IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SARAH LATSCH, GUARDIAN OF MACKENZIE LATSCH Appellant ,

v. MEDING & SON, INC. and
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, Appellees

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. S20 A

- 12

- 0 01 CAK

Submitted: July 28 , 2021 Decided: August 2 , 2021
Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Sarah Latsch, pro se , 18927 Washington Street, Lincoln DE, 19960, Appellant David N. Rutt, Esquire , Moore & Rutt, P.A., 122 W. Market Street, P.O. Box 554 Georgetown, DE 19947, Attorney for Appellee, Meding & Sons, Inc.

KARSNITZ, J.2 Background
Mackenzie Latsch (“ Appellant” ) was employed as a part

- time busser at Meding & Son Seafood by Meding & Son, Inc. (“Employer”). On March 15, 2020, Appellant worked what would be her last shift for Employer. On April 12, 2020, Appellant filed a c laim for unemploy ment insurance benefits with the Delaware Department of L abor

. Between March 15, 2020 and June 8, 2020, Appellant did not work because of COVID

- 19. On June 8, 2020, Appellant came into her place of employment to work a shift

. However, she ended up leaving and did not work. I mmediately after Appellant arrived at her workplace , Employer and Appellant had a meeting. At the meeting, E mployer gave Appellant a paper stat ing that: S he had been offered hours at Meding & Son Seafood; she decided to apply for unemployment insurance benefits without discussing availability with Employer; and she did not contact Employer for employment.

W hat happened at the meeting has been d isputed. During the hearing before
the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”) , Employer testified that Appellant left the workplace voluntarily because , as a sixteen

- year - old minor, she did not feel comfortable signing the document without havi ng her mother review it. It stated that Appellant did not come back to the workplace on that day , and she3

never contact ed Employer after she left

. On the other hand, Appellant testified that Employer required her to sign the document as a condition to remain employ ed, and it terminated her employment because she refused to sign it.
On July 29, 2020, a Claims Deputy in the Delaware Department of Labor , Division of Unemployment Insurance, deni ed Appellant’s application for the unemploy ment insurance b enefits based on the termination date of March 15, 2020
and determined that Appellant did not meet her burden to show “ good cause ” for her voluntarily leav ing employment pursuant to 19 Del. C. 3314(1)

. 1
Appellant appealed th e Claims Deputy’s decision to the Chief Appeals Referee (the “Referee”)

. On August 28, 2020, t he Referee reversed the Claims Deputy’s decision based on the termination date of March 15, 2020 , concluding that Appellant was discharged from her work without “ just cause ” in connection with her work pursuant to 19 Del. C. 3314(2) and , thus, was qualified for unemployment insurance benefits.

1 Even though the Claims Deputy used the words “just cause,” instead of “good cause,” he meant “good cause” as he found that Appellant voluntarily quitted her work, citing 19 Del. C. § 3314(1). The pertinent part of 19 Del. C. § 3314(1) reads: an individua l shall be disqualified for benefits: “[f]or the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or n ot consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount.” 19 Del. C. §3314(1) (emphasis added).4

Subsequ ently, Employer appealed the Appeals Referee’s decision to the Board

. O n November 25 , 2020, t he Board reversed the Referee’s decision . The Board found that the termination date was June 8, 2020 and decid ed that Employer had terminated Appellant’s employm ent for “ just cause ” pursuant to 19 Del. C. 3314(2) , and, thus, Appellant was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Appellant appeals th e Board’s decision to this Court.

Standard of Review

I am aware that Appellant is proceeding pro se , and, thus, I will interpret her filings leniently. 2 However, my review on this matter is limited by law

. 3 I am only allowed to review whether the Board ’ s decision is “ free from legal error ” and

“ supported by substantial evidence. ” 4 If a reasonable person accepts evidence as adequate to support a conclusion, such evidence is substantial. 5 It is not the Superior
C ourt ’ s role “to weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its
own factual f

indings.” 6 The Superior Court should merely decide if the evidence is

2 See Feldman v. YIDL Tr. , 2018 WL 1151797, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2018) (citing Smith v. Christina Sch. Dist. , 1996 WL 757282, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 1997) )

. 3 Mondestin v. Perdue Foods, LLC , 2019 WL 5561395, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019)

. 4 Jogee v. Perdue Foods, LLC , 2020 WL 2124753, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2020) (citation omitted); see 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) (“ In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in th e absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of law. ”)

. 5 Majaya v. Sojourners' Place , 2003 WL 21350542, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 6, 2003)

. 6 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Div. of Unemployme nt Ins. , 803 A.2d 931, 937 (Del. 2002)

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legally adequate to support the [Board] ’ s factual findings. ” 7 It is within t he Bo ard’s
exclusive purview “to judge witness credibility and resolve conflicts in testimony.” 8
Analysis

The Referee found that the termination date was March 15, 2020 , as it was the last day Appellant worked at Meding & Son Seafood. T he Board di s agree d with the Referee on the separation date and found that the separation date was June 8, 2020 , as it was the last day Appellant came in to work at Meding & Son Seafood. T he Board’s finding of the separation date is adequately supported by the evidence submitted to the Board as both parties agreed that Appellant came in to work at Meding & Son Seafood on June 8, 2020.
The important fact in dispute before the Board wa s whether Employer required Appellant to sign the following statement to remai n employed immediately after she arrived at Meding & S on Seafood on June 8, 2020

.

I

_______________ was offered hours at Meding & Son Seafood. Prior to discussing availability or hours available I have decided to apply to unemployment [insurance benefits]

. I have not contacted Meding Seafood & Sons and or Robert Meding for employment nor communicated expectations for employment.

7 McManus v. Christina Serv. Co. , 1997 WL 127953, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997)

. 8 Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys. , 25 A.3d 778, 782 (Del. 2011) (citation omitted).6

At the hearing before the Board, Employer testified that it never required Appellant to sign the statement to remain emplo yed . Instead, Employer stated that Appellant voluntarily left work so that she (a sixteen

- year - old minor) could have her

mo ther review the paper. Employer testified that Appellant did not come back to work on the same day . Employer also said that it never heard back from Appellant

. Employer t estified that it has other employees who had not signed the identical

statemen t and who remained employed

. On the other hand , Appellant stated that the Employer required her to sign the statement to rem ain employed and that the Appellant was terminated because she refused to sign the statement

. The Board found Employer’s evidence more credible because Appellant did not submit any evidence that could rebut Employer’s testimony that there are other employees who had not signed the statement and remained employed

. The Board found that: (1) on June 8, Employer gave Appellant a document containing the statement at issue, however, Appellant was not required to sign it as a condition to remain employed; (2) Appellant left the work voluntarily on the same day and never came back to work or contacted Empl oyer again

. Based on these findings, the Board
decided that Employer had just cause to terminate Appellant ’s employment because she abandoned her job. The Board explained that it “consistently found job abandonment to be just ca use for termination.”7

On appeal to this Court, Appellant contends that she is qualified for the unemployment benefits because she was discharged from her work without just

cause . Appellant submits new evid ence , including Abbegail Allen’s statement, in order to support her contention

. Employer argues that Appellant was discharged from her work for just cause because Appellant’s abandonment of her job constitutes

“ willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or the employee’s expected standard of conduct. ”

I am not allowed to consider the new evidence Appellant submitted to the
Court

. I am only permitt ed to review the evidence submitted as part of the record made before the Board by t he Appellant and the Employer

. I f ind that a reasonable
mind would accept the evidence as adequate to support the Board’s factual conclusion.
Moreover, I do not find any legal errors in the Board’s decision. 19 Del. C. § 3314(2) provides, in pertinent part, that an individual shall be disqualified for
benefits:

[f] or the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual ’ s work for just cause in connection with the individual ’ s work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount.8

Courts have interpreted “ just cause” as “a willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or the employee’s expected standard of conduct.” 9 “Wanton” refers to a “heedless, malicious or reckless act, but does not require actual intent to cause harm.” 10 In contrast, “willful” is defined as “actual, specific or evil intent.” “ Wilful and wanton conduct is that which is evidenced by either cons cious action, or reckless indifference leading to a deviation from established and acceptable workplace performance; it is unnecessary that it be founded in bad motive or malice. ” 11

Job abandonment constitutes “ just cause ” for discharging an employee from her work , as it is willful or wanton conduct disregarding the interests of the employer and duties of employment. 12 In Von F e gyverneky v. CFT Ambulance Service , 13 th is Court found that the employee was discharged for just cause pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2) because she abandoned her work . There, the employee sent several text messages to her supervisor in order to contact the employer. However, the Court noted that the employee “ should have made further effort to contact [the e] mployer through alternative means or by physically reporting to [the e] mployer’ s location to

9 Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernic , 121 A.3d 1215, 1222 (Del. 2015) (citing Avon Products, Inc. v. Wilson , 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 1986)). 10 Igo v. ACTS Ret. Life Communities , 2021 WL 37461, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2021). 11 MRPC Fin. Mgmt. LLC v. Carter , 2003 WL 21517977, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 2003)

. 12 Goubeaud v. Cty. Envtl. Co. , 2013 WL 3001489, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 7, 2013)

. 13 2012 WL 2700464, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 28, 2012)

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obtain scheduling information. ” Because the Court did not find any effort from the employee to obtain scheduling information beyond text messages , t he Court concluded that the employee’s mere claims without more evidence will not negate the employer’s substantial evidence bolstering just ca u se for the employee’s discharge.

T he record shows a factual dispute , which involves the credibility of testimony. The Board found that Employer’s version was more convincing. I am bound by the Board’s decision as it is supported by sufficient evidence. T he Board ’s decision was free from legal error when it concluded that Appellant was disqualified for unemploy ment insurance benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. §3314(2) as she abandoned her job without any further efforts and, thus, was discharged for just

cause . Accordingly, I hold that the decision of the Board, finding that Appellant was terminated for just cause and denying unemployment insurance benefits , is based on substantial evidence and free of legal error.

Conclu sion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED

. IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz Craig A. Karsnitz10

cc: Prothonotary