have infrastructure, a knowledgeable workforce, and 

educated citizens that understand both the science and the risk. Commenters noted that the 

licensing of PFS showed the ability of the NRC to review and approve a temporary storage 

facility, others pointed out that the facility was never built. Commenters stated that no interim 

storage policy should be put in place until a repository is operational. 

RESPONSE: These comments are beyond the scope of the analysis conducted in the GEIS 

because the decision on whether or not to use centralized interim storage is a Federal policy 

decision, and not one made by the NRC. The NRC is not proposing that the spent fuel be 

transferred to temporary or interim locations. The Commission continues to support timely 

disposal of spent fuel, but recognizes that the storage of spent fuel may safely continue beyond 

the licensed life for operation of a reactor. The national policy is still disposal in a geologic 

repository. In the GEIS, the NRC generically describes the environmental impacts of an awayfrom-reactor ISFSI large enough to store spent fuel from multiple reactors. The impacts are 

based, in part, on the NRC’s assessment of the environmental impacts of the PFSF that the 

NRC licensed in 200EXWZKLFKWKHOLFHQVHH3ULYDWH)XHO6WRUDJH//&QHYHUFRQVWUXFWHG

Inclusion of the away-from reactor analysis was not intended to endorse interim consolidated 

storage, but was included in the GEIS because it is reasonably foreseeable that it could occur. 

If an away-from-reactor facility is proposed by the DOE or a private organization, the NRC 

would likely be responsible for conducting any license application review and, if appropriate, 

issuing a license for the facility. Any interim storage facility licensed by the NRC would be 

VXEMHFWWRWKHUHJXODWLRQVLQ&)53DUW7KH15&ZRXOGSUHSDUHD1(3$DQDO\VLVDVSDUW

of any licensing review, as well as a safety evaluation report. 

The NRC has revised the Federal Register Notice and GEIS to clarify that the NRC is not 

proposing consolidated storage at an interim facility. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-----13) (244-2----14----1-2) 

-30-2) (2-20--4----------3) 

-20----4--33--3-3) (343-1) (343-----

1--1--1--2--3) (411----2---

--2----1-------

---------3---2) 

------1) (------21) 

--------1----4) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.38.12 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the spent fuel should be stored onsite 

until a consolidated Federal storage site is established. Commenters stated that the spent fuel 

should remain onsite because it places the risks and costs of storage in the communities that 

benefit from the facility, whereas shipping the spent fuel to other storage sites is an 

externalization of costs; it represents the least hazard to public health in the areas both near the 

reactors and along transport routes; it is the “least bad” solution; and removal would only 

encourage the generation of more spent fuel. Some commenters indicated that the spent fuel 

needed to stay onsite for as long as it is radioactive and that it should be stored in casks 

because dry storage is safer than pool storage. Commenters asked who is financially 

responsible once the spent fuel leaves the plant property. One commenter indicated that the 

companies that generate the spent fuel should pay for the sequestering of it for the thousands of 

years that it remains radioactive. Several commenters requested that the onsite spent fuel be 

stored more safely. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that spent fuel will continue to be safely stored onsite. The NRC is not requiring that the 

spent fuel be moved as part of the GEIS and Rule. The Rule does not impose any new 

requirements on licensees, approve generation of additional spent fuel, or approve movement of 

spent fuel to new locations; the Rule codifies the generic determinations from the GEIS in the 

NRC’s regulations so that the same generic issues related to continued storage do not need to 

be revisited in each site-specific proceeding. In most cases, spent fuel will remain onsite until 

either an interim consolidated storage facility or a repository becomes available. Appendix B of 

the GEIS provides an analysis of the technical feasibility of safe storage that is based, in part, 

on the NRC’s regulatory framework, which provides controls and oversight of storage activities. 

The GEIS includes an analysis of the environmental impacts of transportation of spent fuel to an 

away-from-UHDFWRUVLWHLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,67KHLPSDFWVZRXOGEH60$//WR

MODERATE with the potential for MODERATE impacts being related to traffic at a particular 

site. An analysis of the environmental impacts of transportation of spent fuel from an at-reactor 

or away-from-reactor storage site to a repository for permanent disposal would be included in an 

EIS for the repository. 

Licensees are required to provide funding for any onsite spent fuel storage costs under 10 CFR 

EEDQG &)5(e). Under the NWPA, licensees are also required to pay a fee into 

the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is to be used to fund permanent disposal of spent fuel; DOE 

recently suspended collection of the fee in response to the decision in NARUC v. DOE. The 

NRC acknowledges that, because of delays in the siting and licensing of a repository, the 

Federal government bears an increasing financial responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and 

may become responsible for paying all the costs associated with spent fuel storage at some 

time in the future. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----21------1--40---

23--1--3---3) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.38.13 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed the view that the NRC improperly relies on 

NUREG–15&7KHFRPPHQWHUQRWHGWKDWWKHLQLWLDO:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQ

relied, in part, on NUREG–WRFRQFOXGHWKDWVWRUDJHRIVSHQWIXHODWUHDFWRUVLWHV is 

acceptable. The commenter believes that the report provided a conservative upper bound to 

the length of interim storage that constituted a practical upper bound to the forecasting that may 

be used as a basis for today’s decision-making. The commenter states that the NRC has never 

recognized that NUREG–ZDVEDVHGRQVHYHUDOLQFRUUHFWDVVXPSWLRQVWKDWUHVXOWLQJUHDWO\

underestimating the upper bound to the length of onsite storage and that it is inappropriate to 

rely on this document. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. NUREG–15&LVLQFOXGHGLQ

the list of NEPA documents used in preparation of the GEIS (Table 1-1 of the GEIS). However, 

impact determinations in NUREG–ZHUHQRWUHOLHGRQLQDVVHVVLQJWKHHQYLURQPHQWDO

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel and are not referenced elsewhere in the GEIS. See 

Sections ' and ' of this appendix for more information related to NUREG–

15&. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--2) 

D.2.38.14 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that while the Earthquake Study was not 

referenced in the draft GEIS, it was one of its foundations. The commenter expressed the view 

that the Earthquake Study was developed side-by-side with the proposed Rule to justify its 

conclusion. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment that SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l), called 

Earthquake Study by the commenter, was not referenced in the draft GEIS. The document did 

QRW\HWH[LVWZKHQWKHGUDIW*(,6ZDVEHLQJGHYHORSHG$VQRWHGLQ$RI6HFWLRQ,,,RIWKH

Federal Register Notice for the proposed Rule, the NRC indicated that it would include the 

reference in the final GEIS if SECY-13-0112 was finalized before the final GEIS was published. 

SECY-13-0112 is now final, and it is included in the list of references for Appendix F of the 

GEIS. 

SECY-13-0112 and the draft GEIS were separate actions and were not developed side-by-side 

to justify conclusions. See Section ' of this appendix for information related to how the 

GEIS considered SECY-13-0112 and changes made to the final GEIS to address SECY-13-

0112. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

--1) 

D.2.38.15 – COMMENT: Two commenters asked what the current safety standards were for 

spent fuel storage in pools and dry casks. The commenters asked a number of questions on 

the requirements for cooling and protection from natural disasters. The commenters indicated 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-410 September 2014 

that spent fuel storage should be able to withstand earthquakes, storms, floods, and terrorist 

acts, and be able to handle operator error and equipment failures. The commenters indicated 

that there is no way to guarantee 100 percent safety and adequate safety is not reassuring and 

that strong regulations are needed. The commenters asked whether NRC can state with 

confidence that there is no danger from our current ways of dealing with radioactive waste. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

sets strict requirements for safe spent fuel storage. Developed through a public process, these 

requirements provide a sound technical basis for protecting public health and safety and the 

environment. While 100 percent guarantee of safety is neither possible nor required, the AEA 

establishes “reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety” as one of 

several public health and safety standards governing NRC rulemaking and licensing. The 

NRC’s requirements for both wet and dry storage can EHIRXQGLQ&)53DUWJHQHUDO

GHVLJQFULWHULDLQ$SSHQGL[$WKDWDSSOLHVWRVSHQWIXHOSRROVDQG&)53DUWVSHQWIXHO

storage requirements for dry cask storage), respectively. For example, Appendix A to 10 CFR 

3DUWUHTXLUHVWKDWVWUXFWXUHs, systems, and components that are important to safety, 

including spent fuel pools, be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (e.g., 

earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, and seiches) without loss of capability to 

perform their safety functions. Fuel handling-related accidents are also part of the design basis 

DFFLGHQWVFRQVLGHUHG6LPLODUO\3DUWKDVUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUV\VWHPVVWUXFWXUHVDQG

components important to safety to be designed to withstand, earthquakes, tornadoes and 

missiles, aircraft crashes, floods, fires, and cask drop or tip-over. The NRC’s security 

UHTXLUHPHQWVDUHLQ3DUWLQFOXGLQJWKHDBT for radiological sabotage. In addition, the NRC 

has issued security orders to ISFSI licensees imposing requirements to ensure that a 

FRQVLVWHQWFRPSUHKHQVLYHSURWHFWLYHVWUDWHJ\LVLQSODFHIRUDOO,6)6,V6HFWLRQRIWKH

*(,6FRQWDLQVDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQRQSRVVLEOHDFFLGHQWVDQG6HFWLRQDGGUHVVHV

sabotage and terrorism. The NRC uses these rules to determine that the fuel will remain safe 

under anticipated operating and accident conditions. There are requirements on topics such as 

radiation shielding, heat removal, and criticality. In addition, the NRC reviews fuel storage 

designs for protection against the following phenomena: 

x naturally occurring events (e.g., seismic events, tornadoes, and flooding) 

x dynamic effects (e.g., flying debris or drops from fuel handling equipment and drops of fuel 

storage and handling equipment) 

x hazards to the storage site from nearby activities. 

Reactor licensees and equipment vendors provide detailed descriptions of pool storage racks 

and dry casks, including extensive tests and analyses to show the equipment and its operation 

meet NRC requirements. The NRC carefully reviews these submittals. To obtain NRC 

approval, the designs must meet the following criteria: 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-411 185(*௅

x prevent the release of radiation 

x be structurally robust 

x prevent a nuclear fission reaction 

x safely manage heat 

x use materials that can withstand radiation, heat, and corrosion. 

The NRC requires that spent fuel pools be cooled by an attached cooling system. The system 

keeps fuel temperatures low enough that, even if cooling were to be lost, operators would have 

substantial time to recover cooling before boiling could occur in the spent fuel pool. Licensees 

also have backup ways to cool the spent fuel pool, using temporary equipment that would be 

available even after fires, explosions, or other unlikely events that could damage large portions 

of the facility and prevent operation of normal cooling systems. Operators have been trained to 

use this backup equipment. Licensees have evaluated the backup methods available to provide 

adequate cooling even if the pool structure loses its water-tight integrity. The cooling system 

and backup measures are subject to NRC inspection. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

---2) 

D.2.38.16 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed the view that the NRC cannot finalize 

the GEIS and Rule at this time because of the many unresolved issues regarding the safety of 

continued spent fuel storage. A number of issues, including the following, were identified by 

commenters as requiring resolution: extended cask storage, storage of high-burnup fuel, 

storage of MOX fuel, dismantled cooling pools leaving no way to transfer spent fuel to new 

casks, casks used that are not suitable for transportation, spent fuel that can be stranded in 

deteriorating casks without provision for transfer to new casks, expectation of deteriorated spent 

fuel rods and no provision for management of such degraded spent fuel rods. Commenters 

noted that there are ongoing research efforts to look at extended storage and that the 

information from these studies is needed to complete the GEIS and that the GEIS does not 

PHQWLRQWKH15&¶VSUHYLRXVO\DQQRXQFHG-year effort to examine extended storage. 

Commenters requested that the GEIS address the research needs identified by NRC on longterm storage, including such things as experimental alloys, recriticality, degradation 

mechanisms, stress-corrosion cracking, corrosion, embrittlement, shielding, thermal, structural, 

swelling of fuel pellets due to helium in-growth, fuel rod pressurization due to additional fuel 

fragmentation, helium release, fission gas release during accidents, thermal calculations, effects 

of residual moisture after normal drying, and development of in-service monitoring methods for 

storage systems. Two commenters noted recommendations from the U.S. Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board for research on extended storage. One commenter expressed the 

view that the missing information is critical to assessing the health and environmental impacts of 

spent fuel storage and that without the information the NRC has an inadequate foundation for 

scientifically sound predictive safety findings. The commenter indicated that the GEIS should 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-412 September 2014 

acknowledge the data gaps and that not mentioning the concerns seriously compromises the 

scientific integrity of the GEIS. The commenter noted that the information is needed to make a 

central estimate of impacts and to put meaningful uncertainty bounds on impacts. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. NEPA only requires the NRC to 

consider the information available when it takes the Federal action that is subject to NEPA, 

which the NRC has done here. With respect to the comment that asserts that waste confidence 

is comprised of safety findings, see Section D.2.4.1 of this appendix. In accordance with 

Commission direction, the NRC is separately examining the regulatory framework and potential 

technical issues related to extended storage and subsequent transportation of spent fuel for 

multiple license renewal periods extending beyond 120 years. As part of this effort, the NRC is 

also closely following DOE and industry efforts to study the effects of storing high-burnup spent 

fuel in casks. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-------10----3---

----4--4--4--1--1--1--1-

-1--2--2-

D.2.38.17 – COMMENT: One commenter provided a bibliography of publications from the EPRI 

that the commenter believed would provide information and analysis related to the GEIS and 

requested that the NRC review the publications for potential use in preparing the final GEIS. 

The subjects of these publications include the long-term use of BORAL® in spent fuel storage 

pools, cost estimate for away-from-reactor spent fuel storage, corrosion considerations for 

ISFSIs in a marine environment, DTSs for spent fuel, and interim storage of GTCC LLW. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the references suggested by the comments. The NRC 

has considered these references and updated the GEIS as appropriate. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-------

D.2.38.18 – COMMENT: One commenter provided comments on the Spent Fuel Pool Study 

(NRC 2013l). The commenter noted that the study did not contain a relative risk comparison of 

pool storage with dry casks, did not ask whether pools or dry storage is safer, did not note that 

the Fukushima dry casks remained unscathed, did not contain an analysis of age degradation of 

the fuel and refueling cavity, and assumed that there is no risk to casks. The commenter stated 

that casks can be breached from a shaped charge. 

RESPONSE: Comments on the methodology or specific aspects of the NRC’s SECY-13-0112 

(NRC 2013l) are beyond the scope of this GEIS. Appendix E of the study responds to public 

comments on various aspects of the study. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-413 185(*௅

-4--4-

D.2.38.19 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed concern about the discussion of highburnup fuel, MOX fuel, and other types of spent fuel in the GEIS. In general, these commenters 

were concerned about the continued generation and storage of high-burnup fuel. Some of the 

comments were technical, whereas other comments were more policy-oriented. 

Commenters identified issues of a technical nature that they believe should be addressed in the 

GEIS. Commenters argued that the NRC did not provide an adequate analysis of high-burnup 

fuel, MOX fuel, or other spent fuel types in the GEIS. They cite technical differences between 

high-burnup fuel and low-burnup fuel (e.g., the effect of higher temperatures and greater 

radiation on spent fuel cladding). The commenters contended that limited data exists on highburnup fuel, including the amount and plant location of high-burnup fuel generated and stored 

nationwide. Commenters expressed concerns that MOX is sufficiently different from other fuel 

types and, therefore, needs specific impact evaluations in the GEIS. 

In addition, commenters were concerned that the GEIS does not describe how the NRC will 

monitor and provide aging management for the high-burnup fuel during the timeframes 

considered in the GEIS. Another commenter recommended that the NRC explain how new 

studies regarding high-burnup fuel will be considered in future licensing actions. Commenters 

also supported the feasibility of the safe storage of high-burnup fuel. Some of these 

commenters noted that the use of high-burnup fuel creates less spent fuel waste, which makes 

management easier. Some commenters provided detailed technical comments to support their 

arguments. 

Commenters also identified issues of a policy nature that they believe should be addressed in 

the GEIS. Some commenters requested that high-burnup spent fuel be removed from certain 

plants in high-population areas like Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, and Indian Point. Further, 

many commenters argued that a generic analysis of high-burnup fuel is not appropriate, given 

the site-specific issues raised in their comments, such as population density and the type of fuel 

utilized at a particular reactor site. Several commenters argued that the NRC should require the 

expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks and prohibit the continued production of 

high-burnup fuel until additional studies can be completed; others recommended the immediate 

certification of dry casks for high-burnup fuel and the return of spent fuel pool racks to a lowdensity configuration. These commenters noted that the NRC does not license the storage of 

high-burnup fuel for more than 20 years and has not approved a cask for the transportation of 

high-burnup fuel. Some commenters raised concerns related to costs associated with MOX fuel 

cycle (e.g., costs for reprocessing MOX). 

One commenter stated that Table S-3 does not cover MOX fuel use, although the Rule purports 

to cover it. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-414 September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

disagrees with the comments that high-burnup fuel, MOX and other types of fuels are not 

appropriately addressed in the GEIS. Chapter 2 of the GEIS discusses a variety of fuel types, 

including an explanation of what is considered within the scope of the GEIS. As explained in 

Chapter 2, the fuel types within scope are: (1) those fuel types that have been used in the past 

and continue to be stored under an NRC license; (2) fuel types that are presently used; and (3) 

fuel types for which the characteristics are similar to fuel used today, are well understood, and 

may be used in the near future. Uranium oxide fuel for light water reactors, including highburnup fuel, MOX fuel, and integral pressurized water reactor fuel all fall under the three fuel 

types discussed in Chapter 2. These reactor fuels are considered sufficiently similar following 

discharge from the reactor that separate environmental impact analyses for different fuel types 

are not necessary. Information on the characteristics of low-burnup, high-burnup and MOX 

fuels (e.g., radionuclide inventories and thermal outputs) has been added to the GEIS 

(Appendix I) to help clarify the similarities between these fuel types. 

The NRC agrees that high-burnup and MOX fuel are subject to increased degradation of the 

spent fuel and cladding that could cause further problems with handling, storing, and 

transporting spent fuel. However, the NRC disagrees that the technical capability to safely 

handle, store, and transport damaged or degraded spent fuel is not technically feasible nor 

considered in the GEIS (Specific concerns regarding handling of damaged fuel in dry casks are 

discussed in Section ' and specific concerns regarding transportation of high-burnup 

fuel are discussed in Section ' of this appendix. The comments reflect both the national 

and international interest in degradation mechanisms associated with spent fuel and more 

recently with high-burnup fuel. As described below, the NRC’s regulatory program provides 

regulations and ongoing research to ensure safe storage and timely identification of emerging 

issues related to spent fuel storage. 

NRC regulations for dry cask storage allow for a licensing period of up to 40 years for both initial 

and renewed licenses. Approval of storage casks for high-burnup fuel has been limited to 20 

years due to the more limited data available for high-burnup fuel. These storage times are 

sufficiently short and the degradation rates of spent fuel sufficiently slow that: (1) significant 

storage, handling, and transportation issues are not expected to arise during a single license 

period; and (2) should information collected during the a license period identify any emerging 

issues and concerns, there would be sufficient time to develop regulatory solutions. Comments 

did not raise concerns that the 20- or 40-year license period was too long nor was information 

provided that challenged the slow degradation rates of spent fuel relative to the 20- to 40-year 

licensing periods. 

Ongoing research into the extended storage of spent fuel is part of the NRC’s effort to 

continuously evaluate and update its safety regulations. The NRC is not aware of any 

deficiencies in its current regulations that would challenge the continued safe storage of spent 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

fuel in spent fuel pools or dry cask systems. As part of this effort, the NRC is examining the 

technical needs and potential changes to the regulatory framework that may be needed to 

continue licensing of spent fuel storage over periods beyond 120 years and in 2014 published: 

Identification and Prioritization of the Technical Information Needs Affecting Potential Regulation 

of Extended Storage and Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (NRC 2014e). This report 

considered high-burnup uranium oxide fuel and MOX fuel. International efforts are also 

evaluating degradation mechanisms affecting handling, storage and transportation of spent fuel 

(IAEA 2011b). Currently, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is leading a multi-year 

research project, the majority of which is funded by the DOE, to evaluate the safe storage of 

spent fuel in dry storage casks. EPRI will design and demonstrate dry cask technology at full 

scale for evaluating the condition of “high-burnup” spent fuel during storage. As research 

continues, if the NRC were to identify a concern with the safe storage of spent fuel, the NRC 

would evaluate the issue and take whatever action or make whatever change in its regulatory 

program necessary to protect public health and safety. 

To improve clarity regarding the NRC’s regulatory approach, Appendix B has been revised to 

include additional information on monitoring programs, aging management programs, and the 

collection of operational experience of storage. No changes were made to the Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

With respect to comments that requested policy and regulatory actions, these comments are not 

within the scope of the GEIS. Additionally, costs associated with activities not associated with 

continued storage (e.g., reprocessing of MOX) are not within the scope of the GEIS. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of the comments requesting policy and 

regulatory actions. 

The NRC disagrees with those comments stating the use of different fuel types at different sites 

precludes generic analysis. As described previously, the NRC has determined high-burnup and 

lower burnup fuel to be sufficiently similar that environmental impacts can be evaluated 

generically based on the assumptions and discussion provided in the GEIS. Further, the GEIS 

takes variations in population density into consideration as part of the analysis (e.g., Appendix F 

discusses the impacts of variations in the amount of spent fuel in the pool and the variation in 

impacts depending on population density), and these variations in site-specific population 

densities do not render a generic analysis invalid. See Section D.2.11.1 of this appendix for a 

broader discussion of the NRC’s bases for determining that a generic analysis of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage is possible and appropriate. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

A number of comments requested that the amount and plant location of high-burnup fuel 

generated and stored nationwide be provided in the GEIS. Information of this nature is not 

necessary to evaluate the environmental impacts of continued storage. However, in response 

to other comments about high-burnup fuel, additional information about high-burnup fuel, 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

including how it is licensed and transported, is provided in the GEIS as a new appendix 

(Appendix I). No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

Finally, with respect to the comment that Table S-3 does not cover MOX fuel activities covered 

by Table S-3 are outside the scope of the analyses of the direct and indirect impacts of the 

continued storage of spent fuel. Table S-3 covers impacts that are not caused by continued 

storage (see 6HFWLRQof the GEIS). The Rule codifies the results of the GEIS, which does 

address MOX fuel. See Section ' for a broader discussion of the relationship between 

Table S-3 and the Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

(23-----32------20--3) (211-1) (211-2) 

----------2-----3) 

----------2---1) 

-------12------44--3---

-3--3--------14--22--22-2) (341-1-13) 

---1--2--3) (423-2) (424--3) (431---

--3-14--14--14-------

--1--2-----1--1--1--

----1------3--3-14) 

-3----------------

-3----3------3-----22) 

-----------2--1--2--

1------------

---2------3----44) 

-----3--4--4--4--4--2-

-4--4--4--2--3--1----1--2-

-2--3----3--1--2----4--2-

-----3--2----

D.2.38.20 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the NRC has proposed reasonable 

assurance based on a Finding and an assumption that disposal is technically feasible and will 

have no environmental impact. Another commenter expressed support for the “Conclusions” in 

the GEIS and noted that the “Conclusions” mirror the structure of the NRC’s previous Waste 

Confidence Decision. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments supporting the GEIS and Rule, and 

disagrees with the comment’s assertion that the NRC has proposed a reasonable assurance 

finding based on assumptions. First, the conclusions in the GEIS and in the Federal Register

Notice are the result of extensive analysis by the NRC and other experts. See Appendix B for a 

detailed discussion of the technical feasibility of repository disposal and safe storage. Second, 

this proceeding does not analyze the potential environmental impacts of disposal and does not 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

rely on any disposal determination made in any other proceeding. NRC regulations and Section 

RIWKHAEA UHTXLUHWKH15&WRPDNHUHDVRQDEOHDVVXUDQFHILQGLQJVDVSDUWRILWV

safety review associated with licensing decisions. A future application for a spent fuel repository 

would be subject to a determination whether the applicant has demonstrated the requisite 

“reasonable assurance” as required by applicable regulations. However, a reasonable 

assurance finding regarding a disposal facility is not required—nor is such a determination 

made—in this proceeding, where the NRC is preparing a generic NEPA analysis that is not 

connected to the licensing of a disposal facility. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of these comments. 

(244-14-----

D.2.39 Comments Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Fires 

D.2.39.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that any consideration of spent fuel pool 

risks should address the volume of spent fuel stored in spent fuel pools, the lack of hydrogen 

mitigation and hardened vents, and the lack of redundant emergency makeup and cooling 

systems for spent fuel pools. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. Each of the 

issues identified could have an impact on the risk associated with spent fuel pool fires; however, 

the comment did not identify any deficiencies in Appendix F of the GEIS related to these issues. 

The NRC is reevaluating each of these issues in the context of lessons learned from the 

accident at Fukushima. Should this reevaluation identify any changes sufficiently beneficial to 

public health and safety, the NRC will take action through appropriate regulatory processes, as 

necessary. Any changes that may result would not alter the findings in the GEIS related to 

spent fuel pool fires. Should any changes be implemented, the changes would likely reduce the 

probability of a spent fuel pool fire occurring; reduce the consequence of a spent fuel pool fire, 

should one occur; or both. As a result, the risk of a spent fuel pool fire would be less than what 

was considered in the GEIS. 

More information about the activities associated with the ongoing evaluation of lessons learned 

from the accident at Fukushima can be found on the NRC’s website: 

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard.html. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--2--2--2) 

D.2.39.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concerns related to the potential for, 

and consequences of, a spent fuel pool fire. One commenter stated that the GEIS needed to 

consider the risk of spent fuel pool fires. One commenter stated that having spent fuel pools at 

a particular reactor site added additional potential sources for nuclear accidents, while another 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

stated that residents located near a spent fuel pool would have to live with the potential for 

VSHQWIXHOSRROILUHVIRUXSWR\HDUVDIWHURSHUDWLRQVFHDVH6RPHFRPPHQWHUVVWDWHGWKH

concern that spent fuel is “highly flammable” and would “burn spontaneously” if exposed to air. 

Other commenters asserted that the greater density of spent fuel stored in the pools has 

increased the risk of a fire. Several commenters stated that spent fuel pools are vulnerable to a 

variety of events that could cause a loss of cooling and subsequent fire in a spent fuel pool. 

Commenters also stated that spent fuel pool fires are more likely to have large releases of 

radioactivity due to the fact that spent fuel pools are located outside of reactor containments. 

Some commenters stated that the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire would be disastrous or 

a “national disaster of historic dimensions.” Similarly, some commenters stated that the 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire would be greater than the consequences of a reactor 

accident, with some commenters pointing specifically to the accidents at Three Mile Island, 

Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Several commenters asserted that the NRC had concluded in the 

GEIS that the risk of a spent fuel pool fire would be “inconsequential” because of the low 

probability of an occurrence. These commenters disagreed and stated that the enormous 

consequences of a fire, which could displace more than four million people, make any risk 

unacceptable, regardless of the probability. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The analysis 

of spent fuel pool fires in Appendix F of the GEIS is based on the NRC’s extensive evaluations 

of the risk and consequences of spent fuel pool fires and considers a range of credible initiating 

events that could lead to a spent fuel pool fire. 

The NRC agrees that the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire would be significant, but 

disagrees that the NRC had concluded that the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire would be 

“inconsequential” because of the risk. As described in Appendix F, a significant amount of 

radiation could be released in the event of a spent fuel pool fire. Further, the NRC agrees that 

the extent of contamination from a spent fuel pool fire could exceed that of a reactor accident at 

a given site, for reasons such as the amount of spent fuel in a pool compared to a reactor and 

the location of most spent fuel pools outside of a containment structure. However, because of 

factors such as the robust design of spent fuel pools and the range of credible events that could 

lead to a spent fuel pool fire, the probability of a spent fuel pool fire is significantly less than that 

of a reactor accident. When viewed in light of the extremely low probability of an event, the 

NRC has found that the environmental impacts from a spent fuel pool fire are SMALL during the 

short-term timeframe. While this finding is applicable for the entire short-term timeframe, it is 

important to note that the probability and, therefore, the risk of a spent fuel pool fire would 

decrease dramatically throughout the short-term timeframe as the spent fuel cools. 

The NRC disagrees with comments that characterize spent fuel as “highly flammable” or state 

that spent fuel would “burn spontaneously” if exposed to air, as use of these descriptions imply 

that the zirconium cladding of spent fuel would ignite immediately after being exposed to air. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

While spent fuel cladding could begin to oxidize rapidly (i.e., “burn”) during certain scenarios 

involving extended loss of spent fuel pool water, this would not occur until several hours after 

the fuel has been uncovered, assuming the event takes place at the beginning of the short-term 

timeframe. This distinction is important, because it allows operators time to re-establish cooling 

to the spent fuel pool and prevent a fire, or take actions to mitigate the consequences of a spent 

fuel pool fire, should one occur. Further, the time available until spent fuel cladding would begin 

to “burn” increases significantly after a few years of pool storage due to the decreased heat 

generated from fission product decay. This delayed onset would allow operators even more 

time to take the actions necessary to prevent, or mitigate a spent fuel pool fire. 

For the issue of high-density loading of spent fuel in a pool, the Commission has evaluated the 

risks of high-density loading in the context of expediting the transfer of spent fuel from a pool to 

an ISFSI as part of evaluating the lessons learned from the accident at Fukushima. For further 

discussion on this issue, refer to Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(23--20-4) (230----40--40------

-3---1--2------2---

---2--3-3) 

D.2.39.3 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC was knowingly covering up the 

potentially catastrophic outcome of a spent fuel pool fire and referenced the value of prompt 

fatalities presented in Table F-1 of this GEIS. The commenter asserted that the value in the 

table is unreasonably low. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The discussion in Appendix F of the 

GEIS presents the best available information of the risk and consequences of a spent fuel pool 

fire. The comment does not present any information that would challenge the estimate in 

Table F-1. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-23) 

D.2.39.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC’s evaluation of spent fuel 

pool fires is generally deficient or downplays the risk of fires, which could have catastrophic 

consequences, possibly displacing millions of people and imposing severe economic damage. 

Several commenters cited the NRC’s conclusion of a low probability of a spent fuel pool fire as 

the reason, in their opinion, that the NRC has downplayed or dismissed the issue of spent fuel 

pool fires. One commenter pointed to statements by the NRC conceding that the possibility of a 

zirconium fire occurring years after a final reactor shutdown cannot be dismissed. One 

commenter stated that the NRC’s analysis of fires and leaks is not what the Court of Appeals 

intended in New York v. NRC and is not in compliance with NEPA. One commenter took issue 

with the estimate from NUREG–15&EFLWHGLQWKH*(,6RIHDrly fatalities in 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-420 September 2014 

the event of a spent fuel pool fire, and stated that the conclusions in the GEIS regarding pool 

fires contradict conclusions found in other studies. Another commenter said that the GEIS 

underestimates the risk of pool fire, and ignores the safer alternative of HOSS at power plants. 

One commenter noted that over the course of the indefinite timeframe, an accident is all but 

inevitable, yet the NRC continues to consider the impacts of spent fuel pool fires low. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The evaluation of spent fuel pool fires in 

the GEIS is not deficient and does not downplay the risk of fires. As described in Appendix F, a 

significant amount of radiation could be released in the event of a spent fuel pool fire. 

Assessing the probability of a spent fuel pool fire in the analysis does not downplay or dismiss 

the results, but rather provides an appropriate context for a decisionmaker when considering the 

consequences of an event. The evaluation of spent fuel pool fires in the GEIS takes into 

account that a spent fuel pool could be in service during the entire short-term timeframe, and it 

therefore considers the possibility of a zirconium fire occurring years after a final reactor 

shutdown. The NRC disagrees that a spent fuel pool fire is all but inevitable over the indefinite 

timeframe. As described in Chapter 1 of the GEIS, spent fuel is expected to be removed from 

the spent fuel pool during the short-term timeframe. In addition, the NRC disagrees that the 

conclusions in the GEIS are contradicted by the two studies referenced in the comment. 

Neither study—one was an NRC study, the other cited consequence values from an NRC 

study—was intended to be used for a generic consideration of spent fuel pool risk. Further, 

neither study portrays a significantly different picture of the risk of spent fuel pool fires than the 

one contained in this GEIS. 

The NRC disagrees that the analysis in this GEIS of spent fuel pool fires and leaks is not what 

the Court of Appeals intended and is not in compliance with NEPA. The NRC believes that the 

analysis contained in the GEIS appropriately addresses the Court of Appeals’ concerns and is in 

compliance with NEPA, because the evaluation in Appendix F of the GEIS provides a clear and 

thorough discussion of the significant consequences that could occur in the event of an 

unmitigated spent fuel pool fire. 

For a discussion of HOSS, refer to Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(112---22--2--22--2--2--2---3-22) 

D.2.39.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided examples of reasons they felt the 

analysis of spent fuel pool fires in the GEIS was flawed and led to an underestimation of the 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. One commenter stated that the GEIS failed to comply 

wLWKWKH15&¶VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)52QHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDWWKH*(,6UHOLHVRQ

WKHVSHQWIXHOSRROVKDYLQJRQO\FRUHVLQWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROZKLOHVRPHVSHQWIXHOSRROVDUH

OLFHQVHGWRFRQWDLQXSWR6RPHFRPPHQWHUVVWDWHGWKDWWKH15C failed to properly 

consider a range of initiating events for spent fuel pool fires (e.g., cask drops, extreme weather 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-421 185(*௅

events, spent fuel pool collapse) and the linkage between reactor and spent fuel pool accidents. 

One commenter stated that the GEIS only considered atmospheric releases of noble gases and 

a small fraction of cesium. One commenter contended that the NRC underestimated the cost of 

cleanup because cleanup is a long and expensive job, is not modeled correctly, and there is no 

cleanup standard. One commenter stated that the NRC did not take into account building 

density and that increased building density leads to higher levels of contamination, which leads 

to higher radiological and economic costs. Several commenters suggested that the NRC should 

have aggregated spent fuel pool fire risk across all reactor sites, or cumulatively assessed risk 

across the entire short-term timeframe. Similarly, one commenter faulted the NRC for taking a 

reference reactor approach to analyzing consequences. Two commenters stated that the NRC 

potentially underestimated the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire because it did not account 

for sites with higher populations. Further, one commenter stated that the NRC did not account 

for the potential correlation between seismic risk and population density. This commenter 

stated that the NRC should either use a correlation coefficient to correct the frequency-weighted 

probabilities presented in Table F-2 of the GEIS, or calculate the collective dose risk and 

economic cost risk for each site to determine a new average consequence value. Commenters 

stated that the NRC ignored the potential for an attack on a spent fuel pool and did not consider 

the potential for the risk environment to deteriorate. Some commenters asserted that the GEIS 

DQDO\VLVRIHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVVKRXOGQRWEHOLPLWHGWRNPPLEHFDXVHWKHUPDO

plumes could carry radioactivity for hundreds of miles downwind. A commenter also questioned 

the actual probability of a spent fuel pool fire. One commenter stated that the NRC did not 

adequately account for the potential social, economic, and political upheaval that could occur in 

the event of a spent fuel pool fire. One commenter cited two studies, from Bayea et al. and from 

IRSN, as examples of how the NRC has underestimated the economic consequences of a 

spent fuel pool fire. One commenter cited results from SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) as support 

for the claim that the NRC underestimated the consequences in the GEIS. One commenter 

suggested, quoting language from New York v. NRC, that the NRC did not do a proper analysis 

of spent fuel pool fires because the consequences of a fire were not analyzed. The commenter 

suggested that the NRC was required to do so, unless it could conclude that the probability of 

the event occurring was “remote and speculative.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. As 

discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the NRC recognizes that there are 

uncertainties in the estimation of environmental impacts and that a variety of factors can affect 

the actual estimates at a given plant. The NRC also recognizes that a number of analyses have 

provided quantitative estimates of the potential impact of the spectrum of accidents that could 

occur at spent fuel pools. Several of these are discussed in Section 4.3 of the GEIS. The GEIS 

has been updated to include a discussion of recently published analyses (e.g., SECY-13-0112 

[NRC2013l]). The NRC notes that the determination of the impacts from a potential spent fuel 

pool accident involves consideration of both likelihood and consequence, and that the use of 

these estimates would require a consideration not only of the consequences reported in those 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-422 September 2014 

studies, but an evaluation of the relevance of those analyses to the purpose of the GEIS. As 

discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the NRC believes that use of the quantitative 

estimates from the reference plants in NUREG–15&b) and NUREG–15&

a), together with a discussion of the heterogeneity and uncertainty in factors that can 

significantly affect quantitative estimates and a reasoned evaluation of the extent to which these 

considerations would affect estimates of environmental impacts of spent fuel pool accidents, is a 

reasonable and adequate approach for evaluating environmental impacts. The NRC agrees 

that certain factors (e.g., population density, seismic risk, and spent fuel pool inventory) are both 

important to the estimation of environmental impacts and can vary across plants, and that other 

factors (e.g., the methodology used to quantify the cost and effectiveness of decontamination) 

are subject to uncertainties. Appendix F has been revised to include more discussion of these 

factors and their potential impacts on the quantitative estimates to ensure that these factors are 

fully disclosed and considered. 

The NRC disagrees that the GEIS fails to comply with the NRC’VUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5

7KHUHTXLUHPHQWVDW&)5DUHDSSOLFDEOHIRUHQWLWLHVVHHNLQJDOLFHQVHfor a nuclear 

power reactor manufacturing license and are not relevant to the assessment of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. 

Several comments noted that quantitative estimates were provided only for the area within 

km ( mi) of the plant. Section 4.3.3 of the NRC regulatory analysis guidelines (NUREG/BR-

15&f) explains that the NRC examines changes in public health and safety from 

radiation exposure and offsite property impacts from nuclear power plants over a NPPL) 

distance from the plant site, and these studies therefore reported impacts out to NPPL). 

The NRC recognizes that for large releases, aerosols can be transported long distances. The 

SRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRIWKLVSKHQRPHQRQLVGHVFULEHGLQ&KDSWHURISECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l). 

SHHIRUH[DPSOH7DEOHVDQGRISECY-13-0112, which show the difference between the 

amount of interdicted land and displaced individuals within NPPL) and for the entire 

modeling domain for a range of accidents, and FigXUHZKLFKVKRZVKRZLQGLYLGXDOFDQFHU

risks drop as a function of distance from the plant for different types of release magnitudes 

(NRC 2013l). Appendix F has been updated to expand the discussion of the potential distance 

over which impacts may be observed and how this would affect the quantitative estimates of 

environmental impacts. 

Several comments noted the possibility of a correlation between population density and seismic 

hazard. The NRC recognizes the calculation used to compute the frequency-weighted 

consequences is based on the assumption that these values are uncorrelated, and that the 

resulting number could be either higher (if they were positively correlated) or lower (if they were 

negatively correlated). However, the NRC does not know of the potential for a significant 

positive correlation between the population density and the seismic hazard for reactor sites in 

the United States that would significantly change the quantification of the frequency-weighted 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-423 185(*௅

environmental impacts, and therefore considers the approach of treating these variables as 

uncorrelated to be a reasonable approach. 

Several comments pertained to the potential for a concurrent reactor accident that would 

challenge the ability to prevent or mitigate a loss of pool cooling accident. As discussed in 

Section ' of this appendix, the NRC notes that the effect of concurrent reactor 

accidents, which is relevant to analyses of spent fuel pool fires at operating reactors, is 

considerably less significant to the continued storage impact analysis at permanently shutdown 

reactors. Concurrent reactor accidents are theoretically possible very shortly after final 

shutdown before removal of spent fuel or at multi-unit sites with decommissioning and operating 

units, but the NRC believes that the interactions between the reactor and the spent fuel pool 

described by the comments is less likely at locations covered by the scope of the GEIS than at 

an operating reactor spent fuel pool. 

Several comments requested analyses of an accident occurring anywhere in the United States, 

rather than the reference facility approach used in the GEIS. As discussed in Section '

of this appendix, the NRC believes that the reference facility approach used in the GEIS 

provides a reasonable and adequate generic consideration of the environmental impacts. 

Further, the NRC disagrees it should have aggregated spent fuel pool fire risk across all reactor 

sites, or cumulatively assessed risk across the entire short-term timeframe. For additional 

discussion as to why aggregating risk is inappropriate, see Section ' of this appendix. 

Finally, the NRC disagrees that it did not do an analysis of spent fuel pool fires consistent with 

the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The evaluation in Appendix F of the GEIS provides a clear and 

thorough discussion of the significant consequences that could occur in the event of an 

unmitigated spent fuel pool fire. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(30---2--2--2----2--2--2--1-

2-1--4------4--2--4-

---4-----1------2--2-

-3--1--2--1--3-

D.2.39.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC’s analysis of spent fuel pool 

fires in the GEIS is not bounding and is, therefore, deficient for its purposes. Commenters 

specifically stated that the analysis is not applicable for sites with high-population densities, 

such as Indian Point, and is only valid for the Surry site. Commenters stated that the NRC 

should either perform a bounding analysis, or conduct a site-specific analysis of spent fuel pool 

fire risk. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. As described in Appendix F, the 

primary basis for the NRC’s evaluation of spent fuel pool fires is NUREG–15&b). 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-424 September 2014 

As described in Section ' of this appendix, NUREG–ZDVGHYHORSHGDVDJHQHULF

analysis of spent fuel pool fire risk at decommissioning reactor sites and is therefore suitable for 

the conclusions in the GEIS. Because spent fuel pool fire risk during continued storage can be 

evaluated generically, a site-specific analysis is not necessary for the purposes of this GEIS. 

The analysis in Appendix F did not include a worst-case look at the consequences of a spent 

fuel pool fire based on the characteristics of every site, nor is such an analysis required by 

NEPA. The consequence results in Appendix F provide a reasonable representation of the 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire at a typical site. As described in Section ' of 

this appendix, the NRC has added discussion in Appendix F to describe the site-specific factors 

(e.g., population density) that may impact the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. However, 

the assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such 

that variances that may occur between sites are unlikely to result in environmental impact 

determinations greater than those presented in the GEIS. Therefore, the impact determination 

in Appendix F would apply at all sites. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-13------10) 

D.2.39.7 – COMMENT: The NRC received comments stating that spent fuel pool fire risk 

cannot be assessed generically, and that an impact determination of SMALL is unrelated to 

whether the NRC was certain of the risk at any plant. As support for their claim, commenters 

pointed to past instances where the NRC has generically ruled out determining an age beyond 

which spent fuel would no longer be susceptible to fires. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. In the GEIS, the NRC has provided its 

assessment of the probability and consequences of a spent fuel pool fire assuming that the risk 

persists throughout the short-term timeframe. Consistent with assumptions in NUREG–

(NRC 2001b), there is no assumption in the GEIS of a period of time following reactor shut 

down after which spent fuel is air-coolable and a spent fuel pool fire is not possible. Therefore, 

variations among plants that can affect when spent fuel may actually become air-coolable, 

which include factors such as the age of the spent fuel, fuel burnup, fuel type (i.e., PWR or 

BWR), and storage configurations do not affect the GEIS analysis of the probability and 

consequences of spent fuel pool fires. However, research sponsored by the NRC since 

publication of NUREG–15&b) does suggest that spent fuel pool fire risk is unlikely 

to persist beyond the first few years of continued storage in spent fuel pools. As discussed in 

Section ' of this appendix, the GEIS has been revised to explain the results of the more 

recent research and why the risk results presented in Appendix F of the GEIS are therefore 

conservative. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3-13) -3-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.39.8 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided examples of reasons they felt that the 

analysis of spent fuel pool fires in Appendix F was not applicable at the Indian Point or Diablo 

Canyon sites. Several commenters identified specific Indian Point-related issues they felt made 

the analysis in Appendix F inapplicable for Indian Point, including the following: 

x high-density spent fuel pool loading 

x seismicity concerns 

x use of high-burnup fuel 

x boron dilution events 

x presence of natural gas pipelines 

x higher population density 

x concerns about terrorism 

x concerns about the adequacy of emergency plans 

One commenter stated that the evaluation in Appendix F does not bound the impacts that could 

occur in the event of a spent fuel pool fire at Indian Point. Several commenters presented 

examples of impacts they believed could occur in the event of a spent fuel pool fire at Indian 

Point or Diablo Canyon. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The assumptions used in the analysis 

of spent fuel pool fires are conservative enough to bound the impacts such that variances that 

may occur between sites are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations larger 

than those presented in the GEIS. Therefore, the impact determination in the GEIS would apply 

at all sites, including Indian Point and Diablo Canyon. Several of the concerns raised relating to 

Indian Point (e.g., high-density spent fuel pool loading, the use of high-burnup fuel, and boron 

dilution events) are not unique to Indian Point and the comments do not make it clear how these 

factors would cause a spent fuel pool fire to be different at Indian Point than anywhere else. 

Relative to the presence of two natural gas pipelines on the Indian Point site, an evaluation of a 

simultaneous rupture and ignition of both pipelines determined that there would be no adverse 

effects on vital areas of the plant (NRC 2011h) and, therefore, would not result in a different 

impact determination in the GEIS. For the site-specific spent fuel pool consequence examples 

discussed, the comments do not identify any specific deficiency in the analytical approach used 

in the GEIS analysis. Further, it is not clear from the comments how the probability-weighted 

consequences would result in a different impact determination for either the Indian Point or 

Diablo Canyon site. 

For discussions regarding how site-specific variables (e.g., seismicity and population density) 

are accounted for in the GEIS, threats due to terrorism at Indian Point, and the adequacy of 

emergency plans, see Sections ', ', and D.2.44.2 of this appendix, respectively. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--1--1--1-------3-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.39.9 – COMMENT: Two commenters stated that the NRC should further discuss 

conservatisms in its evaluation of spent fuel pool fires. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part with these comments. While the NRC believes that the 

discussion in Appendix F sufficiently characterizes the conservative assumptions in NUREG–

15&b), additional discussion of the factors that can influence the outcome of a 

spent fuel pool fire is warranted. For additional discussion on the basis for selecting NUREG–

DVWKHSULPDU\WHFKQLFDOEDVLVIRUWKHDQDO\VLVLQ$SSHQGLx F, as well as a discussion of 

the changes being made in Appendix F to clarify the factors that could influence the 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire, see Section ' of this appendix. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--3-

D.2.39.10 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC should undertake additional 

analyses of spent fuel pool fire phenomena because the NRC “has not yet established a solid 

technical understanding of relevant phenomena.” In support of the claim, the commenter 

highlighted a statement from Dr. Dana Powers, a member of the Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards, in which Dr. Powers stated, “[...] the best use of available resources would 

be to assure that mitigation of partial drain events was assured and that complete drain events 

were highly improbable. This would obviate the need for a detailed understanding of accident 

phenomenology.” The commenter stated that a partial loss of water cannot be assured in many 

situations and that the probability of a partial or complete loss of water from a spent fuel pool is 

significant. Therefore, the commenter stated that because the consequences of a spent fuel 

pool fire are significant, the NRC should require low-density configurations of spent fuel and 

conduct a thorough investigation of spent fuel pool fire phenomena. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with this comment. The NRC 

agrees that accident progression modeling involves a number of complex technical phenomena 

and associated uncertainties. As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the NRC 

chose to develop its generic analysis of the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool fires by 

selecting a reasonable existing analysis to provide a basis for its quantitative estimates of the 

impacts, and then discuss any significant uncertainties and whether or how these uncertainties 

would affect the quantitative estimates provided in that analysis. While uncertainties remain, the 

assumptions used in the analysis are sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that 

variances that may occur as a result of these uncertainties are unlikely to result in environmental 

impact determinations greater than those presented in the GEIS. For example, because of the 

uncertainties associated with modeling accident progression phenomena, NUREG–15&

2001b) assumed that a fire would be initiated if the water level reached P3 ft) from the top 

of the spent fuel, and used the source terms from NUREG–15&WRHYDOXDWH

consequences. Use of the NUREG–VRXUFHWHUPLQNUREG–VHH$SSHQGL[%RI

NUREG–PHDQVWKDWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHHVWLPDWHVLQWKH*(,6DUHEDVHGRQD percent 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

release of radioiodine and radiocesium, the two radioisotope groups that contribute the most to 

offsite consequences. In addition, to address potential uncertainties in the source term, 

NUREG–FRPSXWHGFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUDPRGLILHGVRXUFHWHUPWKDWDVVXPHGD percent 

UHOHDVHIUDFWLRQIRUUXWKHQLXPDQG percent release fractions for lanthanum and cerium. The 

consequences from such a release are provided in Appendix F of the GEIS. 

However, the NRC disagrees with the assertion that the NRC “has not yet established a solid 

technical understanding of relevant phenomena.” $VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRISECY-13-0112 

(NRC 2013l), the NRC has spent decades researching and analyzing spent fuel pool fire 

phenomena and continues to undertake new studies and analyses. Following publication of 

NUREG–15&b), the NRC continued spent fuel pool accident research by applying 

best-estimate computer codes (i.e., MELCOR) to predict the severe accident progression 

following various postulated accident initiators. The computer code studies identified various 

modeling and phenomenological uncertainties that prompted a need for experimental 

confirmation of the models for both PWR and BWR spent fuel pools. These experimental 

programs were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories. The BWR experimental program 

ZDVFRQGXFWHGIURP$SULOXQWLO1RYHPEHU7KH3:5H[SHULPHQWDOSURJUDPLVpart of 

an international effort established with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 

Development with 13 countries participating. The main objective of the experimental work was 

to provide basic thermal-hydraulic data associated with a loss-of-coolant accident. The accident 

conditions of interest for the spent fuel pool were simulated in a full-scale prototypic fashion (i.e., 

electrically heated, prototypic assemblies in a prototypic spent fuel pool rack) so that the 

experimental results closely represent actual fuel assembly responses. A major impetus was to 

facilitate severe accident code validation and reduce modeling uncertainties within the MELCOR 

code. The NRC is currently engaged in various international activities related to the spent fuel 

pool draindown accident research. Although unnecessary to support the conclusions of the 

GEIS, the NRC notes that it is engaged in ongoing discussions with Sandia National Laboratory 

and the Paul Scherrer Institute (Switzerland) about the possibility of a model development 

activity to address the phenomena associated with nitriding. In addition, IRSN (France) is 

coordinating a study of partial draindown events, air ingress, and efficacy of sprays that involves 

a number of countries. 

For additional discussion on the issue of whether NRC should require expedited transfer to 

achieve low-density configurations of spent fuel, refer to Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2-13) 

D.2.39.11 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the NRC has dismissed the problem of 

spent fuel pool aging and deterioration by ignoring an NRC-sponsored report, NUREG/CR–

Copinger et el. 2012), which stated that as nuclear power plants age, aging-related 

degradation of spent fuel pools is occurring at an increasing rate. Instead, the commenter 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

VWDWHGWKDWWKH15&UHOLHGRQ3DVWXG\GRQH\HDUVDJREHIRUHDJLQJHIIHFWVZHUHEHLQJ

observed.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The information in NUREG/CR–

(Copinger et al. 2012) most relevant to the analyses in this GEIS includes the descriptions of 

spent fuel pool leaks and age-related concrete degradation. This information was cited 

throughout Appendix E of the GEIS. NUREG/CR–does not contain information about agerelated concrete degradation in spent fuel pools that would challenge the NRC’s evaluation of 

spent fuel pool fires. In addition, as discussed in the GEIS, NUREG–(NRC 2001b) 

represents the NRC’s best forward-looking judgment concerning spent fuel pool fire risk during 

the short-term storage timeframe. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

this comment. 

-2-24) 

D.2.39.12 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC inadequately considered the 

issue of a partial draining of the spent fuel pool in its consideration of spent fuel pool fires. 

Commenters stated that a partial draindown of a spent fuel pool would be a more limiting, worstcase scenario than a complete draindown, because the remaining water would block air flow in 

the spent fuel pool, thereby reducing, or eliminating the capability to air-cool the spent fuel. One 

commenter stated that the NRC acknowledged the greater risk of partial draindown in NUREG–

15&E$QRWKHUFRPPHQWHUFLWHGDUHSRUWIURPVWXGHQWVDW3HQQV\OYDQLD

State University as support that a partial drain of a spent fuel pool would be more likely than a 

complete draining of the pool. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. As 

described in Appendix F of the GEIS, a significant portion of the NRC’s analysis for spent fuel 

pool fires is derived from NUREG–15&b)—see Section ' of this appendix 

for a more extensive discussion of the basis for the selection of NUREG–$VWKH

comments point out, the effect of a partial draindown is to restrict airflow to the spent fuel. 

However, the presence of water above the spent fuel pool baseplate, but below the elevation 

where it would provide effective cooling, has both positive and negative effects for spent fuel 

pool zirconium fires relative to a complete draindown. The effects of restricted airflow were 

incorporated in NUREG–E\WKHILQGLQJWKDWDFULWHULRQRI“sufficient cooling to preclude a 

fire” cannot be defined on a generic basis. Therefore, NUREG–DVVXPHGWKDWDILUHZRXOG

be initiated if the water level reached P3 ft) above the top of the spent fuel (NRC 2001b). 

As the comments point out, restricted airflow prevents the development of natural circulation 

airflow patterns that would otherwise provide convective heat removal and, thus, remove decay 

heat from the fuel assemblies. It can also create an environment where hydrogen may be 

generated (and later combusted) due to the oxidation of zircaloy cladding in steam. However, 

for the same reasons, partial draindown limits the amount of air that can reach the zircaloy 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

cladding and cause a zirconium-air oxidation reaction, which is more exothermic than the 

zirconium-steam oxidation reaction. At the very high temperatures associated with zirconium 

fires, the major source of heat is the exothermic oxidation of the zircaloy cladding, not decay 

heat (see Appendix 1.A of NUREG–[NRC 2001b]). Figure 1A-2 of NUREG–

demonstrates the difference between air-cooled and adiabatic conditions for PWR fuel. In these 

calculations, adiabatic conditions means assuming that all decay heat generated in the spent 

fuel assemblies remains in the spent fuel assemblies, air does not take any heat away by 

convective heat removal and there is no radiation heat transfer. The adiabatic conditions in 

these calculations also assumed that no heat is added by air oxidation of the cladding (i.e., 

oxidation heat source). The inclusion of the oxidation heat source in the air-cooled calculations 

showed that heatup times are shorter than the adiabatic calculations for times up to 2 years 

after shutdown. In addition, at these very high temperatures, the major heat removal 

mechanism is radiative heat transfer, not convective heat transfer. Generally speaking, a partial 

draindown resulting in a water level just above the rack baseplate is more challenging during 

fuel heatup, but a complete draindown is more challenging during a zirconium fire. 

These phenomena can be observed from examination of some of the “small leak” cases studied 

in SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l). For the reasons stated above, some of the “small leak” cases 

studied in SECY-13-0112 could be more limiting than the partial draindown referred to by the 

comments, because the water drained at a rate where partially drained conditions were present 

during the fuel heatup, while fully drained conditions were present during the zirconium fire. 

This situation led to the largest radiological releases reported in that study. Nevertheless, the 

magnitude and timing of those radiological releases, as modeled in SECY-13-0112, were not 

significantly more severe than those estimated in the complete draindown situation in NUREG–

(NRC 2001b) (and other past studies), and in most cases examined were actually less 

severe. This is due to simplifying assumptions made in the past studies, which sought to 

conservatively account for uncertainties in un-modeled phenomena and variation among plants. 

In summary, the NRC agrees that partial draindown scenarios can be more challenging in 

certain respects. However, the NRC disagrees that the issue of partial draindown has not been 

addressed in the NRC’s analyses used to determine the potential environmental impacts of a 

severe accident in the GEIS. 

The NRC disagrees that the referenced report by students at Pennsylvania State University 

supports the conclusion that a partial loss of spent fuel pool coolant is more likely. That report 

attempts to validate spent fuel pool bundle heatup modeling in TRACE and makes no statement 

on the likelihood of a partial loss-of-coolant accident. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(2--13-----1--1--2----2-

D.2.39.13 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should have considered a scenario 

in which a station blackout leads to a spent fuel pool fire. In support of this position, the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-430 September 2014 

commenter pointed to a 2011 report from the office of then-Congressman Edward J. Markey, 

concluding that backup power supplies are not required if the reactor core is defueled. The 

commenter then stated that the time before the water in the spent fuel pool would heat up and 

boiloff would vary based on the amount of spent fuel offloaded and the time since shutdown 

before the spent fuel is transferred to the spent fuel pool. The commenter then asserted that 

once boiloff commenced, a boiloff accident would be similar to a partial draining of the spent fuel 

pool, in that airflow would be blocked, leading to a heatup of the spent fuel assemblies and 

eventual ignition. The commenter further stated that as water level in the spent fuel pool boiled 

off, mitigative actions by plant personnel (e.g., installing hoses for spray) could be precluded by 

the increase in temperature and radiation levels. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

recognizes that slow boiloff events can lead to an accident progression qualitatively similar to a 

partial draindown or slow draindown as discussed in Section ' of this appendix. The 

NRC also recognizes that the likelihood of boiloff events is different from the events initiated by 

a pool drainage because, in general, pool draindowns would be caused by structural failure of 

the pool and liner and boiloff events result from loss of pool cooling resulting in loss of water 

from boiling rather than drainage. NUREG–15&b) found that, given the industry 

decommissioning commitments and staff decommissioning assumptions, the likelihood of 

boiloffs from all causes was comparable to the likelihood of fuel uncovery from a cask drop or 

the likelihood of a seismically induced pool failure based on the EPRI seismic hazard estimates, 

and approximately an order of magnitude lower than the likelihood of a seismically induced pool 

failure based on the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory seismic hazard estimates. 

However, as the comments note, the time before the water in the spent fuel pool would heat up 

and boiloff would vary based on the decay power of the spent fuel in the pool. As the short-term 

WLPHIUDPHFRQVLGHUHGLQWKLV*(,6FDQODVWIRUXSWR\HDUVDIWHUthe licensed life for 

operations, the drop in decay power of the fuel would lead to a boiloff scenario that proceeds 

increasingly slowly with the passage of time. In general, the decay power is dominated by the 

most recently discharged fuel, as can be seen in comparison of a high- and low-density pool in 

6HFWLRQLQSECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l). The effect of the reduced decay power in 

increasing the time available for pool recovery is demonstrated in Table 2.1 of NUREG–

(NRC 2001b), which shows that the time until fuel uncovery ranges from at least 4 GD\VDW

days following shutdown to more than 22 days at 10 years following shutdown. As the spent 

fuel continues to cool following the permanent cessation of operation, the increasingly slow rate 

of boiloff that results renders pool recovery increasingly likely with the passage of time. The 

NRC agrees with the comments that the environment near a pool undergoing boiloff would 

make pool recovery challenging; however, since the pool is an unpressurized system, the water 

level can be recovered with fairly simple systems, and in contrast to large pool leaks resulting 

from structural failure of the spent fuel pool, large volumes of water would not be needed to 

make up for boiloff losses. In addition, the agency has implemented regulatory requirements at 

operating reactors to ensure proper heat-load management within the spent fuel pool, as part of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-431 185(*௅

the agency’s post-September 11, 2001 DFWLRQVODWHUFRGLILHGLQ&)5KK:KLOHWKH

UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5KKDUHQRWDSSOLFDEOHIRUVSHQWIXHOSRROVDWGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJ

reactors, the NRC is considering implementing similar requirements for decommissioning 

facilities as part of its Station Blackout Mitigation rulemaking (rulemaking docket NRC-2011-

)5$OWKRXJKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5KKGRQRWFXUUHQWO\DSSO\

for licensees of decommissioning facilities, many operating reactors licenses have license 

conditions that effectively require the same capabilities. Those conditions would remain in place 

after shutdown. 

The NRC has supplemented Appendix F with additional discussion of the potential for boiloff of 

the spent fuel pool during the short-term timeframe. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of this comment. 

-1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--

1--1--1-

D.2.39.14 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS does not address the plan, or 

lack thereof, of how to control a spent fuel pool fire. The commenter states that plans that 

include using fire hoses to cool the spent fuel in the pool will not work. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with this comment. A discussion of how to control a spent 

fuel pool fire is not relevant to the GEIS because the evaluation in the GEIS does not rely upon 

licensee action to control a spent fuel pool fire. Rather, the GEIS assumes, for the purpose of 

analysis, that a spent fuel pool fire does occur and offers an analysis of the consequences. 

Nonetheless, as stated in the GEIS, the NRC has found that mitigating strategies described in 

Section F.1.2 of the GEIS are effective strategies to prevent a spent fuel pool fire. As part of its 

ongoing Station Blackout Mitigation rulemaking, the NRC is considering requiring licensees of 

decommissioning reactors to develop strategies to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a 

loss of spent fuel pool cooling. Additional information on this rulemaking can be found at 

www.regulation.gov by searching docket number NRC-2011- )5. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-44) 

D.2.39.15 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments on the issue of how long spent 

fuel needs to cool in the pool before it is air-coolable. Some commenters stated that spent fuel 

is only susceptible to ignition in the event of a loss of water in the spent fuel pool for four months 

after the spent fuel is removed from the reactor, with one commenter citing the analysis in 

SECY-13-0112 as support for the comment. Another commenter noted that in the event of a 

partial draining of the spent fuel pool, airflow would be impeded, which would increase the time 

until the spent fuel is air-coolable. The commenter noted that SECY-13-0112 stated that spent 

fuel would be air-FRRODEOHDIWHUGD\VLQWKHHYHQWRIDFRPSOHWHORVVRIZDWHUEXWZDV
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-432 September 2014 

assumed to not be air-coolable in the event of a partial drain of a spent fuel pool for up to 

2 years after removal from the reactor. One commenter stated that even fuel older than the 

NRC has previously considered susceptible to ignition could ignite in the case of a partial 

draining of the spent fuel pool. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

recognizes that the spent fuel is only susceptible to ignition (i.e., runaway oxidation reaction) if 

the fuel is not air-coolable in the event of water loss. The NRC agrees that there may be 

scenarios where the fuel is air-coolable. For example, for the specific conditions analyzed in 

SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) (which are not generically applicable), the NRC found that the fuel 

was air-coolable (defined in that study as no runaway oxidation reaction [i.e., “fire“] ZLWKLQ

hours) at about 2 months after reactor shutdown. As the short-term timeframe considered in 

WKLV*(,6FDQODVWIRUXSWR\HDUVDIWHUILQDOVKXWGRZQWKHGURSLQGHcay power of the fuel 

makes air-coolability increasingly likely with the passage of time in the event of a complete loss 

of water. However, as discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the effect of partial 

draindowns that restrict airflow can result in degraded air cooling. As discussed in NUREG–

15&b), a criterion of “sufficient cooling to preclude a fire” has not been defined on a 

generic basis, although the NRC notes that it may be possible to define such a time based on a 

site-specific analysis. NUREG–DQGE\H[WHQVLRQWKH*(,6WKHUHIRUHDVVXPHGWKDWDILUH

would be initiated if the water level reached P3 ft) from the top of the spent fuel. The 

quantitative impact estimates in Appendix F are based on this assumption, with the range of 

quantitative impact estimates based on decay times of anywhere from 30 days to 10 years after 

final shutdown. The NRC has updated the discussion in Appendix F to include more discussion 

of the potential for coolability of the spent fuel pool during the short-term storage period. 

For beyond-design basis draindown events leading to complete drainage of the spent fuel pool in 

a relatively fast (e.g., hours) timeframe, the NRC expects (provided that adequate heat-load 

management practices are in effect), that the fuel in the pool can be air-coolable in a matter of 

months, or less. In this context, the term air-coolable describes the situation in which decay heat 

relative to passive heat removal mechanisms will not be capable of increasing the fuel’s 

temperature to the point that a runaway oxidation reaction can lead to a spent fuel pool zirconium 

fire. This analysis takes into account the regulatory requirements in place at operating reactors 

to ensure proper heat-load management within the spent fuel pool, as part of the agency’s postSeptember 11, 2001 DFWLRQVODWHUFRGLILHGLQ&)5KK:KLOHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI

&)5KKDUHQRWapplicable for spent fuel pools at decommissioning reactors, the NRC 

is considering implementing similar requirements for decommissioning facilities as part of its 

Station Blackout Mitigation rulemaking. Additional information on this rulemaking can be found 

at www.regulations.gov by searching docket number NRC-2011-$OWKRXJKWKH

UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5KKGRQRWFXUUHQWO\DSSO\IRUOLFHQVHHVRIGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJ

facilities, many operating reactors licenses have license conditions that effectively require the 

same capabilities. Those conditions would remain in place after shutdown. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-433 185(*௅

Alternately, as discussed further in Section ' of this appendix, much longer timeframes 

may be required to reach the point of passive coolability for partial draindown events that 

partially uncover the fuel, leading to a quasi-static water level above the spent fuel pool rack 

baseplate, but below the point at which adequate steam cooling occurs (a point sometimes 

attributed to roughly one-half of the fuel’s height for spent fuel pool applications). It is also 

important to note that once a zirconium fire is initiated, it is likely to “propagate,” meaning that 

the rate of heat addition to surrounding assemblies from radiative heat transfer (relative to the 

heat removal mechanisms in play) may cause those assemblies to heat up to the point where a 

runaway oxidation reaction is possible. Nevertheless, the magnitude and timing of those 

radiological releases, as discussed in Section ' of this appendix, were not significantly 

more severe than those estimated in the complete draindown situation in NUREG–(NRC 

2001b) (and other past studies) and in most cases examined were actually less severe. This is 

due to simplifying assumptions made in the past studies, which sought to conservatively 

account for uncertainties in un-modeled phenomena and variation among plants. In summary, 

the NRC continues to believe that the use of the quantitative results from NUREG–DUH

reasonable and adequate for the GEIS because those results are based on analyses that 

assume that a large radiological release will occur if the water drops to P3 ft) above the 

top of the fuel in the pool, thereby encompassing the effect of air-coolability, or the lack thereof, 

on estimates of environmental impacts from fires in spent fuel pools. 

The NRC has supplemented Appendix F with additional discussion of the potential for coolability 

of the spent fuel pool during the short-term timeframe. No changes were made to the Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(30-----1--1-11--2--13) 

D.2.39.16 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC failed to consider, as part of its 

evaluation of spent fuel pool fires, how fuel fragmentation, relocation, and dispersal would affect 

the progression of an accident in the spent fuel pool. Citing several studies, the commenter 

stated that fuel fragmentation and relocation start early during the life of a fuel rod in the reactor 

core. The commenter further stated that there is a greater potential for fuel relocation in higher 

burnup fuel rods. The commenter claimed that fuel could relocate to areas of rod deformation 

and be dispersed in the event of a rod burst or rupture. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

agrees that fuel fragmentation, relocation, and dispersal are not explicitly modeled in the spent 

fuel pool accident analyses upon which the GEIS is based. However, as discussed in Section 

' of this appendix, the NRC continues to believe that the use of the quantitative results 

from NUREG–15&b) are reasonable and adequate for the GEIS because they are 

based on analyses that assume that a large radiological release will occur if the water drops to 

within P3 ft) of the fuel in the pool, thereby encompassing the effect of fuel fragmentation, 

relocation, and dispersal on estimates of environmental impacts from fires in spent fuel pools. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-434 September 2014 

Although fuel dispersal is not explicitly modeled in the NRC’s spent fuel pool accident analyses 

to date, its potential effects are reasonably understood and are not expected to have a significant 

effect on the characterization of spent fuel pool zirconium fires in the GEIS. Although these 

phenomena are encompassed by the analysis in the GEIS, the NRC is providing additional 

discussion below to help interested members of the public better understand these phenomena. 

The immediate consequences of fuel dispersal are multiple. From a radiological standpoint, 

small, dispersed fuel particles could be entrained in the steam flow and cause a spread of 

radioactive particles away from the initial location of the damaged fuel assemblies (i.e., particle 

transport and possible aerosol transport). Particle dispersal also means the radionuclides are 

all transported in a similar manner—without regard to thermal or chemical volatility. From a 

thermal-hydraulic point of view, dispersed fuel changes the location of the source of heat. If 

dispersed fuel accumulates in one location, it can cause a large source of heat in a region that 

previously did not have one, or had a much smaller one. From a coolability point of view, 

dispersed fuel could create blockages in various areas in plant ventilation systems where it may 

be entrained. This is more likely with coarse particles than fine particles unless the latter 

agglomerate to form a particle bed. The extent to which the above phenomena can occur is 

under study, but is currently not known; nevertheless, it does not significantly change the NRC’s 

understanding of spent fuel pool zirconium fires for the reasons described below. 

For spent fuel pool accident analysis, the biggest expected effects are the characterization of 

gap release and the possibility of flow blockage at the top of the assembly. The term “gap 

release” refers to the release of radioactive material contained between the spent fuel cladding 

and the spent fuel pellets. The gap contains radioactive noble gas fission products and some 

volatile radionuclides. The amount of radioactive material in the gap is small compared to the 

amount in the fuel. The changes in offsite fission product release magnitudes from potential 

changes in the gap release would be small relative to the very large release magnitudes 

associated with a spent fuel pool zirconium fire. Separately, the NRC considered the effect of 

flow blockages at the top of fuel assemblies on the fuel heatup in a series of sensitivity 

FDOFXODWLRQVGRFXPHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQRISECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l), where the NUREG 

assumed that a reactor accident leads to a hydrogen explosion in the reactor building and 

IRUPDWLRQRIGHEULVRQWRSRIWKHDVVHPEOLHVDVVXPHGUHGXFHGIORZDUHDRI percent, thus 

increasing flow resistance). Though not directly representing assembly-exit flow blockage due 

to fuel dispersal, this analysis shows that other phenomena, and uncertainties associated with 

those phenomena (e.g., ingress of cooler air earlier during the accident), have a much larger 

effect on the accident response than flow blockage. Flow blockage affects convective heat 

transfer, but not radiative heat transfer. If flow blockage due to fuel dispersal were to be more 

important than other phenomena, the main effect would be to prolong when air-coolability might 

prevent a zirconium fire, but not to change the radiological releases of a zirconium fire. This is 

because the dominant heat removal mechanism during a zirconium fire is radiative heat 

transfer, rather than the convective heat transfer that dominates at lower temperatures when the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

fuel temperature is rising. Convective heat loses from the reaction zone are typically linearly 

dependent on temperature. At high temperatures in the reaction zone, the radiative losses are 

dependent on the fourth power of the surface temperature and, consequently, become much 

more efficient heat-loss processes. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

------------------

----

D.2.39.17 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC failed to account for other chemical 

reactions that could occur in a spent fuel pool fire. To support his claim, the commenter 

provided detailed technical discussions of the following chemical reactions: 

x zirconium hydriding 

x the boron carbide contained in the spent fuel racks 

x chemical interactions between zirconium and Inconel at “low temperatures” 

x chemical interactions between zircaloy and stainless steel at “low temperatures” 

x molten core concrete interaction in spent fuel pool accidents 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

agrees that accident progression modeling involves a number of complex technical phenomena, 

and that there can be uncertainties associated with modeling these phenomena. The NRC 

recognizes that the phenomena discussed in the comments are important for the realistic 

evaluation of the initiation and progression of spent fuel pool fires. The NRC has considered 

many of these phenomena in recent studies (e.g., SECY-13-0112 [NRC 2013l]) and in the 

development of the MELCOR code, and continues to stay abreast of technical work conducted 

to examine these phenomena. However, as discussed in Section ' of this appendix, 

the NRC continues to believe that the use of the quantitative results from NUREG–15&

2001b) are reasonable and adequate for the GEIS because they are based on analyses that 

assume that a large radiological release will occur if the water drops to within P3 ft) of the 

fuel in the pool, thereby encompassing the effect of these phenomena on estimates of 

environmental impacts from fires in spent fuel pools. 

Although these phenomena will, therefore, not affect the impact estimates in the GEIS, the NRC 

is providing a summary of its technical perspectives on several of the phenomena raised in the 

comments. The NRC agrees that zirconium hydriding of spent fuel cladding (i.e., hydrogen 

pickup) would occur as a spent fuel pool fire begins. However, hydrogen captured on the 

cladding by this reaction will be released as the fuel cladding melts. The main impact of this 

phenomenon is related to predicting hydrogen release during tests. Further research could be 

performed to characterize these effects and their potential impacts, but the effort does not 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

appear to be justified at this time because under severe accident conditions zirconium oxidation 

and the associated heat release and hydrogen generation are the dominant phenomena. 

Modeling hydrogen pickup has not been necessary to predict hydrogen release during 

degradation of irradiation fuel in tests such as those in the Phébus-FP program. Other chemical 

reactions cited in the comments could be studied in more detail to investigate their impacts. 

Nevertheless, inclusion of these reaction models within MELCOR was not necessary to 

adequately reproduce the empirical results from the zirconium fire experiments (see 

NUREG/CR–Lindgren and Durbin 2013). However, MELCOR does include a simplified 

boron carbide reaction model. Finally, as stated in the comments, molten core concrete 

interaction was considered in SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) and the limitations associated with 

modeling of molten core concrete interaction in spent fuel pool were documented. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--3--3--3--3-

D.2.39.18 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC did not address certain 

phenomena associated with zirconium fires in steam and air. To support this claim, the 

commenter provided detailed technical discussions of the following phenomena: 

x in a spent fuel pool boiloff accident, a zirconium fire could ignite in steam if fuel-cladding 

WHPSHUDWXUHVUHDFKHG&)

x in a spent fuel pool boiloff accident, a zirconium fire might not ignite in steam if fuel- cladding 

WHPSHUDWXUHVUHDFKHG&)RUJUHDWHU

x the PHEBUS %5WHVWKDGDORZLQLWLDOKHDWXSUDWHDQGDUDSLGIXHO-cladding temperature 

escalation at relatively low temperatures 

x in a spent fuel pool boiloff accident, a zirconium fire would most likely ignite in air if fuelFODGGLQJWHPSHUDWXUHVUHDFKHG&2°F) or lower 

x exothermic reactions in air: zirconium oxidation and zirconium nitriding 

x nitrogen accelerates the oxidation and degradation of zirconium fuel-cladding in air 

x the axial and radial propagation of a spent fuel pool fire 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

recognizes that the phenomena discussed in the comments are important to realistically 

evaluate the initiation and progression of spent fuel pool fires. The NRC has considered many 

of these phenomena in the MELCOR code and in recent studies (e.g., SECY-13-0112 [NRC 

2013l]). Based on current research, the NRC has concluded that it is reasonable to rely on the 

quantitative results from NUREG–15&b) for the GEIS because NUREG–

assumes that a large radiological release will occur if the water level drops to within P3 ft) 

of the fuel in the pool. This conservative assumption thereby encompasses the effect of the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

spent fuel oxidation phenomena discussed in the comments on estimates of environmental 

impacts from fires in spent fuel pools. Section F.1.1 of the GEIS has been revised to discuss 

the factors that can influence the size of the radiological release. 

As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the evaluation of the likelihood and 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire in the GEIS is based largely on NUREG–15&

2001b). The phenomena identified in the comments are unlikely to result in releases that are 

faster or larger than those assumed for the analyses in NUREG–7RDFFRXQWIRU

uncertainties of the type discussed by the comment, NUREG–FRQVHUYDWLYHO\DVVXPHG

that a fire would be initiated if the water level reached P3 ft) from the top of the spent fuel, 

and used the source terms from NUREG–15&WRHYDOXDWHFRQVHTXHQFHV$V

documented in Appendix 4B of NUREG– (NRC 2001b), use of the NUREG–VRXUFH

term means that the consequenFHHVWLPDWHVLQWKH*(,6DUHEDVHGRQD percent release of 

radioiodine and radiocesium, the two radioisotope groups that contribute the most to offsite 

consequences. In addition, to address potential uncertainties in the source term, NUREG–

computeGFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUDPRGLILHGVRXUFHWHUPWKDWDVVXPHGD percent release fraction 

IRUUXWKHQLXPDQG percent release fractions for lanthanum and cerium. The consequences 

from such a release are provided in Appendix F of the GEIS. The NRC believes that the 

phenomena discussed in comments would not significantly affect the estimates in the GEIS 

because the estimates in the GEIS are based on analyses that assume that spent fuel oxidation 

and a large radiological release will occur if the water level drops to within P3 ft) of the fuel 

in the pool. Because of these conservative assumptions, the analyses in NUREG–UHVXOW

in a faster and larger release than a more detailed model would predict. 

Although these phenomena do not affect the impact estimates in the GEIS, the NRC has 

summarized below its technical perspectives on several of the phenomena raised in the 

comments. Many of the comments are related to details of the analyses conducted in SECY13-0112 (NRC 2013l). As discussed above and in Section ' of this appendix, the GEIS 

is based on NUREG–15&b) rather than SECY-13-0112, and the specific details of 

the effect of these phenomena on the results of SECY-13-0112 are not addressed here. 

Contrary to the assertions in the comments, there is not a specific temperature peculiar to 

zirconium alloy cladding at which self-sustaining oxidation (i.e., “zirconium fire”) occurs. A selfsustaining zirconium fire will develop if the heat-generation rate from reaction with oxidant 

exceeds the heat-loss rate (heat losses include both convective and radiative losses) from the 

reaction zone. Because both heat generation and heat losses increase with temperature, no 

specific temperature defines whether a zirconium fire will occur. 

Although the phenomena of zirconium nitriding was not explicitly modeled in the NRC’s spent 

fuel pool fires analysis, the NRC believes such a model is not necessary for the purposes of this 

evaluation. Nitriding refers to the formation of zirconium nitride (ZrN) when zirconium cladding 

oxidizes at high temperatures in an air environment. As an additional heat source, nitriding is 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

only important in oxygen-starved situations, such as cases where the reactor building is intact 

during the zirconium fire. However, in such cases the releases are likely to be limited by the 

decontamination afforded by the intact reactor building, due to processes such as deposition 

and settling within the building before the radioactive aerosols are released into the 

environment. At higher oxygen potentials (e.g., in cases where the reactor building is not intact) 

the presence of any measurable amount of oxidant in the gas attacking the cladding is sufficient 

to prevent the formation of surface ZrN. Further, if ZrN does form it can be converted readily to 

ZrO2 when exposed to oxidant. The heat generation from the reaction of cladding to form ZrN 

followed by oxidation of the ZrN to form ZrO2 is essentially the same as the direct reaction of Zr 

to form ZrO2. This last reaction is taken into account in accident analysis codes. Detailed 

modeling of the current understanding of the microscopic effects of nitriding is not needed for 

the GEIS because simple empirical kinetics are sufficient to account for the effects and there is 

a sufficient data base of these empirical kinetics. The empirical modeling data base includes a 

substantial body of information on the breakaway phenomenon mentioned in comments. 

With respect to the findings in various tests cited in comments (i.e., CORA-RU3+(%86

%5), these phenomena are well understood and recognized in the formulations of models. 

With respect to zirconium fire propagation, the axial and radial heat transfer within fuel 

assemblies and between groups of fuel assemblies is modeled in severe accident codes (e.g., 

MELCOR) needed for accident progression analysis in a spent fuel pool. The code assessment 

against zirconium fire experiments conducted at Sandia National Laboratory and code-code 

comparison documented in NUREG/CR–DGGUHVVILUHpropagation phenomena (Lindgren 

and Durbin 2013). 

In summary, the NRC recognizes that the phenomena discussed in comments are important to 

realistically evaluate initiation and progression of spent fuel pool fires. The NRC has considered 

important phenomena in MELCOR and in recent studies (e.g., SECY-13-0112 [NRC 2013l]). 

Based on current research, the NRC has concluded that it is reasonable to rely on the 

quantitative results from NUREG–15&b) for the GEIS because NUREG–

assumes that a large radiological release will occur if the water level drops to within P3 ft) 

of the fuel in the pool. This conservative assumption thereby encompasses the spent fuel 

oxidation phenomena discussed in comments and would not substantively change the impact 

determinations in the GEIS. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--2--2--2--2--2--2--2--2-

-2--2--2--2--2--2--2--2-

3-2--2--2-

D.2.39.19 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the NRC failed to consider how hydrogen 

combustion would affect the progression of a spent fuel pool accident in its analysis of the 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. Citing various studies, the commenter stated that a 

reactor accident that leads to a hydrogen explosion in the reactor building of a BWR with a Mark 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

I or II containment could hamper workers’ efforts to mitigate accidents and potentially impede air 

cooling of the spent fuel in the event of loss of water in a spent fuel pool. Further, the 

commenter stated that a compromised reactor building could lead to an increase in zirconium 

oxidation due to an increase in oxygen in the reactor building, which would ultimately lead to an 

increased radiological release from a spent fuel pool fire. The commenter stated that MELCOR 

does not consider hydrogen explosions that could occur when hydrogen concentrations are less 

than 10 percent, even though a hydrogen explosion occurred at Three Mile Island Unit 2 when 

WKHK\GURJHQFRQFHQWUDWLRQLQWKHFRQWDLQPHQWZDVSHUFHQW,QDGGLWLRQWKHFRPPHQWHU

stated that even though spent fuel pools for PWRs and BWRs with Mark III containments are 

less susceptible to hydrogen explosions in the reactor building, they would still be susceptible in 

the event of a spent fuel pool fire, due to the large amounts of hydrogen that would be 

generated. The commenter stated that a hydrogen explosion under those circumstances would 

result in a release of radiation that could exceed the amount released during the Chernobyl 

accident. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC acknowledges that 

uncertainties exist in accident progression modeling. However, in the risk-based analysis that 

the NRC performed for accidents in the GEIS, these uncertainties are relevant only to the extent 

that they affect the risk of a spent fuel pool fire, determined by the likelihood of a radiological 

release as well as its consequences. The GEIS is based largely on NUREG–(NRC 

2001b) for the evaluation of the likelihood and consequences of a spent pool fire. Because of 

the uncertainties associated with modeling accident progression phenomena of the type 

discussed in the comments, NUREG–DVVXPHGWKDWDILUHZRXOGEHLQLWLDWHGLIWKHZDWHU

level reached P3 ft) from the top of the spent fuel, and used the source terms from 

NUREG–15&WRHYDOXDWHFRQVHTXHQFHV7KH15&FRQWLQXHVWREHOLHYHWKDWWKH

use of the quantitative results from NUREG– are reasonable and adequate for the GEIS 

because those results are based on analyses that assume that a large radiological release will 

occur if the water drops to P3 ft) above the top of the fuel in the pool, thereby 

encompassing the effect of hydrogen combustion on estimates of environmental impacts from 

fires in spent fuel pools. 

Although the NRC has not, in preparing the GEIS, relied upon the analysis or findings in SECY13-0112 (NRC 2013l), the NRC has verified that SECY-13-0112 does not contradict the impact 

determinations in the GEIS. SECY-13-0112 discusses the impact that a hydrogen combustion 

event could have on onsite DFFLGHQWPDQDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHVHJ6HFWLRQ in SECY-13-

0112), and (1) specifically analyzes cases where onsite accident management is unsuccessful 

at mitigating the accident, (2) explores the potential for damage to the spent fuel pool if a 

hydrogHQFRPEXVWLRQHYHQWFDXVHGE\DFRQFXUUHQWUHDFWRUDFFLGHQWRFFXUV6HFWLRQDQG

(3) explores the uncertainty in MELCOR’VK\GURJHQFRPEXVWLRQPRGHOLQJ6HFWLRQ15&

2013l). Some of the scenarios studied in SECY-13-0112 do lead to very large radiological 

releases due to hydrogen combustion events damaging the reactor building and creating 

additional air ingress. Nevertheless, the magnitude and timing of those radiological releases, as 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-440 September 2014 

modeled in SECY-13-0112, were not significantly more severe than those estimated in the 

complete draindown situation in NUREG–(NRC 2001b) (and other past studies), and in 

most cases were actually less severe. This is because earlier studies used simplifying 

assumptions to conservatively account for uncertainties in un-modeled phenomena and 

variation among plants. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-----------------

---21) 

D.2.39.20 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the NRC’s evaluation of spent fuel 

pool fires is deficient because the NRC should have examined “alloying, accidental alloying, or 

alloying at the surface” of zirconium cladding as a condition in which zirconium could begin 

reacting with oxygen and air at a much faster rate. The commenter also suggested that this 

“higher rate of fire” may have occurred during the Fukushima accident. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees that the GEIS should have considered an accident caused by 

unspecified “alloying” phenomena. The NRC is not aware of any alloying phenomena that 

would occur as a result of draining a spent fuel pool and exposing spent fuel to air. The 

phenomena considered in the GEIS is rapid oxidation of zirconium cladding in air, which is 

referred to as a spent fuel pool fire. There was no spent fuel pool fire during the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi accident in March 2011. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

(30-14-4) 

D.2.39.21 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the risk of spent fuel fires is 

demonstrated by the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi facility in Japan following the 2011 

earthquake and tsunami. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The accidents at Fukushima resulted 

in extensive damage to the reactors, but did not result in spent fuel pool fires. As discussed in 

Appendix F of the GEIS, analyses and inspections performed subsequent to the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi accident confirmed that all of the spent fuel pools remained structurally intact without a 

significant loss of water. Further, the water volume in the spent fuel pools was sufficient to 

maintain the temperature of the spent fuel, despite the loss of spent fuel cooling for several 

days. Thus, the substantial release of radioactive material from the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors 

resulted from severe accidents involving the reactors, rather than a fire in one or more of the 

spent fuel pools. Accordingly, the accident analysis in the GEIS was not changed as a result of 

the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. While the accident at Fukushima did not result in a spent fuel 

pool fire, the NRC has taken significant action to enhance the safety of reactors in the United 

States based on the lessons learned from that accident. Additional information on the NRC’s 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-441 185(*௅

response to the accident at Fukushima can be found in Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-2---1--4---2-23) 

D.2.39.22 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC improperly accounted for 

the successful evacuation of the surrounding population in its evaluation of the consequences of 

a spent fuel pool fire. Specifically, commenters noted that exemptions to emergency planning 

UHTXLUHPHQWVKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\EHHQJUDQWHGZLWKLQWRPRQWKVDIWHUILQDOUHDFWRUVKXWGRZQ

The commenters asked how populations can be evacuated if emergency planning requirements 

are dismantled. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The evaluation of spent fuel pool fires in 

the GEIS did not improperly credit a successful evacuation. As described in Appendix F, the 

consequence values presented in Table F-1 represent the late evacuation (i.e., an evacuation 

that is not complete before the postulated release occurs) RISHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQZLWKLQ

 km (10 PL7KHYDOXHRISHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQHYDFXDWLQJZDVXVHGLQWKHNUREG–

(NRC 2001b) analyses to address concerns that the fraction of the population that does 

QRWHYDFXDWHLQDQHYHQWFRXOGEHKLJKHU7KHXVHRIWKHSHUFHQWHVWLPDWHGLIIHUVIURPWKH

NRC’VEHVWHVWLPDWHRISHUFHQWZLWKLQ km (10 mi). The inclusion of the late-evacuation 

consequences represents the potential consequences from an event occurring early in the 

short-term timeframe, when the time-to-release would be at its shortest. While the NRC has not 

made a generic determination as to how long after the fuel has been removed from the reactor 

until the time-to-release would be long enough to allow for an evacuation, this transition would 

occur relatively early in the short-term timeframe. This is because time-to-release is directly 

related to the decay heat generated by the spent fuel, which decreases significantly as the time 

since its removal from the reactor increases. As a result, the use of values in Table F-2 that 

DVVXPHDODWHHYDFXDWLRQRISHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQUHSUHVHQWVDUHDVRQDEOH

representation of the consequences that could occur in the event of a spent fuel pool fire in the 

short-term timeframe. 

For the NRC’s response concerning the granting of exemptions to emergency planning 

requirements, see Section D.2.44.3 of this appendix. The NRC’s site-specific process for 

granting exemptions from emergency planning requirements described in Section D.2.44.3 of 

this appendix is appropriately reflected in the consequence results presented in Appendix F of 

WKH*(,67KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIDODWHHYDFXDWLRQRISHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRn 

is consistent with the lack of a pre-planned emergency plan and the use of ad hoc measures. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(2----2) (410---2-------10) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-442 September 2014 

D.2.39.23 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC relied heavily on NUREG–

LQLWVHYDOXDWLRQRIVSHQWIXHOSRROILUHVLQWKH*(,6ZLWKRXWDFNQRZOHGJLQJRUDGGUHVVLQJ

the limitations of NUREG–7KHFRPPHQWHUVSRLQWHGWRYDULRXVVWDWHPHQWVLQ185EG–

LQGLFDWLQJWKDWFHUWDLQDVVXPSWLRQVPD\RUVKRXOGEHYDOLGDWHGRQDVLWH-specific basis to 

argue that the NRC should perform site-specific reviews. Issues the commenters identified 

included the contribution of seismic events to loss of offsite power and internal fire frequencies, 

calculation of failure frequencies for non-single failure-proof crane systems, and the possibility 

of air cooling in the event of a loss of power caused by a severe weather event. One 

commenter stated that the NRC needs to provide additional information in Appendix F of the 

GEIS to identify spent fuel pools that do not meet an assumption or condition included in the 

GEIS, or its supporting documents, as well as information related to risk and measures to 

reduce risk. Specifically, the commenter noted that the plants that have the highest and lowest 

seismic risk were not identified in the range of seismic risk that was discussed in NUREG–

In addition, the commenter noted that the GEIS does not discuss differences in population 

density between sites, or calculate the effect those differences would have on the consequence 

calculations. The commenter also stated that the NRC should identify the changes that have 

been implemented since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident, quantify the reduction in risk that has been achieved by each change, and identify 

which reactor plants have implemented those measures. 

Commenters also questioned the validity of the Industry Decommissioning Commitments and 

Staff Decommissioning Assumptions identified in NUREG–ERWKJHQHUDOO\DQGVSHFLILFDOO\

for spent fuel pool drainage pathways. For all issues identified, the commenters stated that the 

NRC should provide additional information. For the Industry Decommissioning Commitments 

and Staff Decommissioning Assumptions, the commenters stated that a list of reactor plants 

that do not meet the criteria outlined in NUREG–VKRXOGEHLQFOXGHGDVshould a 

discussion of the consequences of not meeting those criteria. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The NRC 

chose to develop its generic analysis for spent fuel pool fires by selecting NUREG–(NRC 

2001b) as the principle basis for its quantitative estimates of the impacts, and then discuss any 

significant uncertainties and how these uncertainties would affect those estimates. The NRC 

chose NUREG– for this purpose in the GEIS because the following features are particularly 

relevant to the spent fuel pool severe accident analysis of the GEIS: 

x NUREG–ZDVGHYHORSHGIRUUHDFWRUVGXULQJGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJUDWKHUWKDQRSHUDWLQJ

reactors, and thus analyzes the earliest and highest-risk period of the short-term timeframe 

considered in the GEIS. 

x NUREG–DQDO\zes a wide variety of initiating events. 

x NUREG–ZDVGHYHORSHGDVDJHQHULFDQDO\VLVE\IRUH[DPSOHFRQVLGHULQJ

geographic variation in seismic hazard (see Figure 3.2 of NUREG–) and by performing 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D-443 185(*௅

sensitivity studies to examine the effects of variation in site-specific factors such as 

population density. 

x NUREG–UHIHUHQFHVSUHFHGLQJVWXGLHVRIVSHQWIXHOSRROULVNVDQGFRPSDUHVWKH

results, thereby serving as a valuable update to earlier spent fuel pool risk studies. 

x NUREG–KDVUHFHLYHGH[WHQVLYHSHHUWHFKQLFDOUHYLHZDQGSXEOLFFRPPHQW

x NUREG–SURYLGHVTXDQWLWDWLYHHVWLPDWHVDWDUHIHUHQFHUHDFWRUVLWHi.e., Surry Power 

Station), for which information on the impacts of potential reactor accidents is also available, 

allowing a comparison of the impacts of potential pool and reactor accidents. 

None of the more recent studies (e.g., the security studies or the spent fuel pool consequence 

study documented in SECY-13-0112 [NRC 2013l]) have these features needed to support a 

generic analysis of continued storage. However, the security studies and SECY-13-0112 were 

reviewed to ensure consistency with the analyses in NUREG–DQGWKHGEIS, and to 

ensure that no new, significant information might call into question the determination of a 

SMALL impact in the GEIS. In addition, the NRC reviewed the analysis in COMSECY–13–0030 

(NRC 2013n), which analyzed spent fuel pool fire risk to determine whether the NRC should 

conduct additional research on whether to require reactor licensees to accelerate transfer of 

older, colder spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry cask storage. Because COMSECY–13–

0030 was drafted to satisfy a limited purpose, did not contain a NEPA analysis, and was not 

intended to satisfy the NRC’s NEPA obligation, the results of the study are not an appropriate 

technical basis for the generic consequence analysis in Appendix F of this GEIS. 

The values in NUREG– (NRC 2001b), and by extension the GEIS, do not represent worstcase values. The impact determination for a spent fuel pool accident involves analysis of both 

likelihood and consequence, and factors at any particular plant may tend to increase or 

decrease either the likelihood or the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. The NRC elected 

to provide the quantitative estimates from the reference plants in NUREG– and NUREG–

 15&D, and then explain qualitatively the factors that may cause the risk to be lower 

or higher than the selected reference plants. For example, as several of the comments note, 

factors such as population density or amount of source term released will affect both health and 

economic impacts, as discussed in Section F.1.1 of the GEIS. The NRC agrees with the 

comments that additional discussion of the factors that may impact the consequences of a spent 

fuel pool fire is warranted and has updated the discussion in Appendix F to more clearly explain 

how the uncertainties in the analyses supporting Appendix F, and the variability among reactor 

sites, may affect the estimates of health and economic impacts presented in Tables F-1 and 

F-2. However, the NRC notes that many, but not all, of these variables (e.g., population density 

and per-capita wealth) would also affect the quantification of reactor accident impact similarly. 

As a result, the comparison of the impacts from a pool fire to a severe reactor accident used as 

the basis for the impact determination of SMALL is expected to remain valid. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D-444 September 2014 

The NRC disagrees with comments that question the generic validity of the industry 

decommissioning commitments and staff decommissioning assumptions in NUREG– (NRC 

2001b). The NRC agrees that the quantitative estimates in Tables F-1 and F-2 are dependent 

on the assumptions and commitments spelled out in NUREG–EHLQJPHWDQGKDVUHYLVHG

Appendix F to note this fact. As discussed in draft ISG NSIR/DPR-ISG-02 (NRC 2013t), a 

licensee must address industry decommissioning commitments and staff decommissioning 

assumptions in its FSAR before being granted an exemption from emergency planning 

requirements after shutdown (see Section D.2.44.3 of this appendix for additional discussion on 

exemptions from emergency planning requirements). While the ISG is not yet final, it explains 

how the NRC intends to approach these exemption requests. Because licensees have an 

incentive to request reductions from emergency planning requirements, it is reasonable to 

assume that the industry decommissioning commitments and staff decommissioning 

assumptions will be met during the period of continued storage. 

Several comments questioned the basis for the frequency of fuel uncovery due to cask drops. 

Appendix 2C of NUREG– (NRC 2001b) provides a detailed assessment of the likelihood of 

fuel uncovery at plants with single-failure-SURRIV\VWHPVDQGDVVXPHV6'$WKDWSODQWV

without single-failure-proof systems would achieve accident frequencies comparable to singlefailure-proof systems. This was based on an industry commitment (IDC#1) that future 

decommissioning plants will comply with Phases I and II of the NUREG–15&

guidelines, including performing a load drop analysis for plants that do not upgrade to singlefailure-proof systems. The NRC recognizes that while the benefit of a load drop analysis may 

be significant, it is unquantified, as described in Appendix 2C. If a load drop analysis were not 

performed or acted upon, it could result in the probability of pool drainage due to cask drop 

being higher than, and therefore no longer bounded by, a seismic event. The consequences of 

fuel uncovery from either a cask drop or a seismic event could be comparable. The NRC 

believes that it is reasonable to use impact estimates based on these commitments and 

assumptions for a generic analysis, because the conditions needed to meet these commitments 

have been clearly identified and considered reasonable at the time that NUREG–ZDV

published, and the NRC is not aware of any new information that would invalidate these 

assumptions. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-13--4----3--3--1--3--4--3-

-4--4--4--4----4----3---

-3-

D.2.39.24 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the MELCOR code, used by the NRC 

in modeling severe accidents, was deficient and could under-predict the severity of a spent fuel 

pool fire. The NRC is interpreting these comments to mean that the commenters believe that 

the GEIS is deficient because it relied on studies that used the MELCOR code. One commenter 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

provided detailed technical comments in the following subject areas related MELCOR to support 

the position: 

x MELCOR does not model the exothermic zirconium-nitrogen reaction 

x MELCOR does not model how nitrogen accelerates the oxidation and degradation of 

zirconium fuel-cladding in air 

x The NRC’s recent post-Fukushima MELCOR simulations are non-conservative 

x Recent Sandia National Laboratory spent fuel pool accident experiments are unrealistic 

because they were conducted with clean, non-oxidized cladding 

One commenter stated that MELCOR was not valid for modeling spent fuel pool fires because 

of the way it modeled heat transfer. Several commenters stated that MELCOR does not 

appropriately model spent fuel rod deformation and bursting that could occur in an accident 

scenario, which, they state, could accelerate the rate of zirconium oxidation. One commenter 

pointed to experimental data that seemed to indicate that MELCOR under-predicts the 

zirconium-steam reaction rates that would occur in a spent fuel pool accident. Specifically, the 

commenter pointed to studies that indicated that (1) oxidation models are not able to predict the 

fuel-cladding temperature escalation that commenced at “low temperatures” in the PHEBUS 

%5WHVWDQG (2) “low temperature” oxidation rates are under-predicted for the CORA-

experiment. One commenter was doubtful that MELCOR “simulates how local heavy oxide 

and/or crud layers would partly impede the local steam or air ‘coolant’ flow through the spent 

fuel assemblies in a spent fuel pool boiloff accident or complete spent fuel pool LOCA [loss-ofcooling accident], respectively.” One commenter stated that MELCOR failed to account for 

phenomena such as zirconium hydriding. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The quantitative estimates in the 

GEIS are not based on MELCOR analyses, although the results of the more recent studies 

conducted using MELCOR are consistent with the earlier studies discussed in NUREG–

(2001b). The NRC recognizes that the phenomena discussed in comments are important for 

the realistic evaluation of the initiation and progression of spent fuel pool fires. The NRC has 

considered many of these phenomena in recent studies, such as SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) 

and in the development of the MELCOR code, and continues to stay abreast of technical work 

conducted to examine such phenomena. However, the NRC continues to believe that the use 

of the quantitative results from NUREG–DUHUHDVRQDEOHDQGDGHTXDWHIRUWKH*(,6

because they are based on analyses that assume that a large radiological release will occur if 

the water drops to P3 ft) above the top of the fuel in the pool, thereby encompassing the 

effect of these phenomena on estimates of environmental impacts from fires in spent fuel pools. 

Neither the MELCOR code, nor the recent Sandia National Laboratory spent fuel pool accident 

experiments were used to estimate the impacts documented in the GEIS. The NRC believes 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

that the topics identified in comments would not significantly affect the quantitative estimates in 

the GEIS because they are based on NUREG–15&b). Because of the 

uncertainties associated with modeling accident progression phenomena of the type discussed 

in comments, NUREG–DVVXPHGWKDWDILUHZRXOGEHLQLWLDWHGLIWKHZDWHUOHYHOUHDFKHG

 m (3 ft) from the top of the spent fuel, and used the source terms from NUREG–15&

WRHYDOXDWHFRQVHTXHQFHV'XULQJWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRISECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l), NRC 

reviewed the ongoing work to determine whether there would be significant new information that 

could affect the conclusions in the GEIS. Appendix F has been updated to discuss how the 

results of SECY-13-0112 are relevant to the evaluation of the environmental impacts from spent 

fuel pool fires in the GEIS. Because these results are consistent with earlier studies, NRC 

concludes that it is reasonable that the finding of SMALL environmental impacts remains valid 

due to the low frequency of these events, despite their potentially large consequences. 

Although the comments related to the use of MELCOR and SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) are 

outside the scope of the analysis in the GEIS and Rule, the NRC is providing this discussion to 

respond to some of the concerns raised by comments regarding MELCOR and SECY-13-0112. 

MELCOR is the NRC’s best-estimate tool for severe accidents analysis and has been validated 

against experimental data. No intentional conservatism was introduced in the MELCOR 

accident progression analysis in SECY-13-0112. SECY-13-0112 contained many sensitivity 

calculations where there are uncertainties in some model parameters (e.g., hydrogen 

combustion). The development of the MELCOR models for SECY-13-0112 was based on 

validation of MELCOR against the BWR zirconium fire experiments as documented in 

NUREG/CR–Lindgren and Durbin 2013). Detailed explanations on the basis of the 

SECY-13-0112 MELCOR models are provided in Appendix E of that study. The Sandia 

zirconium fire experiments were integral tests that not only took advantage of the new airoxidation modeling in MELCOR that was required for correct prediction of the onset of ignition, 

but also looked at other important phenomena including the hydraulic resistance of fuel 

assemblies, the effect of oxide layer thickness on surface emissivity, and radiation heat transfer 

between fuel rods and, radially, between fuel assemblies across the rack. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--3--3--3--3--3--3--3--

3--3--3--3--3-22-3--3--3--3-

-3--3--3--2--4---------12) 

------------------

---------2--2--2-

D.2.39.25 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the analysis of spent fuel pool fires in 

Appendix F of the GEIS does not comply with NEPA because many operators of reactor plants 

have not submitted license amendment requests to adopt National Fire Protection Association 

6WDQGDUGPerformance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Generating Plants. The commenter stated that the use of probabilistic fire-protection analysis is 

not allowed without a license amendment and associated opportunity for hearing. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW15&UHJXODWLRQVDW&)5F

allow licensees to adopt the performance-based fire-protection programs based on the National 

Fire PrRWHFWLRQ$VVRFLDWLRQ6WDQGDUG (NFPA . Adoption of this standard is voluntary 

and licensees may choose to maintain existing fire-protection programs based on the 

deterministic requirements against which the plant was originally licensed. As part of 

implementing a performance-based fire-protection program, a licensee would develop a 

probabilistic risk assessment tailored to gain risk information relevant to its fire-protection 

program. The evaluation of spent fuel pool fires in Appendix F cannot be used as the basis for 

implementing fire-SURWHFWLRQSURJUDPVFRPSOLDQWZLWK&)5FZKLFKFDQRQO\EHGRQH

through a site-specific license amendment. No similar license amendment is required for the 

NRC’s evaluation of spent fuel pool fires during the short-term timeframe. Further, the voluntary 

implementation of a fire-protection program based on National Fire Protection Association 

6WDQGDUGZRXOGQRWKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHHYDOXDWLRQDQGLVQRW

required under NEPA. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.39.26 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated their agreement with a 2003 paper, 

“Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States,” (Alvarez et 

al. 2003), which examined risks associated with spent fuel pools and was co-authored by 

Chairman Macfarlane. Commenters supported the paper’s recommendation of requiring the 

expedited transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry casks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC reviewed and responded to the 2003 paper at the time it was published. 

In a fact sheet detailing its response, the NRC stated that: 

“In summary, we conclude that the authors’ assessment of possible spent fuel pool accidents 

stemming from potential terrorist attacks does not address such events in a realistic manner. In 

many cases, the authors rely on studies that made overly conservative assumptions or were 

based on simplified and very conservative models. The use of these previous studies, most of 

them NRC or NRC contractor studies, provides overly conservative and misleading results when 

assessing potential spent fuel pool vulnerabilities to terrorist events. The overall effect of the 

combined conservatisms in the four major areas discussed cumulatively affect the paper’s costbenefit calculations for its central recommendation by orders of magnitude. Given all of this, 

NRC does not believe that the fundamental recommendation of this paper, namely that all spent 

fuel more than five years old be placed in dry casks through a crash 10-year program costing 

many billions of dollars, is at all justified. Spent fuel stored, in both wet and dry storage 

configurations, is safe and measures are in place to adequately protect the public.” (NRC 

2003b). 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

For more discussion on the NRC’s evaluation of the expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools, 

refer to response Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-2--------41) 

D.2.39.27 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed skepticism that studies performed at Sandia 

National Laboratory on behalf of the NRC, evaluating the effectiveness of reactor plant and 

spent fuel pool modifications in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, supports 

the conclusions of the GEIS related to risk of spent fuel pool fires. In addition, the commenter 

stated that the NRC should have performed the Court of Appeals-ordered analysis of the 

consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. Another commenter expressed concern that the NRC 

cannot provide a complete assessment of Waste Confidence because the public and other 

agencies do not have access to the classified Sandia studies. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees that the Sandia studies do not support the NRC’s 

conclusions in Appendix F of the GEIS. As described in NRC’V'HQLDORI3HWLWLRQVIRU

5XOHPDNLQJ)5WKH6DQGLDVWXGLHVFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHULVNRIVSHQWIXHOSRROILUHVLV

likely lower than previously believed (e.g., in NUREG–>15&01b]). Because the 

information contained in the Sandia studies is security-related, the studies are not publicly 

available. While the NRC strives to be as open as possible, the agency does not release 

information that could be used to plan or execute an attack against a facility. 

The NRC disagrees with the implication that the evaluation in Appendix F does not address the 

Court of Appeals’ ruling as to consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. The evaluation in 

Appendix F of the GEIS provides a clear and thorough discussion of the significant 

consequences that could occur in the event of an unmitigated spent fuel pool fire. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-24--3-

D.2.39.28 – COMMENT: Several commenters submitted comments detailing issues they 

believe were flaws in the analysis performed in the NRC’s recently issued SECY-13-0112, 

Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a 

U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor. One commenter expressed the opinion that the analysis in 

SECY-13-0112 should not be relied upon in the GEIS. The following reasons were cited by 

commenters to support their assertion that SECY-13-0112 is flawed: 

x a lack of consideration of spent fuel pool geometry 

x a lack of consideration of open-frame, low-density storage 

x a lack of consideration of partial spent fuel pool drainage 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

x a lack of consideration of non-earthquake initiating events (e.g., aging, terrorist attack, and 

reactor accidents) 

x the manner in which mitigating actions were considered 

x an inadequate accident duration assumed in the model 

x the use of the MELCOR code to model the accident 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. To the 

extent that comments suggest that SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) should not be used to form the 

basis for the generic consideration of spent fuel pool fires in this GEIS, the NRC agrees. As 

described in Appendix F of the GEIS, “A significant portion of the NRC’s analysis for spent fuel 

pool fires during the short-term storage timeframe is derived from NUREG–Technical 

Study of Spent Nuclear Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants

(NRC 2001b). The reason for that choice is described in more detail in Section ' of this 

appendix. In contrast, SECY-13-0112 was developed as a detailed study of a single reference 

plant based on an existing reactor to determine whether accelerated transfer of older, colder 

spent fuel from the spent fuel pool at the reference plant to dry cask storage would significantly 

reduce risks to public health and safety. Although it was undertaken in the same timeframe as 

the GEIS, SECY-13-0112 was not developed to provide a technical basis for the GEIS. 

Responses to public comments on that study are provided in Appendix E of SECY-13-0112. 

During the preparation of the GEIS, the NRC reviewed the ongoing research in SECY-13-0112 

to determine whether it might affect the conclusions in the GEIS. As discussed in Chapter 10 of 

SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l), the results of that study yielded estimates of environmental 

impacts that were generally the same or less significant to public health and safety than impacts 

derived from earlier studies, including NUREG–15&b) and NUREG–15&

a). Because the GEIS results are consistent with earlier studies, the NRC concludes that 

the GEIS finding of SMALL environmental impacts from spent fuel pool accidents is reasonable. 

These studies confirm, as the GEIS reflects, that spent fuel pool accidents are low-risk events 

due to the low likelihood of occurrence, despite their potentially significant consequences. 

Several of the issues raised by comments with respect to SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) were not 

within the scope of that study, but are addressed within the GEIS. For example, consideration 

of terrorism is not within the scope of SECY-13-0112. Chapter 10 states that “... staff focused 

on studies associated with accidents, rather than studies of safety consequences associated 

with deliberate human actions such as sabotage or terrorism”. The GEIS acknowledges in 

6HFWLRQWKDWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIDVSHQWIXHOSRROILUHUHVXOWLQJIURPDWHUURULVWDWWDFN

could be high. However, due to the low likelihood of such events, the environmental impacts 

are projected to be SMALL. Also, the GEIS spent fuel pool fire risk analysis is based on 

NUREG–15&b), which explicitly evaluates a number of initiating events for which 

risks are not quantified in SECY-13-0112 (e.g., cask drops). In addition, as discussed in 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Section ' of this appendix, the effects of partial draindown (i.e., restricted airflow) were 

addressed in NUREG–ZKLFKLVWKHEDVLVIRUWKHHVWLPDWHVRIKHDOWKLPSDFWVLQ$SSHQGL[

F. Further, as discussed in Section ' of this appendix, Appendix F of the GEIS 

addresses the effect of changes in population density on health-impact estimates. 

Conversely, several of the issues raised by comments are within the scope of SECY-13-0112 

(NRC 2013l), but not within the scope of the GEIS. For example, the GEIS does not examine 

alternatives associated with low-density storage of spent fuel at operating reactor sites, as was 

done in SECY-13-0112 or COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n). Likewise, the effect of 

concurrent reactor accidents, which is relevant to analyses of spent fuel pool fires at operating 

reactors as analyzed in SECY-13-0112, is considerably less significant to continuing storage 

impact analysis at permanently shutdown reactors. Concurrent reactor accidents are 

theoretically possible very shortly after final shutdown before removal of spent fuel, or at multiunit sites with decommissioning and operating units, but the NRC believes that the interactions 

between the reactor and the spent fuel pool described by the comments are less likely at 

locations covered by the scope of the GEIS than at an operating reactor’s spent fuel pool. 

Appendix F has been updated to include information from SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) and 

COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013d) relevant to the issues raised in comments and to 

demonstrate the relationship between these more recent studies and the earlier studies on 

which the conclusions of the GEIS are based. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

(112-3-4) (112-3----2--2--2--2--2-

-4--4--4--4--4--2-12) 

D.2.39.29 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC should update the GEIS to 

reference SECY-13-0112, Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting 

the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (NRC 2013l), that was issued April 

2014. Commenters stated that SECY-13-0112 provides additional support for the NRC’s 

determination that the probability-weighted consequences of a spent fuel pool fire in the shortterm timeframe would be SMALL. Some of the commenters indicated that the discussion in 

SECY-13-0112 regarding the length of time spent fuel is susceptible to fire after it has been 

removed from the core is relevant to the GEIS. One commenter, an NRC licensee, stated the 

belief that the NRC’s findings in the GEIS related to spent fuel pool fires are applicable to the 

licensee’s plants. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments that SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) should be 

referenced in the GEIS. In addition, the NRC agrees that the findings in the GEIS are valid for 

future licensing actions at the referenced facilities, and all other licensed facilities. For 

additional discussion as to how SECY-13-0112 was considered in the context of the GEIS, see 

Section ' of this appendix. For additional discussion on how long spent fuel is 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

susceptible to ignition (i.e., runaway oxidation reaction), see Section ' of this appendix. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--3--2-

D.2.39.30 – COMMENT: Three commenters identified issues pertaining to COMSECY–13–

0030. One commenter stated that the NRC has decided that “population density is not a 

variable that can significantly affect consequence calculation results.” One commenter stated 

that the NRC seeks to “close off any further inquiry into the risk of a pool fire” through 

COMSECY–13–0030. One commenter stated that COMSECY–13–0030, and the study on 

which it was based, SECY-13-0112, was deficient because it was based on a site with a reactor 

“whose characteristics and surrounding demographics are considerably less likely to produce 

large accident consequences than many other reactors.” The commenter further stated that the 

NRC did not consider malevolent events, the probability of which the commenter stated could 

not be calculated. Finally, the commenter stated that the NRC ignored “the many unique, sitespecific and as-yet-unevaluated problems created by the use of high-burnup fuel in reactors,” 

citing an increased chance of accidents and “increased chance of structural failure of the fuel 

rods such that transfer to dry casks is more difficult, more dangerous, and more expensive.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC did not, in fact, rely on the 

analysis in COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n) as a primary basis for the findings in Appendix F. 

As described in Appendix F of the GEIS, “A significant portion of the NRC’s analysis for spent 

fuel pool fires during the short-term storage timeframe is derived from NUREG–Technical 

Study of Spent Nuclear Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants

(NRC 2001b).” The basis for that choice is described in more detail in Section ' of this 

appendix. COMSECY–13–0030, which was issued after the draft GEIS was prepared, analyzed 

spent fuel pool fire risk, to determine whether the NRC should conduct additional research on 

whether to require reactor licensees to accelerate transfer of older, colder spent fuel from the 

spent fuel pool to dry cask storage. As part of the preparation of this final GEIS, the NRC 

reviewed the analysis in COMSECY–13–0030 and determined that, because COMSECY–13–

0030 was drafted to satisfy a limited purpose, did not contain a NEPA analysis, and was not 

intended to satisfy the NRC’s NEPA obligations, the results of the study are not an appropriate 

technical basis for the generic consequence analysis in Appendix F of this GEIS. 

To the extent that comments disagree with the findings in COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n), 

those comments are outside the scope of this GEIS. However, in response to these comments, 

information developed during the preparation of COMSECY–13–0030 has been used to 

supplement the discussion of spent fuel pool fires in Appendix F. Some examples include the 

range of population density surrounding U.S. QXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVDVGRFXPHQWHGLQ7DEOH

of COMSECY–13–0030, and the range of potential spent fuel pool radiological inventories, as 

GRFXPHQWHGLQ7DEOHVDQGRICOMSECY–13–0030. As discussed in Section '

of this appendix, the NRC has revised Appendix F in response to this and other comments to 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

discuss more extensively how variations in factors such as seismicity, spent fuel pool inventory, 

and population density across different geographic locations could affect public dose estimates. 

No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-------4--2-11) 

D.2.39.31 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC did not consider a number of 

phenomena that would increase the probability of a spent fuel pool fire in the event of (1) a 

complete loss-of-coolant accident, (2) a partial loss-of-coolant accident, or (3) a spent fuel pool 

boiloff accident. The commenter pointed to additional comments included as an attachment that 

provided more detailed explanations of these topics. 

RESPONSE: The comments refer to additional comments that were submitted as attachments. 

For responses to the specific issues raised in those comments, see Sections ', 

', ', ', and ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-4--3---

D.2.39.32 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed dissatisfaction with the studies 

referenced in Appendix F of the GEIS. Some commenters stated their opinion that one or more 

of the studies the NRC referenced were old or outdated. One commenter noted that the studies 

referenced did not incorporate lessons learned from the accidents at Fukushima, and suggested 

conducting both a new study that incorporates Fukushima lessons, and a risk analysis of pools 

containing uranium-plutonium MOX fuel rods. One commenter faulted the NRC for not including 

reports from independent, outside experts, including the 2003 report co-authored by Chairman 

Macfarlane and wondered whether NRC relied on secret studies of spent fuel fire risks (Alvarez 

et al. 2003). One commenter expressed concern that the NRC has not retracted or repudiated 

NUREG–15&DVSHFLILFDOO\SRLQWLQJWRGLVFXVVLRQVRQKRZORQJWKHIXHOLV

susceptible to ignition and a failure to consider high-density storage racks. Two commenters 

noted that neither SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) nor the related COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 

2013n), which evaluated expedited transfer of spent fuel, were referenced in the GEIS. One 

commenter went on to state that the coordination between staff discussed in COMSECY–13–

0030 had a “substantial but undocumented influence on the draft GEIS.” Another commenter 

stated that the GEIS relied upon SECY-13-0112 and that the failure to explicitly reference 

SECY-13-0112 in the GEIS represented a violation of NEPA and the APA. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Many comments faulting the age of the 

reports referenced in the GEIS did not explain how the passage of time, by itself, invalidates the 

results of these studies. While the NRC would not object to including other reports not 

referenced in the GEIS, commenters have not specified what information they believe is missing 

from the GEIS that these reports could provide. The NRC does not agree that the description of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

rack designs and susceptibility to ignition in NUREG– 15&a) has any bearing on the 

consequence values from NUREG–UHSRUWHGLQWKHGEIS. On the issue of rack designs, 

contrary to the comments, the analysis in NUREG–ZDVEDVHGRQDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIKLJKdensity storage configurations for both PWR and BWR plants. 

With regard to the request for new analyses, the operating reactor accidents at Fukushima Daiichi provide no particular insights on the phenomena of spent fuel pool fire because a spent fuel 

pool fire did not happen at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Also, as noted in Section ' of this 

appendix, spent MOX fuel is not different from spent uranium oxide fuel in any way that is 

relevant to the likelihood of spent fuel pool fire. 

As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the primary basis for the NRC’s analysis of 

spent fuel pool fires is NUREG–15&b). Neither SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) nor 

COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n) were referenced in the GEIS because the GEIS did not rely 

on either report for its conclusions. As the comments note, there was coordination among the 

staff involved with all three reports; however, that coordination was limited to verifying whether 

or not there was likely to be any new information in either SECY-13-0112 or COMSECY–13–

0030 that would challenge the conclusions in the GEIS. For more information on how SECY13-0112 and COMSECY–13–0030 were considered in the GEIS, see Sections ' and 

' of this appendix, respectively. For discussion on the 2003 report co-authored by 

Chairman Macfarlane, see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-11--2--4--2--2--2--2-

D.2.39.33 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the spent fuel pool fire consequence 

results in SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) are not applicable for Indian Point. The commenter 

presented a variety of site-specific characteristics of the Indian Point site to support that opinion. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with these comments. As described in SECY-13-0112 (NRC 

2013l), the results of that analysis apply only to a postulated spent fuel fire at the reference 

facility and were not intended to represent the likelihood or consequences of a spent fuel pool 

fire at any other facility. For a discussion of how SECY-13-0112 was considered in the GEIS, 

see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-4--4--4--4--4--4-20) 

D.2.39.34 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed support for the analysis and 

conclusions in Appendix F of the GEIS. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the supportive comments. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3---2--2--12) 

D.2.40 Comments Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Leaks 

D.2.40.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided general comments on the issue of spent 

fuel pool leaks. Several commenters noted that leaks have occurred and continue to occur, with 

commenters specifically mentioning leaks at Indian Point and Vermont Yankee. One 

commenter stated that engineers make questionable assumptions to support their designs. 

One commenter stated that concrete-lined pools are not 100 percent foolproof and they can 

leak into the groundwater. Another commenter noted that leaks can occur, sometimes 

unnoticed, due to corrosion of the stainless-steel liner caused by pool chemistry and emissions 

from the fuel elements. The commenter noted that boric acid penetration as well as large tritium 

concentrations outside the pool structure proves that some spent fuel pools have leaked. The 

commenter further stated that tritium migrations “relatively easily off-site” through liquid drainage 

from pool leaks and evaporation as water vapor. One commenter noted that a number of spent 

fuel pool leaks were considered in the GEIS, with all associated impacts “meeting the definition 

of small because the right steps were taken.” Another commenter wondered about 

intergenerational concerns and how future generations would react to “the inevitable problems 

of dangerous leaking old fuel pools.” One commenter stated that if a spent fuel pool were to 

have a leak similar to a service-water leak that occurred at Dresden Unit 1, the results could be 

catastrophic. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part with these comments. The NRC agrees that spent fuel 

pools are not “100 percent foolproof” and that corrosion of the stainless-steel liner could, 

ultimately, lead to leakage from the spent fuel pool. As described in Appendix E, spent fuel pool 

leaks have occurred at a number of sites, including Indian Point. Although not every leak 

identified in Table E-4 resulted in a release of contamination to the environment, some leaks 

were not identified until more indirect signs, such as boric acid precipitate, were discovered. 

The NRC agrees with the comment that the previously identified spent fuel pool leaks have not 

resulted in significant environmental impacts. The NRC’s evaluation of the impacts of a spent 

fuel pool leak during the short-term timeframe, should one occur, can be found in Section E.2. 

On the issue of tritium migration, Appendix E states that tritium does not adsorb onto soil or 

bedrock and would migrate at the same rate as the groundwater onsite. Although a small 

amount tritiated water in the event of a spent fuel pool leak could evaporate in a manner similar 

to non-tritiated water, the concentration in the air would likely be so low as to be non-detectable. 

The NRC disagrees with comments that point to leaks at Vermont Yankee as relevant to spent 

fuel storage during the short-term timeframe. As documented in an NRC inspection report 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

related to the leaks at Vermont Yankee, the source of contaminated groundwater discovered 

onsite was an underground pipe vault associated with the Advanced Off-Gas system (NRC 

2010e). The NRC also disagrees with the comment that engineers make questionable 

assumptions to support their designs. The commenter provided no additional information about 

which assumptions may be considered questionable. The NRC reviews any assumptions that 

are key to safety-significant systems, structures, or components, as appropriate, as part of 

individual licensing reviews. Should the NRC identify a potentially inappropriate assumption, 

the licensee or applicant would need to resolve the potential discrepancy prior to the NRC 

completing the review. 

As to the issue of how future generations would react on the issue of spent fuel pool storage, 

the GEIS assumes that all spent fuel will be transferred from the spent fuel pools to dry casks 

storage or a repository by the end of the short-term timeframe; however, the NRC is not aware 

of any information that would call into question the technical feasibility of continued safe storage 

of spent fuel in spent fuel pools beyond the short-term storage timeframe. The evaluation in the 

GEIS is intended to be forward looking and apply to plants that exist now and those that may 

exist in the future. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

 (30---34------4) (410----12) 

D.2.40.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that site-specific conditions at Pilgrim, 

Indian Point, and the four reactors in New Jersey (Salem, Hope Creek, and Oyster Creek) 

invalidated or made deficient the evaluation of spent fuel pool leaks in the GEIS. Some of the 

commenters stated that, because of these perceived deficiencies, the NRC should conduct a 

site-specific review of spent fuel pool leaks. For Pilgrim, commenters stated that the NRC failed 

to address the discharge of leak-contaminated groundwater and soil, without monitoring, into 

Cape Cod Bay. One commenter stated that, because the impacts of tritium on aquatic life are 

not understood, the NRC cannot evaluate the harm that is being done. 

For Indian Point, one commenter stated that the NRC did not bound, or consider issues unique 

to Indian Point, including susceptibility to seismic hazards, which may affect the structural 

integrity of spent fuel pools, and inadequate plant maintenance and management, both of which 

the commenter claimed would lead to an increased occurrence of spent fuel pool leaks at Indian 

Point. Another commenter stated that contamination at Indian Point exceeds drinking-water 

standards at multiple locations and that the NRC has been reluctant to acknowledge 

contamination other than tritium, including strontium. Several commenters asserted that only 40 

SHUFHQWRIWKH,QGLDQ3RLQW8QLWVSHQWIXHOSRROKDGEHHQLQVSHFWHGZKLOHWKHRWKHU

percent, which is known to be leaking, has not been inspected due to exemptions granted by 

the NRC. One commenter further stated that the Indian Point leaks were discovered 

accidentally, not through leak detection or administrative controls. Another commenter 

challenged the idea that monitoring programs would ensure that impacts from leaks would be 

unlikely because little, if any, monitoring has occurred at Indian Point and that even if it had, 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

nothing has been done to fix the leaks. Two commenters stated that the Indian Point Unit 2 

spent fuel pool does not have a tell-tale drain system that collects leakage and directs it to a 

liquid radioactive waste treatment system or other cleanup or collection system. One 

commenter stated that it is highly likely that the Indian Point Unit 2 spent fuel pool will continue 

to leak radioactivity into the environment. Another commenter stated the belief that Indian Point 

Unit 1 was known to be leaking radioactive effluent for years without remediation, which is proof 

that SAFSTOR is not safe. One commenter stated that tritium and strontium from Indian Point 

have been detected in water intended to be used for drinking water. 

For the New Jersey plants, a commenter stated that groundwater contamination from spent fuel 

pool and other leaks was not detected by existing monitoring programs, and that the extent of 

contamination was not fully realized until the licensees expanded their monitoring programs to 

include the deeper confined aquifer. The commenter stated that groundwater in these deeper 

aquifers may not flow in the direction of the surface waterbody, which refutes the NRC’s 

assumption that it always will. Also, groundwater usage around both sites could cause 

contamination to migrate offsite. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. None of the issues identified invalidate 

the NRC’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of spent fuel pool leaks or establish the need 

to perform site-specific analyses. For Pilgrim, although the source of groundwater 

contamination has not been definitively identified, the source of the leak appears to be from 

underground piping, rather than the spent fuel pool. The contaminated groundwater has 

remained onsite and is not being allowed to discharge to Cape Cod Bay (MDPH 2014), which is 

consistent with the evaluation in the GEIS. For a discussion on radiation effects on biota, see 

Section ' of this appendix. 

The comments regarding Indian Point neither raise issues unique to Indian Point nor provide 

information that would change the impact determinations in the GEIS. Overall, the particulars of 

spent fuel pool leakage during continued storage at Indian Point, like leakage at any site, are 

bounded by the generic assessment of leak potential and consequences in Appendix E of the 

GEIS. On the issue of the potential for future leaks, at Indian Point, the evaluation in the GEIS 

does not assume that leaks will not occur or will occur only below a certain frequency. For the 

reasons explained in Appendix E, should a leak occur, it is unlikely that it will remain undetected 

long enough to cause significant offsite impacts. Regarding existing onsite contamination at 

Indian Point, any onsite contamination from a spent fuel pool leak will be addressed as part of 

the license-termination process. For additional discussion on how onsite contamination is 

addressed, see Section D.2.40.4 of this appendix. Also, contrary to comments, GEIS Tables E4 and E-LGHQWLI\QLFNHO-FHVLXP-VWURQWLXP-DQGFREDOW-DVFRQWDPLQDQWVRWKHU

than tritium) from spent fuel pool leaks at Indian Point. On the issue of the Indian Point Unit 2 

spent fuel pool, although there are no tell-tale drains installed on the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, the 

licensee has implemented appropriate administrative controls to detect future leakage. Further, 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

the licensee has inspected the accessible portions of the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and corrected all 

identified defiFLHQFLHV15&:KLOHWKHHQWLUHVSHQWIXHOSRROOLQHUKDVQRWEHHQ

inspected, this is because the proximity of the spent fuel precludes inspection, not because the 

NRC has granted an exemption to the licensee (NRC 2012m). Additionally, the licensee has 

implemented sufficient onsite monitoring to characterize the extent of existing contamination as 

well as identify contamination from any new leak that may occur (NRC F). Regarding the 

safety of SAFSTOR, the NRC’s regulations provide reasonable assurance that public health and 

safety will be protected during the decommissioning of a facility. There have been no 

identifiable public health impacts from the leaks at Indian Point. The detection of tritium and 

strontium in samples taken for the Haverstraw Water Supply Project, referred to in the 

comments, was attributed to the erosion of natural deposits and were significantly below 

regulatory limits (HWSP 2012). Finally, the reassessment of a facility’s seismic risk and the 

effectiveness of a licensee’s plant maintenance and management are addressed at all facilities 

through the NRC’s ongoing regulatory oversight process. Should new information become 

available for either issue, the NRC will evaluate that information and take whatever action is 

appropriate to ensure that a facility is operated in accordance with the NRC’s requirements. 

Groundwater contamination at Oyster Creek was not a result of a spent fuel pool leak. 

Additionally, groundwater contamination at Oyster Creek and Salem occurred prior to the 

implementation of the industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative; therefore, these cases do not 

speak to the effectiveness of current or future onsite groundwater monitoring programs at those 

and other reactor sites. Further, the GEIS does not state that contaminated groundwater will 

remain in the upper, surficial aquifer and will always flow toward the surface waterbody. As 

discussed in Section E.2.1.3, most nuclear power plants are located at sites where the shallow 

unconfined groundwater at the site flows into the nearby surface waterbody. Because this is not 

the case at all sites, potential impacts to offsite groundwater resources are discussed in Section 

E.2.1.2. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

------2------1-

---

D.2.40.3 – COMMENT: Two commenters stated that the NRC cannot generically analyze spent 

fuel pool leaks for all sites. One commenter stated that the NRC cannot reach a conclusion on 

the impacts of spent fuel pool leaks to groundwater without knowing the demographics and 

water use around a site. Another commenter stated that the NRC did not consider or bound 

site-specific factors in its analysis. The commenter further stated that the NRC’s conclusion that 

the impacts of spent fuel pool leaks can be generically assessed conflicts with the License 

Renewal GEIS, which concluded that the NRC should analyze the impacts of radionuclides in 

groundwater during the license renewal period on a site-specific basis, and that the NRC could 

not rely on the industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative. The commenter stated that failing to 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

conduct site-specific reviews for the continued storage of spent fuel would be a violation of 

NEPA and the APA. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The analysis in Appendix E describes 

the impacts that could be expected from a spent fuel pool leak, given the range of hydrogeologic 

conditions at current and future sites. Further, the assumptions used in the analysis are 

sufficiently conservative to bound the impacts such that variances that may occur from site to 

site are unlikely to result in environmental impact determinations that are greater than those 

presented in the GEIS. Therefore, the impact determinations in Appendix E would apply at all 

sites. Also, it is important to note that site-specific considerations, such as demographics and 

water use around a site, are required to be considered in the development of site-specific 

environmental monitoring programs. The operation of site-specific environmental monitoring 

programs during continued storage is one reason the NRC can make a generic determination 

on the impacts of spent fuel pool leaks. 

The requirement to conduct a site-specific review of groundwater contamination for the 

purposes of reactor license renewal does not conflict with the NRC’s determination in this GEIS 

that impacts from spent fuel pool leaks during continued storage can be generically assessed. 

Further, the NRC disagrees that failing to conduct site-specific reviews for continued storage 

would constitute a violation of NEPA or the APA. Because of the potential scope of 

contamination that has to be considered as part of reactor license renewal, both in terms of the 

number of potential sources and volume of contamination, the NRC determined that a sitespecific review was appropriate. In contrast to reactor license renewal, this GEIS considers 

potential leakage from a single source, a spent fuel pool, which has significantly less volume at 

risk of leaking as compared to an operating reactor site. Because of the relatively limited scope 

of potential contamination, as well as other factors described in Appendix E, such as the similar 

hydrogeologic characteristics at many sites, the NRC has determined that a generic 

assessment is appropriate for the purposes of this GEIS. 

On the issues of groundwater monitoring, as described in 6HFWLRQ', the NRC has 

determined that groundwater monitoring programs implemented in accordance with the 

industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative satisfy the subsurface survey requirements of 10 

&)5)XUWKHU, any licensee that chooses to implement a program different than what 

the industry has committed to would still need to demonstrate compliance with the regulations at 

&)57KHUHIRUHWKH15&KDVGHWHUPLQHGWKDWLWLVUHDVRQDEOHWRLQFOXGHOLFHnsees’ 

groundwater monitoring programs in the spent fuel pool leaks impacts analyses. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.40.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the NRC’s analysis of spent fuel pool 

leaks is deficient. One commenter stated that the description of potential impacts to 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

groundwater did not consider potential leaks from spent fuel pools that could develop after 

reactors shut down. One commenter argued that the frequent use of modifiers indicated a high 

degree of uncertainty in the NRC’s conclusions. Another commenter asserted that there were 

too many low impact determinations. Several commenters argued that the analysis should 

contain a quantitative assessment of spent fuel pool leaks, including at least the volume and 

duration of leaks, speed of the leaks, isotope identification and concentration, and leak 

GHWHFWLRQ2QHFRPPHQWHUDUJXHGWKDW&)5GUHTXLUHVWKH15&WRLQFOXGHD

quantitative analysis of a postulated leak. One commenter stated that the NRC has minimized 

the danger and health risk of leakage as insignificant and unlikely to migrate offsite. One 

commenter disagreed with the conclusions in Appendix E, offering a pamphlet entitled “Routine 

Radioactive Releases from U.S. Nuclear Power Plants” as support. Other commenters 

expressed general opposition to the NRC’s conclusions, or stated that the NRC’s analysis was 

inadequate, without offering specific reasons as to why. 

One commenter stated that neither the NRC Standard Review Plans for reactor operations nor 

any of the safety analysis reports submitted by nuclear power plant operators analyze either a 

long-term, low-volume leak from a spent fuel pool or the rapid and complete loss of spent fuel 

pool water into the environment. The commenter argued that because the spent fuel pool leak 

hazard has not been defined, the adequacy of protection measures cannot be objectively 

assessed and that there is no assurance that adequate protection will be sustained throughout 

WKH-year short-term storage period. The commenter concluded that because neither a spent 

fuel pool leak hazard nor protections against that hazard are explicitly defined in the NRC’s 

regulations and because there is no hypothetical hazard evaluation of a spent fuel pool leak, the 

conclusions expressed in the GEIS concerning spent fuel pool leaks (i.e., spent fuel pool leaks 

of /G>100 gpd] will be detected before causing significant impacts) are speculative and 

subjective. 

One commenter indicated that the GEIS violates NEPA and must evaluate both the probability 

and the consequences of environmental impacts resulting from spent fuel pool leaks. One 

commenter stated that there were serious gaps in the analysis and that the NRC failed to 

support its conclusion that spent fuel pool leaks will be detected or have little impact on the 

environment. One commenter stated that the NRC’s analysis was deficient because it did not 

consider the cumulative impacts of leaks. Another commenter stated that the GEIS discounts 

the impacts to drinking water quality and that onsite contamination in excess of drinking water 

standards exists, but is minimized because the contamination has not migrated offsite. The 

commenter argued that the NRC needs to consider the impacts from onsite contamination to 

drinking water in the context of the eventual decommissioning of the site for unrestricted 

release. Two commenters supported their claim that onsite impacts should be considered in the 

GEIS by citing examples of spent fuel pool leaks, including those at Salem, Oyster Creek, and 

Indian Point that have remained onsite and have resulted in costly investigations and cleanup 

efforts. Two commenters stated that the NRC’s evaluation of spent fuel pool leaks was deficient 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

because it did not consider social and economic impacts, specifically noting property 

devaluations, remediation costs, and questions about licensee longevity as potential impacts of 

a spent fuel pool leak. 

Additionally, one commenter stated that the NRC should consider impacts to the recreational 

use of surface waterbodies that could result from a leak. Two commenters argued that the NRC 

should have evaluated impacts from leaks that result in offsite contamination below NRC and 

EPA standards because they can have significant impacts even if the Federal regulatory limits 

are never exceeded. Commenters referenced the leak at Braidwood as an example where 

offsite groundwater contamination did not exceed Federal limits but required a significant 

response including the use of bottled water at 420 households and the purchase of property and 

reimbursement to 14 impacted property owners. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The evaluation of impacts of a spent 

fuel pool leak, which includes a discussion of the impacts to groundwater and surface water, 

can be found in Appendix E. Appendix E characterizes long-term, undetected leaks and their 

impacts as “unlikely” because this qualitative assessment best describes the likelihood of these 

leaks and their impacts. This conclusion is based on the aggregate factors that reduce the 

possibility of a spent fuel pool leak with sufficient quantity and duration to reach offsite locations. 

The NRC disagrees that the GEIS’s assessment of this likelihood indicates uncertainty or 

minimizes the danger and health risk of spent fuel pool leaks. NEPA impact determinations are 

commonly presented in terms of the degree of likelihood where precise quantification is 

impractical. The pamphlet that was submitted for consideration provided no information that 

would challenge any of the conclusions in the GEIS. 

The NRC disagrees that it should have performed an additional quantitative assessment in 

evaluating the impacts from a spent fuel pool leak. As described in Sections E.2.2.1 and 

E.2.2.2, experience shows that spent fuel pool leakage will likely either remain onsite, or be 

directed to a nearby surface waterbody. Therefore, the NRC performed a quantitative 

assessment in Section E.2.2.2 of the impacts to surface waterbodies from a spent fuel pool 

leak. Table E-2 shows that for a postulated leak rate of /G100 gpd), the amount of 

radionuclides released to a surface waterbody would be bounded by permitted effluent releases 

from normal reactor operations. The NRC determined that a quantitative model was not 

required to assess the impacts of a spent fuel pool leak to offsite groundwater because, as 

discussed in Section 2.2.1, a combination of spent fuel pool design and operational controls, 

coupled with chemical processes of radionuclide transport, and hydrologic characteristics of 

typical nuclear power plant settings make it unlikely that a leak will remain undetected long 

enough or be of sufficient quantity to exceed any regulatory requirement (e.g., the NRC dose 

limit or EPA-mandated Maximum Contaminant Level) in the offsite environment. Accordingly, 

an additional quantitative assessment for groundwater would not provide useful information or 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

lead to a different impact determination. To the fullest extent practicable, the NRC has 

quantified the various factors considered, consistent with the NRC’s NEPA regulations in 10 

&)53DUW

Section E.2.2 of the GEIS evaluates the environmental impacts of a long-term, low-volume 

spent fuel pool leak. 6HFWLRQand Appendix F of the GEIS evaluates the impacts of severe 

accidents, which includes consideration of initiating events that could lead to the complete 

draining of a spent fuel pool. The NRC disagrees that an evaluation of the failure of the spent 

fuel pool, as is done for the liquid waste management system, is necessary for the purposes of 

this GEIS, or that the absence of such an evaluation renders the conclusions in the GEIS 

speculative or subjective. The NRC’s analysis is based in part on a consideration of how leaks 

occur and what factors could influence the consequences of a leak. As a result, the analysis in 

Appendix E provides a reasonable prognosis for leakage impacts that could occur during 

continued storage. As for the adequacy of protective measures, the NRC determined that 

existing regulations are adequate for protection of public health and safety and therefore no new 

regulatory requirements are necessary (NRC 2011i). 

The NRC disagrees that the analysis in the GEIS violates NEPA or that the NRC failed to 

consider the probability and consequences of a spent fuel pool leak in the GEIS evaluation of 

impacts. The conclusions in Section E.2.2 are based on a qualitative assessment of the 

likelihood that a leak of sufficient quantity and duration could occur and result in impacts to the 

offsite environment. Table E-2 provides a quantitative analysis of leak impacts, comparing the 

amount of radionuclides released to a surface waterbody from a postulated /G100 gpd) 

leak to the same radionuclides released during normal reactor operations as permitted effluent 

discharges. As described in Appendix E, there are a variety of factors that minimize the 

likelihood and consequences to the environment of a long-term, undetected spent fuel pool leak. 

These include spent fuel pool design and operational controls, chemical processes associated 

with radionuclide transport, and hydrologic characteristics associated with typical nuclear power 

plant settings. These factors in the aggregate make it unlikely that a leak will remain undetected 

long enough, or be of sufficient quantity to exceed any regulatory requirement (e.g., the NRC 

dose limit or EPA-mandated Maximum Contaminant Level) in the offsite environment. 

Regarding comments concerning the onsite impacts of a spent fuel pool leak, as Appendix E 

explains, the onsite environmental impacts from normal operations and accidents during 

decommissioning activities, which include spent fuel pool operations, are addressed in 

NUREG–6XSSOHPHQW)LQDO*HQHULF(QYironmental Impact Statement on 

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Supplement 1, Regarding the Decommissioning of 

Nuclear Power Reactors (NRC 2002a). The period of decommissioning in NUREG–

corresponds to the short-term timeframe of the GEIS. Further, any significant radioactivity 

identified by licensees, including that resulting from a spent fuel pool leak, must be addressed 

during the decommissioning process to meet the license-termination requirements of 10 CFR 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Part 20, Subpart E. The license-termination process is subject to a site-specific review. The 

environmental impacts of all onsite and offsite residual radioactive material that may remain 

after license termination are address in NUREG–*HQHULF(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFW

Statement in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-

/LFHQVHG1XFOHDU)DFLOLWLHV15&c). 

The NRC’s consideration of the cumulative impacts of leaks is discussed in Section D.2.41.4 of 

this appendix. The NRC’s consideration of the socioeconomic impacts from a spent fuel pool 

leak is discussed in Section D.2.22.4 of this appendix. 

On the issue of impacts to recreational use of surface waterbodies, the NRC determined that 

the impacts to surface water resulting from a spent fuel pool leak would be SMALL. This is 

because the quantities of radioactive material discharged to nearby surface waters in the event 

of a spent fuel pool leak would be comparable to values associated with permitted, treated 

effluent discharges from operating nuclear power plants. See GEIS, Table E-2. Therefore, to 

the extent that there were impacts to recreational use of surface waterbodies during operations, 

there would be no new impacts to recreational use of a surface waterbody resulting from a 

spent fuel pool leak during the short-term timeframe. 

The impact from leaks that result in offsite contamination below NRC dose limits and EPA 

drinking water standards are bound by the NRC’s consideration of a postulated leak that could 

result in contamination that exceeds a public health regulatory limit (e.g., EPA drinking-water 

standards). As such, no further hypothesizing of these leaks is necessary. The impacts from 

these leaks are analyzed in Section E.2.2 of the GEIS. Comments reference the leak at 

Braidwood as an example of impacts; however, the leak at Braidwood was not associated with 

the spent fuel pool and resulted in a significantly larger volume of water released much closer to 

the property boundary and over a much shorter time than would occur with a spent fuel pool 

leak. Further, the remedial action that would be taken in the event of a leak that resulted in 

contamination below regulatory limits, if any, would likely depend on a variety of factors 

including the environmental and public health implications, State and local involvement, and the 

role of EPA. As described in Section E.2.2.1 of the GEIS, in the event of a leak that resulted in 

groundwater contamination that exceeded a drinking water standard, the licensee could be 

compelled under the Safe Drinking Water Act to take action, including, but not limited to, 

providing alternative water supplies, public notification of affected users, and remediation of the 

contamination. These actions are consistent with the actions suggested in the comments. As 

such, the impacts from a spent fuel pool leak that results in contamination below a regulatory 

limit are bound by the NRC’s consideration of a postulated leak that could result in 

contamination that exceeds a public health regulatory limit (e.g., EPA drinking-water standards). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Comments that were general in nature, including the comment that there were too many low 

impact determinations in the GEIS, provided no new information that would challenge the 

conclusions in the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--3--4-13) -4---------13) 

---4--4--3--3--3--1--3--2-4) 

-3--2--3--3---1) 

D.2.40.5 – COMMENT: A number of commenters stated that the GEIS analysis of 

environmental impacts from spent fuel pool leaks improperly relies on compliance with voluntary 

programs rather than NRC requirements. 

Several commenters stated that the GEIS analysis of impacts from spent fuel pool leaks relies 

on a voluntary groundwater monitoring program developed by the nuclear industry. Further, 

these commenters stated that the NRC cannot enforce the voluntary groundwater monitoring 

initiative, that this voluntary program is subject to change by the industry, and that the NRC has 

no regulatory requirement for licensees to monitor groundwater quality. Several commenters 

stated that relying on licensees’ compliance with voluntary groundwater monitoring programs 

contradicts New York v. NRC, which specifically noted that “pointing to the compliance 

programs” is not sufficient to support a finding that leaks from “spent fuel pools will not cause 

significant environmental impacts during the extended storage period.” Additionally, several 

commenters stated that the GEIS erroneously states that licensees are required to perform 

groundwater monitoring, but the NRC previously acknowledged that groundwater monitoring is 

only voluntarily initiated by licensees after leaks are detected. Two commenters stated that the 

NRC should analyze a postulated leak of contaminated water from a spent fuel pool, similar to 

analyses required in other contexts. One commenter stated that additional measurements 

should be required to provide earlier leak detection. 

Several commenters stated that the GEIS incorrectly claims that spent fuel pool water levels are 

constantly monitored. These commenters also stated that the GEIS relies on spent fuel pool 

monitoring requirements that are only applicable during the movement of spent fuel from one 

storage facility to another. 

Several commenters also asserted that there is lessened regulatory oversight after a reactor 

shuts down and that the GEIS erroneously assumes that groundwater monitoring and NRC 

inspections will continue during the short-term timeframe. One commenter stated that, based 

on a search of Inspection Manual Chapters and Inspection Procedures, there is only one 

inspection procedure applicable to permanently shutdown reactors. The commenter further 

stated that this inspection has only been performed three times at Zion in the past three years, 

contrary to the procedure’s requirement of semi-annual inspections. Some of these 

commenters asserted that the NRC requires aging management during a license renewal 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

period, but not during continued storage. Another commenter stated that the Maintenance Rule 

and the aging management programs mandated by license renewal rules to guard against 

equipment degradation apply only during extended reactor operation, and not the short-term 

timeframe analyzed in the GEIS. 

Another commenter stated that the GEIS’s assumptions that spent fuel pool maintenance 

requirements will remain in place during the short-term timeframe and that a licensee is bound 

by the terms and conditions of its operating license until the license is terminated are incorrect, 

EDVHGRQHYHQWVWKDWRFFXUUHGDW'UHVGHQ8QLWLQ$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHG

that the GEIS is deficient in assuming the Dresden failure to maintain a spent fuel leak detection 

program and failure to maintain the quality of the water in the spent fuel pool, was an isolated 

event, and by not identifying specific means to prevent a recurrence. The commenter also 

pointed to changes in spent fuel handling requirements at Zion and stated the only remaining 

requirements for protection against spent fuel pool leaks were maintenance of the fuel transfer 

canal’s weir gate seal and the spent fuel pool cooling-water discharge piping. The commenter 

further stated that the reduced requirements for the Zion plant did not include protection against 

a long-term, low-volume leak. Commenters are concerned that, without aging management 

requirements, incidents of age-related failures will increase during continued storage. 

Several commenters also stated that licensees with reactors that have been shut down do not 

receive important safety communications and enforcement orders that are issued to operating 

reactor licensees, preventing those licensees from learning of necessary safety upgrades for 

spent fuel pools. One commenter pointed to a 2004 Information Notice on spent fuel pool leaks 

and three 2012 orders issued in response to Fukushima, one related to spent fuel pool water 

level monitoring, as examples of issuances to operating, but not permanently shut down, power 

reactor licensees. 

One commenter stated that the GEIS fails to comply with NEPA or New York v. NRC because it 

considers only offsite impacts and relies on institutional controls to manage spent fuel pools. 

This commenter also stated that the GEIS failed to assess whether the regulatory controls being 

relied upon to prevent or mitigate the effects of long-term storage are effective. The commenter 

also stated that the GEIS assumes that existing decommissioning regulations will ensure that all 

onsite contamination will be remediated during the short-term timeframe and that there is no 

need to assess onsite impacts from future spent fuel pool leaks. 

Another commenter stated that, by failing to conduct a forward-looking analysis, the NRC failed 

to recognize the significant impacts that could result from spent fuel pool leaks. Another 

commenter stated that the GEIS should have analyzed the potential impacts of a spent fuel pool 

leak if it were not detected quickly. One commenter stated that the NRC’s inspection report 

assessing the implementation of the industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative, Summary of 

Results from Completion of NRC’s Temporary Instruction on Groundwater Protection, TI-

,QGXVWU\*URXQGZDWHU3URWHFWLRQ,Qitiation, was based only on monitoring performed 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

at operating nuclear power plants and not at those that are permanently shut down. The 

commenter stated that this is contrary to the GEIS, which states that the report was based on 

inspections of groundwater monitoring at all nuclear power plant sites. The commenter stated 

WKDWEHWZHHQ$XJXVWDQG$XJXVWQRJURXQGZDWHUPRQLWRULQJZDVSHUIRUPHGDW

permanently shutdown power plants such as Zion and Humboldt Bay. The commenter further 

stated that the NRC should not rely on a voluntary groundwater monitoring program for the 

entire short-term timeframe based on one inspection, which was conducted only at operating 

nuclear power plants. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. As 

discussed in Section E.1.2, the onsite groundwater monitoring programs that licensees have 

implemented were done so as part of the industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative (NRC 

2011j). This Initiative was a voluntary effort undertaken by industry to address the issue of 

radioactive contamination being leaked to the environment from a variety of nuclear power plant 

systems, some of which were spent fuel pools. An important objective of this Initiative is to 

detect leaks well before radionuclide concentrations approach Federal and State dose and 

drinking-water limits. Subsequent to this Initiative, the NRC issued the Decommissioning 

3ODQQLQJ5XOH)5ZKLFKLQSDUWPRGLILHGWKHUHJXODWLRQVDW&)5WR

require licensees to conduct subsurface surveys (which includes groundwater) to identify the 

magnitude and extent of subsurface contamination. As described in Appendix E, the NRC has 

determined that licensees that implement onsite groundwater monitoring programs consistent 

with the industry’s Groundwater Protection Initiative have satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 



While the primary focus of the Decommissioning Planning Rule was to minimize and identify 

contamination during operations to facilitate the decommissioning process, the subsurface 

VXUYH\UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5FRQWLQXHWRDSSO\IROORZLQJSHUPDQHQWFHVVDWLRQRI

RSHUDWLRQV7KHVXEVXUIDFHVXUYH\VUHTXLUHGE\&)5ZKLFKDUHLQWHQGHGWRLGHQWLI\

and characterize subsurface contamination, allow for the timely detection of onsite groundwater 

resulting from a spent fuel pool leak. As the comments note, NRC regulations do not 

specifically require onsite groundwater monitoring. However, implementing or maintaining an 

onsite groundwater monitoring program that is consistent with the Groundwater Protection 

Initiative is an acceptable way IRUDOLFHQVHHWRVDWLVI\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5DQG

is consistent with the industry’s commitment in the Groundwater Protection Initiative. Further, 

licensees of facilities that have recently entered the decommissioning period have reaffirmed 

their commitment to maintaining onsite groundwater monitoring programs (DEF 2013; DEK 

2013a). 

Any licensee that chooses to implement a program different than the industry commitment 

ZRXOGVWLOOQHHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHFRPSOLDQFHZLWK&)5HYHQDIWHUWKHHQGRIUHDFWRU

operations. Although the NRC has chosen not to require onsite groundwater monitoring by 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

regulation, the Commission has directed the NRC to continue to evaluate the implementation of 

licensees’ groundwater monitoring programs. The Commission has affirmed that if these 

programs are “not conducted in a committed and enduring fashion, the NRC should present 

information to this effect to the Commission which can and, if necessary, will revisit this matter” 

(NRC 2011k). 

The NRC disagrees with comments that suggest the GEIS contradicts previous statements 

made by the NRC indicating that groundwater monitoring was initiated only after leaks were 

detected. The statements referenced in the comments were made prior to the implementation 

of the Groundwater Protection Initiative and the Decommissioning Planning Rule. The NRC 

also disagrees with comments that additional measures should be required to provide earlier 

leak detection. Sufficient mechanisms are already in place to ensure timely detection of 

leakage. See Section E.2.1.1 of the GEIS. Therefore, no additional regulatory requirements 

are necessary. The NRC has revised the discussion of groundwater monitoring programs 

throughout Appendix E to clarify the requirements for groundwater monitoring. 

The NRC disagrees that its inspection and enforcement program is inadequate with regard to 

spent fuel pool leaks. The NRC has inspected and will continue to inspect the implementation 

of groundwater monitoring programs. Also, because these programs have been integrated into 

licensees’ existing environmental monitoring programs, the NRC will continue to inspect both 

the results of and changes to the groundwater monitoring programs through its ongoing 

oversight process. Should a licensee make a change to its monitoring program that could 

constitute a threat to public health and safety, the NRC has adequate regulatory tools to compel 

that licensee to correct the deficiency. The NRC disagrees that the GEIS analysis of offsite 

impacts from spent fuel pool leaks relies on licensees’ compliance. The NRC does not base the 

conclusions in Appendix E solely on the implementation of groundwater monitoring programs. 

As discussed in Appendix E, a variety of factors act to prevent and minimize the effects of a 

spent fuel pool leak to the environment. These include spent fuel pool design (e.g., stainlesssteel liners and leakage-collection systems) and operational controls (e.g., monitoring and 

surveillance of spent fuel pool water levels) that make it unlikely that leaked spent fuel pool 

water will migrate to the environment, or remain undetected long enough for the leak to 

adversely affect the offsite groundwater receptors. Additionally, the hydrologic characteristics of 

a typical nuclear power plant site (see GEIS section E.2.1.3) act to impede the offsite migration 

of spent fuel pool leakage. In addition, groundwater monitoring programs implemented as part 

of the Groundwater Protection Initiative, in conjunction with other onsite and offsite radiological 

monitoring required of licensees, will serve as an important mechanism to detect radiological 

contamination in the event of a spent fuel pool leak, and will facilitate timely detection of a leak 

soon enough to prevent offsite migration at levels that could exceed Federal and State dose and 

drinking water requirements. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The NRC disagrees that a postulated loss of water from a spent fuel pool should be evaluated, 

such as what is required for the liquid waste-management system. The accident analysis 

performed for the liquid waste-management system evaluates the consequences of system 

IDLOXUHVUHVXOWLQJLQWKHUHOHDVHRISHUFHQWRIWKHYROXPHFDSDFLW\RIDWDQNDQGLWV

FRPSRQHQWV15&f). The NRC considers the types of failures analyzed for the liquid 

waste-management system, described in NUREG–15&2012h), to be less likely to occur 

with spent fuel pools. As described in Appendix E, spent fuel pools are robust, seismically 

qualified structures, with multiple design and operational controls in place to prevent or detect 

leaks. Additionally, spent fuel pools are designed to ensure that component failures—such as 

those postulated for the liquid waste-management system—will not cause the near complete 

loss of water analyzed for that system. As a result, the NRC does not believe it is necessary to 

have licensees analyze a postulated loss of water from the spent fuel pool. 

The NRC disagrees with comments that state that spent fuel pool water level monitoring is only 

required during spent fuel movement. As discussed in Section D.2.40.11 of this appendix, 

licensees are required as part of their licensing bases to have instrumentation to monitor spent 

fuel pool water levels as long as spent fuel is stored there. The NRC disagrees with comments 

that regulatory oversight lessens after a reactor shutdown and that the NRC has erroneously 

assumed that groundwater monitoring and NRC inspections will continue after shutdown. 

Decommissioning a nuclear power reactor, like its operation, is a licensed activity under 10 CFR 

3DUWVDQG7KHUHIRUHOLFHQVHHVRIGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJIDFLOLWLHVDUHVWLOOUHTXLUHGWRPHHWDOO

applicable regulations. The NRC continues to maintain its oversight of these facilities 

throughout decommissioning to ensure compliance with these requirements. With regard to 

groundwater monitoring during decommissioning, licensees have committed to perform 

groundwater monitoring, which has been implemented at all decommissioning plants to date. 

As stated above, licensees that have recently begun decommissioning have reaffirmed their 

commitment to groundwater monitoring programs. As discussed, if a licensee were to terminate 

its groundwater monitoring program, it would still need to demonstrate compliance with the 

VXEVXUIDFHVXUYH\UHTXLUHPHQWVDW&)57KHUHIRUHLWLVUHDVRQDEOHWRDVVXPHWKDW

licensees will maintain the capability to detect leaks during the short-term timeframe. 

Regarding inspections, the NRC conducts inspections at decommissioning sites during 

continued storage to verify that spent fuel pools are operated and maintained in accordance 

with requirements, and to verify the conduct and results of licensees’ environmental monitoring 

programs. In this way, the NRC ensures that there are appropriate mechanisms in place to 

facilitate the timely detection of spent fuel pool leaks. The NRC inspects licensees according to 

site-specific master inspection plans. Master inspection plans are periodically reviewed to 

ensure that facilities are being adequately inspected. As described in NRC Inspection Manual 

&KDSWHU15&2003c), the NRC’s guidance document for conducting inspections at 

decommissioning facilities, some of the factors that should be taken into consideration when 

developing a site-specific master inspection plan include plant design; plant status; licensee 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

SHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHPHQWDQGGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJVFKHGXOH,QVSHFWLRQ0DQXDO&KDSWHU

DOVROLVWVFRUHDQGGLVFUHWLRQDU\LQVSHFWLRQSURFHGXUHVWKDW may be performed at a 

decommissioning facility, depending on the circumstances (NRC 2003c). Through Inspection 

3URFHGXUH6SHQW)XHO3RRO6DIHW\DW3HUPDQHQWO\6KXWGRZQ5HDFWRUV 15&G, 

mentioned in comments, the NRC inspects spent fuel pools to identify any conditions that could 

result in a siphon or drain path to prevent large loss of water; reviews and evaluates whether the 

spent fuel pool instrumentation, alarms and leakage-detection systems are adequate; verifies 

satisfactory implementation of spent fuel pool chemistry and cleanliness control to prevent or 

minimize the occurrence of leaks; and reviews and ascertains whether spent fuel pool operation 

is equivalent to that when the system was in operation during reactor power operations, thereby 

ensuring that spent fuel pools are properly maintained and that leaks will be prevented, or 

detected in a timely fashion. ,QDGGLWLRQWR,QVSHFWLRQ3URFHGXUH15&G), the NRC 

has a variety of other core inspection procedures to ensure that a licensee is performing the 

necessary spent fuel pool monitoring and surveillance, and that environmental monitoring is 

being conducted in accordance with its approved radiological environmental monitoring 

program. Contrary to the comments on Zion inspections, inspections associated with Procedure 

KDYHEHHQSHUIRUPHGWLPHVDW=LRQVLQFH)HEUXDU\2000. 

As the comments note, aging management programs for spent fuel pools are intended to 

manage aging effects during the period of extended operation and may be modified following 

SHUPDQHQWFHVVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQV+RZHYHUDVVWDWHGDW&)5NQRZQDVWKH

Maintenance Rule, licensees of decommissioning facilities must continue to monitor “the 

performance or condition of all structures, systems, or components associated with the storage, 

control, and maintenance of spent fuel in a safe condition, in a manner sufficient to provide 

reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and components are capable of fulfilling 

their intended functions.” The Maintenance Rule also requires licensees to take appropriate 

corrective action to correct a deficiency. As such, the Maintenance Rule does apply to 

decommissioning facilities, and the scope of the monitoring required by that rule does not 

decrease during decommissioning, such that systems that are important to protecting against a 

leak are indeed maintained. 

The NRC further clarifies how this applies to decommissioning facilities in Inspection Procedure 

0DLQWHQDQFHDQG6XUYHLOODQFHDW3HUPDQHntly Shutdown Reactors, one of the core 

inspections performed at decommissioning facilities (NRC H). In addition to the spent fuel 

pool structure, spent fuel components covered under the Maintenance Rule include the spent 

fuel pool liner and cooling system, spent fuel racks, criticality control design features, radiation 

monitoring and radiological effluent instrumentation, and spent fuel lifting and handling 

equipment. Therefore, the NRC ensures that systems, structures, and components important to 

preventing or detecting a spent fuel pool leak will be adequately maintained during the shortterm timeframe. Further, should new information emerge on spent fuel pool-related aging 

effects, the NRC will take action through the appropriate regulatory process to ensure public 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

health and safety is adequately protected. Although a comment misstates that licensees are not 

bound by the terms and conditions of their licenses after shutdown, GEIS section E.1.1 has 

been revised to clarify that aging management programs associated with reactor license 

renewal are intended for the period of extended operation and may be modified after shutdown. 

However, as discussed above, licensees are still required by the Maintenance Rule to maintain 

structures, systems, and components related to the spent fuel pool after shutdown. 

Also contrary to the comment, the GEIS is not deficient in not discussing the Dresden spent fuel 

pool incident and means to avoid a recurrence. Subsequent to the Dresden incident, the NRC 

issue BulletiQ-01, Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance 

Practices at Dresden Unit 1, that required licensees of decommissioning facilities to verify and 

report to the NRC that similar conditions such as those that existed at Dresden did not exist at 

RWKHUIDFLOLWLHV15&b)XUWKHUWKH15&ODWHULVVXHG,QVSHFWLRQ3URFHGXUH15&

G), discussed earlier in this response, to ensure routine inspection and verification of spent 

fuel pool systems in accordance with license requirements. 

The NRC disagrees that licensees of decommissioning facilities do not receive important safety 

communications and enforcement orders. When deciding to communicate information to, or 

require action by licensees, the NRC evaluates the subset of licensees for which the information 

or action is appropriate. The NRC determined that the Information Notice and Orders 

referenced in the comments primarily addressed issues relevant to operating reactors, so the 

NRC sent that information to operating reactor licensees. Similarly, and for the same reason, 

%XOOHWLQ-15&b), discussed earlier in this response, was sent only to licensees of 

decommissioning facilities. 

The NRC disagrees that the GEIS does not comply with NEPA and New York v. NRC because 

the GEIS allegedly fails to consider onsite impacts from spent fuel pool leaks. As described in 

Appendix E, the onsite environmental impacts from normal operations and accidents during 

decommissioning activities, which include spent fuel pool operations, are addressed in 

NUREG–6XSSOHPHQW)LQDO*HQHULF(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFW6WDWHPHQWRQ

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Supplement 1, Regarding the Decommissioning of 

Nuclear Power Reactors (NRC 2002a). Further, any significant radioactivity identified by 

licensees, including that resulting from a spent fuel pool leak, must be addressed during the 

decommissioning process to meet the license-termination requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, 

Subpart E. The license-termination process is subject to a site-specific review. The NRC also 

disagrees that its reliance upon institutional controls to manage spent fuel pools is misplaced. 

As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the NRC believes it is reasonable to assume 

for the purposes of these analyses that institutional controls will remain in place. 

As to the comment that the NRC should have assessed whether regulatory controls to prevent 

or mitigate the effects of storage have been effective, it is not clear what assessment is sought, 

or how such an assessment would affect the conclusions in the GEIS. As described in 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Appendix B, the NRC has effective regulatory controls in place to ensure that spent fuel can be 

safely stored during continued storage. Further, license requirements and regulatory oversight 

in place are adequate to prevent, detect, and mitigate the impacts of spent fuel pool leaks 

during the short-term timeframe, as described above. The GEIS acknowledges that, while 

unlikely, a spent fuel pool leak of sufficient magnitude and duration could occur and affect offsite 

groundwater receptors. The evaluation of those impacts is discussed in Appendix E. 

The NRC disagrees that it failed to conduct a forward-looking analysis, or that it did not analyze 

the impacts of a spent fuel pool leak that was not detected quickly. As just noted, the GEIS 

analyzes the impacts of a postulated long-term, undetected spent fuel pool leak. While the 

likelihood of such a leak occurring is informed by a consideration of historical instances of spent 

fuel pool leaks, the conclusions in the GEIS are based on a consideration of what the impacts 

would be, should such a leak occur. 

Regarding implementation of groundwater monitoring programs at decommissioning sites, 

Zion’s groundwater monitoring program pre-dates the industry’s Groundwater Protection 

Initiative and has been inspected by the NRC as part of its review of the licensee’s routine 

environmental monitoring program (15&c). Subsequent to the Groundwater Protection 

Initiative and separate from the inspection performed for operating reactors, the NRC inspected 

the implementation of the Zion groundwater monitoring program relative to the industry’s 

Initiative (NRC 2012n). The NRC did not inspect the implementation of a groundwater 

monitoring program consistent with the industry’s Initiative at Humboldt Bay, because all spent 

fuel was removed from the Humboldt Bay spent fuel pool shortly after the Initiative was 

introduced. However, groundwater monitoring was already being conducted at Humboldt Bay 

SULRUWRWKH,QLWLDWLYH3*(&)LQDOO\WKH15&GRHVQRWUHO\RQRQHLQVSHFWLRQWKDWZDV

performed only at operating nuclear power plants, as suggested by comments. As discussed 

previously in this response, the NRC has inspected, and will continue to inspect licensees’ 

groundwater monitoring programs, as appropriate, throughout the short-term timeframe. No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

----3--3--4---1-----

--4----------2--2--3--

2--2--3--2--2--1--2--2--2-

-2--1--2--2--2--2--2--2--2-

-3) 

D.2.40.6 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the GEIS fails to evaluate mitigation 

measures designed to prevent adverse environmental impacts from spent fuel pool leaks, and 

that that failure is a violation of NEPA. Commenters offered specific mitigation measures they 

felt should have been considered in the GEIS, including the following: 

x regular inspections of all components of the spent fuel handling system 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

x replacement of below ground piping with aboveground piping 

x consideration of new technologies or materials that might minimize the potential for leaks 

x consideration of new seismological information on the integrity of spent fuel pools and 

changes to spent fuel pool design to account for this new seismological information 

x enhanced environmental monitoring, particularly enhanced monitoring to identify impacts to 

aquatic organisms 

x immediate remediation of contamination, including groundwater extraction and soil 

excavation or treatment 

x increased public access to information, including disclosures on a monthly or quarterly basis 

and improved access to site-specific annual radiological monitoring reports 

One commenter stated that the NRC should consider development and enforcement of a 

mandatory groundwater monitoring program, rather than relying on the industry’s voluntary 

program. Another commenter stated that, in addition to the GEIS’s evaluation of long-term 

leaks, the NRC must either look at the probability and consequences of short-term, high-volume 

leaks or explain how mitigation measures can prevent environmental impacts from such leaks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. Appendix E contains a discussion of 

several remediation options that are available in the event of a spent fuel pool leak. Further, it is 

important to note that this GEIS satisfies a small portion of the NRC’s NEPA obligations related 

to the issuance of a reactor or spent fuel storage facility license by generically evaluating the 

environmental impacts of spent fuel storage beyond the facility’s license term. Prior to the 

completion of an individual licensing action, the NRC will conduct a site-specific environmental 

review and document the results of this review in an EA/FONSI or EIS. The site-specific 

environmental review will address, among other things, the environmental impacts of spent fuel 

storage during the license term. In the site-specific licensing review, the NRC will consider, and, 

when warranted, implement site-specific mitigation of impacts. During operation, facility 

operators and the NRC gain significant additional experience with site-specific issues, including 

those related to issues of site configuration, site hydrology and maintenance history. 

Compliance with NRC regulations, and any site-specific mitigation and controls informed by the 

licensing review, operating experience, and ongoing regulatory oversight help to ensure that any 

unplanned release during operation does not exceed regulatory limits at any given site. 

The NRC disagrees that it should include additional consideration of short-term, high-volume 

leaks in the GEIS. As described in Appendix E, a short-term, high-volume leak is likely to be 

identified by a licensee and mitigated, if necessary. The mitigation measure that could be taken 

in an event such as this would vary based on the circumstances of the water loss, but could 

include taking steps to hydraulically contain the contamination, groundwater treatment, or 

monitored natural attenuation. Monitored natural attenuation is a process which relies on 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

natural attenuation processes (e.g., radioactive decay) within the context of a carefully 

controlled and monitored setting. 

For additional discussion on potential effects from the exposure of aquatic organisms to 

radionuclides, see Section ' of this appendix. 

For a discussion on the requirements for groundwater monitoring and the NRC’s consideration 

of groundwater monitoring in the GEIS, refer to Section ' of this appendix. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---3----------23) 

D.2.40.7 – COMMENT: Several commenters did not agree with the NRC’s100-gallon per day 

(gpd) threshold for detectable spent fuel pool leaks. Commenters noted that the NRC’s 

conclusion that a 100-gpd leak from a spent fuel pool will be promptly detected is incorrect and 

not supported by an analysis of past leaks. Commenters described significant leaks from the 

Yankee Rowe and Salem nuclear power plants that were greater than /G100 gpd) and 

where detection was delayed. Commenters also pointed out that the NRC did not evaluate 

leaks that were less than /G100 gpd) and described leaks from the Indian Point Nuclear 

Power Plant and Brookhaven National Laboratory that were less than /G100 gpd), not 

timely detected and resulting in significant impacts. Commenters argued that the NRC must 

either show that leaks less than /G100 gpd) cannot result in significant impacts, even 

when undetected for the short-term timeframe or the NRC must identify the regulatory 

requirements that would provide assurance that a leak would be detected before it causes a 

significant impact. Alternatively, the commenters suggested the NRC could impose a regulatory 

requirement that all licensees conduct a site-specific evaluation before entering the short-term 

storage period. One commenter stated that the GEIS does not analyze a major loss of spent 

fuel pool water from a leak or when “water use has to be dramatically increased in order to 

prevent a spent fuel fire by providing makeup water.” 

One commenter questioned what the measurable amount of leakage is that defines NRC’s 

significant contamination criteria and argued that all leaks require sufficient enforcement action. 

Another commenter asserted that licensees are not required to have spent fuel pool water level 

instrumentation or groundwater monitoring systems during the short-term timeframe, and 

questioned how the licensee or the NRC would detect leaks without these systems. Another 

commenter questioned the NRC’s and a licensee’s ability to determine whether past leaks have 

stopped, which the commenter believes would impair the NRC’s and a licensee’s ability to 

determine whether new leaks have started. The commenter believes that the degradation of the 

Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head is an example of an issue that was thought to have 

been corrected, but was not. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

One commenter noted that although spent fuel pool leaks that puddle on a floor or surrounding 

area can be identified in a timely manner, leaks into the ground are more complicated and 

timely detection of these leaks is less certain. The commenter indicated that the GEIS should 

LGHQWLI\WKHUHJXODWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWUHPDLQLQSODFHGXULQJWKH-year short-term storage 

timeframe that provide reasonable assurance that “spent fuel leakage of X gallons per day or 

greater will be detected before causing significant impacts,” and that the NRC should 

demonstrate by analysis applicable to all sites, that “spent fuel pool leakage of less than X 

gallons per day of infinite duration cannot cause significant impacts.” 

Another commenter stated that there is no basis for the NRC to assume that all waste from the 

VSHQWIXHOSRROVZLOOEHPRYHGWRGU\FDVNVE\-years after the licensed life and it must 

evaluate the consequences of leaving fuel in the pool beyond the timeframe. This includes 

examining the effects of structural integrity and how it would affect leaks throughout all three 

timeframes, short-term, long-term, and indefinite. The commenter noted that the NRC’s own 

technical material (NUREG/CR–Copinger et al. 2012) raises concerns that the structural 

integrity of spent fuel pools may diminish significantly over time and that aging management 

program are only designed for 20-year periods of extended storage and may be inadequate for 

the long-term assurance of pool structural integrity. The commenter also noted that as fuel 

remains in the pool during extended periods, the outer cladding material encasing the fuel may 

degrade, allowing fission products to be released into the pool water; because the NRC cannot 

predict with certainty that all spent fuel will be removed from SRROVZLWKLQ\HDUVLWPXVW

examine the probability and environmental consequences of leaks after that time, as well as 

techniques for managing the aging of spent fuel pools in order to prevent such leaks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The GEIS analyzes the potential for 

spent fuel leaks and impacts to offsite resources. This analysis is based on typical nuclear 

power reactor site hydrology, the design and structural integrity of a spent fuel pool, and the 

regulatory requirements and operational controls in place that influence the ability to detect a 

leak in a timely fashion and the impacts of a leak, should one escape detection. Having 

concluded that it is unlikely that a leak of sufficient quantity or duration could occur without 

detection, or that such a leak would not be impeded by the hydrologic characteristics typical at 

spent fuel pool locations, the NRC has not found it necessary to make a reasonable assurance 

finding as to how long a leak will remain undetected before causing offsite impacts. Nor is such 

a finding appropriate under NEPA for the purpose of this GEIS. Further, the GEIS does not 

conclude that a leak rate of /G100 gpd) is the maximum possible leak rate, or that a leak 

of that magnitude would be identified or corrected within a defined timeframe. The GEIS 

postulates a leak rate of /G100 gpd) precisely because of the operational experience with 

the Salem Unit 1 spent fuel pool leak, which persisted for a long period of time before detection. 

While a leak of greater magnitude is possible, the likelihood that a leak would remain 

undetected long enough to adversely affect the offsite environment decreases as the magnitude 

of the leak increases. Conversely, as the magnitude of the leak increases, the likelihood 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

decreases that the leak will escape detection, either through spent fuel pool water level 

monitoring and surveillance, or onsite groundwater monitoring. 

Although the leak at Yankee Rowe released a large volume of water, as explained in Section 

' of this appendix, it is uncertain whether this release resulted from a spent fuel pool 

leak. This incident therefore has questionable relevance to spent fuel pool leaks analyzed in the 

GEIS. Yankee Rowe was nonetheless added to GEIS Table E-4 because it is possible that the 

leak did emanate from the spent fuel pool (see Section ' of this appendix). The NRC 

also disagrees that it is necessary to specifically analyze a leak rate of less than /G100 

gpd). Although lessening the leak rate would affect detection though spent fuel pool water level 

monitoring and surveillance, the leak is still likely to be detected through onsite groundwater 

monitoring; otherwise, the magnitude of any offsite impacts would be less than described in 

Appendix E. 

In answer to the comment questioning what measurable amount of leakage defines significant 

contamination, in the context of the GEIS, the NRC considers significant contamination to be 

such that an NRC effluent release regulatory limit or EPA drinking water standard is exceeded. 

The NRC has sufficient inspection and enforcement authority to enforce its regulatory limits and 

to take appropriate action to protect public health and safety. The scope of that action would be 

commensurate with the level of the threat to public health and safety. 

Contrary to the suggestion in the comments, and as explained in Section D.2.40.11 of this 

appendix, licensees are required by their licensing bases to have the capability to monitor spent 

fuel pool water levels. In addition, as explained in Section D.2.40.10 of this appendix, licensees 

have implemented groundwater monitoring programs that satisfy the subsurface survey 

UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5 The combination of spent fuel pool water level monitoring 

and surveillance, as well as onsite groundwater monitoring, makes it likely that a spent fuel pool 

leak will be timely detected. While it is not possible to know with certainty that a particular leak 

has been stopped, it is possible to establish a baseline of the contamination from existing 

leakage, such that any new leakage (e.g., from a new leak, or an increase in the existing leak 

rate) would be detected. The Indian Point Unit 2 spent fuel pool leak is an example of such 

subsequent detection (NRC F). 

The NRC disagrees that there is no basis to assume that all spent fuel will be removed from 

SRROVZLWKLQ\HDUV$VGHVFULEHGLQSection ' of this appendix, the NRC continues 

to believe that it is reasonable to assume that all spent fuel will be removed from the spent fuel 

SRROZLWKLQ\HDUV As such, it is not necessary to evaluate the consequences of spent fuel 

pool leaks beyond the short-term timeframe. For additional discussion on degradation of spent 

fuel and spent fuel pool, refer to Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----3--4-------1--1-12) 

-1--3--1--1--3--34) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.40.8 – COMMENT: Several commenters argued that the NRC either failed to consider all 

instances of leaks, or did not properly evaluate the impacts of past spent fuel pool leaks. 

Commenters either identified or provided details concerning the leaks, from the spent fuel pool 

or otherwise, at Salem, Dresden, Indian Point, Connecticut Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Seabrook, 

Watts Bar, Palo Verde, Turkey Point, Pilgrim, and Hatch nuclear power plants; BWX 

Technologies; and the Brookhaven National Laboratory. Several commenters stated that 

because all historical leaks have not been considered, the NRC has underestimated the likely 

frequency of past leaks and did not fully consider the consequences of these leaks, which 

commenters believe were not harmless. One commenter stated that leak at Brookhaven 

National Laboratory supports the GEIS in that onsite wells detected the leak and that no 

drinking water supply was harmed. Two commenters provided additional information intended 

to correct errors in Tables E-4 and E-UHODWLQJWRWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROOHDNVDW6DOHP8QLWDQG

Watts Bar. One commenter stated that the leak at Salem Unit 2 did not make it into the 

environment, citing NUREG/CR–Copinger et al. 2012). One commenter, citing the Watts 

Bar Final Environmental Statement, stated that the maximum onsite tritium concentration due to 

WKHOHDNDW:DWWV%DUUZDVS&L/LQVWHDGRIWKH7DEOH(-YDOXHRIS&L/2QH

commenter requested additional information about the Salem Unit 2 spent fuel pool leak, which 

would characterize it as an accidental release to the environment. 

Several commenters stated that the NRC failed to fully consider the cause of past spent fuel 

pool leaks. One commenter noted that the NRC’s evaluation did not contain a root cause 

analysis of past leaks and as a result could not conclude that leaks will not continue or that they 

will not be more severe in the future. The commenter stated that if the requested root cause 

analysis shows that the aging spent fuel pools are the cause of the leaks, then greater and more 

damaging leaks are more probable in the future, which is contrary to the conclusions in the 

GEIS. Other commenters argued that the NRC’s analysis must explicitly identify the means by 

which past leaks were detected to demonstrate that past leaks were not identified due to sitespecific factors or luck. These commenters believe that the NRC must put in place 

requirements to ensure adequate detection methods remain in place throughout WKH-year 

short-term timeframe. 

Several commenters stated that the leaks listed in Table E-4 undermine the NRC’s conclusion 

that leaks of sufficient magnitude and duration to contaminate offsite groundwater sources 

above regulatory limits are very unlikely. One commenter stated that based on a comparison of 

the data in Table E-4 with Table G-LWLVFOHDUWKDWDERXW percent OHDNVVSHQWIXHO

pools) of spent fuel pools have already leaked. One commenter expressed concern that the 

NRC’s analysis did not examine why the leaks did not affect public health, including an analysis 

of whether the leaks were harmless because of site-specific factors. Further, several 

commenters expressed concern that the NRC did not fully consider the impacts and 

consequences of spent fuel pool leaks and instead only considered public health impacts due to 

the leaks. One commenter stated that the NRC maintains that the risk to groundwater from 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

OHDNVLVORZGHVSLWHWKH/LTXLG5DGLRDFWLYH5HOHDVH/HVVRQV/HDUQHG7Dsk Force Final 

Report, which indicated that leaks did or could impact groundwater resources relative to 

established EPA drinking water standards. 

One commenter argued that the NRC’s analysis is flawed because it makes unsupported 

assumptions about the NRC’s future ability to detect leaks and because it relies on inapplicable 

or nonexistent regulatory requirements for future leak prevention. 

One commenter questioned the structural integrity of spent fuel pools. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. Many of the 

examples mentioned in the comments had already been considered in the draft GEIS. In those 

cases, with the exception of information provided for Salem Unit 2 and Watts Bar, the comments 

did not provide any new information that substantially differs from what the NRC had previously 

considered in preparation of the GEIS. In the case of the spent fuel pool leak at Salem Unit 2, 

the comments correctly note that the leakage was contained in the leakage-collection system, 

and Table E-4 has been updated to reflect that no radioactive liquid was released to the 

environment. As for the spent fuel pool leak at Watts Bar, the comments correctly notes that the 

PD[LPXPRQVLWHWULWLXPFRQFHQWUDWLRQZDVSCi/L and not 30,000 pCi/L. Table E-ZDV

updated to reflect the actual maximum onsite tritium concentration at Watts Bar. Since 

groundwater contamination at Watts Bar has remained onsite, this revised concentration does 

not change the conclusions in Appendix E. 

Several examples provided in comments were not appropriate for consideration in the GEIS. 

Specifically, several comments referenced various cases of leaks at Dresden, Indian Point, and 

Pilgrim that involved reactor plant systems other than the spent fuel pools. Because these were 

not leaks from the spent fuel pool, they are not relevant to conditions that will exist during 

continued storage. As a result, no changes were made to Appendix E to incorporate any 

additional information regarding these leaks. Similarly, the NRC disagrees that the leaks at 

BWX Technologies and Brookhaven National Laboratory should be considered in the GEIS. 

These facilities are neither commercial nuclear power plant sites nor away-from-reactor ISFSIs 

storing spent fuel. The BWX Technologies facility is licensed to possess a maximum of 4 spent 

fuel assemblies for the purposes of research, development, and laboratory analyses. 

Brookhaven National Laboratory is a DOE-owned facility that has never been licensed by the 

NRC to store commercial spent fuel. Leaks from the spent fuel pool at Brookhaven National 

Laboratory were associated with the High Flux Beam Reactor. Additionally, the Brookhaven 

spent fuel pool is unlined and did not have a tell-tale drain system, both typical features in NRClicensed commercial spent fuel pools. As a result of these considerations, these facilities were 

not included in Appendix E. 

Comments identified three cases—Turkey Point, Connecticut Yankee, and Yankee Rowe—in 

which spent fuel pool components had either leaked spent fuel pool water or were implicated as 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

potential sources of onsite contamination. In the case of Turkey Point, a failed seal on a spent 

IXHOSRROSXPSFDXVHGDVSLOORIDSSUR[LPDWHO\JDOORQVRIVSHQWIXHOSRROZDWHU, of which 

VL[WRVHYHQJDOORQVOHDNHGLQWRVWRUPGUDLQV)3/7KLVFRQGLWLRQZDVSURPSWO\LGHQWLILHG

by the licensee and corrected. The spent fuel pool water that had been released into the 

environment remained onsite and went back into the intake of the plant cooling canal, which is a 

ODUJHFORVHGORRSRQVLWHIORZSDWK)57KLVRFFXUUHQFHVXSSRUWVWKH15&’s finding 

that a significant short-term loss of water is likely to be identified and mitigated, if necessary, to 

avoid significant offsite impacts. Table E-4 was updated to include information on the Turkey 

Point leak. In addition, the NRC has revised Table E-4 to clarify that the releases from Hatch 

and Turkey Point were associated with significant short-term losses of water, rather than longterm, undetected spent fuel pool leaks. 

In the case of Yankee Rowe, the NRC’V/LTXLG5DGLRDFWLYH5HOHDVH/HVVRQV/HDUQHG

7DVN)RUFH)LQDO5HSRUW15&a) did not identify Yankee Rowe’s spent fuel pool as the 

source of tritium to groundwater and this occurrence was originally omitted from Table E-4. 

Most if not all of the contamination described in comments is suspected to have come from a 

series of leaks from the ion exchange pit that leaked through a construction joint at the common 

waOOEHWZHHQWKHVSHQWIXHOSRRODQGLRQH[FKDQJHSLW<$(&:KLOHWKHOLFHQVHH

VXVSHFWHGWKDWWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROOHDNHGSHULRGLFDOO\XQWLOWKHLQVWDOODWLRQRIDOLQHULQWKH

amount of leakage was not discernable from water level changes and makeup rates (YAEC 

1RQHWKHOHVVEHFDXVHDVSHQWIXHOSRROOHDNDW<DQNHH5RZHFDQQRWEHUXOHGRXWWKH

NRC has updated Table E-4 to include leak information from Yankee Rowe. 

,QWKHFDVHRI&RQQHFWLFXW<DQNHHWKH/LTXLG5DGLRDFWLYH5HOHDVH/HVVons Learned Task 

)RUFH)LQDO5HSRUW15&a) identified the potential of a previously unidentified spent fuel 

pool leak, based on contamination discovered in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool building. The 

white substance on the exterior of the spent fuel pool building wall, which the licensee 

conservatively assumed to be boron precipitate in its reporting to the NRC and State, was 

WHVWHGDQGGHWHUPLQHGQRWWREHERURQ15&a). Additionally, further inspections 

performed during decommissioning determined that there was no evidence of any active or 

SUHYLRXVOHDNWKURXJKWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROEXLOGLQJZDOO15&a). As a result, Table E-4 was 

not updated to include information about contamination at Connecticut Yankee. 

The NRC disagrees that it failed to fully consider the cause of past spent fuel pool leaks. Each 

leak identified in Table E-4 was analyzed in the documents cited in the GEIS and the causes, to 

the extent they could be determined, were considered by the NRC in preparation of the GEIS. 

The NRC acknowledges in the GEIS that leaks have occurred in the past and that there is a 

potential for spent fuel pools to leak in the future. As described in Section E.2.1.1, spent fuel 

pool leaks can occur through small cracks in the stainless-steel liner that form due to 

intergranular stress-corrosion cracking and crevice corrosion, seam or plug weld defects, or 

damage to the liner. In response to a series of leaks, as described in more detail in Section 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

E.1.2, the industry has implemented its Groundwater Protection Initiative, that intends to 

improve licensee response to inadvertent releases of radioactive materials in subsurface soils 

and water. However, this GEIS is not the appropriate mechanism to identify ways to detect and 

prevent the occurrence of future leaks. 

Spent fuel pools are massive, robust, durable, seismic category I1

 reinforced-concrete structures 

designed and constructed to withstand the effects of operational loads and severe natural 

phenomena events without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. Review of 

available spent pool leak data indicates no reason why future spent fuel pool leaks would be 

more frequent or severe than those previously experienced. Further, the aging of plant 

systems, structures, and components is a topic that the NRC continues to address through its 

ongoing reactor oversight process. Should new information develop that spent fuel pools are 

aging differently than previously understood, the NRC would require its licensees to implement 

whatever corrective or remedial actions are necessary to ensure protection of public health and 

safety. Based on decades of experience with current leak detection methodology, the NRC 

believes that the licensee programs and mechanisms in place adequately ensure timely 

detection of leakage; therefore, no additional requirements are necessary. As requested in 

comments, the NRC has added information to the GEIS explaining how each leak was detected. 

It is important to note, however, that all known instances of spent fuel pool leaks to the 

environment have occurred prior to the industry-wide implementation of onsite groundwater 

monitoring, as discussed below. This is significant because licensees now have an additional 

tool for future leak detection in contrast to how past leaks were detected. The NRC disagrees 

that the number of leaks listed in Table E-4 undermines the conclusion in Appendix E that a leak 

of sufficient magnitude and duration to contaminate offsite groundwater sources above 

regulatory limits is very unlikely. The NRC does not base this conclusion on the number of 

spent fuel pools that have, or have not, leaked. As discussed in Appendix E, several factors act 

to minimize the effects of a spent fuel pool leak to the environment. These include spent fuel 

pool design (e.g., stainless-steel liners and leakage-collection systems) and operational controls 

(e.g., monitoring and surveillance of spent fuel pool water levels) that make it unlikely that a leak 

reach the site’s groundwater system, or remain undetected for a significant period of time such 

that it would impact offsite groundwater receptors. Additionally, the site hydrology of a typical 

nuclear power plant (see Section E.2.1.3) impedes the offsite migration of spent fuel pool 

leakage, should the leakage reach the site’s groundwater. This conclusion is validated by the 

consideration of past spent fuel pool leaks in which the resulting contamination has remained 

onsite, or to a nearby surface waterbody, where the impact are comparable to permitted, treated 

effluent discharged from operating nuclear power plants. In each case, offsite groundwater 

users were not affected. 

 

1

 Seismic Category I: Structures, systems, and components designed and built to withstand the 

maximum potential earthquake stresses for the particular region where a nuclear plant is sited. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Subsequent to the last known spent fuel pool leak identified in Table E-4 that resulted in onsite 

groundwater contamination, all licensees have implemented onsite groundwater monitoring that 

VDWLVILHVWKHVXEVXUIDFHVXUYH\UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5)XWXUHOLFHQVHHVFRPSO\LQJ

with these requirements are expected to implement this program, as well. Performing onsite 

groundwater monitoring throughout the short-term storage period, in conjunction with other 

onsite and offsite radiological monitoring required of licensees, will serve as an important 

mechanism to detect radiological contamination in the event of a spent fuel pool leak, and 

should facilitate timely detection of a leak to prevent the offsite migration at levels that could 

exceed regulatory requirements. Further, this conclusion does not contradict the finding in the 

/HVVRQV/HDUQHG7DVN)RUFH5HSRUW15&a) that leaks did or could impact 

JURXQGZDWHUUHVRXUFHVUHODWLYHWRHVWDEOLVKHG(3$GULQNLQJZDWHUVWDQGDUGV7KHUHSRUW

considered the full range of leaks at nuclear reactor sites, rather than just spent fuel pool leaks 

15&a). 7KHUHSRUWalso took into account instances of onsite groundwater 

contamination above EPA drinking water limits and at least in one non-spent fuel pool-related 

FDVHZKLFKGLGKDYHDPHDVXUDEOHLPSDFWRQRIIVLWHJURXQGZDWHU15&a). Although there 

have been no cases of offsite groundwater contamination identified resulting from spent fuel 

pool leaks, the GEIS nonetheless conservatively acknowledges the potential, however unlikely, 

for a spent fuel pool leak to impact offsite groundwater receptors. 

The GEIS does consider potential public health impacts from spent fuel pool leaks, but 

concludes that, based on the low probability of a leak affecting offsite groundwater sources, the 

impacts to public health would be SMALL. The GEIS analysis demonstrates that all 

contamination from spent fuel pool leaks has either remained onsite, or has flowed to a nearby 

surface waterbody where the impacts are comparable to permitted, treated effluent discharged 

from operating nuclear power plants, i.e., no adverse health effects. The NRC did not limit its 

review to only public health impacts. As described in Section E.2.2, the NRC identified the 

offsite physical resources that might be adversely impacted by spent fuel pool leaks. Potential 

public health effects were then evaluated based on impacts to these resources. 

Finally, the NRC disagrees that the GEIS analysis is based on unsupported assumptions about 

future leak detection, or that it relies on inapplicable or nonexistent regulatory requirements. As 

explained in Section D.2.40.11 of this appendix, licensees are required to have the capability to 

monitor spent fuel pool water levels, and an unexpected change in water level would indicate a 

leak. Additionally, as explained above and in Section ' of this appendix, licensees have 

implemented groundwater monitoring programs that satisfy the subsurface survey requirements 

RI&)56SHQWIXHOSRROZDWHUOHYHOPRQLWRULQJDQGVXUYHLOODQFHDVZHOODVRQVLWH

subsurface contamination surveys constitute regulatory requirements and not assumptions 

about future leaks. The combination of these requirements makes it likely that a spent fuel pool 

leak will be timely detected and remedied. No changes, other than those noted for Tables E-4 

and E-ZHUHPDGHWRWKH*(,6RU5XOHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVHFRPPHQWV
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

(30-2---11-----1--2--1--2--3-3) 

-2--2----3--4--4---1--

1-------1----4-----

-3--1--1--3--1--1--1--1--3-

-------4) 

D.2.40.9 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that “the estimated spent fuel pool leakage 

(Ci/yr) should be two orders of magnitude higher” than the values reported in Table E-2. The 

commenter questioned whether an undisclosed dilution factor was applied to the calculations in 

the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comment. A calculation error resulted in the incorrect 

values presented in Table E-2 of the GEIS. As a result, the NRC has revised its methodology 

used to calculate surface-water contamination to more accurately reflect the level of 

contamination that would be expected in the event of a spent fuel pool leak. Additional 

discussion has been added in Section E.2.2.2 explaining the basis of the methodology used. 

Table E-2 has been updated to reflect the results of this analysis. As discussed in Section 

E.2.2.2, the revised calculation shows that radionuclides released to a surface waterbody in the 

event of a spent fuel pool leak would still fall within the range of values associated with 

permitted, treated effluent discharges from operating nuclear power plants. As such, the impact 

determination of SMALL remains unchanged. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of 

this comment. 

-

D.2.40.10 – COMMENT: Commenters indicated that groundwater monitoring may not detect 

spent fuel pool leaks or detect them in a timely manner. One commenter stated that the NRC’s 

claims that contaminated groundwater will be detected through groundwater monitoring are 

contradicted by the leaks at Oyster Creek and Salem nuclear power plants. The commenter 

stated that groundwater contamination at these facilities was not detected by radiological 

environmental monitoring program groundwater sampling. The commenter noted that the 

experience in New Jersey indicated that contaminant plumes are narrow and that plume 

concentrations dropped significantly in less than 100 ft between monitoring points. The 

commenter further stated that, although the GEIS describes how nuclear power plants are 

developing groundwater monitoring programs that will have conceptual and subsequent 

numerical models to estimate the dispersion of radionuclide releases to groundwater, the NRC 

does not require nuclear power plants to use updated geologic and groundwater information. 

The commenter also alleged that the GEIS downplays the number and impact of leaking spent 

IXHOSRROVIDLOLQJWRLGHQWLI\RIVLWHVDQGOHDNVLWHs at which leaks had reached the 

environment. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

One commenter questioned the NRC’s conclusion that water level monitoring and groundwater 

monitoring would preclude long-lasting spent fuel pool leaks and asserted that a long-lasting, 

undetected spent fuel pool leak at the Brookhaven National Laboratory illustrates that the 

detection of radioactively contaminated water in monitoring wells or in the surrounding soil does 

not necessarily lead to finding a leak from a spent fuel pool. The commenter stated that the 

Brookhaven National Laboratory spent fuel pool was leak tested numerous times, but misplaced 

monitoring wells failed to detect the leak. The commenter concluded that the GEIS must 

explicitly identify the regulatory requirements that remain in place duriQJWKH-year short-term 

timeframe to provide reasonable assurance that future leaks similar to the Brookhaven National 

Laboratory spent fuel pool leak or worse cannot result in significant impacts. 

One commenter asserted that, in contrast to the GEIS statement that spent fuel pool leaks will 

only impact water table aquifers and that groundwater will always flow toward the surface 

waterbody, groundwater flow direction can be changed by “pumping centers” located miles from 

the surface waterbody. The commenter further stated that groundwater usage near nuclear 

power plants in New Jersey has increased as the population has increased and that some rivers 

are now recharging aquifers that were once sources of water for the river. The commenter 

further noted that tritium contamination at the Oyster Creek and Salem nuclear power plants has 

migrated from the water table aquifer into deep hydrogeologic units, despite the presence of 

confining clay layers, and that the groundwater flow in these units may be in a different direction 

than the water table aquifer. The commenter agreed with the GEIS that closure of the nuclear 

power plant will result in less water-resource impacts due to the reduction in water use, but 

asserted that this reduction could impact the groundwater flow direction and subsequent 

population growth near the closed plant, possibly resulting in local groundwater flow toward 

offsite pumping centers. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC acknowledges that 

contaminate plumes from spent fuel pools can be narrow and that the ability to detect 

groundwater contamination through onsite monitoring is dependent on a number of factors, 

including the site hydrologic characteristics as well as the number and placement of monitoring 

wells. However, the GEIS does not conclude that groundwater monitoring will detect 

contamination in every case, or that the combination of onsite groundwater monitoring and 

spent fuel pool water level monitoring will absolutely preclude long-lasting spent fuel pool leaks. 

Rather, as discussed in Appendix E, a variety of factors will minimize the likelihood and impact 

of a spent fuel pool leak to the environment. These include spent fuel pool design (e.g., 

stainless-steel liners and leakage-collection systems) and operational controls (e.g., monitoring 

and surveillance of spent fuel pool water levels) that make it unlikely that a leak will either 

remain undetected for a significant period of time or migrate to the environment, so as to impact 

offsite groundwater receptors. Additionally, site hydrologic characteristics associated with 

typical nuclear power plant settings (see Section E.2.1.3) impede any offsite migration of spent 

fuel pool leakage, should the leakage occur. Further, all licensees have implemented onsite 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

groundwater monitoring that satisfies the subsurface survey UHTXLUHPHQWVRI&)5

Performing onsite groundwater monitoring throughout the short-term storage period, in 

conjunction with other onsite and offsite radiological monitoring conducted as part of a 

licensee’s radiological environmental monitoring program, will allow licensees to detect 

radiological contamination in the event of a spent fuel pool leak, and should facilitate timely 

detection of a leak in sufficient time to prevent the offsite migration at levels that could exceed 

regulatory requirements (e.g., the NRC dose limit or EPA-mandated Maximum Contaminant 

Level). However, the GEIS acknowledges the unlikely possibility that contaminated 

groundwater could migrate offsite, resulting in an impact to offsite groundwater receptors. The 

impacts to offsite groundwater resources are discussed in Section E.2.2.1. 

The leaks at Oyster Creek and Salem referenced in comments occurred prior to implementation 

of onsite groundwater monitoring programs consistent with the industry’s Groundwater 

Protection Initiative, which all current reactor licensees have committed to follow. Therefore, 

these cases do not speak to the effectiveness of current or future onsite groundwater monitoring 

programs. As discussed in Section E.1.2, an important objective of the Groundwater Protection 

Initiative is to detect leaks well before radionuclide concentrations approach regulatory limits 

(e.g., the NRC dose limit or EPA-mandated Maximum Contaminant Level) for radioactive 

releases. 

While there is no specific NRC requirement for licensees to use updated geologic and 

groundwater information in developing groundwater monitoring programs, those implemented in 

accordance with the industry’s program must ensure that the site characterization of geology 

and hydrology provides an understanding of predominant groundwater gradients based upon 

FXUUHQWVLWHFRQGLWLRQV1(,)XUWKHUZKLOHVLWHJURXQGZDWHUIORZFRQGLWLRQVFRXOGFKDQJH

significantly following shutdown, groundwater monitoring programs will be periodically reviewed 

to identify changes in groundwater flow that results from substantial onsite construction, 

substantial disturbance of site property, substantial changes in onsite or nearby offsite use of 

water, and substantial changes in RQVLWHRUQHDUE\JURXQGZDWHUSXPSLQJUDWHV1(,

Therefore, a licensee’s program should capture any of the changes in local groundwater flow 

based on the scenarios mentioned in comments. 

As discussed in 6HFWLRQ'RIWKLVDSSHQGL[, the spent fuel pool leak at Brookhaven 

National Laboratory was not considered in the GEIS; however, to the extent that the comment 

addresses the efficacy of groundwater monitoring, the discussion above applies. 

The NRC disagrees that the GEIS states that contaminated groundwater will always stay in the 

upper water table aquifer and that groundwater will always flow toward the surface waterbody. 

As discussed in Section E.2.1.3, most nuclear power plants are located at sites where shallow 

unconfined groundwater at the site flows into the nearby surface waterbody, though this 

hydrology does not apply at all sites. For that reason, the potential impacts to offsite 

groundwater resources are discussed in Section E.2.1.2. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The NRC disagrees that the GEIS downplays the number and impact of spent fuel pool leaks. 

Table E-4 identifies the known or suspected instances of spent fuel pool leaks. However, the 

impact determinations in the GEIS are not dependent on the number of spent fuel pools that 

have, or have not, leaked, but rather has assessed the aggregate factors described earlier in 

this response and explained why they make it unlikely that a leak of sufficient magnitude or 

duration will remain undetected and unremedied long enough for the leak to affect offsite 

groundwater receptors. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-1--1--1--------33) 

----

D.2.40.11 – COMMENT: Commenters indicated that leak detection in spent fuel pools, 

particularly long-term, low-volume leaks, is difficult and may not detect leaks at all. 

Commenters stated that this reality undercuts the conclusion in the GEIS that it is unlikely for 

leaks to occur and go undetected long enough to result in significant impacts to the 

environment. In support of this point, commenters provided details on the nature and extent of 

longstanding undetected spent fuel pool leaks at the Indian Point, Salem, Pilgrim, and Yankee 

Rowe nuclear power plants, and Brookhaven National Laboratory, stating that neither water 

level instrumentation nor installed leak detection systems detected these leaks and that 

significant contamination occurred as a result. 

One commenter stated that after the operating life, leaks may not be detected as quickly 

because of a smaller workforce. The commenter stated that the GEIS must explicitly identify 

WKHUHJXODWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWUHPDLQLQSODFHGXULQJWKH-year short-term storage period 

that provide reasonable assurance that leaks cannot result in significant impacts. 

Another commenter indicated that spent fuel pool water level instrumentation is not required to 

be functioning except when irradiated fuel is being moved within the pool and that groundwater 

monitoring measures are entirely voluntary. The commenter interpreted the Standard Technical 

Specifications for reactors with respect to the minimum spent fuel pool water level and, hence, 

concluded that spent fuel pool level instrumentation is only required to be available when spent 

fuel is moved, contradicting the NRC’s statements that spent fuel pools are being routinely 

monitored. The commenter further noted that the NRC’s presumption that its inspectors will 

review records such as those prepared by plant workers for tasks like providing makeup water 

to the spent fuel pool to compensate for evaporation was invalid because there are no 

regulatory requirements in place during the short-term storage period that ensure spent fuel 

pool water level instrumentation will be routinely available. The commenter stated the GEIS 

cannot place much weight on equipment and conditions unless they are actually required to be 

in place throughout the short-term timeframe. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. Spent fuel 

pool water level monitoring and surveillance are not infallible and may not detect a leak in every 

case. Further, depending on the circumstances of the leak (e.g., leak rate), it may be difficult to 

determine the full extent of a leak through water level monitoring on its own. In most cases, 

leakage will be collected in a monitored leakage-detection system and will not escape into the 

environment. However, as noted in comments, there have been cases where spent fuel pool 

leakage has escaped detection through spent fuel pool monitoring and surveillance and 

migrated to the environment. The NRC acknowledges the possibility that a future leak could 

escape detection though spent fuel pool monitoring and surveillance. The NRC’s analysis of the 

environmental impacts of an undetected spent fuel pool leak can be found in Appendix E of the 

GEIS. For additional discussion on the NRC’s consideration of past spent fuel pool leaks, refer 

to Section ' of this appendix. However, the GEIS does not base its conclusion regarding 

the environmental impacts from leaks on the assumption that spent fuel pool monitoring and 

surveillance will identify every spent fuel pool leak. As discussed in Appendix E, several factors 

that minimize the effects of a spent fuel pool leak to the environment. The combination of these 

factors makes it unlikely that a leak will make it to the environment or remain undetected for a 

significant period of time such that it would impact offsite groundwater receptors. See Section 

E.2.2.1 for additional discussion. 

The NRC disagrees that a smaller workforce after shutdown will mean that leaks will not be 

detected as quickly. Licensees are still required to conduct routine monitoring and surveillance 

after shutdown. As described in Section D of this appendix, the NRC also routinely 

inspects decommissioning facilities to ensure licensees are monitoring spent fuel pool 

performance. 

Contrary to comments on the functioning of spent fuel pool instrumentation only during the 

movement of spent fuel, all licensees must maintain a minimum water level in the spent fuel 

pool to provide sufficient radiation shielding from spent fuel. During fuel movement, Technical 

Specifications require that a minimum water level be maintained so that sufficient shielding is 

provided in the event of a fuel handling accident. This does not mean, however, that spent fuel 

pool water level instrumentation is only required during the movement of irradiated fuel. All 

licensees are required as part of their licensing bases to have sufficient means to detect 

abnormal conditions in the spent fuel pool that could lead to excessive radiation. This includes 

spent fuel pool water level instrumentation and alarms. This requirement is applicable at all 

times, and not just during spent fuel movement, and remains in place as long as spent fuel is 

stored in a pool. Should a licensee fail to maintain sufficient spent fuel pool water level or 

instrumentation, the NRC would take appropriate action to ensure the continued protection of 

public health and safety. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-12--3--4---2--1--1--1--1-

-1--1--3--3-14) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.40.12 – COMMENT: Commenters questioned the NRC’s assertions in the GEIS 

concerning soil contamination. One commenter stated that the location where soil 

contamination is likely to occur depends on many factors “including soil type, groundwater flow, 

and the size of the leak.” The commenter referenced hydrogeological conditions at the Pilgrim 

nuclear power plant and noted that the Plymouth-Carver Aquifer contains “course-grained soil, 

the sand and gravel glacial outwash deposits” that are “more susceptible to the infiltration and 

migration of contaminates than less permeable soils typical of non-potentially productive 

aquifers.” The commenter further noted that contaminants entering into the soil and 

groundwater at the Pilgrim site “would likely migrate to the Aquifer and/or Cape Cod Bay.” 

Another commenter noted that the GEIS did not appear to contain an analysis of the existing 

soil contamination over time due to sorption and desorption of contaminants, any projection of 

additional soil contamination due to contaminant migration, or the potential of creating more soil 

contamination due to decommissioning activities. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. Soil 

contamination occurs as spent fuel pool leakage migrates from its source to a groundwater 

source below. As described in the GEIS and noted in comments, the extent of soil 

contamination is influenced by several factors, including soil type, direction of groundwater flow, 

and leak size. Because of the radionuclide-transport processes discussed in Appendix E, most 

radionuclides in spent fuel pool water are likely to be absorbed onto the concrete structure of 

the spent fuel pool, or soils surrounding the leak location. Further, because the hydrogeological 

conditions at most sites are such that contamination will either remain onsite, or be directed to a 

nearby surface waterbody, it is unlikely that offsite soil contamination would occur. 

As for an analysis of existing soil contamination over time, or the impact of decommissioning 

activities on soil contamination, the onsite environmental impacts from normal operations and 

accidents during decommissioning activities, which include spent fuel pool operations, are 

addressed in NUREG–6XSSOHPHQW)LQDO*HQHULF(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFW6WDWHPHQWRQ

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Supplement 1, Regarding the Decommissioning of 

Nuclear Power Reactors (NRC 2002a). Any significant radioactivity identified by licensees, 

including that resulting from a spent fuel pool leak, must be addressed during the 

decommissioning process to meet the license-termination requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, 

Subpart E. The license-termination process is subject to a site-specific review. Further, the 

environmental impacts of all onsite and offsite residual radioactive material that may remain 

after license termination are address in NUREG–*HQHULF(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFW

Statement in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-

/LFHQVHG1XFOHDU)DFLOLWLHV15&c). Concerns about leaks at a specific plant, such as 

Pilgrim, are outside the scope of this GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-2-11-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.40.13 – COMMENT: One commenter questioned the effectiveness of “natural attenuation’ 

as a groundwater remediation approach. The commenter asserted that monitored natural 

attenuation at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant in New York means that existing and future 

groundwater contamination will remain in the groundwater until it reaches the Hudson River or 

decays. The commenter further noted that “radioactive groundwater contamination will release 

to the Hudson River for upwards of centuries,” and that extraction of the contamination would 

“better minimize the impact of the groundwater contamination on the environment.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As a proven approach for addressing 

radiological contamination, monitored natural attenuation has been accepted by the EPA (EPA 

DQGPDQ\VWDWHHQYLURQPHQWDOUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHVVXFKDVWKH1HZ<RUNState 

Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC 2010). Monitored natural attenuation 

may be accepted in lieu of more active remediation technologies in cases where chemical, 

biological, or radioactive decay processes will cause the groundwater or soil contamination to 

reach regulatory limits within a reasonable timeframe. As described in Section E.1.3, the 

decision whether and how to remediate the contamination from a spent fuel pool leak is based 

on a variety of circumstances, including the source and magnitude of the contamination events; 

the local and regional groundwater systems; and the NRC’s and other Federal and State 

regulatory requirements. Areas of significant onsite contamination that could potentially serve 

as a source of contamination to offsite water resources would be remediated, as appropriate, 

during license termination. Prior to license termination, if a spent fuel pool leak or onsite 

contamination had the potential to result in significant offsite contamination of water resources, 

licensees would take steps consistent with the requirements at 10 CFR FDQGWKH

ALARA program to isolate or remediate the contamination to terminate or prevent the spread of 

contamination offsite. As described in Section E.3, the Indian Point spent fuel pool leaks have 

not resulted in significant offsite contamination. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as 

a result of this comment. 

-13) 

D.2.40.14 – COMMENT: One commenter stated generally that there could be serious public 

health issues in the event of a leak from, or a successful terrorist attack on, a spent fuel pool. 

Additionally, the commenter suggested that residents living in the vicinity of a facility might 

suffer from psychological stress due to the potential of leaks, even if the potential for impacts 

from contamination is low. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC’s evaluation of spent fuel pool 

leaks that could occur in the short-term timeframe can be found in Appendix E of the GEIS. As 

VWDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&DVVXPHGWKDWDOOWKHVSHQWIXHOLVPRYHGIURPWKH

pool to dry cask storage within the short-term timeframe, which means that the spent fuel pools 

would not be used for continued storage during the long-term or indefinite timeframes. 

Appendix E includes a discussion of factors that could influence the impacts of spent fuel pool 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

leaks including spent fuel pool design and maintenance; operational practices (e.g., spent fuel 

pool leakage monitoring and groundwater monitoring); site hydrogeological characteristics; and 

radionuclide-transport properties. This appendix also includes a discussion of the impacts of 

spent fuel pool leaks during the short-term timeframe, should leakage make it offsite. The 

NRC’VHYDOXDWLRQRISRWHQWLDODFWVRIWHUURULVPRUVDERWDJHLVIRXQGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

Although the consequences of a successful act of sabotage or terrorism could be severe, the 

probability of a successful attack with these consequences is very low. As such, the NRC has 

determined that the risk of a successful attack is small. 

With respect to the comment’s point about psychological stress due to the potential for leaks, 

psychological and social stresses are not environmental impacts evaluated under NEPA 

(Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy). As a result, the GEIS does not 

contain a discussion about any potential psychological stresses caused by the potential for 

leaks from a spent fuel pool or ISFSI. The NRC is charged with protecting the public from 

unnecessary exposure to radiation as a result of civilian uses of nuclear materials. Toward that 

end, the NRC requires nuclear power plants; research reactors; and other medical, industrial, 

and academic licensees to use and store radioactive materials in a way that keeps radiation 

exposures within the agency’s specified dose limits and ALARA. For additional discussion on 

perceived risk see Section D.2.22.3 of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.40.15 – COMMENT: One commenter asserted that the source of the initial radionuclide 

FRQFHQWUDWLRQVLQWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROLVXQFOHDUDQGWKDWWKHLGHQWLILHGUHIHUHQFH15&D

Liquid Radiological Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report does not contain the 

cited information. The commenter further noted that the basis for the initial concentrations of 

spent fuel pool radionuclides of concern was unclear and noted that, with regard to tritium, it is 

not unusual for spent fuel pool concentrations to be an order of magnitude higher than the 

UHSRUWHG[-2 μCi/mL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with these comments. The citation 

for the initial radionuclide concentrations presented in Table E-1 should have been NRC 

DUDWKHUWKDQ15&d). The source for the values comes from the report Indian Point 

Nuclear Generating Unit 2—15&6SHFLDO,QVSHFWLRQ5HSRUW1R15&

D)RRWQRWHELQ7DEOH(-1 has been updated to reflect the correct citation. 

The NRC disagrees that it would not be unusual for concentrations to be an order of magnitude 

higher than the values that were presented in Table E-1. The values presented are from a 

spent fuel pool at an operating nuclear power plant and could be considered to be reflective of 

concentrations at the beginning of the short-term timeframe for a typical spent fuel pool. 

Further, the comments provided no additional information that would indicate other values would 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

be more appropriate. As a result, the NRC has not changed the concentration values in 

Table E-1. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

--

D.2.40.16 – COMMENT: Multiple commenters provided general comments expressing support 

for the NRC’s analysis in the GEIS of the issue of spent fuel pool leaks. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comment support for the analysis of spent fuel pool 

leaks in Appendix E of the GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

-14--3--2--2--2-11) 

D.2.41 Comments Concerning Cumulative Impacts 

D.2.41.1 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the ranges of resource-specific impact 

conclusions reported in the GEIS cumulative impact analysis imply that the environmental 

impact of each facility should be evaluated individually rather than generically. The commenter 

referenced Table ES-RIWKH*(,6QRWLQJWKDWWKHFXPXODWLYHHIIHFWVLPSDFWFRQFOXVLRQVUDQJH

from SMALL to MODERATE or SMALL to LARGE for most resource areas. The comment is 

unclear why the GEIS cumulative impact ranges suggest a separate site-specific analysis is 

needed. The NRC interprets the comment as implying that a site-specific impact analysis for a 

given facility would result in a single impact determination for each resource area, rather than a 

range. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Based on the inherent temporal 

uncertainties that exist whether the continued storage analysis were conducted site-specifically 

or generically, the NRC expects that a site-specific continued storage cumulative impact 

analysis would be unlikely to result in a smaller or different range of impact conclusions than 

WKDWGHWHUPLQHGLQ6HFWLRQWKHUHIRUHDJHQHULFDSSURDFKWRHYDOXDWLQg the cumulative 

impacts of continued storage is appropriate. 

The range of impacts for the cumulative impacts analysis is based on uncertainty related to both 

JHRJUDSKLFYDULDELOLW\DQGWKHWHPSRUDOVFDOHRIWKHDQDO\VLV)RUH[DPSOHLQ&KDSWHURIWKH

GEIS, the NRC acknowledges that reasonably foreseeable actions that would occur near a 

storage facility would depend on the location of the storage facility. In addition, reasonably 

foreseeable actions include a degree of uncertainty that generally increases with time into the 

future. Specifically, the uncertainty and variability associated with projections about reasonably 

foreseeable future actions and their impacts on the environment contribute to the range of 

conclusions in the cumulative impact analysis. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

In general, the temporal uncertainty associated with the continued storage impact analysis is 

KLJKEHFDXVHDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6WKHSHULRGRIDQDO\VLVEHJLQV

DIWHUWKHHQGRIOLFHQVHGRSHUDWLRQVDQGWKHQFRQWLQXHVIRU0 years (short-term timeframe), plus 

100 years beyond the short-term timeframe (long-term timeframe), and indefinitely beyond the 

long-term timeframe (indefinite timeframe). Although a site-specific continued storage impact 

analysis would eliminate geographic variables, temporal uncertainties would not be eliminated 

or even reduced. Thus, a site-specific review would not provide any greater certainty about the 

range, duration, and intensity of reasonably foreseeable activities and impacts well into the 

future. Therefore, the NRC expects that a site-specific continued storage cumulative impact 

analysis would be unlikely to result in a smaller or different range of impact conclusions than 

WKDWGHWHUPLQHGLQ6HFWLRQDQGDJHQHULFDSSURDFKWRHYDOXDWLQJthe cumulative impacts of 

continued storage is appropriate. 

In response to this comment, the NRC has added descriptions of temporal uncertainties 

DVVRFLDWHGZLWKJHQHUDOWUHQGVDQGDFWLYLWLHVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGLPSDFW

ranges in the VXPPDU\RIFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,61RFKDQJHVZHUH

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.41.2 – COMMENT: A commenter questioned the SMALL impact conclusions in the GEIS, 

in general, noting that centuries of storage at multiple sites would be expected to have 

measurable effects on dedicated land-use and terrestrial resources. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The SMALL cumulative impacts 

conclusions in the GEIS would not be expected to be larger based on the long period of analysis 

and the number of sites where continued storage would occur. Within the timeframes of the 

DQDO\VLVIUDPHZRUNGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKHFHQWXULHVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJH

mentioned in the comment would occur beyond the short-term period, which includes the end of 

spent fuel pool storage, and therefore would only involve dry cask storage facilities. As 

described in Sections 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.3 of the GEIS, dry cask storage systems are passive in 

nature and do not occupy large tracts of land relative to, for example, the amount of land used 

for nuclear power plants. Therefore, the terrestrial and land-use impacts are constrained by the 

small and limited nature of the activities. Even over very long periods these resource impacts 

remain small because there are only limited changes over time (e.g., the expected facility 

replacement every 100 years). In addition, the number of storage sites in the nation, for 

example, does not affect the magnitude of cumulative impacts to terrestrial and land-use 

impacts because, based on the purpose of the GEIS to support an individual licensing action, 

the GEIS cumulative impact analysis evaluates only those impacts that would accumulate with 

the impacts from continued storage at an individual proposed storage site over time or 

geographically. Because the geographic area of influence for a dry cask storage facility for 

terrestrial and land-use impacts is limited to the land around the facility, multiple site impacts 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

would not accumulate unless facilities were sited in close proximity. The detailed bases for all 

GEIS impact analysis conclusions are documented in the resource-specific impact analyses in 

&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,6. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

this comment. 

-

D.2.41.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters asserted that the GEIS failed to include an 

integrated analysis of the information that supported the analysis in the GEIS. Commenters 

expressed concerns about various aspects of integration in the cumulative effects analysis 

including accumulating impacts over time; geographically (e.g., nationally rather than at the site 

level); among various past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions; and across 

related resource areas. Commenters were also concerned that systems, conditions, and 

impacts in the GEIS were categorized and evaluated separately rather than together in an 

integrated manner. 

One commenter argued that the GEIS underestimated impacts because it had not integrated 

spent fuel pool storage impacts during power plant operations with the continued storage 

impacts at all sites. Another commenter suggested the GEIS had not evaluated the 

accumulated impacts of radioactive wastes and effluent releases from military, civilian, and 

medical nuclear operations over past, present, and future decades. In addition, the commenter 

requested that the GEIS include an examination of the cumulative effects of all past, present, 

and future releases of radionuclides (including the different pathways and effects). The 

commenter suggested that a number of small individual impacts would not add up to small total 

impacts, and that some impacts had multiplicative effects when taken together. The commenter 

asserted the draft GEIS had not used the most current medical research and environmental 

studies and had not integrated impact analyses involving accelerative factors (e.g., waterresource depletion, dwindling fisheries, polluted and heated waterways, algal growth, additional 

accidental releases from power plant operations, and additional heat and radioactive effluents 

added to groundwater and surface water). The commenter referred to an unspecified NAS 

study and other studies that emphasized the additional vulnerabilities of environmental justice 

populations and of women, children, infants, and the unborn that had not been adequately 

evaluated in the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQWV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6H[DPLQHGWKH

cumulative impacts of reasonably foreseeable past, present, and future actions that could have 

impacts that would overlap in both space and time and accumulate with the impacts from 

continued storage. The geographic scope of the GEIS cumulative impact assessment was 

GHILQHGLQ6HFWLRQIRUHDFKDIIHFWHGUHVRXUFHWRencompass the geographic area of the 

resource and the distances where impacts associated with past, present, and reasonably 

foreseeable actions may occur. Additional descriptions of the geographic scope of the GEIS 

impact analyses are provided in Sections ' and ' of this appendix. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Regarding the accumulation of impacts over time, many of the continued storage impacts were 

small and were characterized on an annual basis (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions and radiation 

GRVHVLQWKHGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWLPSDFWDQDO\VHVRI&KDSWHUVDQG7KHFRQFOXVLRQVRIWKHVH

imSDFWDQDO\VHVZHUHLQFRUSRUDWHGE\UHIHUHQFHLQWRWKH&KDSWHUFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWDQDO\VHV

%HFDXVHUHDFWRUUHQHZDODQGOLFHQVLQJ(,6VZHUHFRQVLGHUHGLQ&KDSWHUWRGHILQHWUHQGVDQG

estimate the magnitude of impacts from past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 

actions in the vicinity of reactor sites, some analyses considered effects that would be additive 

over time. For example, entrainment, impingement, thermal discharges, and chemical 

discharges were considered in the cumulative impact analysis of aquatic ecology (Section 

RIWKH*(,6JUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQVIURPWKHXUDQLXPIXHOF\FOHZHUHDFFXPXODWHG

LQWRWKHFDUERQGLR[LGHHPLVVLRQHVWLPDWHIRUDUHDFWRULQ7DEOH-2; and a dose was 

accumulated over the 20-year period of transportation of spent fuel from an away-from-reactor 

VWRUDJHIDFLOLW\WRDUHSRVLWRU\LQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

7KH*(,6FXPXODWLYHLPSDFWDQDO\VHVFRQVLGHUHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWDVGHVFULEHGLQ&KDSWHU

of the GEIS, an impact that may be SMALL by itself could result in a MODERATE or LARGE 

cumulative impact when considered in combination with the impacts of other actions on the 

affected resource. For impacts that could accumulate over time but were small and considered 

sustainable for the resource, it was not necessary to explicitly and quantitatively accumulate 

these impacts over time. For example, some impacts would continue to remain a small 

proportion of the total annual impact (e.g., a radiation dose that was a small fraction of a 

standard or natural background dose). As described in the conclusions subsections of each 

resource-VSHFLILFFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWDQDO\VLVLQ&KDSWHUPDQ\LPSDFWFRQFOXVLRQVZHUH

based on the accumulation of SMALL continued storage impacts with the overlapping impacts 

of other actions to reach MODERATE cumulative impact conclusions. 

The GEIS also integrated, as applicable, the impact analyses across related resources (e.g., the 

HQYLURQPHQWDOMXVWLFHLPSDFWVDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKDWFRQVLGHUVWKHLPSDFWV

from ecological, historic and cultural, and socioeconomic resource areas). No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(341-2-4) (341-2---

D.2.41.4 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the GEIS failed to adequately analyze the 

cumulative impacts of leaks from spent fuel pools. Two commenters stated that the GEIS does 

not evaluate the cumulative impacts of leaks from multiple spent fuel pools in ecologically 

sensitive areas (e.g., the area surrounding the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station site). 

One commenter expressed concerns about the cumulative impacts of all leaks from multiple 

sites, highlighted leak detection difficulties and monitoring and inspection issues as complicating 

factors, and called for additional data and analysis. Another commenter added that the GEIS 

does not consider the combined impacts from multiple radiological releases from sources such 

as spent fuel pools, other contaminated areas or sites, buried piping, human error, or accidents. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The commenter described examples including the Turkey Point site that includes multiple spent 

fuel pools and the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant site that is adjacent to the Savannah River 

Site, which stores nuclear waste. The commenter cited NRC licensing board statements (NRC 

2012o) about (1) the potential for spent fuel pool leaks to enter groundwater and co-mingle with 

other releases, (2) difficulties in parsing groundwater contamination by source contributions, and 

(3) the resulting necessity to evaluate groundwater impacts on a site-wide basis. The 

commenter argued that non-spent-fuel-pool leaks at power plant sites would increase in the 

future as plants age. The commenter referenced a 2011 GAO report that described past 

leakage problems associated with difficult-to-inspect buried pipes and components that were 

projected to continue into the future. The commenter argued that because the GEIS cumulative 

impact analysis did not consider such reasonably foreseeable impacts, the analysis violates 

NEPA. Another commenter asserted that the GEIS analytical framework was too narrow and 

therefore the NRC did not adequately evaluate the cumulative effects of long-term spent fuel 

pool leaks on aquatic organisms and ecosystems. The commenter referred to the Hudson River 

area surrounding the Indian Point Energy Center site as an example of an ecosystem that 

should have been evaluated. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The GEIS analysis of spent fuel pool 

leaks concludes that the dose from postulated spent fuel leaks would be of low magnitude, such 

that the dose would not significantly add to the doses from other sources, nor be significantly 

increased by additional pool leaks. The low magnitude of postulated leaks and low estimated 

public dose support the conclusion that the impacts from spent fuel pool leaks during the 

continued storage period would be SMALL. 

The spent fuel pool leaks analysis in Appendix E of the GEIS considered the historical 

experience with pool leaks at operating power plants and various factors that influence the 

potential magnitude of impacts of postulated spent fuel pool leaks including pool design; 

radionuclides of concern; radiological characteristics including half-life; fuel pool operational 

requirements; and practices including monitoring, leak detection, and common hydrologic 

conditions that affect flow and transport to offsite locations (e.g., low flow gradients, sorption 

during transport, and proximity to large surface waterbodies). The analysis focused on 

resources that would be the most likely to be impacted in the event of a spent fuel pool release 

including groundwater, surface water, soils, and public and occupational health. 

The analysis concluded impacts to these resources from postulated spent fuel pool leaks would 

be SMALL based on the historical experience to date and the combination of factors that limit 

the potential for offsite impacts. The maximum estimated undetected leak of pool water was 

found to be sufficiently low that when combined with the other factors that limit the likelihood of 

offsite migration, the potential that standards would be exceeded was considered unlikely. 

Historical data on the magnitude of spent fuel pool leaks confirmed releases have either 

remained within the site boundary or discharged to surface water where they were diluted to low 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

levels. To gain insights into the magnitude of potential offsite public health impacts, Appendix E 

of the GEIS referenced a dose calculation considering a maximum onsite tritium concentration 

of leaked pool water from a site with two pools. For this case, all onsite groundwater was 

assumed to be discharged directly to an offsite river with no accounting for any conditions of 

transport that could limit such releases. The resulting dose of 0.0021 mrem/yr is a fraction of 

the 311 mrem/yr natural background dose reported in Table 3-3 of the GEIS and the NRC dose 

limits for individual members of the public given in 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart D that apply to 

SRZHUUHDFWRUVDQGDVVRFLDWHGIXHOSRROVVHH6HFWLRQ.1 of the GEIS). Because this low 

magnitude of public dose would not significantly add to public doses from other sources (e.g., 

other contaminated areas or sites, buried piping, human error, or accidents) nor be significantly 

increased by additional pool leaks as recommended by commenters, the recommended 

changes to the analysis are not needed to support impact conclusions or comply with NEPA. 

Unique site-specific environmental conditions including radiological contamination from past, 

present, and reasonably foreseeable activities or sensitive ecology that may be threatened by 

various regional activities would be addressed by the NRC during power plant or storage facility 

licensing reviews or renewals. 

The GEIS analysis of impacts from postulated spent fuel pool leaks provides an adequate basis 

for concluding that offsite releases and impacts would be sufficiently small that making changes 

to account for multiple additional sources of radiological materials or unique environmental 

conditions that would be evaluated in greater detail during licensing reviews would not improve 

the analysis nor change the conclusions. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(244--------

D.2.41.5 – COMMENT: One commenter claimed the cumulative impacts of pool storage on the 

HQYLURQPHQWIURPZDWHUXVHDQGKHDWGLVFKDUJHRYHU\HDUVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHFDQQRWEH

“SMALL” because the pool impacts would add to the reactor impacts that occurred during 

operation. Referring to Table 4-1 and pages 4-30 and 4-31 of the draft GEIS, that compare 

previously evaluated reactor impacts with spent fuel pool impacts, the commenter argued the 

NRC is calling pool impacts “SMALL” just because reactor impacts are so much larger. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The commenter cited a conclusion from 

the direct and indirect impact analyses of terrestrial impacts in Chapter 4 of the GEIS to assert a 

failure to consider cumulative impacts; however, the cumulative impacts analysis of terrestrial 

impacts is located in &KDSWHURIWKH*(,6DQGWKDWDQDO\VLVLQFOXGHVWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIWKH

impacts from power plant operations that would be expected to accumulate with the direct and 

indirect impacts from continued storage. Because the impacts from cooling identified in the 

comment are not expected to accumulate with continued storage impacts, they are not 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

described further in the GEIS cumulative impact analysis. Additional details are provided in the 

following paragraphs. 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUVWKHLQFUHPHQWDl direct and indirect impacts on terrestrial 

resources of continued storage in spent fuel pools during the short-term timeframe. The 

comparison of water demand and heat loads for reactor operations and continued spent fuel 

pool storage in Table 4-1 and described in 6HFWLRQof the GEIS demonstrated that water 

withdrawal requirements for a spent fuel pool are low relative to a power reactor. Because 

continued storage would occur after the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation (Section 1.0 

of the GEIS), the water demand and heat loads for reactor operations in Table 4-1 would not 

occur during continued storage; therefore, the overall water demand and heat loads for 

continued storage would be limited to the much lower spent fuel pool demands. Considering 

the anticipated SMALL to MODERATE impacts from reactor operations, the NRC concluded 

that the significant reductions in the water demand and heat loads during continued storage 

would reduce the related impacts to a SMALL and sustainable impact level that would be 

unlikely to increase during the short-term timeframe. 

Within the context of the cumulative impacts analysis, the reactor operations impacts from water 

use and heat load that were mentioned in the comment included temporary MODERATE 

impacts on terrestrial resources from water use and SMALL impacts from all other cooling 

system operations based on the analysis in the referenced License Renewal GEIS (see Section 

RIWKH*(,6 These SMALL and temporarily noticeable impacts associated with cooling 

during reactor operations are not expected to persist into the continued storage period and 

therefore are not described as accumulating impacts from past actions in the terrestrial 

FXPXODWLYHLPSDFWDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6

It is important to remember that the impacts of continued storage determined in the GEIS will be 

considered as part of the licensing of individual reactors, at which time the NRC will prepare a 

site-specific analysis of the impacts of reactor operations in order for the decisionmaker to have 

a complete picture of the impacts of the generation and storage of spent fuel, including the 

impacts of water demand and heat loads. 

The NRC considers the GEIS to have provided an adequate basis for the environmental impact 

determinations. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----

D.2.41.6 – COMMENT: Regarding the analysis of spent fuel pool fires in Appendix F of the 

GEIS, a commenter noted that NRC impact conclusions are based on the low annual probability 

RIDIXHOSRROILUHDWDVLQJOHIDFLOLW\RGGVRIDERXWLQ7KHFRPPHQWHUVXJJHVWHGWKH

approach is not protective of public safety because the same risk for the population of 100 

operating reactors over their operational life would be much higher (citing 1 in a few thousand). 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The analysis of spent fuel pool fires in 

$SSHQGL[)RIWKH*(,6VXSSRUWVWKHLPSDFWDQDO\VLVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6UHJDUGLQJ

severe accidents in spent fuel pools. The mean annual accident frequencies reported in 

Table F-1 of the GEIS are at least a factor of 10 lower than the value asserted in the comment 

and the GEIS analysis characterizes the frequencies as being conservative (overestimated). 

Although the annual accident frequency at a specific facility may be higher than the mean, it is 

still estimated to be much lower than asserted in the comment. 

The recommendation that the GEIS report the risks on a national scale for all reactors goes 

beyond the scope of the cumulative impact analysis, which is to evaluate the continued storage 

impacts applicable to an individual reactor licensing action while taking into account the 

additional impacts of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions that would 

overlap in both space and time and accumulate with the impacts from continued storage. A 

more detailed response to comments that requested that the GEIS analyze and report risks on 

broader geographic and temporal scales is provided in Section ' of this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-1) 

D.2.41.7 – COMMENT: A commenter questioned the analysis of cumulative impacts due to 

FOLPDWHFKDQJH6SHFLILFDOO\WKHFRPPHQWHUQRWHGWKDW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQFOXGHVWKDW

cumulative impacts to climate would be noticeable but not destabilizing with or without the 

greenhouse gas contributions from continued storage. The commenter asked whether these 

FOLPDWHSURMHFWLRQVZHUHPDGHIRUDSHULRGRIRU\HDUV,QDGGLWLRQWKH

commenter stated that the NRC should consider worst-case accident scenarios in its analysis. 

RESPONSE: 7KH15&GLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHFRPPHQW7KHFRQFOXVLRQLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS that the impact to climate change from past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 

actions would be noticeable but not destabilizing is based on the scientific assessments of 

climate change projections by the GCRP *&53 and carbon dioxide emissions 

criteria in the final EPA “Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 

Tailoring Rule” )57KH*&53UHSRUWHYDOXDWHG\HDUVRIFOLPDWHGDWDDQG

projected climate changes over a timeframe that extends to the end of the century. The GCRP 

reports and peer-reviewed assessments from GCRP were suggested as sources of the best 

scientific information available on the reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts in the 

)HEUXDU\CEQ memo, Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of 

Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CEQ 2010), issued to Federal departments 

DQGDJHQFLHV$VGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKHLQFUHPHQWDOLPSDFWVIURP

continued storage on climate change are SMALL for all timeframes at both at-reactor and awayfrom-reactor storage facilities. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The NRC disagrees that a worst-case scenario should be analyzed in this GEIS, including for 

climate change impacts. NEPA does not require agencies to conduct a worst-case analysis, but 

rather to assess the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts. The NRC used existing 

information to generically assess impacts by reviewing the evaluations in other GEISs and sitespecific EAs and EISs. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

--1) 

D.2.41.8 – COMMENT: Commenters requested that the NRC consider the additional impacts 

from uranium fuel cycle activities including mining and enrichment as well as other, more global, 

nuclear activities in the cumulative impacts analysis in the GEIS. A few commenters requested 

that the GEIS include an analysis of greenhouse gas emissions from fuel cycle activities. 

Another commenter requested that the NRC evaluate the impacts of radioactive releases due to 

continued storage of spent fuel in the context of radioactive releases from other sources (e.g., 

nuclear weapons testing and natural disasters). 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments requesting additional analysis. Uranium 

fuel cycle impacts that fall within the scope of the GEIS cumulative effects analysis and accident 

risks of natural disaster events are already evaluated in the GEIS. In addition, other suggested 

topics for analysis, including radiological doses from weapons testing and other global nuclear 

activities, would not change impact conclusions or improve the analysis. 

Regarding the evaOXDWLRQRIXUDQLXPIXHOF\FOHLPSDFWV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6H[DPLQHVWKH

cumulative impacts of reasonably foreseeable past, present, and future actions that could have 

impacts that would overlap in both space and time and accumulate with the impacts from 

continued storage. Because the analysis of continued storage in the GEIS begins once the 

operating license of the reactor expires, no additional fuel would be used at that reactor 

although fuel cycle activities would continue to support other reactors licensed to operate during 

that same period. Also, the location of fuel cycle facilities, commonly distant from commercial 

power reactors, limits the potential for the geographic area of many resource impacts to 

intersect with the geographic scope of the continued storage impacts. Therefore, many fuel 

cycle impacts were beyond the geographic or temporal scope of the GEIS analysis. Fuel cycle 

impacts that could overlap with continued storage impacts (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions, 

waste management, transportation, and accidents) are considered in the applicable cumulative 

LPSDFWDQDO\VHV6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,66HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS further notes that the impacts of uranium fuel cycle activities are addressed in EISs for 

SRZHUUHDFWRUVEDVHGRQGDWDFRGLILHGLQ&)57DEOH6-3. In addition, the cumulative 

LPSDFWDQDO\VLVRIDFFLGHQWVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6HYDOXDWHVWKHULVNRIDFFLGHQWV

caused by extreme natural events such as tornadoes, hurricanes, tsunamis, floods, and 

earthquakes and concludes that the combined accident risk of all plants at any location within 

NPPLRIDUHDFWRUVLWHZRXOGEHORZ
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

7KHJHRJUDSKLFVFRSHRIWKHFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWDVVHVVPHQWLVGHILQHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH

GEIS for each affected resource to encompass (1) the geographic area of the resource and (2) 

the distances where impacts associated with past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions 

PD\RFFXU7KHFOLPDWHFKDQJHLPSDFWDQDO\VLV6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,S) is the only 

cumulative impact analysis in the GEIS that considered a global spatial boundary owing to the 

potential area of impact associated with greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear activities are not 

major sources of greenhouse gas emissions as documented by the comparison of emission 

VRXUFHVLQ7DEOH-2 of the GEIS. For the cumulative impacts of both normal and accidental 

UDGLRORJLFDOHPLVVLRQV6HFWLRQVDQGRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUDJHRJUDSKLFDUHDRI

NPPLVXUURXQGLQJWKHVLWHWR evaluate impacts. The NRC has historically used this 

distance to evaluate releases from nuclear power plants. Therefore, the geographic area is 

appropriate for evaluating continued storage impacts in the GEIS. 

Regarding the potential sources of radiation exposure in the cumulative impact analysis, the 

NRC quantifies the average public dose from multiple sources of radiation in Table 3-3 of the 

*(,67KLVUDGLDWLRQGRVHLQFOXGHVDVPDOOFRQWULEXWLRQLHSHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOGRVH

from the types of industrial emission sources identified by the comment (e.g., nuclear power 

plants, nuclear industrial, and DOE installations). These and other potential sources of 

radiological emissions, including nuclear-weapons-test fallout, are not evaluated on a global 

geographic basis in the GEIS because the contribution of such distant emission sources to the 

documented average background radiation dose in the affected environment of the GEIS is 

negligible. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.41.9 – COMMENT: Two commenters argued that the cumulative impact assessment in the 

GEIS was deficient because it failed to analyze the indirect impacts of continued storage, failed 

to address mitigation and emergency preparedness, continued to rely on the assumptions in 

GUDIW6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGIDLOHGWRGLVFXVVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUD3FKLOOLQJHIIHFW ́RQ

economic development in the local area where the storage facility is located. Examples of 

potential economic effects that were provided included increases in local costs for safety 

services, and decreases in tax revenue from lack of normal business development and the 

shutdown of the power plant. In particular, one commenter noted that the analysis of trends in 

6HFWLRQDQG7DEOH-1 of the GEIS does not take into account the chilling effect of 

continued storage on economic development. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that mitigation is not addressed in the GEIS and disagrees with the remainder of the 

comments. The direct and indirect impacts of continued storage were evaluated in the 

resource-VSHFLILFLPSDFWDQDO\VHVFRQWDLQHGLQ&KDSWHUVDQGRIWKH*(,67KHFRQFOXVLRQV

from these analyses were considered in the resource-specific cumulative impact analyses in 

6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6$GGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJPLWLJDWLRQRILPSDFWVUHODWHGWR
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

damaged or degraded fuel has been added to Section 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS. Any determinations 

by the NRC about whether to require mitigation measures of any type will occur on a sitespecific basis during licensing or during the course of ongoing NRC oversight. Additional 

discussion of mitigation in the context of alternatives is located in D.2.10.1. The GEIS details 

emergency preparedness and planning in Section 2.1.2.2 (At-Reactor ISFSIV6HFWLRQ

(Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents); 6HFWLRQ7HUURULVP$WWDFNVRQ,6)6,V

and Appendix F (Spent Fuel Pool Fires). Additional details on emergency preparedness topics 

related to continued storage facilities are provided in Section D.2.44.4 of this appendix. 

&RPPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHDVVXPSWLRQVGRFXPHQWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DUHDGGUHVVHG

in Sections ', ', ', ' of this appendix. 

7KHFXPXODWLYHVRFLRHFRQRPLFLPSDFWVHYDOXDWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6FRQVLGHUWKH

potential for decreases in tax revenue following shutdown of a power plant as a potentially 

LARGE socioeconomic impact. The socioeconomic impact analysis does not consider an 

increase in costs for local safety services as suggested by the comment because the safety 

services would have been already established for many decades of reactor operations prior to 

continued storage. The local safety services needed during continued storage would likely 

remain the same (if other reactors continued to operate) or decrease relative to reactor 

operations (if no other reactors continued to operate). In addition, as described further in Section 

D.2.22.3 of this appendix, the NRC concludes that perception-based chilling effects and stigmarelated impacts are uncertain or speculative and do not need to be considered in this GEIS. 

In response to these comments, changes were made to Section 2.2.2.1 of the GEIS to provide 

additional discussion of actions that licensees could take, or may be required to take to comply 

with NRC safety regulations, to mitigate impacts related to damaged or degraded fuel. No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-10--3--3-

D.2.41.10 – COMMENT: A commenter expressed concern about the potential consequences of 

accidents at nuclear power plants within the region of the Great Lakes Basin, which constitutes 

20 percent of the world’s surface fresh water. The commenter was concerned that an accident 

DWDQ\RIQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVRIZKLFKDUHGLUHFWO\LQWhe watershed, could make the 

water unusable. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees in part. The GEIS 

cumulative impact analysis evaluates the combined accident risks at multiple power plant and 

RWKHUIDFLOLW\VLWHVLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHFRPELQHGULVNVDUHORZ

and therefore impacts would be SMALL. Section D.2.41.4 of this appendix describes how 

unique site-specific environmental characteristics would be addressed during licensing. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.42 Comments Concerning the Cost of Storage 

D.2.42.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters requested that the NRC assess and consider all 

costs associated with nuclear power in the GEIS. Commenters identified a variety of activities 

and potential events that they associated with nuclear power production that the NRC should 

include in these cost assessments: uranium mining, spent fuel production, reactor operation, 

potential accidents, reactor decommissioning, post-decommissioning “clean up,” transportation 

to a repository, development of a repository, and disposal. Many commenters expressed 

concern regarding the high cost of nuclear power and who does or should assume these costs: 

licensees, the Federal government, taxpayers, or rate payers. Commenters stated that the cost 

assessment should include the subsidies related to nuclear power plant construction and 

operation and the hidden costs such as taxpayers’ contribution toward disposal costs and the 

costs of operation that licensees pass to rate payers. Several commenters stated that nuclear 

power is neither cost-effective nor sustainable. Several commenters also lamented the high 

cost of development of a repository and ultimate disposal. One commenter stated that the cost 

of disposal is worth whatever the cost. 

Commenters also stated that waste-management costs are significant (i.e., continued storage 

and disposal) and should be considered in the costs when comparisons are made between 

nuclear power and alternative energies. A few commenters recommended ways by which the 

NRC could assess costs associated with nuclear power or nuclear waste management 

specifically and stated that the NRC should consider these assessments when making licensing 

and license renewal determinations. Many commenters also stated that the NRC must 

specifically assess the costs of continued storage in the GEIS rather than the administrative 

costs of developing a Rule and GEIS. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments because the comments are outside the 

scope of the GEIS and Rule. The costs related to the fuel cycle that are not associated with 

continued storage are evaluated outside of this GEIS and may be included within other EAs. 

However, in response to the significant interest in costs associated with continued storage of 

spent fuel, the NRC has provided additional information on estimated costs for some continued 

storage-related facilities and activities in Chapter 2 of the GEIS. The financial burden of spent 

fuel storage is addressed in Section D.2.42.2 of this appendix. No changes were made to the 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

(3-4) (30-12-3) (30-21-4) (30-12---11-------2) 

------(244---24-----32--

--12) (341-2-14) (341-1--------

-1-------3---10) 

D.2.42.2 – COMMENT: Many commenters raised several concerns regarding the economic 

burden that might be placed on society due to the continued storage of spent fuel, 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

recommended ways to assess these costs, and recommended who should assume these costs. 

Many commenters expressed concerns that the cost analysis in the draft GEIS evaluated costs 

DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6DQGLWVDOWHUQDWLYHV6HFWLRQ

of the GEIS) rather than the costs of continued storage. A few commenters stated that this 

failure in the draft GEIS is a violation of NEPA and is contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling in 

New York v. NRC. 

Several commenters stated that experience has revealed that continued storage could be very 

expensive and others provided calculations of current and projected future costs of storage, 

including the cost of dry cask storage at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. One 

commenter expressed the concern that the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant “cost 

scenario will be repeated across the country and will be in the billions of dollars before the 

indefinite storage phase begins.” 

Many commenters raised concerns regarding who will assume the costs of continued storage. 

Commenters stated concerns that the nuclear industry will eventually be unable to pay the costs 

of continued storage, unfairly placing the burden on the Federal government and taxpayers. In 

support, commenters cited shortages in decommissioning funding as evidence of licensees’ 

likely inability to fund continued storage. Others stated that taxpayers are already funding 

storage because the lack of a repository has resulted in several large court judgments against 

the DOE to compensate licensees for storage. One commenter stated that eternal funding of 

continued storage represents a fundamental change to U.S. oversight of nuclear waste (i.e., 

oversight funds will not be collected from operating nuclear power plants) and will require 

Congressional action. Two commenters expressed concerns about the Federal government’s 

ability to provide compensation to the public in the event of an accident during continued 

storage. One commenter stated that the Court of Appeals ruling in NARUC v. DOE, in which 

the court directed DOE to suspend collection of Nuclear Waste Fund fees, signifies that spent 

fuel will be stored indefinitely and that without the ability to collect fees to fund spent fuel 

storage, the funds for continued storage will eventually be exhausted. 

Commenters offered a variety of recommendations on how to fund continued storage, including 

that the NRC should require separate funds be set aside for costs of extended storage, electric 

rates should reflect the costs of continued storage, and U.S. taxpayers funds should be used to 

VXEVLGL]HSHUFHQWRIWKHFRVWVRIVDIHGU\FDVNV2QHFRPPHQter explained a variety of 

factors that could contribute to licensees’ inability to fund continued storage, including that 

nearly every licensee is a limited liability corporation and that merchant reactors in deregulated 

markets have difficulty competing with cheaper competitors and thus have a higher probability 

of failures after cessation of operations. A few commenters also raised concerns regarding the 

cost of disposal, “clean up,” and spent fuel transportation. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC is not required to consider 

the costs of continued storage in this GEIS. However, the NRC notes that its regulatory 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

structure contains provisions to determine and remain current on the financial qualifications of 

LWVUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVLQ&)5IDQGWRUHHYDOXDWHWKHVHTXDOLILFDWLRQVZLWKLQ\HDUV

IROORZLQJSHUPDQHQWFHVVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQVRIWKHUHDFWRURU\HDUVEHIRUHH[SLUDWLRQRIWKH

UHDFWRUOLFHQVHXQGHU&)5EE3DUDJUDSKEE requires licensees to submit 

written notification to the Commission for its review and approval of the program by which the 

licensee intends to manage and provide funding for the management of all irradiated fuel at the 

reactor following permanent cessation of operation of the reactor until title to the irradiated fuel 

and possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy. Therefore, the financial 

plan and financial burden of continuing spent fuel storage is analyzed within the NRC’s 

regulatory framework. 

However, in response to the significant interest in this issue expressed by commenters, the 

NRC has provided additional information on estimated costs for some facilities and activities in 

Chapter 2 of the GEIS. These cost estimates do not represent an NRC expectation that 

continued storage costs will occur indefinitely, given the NRC’s expectation of repository 

availability within the short-term timeframe. Instead, this additional data provides a more 

complete picture of the costs of the facilities and activities that could occur throughout 

unanticipated but possibly lengthy continued storage. The NRC acknowledges that the cost of 

storage is significant, particularly with respect to longer timeframes, and therefore understands 

the strong public interest in disclosure of this information. Accordingly, Chapter 2 provides 

information applicable to costs of continued storage activities. Furthermore, the NRC 

acknowledges that, because of delays in the siting and licensing of a repository, the Federal 

government bears an increasing financial responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and it may 

become responsible for paying all the costs associated with spent fuel storage at some time in 

the future. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

For more information on the high cost of storage during the indefinite timeframe see Section 

' of this appendix. With respect to the costs of continued storage and the Nuclear 

Waste Fund, the NRC notes that the funds in the Nuclear Waste Fund were never intended to 

cover the costs of continued storage; the recent Court of Appeals decision suspending the 

collection of fees has no effect on the ability of licensees to safely store spent fuel. For more 

information on funds to cover damages caused by accidents during continued storage see 

Section ' of this appendix. 

The issue of continued storage and tax payments is discussed in Section ' of this 

appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as result of these comments. 

-3) (30-2-3) (30--3) (34--4-------3) (244----2) 

-42----24---32--32--13----30-2) 

-12--3--3----2--12----2--4) 

(410---12--------1--3) 

-2--1--2--------
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

1-----1--2--2-----

4--------1-----

--------2-2) (1003-1) 

D.2.42.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated concerns that the NRC’s funding criteria for 

decommissioning does not account for short-term, long-term, or indefinite onsite storage of 

nuclear waste. One commenter stated that the NRC’s assumption that the DOE would provide 

long-term storage is unfounded and particularly unreliable in light of the Court of Appeals’ 

decision in NARUC v. DOE. Another commenter recommended that the NRC either include a 

financial plan for long-term spent fuel storage, or perform a revision to the NRC 

decommissioning certification of financial assurance to include the financial burden of onsite 

spent fuel storage. One commenter stated that the NRC has the responsibility to deny licenses 

to new power plants unless the licensee can demonstrate how it will bear the future costs 

associated with continued storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees in part. The 

comments are correct that the NRC funding criteria for decommissioning does not account for 

short-term, long-term, or indefinite onsite storage of nuclear waste. Rather, under 10 CFR 

EEOLFHQVHHVDUHUHTXLUHGWR“submit written notification to the Commission for its review 

and approval of the program by which the licensee intends to manage and provide funding for 

the management of all irradiated fuel at the reactor following permanent cessation of operation 

of the reactor until title to the irradiated fuel and possession of the fuel is transferred to the 

Secretary of Energy for its ultimate disposal in a repository.” Furthermore, the NRC 

acknowledges that, because of delays in the siting and licensing of a repository, the Federal 

government bears an increasing financial responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and may 

become responsible for paying all the costs associated with spent fuel storage at some time in 

the future. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---3-3) 

D.2.42.4 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that dedicated funding should be provided to 

affected local and State governments to fully participate and independently monitor storage 

sites. 

RESPONSE: The comment is outside the scope of this GEIS. The NRC does not routinely 

provide funds to local and State governments to cover the costs of independently monitoring 

spent fuel storage sites. As discussed in Section D.2.34.12 of this appendix, during facility 

operations the NRC requires licensees to monitor routine and inadvertent radioactive effluents 

discharged into the environment. NRC licensees are required to have a REMP to quantify the 

environmental impacts associated with radioactive effluent releases from the licensed facility. In 

addition, the NRC periodically conducts inspections associated with the facility’s SAFSTOR 

programs, occupational exposure, fire protection, radioactive effluent control, and the site 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

REMP. SAFSTOR is a method of decommissioning in which a nuclear facility is placed and 

maintained in a condition that allows the facility to be safely stored and subsequently 

decontaminated to levels that permit release for unrestricted use. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(222-

D.2.42.5 – COMMENT: One commenter proposed and applied methods to assess the cost of 

nuclear waste management, including onsite storage and geologic disposal. The commenter 

determined that the costs of waste management would significantly change the costs of nuclear 

power in relation to other power options, making nuclear power a less attractive option, and 

possibly the least attractive option. The commenter recommended that the NRC assess the 

costs of nuclear waste management and that the NRC consider these costs as part of its reactor 

licensing and license renewal determinations. The commenter also disagreed with assumptions 

made by third parties (e.g., DOE and the U.S. Energy Information Administration) related to the 

costs of electricity generation and spent fuel disposal and indicated that even with institutional 

controls in place during the indefinite storage timeframe, sufficient funding for continued storage 

may not be available. A few other commenters referenced this commenter’s comments in their 

submittals. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC is not required to consider 

WKHFRVWVRIFRQWLQXHGVWRUDJHLQWKLV*(,6&KDSWHURIWKH*(,6FRQWDLQVDFRVW-benefit 

analysis of the proposed action, a rulemaking, and the alternatives to the proposed action 

GLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQVDQG. Further, the comments’ suggestion to consider the costs of 

continued storage is outside the scope of this Rule and GEIS, which is limited to a review of the 

environmental impacts of continued storage. 

However, the NRC notes that its regulatory structure does contain provisions to determine and 

UHPDLQFXUUHQWRQWKHILQDQFLDOTXDOLILFDWLRQVRILWVUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVLQ&)5IDQGWR

reevaluate these qualifications at decommissioning under 10 CFR EE3DUDJUDSK

EEUHTXLUHVOLFHQVHHVWRVXEPLWZULWWHQQRWLILFDWLRQWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQIRULWVUHYLHZDQG

approval of the program by which the licensee intends to manage and provide funding for the 

management of all irradiated fuel at the reactor following permanent cessation of operation of 

the reactor until title to the irradiated fuel and possession of the fuel is transferred to the 

Secretary of Energy. Therefore, the financial plan and financial burden of continuing spent fuel 

storage during decommissioning is already analyzed within the NRC’s regulatory framework. 

Furthermore, the NRC acknowledges that, because of delays in the siting and licensing of a 

repository, the Federal government bears an increasing financial responsibility for spent fuel 

storage costs, and it may become responsible for paying all the costs associated with spent fuel 

storage at some time in the future. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

However, in response to the significant interest expressed by comments regarding this issue, 

the NRC has provided additional information on some estimated costs for some facilities and 

activities in Chapter 2 of the GEIS. These cost estimates do not represent an NRC expectation 

that continued storage costs will occur indefinitely, given the NRC’s expectation of repository 

availability within the short-term timeframe. Instead, this additional data provides a more 

complete picture of the costs of the facilities and activities that could occur throughout 

unanticipated but possibly lengthy continued storage. The NRC acknowledges that the cost of 

storage is significant, particularly with respect to longer timeframes, and therefore understands 

the strong public interest in disclosure of this information. Accordingly, the GEIS provides 

information applicable to continued storage activities (e.g., Section 2.2.1.3 of the GEIS details 

the financial costs of at-reactor ISFSIs and Section 2.1.3 of the GEIS provides the cost data for 

away-from-reactor ISFSIs). Assumptions made by the DOE and U.S. Energy Information 

Administration related to the costs of electricity generation and spent fuel disposal are out-ofscope of the GEIS. No other changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--------1---

-------3--1--3--3-4) 

-1--3--3------4----1---

-----------

---2--2--2-

D.2.43 Comments Concerning Decommissioning 

D.2.43.1 – COMMENT: The NRC received several comments that expressed concern about 

spent fuel management and NRC oversight at decommissioned plants. One commenter stated 

that the NRC has determined that it is no longer necessary to have permanent inspectors onsite 

during the decommissioning process. Some commenters suggested that spent fuel at 

decommissioned plants should be transferred from pools to dry casks, some suggested that fuel 

should be removed from decommissioned plant sites, and others suggested that sites cannot be 

decontaminated or will become waste facilities for many years. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments regarding 

decommissioning inspections. Unlike facilities with operating reactors, decommissioning reactor 

sites do not have resident inspectors (i.e., inspectors assigned to an operating nuclear plant to 

carry out the inspection program on a day-to-day basis). However, numerous inspections occur 

during the decommissioning period of a reactor site. These inspections include, but are not 

limited to, spent fuel pool safety, decommissioning activities, ISFSIs if the site has an ISFSI, and 

physical security. Inspections are generally scheduled during periods of higher risk activities, 

and during and after remediation activities. Also, as part of decommissioning inspections, the 

NRC conducts independent radiological measurements to confirm licensee radiological survey 

methodologies. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part, with the comments suggesting that sites cannot 

be decontaminated or will become waste facilities for many years. The NRC agrees that part of 

the decommissioning and decontaminating process at reactor sites involves addressing the 

long-lived nature of some of the radionuclides present at the sites, and also agrees with the 

general concept that decontaminating one site can result in contaminating another site (i.e., 

disposal of contaminated material in landfills and hazardous waste facilities). However, this 

situation is not unique to the nuclear industry. For example, disposing of unwanted chemicals 

and cleaners from a house-hold cabinet or contaminated soil from a leaking chemical tank could 

contaminate a landfill or hazardous waste facility. With respect to whether sites can be 

decommissioned, 11 power reactors have had their reactor licenses either terminated and the 

sites released for unrestricted use under 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E or reduced to the area 

housing the ISFSI if the site has spent fuel in dry storage. Unrestricted use means the NRC has 

no limitations on the owner’s future use of the property. 

Section ' of this appendix responds to comments concerning the expedited transfer of 

spent fuel from wet to dry storage. Section ' responds to comments concerning the 

timing of a repository for the spent fuel. Section ' responds to comments concerning the 

feasibility of a repository for the spent fuel. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

-10----12-------2) 

D.2.43.2 – COMMENT: A few commenters stated that decommissioning should be a priority 

and raised concerns about the costs of decommissioning and whether adequate funding or 

plans will be available to provide for decommissioning. One commenter questioned the 

adequacy of funding for the storage of spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: These comments are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Decommissioning 

planning is an important part of the operational and post-operational periods of a nuclear power 

SODQW8QGHU&)5RSHUDWLQJUHDFWRUOLFHQVHHVDUHUHTXLUHGWRFRQGXFWVXUYH\VRI

areas, including the subsurface (i.e., soils and groundwater), that licensees subsequently use to 

assist in developing plans for decommissioning. For power reactor licensees, required 

decommissioning related plans include the licensee-developed Post-Shutdown 

Decommissioning Activities Report and License Termination Plan. 

The NRC disagrees with the comments related to decommissioning funding. The NRC has 

determined that reasonable assurance of decommissioning funding is necessary to ensure the 

adequate protection of public health and safety. Decommissioning funding is an obligation that 

LVWDNHQRQE\DOLFHQVHHZKHQDQ15&OLFHQVHLVLVVXHG3XUVXDQWWR&)5ED

reactor licensee is required to provide decommissioning funding assurance by one or more of 

the methods described in 10 CF5HDVGHWHUPLQHGWREHDFFHSWDEOHWRWKH15&,Q

addition, the NRC has a comprehensive, regulation-based decommissioning funding oversight 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

program in place to provide reasonable assurance that sufficient funds will be available for 

decommissioning and radiological decontamination for each U.S. commercial nuclear facility to 

meet NRC standards and regulations. 

The NRC disagrees with the comment related to spent fuel storage funding. Pursuant to 10 

&)5EE“For nuclear power reactors licensed by the NRC, the licensee shall, within 2 

\HDUVIROORZLQJSHUPDQHQWFHVVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQRIWKHUHDFWRURU\HDUVEHIRUHH[SLUDWLRQRI

the reactor operating license, whichever occurs first, submit written notification to the 

Commission for its review and preliminary approval of the program by which the licensee 

intends to manage and provide funding for the management of all irradiated fuel at the reactor 

following permanent cessation of operation of the reactor until title to the irradiated fuel and 

possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy for its ultimate disposal in a 

UHSRVLWRU\,QDGGLWLRQSXUVXDQWWR&)5HDQDSSOLFDQWIRUDVSHFLILFOLFHQVHIRUDQ

ISFSI must provide information that shows that the applicant either possesses the necessary 

operating funds or that the applicant has reasonable assurance of obtaining the necessary 

operating funds for the planned life of the ISFSI. Finally, the NRC notes that, because of delays 

in the siting and licensing of a repository, the Federal government bears an increasing financial 

responsibility for spent fuel storage costs, and may become responsible for paying all the costs 

associated with spent fuel storage at some time in the future. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----

D.2.43.3 – COMMENT: Two commenters raised concerns related to ownership and 

responsibility for spent fuel post-decommissioning. One commenter raised concerns that the 

GEIS states that the Federal government’s policy for disposal is to construct a deep geologic 

repository, but that the GEIS should provide further explanation of the ownership and 

responsibility for spent fuel post-decommissioning. Another commenter stated the mission of 

the Decommissioning Plant Coalition and stated that the Federal government’s continued failure 

to remove spent fuel from decommissioned reactor sites is an unacceptable public policy. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment that the GEIS should provide further 

explanation of the ownership and responsibility for spent fuel post-decommissioning and neither 

agrees nor disagrees with the remainder of the comments. The ownership and responsibility for 

spent fuel post-decommissioning remains with the licensee until the title of the irradiated fuel 

and possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy for its ultimate disposal in a 

repository. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--3) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.43.4 – COMMENT: The NRC received one comment that suggested decommissioning 

nuclear power plants would increase employment while simultaneously spurring both innovation 

and training in the field of robotics. 

RESPONSE: The NRC neither agrees nor disagrees with the comment. Although operating 

SRZHUUHDFWRUVKDYHKXQGUHGVRIZRUNHUVDVLGHQWLILHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6WKH15&

has estimated that between 100 and 200 workers would be needed to support nuclear power 

plant decommissioning. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-44-3) 

D.2.44 Comments Concerning Emergency Planning 

D.2.44.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters asked the NRC to expand emergency planning 

zones, and some commenters requested up to NPPL), citing the evacuation zone the 

U.S. government recommended for Americans in the area of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

accident in Japan (DOS 2011). Commenters also asked the NRC to include the public in the 

preparation of emergency plans. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. To the extent that comments were 

focused on emergency planning for reactor events, such events are outside the scope of the 

GEIS and Rule, which concerns the evaluation of the environmental impacts of the continued 

storage of spent fuel, not reactor operations. 

The sizes of the emergency planning zones are established in the NRC regulations. See 10 

&)5FDQG&)53DUW$SSHQGL[(6HFWLRQ,3DUDJUDSK&KDQJHVWRWKHVH

requirements can be requested through a petition for rulemaking—seH&)5

However, the NRC recently denied a petition for rulemaking that requested changes to the 

HPHUJHQF\SODQQLQJ]RQHV)5,QGHQ\LQJWKHSHWLWLRQIRUUXOHPDNLQJWKH15&

concluded that the current size of emergency planning zones is appropriate for existing reactors 

and that emergency plans will provide an adequate level of protection of the public health and 

safety in the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant. The NRC also concluded that the 

current emergency planning zones provide for a comprehensive emergency planning framework 

that would allow expansion of the response efforts beyond the designated distances should 

events warrant such an expansion. 

For a new facility, the development of the emergency plan is part of the licensing process and 

members of the public can participate through any associated public meetings and, more 

formally, through the hearing process. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

---11--40--40--2--2---
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.44.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated concerns about the adequacy of offsite 

emergency preparedness for continued storage of spent fuel. Specific concerns were raised 

about the condition of local bridges, the inability to evacuate high-population areas or areas with 

traffic congestion in a timely manner, and coordinating movements of people away from plumes 

of airborne contamination. Several commenters raised specific concerns about emergency 

preparedness in areas surrounding specific facilities. One commenter raised specific concerns 

about the location of the Indian Point facility and stated that the NRC acknowledged that Indian 

Point is poorly located. Several commenters cited the nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi 

as one of the bases for their concerns. One commenter suggested that the NRC develop “its 

own version of a SWAT team, which should be fully funded by the industry” to improve 

emergency preparedness. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. To the extent that comments were 

focused on emergency planning for reactor events, such events are outside the scope of the 

GEIS and Rule, which concerns the evaluation of the environmental impacts of the continued 

storage of spent fuel, not reactor operations. 

NRC regulations require reactor and ISFSI licensees to establish and maintain emergency 

SODQV6HHIRUH[DPSOH&)5DQG&)5(DFKSODQPXVWEHUHYLHZHGDQG

approved by the NRC. The offsite response to an emergency involves coordination between 

the licensee, State and local agencies involved in the plan, and Federal agencies. In the event 

of an emergency, State and local emergency response organizations provide information to the 

public about the emergency and the associated response. 

For the storage of spent fuel, the NRC considers a range of possible accidents, including 

internal events (e.g., partial or complete loss of pool inventory) and external events (e.g., floods, 

tornadoes, and earthquakes). If a significant event were to occur at a nuclear plant, the NRC 

has its own emergency response plans in place. Although not referred to as a SWAT team, one 

part of such a response can include dispatching an NRC team to the site to monitor the 

licensee’s response and to help coordinate the response by the NRC in the associated regional 

office and NRC headquarters. The NRC can also call upon the resources of the entire Federal 

government as necessary when responding to an event. 

See Section' of this appendix for additional information. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-14--2) (114--------20-(230--24--3-

--12--------2) (410--2---4) 

------3-----10) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.44.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated concerns that the NRC may grant 

exemptions from some emergency plan requirements, like evacuation planning, once a plant 

permanently ceases operations. One commenter cited a 2013 exemption request by one 

licensee for a recently shutdown plant as an example of these possible exemptions (DEK 

2013b). Some commenters stated that the plans will be needed and should be maintained 

indefinitely. One commenter expressed concern about the growing population density around 

certain plants as time passes, and how that might affect evacuation plans. Another commenter 

VWDWHGWKDWUDWKHUWKDQJUDQWH[HPSWLRQVWKH15&VKRXOGFRQVLGHU-mi emergency planning 

zones. Finally, another commenter asked that the NRC expedite transfer of the spent fuel from 

the spent fuel pools to dry casks before considering exemptions to relax the emergency 

planning requirements at a plant. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part, and disagrees in part. The NRC 

agrees that exemptions from emergency planning requirements have historically been granted 

on a case-by-case basis for decommissioning facilities. Because the exemptions to emergency 

planning requirements had been granted prior to the issuance of NUREG–Technical Study 

of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (NRC 2001b), the 

NRC conducted a review all of the previously issued exemptions. The NRC conducted this 

review because of the conclusion in NUREG–WKDWD]LUFRQLXPILUHFDQQRWEHJHQHULFDOO\

dismissed based on the age of the spent fuel. Based on its review, the NRC determined that the 

previously granted exemptions did not present an “undue risk to the public health and safety 

given the long time periods available to support implementation of protective measures on an ad 

hoc basis for [spent fuel pool] accidents. Specifically, because of the long spent fuel decay times 

at currently decommissioning plants, a zirconium fire cannot occur for an extended period of time 

(at least 10 hours), if it could occur at all, even under the worst-case adiabatic heatup 

assumptions (no heat transfer of any kind from the fuel assemblies).” (NRC 2001d). 

The NRC has issued draft ISG NSIR/DPR-ISG-02 (NRC 2013t) to provide guidance to staff 

reviewing any future requests for exemption from emergency planning requirements. While the 

ISG is not yet final, it explains how the NRC intends to approach these exemption requests. For 

an exemption to emergency planning requirements to be granted, licensees must first prove, 

with a site-specific analysis, that a design basis accident will not result in an offsite radiological 

release that exceeds the EPA Protective Action Guidelines at the site boundary, or that for a 

beyond-design-basis accident there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions by 

the licensee and for offsite agencies to take protective actions for the public under an “allhazards” plan. 

See Section ' of this appendix for additional information related to exemptions. The 

FRPPHQWWKDWWKH15&VKRXOGFRQVLGHU-mi emergency planning zones is outside the scope 

of the GEIS and Rule, the purpose of which is to determine whether the environmental impacts 

of continued storage can be assessed generically and, if so, to codify the GEIS at 10 CFR 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

6HH6HFWLRQD.2.44.1 of this appendix for additional information. The issue of expedited 

transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks is also outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule; 

see Section ' of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

----------4-1) 

D.2.44.4 – COMMENT: Two commenters stated that the GEIS should describe the emergency 

preparedness and response requirements for ISFSIs. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC did rely on the implementation 

of its regulatory requirements (e.g., those for emergency plans) when it prepared the GEIS even 

though the NRC is not required to describe those safety requirements as part of this 

environmental review. The NRC evaluates an applicant’s emergency plan as part of sitespecific reactor and specifically licensed ISFSI reviews and during periodic inspections for 

licensed facilities. However, the following is provided to address concerns raised in this 

comment. 

The requirements for emergency preparedness for ISFSIs are addressed under either 10 CFR 

IRUDJHQHUDOOLFHQVHRU&)5IRUDVSHFLILFOLFHnse). Licensees are required to 

take actions to maintain the effectiveness of their emergency plans and the NRC evaluates the 

licensee’s performance in emergency preparedness under the NRC’s inspection program – see 

for example Inspection Manual Chapter (,0&,QVSHFWLRQ3URJUDPIRU'U\6WRUDJHRI

Spent reactor Fuel at ISFSIVDQGIRU&)53DUW7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ3DFNDJLQJV15& 2012p). 

See Sections D.2.44.2 and ' of this appendix for additional information. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2--2-

D.2.44.5 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that local tax payments by Prairie Island 

Nuclear Generating Plant have declined greatly over the years, which has adversely affected 

public safety services required to satisfy the offsite emergency preparedness plan. The 

commenter stated that the city of Red Wing, Minnesota is obligated to maintain the necessary 

police, fire, and other emergency personnel, equipment, and facilities to respond in a timely and 

meaningful fashion. The city is obligated under the NRC and the State of Minnesota regulations 

to provide reasonable assurance that it can meet the emergency preparedness plan for the 

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, and accompanying ISFSIs. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. To the extent that comments were 

focused on emergency planning for reactor events, such events are outside the scope of the 

evaluation of the impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

The comment expressed concern about the ability of offsite organizations to support the 

emergency plan. Offsite organizations, such as those mentioned in the comment, participate in 

an exercise every 2 years and are evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency assesses the capabilities of State and local offsite 

emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their radiological emergency response 

plans and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency. 

See http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/related-information/fema-after-actionreports.html for the most recent Federal Emergency Management Agency assessments for a 

given facility. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-2) 

D.2.45 Editorial Comments on the Federal Register Notice 

D.2.45.1 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that the information in the SOC be 

rearranged. The commenter felt that the present organization is unclear, ineffective, and 

confusing. The commenter stated that the Supplementary Information section is more 

appropriately placed after the Rule language, which the commenter viewed as the essential 

information. The commenter also noted that the Table of Contents in the SOC did not contain 

page numbers and is only applicable to the Supplementary Information section of the Federal 

Register Notice. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC cannot change the order or 

format of information in a Federal Register Notice. The order of information provided in a rule 

and the format of the rule is established by the Office of the Federal Register. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-20) 

D.2.45.2 – COMMENT: One commenter requested clarification of a statement in Question A1 

of the proposed Rule SOC. The commenter requested that the statement “(T)he analysis in the 

GEIS provides a regulatory basis for the proposed rule” be clarified to convey that the NRC 

envisions that DTSs and ISFSIs would require rebuilding at some point either at reactors or 

away from reactors and that 100 years is being used as a reasonable analytical surrogate while 

research continues. The commenter noted that this change would also improve the validity of 

the statement “(T)he analyses in the GEIS are based on current technology and regulation.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The GEIS does provide the regulatory 

basis for the Rule. The GEIS contains a number of assumptions, one of which is that the casks 

would be changed out every 100 years and a new storage pad and DTS would be built to 

facilitate the transfer. It is not a requirement that such transfer occur every 100 years. It is 

conceivable that casks can safely contain spent fuel for much longer periods; it is also possible 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

that in some cases transfer might need to occur sooner. For purposes of analyzing the 

environmental impacts of continued storage, the NRC assumes that licensees continue to use 

current technology and regulations; any actual transfer will be based on the technology and 

regulations in place at the time the transfer occurs. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.45.3 – COMMENT: One commenter requested that all NRC language use standard 

definitions and provided the terms “confidence” and “spent” as examples where the NRC’s use 

of the terms was misleading and unacceptable. 

RESPONSE: The NRC does not intend to mislead anyone with the use of terminology. 

Terminology used by the NRC is sometimes unique to the NRC and the nuclear energy 

community and may not reflect common usage and definitions. Historically the term 

“confidence” has been used to express the belief or confidence that a repository will be 

available for the disposal of spent fuel6SHQWQXFOHDUIXHOLVGHILQHGLQ&)53DUWDQG

refers to fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation. The term 

spent fuel or spent fuel is in common use in the nuclear energy community. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--4) 

D.2.45.4 – COMMENT: Commenters requested that the rulemaking package contain 

information on Yucca Mountain and the recent Court of Appeals ruling issuing the writ of 

mandamus to restart the licensing process. One commenter stated that in the interest of 

openness and transparency the SOC and GEIS should recognize the recent decision of the 

Court of Appeals that ordered the NRC to restart the licensing review on Yucca Mountain and 

the NRC’s statement that it will complete the safety evaluation report. The commenter stated 

that the rulemaking package should recognize that the completion and operation of a repository 

at Yucca Mountain continues to be required by the NWPA. The commenter also suggested that 

a statement be added to the SOC to reflect that “the Yucca Mountain license application and 

NRC staff review of that application have shown a safe repository to be technically feasible.” 

Another commenter suggested that the GEIS acknowledge the political difficulties of licensing a 

HLW repository. One commenter suggested that the Yucca Mountain proceeding be included 

as an “area of controversy” in the GEIS because the commenter believes that the NRC’s 

decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain proceeding led to the lawsuit that resulted in the 

remand of the 2010 Waste Confidence Decision. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with the comments in part and disagrees in part. The Yucca 

Mountain review was mentioned in the discussion on repository feasibility in the draft GEIS 

(page B-3). Additional information on the Yucca Mountain review status has been added to 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Appendix B of the final GEIS. Although the NWPA requires consideration of a national 

repository at Yucca Mountain, it would be inappropriate for the NRC to assume the operation of 

a repository at Yucca Mountain. The NRC has not yet completed its review of the Yucca 

Mountain application; therefore, final conclusions have not been made regarding the suitability 

of Yucca Mountain as a repository. In addition, it is unclear how the DOE will proceed in 

regards to Yucca Mountain. The NRC has recognized and acknowledges the political 

uncertainty and difficulties in siting and licensing a geologic repository and has addressed this in 

Appendix B of the GEIS. Additional discussion of this issue is provided in Section ' of 

this appendix. The NRC also acknowledges that the Yucca Mountain repository licensing 

process and related events are a general area of controversy for the agency. However, the 

description of areDVRIFRQWURYHUV\LQ6HFWLRQ(6RIWKH*(,6([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\LV

applicable to substantive areas within the scope of the GEIS. Because the Yucca Mountain 

licensing review is not within the scope of the GEIS, the NRC does not believe that a separate 

listing for Yucca Mountain as an area of controversy is necessary. No changes were made to 

the Rule as a result of these comments. 

------1-13) 

D.2.46 Editorial Comments on the GEIS 

D.2.46.1 – COMMENT: Some commenters asked whether the NRC made a mistake in the 

GEIS’s description of when the site-specific analysis is performed for the storage of spent fuel 

during operations. 

RESPONSE: The description is not in error. The site-specific NEPA analysis performed for 

licensing or relicensing is valid through the term of the license whether the reactor is operating 

or not. Unless the NRC authorizes a change in the licensed activities that would require 

additional NEPA analyses, no new site-specific NEPA analysis will be performed until that 

license expires or is renewed. The GEIS addresses only the period after the initial operating 

license ends, also described as the licensed life for operation. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--2-11) 

D.2.46.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters suggested editorial changes to the GEIS including 

corrections of typographical errors, dates of references, and suggested wording changes. 

RESPONSE: The NRC made changes to the GEIS as necessary in response to these editorial 

comments. No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

--3--3--2---4----2---
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.46.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated there were no definitions in the Index (Chapter 

10) of the GEIS. 

RESPONSE: A glossary has been added to the GEIS as a new Chapter 11. No changes were 

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

-14) 

D.2.46.4 – COMMENT: A commenter suggested that the number of spent fuel pool workers 

–OLVWHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKHGUDIW*(,6VKRXOGEHFRQVLVWHQWWKHQXPEHURIZRUNHUV

listed in Section 4.2.1 of the draft GEIS (i.e., 20–

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with this comment. The text in Section 4.3.1 of the GEIS has 

EHHQUHYLVHGIURP–WR–ZRUNHUVLQUHVSRQVHWRWKLVFRPPHQW1RFKDQJHVZHUH

made to the Rule as a result of this comment. 

--

D.2.47 Comments Concerning Opposition to Rule or GEIS 

D.2.47.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated general opposition to the GEIS and Rule. 

Commenters generally opposed the generic approach, assumptions, and analysis in the GEIS 

and Rule. Some commenters generally stated that the rulemaking violated NEPA, AEA, and the 

NWPA. Other commenters generally opposed the rulemaking because it does not address 

disposal of spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments opposing the GEIS and Rule. General 

concerns cited in the comments opposing the GEIS or Rule are addressed in more detail 

throughout this appendix, including the feasibility of safe storage in Section ', the 

feasibility of geological disposal in Section ', GEIS assumptions and analysis in Section 

', spent fuel pool leaks in Section D.2.40, spent fuel pool fires in Section ', accidents 

in Sections ' and ', security and terrorism in Section ', generic versus sitespecific analysis in Section D.2.11, and environmental justice in Section D.2.23. 

The NRC disagrees with comments that the rulemaking violated NEPA, AEA, and the NWPA. 

The Commission makes a good-faith effort to comply with applicable requirements, and 

individuals who believe that the Commission’s actions are not in accordance with law can seek 

judicial review of the Commission’s actions. The rulemaking addresses the environmental 

impacts of spent fuel storage beyond the licensed life of a reactor and prior to disposal, 

therefore the rulemaking does not address disposal of spent fuel. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

(21-3) (30--1) (30--2) (30--4) (30-12----12-------

-12--12-------2) (102-4) (112-34-1) (112--11) 

(112-34-2) (112--3) (112-34-4) (112--4) (112--4) (112---2--24--1) 

(144---1--12--13--2--33----34-10) 

-----31--34--42--------1-

-34--1----------1) 

-1) (202-1) (204---------11) 

--4) (221-1) (221-3) (244--11) (244--12) (244--2) (244-3-4) (244---30-

-----3--41------10----

14--24--3--------14-----1) 

-22----2----13----2----

-------23--31--34--42---2) 

---------------1---

------------

---------2) (303---

-2) (314----12--------31-

--1) ---------------4-

---11--2--------11----

11--11--12--13----1--3--14---

-------1) (331--4) (341-1-1) (341-2--1--1-

-----------12) 

--1--2--1--4) (404-1) (-1) (410---2) (422-1) 

(423--1) (431--1) (433--2) (443-1) (443-11) (443---2-10) 

-2--1--2--1-----4----1) 

-----------1--

2--1--2--1--1--2--2--1--2-

---------1--1--2-

-1----1--1--1--1-----2) 

------------

-------1--4--1--4) 

------------

-----------1-1) 

-2--3--2--2-12-1--3--1--2--1-

-1-----------1-1) 

-1--------2--1---

-----------1) 

------------1) 

------------

-----------

-----------

---------3--3--2) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

----1----2------

-1--1--3--3--------2) 

-1--3--3--3-------1) 

--------4) (1004-

D.2.48 Comments Concerning Support for Rule or GEIS 

D.2.48.1 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed general support for the Waste Confidence 

Rule and GEIS, the generic approach of the rulemaking, and the NRC’s conclusions regarding 

the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel, and the feasibility of safe 

continued storage and geologic disposal in a repository. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments supporting the GEIS or Rule. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1) (30----2--14--2--2----2----2--

1) (112-1-1) (112--1) (112--1) (112--2) (112--2) (112-12-3) (112--3) (112-1-4) (112-

-4) (112------11--30------11-

---------1) (201-4) (201-

(244-1-2) (244-11-2) (244-12----20--23----33--20-

-21--4--10--21--14--4--21--10--

--24------43---------2) 

-----------------

4--3--41-------------

--2) (313-----4) -32----41--12--

------31--12----31-----14) 

-10--10--2------1) (400---1) 

--1) (----------1-

-2--1--2--2--1--1--2--2--1-1) 

-1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1-

-3--------1-----

-1--2-------4) 

D.2.48.2 – COMMENT: Two companies who each operate multiple nuclear power plants 

submitted comments stating that the generic analysis of the GEIS is appropriate and applicable 

to certain nuclear power plants. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments supporting the analysis in the GEIS. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-3--1--3--2--3--2--2--2--

2--2--2--3--2--2--2--1--2-3) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

-2--3--2--2--3--1--2--2--4--

1--1--1--2--1--2--3--4--1-20) 

-2--1--1--1--1--1--2--1--1-

-2--2--3--2--3--1--2-

D.2.49 Out-of-Scope Comments – General 

D.2.49.1 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that prior to conducting siting activities for a 

permanent repository, the EPA should conduct a rulemaking process to develop new standards 

regarding spent fuel disposal. 

RESPONSE: The environmental impacts of spent fuel disposal and any standards or 

regulations governing disposal are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(-

D.2.49.2 – COMMENT: Commenters criticized Table S-3, Table of Uranium Fuel Cycle 

(QYLURQPHQWDO'DWDFRQWDLQHGLQ&)53DUW&RPPHQWHUVVWDWHGWKDW7DEOH6-3 was 

incorrect, obsolete, invalid, inadequate, contained omissions, violated NEPA, and should be reanalyzed through a rulemaking. Some commenters objected to Table S-3’s zero-release 

assumption regarding the disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository, and said that the NRC 

must prepare a new analysis in the context of the Waste Confidence Decision. One commenter 

stated that there are inconsistencies between the conclusions of Table S-3 and Table B-1, 

Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants. Another 

commenter requested that the NRC analyze the health effects of uranium mining. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The environmental impacts of portions 

of the uranium fuel cycle that occur before new fuel is delivered to the plant and after spent fuel 

is sent to a disposal site have been evaluatHGDQGDUHFRGLILHGLQ&)57DEOH6–3. 

The environmental impacts of the disposal of spent fuel and general comments about the 

adequacy of Table S-3 are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Petitions for a rulemaking 

to update Table S-3 may be submitted in accordance with the NRC’s regulations at 10 CFR 

3HWLWLRQIRURulemaking. With regard to the comment concerning the health effects of 

uranium mining, the NRC does not regulate mining of uranium ore. The NRC regulates milling, 

i.e., the extraction of uranium or thorium from mined ore. The NRC does, however, regulate insitu leach uranium recovery facilities as milling facilities. See the Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement for In-Situ Leach Uranium Milling Facilities (NUREG–15&a). No 

changes have been made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(222----3-------------11) 

----------1) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.49.3 – COMMENT: One commenter criticized the SECY-13-0112, Consequence Study of a 

Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water 

Reactor and COMSECY–13–0030, “Staff Evaluation and Recommendation for Japan LessonsLearned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel.” The commenter stated that SECY13-0112 was not conducted pursuant to NEPA because it did not include a hard look at 

alternatives to continued storage of spent fuel in fuel pools, nor did it examine mitigation 

measures. The commenter also stated that the cost-benefit analysis in COMSECY–13–0030 

did not meet the requirements of NEPA. 

RESPONSE: The processes used to develop SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) and COMSECY–

13–0030 (NRC 2013n) were not developed to meet the NRC’s responsibilities under NEPA and 

are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

----2) 

D.2.49.4 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed both support for and opposition to 

recommendations in the January 2012 Blue Ribbon Commission Report on America’s Nuclear 

Future. Some commenters stated they were opposed to the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future itself and to recommendations in the report, such as centralized 

interim storage, while other commenters stated that the NRC should follow the roadmap 

provided by the Blue Ribbon Commission, including support for consent-based siting of a 

geologic repository. One commenter supported forming an independent Nuclear Waste 

Administration, and another stated that the United States needed final disposal casks as used 

by the U.S. Navy and which were noted in the Blue Ribbon Commission report. 

RESPONSE: Although mentioned in the GEIS, the January 2012 Blue Ribbon Commission 

Report on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC 2012) is beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

The DOE, not the NRC, is responsible for addressing the recommendations from the report. In 

January 2013, the DOE released Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (DOE 2013a), a response to the Blue Ribbon 

Commission report. In this strategy document, the DOE presents a framework for “moving 

toward a sustainable program to deploy an integrated system capable of transporting, storing, 

and disposing of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power 

generation...” NRC would be responsible for conducting the license review and issuing a 

license, if appropriate, for any centralized interim storage facility or geologic repository. 

The casks used by the Navy and the DOE to transport and store spent fuel from the Navy 

program are designed specifically for that spent fuel, which is much more highly enriched than 

the fuel used in power reactors. To be used in the domestic program, the cask designs would 

need to be reviewed and approved for use by the NRC. Use of these casks is beyond the 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-4-------12--2-----4) 

-

D.2.49.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided suggestions for future legislation that 

would: (1) hold nuclear power plant owners accountable for all costs associated with radioactive 

wastes left onsite after plant closure; (2) establish a robust regulatory regime, which must include 

elimination of the pre-emption of State and Federal regulation of radionuclides; (3) provide 

supplemental appropriations for the NRC to achieve a full restart of the Yucca Mountain 

proceeding; (4) amend the NWPA to transfer the DOE responsibilities to a new Federal-private 

corporation, transfer all Nuclear Waste Fund fees and prior collections to the new Federal-private 

corporation, and specify that Nuclear Waste Fund monies be directly collected by the corporation 

and not be subject to Congressional appropriations. One commenter suggested that the 

Commission should order DOE as a party to the Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding to request 

supplemental appropriations from Congress and to provide the NRC, under oath and affirmation, 

with a plan to restart all DOE activities related to Yucca Mountain. Commenters suggested that 

the NRC should propose that the NWPA be amended or replaced to require a specific, 

achievable plan for permanent disposition of spent fuel before any new licenses are granted. 

Another commenter suggested that the law be changed to address the isolation of HLW from the 

biosphere for more than 10,000 years as required by current law. One commenter indicated that 

the NRC should inform Congress of the untenable hazards of the nuclear industry and advise 

Congress to authorize prompt cancellation of all current nuclear power plant licenses and to 

accelerate the political and regulatory processes for repository siting. 

RESPONSE: Suggested legislative changes are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

Commenters interested in proposing legislation should contact their Congressional 

representatives. The licensing process for any specific repository, including the proposed 

facility at Yucca Mountain, is also outside the scope of this proceeding. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1--2------4) 

D.2.49.6 – COMMENT: One commenter requested information about NRC documents or 

procedures that address spent fuel storage during the term of a power reactor’s operating 

license. 

RESPONSE: This rulemaking analyzes the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage after 

the licensed life of a nuclear reactor. Spent fuel storage at operating reactors is outside the 

scope of the GEIS and Rule, and is addressed in other safety and environmental licensing 

reviews. The NRC’s website at http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage.html provides 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

additional information regarding spent fuel storage. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of this comment. 

-3) 

D.2.49.7 – COMMENT: One commenter requested that the NRC explain how it would 

separately address the impacts of reprocessing, advanced reactors, and non-power reactors. 

RESPONSE: The analysis in the GEIS included reactor designs and spent fuel handling 

activities currently in commercial use or under development in the United States; accordingly 

this excluded high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid metal fast reactors, and 

reprocessing. The NRC would conduct separate safety and environmental reviews for future 

reactor design and reprocessing facility applications. The GEIS and Rule apply only to power 

reactors and ISFSIs. Non-power reactors (i.e., research and test reactors) are not covered by 

this rulemaking and thus are subject to individual licensing reviews. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-22---4) 

D.2.49.8 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed concerns about who would carry the 

liability for accidents or catastrophic events similar to events that occurred at Chernobyl and 

Fukushima. Comments included concerns regarding compensation for health, property, and 

community services for private citizens living near a nuclear waste facility or along 

transportation routes used to transport nuclear waste in the event of a waste spill, leak, or 

accident. Several comments mentioned how the outcome of the Downwinders settlement for 

compensation to workers and citizens affected by nuclear testing was not sufficient. One 

commenter noted that the U.S. Government provided compensation to the government of the 

Marshall Islands following Pacific nuclear tests, but that the compensation covered only a 

fraction of the total damages for the victims. The commenter went on to assert that the U.S. 

healthcare system would fail to cover losses from radiological or nuclear events and therefore 

there does not appear to be assurance that victims of a nuclear accident would be 

compensated. 

Several comments asked why the public should have to bear the burden of loss of property if 

their land becomes contaminated as the result of an accident. One commenter expressed 

concern about what options would be available to displaced citizens that would still respect their 

culture and traditions. Another commenter expressed concern that without a clear liability rule, 

lawsuits may be brought by large numbers of citizens or groups against a waste storage 

company, which could negatively affect the NRC. Several comments questioned the effects of 

the Price-$QGHUVRQ$FWRIDQGWKHNWPA, which appear to place the burden of liability on 

the public and not on the nuclear industry or the NRC, and one commenter felt that the NRC 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

has provided opportunity for limited liability corporations to run nuclear power plants, which 

would not have to carry major liability responsibilities. 

Several commenters recommended that the facility owners and the industry should carry 

insurance that should not be subsidized by the U.S. government. Commenters felt that there 

should be no limits on liability in the event of an accident, and there should be no government 

bailouts of private entities that produce and store nuclear waste. One commenter suggested 

that if the private sector is unwilling to take on the liability without subsidies, then the 

government should assume full control of radioactive waste. Another commenter expressed 

concerns regarding how the government would carry out its responsibility to pay for the cleanup 

of a nuclear accident in the event of a national fiscal crisis. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Liability resulting from a nuclear 

accident is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC offers the following information in 

response to the comments. 

The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act, 42 USC 2210), 

ZKLFKEHFDPHODZLQZDVGHVLJQHGWRHQVXUHWKDWDGHTXDWHIXQGVZRXOGEHDYDLODEOHWR

satisfy liability claims of members of the public for personal injury and property damage in the 

event of a nuclear accident. The legislation helped encourage private investment in commercial 

nuclear power by placing a cap, or ceiling, on the total amount of liability each holder of a 

nuclear power plant license would face in the event of a catastrophic accident. Over the years, 

the “limit of liability” for a catastrophic nuclear accident has increased the insurance pool to 

more than $12 billion. Under existing policy, utilities that operate nuclear power plants pay a 

premium each year for as much as $million in private insurance for offsite liability coverage 

for each reactor site. Each reactor unit is required to participate in the secondary, retrospective 

SUHPLXPSRROZLWKDWRWDOOLDELOLW\RIPLOOLRQSHUUHDFWRUXQLWLQFDVHRIDQDFFLGHQW

Because virtually all property and liability insurance policies issued in the United States exclude 

nuclear accidents, claims resulting from nuclear accidents are covered under the PriceAnderson Act and third party liability coverage required under the Price-Anderson Act is not 

limited to the operating period for a reactor. It includes any accident (including those that come 

about because of theft or sabotage) in the course of transporting nuclear fuel to a reactor site; in 

the storage of nuclear fuel or waste at a site; in the operation of a reactor, including the 

discharge of radioactive effluent; and in the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel and nuclear 

ZDVWHIURPWKHUHDFWRU7KH(QHUJ\3ROLF\$FWRIH[WHQGHGWKH3ULFH-Anderson Act to 

'HFHPEHU

Comments concerning the cost of continued storage of spent fuel are addressed in Section 2.42 

of this appendix. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-24-2) (42-1) (113---30------1--3) (410-31) 

-----11) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.49.9 – COMMENT: One commenter suggested that an education program be developed 

and used to educate the public about the health impacts and steps to take in case of a spent 

fuel pool fire. The commenter also suggested that potassium iodide tablets be made available 

through local convenience stores or other resources under the direction of the NRC and the 

Federal government. 

RESPONSE: Chapter 4 and Appendix F of the GEIS address the environmental impacts of 

spent fuel pool fires. Measures to improve emergency preparedness and education concerning 

spent fuel pool fires are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

--

D.2.49.10 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concerns regarding the costs 

associated with decommissioning and the storage of nuclear waste. One commenter stated 

that nuclear plant operators are suing the government over the lack of a storage solution. 

Another commenter presented a calculation that estimates NRC’s portion of the costs resulting 

from delays in implementing the NWPA. One commenter noted that license holders need to 

submit evidence of financial stability to ensure adequate funds are available for 

decommissioning. One commenter stated objections to the appearance that industry is gaining 

financial help through three separate regulatory processes—the Waste Confidence rulemaking, 

Senate Bill 1240, and foreign ownership of reactors. 

RESPONSE: The costs of plant decommissioning are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

Although not within the scope of this GEIS, the GEIS has been revised to include the costs of 

spent fuel storage during the continued storage period due to the extent of public comments 

received on the topic. Additional comments concerning the costs of nuclear power in general 

are addressed in Section D.2.42 of this appendix. This rulemaking is separate from and 

unrelated to the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013 (Senate Bill 1240) and the NRC’s 

ongoing adjudication regarding foreign ownership of nuclear reactors. No changes were made 

to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(112-30--24--24--24--2) 

D.2.49.11 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed both criticism and support of the NRC. 

Commenters expressed the view that the NRC is not living up to its mission of protecting people 

and the environment, does not make safety a priority, lacks a sound safety culture, simply 

rubberstamps the licensing and operation of nuclear plants and ISFSIs, and provides 

inadequate oversight for ISFSIs and reactor license renewals. Commenters requested more 

NRC oversight; stricter NRC regulations; safety assurances; better design criteria for nuclear 

power plants, including a request for increased resistance to aircraft impacts for new reactor 

designs and a requirement for additional sources of backup power; more frequent and thorough 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

inspections at existing nuclear plants; site-specific assessment of existing spent fuel storage 

systems; and tighter regulations regarding pool storage. Some commenters criticized the 

NRC’s oversight, asserting that the NRC has failed to regulate, has failed to implement tougher 

regulations on the nuclear industry, and has a poor safety record. Commenters said that the 

NRC should force industry to come up with a solution for nuclear waste and reduce the nuclear 

industry’s toxic footprint. Some commenters requested that the NRC not allow reactors to 

operate beyond their original license period. One commenter stated that the NRC does a poor 

job tracking nuclear materials. One commenter stated that the U.S. Department of Justice 

needs to examine illegal nuclear waste handling and that the United States should ban the 

burning of nuclear waste. Another commenter said that more emphasis should be placed on 

the radioactivity of the waste rather than the source of the waste. One commenter suggested 

burying spent fuel in NRC workers’ backyards. Another commenter criticized former NRC 

employees that go to work for the nuclear industry. Some commenters expressed support for 

continued NRC oversight. One commenter said more risk-informed, performance-based 

rulemaking was needed. Another commenter stated confidence in the NRC, but that the NRC 

needs to make hard decisions. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments in general. The GEIS and Rule address 

only the environmental impacts of continued storage. Accordingly, any concerns related to the 

design, operation, or inspection of a power reactor are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. 

The term of a reactor operating license, tracking of nuclear materials, the burning of nuclear 

waste, the location of a disposal site, and the employment decisions of former NRC employees 

are also beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC recognizes the comments in 

support of the NRC and its activities. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

----32-1) (112--1) (112-23-2) (112-11-3) (112-31-4) (112---30-

(112-30--30-------22--31----

22--24--2---14) (244---41--2----11-

----4) -31------1) (304--3) (312-

-33--13--31----23--23--24---3) 

---2--1--------2) (330---2) 

----3) (442--------

----1--1-------

-------03----

------------

-----------

--4--4--3-------1) 

(1004--1) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.49.12 – COMMENT: Commenters suggested various research, studies, and actions the 

NRC should undertake, including a root cause analysis followed by corrective actions; collecting 

and sharing raw data regarding radiation leaks; a review of safety considerations for every 

licensing action; a complete, thorough, and rigorous scientific analysis of the spent fuel issue, 

dealing with problems transparently; peer-reviewed toxicology reports on radioactive waste; and 

research into adverse effects of radioactive waste, including impacts on American Indian tribes. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. For this rulemaking, the NRC has 

concluded that sufficient information exists to perform a generic environmental analysis of the 

continued storage of spent fuel after a reactor’s licensed life for operation. Further, NEPA 

instructs the NRC to consider information available at the time of its environmental analysis, 

which the NRC has done here. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-------

D.2.49.13 – COMMENT: One commenter expressed confusion that the NRC is affected by 

Federal fiscal cutbacks and sequestratioQZKHQSHUFHQWRIWKH15&¶VEXGJHWFRPHVIURP

fees paid by the nuclear industry. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with comment. Although licensees pay fees to the U.S. 

Treasury to reimburse the government for the cost of NRC’s licensing reviews and other 

activities, the NRC’s budget is approved and provided by Congress and therefore is subject to 

budgetary cuts including sequestration. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of this comment. 

(30-23-2) 

D.2.49.14 – COMMENT: Many commenters provided opinions on what the United States 

should do with spent fuel. Commenters were both strongly for and against reprocessing of 

spent fuel. Commenters suggested a number of methods for neutralizing nuclear waste or 

alternatives to storage such as using integral fast reactors, putting the U.S. military in charge, 

using thorium molten salt reactors, using the spent fuel as a heat source, electrino fusion power 

reactors, collective ion accelerators, dematerialization using highest powered positive ions ever, 

and photo-deactivation using gamma rays. Another commenter asked why the industry has not 

pursued glassification and burial of at least LLW. 

RESPONSE: The comments suggesting reprocessing, glassification, neutralization of nuclear 

waste, and other alternatives are all beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The GEIS and 

Rule consider only the continued storage of spent fuel in accordance with present NRC 

requirements and assess the environmental impacts accordingly. The current U.S. national 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

policy is disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository and does not include reprocessing or 

glassfication. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(13----2) (30-------2) (100-10) (100-11) (100-

12) (100-13) (100-14) (100-----20) (100-3) (100-30) (100-31) 

(100------------

(222---3) (242-1) (244-4-1) (244-4--12-----31-1) 

---14-------1) (321-2) (321---

-30----33--30--42--11----24-3) 

---41----11---------1) 

(422---3) (440-2) (441-2) (444-------2) 

----------1-13) 

--4----------2) 

------------1) 

(1002-1) 

D.2.49.15 – COMMENT: Two commenters discussed the development of SMRs. One 

commenter supported the use of SMRs as a safer source of carbon-free energy, with lower 

project risks. Another commenter stated that the rulemaking will be used to support the 

development and use of SMRs. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments concerning SMRs. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----2) 

D.2.49.16 – COMMENT: One commenter described the amount of HLW and spent fuel being 

managed by the DOE and expressed support for timely spent fuel storage solutions for DOE 

sites. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comment concerning spent fuel at DOE sites. This 

rulemaking addresses spent fuel generated by commercial nuclear reactors; spent fuel in 

possession of the DOE is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-24) 

D.2.49.17 – COMMENT: One commenter criticized the NRC’s independence for licensing the 

PFS dry storage facility and subsequently waiving the licensing fees. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: Fees associated with the licensing of the PFS dry storage facility are outside the 

scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this 

comment. 

-2) 

D.2.49.18 – COMMENT: Commenters provided their views on sources of energy and energy 

policy in the United States. Many commenters expressed support for energy efficiency and 

conservation, as well as renewable energy sources. A few commenters said that the NRC 

should focus on developing or promoting alternative energy sources, such as solar energy. 

Some commenters supported renewables, but stated nuclear energy should be a part of the 

United States’ energy mix. 

RESPONSE: These comments are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The NRC is an 

independent agency that was established to regulate the nation’s civilian commercial, industrial, 

academic, and medical uses of nuclear materials. The NRC does not license or regulate 

sources of energy other than nuclear power. Further, the NRC does not shape national energy 

policy or promote any source of energy. National energy policy is established by Congress and 

the President and is outside the scope of the NRC’s statutory responsibilities. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(200--1) (244---2------------

-30--24------------34-2) 

---14-----4-----

----

D.2.49.19 – COMMENT: Many commenters stated their belief that the nuclear industry has 

improper influence over the NRC and politicians, or that the NRC puts the welfare of the nuclear 

industry ahead of the public. Several commenters alleged that the NRC is captured by the 

industry and said it is biased toward allowing industry to create even more spent fuel. Many 

commenters requested that the NRC make public safety and protection of the environment its 

number one priority, asking that the NRC listen to the public rather than industry, and one 

commenter requested real-time radiation monitoring. One commenter requested that the NRC 

engage non-industry people in the conversation regarding the fate of spent fuel. One 

commenter stated that both the NRC and the DOE have too cozy of a relationship with the 

nuclear industry. Two commenters said that the NRC should avoid any influence from the NEI. 

Commenters questioned whether the NRC was truly an independent agency and cited the 

agency’s track record of issuing nuclear reactor license renewals. Some commenters 

referenced former Chairman Gregory Jazcko’s positions regarding the safety of nuclear power. 

One commenter specifically referenced a 2003 study co-authored by Chairman Allison 

Macfarlane (Alvarez et al., 2003), and questioned the Chairman’s support of the draft GEIS. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Some commenters refuted the notion that the NRC is a captured agency, stating that the 

regulatory process is adversarial and that the nuclear industry sometimes exceeds NRC 

regulations. One commenter stated that the NRC was over-protective of public safety. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC is an independent Federal 

DJHQF\HVWDEOLVKHGLQWRHQVXUe the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian 

purposes while protecting people and the environment. The NRC strives to conduct its 

regulatory responsibilities in an open and transparent manner, consistent with the NRC 

Approach to Open Government. To ensure objectivity and independence in its regulatory 

activities, the NRC and the Office of Government Ethics have stringent rules and procedures to 

ensure that employees of and advisors to the NRC are free of conflicts of interest and the 

appearance of conflicts of interest. Concerning individual Commissioner’s support for issuance 

of the draft GEIS, each Commissioner’s voting record, which includes any issue with which they 

may have disagreed, can be found in ADAMS by searching for ADAMS Accession No. 

0/$15&2013u). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(14-3) (21-1) (30--4) (111-1) (112-24-3) (112-34----22---2) 

-24--41----1) (242-2) (244-11-------

---43--3------------

31--11-------4----31--32--

--2) (410-2-2------2---3) 

---1--1--------4) 

-----3-----1) (1004--1) (-1) 

D.2.49.20 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed criticism of and a lack of confidence in the 

nuclear industry, stating that the industry is too focused on profit rather than on protecting the 

public. One commenter stated opposition to the nuclear industry and the outcome of the 

Citizens United Supreme Court case. Another commenter stated that workers are paid by 

industry to speak positively of nuclear power. One commenter expressed opposition to the NEI 

stating that its only function was public relations for nuclear power. Another commenter stated 

that the nuclear industry had too much influence over input to the Federal Register and another 

alleged decades of accidents, leaks, and cover-ups by the nuclear industry. One commenter 

stated that the government needs to make CEOs take ownership of the toxic waste their 

companies create, and expressed frustration that CEOs live far from the health hazards their 

industries create. 

RESPONSE: Comments concerning opposition to or criticism of the nuclear industry are 

outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

(11-3) (202--42----------14---

-----------2) 

D.2.49.21 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern that there has been too little media 

coverage, transparency, or political action related to nuclear energy and waste issues. 

Commenters felt that there was not enough information in the media about the risks and 

dangers of radioactive waste leaks and accidents. One commenter expressed concerns that 

the media and the NRC were purposely not reporting contamination events at nuclear energy 

plants or the risk of Fukushima contamination on air quality and seafood consumption. Another 

commenter felt that the media output was being controlled by companies with interests in the 

nuclear industry and that the reality of surviving a highly contaminated environment has not 

been communicated. Other commenters described a lack of transparency regarding politics 

and the funding of industries that support nuclear power. Several comments expressed 

dissatisfaction with their state elected officials not following through on their statements to 

ensure safety and provide an accounting of leaks and other issues at a local nuclear power 

plant. On a national level, one commenter felt that Congressional officials did not vote in the 

interest of the public for loan guarantees and subsidies, and that the election of the chair of 

Exelon to the Blue Ribbon Commission was self-serving and not in the best interests of the 

public. Another commenter expressed frustration that the public is not in control in the 

government and that corporations and special interest groups prevent the government from 

addressing the root issue of nuclear waste. One commenter suggested that elected officials 

need to start being more concerned about the money they accept from nuclear industry 

companies. 

RESPONSE: This comment is beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The actions of the 

media or elected officials are independent of the NRC. Information about licensee events that 

are reported to the NRC can be found on the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/event-status/. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

(30-22-2) (30--4) (102-1) (102-2) (102------22----

----1) 

D.2.49.22 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed general concern about nuclear power, spent 

fuel, nuclear accidents, natural gas fracking, pesticides, the health impacts of radiation, 

industrial pollution, other energy sources besides nuclear power, the security of U.S. nuclear 

facilities, fallout from nuclear weapons testing, genetically modified organisms, and the impacts 

of industrial effluents on waterways in the Midwest. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments concerning environmental impacts from 

various energy sources, industrial pollution, genetically modified organisms, and nuclear 

weapons. The comments are general in nature, unrelated to the continued storage of spent 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

fuel, and are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-1) (112--4) (244---------10--33--33-3) 

-33--32--1--1) (410--1-----1) 

-

D.2.49.23 – COMMENT: One commenter provided multiple comments stating that several 

international organizations are not providing the necessary oversight and monitoring of the 

acquisition, use, and health consequences of nuclear materials. 

RESPONSE: International activities (by the IAEA or other global organizations) related to the 

use of nuclear materials are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The GEIS and Rule 

address the environmental impacts of storage of domestic commercial spent fuel after the 

licensed life of a reactor and prior to disposal. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(113-10) (113-11) (113-2) (113-4) (113---

D.2.49.24 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concerns about military use of nuclear 

material. Commenters stated that depleted uranium used by the U.S. military is a health hazard 

to those that handle it and is detrimental to the environments where it is used. Another 

commenter stated that nuclear waste needs to be better secured or it will end up in the black 

market weapons trade. Two commenters suggested that depleted uranium production should 

be halted and all nuclear weapons should be eliminated from defense uses. 

RESPONSE: Comments concerning military uses of nuclear material, including depleted 

uranium and nuclear weapons, are outside the authority of the NRC and beyond the scope of 

the GEIS and Rule. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-12---34---13) 

D.2.49.25 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed support for, agreement with, or 

adoption of the comments submitted by another commenter or organization. Some commenters 

referred to comments submitted by an industry organization, while one commenter referred to 

comments submitted by a variety of organizations, including a Tribal government, a municipal 

government, and advocacy organizations. 

RESPONSE: The NRC recognizes the comments endorsing other comments. The NRC’s 

responses to the specific comments referred to are addressed elsewhere in this appendix. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

------1-----1) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.50 Out-of-Scope Comments – HOSS and Expedited Transfer 

D.2.50.1 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern about the vulnerabilities of spent fuel 

pools and the density of storage in the pools and stated the NRC should require that spent fuel 

cool enough to be in dry storage be moved as soon as possible from pools to dry storage. 

Many commenters favored moving the fuel into HOSS. Commenters described specific aspects 

of dry cask and spent fuel pool storage, stating that dry cask storage is inherently safer than 

pool storage because it does not depend on an electricity supply. One commenter noted that 

cracks have been found in some pools. Commenters cited the risk of a variety of accidents or 

other events and referred to the effects of the tsunami on the spent fuel pools and dry casks at 

the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan. Commenters also stated that the GEIS 

should have included a consideration of expediting the transfer of spent fuel to dry storage and 

that the NRC’s basis for excluding this from consideration in the GEIS is insufficient. A 

commenter asserted that the NRC is making a mistake in assuming that an unlikely event will 

never happen and that this assumption is irresponsible and counter to the NRC’s mission of 

protecting public safety. Other commenters added that the nuclear power industry should bear 

the costs of transfer and that hardened dry storage should be employed even if it is more 

expensive for utilities. In providing their views on pool storage, commenters referred to specific 

plants, including Calvert Cliffs (Maryland), Peach Bottom (Pennsylvania), San Onofre and 

Diablo Canyon (California), and Browns Ferry (Alabama) and described their concerns with 

pools at those sites (e.g., the risk posed by sudden dam failure, lack of hardened structures 

housing the pools, proximity to facilities such as a natural gas terminal, potential for being used 

as weapons of mass destruction, climate change concerns, and the potential for pool fires 

resulting from a loss of water). 

Several commenters stated that expedited transfer should be implemented at California plants 

before California’s next big earthquake occurs. One commenter stated that the California 

Energy Commission has directed the two plants in California to accelerate the transfer of spent 

fuel to dry storage and asked if the NRC would “stand in California’s way.” 

RESPONSE: The NRC expresses no view on these comments. As explained in Section 

2.2 of the GEIS, the GEIS does not propose or impose safety requirements for the storage 

of spent fuel (e.g., expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks or into hardened dry 

storage). The GEIS assesses the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of the 

continued storage of spent fuel in accordance with current NRC requirements. The impacts of 

expedited transfer and the use of hardened dry storage are not within the scope of the GEIS 

because the NRC does not currently require these actions. 

The NRC acknowledges the concerns about spent fuel storage in pools and agrees that this 

topic requires careful consideration. The Commission evaluated a staff assessment of this 

issue in a separate process and issued its decision on May 23, 2014 (NRC 2014a), not to 

pursue further evaluation of the expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry storage. The 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Commission also directed the staff to evaluate or provide more information on other aspects of 

spent fuel pool regulation and operation. Regarding expedited transfer, the Commission stated, 

“The Commission has approved the staff's recommendation that...no further generic 

assessments be pursued related to possible regulatory actions to require the expedited transfer 

of spent fuel to dry cask storage.” The NRC staff’s conclusion, which was provided to the 

Commission in COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n), is that the “expedited transfer of spent fuel 

to dry cask storage would provide only a minor or limited safety benefit...and that its expected 

implementation costs would not be warranted.” In the COMSECY, the NRC staff did not 

assume, as noted in one comment, that an unlikely event will never happen, but instead 

systematically assessed the probability of unlikely events and weighed that information against 

the costs and benefits of implementing measures such as expedited transfer. The COMSECY 

responded to Commission direction (NRC 2011l) to evaluate whether the issue of expedited 

transfer should be included with the NRC’s Japan lessons-learned activities and whether any 

regulatory action is recommended or necessary. The NRC staff’s assessment relies on another 

NRC technical study (NRC 2013l). 

The issue of whether states or utilities (e.g., the California Energy Commission) may direct 

plants to implement the expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry storage is beyond the scope of 

the GEIS and Rule. 

Comments raised several topics in conjunction expedited transfer, and these topics are 

addressed in other responses or in updated GEIS text. Section ' of this appendix 

responds to comments concerning HOSS. Sections ', ', ', '

' and of this appendix contain further discussion about the safety of dry cask and pool 

storage. Section D.2.40.1 of this appendix addresses concerns about leaks and the integrity of 

pools. Section D.2.42 of this appendix provides information about costs related to continued 

storage. In addition, Chapter 2 of the GEIS has been revised to include some information about 

the costs of storage. Finally, discussions of the applicability of this generic analysis and the 

process for addressing site-specific concerns are provided in Sections D.2.11.1 and ' of 

this appendix, respectively. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(23-10) (30-----------2) (112-10-2) (112-

-2) (112--4) (112--4) (112-----3----2---

1) (230--4) (233---2) (244-14--11-1-22----

-------------2) 

(322----3----------10---3) 

-------43-4-14---------

---1-----3--1---1) (402-

---3) (421--1) (433-4) (443-----1) 

-12-----------3) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

---1---------2) 

-----------21) -

----4) 

D.2.50.2 – COMMENT: In expressing support for expediting the transfer of spent fuel from 

pools to dry cask storage, commenters stated their views that spent fuel should be contained in 

casks suitable for transportation and should be moved offsite. Commenters offered opinions 

about how spent fuel should be casked so as to avoid the need for repackaging for 

transportation. A commenter stated that spent fuel should be transferred to casks small enough 

to be transportable (anGGHVFULEHGWKDWDVEHLQJOHVVWKDQWRQV6RPHFRPPHQWHUV

favored the immediate removal of spent fuel to storage or repository locations away from 

population centers and farmland, citing the risks of terrorism, earthquakes, and other events. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. As explained in Section ' of this 

appendix, the GEIS does not authorize, propose, or impose requirements for the storage of 

spent fuel, (e.g., expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks, either onsite or offsite, 

or requiring that all spent fuel be stored in casks approved for both storage and transportation). 

The GEIS assesses the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of the continued storage 

of spent fuel in accordance with current NRC requirements. 

As discussed in Section 2.1.2.2 of the GEIS, spent fuel may be stored in casks that are NRClicensed for storage only or for both storage and transportation. Both types of casks are 

acceptable provided they meet NRC requirements. Spent fuel that is stored in casks approved 

for storage only must ultimately be transferred into packages approved for transportation. The 

NRC is currently evaluating how to harmonize its requirements for spent fuel dry storage in 10 

&)53DUWDQGLWVUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUVSHQWIXHOWUDQVSRUWDWLRQLQ&)53DUW0RUH

information about this effort can be found in NRC (2012q) and at www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuelstorage/public-involvement.html. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

----2------1) 

D.2.50.3 – COMMENT: In expressing support for expediting the transfer of spent fuel from 

pools to dry cask storage, commenters also stated that the NRC should conduct further analysis 

of dry storage issues. One commenter stated that the NRC should be looking into developing a 

“reliable extreme long-term storage modality,” and stated that any method that relies upon an 

uninterrupted electric supply is bound to fail. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees that further study of long-term storage issues, including dry cask 

storage, would help the NRC plan for the continued safe storage of spent fuel. In accordance 

with Commission direction, the NRC staff is separately examining the regulatory framework and 

potential technical issues related to the extended storage and subsequent transportation of 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

spent fuel. This ongoing research is part of the NRC’s effort to continuously evaluate and 

update its safety regulations. The NRC is not aware of any deficiencies in its current regulations 

that would challenge the continued safe storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools or dry cask 

systems. If, at some time in the future, the NRC were to identify a concern with the safe storage 

of spent fuel, the NRC would evaluate the issue and take whatever action or make whatever 

change in its regulatory program that is necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC 

will continue to monitor the ongoing research into spent fuel storage. 

As part of its Station Blackout Mitigation rulemaking, the NRC is considering the need to 

implement additional requirements to address potential issues relating to the extended loss of 

offsite power. One of the requirements being considered as part of this rulemaking is the need 

for additional, diverse backup power supplies for the spent fuel pool. Section 2.1.2.1 of the 

GEIS has been updated to account for this rulemaking, and additional information on the 

rulemaking can be found on www.regulations.gov by searching for docket NRC-2011- No 

changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----2) 

D.2.50.4 – COMMENT: Commenters described the benefits and costs associated with moving 

spent fuel from the pools to dry cask storage. One commenter stated that expediting the 

transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks should not be more expensive, because all spent 

fuel will need to be transferred eventually, and the only unanswered question is when that will 

occur. The commenter referred to an EPRI technical report (EPRI 2012), stating that the 

UHSRUW¶VHVWLPDWHRIWKHFRVWVRIWUDQVIHUULQJDOOVSHQWIXHOWRGU\VWRUDJHWRELOOLRQ

would be significantly less than the potential costs associated with a spent fuel pool fire at 

3LOJULP1XFOHDU3RZHU6WDWLRQELOOLRQ

Another commenter stated that expediting the transfer of spent fuel to dry casks would benefit 

the economy by creating jobs, and that not doing this creates a risk of hurting a regional 

economy in the event of an accident or power loss. The commenter provided an estimate of 

costs to move spent fuel to casks, concluding that the total cost would be about $14.4 billion to 

move all spent fuel LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIURPQRZXQWLO7KHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDW

billion of that would be cycled back into the economy through trade workers. 

RESPONSE: The NRC expresses no view on these comments. As explained in Section 

2.2 of the GEIS, the GEIS does not authorize or propose or impose requirements for the 

storage of spent fuel (e.g., expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to casks). The GEIS 

considers only the continued storage of spent fuel in accordance with present NRC 

requirements and assesses the environmental impacts accordingly; the impacts and costs of 

expedited transfer are not within the scope of the GEIS and Rule because NRC does not 

presently require this activity. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the Commission has evaluated and made a 

decision concerning a staff assessment of expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry 

storage, and this assessment includes a cost-benefit analysis. The Commission’s decision is 

provided in a Staff Requirements Memorandum of May 23, 2014 (NRC 2014a), and the NRC 

staff's assessment and cost-benefit analysis are provided in a memorandum to the Commission, 

COMSECY–13–0030 (NRC 2013n). No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of 

these comments. 

---

D.2.50.5 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the NRC should require HOSS and that it 

should be a top national security priority as an interim measure before the final disposition of 

spent fuel. The commenters referred to or repeated the specific elements of HOSS contained in 

the statement of “Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear Waste at Reactors”. Some commenters 

provided additional suggestions for hardening onsite storage (e.g., bolting casks to the pad or 

using concrete ramps in front of casks to deflect aircraft impacts). Commenters stated the NRC 

should not continue licensing reactors until HOSS is implemented nationwide. Some 

commenters expressed concern about water supplies and emphasized that HOSS cannot be a 

permanent measure near water sources (e.g., noting that there are 33 reactors on the Great 

Lakes basin). Most commenters favored HOSS and were opposed to transporting spent fuel 

offsite, but some commenters expressed disagreement with HOSS or support for moving spent 

fuel to hardened facilities at remote locations. 

RESPONSE: As stated in Appendix B of the GEIS, current NRC licensing requirements for 

storage facilities ensure their robust design, and spent fuel has been stored safely in pools and 

in dry casks for several decades. See Sections ', ', ', ', and 

', and of this appendix for further discussion regarding the safety of dry cask and pool 

VWRUDJH$OVRDVH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQ2.2 of the GEIS, the GEIS does not impose new 

regulatory standards for spent fuel storage (e.g., requirements to harden onsite or offsite 

storage in pools and dry casks). The GEIS assumes that technology remains the same 

throughout the timeframes analyzed and considers the impacts of continued storage in 

accordance with current NRC requirements. Likewise, technical judgment as to how hardened 

storage would be implemented (e.g., whether to use concrete ramps, bolt casks in place, locate 

hardened storage near waterbodies, or hardened storage at or away from reactor sites) and the 

associated costs, benefits, and environmental impacts are not within the scope of the GEIS, 

because NRC regulations do not require hardened storage. 

As a matter separate from this rulemaking, the NRC is considering, in its update of the ISFSI 

security requirements, a request that the NRC require HOSS at all power plants and away-fromreactor storage sites (see “Petition for Rulemaking Submitted by C–10 Research and Education 

Foundation, Inc.,” )5). The proposed Rule, scheduled to be published for comment 

LQ, will formally address the petition. The NRC had offered the draft technical basis for this 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

proposed Rule for public comment and has published responses to the comments that were 

VXEPLWWHG)5)XUWKHULQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHUXOHPDNLQJLVSURYLGHGLQFRPPHQW

responses dated November 21, 2013 (NRC 2013v). Consistent with its NEPA responsibilities, 

the NRC would determine based on that or any related rulemaking whether an update to the 

GEIS is necessary. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(2--2) (30-2----1--------2--4) 

--------4) (222----

31--13--11------12----30--

--------10) -20--33--11-

----1-------2---

-1--1--2--------

------------

---------3--3--1) 

----2) 

D.2.50.6 – COMMENT: In expressing support for implementing HOSS, commenters cited the 

risks of terrorism and accidents in pools and stated that dry storage should be able to withstand 

a range of natural and human-induced accidents or events (e.g., tornadoes, power outages, 

climate change effects, and terrorist attacks). Commenters referred to the accidents at 

Chernobyl and the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. One commenter stated that the 

GEIS underestimates the risks of pool fires and ignores the HOSS alternative. Another 

commenter requested that the NRC impose a schedule for moving spent fuel from pools into dry 

storage at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant and other power plants with Mark I and Mark 

II reactors. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. The NRC 

agrees that spent fuel storage must be robust, and in fact spent fuel has been stored safely in 

pools and dry casks of robust design for several decades. The NRC requires that fuel storage 

systems be designed to protect against natural phenomena, such as seismic events, tornadoes, 

and flooding; dynamic effects (e.g., flying debris or drops from fuel handling equipment and 

drops of fuel storage and handling equipment); and hazards to the storage site from nearby 

activities. More information about the safety of dry storage is provided in Sections ', 

', ', ', and ' of this appendix. More information about accidents 

is provided in Section ' of this appendix. Additional information about actions taken or 

required by the NRC in the wake of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear facility is provided on 

the NRC’s website (http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japandashboard.html). 

Concerning potential terrorist attacks, the NRC takes very seriously the security of all NRCregulated facilities. Security requirements at NRC-regulated facility are based on an analysis of 

WKHWKUHDWWRWKHVHIDFLOLWLHVDVGHVFULEHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6,QFDVHVZKHQDQHZ
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

threat is detected, immediate effective security orders may be issued (and have been in the 

past) to address emerging threats. Detailed discussions of many aspects related to security 

and terrorism are provided in Section '. 

$VH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQ2.2 of the GEIS, the GEIS does not authorize, propose, or impose 

any particular approach to storage of spent fuel, including HOSS. Further, this GEIS does not 

propose or assess the impacts of alternatives (e.g., HOSS) that are not currently required by the 

NRC. 

The NRC disagrees with the comment that it has underestimated the risks of spent fuel pool 

fires. The NRC staff’s analysis of spent fuel pool fires in Appendix F of the GEIS is based on 

the NRC’s extensive evaluations of the risk and impacts of spent fuel pool fires and has 

considered a range of credible initiating events that could lead to a spent fuel pool fire. The 

NRC agrees that the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire would be significant, as explained in 

Appendix F, but disagrees that the NRC has underestimated the risks. More information about 

the analysis of spent fuel pool fires is provided in Section ' of this appendix. 

As discussed further in Section ' of this appendix, the Commission has issued a 

decision concerning expedited transfer and provided direction to staff concerning other topics 

related to spent fuel pool management and regulation (NRC 2014a). No schedules for moving 

spent fuel to dry storage would be developed for any site unless the Commission determines 

that this activity is warranted. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

--31-------13----

D.2.50.7 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed concern about the storage of high-burnup 

spent fuel. Commenters stated that before transferring spent fuel from pools to dry casks, cask 

storage should be reinforced to allow for the safe storage of high-burnup fuel. Another 

commenter stated that the NRC has allowed the industry to produce high-burnup spent fuel 

without having a plan for handling it. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the concerns about storing high-burnup spent fuel. In 

response to these concerns, and as discussed in more detail in Section D. of this 

appendix, the NRC has added Appendix I and updated several areas of the GEIS to include a 

description of high-burnup fuels. 

The NRC disagrees with the comment concerning a plan to handle high-burnup spent fuel. 

Currently, dry cask designs for all fuels must meet transportation requirements in 10 CFR Part 

RUVWRUDJHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ&)53DUW7KH15&DSSURYHVGHVLJQVRQO\DIWHUDIXOO

safety review, and more information about the NRC’s oversight of high-burnup fuel is provided 

in Section ' of this appendix and the new Appendix I. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

To gain a more complete understanding of high-burnup fuels, the NRC has a number of 

activities underway. The NRC is continuing testing to provide further information on how 

different types of cladding on spent fuel will behave. In addition, the NRC has begun planning 

its oversight of a study that will be managed jointly by the nuclear industry and the DOE. In this 

study, high-burnup spent fuel will be loaded into a cask fitted with instruments to provide 

temperature readings and allow gas sampling. Those readings, combined with other tests and 

inspection information, will provide a better understanding of what happens to high-burnup 

spent fuel in a storage cask as it cools over time. The NRC is also monitoring international 

efforts in this area. All these activities will help cask designers, users, and regulators better 

understand how to ensure that high-burnup spent fuel will remain safe in storage. No changes 

were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

----3) 

D.2.50.8 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that it is unclear whether the NRC’s ISFSI security 

rulemaking will consider requiring dry cask storage at reactor sites. The commenter cited a 

portion of the Federal Register Notice of availability for the draft technical basis for the 

rXOHPDNLQJ)5ZKLFKDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWWKH15&LVFRQVLGHULQJDSHWLWLRQWR

implement requirements for hardening spent fuel storage facilities and that the NRC may 

consider this petition in the course of developing the proposed Rule. 

RESPONSE: As stated in a 2012 Federal Register Notice )5WKH15&LV

considering in its update of the ISFSI security requirements a petition requesting that the NRC 

require HOSS at all power plants and away-from-reactor storage sites. The proposed Rule, 

sFKHGXOHGWREHSXEOLVKHGIRUFRPPHQWLQ, will formally address the petition. The NRC 

had offered the draft technical basis for this proposed Rule IRUSXEOLFFRPPHQW)5

and has published responses to the comments that were submitted (NRC 2013v). Further 

information on the rulemaking is provided in those comment responses. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

(1-21) 

D.2.50.9 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the NRC should require power plant operators 

to harden the structures housing spent fuel pools, citing the effects of the tsunami in Japan on 

the spent fuel pools at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. One commenter stated that 

spent fuel pools are not hardened, yet they contain greater quantities of radioactive materials 

than the reactor cores protected by containment buildings. The commenter further stated that 

the NRC has not studied all of the potential modes of attack on spent fuel pools and related 

consequences. The commenter also expressed disagreement with NRC statements that 

“airspaces are or can be protected or defended.” Two commenters stated that the NRC will not 

admit its standards for the pools are insufficient, because then licensees would need either to 

shut down or spend money on safety-related improvements. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees in part and disagrees in part with the comments. As explained 

LQ6HFWLRQ2.2 of the GEIS, the GEIS does not authorize any particular approach to storing 

spent fuel or impose new regulatory standards (e.g., requirements to harden spent fuel pool 

housing structures). The GEIS assumes that technology remains the same throughout the 

timeframes analyzed and considers the impacts of continued storage in accordance with 

present NRC requirements. 

As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the NRC acknowledges the concerns about 

spent fuel storage in pools. Concerning whether spent fuel should be moved expeditiously out 

of the pools and into dry storage facilities, the Commission decided on May 23, 2014, not to 

pursue further evaluation of the expedited transfer of spent fuel out of pools. The Commission 

also directed the staff to evaluate or provide more information on other aspects of spent fuel 

pool regulation and operation (NRC 2014a). The NRC has conducted numerous studies on 

nuclear power plant and storage facility vulnerabilities since September 11, 2001 and the 

accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear facility in Japan. The NRC’s studies systematically 

and methodically assess those threats, accidents, or vulnerabilities that the NRC staff have 

determined to be worthy of consideration because of the severity of their consequences or the 

probability of their occurrence. Thus, all potential modes of attack may not warrant in-depth 

FRQVLGHUDWLRQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6SURYLGHVDVXPPDU\DQGDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH

information from these studies. Section ' of this appendix discusses this information in the 

context of the GEIS impacts analysis. Sections ' and ' of this appendix contain 

further discussion about the safety of spent fuel storage in pools. 

The protection and defense of airspaces is an aspect of national security and does not fall within 

the NRC’s purview. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

----2--1---3-

D.2.50.10 – COMMENT: A commenter referred to points made by an NRC manager in a 2012 

speech at the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure Council Meeting concerning spent fuel pools, 

specifically on the consequences of a pool fire and the potential benefits of reducing the spent 

fuel density in pools. The commenter stated that the revised GEIS for license renewal should 

reflect the NRC’s new understanding of the risks of spent fuel pools. 

RESPONSE: This comment is referring to the GEIS for power reactor license renewal (License 

Renewal GEIS) and is therefore not relevant to this GEIS. The NRC included a qualitative 

evaluation of spent fuel pool fire accidents in Appendix E of the updated License Renewal GEIS 

(NRC 2013m). Based on this evaluation, the License Renewal GEIS concludes that the 

environmental impacts from accidents involving spent fuel pools are comparable to impacts 

IURPWKHDFFLGHQWVRIUHDFWRUVDWIXOOSRZHUWKDWWKH15&KDGHYDOXDWHGIRUWKH/LFHQVH

Renewal GEIS. As such, the 2013 License Renewal GEIS also concludes that pool accidents 

do not warrant a separate evaluation. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

As discussed in Section ' of this appendix, the Commission evaluated a staff 

assessment of the benefits of expediting the transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry storage. 

The Commission decided on May 23, 2014, not to pursue further evaluation of the expedited 

transfer of spent fuel from pools. Further, as stated in the License Renewal GEIS, in the event 

that the NRC identifies new and significant information with respect to the environmental 

impacts of license renewal, the NRC will discuss that information in its site-specific 

supplemental EISs to the License Renewal GEIS. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule 

as a result of this comment. 

-2-11) 

D.2.50.11 – COMMENT: Commenters stated that the NRC is collaborating with the nuclear 

power industry and prioritizes money over safety. The commenters demanded that the NRC 

move spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage as soon as possible, stating that, in the wake 

of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant in Japan, the NRC still acts in a “business 

as usual” manner. Commenters specifically mentioned the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon 

power plants in California as subjects of collaboration between the NRC and the nuclear power 

industry. One commenter presented a “Petition to Upgrade Health and Safety Measures at 

Indian Point,” with signatures attached, requesting the NRC to, among other things, require the 

nuclear industry to move spent fuel into dry cask storage. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC is an independent Federal 

agency and strives to conduct its regulatory activities in an open and transparent manner, 

consistent with the NRC Approach to Open Government. To ensure NRC objectivity and 

independence, the NRC and the Office of Government Ethics have stringent rules and 

procedures to ensure that employees of and advisors to the NRC are free of conflicts of interest 

and the appearance of conflicts of interest. 

Sections ', ', and ' of this appendix provides information about the 

NRC’s activities to address concerns arising from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

nuclear facility in Japan. More information about the NRC’s activities in this area is provided on 

the NRC’s website: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japandashboard.html. 

The petition presented in one of the comments requests that the NRC implement a number of 

measures at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. Because the petition raises concerns about 

the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, the NRC is processing the petition within its Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation. While the petition does not provide comments on the scope of the 

GEIS, two issues raised in the petition are relevant to spent fuel storage: requiring the 

expedited transfer of spent fuel out of pools and requiring additional safety measures for spent 

IXHOSRROV$VH[SODLQHGLQ6HFWLRQ2.2 of the GEIS, the GEIS does not authorize any 

particular approach to storing spent fuel or impose new regulatory standards (e.g., requiring the 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry storage or requiring additional safety measures for pools). 

Sections ' and ' of this appendix provides more information about the safety of 

spent fuel storage in pools and Sections ' and ' of this appendix address the 

safety of spent fuel storage generally. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result 

of these comments. 

-----2) 

D.2.50.12 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided comments on SECY-13-0112 (NRC 

2013l). Commenters disagreed with the study’s conclusion that the accelerated transfer of 

spent fuel to dry casks is not warranted. Commenters expressed support for lowering the 

density of spent fuel stored in pools and for the expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry 

storage. The commenters disagreed with the NRC’s use of a cost-benefit analysis in the study, 

stating that the NRC put costs above safety and questioning the NRC’s independence as a 

regulator. One commenter cited particular aspects of the study (e.g., the focus on dose to the 

public) as an indicator of accident severity rather than the area of land rendered unusable or 

uninhabitable. 

RESPONSE: Comments on the methodology or specific aspects of the spent fuel pool study 

are beyond the scope of this GEIS and Rule. Appendix E of SECY-13-0112 (NRC 2013l) 

responds to public comments on various aspects of the study. 

The NRC agrees that spent fuel storage in pools is a subject that requires careful evaluation 

and oversight, but also recognizes that spent fuel has been safely stored in pools for many 

decades. The spent fuel pool study, along with a separate regulatory analysis, informed a NRC 

assessment on this issue that is discussed in a memorandum to the Commission (NRC 2013n). 

As the comments note, the staff’s conclusion (in NRC 2013n) is that the “expedited transfer of 

spent fuel to dry cask storage would provide only a minor or limited safety benefit...and that its 

expected implementation costs would not be warranted.” As stated in Section ', the 

Commission decided on May 23, 2014, not to pursue further evaluation of the expedited transfer 

of spent fuel from pools to dry storage and directed the staff to evaluate or provide more 

information on other aspects of spent fuel pool regulation and operation (NRC 2014a). No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----

D.2.51 Out-of-Scope Comments – Reactor Accidents 

D.2.51.1 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated general concerns with operating reactor 

safety. One commenter stated that nuclear reactions are fundamentally uncontrollable, and that 

any number of material and equipment failures can cause an accident. The commenter 

described problems with handling hot fuel, physical integrity of reactors, bulging, warping and 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

distortion of fuel assemblies and control rods, loss of criticality controls, cooling system failures, 

and fuel fires. The commenter also stated that SMRs use metallic fuels and are therefore 

fundamentally much more dangerous than the metal oxide fuels in common use today in large 

commercial reactors. Other commenters cited the accidents at Three Mile Island and 

Fukushima Dai-ichi as reasons that operating nuclear power plants are not safe. Another 

commenter noted that NRC ignores the vulnerabilities in General Electric boiling water reactors, 

such as those used at Fukushima. 

RESPONSE: These comments are outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule because they raise 

concerns about operating nuclear power reactor safety, potential causes of reactor accidents 

and the NRC’s related regulatory oversight. The scope of the GEIS is limited to the 

environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. The issues raised by the commenters 

are considered as part of site-specific environmental reviews in individual proceedings for 

licensing and license renewal of reactors. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

---23) (112-22------4) (224--2) (341-1-10) 

-1) (410------3--3) 

D.2.51.2 – COMMENT: Several commenters disagreed with the NRC’s conclusion of SMALL 

land-use impacts in the Waste Confidence GEIS. The commenters assume that a severe 

accident would occur at a nuclear fuel storage facility resulting in offsite land contamination 

HYHU\WR\HDUV7KHFRPPHQWHUVXVHWKH)XNXVKLPD'DL-ichi nuclear power plant 

accident to support their arguments. Commenters asserted that based on this real-world data, 

there will be a major leak of high-OHYHOQXFOHDUZDVWHHYHU\WR\HDUVZKLFKZRXOGUHQGHU

VTXDUHNLORPHWHUVRIODQGXQXVDEOHIRUDPLOOLRQ\HDUVDQGFROOHFWLYHO\ZRXOGFRQWDPLQDWH

million square kilometers, which would be catastrophic, not SMALL. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The comments assert that severe 

accidents involving spent fuel in continued storage would occur at a frequency of once eYHU\

WR\HDUV6SHQWIXHOKDVEHHQVWRUHGVDIHO\DWKXQGUHGVRIOLJKWZDWHUUHDFWRUVDURXQGWKH

world for decades, which represents thousands of years of collective experience without a 

single accident that resulted in significant land contamination. The NRC’s estimate of the 

probability and consequences of a spent fuel pool fire – the only accident that would release 

enough radioactive material to cause significant land contamination – is provided in Section 

RIWKH*(,6,QWKLVDQDO\VLVWKH NRC estimates the annual probability of a severe 

accident would be less than once in every 410,000 years. Appendix F discusses the 

environmental impact of spent fuel pool fires, which includes economic costs related to offsite 

land contamination. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(112-20------2--2-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.2.51.3 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that nearly four dozen reactors in the U.S. still 

GRQRWFRPSO\ZLWK15&ILUH-protection regulations that NRC promulgated after the March 

%URZQ¶V)HUU\5HDFWRUDFFLGHQWLQ$ODEDPD7KHFRPPHQWHUFLWHG'DYLG/RFKEDXP¶V

paper on “Cumulative Effects of Non-Regulation,” in support of the comment (Lochbaum 2012). 

RESPONSE: This comment is outside the scope of the GEIS because it describes the fireprotection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors and does not address how the 

comment applies to continued storage of spent fuel. Additional information on NRC’s fireprotection regulations for operating nuclear power plants can be found at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/fire-protection.html. No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-21) 

D.2.51.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that the Waste Confidence GEIS should 

address “defects” in the GE boiling water reactor Mark I containment vessel, and how this could 

affect spent fuel storage, including potential accidents. One commenter recommended closing 

down and not reissuing licenses to reactors, including those based on the Mark I design. 

RESPONSE: These comments are outside the scope of the GEIS because they describe 

potential deficiencies and accident risks related to a specific containment design for an 

operating nuclear power reactor and do not address continued storage of spent fuel. The 

environmental impacts of reactor accidents are considered in site-specific environmental 

reviews in individual proceedings for licensing and license renewal of reactors. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-13---2) 

D.2.51.5 – COMMENT: Several commenters provided comments about the methodology and 

results for PRAs for operating reactors. Some commenters cited the March 2011 accident at 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plants as the basis for reconsidering approaches to PRAs. 

To support their view that PRAs are flawed, several commenters compared their estimates of 

actual core damage frequencies in boiling water reactors ZLWK0DUN,FRQWDLQPHQWVLQ

reactor years was a common estimate) to PRA values of core damage frequency. 

RESPONSE: These comments are outside the scope of the GEIS because they raise concerns 

about operating nuclear power reactor PRAs and do not address continued storage of spent 

fuel. The environmental impacts of reactor accidents are considered in site-specific 

environmental reviews in individual proceedings for licensing and license renewal of reactors. 

No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(112--1) (112-3-2) (112--3) (112-11--20-----34---3) 

-1---------2--1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

D.2.51.6 – COMMENT: A commenter described criticality safety concerns with storing fresh 

fuel assemblies in a spent fuel pool. The commenter described the potential for a peak in 

reactivity, and a possible nuclear criticality accident, caused by a pool draindown event, 

followed by use of flooding, foam, or water mist by firefighters. 

RESPONSE: This comment is outside of the scope of the GEIS because it describes a possible 

accident involving fresh nuclear fuel, i.e., fuel that has not been used in a nuclear reactor core, 

which is only onsite during the reactor licensed life for operation, a timeframe that is outside the 

scope of the GEIS. The GEIS addresses the environmental consequences of continued storage 

of spent fuel. Operating nuclear power plants store fresh nuclear fuel onsite in preparation for 

refueling of the reactor core. Once operation of the reactor ceases, no fresh nuclear fuel is 

needed for the facility, and none would be stored in the spent fuel pool for the short-term, longterm and indefinite storage phases evaluated in the GEIS. The requirements for prevention of 

FULWLFDOLW\LQVSHQWIXHOSRROV&)5SURYLGHIRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIVWRUDJHRIIUHVKIXHOLQ

the spent fuel pool, which occurs during reactor operation, and such storage is under NRC 

oversight. Further, the Rule applies to the continued storage of spent fuel, i.e., nuclear fuel that 

has been used in a reactor, not fresh fuel, which has not been used in a reactor. 

&ULWLFDOLW\LQWKHVSHQWIXHOSRROLVGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,61RFKDQJHVZHUH

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2-4) 

D.2.51.7 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that the GEIS should evaluate the vulnerability 

of the population of the United States to sources of contamination from beyond U.S. borders, 

including contamination from Fukushima Dai-ichi. The commenter asked how the United States 

would deal with nuclear waste and contamination from a Fukushima-like event in the United 

States. 

RESPONSE: The comment is outside the scope of the GEIS because it discusses risks of and 

response to sources of radioactive contamination other than those from continued storage of 

spent fuel at U.S. facilities. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

-4) 

D.2.52 Out-of-Scope Comments – Fukushima 

D.2.52.1 – COMMENT: A number of commenters expressed concern about the local, regional, 

and global environmental consequences of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

power plant following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan. 

Commenters stated concerns about the large releases of radioactive material that resulted from 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

accidents involving the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Several commenters stated that onsite 

spent fuel storage, including the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, is also a source of large ongoing 

releases of radioactive material. Several commenters stated that onsite storage of radioactive 

waste contributed as a cause of the accident. One commenter described estimates of the costs 

and time required to clean up after the accident (up to $14 billion). Several commenters 

described concerns over the unloading of the spent fuel pool at the damaged Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 reactor building. 

RESPONSE: The NRC considers these comments to be out-of-scope because they describe 

concerns about the effects of the earthquake and severe reactor accidents at the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station and the costs and time required to clean up after a reactor 

accident, not the continued storage of spent fuel. 

The NRC disagrees with the comments regarding radioactive releases from spent fuel pools at 

Fukushima Dai-ichi. There were no large releases of radioactive material from the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi spent fuel pools. Further, the presence of stored spent fuel onsite at Fukushima Daiichi did not contribute to releases from the site. 

The environmental impacts of accidents for at-reactor storage in spent fuel pools and casks are 

GLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQRIWKH*(,6ZLWKDGGLWLRQDOVXSSRUWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQRQVSHQWIXHOSRRO

fires in Appendix F of the GEIS. Economic damages as a result of spent fuel pool fires, which 

include costs of cleanup, are estimated in Appendix F. No changes were made to the GEIS or 

Rule as a result of these comments. 

-2) (21-2) (23--22-4) (30---12---2) (112--3) (113-1) (113-3) (113-

(120-3) (133-1) (144----------13--

--------32--43--13-----

---2) (--------2-10) 

-2------------

-----

D.2.52.2 – COMMENT: Many commenters described the lessons the United States should 

learn from the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Commenters described problems like 

inadequate seismic hazard mapping, communication problems within the Japanese operator of 

Fukushima Dai-ichi, collusion between the Japanese nuclear industry and regulators, the 

potential for damage to spent fuel pools by natural phenomena, transfer of spent fuel to dry 

casks, siting of nuclear power plants, and overconfidence in the safety of plants, as lessons the 

United States should learn from the accident. One commenter urged the Commission to 

implement all of the NRC staff’s post-Fukushima safety recommendations. Another commenter 

stated that the GEIS must address waste storage during licensed reactor operations. Several 

commenters stated that a discussion in the GEIS of the lessons learned from Fukushima should 

mention that stored spent fuel withstood the accident without significant damage. Some 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

commenters also called for an international response to Fukushima Dai-ichi and the 

establishment of a nuclear first-response team for future accidents. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. Following the March 11, 2011 

Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accidents, the NRC considered and prioritized a number of 

significant regulatory actions and additional studies in response to lessons learned from the 

accidents. For example, in March 2012 the NRC issued orders to all operating nuclear power 

plants. These orders required nuclear power plants with operating reactors to: (1) enhance 

capability to maintain plant safety during a prolonged loss of electrical power, (2) install 

hardened containment vents on boiling water reactors with Mark I or Mark II containment 

designs, and (3) install reliable wide-range instruments to measure water level in spent fuel 

storage pools. At this time, the NRC has determined that lessons-learned from Fukushima 

about reactor accidents do not apply to decommissioning nuclear power plants that have spent 

fuel in continued storage in either spent fuel pools or dry casks. However, as any new lessons 

learned arise, the NRC will consider whether they should be applied to facilities with spent fuel 

in continued storage. 

This rulemaking addresses the environmental impacts of continued storage; therefore, the 

rulemaking does not address waste storage during licensed reactor operations. The NRC 

acknowledges the comments that state that stored spent fuel withstood the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident without significant damage and notes that reports from the site support that statement. 

However, the GEIS presents information on the environmental risk from accidents related to 

continued storage. The consideration of these accidents includes natural events such as 

earthquakes and tsunami. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these 

comments. 

(14------3) (232-1) (232-3) (244-11-10) (244-10-2) (244-14--

------------4--31--4) 

-------1------

-2--3--2--2----4----3) 

--2) 

D.2.52.3 – COMMENT: Several commenters expressed concern over efforts by the Tokyo 

Electric Power Company beginning in November 2013 to unload spent fuel from the damaged 

Unit 4 reactor building spent fuel pool at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, including 

WKHULVNVRIDIXUWKHUDFFLGHQW2QHFRPPHQWHUVWDWHGWKDWWKLVRSHUDWLRQLQYROYHVEULttle 

and potentially damaged spent fuel assemblies and may take up to one year to complete. The 

commenter noted that plant decommissioning will likely take decades and billions of dollars. 

RESPONSE: These comments are out-of-scope because they raise concerns with removal of 

spent fuel and plant decommissioning following an operating reactor accident, not continued 

storage of spent fuel. The environmental impacts of reactor accidents are considered in site-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

specific environmental reviews in individual proceedings for licensing and license renewal of 

reactors. The GEIS evaluates the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(34----13--14-2) -3---13-1) (410-12) 

D.2.52.4 – COMMENT: Several commenters stated that all of the spent fuel remained 

protected after the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and remains in safe storage today. 

RESPONSE: The NRC agrees with these comments. The spent fuel pools at the boiling water 

reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi are similar in design to those at boiling water reactors in the 

United States. Therefore, Japan’s experience with a large earthquake and tsunami at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant demonstrates that spent fuel pools of this design are, 

as described in Section 2.1.2.1 and Appendix B of the GEIS, massive and durable structures 

constructed from thick, reinforced-concrete walls and slabs designed to be seismically robust. 

Similarly, Japan’s experience with dry cask storage systems at the Fukushima Dai-ichi site 

demonstrates the ability of these systems to withstand considerable natural forces. No changes 

were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30---13-----12--

D.2.52.5 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that there is a lack of transparency in the 

Japanese information about the Fukushima accident. Citing a new Japan secrecy law, the 

commenter noted that public statements to the press in Japan can garner a 10-year prison term 

and fines. The commenter questioned how the NRC can effectively implement lessons learned 

from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident without violating Japanese law. 

RESPONSE: The NRC considers this comment to be out-of-scope because it does not address 

the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-2) 

D.2.52.6 – COMMENT: One commenter provided an alternative theory for the explosions in the 

Units 1, 3 and 4 reactor buildings at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The 

commenter believes that the “mushroom clouds” following hydrogen explosions in those 

structures were actually caused by nuclear energy released by criticality accidents. The 

commenter believes the criticality accidents were caused by precipitation under anoxic 

conditions of uranium and plutonium compounds, which settled to the bottom of the respective 

reactors in a supercritical configuration. The commenter believes a similar mechanism is 

responsible for radiation spikes in water storage containers at the Fukushima Dai-ichi site. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

RESPONSE: The NRC considers these comments to be out-of-scope because they do not 

address the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. The NRC notes that 

these comments describe an alternative theory for the reactor accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi site that is not supported by any of the numerous scientific studies about the accident. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

---

D.2.52.7 – COMMENT: One commenter stated that butterfly genes have mutated in 

Fukushima, Japan, as a result of radiation exposure. This commenter also stated that on 

September 12, 2012, the Unit 4 reactor building at Fukushima Dai-ichi sank 31 in. into the 

ground. 

RESPONSE: The NRC considers this comment to be out-of-scope because the commenter 

has not described how potential radiation effects on butterflies or potential reactor building 

subsidence after the reactor accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi are related to the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent fuel. 

However, the NRC acknowledges that there is concern about human health effects of the 

radioactive releases from the accidents. The local government of Fukushima prefecture is 

conducting the Fukushima Health Management Survey to look for health effects on the people 

in the prefecture (FMU 2014). In February 2013, the World Health Organization issued a global 

report on the Fukushima accident that discusses a comprehensive assessment by international 

experts on the health risks (WHO 2013). The United Nations Scientific Committee on the 

Effects of Atomic Radiation is in the process of finalizing a major study to assess the radiation 

doses and associated effects on health and environment (UNSCEAR 2014). No changes were 

made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-22-3) 

D.2.53 Out-of-Scope Comments – Yucca Mountain 

D.2.53.1 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed support for and frustration about the status of 

the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, describing or criticizing the events in the legislative, 

executive, and judicial branches of the Federal government that led to the present situation. 

Several commenters discussed the relationship between the Yucca Mountain review and the 

Waste Confidence rulemaking. Other commenters noted that the NWPA represents the 

national policy regarding a repository and appealed to the NRC to take the necessary steps to 

complete its review of the DOE license application. 

RESPONSE: The licensing process for any specific repository, including the proposed facility at 

Yucca Mountain, is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. Regardless of the status of any 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

proposed repository, this GEIS considers the environmental impacts only of the continued 

storage of spent fuel. The environmental impacts associated with disposal in a repository, 

repository funding, and other waste disposal issues are outside the scope of this GEIS and are 

not considered in this analysis. Further, the GEIS assumes in its assessment of impacts for the 

short-term and long-term timeframes that a repository will be available; in the indefinite 

timeframe the GEIS assumes that no repository becomes available. Based upon its review of 

the available information and as discussed further in Appendix B, the NRC believes that the 

most likely scenario is that a repository will be available by the end of the short-term timeframe. 

The NRC acknowledges the commenters’ expressions of support for a repository and concern 

about the repository siting and licensing process. In response to the decision of the Court of 

Appeals (In re Aiken County) and Commission Order CLI-13-15&2013s), the NRC has 

resumed its review of the DOE’s application for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. No 

changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30-23------1) (112-----2) (201--12--

34--12--4--10--13----4-0----

4------------42-----

------------

-2----1) 

D.2.53.2 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the draft GEIS and proposed Rule do not 

SURPRWHRUHQIRUFHWKH1:3$RUWKH6WDQGDUG&RQWUDFWRI&)53DUWUHTXLULQJWKH

Federal government to take title to and dispose of spent fuel) and in fact demonstrate that the 

NRC has an unreasonable view of spent fuel disposal actions. The commenter argued that the 

draft GEIS and the proposed Rule ignore the delays in the disposal program, breaches of the 

Standard Contract, violations of the NWPA, and the lack of Congressional appropriations for 

complying with these requirements. The commenter listed the various costs associated with not 

disposing of spent fuel, including court-awarded damages and settlements from the Judgment 

Fund (related to breaches of the Standard Contract), continued payments into the Nuclear 

Waste Fund, costs for expanding spent fuel storage facilities, greater decommissioning costs, 

and unknown future costs in the event that no disposal for spent fuel is ever made available. 

The commenter stated that the Federal government also refuses to abide by court decisions 

that clarify spent fuel disposal obligations, noting that there are also many court decisions 

relating to Standard Contract breaches. 

Another commenter estimated that, through September 30, 2013, the Judgment Fund has paid 

ELOOLRQWRQXFOHDUSRZHURSHUDWRUVRIZKLFKPLOOLRQLVDWWULEXWDEOHWRWKH15&’s 

decision to suspend the licensing proceeding. This commenter also stated that the nuclear 

industry benefits from the NRC’s decision to stop the Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding 

because its spent fuel management expenses are being paid by the taxpayer through the 

Judgment Fund while the industry’s investment in the Nuclear Waste Fund is preserved, and 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

because power operators retain title to spent fuel that has the energy equivalent of over six 

billion barrels of oil. The commenter asked whether the NRC has considered the appearance of 

collusion between the NRC and the nuclear industry. 

Another commenter added that the uncertainty stemming from the NRC’s repository-related 

decisions causes investors to doubt the future availability of the consistent, large-scale 

production of electricity needed for industry in the United States. The commenter noted that 

investors are instead going overseas. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comment concerning the GEIS’s relationship to 

spent fuel disposal policy and requirements. The GEIS is an environmental analysis of the 

continued storage of spent fuel; it does not promote or enforce the NWPA or the Standard 

Contract. In the GEIS, the NRC has accounted for scenarios involving both the availability of a 

repository (in two timeframes) and the unavailability of a repository; thus, the GEIS does 

acknowledge the uncertainty in the repository program. Further, these comments, which are 

related to the Yucca Mountain proceeding and other unrelated litigation regarding the failure of 

the Federal government to take title to commercially generated spent fuel in accordance with 

contracts signed by contract holders and the DOE, are outside the scope of this GEIS. Any 

potential benefits or costs to plant owners and operators in stopping the Yucca Mountain 

repository license application review were not a factor in the NRC’s decision to stop the license 

application review. In addition, the NRC has resumed its review of the Yucca Mountain 

application in response to the decision of the Court of Appeals (In re Aiken County) and 

Commission Order CLI-13-1RYHPEHU13 (NRC 2013s). 

The NRC acknowledges the concerns about continuing costs associated with storing spent fuel, 

including those from lawsuits concerning the Federal government’s obligation to take title to the 

waste. Costs related to continued storage activities have been added to Chapter 2 of the GEIS. 

No changes were made to the Rule as a result of these comments. 

-------

D.2.53.3 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC’s decisions and actions that led to 

the In re Aiken County ruling by the Court of Appeals, which directs the NRC to resume its 

repository license application review, undermine the agency’s reputation as an independent and 

transparent regulator. The commenter asserted that the NRC’s management and oversight 

systems need to be sufficiently robust to withstand political influences that could lead to unlawful 

NRC actions. The commenter noted that the NRC Chairman’s prepared remarks for 

presentation on November 11, 2013, at the American Nuclear Society’s Winter Meeting suggest 

that the NRC is in denial regarding the effect of the Court of Appeals decision and that it views 

the NWPA to be an “okay-to-violate” statute. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

The commenter suggested that, before finalizing the GEIS and Rule, the NRC identify the 

failures of the agency’s management and oversight systems that led to the adverse ruling in In 

re Aiken County and identify corrective actions to address these failures and their financial, 

security, health, safety, and environmental ramifications. The commenter stated that such a 

review is important to determine whether there are other statutes and regulations that the NRC 

is violating. In arguing for this review, the commenter noted that the public, the nuclear industry, 

and the NRC staff would probably appreciate answers to questions relating to the Commission’s 

review and decision-making concerning the Yucca Mountain licensing process, noting 

specifically that more than a year passed between the Secretary’s Order of June 30, 2010 

establishing a schedule and the Commission’V6HSWHPEHU2UGHUVXVWDLQLQJWKH$WRPLF

Safety and Licensing Board ruling on the DOE’s request to withdraw its license application. The 

commenter also asked why the NRC had not requested sufficient funding from Congress to 

complete the licensing process. 

The commenter stated that, without this review of management and oversight systems and 

corrective action, the NRC cannot say that the waste confidence rulemaking complies with any 

governing statute. The commenter stated further that, without such a review, the GEIS 

assumption concerning institutional controls is invalid, because the NRC has not demonstrated 

it has control. 

RESPONSE: The NRC disagrees with the comments. The NRC prepared the GEIS and Rule 

in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the AEA, NEPA, and the APA. The NRC 

believes that the GEIS and Rule fully comply with these statutes and the NRC’s regulations. 

The NRC has a robust management structure that strives to ensure compliance with all relevant 

statutes and regulations. In those rare circumstances where the NRC’s actions are overturned 

by a Federal court, the NRC takes timely and appropriate action to comply with the court’s 

directives, as the NRC has done with this GEIS. 

The NRC appreciates the comments’ concerns about the Yucca Mountain litigation and the 

status of the NRC’s ongoing review of the application. However, the comments related to the 

Yucca Mountain litigation and licensing review do not provide information related to the scope of 

the GEIS, and are therefore not considered further in this context. No changes were made to 

the GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

-----------4) 

D.2.53.4 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC should abide by the most recent 

decision of the Court of Appeals (NARUC v. DOE) and ask permission to stop collecting the 

Nuclear Waste Fund fee because, the commenter stated, there seems to be no plan for 

establishing permanent geologic storage. 

RESPONSE: The DOE, and not the NRC, collects the fee for the Nuclear Waste Fund, and the 

NRC has no control over the collection of fees for the Nuclear Waste Fund. In the decision to 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

which the commenter referred, the Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of Energy “to submit 

to Congress a proposal to change the fee to zero until such a time as either the Secretary 

chooses to comply with the Act as it is currently written, or until Congress enacts an alternative 

waste-management plan.” The NRC was not a party to the case and was not directed to do 

anything by the Court. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-12-

D.2.53.5 – COMMENT: A commenter stated that the NRC’s decisions concerning the 

repository licensing process served to foreclose the placement of spent fuel in a remote location 

and to prolong by at least 41 months the risks associated with the storage of spent fuel at plant 

sites. The commenter further noted that this delay has required plant operators to transfer 

additional spent fuel from the pools to dry casks, which presents its own risks. The commenter 

also cited weather-related degradation of casks during prolonged dry storage. The commenter 

further noted that the NRC’s decisions to halt the repository licensing process also have a 

national security aspect, because prolonging dry storage would also prolong the increased 

chances for a terrorist attack. 

RESPONSE: The NRC’s decisions regarding the Yucca Mountain application are outside the 

scope of the GEIS and Rule. This GEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of storing spent 

fuel for extended periods of time, including the need to store indefinitely if a repository does not 

become available. However, as stated in the GEIS, the NRC continues to believe that a 

UHSRVLWRU\LVOLNHO\WREHFRPHDYDLODEOHZLWKLQ\HDUVRIWKHHQGRIDUHDFWRU’s licensed life for 

operation. Further, in response to the decision of the Court of Appeals (In re Aiken County) and 

Commission Order CLI-13-1RC 2013s), the NRC has resumed its review of the DOE’s 

application for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of this comment. 

-

D.2.53.6 – COMMENT: Commenters expressed their disapproval of the proposed high-level 

radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, stating it has already failed, that the United 

States has no policy and no plan for the permanent disposal of spent fuel. Some commenters 

felt that the GEIS assumption that there will be a repository predetermines the outcome of a 

repository licensing process. Many commenters expressed concern about the social and 

political process behind the selection and cancellation of Yucca Mountain, including the amount 

of money already spent on the project. Other commenters expressed concern about the 

technical feasibility, capacity, and underlying analysis supporting the DOE’s application for the 

Yucca Mountain facility. 

RESPONSE: The licensing process for any specific repository, including the proposed facility at 

Yucca Mountain, is outside the scope of the GEIS and Rule. The assumption in the GEIS that a 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

repository will be available for the short-term and long-term timeframes is based on the NRC’s 

review of available information regarding the technical feasibility of a repository, the DOE’s 

current spent fuel management plans, and a review of relevant domestic and international 

experience with siting, constructing, and operating a nuclear waste repository. The analysis in 

the GEIS does not assume that a specific repository, such as the proposed facility at Yucca 

Mountain, becomes available. The NRC has not predetermined the outcome of any licensing 

proceeding, including the ongoing proceeding regarding the DOE’s Yucca Mountain application, 

and has assessed three different scenarios, including one that does not assume the licensing 

and construction of any repository. Regardless of the status of any proposed repository, this 

GEIS considers the environmental impacts only of the continued storage of spent fuel. The 

environmental impacts associated with disposal in a repository, repository funding issues, and 

other waste disposal issues are outside the scope of this GEIS. No changes were made to the 

GEIS or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(23----22------4-------

--------1--1--2-12) 

-2--1---

D.2.54 Out-of-Scope Comments – Opposition to Nuclear Power 

D.2.54.1 – COMMENT: Numerous commenters expressed opposition to nuclear power, the 

nuclear power industry, and the NRC. Comments included calls to stop generating additional 

spent fuel, to stop licensing and relicensing nuclear facilities, to close and decommission all 

nuclear facilities, and to replace nuclear power with renewable energy. In expressing their 

opposition to nuclear power, commenters cited safety, environmental, and cost concerns 

regarding the operation of nuclear plants and the storage and disposal of spent fuel. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments opposing nuclear power. Comments 

opposing nuclear power are beyond the scope of the GEIS and Rule. This rulemaking 

addresses the environmental impacts of storage of spent fuel beyond the licensed life of a 

reactor and is supported by the analysis in the GEIS; the rulemaking does not address reactor 

operating issues, generation and storage of spent fuel during the licensed life of a reactor, or the 

ultimate disposal of spent fuel. Further, the NRC is an independent regulator that does not 

promote nuclear or other types of energy. No changes were made to the GEIS or Rule as a 

result of these comments. 

(2-1) (3----1) (10-1) (11-1) (12-1) (14----1) (20-2) (23-1) (23-11) 

(24--2) (30-13-1) (30-2-1) (30-21-1) (30-12-10) (30--11) (30-11-2) (30--2) (30-24-3) 

(30-2-4) (30-22------1) (32-1) (33-----4) (40-1) (44-1) 

-10--12------10--1--1--------

--------------

--------------1) 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

--1) (103-1) (104---1) (112-10-1) (112-24-1) (112-30-1) (112-33-1) (112-

-1) (112--10) (112--2) (112--2) (112-22-3) (112-30-4) (112-10--22--11-

(112-----11--31--11--1) (114----

--3) (124--------3) (132-1) (132-2) 

(133-3) (134----3) (140-1) (141-2) (143-----2) 

--------23----3--

43--44----10--14------44---2) 

-12----------40--41----

--31-3-42------24----34---

-------22--------1) 

-----------4-1) 

-------1) (200-----4) 

-1) (230------1) (240-1) (240-3) (241-2) (241-3) (243-2) 

(244-10-1) (244--1) (244-14-10) (244--2) (244-10-3) (244--3) (244-10-4) (244--4) (244--

4) (244-----11--14--22--------

--------------21--24-2) 

-32----44----11----3----

42--------22--10-------

-31--14----31----11----23--

-2) (2-30------23--31--11----30-4) 

-31----23--3------11-----

----11--12--23----34-1---

44-----------------1) 

---20--------------

----------2--33-----3) 

-------30--33--34--42----

------------42-----

-------31--------30--

----30-----------

------------

------------

---1) (300-1) (301-2) (302-1) (303-----

--1) (314-1) (314-4) (322-1) (322-2) (322-3) (322---2) ----

-----------33------

10--12----20--23----31----40-1) 

---------21--22------

--------------40---3) 

-------10--14--23--44----

-----4) -----------21-1) 

-24------32--33----40-----

-21------3--32----40--42--
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

44----14--22--23--3----4--30-4) 

-32----42--44--------20--21-

-23--------22--2--3--42--

11----4--13-----------3) 

-------------4-----

-31--1----20-2) (32-23--30--32----

1------34--4----34--4----

----1) (332-3) (333-4) (334-2) (334---4) (341-2-10) (341-1-

-----------2) 

-----------1-11) 

-------1-------1) (-

1) (403-2) (403-3) (403-4) (404------1) (413-1) (413--

-----------3) 

----3) (441-3) (443------1--

2--2-----------2) 

------------12) 

------------1) 

----------2--1-

-1--1--2--2--2------2) 

------1--3-----2) 

------------2) 

------------1) 

-----------2) 

------------

-----1) -------

-----------

------------10) 

-11) ----------1) 

---1---------12) 

------------

------------

-----------

------1) (------

-----------

------------

---2--------

------------

-----------2) 

------------1) 

------------

------------
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

---------3--4--1) 

---2----------

------------

1) (1004--

D.2.55 Out-of-Scope Comments – Support for Nuclear Power 

D.2.55.1 – COMMENT: Many commenters expressed support for nuclear energy. 

RESPONSE: The NRC acknowledges the comments supporting nuclear energy; however, 

these comments are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. No changes were made to the GEIS 

or Rule as a result of these comments. 

(30--1) (30--2) (30--2) (30-20-3) (30-3-3) (30--4) (30-23-4) (30--4) (30---20-

(30-20--4--------13---------1) 

-----2) (100-2) (100-21) (100-22) (100-24) (100---4) 

(112-1-2) (112-1-3) (112-21-3) (112--3) (112-12-------10) 

-------------1) 

-------30----------

11------1------14) (201-2) 

(212-1) (212-4) (212--1) (213-2) (213-4) (244-12-1) (244-2-1) (244-11-12) (244--2) 

(244-1-4) (244-12--------1------23-1) 

--1) -33--4--------34--1---

-33--34----12--1--10----20--

----21--20--20--10-------1) 

-21--32----41----------

24--32--------------14-3) 

-41--43--10--3---4) (-41------

------4----------1) 

-----1) (312----4--13----

13----13-4) (3-----------41-1) 

---33----------3--43--

----10----10----2--2---

-----------4) 

------------

------------

--2) 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

D.3 List of Unique Comment Authors 

Table D-3 lists commenters who provided unique (i.e., non-form letter) comment submissions 

on the draft GEIS and proposed Rule. A table of form letter authors is provided in a separate 

document titled, Comments on the Waste Confidence Draft Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement and Proposed Rule, which is located in ADAMS under accession number 

0/$

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Abbott, Dana 0/$ 

Abbott, Sandra 0/$ 

Abdro, Ann 0/$ 

Abendano, Juan 0/% -41

Adam, Peter Santa Barbara County, California 0/$ 

Adams, Grace 0/$ 13

Adams, Grace 0/% 

Adams, Grace 0/$ 

Affonso, Jane 0/% 

Agnew, David ML13320A012 

Agnew, David Cape Downwinders 0/$ 

Agnew, David Cape Downwinders 0/% 112-11

AGreen Road Project, 

Anonymous 

0/$ 

Aguilar, Margaret ML13330C033 -

Allen, Judy 0/$ -24

Allen, Rick United Association of Plumbers and 

Pipefitters 

0/$ -13

Allerton, George 0/$ 

Amos, T.J. 0/% -

Amram, David 0/& 

Amram, David 0/$ 

Amram, David 0/$ -

Amthony, Elizabeth 0/$ 

Anderson, Cody 0/$ 

Anderson, Janet M. 0/$ 

Andrews, Richard 0/$ 

Andrews, Richard 0/$ 

Andrews, Richard 0/$ -
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 200

Anonymous 0/$ 210

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 412

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous ML14001A020 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous 0/$ 

Anonymous, Brian 0/$ 

Anonymous, Debra 0/$ 

Anonymous, Janet 0/$ 

Anonymous, JEC 0/$ 

Anonymous, Jeff 0/$ 

Anonymous, Jill 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Anonymous, Scott 0/$ 

Apted, Michael 0/$ -

Arauz, Jorge 0/$ 143

Archie, Jeff South Carolina Electric & Gas 0/% -3

Armer, Sunny Raging Grannies WOWW 0/$ -

Armerding, Christopher ML13304C023 

Arnason, Deb 0/$ 

Arnason, Deb 0/% 

Arnason, Deb 0/$ 

Arnason, Deb 0/% -42

Arnold, James 0/$ 

Arnott, Melissa 0/$ 

Arrabaca, Andrew 0/$ 

Ashe, Kenneth 0/% -23

Atlee, Susan 0/$ 

August, Bernard Committee Against Plutonium 

Economics 

ML14001A014 

Avilla, Karen City of Carson, California 0/$ 

Azulay, Jessica Alliance for a Green Economy 0/$ -34

Baade, Joanne City of San Clemente, California 0/$ 

Babski, Mark 0/$ 

Bagwell, Charles 0/% 321

Bailey, Savannah CASEnergy Coalition 0/& 122

Bailey, Savannah CASEnergy Coalition 0/$ -

Bailey, Savannah CASEnergy Coalition 0/$ -

Bailey, Savannah CASEnergy Coalition 0/$ -

Baker, Anna 0/$ 

Baker, Anna 0/% 112-

Baker, Crystal North American Indigenous Peoples 

Caucus 

0/$ -

Baker, Hannelore 0/% 322

Baker, Helen 0/$ 441

Baker, Sheila 0/$ 

Baker, Tammera Palo Verde Nuclear Generating 

Station 

0/$ -

Balgemann, Dennis 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Balke, Karl 0/$ 333

Bandfield, Gary 0/$ 

Barczak, Sara Southern Alliance for Clean Energy 0/% -

Barczak, Sara Southern Alliance for Clean Energy 0/% -

Barilla, Frank 0/% -

Barker, Laurenn 0/$ 

Barnes, Kathryn 0/$ 

Barnes, Kathyrn 0/$ -

Bartlett, Bill Green Party 0/$ -

Barton, Jim 0/$ 

Bast, Nancy 0/$ 

Batobato, Alicia 0/$ 

Bauer, Scott STARS 0/$ 

Bay, Miki 0/$ 

Bean, Judith 0/$ -11

Beane, Gary 0/& 

Beccia, John 0/$ 330

Becker, Joanna 0/$ 

Becker, Rochelle 0/$ -3

Behling, Steve ML13304C034 100

Behling, Steve 0/$ 100

Bennett, Mary 0/$ 

Bennett, Nathan 0/% -10

Bergier, Kim 0/$ 

Bergier, Kim 0/$ 

Berlincourt, Kerry 0/$ -40

Bernhoft, Eric 0/$ 

Bernstein, Patricia 0/$ 

Bessette, Paul Counsel for Entergy Nuclear 

Operations, Inc 

0/$ 

Betancourt, Nelson 0/% 244-10

Bethlenfalvay, Marina 0/$ 

Bettega, Gayle 0/$ 

Bevill, Bernard Arkansas Department of Health 0/$ 

Bibb, William 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Biddle, Lynn 0/$ 21

Biersdorf, John 0/% -10

Bilenko, Stephanie ML13330C033 -

Bird, Melissa ML13323C013 

Bird, Melissa 0/$ 

Black, Ryan 0/$ 

Blackburn, Lee 0/$ 

Blackburn, Lee 0/& 

Blacker, Paul 0/$ 343

Blake, Elisabeth 0/$ 

Blankenmyer, Eric 0/$ 400

Blee, David U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure Council 0/$ 30-23

Blevins, Eric 0/% -

Bluestein, Bonnie 0/$ 

Bluestein, Bonnie ML13330C033 -

Bogdan, Andrew ML14001A040 

Bogen, Doug Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 0/$ 

Bogen, Doug Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 0/% 112-

BojeLebs, Nannette 0/$ 

Bolognini, Franceseca 0/$ 14

Bonanno, Jerry Nuclear Energy Institute 0/$ 30-

Bonanno, Jerry Nuclear Energy Institute 0/$ -

Bonney, Mary 0/$ 

Bonniwell, Colleen 0/$ 

Bonniwell, Colleen 0/% -

Boosinger, Marilynn 0/% 

Borchmann, Patricia ML13323C022 

Borchmann, Patricia 0/$ 

Borchmann, Patricia 0/$ -11

Borchmann, Patricia 0/$ 

Border, Gary 0/$ -

Borie, Edith 0/$ 

Bosold, Patrick 0/$ 

Boudart, Jan ML13330C033 -21

Boudart, Jan 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Bourgeois, Paula 0/$ 

Boyd, David Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition 0/$ 

Boyda, Jonathan 0/$ 

Boyes, Pam 0/% 112-

Brack, H.G. 0/$ 

Brancato, Deborah Riverkeeper 0/$ 

Branigan, Mary Beth Ecological Options Network 0/$ -

Brave, Jacqueline 0/& 

Brechin, Vernon 0/$ 

Brefeld, James 0/$ 

Bridgeman, Janis 0/$ 

Bridges, Martha 0/$ 23

Brinton, Samuel 0/% 112-

Brinton, Samuel 0/$ 

Britz, Joan 0/$ 

Bromm, Susan E. U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency 

0/$ 

Brookhart, Ryan 0/% -14

Broska, Robert 0/$ 

Brotine, Howard 0/$ 

Brousse, Elizabeth 0/$ -

Brown, Deborah 0/$ 403

Brown, Jeffrey 0/$ -

Brown, Jerry World Business Academy 0/$ 

Brown, Jerry World Business Academy 0/$ -4

Brown, Marti 0/$ -14

Brown, Marty 0/$ 

Brown, Steve 0/$ 444

Brown, Susan 0/$ 

Brown, Tim City of San Clemente, California 0/$ 

Brunelli, Crystal 0/& 

Buchanan, Tom 0/$ 

Buckingham, Jeffrey 0/$ 

Bucklin, Christine 0/$ 

Burchfield Rhodes, Valerie 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Burkhead, Elizabeth 0/$ 

Butler, Dee 0/$ 442

Butler, Ruth 0/$ 

Byrne, Genevieve Project for Energy Accountability and 

the Concerned Neighbors of Pilgrim 

0/% 112-13

Byrne, Peter 0/$ -

Byrne, Timothy United Association Plumbers and 

3LSHILWWHUV/RFDO 

0/% 

Cagnetta, Matt 0/% -

Caldicott, Helen Physicians for Social Responsibility 0/& 113

Callahan, Mike Decommissioning Plant Coalition 0/% -4

Callen, Ronald C. Public Law Resource Center PLLC 0/$ 

Calnan, Christopher ML14001A021 

Campbell, Bruce 0/$ 

Campbell, Bruce 0/$ -

Campbell, Mary 0/$ 

Cannon, Tom Arizona Public Service 0/$ -

Capozzelli, J. 0/$ 

Capurso, Thomas I.B.E.W. Local Union #3 0/$ 

Carberry, Mike Sierra Club Nuclear-Free Campaign 0/$ 30-21

Carberry, Mike Sierra Club Nuclear-Free Campaign 0/% -

Carberry, Mike Sierra Club Nuclear-Free Campaign 0/% -31

Carey, Corinne ML14014A110 

Carey, Corinne 0/$ -33

Carey, Kevin ML14002A000 

Carlton, Paul 0/$ 

Carrigan, Milton 0/$ -

Carter, Pat 0/$ 20

Cartmell, Cathy 0/$ 1003

Case, Ed 0/$ 340

Casebier, William 0/$ 

Cash, Joy 0/$ 

Casteleiro, Darcy 0/$ -13

Casten, Liane ML13330C033 -

Cato, Michael 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Caulfield, Lee 0/% 

Caulfield, Lee 0/$ -20

Causey, Lee 0/% -43

Cavlan, Michael 0/% -

Cella, Dr. Francine ML13330C033 -41

Cerrito, Robert ML13323C212 

Chamberlain, Lora ML13330C033 -

Chambers, Fred 0/$ -10

Chappellet, Carissa 0/$ 

Chavez, Tim 0/$ -44

Chen, S.Y. ML13330C033 -

Chichester, Ben 0/% 112-34

Chin, Rebecca Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee 0/$ 

Chrisler, Gary 0/$ 

Christie, Andrew Santa Lucia Sierra Club 0/$ 

Chunglo, Steve 0/$ 

Church of New York, The 

Riverside 

0/$ 

Ciferri, Flavio 0/$ 

Clark, Brita Larsen PSR 0/$ 

Clark, Terrence Physicians for Social Responsibility 0/$ 

Clark, Terrence Physicians for Social Responsibility 0/$ 

Clark, Terry Physicians for Social Responsibility 0/% -31

Claybourne, Ana 0/$ 

Clemons, Victoria 0/$ -20

Clemons, Victoria 0/$ 421

Clendening, Tommie 0/$ 

Clermont, Elaine 0/$ 

Cleveland, Charles 0/$ -30

Clig, George 0/$ 

Coalition, Clean and Safe 

Energy 

Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/& 213

Cobb, Sandra 0/$ 33

Cohen, Sam Santa Ynes Band of Chumash Indians 0/$ 

Cohn, Jeremy Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems 0/$ 30-
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Colfi, Alessandra 0/$ 

Collier, Grant 0/$ 

Collins, Fred Northern Chumash Tribal Council 0/$ -2

Collins, Jessie Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 0/$ 

Collins, Jessie Pauline 0/$ 

Collins, Jessie Pauline 0/$ -

Collins, Yoko 0/$ 

Comer, Gail 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 2

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 3

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/% 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/& 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Commenters, Multiple(a) ML14043A331 

Commenters, Multiple(a) 0/$ 

Conley, Pam 0/$ 

Conley, Patrick 0/& 

Conn, Corey ML13330C033 -24

Conn, Diane 0/$ -21

Connor, Vicki 0/$ -

Connoy, Gina 0/$ 

Conrad, Chad 0/$ 

Cook, Andrew 0/% -

Cook, Dr. Andrew G. 0/' 

Cooper, Elaine South Carolina Sierra Club 0/% -20

Cooper, Mark 0/$ 

Coor, Kristen 0/$ 

Corbett, Susan 0/% -

Cordes, Reo 0/$ -

Corrino, G 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Costanza, Frank ML13330C033 -

Cox, Bruce 0/& 130

Cox, David 0/$ 

Craig, Anne 0/$ 

Craig, Anne 0/% 

Craig, Evan ML13330C033 -

Craig, Tom 0/$ 

Crimmel, Steve 0/$ -

Crocker, George North American Water Office 0/$ 

Crocker, George North American Water Office 0/% -

Crow, Valerie 0/$ -

Crowley, Lawrence 0/$ 

Cullen, Noreen 0/$ 

Cummings, Kristopher 0/% -

Cunningham, William and 

Barbara 

0/& 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP; For the Office of 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP; For the Office of 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP; For the Office of 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP; For the Office of 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP; For the Office of 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP 

0/$ 

Curran, Diane Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & 

Eisenberg, LLP 

0/$ 

Curren, Elizabeth 0/$ 

Curtin, Kenneth Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/$ 30-

Curtis, Daniel 0/% 112-

Curtis, Daniel 0/$ 

Cuthbert, Donna The Alliance for a Clean Environment 0/% -
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Cuthbert, Lewis The Alliance for a Clean Environment 0/% 

Cuthbert, Lewis The Alliance for a Clean Environment 0/% -3

Cypser, Betty 0/' 

Cypser, Betty 0/' 

Cypser, Betty Raging Grannies 0/$ -

D’Arrigo, Diane Nuclear Information Resource Service 0/$ 30-

D’Arrigo, Diane Nuclear Information Resource Service 0/% -2

Dailey, Arthur ML13320A014 

Daily, G. Allen 0/$ 

Dalton, Andrew 0/$ -43

Daly, John 0/$ 

Damratoski, Katie North American Young Generation in 

Nuclear 

0/$ 

Daniels, John 0/% 

Darling, Ann Safe and Green Campaign 0/% 112-24

Davidson, Judith 0/$ 

Davies, Phyllis 0/$ -22

Davis, Adrianne 0/$ -

Davis, Anonymous 0/$ 

Davis, Cherie 0/$ 

Davis, Ed Nuclear Infrastructure Council 0/$ 

Davis, Leslie Earth Protector Environmental Group 0/% -

Davis, Patti 0/$ -

Davis, Shelle 0/% 

Davis, Suzanne 0/$ 

Davis, Tom 0/$ 

Davison, David 0/$ 

Davison, Heidi 0/% 

de Graaf, Brandon ML13330C033 -12

De Lacey, Carol 0/$ 

Dean, Janice New York State Attorney General’s 

Environmental Protection Bureau 

0/$ 

deBruler, Gregory ML14002A003 

DeCrescenzo, Jackie 0/$ -

DeCrescenzo, Jocelyn 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

DeCrescenzo, Jocelyn 0/$ -

Degher, Darius ML13324B143 220

DeLano, Harry ML14001A012 

DeMare, Joseph 0/$ -

Dengler, Allegra Sierra Club 0/$ -40

Denneen, Bill 0/$ 

Denneen, Bill 0/$ 

Denneen, Bill 0/$ 

Dennis, Harold E.B. 0/& 

Denton, Jill ML13320A022 

Deshotels, Bob 0/& 214

Deshotels, Bob 0/% 231

Deshotels, Bob 0/$ -

Devitt, Andrea 0/$ 

Devitt, Andrea 0/$ -

DeVoe, Joe 0/% -

Dew, Jane 0/$ 

Diaconeasa, Mihai 0/% 112-

Diamond, Jim 0/$ 

Diem, Larkin 0/% 

Diem, Larkin 0/% -

Dimondstein, Carla 0/$ 1004

Doctor, Appalled 0/% 223

Dolegowski, John 0/$ 

Dolph, Ivar 0/$ 

Dolph, Phyllis 0/$ 

Donaldson, John 0/$ 

Donnelly, Dennis 0/% 

Dorans, Rob Affiliated Construction Trades 

Foundation of Ohio 

0/$ -31

Dorsey, Chris 0/% -1

Doyle, Rosemary 0/$ 

Doyle, Rosemary 0/$ 

Drey, Kay 0/$ 

Drotar, Laura 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Dubois, Gwen L Chesapeake Physicians for Social 

Responsibility; Crabshell Alliance 

0/% -11

Dubois, Gwen L Chesapeake Physicians for Social 

Responsibility; Crabshell Alliance 

0/% 233

Dudley, Chris 0/$ 422

Dugan, Pat 0/$ 

Dugdale, Jane 0/$ 

Dugdale, Jane 0/% -

Duke, George 0/$ 

Duke, Paul PSEG Nuclear LLC 0/$ 

Duke, Paul PSEG Nuclear LLC 0/$ 

Dunlap, Jeff Exelon ML13330C033 -20

Dupiche, Sharon ML13304C031 

Dupont, Alice ML14001A041 

Earl, David 0/$ 

Eckert, Rose 0/% 

Eder, Harvey Public Solar Power Coalition ML14001A010 

Edwards, Gordon Canadian Coalition for Nuclear 

Responsibility 

0/$ 

Edwards, Greg 0/& 

Ehrle, Lynn Howard International Science Oversight Board 0/& 113

Ehrlich, Jeremy 0/$ 

Eide-Tollefson, Kristen 0/% -12

Eide-Tollefson, Kristen PINGP Study Group ML14002A040 

Ein, Mark 0/$ 

Einhorn, Jeremy 0/$ 

Eisman, Val 0/$ 

Elie, Marilyn 0/$ -21

Ellison, David 0/$ 

Ellison, David 0/$ -14

Embrey, Monica 0/% -

Emerson, Willis 0/$ 

Emmons, Roger 0/$ 

Endo, Yuki 0/& 114

Endo, Yuki 0/$ -

English, Becky Sierra Club, Rocky Mtn. Chapter 0/$ -1
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Enriquez, Elizabeth Nye County, Nevada 0/$ 

Epple, Melissa 0/% 

Evans, Laurie Westchester Safe 0/$ -

Evans, Michael W. 0/$ 

Evans, Pete 0/$ -

Evjion, Virginia 0/& 

Fabihn, Dagmar Crabshell Alliance of Greater 

Baltimore, Maryland 

0/% -30

Fahey, John 0/$ 

Falis, Edward ML13301B123 

Fallon, Gloria 0/$ 

Farbish, Peter 0/$ 

Faris, Kelly 0/$ -42

Fast, Wendy 0/$ 

Fast, Wendy 0/$ 

Fast, Wendy 0/$ 

Fasten, Susan 0/% 

Fasten, Susan 0/$ 

Fasten, Susan 0/$ 

Fasten, Susan 0/$ 

Fasten, Susan 0/$ 

Faunce, Stephanie 0/$ 

Feathers, Jösan 0/$ 

Feathers, Jösan 0/$ -

Felder, H.M. 0/& 131

Feldman, Jane Sierra Club (Toiyabe Chapter) 0/% -33

Ferguson, Tom ML13324B144 221

Ferreira, Raul 0/$ 

Fettus, Geoffrey Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Inc. 

0/$ 

Fettus, Geoffrey Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Inc. 

0/$ 

Fisher, Allison ML14014A312 

Fisher, Allison Public Citizen’s Energy Program 0/% -22

Fisher, Peter 0/% 

Fishman, Zelma 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Fitch-Johnson, Janet 0/$ 

Fleischer, Robert 0/% 112-32

Fleming, Scott 0/$ 

Fleming, Scott Will County Center for Economic 

Development 

ML13330C033 -4

Foley, Nancy ML14002A021 

Follett, Carol 0/$ 11

Ford, Jay 0/% 

Fosmo, Vaugh 0/$ -

Foster, Ruth New Jersey Department of 

Environmental Protection 

0/$ 

Foster, William 0/$ 

Foushee, Lea 0/% -

Fox, Patsy ML13304C030 111

Fox, Rick Global Warming Solutions Group of 

Central Illinois 

ML13330C033 -

Fox, Tracy ML13330C033 -31

Fradella, Richard 0/$ 

Frances, Esther 0/$ 

Frank, Fred 0/$ 

Frank, Fred 0/$ -

Frankland, Chris ConverDyn 0/$ -14

Frantz, Charles 0/$ 

Fray, Joseph 0/$ 

Freeman, S. David Consultant 0/& 113

Freeman, Susan ML14001A030 

Fregonese, Vic 0/% -

Fregonese, Vic AREVA 0/$ 201

French, Walter Plumbers, Pipe and Refrigeration 

Fitters Local Union No. 403 

0/$ 

Freund, Tim 0/$ 

Frey, Paul 0/$ 

Friedman, Avram Canary Coalition ML13320A001 

Friedman, Avram Canary Coalition 0/% -33

Fritz, John 0/$ 

Fry, Mark 0/$ -42
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Fuentes, Julio Florida State Hispanic Chamber of 

Commerce 

0/% 

Fullerton, Dan 0/$ -23

Fulton, Doris 0/$ 

G, Ambriel 0/& 

G., Brittany 0/$ 

Gale, Maradel 0/$ 

Gale, Robert and Beverly 0/$ 

Gall, Gary 0/$ 

Gallagher, Dr. Terry ML13330C033 -44

Gamble, Dan INviro Design and Consulting, LLC 0/$ 

Gantt, Carol 0/% -

Garb, James 0/% 230

Garcia, Diego 0/% 112-12

Garcia, Diego 0/% -21

Garden, Claire 0/% 

Garner-Ritter, Maureen 0/$ -

Garvey, Lydia 0/$ 

Garza, John SCE&G – V.C. Summer Nuclear 

Station 

0/$ 

Geary, B. 0/$ 

Geesman, John Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility 0/$ -

Geist, Sheila 0/$ 

Geist, Sheila Shut Down Indian Point Now 0/$ -33

Gellert, Sally Jane 0/$ -20

Gellert, Sally Jane 0/$ 

Georgi, Carol California Central Coast Marine 

Sanctuary Alliance 

0/$ 

Georgi, David 0/$ 

Gerard, Daniele Three Parks Independent Democrats 0/$ -

Gerhart, Dan 0/% 

Gerleman, Doug 0/% -

Gerleman, Douglas 0/$ 

Gerstein, Bill 0/$ 

Gibson, Bruce San Luis Obispo County California 0/$ 

Gibson, Julie 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Giese, Mark M. 0/$ 

Giese, Mark M. 0/$ 

Giese, Mark M. ML14001A004 

Gill, Susan 0/$ 

Gilmore, Donna 0/$ -2

Gilmore, Donna ML14001A022 

Gilmore, Donna Coalition to Decommission San 

Onofre 

ML14001A031 

Ginsberg, Ellen Nuclear Energy Institute 0/$ 30-3

Ginsberg, Ellen Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% 112-

Ginsberg, Ellen Nuclear Energy Institute 0/$ -30

Ginsberg, Ellen Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% -14

Ginsberg, Ellen Nuclear Energy Institute ML14001A002 

Giunta, Tony City of Franklin, NH 0/% 112-1

Glass, Peter Xcel Energy 0/$ 

Glime, Janice 0/% 

Gloege, William 0/$ -24

Golden, Leon 0/$ 

Goldin, Martha 0/$ 

Goldstein, Mindy Turner Environmental Law Clinic 0/$ 

Goldstein, Mindy Turner Environmental Law Clinic 0/$ 

Goley, Timothy 0/$ 

Good, Joyce ML13330C033 -

Goodwin, Liberty ML13331C303 

Gordon, Mark 0/$ 

Gordon, Michelle 0/$ 

Gordon, Michelle ML14001A003 

Goudeau, Terry 0/$ 1001

Grace, Karli ML13330C033 -

Graham, Candace 0/$ 

Graham, Susan 0/% 

Grannies, Raging 0/$ 

Graves, Caryn 0/$ 423

Gray, Erica 0/$ 30-

Gray, Erica 0/% -3
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Gray, Erica 0/% -

Gray, Erica 0/% -

Gray, Erica 0/$ 

Gray, Susan Maryland Department of Natural 

Resources 

0/% -

Green, Carlyn 0/% 

Green, Jeane 0/$ 

Green, Jeanne 0/% 

Green, Michael Arizona Public Service Company 0/$ -2

Greene, David 0/$ 

Greene, Linda 0/$ 31

Greenfield, Jan 0/$ 

Greenwood, John 0/$ -

Greisch, Edward 0/$ 

Greisch, Edward 0/$ 

Griffin, William Office of the Attorney General, State 

of Vermont 

0/$ 

Griffin, William Office of the Attorney General, State 

of Vermont 

0/$ 1

Griffin, William Office of the Attorney General, State 

of Vermont 

0/$ 

Grigg, Richard 0/$ 

Grodzinsky, D.M. Presidium of the National Academy of 

Science of Ukraine 

0/& 113

Groff, Inga 0/$ 41

Groff, Joe 0/$ 41

Groot, Henriette 0/$ -

Gross, Cheryl 0/$ 402

Guido, Jeffry Maryland State Pipe Trades 

Association 

0/$ 30-

Guindon, Ernest 0/$ -

Gunderson, Arnie Fairewinds 0/& 113

Gunn, George Vogtle Units 1 and 2 0/% -21

Gunter, Keith Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 ML14002A022 

Gunter, Keith Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 0/$ -

Gunter, Paul Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Gupton, William 0/% -

Gutherman, Brian 0/$ -11

Gutierrez, Ruth 0/$ 

Guttierez, Ingrid 0/$ -

Haber, Jim 0/$ 

Hafemeister, David 0/$ -30

Hafer, Sarah 0/$ 

Haggerty, Bernard 0/$ 

Haggerty, Bernard 0/$ -3

Hall, Caroline 0/% 232

Hall, Christoper 0/% 

Hamilton, Richard 0/$ 

Hancock, Mandy 0/% 244-3

Hancock, Mandy Southern Alliance for Clean Energy 0/% 244-3

Handelsman, Robert 0/$ 

Hands, Tara 0/% -22

Hanna, Helen ML14002A001 

Hannaman, Bill 0/$ 

Hannaman, Bill 0/$ -

Hanrahan, Carol 0/% -

Hanson, Courtney Alliance for Nuclear Accountability 0/$ 

Hanson, Courtney Georgia Women’s Action for New 

Directions 

0/% -

Hanson, Lauren 0/$ 

Harkins, Lynne 0/$ 

Harlan, Thomas City of Red Wing, Minnesota 0/$ 

Harris, Kate ML14001A034 

Hatfield, Barry 0/$ 32

Haughney, Charles 0/$ 

Hayati, Sally 0/$ 301

Headington, Maureen 0/$ 

Headington, Maureen ML13330C033 -

Headington, Maureen Stand Up/Save Lives Campaign 0/$ 30-22

Headington, Vince 0/$ 

Headington, Vince ML13330C033 -22
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Headrick, Gary 0/$ 

Headrick, Gary San Clemente Green 0/$ 

Headrick, Gary San Clemente Green 0/$ -1

Headrick, Gary San Clemente Green 0/$ 

Heald, Deborah 0/$ 344

Hedlund, Robert L. Massachusetts Senate 0/$ 

Heinle, Helen 0/& 

Helker, David P. Exelon Generation Company, LLC 0/$ 

Hellwig, Louis 0/$ 42

Helsel, Adam 0/$ 

Hennen, Jimmy North American Young Generation in 

Nuclear 

0/% -

Hennessy, Diane ML14002A002 

Hennig, Anna Christina 0/% 

Henning, Marcia 0/$ 

Henry, Anita 0/$ -

Herwig, Bill V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 0/% -13

Hibbard, Angela 0/$ 

Higgins, Kevin 0/$ 

Highfill, Debbie 0/$ -31

Hill, Adam San Luis Obispo County Board of 

Supervisors 

0/$ -1

Hill, Barbara 0/$ 

Hill, Jack 0/$ 202

Hiller, Stephanie 0/$ 

Hinch, Richard 0/$ 

Hirsch, Daniel Physicians for Social ResponsibilityLA, Southern CA Fed. of Scientists; 

Committee to Bridge the Gap 

0/$ 

Hirsch, Daniel Physicians for Social ResponsibilityLA, Southern CA Fed. of Scientists; 

Committee to Bridge the Gap 

0/$ 

Hisasue, Carole 0/$ 

Hisasue, Carole 0/$ 

Hoch, Susan 0/% 243

Hodik, Barbara J. 0/' 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Hoffman, Ace 0/$ 

Hoffman, Ace 0/% 

Hoffman, Ace 0/$ 

Hoffman, Ace 0/$ 30-4

Hoffman, Ace 0/% -

Hoffman, Ace 0/$ -

Hoffman, Ace 0/% -

Hoffman, David 0/$ 401

Hoisington, Paula 0/$ 

Hollingsworth, Timothy 0/$ -42

Holloway, Patricia 0/$ 

Holmes, Helen 0/$ 

Holt, Cathy 0/$ 

Holt, Joan 0/% 

Homick, Nick 0/$ 

Homick, Nick 0/$ -

Horne, Shari ML14001A013 

Houston, Ann E. 0/& 

Howard, Claude 0/% -

Howard, Gordon 0/$ 

Howarth, Robert ML13320A002 

Howarth, Robert 0/% -12

Howell, Adam 0/% -

Hughes, Kevin 0/$ 

Hulstrunk, Matt 0/% 

Hunt, Le 0/$ 

Husch, Ben National Conference of State 

Legislators 

0/% -1

Hynes, H Patricia 0/$ 

Imhoof, Christina 0/$ 

Ingram, Gwen 0/$ 

Iwane, Cathy 0/$ -21

Iwashita, Thomas 0/$ 

Izant, Carol Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 ML14002A022 

Izant, Carol Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 0/$ -
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Jackson, Bruce 0/$ 

Jackson, Carol 0/$ 

Jacobs, Kamri 0/$ 

Jacobson, Janet 0/$ 

Jacopetti, Anna 0/$ 

Jaffee, Ellen WK$VVHPEO\'LVWULFW 0/$ -13

James, Andrew 0/% -

Jamil, Dhiaa Duke Energy 0/$ 

Jennings, Stephanie 0/$ 

Jensen, Phyllis 0/$ 

Johanson, Birgit 0/% 112-31

Johnson, Abigail Eureka County, Nevada 0/$ 

Johnson, Amber 0/$ 

Johnson, Arlene 0/$ 

Johnson, Bobie 0/% 

Johnson, Joe 0/$ 

Johnson, Madeleine 0/% 311

Johnson, Ray 0/$ 

Johnson, Reed 0/$ 

Johnson, Reed 0/$ 

Johnson, Roger 0/$ 

Johnson, Roger ML14001A033 

Johnson, Roger 0/$ -31

Johnson, Ron Prairie Island Indian Community 0/% -1

Johnson, Troy 0/$ 

Johnston, Christined 0/$ 

Johnston, Gretel BEST/MATRR 0/% -13

Johnston, Josiah 0/& 134

Jones, Angela ML14002A012 

Jones, Lauren North American Young Generation in 

Nuclear 

0/% -

Jones, Mary 0/$ 

Joslyn, Celia 0/$ 

Jouet, Lisa 0/$ 

Jouet, Tim 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Judson, Tim Nuclear Information and Resource 

Service 

0/$ 30-

Justesen, Evelyn 0/$ 

Kalama, Laura 0/$ 

Kalas, Mike ML13330C033 -

Kamps, Kevin 0/$ 30-2

Kamps, Kevin 0/% -32

Kamps, Kevin ML13330C033 -13

Kamps, Kevin 0/$ -10

Kamps, Kevin 0/% -11

Kamps, Kevin 0/% -20

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kamps, Kevin Beyond Nuclear 0/$ 

Kane, Lynne 0/$ 

Kansas, Sharon 0/$ 

Karas, Catherine 0/$ 

Karbowsky, Brad United Association of Plumbers, 

Steamfitters, and Sprinklerfitters 

0/% -

Karson, Ann 0/& 132

Kasher, Brian 0/% -

Kates, Daisy 0/$ 

Katz, Shari 0/$ 

Kaul, Michelle 0/$ 

Keegan, Michael 0/$ -2

Keegan, Michael J. Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great 

Lakes 

0/$ 

Keegan, Michael J. Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Lakes 

Kelley, Devin AREVA Inc. 0/$ 

Kelley, Don 0/$ 

Kelly, Dan 0/$ 4

Kemp, James 0/$ 

Kemp, Karla 0/$ 

Kennedy, David 0/% 320

Kernahan, Gary 0/$ -24

Kernahan, Mel 0/$ 

Kernahan, Mel 0/$ -23

Kerr, Beverly 0/% -40

Kerr, Julius 0/% -11

Kerr, Mary Ellen 0/$ 

Keskey, Donald L. Public Law Resource Center PLLC 0/$ 

Kessler, John Electric Power Research Institute 0/% 

Kidney, Barbara A. 0/& 

Kidney, Barbara A. 0/$ -41

Killpack, Gary 0/$ 

Kimmich, Erl Three Parks Independent Democrats 0/$ -10

Kinnaird, Eleanor 0/$ 

Kinnicle, Kat 0/$ 

Kinsella, William 0/$ 

Kinsey, Bob 0/$ -12

Kinzinger, Adam WK'LVWULFWRI,OOLQRLV 0/$ 

Kirkland, Gary L. 0/$ 

Kirsch, Steve OneID 0/% 

Kirschbaum, Saran 0/% 

Kirton, Kenneth CASEnergy Coalition 0/$ 

Kirton, Stratton CASEnergy Coalition 0/% 112-4

Kirton, Stratton CASEnergy Coalition 0/$ -

Kirton, Stratton CASEnergy Coalition 0/$ -

Klein, George Sierra Club Lower Hudson Group 0/$ -

Klepner, Lou 0/$ 

Kline, Connie 0/$ 

Kline, Connie 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Kline, Connie 0/$ -11

Klutho, Mark 0/% 244-

Kneidel, Ken 0/% -

Kneidel, Sally 0/% 

Kneidel, Sally 0/% -

Knisley, Mike Ohio State Donating Construction 

Trades Council 

0/$ -12

Knowles, Berdell Florida Chapter of the American 

Association of Blacks in Energy 

0/% 244-2

Koehl, Dennis L. STP Nuclear Operating Company 0/$ 

Koehnlein, Wolfgang 0/& 113

Koerblein, Alfred 0/& 113

Korn, Susan ML13330C033 -23

Korsen, Alan 0/$ 

Korsen, G 0/$ 

Kotra, Janet 0/$ 30-1

Kotra, Janet 0/$ 

Kovacs, Ashley ML13330C033 -

Kraft, Dave NEIS 0/$ 

Kraft, David NEIS 0/$ 

Kraft, David NEIS ML13330C033 -3

Kraskian, Jessica 0/$ 

Krause, Laurel 0/$ 

Kremer, Jerry New York Affordable Reliable 

Electricity Alliance 

0/$ -

Krimsky, Pam ML14002A013 

Krist, Mark 0/$ -

Krotz, Susan 0/% -

Krumm, Paul 0/$ 411

Kuchnia, Margaret 0/$ 

Kuntawala, Jitesh 0/% 244-

Kurland, Miriam 0/$ 

Kurz, Carol 0/$ 

Kurz, Carol ML13330C033 -14

Kurz, Carol 0/$ 

Kushigian, Elizabeth ML13340A434 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Kutcher, Celia 0/$ 

Kuttler, Eugeni 0/$ 

Kuyler, Raphael Counsel for Entergy Nuclear 

Operatinos, Inc 

0/$ 

Kysor, Jillian Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/$ 

Kysor, Jillian Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/$ 

Labiosa, Eleanor 0/% 242

LaForge, John 0/% -

Laing, Josephine 0/$ 

Lamb, Charles 0/$ 

Lamberger, Paul 0/$ -

Lamberts, Frances 0/$ 303

Lamberts, Frances 0/$ 

Lamont, Dana 0/$ 

Lampert, Jim 0/% 112-2

Lampert, Mary Pilgrim Watch 0/$ 

Lampert, Mary Pilgrim Watch 0/$ 

Lampert, Mary Pilgrim Watch 0/% 112-3

Landers, Don 0/% 

Landgren, Nancy 0/$ 342

Landreth, Will 0/$ -32

Laney, Nan S. ML14002A014 

Lang, Amanda 0/% -

Lang, Amanda 0/$ 

Lange, Howard 0/$ 

Lapiska, Evan Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/$ 

Lapiska, Evan Clean and Safe Energy Coalition ML13323C000 212

Lapiska, Evan Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/$ 30-20

Lapiska, Evan Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/$ -

Lapiska, Evan Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/% -20

Large, Gerry 0/$ 

Larsen Clark, Brita 0/% -

Larson, Jean 0/% -44

Laverty, Michael 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Lawhorn, Larry 0/$ 

LeCour, Melinda 0/$ 

Lee, Catherine 0/& 

Lee, Denise 0/% -

Lee, Michel 0/$ 

Lee, Michelle 0/$ -12

Lehman, Dale ML13330C033 -

Leichtling, Don 0/% 211

Leichtling, Don 0/% -

Leighton, Taigen 0/% 

Leiter, Susan 6LHUUD&OXE6WRQH\3RLQW 0/$ -

Lemmon, Tom 0/$ -

Leon, Vicki 0/$ 

Leonardi, Michael 0/$ -

Leontis, Neocles 0/$ -

Levine, Jeff 0/' 

Levine, JR 0/$ 

Lewis, Carol 0/$ 

Lewis, Dave 0/$ 43

Lewis, Marvin 0/% 

Lewis, Marvin 0/% 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 430

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 30-14

Lewis, Marvin 0/% -

Lewis, Marvin 0/$ 

Lewis, Sherry Mothers for Peace 0/$ 

Lewis, Sherry Mothers for Peace 0/$ -44

Lewison, Linda Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/$ 

Lewison, Linda Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Lewison, Linda Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/$ 

Lewison, Linda Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/% -

Lewison, Linda Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign ML13330C033 -10

Lewison, Linda Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/% -23

Leyse, Mark 0/% -

Leyse, Mark Atomic Safety Organization 0/$ 

Lieberman, Bruce 0/$ 

Light, Lillian Environmental Priorities Network 0/$ 302

Lind, Jeff S. Lombardi and Associates 0/$ 

Lish, Christopher 0/$ 

Little, Jim Carolinas Nuclear Cluster 0/% -

Littlejohn, Nick 0/$ 

Livingston, Rosanne 0/$ -

Lochbaum, David 0/$ 

Lodge, Terry 0/$ -13

London, Rick 0/$ -33

Long, Marcie 0/$ 

Longyear, John 0/$ 

Lord, Stephen 0/$ -32

Louise, Tiffany 0/$ 203

Ludwig, Andy 0/% 

Luttinger, Lionel 0/$ 

Lutz, Ray 0/$ -

Lutz, Ray Citizens Oversight 0/$ 

Lynch, Laura ML14001A024 

Lyons, Laura ML13320A020 

MacKenzie, Therese 0/& 

Macks, Vic 0/$ 

Macks, Vic 0/$ -

Madden, Donna 0/$ 

Magda, Marni 0/$ 

Magda, Marni 0/$ 

Magda, Marni 0/$ -12

Magda, Marni 0/$ 

Maghakian, Carol 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Maguire, Cynthia 0/& 

Magyar, Michael 0/$ 

Maher, Ed 0/$ 

Mahowald, Philip Prairie Island Indian Community 0/% -3

Mahowald, Philip R. Praire Island Indian Community 0/$ 

Mahowald, Philip R. Praire Island Indian Community 0/$ 

Maier, Marie 0/$ 

Makhijani, Arjun 0/$ 

Makhijani, Arjun 0/$ 

Malboeuf, Simone 0/$ 

Malboeuf, Simone 0/$ -23

Mallon, James PSEG Power, LLC 0/$ 

Malone, Patricia 0/$ 434

Mandrell, Rebecca 0/$ 

Manfredi, Timonthy 0/$ 

Maphet, Sheila 0/% -

March, Leslie 0/$ 30-12

March, Leslie 0/$ -11

Marcley-Hayes, Janet 0/$ -44

Marida, Patricia 0/$ -4

Marks, Lisa 0/$ 

Marschak, Cheryl 0/$ 

Marsh, Kathryn 0/$ 

Martin, David 0/& 

Martin, David 0/% -

Martini, Shawn Consumer Energy Alliance 0/$ -4

Martz, Robert 0/$ 

Marzullo, Dominic Utility Works Union of America Local 

1-2 

0/& 123

Marzullo, Dominic Utility Works Union of America Local 

1-2 

0/$ -

Massey, Jennifer 0/$ 

Masullo, Ginny 0/$ 

Matsuda, Thomas ML13323C011 

Matthews, Tim Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 0/$ 30-
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Mattox, Judy 0/$ 

Maurer, Bill 0/% 112-23

Maurer, William 0/$ 

Mauter, Nancy 0/$ 

Mazzocco, Kevin 0/$ 

McArdle, Ed Michigan Sierra Club 0/$ 

McArdle, Ed Michigan Sierra Club 0/$ -

McClintock, Francene 0/$ 

McClintock, Francene 0/$ 

McClintock, Francene 0/$ 

McComb, Sandy ML13330C033 -

McCoy, Dave 0/$ 

McCraney, Richard 0/$ 

McCraney, Richard 0/$ -34

McCullum, Rod 0/$ 30-

McCullum, Rod Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% 112-

McCullum, Rod Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% -

McCullum, Rod Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% 244-11

McCullum, Rod Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% -

McCullum, Rod Nuclear Energy Institute ML13330C033 -34

McCullum, Rod Nuclear Energy Institute 0/% -10

McCune, Chuck 0/% -24

McGibney, Patrick 0/$ -

McMillian, C.C. 0/% 

McMurrian, Katrina Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition 0/% -12

McNair, Robert 0/$ 1002

McNeil, Dorothy F. 0/% 234

Meincke, Doro 0/% 

Mellow, Marion 0/$ -

Mermelstein, Richard Leadership Council of the Indian Point 

Safe Energy Coalition 

0/$ 341

Merrifield, Jeffrey 0/% 

Merrifield, Jeffrey 0/% -4

Messer, Diane 0/% -

Messer, Diane 0/% -4
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Messinger, Michael 0/$ 

Metcalf, Michael 0/$ 

Metcalf-Kemp, Joni 0/$ 

Meyer, Alfred C. Friends of Chernobyl Centers U.S. 0/& 113

Meyer, Bill 0/$ -

Meyer, Charles 0/% 312

Meyer, Frederick ML14001A000 

Michael, Edward 0/% 

Michaud, Debra ML13330C033 -43

Michetti, Susan 0/$ 

Michetti, Susan 0/% -

Mierzwicki, Tony 0/$ 

Mikkelsen, Sara ML14014A102 

Milcarek, Thomas 0/$ 

Miller, Daniel 0/$ 

Miller, Kirk 0/$ 331

Miller, Susan 0/$ -

Milone, Deb Hudson Valley Gateway Chamber of 

Commerce 

0/$ -

Minniss, Regina Crabshell Alliance 0/% -

Minno, Maria 0/$ 

Minster, Bernard 0/% 

Mironova, Dr. Natalia Movement for Nuclear Safety 0/& 113

Mirsky, Steven 0/% -2

Miskena, Jessice 0/$ -21

Mitchell, Steve 0/$ 

Mock, Neal 0/$ 

Moffroid, Jenn 0/$ 

Moncy, Charles 0/$ 

Monge, Roberto 0/$ -

Mooney, William Westchester County Association 0/& 

Moore, Richard 0/$ 

Moran, Aliese 0/$ 

Mordaunt, Brandon 0/$ 

Mordaunt, Laura 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Mordaunt, Philip 0/$ 

Morgal, Richard 0/$ 

Morgal, Richard 0/$ -22

Morgal, Rick 0/$ 

Morgan, Leona 0/$ 

Morgan, Sally Clean Water for North Carolina 0/$ 

Morris, Beverly 0/$ 

Morris, Kelsi CASEnergy Coalition 0/% 112-21

Morris, Wendy 0/$ 

Morrow, Jon 0/$ -43

Morrow, Jon Paul 0/$ 

Mull, Steven 0/$ 

Mullens, Mark 0/$ 

Muller, Alan 0/% -11

Munson, Marcia ML14002A031 

Murdock, J. 0/% 323

Murphy, William 0/% -

Musegaas, Philip RiverKeeper 0/$ 

Musegaas, Philip RiverKeeper 0/$ -2

Muser, Mary Jo 0/$ -22

Myers, Dan 0/$ -

Myers, Susan 0/% -34

Navrkal, Alisa 0/$ -10

Nelson, Bob Santa Barbara County 0/$ 

Nelson, David 0/$ -

Nelson, Dennis 0/$ 410

Nelson, Dennis Support and Education for Radiation 

Victims 

0/$ 30-24

Nelson, Dennis R ML13320A010 

Nelson, Pam Sierra Club 0/$ 

Nesbit, Steve Duke Energy 0/% -

Nestel, Hattie 0/% 112-22

Nester, Dennis F. 0/$ 

Nichols, John 0/% 

Nichols, Susan 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Nickerson, Samantha 0/$ 140

Nixon, Kerry 0/% 241

Norman, M. Jean 0/% 

Norton, Wayne Decommissioning Plant Coalition 0/$ 

Nuccio, Theresa 0/$ 334

O’Brien, Doug Illinois Clean Energy Coalition ML13330C033 -

O’Brien, Patricia 0/$ 

O’Leary, David Maryland Sierra Club 0/% -13

O’Mahony, Emily 0/$ 324

O’Malley, Brian 0/$ 

O’Nan, Margaret S. 0/$ 144

Ober, Jack 0/$ 

Oeser, Robert 0/$ 

Olmstead, Stan ML13324B142 

Olsen, Steven 0/$ 

Olson, K. ML14001A011 

Olson, Mary 0/% -2

Olson, Mary Nuclear Information and Resource 

Service 

0/$ 

Orlinski, Patricia 0/$ 

Osta, Hanna 0/$ 

Oster, Phyllis 0/% 310

Overland, Carol 0/$ 

Overland, Carol 0/% -14

Owen, Linde 0/$ -

Ower, Douglas ML13330C033 -

Owl, Griffin 0/$ 

Pace, Greg Radioactive Waste Alert 0/$ -32

Pace, Gregory Radioactive Waste Alert 0/$ 

Padden, Jim 0/$ 

Paddock, Brian ML14002A042 

Paddock, Brian 0/% -12

Paddock, Brian 0/% -

Padot, Paul 0/$ -

Palaia, Joyce 0/$ 413
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Paleias, Lewis 0/$ 

Paleias, Linda 0/$ 

Palomarez, Javier United States Hispanic Chamber of 

Commerce 

ML14002A211 

Pan, Arthur 0/$ 

Parker, Bob 0/$ -30

Parks, Eric 0/$ 332

Parks, Sheila 0/$ 

Parks, Sheila 0/% 112-30

Parrish, Dave 0/$ 

Pascall, Glenn 0/$ 431

Pascall, Glenn 0/$ 

Pascall, Glenn 0/$ 

Patrick, Kay 0/$ 

Patrie, Lewis Western North Carolina Physicians for 

Social Responsibility 

0/$ 

Patrie, Lewis E. Western North Carolina Physicians for 

Social Responsibility 

0/% -30

Patrie, MD, MPH, Lewis E. Western North Carolina Physicians for 

Social Responsibility 

0/$ 

Patrie, MD, MPH, Lewis E. Western North Carolina Physicians for 

Social Responsibility 

ML13320A003 

Patterson, Jeffrey J. Physicians for Social Responsibility 0/& 113

Patterson, Karen SC Governors Nuclear Advisory 

Council 

0/$ 

Paul, Jerry 0/% 244-

Paul, Stephen 0/& 

Paulsen, Carol 0/$ 

Paulus, Jill ML13330C033 -

Pavlik, Rayena 0/$ 

Payne, Gail 0/$ 

Payne, Joanne 0/& 

Pearson, Jeremy 0/$ -

Peck, Jerry Illinois Manufacturers Association ML13330C033 -

Peck, Joe 0/$ -3

Peinado, Susan 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Pelletier, David A. United Association Local Union 131 0/$ 

Pennington, Charlie NAC International 0/% -

Perez, Robert 0/$ 

Perkins, V.E. 0/$ 

Peters, Mark 0/$ 

Peterson, Alyse New York State Energy Research and 

Development Authority 

0/$ 

Petro, James NextEra 0/$ 

Pflugbeil, Sebastian German Society for Radiation 

Protection 

0/& 113

Phelan, Steven ML13320A004 

Phelan, Walter ML13320A004 

Phillips, Mark 0/$ -34

Pickens, Terry Xcel Energy 0/% -

Picking, Brian 0/$ 

Pieart, Richard 0/$ 440

Pierman, Bette Michigan Safe Energy Future 0/$ 

Pierman, Bette Michigan Safe Energy Future ML13330C033 -11

Pipes, Betty ML13304C024 

Pisha, Gayla 0/$ 

Pittillo, Dan 0/$ 

Pluta, Tim 0/% 

Poole, Jesse 0/$ 

Popa, Jeni 0/& 

Poprafsky, Nancy 0/$ -

Poulson, Judi 0/$ 

Poulson, Judi 0/$ 

Powell, Michael 0/$ 

Powers, Jim ML14002A004 

Pratt, Curtis 0/$ 

Preobrazhenskaya, Natalia The Save Children of Ukraine from 

Chernobyl Catastrophe Charitable 

Fund 

0/& 113

Preschle, Gus 0/& 

Prescott, Lisa Marie 0/% 244-14

Priano, Guy ML14021A042 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Priano, Guy 0/$ 

Price, Scott Alliance for Progressive Values 0/$ 

Price, Scott Alliance for Progressive Values 0/% -30

Proeller, John 0/$ 

Prosser, Audrey 0/$ 

Qian, Dorothy 0/$ 

Quarterman, John S. ML14001A001 

Quinn, Ted 0/$ -4

Racano, Joey Nukes Templar 0/$ -12

Raimondi, Frank 0/$ 

Ramsay, Rebecca 0/$ 

Ramsey, Betty 0/$ 

Rasmussen, Kenneth 0/$ 

Ratchford, James CASEnergy 0/% 244-12

Rauterkus, Ralph Red Wing City Council 0/% -2

Raynier, Kathleen 0/$ 40

Reichardt, Dorothy 0/$ 300

Reimer, Matt 0/$ 

Reinheimer, Alice 0/$ 

Remein, Warren 0/% 240

Renzoni, Dante 0/$ 

Resnyanky, Dmitry 0/$ 

Reson, Myla 0/$ -

Rethmeier, Blain 0/$ -

Revilla, Oscar ML14001A042 

Richards, Kitty Katherine 0/% -

Richardson, Carlos 0/$ 

Richardson, Don 0/& 

Richardson, Don 0/$ 

Riddle, William 0/$ 

Rielly, Thomas P. 9LVWD ML13304C013 

Rielly, Thomas P. 9LVWD 0/$ 

Riesterer, Zita-Ann 0/$ 

Rippner, Sharon 0/$ 

Rippner, Sharon 0/$ -43
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Rippner, Thomas 0/$ 

Rivard, Betsey Georgia WAND; Women’s Action for 

New Directions; Nuclear Watch South 

0/% -

Rivera, Evelyn 0/$ 

Rivera, Wendy MultiCultural Education Alliance 0/$ 

Rivers, Alicia 0/$ -24

Robinson, David ML13320A000 

Robinson, David 0/% -

Robinson, Eric 0/$ -

Robinson, Herb 0/% 112-20

Robinson, Herb ML13320A024 

Rochte, Tim 0/$ 

Rodack, Tom 0/% -

Rodarte, Ron 0/$ 

Rogers, Tim 0/% -24

Rogers, William 0/$ 

Rogina, Raymond City of St. Charles, Illinois 0/& 

Rohl, T. 0/& 

Roman, Margo 0/% 112-

Rorem, Bridget ML13330C033 -42

Rosanelli, Donald 0/$ 

Roscoe, Lee Cape Downwinders 0/$ 

Roscoe, Lee Cape Downwinders 0/$ 

Rose, Melene 0/& 

Rosenstein, Carl 0/$ 

Rosin, Lawrence 0/& 

Rosin, Lawrence 0/$ 

Rossin, A. David 0/$ 

Rossin, A. David 0/$ 

Rossin, A. David 0/% 244-4

Rossin, Linda ML13311C320 

Rosso, Chris ML13330C033 -

Rousseau, Barbara ML13304C022 104

Rowlett, Kimberly 0/$ 

Rude, Kathleen ML13330C033 -32
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Rudolph, Shannon 0/$ 420

Rundle, Steve 0/% -

Ruppe, Lorraine 0/% -23

Ryan, Kate 0/$ 

Ryan, Paul 0/$ 

Sabo, Betty 0/$ 443

Sachs, Gary 0/% 112-1

Sachs, Gary 0/% 112-

Sachs, Leslie Sullivan Safe and Green Campaign 0/% 112-

Sack, Emily 0/$ -

Safer, Don 0/$ 30-

Safer, Don Tennessee Environmental Council 0/% -

Sahagian-Allsopp, Ed 0/$ 

Salas, Peggy 0/$ 

Salgaller, Stephen 0/$ 414

Salley, Lawrence African American Men of Westchester 0/& 

Sallis, Gary United Association of Plumbers and 

Pipefitters 

0/$ -14

Salto, Don 0/$ 

Saltzman, Dale 0/% 

Sams, David 0/$ 

Sanders, John 0/$ 

Sandos, Theann ConverDyn 0/$ -

Sass, Jim Ottawa County 0/$ -1

Sattler, Alfred 0/$ 

Sauerheber, Richard 0/$ 

Saxon, Craig 0/% 

Scarff, Steve 0/$ 

Scharin, Lisa 0/$ 

Scheller, April 0/$ 

Schepart, Margot 0/$ -14

Schepperly, David North American Young Generation in 

Nuclear 

0/$ -

Scherbak, Yuri World Academy of Art and Science 0/& 113

Schietinger, Helen 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Schilling, Francis ML13320A234 

Schimmelpfennig, Pamela 

Y. 

0/$ 

Schimmelpfennig, Pamela 

Y. 

0/$ 

Schlegel, Ed 0/$ 

Schmidt, Otto 0/$ 

Schmidt, Peg 0/$ 

Schmitz, Diane 0/$ 

Schneider, Howard 0/$ 

Schneider, Linda 0/& 

Schneiderman, Eric 0/$ -1

Schonberger, David 0/$ 

Schonberger, David 0/$ -

Schonberger, David 0/$ -

Schonberger, David 0/% -

Schonberger, David 0/% -

Schrader, Ken 0/$ -

Schulte, Karen 0/$ 

Schumann, Klaus 0/$ 

Schumann, Klaus 0/$ -

Schussele, Samantha ML13330C033 -33

Schwartz, Robert ML13330C033 -40

Schwartzberg, Lora 0/$ 

Scott, Emily Elizabeth 0/$ 

Scott, Sabra 0/$ 

Sears, Peggy 0/& 

Seastrom, Tina Nuclear Energy Information Service ML13330C033 -

See, Daniel 0/$ -

Seeley, Linda San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 0/$ -

Seeley, Linda San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 0/% -32

Seeman, Laurie 0/& 120

Seeman, Laurie 0/$ -

Segal, Elizabeth 0/$ -

Seitz, Tim 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Selesky, Laura 0/$ 

Senkiw, Sheryl 0/$ 

Severance, Beth 0/$ 

Severance, Bruce 0/$ -

Shadis, Raymond New England Coalition And Friends of 

the Coast 

0/$ 

Shapiro, Susan 0/$ 

Shapiro, Susan Radiation Public Health Project 0/$ -

Shaw, Gary 0/' 

Shaw, Gary 0/$ -22

Shaw, Jeanne 0/$ -

Shaw, Sally 0/& 

Shaw, Sally 0/% 112-

Shea, Joseph TVA 0/$ 

Shelton, Matt 0/$ 

Sheridan, Paul 0/$ 

Shima, Tetsuo 0/$ 

Shineflug, Marilyn ML13330C033 -

Shinker, Carol 0/& 

Sieling, Jerry and Jean 0/% 

Silberstein, Mary 0/$ 

Silver, Daniel 0/% 

Simon, Daniel 0/% 224

Sipos, John Assistant Attorney General, State of 

New York 

0/$ 

Sipos, John Assistant Attorney General, State of 

New York 

0/$ 1

Skopic, Catherine 0/& 121

Skopic, Catherine 0/$ -32

Skopic, Catherine 0/$ 

Skov, Jeff 0/$ 

Skov, Jeff 0/$ 

Skud, Bruce No More Fukushimas 0/$ 

Skud, Bruce No More Fukushimas 0/% 112-10

Smith, Adam 0/$ 

Smith, Amanda Utah Department of Environmental 0/& 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Quality 

Smith, Diane 0/$ 22

Smith, Diane 0/$ 

Smith, Ed Missouri Coalition for the Environment ML13330C033 -

Smith, Roger 0/$ 404

Snook, Robert Assistant Attorney General, State of 

Connecticut 

0/$ 

Snook, Robert Assistant Attorney General, State of 

Connecticut 

0/$ 1

Snyder, Gail 0/$ 30-10

Snyder, Gail 0/% -

Snyder, Gail ML13330C033 -30

Snyder, Mark 0/% 

Soldier, Wolf ML14002A043 

Solinsky, Joseph 0/$ 

Solomon, Laurie 0/$ 142

Sondheim, Steven 0/$ 

Sondheim, Steven 0/$ 30-13

Sondheim, Steven 0/% -

Sondheim, Steven 0/% -14

Sondheim, Steven 0/% -22

Songchild, Stephanie 0/% 

Sorensen, Laura 0/$ 

Sorensen, Ole 0/% 314

Sorenson, Laura SAFE Carolinas 0/% -

Sorenson, Ole 0/% -34

Sorgen, Phoebe 0/$ 

Sorgen, Phoebe 0/$ 

Soto, Carol 0/$ 

Souza, Celine 0/$ 

Sovacool, Benjamin K. Vermont Law School 0/& 113

Sovereign, David 0/& 

Spangenberg, Samuel 0/$ 

Spooner, Rena 0/$ -

Spring, Janet 0/$ 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Springer, Darren Vermont Department of Public 

Service 

0/$ 

Springer, Darren Vermont Department of Public 

Service 

0/$ 1

Stadnik, George 0/$ 

Stamm, Steve 0/% 112-

Stanick, Kim 0/$ 

Stansberry, Mark 0/$ 

Stansberry, Mark 0/$ -

Star, Priscilla Coalition Against Nukes 0/% -

Star, Priscilla Coalition Against Nukes 0/% -21

Starr, Steven University of Missouri 0/& 113

Steidler, Paul New York Affordable Reliable 

Electricity Alliance 

0/$ -

Stein, Ed 0/$ 

Stein, Ed 0/% -

Stein, Robert 0/$ 

Stein, Tami 0/$ 204

Stennes, Nancy 0/$ 

Stenson, Amanda ML13330C033 -

Steorts, Tim 0/% 244-

Stewart, Jim 0/$ 424

Stone, Gene Residents Organized for a Safe 

Environment 

0/$ 433

Stonecipher, Carolyn 0/& 

Stork, Gilbert Cuesta College ML14014A311 

Streeter, Richard 0/& 101

Strell, Ethan Columbia Center for Climate Change 

Law 

0/$ 

Strickland, Gerald Diablo Canyon 0/$ -3

Stringfellow, Paris 0/% 

Sugas, Zick 0/& 

Sullivan, Cornelia 0/% 112-33

Sullivan, Martha Coalition to Decommission San 

Onofre 

0/$ -20

Sunderland, Mary Brooke 0/% -31
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Sunflower, Susan 0/& 133

Swanson, Jane San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 0/$ 

Swanson, Jane San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 0/$ -

Swanson, Mark 0/$ 12

Sweeney, Jay Green Party of Pennsylvania 0/$ 

Sylvester, Richard 0/$ 

Szabo, Lou 0/$ 

Szabo, Lou 0/$ -

Szymanowski, Jennifer 0/$ 

Tache, Jan 0/$ 

Takarabe, Tamae 0/$ 

Talbot, J 0/$ 44

Tampas, Courtney V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 0/% -10

Tanner, John 0/$ 

Tannler, Sandra 0/$ 

Tapp, Yvette 0/$ 

Taylor, David 0/$ 

Taylor, Jeff 0/% 

Taylor, Tom 0/$ 

Taylor, Wallace Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/$ 

Taylor, Wallace Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign 0/% -4

Temlock, Ayumi 0/$ 

Temple, Scott 0/$ 

Terra, Ben 0/$ 

Thabit, Nick 0/$ 

Thatcher, Tami 0/$ 

Thaw, Karen 0/$ 

Thesling, William The Energy From Thorium 

Foundation 

0/$ -41

Thomas, Bill 0/$ 24

Thomas, Ellen 0/% -

Thomas, Ellen Women’s International League for 

Peace and Freedom, Western 

Carolina Branch, and Proposition One 

Cam 

0/$ 

Thomas, Richard Affordable Reliable Electricity Alliance 0/$ -4
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Thomas, Ruth Environmentalists, Inc. ML14002A020 

Thomas, Ruth Environmentalists, Inc. 0/$ 

Thome, William L. 0/$ 

Thompson, Gordon R. Institue for Resource and Security 

Studies 

0/$ 

Thompson, Lydia 0/$ 

Thompson, Tammy ML13330C033 -

Thompson, Tammy 0/$ 

Thornlow, Ann ML13304C021 103

Thornton, Adam North American Young Generation in 

Nuclear 

0/$ 

Thunder, Warren Storm 0/$ 

Tietjen, Jamie 0/$ 

Tilbury, Don 0/$ 

Tilbury, Don 0/% 112-14

Titus, Mary 0/$ 

Tobin, Clare ML13330C033 -

Tocornal, John 0/% 

Todd, Doug 0/$ -3

Tognazzini, Randall 0/$ 

Tognini, Dana 0/$ 

Tolls, Leatrice 0/$ -23

Tomlin, Willie 0/% -

Tompkins, Robert 0/$ 

Tompkins, Robert ML13320A021 

Tonohira, Yuko 0/$ -31

Tonohira, Yuko 0/$ 141

Totoiu, Jason Everglades Law Center 0/% 244-

Trahey, Linda 0/$ 

Tucker, Alison ML14001A032 

Tulenko, James University of Florida 0/% 244-1

Turnbow, Lisa M. 0/$ 

Turner, D 0/$ 

Uhls, Agnes ML14001A044 

Utley, Charles Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/% -
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Vale, Karen Cape Cod Bay Watch 0/$ 

Vale, Karen Cape Cod Bay Watch 0/% 112-

Van Leekwijck, Natalie 0/$ 

van Thillo, Grace 0/$ 

Van Wicklen, Betty J. 0/$ 

Vandel, Niki 0/$ 30-11

Vandel, Niki 0/% -

Vandel, Niki 0/% -

Vandel, Nikohl 0/$ 

Vandel, Nikohl 0/$ 

Vandel, Nikohl 0/$ -

Vandenberg Clermont, 

Elaine 

0/$ 

Vandenbosch, Robert 0/$ 

Vanderlan, Kelly 0/$ 

Vanderwoerd, Jennifer 0/& 

VanWicklen, Betty J. 0/$ 1000

Vejdani, Vivianne SC Department of Natural Resources 0/$ 

Velazquez, Lisette 0/$ 

Vesperman, Gary 0/$ 

Vetter, Richard Health Physics Society 0/$ 

Vilen, Sydney 0/$ 

Vince, Jenny Clean and Safe Energy Coalition 0/% -

Von Duvillard, Serge 0/& 

Von Thillo, Grace 0/$ -

Vytlacil, Gordon Generation mPower 0/% 

Vytlacil, Gordon Generation mPower 0/% -

Waage, Edward 0/% 313

Waddell, Duane 0/$ -

Wagner, Deborah 0/$ 

Wagner, Jim and Virginia 0/$ 34

Wagner, Sam 0/% -13

Waldstein, Joe 0/$ 

Walking Turtle, Willow 0/$ -

Waller, Viviane 0/$ -34
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Walter, Beverly ML13330C033 -

Walter, Joan California Energy Commission 0/$ 

Warren, Barbara Citizens Environmental Coalition 0/$ 

Waterman, Charles 0/$ 

Waters, Christine 0/% 

Watkins, Conor 0/$ 

Watkins, Karen 0/& 

Watland, George 0/$ 431

Watland, George 0/$ 

Watland, George 0/$ 

Watland, George 0/$ 

Watson, Jeannette 0/$ 

Wayland, Gregory 0/$ 

Webb, David ML13320A013 

Webb, Hubert ML13311C141 

Weinberg, Luz City of Aventura, Florida 0/% 

Weisman, David Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility 0/$ 

Weisman, David Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility 0/$ -13

Weissglass, Theresa 0/$ -

Wells, Gerald 0/$ 

Wells, Harmony 0/$ 

Wells, Jim 0/$ 

Wellwood, Jay 0/% -

Welty, Delores 0/$ -

Werner, Shahla M. Sierra Club- John Muir Chapter 0/$ 

Wesley, Ashleigh Southern Nuclear 0/% -32

Westchester, Business 

Council of 

0/& 

Whiting-Broeder, Pamela 0/$ 

Wickham, Wendelyn 0/$ 

Wicks, Tonja TLW Legal and Government Support 

Services 

0/$ 

Wicks, Tonja TLW Legal and Government Support 

Services 

0/$ -13

Wieder, Dr. Robin 0/& 124

Wigglesworth, Marilyn 0/$ 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Wilansky, Laura 0/$ 

Wilansky, Laura 0/% -

Wilde, Paul 0/$ 

Williams, Chris Citizen’s Awareness Network 0/% 112-

Williams, David 0/$ 

Williams, Jim Western Interstate Energy Board 0/$ 

Williams, Robert 0/$ 

Wilmott, Emily 0/$ 

Wilshire, Howard 0/$ 

Wilshire, Howard ML14002A010 

Wilson, Annie New York Environmental Law and 

Justice Project 

0/$ -

Wilson, Greg 0/$ 

Wilson, Greg 0/% -

Wilson, Greg Coalition Against Nukes 0/% -24

Wilson, Greg Windjammer Energy Incorporated 0/% 244-13

Wilson, Lavern 0/% 

Wilson, Reed The Office of Congressman Adam 

Kinzinger 

ML13330C033 -1

Wilvert, Calvin 0/% 

Wilvert, Calvin 0/$ 

Wilvert, Rosemary 0/$ 

Wilvert, Rosemary 0/$ -40

Windsong, Debra 0/$ 

Wing, Steve University of North Carolina 0/& 113

Wolf, Ann 0/& 110

Wolf, Peter 0/$ -

Wolf, Robert S. 0/$ 

Wolf, Tom 0/$ 

Wolf, Tom ML13330C033 -2

Wolpoff, Deborah 0/$ 

Women’s Action for New 

Direction, Georgia 

0/$ 

Wood, Keely 0/& 

Wood, Nick 0/% -

Woodward, Julie 0/$ 102
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

Table D-3. Individuals Providing Unique Comments on the Draft GEIS and Proposed Rule 

(cont’d)

Commenter Affiliation (if stated)

ADAMS 

Accession #

Correspondence 

ID

Woodward, Julie 0/$ -

Wopat, Jeen 0/$ 432

Worthington, Juniel 0/$ 

Wrenn, Nancy 0/& 

Wrenn, Nancy 0/% 112-

Wright, Margaret Z. 0/$ 

Wylie, Robert Duke Energy 0/$ 

Wythe Elnagar, Romi 0/$ 

Yablokov, Alexey International Socio-Ecology Union 0/& 113

Yarrobino, Erin 0/$ 

Yelda, Peter 0/$ 

Young, Jane 0/% 

Young, Roberta 0/$ 304

Yusuf, Hassan 0/$ 

Zaitz, Kristin 0/$ -41

Zaklan, Jill 0/$ 

ZamEk, Jill San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 0/$ -10

Zawalick, Steven 0/$ -

Zeller, Lou Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/% 222

Zeller, Lou Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/% -1

Zeller, Lou Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/% -

Zeller, Louis Blue Ridge Environmental Defense 

League 

0/$ 

Zidbeck, George 0/$ 

Zigler, Randy 0/$ -33

Zimmem, Matt 0/$ 

Zuccarini, Ana 0/% 244-

Zuckerman, Naomi 0/$ 10

Zure, Lisa 0/$ 

Zure, Lisa ML14001A043 

(a) For administrative reasons, “Commenters, Multiple” is listed as the sole author of the comments, but 

the NRC notes the additional signatories to these comment documents. A complete listing of 

commenters can be found in the document that accompanies the GEIS (ADAMS Accession No. 

