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EXAMINING WHAT A NUCLEAR IRAN DEAL MEANS

FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 20, 2014

Serial No. 113–224

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

General Michael Hayden, USAF, Retired, Principal, The Chertoff Group 

(former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) ........................................ 9

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 16

Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ........................................................................ 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

General Michael Hayden, USAF, Retired: Prepared statement .......................... 12

Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Mr. Karim Sadjadpour: Prepared statement ......................................................... 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 70

(1)

EXAMINING WHAT A NUCLEAR IRAN DEAL 

MEANS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. This subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize other members seeking recognition. 

We will then hear from our witnesses, and, without objection, the 

witnesses prepared statements will be made a part of the record. 

Members may have 5 days in which to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

We are now just a few days away from the Iran nuclear deadline, 

and the P5+1 appear poised to accept a weak deal with a regime 

that cannot be trusted. 

Despite approximately $14 billion in direct sanctions relief, as 

well as incalculable indirect benefits to the Iranian economy and 

the nuclear program, Iran has repeatedly stated that it will never 

stop enriching uranium or take one step back in its research and 

development. 

Despite a 4-month extension of talks and allowing Iran access to 

an additional $700 million of its blocked currency each month, 

Iran’s Supreme Leader 2 weeks ago called for the destruction of our 

greatest ally in the Middle East, the Democratic Jewish State of 

Israel. 

Iran recently claimed its ballistic missiles are capable of razing 

Israeli cities and American military bases in the region to the 

ground. Iran has called for a Palestinian incitement against Israel, 

the result of which can be seen in the tragic murders 2 days ago 

of five Israelis, three of whom were U.S. Citizens in Jerusalem synagogue as they were praying. 

From the onset, Iran has not complied with the terms outlined 

by the P5+1, exporting more oil than allowed, continuing production at the Arak heavy water reactor, denying access to key facilities, and dragging its feet every step of the way. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that Iran isn’t even cooperVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:47 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\112014\91459 SHIRL
2

ating with its past commitments, such as completely disclosing its 

past work on nuclear weaponization. 

Rouhani, who bragged in the past about deceiving the administration, as its chief negotiator, is known for using stall tactics while 

continuing to advance Iran’s nuclear weapons program behind the 

scenes. And our leadership in the White House falls for it. 

The administration turns a blind eye to Iran’s support of terrorism, its constant threats against the United States and our allies, and its failure to cooperate even during this negotiation period. It ignores every lesson we thought we learned when North 

Korea delayed its way into a nuclear weapon. President Obama 

even sends secret letters to the Supreme Leader, naively hoping to 

appeal to the rational side of a man who has proven himself to be 

anything but. 

The Iranians have made clear that no matter what a final deal 

contains, they will not stop enrichment and will not allow access 

to sites like Parchin and who knows how many other covert sites. 

As General Hayden has stated, because of the covert nature of 

Iran’s activities, American intelligence alone will not be able to 

verify the agreement. And, if he would still be advising the President, he would tell him that this deal could not be adequately 

verified. 

Iran must be completely transparent about its current and past 

programs, including its weaponization programs and accept snap 

inspections anywhere, any time. But experience and a track record 

tells us that Iran will not do so. It is impossible to verify Iran’s nuclear program because, as a Defense Science Board report has said, 

‘‘The capability to detect Iran’s undeclared or covert nuclear sites 

is either inadequate or does not exist.’’

Finally, the administration has misunderstood the point of sanctions, sanctions that Congress worked hard to build from the very 

beginning. The sanctions regime that Congress put into place was 

designed to work together. The sanctions are interconnected to target, not just the nuclear program, but Iran’s ballistic weapons program and human rights abuses as well. 

The P5+1 has allowed Iran’s economy to grow, its currency to 

strengthen, and has provided a dangerous amount of concessions 

and sanctions relief to the regime based only on its nuclear program. And they have given Iran the time and money it needs to 

be more resilient and even better able to weather sanctions in the 

future. The effect of sanctions takes time and it cannot be easily 

re-implemented or once lifted or once suspended. 

Yet all indications are that President Obama, if a final deal is 

reached, would seek to lift sanctions or use waiver authority provided within the sanctions law. These waivers, however, are national security waivers. It is not in the national security interest 

of the United States to provide Iran additional access to cash with 

which it can proliferate and expand other ilicit activities, specifically, its support for global terror. 

Just last week, the President reissued a continuation of the national emergency with respect to Iran, a status which has been in 

place since the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. It strains the imagination to see how the President can, on one hand, declare Iran as a 

national emergency, yet on the other waive sanctions and say, Iran 

3

is not a national security threat. Congress needs to reclaim its 

sanction authority from this administration, do everything it can to 

prevent this weak deal from happening. 

So let me be clear, no matter what the P5+1 does, Congress 

should not allow a deal that threatens our national security interest to stand, and we intend on repairing the damage that has been 

done as soon as possible. We must reinstate and expand sanctions, 

and we must not allow Iran to get a nuclear bomb. 

Either the P5+1 secures the deal that includes the complete cessation of Iran’s enrichment and the full dismantling of its nuclear 

infrastructure or it must walk away from these doomed talks altogether. 

And with that, I am pleased to yield to my good friend from Florida, the ranking member, Congressman Ted Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks for holding this extremely timely hearing as we are just 

4 days away from the November 24th deadline to reach a deal to 

prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

Madam Chairman, often we are told these hearings that—often 

when we are told that, in these hearings, we have important points 

to make, 5 minutes is not enough to lay out the complex issues that 

we are tackling in the Middle East. But today it really comes down 

to one simple question. Will we prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities? 

I don’t think any of us are under the illusion that a satisfactory 

and comprehensive deal will be reached on Monday. But let me be 

clear, any deal must cut off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear 

weapon; and this specifically includes the Arak reactor. A deal 

must dismantle Iran’s centrifuge program to prevent Iran from becoming a threshold nuclear state, create robust verification and 

monitoring mechanisms to prevent undetectable breakout, force 

Iran to come clean on its past nuclear activities, including impossible military dimensions and cover a long enough duration that 

the regime won’t simply wait it out. 

In the absence of a deal on Monday, we could be left with alternative outcomes. Either an extension of talks under the current 

terms or framework agreement with details to be addressed in the 

future negotiations or final recognition that the clerics running 

around never intended to make a deal at all. Any suggestion that 

talks should be extended must include verifiable mechanisms to 

prevent Iran from covertly advancing its nuclear program. 

Madam Chairman, I can’t stress enough to our negotiators in Vienna and our P5+1 partners how seriously we take the implementation of a strict verification and monitoring process. This regime 

has unfortunately proven itself untrustworthy time and time again. 

We have uncovered covert nuclear facilities. We have discovered 

military dimensions to its nuclear program, the development and 

testing of ballistic missiles, the arms shipped to terrorist groups, 

all in direct violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

If an extension is suggested, it must be for a clearly defined and 

limited time. Iran cannot be allowed to negotiate in perpetuity, 

dragging things out while continuing to receive sanctions relief in 

exchange for incremental baby steps. The current status quo will 

4

not be the accepted new normal. Now is the time for Iran to take 

significant steps to show the world, once and for all, whether or not 

it is serious. 

And if an extension is proposed, Congress should make clear to 

Iran that sanctions will be ratcheted up dramatically at the expiration of an extension period. This will finally make Iran understand 

the ramifications of failing to yield on its pursuit of a nuclear 

weapon. 

And while the world has been focused for the past year on nuclear negotiations, this regime has continued to engage in the most 

egregious human rights abuses against its own people, something 

that we hear too little about. Make no mistake, deal or no deal, we 

will not continue—we will not overlook Iran’s abysmal human 

rights record. 

Yesterday, United Nations issued a strong rebuke to the regime 

on human rights, adopting a resolution criticizing Iran—and I 

quote—‘‘alarming high frequency and increase in the death penalty, widespread restrictions on basic freedoms and worsening discrimination and persecution of women and minorities.’’

This regime, during the Rouhani presidency, has executed over 

850 people in the past 15 months. This includes 12 executions in 

one prison over 11 days in October. Religious minorities, women, 

and the LGBT community continue to be persecuted. Access to free 

press and the internet is blocked. Communications are monitored 

and people are detained for expressing dissent toward regime policies. 

Iran has not fulfilled its promises of assistance in our efforts as 

well to find my constituent, Robert Levinson, who has now been 

missing and separated from his wife, children, and grandchildren 

for 2,813 days. It has not released the other Americans imprisoned 

or Washington Post journalist, Jason Rezaian, who has been held 

without charges for over 120 days. 

This regime may no longer have the bombastic spokesman, 

Ahmadinejad, to incite anti-Semitism and spew vitriol. But that 

hasn’t stopped the Supreme Leader from issuing just recently a 

nine-point plan on why and how Israel should be annihilated. It 

hasn’t stopped the regime’s unabated support for the murderous 

Assad regime, or it relentless support for Hezbollah’s terrorism 

around the world. It hasn’t stopped its meddling in Iraq, and 

Yemen, and Bahrain, and other Gulf countries. 

Look, I want to see a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. 

The best resolution would be to reach a comprehensive deal that 

addresses all of the points that I laid out earlier. But even if a nuclear deal is reached, Iran must know that its behavior will not be 

accepted by responsible Nations. We will speak out against the regime’s barbaric treatment of its own people. We will continue to enforce sanctions on those who perpetuate these abuses. And we will 

continue to go after the regime’s financial and military support of 

terrorist organizations. 

I know we are all anxiously awaiting Monday’s deadline, and I 

would just like to repeat what we have heard from the administration since day one, ‘‘No deal is better than a bad deal.’’ A bad deal 

will gravely threaten the safety and security of the United States, 

of our allies in the region, especially Israel. 

5

And, Madam Chairman, let me be clear about one last thing, 

those of us who may question the merits of an inadequate deal are 

not on a march and do not advocate a march to war. We simply 

do not want to see an agreement that allows Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon right under our noses. 

Again, I thank our witnesses for appearing today. You each bring 

unique expertise and insight into Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, and I look forward to a productive discussion. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now I will recognize other members for their opening statements. 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And I would like to join in with Congressman Deutch to reiterate 

that this is an untrustworthy regime. It is untrustworthy to its citizens, indeed the violations of human rights, the subjugation of the 

women of Iran. 

We know this is the great culture of Persia. More should be expected of such an extraordinary country, but the people are being 

subjugated. And, then, at the same time, we have an American administration that, I think, is being extraordinarily naive. 

Our country, we should remember the inhumanity of the hostage 

crisis, the taking of our Embassy in 1979, violating every norms of 

civilized law, international law. Additionally, I will never forget 

that it was Iran that directed the bombing of the Marine barracks 

at Beirut, hundreds of Americans were killed. It was the largest explosion since Nagasaki. And then the IEDs provided to terrorists 

to kill American personnel, Iraq, Afghanistan. Having two sons 

serve in Iraq, another in Afghanistan, it was quite personal to me. 

We should remember that their signs carried, in English for our 

benefit, ‘‘Death to America. Death to Israel.’’ And that is the way 

the negotiations should be conducted as people not trustworthy. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this important hearing. 

The nuclear—a nuclear Iran would have severe repercussions for 

America’s security and that of our allies, further destabilizing an 

already volatile region and emboldening a already dangerous regime. 

Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is a major strategic imperative of the United States and must be continued. As 

the deadline for concluding a nuclear deal approaches, it is useful 

to provide some context on the evolution of Iran’s nuclear program. 

In the past, Iran cynically used the negotiations process with the 

EU Nations in order to continue enrichment activities and protect 

itself from United States intervention. Now, Iran has built out its 

capacity to 19,000 centrifuges. 

Stiff sanctions are what brought Iran to the table, and they must 

continue to be our leverage point. I fear that by continuing to provide sanctions relief in exchange for vague commitments by the 

6

Iranians, we are helping to rehabilitate an Iranian economy and 

eroding a robust and effective sanctions policy. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Dr. YOHO. I have no opening statement, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this 

important hearing and your diligence on this subject. 

You know, between the time we left before the election and reconvene, there were two troubling reports. One was the report of 

the President writing a letter to the Ayatollah about potential common interests that we may have with Iran to fight ISIS, and then 

the other report that was troubling was that the Iran deal was 

most likely to be constructed in a way to avoid scrutiny by Congress. 

And so I looked at that and said, they want Iran to be a constructive force in Iraq and what type of consideration are they 

going to provide in these nuclear negotiations, because I don’t think 

we are likely to be successful anyways. And I really fear that we 

could be running into a catastrophic policy outcome, and I think it 

is very incumbent on the Congress to insert ourselves in this. 

We should not allow a bad deal to go without us having to vote 

and, if it is a bad deal, then, we need to be strong and impose sanctions. There would have been sanctions to pass the Senate, except 

for one man, Harry Reid, would not let that come for a vote. In 

January, there is a new sheriff in town. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

And witnesses for being here today. 

I have always believed that it has been naive to negotiate with 

Iran over their nuclear program. I think the Iranians, their negotiating policy, really is to stall and they have stalled. And they have 

extended, and they have extended. I think they are going to continue to do that. 

I thought the appropriate approach was to pass more comprehensive sanctions. I did that here, and I thought that they had to really pick, then, between they want an economy that functioned, a society, or did they want their nuclear program. They couldn’t have 

both. Unfortunately, we are down this path, and it looks like they 

want to extend and stall once again. 

I hope that we will get back to the sanctions. I hope that we pass 

stronger sanctions, and I think that that is the way to go. They 

have to make a decision. Do you want this nuclear program, or do 

you want a functioning society? 

I thank you again, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I think we are all mindful that one of the ramifications of Iran 

obtaining nuclear weapons is the potential of proliferation in the 

7

region. And so, as you testify today, I would be interested in hearing what other countries you think might seek to obtain nuclear 

weapons and how would that relate to what is going on with ISIL? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good question. 

Thank you. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I yield the rest of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Deutch for holding today’s hearing on this issue that is 

really vital to the U.S. national security interests. 

The continuing threat that Iran poses to international stability 

is of paramount concern to the United States and to our national 

security interest. I certainly appreciate the efforts made by the administration and the P5+1 in negotiations with Iran pursuant to 

the terms of the joint plan of action, but serious questions remain 

regarding Iran’s interest in reaching a final deal and Iran’s intention of arming the terms of any agreement, even if one were 

reached. 

While reports suggests that some small progress has been made 

in the negotiations, we must remain vigilant to ensure that any 

comprehensive deal truly protects the national security interests of 

the United States and our allies around the world. We will need 

to ensure that Iran complies with international law and any restrictions and requirements agreed to in a final deal are verifiable 

and, also, guarantee that Iran is unable to develop a nuclear weapons capability, period. 

Finally, I want to note that it is crucial that Congress and the 

administration continue to work together, not separately to best 

achieve the foreign policy priorities of the United States, an agreement that once and for all prevents a nuclear Iran. 

I thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Madam Chairman, let’s stipulate, we don’t like Iran. Let’s also 

stipulate we don’t want a nuclear Iran. They are two different 

things to conflate the need for domestic reform in Iran to the point 

where it is pluralistic, democratic, inclusive, and respects all 

human rights, otherwise, we are never going to sit down with them 

and negotiate a nuclear deal, is a very perilous proposition. We 

don’t live in an ideal world. 

The interim agreement, according to the International Atomic 

Energy Agency, has produced pursuant to the agreement. There 

are no new centrifuges. Construction has been halted in a heavy 

water facility reactor at Arak. Five percent uranium 235 stockpiles 

remain at pre-JPOA levels, and 20 percent uranium 235 stockpiles 

have been eliminated. It ain’t perfect. We would like to finalize a 

final agreement. But if we make perfect be the enemy of the good, 

we are condemning the world to a confrontation over Iran. And I 

think most Americans want to avoid that if that is possible. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

8

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you 

for calling this hearing. Thank you for your profound remarks. 

Also, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch, I want to associate myself with those remarks as well. 

There is no newspaper big enough to cover all of the issues happening around the world today. But every day, not just today, 

every day the number one story at the top of the fold has to be preventing a nuclear Iran. 

If there is going to be a deal, it must only be a good deal. And 

a good deal will only be such if it blocks all of Iran’s pathways to 

a nuclear weapon and not temporarily, but permanently across 

generations. It has to be a deal that blocks their programs for enrichment, weaponization, and delivery systems. But it must also 

deal with Iran’s support of international terrorism and Iran’s 

threats to the region as well as its human rights violations. We 

must have a deal that blocks that and protects, not just the region, 

but the entire world. 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses to hear what 

you have to say how we might best get to the that or what happens 

if we don’t. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

And now I will turn to Mr. Cotton of Arkansas. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. 

In the interest of time, I will speak very briefly and just say that 

I am doubtful that any deal could be reached with this Iranian regime that would stop this Iranian regime from pursuing nuclear 

weapons, and I hope that the President will take the right action 

to keep America and our allies safe in the region. 

And I look forward to hearing what the witnesses have to say on 

these matters. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, than you very much. 

To the ranking member, thank you both for hosting an important 

hearing. 

To the witnesses, thank you for, once again, appearing before 

this committee and thank you for your service to our country as 

well. 

There are a number of issues obviously before this Congress and 

before the next one. Very few have the potential of a generational 

impact like an Iranian nuclear weapon and the cascading effects 

throughout the region. I would ask to—I would like—I want to get 

to your testimony, your comments. 

I would like to hear from the witnesses at some point, if you can 

speculate a little bit, assuming that a deal is not reached on the 

24th, what happens then, particularly with regards to, I would say 

three points in building off my colleague, Ms. Frankel, with regards 

to Russia and our relationship with Russia, with regards to Iraq, 

and with regards to ISIL and Syria? 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

And now I will introduce our witnesses. 

9

First, we are all very pleased to welcome General Michael Hayden, who has had a very impressive and distinguished career. Over 

his 40-year career, he rose through the ranks to become a FourStar General, the Director of the National Security Agency, the 

first Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. General Hayden is now 

a principal with the Chertoff Group, and we welcome him here 

today and we thank him for his service. Thank you very much, 

General. 

Next, we welcome back to our committee Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 

where he leads projects on Iran, sanctions, proliferation, as the 

head of FDD’s center on sanctions and ilicit finance. Mr. Dubowitz 

is the author of 15 studies on economic sanctions against Iran, and 

he is also co-chair of the project on U.S.-Middle East nonproliferation strategy. Welcome, Mark. 

And, finally, we also welcome back Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Prior to this, Mr. Sadjadpour was the chief Iran analyst at the 

International Crisis Group and he is a board member of the Banu 

Foundation, an organization dedicated to empowering women 

worldwide. 

We are very pleased with the high quality of our witnesses today; 

your prepared remarks will be made a part of the record. Please 

feel free to synthesize them for us. 

General Hayden, we will begin with you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN, USAF, RETIRED, 

PRINCIPAL, THE CHERTOFF GROUP (FORMER DIRECTOR OF 

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, ma’am, and thanks for the opportunity to testify today. 

In the nearly 6 years since I have left government, people have 

asked me, ‘‘What keeps you awake at night?’’ Iran has always been 

in my list. In fact, let me add that Iran was the problem with 

which I was least satisfied when I left government in February 

2009. We certainly did not hand our successors a pretty package 

here. 

And so I said to myself, with the questions Mr. Schneider and 

Mr. Kennedy brought up, it is the problem I think that has most 

consistently continued to worsen in the intervening 51⁄2 years. 

Now, we are involved in nuclear negotiations with the Islamic republic and, no doubt, as you have pointed out, that is the product 

of the tough sanctions that two administrations have levied against 

Tehran. Now, the real question before us is, can we come out of 

these negotiations with a nuclear agreement that will give us confidence that we will have the time, the certainty, and the will to 

prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state at any time in 

the future? 

Now, I come at this as a professional intelligence officer, so I will 

keep my remarks pretty much in that lane. 

First point I would like to make is Iran is a tough intelligence 

target. During my time as Director of CIA, Iran was the second 

most discussed topic in the Oval Office. The only one more disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:47 Dec 19, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\112014\91459 SHIRL
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cussed was terrorism. And, frankly, there wasn’t a number three. 

I mean, we talked about a lot of other things, but we didn’t aggregate around it like we did terrorism and Iran. 

President Bush used to ask me two kinds of questions. One basket was, ‘‘What does the program look like? How much low-enrich 

uranium, how many centrifuges?’’ The other basket of questions 

was simply, ‘‘How do these guys make decisions? How do I influence their processes going forward?’’

I always wanted the nuclear questions because Iran is an incredibly, incredibly opaque society. So we should be under no illusions 

that we can precisely define the motivations or the future plans of 

the various power centers that vie for control in Tehran today. So 

that gives me little confidence about any plan of action predicated 

on helping the moderates in Tehran. 

Second, our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program is incomplete. That is why I believe an important element of any agreement 

has to be far more transparent than we have today about the past 

history of Iranian nuclear efforts. It is particularly disheartening, 

as you said, Madam Chairman, when the IAEA is denied access to 

facilities and information that they think they need to judge Iranian compliance. 

Look, the objective of these talks is to put distance between 

where the Iranians are parked and where they have to be to have 

a weapon. It is near impossible for us to judge whether the distance is adequate without a full accounting of the work they have 

done to date in secrecy. 

Third, even with incomplete knowledge on the program, it is my 

belief that, at a minimum, Iran is keeping its options open, working very hard to keep its options open for a nuclear weapon. There 

is no other logical explanation for their investment in time, energy, 

commerce, and prestige that they have been willing to make. 

Now, I say that fully aware that I was in government when we 

produced a national intelligence estimate in 2007 that said that 

Iran had stopped a part of its nuclear weapons program. And that 

judgment was not based on the absence of evidence. It was indeed 

based on evidence of absence. They had stopped some work, but 

that was far more tactical than strategic. Some of that work has 

resumed in other important aspects, like creating fissile material 

and ballistic missile technology. That continued to pace. 

A fourth point. Iran is already close to a weapon—too close to a 

weapon. The point of the negotiations, from our point of view, has 

to be to roll the program back, not freeze it in place. That means 

that certain activities, stocks, facilities have to be dismantled. 

From all accounts, the Iranians have not been very forthcoming on 

that important subject; and so I would be very cautious about creative solutions that have been put forward in place of the actual 

dismantlement of facilities and equipment and stockpiles. 

Ms. Frankel, an Iran that is parked too close to a nuclear weapon will pretty much have the same destabilizing effect on the region as an Iran that has just tested a nuclear weapon. The Sunni 

neighbors will draw their conclusions, and they will act accordingly, and I know that this committee understands how harmful 

that would be for the entire region. 

11

A fifth and final point has to do with verification. I had to deal 

with this question at the end of the Bush administration when we 

were negotiating with the North Koreans. At that time, in NSC 

meetings, I pressed for an invasive verification regime as a necessity for any agreement because I was unwilling to guarantee that 

American intelligence could sufficiently verify the agreement on its 

own. 

So let me repeat that position for the question before us today. 

Absent an invasive inspection regime, with freedom to visit even 

suspect sites on short notice, American intelligence cannot provide 

adequate warning of Iranian nuclear developments. 

I know there are many other aspects of the issue that the committee will want to explore, and I look forward to that discussion, 

ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. That was very clear. 

[The prepared statement of General Hayden follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Dubowitz. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, members of the subcommittee, on behalf of FDD, thank 

you for inviting me again to testify. 

I am honored and certainly humbled to be testifying with General Hayden and with Karim Sadjadpour, whose work and service 

to our country I greatly admire. 

As many of you have said, Iran is at this negotiation table because of you, because of the sanctions that you have passed. Now, 

Congress has attempted to do other things. You have attempted to 

establish clear parameters for what constitutes an acceptable nuclear deal. You have attempted to put in place sanctions and waiting to increase American leverage. You have attempted to set a 

strict timeline for the conclusion of a deal, and you have attempted 

to demand that a final deal should be put to a vote in Congress. 

The administration has blocked all of these efforts. Congress 

should continue pushing on all of these fronts, but it should also 

defend the very sanctions architecture that was so instrumental in 

creating. This is going to be essential to enforce any Iranian nuclear deal, to provide increased leverage to respond to Iranian noncompliance, and to deter and punish Iran’s elicit activities. Because 

after detection, what? What leverage are we going to have left to 

force the Iranians back into compliance? 

Now, a negotiated agreement is the preferred solution to peacefully resolve this nuclear crisis. Iran’s record of nuclear deception, 

its sponsorship of terrorism, it egregious human rights abuses, all 

of this does not inspire confidence in Tehran’s commitment to 

honor a final nuclear agreement. 

Moreover, the administration may not be demanding the best 

deal it can get. Administration officials are on record actually, in 

the past 7, 8 months as committing to a deal that will ‘‘dismantle’’ 

‘‘a lot’’ or ‘‘significant portions’’ of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But 

the terms of a deal could fall far short of that. The more flawed 

the deal, the more important it will be for Congress to defend the 

sanctions architecture to maintain economic leverage. 

Now, the administration has reportedly studied how it might suspend the ‘‘vast majority of sanctions’’ after a nuclear deal while bypassing you. In response, Congress needs to stand behind the July 

2014 letter that was signed by 344 members of the House of Representatives. It affirmed ‘‘that the concept of an exclusively defined 

nuclear-related sanction on Iran does not exist in U.S. law’’ and 

that ‘‘almost all sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program are 

also related to Tehran’s advancing ballistic missile program, intensifying support for international terrorism and other unconventional weapons programs.’’

Based on press reports, it appears that the administration and 

perhaps the EU and the U.N. Security Council are designing a 

phased program of sanctions relief, using suspensions and 

snapbacks where sanctions will be suspended and only reimposed 

in the event of Iranian noncompliance. 

17

Now, the legalities of snapbacks are simple, but the politics and 

economics are very complicated. A premature suspension of U.S., 

UNSC, and EU sanctions an overreliance on snapbacks could seriously undermine the Iran sanctions regime and give Iran’s nuclear 

program political legitimacy. 

At the U.S.–EU UNSC, there would have to be agreement that 

there is sufficient evidence of Iranian noncompliance to warrant a 

decision to reinstate these sanctions. Significant disputes are inevitable about the seriousness of infractions, the appropriate level of 

response, and possible Iranian retaliation. 

Furthermore—and this is a concern a number of members have 

expressed today—the administration may not respond effectively to 

evidence of Iranian noncompliance for fear that enforcement could 

prompt Iranian countermeasures. Now, this is particular disconcerting amidst reports of a growing U.S.-Iran detente and possible coordination to weaken ISIL. 

The snapback is equally challenging to implement, given certain 

economic reality. Sanctions took years before international companies terminated their business ties with Tehran. Once loosened, it 

is going to very difficult to get those companies to leave again. 

Iran also enjoyed substantial psychological benefits from inking 

a deal. That will translate into improved macroeconomic conditions 

as it already has under the JPOA. The administration seriously underestimated the value of sanctions relief under the JPOA. It did 

not account for the psychological impact on Iran’s macroeconomic 

environment. As a result, Iran’s economy has shown signs of stabilization, reflected in modest GDP growth, a stabilization of the 

currency, and a significant drop in inflation. 

As Iran’s economic recovery becomes less susceptible to snapback 

sanctions, economic pressure is going to be a less effective tool to 

respond to Iranian nuclear noncompliance. This will make it more 

likely that the U.S. will be forced to cheat—or forced to choose between either tolerating Iran’s cheating or using military force to respond to violations. And that is unrealistic, given that this regime 

tends to cheat incrementally. 

In my written testimony, I provide detailed recommendations in 

how Congress can defend its sanctions architecture, including how 

to limit ways the administration could act unilaterally. 

In conclusion, Congress has a vital role to play to protect and enhance U.S. economic leverage, and this leverage is going to be essential to enforce a deal and pressure Tehran to end all of its ilicit 

activities. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Dubowitz. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Sadjadpour. 

STATEMENT OF MR. KARIM SADJADPOUR, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Thank you to the committee. It is a real honor 

to be here. 

I would like to preface my comments by saying that I think everyone in this room shares the same goal. We want to avert a nuclear armed Iran. We want to avert another military conflict in the 

Middle East, and we want to see Iran’s transformation into a more 

democratic, tolerant government. 

I would like to focus my comments in three separate parts. First, 

internal implications of the nuclear talks within Iran, second the 

regional implications of the nuclear discussions and, third, the implications for U.S. policy. 

Let me start with Iran internally. The paradox of Iran is the fact 

that you have a society which aspires to be like South Korea, prosperous and integrated, and you have a regime which shows a much 

greater resemblance to North Korea, prioritizing isolation, ideological purity, and militarization. 

The optimists, proponents of a nuclear deal would argue that a 

deal could strengthen the hand of the moderates in Tehran and 

strengthen civil society. And, again, a more integrated Iran is good 

for the interests of our more pragmatic factions in Tehran. 

