# EUR-Lex - 52012JC0027 - EN

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# 52012JC0027

**JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU SUPPORT FOR SUSTAINABLE CHANGE IN TRANSITION SOCIETIES /* JOIN/2012/027 final */**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1........... HOW CAN THE EU HELP CREATE
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS?      5

1.1........ Support for inclusive political
process and governance..................................................... 5

1.2........ Support for institution building and
the rule of law............................................................ 6

1.3........ Support for economic and social
development................................................................. 7

1.4........ Support for conflict prevention,
peace-building and security............................................. 8

2........... HOW CAN THE EU IMPROVE ITS TOOLS
AND APPROACH?............................. 9

2.1........ Responding to partner societies'
needs............................................................................ 9

2.2........ Anchoring the process with early
achievements.............................................................. 10

2.3........ Applying incentives, constraints
and conditionalities........................................................ 11

2.4........ Involving all relevant
stakeholders.................................................................................. 13

2.5........ Enhancing knowledge-sharing and
development capacities............................................. 14

2.6........ Cooperating with Member States,
other donors and organisations.................................. 15

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

EU SUPPORT FOR SUSTAINABLE CHANGE IN
TRANSITION SOCIETIES

Purpose and context

People in every part of the world aspire to
political freedom, security for themselves and their families, accountable
government, economic opportunities and justice. In response, many countries,
including those in the EU's own neighbourhood, have recently undertaken or are
now embarking upon major reforms – reforms designed to transform their
societies into inclusive democracies that are both willing and able to address
the needs and aspirations of the population and, in some cases, normalise their
relations with the international community and neighbouring countries.

The EU has considerable experience from
such transition processes, both internally and in supporting the efforts of
other countries in its neighbourhood and around the world. The EU's enlargement
policy, in particular, has proven to be a powerful tool to foster societal
transformation. Countries that have already acceded to the EU, in particular
those who joined in 2004 and in 2007, and those on the road to join have
undergone impressive changes through accession-driven democratic and economic
reforms.[1]
The close inter-linkage of peace,
stability, democracy, and prosperity has come to the
forefront also in other frameworks, including the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), development cooperation and EU's Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

This Communication is intended to examine
what the EU has to offer to help countries in transition achieve successful and
sustainable transformations, building on its own experiences. It also sets out
a number of concrete measures to improve the way in which the EU supports these
countries so that they could achieve lasting reforms and avoid backsliding.

In particular, it addresses situations
where a reform process needs further support to deliver workable, lasting
change. "Transition" is understood in a broad sense to include
stabilisation, societal transformation, institution building and consolidation
of reforms. While fragile states and situations of conflict are not
specifically addressed, as they involve a number of context-specific challenges
and require a different constellation of EU supporting measures, some
experiences mentioned herein can also be relevant in those cases.

Transition poses challenges which vary
widely from one country to another, as described in the accompanying Staff
Working Document. The process can be peaceful or crisis-driven; it involves uncertainty,
risk and sometimes even threats to domestic or regional stability. Experience
shows that transitions can fail. Such failure can cause high political, social
and economic costs to societies. A successful transition process means
consolidating reforms and making them sustainable in the long-term, in an
atmosphere of stability and confidence. In some cases, there will also be a
need to prevent conflict while promoting and managing peaceful change. To
achieve this, the process needs to be domestically driven and inclusive and
address comprehensively the relevant political, social and economic challenges.

To
contribute to sustainable change in transition societies, the EU should:

–
mobilise all its instruments in a comprehensive,
targeted and long-term response which takes account of the partner country's
needs and the root causes underpinning people's desire for societal change;

–
promote democratic governance, human rights and
the rule of law, economic and social welfare at national and regional, as well
as peace and stability, in a way that contributes to socially, economically,
politically and environmentally sustainable reforms and regional integration;

–
act in a way that enhances the partner
countries' ownership of the reform process and encourages the exchange of
experiences without the imposition of specific models.

To achieve this, the EU should:

–
base its response on a proper needs
assessment, taking full account of the key challenges facing its partner
countries;

–
explore possibilities for early achievements
on issues relating to basic freedoms, income generation and public service
delivery in the initial transition phase, to encourage continued popular
support for reforms;

–
use incentives and conditionalities more
coherently and efficiently;

–
involve all relevant stakeholders – such as social and economic partners, the private sector and
other ­civil society organisations (CSO), as well as regional organisations – in
reform processes and policy dialogues;

–
invest more in the building of impartial institutions
bound by the rule of law to ensure that the reforms undertaken are also implemented
and enforced in practice; and extend capacity development beyond
institutions to improve citizens' access to public services, such as
security and justice.

–
make efficient use of knowledge-sharing
and capacity development methods, including the use of transition
experience of EU Member States;

–
engage in efficient cooperation and
coordination with EU Member States, including possible joint programming,
and with other donors and actors.

1.           HOW
CAN THE EU HELP CREATE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS?

It is up to each partner country to
determine how it wishes to manage its transition and transformation. The EU, in
turn, can use its support methods to assist home-grown processes and to help
create favourable conditions for the process. In doing so, it needs to respect the
partner country's ownership of the process, as well as the principle of policy coherence
for development in policies affecting developing countries and the principle of
sector concentration as regards development cooperation. Moreover, EU support
must take into account the long-term nature of a democratic and economic
transition process. A comprehensive and sustained approach will allow the EU to
assist and revitalise often wavering or stagnating transition processes.

Evidently, the degree of change and its
speed can vary widely depending on the partner country. At the same time, reforms
need to tackle existing shortcomings comprehensively. Political reforms are not
sufficient if there is no independent and accountable judiciary, no competition
authority and no effective anti-corruption policy, as these are needed to allow
for investments to boost the economic development. Good coordination between
the different authorities involved in the reform efforts is also important. In
enlargement countries, for instance, the fact that governments established
ministries or offices for European integration with coordination functions and
followed a clearly set policy agenda of alignment with European standards and
the EU acquis has helped governments to focus on a comprehensive reform agenda.

The sequencing of reforms is highly
context-dependent and a balance has to be sought between "quick-win"
reforms that serve to maintain the political and social momentum and to retain
popular support for the entire process and for longer-term reforms. The policy
mix will vary according to the needs and aspirations of the country concerned
and the key motivations underpinning people's desire for societal change.

1.1.        Support
for inclusive political process and governance

The EU
enlargement policy is the most comprehensive approach to supporting inclusive
political processes and governance. Democratic institutions, the rule of law
and the respect for human rights are at the centre of the accession criteria.
The substantial transitions from communist regimes to real democracies in the
eastern and central European Member States was made possible by the clear
desire of the citizens and the political will of the elected authorities. These
processes were supported by the EU, including through financial assistance,
expert advice and the accession negotiation process.

The EU
continues to consolidate its support for democracy world-wide, in line
with the 2009 Council Conclusions which call for a comprehensive EU approach.[2] The examples of Tunisia and Bolivia illustrate the use of all relevant EU instruments.[3]

The EU support is centred on four main
fronts: establishment of constitutional and electoral processes; strengthening
of democratic institutions; strengthening of political and civil society; and gradual
development of a democratic political culture. The traditional focus on credible
elections and security, and on bolstering the executive branch of
the government, is increasingly shifting towards also strengthening
constituent assemblies and legislatures and the putting in place
effective systems of checks and balances[4].
The EU is also stepping up its engagement with political parties (in Tunisia, for instance) on a non-partisan basis through capacity development activities and
the facilitation of multi-party dialogues.

Moreover, EU development policy has made a
strategic shift towards stronger emphasis on human rights, democracy, rule of
law and other elements of good governance, by proposing a higher share of EU cooperation programmes
to be devoted in this area.[5]

The EU and its Member States are also
reinforcing the effectiveness and coherence of their support for human rights
in partner countries. For this purpose, comprehensive human rights country
strategies are being developed. These strategies identify priority areas
for EU action,
inform the human rights and political dialogues at all levels and will be taken into
account in policy-making and when programming
and implementing financial assistance, including budget support. These
strategies will also be taken into account in the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) progress reports, so as to ensure that the "more for more"
principle is applied in a consistent way across the ENP region.

The EU is also currently improving its
analytical tools for democratisation strategies through democracy
profiles in pilot cases, which map the political
structures and processes and inform both EU programming and political dialogue.
They provide, in particular, information on the legal system, the division of
powers both horizontally and vertically, the constitution and the electoral
system and look at the efficiency and effectiveness of the rule of law, of the
public sector and its ability to drive and/or contribute to sustainable
development.

1.2.        Support
for institution building and the rule of law

The establishment and consolidation of
independent, transparent and effective institutions is highly important for
building trust in a country in transition and for creating the basis for
further developments, as well as for tackling corruption and organised crime
early in reform processes – an important lesson learned in the context of
reforms linked to recent EU enlargements. Macroeconomic stability can only grow
if there is a climate that attracts investments and that allows businesses to
thrive. This requires an independent judiciary to solve disputes, clearly
regulated property rights and respect for the rule of law. Moreover, credible
institutions are needed to avoid gaps between legal rules and the capacity to implement
and enforce them, which in practice can prevent or slow down a real change and
facilitate corruption.

An independent judiciary needs to ensure
the respect for the rule of law and the protection of human rights. This can be
a particular challenge, as judges and prosecutors appointed under previous,
non-democratic regimes might undermine reform efforts. At the same time, lustration
(i.e. dismissal of those associated with abuses of the previous regime) or
vetting procedures bear the risk of further politicising the system for a
prolonged period of time. Therefore, a balanced approach needs to be taken,
which should also explore possibilities of holding judges and prosecutors
accountable through disciplinary or criminal proceedings. At the same time, capacity development should contribute
to better access for citizens to security and justice services (for example
through awareness raising), which as such is crucial if the transition process
is to be sustainable and legitimate.

Public administrations need to be reformed so
that they work in the interest of the citizens. Independent supervisory bodies,
such as ombudspersons, anti-corruption agencies or data protection supervisors
are necessary to control the work of the other state institutions and protect
citizens' rights. Provided that these new institutions are set up with real
independence and are given sufficient means to carry out their tasks
effectively, they can ensure concrete and visible progress on the rule of law
and human rights and increase citizens' trust.

The EU can contribute to institution
building in various ways, such as financial support, policy dialogues and
technical cooperation. For instance, the Instrument for Pre-accession
Assistance in the enlargement policy has helped the Western Balkan countries
significantly in their reform efforts. In addition, a comprehensive
institutional framework will ensure the sustainability of the reforms made.
Such a framework, however, needs to be well balanced and a system of checks and
balances established. Concentrating too much power in the hands of one or few
institutions creates the risk of abuses of this power or of backsliding of the
reform process through closure of such institutions.

1.3.        Support
for economic and social development

A country-specific reform agenda

As a result of economic and political
uncertainties, transition often brings about a short-term deterioration in
growth and employment, as well as in public and external accounts. Where this
results in increasing unemployment and poverty in particular, it may erode and
put at risk the legitimacy of the democratisation process and result in
increased emigration and brain-drain. In the longer term, reforms need to be
able to meet citizens' expectations for decent jobs, economic opportunities and
social justice.

Experience from countries that have carried
out successful governance reforms, like Member States that joined the EU in the
past decade,[6]
indeed demonstrates that these are often linked to the processes of economic
and social development. In these countries, the
economic reform agenda was defined by four priorities: macroeconomic
stabilisation, privatisation and restructuring of enterprises, improving the
business environment, and upgrading the performance of labour markets. These
priorities supported the overarching objective of raising productivity growth
in order to raise living standards and improve economic and social cohesion and
welfare in a sustainable manner. The reform and
development of public finances was equally important to ensure resources to
support other economic reforms and to maintain and further develop an
appropriate level of public services.

Even if, in general, the long-term
objectives of the new leaders of these countries were similar, the priorities,
sequencing and pace of the reforms differed widely. Some countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia) quickly introduced radical reforms to create conditions for an
economic recovery (the so-called “shock therapy”), despite its significant
negative impacts in the short term, such as output drop, unemployment and
recession. Other countries (such as Hungary and Slovenia) took a more
“gradualist” approach by implementing step-by-step macro-economic, structural
and institutional reforms, avoiding thus abrupt changes in economic output,
employment and welfare. This allowed time for national enterprises and economic
operators to adapt to the new conditions of an open market economy.

The EU has a
broad range of types of support to offer. Budget support, including State
Building Contracts where appropriate, can be deployed to help countries consolidate
the transition and stabilise their short-term growth prospects and employment
in the initial phase characterized by uncertainties, while avoiding
unsustainable development of their external and/or public debt. Other forms of
development assistance, including project based assistance (see the example of Ivory Coast) and technical assistance can also be deployed to meet specific transition
needs.

Helping create decent jobs and a secure
business environment

In the long run, the EU can help partner
countries build a more robust policy and regulatory framework capable of
attracting private investment, spurring
entrepreneurship, promoting SMEs, ensuring the
effective and efficient management of natural resources, enhancing their
capacity to collect taxes, improving agriculture, and strengthening economic
cooperation and integration with other countries.[7] Trade agreements and
instruments, along with aid for trade, can further contribute to creating a favourable
environment for economic development and regional integration. Similarly,
support to establish a stable, predictable and secure environment for
business remains crucial. It is also often necessary to (re)define property
rights, land ownership and the role of the private sector. For instance, in the central
and eastern European Member States, the investment
climate was improved by legal and regulatory institutions to oversee business
management, secure property and contract rights, simplified regulatory and
licensing procedures, as well as an adequate banking system. Similarly,
conditions for agriculture were improved by land market reform,
including property rights, tax aspects, cadastre and registry.

The EU can support relevant reforms through
sector reform contracts coupled with intensified policy dialogue.
Moreover, it can support and facilitate capacity development of local
enterprises, notably micro, small and medium-sized ones (see the example of
SANAD in the MENA region[8]).
Partnering with the private sector may also be an efficient way to
attract investment, strengthen linkages between Foreign Direct Investment and
local business, and to stimulate employment. EU regional blending facilities
have proven to be able to leverage substantial additional funding by combining
EU grants with other resources, such as loans from European Finance
Institutions, including the European Investment Bank.[9]

Helping to build
inclusive economies and societies

It is equally important for the EU to
continue to support its partner countries' efforts in addressing their citizens'
aspirations for more equity, social inclusion and social protection (a
specific Communication on social protection is foreseen in the second half of
2012). Support is particularly needed for actions that promote social
and public service delivery to all population groups. In this regard, CSOs can
play an important role by promoting ethical, inclusive and equitable business
models. The involvement of young people, the future leaders, should be
particularly promoted.

Transition is also a critical moment for
taking concrete steps to promote gender equality and the empowerment
of women as key participants in transition, to boost both their security
and their participation, through means such as sector budget support and
actions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
(for examples, see Morocco and Afghanistan)[10].

1.4.        Support
for conflict prevention, peace-building and security

Some transitions towards democracy face a
key two-fold challenge: ensuring that security and peace contribute to
sustainable development on the one hand, and that development contributes to
peace and stability on the other.

Events such as elections, changes in the
government or the (re)allocation of resources can trigger outbreaks of violence
and/or armed conflict, and trigger setbacks in often fragile transition
processes, especially in those societies which have not yet established
effective and legitimate institutional frameworks to resolve conflicts
peacefully.

EU support in such circumstances must involve
a conflict-sensitive and context-specific approach. In tackling the root causes
of conflict, it should avoid increasing the dependency, power and patronage of
certain groups or exacerbating the negative impacts on coping mechanisms. The exact
approach and considerations in individual country situations should be
identified through a dedicated conflict analysis. In many cases, such an
analysis will reveal specific issues related to the peace-building goals as
developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and
endorsed by the international community, including the EU.[11] These goals relate to the need
for an inclusive political process and reconciliation, intercultural dialogue, access
to security, justice and jobs, and accountable and effective resource
management.

In any event, EU support must be
implemented within a broader approach that considers all the relevant areas,
including reconciliation and support for uprooted people, crisis prevention,
security sector reform, resilience and climate change, sustainable and
responsible management of resources, the rule of law, democratisation, civil
society, human rights, public administration reform and public service
delivery. As an example, the EU has contributed to reconciliation in the
countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia and the clear conditionality of
the accession process ensured the prosecution of war crimes and cooperation
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Reform of the security sector constitutes a
particular challenge in efforts to guarantee security and stability. Better
civilian oversight of security services is generally a priority, as is improving the effectiveness, accountability and behaviour
of the broad range of security actors. The participation of communities and
civil society groups can make the provision of security both more effective and
more accountable. Particular attention needs to be paid to the role and rights
of vulnerable groups. As part of a comprehensive EU approach, the EU's
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can also play an important role in
addressing key transition challenges. Since 2003, the EU has inter alia been
providing training, advice or mentoring in support of security sector reform, monitoring
peace plans or providing security support, often under a UN mandate. This is
done through civilian and/or military support measures.

2.           How
can the EU improve its tools and approach?

2.1.        Responding
to partner societies' needs

To secure a peaceful and successful
transition, the specific reform process of each country should respond to people's
needs, defined by the country itself. While key needs and challenges in
transition countries vary considerably, they very often include:

–
national reconciliation and building a national
consensus on fundamental issues;

–
establishing well-functioning democratic
institutions and processes;

–
avoiding an unsustainable decline in incomes and
employment and restoring or maintaining macroeconomic stability;

–
promoting long-term socio-economic development
and inclusion, with decent jobs, economic opportunities, basic social services,
including quality healthcare, education, and social justice;

–
establishing a business-friendly environment,
(re)defining property rights and the role of the private sector, and reviewing
the functioning of the market; and

–
where necessary, restoring security, justice and
the rule of law.

As situations vary widely, there is no
uniform prescription for a successful transition process or EU response.
For instance, a fragile state within the group of least developed countries,
such as Burma/Myanmar, may require a somewhat different response from that of
more advanced middle income countries like Tunisia or Egypt.

EU support should to be tailored to consider
the specific situation and needs of each country along with the added value
that EU support can bring, and an assessment of the specific interests and potential
risks for the EU. The starting point should generally be the countries' own assessments
of needs and how these can be addressed. The swift deployment, during the
initial stage of a transition, of a joint EU services mission involving
all those responsible for the different available instruments, is key to
prepare in a timely manner a comprehensive, integrated and long-term response. For
instance in the framework of the enlargement policy, peer assessment missions
with the participation of Member States experts, as well as broad consultations
with other donors, international organisations and civil society have proved to
deliver good results in the preparation of EU assistance. In the context of aid
for trade, the EU has also provided support for the trade needs assessment,
diagnostic studies and elaboration of trade strategies through dedicated programmes
in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

2.2.        Anchoring
the process with early achievements

Given the
uncertainty and instability linked to transition processes, it is critical to
achieve, as soon as possible, some tangible improvements to establish
confidence and to promote political stability and social cohesion. While
long-term strategies are being put in place, potential areas for such early
achievements can cover basic democratic rights and freedoms including cultural
rights, job creation and removing constraints to growth, public service
delivery, including basic social services, as well as recovery of lost assets
and re-establishment of livelihoods particularly in post-conflict situation.

In the area of democratic governance,
typical examples of areas where such quick wins could be possible include
freedom of expression and credible elections (see the example of Tunisia[12]), a representative and
legitimate constituent assembly and the adoption of a new constitution through
participatory processes. As experience in current and past EU enlargement
processes has demonstrated, trust of citizens in the rule of law and protection
of human rights can be strengthened through concrete support of relevant
institutions and setting up of independent supervisory bodies, as well as
through improved access to information and data on key economic and social
issues.

In the short run, democratic transition may
weaken economic activity, employment rates and macroeconomic stability. It is
crucial that measures are taken and projects implemented that can help usher in fast improvements in income generation, social safety nets and basic
service delivery, and can guard against unsustainable poverty increases.
This is often necessary to generate support for economic reforms with a
longer-term impact – or at least to overcome
resistance to change. For instance, funds and
projects promoting job creation through the development of SMEs and microcredit
schemes[13]
can be used in this context. Reforms
can be facilitated also at industry level, in particular where there is
potential for rapid take-off and for tangible results in terms of incomes and
jobs.

Programmes for quick-win job creation and short-term
employment should, however, strive to include longer-term follow-up for
instance by vocational training and job mediation services that help programme
participants find regular work. The need for quick
wins should be built into longer-term strategies for employment generation and
should not spawn new entrenched interests and unsustainable situations.

In the area of security, immediate
steps to help stabilise a country following a possible conflict are often
needed to prevent the situation from deteriorating and the transition process
from backsliding. Successful, although very different, examples of EU support
include negotiating and monitoring steps towards peace (enlargement countries, Georgia,
Aceh Indonesia); supporting border management (enlargement countries, Libya);
training police officers (enlargement countries, Afghanistan); temporarily ensuring
international civil administration or policing and justice functions (EULEX, Kosovo[14]); and supporting the United
Nations, for instance through a bridging operation (Chad and the DRC) or
assistance to a UN monitoring mission as in Syria.

2.3.        Applying
incentives, constraints and conditionalities

While incentives,
constraints and conditionalities cannot be the main driver of reforms, they can
support the process. Different EU external policy frameworks, including
enlargement policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Cotonou
Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, contain such measures.
These may be financial (in the form of assistance, for example), economic (such
as inclusion in European networks and policy dialogues) or political (including
political dialogue); they can be positive or negative (involving, say, imposing
or lifting sanctions). In the enlargement policy, for instance, negotiations
for accession are opened only upon a set of conditions such as democracy, rule
of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities. Moreover,
in trade policy, the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) contains
incentives that may indirectly support reforms even though this is not its policy
objective, given inter alia that trade instruments have to be consistent with
WTO rules.

Sanctions
and restrictive measures

Sanctions, as part of a wider set of
political initiatives in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, can be
instrumental to help maintain the political momentum for change and transition
in situations which otherwise risk deteriorating rapidly. They
should ideally be imposed at UN level wherever feasible to
ensure adoption and implementation of similar measures by the largest
number of countries. EU autonomous measures can provide a targeted and timely
complement to UN based measures. Where agreement at the UN is not possible, EU
autonomous measures can be used to exert pressure in the targeted country
or situation.

In case of
positive developments, EU measures can be swiftly lifted or amended to
support and encourage transition processes. Some limited measures may
however be retained to prevent threats or adverse impacts on the
transition process or the measures may also be suspended as a way of
encouraging positive developments that have taken place, whilst retaining a
method of exerting continued pressure in anticipation of further improvements.

Incentive-based
approach

Incentive-based
approaches under the EU enlargement policy have produced positive results, for
instance in the Western Balkans. Progress on the EU accession path is linked to
concrete steps in the reform agenda. As an example, Montenegro had to meet a
number of key priorities set out in the Commission's opinion on the membership
application, which included important rule of law and human rights aspects,
before accession negotiations could be opened. Also the visa liberalisation
dialogue with five Western Balkan countries was based on detailed roadmaps with
specific benchmarks and led to concrete improvements in areas such as document
security and the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as
border controls, migration policy and document security.

The ENP also follows a so-called "more
for more" principle. Countries which go further and faster with specific,
measurable democratic reforms, will receive greater support from the EU. To
reflect this new incentive-based approach, two umbrella programmes were set up
to offer additional “more-for-more” resources: Support for Partnership, Reform
and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) for the southern Neighbourhood (see the example
of Tunisia[15])
and Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme (EaPIC) for the
Eastern Neighbourhood. The programmes will fund initiatives addressing new
challenges in relation to democratic reform and inclusive socio-economic
development in particular.

A similar approach could be applied beyond
the EU's neighbourhood, provided that measures taken
to address crises and support civil society, cooperation among local
authorities and people-to-people contacts fall
outside the "more for more" approach.

The
incentive-based approach of the Governance
Initiative under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) for countries
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) enjoyed only limited success,
partly because the initial governance allocation did not sufficiently
differentiate among partner countries and the commitments to future reforms were
not sufficiently monitored, which reduced the impact on governance performance.

Experience in these different contexts has
indeed shown that effective monitoring and open
information about the government's progress are crucial
in assisting the reform process and can play a key role in motivating partner
countries to speed up reforms. Its impact can increase yet further if multiple
stakeholders are involved in the process and the general public is informed
about the government's performance (see the example of Benin[16]).

In incentivising
reforms, the following lessons should therefore be
heeded:

–
rewards should be unambiguously defined at the
outset and granted for actual achievements and real performance;

–
preference should be given to work schemes that
enhance ownership and thereby commitment to results and impact;

–
performance should be monitored on a regular
basis and shortcomings addressed through appropriate follow-up;

–
the government's progress should be exposed to a
wide audience in open consultations; and

–
dialogue should take place with all relevant
stakeholders.

2.4.        Involving
all relevant stakeholders

The experience of Member States which joined
the EU in the past decade and the current enlargement cases shows that a
successful transition must enjoy broad public support. Civil society, local authorities
and a wide range of non-state actors (including social and economic partners,
consumer associations and the private sector) have an important role to play in
domestic reforms as they can highlight existing shortcomings, suggest concrete
solutions and put pressure on the authorities to continue the transition
process.

The supporting role of the EU has not been
confined to actions by the Commission, the European External Action Service and
  Member States; other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions also
have an important role to play.[17]

Specific support to civil society

The EU has various tools to support civil
society organisations (CSO), including the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA), the
Civil Society Facilities for the enlargement and neighbourhood, EIDHR, European
Endowment for Democracy, thematic programme for non-state actors and local
authorities under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and capacity-development
programmes under the European Development Fund (EDF) and the DCI. Experience
from the EU enlargement policy shows that it is important to create an enabling
environment (legal framework and rules on funding, inclusion in political
consultation procedures) that allows civil society in the country to develop in
a sustainable manner. Therefore, all EU instruments in this area are designed
to empower actors based on their capabilities and strengths in their own areas
and hence are crucial for addressing socio-economic issues, political disputes
or conflicts of interest, for instance.

CSO platforms and networks have proven
important in strengthening civil society's outreach. The enabling environment
should be addressed in political dialogues with partner governments to ensure
that CSOs have space within which to operate. Where this is not possible, the
EIDHR is well-placed to support civil society since, if need be, it can be used
without the government's consent.

A Communication on engagement with civil
society is foreseen for the second half of 2012.

Inclusive dialogues and consultations

Policy dialogues play an important role in
assisting partner countries to achieve successful political, social and
economic reforms. For instance, regular meetings with
representatives of the enlargement countries are essential in the Stabilisation
and Association Process and are further strengthened though country specific
dialogues, such as the Structured Dialogue on Judiciary with Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Dialogues can be facilitated by the EU Delegations and
strengthened with the participation of Member States, where appropriate.

The EU has conducted its policy dialogues primarily
with government partners in the past. That said, it has also acquired some
positive experiences of multi-stakeholder dialogues. The Structured Dialogue on
the Involvement of Civil Society and Local Authorities in EU Development
Cooperation is an inspiring example. Another one is the "Speak Up!"
conference organised by the Commission in the context of the enlargement
process in 2011 which brought together journalists and media professionals to
discuss challenges concerning freedom of expression and media in the Western
Balkans and Turkey. Civil society in enlargement countries also provides
valuable contributions to the European Commission's annual Progress Reports and
to the preparation of projects financed through IPA.

The EU should actively promote more
inclusive policy dialogues and support the involvement of a wide range of
stakeholders in reform processes (see the example of Benin under the EDF
Governance Initiative[18]);
the process followed in enlargement countries is a good example. It should make
full use of the tools available for supporting political and civil society in
this context, while taking appropriate account of the sensitive issues of
legitimacy, accountability and representativeness.

The EU should also help transition
countries consult (emerging) political actors, local authorities and the wide
range of non-state actors mentioned above. It is also important to involve
specific groups in society, such as young people, women and marginalised groups
(minorities, the poor, displaced people). Moreover, when it comes to economic
reform and private sector development specifically, active public-private dialogue
is essential.

2.5.        Enhancing
knowledge-sharing and development capacities

Knowledge-sharing platforms

The European Transition
Compendium, designed to disseminate transition information, has been made
available through an online interactive database and can now be consulted by
various stakeholders around the world.

The Commission should set up a broader
platform or network for sharing knowledge on democratic transformation
issues with developing countries, other donors, emerging economies, civil
society, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders. Such a platform
could be made available through the existing capacity4dev platform.

Twinning and Capacity Development

The High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
in Busan, South Korea, in November 2011 marked a shift towards a more modern view
of capacity development as being not just about technical assistance and
training, but also about support for change and reform, including better access
to knowledge.

In supporting transition processes, the EU
should foster capacity development and technical cooperation with its partners.
Inspiration can be taken from the innovative tools developed in its enlargement
policy and already extended to the neighbourhood, including, in particular:

–
TAIEX (Technical
Assistance and Information Exchange), which provides support through EU public
sector expertise for the approximation, application and enforcement of EU
legislation.

–
Twinning, which
contributes to institutional development through partnerships between public
institutions in beneficiary countries and their counterparts in EU Member
States. Together with SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and
Management), twinning has supported public administration reforms and helped
develop modern and efficient administrations in beneficiary countries.

–
In the Eastern Partnership, the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) initiative specifically addresses
institution reforms in areas linked to the new bilateral agreements with the EU[19]. Each country identified its
own key reform challenges under the CIB, and designed comprehensive
Institutional Reform Plans.

Beyond neighbourhood, ad hoc
solutions have been set-up to mobilize expertise under various external instruments,
such as expert facilities implemented under the Instrument for Stability or the
Migration EU Expertise (MIEUX) under the DCI which encourages the peer-to-peer
transfer of expertise and know-how to beneficiary countries.

2.6.        Cooperating
with Member States, other donors and organisations

The
EU and its Member States should increasingly "act as one" to support
transition societies. This would help to avoid duplications of efforts,
omissions or contradictions and to improve the impact and effectiveness of EU
action. They should continue to strive for greater internal coherence and
synergy in their dialogue, programmes, and actions, and use joint programming,
where appropriate. Encouraging achievements in the area of democracy support, beyond
the successful reforms under the enlargement process include:

–
the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support,
which creates a framework for a common EU understanding, approach and
programming (in Bolivia and Tunisia, for instance);

–
EU Human Rights Country Strategies, jointly
prepared by the Commission, EEAS and Member States; and

–
The envisaged Joint Framework Documents, defining
a joint strategic approach in relation to a partner country in all policy areas.
These could be of particular interest when coordinating the EU policy response
to transition processes.

In supporting transition processes the EU
should explore triangular cooperation and other options for cooperating with
developing countries that are also emerging as providers of development
cooperation and have recent experience with democratic transition.

It should also look at enhancing
cooperation with regional organisations and regional networks,
which can exert leverage and act as a major catalyst in consolidating reforms
and regional integration in their respective regions. These might include
regional parliamentary assemblies or regional electoral commissions; they could
assist constitutional, electoral and capacity-building processes in their
respective regions, and in doing so, rely on regional best practice. This would
increase the legitimacy of external support. These organisations can also play
a valuable role in monitoring progress towards democratisation.

Most major regional organisations have
democracy charters or instruments of similar substance, and are opening the
door to more systematic interregional work. By virtue of its own experience and
that of its Member States, the EU is a natural partner for such organisations.

The EU supports initiatives by international
organisations, including the UN and the Council of Europe, that aim at
accompanying political processes, strengthening democracy and promoting
socio-economic development in transition countries. In the area of security,
for instance, the EU is working closely together with international and
regional actors such as the UN, Arab League, African Union and Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Many partner countries also contribute to
CSDP missions and operations. Building long-term relationships in the area of
security and defence with the EU partners, including southern and eastern
neighbours, may also contribute to the consolidation of their internal
transformation and democratisation processes thus enhancing regional security
and stability.

Conclusion

The EU already has a range of useful
policies and tools available to support transition countries worldwide as they
embark on the path to democracy, which it has successfully developed and
deployed, especially but not only in its immediate neighbours. These range
along a spectrum from incentivising initial and further reform to supporting
the design of reform, its implementation and helping to achieve sustainability.
The EU can play a key role, in particular, by helping to create an enabling
environment for some of the crucial elements of successful democratic and economic
transformations, such as for various democratic actors, enterprise,
investments, trade and social protection.

These tools and methodologies should form a
coherent part of the EU's overall framework of support to partner countries,
especially where they are engaging in transition. While experience shows that
transition processes should, first and foremost, be owned by the state and its
citizens, experience also shows that the EU does have valuable expertise to
offer, adapted of course to the needs and wishes of partner countries anywhere
in the world, as part of a wider EU package of political, economic or other
support. For that purpose, the EU stands ready to
mobilize its entire range of available instruments and improve its
implementation tools and methods to further increase the impact of its support.

[1]               See European Transition Compendium.

[2]               EU Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the
EU's External Relations, Brussels, 17 November 2009, and the accompanying
Agenda for Action.

[3]               Staff Working Document, section 2.1.1.

[4]               Ibid, section 2.1.1; see also the reference document
on "Engaging and Supporting Parliaments Worldwide: EC strategies and
methodologies for action to support parliaments".

[5]               Communication on Increasing the impact of EU
Development Policy: an Agenda for Change (the "Agenda for Change"),
section 2; and the Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012.

[6]               See European Transition Compendium.

[7]               The Agenda for Change, section 3. This includes capacity building on sustainable low emission and climate
resilient development, including access to sustainable sources of energy.

[8]               Staff Working Document, section 2.1.5.

[9]               Ibid, section 1.4.

[10]             Ibid, sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, respectively.

[11]             The 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in
Busan.

[12]             Staff Working Document, section 1.2.1.

[13]             Ibid, section 2.1.5.

[14]             This designation is without
prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

[15]             Staff working Document, section 2.1.4.

[16]             Ibid, section 2.1.4.

[17]             Ibid, section 2.1.3.

[18]             Ibid, section 2.1.4.

[19]             Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Areas, Visa Facilitation/Liberalisation and Readmission Agreements