COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

HARRISON R. JONES, JR., S/K/A 

 HARRISON RANDOLPH JONES, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0604-96-4 BY JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 APRIL 22, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

James H. Chamblin, Judge 

 Robert J. Hartsoe, Assistant Public Defender, 

for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Harrison R. Jones, Jr. (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of possessing phencyclidine (PCP) and marijuana. On 

appeal, appellant challenges the trial judge's refusal to 

suppress the evidence based upon the police officer's encounter 

with him. For the reasons that follow, we find no error and 

affirm appellant's convictions. 

 "On appeal, the burden is on appellant to show, considering 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

that the denial of the motion to suppress constituted reversible 

error." Stanley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 874, 433 

S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993). Although we are bound to review de novo

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion, we "review 

findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give 

due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers." Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. ___, ___, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). 

 Here, Officer Ebersole responded to a shopping center 

parking lot to investigate "a citizen's report of a possible 

intoxicated driver." The report indicated that "two white male 

subjects had left Zingers [a nightclub] and had gotten into a 

light blue Chevrolet pickup truck that had . . . Pennsylvania 

license plates on it and that the vehicle's occupants were being 

disorderly." On cross-examination, Ebersole further elaborated 

that he was told that "these two disorderly subjects that were 

reported to be intoxicated had entered a vehicle and appeared as 

though they were attempting to leave." 

 Within five minutes, Ebersole arrived and found the truck at 

the reported location; it was parked and contained two white 

males. Ebersole parked his police car so as not to block the 

truck and, dressed in his uniform, he "attempted to make contact" 

with the driver by "knocking on the driver's side window." 

Appellant sat in the driver's seat, looked at Ebersole "and then 

turned away and continued" to talk with the person in the 

passenger seat. Ebersole "again knocked on the window louder," 

and appellant "rolled down the window" and asked what Ebersole 

wanted. Ebersole "requested to see some identification," and 
 3 

appellant "produced [his] driver's license." "Talking with 

[appellant, Ebersole] detected a very strong odor of alcohol 

emitting from [appellant's] person. [Ebersole] noted that 

[appellant's] eyes were glassy and when he spoke his speech was 

very slurred." Appellant did not appropriately respond to 

Ebersole's questions, and eventually he "got abusive towards 

[Ebersole] and became angry." 

 After appellant became "argumentative," Ebersole asked 

appellant to exit the vehicle. Upon alighting from the vehicle, 

appellant "was staggering to the point where he had to brace 

himself on the vehicle to keep from falling." Due to appellant's 

condition, Ebersole "was unable to have" appellant perform any 

field sobriety tests. At that point in time, Ebersole "placed 

[appellant] under arrest for being drunk in public." 

 Following a search incident to appellant's arrest, the 

police recovered PCP and marijuana. The trial judge found no 

Fourth Amendment violation and denied the suppression motion. He 

then found appellant guilty of both charges. 

 Assuming without deciding that appellant was seized when 

Ebersole knocked on the window a second time and requested 

identification, we find that the encounter was supported by a 

reasonable suspicion that appellant was or was about to be 

engaged in criminal behavior. 

 "A police officer may lawfully stop . . . an individual if 

the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, based on 
 4 

articulable facts, that the individual is or is about to be 

engaged in criminal activity." Gregory v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. 

App. 100, 105, 468 S.E.2d 117, 120 (1996). "Although the 

Commonwealth has the burden of proving that such an investigatory 

stop is lawful, the 'level of suspicion required [for an 

investigative stop] is less demanding than the standard of 

probable cause.'" Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 441, 

452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) (en banc) (citation omitted). "'When 

a court reviews whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to 

make an investigatory stop, it must view the totality of the 

circumstances . . . objectively through the eyes of a reasonable 

police officer with the knowledge, training, and experience of 

the investigating officer.'" Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. 

App. 162, 170, 455 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1995) (quoting Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989)). 

 "In considering whether facts based on an anonymous tip are 

sufficient to provide a police officer a reason to suspect 

criminal activity, the United States Supreme Court has stated 

that 'anonymous [information that has] been sufficiently 

corroborated [may] furnish reasonable suspicion . . . [justifying 

an] investigative stop.'" Gregory, 22 Va. App. at 106, 468 

S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 

(1990)). "[A]lthough the police do not have to verify every 

detail provided by an anonymous tipster, 'significant aspects of 

the informer's information must be independently corroborated.'" 
 5 

Id. (quoting Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 137, 428 

S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993)). "This Court has held that Alabama v. 

White does not preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion when 

the anonymous tipster does 'not provide the government with 

information that predicts the future actions of the [defendant], 

if some other indicia of reliability of the informant exists.'" 

Beckner v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 535, 425 S.E.2d 530, 

531 (1993). 

 Here, the tipster provided a detailed description of the 

vehicle, the location, and the nature of the illegal activity in 

which the individual was possibly engaged. Although Officer 

Ebersole did not observe appellant engaged in illegal activity, 

he verified significant details provided by the tipster within 

moments after receiving the detailed information. Ebersole 

verified that, indeed, two white males were in the truck and the 

truck matched the description provided by the tipster. 

 Viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that Ebersole sufficiently 

articulated circumstances from which it reasonably could be 

inferred that appellant may be intoxicated in public, see Code 

§ 18.2-388, and that he might attempt to drive while intoxicated, 

see Code § 18.2-266. Ebersole immediately verified the tipster's 

detailed information, and proceeded to investigate. It was 

nighttime, and, although appellant was in a nonmoving vehicle, 

the truck was located in a public parking lot. See Fierst v. 
 6 

Commonwealth, 210 Va. 757, 760, 173 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1970) 

(holding that officer had probable cause to arrest defendant 

seated in parked car for being drunk in public). After Ebersole 

knocked on the window, appellant looked at Ebersole and turned 

away without making an auditory or visual acknowledgment. Based 

on these circumstances, Ebersole had no way to determine the 

status of appellant, who was located in a public place at the 

time. The evidence established sufficient reasonable suspicion 

to warrant the initial encounter. See Layne v. Commonwealth, 15 

Va. App. 23, 26, 421 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1992). Therefore, the 

trial judge did not commit reversible error in denying 

appellant's motion to suppress. 

 Because Ebersole had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

approach appellant and investigate, we find it unnecessary to 

address whether the initial encounter between appellant and 

Ebersole was consensual. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's 

convictions. 

 Affirmed.