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i 

87–860 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–97] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL 

YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 26, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request for Seapower and Projection Forces ................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 26, 2014 ................................................................................... 33 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Glueck, LtGen Kenneth J., Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat 

Development and Integration, and Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command ......................................................................... 8 

Mulloy, VADM Joseph P., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources ................................................................ 7 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of the Navy ............................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 37 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Joseph P. Mulloy and LtGen 

Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr. .................................................................................. 40 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 75 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 79 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 83 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 26, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members and the distinguished panel of Navy and Marine Corps leaders for today’s 

hearing. We have testifying before us on the fiscal year 2015 budget request the Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; Vice Admiral 

Joe Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of 

Capabilities and Resources; and Lieutenant General Kenneth 

Glueck, Jr., Deputy Commandant for Combat Development, Integration and Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here, for your service to our 

country. We look forward to your thoughts and your insights on 

these important issues. First of all, I want to commend the Department on their continued emphasis on the undersea warfare domain. I believe that the United States has a clear asymmetric advantage in this area, and it is critical to continue procurement of 

two Virginia-class submarines a year. I also appreciate the continued emphasis on the Virginia payload module and support the 

eventual inclusion of this capability in the fiscal year 2019 Block 

4 procurement. 

As to the aircraft carrier force structure, I am dismayed at the 

intent of this administration to reduce our aircraft carrier fleet. 

The equivocation and vacillation on this issue is, frankly, disappointing. It is a fact that the administration has requested appropriations in fiscal year 2015 only for inactivating the USS 

George Washington. It is a fact that the law requires 11 aircraft 

carriers. It is a fact that the USS George Washington refueling and 

complex overhaul is not included in the Future Year Defense Plan. 

It is a fact that the hull of the USS George Washington has another 

25 years of service life remaining. The administration’s rhetoric 

that they are not removing an aircraft carrier of the fleet simply 

does not match their actions. I think our decision on this issue is 
2 

clear. I look forward to fully restoring the requisite funding to ensure we retain the USS George Washington for another 25 years. 

There are a multitude of other procurement shortfalls in the 

Navy and Marine Corps budget regarding ships, aircraft, and 

weapons. Our subcommittee is going to take a hard look at the entirety of combatant commander requirements and relate those to 

what is requested in the budget to ensure our maritime forces are 

best funded with the right capabilities. 

I look forward to discussing several of these issues today, and 

specifically I want to have an in-depth discussion on the Navy’s 

cruiser retention plan. If the Navy believes it must pursue this 

plan because of budget constraints, then we look forward to understanding the details of how you all plan to execute this endeavor 

in the decade ahead and eventually restore all 11 cruisers to the 

fleet in a timely fashion. 

We also want to understand the risk if 22 cruisers are required 

to meet global force management requirements today, why is it 

now acceptable risk to reduce by half the quantity when world 

events obviously indicate otherwise? 

And finally, the Navy has cultivated tremendous uncertainty related to developing and maintaining offensive surface warfare missile capabilities. Despite being well below missile inventory requirements, the Navy has cut in half planned production of Tomahawk missiles in 2015 and terminated that line in 2016. And further concerning, replacement missile capabilities are in the infancy 

stages of concept development and years off from operational fielding. We need to again understand why this is acceptable risk, and 

what is your surface attack missile road map going forward. 

As to the Marine Corps, I believe that the amphibious ship construction industrial base is fragile. A significant gap exists between 

current and new ship construction plans that will lead to destabilizing the industrial base. We need to move with firm and deliberate steps to ensure that we retain an appropriate and unquestionable force structure to support our maritime presence and 

warfighting requirements. 

As to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program, I understand the 

Marine Corps plans to pursue a two-tiered approach that would 

procure a wheeled armored personnel carrier in the short term and 

continue the development to achieve capabilities in the long term 

associated with high water speed technology efforts from previous 

amphibious vehicle programs. While this approach seems reasonable, I look forward to gaining a better understanding of the Marine Corps’ plans. We need to be assured we are providing our Marines with essential capabilities at the right time. 

I look forward to discussing these important topics with our expert panel of judges. I want to also point out that we understand 

the great service you provide to our country. We also understand 

that you three are the messengers, and we appreciate that a lot of 

these decisions are not your decisions, but we thank you for sharing your insight with us on them, and with that, I return—I turn 

to my good friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Congressman Mike McIntyre. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to each of you for your continued service and commitment to our Navy, our Marine Corps, and to our great country’s 

armed services. Welcome to each of you today. I know earlier this 

month, the full committee in this room heard from Secretary 

Mabus and Admiral Greenert and General Amos about the big picture budget request, of course, for the Navy and Marine Corps, and 

today we do want to dive down deep into the details as we consider 

underwater warfare and other concerns pertaining to submarine 

building, weapons programs, some of our Marine Corps programs 

as well as, of course, shipbuilding. 

While the Navy is facing many challenges, we are pleased that 

in the proposed budget that the Navy-Marine Corps is being funded strongly in some areas that it will need to be funded in with 

our shift to the Pacific and our focus in pivoting to the Pacific region. 

When we talk about the positive parts, the continued strong support for building two Virginia-class submarines a year, knowing 

that the U.S. dominates undersea warfare; in that environment, we 

know the Virginia class will continue to help us maintain that important edge. Another encouraging area in the budget is the 

Arleigh Burke-class DDG [guided missile destroyer] program, now 

in its fourth decade, still making sure that we have superb ships 

year after year in that class. And with the plan now to start a 

Flight III set of ships with even better air defense capability, we 

are encouraged by that. 

However, we realize that both services, the Navy and Marine 

Corps, face significant challenges in this year’s budget, and that is 

what we want to hear about in this hearing. 

First, as our good chairman, my good friend Mr. Forbes mentioned, the potential loss of an aircraft carrier and an air wing is 

a major concern. Aircraft carriers, we know, allow the United 

States to project power almost anywhere in the world on very short 

notice and is a strong statement of our being a force for democracy. 

No nation can match that, and I am concerned that letting another 

aircraft carrier go, we are opening the door to an even steeper decline in American naval power and presence. 

However, if we do keep the carrier and air wing, the question is 

and we would welcome your recommendations at what is being 

given up if more funding isn’t provided to the Navy? 

I also want to hear about the concern about the Navy, how it can 

afford to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine, given the many 

other shipbuilding needs. We want to know what our options are 

for dealing with this issue, including the potential of setting up an 

account, perhaps similar to the National Defense Sealift Fund Congress established in the 1990s to help the Navy build more sealift 

capability. So we would like to hear about a possibility that way 

in order to make sure that we can replace the Ohio-class ballistic 

missile submarine. With such an account, the Navy would be able 

to spread the burden of replacing this very expensive capability 
4 

without gutting the rest of our shipbuilding budget, which is so important. 

We also want to hear about the proposed layup, as it is called, 

of some of our cruisers and amphibious ships. I am encouraged that 

the Navy is taking serious this subcommittee’s concerns about the 

declining size of the fleet, but we need more detail about how this 

plan would work and what the risks might be. What we don’t want 

to see happen is these ships go into layup status and then not be 

properly funded and eventually decommissioned as a result. If that 

happens, we will have wasted more money than if they were retired. So we want to understand exactly what this proposal includes when the term laying up these ships is talked about. Particularly with layups this basketball season being so prevalent during March Madness, we want to make sure we are planning properly in March so we don’t have madness in our budget with something as important as United States Navy. 

So we thank you for the seriousness that you take these topics, 

and we look forward to asking these serious questions and getting 

these serious answers as we plan ahead to continue America’s best 

defense that we have to offer, and we thank you for being at the 

forefront of that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, as you know, without me having to say 

it, our subcommittee is incredibly bipartisan. We have enormous 

respect for each other. I am going to defer my questions until the 

end when we get there because we may have votes probably at 

about 3:15, something like that—4:15, I am sorry. 

So if you could, we have your joint statements that will be made 

a part of the record, and if each of you would try to limit your remarks to maybe 5 minutes or so if possible so we could move on 

from there. 

And with that, Mr. Secretary, we will let you start off for us. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to address Department of 

the Navy acquisition programs. 

Joining me today are the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 

Capabilities and Resources, Vice Admiral Joe Mulloy, and Deputy 

Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Lieutenant 

General Ken Glueck. With permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide a brief opening remarks and submit a separate formal statement for the record. 

Mr. FORBES. It will be admitted. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Two years ago, in testimony before this subcommittee, the Navy described how we had reshaped our shipbuilding, aviation, and tactical vehicle plans to reflect the priorities of 

the new defense strategy, and Congress strongly supported that 

year’s 2013 budget request. In fact, funding was increased for additional ships and aircraft. However, sequestration more than offset 

those gains, and the Department of the Navy ended up about $11 
5 

billion out of balance across the operations, maintenance, and investment. 

Last year, we again submitted a budget sized and shaped to provide the capability, capacity, and readiness required by the defense 

strategy, and while this committee was particularly supportive of 

our request, at the end of the day at the bottom line the Bipartisan 

Budget Act [BBA] reduced the Navy-Marine Corps budget by $6 

billion in 2014 and another $15 billion in 2015. 

So this year’s budget submission is anchored by the BBA in 2015, 

and though we exceed the Budget Control Act caps across the Future Years Defense Plan, the Navy and Marine Corps request falls 

$38 billion below the level planned just 1 year ago. So to minimize 

the impact of this reduced top line, we have leveraged every tool 

available to drive down cost. We have tightened requirements, 

maximized competition, and capitalized on multiyear procurements 

for major weapons systems, and we have attacked our cost of doing 

business from headquarters billets to service contracts so that more 

of our resources can be dedicated to warfighting capability. And in 

balancing resources and requirements, we have placed priority on 

forward presence, near-term readiness, stability in our shipbuilding 

program, and investment in those future capabilities critical to our 

long-term technical superiority. 

Major milestones this past year highlight some of those capabilities. The Marine Corps took the Joint Strike Fighter to sea, conducting extensive testing on board USS Wasp. The Navy conducted 

first flight of its high endurance unmanned maritime surveillance 

aircraft, the Triton, followed shortly by the first trap and catapult 

on and off an aircraft carrier of the unmanned combat air system. 

The Navy’s game-changing maritime patrol aircraft, the P–8A 

Poseidon, is today ranging the Western Pacific on her first deployment and contributing to the search for Malaysian Airline Flight 

370. In the first demonstration of the Navy’s integrated fire control 

capability, an E–2D Advanced Hawkeye passed track data to an 

Aegis cruiser firing the Navy’s newest missile, the SM–6, to knock 

out a target well over the horizon without ever tracking it on the 

ship’s radar. And in a series of firsts, USS John Paul Jones demonstrated the power of Aegis modernization by simultaneously engaging inbound cruise and ballistic missile targets. USS Lake Erie 

knocked out a ballistic missile target by firing on the remote track 

of a distant satellite. A few months later, she would take out a 

complex separating ballistic missile target and, in a third test, set 

the mark for the highest altitude intercept to date. Meanwhile, the 

DDG 1000 advanced gun system went nine for nine, firing 155[mm] 

rounds at ranges greater than 60 nautical miles with a strike pattern unlike anything ever seen from the barrel of a gun. And the 

Long Range Anti-Ship Missile conducted its first air launch demonstration, striking a maritime target from a distance far beyond 

the reach of the weapons in our arsenal today. 

With particular regard to Navy shipbuilding, we kept on track 

our objective for a 300-ship Navy. Seven first-of-class ships met 

major milestones. Gerald Ford, the first new design aircraft carrier 

since Nimitz, and Zumwalt, the first new designed destroyer since 

Arleigh Burke, launched just 1 week apart, each at extremely high 

levels of completion. The amphibious assault ship America success-
6 

fully completed sea trials. The joint high speed vessel Spearhead 

and the mobile landing platform Montford Point delivered to the 

fleet. The littoral combat ship Freedom successfully completed her 

10-month maiden overseas deployment. And finally we laid the 

keel for the first afloat forward staging base, the Chesty Puller. 

In total, 43 ships are under construction in shipyards and weapons factories stretching across the country, yet this critical industrial base is fragile, and we will need to work with industry and 

Congress to keep it whole as we navigate the budget beyond the 

BBA. 

Meanwhile, the third leg of our balanced naval air-ground task 

force, the Marine Corps tactical vehicles, is at the front end of 

much needed recapitalization. In 2015, we commenced procurement 

of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to replace the HUMVEE [High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], and separately, we are 

moving forward with acquiring a highly capable, highly survivable 

wheeled vehicle in a first phase of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 

[ACV] program. The ACV is, as the Commandant stated in testimony, a top Marine Corps priority. And the strategy for procuring 

this vessel is striking a necessary balance between requirements 

and affordability. 

I would like to briefly discuss two critical issues posed by our 

budget request. First, the refueling complex overhaul of George 

Washington CVN–73. The Navy has a hard requirement for 11 aircraft carriers, and title 10 requires the Navy to retain 11 aircraft 

carriers. However, the cost to refuel CVN–73 plus maintain its air 

wing, manpower, and support would require an additional $7 billion across the 2015–2019 period, and the Secretary of Defense has 

stated if we return to BCA [Budget Control Act] funding levels in 

2016, we will likely be compelled to inactivate the CVN and its air 

wing. Therefore, in this budget submission, we have effectively 

taken a pause, maintaining the option to include refueling CVN– 

73 in our 2016 budget as we await determination of that budget’s 

top line. 

Second, cruiser and LSD [landing ship, dock] modernization. The 

oldest 11 cruisers, CG–52 through 62, have been modernized and 

will deploy with carrier battle groups until their end of service 

which commences in 2019. The Navy plans to modernize and extend the service life of the remaining 11 cruisers, CG–63 through 

73, through an extended phased modernization program. The elements of the program are that we will commence in 2015 with 

planning and material procurement for repair and modernization of 

hull, mechanical, and electrical [HM&E] systems for all 11 cruisers. 

The depot work will be scheduled to ensure efficient execution and, 

to the extent practical, to provide stability to the industrial base, 

and once complete that HM&E phase, these cruisers will be maintained in the modernization program until completion of their subsequent combat systems modernization, which will be aligned with 

retirement of the first 11 cruisers. 

A similar yet simpler approach is planned for three of the LSD– 

41 class ships. This Navy plan is made affordable by drawing down 

ship manpower and operating costs during the extended modernization period, a cost avoidance in excess of $6 billion. It ensures we are able to sustain the 12-ship LSD–41/49 class for its full 
7 

service life and the critical air defense commander capabilities of 

the cruiser force beyond its current service life into the 2040s. It 

also retains flexibility, if needed, to accelerate completion of the 

modernization pending availability of added funding and training 

of additional crews. In total, in managing the cumulative impact of 

the sequestration in 2013, the BBA level funding in 2014 and 2015, 

the reductions across 2015 through 2019, the Department has been 

judicious in controlling costs, reducing procurements, stretching developments, and delaying modernization. However, these actions 

necessarily add costs to our programs, add risk to our industrial 

base, and add risk to our ability to meet the Defense Strategic 

Guidance. If we are forced to execute at BCA levels in fiscal year 

2016 and beyond, these cuts will go deeper and will fundamentally 

change our Navy and Marine Corps and the industrial base we rely 

upon. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. We look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, Admiral 

Mulloy, and General Glueck can be found in the Appendix on page 

40.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM JOSEPH P. MULLOY, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 

Admiral MULLOY. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, 

other distinguished members of the committee, I am Admiral Joe 

Mulloy, and I am very honored to be here with you today, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

I just want to indicate that I support Mr. Stackley’s statement, 

but for the last 4 and a half years, I have served as the Department of Navy budget officer, and many of your staff members know 

who I am. I have seen the highs and lows of the Navy budget. I 

had the peak budget and over $170 billion in fiscal year 2011. I 

have also saw the pain of sequester and what it took to the Navy 

to try to operate with what started as an 8.6 and became a $4 billion reduction. 

We certainly appreciate the BBA law that was passed by the 

Congress, that it gave some stability, but as Mr. Stackley pointed 

out, it also came at a cost of a significant amount of money. We 

are forced to come up with a balanced position minus $38 billion 

over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and looming over 

our head is fiscal year 2016, again with either a sequester or not, 

and another over $30 billion cut through the FYDP. I look forward 

to your questions. I think this provides a balanced budget trying 

to maintain all facets of the Navy because before I was budget officer, I was the N5N8 [Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and 

Requirements, U.S. Pacific Fleet], doing all pol-mil [political-military] planning and operations for the Pacific Fleet and all infrastructure and resources for out there, so I have seen our fleet used, 

I have seen our forces prepared, and did all that planning for over 

3 years, so I have been on both ends of this in the Pentagon and 
8 

out at the fleet, and I think we tried to find balance in here, but 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Mulloy, Secretary 

Stackley, and General Glueck can be found in the Appendix on 

page 40.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. You certainly bring a unique 

experienced background to our committee, and we appreciate your 

willingness to help us. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN KENNETH J. GLUECK, JR., USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, AND COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS 

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 

General GLUECK. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The Marine Corps’ ability to serve as our Nation’s premier crisis response force is due in large part to this subcommittee’s strong support, and on behalf of all Marines, I say 

thank you. 

History demonstrates when fiscal austerity reduces the size of 

available forces, the Nation must rely on the persistent presence 

and power projection capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team. 

The Marine Corps remains first and foremost a naval service, operating in close partnership with the Navy. Today the two naval 

services leverage the seas not only to ensure global peace and stability but also, when necessary, to project our national power and 

influence ashore. A forward-deployed Marine Corps provides our 

combatant commanders a universal tool that they can immediately 

employ. This force can serve as a leading edge of a larger joint 

force or deploy and sustain itself in even the most austere environments. This ability to rapidly respond to developing crises not only 

ensures the combatant commander has the right force in the right 

place at the right time but also provides our national leaders with 

valuable decision space. 

Flexible and scaleable by organizational design and instinctively 

adaptive by culture, the Marine Corps is guided by our expeditionary ethos and bias for action. These characteristics are the hallmark of our corps’ capstone concept, Expeditionary Force 21. Expeditionary Force 21 blends our time-tested concepts of Operational 

Maneuver from the Sea, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, Seabasing, 

with the strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility 

that forward-stationed and forward-deployed expeditionary units 

provide. 

Crucial to these capabilities and persistent presence are our amphibious warships. They are versatile, interoperable warfighting 

platforms capable of going into harm’s way and serve as a cornerstone of America’s ability to project power and respond to the full 

range of crises. With embark Marines, amphibious ships are the 

Swiss Army knife of the fleet, providing diverse capabilities unlike 

any other naval platform. They are critical to both our combatant 

commanders’ theater engagement strategy and crisis response options, significantly contributing to both regional stability and secu-
9 

rity. From humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to forcible 

entry operations, it is the amphibious fleet that answers the call. 

When the Nation requires a forcible entry capability, these warships can launch the assault echelons in two Marine expeditionary 

brigades. However, an inventory fewer of 38 ships creates a significant risk in maintaining continuous presence and undermines the 

ability to generate the necessary capabilities to respond to crisis or 

conduct forceful entry. While our goal remains to—an increase of 

sea-based and forward-deployed forces, we are examining alternatives that will still ensure persistent presence. 

Future security environment requires a robust capability to operate from the sea and maneuver ashore to positions of advantage. 

The core capability of technology—excuse me. Core capability of expeditionary forces is the ability to project forces ashore from amphibious platforms and to maneuver once ashore. The Amphibious 

Combat Vehicle program provides us that capability. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle has been refined to reflect the family assistance approach to a military problem. It will integrate at sea with 

amphibious as well as maritime sealift ships and connectors and 

enable amphibious operations rapidly from further offshore. The 

Amphibious Combat Vehicle leverages experience gained in the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program, the Marine Personnel Carrier program, current threat analysis, and commercial technology 

to provide a superior armor protection and mobility. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle is the Marine Corps’ number one ground modernization priority. It will replace our aging 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle. It will be procured on a phased approach, 

thus complementing the existing capabilities to maximize both surface power projection and littoral maneuver. The benefits of this 

phased effort are aimed at producing an amphibious capability that 

deploys from greater distances and speed, thus ensuring greater 

standoff distances for our forces. Given continuing advancements in 

applicable technology, the Marine Corps believes that further investment in these technologies will lead to the envisioned high 

water speed capability. 

Additionally, as part of the systems approach, the Navy and Marine Corps team will continue its investment in the next generation 

of future connectors. These connectors, with enhanced speed and 

range, both aviation and surface, will provide future expeditionary 

force commanders with the flexibility to operate in contested environments. The type of transformational technology the MV–22 Osprey has already demonstrated needs to be brought to our surface 

connector fleet. 

Clearly there are challenges to today’s new normal security environment as well as the challenges of constrained and uncertain 

budgets, but rest assured that our forward-stationed, forwarddeployed Marines are poised to remain the Nation’s premier expeditionary force in readiness. In partnership with the Navy, the Marine Corps looks forward to working with you to address these 

issues. Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Glueck, Secretary 

Stackley, and Admiral Mulloy can be found in the Appendix on 

page 40.] 
10 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

And with that, I would like to now recognize the ranking member, Mike McIntyre, who since his Tarheels have now exited the 

tournament is supporting the Virginia Wahoos I know as they go 

in there, and now recognize him for any questions he may have. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Absolutely, I want to uphold the ACC [Atlantic 

Coast Conference] tradition. Congratulations to Virginia. 

Mr. Stackley, I want to ask you one question. I know our time 

is going to be compressed, and I want to have other members, give 

them a chance to ask questions since we have votes coming up. The 

subcommittee has heard numerous times from the Navy that the 

Ohio replacement program could consume most of the normal shipbuilding budget for 10 years or more. I referred to some to this in 

my opening remarks today. 

What are the alternatives? Could one of them be the establishment by Congress of a fund similar to the National Defense Sealift 

Fund so that funding for procurement of the Ohio-class submarine 

is funded across the Department of Defense? Would you address 

that, please? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, thanks for the question. First and 

foremost, to be real clear, the Ohio replacement program, as repeatedly stated by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], is our top 

priority in this budget. It will remain a top priority in the next 

budget. We are doing everything we have to to protect the funding 

stream to ensure that the boat is designed on schedule, built on 

schedule, and deploys on schedule in 2031. 

Now, what that means is if you look at what the cost of the pro- gram is in current dollars, it is about a $17 billion research and 

development funding stream, most of which will be obligated and 

expended leading up to that first ship’s procurement, and in today’s 

dollars, we are looking at a $6.3 billion cost for the lead boat and 

targeting $4.9 billion for subsequent boats 2 through 12. The first 

boat is procured in 2021; the last boat in 2035, so there is a 15- 

year period where it will be the largest part of our shipbuilding 

program and, as has been pointed out, puts extraordinary pressure 

under our shipbuilding—on our shipbuilding program. 

So the notion of a National Defense Sealift Fund [NDSF] type of 

funding mechanism, that won’t change the bottom line cost for the 

Ohio replacement program, clearly. What it would do, as it had 

done for the NDSF fleet, is provide a mechanism that is extremely 

flexible to deal with the year-to-year challenges associated with 

executing the funding associated with concurrent building the lead 

boat, completing the R&D [research and development] effort that 

would be done in parallel with the lead boat, and then ramping up 

procurement of follow boats. Ultimately, though, when we are 

building one boat per year in the 2026 through 2035 timeframe, 

then that is going to be a steady requirement by the Department 

of the Navy for what is today about $5 billion per year, and out 

in that timeframe, when you add inflation and other considerations, will measure up to a significant part of our shipbuilding 

budget. So creating an NDSF, the flexibility that NDSF provided 

to us, aided our efficiency in building the NDSF fleet. Pulling that 

budget out of our SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy], our 

shipbuilding top line, if we are able to sustain our shipbuilding top 
11 

line, that does great—you know, that gives us the ability to continue to procure the balance of our force, but in the end, the bottom 

line for building out the Ohio replacement program will be about 

the same. So the source of the funding ultimately becomes the challenge greater than the mechanism for the funding. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right, thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Any other response? 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, having served as budget officer, I completely support Mr. Stackley’s position is that ultimately as we 

looked at this, this is 45 percent over 15 years of the entire SCN 

account. The first two boats are scheduled over 5 years, but it is 

half of our budget all those years, so the NDSF account like does 

provide tremendous flexibility for solving problems, but as Mr. 

Stackley pointed out, it ends up being the total amount of money 

that we are talking about is right now as the DON [Department 

of the Navy] is planning on doing that, but it would—it essentially 

crushes the other shipbuilding part of the budget is that I have 

half the budget on one ship, I have to build an aircraft carrier, 

spread it over 4 years, and then I end up looking at is the DDG 

and amphibious submarine, and do I build one, two or three, but 

I can’t build all three in every one year. So it comes back to being, 

even if we then look at all our other accounts, you know, do I shave 

down aviation? I have a lot of things I need to buy out there. We 

now are stuck into OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and 

will be talking to the Hill. So an NDSF fund that has some other 

way of adding money to it would be more flexible there for us as 

opposed to it is just moving Navy dollars there, it doesn’t provide 

any flex—it provides flexibility but not source dollars. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay, thank you. Were both you gentlemen classmates in the Naval Academy? You both graduated in 1979, right? 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. It is amazing that these years later, 

you serve us together at this table on this day, and God bless you 

and thank you. 

And thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mike. 

The gentlelady from South Dakota is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To Admiral Mulloy, what is the average lifespan of an aircraft 

carrier? 

Admiral MULLOY. Ma’am, the average lifespan of a Nimitz-class 

aircraft carrier is about 50 years. The USS Enterprise just completed a little over 51 years. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay, thank you. 

Secretary Stackley, as we all know, the Tomahawk has been and 

will continue to be hopefully the Nation’s long-range precision 

strike weapon of choice. Although you did reference a new longrange missile that you have been under development. I know the 

Navy decreased the procurement of the Tomahawk Block 4 cruise 

missiles by 800 and plans to cease the production of the Tomahawk 

beginning in fiscal year 2016. So can you describe some of the 

thinking and the analysis on that and maybe a little bit more detail on your future weapon that you have just tested? 
12 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am, thanks for the question. First, 

the budget does not—the budget cuts our quantity for Tomahawk 

in half from prior years, so we had been sustaining a 200 Tomahawk per year rate. In 2015, we have dropped down to 100, and 

in 2016 and out, I guarantee you we will revisit the question of 

whether the time is right to cease production of Tomahawks, but 

what we have procured to date meets our inventory requirements 

for Tomahawks, so we have about 4,000 in our arsenal. We have 

satisfied our inventory requirement. What we have got to get to is 

that next-generation weapon. That next-generation weapon could 

be an upgraded Tomahawk, could be another weapon that would 

show up at the competition. So we are moving forward with development of what has been referred to as next-generation land-attack 

weapon, and the key elements of that weapon will be its increased 

lethality, survivability beyond what Tomahawk brings today. 

So the future of Tomahawk 100 in the 2015 budget request, we 

will certainly revisit that as we build the 2016 budget. We are 

going to press forward with advances to our cruise missile line. We 

are today demonstrating and testing what I refer to as the Long 

Range Anti-Ship Missile, that is an air-launched version. A future 

increment which will be competed will be a surface ship-launched 

version, which will require development from whoever shows up 

from industry, and then downstream, there is modification of the 

Tomahawks that we have in our inventory and ultimately a recertification of those Tomahawks that we have in our inventory. So we 

are trying to keep it all in balance. We are keeping a close eye on 

our inventory numbers, and equally important, we are going forward in terms of advancing the capability of those cruise missiles. 

Mrs. NOEM. Well, recertification is to begin in fiscal year 2019. 

Is that correct? Do you see—because in fiscal year 2016 is when 

you basically have it zeroed out as far as new Tomahawks, correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. NOEM. Because you believe that your inventory is sufficient 

enough to bridge the gap until we get past recertification and into 

a new weapon that could be developed? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am, our inventory is very healthy. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. But we are keeping a close eye on the recertification timeline. We cannot delay that, so we have to get into recertification in the 2019 timeframe. There is that potential gap between 2016 and 2019 as far as Tomahawk production. Recertification is different from all-around production, and we are working 

with Raytheon in terms of the risks that this potential gap would 

pose on their factory. 

Mrs. NOEM. But you do have some plans for modernization in fiscal year 2020, correct? Is that—could that not be streamlined a little bit better with recertification so that the modernization could 

happen at the same time these weapons are brought in and recertified—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely. 

Mrs. NOEM [continuing]. So that it is a bit more streamlined. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely, and that is the part of the discussion that we are having with Raytheon. In fact, there is a fairly 
13 

healthy R&D stream going towards Tomahawk for the modifications that we need for the missile. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. 

Admiral Mulloy, did you have something to add? 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, ma’am, I appreciate the question also. 

Clearly, as you pointed out, with the inventory we have is a very 

large number of these weapons, which we are continuing to modernize. There have been four steps. The most important one is a 

brand new digital radio—— 

Mrs. NOEM. Right. 

Admiral MULLOY [continuing]. Which we are installing which allows the combatant commanders, you know, carrying out national 

command authority missions to retarget the aircraft and have 

much more reliable communications, no matter where they are 

from satellites. That install is going forward. There are a number 

of other ones that we need to do, and those are also in the plan, 

but as we talked about, we are down in the Navy $31 billion. What 

we had to look at was, what do I have to do with a weapon that 

I have overcapacity on but I need to modernize and I need to certify? Part of the line, in fact actually your staff will find this, we 

have bought spares in 2015 and 2016 such that when the line 

starts back up to do the certification, we have the appropriate 

amount from the vendors to keep going, but that period of time is 

we, on average, have shot 100 weapons a year. We have, as we 

looked at all the plans and met the requirements of the combatant 

commanders, in the areas that we have to take some risk in tough 

years, we have to have a path to reach ahead. And so this is one 

of the ones we looked at was we will analyze a shutdown. We want 

to fund the R&D to get the next weapon. We want to fund the R&D 

to make the current weapon work and take a much smaller view 

as compared to other parts of this budget, a smaller risk, and, you 

know, having looked at detail about what these weapons require 

and having personally been at sea with these, Tomahawks are 

amazing things. But they were also built when I was a junior officer, and we have modernized them, but we need to keep thinking 

about the future. 

Mrs. NOEM. Well, that would be my hope, that as we recertify, 

that we would also look at modernization at the same time so it 

is streamlined and there could be some savings then—— 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes. 

Mrs. NOEM [continuing]. Rather than bringing those weapons 

back in to modernize just after they have been through the recertification process. 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, ma’am, and we are looking at what could 

be done at that time because, as we say, this is on Block 4, we can 

talk with a radio. 

Mrs. NOEM. Right. 

Admiral MULLOY. The early ones I qualified with didn’t have any 

of this. They were all just merely, not even GPS [Global Positioning 

System] capable, but we never looked totally down. We have never 

eliminated the ability to do camera and TERCOM [Terrain Contour 

Matching] guidance because in a GPS-enabled or a world that has 

electromagnetic deviations, you want to have a weapon that can 
14 

still find a path, so we have never eliminated some of the stuff that 

made it work. The idea is to keep working to make it better. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Recognize the gentleman from Connecticut for 5 minutes. After 

his questions, we are going to recess for about an hour, unfortunately. We will be back at 5:00 if you could stay with us until that 

time. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In light of the press of time, I won’t talk about how the UConn 

Huskies are, men and women, are both in the Sweet 16. 

Mr. FORBES. And we hope they come in second. We will be supporting them strongly. 

Mr. COURTNEY. The women I don’t think I would put much 

money on that. 

But anyway, Mr. Stackley, again, you laid out sort of the scenario with the CVN–73 in terms of, you know, the fact that it is 

sort of a pending question right now that sort of turns on whether 

or not we check, we, again, fix the BCA levels, as you put it, in 

your remarks, and again just for clarification, when you say BCA 

levels, you are talking about sequester? Is that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Because, I mean, obviously, the BCA 

has a different level also built into it, which is nonsequester, and 

I guess so, you know, everybody is sort of crystal clear, two questions: Number one, if the sequester levels go into effect in 2016 and 

years beyond, I mean, really it is not just aircraft carriers that are 

going to be impacted if that were to happen, and maybe you can 

just talk a little about that in terms of the spread of damage that 

would occur. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, and well, let’s start with the fact 

that the budget that we submitted, the 5-year Future Years Defense Plan budget is about $38 billion for the Department of the 

Navy above that BCA adjusted cap level, and that is in 2016 

through 2019. If we have to, if we have to budget to that BCA level 

or, alternatively, if we submit the budget at the current top line 

and it gets sequestered—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. We have already discussed the 

impact in terms of CVN–73 RCOH [refueling and complex overhaul], but you look across the rest of the board and you just take 

an average of $8 billion to $9 billion that is going to come out of 

the Department of the Navy budget and you try assess where it is 

going to come, and we have very limited alternatives in terms of 

where we are going to pull it. So it is going to clearly impact our 

procurements, but it is also going to impact the size of the force 

and the way we operate it, and that is going to directly impinge 

on our ability to meet our requirements in terms of the Defense 

Strategic Guidance. 

