[J-77-2014] [MO:Eakin, J.] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee 

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JACOB MATTHEW CHRISTINE, 

 Appellant 

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No. 8 MAP 2014 

Appeal from the Order of the Superior 

Court dated August 30, 2013 at No. 1893 

EDA 2011 affirming the Judgment of 

Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Northampton County, Criminal Division, 

dated November 24, 2010 at No. CP-48-

CR-0003344-2009 

ARGUED: September 9, 2014 

CONCURRING OPINION 

MADAME JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: October 27, 2015

I join the majority in affirming the Superior Court’s holding that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the shank found in Appellant’s cell for 

the purpose of rebutting Appellant’s claim that he was unarmed and acted in selfdefense. I also agree that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion in limine to 

question the victim regarding his conviction for simple assault which occurred after his 

jailhouse altercation with Appellant; I write separately, however, because my reasoning 

on this second issue differs from that of the majority. 

As noted by the majority, Appellant was charged with, inter alia, aggravated 

assault based on a jailhouse altercation involving the victim in June 2009, during which 

the victim allegedly threw hot coffee onto Appellant and punched Appellant several 

times. Appellant filed a pretrial motion seeking to introduce evidence that the victim was 

convicted of simple assault based on an incident of domestic violence between the 

victim and his girlfriend which occurred subsequent to the victim’s release from prison, 
[J-77-2014] [MO: Eakin, J.] - 2 

approximately 11 months after the jailhouse altercation involving Appellant. Appellant 

argued that the victim’s simple assault conviction was relevant to Appellant’s selfdefense claim because it demonstrated the victim’s violent propensities and suggested 

the victim was the initial aggressor. 

In denying Appellant’s motion to introduce evidence of the victim’s simple assault 

conviction, the trial court first noted that, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), evidence of 

other crimes generally is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to 

show conformity therewith. Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/11, at 12. The trial court 

acknowledged that this Court has held that a defendant who alleges self-defense may 

use a deceased victim’s criminal record either to corroborate his alleged knowledge of 

the victim’s quarrelsome and violent character to show the defendant reasonably 

believed his life was in danger; or to prove the allegedly violent propensities of the 

victim to show the victim was the aggressor. See Commonwealth v. Amos, 284 A.2d 

748 (Pa. 1971); Commonwealth v. Beck, 402 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1979). However, the trial 

court distinguished those cases on the basis that, unlike the present altercation, they 

involved a deceased victim. The trial court concluded that Appellant was attempting “to 

use future events to retroactively establish [the victim’s] character,” and opined: 

the law only allows evidence of prior incidents to prove the 

character or reputation of the victim at the time of the crime 

in question. A subsequent conviction arising from events 

that transpired after the incident involving [Appellant] simply 

has no bearing on whether [the victim] possessed violent 

propensities on June 8, 2009. 

 Id. at 13. 

On appeal, the Opinion in Support of Affirmance (“OISA”) below recognized the 

principle expressed in Amos that a defendant alleging self-defense may use a deceased 

victim’s criminal record to prove the alleged violent propensities of the victim to show 

that the victim was the aggressor, and further recognized that, to be admissible, the 
[J-77-2014] [MO: Eakin, J.] - 3 

victim’s crimes must be “similar in nature and not too distant in time” from the underlying 

incident. Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2013) (OISA) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 741 (Pa. 2012)). However, without 

acknowledging, as the trial court did, that Amos was distinguishable because the victim 

in the instant case is not deceased, the OISA concluded the trial court in the instant 

case properly excluded evidence of the victim’s simple assault conviction because the 

offense was not “similar in nature” to the jailhouse altercation during which the victim 

threw hot coffee onto and punched Appellant. Christine, 78 A.3d at 5 (OISA). 

Although the Opinion in Support of Reversal (“OISR”) below also concluded the 

trial court properly precluded introduction of the victim’s conviction for simple assault, it 

did so based on its belief that the victim’s simple assault conviction did not show a 

propensity for violence on June 8, 2009, because the conduct underlying the conviction 

was then a future event. Thus, the OISR would have affirmed the trial court’s ruling 

because the victim’s “subsequent conviction for an event that transpired after the prison 

incident should not be used ‘to retroactively establish [his] character’ at the time of the 

incident.” Christine, 78 A.3d at 11-12 (OISR) (citation omitted). 

The majority concludes that “the Superior Court did not err in determining the trial 

court acted within its discretion by excluding [the victim’s] subsequent simple-assault 

conviction,” but declines to “endorse the claim that a subsequent conviction can never

be probative and admissible.” Majority Opinion at 8 (emphasis original). The majority 

further opines: “Proximity in time is a factor, as is similarity of facts. Here we have 11 

months between events, but a strikingly disparate factual scenario.” Id. The majority 

proceeds to affirm the trial court based on this factual disparity. 

While I agree with the majority that the Superior Court did not err in affirming the 

trial court’s holding, I disagree with its premise. Indeed, there is no case law supporting 
[J-77-2014] [MO: Eakin, J.] - 4 

introduction of evidence of a victim’s subsequent conviction to demonstrate the victim’s 

character for purposes of proving the victim was the aggressor. Both Amos and Beck 

involved evidence of a deceased victim’s aggressive behavior which occurred prior to 

their fatal altercations, and this Court has continued to limit introduction of evidence of a 

victim’s convictions to those which occurred prior to the incident in which the victim is 

alleged to have been the aggressor: 

[A]s an evidentiary matter, this Court has held that when 

self-defense is properly at issue, evidence of the victim’s 

prior convictions involving aggression may be admitted, if 

probative, either (1) to corroborate the defendant’s alleged 

knowledge of the victim’s violent character, to prove that the 

defendant was in reasonable fear of danger, or (2) as

character/propensity evidence, as indirect evidence that the 

victim was in fact the aggressor. 

Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 741 (emphasis added). 

Thus, I would hold that the trial court properly precluded Appellant from 

introducing evidence of the victim’s subsequent simple assault conviction to support 

Appellant’s claim of self-defense pursuant to Rule 404(b)(1), and would not engage in 

an analysis of whether the facts underlying the two altercations were sufficiently similar 

in nature.