NO. 96-336 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

ROBERT W. LUDWIG, JEANNE M. LUDWIG, 

GARY G. GUNDERSON, KAREN L. GUNDERSON, 

CRAIG AMBROSE, CONNIE JO AMBROSE, 

JON E. ENDERSEN, LORIE R. ENDERSEN, 

MARIE HEITMAN, and BERYL ESHOM, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

v. 

ROBERT SPOKLIE, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Katherine R. Curtis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Stephen C. Berg; Warden, Christiansen, 

Johnson & Berg; Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Douglas Weld; Wold Law Firm; 

Polson;C Montana '* 

Submitted on Briefs: December 5, 1996 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The appellants, Robert W. Ludwig, et. al., filed an action 

against the respondent, Robert Spoklie, in the District Court for 

the Eleventh Judicial District in Flathead County, to enjoin 

Spoklie from developing and using a reserved easement for access 

which burdens their property. The District Court determined that 

Ludwigs do not have standing to bring an action to enjoin Spoklie 

from developing and using his easement, and dismissed the action. 

Ludwigs appeal the judgment of the District Court. We affirm the 

District Court. 

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred when it determined that Ludwigs do not have standing to bring 

an action to enjoin Spoklie from developing and using his easement. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Ludwigs own property which is subject to two valid easements 

of record. The first is a two-hundred-foot-wide transmission line 

easement which was granted to the Bonneville Power Administration 

in 1947. The second is a sixty-foot-wide easement for road and 

utility purposes. It is located within the boundaries of the BPA's 

easement, and was expressly reserved by Brian and Caroline 

Yarbrough in 1977. The BPA's transmission line easement is senior 

in both time and entitlement to the Yarbroughs' reserved easement. 

Spoklie sought to purchase the Yarbroughs' property. A valid 

conveyance of the real property would also convey "all easements 

attached" to the property. Section 70-20-308, MCA. In anticipation 

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of that acquisition, he began using and developing the road located 

within the boundaries of the reserved sixty-foot road and utility 

easement. 

In response, Ludwigs petitioned the District court for 

injunctive relief. In November 1992, they obtained a temporary 

restraining order and, on December 18, 1992, the District Court 

entered a preliminary injunction which enjoined Spoklie from 

constructing, improving, repairing or otherwise doing any 

work upon or traveling upon or allowing any traveling 

upon his purported existing road upon the westerly most 

aspect of the property of the Plaintiffs herein. 

Subsequently, Spoklie acquired the Yarbroughs' property and 

the sixty-foot road and utility easement attached to it. He also 

obtained, from the BPA, a Land Use Agreement in which the BPA 

recognizes his right to use the land over which it holds senior 

easement rights. The Agreement also establishes conditions with 

which Spoklie must comply when he uses and develops his junior 

easement. Relevant to this appeal is the following provision: 

PLEASE NOTE: BPA is not the owner of this property and 

if you are not the owner, you must obtain the owners' 

permission to use this property. There may also be other 

uses of the property which might be located within the 

same area as your project. This aqreement is subiect to 

those other riuhts. 

Following a series of motions, a pretrial conference was held 

on February 2, 1996. Both parties stipulated that the only 

remaining issues regarding Ludwigs' petition for a permanent 

injunction were issues of law, and that the District Court could 

decide those issues without a trial 

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On February 13, 1996, the District Court ordered that Ludwigs 

"do not have standing to restrict [Spoklie's] use of his easement 

on the basis of the Land Use Agreement dated November 23, 1993. " 

Accordingly, it dismissed Ludwigs' action. 

Ludwigs subsequently filed a motion for new trial, 

reconsideration, or relief from order. On April 18, 1996, the 

District Court denied Ludwigs' motion; and on May 14, 1996, the 

District Court dissolved the preliminary injunction which it had 

previously entered on December 18, 1992. 

DISCUSSION 

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred when it determined that Ludwigs do not have standing to bring 

an action to enjoin Spoklie from developing and using his easement. 

When we review a district court's conclusions of law, the 

standard of review is whether those conclusions are correct. Carbon 

Countyv. UnionReserveCoalCo. (19951, 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 

686. 

The District Court determined that Ludwigs are not intended 

third-party beneficiaries of the Agreement between Spoklie and the 

BPA and that, therefore, they do not have standing to bring an 

action to enforce its provisions. On that basis, the District 

Court dismissed Ludwigs' petition for injunctive relief. 

On appeal, Ludwigs contend that the District Court erred when 

it determined that they do not have standing to bring an action to 

enjoin Spoklie from using and developing his easement. They 

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maintain that, as intended third-party beneficiaries of the 

Agreement between Spoklie and the BPA, they have standing to bring 

an action to enforce its terms. Specifically, they seek to enforce 

the following provision: 

PLEASE NOTE: BPA is not the owner of this property and 

if you are not the owner, you must obtain the owners' 

permission to use this property. There may also be other 

uses of the property which might be located within the 

same area as your project. This agreement is subiect to 

those other rights. 

Ludwigs assert that, because Spoklie did not obtain their 

permission to use their property, he failed to comply with the 

express terms of the Agreement. Therefore, they claim that, 

pursuant to the Agreement, they are entitled to bring an action to 

enjoin Spoklie from developing and using his easement. 

In Hovmanv.MIAServiceContracts (1993), 260 Mont. 67, 858 P.2d 19, 

we adopted the following definition of an intended beneficiary: 

(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and 

promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended 

beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in 

the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the 

intention of the parties and either 

. . . 

(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee 

intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the 

promised performance. 

Harman, 260 Mont. at 72, 850 P.2d at 22-23 (citing Restatement 

(Second) of Contracts 5 302 (1981)). 

Therefore, in order to establish the existence of a contract 

for the benefit of a third party, it must be shown that it was the 

intention of the contracting parties to benefit the third party. 

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See, e.g., R.H. Grover, Inc. v. Flynn Ins. Co. (1989) , 238 Mont. 278, 284, 777 P.2.d 

338, 342. 

The relevant provision of the Agreement states that, "[the] 

BPA is not the owner of this property and if you are not the owner, 

you must obtain the owners' permission to use this property." We 

conclude that this provision merely acknowledges the limits on the 

BPA's authority to consent to the use and development of land that 

is owned by Ludwigs, and that it is not intended to benefit Ludwigs 

by taking away rights derived from some other source. 

The BPA and Spoklie both have easements to use the same 

property for different purposes. Although the BPA's easement was 

first in time and is, therefore, the senior easement, it is a 

nonexclusive easement and additional easements, such as Spoklie's, 

can lawfully be created on the same land. 25 Am. Jur . 2d Easements 

andLicenses § 89 (1966). Therefore, Spoklie, as the holder of a valid 

reserved and recorded easement, is entitled to use and develop his 

easement without being required to obtain Ludwigs' permission. 

As the holder of the senior easement, the BPA has the right to 

object to and preclude any use of a junior easement which 

unreasonably interferes with its senior easement. See Gabriel v. Wood 

(1993), 261 Mont. 170, 176, 862 P.2d 42, 45. In fact, the BPA 

could bring an action to enforce the terms of the Agreement if 

Spoklie, through the use and development of his junior easement, 

unreasonably interfered with the BPA's senior easement. However, 

while the Agreement may bear upon the question of what constitutes 

6 
unreasonable interference with the BPA's senior easement, it does 

not give Ludwigs standing to enforce the specific terms and 

conditions contained within it. 

Ludwigs are the owners of the servient tenement, and their 

interests are subordinate to the interests of both Spoklie and the 

BPA. Their only cause of action against Spoklie regarding the use 

of his easement would have to be based on the terms of the easement 

grant. It is undisputed, however, that Spoklie holds a valid 

reserved and recorded easement for road and utility purposes; 

therefore, he has an actual interest in the land. Kuhlman v. Rivera 

(1985), 216 Mont. 353, 358, 701 P.2d 982, 985. 

When Spoklie acquired the dominant tenement, he also acquired 

the reserved easement that is attached to it. Therefore, at the 

time the Agreement with the BPA was entered into, Spoklie did, in 

fact, have the "owners' permission to use the property." He is not 

required to obtain Ludwigs' permission to do what he is already 

legally entitled to do--in this case, use and develop his valid 

reserved and recorded easement. 

In sum, the Agreement cautioned Spoklie to make sure that, 

before he took any action, he had the legal right to use the 

underlying property. It put him on notice that he would need to 

obtain the owners' permission if he did not already own either the 

property or the legal right to use it. Spoklie, pursuant to his 

valid easement, owns the legal right to use the underlying 

property, and the relevant provision in the Agreement does not, 
therefore, provide Ludwigs with standing to bring an action to 

terminate or restrict his easement rights. 

We conclude that Ludwigs are not intended third-party 

beneficiaries of the Land Use Agreement between Spoklie and the 

BPA. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when 

it held that Ludwigs do not have standing to bring an action to 

enjoin Spoklie from developing and using his easement. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

We concur: 

ief Justice