FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE P. CHAPMAN, JR.; BRENDA 

J. GULLY CHAPMAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 10-15215 v.

D.C. No. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST

3:09-cv-00228-RCJ COMPANY, as Trustee, a German  District of Nevada, national corporation; NATIONAL

Reno DEFAULT SERVICING CORPORATION,

an Arizona corporation; HOMEQ ORDER

SERVICING CORPORATION, a

California corporation,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 12, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed June 23, 2011

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and Amy J. St. Eve,, District Judge.*

*The Honorable Amy J. St. Eve, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

8555
ORDER

“Where concurrent proceedings in state and federal court

are both suits in rem or quasi in rem, the court first assuming

jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that

jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” Knaefler v. Mack,

680 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted). The

property at issue in this quiet title action was also the subject

of a previously filed unlawful detainer action that was proceeding concurrently in state court. In order to decide whether

the federal District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over

this action, we must determine whether Nevada law characterizes quiet title actions and unlawful detainer actions as in rem,

quasi in rem, or in personam. 

Because these questions of law are determinative of the

matter pending before this court, and there is no clearly controlling precedent in the decisions of the Nevada Supreme

Court, we respectfully certify to the Nevada Supreme Court

the questions of law set forth in Part III of this order. See Nev.

R. App. P. 5. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Quiet Title Action

This appeal stems from a complaint (the Quiet Title

Action) filed by Plaintiffs-Appellants George and Brenda

Chapman (the Chapmans) against Defendants-Appellees

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank),

National Default Servicing Corporation, and HomEq Servicing Corporation (collectively, the Defendants). The complaint

was filed in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of

Nevada (the state District Court), and was subsequently

removed to the United States District Court for the District of

Nevada (the federal District Court). 

In their complaint, the Chapmans alleged that “[t]hey fell

behind on payments on [their] mortgage,” and the Defendants

8556 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against the

Chapmans’ home (the Property). Deutsche Bank then purchased the Property at an October 2008 trustee’s sale. 

According to the complaint, the Defendants’ conduct allegedly violated two rules governing trustee’s sales under

Nevada law: first, the Chapmans “were never given statutory

notice of the default” or “notice of trustee’s sale” as required

by Nevada Revised Statutes § 107.080, and second, the

Defendants did not “own[ ] [the Chapmans’] promissory note

or their deed of trust,” thus barring them from foreclosing and

obtaining title to the Property. The Chapmans sought the following relief: (1) declaratory relief determining that the trustee’s sale was void ab initio, (2) a quiet title judgment

determining that they are owners of the Property in fee simple, and that the Defendants “have no right, title, estates, lien

or interest in the Property,” and (3) actual and punitive damages on account of the Defendants’ “massively disorganized”

conduct and “open disregard for the law.” Fairly read, the

Chapmans’ complaint included two causes of action: a

common-law claim for the tort of wrongful foreclosure, see

Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 99 Nev. 284, 304,

662 P.2d 610, 623 (1983), and a statutory claim for quiet title,

see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010.

B. Unlawful Detainer Action

Approximately three months prior to the time that the

Chapmans filed the Quiet Title Action, Deutsche Bank initiated unlawful detainer proceedings (the Unlawful Detainer

Action) against the Chapmans in the Reno Justice Court of the

State of Nevada. Deutsche Bank alleged that it was the owner

of the Property, and accordingly requested restitution of the

premises from the Chapmans. From the record presented to

us, it appears that the Justice Court did not take any action in

the Unlawful Detainer Action until after the Quiet Title

Action was filed in state District Court.

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8557
C. State and Federal Court Proceedings

After the Chapmans filed their Quiet Title Action against

Defendants, but before Defendants removed that action to

federal court, the Chapmans filed a motion in the Unlawful

Detainer Action to transfer that case from the state Justice

Court to the state District Court, where the Quiet Title Action

was pending. While the motion to transfer was pending in

state Justice Court, the Defendants removed the Quiet Title

Action to federal court. A week later, the state Justice Court

transferred the Unlawful Detainer Action to the state District

Court. 

In the federal proceedings, the Chapmans filed a motion to

remand the action to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Chapmans contended (in relevant part) that the federal

court should abstain or dismiss the Quiet Title Action because

the Unlawful Detainer Action was proceeding simultaneously

in state court. The Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss

the Quiet Title Action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After holding a hearing

on the motions, during which the Chapmans’ attorney

informed the court that the Unlawful Detainer Action

remained pending in state District Court, the court denied the

motion to remand and granted the motion to dismiss the complaint. The Chapmans timely appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction over “all final decisions” issued by

federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Ordinarily an order

dismissing the complaint rather than dismissing the action is

not a final order and thus not appealable. However, if it

appears that the district court intended the dismissal to dispose of the action, it may be considered final and appealable.”

Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 983

8558 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
(9th Cir. 2000) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the federal District Court intended to fully and

finally resolve this action. The court did not permit the Chapmans to amend their complaint, see, e.g., In re Ford Motor

Co./Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001),

and, after considering various pieces of evidence extrinsic to

the complaint, the court determined conclusively that the “Defendants complied with the non-judicial foreclosure requirements established under Nevada law.” We therefore have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to

remand to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d

756, 760 (9th Cir. 2002). Determinations regarding subject

matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, and factual findings

underlying those determinations are reviewed for clear error.

Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009).

We review underlying determinations of state law de novo.

Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).

B. Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine

Before we can address the merits of the Chapmans’ appeal,

we must determine whether the federal District Court had

jurisdiction to decide the Quiet Title Action while the Unlawful Detainer Action remained pending in the state District

Court. Ordinarily, “ ‘the pendency of an action in the state

court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in

the Federal court having jurisdiction.’ ” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (quoting

McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). However,

“[c]omity or abstention doctrines may, in various circumstances, permit or require the federal court to stay or dismiss

the federal action in favor of the state-court litigation.” Id.

Relying on the “prior exclusive jurisdiction” doctrine, the

Chapmans contend that the federal District Court should have

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8559
remanded the Quiet Title Action to state court. The prior

exclusive jurisdiction doctrine holds that “when one court is

exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will

not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.” Marshall

v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006); see also Princess Lida

of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466-67 (1939).

“Although the doctrine is based at least in part on considerations of comity and prudential policies of avoiding piecemeal

litigation, it is no mere discretionary abstention rule. Rather,

it is a mandatory jurisdictional limitation.” State Eng’r v. S.

Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians, 339

F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). As summarized by the Supreme Court: 

Where the action is in rem the effect is to draw to the

federal court the possession or control, actual or

potential, of the res, and the exercise by the state

court of jurisdiction over the same res necessarily

impairs, and may defeat, the jurisdiction of the federal court already attached. The converse of the rule

is equally true, that where the jurisdiction of the state

court has first attached, the federal court is precluded

from exercising its jurisdiction over the same res to

defeat or impair the state court’s jurisdiction.

Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922). 

When applying the doctrine, courts should not “exalt form

over necessity,” but instead should “look behind the form of

the action to the gravamen of a complaint and the nature of

the right sued on.” State Eng’r, 339 F.3d at 810 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the action is not “ ‘strictly in

personam’ ”—that is, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem—

then the doctrine ordinarily applies. Id. at 811 (quoting Penn.

Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S.

189, 195 (1935)). Accordingly, where parallel state and federal proceedings seek to “ ‘determine interests in specific

property as against the whole world’ ” (in rem), or where

8560 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
“ ‘the parties’ interests in the property . . . serve as the basis

of the jurisdiction’ ” for the parallel proceedings (quasi in

rem), then “the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction fully

applies.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1245 (6th ed. 1990)). 

Whether the doctrine is described as a rule of comity or

subject matter jurisdiction, see id. at 810 (subject matter jurisdiction); Metro. Finance Corp. of Cal. v. Wood, 175 F.2d 209,

210 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1949) (comity); see generally 13F Charles

Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3631 (3d

ed. Supp. 2010) (noting conflicting views), courts in this circuit are bound to treat the doctrine as a mandatory rule, not

a matter of judicial discretion, State Eng’r, 339 F.3d at 810;

United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142,

1145 (9th Cir. 1989). If the doctrine applies, federal courts

may not exercise jurisdiction.1

C. Application of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine

1. Priority of Concurrent Actions

“Where the assertion of jurisdiction by the two courts is

nearly simultaneous, it becomes important . . . to determine

the precise time when the jurisdiction attaches.” Penn. Gen.

1Applying this rule, we have affirmed a district court decision remanding a federal action to state court, State Eng’r, 339 F.3d at 814; affirmed

a district court decision staying federal proceedings pending the outcome

of state proceedings, 40235 Washington St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 976 F.2d

587, 589 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); and vacated a district court judgment while remanding “for further factual determination” regarding the

doctrine’s application, One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d at 1146. In

other words, if the doctrine applies, it is legal error for a district court not

to remand, dismiss, or stay federal proceedings on account of the state

court’s prior exercise of jurisdiction, and any decision on the merits must

be vacated. E.g., 40235 Washington St. Corp., 976 F.2d at 589 (“[W]e

vacate the district court’s alternate holding on the merits.”); One 1985

Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d at 1146 (“We thus reverse the order of summary

judgment forfeiting $434,097.”). 

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8561
Cas. Co., 294 U.S. at 196. The Nevada Justice Court first

asserted jurisdiction over the Unlawful Detainer Action when

Deutsche Bank filed its complaint on December 30, 2008, and

the federal District Court obtained jurisdiction over the Quiet

Title Action when Defendants filed their notice of removal on

April 29, 2009, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state court

loses jurisdiction upon the filing of the petition for removal.”).2

2The federal District Court properly concluded that the Quiet Title

Action satisfied the diversity jurisdiction requirements of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a)(1), and the removal requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and

1446(a)-(b). It is undisputed that the parties are of diverse citizenship, and,

contrary to the Chapmans’ contention during oral argument, the District

Court properly held that this action satisfies the $75,000 amount-incontroversy requirement. “ ‘In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive

relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by

the value of the object of the litigation.’ ” Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d

837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple

Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). Here, the object in litigation

is the Property, which was assessed at a value of more than $200,000, and

therefore satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Garfinkle v.

Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973) (treating entire

value of real property as amount in controversy in action to enjoin foreclosure sale); Woodside v. Ciceroni, 93 F. 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1899) (“In a suit to

quiet title, or to remove a cloud therefrom, it is not the value of the defendant’s claim which is the amount in controversy, but it is the whole of the

real estate to which the claim extends.”). 

The District Court also properly rejected the Chapmans’ argument that

the Defendants “waived their right to remove this action” on account of

their conduct in state court. A defendant “ ‘may waive the right to remove

to federal court where, after it is apparent that the case is removable, the

defendant takes actions in state court that manifest his or her intent to have

the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon his or her right to a federal

forum.’ ” EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322

F.3d 635, 649 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d at

1240). However, such waiver “ ‘must be clear and unequivocal.’ ” Id.

(quoting Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d at 1240). The Defendants did not

file any pleadings in the Quiet Title Action prior to removing it to federal

court, and did not engage in any “actions . . . that manifest[ed] [their]

intent to have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon [their] right to

a federal forum.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no merit

in the Chapmans’ argument that the Defendants waived their right to

8562 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
Because the state Justice Court exercised jurisdiction over the

Unlawful Detainer Action before the federal court exercised

jurisdiction over the Quiet Title Action, the state court’s exercise of jurisdiction takes priority. 

2. Characterization of Concurrent Actions

We therefore must determine whether the two actions are

characterized as in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam under

Nevada law. If both the Unlawful Detainer Action and the

Quiet Title Action are characterized as in rem or quasi in rem,

the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies. For the following reasons, we conclude that the characterization of these

two actions is an open question of Nevada state law.

In order to characterize the actions as in rem, quasi in rem,

or in personam, we first must “look behind the form of the

action[s] to the gravamen of [the] complaint[s] and the nature

of the right[s] sued on.” State Eng’r, 339 F.3d at 810 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The gravamen of the Unlawful

Detainer Action is self-evident. The complaint in the Unlawful Detainer Action asserts a single cause of action and

requests a single form of relief: possession of the Property.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.255(1)(c); see Gibby’s Inc. v. Aylett, 96

Nev. 678, 680, 615 P.2d 949, 951 (1980) (“Unlawful detainer

is an action designed to afford to a landlord a summary remedy for the recovery of demised premises.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). The Quiet Title Action likewise involves a

dispute over the Property. The Chapmans request that the

October 2008 trustee’s sale be declared void, and that the

Chapmans be declared owners of the Property in fee simple.

remove the Quiet Title Action because the Defendants previously filed the

Unlawful Detainer Action in state court. “A defendant’s conduct in a prior

lawsuit has no bearing on the removability of a later suit.” Hingst v.

Providian Nat’l Bank, 124 F. Supp. 2d 449, 452 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (citing

Baker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F. Supp. 244, 247 (S.D. Fla.

1982), aff’d after trial, 793 F.2d 1196 (11th Cir. 1986)). 

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8563
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.080(5)(a) (providing that a trustee’s

sale “may be declared void” if the statutory foreclosure

requirements are not “substantially compl[ied]” with); Title

Ins. & Trust Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 97 Nev. 523, 527, 634

P.2d 1216, 1218 (1981) (voiding sale where statutory notice

was not given). Although they also seek actual and punitive

damages, any damages that the Chapmans recover with

respect to their wrongful foreclosure tort claim are incidental

to the central relief requested in the complaint: possession of,

and title to, the Property. The gravamen of the Quiet Title

Action is therefore a claim for quiet title: the Defendants

“claim[ ] an . . . interest in real property, adverse to the”

Chapmans, and the Chapmans brought the action “for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 40.010. 

We are not aware of any controlling precedents regarding

the characterization of quiet title actions and unlawful

detainer actions under Nevada law.3 Nevada follows general

3Faced with a similar pairing of cases—one action involving a dispute

over possession of a property (as with the Unlawful Detainer Action), and

a separate action involving a dispute over ownership of that property (as

with the Quiet Title Action)—a number of circuit courts (including our

own) have invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss,

remand, or enjoin the second-filed action. See Crossman v. Fontainebleau

Hotel Corp., 273 F.2d 720, 729 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that state unlawful detainer action should be enjoined during pendency of prior-filed

federal action for declaratory relief regarding ownership of lease interest);

Wolf v. Dist. Court, 235 F. 69, 73 (9th Cir. 1916) (holding that federal

action regarding possession of property should be stayed pending priorfiled state action regarding ownership); Westfeldt v. N.C. Mining Co., 166

F. 706, 711-12 (Fuller, Circuit Justice, 4th Cir. 1909) (holding that federal

quiet title action must be dismissed because prior-filed ejectment action

was pending in state court); McAlpine v. Tourtelotte, 24 F. 69, 70-71 (Miller, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Kan. 1885) (same). 

Despite these persuasive precedents, the outcome here depends entirely

upon Nevada law’s characterization of quiet title actions and unlawful

detainer actions. If either action is in personam, then the prior exclusive

jurisdiction doctrine will not apply. E.g., Knaefler v. Mack, 680 F.2d 671,

8564 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
common-law principles distinguishing in rem actions from in

personam actions. “A judgment in rem is an adjudication pronounced upon the status of some particular subject-matter,”

whereas a judgment in personam operates “between the parties claiming the right.” State v. Cent. Pac. R.R., 10 Nev. 47,

80 (1875) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on

other grounds by State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization v.

Barta, 124 Nev. 58, 188 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2008). “Judgments

in personam are binding only upon parties and privies, but

judgments in rem are binding not only upon parties and

privies but also upon strangers.” Id. Quasi in rem actions lie

between in rem and in personam:

A judgment quasi in rem, like a judgment in rem,

affects interests in a thing; but unlike a judgment in

rem it affects the interests of only particular persons

in the thing and not the interests of all persons in the

thing. It differs from a personal judgment in that it

does not impose a personal liability or obligation

upon anyone.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, ch. 3, intro. note

(1971). 

Applying these general rules, courts in other jurisdictions

have issued conflicting statements about the proper characterization of quiet title and unlawful detainer actions. Courts

have described quiet title actions as in rem, e.g., 40235 Washington St. Corp., 976 F.2d at 589 (“A quiet title action is a

proceeding in rem.”); in personam, e.g., Nevada v. United

States, 463 U.S. 110, 143-44 (1983) (“[Q]uiet title actions are

675-76 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that later-filed federal ejectment action

need not be dismissed during pendency of prior-filed state foreclosure

action, because ejectment is in personam under Hawaii law); Lefkowitz v.

McQuagge, 296 F.2d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1961) (reversing dismissal of federal

ejectment action where prior-filed state-court ejectment action was in personam under Florida law). 

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8565
in personam actions . . . .”); and quasi in rem, e.g., Humble

Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 191 F.2d 705, 718 (5th Cir.

1951) (“Suits to quiet title . . . may be characterized as quasi

in rem.”). Likewise, courts have described unlawful detainer

(or ejectment or eviction4) actions as in rem, e.g., Hepburn &

Dundas’ Heirs & Ex’rs v. Dunlop & Co., 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)

179, 203 n.4 (1816) (“[I]n real actions and ejectment . . . the

proceedings are in rem . . . .”); in personam, e.g., Knaefler,

680 F.2d at 676 (“[T]he ejectment claims at issue here are in

personam actions under Hawaii law.”); and quasi in rem, e.g.,

United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34, 40-41

(1st Cir. 2007). 

The closest authority we have identified under Nevada law

is Robinson v. Kind, 23 Nev. 330, 339, 47 P. 977 (1897)

(order denying petition for rehearing). That case involved a

suit “to cancel a deed of conveyance . . . and revest the title

in the plaintiff.” Id. at 342, 47 P. at 978. The court explained

that an action between individuals for declaratory relief

regarding the status of real property is in rem or quasi in rem:

Where a court of equity is empowered to cancel a

deed and establish title to land within its jurisdiction

by mere force of its decree, to that extent its action

is in rem. 

In Galpin v. Page, [9 F. Cas. 1126 (Field, Circuit

Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 5,206)], the court

held that proceedings which are in form personal

suits, but which seek to subject property brought by

existing lien or by attachment under the control of

the court, and those which seek to dispose of property, or relate to some interest therein, but which

touch the property or interest only through the judg4

See, e.g., 9 Richard R. Powell et al., Powell on Real Property

§ 68.09[2][a] (Supp. 2011) (describing unlawful detainer as a “statutory

substitute” for common-law ejectment action). 

8566 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
ment recovered, while not strictly proceedings in

rem, so far as they affect property in the state, are

treated substantially as such proceedings. . . . 

The case at bar is substantially a proceeding in

rem. Its direct object is to reach and dispose of the

property of the parties described in the complaint.

The decree of the trial court is substantially a decree

in rem.

Id. at 342-43, 47 P. at 978-79 (citation omitted).

This statement suggests that both the Quiet Title Action

and the Unlawful Detainer Action are substantially in rem, or

perhaps quasi in rem, because these actions require courts to

determine the parties’ respective possessory and/or ownership

interests in the Property. However, Robinson is not conclusive

of the issues presented in this appeal. The principles underlying in rem actions have changed since Robinson was issued,

see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 cmt. a

(1982) (“[T]he notice requirement may erase the distinction

between in rem and quasi in rem proceedings. It is therefore

questionable whether the traditional distinction is useful for

any purpose.”), and persuasive authorities have disagreed

with the conclusions stated in Robinson, see, e.g., Nevada v.

United States, 463 U.S. at 143-44. In addition, as Defendants

observed at oral argument, Robinson might be distinguished

on its facts, as it involved an action to cancel a deed of conveyance, not a statutory action for quiet title, Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 40.010; improper foreclosure, Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 107.080(5)(a); or unlawful detainer, Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 40.255(1)(c).

We believe that the Nevada Supreme Court should have an

opportunity to decide these questions in the first instance. The

resolution of these questions will determine the outcome of

this appeal, because if both the Quiet Title Action and the

Unlawful Detainer Action are characterized as in rem or quasi

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8567
in rem, then the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine requires

us to vacate the District Court’s dismissal of the Quiet Title

Action.

III. THE QUESTIONS CERTIFIED

The questions of law we certify are: 

1. Is a quiet title action under Nevada Revised Statutes

§ 40.010, which is premised on an allegedly invalid trustee’s

sale under Nevada Revised Statutes § 107.080(5)(a), properly

characterized under Nevada law as a proceeding in personam,

in rem, or quasi in rem? 

2. Is an unlawful detainer action under Nevada Revised

Statutes § 40.255(1)(c) properly characterized under Nevada

law as a proceeding in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem? 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because these open questions of Nevada state law will

determine the outcome of this case, we respectfully request

that the Nevada Supreme Court accept and decide the questions certified. We agree to abide by the Nevada Supreme

Court’s decision, as specified by Nevada Rule of Appellate

Procedure 5(h), which provides that “[t]he written opinion of

the Supreme Court stating the law governing the questions

certified . . . shall be res judicata as to the parties.” 

The clerk of this court shall forward a copy of this order,

under official seal, to the Nevada Supreme Court, along with

copies of all briefs and excerpts of record that have been filed

with this court. The parties shall notify the clerk of this court

within seven (7) days of any decision by the Nevada Supreme

Court to accept or decline certification, and, if the Nevada

Supreme Court accepts certification, the parties shall then

notify the clerk of this court within seven (7) days of the issuance of that Court’s opinion. 

8568 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
If the Nevada Supreme Court accepts certification,

Plaintiffs-Appellants George and Brenda Chapman shall be

the appellants in that Court, and Defendants-Appellees Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, National Default Servicing Corporation, and HomEq Servicing Corporation shall be

the respondents. As required by Nevada Rule of Appellate

Procedure 5(c)(5), the names and addresses of counsel appear

in the appendix. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Respectfully submitted,

Ronald M. Gould and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges, and

Amy J. St. Eve, District Judge. 

__________________

Ronald M. Gould 

United States Circuit Judge, presiding 

CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 8569
APPENDIX

Terry J. Thomas, 7330 Hunter Glen Drive, Reno, NV 89523;

Geoffrey Lynn Giles, P.O. Box 93, Reno, NV 89504, for the

plaintiffs-appellants.

Jeffrey S. Allison, Houser & Allison, 9970 Research Drive,

Suite 100, Irvine, CA 92618; Stephanie Cooper Herdman,

The Cooper Castle Law Firm, LLP, 820 South Valley View

Boulevard, Las Vegas, NV 89107, for the defendantsappellees.

8570 CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST