Filed 8/25/15 In re I.G. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re I.G., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 H040896

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. 3-13-JV40440A)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

After a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation 

that I.G. (minor) committed second-degree attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, 

212.5, subd. (c)) and that during the commission of the offense he personally used a

deadly weapon, a machete. On appeal, minor argues the court erred when it found the 

offense of attempted robbery qualified as an offense under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707, subdivision (b).1 He also claims the probation condition requiring him to 

comply with school rules and regulations is unconstitutionally vague and requires 

modification. 

We conclude that attempted robbery is not an offense listed under section 707, 

subdivision (b). However, we find that the facts and circumstances surrounding minor’s 

 

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

offense rendered it within the purview of section 707, subdivision (b). Therefore, the 

juvenile court’s designation of his offense was not in error. We agree with minor’s 

contention regarding his probation condition, so we modify the challenged condition. As 

modified, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2013, a juvenile wardship petition (§ 602) was filed alleging 

that minor attempted to commit second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, 212.5, 

subd. (c)) with a deadly weapon (id., §§ 667, 1192.7).2

On January 23, 2014, a contested jurisdiction hearing was held. Richard Roxas, 

the victim, testified. Roxas worked as an automotive technician and was towing a 

customer’s car late one night in December 2013. Approximately four men approached 

Roxas, demanding money. One of the suspects, later identified to be minor, was carrying 

a machete. Minor was approximately four feet away from Roxas, and Roxas testified that 

minor held the machete in his hand and waved it in a threatening manner. Roxas was 

afraid minor would come at him with the machete and believed minor and his 

accomplices were trying to rob him. Roxas told the group that he did not have any 

money and that he did not want any trouble. Afterwards, the group walked away. Roxas 

called 911. Shortly thereafter, an officer arrived and showed Roxas four men, including 

minor. Roxas identified them as the ones who had attempted to rob him.

San Jose Police Officer Todd Wellman responded to Roxas’ call. As he was 

driving to the scene, Wellman saw a group of men walking along the street that matched 

the description he had received over the police dispatch. All four individuals, including 

minor, were apprehended. Shortly thereafter, the officers found a machete matching the 

description Roxas had provided. 

 

2

The petition was amended on January 23, 2014. 
3

Minor testified on his own behalf. He said he was walking around with three 

friends that night. Minor saw Roxas on the street. As minor and his friends passed 

Roxas, Roxas shined his flashlight on them. Minor and his friends asked Roxas why he 

was shining a flashlight. Roxas responded by asking minor and his friends what they 

were doing. At the time, minor had a machete under his sleeve, and approximately six 

inches of the blade was sticking out. The sharp end of the machete was pointed 

downward, toward the concrete. Minor denied ever waving the machete at Roxas.

Minor asked Roxas for some change, referring to Roxas as “sir.” Minor asked him 

twice, and Roxas said no. Afterwards, minor asked Roxas if they were “cool.” Minor 

said he also added a “sir” when he asked Roxas if they were “cool” for the second time. 

Roxas responded affirmatively, and minor walked away with his friends. Minor said that 

Roxas was on the phone the entire time. Minor explained that he had asked Roxas for 

change so that he could take the bus back home. 

At the end of the jurisdiction hearing, the court found the allegations that minor 

had committed attempted robbery and that he had personally used a deadly weapon, the 

machete, true. The juvenile court also found that the offense qualified as an offense 

under section 707, subdivision (b). Minor’s attorney objected, arguing that attempted 

robbery was not named as an offense under section 707, subdivision (b).

The court held a disposition hearing on February 24, 2014. Again, minor’s 

attorney reiterated his objection to minor’s offense being designated a section 707, 

subdivision (b) offense. The court acknowledged the objection, but noted that a different 

judge had found the offense to be a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. The court 

declined to modify the prior judge’s finding. Thereafter, minor was adjudged a ward of 

the court, was ordered to serve 41 days on the electronic monitoring program, and was 

returned to the custody of his parents. He was also placed on probation, subject to 

various terms and conditions including that he obey all school rules and regulations. 
4

Minor appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, minor challenges the juvenile court’s determination that his offense 

qualified as an offense under section 707, subdivision (b). He also argues the probation 

condition requiring him to comply with school rules must be modified to include a 

knowledge element to render it constitutional. We first address his claims regarding 

section 707, subdivision (b).

1. Section 707, subdivision (b)

Minor challenges the court’s determination that his attempted robbery allegation 

was an offense under section 707, subdivision (b), on two alternate grounds: (1) the 

finding is void, because it was not alleged in the petition that the offense qualified as an 

offense under section 707, subdivision (b), and (2) the determination was made in error, 

because attempted robbery is not listed under section 707, subdivision (b). 

a. Statutory Framework

Section 707, subdivision (a) states that whenever a minor who is 16 years of age or 

older is alleged to be a person described under section 602, subdivision (a), the juvenile 

court may make a finding on whether the minor is a fit and proper subject to be dealt with 

under juvenile court law. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 707 specify that if the minor 

is alleged to be a person described under section 602 when he or she is 14 years of age or 

older, having committed one of the 30 enumerated offenses under subdivision (b), the 

minor is presumed to be unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law. 

b. Mootness

First, we address the issue of mootness. It is this court’s duty to decide actual 

controversies, not to give opinions on moot questions or abstract principles or declare 

principles or rules of law that cannot affect the case before us. (Eye Dog Foundation v.

State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) Here, the People 
5

insist that the issue is moot, because the court’s determination that the offense was one 

enumerated under section 707, subdivision (b) will have no impact on minor in the future 

and had no impact on minor’s case below. 

In minor’s case, even though the juvenile court determined at the end of the 

jurisdiction hearing that minor’s offense qualified as an offense under section 707, 

subdivision (b), there was no express finding that minor should not be tried in juvenile 

court. Additionally, minor was tried in juvenile court, not in criminal court, and was 

placed on probation, not committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. 

Furthermore, the People claim that the juvenile court’s determination that the 

offense was a section 707, subdivision (b) offense would also have no adverse 

consequences against minor in the future. Although an offense under section 707, 

subdivision (b), can qualify as a prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)(3)(B), (D)), in 

future prosecutions the People would still need to plead and prove that minor’s prior 

adjudication qualifies under the Three Strikes Law. Additionally, minor is now 18 years 

of age and will no longer be the subject of a wardship petition under section 602, or 

receive a juvenile court disposition in the future.

Minor, however, insists that the court’s declaration that his offense is one 

enumerated under section 707, subdivision (b), will have practical consequences. We 

agree. As minor points out, minors who are found to have committed an offense listed 

under section 707, subdivision (b), are precluded from sealing their juvenile records 

pursuant to section 781, subdivision (a). Accordingly, the issue is not moot and we will 

address the merits of minor’s claims.

c. Due process

Minor argues that his due process rights were violated when the juvenile court 

found his offense to be within section 707, subdivision (b), because it was never alleged 

in the section 602 petition.
6

To support his contention, minor relies on People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 

735 (Mancebo). In Mancebo, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court erred 

when it found an additional sentence enhancement under Penal Code section 12202.5, 

subdivision (a), that was not separately pleaded and proved. (Mancebo, supra, at p. 743.) 

Mancebo concluded that failing to plead this enhancement provided defendant with 

inadequate notice, since defendant had no advance knowledge that the People would 

attempt to secure the additional enhancement. (Id. at p. 746.) 

Minor also cites to In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437 (Robert G.). In Robert 

G., the Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court’s judgment finding that minor 

committed a battery. (Id. at p. 439.) The section 602 petition had charged minor with 

committing an assault with a deadly weapon, not battery, and it was well-established that 

battery is not necessarily a lesser included offense of a charge of an assault with a deadly 

weapon. (Robert G., supra, at pp. 439, 442.) 

We agree with minor that the juvenile court cannot sustain an allegation against 

him that is not first alleged in the section 602 petition, because that would be a violation 

of his due process rights. However, that is not what happened here, and the cases relied 

on by minor are inapposite. For example, Mancebo and Robert G. concern additional 

allegations and enhancements. Here, the section 707, subdivision (b) finding was not an 

enhancement or an additional allegation. 

Furthermore, the court’s finding that the sustained allegation was for an offense 

enumerated under section 707, subdivision (b) was based on the facts and circumstances 

of minor’s offense of attempted robbery with the personal use allegation. The attempted 

robbery allegation and the personal use allegation were both set forth in the petition. 

Therefore, even if minor was informed that the People sought to designate the offense as 

a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, minor would not have prepared his defense 

differently. Additionally, the court’s section 707, subdivision (b) finding was “not based 
7

on allegations in the pleadings but on evidence the court is directed to evaluate pursuant 

to sections 706 and 725.5.” (In re Gary B. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 844, 853 (Gary B.).)

Accordingly, we find no violation of minor’s due process rights.

d. The allegations in the section 602 petition

Here, the juvenile court designated minor’s offense of attempted robbery with the 

additional allegation he personally used a deadly weapon as an offense under section 707, 

subdivision (b). Although minor’s offense is not specifically named under section 707, 

subdivision (b), there is support for the “general proposition that a court may, under 

certain circumstances, look beyond the bare elements of a juvenile adjudication to 

determine whether it is based on conduct qualifying under section 707, subdivision (b).” 

(In re James H. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1086-1087, italics added.) 

For example, in Gary B., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at page 850, the appellate court 

held that “the juvenile court is entitled to base its section 707 determination on facts 

before it at the dispositional hearing which are either admitted by the minor or which the 

court finds to be true by a preponderance of the evidence.” Therefore, at issue here is 

whether minor’s conduct sufficiently rendered his offense to be one listed within section

707, subdivision (b). “We review the juvenile court’s findings under the substantial 

evidence standard.” (In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1065 (Emilio C.).)

Attempted Robbery

Minor argues that attempted robbery is not listed as an offense under section 707, 

subdivision (b), and we agree. 

Section 707, subdivision (b), lists 30 offenses that can create the presumption of 

unfitness. Robbery (§ 707, subd. (b)(3)) is listed, and so is one attempt offense, the 

attempt to commit murder (id., subd. (b)(12)). No other attempt offense, including 

attempted robbery, is listed under section 707, subdivision (b).
8

The People disagree with minor, contending that attempted robbery is listed under 

section 707, subdivision (b)(17). Section 707, subdivision (b)(17) lists “[a]n offense 

described in section 12022.5 or 12022.53 of the Penal Code,” and Penal Code section

12022.53 lists “attempted robbery” as an offense. The People acknowledge that Penal 

Code section 12022.53 describes sentence enhancements for individuals who commit 

certain felonies while personally using a firearm. However, they claim that section 707, 

subdivision (b)(17), specified “offenses,” not “enhancements,” thereby rendering all the 

listed “offenses” in Penal Code section 12022.53 within the purview of section 707, 

subdivision (b), regardless of whether a firearm was used. 

We disagree with the People’s interpretation. “Where a statute is theoretically 

capable of more than one construction we choose that which most comports with the 

intent of the Legislature. [Citations.] Words must be construed in context, and statutes 

must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. 

[Citations.] Interpretive constructions which render some words surplusage, defy 

common sense, or lead to mischief or absurdity, are to be avoided.” (California Mfrs.

Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844.) Therefore, “ ‘a court will 

adopt a restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more expansive meaning 

would make other items in the list unnecessary or redundant.’ ” (People ex rel. Lungren 

v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 307.)

The list of offenses described in Penal Code section 12022.53 duplicates some of

the offenses listed under section 707, subdivision (b).3 Accordingly, if we were to read 

section 707, subdivision (b)(17) to incorporate all the offenses listed in Penal Code 

 

3

For example, Penal Code section 12022.53 lists offenses such as murder, 

kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, and lewd or lascivious acts. Section 707, subdivision

(b), also lists these offenses.
9

section 12022.53, we would render a portion of the listed offenses under section 707, 

subdivision (b), extraneous and redundant. 

We therefore adopt a more restrictive interpretation and conclude that section 707, 

subdivision (b)(17)’s incorporation of the offenses described under Penal Code section

12022.53 are limited to those offenses where a minor has personally used a firearm. 

Since minor did not use a firearm in the commission of the attempted robbery, his offense 

was not one enumerated under section 707, subdivision (b)(17). This conclusion is in 

line with other appellate cases that have concluded that attempted robbery is not subject 

to the presumption set forth under section 707, subdivision (c), because it is not a listed 

offense under section 707, subdivision (b). (David P. v. Superior Court (1982) 127 

Cal.App.3d 417, 419 [“the presumption of unfitness contained in subdivision (c) of 

section 707 does not apply to an allegation of attempted robbery”]; In re J.L. (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 43, 56 [“the underlying attempted robbery is not a section 707, subdivision 

(b), offense”].) 

Use of a Deadly Weapon (Machete)

The court also found minor personally used a deadly weapon, a machete, during 

the commission of the attempted robbery. Minor argues his use of a deadly weapon does 

not render his offense one within the purview of section 707, subdivision (b). 

First, minor argues his offense is not within section 707, subdivision (b)(18), 

which specifically includes felony offenses in which the minor personally used a weapon 

as described in Penal Code section 16590. Penal Code section 16590 lists 26 specific

types of weapons, including a “lipstick case knife” (Pen. Code, § 16590, subd. (n)), a 

shobi-zue (id., subd. (s)) and a writing pen knife (id., subd. (y)). A machete is not listed 

by name as a weapon under Penal Code section 16590.

However, Penal Code section 16590, subdivision (i) defines a prohibited weapon 

as a “concealed dirk or dagger, as prohibited by [Penal Code] Section 21310.” (Italics
10

added.) Penal Code section 16470 defines a dirk or dagger as a “knife or other 

instrument with or without a handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon 

that may inflict great bodily injury or death.” Therefore, on its face it appears that the 

defendant’s use of a machete may qualify as a dirk or dagger. However, there is 

insufficient evidence in the record to support the required element that the machete was 

concealed. 

Roxas testified at minor’s trial that minor waved the machete at him. Minor 

testified in court that he had the unsharpened side of the machete up his sleeve, but 

asserted that approximately half a foot or six inches of the machete was hanging out of 

his sleeve. Although the law does not require complete concealment for a conviction of 

carrying a concealed dirk or dagger to stand, at a minimum “substantial concealment is 

required.” (People v. Wharton (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 75 [holding knife was concealed 

when only approximately one or two inches of blade was protruding from defendant’s 

pocket]; People v. Fuentes (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953 [finding concealment when portion 

of dirk’s handle was visible as protruding from defendant’s waistband].) Accordingly, 

there is insufficient evidence that minor’s conduct constituted an offense specified under

section 707, subdivision (b)(18).

Next, minor argues his conduct cannot be construed to be within section 707, 

subdivision (b)(14), which lists an assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. 

Assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury has also been construed to include 

the offense of assault with a deadly weapon in this context. (In re Pedro C. (1989) 215 

Cal.App.3d 174, 183.) 

Assault is defined as “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to 

commit a violent injury on the person of another.” (Pen. Code, § 240.) In contrast, 

robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of 

another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by 
11

means of force or fear.” (Id., § 211.) The requisite element of fear in a robbery offense

may either be (1) the fear of unlawful injury to the person or property of the person 

robbed, or any relative or family member, or (2) fear of immediate and unlawful injury to 

the person or property of anyone with the person robbed at the time of the offense. (Id., §

212.) Unlike assault, the threat to inflict injury required under a robbery offense “need 

not be accompanied by the present ability to carry it out.” (People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 

Cal.3d 92, 100.)

Assault, however, requires that the perpetrator have a present ability to commit a 

violent injury upon the other victim. A present ability to commit injury has been the 

subject of interpretation by various cases. “ ‘Holding up a fist in a menacing manner, 

drawing a sword, or bayonet, presenting a gun at a person who is within its range, have 

been held to constitute an assault. So, any other similar act, accompanied by such 

circumstances as denote an intention existing at the time, coupled with a present ability of 

using actual violence against the person of another, will be considered an assault.’ ” 

(People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 219.) “ ‘There need not be even a direct 

attempt at violence; but any indirect preparation towards it, under the circumstances 

mentioned, such as drawing a sword or bayonet, or even laying one’s hand upon his 

sword, would be sufficient.’ ” (People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1172.) Courts 

have held that merely holding a “knife in a threatening manner and demand[ing] money 

is sufficient to satisfy the requisite intent” for a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, 

even without an affirmative attempt to commit a battery like a lunge toward the victim. 

(People v. Vorbach (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 425, 429.) 

Here, Roxas testified that minor waved a machete at him, causing him fear of 

injury. Minor argues that Roxas’ testimony establishes that he was not close to Roxas 

when he waved the machete. Roxas testified that he was in the middle of the street, while 
12

minor and his friends were several feet away on the sidewalk, approximately four feet 

away from minor. 

However, case law has established that assault with a deadly weapon occurs once 

a defendant holds a knife in a threatening manner and makes demands or threats. (People 

v. Vorbach, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 429.) Furthermore, a distance of only four feet is 

not far, especially when taking into consideration the size of the machete. Even if 

minor’s testimony that part of the weapon was up his sleeve was true, minor testified that 

approximately half a foot of the blade’s sharp end was protruding. Based on minor’s 

proximity to Roxas and his use of the machete, sufficient evidence supports the 

conclusion that minor had the present ability to commit violent injury on Roxas. 

Accordingly, sufficient evidence would support both the determination that 

minor’s offense constituted attempted robbery, and also would support the finding that he 

committed an assault with a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, which 

was a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. 

Minor, however, argues that a finding that his offense constituted an assault would 

violate his due process rights, because he was not charged with committing assault in the

section 602 petition. In support of his proposition, minor again relies on Mancebo and 

Robert G. However, we again find those cases distinguishable. 

As we noted earlier, the finding that a minor’s offense falls within the purview of 

section 707, subdivision (b) “is not based on allegations in the pleadings but on evidence 

the court is directed to evaluate pursuant to sections 706 and 725.5.” (Gary B., supra, 61 

Cal.App.4th at p. 853.) 

For example, in Emilio C., the trial court concluded that minor’s conduct 

constituted an offense under section 707, subdivision (b), for a violation of Penal Code 

section 288, even though the count was dismissed and the juvenile court sustained the 

minor’s petition for a violation of Penal Code section 288.5 (continuous sexual abuse of a 
13

child), an offense not listed under section 707, subdivision (b). (Emilio C., supra, 116 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065-1066.) The Emilio C. court concluded that the juvenile court 

was “entitled to look beyond the pleadings and consider the circumstances of [minor’s] 

offense.” (Id. at p. 1065.) Additionally, Emilio C. reiterated that the juvenile court was

also able to base its decision on “facts presented at the disposition hearing that the court 

found to be true by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Ibid.) In Emilio C., the appellate 

court concluded that sufficient evidence showed that minor’s conduct constituted a 

violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b) (lewd and lascivious acts on a child 

under the age of 14 by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and 

unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person), which is specifically enumerated 

in section 707, subdivision (b). Additionally, the court concluded the evidence also 

established that minor’s assaults constituted rape with force or violence or threat of great 

bodily harm, an offense also enumerated under section 707, subdivision (b). (Emilio C., 

supra, at p. 1066.) 

Similarly, the appellate court in Gary B. held that the juvenile court appropriately 

considered minor’s personal use of a firearm during the commission of the charged 

robbery, even though the firearm enhancement was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. 

(Gary B., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.)

Here, when making the determination on whether minor’s offense constituted an 

offense within the meaning of section 707, subdivision (b), the trial court was entitled to 

contemplate facts “transactionally related to the offenses upon which the petition is 

sustained.” (Gary B., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) Minor’s use of the machete when 

demanding Roxas’ money was transactionally related to the attempted robbery offense. 

Since this evidence supports the trial court’s determination, we find no due process 

violation. 
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2. Probation Condition

Lastly, minor challenges probation condition No. 6 imposed by the juvenile court 

that stated that he should “attend school regularly with no unexcused absences or tardies, 

and obey all rules and regulations of school officials.” He claims the part of the 

condition requiring him to comply with school rules and regulations is unconstitutionally 

vague. 

“A Court of Appeal may review the constitutionality of a probation condition, 

even when it has not been challenged in the trial court, if the question can be resolved as 

a matter of law without reference to the sentencing record. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 875, 888-889 (Sheena K.).) Our review of such a question is de novo.” (People 

v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345.)

“[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair 

warning.’ ” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “A probation condition ‘must 

be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the 

court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a 

challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Ibid.) That is, the defendant must know in 

advance when he may be in violation of the condition. “[T]he law has no legitimate 

interest in punishing an innocent citizen who has no knowledge” that he or she may be 

violating a probation condition. (People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752.) 

The People oppose modification, arguing that the condition is already sufficiently 

constitutionally clear. They argue that the addition of a knowledge requirement is not 

necessary, because probation violations must be willful. (People v. Zaring (1992) 8 

Cal.App.4th 362, 378-379.) Therefore, they argue that minor will not be found in 

violation of his probation unless the evidence shows he willfully broke school rules or 

regulations. 
15

We agree with the People that even without modification, there is a requirement 

that minor must be found to have willfully violated school rules or regulations before he 

can be found in violation of his probation. However, this does not cure the condition’s 

vagueness problem. By itself, the condition does not sufficiently inform minor of what 

he is required to do. School rules and regulations can range widely from rules set forth 

by an individual school to the rules set forth by the school district. They can also include 

internal classroom rules that are set by teachers or other rules and regulations that are 

posted on school grounds. To add to the confusion, rules and regulations can be set 

orally by school administrators, or written in school handbooks. Based on the present 

wording of the probation condition, it is not clear what conduct is proscribed, because it 

is not sufficiently clear what types of rules or regulations are at issue. Accordingly, out 

of an abundance of caution, we modify the probation condition to clarify that minor is 

required to obey school rules and regulations that are known to minor or that are set forth 

by his probation officer, school staff, or in the institution’s handbook. 

DISPOSITION

Probation condition No. 6 is modified to read that “said minor attend school 

regularly with no unexcused absences or tardies, and obey all known rules and 

regulations of school officials and those rules and regulations of school officials as set 

forth by the probation officer, school staff, or in the institution’s handbook.” As 

modified, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
Walsh, J.*

WE CONCUR:

Rushing, P. J.

Elia, J.

 

*

Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.