Skeptics would argue the opposite that what we have seen in the 

last few weeks, as Representative Deutch alluded to, are increased 

human rights abuses. In the event of a deal, it is possible that the 

repressive apparatus of the Islamic republic will show even greater 

repression in order to signal to the population that external flexibility doesn’t signal internal weakness. 

My own take is that both of these outcomes are possible in the 

event of a deal. And that both Iranian civil society could be 

strengthened, but we will also see a backlash at the hand—by the 

Iranian hardliners. But it is important to note that Iranian—Iran 

civil society and human rights community has been overwhelmingly supportive of seeing a deal, whereas the more hardline, revolutionary elite in Tehran have expressed a real concern that this 

could possibly undermine their hold on power. 

Let me move next to the regional implications of these regional 

talks. The optimists would argue that a nuclear deal could 

strengthen greater—could foster greater U.S.–U.N. cooperation in 

the Middle East on issues of mutual concern, whether that is Syria, 

Iraq, or Persian Gulf security. The skeptics would argue that a nuclear deal would actually provide Iran a financial boost to buttress 

forces like the Assad regime in Syria or to militant forces, whether 

in Hezbollah or Shiite militias in Iraq. 

My own sense is that, over the last 35 years, we have seen tremendous consistency in Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East. I 

would argue the twin pillars of Iran’s regional policy has been rejecting U.S. influence and rejecting Israel’s existence. And I haven’t 

seen, either a historic precedence or any recent evidence, to suggest 

that Iran is prepared to abandon these long-held principles in the 

region. 

42

In fact, one of the fault lines between the moderate forces and 

Tehran and the hardliners is that moderate forces have, in the 

past, shown themselves willing to work with the United States 

against mutual regional adversaries, such as the Taliban, whereas 

hardline forces in Tehran have shown themselves willing to work 

with groups like Taliban or even al-Qaeda against the United 

States. 

So my sense on the regional implications of these nuclear talks 

is that, as long as Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, remains in power, we won’t see any major changes in Iran’s regional 

policies. 

Let me end on talking about the implication for U.S. policy. I 

think, as one of the members alluded to earlier—and I would 

agree—my sense is that we will neither see a comprehensive resolution, nor a comprehensive failure come next Monday. We will 

more likely see a limited agreement used to justify an extension of 

the negotiations. I understand that, in the past, sanctions have 

proven to be effective at forcing Iran to come to the negotiating 

table and negotiate in a serious way. 

My concern, however, is that in the event of an impasse, premature and unilateral sanctions by the United States, which don’t 

enjoy the support of our allies, could actually jeopardize P5+1 unity 

and trigger Iran to reconstitute their program. I believe that Iran’s 

abrogation of the interim deal should trigger additional sanctions, 

rather than additional sanctions triggering Iran’s abrogation of the 

interim deal. 

And lastly, I would just like to say that I believe that U.S. policies that have proven necessary to counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions 

in a way are at loggerheads with U.S. policies necessary to facilitate Iran’s—the transformation of political change within Iran. I 

believe that what we have seen necessary to counter Iran’s nuclear 

ambitions has been economic and political isolation, whereas Iranian civil society, Iran’s human rights community overwhelmingly 

believes that, in order to foster change in Iran, they need more political and economic intervention. So I think we need to think more 

creatively about how to reconcile these two policies. I will stop 

there. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to all of our witnesses. I will 

begin the question-and-answer period. 

As the author of the strongest set of sanctions currently on the 

books, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 

2012 and the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, I know how hard 

it was to have these sanctions with teeth and how hard it is to get 

the administration to enforce them. 

The P5+1 started from a position of weakness and proceeded to 

give up too much too fast, and the Iranians have taken advantage 

every step of the way. The Iranians cannot be trusted. It is impossible to verify their nuclear program, and Rouhani has been on 

record bragging about his ability to deceive the administration. 

General Hayden, you have said that Iran and its nuclear program are among the things that keep you awake at night. You are 

also on record as saying that Iran isn’t coming clean about its past 

weaponization activities or submitting to snap inspections of suspect facilities and that if you were still the Director of the CIA, you 

would ‘‘advise the President that the agreement could not be adequately verified.’’

The IAEA has said that Iran is not in compliance and can’t verify 

its nuclear program, and our intel community has assessed that we 

cannot independently verify Iran’s nuclear program. 

Therefore, General Hayden, I will ask you this: What kind of 

threat is posed to the interests of the United States, to our allies, 

to global security since the administration is constructing a deal 

that can’t be verified or monitored? And what could be the impact 

if Iran were to actually secure a nuclear weapon? 

Secondly, how will the other actors in the region respond to a 

deal that can’t be trusted? And, lastly, given the fact that our intelligence has not been able to detect Iran’s nefarious activities in the 

past, how can we believe that we can detect them now? 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

First of all, just point of clarification: We can’t verify this agreement in a noncooperative regime. All right. That is why we need 

the robust inspection regime. 

So I was asked this question as I was leaving government during 

the transition. So how many nuclear—well, what is Iranian nuclear 

doctrine? And I answered quite honestly, ‘‘I have no idea.’’ And, 

well, how many weapons do you think they will get? Oh, three, 

four, I am not sure. How many do we have? Oh, tens of thousands. 

So, then, why can’t we deter them? And I said, ‘‘Ah, now we have 

come to—now we have come to the matter.’’ This is not about deterring them. This is about deterring us. 

Look at Iranian behavior without one of these kits in the garage. 

And I use those terms carefully. Even without the test, even without the nuclear detonation, a parking close enough to the nuclear 

weapons reality that there is great ambiguity, how much more confidence do we give the Islamic republic in continuing the kinds of 

activities that we have seen them do and you have cataloged in 

your commentary at the beginning of the hour? How much more involvement in Iraq and Syria and Afghanistan, in the Gulf do we 

see when they have got one of these things, which is kind of that 

whole card that they can turn face up at any time? 

49

With regard to what the neighborhood does, the definitive fault 

line now in this part of the world isn’t Arab-Israeli, isn’t moderate, 

religious, secular—the defining fault line here is Sunni-Shiia. And 

that may be good, it may be bad. But it certainly is. 

I can’t conceive of the Sunni states continuing to exist with a 

Shiia state, Iran, having or too close to having a nuclear weapon 

without taking actions on their own. And so here I would see nuclear development within these countries, perhaps not going to creating fissile materials. 

But let me give you a thought, a scenario that surely can’t bring 

you much comfort. How about a Pakistani nuclear guarantee for 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons programs? Now, that can’t make you sleep well at night? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I would now turn to Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

I wanted to just ask you about what a lot of us take as a threshold issue here, which is how can we expect to reach any sort of 

comprehensive agreement that is verifiable if we don’t—if we are 

not able to get past the very fundamental questions of the history 

of Iran’s nuclear program? 

In 2020—it is now more than 2 years ago that the P5+1 asked 

that the IAEA be able to finish its work in Parchin. And, to date, 

at least as far as I know, the Iranians haven’t permitted that. If 

they can’t come clean about the past military dimensions of the 

program, how is it possible to expect that any agreement can be 

valid going forward? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, Congressman Deutch, I mean, you are exactly right. We can’t have that confidence. And, again, I think this 

has been misrepresented in the public domain, that this is about 

Iran’s mea culpa, that Iran has to come clean and make a confession. This is not about a confession. 

This is about can you design—as you alluded to, can you design 

a proper verification and inspection regime? Because if you don’t 

know where Iran was conducting its past weaponization activities—and, by the way, the IAEA says that there are still possible 

military dimensions of the program still ongoing. Then, if you 

can’t—if you don’t know where they did it, if you can’t interview 

the people involved, if you can’t see the documentation, if you don’t 

have eyes into those details, then, it is very difficult to design a 

comprehensive verification and inspection regime for the future. 

And so, this is why PMDs are so critical. This is why the French, 

for example, have made PMDs their key issue. And without that 

comprehensive verification and inspection regime, that is, as General Hayden said, go anywhere, go any time, snap inspections, we 

can see IRGC bases, we can go into military bases, any suspected 

establishment we have access to, then, we have no ability to detect 

an Iranian breakout, sneak-out or fake-out. And that has been the 

history of Iranian nuclear mendacity for 30 years. 

Mr. DEUTCH. General Hayden, we always—we tend to get caught 

up in the discussion of the moment and now PMD is just part of 

this overall discussion. 

50

But in your experience, what is the real concern that—that the 

whole discussion of the military dimension of the program, what we 

know, what we don’t know? What is the real concern and how 

should that impact our discussions going forward? 

General HAYDEN. Congressman, the real concern is we don’t 

know the point at which they are now parked, in terms. And, here, 

we are really talking about the weaponization program. We are 

really talking about the hardening, the miniaturization, the science 

that is involved in creating the nuclear detonation. That is not the 

long pole on the tent. 

The long pole on the tent is the fissile material. And if you recall, 

even in 2007, when we said ‘‘good evidence they have stopped 

weaponization,’’ they kept working on the long pole, which was the 

fissile materials. And so you have got fissile material being developed—sorry, Congressman. Let me—let me give a slightly 

longer——

Mr. DEUTCH. Sure. 

General HAYDEN [continuing]. Answer because something strikes 

me. 

In the transition, again, to the Obama administration, we had an 

NSC meeting about Iran. And the President asked me, ‘‘How many 

kilos of LEU and medium-enriched uranium do they have?’’ And I 

said, ‘‘Mr. President, I actually know the answer to that and I am 

going to give it to you in a minute, but let me give you another 

way of thinking about this.’’

There isn’t a neutron or an electron in Natanz that is ever going 

to show up in a nuclear weapon. Okay. What they are building out 

in Natanz is confidence. What they are building out in Natanz is 

technology and the ability to do this. They are going to build the 

fissile material for a weapon, the HEU, at a site about which we 

have no knowledge. Okay. 

And so this—as Mark points out, our lack of knowledge, our lack 

of an ability to go to locations where they may be doing these 

things gives me very little confidence that we know how—as I said, 

we are not going to get an agreement that absolutely prevents. We 

are going to get an agreement that creates enough space for us to 

do something between the decision to go and the decision to have. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, General Hayden. 

Mr. Sadjadpour, in my remaining few seconds: Does the Iranian—do the Iranian people want the right to enrich as much or 

more than a government that is not repressive, that doesn’t violate 

human rights, that respects freedom of the press and so on? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Representative Deutch, there has never been 

an open discussion in Iran about the nuclear issue. 

Recently, a prominent intellectual, Sadegh Zibakalam, who questioned the wisdom of Iran’s nuclear program was sentenced to 18 

months in prison. So, despite the fact that the government says 

that the population is united behind the program, they don’t allow 

for open debate. 

Recently, a former minister in Iran said the ancillary costs of the nuclear program have been upwards of $400 billion. I think if you 

posed the referendum to the Iranian people, ‘‘Would you like $400 

billion to be spent on hospitals and schools, or would you like $400 

billion spent on an antiquate nuclear program, which has isolated 

51

the country politically and economically,’’ I think the vast majority 

would prefer the former. But this is a program, which is not driven 

by the Iranian people, but by the Iranian Government. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you for 

your leadership on this issue. 

And we appreciate each one of you being here today. And, Mr. 

Sadjadpour, your analogy of Korea was very thought provoking, 

and I really hope the people of Iran think about it, too, because the 

extraordinary success of South Korea is something to be emulated 

everywhere in the world. And it was really intriguing. 

General Hayden, in your testimony, you mentioned creative solutions and what—that we should be cautious of them. Could you expand on what a creative solution is and why we should be wary? 

General HAYDEN. The one I had in mind, Congressman, was the 

one that have been floated with regard to the number of centrifuges. I know what all of us in the room would like, is that the 

right number is zero. But I think the cost of admission to the current negotiations was an agreement that there would be some enrichment in Iran. Now, we can judge whether that is good or bad, 

but I think it truly is. 

So, now, the debate is how many. All right. My very unscientific 

number is maybe four to 5,000. The regime has 19,000. The Supreme Leader is talking in tens and scores of thousands. 

The creative solution we have is, well, they wouldn’t dismantle 

the centrifuges. They disconnect the plumbing so you couldn’t use 

them in sequence to enrich uranium. It is those kinds of things 

that make me uncomfortable. That the Iranians are holding their 

ground—just in the tactics of negotiations, they are holding their 

ground and we are coming up with, ‘‘Well, how about this’’ as another way to get some sort of an agreement. I am just made very 

uncomfortable about that. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you for your insight because it really is 

very important. 

Mr. Dubowitz, in your testimony, you reference analysis of a recent IAEA report that indicates Iran has directly violated terms of 

the joint plan of action. How has the administration responded to 

this evidence of Iranian cheating? I am concern that Iran will continue in incremental cheating, and the international community 

won’t respond effectively. 

What kind of punishments for breaches to the JPOA or violations 

of a possible comprehensive agreement should be put in place to 

send a message that no cheating of any sort would be tolerated? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, thank you for the question. And, 

actually, it gets to Karim’s comment that, you know, we should set 

up it so that Iran’s abrogation should trigger sanctions. Well, in 

fact, if H.R. 850 and S–1881 had been in place, those sanctions in 

waiting would have been triggered and rightfully so, because the 

Iranians were cheating on the JPOA. And what they were doing is 

they were introducing UF6 gas into an advanced centrifuge, into 

the IR5. And that was a violation of the JPOA. It was in the IA 

report, and it was detected and publicized by David Albright. 

52

And this is an example of what Iran does when I say ‘‘they cheat 

incrementally and not egregiously’’ and that they are testing the 

boundaries of our willingness to respond. And there was no response. There were no sanctions. There was no economic cost. And 

the message to Iran is, when there is a comprehensive agreement, 

you can cheat incrementally, you can exploit ambiguities, you can 

find workarounds. And the Iranians are experts at doing this. The 

regime is an expert sanctions buster. It is also an expert at busting 

the spirit and the commitments that they make. 

And so what can we put in place? Well, what we have to put in 

place is significant economic leverage. We have to be able to hit 

them hard economically when they cheat. So when they don’t let 

inspectors into Parchin number 1, 2, 3 and 5, when they start moving ahead on advanced centrifuge R&D, when they do a number of 

the things that they are going to do to cheat, we have to have sufficient economic leverage. 

My fear and my testimony is that we are going to surrender that 

economic leverage, the President is going to suspend sanctions and, 

through that sanctions relief, Iran’s economy is going to increase, 

it is going to harden, it is going to become more durable, and it is 

going to be much more difficult to then use economic leverage to 

force them back into compliance. 

Mr. WILSON. And the response of the Obama administration was 

no response at all? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, public reporting confirmed that the administration has heard what Mr. Albright had said and had spoken to 

the Iranians, and the Iranians denied having done it, and the administration assures us that the Iranians are not doing it anymore, 

so——

Mr. WILSON. Well, that would be no response. And I share your 

concern. 

In regard to the financial based sanctions, have they been effective? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Financial sanctions have been very effective. And 

I just want to point out, again, your letter of July 20th makes this 

very clear, those financial sanctions are not nuclear sanctions. Secretary Lew, Under Secretary Cohen, Under Secretary—former 

Under Secretary Levy have all made clear that the sanctions, the 

financial sanctions that have been put in place are because of a 

range of Iran’s elicit activities. It is nuclear, it is ballistic missile, 

it is terrorism, it is money laundering, it is elicit financial conduct. 

In fact, administration officials have repeatedly said we put the 

financial sanctions in place to protect the integrity of the global financial system. It would be a big mistake to unwind those financial 

sanctions because we have a nuclear deal. We have seen this movie 

before, it was called North Korea. And the unwinding of the sanctions against Banco Delta Asia, and we saw two subsequent nuclear tests after that and the unwinding of the tough financial 

sanctions against North Korea. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

53

General Hayden, you had said that the knowledge of the Iranian 

nuclear program is incomplete. And here is what we do know. The 

growth of the program, obviously, in the last decade has been explosive—163 centrifuges, which are the machines that I understand 

mix at supersonic speeds to enrich uranium to bomb-grade. There 

are now 19,000. There are heavy water reactors, which are used to 

create plutonium, which is another bomb fuel. 

My concern is not as much even for the current capacity of Iran 

to create a nuclear weapon; it is the second and third generation. 

It is the things that they are doing now. It is the knowledge in this 

multibillion-dollar atomic infrastructure, or they created it, which 

is a huge part of the economy and finances the Revolutionary 

Guard, that you can’t destroy knowledge. 

So what is it additionally that we don’t know? Because I will tell 

you something. From what we do know, it is pretty compelling that 

we shouldn’t pull back on sanctions, that we should be accelerating. 

You know, the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, used to say, you 

know, that the sanctions don’t hurt us, you know, they make us 

stronger, they make us economically independent. But his statements in the last, you know, 12 months, he is talking about, you 

know, the sanctions are brutal, both in terms of inflation and oil 

output and currency valuation, even to the extent that you can’t 

get chickens at Ramadan because there is no chicken feed. 

So what don’t we know? 

General HAYDEN. Well, number one, Congressman, we don’t 

know where everything is. All right? The facilities we know we 

know, and we don’t know what we don’t know. 

Qom, for example, Fordow, all right? We discovered that before 

it became operational, but it was fairly far along before we discovered it. And it was a major facility, and we actually had some help 

in order to make our initial discovery there. 

We don’t know about the weaponization program, the details. 

How far along are they, for example? How quickly are they transforming from IR–1s to IR–2s, the advanced centrifuges? 

So, to take your point, as they build competence, as they build 

technology, the footprint that they need to do the breakout sprint 

to highly enriched uranium, that footprint becomes smaller and 

smaller. 

And back to my point, they are not going to do this at Natanz, 

because they have to kick the IAEA out, literally, to do that. That 

is a trigger. They are going to do it somewhere else, a somewhere 

else about which we have no knowledge at the present time. And 

this gets harder to detect as their efficiency increases and, again, 

the footprint that has to be shown gets smaller and smaller. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Dubowitz, you said that Iran is at the table because of sanctions. And that is your area of expertise, the sanctions 

history. 

What is it that we are not doing that we ought to be doing to 

further apply pressure on the Iranian regime? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So, very specifically, Iran still exports 1.3 million 

barrels of oil——

Mr. HIGGINS. To? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ [continuing]. And an additional couple hundred 

thousand barrels of condensates. 

54

Mr. HIGGINS. To? To whom? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. They are exporting it to China, India, Japan, 

South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. Keep going. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And H.R. 850, which has cleared your committee, 

would have taken a significant bite out of those exports. It would 

have closed the condensates loophole. It would have denied them 

essential oil revenues. 

They also have $120 billion of oil revenues sitting in escrow accounts around the world. They are semi-restricted, meaning they 

can only spend that money in the six countries that I named earlier on bilateral trade. So you could——

Mr. HIGGINS. Where is that money being held? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. It is, again, held in China, India, Japan, South 

Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan——

Mr. HIGGINS. Yep. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ [continuing]. And only used for bilateral trade 

purposes. But Iran can use the money. So you could lock up the 

full $120 billion and deny them all of that revenue and they 

wouldn’t have money to fund their imports. 

Again, those are two ideas that would take a serious bite out of 

the Iranian economy. 

And, more importantly, it sometimes is not the substance of the 

sanctions, it is the psychology of sanctions. In an escalating sanctions environment, like we saw between 2007 and 2013, the psychological blow of sanctions created a sense of fear in international 

markets and a sense of despair in the Iranian domestic economy. 

And that translated into a severe economic recession that Iran is 

now emerging from. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

My time has expired. 

Mr. DESANTIS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, I thank the chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

And, General, it is great to see you. From one Air Force guy to 

another, I thank you for your service. 

It is sad because, to me, you know, we are sitting around talking 

about what could happen or what will happen, and none of this 

surprises me. I mean, honestly, I could have told you a year ago 

that we would be extending the interim agreement for 6 months, 

that we wouldn’t come to a conclusion, that we would be sitting 

here 4 days prior to the 1-year deadline and probably will get some 

kind of a request, either a terrible deal that miraculously has a 

breakthrough at the end or, more than likely, another request for 

an additional 6 months or however long the administration will 

want, which, to me, is going to be interesting because I don’t understand what can happen in a further 6 months or any further 

time period that could compel Iran to come to the table that hasn’t 

been able to occur in the first year. I mean, there is not going to 

be any additional step-up of pain or anything like that. 

I also think it is important to remind everybody, especially when 

we talk about ISIS but when we talk about this issue too, Iran is 

55

not our friend. Probably a significant number of American casualties that occurred in the war I was in in Iraq occurred directly or 

indirectly from Iran—from Iranian actions directly, from Iranian 

technology that was exported to terrorists for one purpose, to kill 

American soldiers. That is why it was sent. So this technology was 

compiled in Iran and exported to Iraq for the sole purpose of killing 

young men and women from the United States of America. Okay? 

Let’s just remember that. This is the Iran that we are talking 

about. 

And now we find ourselves in a situation where, you know, we 

are 4 days out from trying to guarantee that they won’t build a nuclear weapon. We have to send a message to South Korea that has 

begged for the right to do some kind of reprocessing and recycling 

that we are going to give, potentially, the right to enrich to our 

worst enemy but yet our best friend, among our best friends, will 

not have the equal right. We all know that debate. 

I have a question that I would like to ask first off. Let’s talk a 

little bit about what happened in North Korea. I was a young guy 

when there was the discussion of possibly striking locations in 

North Korea. I believe that President Clinton at one point had been 

ready to give the go order, and then it was backed off when a 

breakthrough deal was reached with North Korea to prevent them 

from obtaining nuclear weapons. We all know that basically, theoretically, a little bit later, they had a big parade and we saw nuclear weapons and they were nuclearized. 

What lessons did we learn from that that we ought to apply to 

this moment here? I know you guys addressed North Korea when 

I was out of the room, so if we are reiterating, please forgive me. 

So I want to talk about that. 

And the other thing I want to say is this—or the other question 

I want to ask is this. What kind of a message is it going to send, 

not just to Iran but to Russia, to all these hotspots we are dealing 

with around the world, if at the point the deadline, the red line 

comes up with a deal with Iran we simply extend it and go back 

to negotiations? 

So, General, I will start with you, both the issue of North Korea 

as well as the issue of what message are we going to send to the 

world and not just in the Iran situation. 

General HAYDEN. Thanks, Congressman. I will be very efficient. 

When we were negotiating with the North Koreans in 2008, early 

2009, I mean, our judgment was simply they are not going to give 

up their weapons program. They can’t. It would be irrational on 

their part, given their world view. All right? There is a bit of that 

inside the Iranian regime, as well. And, you know, my job is to try 

to think like they think, so forgive me while I lay out the point of 

view from a serious person in Tehran. 

They went to school on what happened to Muammar Qadhafi. All 

right? Here was someone who gave up his WMD program in negotiations with the United States in return for what he perceived to 

be a bit more welcoming international community. And we ended 

up over a 10-month period with a sustained bombing campaign 

under NATO, overthrowing that government and leading to his 

death. 

56

And so even the calmer people in Tehran, you know, not the 

apocalyptic ones, are saying, oh, so that is what happens to you 

when you give up this kind of program. So I don’t have to demonize 

the Iranians to tell you I have come to the conclusion that this is 

too important to them for them to give it up. 

When we went out of the gate the first time—what now, 10 

months ago?—I was very careful with my public commentary to be 

broadly supportive of the negotiations. I wanted to exhaust all possibilities. But I learned in my last job at CIA to think ahead, think 

of what you think—think of what people are going to want you to 

think in 10 months. And so I thought through the process of, what 

if we don’t get an agreement in 6? What is an okay process then? 

And when we began—I am talking 10 or 11 months ago—my conclusion was, I will give it one more 6, I will give it one more period. 

But what we can’t stand is the diplomatic equivalent of a continuing resolution, you know, where we have them too close and we 

are not pushing them back. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

I would love to hear from you, but we are out of time, so I will 

I yield back. 

Thanks. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

General Hayden, I want to build on what you were just saying. 

So if it is, in fact, the case that the Iranians or the regime believe 

that the development of a nuclear weapons program is necessary 

for their self-defense, is there any reason to have any hope that 

there will ever be a resolution which includes an agreement to dismantle the program that they find necessary for their self-defense? 

Or is there some other set of systems or defense capability that 

would replace, potentially, their belief that they need it to defend 

themselves? Or is that just beyond——

General HAYDEN. I don’t think there is a military answer from 

their point of view that gives them the same kind of assurance that 

the ambiguity of the program, not the actual detonation, maybe not 

even the possession—that is why good people—number one, Congressman, that is why this is a problem from hell. There are no 

good off ramps. 

But that is also why some good people, like Amos Yadlin, who 

was my counterpart in the Israeli Defense Force—General Yadlin 

thinks you can’t get the small deal, ‘‘small’’ as being defined as the 

nuclear deal. You can only get the nuclear deal inside of a much 

larger deal between Iran and the West. And we have already 

talked about how difficult that would be, given all of the other parameters. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So you take that assessment and you add to it the 

testimony you provided with respect to the incredible difficulty, 

maybe impossibility, of verifying the activities of the regime. When 

you take those two facts together, does it make it even less likely? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, it does. 

57

Look, when I do this publicly, I do a little Venn diagram in the 

ether here. Here is everything the Iranians can legitimately give 

up. Here is everything we legitimately need. 

Mr. CICILLINE. They don’t intersect. 

General HAYDEN. They don’t intersect. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So, then, if, in fact, the conclusion of these negotiations is some determination that we can’t reach an agreement 

and the parties stop the negotiations, I would like to know what 

your assessment is of what happens next. 

Mr. Dubowitz, Mr. Sadjadpour might also add to it, but starting 

with General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. That is why we left this an ugly baby for the 

next administration. We didn’t have any good answers. 

You know, the other answer is, well, then, we have to go physical, we have to go kinetic. And Secretary Gates used to consistently say in our meetings, if we go kinetic, we will guarantee that 

which we are trying to prevent, an Iran that will stop at nothing, 

in secret, to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And do you think that is——

General HAYDEN. Yeah. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So, Congressman, I think there is, first of all, another kinetic option and there is another economic option. 

The kinetic option is not necessarily to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities today. The kinetic option is to actually ground the Assad air 

force, an air force that is dropping barrel bombs on Syrian men, 

women, and children. The Syrian regime is Iran’s closest ally in the 

Middle East. They have gone all-in to support Assad. 

And it is also going to be critically important to the defeat of 

ISIL that we actually are finding a way to support the Syrian 

Sunnis, who have been increasingly radicalized because of the 

butchery of the Assad regime, and they have turned, as a result, 

to ISIL. 

So I think the kinetic option is to actually—as part of the administration’s Syria review process is to look at grounding Assad’s air 

force and moving militarily against Iran’s closest ally in the Middle 

East. 

The economic option is—again, there are a tidal wave of sanctions that are possible. There are also phased, calibrated sanctions 

that will begin to tighten the squeeze on Iran and do so in a way 

that is not going to necessarily lead to a significant nuclear physics 

escalation from the Iranians. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But can I ask you, Mr. Dubowitz, on the—with respect to additional sanctions, you know, I have read a lot of material that talks about the ability of the leadership of the regime to 

sort of protect themselves from the impact of sanctions and, in fact, 

to even benefit from some of the market conditions that result from 

sanctions. 

And it seems to me, long-term sanctions can only work if ultimately they create conditions which cause people in the country to 

assert pressure on the government or the regime to change. And 

it doesn’t sound like, from any of the testimony today or anything 

we have heard in this committee, that there is any likelihood that 

that pressure is going to be sufficiently strong to actually change 

58

the regime so long as things like the gentleman who spoke out and 

is imprisoned for 18 months for just questioning the worthiness of 

the program. 

So, you know, speak to that question of, how do we impact, you 

know, the folks who are making the decisions in the regime, who 

I think sometimes actually benefit from these sanctions? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So the elites will always benefit, but the question 

is, can you shake the economy—the macroeconomic fundamentals 

of an economy, that the regime fears economic collapse? 

And what we saw in 2009, combined with 2012 and 2013, was 

millions of people on the street in 2009, yelling, ‘‘Death to the dictator,’’ ‘‘President Obama, are you with us or with the dictator?,’’ 

and in 2011, 2012, an economy that was facing a balance-of-payments crisis and that was in a severe recession, which combined 

to create fear in the regime that this Green Revolution would become a blue revolution, that it would lead to millions and tens of 

millions of Iranians outside of the middle-class suburbs of North 

Tehran but into the cities and towns of Iran and labor strikes in 

the key energy sector—in fact, conditions that we saw in 1979 that 

led to the Iranian revolution in the first place. 

That combination created terror, in my view, and the regime has 

avoided that now. They have repressed the Green movement, as 

Karim has said, and they have also dealt with this economic stress 

by moving away from a severe recession into a modest economic recovery, thanks to the sanctions relief and the de-escalation of sanctions pressure. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Yoho? 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate you guys being here today. 

And, General, if you had a hard time sleeping before, I am sure 

you have a really hard time sleeping now. I never have a hard time 

sleeping, but I do now since I have been on Foreign Affairs. 

I have been here for 2 years—this is my first term—and I have 

had multiple hearings on this subject. All the experts have said 

that Iran is, you know, 5, 6 months away from having enough material to have a nuclear bomb. That was 1 year ago, so I can only 

assume they have enough material. 

And I agree with you in that their two pillars are the rejection 

of U.S. influence and the rejection of Israel’s existence. I don’t 

think they have wavered on that. And I have watched this for over 

30 years, since the oil embargoes of the 1970s. 

And they are hellbent on getting a nuclear weapon. Would you 

agree with that? 

General HAYDEN. I would change that slightly. They want to 

keep that door open, and visibly open, that they have the nuclear 

option to exercise, to go to a weapon. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. But what I am seeing for the last 30 years is 

a cat-and-mouse game where they say they are not doing it but we 

find out they are, and they are doing it——

General HAYDEN. Oh, they are clearly—they are clearly setting 

the stage for it. 

59

Mr. YOHO. And so we know what their intent is. 

And I guess a couple questions I have here: How do you get Iran 

to roll back their program? What is the impetus that is going to 

make them roll back? 

Because with the sanctions that have been in place, they were 

still continuing. They have not stopped. They have gotten closer, 

and they have got the ICBM program going on. And I agree 100 

percent with you; what they are doing is refining the technology. 

They don’t need as many centrifuges. They are more efficient with 

the smaller ones or the higher-tech ones. So they can do a better 

job, and they can keep that hidden, covert. 

In order to negotiate an agreement, there has to be trust, understanding, character, integrity, and verification. I have seen none of 

that. I mean, they throw the IAEA out, the International Atomic 

Energy Agency out every chance they get, or they prevent them 

from going in. We know they have exploded a nuclear trigger device, but they have covered that up. They have covered it up with 

a parking lot. And there is just no trust there. 

And so, with these negotiations, do you feel the sanctions were 

backed off too early? 

General HAYDEN. That is a tough call. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Dubowitz, how about you? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I am certainly on record repeatedly saying that. 

I mean, I think that we had brought them very close to a——

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ [continuing]. Balance-of-payments crisis, and 4 or 

5 more months of sanctions escalation would have presented this 

regime—and let me just actually—it is not just me saying this. 

Mr. YOHO. No. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. When Rouhani came into office, he said it. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I mean, he actually came out and said, ‘‘It is 

worse than I expected.’’ Now, politicians always say that. ‘‘The 

other guy did a bad job’’ and——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ [continuing]. Lowering expectations so that I can 

exceed them. But you had many Iranian officials—the President, 

economic officials—coming out and saying, ‘‘This economy is a complete mess. It is worse than we expected.’’

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So they were very close to an even more severe 

economic crisis. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. 

Let me ask you, what did we get out of the negotiation? I mean, 

usually, when you negotiate, there is something that you get. I 

don’t see anything that we got. I mean, we still have four Americans over there that—I don’t want to put Americans as hostages 

and negotiate for them, but I don’t see anything that we got to 

even open up these negotiations. I think we should have carried 

them on another 5, 6, 7 months, 1 year. 

How likely is it—well, if we continue with the negotiations and 

we extend it, do you see Iran backing off on their ultimate goal of 

getting a weapon? 

General, go ahead. 

60

General HAYDEN. Again, I do not see them backing away from 

keeping the option open——

Mr. YOHO. Keeping the option open. 

General HAYDEN [continuing]. And turning to a weapon. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Sadjadpour, how about you? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I agree with the General, in that I have always 

thought Iran’s ambitions are to have the capability, not necessarily 

to weaponize. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. So they want to have the right to do that, 

is what they are working on. 

And so, with the sanctions, they were doing that anyways. All 

right? They were getting closer to that. Now that we are in negotiation, they are going a little bit faster. They are getting the technology. So what I see is they are going to do it regardless. 

What would be the effect if we just pulled out and says, ‘‘You 

know what? You are not playing fair. We don’t like the way you 

are playing. We are just going to put the sanctions back until you 

are serious about it’’? I mean, is that an option that you would recommend? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I think, Congressman, it is important to contrast the current Iranian Government with the predecessor government of with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Two years ago, Ahmadinejad 

united the international community against Iran. Countries like 

Russia, China, Europe, which actually have disparate interests visa`-vis Iran, united around the same policy. 

I think this time around it is going to be much more difficult to 

maintain international unity, especially if the United States issues 

what I would say are unilateral sanctions against Iran. You may 

see the P5+1 split up and Iran exploit those divisions, which would 

be a very negative outcome for us. 

Mr. YOHO. I am out of time, and I thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. 

In some ways, the previous President—you were referring to the 

regime blaming the other guy. It took us 4 or 5 years to learn how 

to pronounce his name, ‘‘Ahmadinejad.’’ Maybe we miss that part 

of him. 

I guess I am not sure I am following where this testimony is all 

going or where my colleagues want us to go. 

So would we be better off if we had not had the interim agreement? Should we have just walked away from it and said, no, we 

don’t trust you, we don’t like you, we have lots of other issues as 

well, we think you are headed inevitably to a nuclear capability, 

and therefore we are not going to pursue the negotiation option? 

Should we have done that? 

General HAYDEN. I will jump in first, Congressman. 

The other options are so bad that I, personally, 10 months ago, 

11 months ago, that is why I was willing to tolerate negotiations 

with a state I believed to be a fundamentally unreliable negotiating 

partner. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

General HAYDEN. I was willing to give this a chance. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So you——

61

General HAYDEN. But it depends on the character of the agreement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I agree. But I wanted to get that—I mean, given 

all other options, we should have pursued this and tried to make 

it work? 

General HAYDEN. Again, given how bad all the other ones were, 

we needed to exhaust the table before we started to turn to the others. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, I agree. I mean, as I said in my 

testimony, I think that a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear 

crisis was the right way to go. I think a negotiated agreement is 

the right way to go. 

I think the dispute that is taking place now is between those who 

are skeptical of Iran and those who may be skeptical but they fundamentally believe that there has been a sufficient change in the 

domestic environment in Iran and in any interfactional power balance that we should be supporting Rouhani and Zarif against the 

hardliners and that we have a chance to fundamentally change the 

Iranian regime’s approach to its nuclear weapons program. 

I don’t believe that there is a fundamental distinction between 

the so-called moderates and the hardliners. They are all united 

around a common objective. 

I do think that we can do a better job of negotiating with the Iranian regime. I think we—we didn’t have to give up four concessions 

right up front as part of the JPOA and diminish our economic leverage at the same time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah, and I want to get there, because that is my 

next question. 

But did you want to comment, Mr. Sadjadpour? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Yeah, Congressman. As Henry Kissinger often 

says, we have to weigh these major foreign policy decisions not 

against the ideal alternative but the realistic alternative. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I think we would all agree here there wasn’t 

a better alternative than the interim deal. 

I would also add that the interim deal has done a few things 

which have been useful. We got Iran to pull its car over to the side 

of the road; it is not making forward progress——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. And I think that is really important, because—all right, we have now established all three of you agree, 

given the options, we had to go that route. And I think I am hearing you admit, or say, it is not all bad. I mean, some of my colleagues get carried away maybe a little bit, and you would think 

that this interim agreement has been an abject failure in all respects. That is not true. 

But moving forward, there is the question, Mr. Dubowitz, you 

were I think getting at, which is efficacy. We want a non-nuclear 

Iran. If I am hearing General Hayden correctly, your view of history and your view of intelligence is that is an unachievable goal, 

given what options we have in front of us. The what you 

euphemistically call the ‘‘kinetic’’ option would actually have the 

opposite effect, you said, which we may want to make sure Prime 

Minister Netanyahu understands. And we could bomb or take out 

62

Assad’s air force. I am not sure, in terms of efficacy, that will deter 

Iran from pursuing a nuclear option. We can double down on sanctions, which guarantees that Rouhani cannot politically stay at the 

negotiating table, which effectively will end negotiations and probably seal our fate in terms of what happens next: We either accept 

the nuclear Iran or we take it out militarily. 

I don’t see a lot of good options here. And I see Congress doing 

what it usually does, which is cavil, but not have any helpful solutions in terms of, well, then, what will we do. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, I disagree with you, because I 

don’t think Rouhani is going to leave the negotiating table. I think 

the Iranians are going to stay at the table. I think the fact——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Even if we double down——

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Even if we double down. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. On sanctions? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Even if we double down on sanctions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Huh. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Because I think that they need to stay at the 

table. They need to stay at the table because they need to figure 

out a way to get themselves out from under this international pressure. I agree with Karim. I think that is part of their strategy. 

They also need to stay at the table because, for them, diplomacy 

has actually been very useful—with the Europeans from 2003 to 

2005, with us. Diplomacy is the way to move their nuclear program 

along. 

The car is not at the side of the road, by the way. On certain elements of the nuclear program, like 20-percent enriched uranium, 

we have made some progress, but the Iranians are moving on other 

aspects of the program. To Congressman Deutch’s point, we don’t 

know what they are doing on weaponization. They could be moving 

their weaponization activities down the fast lane as quickly as possible, and we don’t know. Advanced centrifuge R&D. As Olli 

Heinonen has said, they could have thousands of advanced centrifuges somewhere that we don’t know about, and they could be 

manufacturing them today. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So it is incorrect, A, to say that the Iranians have 

no other option but to walk away, because if they walk away and 

they walk away, they will be faced with a tidal wave of sanctions 

that will collapse their economy. 

And, B, there are inherent flaws in the JPOA that need to be corrected, and a comprehensive agreement needs to be a more effective agreement. And there are very good reports out there and 

analysis that shows how it can be better. We all agree there should 

be a negotiated agreement. We just think it should be a fine agreement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. I——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Although your time is over, Mr. Connolly, I 

know General Hayden would like to respond. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Congressman, another way of thinking about it perhaps: You 

think about this as two clocks going. All right? One clock is the 

clock on the Iranian nuclear program, and the other clock is the 

63

potential for change within the Iranian political system. I mean, we 

don’t want to treat Iran like Japan, because Iran is not like Japan, 

but Iran doesn’t have to stay not like Japan forever. 

And so maybe one way of thinking about this is what we are 

really trying to do here is to slow their progress, to slow this clock 

down, to leave the potential for other developments over here to 

take place. 

And there are a variety of tools to slow that clock down. There 

are sanctions, there are embargoes, there is covert action, and 

there are negotiated settlements, duly, carefully arrived at, that 

make it more difficult for the regime to speed up this clock. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. DeSantis? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Yeah, I just want to associate with what Mr. Dubowitz just said. 

I think that, you know, more pressure—you know, Iran—it may not 

ever be possible, I have been skeptical, we could actually come to 

a negotiated agreement, but, certainly, relieving sanctions, I think, 

shows them they can get away with more. When you are putting 

more pressure on them, from their psychology, I think that you at 

least have a chance. 

And that is why, General Hayden, I appreciated your admonition 

about trying to think like they think. Because I think sometimes 

some of the folks in the State Department—and I think this is indicative, when the President is writing a letter to the Ayatollah to 

try to, you know, seek common ground in the fight against ISIS, 

I don’t know that that appreciation is there the way it should be. 

Let me ask you this. You had mentioned how Iran looks at something like what happened to Qadhafi and they say, well, gee, why 

would we not want to have a weapon? I think that is 100 percent 

correct. 

Is it the case—it has been reported, and, kind of, I know we say 

that around here—that when the U.S. deposed Saddam Hussein in 

2003, that Iran halted its program at that time out of fear? 

General HAYDEN. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, reflecting back on that period, the Iranians did stop one aspect of the 

program, the weaponization, and not the others. They did. It was 

coincident with the American move into Iraq, the American presence in Afghanistan, but my analysts, Congressman, were reluctant to draw it as cause and effect. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I appreciate that. 

In terms of—so we have talked about North Korea, that example. 

Obviously, that is not a good path for us to follow. It didn’t work. 

And I know it is a tough issue. It seems to me, if you look in the 

Middle East, the other examples of nascent nuclear states, Iraq in 

the 1980s, that was neutralized militarily by Israel; Syria, 2007, 

same thing. 

But I noticed there was an article in The Atlantic in which, or 

Jeffrey Goldberg, Bloomberg—he writes for one of those—where I 

think he quoted an administration official basically cowing that 

Netanyahu, you know, he has waited too long, he is not going to 

be able to do anything. And they thought that was kind of, like, 

a good thing. 

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And I just wonder, I mean, if Iran does not fear the potential 

credible threat of military force, isn’t it much less likely that they 

are going to be willing to make the concessions that we are looking 

for? 

General HAYDEN. It is very important that Iran believe that all 

options are on the American table. And I am making this distinction, Congressman, because this is not about will, it is about capacity. And the ability of the Israeli Air Force, much smaller than 

ours, distant from the battlefield and so on, their ability to inflict 

a punishing strike on this nuclear program is far less than ours. 

So it is our will, it is our policy that makes the difference and creates leverage in negotiation. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And in terms of the kinetic targets, that with 

Iran’s program, we are looking at something that is much more dispersed and difficult compared to Syria and Iraq, correct? 

General HAYDEN. The Osiris reactor in Baghdad, al-Kibar in 

Syria in 2007, a raid. This will have to be a campaign, if it were 

ever chosen. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So the underlying problem with the whole thing 

with Iran is that, of course, it is led by an Islamic fanatic ideology. 

And having a new regime there, I think you have millions and millions of people who would rejoice at being liberated from what is 

essentially a theocratic, authoritarian country. 

Now, we know and I think, Mr. Dubowitz, you mentioned 2009 

and how there was turmoil. So, today, what are the prospects of 

more demonstrations? What are the prospects of there being a really credible movement to try to govern Iran in a different way? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Congressman, the discontent which existed in 

2009 hasn’t gone away, but, at the moment, I see no prospects for 

any type of meaningful popular uprising. There is no cohesion to 

the opposition. And I think, frankly, when Iranians look around at 

what is happening elsewhere in the region—the carnage in Syria, 

the carnage in Iraq—I argued that in 1979 the Iranians had a revolution without democracy, and today they aspire for a democracy 

without a revolution. 

I think there is an important point here, because there is a paradox to U.S. Policy toward Iran which I think it behooves us to 

think creatively about. And that is that I think everyone in this 

room would agree that the underlying problem we have with Iran 

is really the nature of this Iranian regime. We are never going to 

be able to trust its nuclear program is purely peaceful. But the 

challenge is that the policies that we are pursuing in order to 

counter Iran’s nuclear program, political and economic isolation, I 

would argue entrenches those very hardline forces in Tehran that 

we are trying to get rid of. 

And I think it is important for U.S. policy to think about being 

aligned with the aspirations of the Iranian people for greater political and economic integration rather than being aligned against 

those aspirations of the Iranian people. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I am out of time, but if you could for the 

record maybe submit some examples of what we can do policy-wise. 

Because I think that that would solve a lot of problems in the region. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. DeSantis. 

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Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Again, to the witnesses, thank you for sharing your insight here, 

but thank you, more importantly, for the work you have done and 

continue to do. What happens in Congress can’t happen without 

the work that you do. But I also want to emphasize that I don’t 

think the United States and the international community can effectively stop Iran without the work Congress does, so, again, to implore the chair and the ranking member to continue on that. 

Mr. Sadjadpour, I want pick up on something you said in your 

opening remarks, and that was the prospect—there is so much we 

need to focus on, but I want to stay focused on Monday, on the 

24th—the prospect of a partial agreement on Monday. The principle was and the need for a comprehensive agreement 1 year ago 

was that there would be nothing agreed to until everything was 

agreed to. 

So I guess I will throw this to the whole panel. What happens 

if there is a partial agreement? What does that do? What is the 

consequence of that? And what actions must Congress take, in that 

case? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Congressman, I think that when both sides 

and, frankly, when all sides—China, Russia, our European allies, 

United States, and Iran—when they contemplate the alternatives 

to failed negotiation—potential return to status quo ante, potential 

escalation, potential conflict—I think everyone appreciates the fact 

that, even if it is not possible to meet in the same place to comprehensively resolve this issue, it behooves all sides to try to continue to work forward and at least extend the negotiations. 

What happens afterwards? It is my sense that if you can lock in 

Iran’s current compromises, they are not making forward progress, 

and continue to deter forward progress, keep them in place, that 

is not a bad option for the United States. It is what I call ‘‘managed 

irresolution.’’ I think if you have a scenario whereby they remain 

1 year away from having a nuclear weapon, we have averted a conflict in the region. That is not a perfect outcome, but, compared to 

the alternative, it is not a bad outcome. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. 

Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So, Congressman Schneider, I would say this. 

First of all, Iran is about 21⁄2 months away from breakout as a result of the Joint Plan of Action, which means the length of time 

it takes to weaponize a sufficient amount of uranium for a nuclear 

weapon. We actually don’t know, as General Hayden has said and 

others have said, what is happening on the weaponization side. So 

we actually don’t know how far Iran is from having a nuclear 

weapon. We know they are 2 months away from having weaponized 

uranium for a bomb. So the status quo is fragile, to say the least. 

The second thing is, regardless of what happens on Monday—I 

will get back to my original testimony—we have to maintain sufficient leverage through these negotiations. And that is economic leverage, it is political leverage, it is a credible threat of military 

force. My fear has been, since signing the JPOA, that our economic 

leverage is diminishing. 

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And now you, as Congress, are in the position where the administration has said to you, we are going to bypass you with respect 

to sanctions relief. And so, as I detail in my testimony, there are 

12 recommendations about how you can build a sanctions relief 

firewall, how you can ensure that what you are putting in place 

will maintain some of the toughest sanctions. It will give a phased 

and smart program of phased sanctions relief and that you can 

maintain that economic leverage. 

Because whether it is a comprehensive deal, a partial deal, an 

extension of the JPOA, at the end of the day the Iranian regime 

is salami-slicing us, and they are stretching out these negotiations. 

They are diminishing our economic leverage. They are giving up 

concessions on the nuclear side that are reversible. 

That is the key. Nuclear concessions they give up are reversible. 

Sanctions relief that we give up is irreversible. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree. 

And I just want to give General Hayden the last word with two 

other small questions to that. Because I do think, if there is to be 

sanctions relief, Congress has to have its voice heard. 

But, to your point, you talked about clocks, and you also talked 

about the term or duration of an agreement. How far back do you 

think the clock has to be set, in an agreement moving Iran from 

decision to breakout capability, to be effective? And how long do 

you think that agreement has to stay in place to be viable and to 

give us something that we can count on? 

General HAYDEN. I would begin my discussions at at least a year. 

Okay? And I would begin my discussions with indefinite. And I 

don’t mean——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree. 

General HAYDEN [continuing]. To be flippant. I am quite serious. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. I use the term ‘‘generations.’’ But it can’t 

leave the people in power today in power when this agreement 

ends. 

All right. With that, my time has expired. Again, thank you for 

what you do. And thank you to the chair and the ranking member. 

Mr. DESANTIS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair thanks the witnesses for their time and their testimony. We learned a lot, and we very much appreciate you taking 

the time to come. 

And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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