U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

49–010 

" ! SENATE 113TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2014

113–283 

Calendar No. 610 

ENHANCED SECURITY CLEARANCE ACT OF 

2014 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 1618 

TO ENHANCE THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM FOR THE GRANTING, DENIAL, OR REVOCATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OF EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS OF THE 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

DECEMBER 2, 2014.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Chief Counsel 

LAWRENCE B. NOVEY, Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs 

TROY H. CRIBB, Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

CHRISTOPHER J. BARKLEY, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

ANDREW C. DOCKHAM, Minority Chief Counsel 

MARK K. HARRIS, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with SENATE REPORT
Calendar No. 610 

113TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 2d Session 113–283 

ENHANCED SECURITY CLEARANCE ACT OF 2014 

DECEMBER 2, 2014.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. CARPER, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 1618] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 1618), to enhance the Office of 

Personnel Management background check system for the granting, 

denial, or revocation of security clearances or access to classified information of employees and contractors of the Federal Government, 

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 

amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the 

bill, as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 11 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 11 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 12 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 13 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 14 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

S. 1618 seeks to make the nation more secure by requiring that 

federal personnel who have security clearances or who hold sensitive agency jobs will have their background information checked 

more frequently than is done now. The government periodically reinvestigates the background information of these individuals, 

though the required schedule for these periodic reinvestigations is 

frequently not met, and the sometimes lengthy periods between reinvestigations creates vulnerability. This bill would address that 

vulnerability by supporting the government’s efforts to clear the 

backlog of periodic reinvestigations and by requiring randomly 


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1See Exec. Ord. 12968 ‘‘Access to Classified Information’’ (Aug. 2. 1995) (50 U.S.C. § 3161 

note). 2See Exec. Ord. 13526 ‘‘Classified National Security Information’’ (Dec. 29, 2009) (50 U.S.C. 

§ 3161 note). 3See U.S. Department of Energy, Order DOE O 472.2, ‘‘Personnel Security’’ (Approved: July 

21, 2011), https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/400-series/0472.2-BOrder, 

https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/400-series/0472.2-BOrder/@@download/ 

file; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Security (Last Reviewed/Updated October 31, 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/security/info-security.html. 4See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Number 704.1, Intelligence Community 

Policy Guidance, Personnel Security Investigative Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and Other Controlled Access Program 

Information (ICPG 704.1, Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/ 

ICPGl704-1lInvestigative%20Standards.pdf. 5See Exec. Ord. 10450 (April 27, 1953) (5 U.S.C. § 7311 note). 6See 5 C.F.R. § 732.101 (The requirement to designate sensitive positions at one of these three 

levels of sensitivity applies to position in the competitive service (i.e., positions filled according 

to the Office of Personnel Management’s competitive-hiring regulations) and to Senior Executive 

Service positions filled by career appointment, and agencies may apply the requirement to other 

positions); Office of Personnel Management, Position Designation Tool, Position Designation of 

National Security and Public Trust Positions (October 2010), http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/position-designation-tool/oct2010.pdf. 

timed automated background checks during the interim between 

the periodic reinvestigations. Taken together, these steps would enable the quicker discovery of information that may call into question the trustworthiness of personnel with clearances or in sensitive positions. 

II. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

Processes for vetting government personnel for security clearances 

and sensitive positions. Because unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause damage to national security and loss of 

human life, federal personnel—including civilian employees, military personnel, and employees of contractors and grantees—are allowed access to classified information only after the government 

conducts a background investigation and issues them a security 

clearance.1 For classified national security information, the levels 

of security clearance—‘‘Top Secret,’’ ‘‘Secret,’’ and ‘‘Confidential’’— 

correspond to the degree of sensitivity of the classified information 

to which the individual may have access.2 To indicate access to sensitive nuclear information and materials, ‘‘Q’’ clearances and ‘‘L’’ 

clearances are issued, with Q clearances allowing access to the 

more highly sensitive level.3 Another category of security clearances allow access to ‘‘Controlled Access Programs,’’ including ‘‘Sensitive Compartmented Information,’’ which involves intelligence 

matters and is particularly sensitive.4

Moreover, the head of an agency is required to designate positions within the agency as ‘‘sensitive positions’’ if an individual occupying a position could bring about ‘‘a material adverse effect on 

the national security.’’ 5 Most sensitive career civil-service positions 

and some others are categorized among three levels of sensitivity: 

‘‘Noncritical-Sensitive,’’ ‘‘Critical-Sensitive,’’ and ‘‘Special-Sensitive.’’ 6

The vetting of government personnel generally involves two distinct steps: investigation and adjudication. A security investigation 

begins when the individual, at the request of the sponsoring agency, submits an application in which the individual provides detailed 

information on a broad range of topics, including: personal history, 

identity of relatives and friends, foreign contacts and activities, 

criminal and legal record, any financial or tax difficulties, use of 


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7See OPM, Standard Form 86, ‘‘Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Revised December 2010). 8See Office of Management and Budget, ‘‘Suitability and Security Processes Review: Report 

to the President,’’ conducted by the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (February 2014) (‘‘120–day Suitability and Security Report’’), at pages 2–3, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-report.pdf. 9See id. 

10See id. 11The requirement for periodic reinvestigations established in 1997 was: every 5 years for a 

Top Secret clearance or for access to sensitive compartmentalized information; every 10 years 

for a Secret clearance, and every 15 years for a Confidential clearance. See id., at page 2. This 

minimum frequency was established in Federal Investigative Standards issued in 1997 pursuant 

to section 3.4(c) of Exec. Ord. 12968, note 1 above. 12See Beth Cobert, Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget 

and Chair of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council, 

‘‘Progress on Security and Suitability,’’ posted by Beth Cobert (Sept. 16, 2014), http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/16/progress-security-and-suitability. 13See 5 C.F.R. § 732.203; 78 Fed. Reg. 31847 (May 28, 2013); 75 Fed. Reg. 77783, 77784– 

77785 (Dec. 14, 2010). 

drugs and alcohol, and other matters.7 Then, using the information 

provided by the applicant, a background investigation is conducted. 

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts the great majority of the investigations, though several agencies, many of which 

are in the Intelligence Community, are authorized to conduct their 

own.8 OPM hires contractors to conduct much of the information 

collection, and other agencies also use a mix of contractors and federal employees to gather the information needed for a background 

investigation.9

The degree of scrutiny of an individual’s background will depend 

on the level of risk or sensitivity of the information or position to 

which the individual may be granted access. The background investigation may include reviews of the individual’s criminal history, 

any terrorist activity, credit issues, and foreign activities and influence, and may also include interviews of the subject, employers, 

and social references.10 Following the background investigation 

comes the adjudication stage, in which the sponsoring agency assesses the information collected and determines whether to grant 

to the individual a security clearance or allow the individual to occupy the sensitive position. 

Individuals with security clearances may be the subject of reinvestigation any time there is reason to believe the individual may 

no longer meet the standards for the clearances, but cleared individuals are also supposed to be the subject of a periodic reinvestigation a specified number of years after the last investigation. 

The frequency of periodic reinvestigation was originally established 

government-wide in 1997 with three different periods for the three 

levels of security-clearance access,11 and the frequency has been 

standardized with a uniform reinvestigation requirement of every 

five years, regardless of the level of access.12

Moreover, employees in Special-Sensitive and Critical-Sensitive 

positions must undergo reinvestigation at least every five years 

under current regulations, and some agencies require reinvestigations for employees in Noncritical-Sensitive positions every 10 

years. The regulations applicable to these categories of sensitive positions in the career civil service are now under review, and the requirements for reinvestigation may be changed when revised regulations are issued.13

Recent high-profile incidents focused attention on the need to 

strengthen security-related vetting processes. Several high-profile 


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14See U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, ‘‘A Ticking 

Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort 

Hood Attack,’’ a special report by Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, and Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/fort-hood-report; Hearing 

before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong., 1st 

Sess., ‘‘The Fort Hood Attack: A Preliminary Assessment,’’ S.Hrg. 111–810 (November 19, 2009), 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56145/pdf/CHRG-111shrg56145.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the DoD Independent Review, ‘‘Protecting the Force: Lessons 

from Fort Hood’’ (January 2010), at pages 12–13, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-Protecting TheForce-WeblSecuritylHRl13Jan10.pdf; Department of Defense, ‘‘Internal Review of 

the Washington Navy Yard Shooting: A Report to the Secretary of Defense’’ (November 20, 2013) 

(‘‘DoD Internal Review’’), at pages 15–16, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD-Internal-Review-ofthe-WNY-Shooting-20-Nov-2013.pdf. 15See U.S. Army, ‘‘Army to transfer Manning to new Leavenworth correctional facility,’’ by 

Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service (April 19, 2011), http://www.army.mil/article/ 

55211/army-to-transfer-manning-to-new-leavenworth-correctional-facility/; U.S. Army, ‘‘Army 

charges Manning with leaking intelligence,’’ by Dave Vergun (Feb. 23, 2012), http:// 

www.army.mil/article/74417/ArmylchargeslManninglwithlleakinglintelligence/; U.S. 

Army, ‘‘Manning guilty of 20 specifications, but not ‘aiding the enemy’ ’’, by David Vergun, Gary 

Sheftick (July 26, 2013), http://www.army.mil/article/108143/Manninglguiltylofl20lspecificationslbutlnotlaidinglenemyl/. In April 2014, Manning’s 

name was legally changed to Chelsea Elizabeth Manning, at Manning’s request. See Ernesto 

London ̃ o, ‘‘Convicted leaker Bradley Manning changes legal name to Chelsea Elizabeth Manning,’’ Washington Post (April 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/convicted-leaker-bradley-manning-changes-legal-name-to-chelsea-elizabeth-manning/2014/ 

04/23/e2a96546-cb1c-11e3-a75e-463587891b57lstory.html. 16See ‘‘Safeguarding our Nation’s Secrets: Examining the Security Clearance Process,’’ joint 

hearing before the Subcommittee on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and 

the Federal Workforce and the Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight, Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong, 1st Sess. (June 20, 

2013), S. Hrg. 113–316; testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, ‘‘Open 

Hearing: Current and Projected National Security Threats Against the United States,’’ before 

the Senate Intelligence Committee, January 29, 2014, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cfm?hearingid=138603a26950ad873303535a630ec9c9&witnessId=138603a26950 

ad873303535a630ec9c9-0-1, unofficial transcript at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/transcript-senate-intelligence-hearing-on-national-security-threats/2014/01/29/ 

b5913184-8912-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267lstory.html.See also, Mark Hosenball, ‘‘Snowden 

downloaded NSA secrets while working for Dell, sources say,’’ Reuters (Aug. 15, 2013), 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/15/usa-security-snowden-dellidUSL2N0GF11220130815. 17See DoD Internal Review, note 14 above; ’’), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD-Internal-Review-of-the-WNY-Shooting-20-Nov-2013.pdf; Department of Defense, ‘‘Security from Within: 

Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting’’ (November 2013) (‘‘DoD Independent Review’’), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Independent-Review-of-the-WNY-Shooting-14- 

Nov-2013.pdf. 

crimes committed in recent years by individuals with security 

clearances have highlighted weakness in our processes for vetting 

cleared federal personnel and demonstrated the urgent need to 

strengthen these processes: • On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, 

while holding a Secret security clearance, shot and killed 13 people 

and wounded 43 others at Fort Hood, Texas.14

• During 2009 and 2010, an Army intelligence analyst, then 

named Bradley Manning, stole and publicly leaked enormous quantities of classified documents regarding military operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.15

• During June 2013, computer systems administrator Edward 

Snowden leaked to the news media enormous quantities of National Security Agency classified documents that he obtained while 

working for intelligence contractors Dell and Booz Allen, in what 

is said to be the most massive and damaging intelligence leak in 

our history.16

• Most recently, on September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis, fatally 

shot 12 U.S. Navy civilian and contractor employees and wounded 

several others in a mass shooting inside the Washington Navy 

Yard in Washington, D.C.17 At the time of the shooting, and despite a history of arrests and other troubling behavior, Alexis was 

employed by a Navy contractor and held a Secret-level security 


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18See U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, ‘‘A Ticking 

Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort 

Hood Attack,’’ a special report by Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, and Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member (Feb. 3, 2011), at pages 27–39, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/fort-hoodreport. 19See DoD Internal Review, note 14 above, at page 16. 20See Eric Schmitt, ‘‘CIA Warning on Snowden in ’09 Said to Slip Through the Cracks,’’ New 

York Times (October 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/us/cia-warning-onsnowden-in-09-said-to-slip-through-the-cracks.html?pagewanted=all&lr=0. 21See DoD Internal Review, note 14 above, at page 16. 22 Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

‘‘The Navy Yard Tragedy: Examining Government Clearances and Background Checks’’ (October 

31, 2013) (‘‘HSGAC hearing’’), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg85500/pdf/ 

CHRG-113shrg85500.pdf. Witnesses were: Joseph G. Jordan, Administrator, Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget; Elaine D. Kaplan, Acting Director, U.S. 

Office of Personnel Management; Brian A. Prioletti, Assistant Director, Special Security Directorate, National Counterintelligence Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 

Stephen Lewis, Deputy Director for Personnel, Industrial and Physical Security Policy, Directorate of Security Policy & Oversight, Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, U.S. 

Department of Defense; and Brenda Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office. 23For employment in a civilian position outside the competitive service or a position with a 

government contractor, the term ‘‘fitness’’ is generally used instead of ‘‘suitability.’’ See, generally, 5 C.F.R. parts 302, 731. 24The work was carried out by the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC), which was established by section 2.2 of Exec. Order. 13467 (June 30, 

Continued 

clearance, issued in March 2008 while he was in the military service. 

In the periods leading up to each of these incidents, there had 

been warning signs about troublesome behavior by the individual 

involved which were not heeded or communicated to the proper authorities. During Hasan’s military medical training, colleagues and 

superiors had expressed concern about his behavior and comments, 

and government officials were aware that Hasan had expressed violent, extremist sentiments.18 Manning had demonstrated instability by his many emotional and physical outbursts in the months 

leading up to his leaking classified documents, and had even disregarded basic security measures common to classified working environments.19 Reportedly, Snowden had been suspected of trying to 

break into classified computers, and changes in his behavior and 

work habits raised concerns when he was working for the CIA in 

2007–2009.20 Alexis had been arrested several times, twice involving firearms, and in the weeks before the Navy Yard shooting had 

been observed complaining of being followed, of hearing voices, and 

of being under attack by vibrations and microwaves.21

On October 30, 2013, in the aftermath of the Navy Yard shooting, Senators Collins, McCaskill, Ayotte, and Heitkamp introduced 

S. 1618, the Enhanced Security Clearance Act, to require randomly 

timed audits of background information for cleared personnel. The 

next day, on October 31, 2013, this Committee held a hearing entitled ‘‘The Navy Yard Tragedy: Examining Government Clearances 

and Background Checks,’’ at which S. 1618 was one of several topics discussed.22

Also in the fall of 2013, the President instructed the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) to conduct within 120 days a thorough review of the suitability and security vetting procedures for 

civilian, military, and contractor personnel. (‘‘Suitability’’ refers to 

being found suitable for federal employment generally; ‘‘security’’ 

refers to being found eligible to hold a sensitive national security 

position or to have access to classified information.23) Having conducted the work through an interagency team,24 OMB prepared 


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2008) (5 U.S.C. § 3161 note); and a Senior Review Panel of representatives from key security 

and personnel agencies drove the review and to identify recommended solutions. See 120-day 

Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above, at page 1. 25 120-day Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above; see also OMB press release, ‘‘Administration Releases Suitability and Security Report’’ (March 18, 2014), http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/press—releases/suitability-and-security-reportpress-release-03182014.pdf. 26 120-day Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above, at page 8. 27DoD Independent review, note 17 above, at page 39. 28See HSGAC October 31, 2013 hearing, note 23 above, Lewis’s oral testimony; DoD Internal 

Review, note 14 above, at page 20–21, 36–37; DoD Internal Review, note 14 above, at page 20. 29DoD Independent Review, note 17 above, at page 16. 30 120-day Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above, at page 8. 31 Id., at page 11. 32 Id. 

and submitted, and the President approved, the report in the winter of 2013 (‘‘Suitability and Security Processes Review: Report to 

the President’’ (February 2014), referred to herein as the ‘‘120-day 

Suitability and Security Report’’).25

Addressing the vulnerable time-gap between periodic reinvestigations. Reviews in the aftermath of the Navy Yard shooting and the 

other recent incidents found that a substantial weakness in the 

current process arises from the time-gap between periodic reinvestigations. As the Administration’s 120-day Suitability and Security 

Report put it, 

The current reinvestigation practices do not adequately 

reevaluate or appropriately mitigate risk within the security and suitability population. Lengthy periods between 

reinvestigations do not provide sufficient means to discover 

derogatory information that develops following the initial 

adjudication.26

The events involving Alexis prior to the shooting at the Navy 

Yard starkly demonstrate this vulnerability. Alexis had several 

run-ins with law enforcement, including at least two within the period since his 2007 background investigation: an August 2008 arrest in Georgia for disorderly conduct and a September 2010 arrest 

in Texas for unlawfully discharging a firearm.27 Moreover, the defense contractor by whom Alexis was employed at the time of the 

shooting was aware of indications of his mental instability, but 

failed to report that information to the Defense Department as required under the contract, apparently influenced by a lack of clear 

understanding about what must be reported.28 Thus, information 

showing Alexis’s instability was available in police records and was 

known to government contractors with an obligation to report it, 

but no mechanism existed to adequately bring such information to 

the attention of the agency between periodic investigations. The 

DoD Independent Review found that ‘‘DoD gains little to no insight 

into its cleared workforce between periodic investigations’’ and that 

the Department must find a way to account for this risk.29

Moreover, the schedule for periodic reinvestigations is not being 

met. The 120-day Suitability and Security Report found that ‘‘resource constraints lead agencies to conduct fewer than the required 

number of reinvestigations,’’ 30 resulting in a backlog of periodic reinvestigations for even the most sensitive populations.31 Of the individuals eligible for access to Top Secret classified information or 

to Sensitive Compartmentalized Information, roughly 22 percent of 

the background investigations were outdated as of March 2014, and 

no reinvestigation had even been requested.32


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33See DoD Internal Review, note 14 above, at page 20. 34See id., at page 16. 35 120-day Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above, at page 7. 36 HSGAC Hearing, note 23 above, oral testimony of Prioletti. 37 HSGAC Hearing, note 23 above, oral testimony of Lewis. 

During the time-gap between reinvestigations, the government 

relies on individuals to self-report and on others to report any relevant information. However, the requirements are not adequate, 

and too little reporting is being done. As noted above, the managers 

at the defense contractor that employed Alexis were aware of troubling behavior, but ‘‘[t]he employer’s decision not to report Alexis’ 

behavior appears to be influenced by a lack of awareness about 

what types of behaviors are considered ‘adverse’ information that 

must be reported (particularly those related to mental health 

issues).’’ 33 Likewise, regarding the incident involving Manning, 

DoD found, ‘‘In the months leading up to the unauthorized disclosure, Manning displayed behaviors indicating instability through 

multiple emotional and physical outbursts, expressed discontent 

with the Army and the Federal Government, and disregarded basic 

security measures common to all classified working environments.’’ 34 More generally, the 120-day Suitability and Security Report found that inadequate reporting and self-reporting is a critical 

and pervasive problem: 

This review found that clear and consistent requirements do not exist across government for employees or 

contractors to report, subsequent to their being hired or 

granted a clearance, information that could affect their 

continued fitness, suitability, or eligibility for Federal employment (e.g., criminal conduct, behaviors of concern), or 

their eligibility to access government facilities and IT systems. Neither is there consistent guidance in place to direct contractors or contract managers in the Federal Government to report noteworthy or derogatory information 

regarding employees.35

Recognizing the security vulnerabilities that arise from the timegap between reinvestigations, the agencies are undertaking a number of efforts to eventually address various aspects of this problem. 

The government has been working to establish automated systems, 

referred to generally as Continuous Evaluation (CE), to check government and commercial data sources on a more frequent or even 

continuous basis to flag issues of concern during the period between background investigations. At this Committee’s October 31, 

2013 hearing, witnesses reported that all government agencies already conduct some automated electronic record checks now,36 and 

described the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) 

being developed by DoD to test, on a large population of cleared 

military, civilian, and contractor personnel, the concepts of conducting one-time inquiries and then moving towards providing realtime updates as soon as an arrest is posted on a law-enforcement 

database, for example, or when other relevant information becomes 

available.37

The 120-day Suitability and Security Report stated that the 

ACES and other pilots provide compelling evidence of the benefits 

of the CE approach, and that CE can help address the vulnerability 


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38 120-day Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above, at page 9. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Cross Agency Priority Goal Quarterly Progress Update, ‘‘Insider Threat and Security Clearance Reform,’’ FY2014 Quarter 3, Work Plan: Implement Continuous Evaluation, http:// 

www.performance.gov/node/3407/view?view=public#progress-update. 42 120-day Suitability and Security Report, note 8 above, at pages 11–12. 

arising from the years-long time-gap between periodic reinvestigations: 

By identifying issues between reinvestigations, CE will 

more frequently evaluate employees and contractors who 

are eligible for access to classified information by using 

periodic, random, and event-driven assessments to better 

resolve issues or identify risks to national security.38

The Report explained that CE is an ambitious undertaking— 

‘‘Success of the CE program will depend on a fully-integrated solution across government, which will eliminate inefficiency and avoid 

the expenses of duplicative systems’’ 39—and the report also recognized the challenges and stated how much is yet to be done to 

reach that goal: 

Implementing a system for continuous evaluation is resource intensive, and poses genuine technical and procedural challenges. Currently there is no government-wide 

capability, plan or design present in the investigative community to operate a data-driven architecture to collect, 

store, and share relevant information.40

To help manage and track government-wide progress towards implementing the recommendations from the 120-day Suitability and 

Security Review, including CE, OMB recently published an implementation work plan as part of its new Cross Agency Priority Goal 

of ‘‘Insider Threat and Security Clearance Reform.’’ 41 The 

workplan for FY2014 Quarter 3 sets out a series of ten milestones. 

Specifically for personnel with Top Secret or sensitive compartmented clearance, the workplan sets a December 2014 goal for having an initial CE capability for the most sensitive population, and 

a December 2016 goal for the entire population. The workplan includes tiered expansion by DoD of its CE capability to cover 

100,000 cleared personnel by October 2014, 225,000 personnel by 

December 2015, 500,000 personnel by December 2016, and 1 million during 2017. Other milestones include various planning goals 

and other items. The workplan illustrates the Administration’s 

commitment to achieving a government-wide CE capability, as well 

as the length of the road ahead. 

To address the reinvestigation backlog itself, the 120-day Suitability and Security Report includes recommendations to reduce 

the backlog using a ‘‘risk-based approach’’ that would ‘‘identify high 

risk populations through the use of automated records checks (e.g., 

derogatory credit or criminal activity) and prioritize overdue investigations based on the risk posted by job responsibilities and access.’’ 42

With respect to self-reporting and reporting by others during the 

period between reinvestigations, the 120-day Suitability and Security Report set forth a multi-stage planning process. Uniform reporting requirements applicable to employees across the executive 


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43 Id., at pages 7–8. 

branch must first be developed and issued, followed by training for 

both employees and supervisors. Moreover, to establish uniform reporting requirements applicable to government contractors, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy will need to propose and issue 

changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulations that would ‘‘impose 

those applicable reporting requirements on contractors and to ensure that enforcement and accountability mechanisms are in 

place.’’ 43

S. 1618, to require randomly timed automated record checks during the time-gap between reinvestigations. As discussed, plans are 

being developed and implemented to address the three major aspects of time-gap between reinvestigations— • Development and implementation of CE capabilities, which can 

provide prompt or real-time access to relevant data during the period between reinvestigations. • A program to apply a risk-based approach to identify high-risk 

populations while eliminating the backlog of overdue reinvestigations. • Plans to foster more reliable self reporting and reporting by 

managers and colleagues when troubling information becomes evident. 

Even with the current efforts, full implementation of these efforts 

will be years in the future. To support these ongoing efforts and to 

strengthen the security process while long-term solutions are being 

put into place, the Committee decided that every individual with 

a security clearance or eligible to hold a sensitive position should 

be covered by a program of random automated record checks, as 

provided under S. 1618. 

As noted, S. 1618 was introduced soon after the mass shooting 

at the Washington Navy Yard. Over the subsequent several 

months, the responsible agencies under the leadership of the PAC 

conducted in-depth reviews and developed strategies and plans, 

summarized in the 120-day Suitability and Security Report, to reform the processes to improve decisionmaking and reduce risk in 

the vetting of federal personnel, particularly with regard to eligibility for security clearances and for holding sensitive positions. 

Over the past several months, staff for the bill sponsors have engaged in detailed discussions with agency officials involved in the 

preparation of the Report and implementation of its recommendations, and, informed by those discussions, the sponsors modified the 

legislation to ensure that it is consistent with, and supportive of, 

the agencies’ ongoing plans. That modified language constitutes the 

substitute amendment submitted to, and approved by, the Committee. 

S. 1618, as amended, would reform the security programs for federal employees, military personnel, and employees of contractors in 

several key ways. The central element of the legislation is to require each agency to establish an Enhanced Personnel Security 

Program under which individuals with security clearances or who 

are eligible to occupy sensitive positions would be the subject of 

randomly timed automated record checks. To avoid drawing resources away from the ongoing efforts to address the backlog in reinvestigations, the full requirements regarding enhanced personnel 


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security programs would not go into effect until the backlog is 

eliminated, or until five years pass since enactment, whichever 

comes first. 

For this initial period, S. 1618 codifies the recommendation in 

the 120-day Suitability and Security Report stating that the Director of National Intelligence must develop and implement a plan to 

eliminate the backlog and that this plan should use a risk-based 

approach to prioritize reinvestigations. To achieve a prompt reduction in vulnerability while this backlog is being eliminated, the bill 

requires that every individual who has a security clearance or who 

is eligible to hold a sensitive position would be placed into a pool 

of individuals subject to a one-time automated record check. It is 

expected that the agencies will require at least five years to address the reinvestigation backlog. During this period, the randomly 

timed audits will insert a critical security component for the population who have not yet been the subject of a reinvestigation. 

Once the backlog has been addressed or five years have passed, 

whichever comes first, the full requirements of the Enhanced Personnel Security Program will go into effect. The Director of National Intelligence will then direct each agency to provide enhanced 

security review of all individuals who have security clearances or 

eligibility to occupy sensitive positions. Such a program must integrate relevant information from various sources, including government and commercial data sources, consumer reporting agencies, 

and social media, including the types of information that are relevant for consideration in a background investigation. Any individual covered by the enhanced personnel security program will 

then be subject to two randomly timed audits every five years. 

The audits will increase the likelihood that troubling information 

about cleared personnel or employees in sensitive positions will be 

promptly discovered by the responsible agency. Moreover, by making covered individuals aware (as well as making those, like managers, who are obligated to report, aware) that the individual’s 

background information will be audited and that the timing of the 

audits is unpredictable, the legislation would create a powerful incentive for the individual to promptly self-report (and for others, 

like managers, to report) before the audit occurs. S. 1618 would 

thus strengthen the national security helping agencies to promptly 

learn of incidents or changed circumstances indicating that an individual is no longer trustworthy enough to be eligible for a security 

clearance or a sensitive government position. 

S. 1618 provides that random audits would not be required if 

more frequent automated checks of governmental and commercial 

records and data are being conducted with respect to the individual. This exemption for individuals who are the subject of more 

frequent automated checks is a key component of the program. 

This provision would phase out the random audit requirement as 

individuals are placed under CE or similar automated programs, 

because relevant data regarding such individuals would be obtained more frequently or in real-time. The enhanced personnel security program under S. 1618 in this way dovetails with CE as it 

is being implemented, thereby preventing duplication of effort but 

enabling the automated record checks to apply with respect to individuals who are not covered by the more rigorous CE systems in 

the future. 


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S. 1618 thus increases the likelihood that troubling behavior or 

other derogatory information about personnel with security clearances or eligibility to occupy sensitive positions will be identified in 

the current system. It also provides a safety net should CE not be 

fully implemented or be delayed. S. 1618 does not replace the current process, but rather strengthens the current system and provides a safety net while these broader reforms, like CE, are instituted. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On October 30, 2013, Senators Collins, McCaskill, Ayotte, and 

Heitkamp introduced S. 1618, the Enhanced Security Clearance 

Act of 2013, which was referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. The Committee considered S. 1618 

at a business meeting on July 30, 2014. 

Senators McCaskill and Heitkamp offered a substitute amendment containing a number of changes based on staff discussions 

with representatives of OMB and other agencies involved in preparing the 120-day Suitability and Security Review. Changes in the 

legislation made by the substitute amendment include—(1) deferring the requirement that enhanced security programs be implemented until after the agencies have eliminated the backlog in reinvestigations (not to exceed five years after enactment); (2) assigning to the Director of National Intelligence the responsibility for directing the implementation of a program to provide enhanced security review by each agency; and (3) making the enhanced personnel 

security program applicable to individuals eligible to hold a sensitive position in the government, as well as to individuals with security clearances. In addition, Senator McCaskill offered an amendment to the title of the bill. 

The Committee approved the McCaskill-Heitkamp substitute 

amendment and the McCaskill amendment to the title of the bill, 

both by voice vote. The Committee then ordered S. 1618, as amended, reported favorably by voice vote, with Senator Coburn asking 

to be recorded ‘‘present.’’ Senators present for all three votes were: 

Carper, Levin, Landrieu, McCaskill, Begich, Baldwin, Coburn, 

Johnson, and Ayotte. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Section 1—Short title 

This section states that the short title of the bill is the ‘‘Enhanced Security Clearance Act of 2014.’’ 

Section 2—Enhancing Government Personnel Security Programs 

Subsection (a)—Definitions 

This subsection defines two terms: 

• The term ‘‘covered individual’’ is defined to mean an individual 

who has been determined eligible for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position. 

• The term ‘‘periodic reinvestigations’’ is defined to mean investigations conducted periodically, with a frequency as required by 

the Director of National Intelligence, for the purpose of updating 

a previously conducted security background investigation. 


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Subsection (b)—Resolution of backlog of overdue periodic reinvestigations 

This subsection directs the Director of National Intelligence to 

develop and implement a plan to eliminate the backlog of overdue 

periodic investigations of covered individuals. In developing this 

plan, the Director must use a risk-based approach to identify highrisk populations and to prioritize investigations. During this time, 

each covered individual would be included in a pool subject to one 

random audit. 

Subsection (c)—Enhanced Security Clearance Programs 

This subsection adds a new section 11001 to title 5, United 

States Code, which would require that an Enhanced Personnel Security Program be established at each agency. In addition, the subsection would provide that the Inspector General of each agency 

must conduct at least one audit of the agency’s enhanced personnel 

security program. 

The subsection includes the following specific requirements with 

respect to the Enhanced Personnel Security Programs: 

• The Director of National Intelligence must direct each agency 

to provide for enhanced security reviews of all covered individuals 

following the elimination of the backlog of reinvestigations or by 

five years after enactment of the bill, whichever comes first. 

• The Enhanced Security Program at each agency must require 

at least two random automatic record checks (audits) in each fiveyear period for each covered individual who is employed by the 

agency or by a contractor for the agency, unless an individual is 

covered by Continuous Evaluation or a similar program that provides for automated record checks regarding the individual more 

frequently than twice in each five-year period. 

• The Enhanced Security Program of each agency must integrate 

relevant information from various sources, including government 

sources, publicly available and commercial data sources, consumer 

reporting agencies, social media, and such other sources as are determined by the Director of National Intelligence. 

• The head of each agency must ensure that each covered individual is adequately advised of the types of information the individual is required to report. A review of the information relating 

to the individual may not be conducted until more than 120 days 

after the individual receives the notification. 

• The Director of National Intelligence also must issue guidance 

defining minor financial or mental health issues in accordance with 

this section of the bill. 

Beginning two years after the date of implementation of the Enhanced Personnel Security Program at each agency, the Inspector 

General of the agency must conduct at least one audit to assess the 

effectiveness and fairness of the system, in accordance with performance measures and standards established by the Director of 

National Intelligence. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of S. 1618. The Congressional Budget Office 


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states that the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act and 

would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments, or private entities. The enactment of this legislation will not have significant regulatory impact. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

S. 1618—Enhanced Security Clearance Act of 2014 

S. 1618 would require federal agencies to develop an enhanced 

personnel security program that would conduct interim reviews of 

certain types of information (primarily electronic records) between 

regularly scheduled full background investigations for individuals 

with security clearances or who hold sensitive positions that might 

affect national security (some positions are designated as sensitive 

but do not require security clearances). Based on guidance from the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), agencies 

would be required to check certain types of information—such as 

criminal, financial, and social media records—not less than twice 

every five years to ensure the continued suitability of individuals 

to hold security clearances or to remain in sensitive positions. 

Enacting S. 1618 would not affect direct spending or revenues; 

therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. 

Conducting the required checks and incorporating newly acquired information into the security records of employees would increase the costs to certain federal agencies, subject to appropriation 

of the necessary funds. However, the bill would not require the program to be implemented until the earlier of five years after enactment of the bill or such time as the current backlog in periodic security reinvestigations is eliminated. Periodic reinvestigations are 

background checks of individuals who have previously had background investigations and are supposed to occur every five years. 

Because there has been a significant backlog in such investigations 

for many years, CBO anticipates that the new program would not 

be implemented until after 2019; therefore, the costs of implementing the bill would be negligible over the 2015–2019 period. 

Although CBO does not have enough information to provide a 

precise estimate of the costs of implementing S. 1618 after 2019, 

the cost of conducting the kinds of record checks that would be required by the bill and the large number of employees who would 

probably be affected indicates that those costs would be significant. 

S. 1618 would require such checks to be completed twice every five 

years. CBO expects that the records checks would require a level 

of effort roughly equivalent to that of a basic National Agency 

check, which is a check of certain government records, including 

federal investigative records. Such checks currently cost about $100 

each. 

About 5 million people currently hold security clearances and an 

unknown additional number hold positions that do not require security clearances but are deemed sensitive for the purpose of national security. However, both the ODNI and the Department of 

Defense (DoD) are developing programs under current law to continually evaluate certain personnel for their fitness to hold security 

clearances or to remain in sensitive positions. Personnel subject to 

those programs would be exempted from the checks required under 


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S. 1618. Although no data are available on the number of people 

the ODNI’s program would cover, DoD’s program is expected to 

apply to approximately 1 million employees by the end of 2017. On 

that basis, the costs of implementing S. 1618 would probably be in 

the low hundreds of millions of dollars a year after 2019. 

S. 1618 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock. The 

estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 1618, as 

reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

UNITED STATES CODE 

TITLE 5—GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 

AND EMPLOYEES 

* * * * * * * 

PART III—EMPLOYEES 

SUBPART A—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Chap. Sec. 

21. Definitions ........................................................................................................ 2101 

* * * * * * * 

SUBPART J—ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS

110. Enhanced personnel security programs ....................................................... 11001 

Subpart A—General Provisions 

* * * * * * * 

Subpart J—Enhanced Personnel Security 

Programs 

CHAPTER 110—ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY 

PROGRAMS 

Sec. 

11001. Enhanced personnel security programs 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—— 

(1) the term ‘‘agency’’ has the meaning given that term in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341); 


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(2) the term ‘‘consumer reporting agency’’ has the meaning 

given that term in section 603 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 

(15 U.S.C. 1681a); 

(3) the term ‘‘covered individual’’ means an individual who 

has been determined eligible for access to classified information 

or eligible to hold a sensitive position; 

(4) the term ‘‘enhanced personnel security program’’ means a 

program implemented by an agency at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (b); and 

(5) the term ‘‘periodic reinvestigations’’ means investigations 

conducted periodically, with a frequency as required by the Director of National Intelligence, for the purpose of updating a 

previously completed security background investigation. 

(b) ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM.—The Director of 

National Intelligence shall direct each agency to implement a program to provide enhanced security review of covered individuals— 

(1) in accordance with this section; and 

(2) not later than the earlier of— 

(A) the date that is 5 years after the date of enactment 

of the Enhanced Security Clearance Act of 2014; or 

(B) the date on which the backlog of overdue periodic reinvestigations of covered individuals is eliminated, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence. 

(c) COMPREHENSIVENESS.— (1) SOURCES OF INFORMATION.—The enhanced personnel security program of an agency shall integrate relevant information from various sources, including government, publicly available, and commercial data sources, consumer reporting agencies, social media, and such other sources as determined by the 

Director of National Intelligence. 

(2) TYPES OF INFORMATION.—Information obtained and integrated from sources described in paragraph (1) may include— 

(A) information relating to any criminal or civil legal 

proceeding; 

(B) financial information relating to the covered individual, including the credit worthiness of the covered individual; 

(C) public information, including news articles or reports, 

that includes relevant security or counterintelligence information about the covered individual; 

(D) publicly available electronic information, to include 

relevant security or counterintelligence information on any 

social media website or forum, that may suggest ill intent, 

vulnerability to blackmail, compulsive behavior, allegiance 

to another country, change in ideology, or any other information that may suggest the covered individual lacks good 

judgment, reliability or trustworthiness; and 

(E) data maintained on any terrorist or criminal watch 

list maintained by any agency, State or local government, 

or international organization. 

(d) REVIEWS OF COVERED INDIVIDUALS.— (1) REVIEWS.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The enhanced personnel security program of an agency shall require that, not less than 2 times 

every 5 years, the head of the agency shall conduct or reVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:19 Dec 08, 2014 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR283.XXX SR283

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quest the conduct of automated record checks and checks of 

information from sources under subsection (c) to ensure the 

continued eligibility of each covered individual employed by 

the agency or a contractor of the agency, unless more frequent reviews of automated record checks and checks of information from sources under subsection (c) are conducted 

on the covered individual. 

(B) SCOPE OF REVIEWS.—Except for a covered individual 

who is subject to more frequent reviews to ensure the continued eligibility of the covered individual, the reviews 

under subparagraph (A) shall consist of random or aperiodic checks of covered individuals, such that each covered 

individual is subject to at least 2 reviews during the 5-year 

period beginning on the date on which the agency implements the enhanced personnel security program of an agency, and during each 5-year period thereafter. 

(C) INDIVIDUAL REVIEWS.—A review of the information relating to the continued eligibility of a covered individual 

under subparagraph (A) may not be conducted until after 

the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date the covered individual receives the notification required under 

paragraph (3). 

(2) RESULTS.—The head of an agency shall take appropriate 

action if a review under paragraph (1) finds relevant information that may affect the continued eligibility of a covered individual. 

(3) INFORMATION FOR COVERED INDIVIDUALS.—The head of an 

agency shall ensure that each covered individual employed by 

the agency or a contractor of the agency is adequately advised 

of the types of relevant security or counterintelligence information the covered individual is required to report to the head of 

the agency. 

(4) LIMITATION.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the authority of an agency to determine the appropriate weight to be given to information relating to a covered 

individual in evaluating the continued eligibility of the covered 

individual. 

(5) GUIDANCE FOR MINOR FINANCIAL OR MENTAL HEALTH

ISSUES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall issue guidance defining minor financial or mental health issues, in accordance with this section and any direction from the President. 

(6) AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as limiting the authority of the President to direct or perpetuate periodic reinvestigations of a more 

comprehensive nature or to delegate the authority to direct or 

perpetuate such reinvestigations. 

(e) AUDIT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning 2 years after the date of implementation of the enhanced personnel security program of an 

agency under subsection (b), the Inspector General of the agency 

shall conduct at least 1 audit to assess the effectiveness and 

fairness, which shall be determined in accordance with performance measures and standards established by the Director 

of National Intelligence, to covered individuals of the enhanced 

personnel security program of the agency. 


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(2) SUBMISSIONS TO THE DNI.—The results of each audit conducted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the Director 

of National Intelligence to assess the effectiveness and fairness 

of the enhanced personnel security programs across the Federal 

Government. 

Æ 


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