T he r eal par t y i n i nt er es t i s W y at t N orman d/ b/ a Al l St ar M ot ors
. T he r es po ndent i s t he H onorabl e Cl ay 1 G o ssett , Ju d ge o f

t he F o urth Ju d i cial D i st rict C o urt o f R usk C o un t y, T ex as. 

## NO. 12-08-00126-CV
IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

§ IN RE: CITY NAT

IO NA L BA NK

, ELIZABE TH KING AND JULIE TAY LOR, § ORIGINAL PROCEE DING REL ATO RS §
OPINION I n this original manda

mus proce eding , City National Bank of Kilgor e, Elizabeth King , and J ulie Taylor, the relators, challeng e the trial court’s order denying their motions to transfer ve nue. 1 The issue pre sented is whethe r the trial court abused its di scre tion in deny ing the relators’ motions to transfe r venue to Greg g County under Section 15.011 of the Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code. We conclude that venue in Gre g g County is mandatory . There fore , we c onditionally g rant the wr it. B ACKG ROUND Wy a tt N or

man, a re sid e nt o f G re g g County , Tex a s, op e rate s A ll St ar M oto rs . T o o bta in financ ing f

rom City National B ank for

th e v eh i cl es he purchase d for r esale , Norman e x ecute d a pr omi sso ry no te pa

y a ble to the B ank , wh ic h w a s se c ur e d b y a de e d o f t ru st l ie n o n th e re a l pr op e rt y wher e he operated hi s business. Norman became delinquent on the pr omissory note. The B ank sent a letter to Norman infor

ming him of the de linquency and g iving him twenty

day s to c u re i t

. The Ba nk also informed N orman that it would beg in forec losure proc eeding s on the rea l pr operty if the delinquency

was not cur ed within the time specifie d. Norm an re s p o n d ed by filing a “Plaintiff’s Or ig ina l Pe tit ion

F or Te mpo ra ry Re str a ini ng Orde r, I nju

nc tio n A nd

Da ma g e s” in d ist

ri c t c ourt in2

Rus k Co un ty

namin g the B ank and oth e rs a s def e nd ants

. No rm an all e g e d tha t ven ue wa s p ro pe r i n Rusk Count y

beca use Jul ie Tay

lor, the assistant t o his loan officer at the Bank and a defe ndant in the lawsuit, resided in Rusk County at the time the ca use of a ction acc rued. N orman soug ht damag es bas ed upon conve rsion, the Texas Theft L iability Act, fr aud, bre ach of

fiduciar y duty , brea ch of contra ct, and violations o f t h e Tex as De ceptive T rade Practice s Act. He also reque sted an

acc ounting, attorn ey ’s fe es, ex pert fe es, costs, and te mporary and per manent injunctive re lief prohibiting the B ank’s f

orec losure of its dee d of trust lien. E ac h re l at o r f

i l eda m o t i o nt o t ra n s fe r v en u e s t at i n g t h at v en u e w as m an d at o ry i nGr egg County un der S ect ion

15 .0 11 of

the Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e and Re me die s Co de be c a

us e the su it inv olv e d a

n in te re st i n r e a l pr op e rt

y loc a te d in

Gr e g g County . In his re sp on se to t he se mot ion s to transfe r venue , Norman a lle ged t h at the re lators’ fr audulent conduc t, and not an intere st in land, formed the primary basis of hi s complaint. The trial court then entere d an orde r deny ing the motions to transfe r venue . This orig inal proce eding followed. A V A ILA BILITY O F M ANDAMUS Or din ari ly , a

wr it o f m and a mus wi ll i ssu e on ly if the tr ia l c ourt

ha s c omm itt e d a

c le ar a bu se of discre tion and the re lators have no adequate re medy by appea l. In re Cerberus Capital M gm t., L.P. , 164 S.W .3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005). The tria l court abuse s its dis cre tion if “it reac hes a de cision

so arb itr ary and un re a so na ble a s to amo un t to a c le ar a nd pr e jud ic ia l e rr or

of law” or if it c le arl y fa ils to corre ctly

analy ze or apply

the law. Id. (q u o t i n g W

a lke r v . P acker , 827 S. W. 2 d

8 3 3 , 8 3 9 ( T e x. 1992)). I n this case, the r elators c ontend that venue is gove rned by Section 15.011, a manda t ory venue statute. Mandamus is ava ilable by statute to enfor ce Sec tion 15.011. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE Ann. § 1 5. 06 42 (V e rn on 20 02 ); see also In re A

pplied Chem ical Magnesias Cor p. , 206 S.W. 3d 11 4, 11 8 ( Te x. 20 06 ). Th e re fo re , in a de qu a c y of an a pp e llate re me dy

is n ot a pre re qu isi te to mandamus under se ction 15.0642. See In re Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. , 9 9 8 S. W. 2 d 2 1 2 , 215 (Te x. 1999) . I NT E RE S T I N L AND E STA BL IS H ES V E NUE The relators argue that the relief soug ht in the under ly ing la wsuit filed by

Norman involves

an in te re st i n r e a l pr op e rt y , w hic h w ou ld r e qu ir e the su it t o b e tr ie d in Gr e g g Co un ty pu rsuan t to3

Section 15.011 of the Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code. Se c tio n 1 5. 01 1 s ta te s a s f oll ow s: A cti o ns f

or r ecove r y of

r eal proper t y or an es t at e or i nt er es t i n r eal proper t y , f or par t i t i on of

r eal propert y , t o r emo ve enc umbran ces f r om t he t i t l e t o r eal propert y , f or r ecove r y of dam age s t o r eal p rop ert y , or t o quiet t i t l e t o real p rop ert y s hal l be bro ught i n t he co unt y i n whi ch al l or a p art of t he pr oper t y i s l oca t ed. T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE § 15.011 (Ve rnon 2002). A pa rty must alleg e two “ve nue fac ts,” and establis h them by

prima fa cie pr oof if spec ifically denied, to show that ve nue is mandatory under Section 15.011: (1) that the nature of the suit fits wit hin those listed in Section 15.011, and (2) that all or par t of the re alty at issue is loc ated in the county of suit. In re Str oud Oil Properties, In c. , 110 S.W .3d 18, 24 (Tex. A

pp.–Waco 2002, orig . proce eding ). I t is the ulti mate or dominant purpose of a suit that determines whether a par ticular suit falls under

the mandator

y venue statute, and not how the ca use of a ction is de s cr i b ed b y t h e par ties. Bra c e we ll v

. Fa ir , 6 3 8 S. W. 2 d

6 1 2 , 6 1 5 ( T e x. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ). The nature of the plaintiff’ s claim is determined f rom the principal rig ht asserte d and the relief soug ht in the plaintiff’s petition. Stro ud O il , 110 S.W .3d at 25. I f a ma

ndatory venue pr ovision applies t o any claims or ca use of a ction, then all claims and

cause s of ac ti o n ar i s i n g from the same transa ction must be broug ht in the county of mandatory
venue. In re Texas Windstor m Ins. A ss’n , 1 2 1 S

. W

. 3 d 8 2 1 , 8 2 5 (T ex
. Ap p
. – Be au m o n t2 0 0 3 , o ri g. proce eding ). Onc e it is demonstrated that th e co u rt ’s judg ment would have some eff ect on a n interest in land, then the ve nue of the suit is properly fix ed under

the mandator

y venue statute. Northern Natu ral Gas v. Chisos Joint V enture I , 142 S.W .3d 447, 453 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2004, no pet.). The lien cre ated by a deed of trust is an encumbr ance on the title to real prope rty

. Pringle v. S. Ban kers Life Ins. Co. , 296 S.W .2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1956, no writ). Theref ore, a suit to c ance l a deed of trust pr ocure d by fra ud is a suit to remove an e ncumbra nce f rom title and aff ects a n interest in land. See id

. Moreove r, any deed, contra ct, judg ment, or other instrument not void on its face that purports to convey any interest in or make s any

char g e upon the l and of a true

owner , the invalidity

of which w ould require proof, is a cloud upon the l eg al title of the owne r. DR G Fin . Corp. v. Wade , 577 S.W .2d 349, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.–Houston [ 1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).4

Norman doe s not contest the fa ct that his promissory note pay able to the B ank is secur ed by a dee d of trust lien on his land or that the land is in Gre g g County . I n s t ea d , h e contends that the p r im ar y is s u e in h is s u it is th e r e lato r s ’ f

r a u d u le n t c o n d

u c t r e lati n g to th e p r omi s s o r y n o te

. We disag ree . I n his origina l petition, Norman alleg es t hat t he Bank a nd its employ ees c onverte d monies he pa id t o th e B ank

tha t w e re to b e a

pp lie d to h is a c c ount. He a lso a lle g e s th a t th e B ank and its emp l o y ee s required him to place his business prope rty as collate ral a g ainst a line of c redit, which was not necessar

y , coer ced him into waiving his business homestead rig hts to his real proper ty by havin g him

e xec ute a no nh ome ste a d af

fi davit , an d ar e no w at te mpt ing to unl awf ull y a pp ro pr ia te his

rea l property . Norman a sserts var ious causes of action arising from these a lleg ations. Although he

see k s d a ma g e s f

o r a ll o f th e a ll e g e d w r o n g f u l a c ts d e s c r ib e d in h is p e ti ti o n , th e u lt im ate r elief he seeks relating to the deed of trust is a per manent injunction to preve nt forec losure of the Ba nk’s dee d of trust lien on his la

nd. The issuance of a perma nent injunction would not r esult in the canc ellation of the de ed of trust, ther eby removing the enc umbranc e from Norman’ s titl e. As a prac tical matter, howeve r, it would rende r a nullity the Bank’s li en and its corr esponding rig ht to forec lose under the terms of the d ee d o f t ru s t

. I n eff ect, Nor man would avoid the lien a nd the B ank would be le ft wi tho ut s e c ur ity fo r No rm an’ s pr omi sso ry no te

. Un de r t he se fa c ts, No rm an’ s su it i s ta nta mou nt t o a suit to remove a

n encumbr ance from the title re al prope rty , and the judgment he se eks will aff ect an intere st in real prope rty . There fore , Section 15.011 g overns ve nue. C ONCL US I ON Ba sed upon our r eview of the re cord and the f

oreg oing a

naly sis, we conc lude that the trial court should ha

ve g rante d the relators’ motions to transfe r venue to G reg g County und er S ec t i on 1 5

. 0 1 1

. A c c o r d i n g l y, w e c o n d i t i o n a l l y g r an tm an d a m u s r e l i e f

. W e t r u s tt h a t , w i t h i nf

i f t e e n d a ys from the date of this opinion and corr esponding order , the trial cour t will vacate its Mar ch 11, 2008 Orde r De ny ing D efe ndants’ Motions to Transfe r Ve nue, and in its stead, will issue an order g ranting the re la tor s’ mot ion s to tr ans fe r v e nu e to G re g g Cou nty , T e xas. Th e wr it wi ll iss ue on ly if it f a ils to do so. The trial court shall furnish this court, within the time of compliance with this court’s opinion and order , a ce rtified copy of the orde r evide ncing such complianc e.5 JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief J ustice Opinion delivere d J une 11, 2008. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)