0/$). 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

References 

10 CFR Part 2. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Part 2, “Agency Rules of 

Practice and Procedure.” Washington, D.C. 

10 CFR Part 20. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Part 20, “Standards for 

Protection Against Radiation.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3'RPHVWLF/LFHQVLQJRI

Production and Utilization Facilities.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3(QYLURQPHQWDO

Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions.” 

Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3/LFHQVHV

Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW35HTXLUHPHQWVIRU

Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3'LVSRVDORI+LJKLevel Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3/LFHQVLQJ

Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3'LVSRVDORI+LJKLevel Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.” Washington, 

D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy3DUW3DFNDJLQJDQG

Transportation of Radioactive Material." Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3/LFHQVLQJ

Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than Class C Waste.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW33K\VLFDO3URWHFWLRQRI

Plants and Materials.” Washington, D.C. 

10 CFR Part 100. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Part 100, “Reactor Site 

Criteria.” Washington, D.C. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3)HHVIRU)DFLOLWLHV

Materials, Import and Export Licenses, and Other Regulatory Services Under the Atomic Energy 

$FWRIDV$PHQGHG ́:Dshington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW3$QQXDO)HHVIRU

Reactor Operating Licenses and Fuel Cycle Licenses and Materials Licenses, Including Holders 

of Certificates of Compliance, Registrations, and Quality Assurance Program Approvals and 

Government Agencies Licensed by the NRC.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, 3DUW36WDQGDUG&RQWUDFW

for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations7LWOHParks, Forests, and Public Property, 

3DUW3URWHFWLRQRI+LVWRULF3URSHUWLHV:DVKLQJWRQ'&

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of Environment3DUW

“Determining Conformity of Federal Actions to State or Federal Implementation Plans.” 

Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of Environment3DUW

“Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada.” 

Washington, D.C. 

40 CFR Part 300. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of Environment, Part 300, 

“National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.” Washington, D.C. 

4&)53DUWVWKURXJKCode of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of 

Environment3DUWV33XUSRVH3ROLF\DQG0DQGDWH ́WKURXJK37HUPLQRORJ\DQG

Index.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations7LWOHTransportation3DUW3+D]DUGRXV

Materials Program Procedures.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWV-Code of Federal Regulations7LWOHTransportation3DUWV-1, 

“Hazardous Materials Regulations.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWV-. Code of Federal Regulations7LWOHTransportation, Parts -

“Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.” Washington, D.C. 

&)53DUWCode of Federal Regulations7LWOHWildlife and Fisheries, Part 402, 

“Interagency Cooperation—EndangereG6SHFLHV$FWRIDV$PHQGHG ́:DVKLQJWRQ'&
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

)5-XQH31DWLRQDO3ROOXWDQW'LVFKDUJH(OLPLQDWLRQ6\VWHP5HYLVLRQRI

Existing Regulations.” Federal Register, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, 

D.C. 

)5 -XQH31XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQW$FFLGHQW&RQVLGHUDWLRQV8QGHUWKH

1DWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\$FWRI ́Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)51RYHPEHU3/LFHQVLQJ5HTXLUHPHQWVIRUWKHStorage of Spent Fuel in 

an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5$XJXVW3:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQ ́Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5$XJXVW36DIHW\*RDOVIRUWKH2SHUDWLRQVRI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV

Policy Statement; Republican.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, D.C. 

)5-XQH35Hvision of Backfitting Process for Power Reactors.” Federal 

Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5-XO\3*HQHUDO/LFHQVHIRU6WRUDJHRI6SHQW)XHODW3RZHU5HDFWRU

Sites.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)536HSWHPEHU3&RQVLGHUDWLRQRI(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFWVRI7HPSRUDU\

Storage of Spent Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation; Final Rule.” Federal Register, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)56HSWHPEHU3:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQ5HYLHZ ́Federal Register, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5)HEUXDU\3([HFXWLYH2UGHU)HGHUDO$FWLRQVWR$GGUHVV

Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.” Federal Register, 

Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. 

)50D\3,QGLDQ6DFUHG6LWHV ́([HFXWLYH2UGHUFederal Register, 

Presidential Documents, Washington, D.C. 

)5-XQH3(QYLURQPHQWDO5HYLHZIRU5HQHZDORI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQW

Operating Licenses.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

D.C. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

)51RYHPEHU3&RQVXOWDWLRQDQG&RRUGLQDWion With Indian Tribal 

*RYHUQPHQWV ́([HFXWLYH2UGHUFederal Register, Presidential Documents, 

Washington, D.C. 

)5)HEUXDU\33UDLULH,VODQG&RDOLWLRQ'HQLDORI3HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ ́

Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5$XJXVW33ROLF\6WDWHPHQWRQWKH7UHDWPHQWRI(QYLURQPHQWDO-XVWLFH

Matters in NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5$XJXVW3/LFHQVHV&HUWLILFDWLRQVDQG$SSURYDOVIRU1XFOHDU3RZHU

Plants.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5$XJXVW37KH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDORI&RPPRQZHDOWKRI0DVVDFKXVHWWV

The Attorney General of California; Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking.” Federal Register, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5'HFHPEHU3(QGDQJHUPHQWDQG&DXVHRU&RQWULEXWH)LQGLQJVIRU

Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202DRIWKH&OHDQ$LU$FW” Federal Register, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 

)5'HFHPEHU3'UDIW7HFKQLFDO%DVLVIRU5XOHPDNLQJ5HYLVLQJ6HFXULW\

Requirements for Facilities Storing SNF and HLW; Notice of Availability and Solicitation of 

Public Comments.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5-XQH3UHYHQWLRQRI6LJQLILFDQW'HWHULRUDWLRQDQG7LWOH9*UHHQKRXVH

Gas Tailoring Rule." Federal Register, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, 

D.C. 

)5'HFHPEHU3&RQVLGHUDWLRQRI(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFWVRI7HPSRUDU\

Storage of Spent Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation.” Final Rule, Federal Register, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5'HFHPEHU3:DVWH&RQILGHQFH'HFLVLRQ8SGDWH ́Federal Register, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5)HEUXDU\3/LFHQVHDQG&HUWLILFDWHRI&RPSOLDQFH7HUPV ́Federal 

Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5-XQH3'HFRPPLVVLRQLQJ3ODQQLQJ ́Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

)50DUFK36WDWLRQ%ODFNRXW ́Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)52FWREHU33HWLWLRQIRU5XOHPDNLQJ6XEPLWWHGE\&-10 Research and 

Education Foundation, Inc.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, D.C. 

)52FWREHU3&RQVLGHUDWLRQRI(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFWVRI7HPSRUDU\

Storage of Spent Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation.” Federal Register. U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. 

)5'HFHPEHU3/RQJ-Term Cooling and Unattended Water Makeup of 

Spent Fuel Pools.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)50D\33K\VLFDO3URWHFWLRQRI,UUDGLDWHG5HDFWRU)XHOLQ7UDQVLW ́

Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)56HSWHPEHU33URSRVHG:DVWH&RQILGHQFH5XOHDQG'UDIW*HQHULF

Environmental Impact Statement.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, D.C. 

)56HSWHPEHU3'UDIW:aste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)56HSWHPEHU3:DVWH&RQILGHQFH—Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)56HSWHPEHU33URSRVHG:DVWH&RQILGHQFH5XOHDQG'UDIW*HQHULF

Environmental Impact Statement.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, D.C. 

)51RYHPEHU2013. “Waste Confidence—Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5'HFHPEHU36HFXULW\5HTXLUHPHQWVIRU)DFLOLWLHV6WRULQJ6SHQW1XFOHDU

Fuel.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5-DQXDU\3([HORQ*HQHUDWLRQ&RPSDQ\//&/LFHQVH([HPSWLRQ

Request for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)50DUFK30RQLWRULQJRI1HXWURQ-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel 

Pools.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

)5$SULO3(PHUJHQF\3ODQQLQJ=RQHV ́Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

)5$SULO35HYLVHDQG,QWHJUDWH$OO6DIHW\DQG(QYLURQPHQWDO5HJXODWLRQV

Related to Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal.” Federal Register, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, D.C. 

1<&55New York Codes, Rules and Regulations7LWOH(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQVHUYDWLRQ

3DUW3&ODVVLILFDWLRQV—Surface Waters and Groundwaters.” 

1<&55New York Codes, Rules and Regulations7LWOH(QYLURQPHQWDO&RQVHUYDWLRQ

3, “Surface Water and Groundwater Quality Standards and Groundwater Effluent Limitations.” 

86&United States Code7LWOHGovernment Organization and Employees&KDSWHU

3$GPLQLVWUDWLYH3URFHGXUH ́3'HILQLWLRQV ́

42 USC 2133. United States Code, Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 23, 

“Development and Control of Atomic Energy”, Section 2133, “Commercial Licenses.” 

Washington, D.C. 

$GPLQLVWUDWLYH3URFHGXUH$FWRI$3$DVDPHQGHG86&et seq.

Affordable Care Act oI$&$DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

Alvarez, R. 2011. Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the U.S.: Reducing the Deadly Risks of 

Storage. Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. 

Alvarez, R., J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson, and F.N. 

von Hippel. 2003. “Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United 

States.” Science and Global Security 11:1-

ACS (American Cancer SociHW\3)DFWV	)LJXUHV(QYLURQPHQWDO&DQFHU5LVNV ́

Atlanta, Georgia. 

$(&$WRPLF(QHUJ\&RPPLVVLRQEnvironmental Survey of Transportation of 

Radioactive Materials to and From Nuclear Power Plants. WASH-:DVKLQJWRQ'&

Available at KWWSZZZRVWLJRYHQHUJ\FLWDWLRQVSURGXFWELEOLRMVS"RVWLBLG . 

$16$PHULFDQ1XFOHDU6RFLHW\Guidelines for the Verification and Validation of 

Scientific and Engineering Codes for the Nuclear Industry. ANSI/ANS-10.4-/D*UDQJH

Park, Illinois. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

$60($PHULFDQ6RFLHW\RI0HFKDQLFDO(QJLQHHUV34XDOLW\$VVXUDQFH5HTXLUHPHQWV

for Nuclear Facilities.” NQA-1-1HZ<RUN1HZ<RUN 

ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers). 2012. Forging a New Nuclear Safety 

Construct. Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events, New 

York, New York. Available at KWWSVZZZDVPHRUJJHWPHGLDGH-H---

IEGDEG)RUJLQJBDBQHZBQXFOHDUBVDIHW\BFRQVWUXFWDVS[. 

$WRPLF(QHUJ\$FWRI$($DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

%DOGDQG*ROGHQ(DJOH3URWHFWLRQ$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&-G et seq. 

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 86

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

%HFKWHO%HFKWHO6$,&&RPSDQ\//&Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling in Air 

Study. Report 000-30R-MGR0--000-000, Las Vegas, Nevada. 

BRC (Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future). 2012. Report to the Secretary 

of Energy. :DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission))G

 '&&LU

Carolina Evntl. Study Grp. v. United States. )G (D.C. Cir. 

CASE (Connecticut Academy of Science and Engineering). 2001. “Study of Radiation 

Exposure from the Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant.” Bulletin of the Connecticut 

$FDGHP\RI6FLHQFHDQG(QJLQHHULQJ9ROXPH+DUWIRUG&RQQHFWLFXW$YDLODEOHDW

http://wZZFWFDVHRUJEXOOHWLQBSGI. 

CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality). 2003. Modernizing NEPA Implementation. 

Washington, D.C. Available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/report/finalreport.pdf. 

CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality). 2010. Memorandum from N.H. Sutley to Heads of 

)HGHUDO'HSDUWPHQWVDQG$JHQFLHVGDWHG)HEUXDU\UHJDUGLQJ'UDIW1(3$*XLGDQFH

on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions." 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality). 2012. Memorandum from N.H. Sutley to Heads of 

)HGHUDO'HSDUWPHQWVDQG$JHQFLHVGDWHG0DUFKUHJDUGLQJ3,PSURYLQJWKH3URFHVVIRU

Preparing Efficient and Timely Environmental Reviews under the National Environmental Policy 

Act.” Washington, D.C. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

City of New York v. Dep’t of Transp. )GnG&LU

&OHDQ:DWHU$FW6HH)HGHUDO:DWHU3ROOXWLRQ&RQWURO$FWRI

Coastal Zone ManagemeQW$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&et seq.

&RPSUHKHQVLYH(QYLURQPHQWDO5HVSRQVH&RPSHQVDWLRQDQG/LDELOLW\$FWRI&(5&/$

DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States)HG&O (2010). 

Copinger, D.A., C.B. Oland, and D.J. Naus. 2012. A Summary of Aging Effects and Their 24 

Management in Reactor Spent Fuel Pools, Refueling Cavities, Tori, and Safety-Related 

Concrete Structures. NUREG/CR–2DN5LGJH1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\2DN5LGJH

TennessHH$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$. 

DEF (Duke Energy Florida). 2013. Crystal River Unit 3—Post-Shutdown Decommissioning 

Activities Report&U\VWDO5LYHU)ORULGD$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

DEK (Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.) 2013a. Kewaunee Power Station Post-Shutdown 

Decommissioning Activities Report. Glen Allen, Virginia$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

DEK (Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.) 2013b. Letter from M.D. Sartain to NRC, dated 

December 11, 2013, regarding “Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Kewaunee Power Station 

Supplement 1 and Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for 

([HPSWLRQVIURP3RUWLRQVRI&)5DQG&)5$SSHQGL[( ́*OHQ$OOHQ9LUJLQLD. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

DOE (U.S. Department of (QHUJ\Dry Transfer System Topical Safety Analysis Report. 

Volume I, Washington, D.C. Accession No. 0/

'2(86'HSDUWPHQWRI(QHUJ\Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal Phase Final 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. DOE/EIS--S-2, Carlsbad, New Mexico. 

Available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EIS--S2-FEIS-v01-SGI. 

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 2002. Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic 

Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca 

Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. DOE/EIS-2IILFHRI&LYLOLDQ5DGLRDFWLYH:DVWH

Management, Washington, D.C. Accession 1R0/$
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

'2(86'HSDUWPHQWRI(QHUJ\Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement 

for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive 

Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. DOE/EIS-0)-S1, Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management, Las Vegas, Nevada. $FFHVVLRQ1R0/

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 2011a. Inventory and Description of Commercial Reactor 

Fuels Within the United States. Fuel Cycle Research and Development, Savannah River 

National Laboratory, Aiken, South Carolina. Available at http://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/SRNL-STI2011-SGI. 

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 2011b. Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the 

Disposal of Greater-Than-Class C (GTCC) Low-Level Radioactive Waste and GTCC-Like 

Waste. DOE/EIS--D, Washington, D.C. $FFHVVLRQ1R0/

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 2013a. Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste. Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 2013b. Software Quality Assurance Improvement Plan: 

MACCS2 Gap Analysis. DOE-EH-4.2.1.3-MACCS2-Gap Analysis, Washington, D.C. Available 

at 

KWWSHQHUJ\JRYVLWHVSURGILOHVI)LQDOB0$&&6B*DSB$QDO\VLVB5HSRUWSGI. 

DOS (U.S. Department of State). 2011. “Statement by U.S. Ambassador John V. Roos on 

Japan’s Earthquake and Tsunamis.” Tokyo, Japan. Available at 

KWWSZZZVWDWHJRYSHDSUOVUPKWP. 

Earthrise Law Center. 2013. Letter from K. Cassidy to NMFS and NRC dated March 22, 2013, 

UHJDUGLQJ35HTXHVWWR5HLQLWLDWH(6$6HFWLRQ&RQVXOWDWLRQ5HODWHGWR2SHUDWLRQRIWKH3LOJULP

Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, MA.” Norwell, Massachusetts. Accession No. 

0/$

Elam, K.R., J.C. Wagner, and C.V. Parks. 2003. Effects of Fuel Failure on Criticality Safety 

and Radiation Dose for Spent Fuel Casks. NUREG/CR–2DN5LGJH1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\

2DN5LGJH7HQQHVVHH$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

E/,(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZ,QVWLWXWHInstitutional Controls in Use. Washington, D.C. 

Available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-SXEVGSGI. 

Endangered Species $FWRI(6$DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

(QHUJ\3ROLF\$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

(QHUJ\5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&et seq.

(3$(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQ$JHQF\ Use of Monitored Natural Attenuation at 

Superfund, RCRA Corrective Action, and Underground Storage Tank Sites. Office of Solid 

:DVWHDQG(PHUJHQF\5HVSRQVH'LUHFWLYH-3:DVKLQJWRQ'&Available at 

http://www.HSDJRYRXVWGLUHFWLYGSGI. 

EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 2011. Recommended Evaluation of Institutional 

Controls: Supplement to the 'Comprehensive Five-Year Review Guidance. OSWER Directive 

-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$YDLODEOHDW

KWWSZZZHSDJRYVXSHUIXQGFOHDQXSSRVWFRQVWUXFWLRQSGI. 

EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 2012. Institutional Controls: A Guide to Preparing 

Institutional Control Implementation and Assurance Plans at Contaminated Sites. EPA--R-

-002, Washington, D.C. Available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/ic/guide/ICIAP%20guidance%20(FINAL)%20-

%2012.04.2012.pdf. 

EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 2013. PAG Manual—Protective Action Guides and 

Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents. Draft for Interim Use and Public Comment, 

Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/er/pag-manual-interim-publiccomment-4-2-2013.pdf. 

EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 2004a. Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation—An 

Overview5HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

http://www.epri.com/abstractV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 2004b. Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) of Bolted 

Storage Casks: Updated Quantification and Analysis Report. 5HSRUW3DOR$OWR

California. Available at 

KWWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

(35,(OHFWULF3RZHU5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWHDAssessment of Accident Risk for Transport of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel to Yucca Mountain using RADTRAN 5.55HSRUW3DOR$OWR

California. Available at 

htWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

(35,(OHFWULF3RZHU5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWHESummary of the NAS Report, “Going the 

Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the 

United States”5HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=000000. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

(35,(OHFWULF3RZHU5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWHDSpent-Fuel Transportation Applications—

Normal Conditions of Transport5HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

KWWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

(35,(OHFWULF3RZHU5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWHEFuel Relocation Effects for Transportation 

Packages5HSRUW3DOR$OWRCalifornia. Available at 

KWWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute)FSpent Fuel Transportation Applications—

Assessment of Cladding Performance5HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

http://www.eprLFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

(35,(OHFWULF3RZHU5HVHDUFK,QVWLWXWHCriticality Risks During Transportation of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel5HYLVLRQ5HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

KWWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 2010a. Industry Spent Fuel Storage Handbook. 

Palo Alto, California. Available at 

KWWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 2010b. Transportation of Commercial Spent Nuclear 

Fuel: Regulatory Issues Resolution5HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

KWWSZZZHSULFRPDEVWUDFWV3DJHV3URGXFW$EVWUDFWDVS["3URGXFW,G . 

EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 2012. Impacts Associated with Transfer of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel from Spent Fuel Storage Pools to Dry Storage After Five Years of Cooling, 

Revision 15HSRUW3DOR$OWR&DOLIRUQLD$YDLODEOHDW

http://www.epri.com/Abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstractDVS["3URGXFW,' . 

)HGHUDO:DWHU3ROOXWLRQ&RQWURO$FWRIDVDPHQGHGDOVRUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH&OHDQ:DWHU

$FW86&et seq.

Fettus, G.H., M. Goldstein, and D. Curran. /HWWHUWR15&GDWHG1RYHPEHU

regarding “Notice of Intent to Prepare Waste Confidence EIS.” National Resources Defense 

Council, Washington, D.&0/$

)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH&RRUGLQDWLRQ$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&-Het seq. 

FDOH (Florida Department of Health). 2001. Report Concerning Cancer Rate in Southeastern 

Florida. Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology, Tallahassee, Florida. 

FMU (Fukushima Medical University). 2014. “Fukushima Health Management Survey.” 

Fukushima, Japan. Available at https://www.fmu.ac.jp/radiationhealth/survey/. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

)3/)ORULGD3RZHUDQG/LJKW&RPSDQ\/HWWHUIURP-$6WDOOWR15&GDWHG-XO\

UHJDUGLQJ3*URXQGZDWHU3URWHFWLRQ—Data Collection Questionnaire.” Juno Beach, 

FORULGD$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

):610)686)LVKDQG:LOGOLIH6HUYLFHDQG1DWLRQDO0DULQH)LVKHULHV6HUYLFH

Endangered Species Consultation Handbook: Procedures for Conducting Consultation and 

Conference Activities Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Washington, D.C. 

Accession No. 0/$. 

*$286*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2IILFH/HWWHUIURP*/-RQHVWR6HQDWRU%

%R[HUDQG5HSUHVHQWDWLYH*0LOOHUGDWHG0D\UHJDUGLQJ35DGLRDFWLYH:DVWH

Answers to Questions Related to the Proposed Ward Valley Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal Facility." GAO RCED--40R; B-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$YDLODEOHDW

KWWSZZZJDRJRYFRUUHVSUFUSGI. 

GAO 86*RYHUQPHQW$FFRXQWDELOLW\2IILFHHazardous Waste Sites: Improved 

Effectiveness of Controls at Sites Could Better Protect the Public. GAO--:DVKLQJWRQ

D.C. Available at KWWSZZZJDRJRYDVVHWVSGI. 

GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office). 2012. Spent Nuclear Fuel: Accumulating 

Quantities at Commercial Reactors Present Storage and Other Challenges. GAO-12-

:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office). 2013. Commercial Spent Fuel: Observations 

on the Key Attributes and Challenges of Storage and Disposal Options. GAO–13-7

Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-7. 

*&5386*OREDO&KDQJH5HVHDUFK3URJUDPGlobal Climate Change Impacts in the 

U.S. T.R. Karl, J.M. Melillo, and T.C. Peterson, eds. Cambridge University Press, New York. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

GCRP (U.S. Global Change Research Program). 2014. Climate Change Impacts in the United 

States: The Third National Climate Assessment. Melillo, J.M., T.C. Richmond, and G.W. Yohe, 

eds. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Accession 1R0/$

*OREDO&KDQJH5HVHDUFK$FWRI86&et seq.

Gorham, E.D., R.J. Breeding, J.C. Helton, T.D. Brown, W.B. Murfin, F.T. Harper, and S.C. Hora. 

Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks: Methodology for the Containment, Source Term, 

Consequence, and Risk Integration Analyses. NUREG/CR–5HYLVLRQ6DQGLD1DWLRQDO

/DERUDWRULHV$OEXTXHUTXH1HZ0H[LFR$FFHVVLRQ1R0/
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

*RYHUQPHQW3HUIRUPDQFH5HVXOWV$FWRI*35$3XEOLF/DZ-6WDW

HPS (Health Physics Society). 2004. “Radiation Risk in Perspective.” Position Statement of 

the HPS, Bethesda, Maryland. Available at http://www.hps.org/documents/radiationrisk.pdf. 

Hobbs Act, as amended86&et seq.

HWSP (Haverstraw Water Supply Project). 2012. “Comparison of HWSP Pilot Water to 

Current Rockland Drinking Water.” Rockland, New York. Available at 

http://haverstrawwatersupplyproject.com/images/stories/pubs/Pilot%20Water%20Quality%20Ch

art.pdf. 

,$($,QWHUQDWLRQDO$WRPLF(QHUJ\$JHQF\Management of Severely Damaged Nuclear 

Fuel and Related Waste. Technical Report Series No. 321, Vienna, Austria. Available at 

http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/TechnicalAreas/WTS/documents/Post_accident_documents/Management_of_Severely_Damaged_Fuel_t

rs321.pdf. 

,$($,QWHUQDWLRQDO$WRPLF(QHUJ\$JHQF\Radioactive Waste Management, Status 

and Trends—Issue #4. IAEA/WMDB/ST/4, Vienna, Austria. Available at http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/WMDB-ST-4.pdf. 

,$($,QWHUQDWLRQDO$WRPLF(QHUJ\$JHQF\Management of Damaged Spent Nuclear 

Fuel. IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NF-T-9LHQQD$XVWULD$YDLODEOHDWhttp://wwwSXELDHDRUJ07&'SXEOLFDWLRQV3')3XEBZHESGI. 

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2011a. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific 

Safety Requirements No. SSR-9LHQQD$XVWULD$YDLODEOHDWhttp://wwwSXELDHDRUJ07&'SXEOLFDWLRQV3')3XEBZHESGI. 

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2011b. Impact of High Burnup Uranium Oxide and 

Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Water Reactor Fuel on Spent Fuel Management. IAEA 

Nuclear Energy Series NF-T-9LHQQD$XVWULD$YDLODEOHDWhttp://wwwSXELDHDRUJERRNV,$($%RRNV,PSDFW-of-High-Burnup-Uranium-Oxide-and-MixedUranium-Plutonium-Oxide-Water-Reactor-Fuel-on-Spent-Fuel-Management. 

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2013. Spent Fuel Storage Operation—Lessons 

Learned7(&'2&1R9LHQQD$XVWULD$YDLODEOHDWhttp://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/TE-BZHESGI. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

,&53,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRQ5DGLRORJLFDO3URWHFWLRQ1990 Recommendations of 

the International Commission on Radiological Protection,&533XEOLFDWLRQ3HUJDPRQ

Press, New York, New York. 

IDPH (Illinois Department of Public Health). 2000. “Pediatric Cancer Incidence and Proximity to 

Nuclear Facilities in Illinois.” Health and Hazardous Substances Registry Newsletter 2000:1–2, 

Division of Epidemiologic Studies, Springfield, Illinois. Available at 

http://www.idph.state.il.us/cancer/pdf/article.pdf. 

In re Aiken County. )G'&Cir. 2013). 

Jo, J.H., P.F. Rose, S.D. Unwin9/6DLORU.53HUNLQVDQG$*7LQJOHValue/Impact 

Analysis of Accident Preventative and Mitigative Options for Spent Fuel Pools. NUREG/CR–

%URRNKDYHQ1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\8SWRQ1HZ<RUN$FFHVVLRQ1R0/. 

Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission))Grd Cir. 



Lindgren, E.R. and S.G. Durbin. 2013. Characterization of Thermal-Hydraulic and Ignition 

Phenomena in Prototypic, Full-Length Boiling Water Reactor Spent Fuel Pool Assemblies After 

a Postulated Complete Loss-of-Coolant Accident. NUREG/CR–6DQGLD1DWLRQDO

Laboratory, 13 Albuquerque, New MH[LFR$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

Lochbaum, D. 2012. “Cumulative Effects of Non-Regulation.” All Things Nuclear, Union of 

Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Available at 

http://allthingsnuclear.org/cumulative-effects-of-non-regulation/. 

Low-/HYHO5DGLRDFWLYH:DVWH3ROLF\$PHQGPHQWV$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&Eet 

seq.

Magnuson-Stevens Act (Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 

DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

Maine Yankee Power Co. v. United States)GFed. Cir. 2000). 

0DULQH0DPPDO3URWHFWLRQ$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council.  86. 

Massachusetts v. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission)G (1st Cir. 2013). 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

MDPH (Massachusetts Department of Public Health). 2014. “Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 

(PNPS): Tritium in Groundwater Monitoring Wells, PNPS Updates as of February  ́

Boston, Massachusetts. Available at 

http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/environmental/radiationcontrol/tritium/2014-updates/pnpsupdate-02--14.pdf. 

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy86 . 

0LJUDWRU\%LUG7UHDW\$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86& et seq. 

Minnesota v. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). )G'& Cir. 

1$61DWLRQDO$FDGHP\RI6FLHQFHVTechnical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards. 

National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council of Board on Radioactive Waste 

Management, Committee on the Remediation of Buried and Tank Waste, National Academy 

Press, Washington, D.C. 

NAS (National Academy of Sciences). 2000. Long-Term Institutional Management of the U.S. 

Department of Energy Legacy Waste Sites. National Academy of Sciences/National Research 

Council of Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Committee on the Remediation of Buried 

and Tank Waste, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 

NAS (National Academy of Sciences. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear 

Fuel Storage, Public Report. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. 

NARUC v. DOE (National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners et al. v. U.S. 

Department of Energy). )GD.C. Cir. 2013). 

1DWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\$FWRI1(3$DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

1DWLRQDO+LVWRULF3UHVHUYDWLRQ$FWRI1+3$DVDPHQGHG86&et seq.

1DWLRQDO5HVHDUFK&RXQFLOHealth Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing 

Radiation: BEIR VII—Phase 2. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. 

NCI (NatiRQDO&DQFHU,QVWLWXWH Cancer in Populations Living near Nuclear Facilities. 

Bethesda, Maryland. 

1($1XFOHDU(QHUJ\$JHQF\The Roles of Storage in the Management of Long-Lived 

Radioactive Waste. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris, France. 

Available at https://www.oecd-QHDRUJUZPUHSRUWVQHD-storage.pdf.
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

1(,1XFOHDU(QHUJ\,QVWLWXWHIndustry Ground Water Protection Initiative—Final 

Guidance Document1(,-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/. 

New York v. NRC (State of New York et al. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission))G

'&Cir. $FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NFPA (NatLRQDO)LUH3URWHFWLRQ$VVRFLDWLRQNFPA® 805: Performance-Based 

Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2010 Edition. 

Quincy, Massachusetts. 

NMFS (National Marine Fisheries Service). 2013. Letter from J.K. Bullard to NRC, dated June 

13, 2013, regarding “Request from Earthrise to Reinitiate the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 

6HFWLRQ&RQVXOWDWLRQIRUWKH&RQWLQXHV2SHUDWLRQRIWKH3LOJULP1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQW ́

Gloucester, Massachusetts. Accession No. M/$

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQEnvironmental Survey of Transportation of 

Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants. Supplement 1 to WASH-1238, 

NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'&

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissiRQDFinal Environmental Impact Statement on 

the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes. NUREG–

Washington, D.C. Accession No. 0/$. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQECalculation of Annual Doses to Man from 

Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix I5HJXODWRU\*XLGH5HYLVLRQ:DVKLQJWRQ'C. Accession No. 

0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ComPLVVLRQFinal Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel. NUREG–

:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQControl of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power 

Plants: Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'&

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQ3&RQWURORI5DGLRDFWLYHO\&RQWDPLQDWHG

0DWHULDO ́,(&LUFXODU-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$YDLODEOHDW

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-FRPPFLUFXODUVFUKWPO. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

NRC (U.S. NucleaU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQ36XUYH\VRI:DVWHV%HIRUH'LVSRVDOIURP

1XFOHDU5HDFWRU)DFLOLWLHV ́,QIRUPDWLRQ1RWLFH1R-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$YDLODEOHDW

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-QRWLFHVLQKWPO. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQD. Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of 

Generic Issue 82, “Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools.” NUREG–

Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQE. Environmental Assessment for Proposed 

Rule Entitled, “Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in NRC-Approved Storage Casks at Nuclear 

Power Reactor Sites.” Washington, D.C. Accession No. 0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQSevere Accident Risks: An Assessment 

for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG–Volume 1, Washington, D.C. Accession 

1R0/. 

NRC (U.S. 1XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQDRevised Livermore Seismic Hazard 

Estimates for Sixty-Nine Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains. NUREG–

:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). E33RWHQWLDO)XHO3RRO'UDLQGRZQ&DXVHG

by Inadequate Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit 1.” BuOOHWLQ-01, Washington, D.C. 

Available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/genFRPPEXOOHWLQVEOKWPO. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQAccident Source Terms for Light-Water 

Nuclear Power Plants—Final Report. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R

0/3. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQDGeneric Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Volumes 1 and 2, NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'&

Accession Nos. 0/, 0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ComPLVVLRQEInformation Handbook on Independent 

Spent Fuel Storage Installations. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'&. Accession No. 

0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQF3%RUDIOH['HJUDGDWLRQLQ6SHQW)XHO3RRO

Storage Racks.” 15&*HQHULF/HWWHU-04, Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQDRegulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation 

Handbook. NUREG/BR–:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC (U.S. Nuclear 5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQE33ROLF\,VVXH3URSRVHG6WUDWHJ\IRU

Development of Regulations Governing Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a 

Proposed Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.” SECY--300, Washington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/0444. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQFGeneric Environmental Impact Statement 

in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-Licensed 

Nuclear Facilities. NUREG–Volume 1, Washington, D.C. AccessioQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQG36SHQW)XHO3RRO6DIHW\DW3HUPDQHQWO\

6KXWGRZQ5HDFWRUV ́,QVSHFWLRQ3URFHGXUHLQNRC Inspection Manual, Washington, 

D.C. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQH30Dintenance and Surveillance at 

3HUPDQHQWO\6KXWGRZQ5HDFWRUV ́,QVSHFWLRQ3URFHGXUHLQNRC Inspection Manual, 

Washington, D.C. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2000. Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry 

Storage Facilities. NUREG– Washington, D.C. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2001a. Final Environmental Impact Statement for 

the Construction and Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation on the 

Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians and the Related Transportation Facility 

in Tooele County, Utah. NUREG–Volume 1, Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2001b. Technical Study of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ

D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2001c. Big Rock Point Plant Environmental 

Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact. Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

ML01

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2001d. Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, 

Insurance, and Emergency Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools. SECY-01-100, Washington, D.C. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2002a. Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, Supplement 1 Regarding the Decommissioning of 

Nuclear Power Reactors, Final Report. NUREG–9ROXPHVDQG:DVKLQJWRQ, D.C. 

Accession Nos. ML02340/
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2002b. Status of the Entombment Option for 

Power Reactors. SECY-02-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2003a. Environmental Review Guidance for 

Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs. Final Report, NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ

D&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2003b. “NRC Review of Paper on Reducing 

Hazards from Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel.” Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2003c. “Decommissioning Power Reactor 

Inspection Program.” &KDSWHULQNRC Inspection Manual, Washington, D.C. Available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/manual-FKDSWHUPFSGI. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2004a. “Memorandum and Order in the Matter of 

([HORQ*HQHUDWLRQ&RPSDQ\//&(DUO\6LWH3HUPLWIRU&OLQWRQ(636LWH ́15&-

$XJXVW5RFNYLOOH0DU\ODQG$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2004b. “Memorandum and Order in the Matter of 

'RPLQLRQ1XFOHDU1RUWK$QQD//&(DUO\6LWH3HUPLWIRU1RUWK$QQD(636LWH ́15&

-$XJXVW5RFNYLOOH0DU\ODQG$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2004c. Environmental Impact Statement for the 

Proposed Idaho Spent Fuel Facility at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 

Laboratory in Butte County, Idaho. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'& Accession No. 

0/. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2004d. Issuance of Materials License No. SNM2512 for the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility (TAC No. L23389). Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2004e. Safety Evaluation Report for the Idaho 

Spent Fuel Facility, Docket No. 72-25, Materials License No. SNM-2512. Washington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2004f. Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG/BR–5HYLVLRQWashington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQD3&RQWURORI6HFXULW\-Related Sensitive 

Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Handled by Individuals, Firms, and Entities Subject to 

NRC Regulation of the Use of Source, Byproduct, and Special Nuclear Material.” NRC 

Regulatory Issue SumPDU\-31, Washington, D.C. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQE3,PSOLFDWLRQVRI8SGDWHG3UREDELOLVWLF

Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States.” GenerLF,VVXH

Washington, D.C. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQDLiquid Radioactive Release Lessons 

Learned Task Force Final Report. Washington, D.C. AccessLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). EConsolidated Decommissioning 

Guidance: Decommissioning Process for Materials Licensees. NUREG–5HYLVLRQ

Washington, D&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQF/HWWHUIURP-&DPHURQWR&0&UDQH

GDWHG6HSWHPEHUUHJDUGLQJ315&,QVSHFWLRQ5HSRUW--02 (DNMS)—Zion 

Nuclear Station.” Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQGIndian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2—

NRC Special Inspection Report No. 05000247/2005011. Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQD30HPRUDQGXPDQG2UGHULQWKH0DWWHURI

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., and Entergy 

Nuclear Generation Company and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.” CLI--03, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQEDivision of Spent Fuel Storage and 

Transportation Interim Staff Guidance No. 1, Revision 2, "Classifying the Condition of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel for Interim Storage and Transportation Based on Function." SFST-ISG-1, 

:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQFGeneric Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 28, Regarding Oyster Creek Nuclear 

Generating Station. NUREG–6XSSOHPHQWVolume 1, Washington, D.C. Accession 

1R0/
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQG Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 29, Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power 

Station, Final Report. NUREG–Supplement Volume 1, Washington, D.C. Accession 

No. 0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQe. A Pilot Probabilistic Risk Assessment of 

a Dry Cask Storage System at a Nuclear Power Plant. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQI33RVWXODWHG5DGLRDFWLYH5HOHDVHV'XHWR

Liquid-Containing Tank Failures.” Standard Review Plan, NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQ Letter from M.K. Gamberoni to J. Pollock, 

dated 0D\UHJDUGLQJ3Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1 & 2—NRC Inspection 

5HSRUW1RVDQG ́($--:DVKLQJWRQ'&

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

15&861XFOHDU5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQDGeneric Environmental Impact Statement 

for In-Situ Leach Uranium Milling Facilities. NUREG–9ROVDQG:DVKLQJWRQ'&

$FFHVVLRQ1RV0/, 0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). b. “Degradation of Neutron-Absorbing 

Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool.” NRC Information Notice -:DVKLQJWRQ'C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). c. Letter from D.J. Roberts to J. Pollock, 

GDWHG2FWREHUUHJDUGLQJ3,QGLDQ3RLQW1XFOHDU*HQHUDWLQJ8QLWV	—NRC 

Inspection Report Nos. DQG ́.LQJ

of Prussia, PennsylvaniD$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2010a. Waste Confidence Decision Update. 

NRC–200––:DVKLQJWRQ'&

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2010b. Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 38 Regarding Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Final Report, Main Report, and Comment Responses. NUREG–

Supplement Volume 1, Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/ 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2010c. “NRC Asks National Academy of 

Sciences to Study Cancer Risk in Populations Living Near Nuclear Power Facilities.” NRC 

Nuclear News, No. 10-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2010d. A Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 

1946–2009. NUREG/BR–5HYLVLRQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2010e. Letter from D.J. Roberts to M. Colomb, 

GDWHG$SULOUHJDUGLQJ39HUPRQW<DQNHH1XFOHDU3RZHU6WDWLRQ3UHOLPLQDU\5HVXOWVRI

Inspection Related to Vermont Yankee Ground Water Program and Recent Onsite Ground 

Water Contamination.” King of Prussia, PennsylvaniD$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011a. “Policy Issue Information: Plan for the 

Long-Term Update to the Waste Confidence Rule and Integration with the Extended Storage 

and Transportation Initiative.” SECY-11-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011b. Background and Preliminary 

Assumptions for an Environmental Impact Statement—Long-Term Waste Confidence Update. 

Draft Report for Comment, Washington, D.C. Accession No. M11340A141. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011c. Final Environmental Impact Statement for 

Combined Licenses for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. NUREG–9ROXPHV

and 2, Washington, D.C. Accession 1RV0/$0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011d. Final Environmental Impact Statement for 

Combined Licenses (COLs) for South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Units 3 and 4. 

NUREGí:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011e. Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 45 Regarding Hope Creek Generating 

Station and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2—Final Report. NUREG–

Supplement Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011f. Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21st Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima 

Dai-Ichi Accident. SECY-11-15&7DVN)RUFH:DVKLQJWRQ'&. Accession No. 

0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011g. Standard Review Plan for Renewal of 

Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System Licenses and Certificates of Compliance—Final Report. 

NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011h. Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Unit 3 

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Partial Release with Redacted Information, 

Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011i. “Policy Issue (Information): Senior 

Management Review of Overall Regulatory Approach to Groundwater Protection.” SECY-11-

:DVKLQJWRQ'&

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011j. Summary of Results from Completion of 

NRC’s Temporary Instruction on Groundwater Protection, TI-2515/173 Industry Groundwater 

Protection Initiation. Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011k. Memorandum from A.L. Vietti-Cook to 

5:%RUFKDUGWGDWHG$XJXVWUHJDUGLQJ36WDII5HTXLUHPHnts—SECY-11-—

Senior Management Review of Overall Regulatory Approach to Groundwater Protection.” 

Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2011l. Memorandum from A.L. Vietti-Cook to 

R.W. Borchardt and J.('\HUGDWHG'HFHPEHUUHJDUGLQJ36WDII5HTXLUHPHQWV—

SECY-11-—Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned.” Washington, D.C. Accession 1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012a. Memorandum from A.L. Vietti-Cook to 

5:%RUFKDUGWGDWHG6HSWHPEHUUHJDUGLQJ36WDII5HTXLUHPHQWV—COMSECY-12-

—Approach for Addressing Policy Issues Resulting from Court Decision to Vacate Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule.” SRM-COMSECY-12-:DVKLQJWRQ'C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012b. 0HPRUDQGXPDQG2UGHUGDWHG$XJXVW

2012, regarding “Petition to Suspend Final Decision on All Pending Reactor Licensing 

Proceedings.” Commission Order CLI–12–:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ

No. 0/$. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012c. Memorandum from R.W. Borchardt to 

Chairman Mcfarlane and Commissioners Svinicki, Apostolakis, Magwood, and Ostendorff, 

GDWHG-XO\regarding “Approach for Addressing Policy Issues Resulting from Court 

Decision to Vacate Waste Confidence Decision and Rule.” COMSECY-12-:DVKLQJWRQ

'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/0A424. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012d. Letter from A.M. Macfarlane to D. Curran, 

GDWHG'HFHPEHUUHJDUGLQJ“Concern About NRC’s Federal Register Notice Regarding 

Updates to the Commission’s Waste Confidence Rule.” Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012e. Letter from E. Leeds to All Power 

Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status dated 

March 12, 2012, regarding “Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

5HJXODWLRQVI5HJDUGLQJ5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVDQGRIWKH1HDU-Term Task 

Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident.” Washington, D.C. Accession 

1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012f. “Memorandum and Order in the Matter of 

Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear 

Power Station).” LBP-12-5RFNYLOOH0DU\ODQG$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012g. Environmental Impact Statement for 

Combined Licenses (COLs) for Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2—Final Report. NUREG–

Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012h. Standard Review Plan for the Review of 

Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition. NUREG–:DVKLQJWRQ

D.C. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012i. “Memorandum and Order in the Matter of 

Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear 

Power Station).” LBP-12-10, Rockville, MarylanG$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012j. “Policy Issue Notation Vote: 

Consideration of Economic Consequences Within the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 

Regulatory Framework.” SECY-12-0110, Washington, D.C. Accession No. 0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012k. “Policy Issue Notation Vote: 

Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water 

Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments.” SECY-12-:DVKLQJWRQ'C. Accession 

1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012l. “Potential Chloride-Induced Stress 

Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steel and Maintenance of Dry Cask Storage System 

Canisters.” NRC Information Notice 2012-20, Washington, D.C. Accession No. ML123$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012m. Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit List 

of Exemptions. Washington, D&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012n. Letter from C.A. Lipa to J.A Christian, 

GDWHG-XQHUHJDUGLQJ315&,QVSHFWLRQ5HSRUW--'106-

00304/12-'106—Zion Nuclear Power Station.” Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012o. “In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear 

Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) —Order Granting in Part and 

Denying in Part Applicant’s Motions in Limine.” Rockville, Maryland. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012p. “Inspection Program for Dry Storage of 

6SHQW5HDFWRU)XHODW,QGHSHQGHQW6SHQW)XHO6WRUDJH,QVWDOODWLRQVDQGIRU&)5

TranVSRUWDWLRQ3DFNDJLQJV ́&KDSWHULQNRC Inspection Manual, Washington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2012q. “Compatibility Requirements for Storage 

and Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Retrievability, Cladding Integrity, and Safe 

Handling).” Issue Summary, Washington, D.C. Accession No0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013a. Letter from S. Lopas to A. Imboden, 

dated August 21, 2013, regarding “Summary of August Public Teleconference to Discuss Status 

of Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement and Rulemaking.” Washington, 

D.C. Accession No. ML13204A111. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013b. Letter from S. Lopas to A. Imboden, 

dated September 24, 2013, regarding “Summary of September Public Teleconference to 

Discuss Status of Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement and 

Rulemaking ́:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013c. “NRC Schedules 12 Meetings Nationwide 

on Waste Confidence Proposed Rule and Environmental Study.” Press Release No. 13-

GDWHG6HSWHPEHUWashington, D.C. Accession No. 0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013d. “NRC Postpones California Meetings on 

Waste Confidence Because of Government Shutdown.” Press Release No. 13-GDWHG

October 4, 2013. Washington, D.C. Accession No. 0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013e. “NRC Postpones Ohio, Minnesota 

Meetings on Waste Confidence Because of Government Shutdown.” Press Release No. 13-

GDWHG2FWREHUWashington, D.C. Accession No. 0/$
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013f. “NRC Schedules Nov. 4 Meeting in 

Charlotte to Take Comments on Proposed Spent Nuclear Fuel Rule and Environmental Study.” 

Press Release No. II-13-GDWHG2FWREHU Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013g. “NRC Schedules NRY0HHWLQJLQ

Orlando to Take Comments on Proposed Spent Nuclear Fuel Rule and Environmental Study.” 

Press Release No. II-13-GDWHG2FWREHUWashington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013h. “NRC Extends Public Comment Period 

for Proposed Rule and Environmental Study on Extended Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” 

Press Release No. 13-GDWHG2FWREHUWashington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013i. Letter from A.M. Macfarlane to W.H. 

Sorrell, dated July 23, 2013, regarding “Petition for Review of [Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC)] Staff Scoping Decision.” Filed jointly by the State of Vermont, State of Connecticut, 

State of New York, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Washington, D.C. Accession 

1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013j. Waste Confidence Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement Scoping Process Summary Report. Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013k. Scoping Comments on the Waste 

Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement. Washington, D.C. Accession No. 

0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013l. Consequence Study of a Beyond-DesignBasis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor. SECY13-:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013m. Generic Environmental Impact 

Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. NUREG–Volume 1, Revision 1, 

Washington, D.&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013n. Staff Evaluation and Recommendation 

for Japan Lessons-Learned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel. COMSECY–13–

0030, Washington, D.C. Accession Nos. 0/$0/$. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013o. Draft Environmental Assessment for the 

Proposed Renewal of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License No. SNM-2506 for Prairie 

Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation'RFNHW1R-0010, Washington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013p. Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 38, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Final Report, Supplemental Report, and Comment Responses. 

NUREG–9ROXPH:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013q. Letter from M.C. Wong to NMFS, dated 

May 31, 2013, regarding “Earthrise Law Center’s Request IRU15&WR5HLQLWLDWH6HFWLRQ

Consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service for Continued Operation of Pilgrim 

Nuclear Power Station.” Washington, D.C. AcFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013r. Report on Waste Burial Charges: 

Changes in Decommissioning Waste Disposal Costs at Low-Level Waste Burial Facilities. 

NUREG–5HYLVLRQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRn No. ML13023A030. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013s. “Memorandum and Order in the Matter of 

U.S Department of Energy (High Level Waste Repository).” CLI-13-5RFNYLOOH0DU\ODQG

Accession No. ML13322A44. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013t. Interim Staff Guidance on Emergency 

Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants. NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, 

Washington, D.C. Accession No. ML13304B442. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013u. “Commission Voting Record on Proposed 

Rule: Waste Confidence—&RQWLQXHG6WRUDJHRI6SHQW1XFOHDU)XHO5,1–AJ20).” 

Decision Item SECY–13–:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2013v. Federal Register Notice for Security 

Requirements for Facilities Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste Regulatory Basis 

Comment Resolution. Washington, D.C. AccHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2014a. Memorandum from R.C. Bavol to M.A. 

Atorius dated May 23, 2014, “Staff Requirements—COMSECY-13-0030—Staff Evaluation and 

Recommendation for Japan Lessons-Learned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent 

Fuel.” Washington'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2014b. “In the Matter of Proposed Rule: Waste 

Confidence—&RQWLQXHG6WRUDJHRI6SHQW1XFOHDU)XHO&)53DUW'UDIW:DVWH

Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement.” PRM--30, Washington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2014c. Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Supplement 52 Regarding Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 

Station. NUREG–Supplement Draft Report for Comment, Washington, D.C. 

$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2014d. Spent Fuel Transportation Risk 

Assessment Final Report. NUREG– Washington, D.C. Accession No. ML14031A323. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 2014e. Identification and Prioritization of the 

Technical Information Needs Affecting Potential Regulation of Extended Storage and 

Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel. Washington, D.C. Accession No. ML14043A423. 

NRDC v. NRC (Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 

)G2nd Cir. 

Nuclear Waste Administration Act 2013, Senate Bill 1240, 113th Congress (2013). 

1XFOHDU:DVWH3ROLF\$FWRI1:3$DVDPHQGHG86&et seq. 

NYSDEC (New York State Department of Environmental Conservation). 2010. Technical 

Guidance for Site Investigation and Remediation. DER-10, Albany, New York. Available at 

http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/remediation_hudson_pdf/der10.pdf. 

OMB (Office of Management and Budget). 2003. Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis. 

15&:DVKLQJWRQ'&$FFHVVLRQ1R0/$

PGEC (Pacific Gas and Electric). /HWWHUIURP71HOVRQWR15&GDWHG-XO\

regarding “Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 Groundwater Protection—Data Collection 

4XHVWLRQQDLUH ́(XUHND&DOLIRUQLD$FFHVVLRQ1R0/

3UDVDG5Tsunami Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United 

States of America—Final Report. NUREG/CR–3DFLILF1RUWKZHVW1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\

5LFKODQG:DVKLQJWRQ$FFHVVLRQ1R0/. 

Price-$QGHUVRQ$PHQGPHQWV$FWRIDVDPHQGHG86&et seq.

Price-Anderson Act (Price-$QGHUVRQ1XFOHDU,QGXVWULHV,QGHPQLW\$FWRIDVDPHQGHG

42 USC 2210 et seq. 
Appendix D 

185(*௅ D- September 2014 

Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). No. 

13-cv--JDB (D.D.C.). 

Ramsdell, J.V., Jr, C.E. Beyer, D.D. Lanning, U.P. Jenquin, R.A. Schwarz, D.L. Strenge, P.M. 

Daling, and R.T. Dahowski. 2001. Environmental Effects of Extending Fuel Burnup Above 60 

GWd/MTU. NUREG/CR-3DFLILF1RUWKZHVW1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\5LFKODQG:DVKLQJWRQ

Accession No. ML01

5HVRXUFH&RQVHUYDWLRQDQG5HFRYHU\$FWRI5&5$86&Fet seq.

Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended. 42 USC 300f et seq.

Sailor, V.L, K.R. Perkins, J.R. Weeks, and H.R. Connell. Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel 

Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82. NUREG/CR–%URRNKDYHQ1DWLRQDO

Laboratory, Upton, New York. Available at http://www.osti.gRYEULGJHVHUYOHWVSXUO-

YRRI/SGI. 

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission))G

WKCir. 

So. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States)G

Sprung, J.L., D.J. Ammerman, N.L. Breivik, R.J. Dukart, F.L. Kanipe, J.A. Koski, G.S. Mills, 11 

K.S. Neuhauser, H.D. Radloff, R.F. Weiner, and H.R. Yoshimura. 2000. Reexamination of 12 

Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates. NUREG/CR–6DQGLD1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\

Albuquerque, New Mexico. $FFHVVLRQ1R0/. 

Talbott, E.O., A.O Youk, K.P. McHugh, J.D. Shire, A. Zhang, B.P. Murphy, and R.A. Engberg. 

30RUWDOLW\DPRQJWKH5HVLGHQWVRIWKH7KUHH0LOH,VODQG$FFLGHQW$UHD- ́

Environmental Health Perspectives, -

Travis, R.J., R.E. Davis, E.J. Grove, and M.A. Azarm.  Safety and Regulatory 

Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants. 

NUREG/CR–%URRNKDYHQ1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\8SWRQ1HZ<RUN$YDLODEOHDW

KWWSZZZRVWLJRYEULGJHVHUYOHWVSXUO-TPZ3%3ZHEYLHZDEOHSGI. 

Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). )G2 

(D.C. Cir. 

UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation). 2013. 

UNSCEAR 2013 Report: Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation.” Vienna, Austria. 

Available at http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2013_1.html. 
Appendix D 

September 2014 D- 185(*௅

UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation). 2014. 

“The Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident—UNSCEAR’s Assessment of Levels 

and Effects of Radiation Exposure Due to the Nuclear Accident after the 2011 Great East-Japan 

Earthquake and Tsunami.” Vienna, Austria. Available at 

http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/fukushima.html. 

USACE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). 2000. Establishing and Maintaining Institutional 

Controls for Ordnance and Explosives (OE) Projects. Engineer Pamphlet 1110-1-24, EP 1110-

1-24, Washington, D.C. Available at 

KWWSZZZSXEOLFDWLRQVXVDFHDUP\PLO3RUWDOV3XEOLFDWLRQV(QJLQHHU3DPSKOHWV(3B-1-

24.pdf. 

WHO (World Health Organization). 2013. Health Risk Assessment from the Nuclear Accident 

after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, Based on a Preliminary Dose 

Estimation. Geneva, Switzerland. Available at 

http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/fukushima_risk_assessment_2013/en/. 

<$(&<DQNHH$WRPLF(QHUJ\&RPSDQ\Groundwater Monitoring Plan to Support 

Closure Under the Massachusetts Contingency. Rowe, Massachusetts. Accession No. 

0/

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

6HHLQVWUXFWLRQVRQWKHUHYHUVH

NRC FORM 335

(12-2010)

NRCMD 3.7

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER

(Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,

 and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

MONTH YEAR

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if 

 contractor, provide name and mailing address.)

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type "Same as above", if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 

 Commission, and mailing address.)

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.)

14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

unlimited

7KLV3DJH

unclassified

7KLV5HSRUW

unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

NRC FORM 335 (12-2010)

NUREG-2157, Volume 2 

FINAL

Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Final 

Report and Public Comments September 2014

U.S. NRC

Technical

Waste Confidence Directorate 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Same as above

This Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (GEIS) examines the potential 

environmental impacts that could occur as a result of the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at at-reactor and away-from-reactor 

sites until a repository is available. For the resource areas considered, this GEIS attempts to establish generic impact determinations 

that would be applicable to a wide range of existing and potential future spent fuel storage sites. While some site-specific 

information is used in developing the generic impact determinations, the NRC does not intend for this GEIS to replace the NEPA 

analysis associated with any individual licensing action. This GEIS makes maximum use of existing environmental impact 

determinations, site-specific data, publicly available literature, and public comments received. 

This GEIS evaluated alternatives to the proposed action, including options under the no-action alternative (site-specific licensing 

review, a GEIS-only option, and a policy statement). The proposed action would have the same potential environmental impacts as 

any of the alternatives evaluated. However, as shown in quantitative analysis of costs, the cost for the proposed action is less than the 

cost for any of the alternatives. 

EIS, GEIS, environmental impact statement, NEPA, national environmental policy act, waste confidence, 

waste confidence decision, waste confidence rule, continued storage


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

------------------

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NUREG

-2157, Vol. 2

Final

Generic Environmental Impact Statement for 

Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel