### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 25, 200 5

TIM HO LT v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Hancock County No. CR- 2491 Jam es E. Beckner, Judge

No. E2005-00587-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Janu ary 27, 2006

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Ti m H olt , a pp e a ls the jud g me nt o f the Ha nc oc k Co un ty Cr imi na l Co urt d e n yi ng po stc on vic tio n r e lie f. Ho lt w a s c on vic te d o f f ir st d e g re e mur de r andse nte nced to lif e imp ri so nme nt. On appe al, Holt arg ues t hat he was denied his Six th Amendment right t o the effec tive assistance of counsel. Af

ter re view, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J

. , d el i vere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Wayne R. St a mba

ug h, Mo rrist ow n, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Ti m H olt

.
Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidE. Coe ne n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. Ber keley Be ll, District Attorney Ge n er al; and Connie Trobaug h, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

P roce dural Hi story
The Appe llant’s incar cer ation stems from his jury conviction for the first degr ee mur der of Wil liam Ma

rshall Haa s on Aug ust 21, 2001, in Hancoc k County . The proof at trial established tha t the Appellant “ followed the vic tim for three miles, pulled beside the victim’s vehicle and shot him.” Sta te v . Ti m H

olt
, No. E2002-02471-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvil le, Nov. 17, 2003). Af te r s ho oti ng the vic tim a t c los e ra ng e wi th a sh otg un , th e Ap pe lla nt r e turne d h ome a ndmow e d h is y ard. Id

. The Appellant conf essed to a T BI

ag ent that he killed the victim. Id . The Appe llant’s wife testified that her

thirty -six -y ear -old husband had been using methamphetamine f or the pa st y ear

and believed that the victim wa s an under cover ag ent who wa s spy ing on the ir house. Id

. Howeve r, the proo f e s ta b li s h e d th a t th e v ic ti m d r o v e b y th e A p p e ll a n t’ s r e s id e n c e d a il y b e c a u s e h e d e li v e red newspa pers. Id

. After the victim wa s murdere d, it was learned that the victim was a lso a Hanc ock-2-

Countyconstable. Id

. A mental evaluation e stablished that the Appellant wa s competent to stand trial and that a n insanity

defe nse could not be supported. Id

. The Appe llant filed a pro s e pe titi o nf o r p o s t

- c o nv ic tio n r e lie f a lle g ing , a mon g oth e r g ro un ds
, ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Counsel was appointed, an d an am ended pe tition was filed on November

29, 2004. A post-conviction h ea ri n g was he ld on Dece mber 6, 2004, at which the Appellant, trial c ounsel, and a n investigator in the ca se testified.
The Appe llant testified that at the time of the homicide , he had a drug problem for which he had been previously trea ted and that he believed that certain individuals were br ainwashing him and threatening his family . The Appe llant admitted that he met with trial counsel and his investigator

on se ve ra l oc c a sio ns pr ior to tr ia l a nd dis c us se d po ssi ble de fe ns e s to the c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m, a s w e ll

a s v ari ou s a sp e c ts o f the c a se . T he Ap pe lla nt d id not dis pu te that du ri ng the ir

fi rs t me e tin g he tol d trial counsel that he had in fa ct shot the vi cti m and had made a stateme nt to that effe ct to law enfor ceme nt office rs. The A ppellant admitted that he ref used to plead g uiltyin the case and that he

c ho se to t e sti fy , a lth ou g h h e sa id the de c isi on wa s re a c he d b e c a us e tr ia l c ou ns e l to ld h im i t w ou ld “wor k out better in court.” Nonethe less, the Appellant a cknowledg ed that the tria l court re viewed his rights with him prior to his testimonyand that he told the judg e that his decision to testify was voluntary . Nonethele ss, the Appellant stated tha t “I fee l like there should have been a lot more investigating we nt on” in the ca se.

L a wr e nc e Smith, a n inv e sti g a tor wi th the pu bli c de fe nd e r’ s of fi c e r, te sti fi e d that he me t w ith the Ap pe lla nt o n n umerous occ a sio ns a nddis c us se d th e c a se . Sm ith te sti fi e d th a t he fu lly inv e sti g a te d a ll c la ims ma de by the A pp e lla nt, inc lud ing c la ims a g a ins t la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls and various drug deale rs in the community . Howeve r, Smith st ated that he found no proof to support the Ap pe lla nt’ s a c c us a tio ns of thr e a ts by a ny ind ivi du a ls. As a re su lt of the ir inv e sti g a tio n, Smith

a ndtr ia l c ou ns e l r e c e ive d d e a th thr e a ts, bu t S mi th st a te d th a t th e thr e a ts d id n ot a ff e c t th e ir investigation in any

manner

.
Trial counse l, who was a

ppointed to r ep re s ent t he Appe llant, testified that he asse mbled a de fe ns e te a m whic h inc lud e d his inv e sti g a tor , a neu ro ps y c ho log ist , a jur y c on su lta nt, a nda fi re arm s expert. Counsel noted that both he and his investig ator met with the Appe llant severa l times in order to ensure f

ace to fac e communication beca use of the Appellant’s inability to rea d and under stand. Trial counse l said that he and his te am spent “hundre ds of hours” prepa ring for trial. Counsel stated that hi s tria l st

rate g y wa s b a se d upo n the Ap pe lla nt’ s ac tio ns : “I a ssu me d th a t [th e Ap pe lla nt] w ou ld testify in the manner

he said he was g oing to testify
, and the strateg y was to convinc e the jury

that he did not intend to kill M r. Ha as, that i t was basically a mi stake.” He f urther de veloped a

mitigation strateg y to utili ze at trial which involved the use of the psy cholog ist, whose tests reve aled that the Appellant wa s border line mentally reta rded. Counsel further e x plained that it w a s the Appellant who

wa nte d to te sti fy

a ndte ll h is s ide of

the sto ry to the jury . Co un se l a lso re la te d that the de a th thr e a ts he and his investig ator re ceive d had no ef fec t on his handling of the c ase. A t the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the pe tition.-3- Ana lys is

On app eal , th e Ap pe lla nt h a s r a ise d th e sin g le iss ue of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l,

a sse rt ing that tria l c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n w a s d e fi c ie nt b e c a us e : (1) tr ia l cou ns e l f a ile d to pr op e rl y pr e pa re fo r t ri a l; ( 2) tr ia l c ou ns e l aba nd on e d a pr e vio us ly

fi le d mo tio n f

or c ha ng e of

ve nu e du e to pr e tr ia l pu bli c ity ; a nd(3 ) t ri a l c ou ns e l f

a ile d to fo rm a lly ob

je c t to the Sta te ’s us e of a vo id indictment. To succe ed on a c halleng e of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l, the Appellant bea rs the burden of establishing the alleg ations set forth in his petitio n b y cl ea r and convincing e vidence

. T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 11 0( f) (2 00 3) . T he Ap pe lla nt mus t de mon str a te that c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll below the rang e of competenc e demanded of attorney s in criminal case s. Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2064 (1984), the A ppellant must establish (1) defic ient perf ormanc e and ( 2) pre

judice re sulting fr om the de fi c ie nc y . T he pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of hin ds ig ht, ma y

no t se c on d- g ue ss a
rea sonably

based tria l strateg y , and ca nnot criticize a sound, but unsucce ssful, tactica l decision made during the cour se of the pr ocee dings. Ad k ins v . S tat e , 911 S.W

. 2 d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). This defe renc e to the tactica l decisions of trial counse l is dependent upon a showing that the decisions wer e made afte r ade quate pr epar ation. Coo pe r v . S tat e , 8 47 S.W. 2d52 1, 52 8 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1992).

I t i s u n n ec es s ary

for a court to addr ess def

iciency and pre judice in any

particula r orde r, or even to a ddress both if the pe titioner makes an insufficient showing on either. Strickland , 4 66 U. S.

a t 69 7, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 69 . In ord e r to e sta bli sh pr e jud ic e , th e pe tition e r m us t e sta bli sh a “ re a so na ble probability

that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr o c e e ding w ould have be en differ ent. A re ason ab l e p ro b abil ity is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” State v. Burns , 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 5 3 , 4 6 3 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068).

The i s s u e s o f d e f

ic ie n t p e r f

o r man c e b y c o u n s e l a n d p o s s ib le p r e ju d ic e to th e d e f

ense are mix ed questions of law and fa ct. Id . a t 46 1. “ [A] tria l c ou rt ’s findings of fact underlying a

claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel are revie wed on appeal under a de novo sta nd ard , a c c omp a nie d w ith a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Fi e lds v . S tat e , 40 S.W. 3d45 0, 45 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) (c iti ng Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; He nle y v . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997)). Howeve r, conclusions of law
, ar e r e v i e w e d u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo standard w ith no presumption that the post-conviction court’s f indings a re c orre ct. Id

.
I. Trial Pr eparation

F ir st, the Ap pe lla nt a lle g e s that tr ia l c ou ns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e in that he faile d t o p rope rl y prepa re f or trial. Specif

ically , the Appellant a

rg ues that trial co u n s el : (1) f ailed to interview key de fe ns e wi tne sse s du e to thr e a ts ma de a g a ins t tria l c ou ns e l a nd his sta ff ; (2) fai led to prop e rl y instruct the Appellant r eg arding his constituti onal rig h t t o testify , as we ll as proper ly prepa re the Ap pe lla nt t o g ive te sti mon y a t trial ; a nd(3 ) f

a ile d to pr op e rl y

a dmi nis te r and

/or c on du c t ba lli sti c tests on the alleg ed we apon used by the Appellant.-4-

(a) F ailure to Inter view Witn esses The Appe llant alleg es that trial counse l failed to interview c erta in key witnesses re g arding th e a lle g ed death threats which w ere made a g ainst the Appellant a nd his family by methamphetamine de a le rs be c a us e of

de a th thr e a ts a g a ins t tria l c ou ns e l a nd his of fi c e sta ff . Sm ith te sti fi e d th a t de sp ite the sometimes confr ontational events, e very single alleg ation made by the Appellant wa s investigated.

I n d e ny ing the Ap pe lla nt’ s p e tit ion , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt fo un d:

As to whethe r o r n o t counsel . . . wa s eff ective in his re prese ntation of the petit i o n er , this Court finds t hat [trial counsel] and his defense team . . . communicat ed wi t h the petitioner fa ce to f ace on a re g ular ba sis, spending ma ny hours discussing every

possible strateg y , piece o f ev i dence , witness, avenue of investigation, moti on, plea ba rg ain, and a ny thing e lse that could possibly or
conce ivably

be pursue d. No stone was lef t unturned. No stra teg y

or theory was lef t uninvestigated.

We f indno thi ng in the re c or d to pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s. Moreove r, the Appe llant’s arg ument must also fail because the Appellant has failed to pr esent a ny proof at the post-conviction h ea ri n g , other than his own ba re a ssertions, as to whom trial counse l failed to intervie w and what they would have te st ified to had they been c alled. When a pe titioner claims that t ri al counse l failed to interview or pre sent a witness in support of his def ense, the Appellant should prese nt that witness at the evidentiary hearing. Bl ac k

v . S tat e , 794 S. W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) . Be cause the Appellant f ailed to produc e the witnes ses, or e ven produce their name s, it would be specula tive to conclude that their testimony would have a ffe cted the outcome of

the trial. Thus, this alleg ation falls fa r short of c lear

and convinc ing e vidence

. ( b) R ig ht t o Te s t if y Next, the Appellant asserts that tria l c ounsel failed to instruc t him of his constitutional rig ht to testify or not te stify in his own defe nse. He asserts tha t he testified bec ause tria l counsel wa nted him to do so.

Trial counse l testified that the Appellant insisted upon g oing to tria l and placing his side of the sto ry be fo re the jury

. Cou ns e l te sti fi e d that he re vie we d a nde xpla ine d th e Ap pe lla nt’ s r ig ht t o him in gre a t d e ta il
, g o in g s o f a r a s to p r e p ar e a w r it te n d o c u me n t, w r it te n in a w a y w h ic h was
un de rs ta nd able , w hic h w a s si g ne d a nda c kn ow le dg e d b y the Ap pe lla nt. Tria l c ou ns e l sp e c if ic a lly testified that the d o cu m en t wa s rea d to the Appellant, g oing “ throug h every one of those w ords,” pr ior to h im s ig nin g it. I n an abu nd a nc e of c a uti on , tria l c ou ns e l a lso re qu e ste d th e tr ia l c ou rt vo ir dire the A ppellant re g arding his right to t es t ify , prior to his taking the stand, which the court did.-5-

We f in d n o th in g in th e r e c o r d to s u g g e s t th a t th e A p p e ll a n t d id n o t p e r s o n a lly make the decision to testify in his case

. I ncluded in the rec ord is a signe d document which spe cifica lly states that the Appellant kne w he c ould refuse to tes t i fy i f h e s o chose. Trial counsel testified that he revie wed this document with the Appe llant, expl aining it in gre at detail, despite the fac t that the Appellant testified he did not reca ll this occur ring . Moreove r, the Appe llant admitted that the trial court re viewed his rig h t s with the Appellant prior to his testify ing. A s such, we f ind this i ssue without merit.
(c ) B all ist ic Te st ing
The Appe llant also asserts that trial counsel was ineffe ctive for f ailing to pr operly

administer and/or c onduct ballistic tests on the alleg ed we ap on used by the Appellant in the homicide. Spe c if ic a lly , th e Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s th a t “[o]ne of the mos t cr uc ia l parts o f that in ve sti g a tio n w a s to proper ly conduct ba llist ic t ests on the allege d murder w eapon thr oug h differ ent methods of fr ag ment ide nti fi c a tio n a ndwh e the r i t w a s p os sib le that pa rt ic ula r we apo n c ou ld ha ve be e n f ir e d a t th e a ng le

a s a lle g e d b y

the Sta te of Te nn e sse e in it’ s the ory of pr os e c uti on

. I t wa s c ri tic a l f or [tr ia l c ou ns e l] to test the actua l possibil ity of the firing of the alleg ed murde r we apon at a certain rate of spee d and ang le to determine whether [t he Appellant’s] alleg ed discharg e was the one who did end the life of the victim.”

I n finding that trial counsel wa s not deficient, the post-c onviction court made the following fi nd ing s:

Much has been said about the investig ation of and e stablishment of phy sical evidenc e having to do with the positions of the vehicles and w hether or not they

wer e
mov ing a nda t w ha t posi ti on the we apo n w a s f ir e d a ndun de r w hat c ir c ums ta nc e s. T h e m o s t t h at any one had to g o on reg arding that was the c onfession of the [A p p e ll a n t]

. As [trial counsel] correc tly answe red, nothing else imagina ble could have been done and, in fa ct,

. . . no sug g estion has been made a s to what could have been d o n e t h at wa s n ’t d o n e. An d t h er e is a goo d re as o n fo r t h at , b ec au s e t h er e i s n o t h i n g.

We f indno thi ng in the re c or d to pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s. As previously

noted, trial counse l stated that he employ ed a firea rms expert to investigate the ca se. Th a t e xpe rt c on c lud e d that the we apo n re c ov e re d wa s the mur de r we apo n a s its sh ot p a tte rn “ fi t w ith the evidenc e.” Mor eover , the Appellant testified at trial that the shotg un introduced into evide nce “wa s the one that he used to shoot on Aug ust 21 , 2001.” st
(2 ) W it hdr awal of M ot ion forCha nge of V e nue Next, the Appellant contends that trial c ounsel was inef fec tive by abandoning his pursuit of a cha ng e of ve nue af

ter filing a “Motion for

Ex tension of Time to file Motion for Chang e of V enue.”-6-

The motion was ultimately withdrawn by

trial counsel. The Appellant ar g u es t hat trial counse l should have pursue d the motion because the victim was an e lected la w enf orce ment officia l and was well known withi n the communi ty , specific ally arg uing that even thoug h there was no undue amount of publicity

reg arding the ca se, the mer e fa ct that the alleg ed victi m wa s a dulyelec ted law enfor ceme nt official would be g rounds enoug h to pursue a motion for a chang e of ve nue. At the post-conviction h ea ri ng , trial counsel testified and explained his reasoning behind withdrawing the motion:

We ha d no rea l ba sis to ask for a chang e of venue.

. . . First, a pe rsonal pre fer ence

. I re a lly lik e Ha nc oc k Co un ty

jurie s. Se c on dly , th e re is n o ma jor sin g le ne ws me dia

c omi ng ou t of Sne e dv ill e that ba rr a g e s pe op le da y to da y abo ut c a se s th a t . . . te ndto po llu te the jurie s. An d Ha nc oc k Cou nty is a larg e c ou nty . I fe lt w e c ou ld g e t a

fair tr ia l.
The post-c onviction court, in denying the Appellant’s pe tition, found:

I ncluded in those pretria l motions was one for c hang e of ve nue. This Court has ruled that the matter w ould be taken unde r adviseme nt to se e i f a fair jury could be obtained in Hanc ock County , Tenne ssee, a n d al t h o ug h that motion was later withd raw n by

defe nse counse l, the jury selec tion process shows be y ond any doubt that the petitioner wa s able to obtain a f air jury in Hancoc k County , Tenne ssee. The Appe llant has failed to introduc e any proof whic hw o u ld

p r e p o nderate ag ainst the court’ s fi nd ing . Cl e arl y , tria l c ou ns e l w a s a wa re of po ss ib le ven ue pr ob le ms a ndfi le d th e app ro pr ia te
m o t i o n

. Ho we v er , af

t erre v i ew , tri al co u n s el d et er m i n ed t h at h e ha d n o b as i s fo r s ee k i n g a c h an ge of venue

. Clearly
, the pos t-conviction court found no prejudice as i t conclude d that the Appellant obtained a f

air a nd impartial jury . Thus, this iss ue is without merit.
(3 ) L ac k of Obj e c ti on t o V oid Indi c tm e nt

L astly , the Appellant c omplains that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive in that he fa iled to object to the Sta te ’s us e of

a vo id i nd ic tme nt. Spe c if

ic a lly , the Ap pe lla nt as se rt s tha t tria l c ou ns e l sh ou ld have f iled a motion to dism iss the first deg ree murder indic t m en t beca use “it included the word ‘deliber ate’ which repr esente d an ‘additional element.’ ” As the State asserts, this issue is w aived due to the Appellant’s f

ailure to include a copy

of the indictment in the re cord. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 24 (b ). Mo re ov e r, the Ap pe lla nt fa ils to p re se nt any le g a l arg ume nt a s to wh y the ind ic tme nt i s v oid beca use it contains the wor d “deliberate.” See Te nn . R. Ct. Cr im. Ap p. 10 (b ). Ac c or din g ly , th is issue is waived. Notwithstanding waiver , we c onclude the issue is without merit.
The proof at the post-conviction hearing established that the first deg ree murder indictment included the word “deliber ate.” The post-conviction court enter ed the following finding s releva nt to this i ssue:-7-

I t is alleg ed that the indictmen t wa s v oid for a f atal def ect in conta ining the require ment that the ac t of murder be found to be deliberate. . . .

. . . . [T] his Court finds that the indictment is not void because it require d an extra ele ment of ac ting de liberate ly . That would inure, in fac t, to the petitioner’s benef it if it we re
so c ha rg e d b ut i t w a s n ot c ha

rg e d to the jury

. I f a

mot ion ha d b e e n r a ise d to dis mis s the indictment beca

use of that, the motion would have been denied a nd no differ ent result would have occur

red.

The inclusion of the w ord “de liberate ” in t he indictment was me re sur plusag e and did not aff ect the va lidityof the indictment. Se e Sta te v . H ill
, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) . I ndeed, the tr ia l cou rt pr op e rl y ins truc te d the jury wi th re g ardto the re qu isi te e le me nts of pr e me dit a te d f

ir st deg ree murder; thus, no pre judice re sulted.

CO NC LU SION

For the fore g oing r easons, the H ancoc k CountyCriminal C o u r t’ s d is mi s s a l of the Appe llant’s petition for post-conviction re lief is aff irmed.

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE