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A REVIEW OF THE PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE TO, AND RECOVERY 

FROM HURRICANE SANDY 

(112–112) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DECEMBER 4, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

VACANCY 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

VACANCY 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

Hon. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency ........................................................................................................................... 15 

Major General Michael J. Walsh, Deputy Commanding General, Civil and 

Emergency Operations, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers .................................... 15 

Frederick Tombar, Senior Advisor to the Secretary for Disaster Recovery, 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ..................................... 15 

Robert R. Latham, Jr., Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 15 

Mark Riley, Deputy Director, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana ................................................... 15 

David J. Popoff, Chief Emergency Management Coordinator, Galveston County Office of Emergency Management, State of Texas ....................................... 15 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Andy Harris, of Maryland .............................................................................. 53 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Hon. W. Craig Fugate ............................................................................................. 55 

Major General Michael J. Walsh ............................................................................ 66 

Frederick Tombar .................................................................................................... 73 

Robert R. Latham, Jr. ............................................................................................. 80 

Kevin Davis, Director, Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana, submitted by witness Mark Riley ... 90 

David J. Popoff ......................................................................................................... 133 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. John L. Mica, of Florida .......................................................................... 62 

Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, of West Virginia ........................................................ 64 

Major General Michael J. Walsh, Deputy Commanding General, Civil and 

Emergency Operations, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, response to question 

for the record from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress 

from the District of Columbia ............................................................................. 71 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, responses to questions 

for the record ........................................................................................................ 78 

ADDITION TO THE RECORD 

Ed Bolen, President and CEO, National Business Aviation Association, letter 

to Hon. Jeff Denham, Chairman, and Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, 

and Emergency Management, and list of efforts undertaken by the business 

aviation community to assist Hurricane Sandy victims, December 18, 2012 . 147 

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(1) 

A REVIEW OF THE PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE TO, AND RECOVERY 

FROM HURRICANE SANDY 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (Chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Mr. MICA. Good morning. And I would like to call this hearing 

of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure to 

order. 

This is a full committee hearing. We conduct our oversight and 

investigations at the full committee level. We are conducting this 

in cooperation with our subcommittee that oversees FEMA, economic development, public buildings, and emergency management 

services. 

The title of today’s hearing is, ‘‘A Review of the Preparedness, 

Response to, and Recovery from Hurricane Sandy.’’ We have a list 

of witnesses, and we will welcome those witnesses in a few minutes. The order of business today will be as usual. We will have 

opening statements by Members, hear from our witnesses, and we 

will hear from all of them, and then we will go into a round of 

questions. 

So I want to welcome everyone and thank you for your participation, and also yield to myself for an opening statement, and then 

we will go to other Members. 

Well, again, I am pleased that we have come together here as a 

committee to review the progress from Hurricane Sandy, recovery 

progress. But this hearing actually goes beyond the most recent 

hurricane and storm. 

We have attempted as a committee to make some reforms and 

also deal with some of the problems we have had from past storms 

and natural disasters. And the House, prior to this most recent 

storm, passed H.R. 2903, which was the FEMA Reauthorization 

Act. That was passed on September 19th, before the storm began. 

And it was passed specifically to deal with some of the problems 

we have had with previous natural disasters and also the ability 

of FEMA, our emergency management organization at the Federal 

level, to deal with some of those issues. 

The bill, unfortunately, is languishing in the United States Senate, along with other pieces of legislation, but I am hopeful that we 

can dislodge it. And I think we will hear from this hearing that we 

2 

need some of the mechanisms and reforms in that legislation to 

help FEMA and other agencies better do its job in helping folks restore their lives and their property and, really, the country and the 

regions’ and communities’ economies. 

The bill, for example, creates a public assistance pilot program. 

It is a grant-like program based on cost estimates, not actual damages. And we think that that can also speed up the process, cut 

some of the redtape, paperwork. And we will hear a little bit about 

some of the impediments to getting folks back on their feet through 

the FEMA process today. 

It also requires cost-estimating, shortens FEMA’s appeals process. And we will hear also about the constraints that FEMA works 

under now under current laws and regulations. And, hopefully, 

that can be expedited so people who have experienced damage most 

recently can be made whole or at least get the Federal part of the 

assistance underway in an expedited fashion. 

The legislation also allows State administration of hazard mitigation. And we think that that is important, also, in the process and 

some of the problems we have seen in the past. 

The legislation, if passed by the Senate, would reform the rebuilding process, cut through redtape and sometimes the bureaucratic nightmare that we have seen other States have to deal with. 

The legislation was formed on a bipartisan basis, and we reviewed different disasters in States. Of course, the premier disaster 

we are all familiar with is Katrina, but storms in Louisiana, natural disasters in Texas, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, Iowa. And 

I had a chance to visit most of those venues and talk to folks and 

hear about the problems they incurred in dealing, again, with the 

Federal Government and FEMA programs. 

Some 10 years from now, we don’t want to be having hearings 

and asking FEMA why it is taking so long to rebuild from Hurricane Sandy. We know what is awaiting, unfortunately, some of the 

folks in New York and New Jersey and other areas that have been 

impacted in the Northeast by this most recent storm. And we know 

the redtape, paperwork, and sometimes confusing process that they 

have to deal with. And, hopefully, again, our legislation can be 

passed before this Congress leaves. 

Let’s see, I guess it was the week before last, this past week, I 

led a congressional delegation, some of our committee members, to 

New York. And it was kind of interesting to meet with local officials and also see where they are in this stage of recovery. 

First, I have to say how much I admire the people of New York, 

New Jersey, the northeast region that were hit. Some absolutely 

incredible people who worked 24/7—local officials, State responders. We had different agencies—DOD, the National Guard. We had 

private individuals who came out—churches, Red Cross, community organizations, just thousands of people who were helping their 

fellow Americans in recovery. And we also saw our FEMA folks on 

the scene. And we will talk about what their role has been and, 

again, how, hopefully, we can help them. 

Interestingly enough, they were praising the FEMA folks in both 

New York and Staten Island where we visited. When I left Staten 

Island, the president of the borough said to me as I was leaving 

the meeting and we were getting a briefing, he says, By the way, 

3 

Mr. Mica, he says, do you think you could help us with some 

FEMA recovery? And I said, What is that? And he said, Well, they 

promised us I think it was $25 million, and so far—I guess it was 

Hurricane Irene almost a year and a half ago—so far they have 

only gotten $7 million from that. So I said, Well, hang on to your 

shorts because, you know, if you are looking at multibillion-dollar 

recovery and you can only get $7 million out of $25 million promised, you may be in for a long ride. 

We then met with Mayor Bloomberg and toured some of the 

damage in New York City. And he also praised some of the work 

for FEMA and others. But as also he was leaving, he took me aside 

and said—he had talked, I guess, to Secretary Napolitano, and he 

was still having difficulty getting money from FEMA from Hurricane Irene. 

So, again, there appears to be difficulty in past storms. I had 

asked staff about Katrina, and I think we will hear more about 

that. But I understand Louisiana still has $1.7 billion in unreserved claims from 2005. That was August 29, 2005. 

So I think the point here is that we want to find a way to make 

certain that this process moves forward as quickly, efficiently, and 

as responsibly. And FEMA does have to comply with the law that 

we set on the regulations and certainly be good stewards of taxpayers’ money. 

So, again, we now find ourselves with the current situation. The 

President has visited the Northeast. And on the 15th of November, 

the President announced that HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan 

would be in charge of coordinating some of the rebuilding and recovery effort—a little bit different. Maybe his intent is to sidestep 

some of the bureaucracy; we don’t know. But we hopefully will find 

out—we have a witness today, in addition to FEMA, from HUD— 

and find out where we stand with that new approach. The announcement did not supply us with any details, and subsequent 

statements made by Secretary Donovan do raise a number of serious questions as to who will be in charge of that particular activity 

and how it will fit into the FEMA recovery scheme. 

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And we hope 

to make this a productive hearing in which we can, again, keep 

people from going through redtape and paperwork, maybe passing 

that. I asked staff to pull a couple of clips from the most recent— 

and we will hear from our Representative from Maryland in a 

minute. The headlines say, ‘‘FEMA denies help to Maryland homeowners.’’ ‘‘New Yorkers hit hard by Hurricane Sandy denied aide 

by FEMA bureaucracy.’’ ‘‘After disasters, FEMA does not help 

every State.’’ The clips go on and on. And I think that we will also 

hear from some other people that have had issues with this storm 

and past storms. 

What we need to do is make certain that these folks, again, get 

the very best response and that we give FEMA the very best tools 

so they can respond. 

With that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, distinguished gentleman from West Virginia, Mr. Rahall. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I commend you for 

holding this hearing today, and certainly welcome all of our witnesses and commend each of you and your organizations for the 

4 

tremendous work that you have done to help our people, for your 

service to our Nation. We all are deeply indebted to you for that. 

I also want to recognize the work and thank those who selflessly 

gave of their time to help others in need before, during, and after 

the storm—Federal, State, and local emergency responders, National Guardsmen, and numerous volunteers, who themselves often 

reside in the path of oncoming storms. They say goodbye to their 

loved ones for whatever time is necessary so that they can help 

prepare for and respond to disasters. Their dedication and their 

commitment is truly commendable to their fellow human beings. 

Superstorm Sandy inflicted brutal damage up and down the east 

coast, but it also severely impacted inland States, such as West 

Virginia, where the hurricane and a nor’easter collided, leaving in 

some areas up to 6 feet of snow. 

It appears with each storm these days there are different circumstances. And certainly I know that we are learning from each 

storm so that we can be prepared for the next one, no matter what 

circumstance it takes or what nature of a storm hits us. 

But in this last one, roofs collapsed because of accumulated snow, 

destroying businesses; roads were impassable for days, cutting off 

emergency assistance to households; power outages were long-lasting and widespread; property was destroyed; and lives were seriously disrupted and even lost. 

Last week, President Obama issued a major disaster declaration 

for 18 counties in West Virginia, including 7 counties in southern 

West Virginia. It took nearly a full month before the full extent of 

the public assistance program was granted to these counties. 

And I commend you, Administrator Fugate, for your work. We 

have talked on this issue. You have kept Members of Congress 

briefed, all of you have, throughout this recovery process. 

West Virginia families, however, are still waiting for a decision 

on whether individual assistance will be made available. It has 

been nearly 5 weeks now and still no response. Our citizens need 

and deserve timely answers, especially when such disaster assistance is so critically needed. 

In the FEMA reauthorization bill passed earlier this year by the 

House, at my request a provision was included to require FEMA 

to update its rules regarding the issuance of individual disaster assistance. 

Clearly, Sandy is yet another reminder that such updates are 

very much needed in order to ensure more timely and responsive 

assistance. Over 300,000 West Virginia customers were left without 

power after Sandy. This comes just months after more than twice 

as many West Virginia customers lost power, some for several 

weeks, following the June derecho. 

While I appreciate FEMA’s updated guidance on the eligibility of 

generator purchases for critical facilities under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, I do encourage FEMA to determine whether 

even broader eligibility is appropriate and to clarify how FEMA intends to determine the cost-effectiveness of generator requests. I 

hope FEMA will consider the full range of potential costs of power 

outages at public facilities in order to ensure generators can be 

more readily available using Hazard Mitigation Grants. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. 

5 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Let me yield now to the chair of the subcommittee of jurisdiction, 

Mr. Denham, from California. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this hearing, not only on such an important issue, but at such 

a critical time for this issue. 

As a Representative from California, my constituents and I know 

very, very well how important it is to plan and prepare for disasters, from earthquakes, floods, wildfires. We know that good planning and preparedness saves lives and mitigates against damages. 

That is why, as chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction 

over FEMA and emergency management, I have held numerous 

hearings focusing on emergency management capability and authored the FEMA Reauthorization Act, which passed the House in 

September and is currently over in the Senate now. We look forward to seeing that passed all the way to the President—meaningful reforms that would help us out in today’s current situation. 

And I want to thank Mr. Fugate for not only your partnership 

and your expertise in this area but certainly for being willing to go 

out there and help us to get both parties, both Houses working together to get this very important legislation passed. 

What is critical to communities and people devastated by a disaster is not only the initial response but also how quickly people 

can rebuild and get back to normalcy. We have seen improvements 

made since Katrina in how we prepare for and respond to disasters, but we still see many problems. Despite prepositioning of certain assets, we still saw massive fuel shortages, people in places 

like Staten Island who did not have help for days, and millions 

without power. 

In addition, we have seen meaningful improvements in recovery 

and rebuilding. We don’t want to see New York and New Jersey 

still haggling with FEMA over every different doorknob and light 

switch. We want to see bills paid immediately and that rebuild 

done immediately. 

That is why the FEMA Reauthorization Act, H.R. 2903, includes 

a new public assistance pilot program that would immediately 

allow FEMA to waive duplicative and outdated regulations and 

give more flexibility to the rebuilding process. We direct FEMA to 

review and streamline its regulations, require the use of cost estimates, shorten the FEMA appeals process, and make it easier for 

communities to have access to temporary housing units. 

I am pleased that we have emergency managers from States who 

are still rebuilding from prior disasters. I hope today we can hear 

from them what their experiences have been with the current process, what are the lessons learned, and what improvements they 

might recommend to the process. 

I am also interested in hearing how FEMA and HUD intend to 

address the current housing issues. Thousands are still without 

homes, and it still is not clear what will be the total number of people who will need longer term housing while they rebuild. It is also 

not clear what exactly will HUD’s role be in the recovery process, 

given the President’s announcement that the Secretary of HUD will 

lead redevelopment and rebuilding efforts. I hope today to get more 

6 

details on that process, how it will work, and what the timeline 

will be to get people back in new homes. 

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and 

thank Chairman Mica for holding this important hearing. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

And I am pleased to yield now to the ranking member of the subcommittee of jurisdiction, the gentlelady from the District, Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I especially 

thank you for holding this very timely hearing on yet another unprecedented storm in our country. 

I ask to revise and extend my remarks so I may summarize 

them. 

This event covered 24 States and saw a confluence of climate I 

don’t think we have ever seen before: a hurricane colliding with a 

nor’easter, and whiteout snow conditions. That is what has lots of 

scientists thinking about the effects of climate change. 

Thousands of people, when you have an event this large, are still 

living in temporary housing. Twelve States received emergency 

declarations before the storm, and so far, 10 States have received 

disaster declarations. The District of Columbia has a disaster declaration pending. 

Our Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, I believe, 

has proved useful during this storm. We provided FEMA with new 

tools, clarified their duties and functions. And we see some of this 

not only with respect to FEMA but also its nonprofit partners and 

the, apparently, good prepositioning of supplies, the closing of subways and of the Metro system, to name two of the most obvious. 

But I hope this hearing will focus on forward thinking as these 

States rebuild, and especially hazard mitigation to prevent similar 

loss of life. I don’t know if anyone could have mitigated what happened to New York and New Jersey because in a real sense these 

storms brought as unprecedented conditions as one might expect in 

a terrorist disaster. You didn’t know what to expect; you never 

would have expected this. How do you mitigate, given our hazard 

mitigation legislation and funds, so that the next time, should it 

come, these important States are not put in the position that they 

are today? 

I am also concerned about the failure of FEMA to put into effect 

cost-estimating for the recovery phase. In the last Congress, our 

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and 

Emergency Management held a hearing in which among the issues 

focused was the failure of FEMA to, in fact, use cost-estimating for 

the removal of debris and the like, just as the insurance industry 

does. 

Now, the insurance industry is known for conserving its funds 

and going after people who cheat. Now, if the insurance industry 

can use cost-estimating to hurry up the process of clearing after an 

event, I will be very interested to learn whether or not cost-estimating, which we first mandated in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 

2000, will for the first time be used after Hurricane Sandy. 

I will also be interested in the President’s announcement that 

the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development agency will lead 

7 

the Government’s Sandy assistance. I believe this is the first time. 

It appears to be a coordination function. I normally am for such coordinating functions. I will be interested, however, to see how they 

will operate in this new joinder of agencies; FEMA to continue to 

have, however, the individual and public assistance function. It will 

be important for the two agencies to sort out whose regulations 

apply so that there is a real coordination function rather than a 

stepping on one another’s toes. 

I look forward to today’s witnesses. And I particularly commend 

and thank FEMA for the Herculean work it did in the beginning 

of this storm and all the partners who assisted the Agency. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentlelady. 

Pleased now to recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. 

Harris. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing today and for the opportunity to discuss the impact of 

Hurricane Sandy on the area I represent and the response efforts 

to date. 

The First Congressional District includes all of Maryland’s Eastern Shore, much only a few feet above sea level. Somerset and 

Worcester Counties and particularly the communities of Crisfield, 

Smith Island, Marion, Fairmount, Deal Island, Ocean Pines, and 

Princess Anne were particularly hard-hit with flood, wind, and rain 

damage from Hurricane Sandy. 

While these communities continue to recover, our thoughts and 

prayers certainly go out to our neighbors from New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and other areas where the lives and businesses of 

families were disrupted as they dealt with massive property loss. 

On October 31st, 3 days after the storm, I toured the affected 

sites in Crisfield and Ocean City with Governor O’Malley and 

FEMA and local officials to see firsthand the serious impact of the 

superstorm. While Army Corps beach engineering projects protected Ocean City, I was stunned to see the evident devastation 

that some of our bay coastal communities like Crisfield suffered. 

Three weeks ago, I hosted a tele-town-hall meeting with over a 

thousand residents from impacted communities participating, with 

officials from FEMA and Maryland’s emergency management agency also on the phone. I was encouraged by the Federal and State 

coordinated response efforts to date. But a message I did hear loud 

and clear is that few citizens have an understanding of the different responsibilities of Federal, State, and local governments in 

disaster response and recovery. 

Two weeks ago, President Obama issued a major disaster declaration for Maryland and approved Governor O’Malley’s request 

for public assistance and hazard mitigation. However, yesterday, a 

request for individual assistance has been rejected. I am puzzled by 

that rejection, given the lack of resources in our lower shore counties, and hope this hearing may shed some light on the reasoning 

behind that decision. 

Mr. Chairman, this hearing will underscore the need for all levels of Government to be prepared for these catastrophes in the future, ensuring that scarce resources can always be made available 

to those of our communities most in need of assistance. 

8 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our panel of witnesses 

this morning, and I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

And I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New York and 

thank him for his hospitality he extended to the committee in viewing some of the damage in his district in Manhattan. 

Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and the 

Ranking Member Rahall for holding this hearing on the Federal response to Hurricane Sandy. 

I currently represent New York’s Eighth Congressional District, 

which includes Lower Manhattan and the Brooklyn waterfront 

communities of Red Hook, Sea Gate, and Coney Island, all of which 

were hard-hit by this storm. 

Although the emergency response agencies worked hard to get 

the city back up and running, there were gaps in the recovery operations, and there are many challenges that remain, particularly for 

a dense urban area like New York. Our transportation system is 

too vulnerable. Our infrastructure is old and harder to replace. The 

power grid runs more than just lights and computers; it also powers heat and hot water, and all water in the highrises all over the 

city, and it operates the elevators that the elderly and disabled rely 

upon to escape their homes when they become unsafe. 

Although FEMA and the National Guard set up distribution centers around the city, in many cases people were unable to leave 

their apartments to pick up supplies, and deliveries didn’t make it 

to many buildings. My office, along with other elected officials, organized volunteers, collected supplies, and hand-delivered blankets, 

food, and water to people stuck in highrises. Lugging goods up 

flights of stairs is no easy task, and it is better left to trained professionals. But if we hadn’t done it, with the help of students from 

NYU and other good samaritans, many people would not have received any help at all in the weeks after the storm. 

This is just one example, but I fear it illustrates the particular 

challenges of an urban setting that our emergency response agencies are ill-equipped to handle or at least haven’t had to contemplate on a scale of this magnitude. 

Another particular challenge in New York is the lack of available 

hotels and rental units for displaced storm victims. FEMA has 

issued millions of dollars for transitional housing and temporary 

rental assistance, but vacancies in which to use that money are 

hard to find, and the reimbursement rates are often too low for 

whatever is available. 

The lack of a viable long-term housing plan is one of the biggest 

challenges we face going forward. All levels of Government need to 

work together to solve this problem. Our most basic responsibility 

is to ensure that people have a safe place to stay following a storm, 

and yet it is the biggest question for which we now have no answer. 

For people who can stay in their homes, we are hearing increasing reports about environmental contamination from toxic mold, 

sewage, and other hazardous substances. Although there are some 

resources available to assist with the cleanup, in many cases it is 

9 

inadequate, particularly for those living and working in densely 

populated buildings that share common spaces and HVAC systems. 

Given New York’s recent history with environmental hazards 

caused by the collapse of the World Trade Center on 9/11, we know 

all too well the danger presented by indoor contamination. We 

must not repeat the mistakes of 9/11 by leaving people to their own 

devices to clean up complex toxins in their homes without proper 

guidance and assistance from the Federal Government. I have 

asked the EPA to conduct or oversee comprehensive testing to ensure that people’s homes and workspaces are safe to inhabit, and 

I urge my colleagues to join in that request. 

I am also concerned that OSHA rules are not always being followed and that many cleanup workers are not being given proper 

protective equipment. This is another mistake from 9/11 that is too 

often repeated in response to disasters, and I have asked OSHA to 

ensure that its rules are adequately enforced. 

State and city agencies estimate the cost to repair the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy will be at least $40 billion for New 

York State alone. Within New York City, the mayor estimates public and private losses of $19 billion, including $4.8 billion in uninsured private losses and $5.7 billion in lost gross product from 

business closures. 

For many small businesses, who are already operating on a thin 

profit margin or who are only now paying off loans from 9/11, the 

SBA loan program will not suffice. We will need to provide grants 

or some form of direct aid, as we did after 9/11, if we want these 

businesses to survive. 

With costs this high, New York State and New York City, like 

its counterparts in the region, cannot shoulder this burden alone, 

and the standard FEMA reimbursement process will not work. The 

State and the city do not have billions of dollars sitting in their coffers to advance to fund repairs, and FEMA reimbursement is slow 

and cumbersome. In fact, New York is still waiting on the payments for Hurricane Irene. And I am sure many of my colleagues 

have had similar experiences in their States. That is why we will 

be requesting that the Hurricane Sandy supplemental be distributed through the various agencies in direct aid to affected areas, 

as we have done at times in the past to expedite recovery. 

And we were must pass an emergency supplemental without requiring offsets, as some have suggested in past disasters. As the 

current debate over the pending sequestration shows, finding offsets is no easy task, and it makes no sense. It defies the very nature of emergency aid, and it impedes the Federal Government 

from doing its most important job: protecting our citizens when calamity strikes. 

It will be expensive to rebuild, but we must. And it would be foolish not to do so with the next storm in mind, which will undoubtedly come. We must fortify our shorelines and seawalls and better 

protect low-lying areas from storage surge. I expect the Army 

Corps to finally construct the Coney Island shorefront protection 

project. It is fully funded. The local match is already secured, and 

it was ready to go out to bid this summer. 

The Corps must move forward as originally intended without 

delay, but, frankly, that is the bare minimum we could do, and it 

10 

is not enough. We should invest in research and explore technologies to better protect our road and rail tunnels from flooding. 

We should allow the MTA to upgrade its aging transit system rather than require it to use Federal funds to replace a 70-year-old 

switching system with equivalent 70-year-old technology. And we 

must have a better plan for restoring power lines and gas supplies. 

Hurricane Sandy should be a major wakeup call. When disaster 

strikes, our densely populated urban areas and economic centers 

must be able to recover quickly. If we are going to invest billions 

of dollars in rebuilding storm-ravaged areas, we should do so in a 

way that will protect people from future storms. And we have every 

reason to believe that major storms will threaten us again and 

soon. 

The devastation and chaos brought by Hurricane Sandy have 

had a lasting impact on our city and region, and the lives of thousands of New Yorkers are still upsidedown. But if we all stand together, we can rebuild quickly, stronger, and better than before. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. 

And from nearby New Jersey, we have the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo, who was also hit by this storm. 

You are recognized, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. 

As many of you know, I represent the Second Congressional District in southern New Jersey. It is a little bit more than a third 

of the State, geographically, with an awful lot of coastline. We 

faced catastrophic destruction with the storm and as a result of the 

storm. The images speak to the sheer destruction. The personal 

story of those affected detail the physical, emotional, and financial 

toll on our community and their residents. 

I spent a great deal of time on the ground visiting communities, 

discussing the response and recovery with emergency management 

officials, meeting individually with constituents and business owners who are determined to not let the storm stand in the way of 

getting back on their feet. But we need to work together, and that 

is why I have joined with my colleagues in DC to ensure that Congress provides additional Federal support that has been requested 

and is desperately needed. 

Even though the coverage of this devastation has left the front 

pages of many media outlets, it is still in the forefront of my mind 

and the minds of my constituents, who are responding with 

strength, courage, and resiliency as they do their best to pick up 

the pieces in an unprecedented recovery effort that is underway. 

When President Obama visited Brigantine, which is in my district, he also saw firsthand the way this storm has impacted individuals’ livelihoods and how their ways of life have been forever 

changed due to the horrific flooding and wind. 

To date, Federal Emergency Management Agency—and, Mr. 

Fugate, we thank you for what you are doing and thank you for 

being on the ground that day in my district—along with U.S. Small 

Business Administration, Department of Agriculture, Department 

of Housing and Urban Development, and other Federal agencies 

11 

and departments, have truly been boots on the ground, ensuring 

disaster assessments are being conducted in a timely manner. 

These emergency management personnel have gone above and beyond the call of duty, many of them working around the clock tirelessly to ensure the safety of our residents, and they deserve tremendous praise. 

Likewise, Governor Christie has shown tremendous poise and 

unwavering leadership during this crisis, coordinating all of the different emergency response units and leading the State, maybe very 

importantly, in the days prior to the storm hitting as well as during and after the storm has hit. 

However, it is going to be a long and challenging road ahead, a 

challenge my colleagues in the New Jersey delegation, including 

my friend Congressman Sires, and I recognize and are prepared to 

deal with. The most recent damage assessment by Governor 

Christie of approximately $37 billion for all of New Jersey makes 

it clear that the State will not be able to handle this financial burden alone and emergency supplemental funding will be needed. 

I am working with President Obama’s administration and the 

House leadership, as a long recovery is planned, specifically: requesting funding for the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies 

Account; imploring the President to fund all previously authorized 

Army Corps beach and flood control projects in New Jersey; requesting a Federal fisheries resource disaster declaration for New 

Jersey; expediting an emergency supplemental bill to the floor to 

provide Sandy relief; and insisting that redtape be eliminated and 

minimized and the bureaucracy be set on notice to get everything 

moving, just to name a few of the things. 

Congress has worked together in a bipartisan and bicameral 

manner in the past to respond to other national natural disasters. 

New Jersey and the States affected by this storm should not be 

treated any differently than any of these past natural disasters. So 

we are expecting that when it comes to Federal relief and recovery 

efforts from Hurricane Sandy, we must stand ready to provide the 

aid and assistance to the people and communities devastated by 

this storm as we have done for other States and other parts of the 

Nation when this has hit. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today to testify. I look forward to hearing their testimony on the recovery efforts from previous disasters and lessons learned by the recovery effort that may 

help inform us as we move through this latest disaster. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. 

Another gentleman from the hard-hit State of New York, Mr. 

Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, 

I won’t make a formal opening statement, but let me just make a 

couple of points. 

First, I want to thank Mr. Fugate from FEMA and General 

Walsh from the Army Corps for the effectiveness of your response 

thus far to the thousands of homeowners in our district that were 

dislocated by the storm. And particularly with respect to the Army 

Corps, we had three new breaches, and the Army Corps has moved 

very quickly. One has already been closed, one is in the process of 

12 

being closed now, and a third is being reviewed to see if it will 

close naturally. So I thank you very much for that. 

An observation: The engineered beaches in our district fared 

vastly better than the nonengineered beaches. I think that is, in 

my view, an open-and-shut argument for beach nourishment and 

for the role that the Corps can play in stabilizing our shoreline. 

And, thirdly, let me echo what Mr. LoBiondo and Mr. Nadler 

said with respect to the necessity for an emergency supplemental. 

We absolutely need one, and we need one without offsets. That has 

been the way this Congress has responded to natural disasters 

elsewhere in this country. We need to respond in the same way, 

with the same degree of commitment as we did for Katrina, as we 

did for the tornadoes in the Midwest, as we have for fires elsewhere. So I very much hope that our colleagues on both sides of 

the aisle will respond quickly and appropriately for the need for an 

emergency supplemental without offsets. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

And we do have another Member from New Jersey, also hard-hit 

State, as you know. Pleased to recognize Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

today. 

I will just agree and echo, and I won’t repeat myself, with my 

colleague from New Jersey, LoBiondo. I think he said it best when 

he made those statements, and I agree with my colleagues from 

New York. But I would like to make a couple observations. 

You know, I represent what they call the Gold Coast, which is 

the Eighth Congressional District. Hoboken, Jersey City, Bayonne, 

that area got hit very hard. And one of the things that is still not 

clear is, when is the PATH in Hoboken going to be ready for people 

to go into New York City? You know, right now they are taking the 

ferries, $9; the PATH $2.25. 

I spoke to a former Congressman, Frank Guarini, who still has 

no power in his building in Jersey City. So we are just wondering 

if anybody can talk a little bit about that. It is a whole building. 

I also would like to compliment all of you because every time I 

made a phone call people got back to me. You were terrific. I don’t 

know how you do it, staying so calm when people are yelling at 

with you all their frustrations. But I certainly compliment you, Mr. 

Fugate; and I want to compliment you, because the Army Corps of 

Engineers has always responded professionally; and everybody else. 

But certain things we have to certainly do. We have to certainly 

coordinate the fuel situation better. You know, in my district, it 

was difficult to get the fuel. And I expressed this to Governor 

Christie, about possibly getting generators for some of these places, 

and he suggested that at some of these places the problem was the 

hookup. It wasn’t the fact that you did not provide the generators. 

The other issue that I have in Hoboken, you know, it is a very 

congested area. A lot of people live in basements, and their basement is their home. It is their first home. And they want to know, 

you know, what is going to happen to them. So there are a lot of 

questions. 

And the last thing, which is my pet peeve, is we had so many 

people volunteer, come into the State to help, and it did not seem 

13 

it was well-coordinated with the power companies. We had trucks 

parked behind hotels, people in the hotels, and two blocks away in 

Weehawken, New Jersey, people had no power. There has to be a 

way of working the coordination when so many people want to give 

of their time and volunteer to help other people, that we must find 

a way to coordinate these people as they come into any State, so 

you can send them into the most devastated area. 

But I just want to thank you. 

And thank you for the extra time. 

Mr. MICA. Thank the gentleman. 

If there are no other Members that seek recognition—oh, I am 

sorry, Ms. Edwards. And thank you also for joining us in the committee visit to the affected area. Ms. Edwards, you are recognized. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do appreciate 

being able to visit the storm-affected areas in Staten Island and 

through New York City. 

I think that although we didn’t have tremendous impacts here in 

the Washington, DC, metropolitan area from Hurricane Sandy, 

there were some. Certainly, our State in Maryland, as we heard 

from my colleague from the Eastern Shore, had damage there. 

You know, one of the things that it occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, 

is how important it is for us to have actually been able to visit and 

to see some of the damage firsthand and to meet with local officials 

and with residents because I think it gives you a different perspective about what the need is for recovery. And for me as a Member, 

even though there is not a personal concern for my congressional 

district, it makes me a stronger and better advocate for the people 

in the worst-affected areas. 

Also, on the ground, I will say to Administrator Fugate, your personnel on the ground remind us of the importance of a strong and 

talented and equipped Federal workforce. And I really appreciate 

that. And I think for all of the time that is spent beating up on 

our Federal workers for various reasons, we heard over and over 

and over again how competent and talented and organized and resourceful the assets are on the ground. 

It is also true that, you know, while there have been clearly, as 

was pointed out to us both by the chairman and other Members as 

well as the officials in New York, you know, problems with payout 

for previous storms, we have to clear those things up, but it 

shouldn’t stop us from moving forward and from making a commitment to the people of all of the storm-affected areas that we are 

going to provide what is necessary to rebuild and to replace. 

I hope that the members of the panel today will address questions regarding how we need to rethink our infrastructure in light 

of these kinds of storms in these low-lying areas. The elephant in 

this room that needs to be spoken about is the impact of climate 

change and the increasing intensity of storms and the variedness 

of the storms, the breadth of a storm like Sandy. And I think that 

we have to rebuild and rethink our infrastructure in those terms. 

And that is something that this Congress and our next Congress 

ought to address sooner rather than later. 

Things like our power grid in densely populated areas; what is 

it that we can better do to better protect them to make sure that 

we are able to bring them back on line as soon as possible? Our 

14 

water infrastructure, sewer infrastructure that is located close to 

the coastline so that it is more vulnerable; and of course our transit 

infrastructure. To know that at least one tunnel in New York that 

is brand-new is devastated. And the tunnels, the tubes are old. And 

while the city, I think, has done an amazing, amazing job in getting things back on line and people moving from one place to another, that infrastructure is really vulnerable, as it is vulnerable 

all across this country. 

And so I think, you know, at a time where we are constantly 

haggling, as sometimes we need to, over budget constraints, the importance of investing in this infrastructure now so that we don’t 

make it more vulnerable later on needs to be high on the priority 

list because the damage to us in terms of our long-term economy 

and competitiveness I think is really huge. 

Mr. Chairman, in addition, I think one of the things that we will 

come to learn, and not in this committee, is that we are challenged 

by our weather prediction assets, as well. Although we had a lot 

of warning with Sandy, it allowed for prepositioning and for moving in assets, that that is vulnerable to budgets as well. And the 

impacts, whether on the east coast or any of our other coastal 

areas, will be tremendous. 

And then lastly, I know with respect to Maryland, although I 

want to hear addressed why it is that we were denied the final 

kind of recovery and rebuilding, I understand the importance of 

balancing when it is appropriate for Federal and State assets to 

take over. And we have had the great benefit of Maryland being 

provided assistance in the last year’s derecho and the three blizzards the year or two previous to that and in other storms. Maybe 

our Governor will appeal that decision. But I am just interested to 

know the process by which FEMA goes about making a final determination. 

And I thank you all for your testimony today. 

Mr. MICA. If there are no other Members that seek recognition, 

then we will go now to our panel of witnesses. 

And we have today appearing before the committee Craig 

Fugate, the Administrator of FEMA; Major General Michael Walsh, 

Deputy Commanding General, Civil and Emergency Operations for 

the Corps of Engineers; Mr. Fred Tombar, and he is the senior advisor to the Secretary for Disaster Recovery with HUD; Mr. Robert 

Latham, executive director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency; Mr. Mark Riley, deputy director, the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, State of 

Louisiana; and then Mr. David Popoff, and he is the emergency 

management coordinator for Galveston County, Texas. 

So, first of all, welcome. Thank you for your participation. 

The order of business will be we will hear from each of the witnesses; then we will go to questions. And I was told—we don’t want 

to delay Mr. Fugate. So what we will do when we go to questions, 

we will limit the first round of questions to Mr. Fugate and then 

get the rest of the panelists, if that is—well, that will be the way 

we are going to do it, so just want to let you know upfront, to accommodate the Administrator’s schedule, particularly in this very 

difficult timeframe that he faces. 

15 

So, with that, let me welcome the gentleman, former gentleman 

from Florida, who we are very proud of to have had us help in so 

many ways in Florida. And I think we are prone to every disaster. 

We have had hurricanes, multiple hurricanes, we have had floods, 

we have had fires. Everything but locusts we have dealt with. And 

now he is here leading the Agency in the capacity of FEMA director. 

So welcome. You are recognized. 

And let me tell you, too, I saw some long testimony here. You all 

have 5 minutes. Longer testimony we will put in the record. And 

some folks have done a great job in preparation. But this is an opportunity to summarize that and also have a discussion about 

where we are. 

So, Mr. Fugate, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL J. WALSH, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, 

CIVIL AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS; FREDERICK TOMBAR, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE 

SECRETARY FOR DISASTER RECOVERY, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; ROBERT R. 

LATHAM, JR., DIRECTOR, MISSISSIPPI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; MARK RILEY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, STATE OF LOUISIANA; AND DAVID 

J. POPOFF, CHIEF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR, GALVESTON COUNTY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Norton, and other members of the committee. 

Mr. MICA. Could you pull that up a little bit, Craig? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. Is that better? 

Mr. MICA. Yeah. 

Mr. FUGATE. You know, I submit my testimony for the record, 

and my talking points are here, so I will keep it brief. 

Mr. MICA. Without objection, it will be included in the record. 

Mr. FUGATE. First thing, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this 

committee and the House of Representatives for finally recognizing 

the sovereignty of the federally recognized tribes in your legislation 

which would have added them to the Stafford Act, allowing those 

tribes to request from the President a disaster declaration. That 

was an historical act that the House took. And, again, we eagerly 

await the Senate’s action on that. 

The second thing, Mr. Chairman, I need to thank this committee 

and the appropriators for fully funding the Disaster Relief Fund in 

the previous budget. Those of us that were here remember Hurricane Irene and knew the challenges we had with very little funds 

left in that account and how it affected the response. Right now, 

in the Disaster Relief Fund we currently have a balance of $4.88 

billion that has not been obligated yet. 

However, we do anticipate with Sandy, as well as other outstanding disasters—Congressman Long, we are still working in 

Joplin. We have still got people that need housing. We are still reVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:47 Nov 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\FULL\12-4-1~1\77210.TXT JEAN
16 

covering from Irene. We had Isaac earlier this year. We had Debby 

in Florida. So we are working with the administration on what that 

supplemental request will require. 

The response to Sandy I think was due in part to a lot of the 

reforms that this committee took to amend the Stafford Act in the 

Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. It clarified roles 

and responsibilities and gave us tools that we have been able to 

utilize successfully. 

Challenges remain. And I think some of the questions, as we talk 

about how we are looking at the longer term recovery, actually 

come from the requirements of that act. One of the things that 

Congress directed that FEMA was to develop was a long-term recovery plan. We have developed the National Recovery Framework 

that recognizes that FEMA programs by themselves will not successfully recover from storms of the size of Sandy. We have both 

preexisting conditions, and we have other areas where FEMA programs are not the best tool to engage in the types of work that will 

need to be done. 

And so, in recognizing that and using the framework, we partner 

with HUD. And the President concurred that it made sense that 

FEMA’s programs, which FEMA will continue to administrate, all 

those funds out of the DRF, all the recovery dollars, all the individual assistance, all the mitigation dollars, will be administered 

through the States at the Governors’ direction based upon eligible 

requirements. 

However, those programs by themselves will not address the preexisting housing conditions, as was pointed out, where people who 

lived in basements have nowhere to go. We will have a lot of challenges dealing with the housing needs far beyond the FEMA repair 

programs. And that is why it is so important that HUD, Army 

Corps of Engineers, U.S. DOT, and other programs that will be required receive the funding, but that FEMA’s programs, working in 

partnership with the rest of the Federal team, will be working to 

support the Governors and their communities in recovery. 

The other lesson that we learned from Sandy, as was pointed 

out, is when you have a disaster of this size and this magnitude, 

it takes a lot of people, it takes a lot of resources. Some of those 

resources, because of the way that you have supported FEMA in 

our budget, allowed us to do things this year we had not had before, one of which is a partnership with the Corporation for National Service, in utilizing their AmeriCorps program, where we 

had just brought in the first classes under a program called FEMA 

Corps and deployed people in support of our response. These individuals, many of them very enthusiastic in their opportunity to 

serve this country, were there on the ground in the hard-hit States 

providing direct services and helping people register with FEMA 

assistance. 

Another thing, Mr. Chairman, that we took from your bill is 

something that we know is a regulatory impediment, is that we 

have not allowed jurisdictions to use straight time or their regular 

public works and other debris folks to pick up debris. We always 

said it had to be the extraordinary costs, oftentimes causing the 

unintended consequences of greater costs as they contracted out for 

services rather than using their own resources. The President conVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:47 Nov 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\FULL\12-4-1~1\77210.TXT JEAN
17 

curred, and through emergency rule we were able to provide for 

Sandy force account or direct cost to local jurisdictions for picking 

up debris as a result of Sandy. 

Again, we have tried to address the concerns of this committee, 

and, where we can, we have implemented those procedures. 

One last thing that we have done, in working with our partners, 

is we recognized that the current household reimbursement that 

we would provide under individual assistance is capped at about 

$31,000. We know that is insufficient to provide repairs to many 

of the homes that were heavily damaged. However, if we can provide temporary repairs, many people can get back in their homes 

while awaiting more permanent assistance, which may require 

other Federal programs. 

So rather than being constrained by that, we actually used our 

shelter authorities and are providing expedient repairs to homes 

that allow people to get back in their homes but do not necessarily 

constitute permanent work, reducing demand for temporary housing and allowing the people to stay in their communities. Again, 

these are authorities that we have been using to address the fundamental issues. 

But I want to get to the last thing, Mr. Chairman, you and the 

ranking member brought up, and that is how do we further speed 

up the process while maintaining accountability and ensuring that 

work that is to be performed in a disaster is that that Congress has 

authorized, without necessarily treating it as a reimbursement 

process that takes indefinite timeframes to complete the review 

and rebuild cycles. 

We have identified impediments and are willing and are eager to 

work with your committee on technical language to address some 

of the shortfalls that we have incurred in Sandy and continue to 

provide questions for us as we attempt to look at how to speed up 

more of an estimate process that provides protection for both the 

applicants but also the Federal Government, and also ensure that 

we don’t unintentionally create situations that may result in IG 

findings that could de-obligate substantial funds from jurisdictions 

after the fact. 

I think being a steward of the money sometimes, Mr. Chairman, 

is if we can’t do it, we need to say no and not make promises or 

allegations that we can do something we can’t. But when we do 

make a decision, I want those decisions not to penalize local jurisdictions if, after the fact, the IG finds other issues which would result in deobligations. 

And so with estimates, we want to make sure that as we go forward we are providing fiscal accountability to the taxpayer but also 

ensuring that the applicant isn’t in a double jeopardy where perhaps the IG finds that they may have had a project that the funds 

weren’t all required. Do they have to pay back the funds overages, 

or can they use those in their programs? What happens if we find 

that in those programs, they came up with an alternative project, 

and is the IG going to find that that was not allowable? So we 

want to work with the committee and look at technical language 

that would ensure that as we do these estimates, they are do done 

in good faith, both the applicant and the Federal Government have 

equal protections, but more importantly, it addresses issues, how 

18 

many times can the applicant appeal that decision? How many 

times do we go back and look at projects, and what happens if the 

original estimate is up or down a certain amount, what happens to 

those shortfalls or to those surpluses? And we will need guidance 

from Congress to answer some of those questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony. 

We will now move to General Walsh with the Corps of Engineers. 

General WALSH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the committee. I am pleased to testify on the Corps activities to 

prepare for, respond to, and recover from Hurricane Sandy. 

In partnership with other Federal agencies and States and numerous local entities, the Corps has engaged in a multitude of response activities in an effort to mitigate the risk to public health 

and safety and to facilitate the recovery of this severe weather 

event. The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Appropriation 

Account provides funds for the Corps of Engineers to prepare for 

and implement emergency response activities to natural disasters, 

including flood fighting, infrastructure, search-and-rescue operations, and rehabilitation of flood control and hurricane protection 

structures. 

Disaster preparedness activities include the coordination, planning and implementation of response exercises with local, State 

and Federal agencies. These exercises provide Federal and nonFederal agencies an opportunity to plan for natural disasters and 

learn about partner agencies’ capabilities, resources and their responsibilities. 

Corps leaders, including district commanders and tribal liaisons 

and emergency management staff, regularly meet with State, Federal and local officials and other interested parties to discuss Corps 

authorities under our Public Law 84–99, which authorizes the 

Corps of Engineers to undertake activities relating to advanced 

preparedness, emergency flood fighting operations and rehabilitation of eligible flood control works or shore protection features adversely impacted by flood and storm events. 

These meetings provide an opportunity to share lessons learned 

from previous flood events and conduct table top exercises, review 

flood fighting techniques and strengthen the collaboration among 

the Corps, State and local governments, as well as tribal entities. 

In preparation for Hurricane Sandy, the Corps took steps to ensure its personnel, facilities, and equipment were prepared and 

prepositioned before the event. The Corps took preventative measures, such as lowering the pool elevations behind our dams; closing 

hurricane barriers in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut; moving Corps vessels into safe harbors; and securing 

Corps construction projects and facilities. 

The Corps also deployed mobile command-and-control vehicles to 

key locations, prepositioned power generators and moved them into 

intermediate staging areas, located 512 truckloads of water to 

move into New York and New Jersey, as well as issued approximately 200,000 sandbags to the States. 

The Corps conducted pre-storm inspections along the coast by updating survey plans and employing extensive use of LIDAR, an optical remote sensing technology that is used to assess existing conditions on shoreline protection features. Personnel were activated 

19 

to the district and division emergency operation centers, liaison officers were deployed to State emergency operation centers, and 

emergency support function team leaders and their assistants were 

assigned to the States. Before and during our response to Hurricane Sandy, the Corps continued its tradition of close collaboration 

and coordination with the Federal, tribal, and State partners. The 

Corps participated as an integral part in FEMA’s Joint Information 

Center, coordinating activities among all the responsible agencies 

and transparently communicated with all the affected parties. 

Described as a superstorm, Hurricane Sandy brought over 80- 

mile-per-hour winds and storm surges above 13 feet. Flood damages in the hardest hit areas severely impacted public infrastructure, flooding subways, highway tunnels, public housing structures, 

wastewater treatment plants, causing extensive power outages, impacting mass transit systems, and affecting public housing as well 

as private residents. Although the north Atlantic shore suffered severe coastal storm damage, existing Corps shoreline protection and 

beach nourishment projects performed as designed and helped mitigate the flood damages. 

In response to the disaster, the Corps of Engineers moved folks 

from six different districts, and their division emergency operation 

centers were activated in numerous response, and we surged a 

number of members forward. The Corps responded to mission assignments from FEMA and provided over 1,000 highly trained technical personnel, including the 249th Prime Power Battalion, to 13 

States. 

To date, the Corps has accepted 69 FEMA missions for over $380 

million to New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Delaware, Ohio, 

Pennsylvania, Connecticut, West Virginia, and Rhode Island. These 

missions include emergency support function management, as well 

as technical assistance, temporary housing, commodities, temporary power, and debris management and removal. We worked 

closely with the Coast Guard to determine threats to navigation 

and waterway closures, and affected ports were cleared for operation. 

In conclusion, the Army Corps of Engineers continues to stand 

ready to respond to and assist in disasters like Hurricane Sandy. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to 

answer any questions from you and other members of the committee. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And as I said, we will hold questions. 

Mr. Fred Tombar, senior advisor to the Secretary for Disaster 

Recovery with HUD. Welcome. And you are recognized. 

Mr. TOMBAR. Thank you. 

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Norton and members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding 

Federal actions in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, particularly 

by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

As senior advisor for disaster recovery to HUD Secretary Shaun 

Donovan, I have been deeply involved in those activities, including 

with respect to the role that President Obama has announced for 

Secretary Donovan. 

As I described in my written testimony, Hurricane Sandy and 

the nor’easter that followed caused widespread damage and forced 

20 

hundreds of thousands of families from their homes. This is an 

issue of particular concern to me, as I directed a key project in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Road Home Program 

in Louisiana. This project served as the single largest housing recovery program in the history of the United States. 

As someone born and raised in New Orleans, I have seen firsthand both the devastation that storms like Sandy and Katrina 

have brought and the tremendous results of sustained and effective 

recovery and rebuilding efforts. 

Let me describe HUD’s participation in the ongoing response and 

focus on recovery efforts concerning the storm and discuss the role 

that the President has announced for Secretary Donovan with respect to Federal rebuilding efforts. HUD has played a significant 

role in response to recovery from past major storms and is doing 

so with respect to Sandy. 

It is important to note the unprecedented cooperation that is taking place across the Federal family and in cooperation with State, 

local, and tribal authorities. This cooperation and partnership is 

how we will continue to speed the recovery of affected areas. Key 

to HUD is providing immediate help to storm-displaced families to 

find temporary replacement housing. We have identified thousands 

of housing units, including more than 12,000 in HUD subsidized 

housing. 

HUD has also focused on help to persons living in and owners 

of HUD-assisted housing damaged and destroyed by the storm. For 

example, to rapidly deliver safe and decent housing to displaced 

public housing and subsidized multifamily housing residents we 

are helping to temporarily find places for these persons, giving boilers and generators to impacted developments that house low-income families, and waiving administrative requirements. 

Relief from the storm cannot be accomplished by the Federal 

Government alone. That is why HUD is working to encourage the 

private sector to help displaced families. Shortly after the storm, 

HUD Secretary Donovan reached out to several private sector organizations to encourage their involvement in this effort and a number have stepped forward. We have deployed scores of HUD personnel to help staff FEMA’s disaster recovery centers and do other 

storm-related work. 

HUD has provided foreclosure protection to more than 200,000 

homeowners in affected portions of the tri-State area who are 

storm victims, through a mandatory 90-day moratorium on foreclosures. For storm victims who must rebuild their homes, FHA insurance is available for new mortgages, providing borrowers 100 

percent financing, including closing costs. HUD has directed FHA 

lenders to provide insurance payments they receive related to the 

storm directly to homeowners to avoid a problem that occurred 

after Hurricane Katrina, where some mortgage companies used insurance payments that were supposed to be used to rebuild damaged homes for other purposes. 

HUD is also providing help to affected State and local governments. For example, we have provided waivers to existing rules so 

that Federal Community Development Block Grant and HOME 

funds can be used for disaster relief. 

21 

On November 15th, President Obama announced that HUD Secretary Donovan will lead the coordination of Federal action relating 

to Hurricane Sandy rebuilding efforts. This role is different from 

the role the HUD Secretary usually carries out with respect to disasters in relation to the National Disaster Recovery Framework. 

Early in his first term, President Obama recognized that previous 

experience concerning Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need for 

additional guidance, structure and support to improve how we as 

a Nation address disaster-related recovery and rebuilding challenges. 

In September of 2009, President Obama charged the Departments of HUD and Homeland Security to work together in an effort 

to establish the Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working Group, composed of more than 20 Federal agencies, HUD, DHS and the working group consulted with State and local governments, as well as 

experts and stakeholders, and worked on improving our approach 

to disaster recovery and on developing operational guidance for recovery efforts. As a result, FEMA published a final version of the 

NDRF in September 2011. 

The Secretary’s responsibilities in this additional role will occur 

in coordination with the NDRF and will involve cooperating closely 

with FEMA and other agencies already involved in the recovery efforts. A key objective, as President Obama has directed, will be to 

cut redtape for State and local governments and tribes as they seek 

Federal assistance for longer term projects and identify priorities 

for community development. As a person who has been the lead for 

Secretary Donovan since the start of the administration on disaster 

recovery, I can tell you that cutting redtape and helping communities recover stronger, safer and smarter than before is a responsibility he takes seriously. 

Work on structure and functioning of this effort is proceeding 

rapidly. Secretary Donovan has already met with a number of most 

directly affected Federal, State and local officials, as well as many 

of his colleagues in the cabinet. He asked me to express that he is 

looking forward to working with this committee and other Representatives and Senators on this important effort. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be 

pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

And we will turn now to Mr. Robert Latham, who is the director 

of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency. 

Welcome. And you are recognized, sir. 

Mr. LATHAM. Thank you, Ranking Chairman Mica, Ranking 

Member Norton and distinguished members of the committee, for 

allowing me the opportunity to provide you with a statement for 

the record on what Mississippi has learned in responding and recovering from more than 20 Presidential disaster declarations since 

2000, including Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 

Today many communities in the Northeast are facing some of the 

same challenges that the Mississippi Gulf Coast experienced following Hurricane Katrina. The landscape in these communities is 

changed forever. Large disasters affect every aspect of a community, where people work, where people live, where they worship, 

where they raise their families, where they shop and, yes, where 

22 

they work. Recovery is a shared responsibility and must be driven 

by a well thought-out long-term recovery plan. This strategy can 

only be successful when driven at the local level. I would like to 

emphasize that; it must be driven at the local level. The absence 

of such a plan will often result in hasty decisions guided by political posturing and constantly changing priorities. 

There are never enough resources to rebuild the way we want to, 

but that does not mean we can’t rebuild better, smarter, safer and 

more resilient communities. By engaging the whole community, we 

provide a much better chance for success. Unity of effort, transparency in activities and managing expectations is critical; managing expectations is absolutely critical. 

Every decision must ask one question: Is what we are doing in 

rebuilding best for the community, and more importantly, can we 

sustain it? In the rush to recover, community leaders sometimes 

fail to take advantage of unique opportunities they have. By thinking beyond temporary solutions to move to more permanent sustainable solutions, leaders can make the community attractive for 

repopulation and growth. Basic Government services must be reestablished, and shifts in population must be considered for housing, 

schools and health care. They must address, how do we stimulate 

an economic recovery and restore our tax base? And how can we 

leverage the resources, which are limited, from the very sources to 

maximize what we want to achieve? 

Avoid the temptation to constantly shift priorities for short-term 

gains. Housing, transportation, schools and business development 

must be considered when repairing or rebuilding infrastructure. 

Stafford Act funding never gets you back where you want to be or 

makes you whole again. Public-private partnerships is critical. 

So what are some of the barriers to recovery? The Public Assistance Program is a reimbursement program. Current law restricts 

FEMA from providing recovery funds based on estimates. Quite 

often, it makes sense to build a community back with a different 

footprint than what existed pre-event. When this happens, communities are faced with an extensive approval process for alternate or 

improved projects. The current Disaster Assistance Policy cap State 

management cost is 3.34 percent of the Federal share of public assistance program cost; far much too inadequate to help a community recover like it should. Lack of flexibility in the Public Assistance Program often limits or restricts rebuilding a community the 

way that it should be. 

But applicants must understand that they cannot expect FEMA 

to pay for everything. Understanding Stafford Act eligibility early 

in the process and managing expectations in this process is critical 

to minimizing conflict throughout the recovery and delay in rebuilding. Many Federal agencies contributing funds to a recovery 

project must conduct its own environmental and historic preservation reviews. This oftentime results in multiple reviews for the 

same project resulting in extensive delays in the rebuilding. 

So what can with do to make the recovery process easier? FEMA 

and States must continue to work to identify potential opportunities in the PA program to make it easier for applicants, including 

implementing the results of the PA pilot program that was tested 

from June 2007 until December 2008. Congress should work with 

23 

FEMA to change the language in the law that would allow FEMA 

to advance the Public Assistance Fund using estimates similar to 

block grants allowing for flexibility within specific guidelines for 

applicants, explore additional opportunities for PA pilot projects 

that can expedite the recovery process and help applicants recover; 

increased State management costs from the current 3.34 percent 

cap to 7 percent so grantees and subgrantees can afford what managing recovery actually costs; and streamline environmental and 

historic preservation reviews. 

In the face of disaster comes a tremendous opportunity for a community to build back smarter, better, stronger, safer and more resilient. Every disaster begins and ends locally. Successful recovery 

demands local leadership with a vision and a strategy and the resources to help achieve their community rebuilding efforts. Decisions must be made based on what is best for the community, not 

what is best for the State or the Federal Government. Finding 

ways to make the Public Assistance Program work better and more 

efficiently could significantly reduce recovery time and expedite disaster closeout. The consequences of every disaster are the same, except for the size of the event, the population and the cost of the 

recovery. We have to take advantage of the lessons learned in the 

past if we are to change the future. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to 

share my experiences in disaster preparedness response and recovery in Mississippi. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be glad to 

answer any questions that you or the committee may have. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

And will now turn to Mark Riley, who is with the Governor’s Office Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana. 

Welcome. And you are recognized. 

Mr. RILEY. Thank you. Louisiana is currently managing $14.5 

billion in Stafford Act funding for the recovery from nine Presidentially declared major disasters since Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita struck in 2005. As a result of these events, we think of Louisiana as the largest living laboratory for recovery in the Nation, 

and we have a lot of experience. 

On behalf of the State of Louisiana, I would like to thank this 

committee for the opportunity to discuss our experiences with disaster recovery. 

Thank you, Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Norton and distinguished members of the committee, for taking an interest in providing leadership in this very vital discussion. 

Currently, there is considerable conversation among recovery 

professionals in both the public and private sectors that Federal recovery assistance needs to be rethought. We agree. The current 

process is too cumbersome, too bureaucratic and does not support 

the rapid, strong, resilient recovery of a community. Today we 

want to talk about the difficulties of recovery which Louisiana has 

experienced and New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and other 

States impacted by Hurricane Sandy are beginning to experience. 

Although we are discussing the Federal recovery process, that 

process is only one of the challenges that communities face during 

recovery. Seven years after the Nation’s largest disaster, Hurricane 

24 

Katrina, communities in Louisiana are still struggling, and the 

problems exceed just the implementation of the Stafford Act. To illustrate the issues of delivery of the Stafford Act Public Assistance 

Program, I would like to present an exhibit to your right and bring 

your attention to the foldout that was provided to the committee. 

It chronicles the project worksheet of the development of the Youth 

Study Center in New Orleans. Before I begin, let me emphasize 

that this is not an anomaly but is typical of thousands of facilities 

that were damaged by disasters in Louisiana. The Youth Study 

Center had significant damage. And from the city’s perspective, 

supported by an analysis from its professional architects and engineers, the building was eligible for replacement under the Stafford 

Act. 

However, a year after the storm, despite the assessment from the 

city’s professionals, FEMA would not agree that the building needed to be replaced and fixed the value of repair at $1.6 million. More 

than 7 years later and 182 meetings, FEMA has agreed to the replacement of the facility at $27 million, an increase of $25.5 million, but they still do not accept the architect and engineer’s design 

assessments as to the number of pilings that are needed to support 

the facility. That shortfall is still $1.2 million. If we come to an 

agreement by the end of the year and after the city engages in design bid and construction, it is projected that the building will be 

completed in the year 2016, 11 years after Hurricane Katrina made 

landfall. As the timeline illustrates, this process does not support 

a rapid recovery. 

To compound matters, FEMA has limited the availability of direct administrative costs. In our single example, the city has incurred considerable cost preparing for and attending the 182 meetings for the Youth Study Center. These costs will not be recoverable under the new FEMA policy, further inhibiting the city’s ability to recover. 

Again, the Youth Study Center is not an anomaly. The challenges they face can be multiplied by thousands of similar projects 

across Louisiana. Another example is Charity Hospital in New Orleans. Originally estimated at $28 million for repair, we were finally able to break ground this year, after 7 years of disagreement 

and bureaucracy, for a replacement hospital valued over $530 million. 

Just for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have over 2,000 

projects that have doubled in funding. More than 450 have grown 

by a factor of 10. And 1,300 projects have been amended more than 

five times. Clearly we need a recovery program that results in more 

accurate and timely identification of eligible work. 

In my written testimony, you will see some recurring themes. 

The size of a disaster significantly changes the requirements of delivering of disaster assistance. Time is critical. The FEMA PA program is too complex. Existing policies and processes are inconsistently applied at the ground level. Policies are inconsistent with the 

Stafford Act language and intent and limit authorized recovery 

support. Capacity for recovery from catastrophic events is limited 

at all levels, but especially at the local level. 

Let me be quick to say FEMA is a good partner, especially in the 

response phase. However, it is our experience that the regulatory 

25 

process and its implementation is unnecessarily highly bureaucratic and cumbersome, seriously complicating a community’s recovery from a disastrous event. Again, I thank the committee for 

its leadership and attention to recovery issues, and I am available 

for any questions. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

And we will turn to David Popoff, for our last witness, with 

Emergency Management for Galveston County, Texas. 

Welcome. And you are recognized. 

Mr. POPOFF. Good morning, Chairman Mica, Ranking Member 

Norton and distinguished members of the committee. 

I am honored for the opportunity to provide testimony on this important topic. I along with a small and highly skilled staff are responsible for overseeing disaster response and recovery for all the 

unincorporated areas of Galveston County. I report directly to 

County Judge Mark Henry. 

First of all, I would like to thank the committee for their strong 

support in the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, which is critical for building emergency management capacity at the local and State level. I would also like to thank you for 

your critical role that you played in the post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act to strengthen FEMA. 

Galveston County has a population of 300,000, which includes 

Galveston County and the Bolivar Peninsula. With about 60 miles 

of coastline, our population swells during hurricane season. Most of 

the population in Galveston County lives in the 10 incorporated cities on the mainland. Galveston County is a great place to live, 

work and play. 

Since 1960, Galveston County has been declared a Presidential 

disaster area 19 times. Galveston County also has the unfortunate 

distinction of being home to two of the worst Nation’s disasters: the 

1900 storm, which killed 6,000 people, and the 1947 Texas City explosion, which killed 581 people, injured 5,000, and vaporized all 

but one of the members of the Texas City Fire Department. As you 

can see, I work in a dynamic threat environment, so we take preparedness seriously. 

Our hearts certainly go out to all the people impacted by 

Superstorm Sandy. One of the most critical components of a hurricane response doctrine is never stop learning. Everything we do is 

learned at the pointy end of the stick. In the last decade, we have 

had three signature storms that we have learned from. The first 

one is Katrina. Katrina taught us about mass care and sheltering. 

From that experience came initiatives to pre-identify shelters and 

develop more detailed shelter concept of operations and to locate 

missing people. 

From Hurricane Rita, we learned about mass evacuation of major 

population centers. Who will ever forget the cars stuck in gridlock 

that ran out of gas in the Texas heat. From that experience, we developed traffic management plans; we developed State fuel teams 

to supply fuel to people who were evacuating and people who 

stayed after the storm. We also redefined our evacuation zones 

through a massive outreach program, and today, we actually use 

zip codes. 

26 

Hurricane Ike was a dangerous storm beyond all preconceptions. 

Hurricane Ike’s path was eerily similar to the 1900 storm. Damage 

to Galveston County was catastrophic. Early recognition to the 

threat is critical. They say it was only a Category 1. Reclassifications of hurricanes is a priority one to dangerous, major, catastrophic. We need to stop using the numbers now. 

Cooperative relationships are critical. Galveston County has put 

a great deal forward in bringing together the entire team; the local, 

the State, the Federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, 

private industries. We produce policies, procedures and we plan, 

train, and we operate together. Evacuation needs to be done, but 

it must be done quickly and remove the perceived barriers. 

The first point-to-point sheltering agreement was penned by the 

city of Galveston and the city of Austin after Hurricane Rita. No 

longer will we just tell people to go north and hope for the best. 

Reentry and recovery: Hurricane Ike destroyed the infrastructure 

and disabled most of ourmodern conveniences. We are fortunate 

that Texas deployed the Public Works Response Team. Debris removal was a challenge because most of the debris was on private 

property or in open fields. Bolivar Peninsula was a devastated community, so a local team was formed, and with extensive outreach, 

we were able to produce the Bolivar blueprint, and Bolivar is now 

a thriving community. 

Jurisdiction struggled with a wide variety of FEMA interpretations of policy, particularly with public assistance. This slowed 

down the completion of a project. Just as we thought we were in 

agreement that we reached on a project, it would require us to 

start over. We applaud the effort of Director Fugate for obtaining 

consistency in urging his recovery officials to get it right the first 

time. 

In conclusion, thank you for allowing me to testify today. On the 

Texas Gulf Coast, we say we have two seasons: We say we have 

hurricane season and preparing for hurricane season. As I have always said, emergency management is open book; we learn from our 

neighbors; and we won’t fail if we use the system. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

I thank all the witnesses. 

And as I said, we will turn first for questions to Administrator 

Fugate, and then we will come back to the rest of the panel. And 

I will lead right off. 

Again, thank you for your work and your efforts and participating with us here today. I was pleased to hear your testimony, 

much in support of our pending legislation in the Senate and how 

you used some of that as a template for trying to take action and 

initiatives, but you do need the law. 

I might say one thing to you. I know OMB has not given—I don’t 

think they have given you a sign off on providing us with the specifics, but any technical assistance you can provide to the committee so that we can improve the Public Assistance reforms in our 

bill, we would welcome that. The bill—you know, 2903, I believe is 

the number, is over in the Senate—we are welcome to improving 

that. I heard a couple of suggestions here today, too, that we might 

consider in reform of our reform bill or additions to our reform bill. 

But we think that—we believe that, again, hearing the testimony 

27 

of folks that have experienced problems, and a lot of the bill came 

actually from Members who had experienced problems in their own 

districts or States dealing with past storms, has the tools that will 

help you. Is that acceptable? Can you agree to participate. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Good. 

And let me jump now to a couple of major questions. One, you indicated we have about $4.8 billion left in the account. You have 

moved quickly to distribute some funds and make up—how long 

will that last, and how soon do you expect a supplemental bill to 

come to Congress? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, Mr. Chairman, based upon what we are seeing and some of the obligations, as the Corps pointed out, some of 

the mission assignments we have already made that have already 

been subtracted from that, we would look at early spring. We don’t 

have an exact date. Part of this will be as projects are coming 

forth, particularly on some of the large projects that we are dealing 

with. But we will look at early spring. We would probably reach 

the point where we would have to go to immediate needs funding. 

Mr. MICA. So you probably won’t submit to Congress a supplemental and the administration won’t until after the beginning of 

the year? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I can’t speak to that. I just know 

that where the DRF stands, we do not anticipate immediate needs 

funding until early spring. And again, thanks to the work of this 

committee and others making sure we were fully funded gives us 

that capability to continue a response. But we are working very 

closely with OMB as well as other Federal agencies as the administration looks at what additional funds will be required for Sandy. 

The one thing I am confident is, Mr. Chairman, FEMA will need 

supplemental funds, not this calendar year but this fiscal year, in 

order to continue the response to all other disasters as well as the 

obligations that will be expended in this fiscal year for Sandy. 

Mr. MICA. We have heard other disasters, Irene, still back to 

Katrina, in which there are obligations that have been made. Any 

estimate as to what that total is? 

Mr. FUGATE. Based upon the $4.8 billion, that is already factored 

into what we are requesting—— 

Mr. MICA. That would cover it? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. We were actually looking at, based upon 

your full funding of the DRF outside of Sandy, we actually had 

funds to go through the fiscal year, based upon not only your appropriations but also as we have closed out older disasters that put 

money back in the DRF. So we were not anticipating, outside of a 

catastrophic disaster, any request for additional funding. So, obviously, Sandy falls in that category as a catastrophic disaster. So it 

will be in addition to all of the existing disasters that we are working. 

Mr. MICA. Well, some of the temporary housing assistance we 

have provided will soon be expiring. Will there be opportunities for 

renewal? And then you heard one of the things we wanted to do 

is have HUD in here to explain what they were doing. And could 

you describe the cooperative effort, and will that be sufficient? But 

we were in New York and also—well, Manhattan, which is a whole 

28 

unique venue for a disaster, and then Staten Island, I guess Long 

Island, New Jersey. They have very unique housing requirements 

and also higher costs. So how will what HUD has committed to and 

the President has said they are going to do coordinate with your 

efforts? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, the housing program, we are actually looking at three pretty substantial areas. The first one was the 

temporary sheltering. And that is where maybe the home wasn’t 

destroyed, but they couldn’t get back in; they had power outages 

or other damages. We would provide in cooperation, this is a State 

request, on a cost share basis short-term mainly hotels, motels, 

short-term leases, measured in weeks, and we are extending that 

as the States request it. The traditional temporary housing where 

people have qualified and are leasing for a longer period of time 

goes to 18 months and we are working that. The other thing was, 

and this is something the committee had looked at before, is, how 

can we repair damaged homes to the point where if they could get 

back in their homes but it is not permanent long-term work, would 

that be more cost effective than renting a hotel or renting an apartment? So we are implementing that. But I think you hit upon one 

of the key reasons why we have been working very closely with 

HUD. Our programs do not do the permanent work that will be required to ensure there is sufficient affordable housing in these 

areas of devastation. And that is that part of that rebuilding that 

the Stafford Act doesn’t address, but if we are not successful, we 

will end up like we did in Katrina where people were in temporary 

housing units, not for months but for years. We want to avoid that. 

That is why we thought it was important, why Secretary Donovan 

stepped up to the challenge as the President asked. If we don’t 

have housing solutions in the short term, the temporary programs 

will not provide the long-term solution. 

Mr. MICA. From information provided by your staff to me earlier, 

there were 1,100 approximately housing units purchased. I know 

when we went through Katrina, we had hundreds of thousands of 

trailers, and we had them condemned because of the formaldehyde, 

and then we had them in storage and then we had to pay to get 

rid of them. It turned into a nightmare. Is this the only anticipated 

acquisition of housing from FEMA? I have also encouraged some 

temporary housing that could be reused. There are different products on the market. These will—the ones that I was told are not 

recyclable or would be pretty subject to some type of demolition or 

disposal at the end, the 1,100 that have been required—or I am 

sorry, not required; acquired. 

Mr. FUGATE. These were units that we had that we moved into 

the area. We are working with the State housing task force. We did 

this preliminarily based upon not so much in the urban area but 

out in Nassau, Suffolk County and places in New Jersey where 

they indicated that may be a solution. Our preference is rental 

property. Quite honestly, Mr. Chairman, if we can put money back 

in the local economy, we would much rather rent than have to do 

the temporary housing. And we have moved towards manufactured 

housing to replace the temporary units that we used previously. 

But again, we are making options available to the State-led task 

force. How many they use we are not sure yet, but we thought it 

29 

was prudent to move them in the area based upon the initial numbers—— 

Mr. MICA. Do we have any—maybe you could supply the committee with, because they had told me the same thing but haven’t 

seen any figures, and wondered what is going to be acquired and, 

again, what the needs will be. We have no assessment complete 

yet? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I don’t at this point, looking at what 

I have seen, I don’t anticipate us acquiring any more additional 

units based upon some of the earlier reports. But again, as we 

work with this housing task force, we are going to find what the 

longer term needs are going to be. And quite honestly, it is going 

to come back to how much of that housing can be built in the timeframes that will be needed. 

Mr. MICA. Just two quick other questions: One, Katrina got so 

bad, we had such a backlog. We had the guy from—this guy was 

in Charity Hospital. And I had that opened up, even though it was 

closed, and we held a hearing in there to try to move that forward. 

I guess you are breaking ground you said this year. But we had 

a huge backlog, thousands I believe it was, of public projects that 

were being debated. We came back and changed the law and instituted arbitration. But staff tells me that was only good for Katrina. 

We don’t have that in the 2903, but I would like your recommendation for arbitration or mediation, particularly on the public side, but I mean, it can also work on the private side because 

sometimes you are held to you know certain requirements and 

things do get sticky, but they need to get more than anything resolved. What do you think? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to think we make the 

best possible decisions we can. But I also recognize, particularly if 

we go to cost estimates, what happens when we cannot agree with 

the applicant on that estimate? What is the appeal process? And 

as the ranking member has oftentimes said, when you are appealing to yourself, the answer is usually going to be the first answer 

you gave. Why would you change your mind if you already told 

them no the first time? So I would look at that, sir, as we are looking at how to best facilitate public assistance, either in a grant 

process or some kind of a cost estimate, is how do we ensure that 

the States and locals are provided ample protection against arbitrary decisions on the Federal side but, on the other end, we don’t 

create an unnecessary administrative process which then adds a 

regulatory burden to the Federal taxpayer. So it has got to be balanced. But I tend to come back to—— 

Mr. MICA. I go back to Mr. Riley’s chart you have got up there. 

He has got the large one up there that everybody can see, and actually produced a brochure. But 7 years of the thing going on and 

on, there has to be some ability for us to move forward in a more 

expedited fashion. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is one advantage that 

Louisiana has on all of those outstanding projects that they have 

not agreed with. They can always go to arbitration. 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, the question would be, we have seen what 

happened in Katrina and we want also our legislation to reflect opVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:47 Nov 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\FULL\12-4-1~1\77210.TXT JEAN
30 

portunities to resolve this so we don’t have these situations occur 

in the future. So I will take your counsel. 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, my recommendation is, you need to 

talk to the Governors and to the local officials. If we go the route 

of an estimate, how do we avoid multiple appeals to that, and how 

would they feel most comfortable that once we do an estimate, we 

are done? Because I think if we continue to come back after that, 

it isn’t an estimate, it is just a project in another name. But if we 

go with a true estimate where we say we have made a decision, we 

are done, I would talk to the States and locals how they want the 

assurances that later on, they have not made a decision that cost 

them unfortunately that they didn’t get what they needed to be rebuilt. 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, we are looking for solutions and also ways 

to expedite this process. We will work with you. Finally, just one 

little thing. We have done a good job in the past getting water, 

some food supplies, things in reserve. And I see now repeated 

again, and this northeast storm was no different, the difficulty with 

getting fuel and power, particularly with a jam up we had of people 

in long lines and everything, it seems like we could contract with 

simple suppliers and maybe have some equipment. I have seen 

where they can even put meters on some of these tankers and get 

them into areas. They prepositioned a lot of the power assistance. 

We prepositioned, and you have done a good job with food and 

some basic supplies, but I think we need some plan for 

prepositioning fuel and power, and we will be glad to work with 

you on that. 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, the inherent danger of trying to replicate what the private sector does every day, just to give you an 

example, on fuel we had contracted with a defense logistic agency 

that was providing emergency fuel to responders as well as to some 

of the public. The total amount which was having to go again oftentimes competing with the same vendors that were doing it locally, 

so we were having to even bring fuel from further away. I don’t 

think we ever got to one-tenth of what the total demand on an average day was in New York. I think part of this is we need to look 

back at critical infrastructure, which is primarily owned by the private sector as an investor-based operation and look at how we can 

ensure resiliency in those systems. For us to replicate that and on 

the scale that would have been required would be staggering. 

Mr. MICA. Again, I don’t advocate replicating it. It somehow 

hasn’t worked. I think we need to find a better mechanism for 

power and then fuel. Power, most of our problems I was told was 

from the public utility, I guess in Long Island, and they dropped 

the ball there. The others were prepositioning, and that went off 

very well. But I meant power to essential fuel generating and also 

fuel providers. And that can be brought in I think faster in the future. So we should look at that. Not getting into the weeds too 

much, and we will have some more discussions on that, let me turn 

to Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have been listening closely, Mr. Fugate, at what you have been 

saying about cost estimation, especially since there are difficulties. 

And you have talked about the appeal process. That seems to be 

31 

the basic difficulty. We got so fed up with money lying on the table 

and the appeals during the Katrina recovery process, that is how 

we came up with the arbitration notion. One thing arbitration, 

where both parties have to agree on the arbitrator, is that is the 

final result. And I am not sure there is any way to get around it. 

As you have said, and as we said here, you can keep appealing to 

yourself and expecting a different answer. 

Now, I understand there was a pilot project, and I am going to 

ask you about that first, that there was a pilot project for cost estimation up to half a million dollars, projects of half a million dollars 

or so. And that while some chose cost estimation, others, which I 

take it would have been expedited, others chose to go with the old 

system. And to expand, part of the difference was that if you used 

cost estimation, you gave them flexibility on straight or overtime; 

whereas, with the present system, you pay for straight time. 

What did that pilot project—how did that pilot project inform 

you? What did it tell you about whether or not cost estimation is 

just a figment of our imagination? Here you have done something 

on the ground that I would respect. What did you learn from the 

pilot project? Because people could choose one or the other. They 

didn’t choose cost estimation. Why they didn’t choose it, I would be 

interested to know. And I would be interested to know whether or 

not choosing cost estimation to get rid of debris—nothing is worse 

than living in such a storm-tattered place and the debris is there 

month after month after month. Did the jurisdictions themselves 

believe that better to have it lie there than to go to cost estimation? 

And if they didn’t use it, why didn’t they figure they should use it? 

Why did they go for the sure thing? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would hesitate to say exactly why. I know some 

of the reasons were this. In the cost estimation, if it is going to be 

working and it is going to be effective, is we come to a number, we 

agree to it and we are done. I think the concern has always been 

we may not know all of the cost at the time the estimate is made. 

And the question was always, well, what if we find out it is going 

to cost more? If we agreed to the estimate, we can’t get any more 

money. If we go through the traditional process, we literally can 

come back multiple times as we see incremental cost increase and 

add those in. 

I think, though, with debris we are gaining more confidence in 

the Corps modeling. And having looked at what the Corps models 

are versus actual debris cost, I think we can come up to a much 

closer number. But it is always the concern that if I am an applicant, I always want to come back and if it cost me more money, 

get more money. Well, that kind of defeats the purpose of doing it 

as a cost estimate. 

I think there is another part of that, though, that does make 

more sense. And this goes back to the charities and these other big 

projects. And that is looking at a design-build phase, where we do 

a design phase where we fund them to come in and take these complex projects, get their cost estimates, get their design, do all of the 

environmental historical review, come in with the architect or the 

professional engineer certifying these are the costs and we agree to 

that. And then the second part of that is, we issue the grant and 

we are done. That would get a lot of these potential unknowns out 

32 

early, it would get a lot of the regulatory issues on the front end, 

so we know what those costs are, and once we have an agreeable 

cost, then we issue the grant. As it is now we do a reimbursement 

process where, again, we don’t give them all the money upfront, it 

is reimbursed, it takes time. We would like to approach that, but 

we think there is some technical issues we have. And counsel may 

be more aware of this, but we are running into issues where actual 

cost versus estimated cost and also, what happens if the project 

comes in under what we authorized, what happens with those dollars if they have a surplus, and do they have any recourse if it 

turns out the project cost them more money? And again, we are 

back to they want to come back and get more funds, which is a 

more traditional project. So we are working this. We think if we 

can get the skill to make sure States and the locals are comfortable 

with these decisions, it is faster for everybody to do this as a block 

grant estimate versus a project that is reimbursed that literally 

can take years in the rebuilding process. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Fugate, have we once and for all gotten rid of 

the process, which perhaps was even worse for us during Katrina, 

where the Government hired somebody to do an estimate, the State 

hired somebody to do an estimate, and we paid for both of these 

estimates and then we are caught betwixt and between these estimates that we have both paid for? I thought we agreed that that 

was not the most cost-effective way to get an estimate; that we 

could agree in the beginning on somebody that we both agree 

should come up with an estimate and then we would go with it. 

Are we using that? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes. Let me give you a specific example. I was up 

at NYU University’s Hospital, which was heavily damaged in the 

flooding. I had my senior public assistance official, Bill Roche, with 

me. We were walking through the basements. Senator Schumer 

had brought us there. Devastation. The facility wanted to know 

what kind of documentation; do we need to get our inspectors down 

there to look at the electrical system that had been damaged by the 

seawater? And Bill said, look, if you will get your engineer to certify the damages, we will accept it, we will not have to come down 

here and look at it. So we are—again, I won’t say it is 100 percent. 

There is probably somebody that didn’t get the email. But if you 

have a licensed engineer, professional engineer, architecture or 

other licensed individual certifying the damages, we will accept 

that and have been using that to make those determinations. 

Ms. NORTON. That is a very important efficiency, and I commend 

you on that. 

I am very interested in this program that apparently is being 

used in New York to allow people to stay in their own homes without power instead of going to temporary housing. I don’t know if 

we have ever done that before. It does seem to me that that is very 

important to do. And does it apply to people that live in apartment 

buildings? Does it apply to other States other than New York? The 

only information I have is New York. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, ma’am. This is something New York has asked. 

We have made it available to other States to have individual assistance. What we are looking at is those people that cannot take 

power, you know this is where the power has come back on, but 

33 

they can’t take power because they had water damage; we are providing funds to do more than just—if you are familiar with the blue 

roofs, where we do temporary roof repairs trying to get people back 

in their homes, we have extended this to look at what things can 

we do just to get the power turned back on so people could stay 

in their homes and not put a demand for other housing assistance 

at a much greater cost to the taxpayer. It didn’t mean we are doing 

all the repairs, but we are doing just enough to get the power back 

on. In some cases, because of the way their homes are built with 

basements, we are having to look at also water heaters and boilers. 

But we are just doing enough so they can get back in their home. 

They are still going to have to take care of permanent repair costs 

and are going to probably still need help from HUD and other programs or volunteer agencies like Red Cross. But this at least gets 

it back where the power company can hook them back up and they 

can stay in their home while they make repairs versus leaving 

their home, their community and going to a temporary housing 

source. 

Ms. NORTON. And does it apply to people who live in apartment 

houses? 

Mr. FUGATE. To be honest with you, I don’t think so, because in 

those cases we are dealing with an occupant where we either are 

working with the housing authority, which HUD is working very 

closely with those on bringing in boilers and other things to get 

power back up. So this is mainly directed at attached or single family, not so much the large apartment buildings. But HUD has been 

working with both those of the housing authority and those that 

provide low-income housing and are providing assistance as we are 

supporting them in the Corps in getting their critical life support 

up, not only power but also boiler operations so they have heat. 

Ms. NORTON. And perhaps this wouldn’t work in New Jersey, 

where so much of the housing was wiped out, but is there any reason why this stay-in-place approach could not be used in New Jersey or some of the other States that were devastated by Sandy? 

Mr. FUGATE. No ma’am, it can be used. In fact, we are working 

with the State of New Jersey’s State-led housing task force. This 

is one of the tools that we are giving them as they look at what 

those needs are and how to best meet their needs. 

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you, HUD and FEMA have always 

worked when there has been a major storm. How would you describe the major difference now between this new relationship with 

HUD, with HUD as apparently the lead coordinating agency and 

yet FEMA, and you can see that we are talking to you first and 

foremost here this morning, still in charge of much of what the 

public expects. What is the difference between what you are doing 

now and what you were doing for example in Katrina? 

Mr. FUGATE. I think, in Katrina, the problem was there was not 

a concerted effort to address what the housing needs would be. And 

as Fred pointed out, in some of the programs he ran, the Federal 

Government never really anticipated that kind of rebuilding efforts, 

and initially, everybody turned to FEMA. FEMA doesn’t do a lot of 

the permanent work, nor do we deal with the preexisting conditions. So it is a natural fit of existing programs and authorities 

that take what we can do in the short run and match it up with 

34 

what HUD is best at, which is providing longer term affordable 

housing solutions. 

And we are going to go far beyond housing. As was pointed out 

by several members, we have transportation issues that go far beyond merely repair work. We have Corps of Engineer beaches that 

are authorized. But again, as the damages mount funding those 

programs. So as we looked at this it became clear that we are dealing with not only State issues; we are going to have regional issues 

that go beyond the States. And so having a cabinet level member 

leading the non-Stafford Act programs and funds and plugging in 

so that, as we go forward with our short-term programs, there is 

an end where there is housing available. What we don’t want to get 

into is what we saw in Katrina. We do a lot of short-term events 

and 5 years later people are still living in a trailer because there 

is no housing solution at the other end. And again, this goes far 

beyond what FEMA does; it goes far beyond the Stafford Act. The 

Stafford Act is a key part of this initial fix or repair, but it does 

not get to the preexisting conditions; it does not get into things 

that FEMA has historically not done well that other programs are 

much more successful in doing with their authorities; and it doesn’t 

get to some of the regional challenges that we have in that dense 

populated the area. 

Ms. NORTON. So HUD will be dealing exclusively with preexisting conditions, what is to be rebuilt and not FEMA? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would let Fred speak to it, but I think the term 

is rebuilding and looking at how do we work long-term housing solutions, particularly given the density of some of the housing authorities as well as other parts of the communities that were devastated? 

Ms. NORTON. I have one more question. When we did the PostKatrina Act, in fact after 9/11, when FEMA was made a part of the 

Department of Homeland Security, we were focused mainly on terrorism. Now what we have learned as a result of the droughts, as 

a result of Sandy, as a result of Katrina, is that, I don’t know, we 

may not have another 9/11; we certainly have done a lot to prepare 

in case we are faced with another tragedy of that size. 

But we almost surely are finding ourselves each and every year 

with a major unprecedented set of storms—not just storms. I don’t 

even know what is happening on the west coast, but that looks like 

something other than their usual rainfall. 

Has being in the Department of Homeland Security been of any 

material advantage to FEMA, as opposed to when FEMA was not 

a part of the Department of Homeland Security? And as a State official, you have participated in the before-and-after of this question. 

Mr. FUGATE. The short answer is yes, because of the availability 

of the other resources. 

I will give you an example. One of the things that we have 

launched that I didn’t put in my comments, in my testimony—it is 

a fact that FEMA has a finite workforce. And even with our reservists and the ability to call people up, it takes time to get people into 

a disaster area. We were able to leverage Department of Homeland 

Security and send over 1,200 Homeland Security folks from various 

components of the Department into New Jersey and New York to 

35 

do the initial response support. That would not have readily been 

available without that. 

So I would continue to support that our role within Homeland 

Security, as you have directed in that act, as the principal advisor 

to the Secretary and the President as well as Congress on emergency management, thrives in this environment. And it is the additional resources we can tap in to as part of the Department that 

enables us, in some cases, to actually augment our FEMA resources. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Fugate. And, 

again, thank you for your work on Sandy, in particular. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Other Members? 

Mr. Harris? 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Fugate, thank you for appearing before the committee today. 

I was informed yesterday that Maryland’s request for individual 

assistance had been denied. Given that some of the counties in my 

district are some of the poorest counties in Maryland and these individuals really are going to have difficulty rebuilding, can you explain what specific qualifications were lacking in our request as 

compared to other States that were successful? 

Mr. FUGATE. The number of destroyed uninsured losses was not 

very high. The number of affected would suggest that it was within 

the capabilities of the State of Maryland. 

The trouble with trying to do this is it never addresses the individual trauma of the destruction; it is always based upon the impacts to the State as a whole. And we look at the availability of 

other programs, such as Small Business Administration disaster 

loans, and, again, the State’s ability to redirect community block 

development grant dollars to address some of these issues. 

So it is not based upon the trauma to the individual. You know, 

our hearts go out to them. It is based upon the impacts to the State 

as a whole. And we looked at that and made a determination and 

recommendation that the President concurred with that at this 

point the information does not support a major Presidential disaster declaration. 

And it is not uncommon that in a same storm system States sideby-side may find different outcomes for individual assistance, 

whether it is tornadoes, floods, or storms. But it is always based 

upon our best estimate of the information the State provides 

against the available programs that may be there. 

Yesterday I spoke to Gail McGovern, president of the American 

Red Cross. The American public has been very generous to the Red 

Cross. And that continued support allows them to support not only 

those that are in the areas that have been declared by the President but also in those areas that have not been declared. And I 

brought to her attention, again, the State of Maryland, that there 

are individuals there and communities that still need help. And 

even though it did not warrant a Presidential disaster declaration, 

it should never take away from the fact that people did have damages and losses due to the storm. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. 

36 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Major General Walsh, I want to follow up with you on the Sea 

Gate protection project in Coney Island, New York. As you know, 

the Sea Gate community has been vulnerable to storm damage for 

decades because of an error in the previous Army Corps project in 

Coney Island. The Sea Gate correction was finally slated to begin 

construction this fall. It has been fully funded by Congress, fully 

appropriated, and the local match secured. I know you are familiar 

with the project, as we discussed it in person earlier this year before the storm hit. 

Now that the area has been devastated by Sandy, it is more important than ever that the project be completed as originally intended and funded. I raised this with the Corps and with Secretary 

Napolitano during a tour of Sea Gate storm damage, and everyone 

said they would find a way to get it done. 

I assume the Corps will move forward quickly, but we haven’t received confirmation of how the Corps intends to proceed. Can you 

confirm now that, in fact, the Corps will move forward quickly with 

the Sea Gate protection project as originally intended and funded 

by Congress? 

General WALSH. Sir, as you know, there is an authority problem 

with the funding. So we are going to move ahead with the project 

at a lesser funding requirement. So we will be looking at the—— 

Mr. NADLER. So that is a ‘‘no’’ to the full funding that was appropriated by Congress. 

General WALSH. We will work with the authority that we have, 

and the project will move forward. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, of course our contention was that, considering 

the President’s instructions to cut through redtape and find a way 

to say ‘‘yes,’’ and considering the more than considerable legal ambiguity, that I can’t imagine anyone wants to tell the community 

they should remain vulnerable, given what just happened there, 

and that given that Congress has appropriated all the funds necessary to do the project. But I gather from your reply that we are 

going to have further rather difficult conversations. 

Mr. Fugate—— 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Nadler, just a second. 

If you wanted to quickly—did you want to respond to his comment? 

What we had asked was that we try to get any questions for Mr. 

Fugate first. 

Mr. NADLER. That is why I am going to him now. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, that is the Major General. But if you go to 

him next. And other Members, please. Because I promised Mr. 

Fugate we would get him out as soon as possible. 

Mr. NADLER. I just said—— 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. NADLER. Administrator Fugate, I recently wrote to you and 

to the EPA about environmental contamination from mold and 

other hazardous substances inside buildings following Sandy. 

37 

Although FEMA will reimburse some homeowners for hiring an 

environmental contractor, in some places it is not that easy. In 

public buildings, such as public housing, it is more incumbent on 

public agencies to properly remediate. And in highrises, including 

private highrises, or densely populated buildings that you find in 

New York City, residents share walls, HVAC systems, and common 

areas, so that cleanup has to be done in a coordinated manner. If 

one resident cleans up his apartment but gets recontaminated 

through the HVAC system, it is not terribly helpful. 

Will FEMA support tasking EPA with overseeing comprehensive 

testing and cleanup of contaminated buildings and develop a plan 

that ensures that people’s homes and workplaces are safe to inhabit? 

Mr. FUGATE. We will take that message back to our partners at 

EPA. 

The other thing, Congressman, is those public buildings and public spaces that they need to do those inspections, that is eligible 

work for reimbursement of FEMA. 

But this is also something that Secretary Donovan is looking at. 

As you point out, in some of the privately owned apartment buildings, it is not clear what programs may be available. So we are 

looking at what additional programs and authorities may be needed outside of those that it is clear where FEMA can support activities, particularly in those that are privately owned buildings. 

Mr. NADLER. I appreciate that. So you—and I appreciate what 

you are saying, and I thank you for that. 

So I gather that you are saying there is a problem now, and especially in apartment buildings which are privately owned, where 

you can’t simply isolate each apartment, you can’t isolate each residence. 

Mr. FUGATE. Obviously, there are going to be some challenges 

there. We are not sure exactly, particularly in those that are private, not public, how that would best go. A lot of this is going to 

come back to State and local health codes, those inspections, EPA 

providing technical guidance. 

But we will work with the State. We know this is an issue. It 

is something that we have dealt with before. But I think because 

of the number of buildings and densities and past history here, 

there is going to be required additional scrutiny as we look at what 

will be necessary to ensure air quality standards in these homes 

and businesses. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me go now to Ms. Schmidt. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Chairman Mica. 

I have a couple of questions for Mr. Fugate. Number one is I noticed in the testimony from Mr. Robert Latham that he talked 

about the duplicative environmental and historical preservation reviews, in that in each and every case, whenever you are dealing 

with an agency, each and every individual has to reinvent the 

wheel on those very time-consuming reports. 

And it seems to me that FEMA could have a box, that once somebody has done all of that assessment, that it can be passed down 

38 

to everyone else in the chain that also has to go through FEMA or 

another governmental agency for money; that, in other words, just 

one process for those reviews that can be used for everybody, instead of everybody reinventing the wheel. 

And couldn’t FEMA be the one to lead that charge? 

Mr. FUGATE. Certainly something we have been working on. Part 

of it comes back to, though, is how our authorizers have given us 

authorities. Both the Corps, us, EPA, we all have responsibilities 

in doing these reviews. But since they all come from the same 

original Federal legislation, we are working on how we can reduce 

and share those findings. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Well, that doesn’t make sense to me. If you are 

all trying to work together, why didn’t you come up with a master 

plan? Or does it need legislation to say there is going to be one review when you all can look at it? 

Mr. FUGATE. Where we can, we have. And we will take this back 

to work on. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Mr. Latham, you are the one that brought this up 

in your report. Do you want to respond to that? 

Mr. LATHAM. I think part of the problem has been when there 

are multiple funding sources and who the lead agency is for that 

particular project in the rebuilding process. And when there are 

multiple funding sources or multiple Federal agencies involved in 

that project, then we have to go through those multiple reviews. 

And I think what Craig is saying is that, you know, I think that 

there are some statutes, probably, that require the Federal agencies to do that. 

You know, I think what I am saying is, when we have those rebuilding projects that have multiple funding sources, Federal agencies oversight, there has to be a single historic preservation review 

process because multiple reviews extend the project tremendously. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Well, let me ask you, how do you think we can 

fix that? Should it be done by legislation, or should it be done by 

a mutual agreement? 

Mr. LATHAM. You know, I don’t dare to understand all the Federal regulations, but, you know, from someone that has worked at 

the State and local level, you know, the fact that there is a declaration, number one, ought to trump just about everything. So when 

those funding sources contribute to the rebuilding of the project as 

a result of a disaster, then maybe—I am not sure; I certainly 

wouldn’t dare speak for Craig—then maybe FEMA does take the 

lead. 

But, you know, I do agree that until we expedite those reviews 

and try to get them down to one review, that it is going to continue 

to drag out the rebuilding process. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. 

Mr. Fugate, the second question is, in my district, back in March 

we had a tornado that hit and devastated a very small community. 

And our Governor really didn’t want to go to the Federal Government for help because he said that he felt if we looked at it from 

a State perspective we could get it done quicker and cheaper and 

that there was a time gap between presenting the bill to the Government and getting reimbursement. 

39 

And I forget whose testimony I read today that talked about the 

time gap between getting reimbursed and how it really is costly to 

local communities. Is there any way to resolve that? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, I would think the first response would be to 

the Governor’s request. It is not only just timely; it is also, was it 

within their capabilities? I would assume that if it had not been 

within the capabilities of the State or they exceeded their per capita threshold for public assistance, they would have asked. 

What they may have been referring to has been a previous issue 

with Small Business Administration where, if you are appealing individual assistance, Small Business Administration historically had 

not moved forward with their authorities to issue a declaration. 

They have changed that and will do that separately. 

But as far as the reimbursement process, both Louisiana and 

Mississippi saw what we tried to do in the storm earlier this year. 

One of the things that is most immediate for them is the cost of 

the debris removal and their protective measures. Historically, we 

had always waited for the final bills. This kind of comes back to 

the estimations. We have been working and using estimates to forward initial funds for both debris and protective measures, those 

first dollars that go out the door, oftentimes within the first 30 

days or less of the disaster. We are using estimates; we are not 

waiting for final numbers. And we are working to get money back 

in that is expended on the front end before we get to the permanent work. 

We are doing that in Sandy, working particularly with New York 

and New Jersey, where a lot of their smaller communities have expended literally millions of dollars, and have started a process of 

getting those initial reimbursements done based upon estimates. 

We are not waiting for the final bill. 

So we have been pushing to get cash back into the communities 

faster based upon those that they have expended when a declaration does occur. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Additional questions for Mr. Fugate? 

Mr. Bishop? 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one question 

for Mr. Fugate. 

I want to talk to you a little bit about the hazard mitigation 

piece of FEMA reimbursement. As I understand it, it is 15 percent 

of the first $2 billion of public assistance that goes to a State and 

then 10 percent of between $2 billion and $10 billion. 

So my question is, is that cap not too limiting? 

It seems to me that, given what we are going to be dealing with 

in New York, we have two problems. One, even though there is 

going to be a fair amount of public assistance money that will flow 

to the State, 15 percent of that, or 10 percent of that, will fall short 

of the kinds of preventive measures that we could take statewide. 

And then more specifically, it is going to set up a competition between, let us say, New York City, which has enormous needs, and 

counties such as the one I represent, Suffolk County, which has 

significant needs, nowhere near as significant as New York City, 

but we have our own needs with limited capacity to address them. 

40 

So the question is, wouldn’t we be wise to either adjust that cap 

upward or eliminate that cap so that we could be putting into place 

preventive measures that will save us money down the road and 

will also save our citizens a great deal of consternation and dislocation? 

Mr. FUGATE. I will defer to Congress on raising the caps, sir. But 

I would also think we need to recognize that the FEMA mitigation 

programs are not well designed for some of the things that may be 

required. 

I will give the example of Louisiana, where a decision was made 

to build the protective levee structures. It was going to be primarily 

a Corps project. It was fully funded through the Corps. And it was 

a project that they expedited and got done rather quickly given the 

history of building that type of protection system. 

So I would not assume that merely increasing the FEMA dollars, 

which would go to the Governor and would then have to be determined by the State, the priorities—there may be other things to 

look at more holistically that would go beyond those FEMA mitigation dollars, particularly with some of the coastal communities—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, if I may, I am going to have the same question 

for General Walsh with respect to repairs that are pursuant to 

Public Law 84–99 with restoration to, in effect, pre-storm conditions as opposed to design standards. It is basically the same issue, 

which is, ought we be restoring in a way that would prevent future 

disasters or at least mitigate them, as opposed to just getting to 

pre-storm conditions or just spending up to a certain cap? 

Mr. FUGATE. And, Congressman Bishop, you are going to have a 

lot of folks in your communities already wanting to elevate their 

structures because they saw where elevated homes went through 

the storm with very little damage and it was a very successful mitigation. 

Knowing that there is finite FEMA dollars, again, this is why we 

were looking at other Federal programs that have been used previously to support those activities, but also taking a look at some 

of the regional needs that are going to be critical infrastructure 

protections. 

And so whether or not Congress chooses that, I think the administration is actually looking bigger than what FEMA’s mitigation 

programs do and looking at some of the challenges and what would 

be the best funding mechanism for some of the larger mitigation 

projects that may be required. 

Mr. BISHOP. OK. Thank you very much. 

And I want to thank you again. Your people on the ground, at 

least in my county, have been phenomenal. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. LoBiondo wanted a 30-second personal privilege here. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Major General, I just wanted to tell you what an extraordinary 

team you have in Philadelphia. Not just with this storm but over 

the years they have done just an exceptional job. Dedication above 

and beyond the call of duty. Finding ways to work with us, with 

all the coastal communities. And the outstanding work they have 

41 

done has resulted in an enormous amount of money being saved 

from damage and I think from hurting people or loss of life. 

So I just wanted to make sure I publicly thanked you and congratulated and thanked them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo. 

General WALSH. Thank you, sir. I will pass that information 

down. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. Sires? 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fugate, what can I bring back to these people in the city of 

Hoboken that live in basements, that have lost everything, that 

this is their primary home where they have lost all their belongings? Is there any place that they can tap into where there is an 

assistance for these people? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the most immediate assistance, if they are uninsured, is the FEMA individual assistance program, the 1–800– 

621–FEMA, or they can register online at disasterassistance.gov. 

And we have set up and we have disaster recovery centers there. 

So if they have registered and they are still working through that, 

we are providing both short-term assistance as well as longer term 

housing. 

But I think you have to understand that, what are we going to 

do if we can’t fix those basements? Where are they going to live? 

And I think that is why we are working very closely with HUD and 

why the President asked Secretary Donovan to take this lead. Because I think we can do some stuff in the short run, but if those 

basements—again, they are going to flood the next storm. Does it 

make sense always to go back where they were or to look at things 

differently? 

And I think this goes back with Congressman Bishop and others. 

There is a sense among the communities there that they don’t just 

want to repair what was there. They want to really look at, how 

do we minimize people at risk next time? And because those basements oftentimes were affordable housing units, they are not as 

easy to replace because people didn’t own them. It was a good place 

to rent. They were able to work and live in their communities. And 

that is gone. And it may not be repairable. And if it can be repaired, great. But how long is that going to take? But if we cannot 

repair all of that, where are people going to be able to live so they 

stay in their community, where their jobs are, where their schools 

are, where their kids go to school? 

And I think that is why the President recognized we are going 

to look far beyond Stafford Act programs. Because some of these 

issues will not be something that will get addressed immediately. 

We can deal with some of the immediate needs. But longer term, 

if we can’t prepare all repair all those basements, or in the next 

storm, would it make sense to have people live somewhere else or 

have moreaffordable housing solutions so they weren’t vulnerable 

next time it floods? 

Mr. SIRES. Now, is that going to be a coordinated program with 

HUD? 

42 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. And that is again why the President has 

asked Secretary Donovan to take that lead, because, again, much 

of what is going to be needed longer term are not programs that 

FEMA has. They are really the programs that HUD and other Federal agencies have. And that is why we have looked at this from 

the standpoint of the recovery framework. Much of this is going to 

go far beyond what the Stafford Act programs were intended to do 

by Congress. 

Mr. SIRES. And according to the mayor, she told me she has over 

a thousand families that were impacted by this. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yep. 

Mr. SIRES. The other question that I had is regarding fuel. And 

one of the problems that we had was getting the fuel to these 

places. And then once we got into these places, they couldn’t hook 

up. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yep. 

Mr. SIRES. And, you know, like the Governor said, it was not an 

issue that we didn’t have the fuel. It was an issue of—how do you 

deal with that? How do you—— 

Mr. FUGATE. Here is a recommendation from States that have 

been through it, since this is something that State legislatures are 

much better at doing. 

Mr. SIRES. I actually talked to them also. 

Mr. FUGATE. Many of the States that have dealt with this have 

come back with requirements to look at pre-wiring, not necessarily 

putting a generator in, but pre-wiring gas stations. Part of the 

challenges with underground wiring, it is not easy to get a generator hooked up. And so, doing some things ahead of time, where 

it does involve the private sector. It is going to be their money, but 

it is also their customers. Looking at pre-wiring stations and identifying key stations and key areas that have capacity, that the 

State would want to make sure that if the power went out and we 

got a generator, there they could service that community. 

But these are really things that I think we will be working with 

our State partners, as much of this, I think, is going to be the State 

legislature looking at lessons from other Governors, how to best address those distribution issues. 

Mr. SIRES. I also think you should look at food stores to do the 

same thing. Because the other issue was, you know, obviously, all 

the food that went bad, you know, in all that area. 

Mr. FUGATE. If history tells me anything, there will be a lot of 

retailers, particularly the food service industry, pharmacies, gas 

stations, that will be looking at either pre-wiring, transfer switch, 

or installing generators. We have seen this repeatedly after major 

hurricanes across the South, where it becomes a business decision 

that it is much better to have that generator versus deal with the 

losses and disruptions that occur when power goes out for not just 

days, in many cases, but weeks. 

Mr. SIRES. And, again, thank you for the work that your people 

do. 

Mr. MICA. I thank you. 

And if we don’t have any further questions for Administrator 

Fugate, we will excuse you at this time. Thank you for your participation. 

43 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, appreciate it. We expect that you 

will have further questions, and we will be responsive as the committee looks at additional information. 

Mr. MICA. And working with the other side of the aisle, we will 

leave the record open for a period of 2 weeks. And we may give all 

the witnesses additional questions, and appreciate their response. 

But we will excuse you now, and then we will go to questions for 

the other panelists. 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

First, we have pending a question from Mr. Bishop from New 

York. 

Mr. Bishop, you are recognized. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want 

to thank you for holding this hearing. 

I just have one question for General Walsh, and you know what 

I am heading toward. It is the same sort of issue as the hazard 

mitigation cap. 

My understanding of existing law, Public Law 84–99, it limits repairs to pre-storm conditions as opposed to design specification. 

And as our Governor has said, we seem to be having a 100-year 

storm every 2 years. And so, it begs the question, shouldn’t we be 

repairing to design specification as opposed to pre-storm condition? 

And I will just give you a very specific example in my district 

that I do not expect you to be familiar with, but there is a section 

of our shoreline called Tiana Beach. Tiana Beach is enormously 

subject to a breach. It was very badly eroded during the most recent storm. There is an effort in place between the Corps and the 

State of New York to put some sand on the beach at Tiana. But 

to restore it to its pre-storm condition continues to leave it very 

vulnerable to a breach. 

And so it just seems logical that we should be making a greater 

effort there so as to hopefully create something that withstands 

storms, such as we did in West Hampton Dunes, which, as I said 

in my opening statement, held up remarkably well compared to, 

you know, beach on either side of West Hampton Dunes. 

So there is my question. How does the Corps feel about this? I 

know it is the prerogative of Congress, but what would be the 

Corps reaction to lifting that restriction and being able to repair it 

or restore it to design specification? 

General WALSH. Sir, the Public Law 84–99 is an emergency authority to bring systems back to pre-storm condition. It is not a 

construction authority—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Right. 

General WALSH [continuing]. Or funding. And that is where the 

difference is. 

And I believe the answer to your question is there are a lot of 

construction requirements that are here on the coasts and in other 

areas that would go through a prioritization process in regards to 

bringing things to full design. Again, the 84–99 is an emergency 

authority. 

Mr. BISHOP. If I may, though, but aren’t we then, in effect, 

throwing good money after bad? I mean, it seems to me that, again, 

this is an issue we are going to have to confront given the freVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:47 Nov 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\FULL\12-4-1~1\77210.TXT JEAN
44 

quency of such devastating storms. So I understand the distinction 

between emergency repair and construction, but I, at least, am 

going to push for a lifting of that restriction and push for design 

specification as opposed to pre-storm condition. 

General WALSH. Yes, sir. And I would agree that those communities that live behind an engineered beach probably fared better 

than those that did not. 

Mr. BISHOP. OK. Thank you, General. Appreciate it. 

Mr. MICA. Other Members with questions? 

Mr. Sires? 

Mr. SIRES. Yes, I have two questions. 

One, General, every spring I seem to get an awful lot of calls 

from people for debris on the river. Obviously, after the storm there 

is a going to be a lot of debris in the Hudson River. Are you making 

plans to pick up some of that debris, some of the piers that were 

destroyed and are floating around? 

And I know you have done a great job picking up debris up till 

now, but this is a constant problem on the Hudson River, as you 

know. So I was just wondering, you know, are you gearing up for 

this? 

General WALSH. Yes, sir. We have three debris vessels that are 

working on the Hudson and in the port. 

Mr. SIRES. Great. 

And, Mr. Popoff, you mentioned that you had a plan for fuel delivery that you came up with since you get so many hurricanes. Is 

that what I heard? 

Mr. POPOFF. Yes, sir. It was actually the State of Texas which 

came up with the plan. 

Mr. SIRES. And what does it consist of? 

Mr. POPOFF. It was developed by creating a partnership of the 

fuel vendors, the fuel distributors, and then taking the critical fuel 

locations—the locations along the evacuation routes, the interstate 

highways—the gas stations, making sure that they are full of fuel. 

And through their local emergency management partners, making 

sure that those facilities had emergency generation power for both 

evacuating and then reentry, including emergency responders. 

Mr. SIRES. So they do have generators. You require them to have 

the generator? 

Mr. POPOFF. No, sir. There is no State law or legislation that requires a private business to have a generator. But most of the retailers, as Director Fugate said, most of the retailers have realized 

it is just good business practice to install emergency generators. 

In my county, I actually have a service station on an evacuation 

route that has two emergency generators, and they did that as an 

initiative on their own. They weren’t compelled to do it. They just 

realized it was good business practice. 

Mr. SIRES. Do you know if food stores have the same approach? 

Are you aware of any? 

Mr. POPOFF. Well, I am not too sure on food, sir. I can tell you 

the one instance in Galveston County, that particular store is a 

food store, but they have a large distribution of gasoline that they 

do there. 

Mr. SIRES. All right. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

45 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Ms. Norton, additional questions? 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do. 

We have seen a shoreline devastated that I cannot believe—and 

I suppose this is for Mr. Walsh—but I cannot believe that, even in 

the 100-year exercise that we have just gone through, that kind of 

devastating loss along the northeast shoreline was anticipated. 

Now, we have had a lot of talk about what happened and rebuilding, but rebuilding here is going to be very different from rebuilding in the Katrina-affected areas. To be sure, there were—for 

example, in Mississippi there were some business interests. Gambling along the shore, that was wiped out. I think they even went 

back and built. But it is hard to imagine talking about the shoreline of New Jersey, for example, and New York, that we aren’t talking about millions of people who lived on or close to the shoreline 

or had second homes there. And I am not sure that any of our 

thinking about natural disasters has been left intact. 

Let me just read a section of what the National Weather Service 

provided to me, speaking about this area, where the Nation’s Capital and many of its resources are located. ‘‘It is not out of the question’’—and here I am quoting—‘‘under the right set of circumstances’’—that is what you had in Sandy—‘‘a strong hurricane, 

Category 3 or higher, making landfall south of Washington and 

tracking to the northwest, a stronger storm could collide with a 

southern mid-Atlantic and generate a higher storm surge than Isabel for a Sandy-like storm displaced to the south. The reality of 

such a possibility, along with the slowly creeping sea-level rise 

from climate warming, should serve as a compelling call to action 

for local infrastructure planners.’’ 

Well, General Walsh, you are going to be in the midst of that, 

and so will you, Mr. Tombar. 

As the Corps helps to clear the debris and will almost surely be 

called upon to help build at least some of the public resources, 

what is the best way to protect the shoreline of New York and New 

Jersey, for example, so that we are not faced with such a disaster 

in the future? 

General WALSH. Thank you for that question, Congresswoman. 

The best approach that we have seen in a number of different 

areas is to look at things from a systems perspective. Trying to put 

a structural fix on one side of a city or a State and not on the other 

could have competing impacts. So what we advocate is looking at 

things from a systems approach. 

The other thing that we look at—— 

Ms. NORTON. I don’t understand what that means. Here we have 

the shoreline busted. We had apartment buildings, we had singlefamily homes, we had multifamily homes along there. I don’t know 

what a systems approach means. 

So please give me the common language in describing, if you are 

the Corps of Engineers, the Governor of New Jersey, the Governor 

of New York, are you going to rebuild there? What are you going 

to do to protect in the places that were devastated? What would the 

Corps recommend, what would HUD recommend to respect the 

shorelines of this part of our country? 

46 

General WALSH. Yes. There are a number of projects along the 

coast. Many of them have their own authorities, and some of them 

have their own construction funding. What we try to do is we work 

through those designs to make sure that when we put a structure, 

a sea wall, or we put a beach renourishment project in one area, 

that it doesn’t have negative impacts on another area. 

So we are looking at it from a systems approach to make sure 

that when we do a beach renourishment project that it is wide 

enough and long enough that it is not having negative impacts in 

another area. 

Ms. NORTON. Are there island barriers of the kind that were in 

Louisiana that didn’t prove as useful because we hadn’t kept 

them—we hadn’t grown them? Are there barriers, natural barriers, 

that could be useful or could be planted in the Atlantic close to 

these two States? 

General WALSH. Yes, there are barrier islands across from each 

of the two States. And we need to be looking at them from both 

a structural and nonstructural solutions to solving the storm surge. 

Ms. NORTON. ‘‘Structural and nonstructural’’ meaning what? 

General WALSH. Structural means a beach renourishment 

project. A nonstructural is that people perhaps would move away 

from the risky areas. 

Ms. NORTON. Are we sure that there will be no rebuilding, Mr. 

Tombar, in the affected areas until some barriers are constructed 

that would go far toward making a similar disaster not impossible? 

Mr. TOMBAR. Unfortunately, ma’am, no. What typically happens 

is that you have individual homeowners or building property owners who will move quickly to try to restore that which was damaged. And it will often outpace decisions that—some of these tough 

decisions that local political leaders and State political leaders have 

to make about mitigation. And so—— 

Ms. NORTON. Isn’t there something we can do about that? I 

mean, I can understand that people who have lived in an area all 

their lives, they can’t possibly imagine not living there. But the 

Government is having to reimburse them, at least in part, for the 

damage they have accrued. 

Isn’t there something that the Government can do to make sure 

that they don’t get ahead of the Government and thereby perhaps 

incur additional costs to the Government at a later date? 

Mr. TOMBAR. Yes, certainly. We have, as Administrator Fugate 

mentioned, been working with the State-led housing task forces in 

all the affected States to begin to identify some of the tough decisions that need to be made and suggest to the local leaders, as well 

as the State leaders, some of the things that have been done in the 

past that we have seen that have proven effective in mitigating 

against subsequent disasters. 

For example, a recent storm, Hurricane Isaac, impacted areas 

that were impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Ike and Gustav 

prior to that, but because of the mitigation measures taken by individual homeowners at the direction of the State and local leaders, 

many of those homes that did, in fact, mitigate against future disaster by elevating were left, as we say, high and dry, without any 

impacts from Hurricane Isaac. 

47 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah, and that was not the case here because we 

had never experienced that kind of storm here. So what I am really 

asking is, could the Governors of New Jersey and New York use 

their governmental authority, their—yes, their authority to forbid 

rebuilding until an assessment was made as to the safety? Or is 

there nothing in place to keep people from going ahead and saying, 

To hell with it, I am putting up my house since there is nothing 

here to keep me from doing it? 

Would you recommend to the Governors of the affected States 

that they take some kind of action to at least delay the immediate 

rebuilding of homes in the devastated area? 

Mr. TOMBAR. Yes, ma’am. I am not quite certain what the authorities are for the individual Governors, but I can tell you that 

we have already been in discussions with them and their staffs 

about the fact that some of these hard decisions that are important 

for the long-term viability of these areas and to guard against repetitive loss in future storms like this need to be made as expeditiously as possible. But we have—— 

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would, within 30 days, get information 

to the chairman about what action HUD and FEMA have together 

taken, perhaps, to ask the authorities in these two States in particular whether something can be done to keep the rush to rebuild 

from occurring. 

Mr. TOMBAR. Certainly. 

I will say that what we are talking about here, essentially, are 

decisions around building codes. And those are things are not even 

controlled by a Governor’s office. Typically, they are very locally 

driven decisions that rest with a mayor or county executive. And 

so, trying to drive some consistency and consensus around those 

decisions is that much more difficult because of the several layers 

of Government and authority that need to be acknowledged in this 

process. 

Ms. NORTON. To be sure. I am still not convinced that Governors 

don’t have authority, perhaps with their legislators, to keep from 

smacking us in the face with more liability because nobody could 

figure out who to turn to. 

Could I ask about Mississippi? Excuse me, one of our witnesses, 

or maybe it was the Corps, can tell me about the decision of the 

gambling interests to rebuild. Did they not rebuild precisely where 

they were before? 

Mr. LATHAM. Ms. Norton, I would like to answer that for Mississippi because, prior to Katrina, the gambling industry and the 

permitting for that required them to build on the water, to limit 

expansion. The legislature and the Governor moved quickly after 

Katrina to allow them to move inland. 

So the casinos have rebuilt, yes, but to a different standard that 

would minimize future impacts of storms. So I think that that part 

of our economic development side is much more resilient now than 

it was pre-Katrina. 

Ms. NORTON. So they are not on the water but they are on land 

close to the water, and you think they are essentially protected. 

Mr. LATHAM. Yes. And most of them have moved all of the critical components of the casino. They all require hotels, but they are 

pretty much elevated so that the ground floors are built to blow out 

48 

or are maybe parking areas so that the cost of recovery and rebuilding and the time required to get back up and going is minimized. 

Ms. NORTON. One more question. It is really for Mr. Walsh. 

We have just gone through this 100-year exercise. And anyone 

who went through it, great hardship, because people didn’t want to 

buy flood insurance. And it is the outcome, really, of Katrina that 

made FEMA, in fact, take us all through another 100-year exercise. 

And that really meant, you know, every 100 years, I mean, roughly 

speaking, you could get a Katrina-like, or here it would be a Sandylike event, except that I don’t think anybody contemplated even in 

100 years a Sandy-like event. 

Is the 100-year storm notion, has it been made obsolete by recent 

storms in the last, let us say, 3 or 4 years? 

General WALSH. Congresswoman, the word ‘‘100-year’’ storm is 

actually a misnomer. It is a 1-percent chance of that event happening, and so it is 1 percent every year. And some people have 

used that 1 percent a year to say the event wouldn’t happen in 100 

years. But that is a misnomer. You have a 1-percent chance of—— 

Ms. NORTON. That is a good point. So is the 1-percent notion obsolete, or do we need to be rethinking even that? Does this fit? Did 

what happened to New York and New Jersey fit the 1-percent notion? 

General WALSH. I believe it is a 1-percent storm, but I would 

have to go back and look at the storm surge. 

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would get that information to the chairman, too, because maybe that is what 1 percent means. Makes a 

lot of sense to me. 

Final question for Mr. Tombar, and that is about exactly what 

resources that FEMA could not use, as I understand HUD to have 

a much broader array of resources and greater flexibility. And what 

is the value added of HUD being the coordinator, bringing to the 

table flexibility and resources that would not otherwise easily be 

available to FEMA? We discussed one of them with, of course, Mr. 

Fugate, but go right ahead. 

Mr. TOMBAR. Certainly. There are a few things I would say in 

that regard. 

One is, personally for Secretary Donovan, he is a native of the 

affected area, and his previous role was actually as housing commissioner for the city of New York. And so he has relationships because he worked directly with Mayor Bloomberg and—— 

Ms. NORTON. Is that the chief reason that HUD was made the 

lead coordinator? 

Mr. TOMBAR. It certainly has had some bearing on that decision. 

He worked for Governor Cuomo, as well, in the previous administration and led one of the large financial institutions that was 

based in New Jersey. So he has deep connections to the area and 

has been using those to great effect already to lead to some coordination around the Federal role in working with the State and local 

governments. 

Beyond that, there is, as pointed out by Administrator Fugate, 

in HUD’s programs great flexibility. In particular, I will call out 

the Community Development Block Grant program that has in this 

disaster already been used in places like Maryland, where an indiVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:47 Nov 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\FULL\12-4-1~1\77210.TXT JEAN
49 

vidual assistance designation has not been given, been used to actually house on a temporary basis some of the families that have 

been impacted. 

Ms. NORTON. You mean right now. 

Mr. TOMBAR. Right now, yes, ma’am. 

Beyond that, there are plans underway, in talking to the State 

and local governments, that are CDBG entitlement communities— 

meaning that they receive annually CDBG grants from us—what 

waivers would be available to help them to do something that I 

think has been alluded to a number of times in this hearing, and 

that is to build back in a way that is smarter and safer than what 

has been done before. 

I am sure any of the witnesses to my left can tell you, because 

each of their States benefited from allocations of Community Development Block Grant in their recovery processes in the past. And 

that money was used where, at the edge, you have FEMA only allowing rebuilding up to a standard that existed prior to the disaster impacts. That HUD money essentially can make things better. 

And we have made a priority of that during this administration 

to, quite frankly, to focus on mitigation, to make sure that that 

which is done benefits the taxpayers in the long run. In fact, there 

is a study that HUD often cites and the Secretary often cites that 

says that for every dollar used in mitigation, there is a four-to-one 

return on investment in a subsequent disaster. 

It is why we have worked with places like Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 

to actually buy out homeowners in a neighborhood that flooded in 

2008 and move them to higher ground. 

Ms. NORTON. Using CDBG funds? 

Mr. TOMBAR. Yes, ma’am, using CDBG funds. 

Similarly, in the States of Louisiana and Texas, buyout programs 

have been underway to move families out of homes away to places 

that are less vulnerable to subsequent storms. 

It is something that we have already begun to discuss with State 

and local leaders and are working with them to find ways to implement that using existing resources and any additional resources 

that Congress may provide for that benefit. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Following that line of questioning by the ranking member, Mr. 

Tombar, this is the National Disaster Recovery Framework that 

was published in September 2011 by FEMA. Now, we looked 

through this and we did not see any mention of HUD or some of 

the activities you described. Have you read this? 

Mr. TOMBAR. Not only read it, sir, but I had a hand in its production. 

Mr. MICA. OK. But maybe it would—and I have no objection to 

HUD’s participation, but maybe it would be good to—and you said 

you have also used CDBG grants before. Maybe it would be good 

to have that as part of this plan, your participation. And Ms. Norton asked within 30 days. If you could supply an outline of what 

you plan to do. 

50 

Again, we are crafting legislation to try to expedite this whole 

process. And I have no problem even moving some of FEMA’s current responsibilities over to HUD if CDBG grants get things out 

faster, get it done more efficiently with less redtape. 

Did you see Mr. Riley’s description here of—we got it over 

there—of how long some of these projects get to be resolved? So we 

would call on you to—have you read our bill, 2903? 

Mr. TOMBAR. No, sir, I have not. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, maybe you could review that, too. We welcome your suggestions. I know sometimes the agencies have constraints, going through OMB and all of the bureaucracy you face. 

But we are really trying to craft—finalize legislation—we have 

crafted legislation—but finalize it with the best provisions possible 

so that people who have been through Katrina, Irene, tornadoes 

and floods and everything else don’t have to go through the same 

long, drawn-out, redtape process. And if there is an easier way to 

do it, we welcome it. So we would like to hear from you, if we may. 

Mr. TOMBAR. If I might, Mr. Chairman, you will find that in my 

testimony I said that Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Donovan 

actually worked together under an effort started in 2009 by the 

President called the Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working Group. 

That NDRF that you held up is an outgrowth of that process. 

You will find in it that there are six recovery support functions. 

The housing recovery support function is one led by HUD. And it 

is the very one that we are using right now to begin those communications and those conversations with State and local leaders that 

I raised in answering Ms. Norton’s question. And so what we have 

found is that this framework is a useful way for us to do some of 

that work. 

Mr. MICA. Well, two things then. Secretary Donovan and you all, 

if you revise this, maybe you should include yourself. And also, if 

you can provide the committee with what you are doing and then 

any of your recommendations. If we do need legislative authority 

to revise FEMA’s role and your role, we would be glad to look at 

that, those suggestions. 

Mr. Popoff, I was trying to get the Administrator—he is gone 

now—but to look at maybe not trying to replace what the private 

sector is doing, but to help facilitate, help initiate some assistance 

or coordination of efforts from the private sector to deal with the 

fuel situation. We have seen it repeated time after time. Fuel and 

some sources of energy, maybe—again, we are not trying to supplant what the private sector is doing or public utilities are doing. 

And I think you described, again, a cooperative plan. And we are 

going to submit a question to you and also to the Administrator to 

see if he can’t initiate on a larger scale what you have done and 

you described before the committee today. Because every disaster, 

it appears, we have this issue with getting fuel and power generation to specific activities or to individuals who could make things 

be restored again. 

So thank you for your recommendation. You think it would work 

on a larger scale? 

Mr. POPOFF. Yes, sir, absolutely. You know, I believe that we 

truly—we only respond to seven different types of disasters. And 

with those seven, and understanding the mechanics of it, it is how 

51 

we manage the organization is how we respond to these folks and 

how we provide the necessary assistance. And the fuel plan that 

was produced by the State is a great example of how government 

can work with the private sector and put a significant plan together. 

Mr. MICA. Good. Well, again, your testimony was most helpful. 

And we are trying to address where we have gaps, again, and repeated experiences with these disasters. 

Mr. Riley, I don’t think we have ever had anybody so graphically 

describe Government redtape and bureaucracy, at least dealing 

with disasters. We have some charts on health care and other Government proposals, but that is pretty amazing. 

Now, Administrator Fugate did point out, however, and I mentioned that after we came down there, we came back and did this 

arbitration mediation. Why didn’t you turn to that as a solution? 

Mr. RILEY. It is a very complicated process. And if you follow the 

timeline, there was ongoing discussion during the whole thing. So, 

you know, it was just a matter of we never got a ‘‘no’’ completely, 

so we never went to arbitration. 

The frustrating thing about this is that if you look at the 

timeline, early on in the timeline, there was the cost estimate and 

recommendation of professional architects and engineers concerning the status of the building. FEMA’s process didn’t allow 

them to accept that, and they went through their own process, and 

we ended up in the same place. 

Mr. Fugate indicated that currently they are in a position to 

allow their staff to accept the applicants’ architects and engineers 

reports and use that as the basis for funding. We certainly support 

that. We don’t always see that. And maybe they just haven’t gotten 

the email in Louisiana, as he said. 

But, you know, that is certainly a way that this particular process—and like I said, this is not an anomaly. There are thousands 

like this, in Katrina, in Gustav, in Ike, even in recent storms. And 

so a process that would, you know, get to the result a lot quicker— 

arbitration is a good tool, and we have used it, and we have used 

it successfully. 

We would recommend that the tool be continued, that the cap be 

lowered so that the smaller communities that have smaller projects 

have access to that independent, you know, third-party review of 

the FEMA process. And we do feel, from the large projects, we have 

seen these large projects be sped up simply by the threat of arbitration. 

Mr. MICA. Well, we would like to have as many tools at the disposal of FEMA to get these issues resolved and get the claims settled. We welcome your recommendations, too. 

We are trying to get the Senate to conclude their consideration 

of the legislation. I think that that measure can do more than all 

the money we throw at the problems, or try to throw at the problems. Sometimes, as you heard the Administrator, they are still 

dealing with so many settlements from so many disasters because 

of the way their hands are tied and our inability to be a little bit 

more flexible or have, again, some options that don’t currently 

exist. 

52 

So any other recommendations you can provide us. We are going 

to leave the record open for the next 14 days, by unanimous consent. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

And I want to thank each of you for being with us today. We will 

have additional questions we will submit to you. 

The hearing has gone on for 2 hours. You have been most patient 

and also, I think, most productive in your recommendations and 

observations to the committee. So we thank you so much. 

And there being no further business before the committee, this 

hearing of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the 

House of Representatives is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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Æ 


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