So whether it is a shipbuilding program, an aviation program, 

whether it is the depot maintenance schedule, whether it is the 

number of ships and aircraft that not necessarily that we are able 

to deploy, but we are able to surge in the event of crisis, those 

numbers are all going to come down. And there is—we have done 
15 

everything we can inside of our lines to wring out our costs of doing 

business. We have done everything we can in terms to try to drive 

down the cost of our major weapons systems, the cost of our operations, and we have been starting to cut our quantities, so, at this 

point forward, deeper cuts into that top line are going to go directly 

at the tip of the spear, and we are going to be looking at, in the 

2016 budget build, at that, at that extreme case. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So, for example, DDGs, submarines, you know, 

littoral combat ships, I mean, what does that mean? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, the CNO has already stated in testimony that we could be looking at three fewer DDG–51s in the next 

budget cycle, or if we are at BCA levels, a Virginia-class submarine, that is at risk, the CVN–73 which we have already talked 

to at length. Each program is going to be revisited in terms of we 

have to maintain a balanced force. We have to look at our nearterm requirements in terms of combatant commander demands. We 

are going to end up taking risk in terms of future readiness because our investments are going to end up bearing a very tough 

brunt of further reductions. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, thank you. I mean, I think, you know, my 

friend Mr. McIntyre raised the issue of the ORP [Ohio Replacement 

Program] funding which I have asked Secretary Hagel and Secretary Mabus about, and I mean that is definitely a long-term, relatively long-term, you know, fiscal challenge that we have to fix or 

deal with, but obviously, right now, we have got to not lose sight 

of the fact that sequester didn’t evaporate with the passage of the 

budget last December and the spending bill. And I think, you 

know, laying out the damage, as you just did, I think is a pretty 

powerful warning to people who care about a 300-ship Navy and 

our national defense, that this is right now, you know, in front of 

us, and we have just got to, you know, figure out ways to turn off 

that sequester. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The effort of Congress last year to 

give us the Bipartisan Budget Act gave us 2 years of breathing 

room and gave us a funding level above those BCA capped levels. 

That is greatness. However, if we allow this time to lapse and we 

don’t address the longer-term issue, then we will be sitting here 

next year talking about the devastation associated with BCA, and 

we will be having the same conversations we had last year regarding sequestration and what the impacts are to our ability to meet 

our requirements for national security. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We will recess until right after the votes, and reconvene immediately upon the votes. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your patience. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. I know these votes interfered with your schedules. 

But that is what we are here to do. 

So, at this particular point in time, I would like to recognize Congressman Wittman, who chairs the Readiness Subcommittee, for 

any questions that he might have for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Vice Admiral Mulloy, Mr. Stackley, Lieutenant General Glueck, 

thank you so much for joining us today. We really appreciate your 
16 

perspective in this challenging time to figure out how we put the 

pieces of these things together. 

Lieutenant General Glueck, I want to begin with you and go 

from the perspective of the Commandant in his words about LPD– 

17 and that the LPD–17 hull form should be what we use as the 

replacement for LSD. Can you elaborate a little bit on why that 

LPD [landing platform/dock] hull form is the preferred platform for 

replacement of the LSD? What are its capabilities? How does it 

meet the Marine Corps’ needs? And if you can put that in perspective about how the Marine Corps sees its structure going in the future and why that is so important for capability within the Marines. 

General GLUECK. Thank you, sir, for that question. And also 

thank you for your support to our Wounded Warriors. It is greatly 

appreciated. 

I think when you look at the LPD–17, it has been a success story 

for the Navy-Marine Corps team. And we are working through a 

lot of the bugs in that right now. So we view it as a proven performer. As you look at what I believe are the requirements for the 

new normal that exists out there today, you know, it is going to be 

independent deployers, as, you know, Admiral Locklear has talked 

about that his requirement out there as a combatant commander 

is in the neighborhood of, you know, 50, 54 ships to maintain that 

engagement. 

And we see that ability to be an independent deployer that the 

LPD–17 hull and form brings in terms of their ability to do C2 

[command and control], the aviation capability, the medical capability, and the surface capability are all the type of capability that 

you want in a future ship to be able to do the things that our Nation requires them to do for stability. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Stackley, in that realm of the perspective of the Marine Corps and also the Navy about the LPD hull 

form, its capability, its need to be put into service as a replacement 

for the LSD, understanding, too, that we have a requirement for 

38 amphibs; we are at 28 currently. 

From your perspective, and hearing that the Marine Corps looks 

at that as being able to meet their need, if the funding was available, in your opinion, does Navy and Marine Corps need another 

LPD? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me answer that a couple ways. First, 

you go back to the basic requirement, which CNO and Commandant have agreed to in terms of the lift capability that our 

Navy and Marine Corps team needs in total in terms of both major 

combat operations, but more prevalent is just the routine operations that are being conducted globally today. 

So you have a balanced amphib [amphibious] force of 38 ships 

that are required to meet that requirement. And that is a mixture 

of big-deck amphibs, the LPD–17 hull form, and today the LSD– 

41. That gives you the total lift package. 

Now, we don’t have a plan to get to 38 ships. We have a plan 

to get to 33 ships, which introduces some risk in terms of being 

able to provide the total lift for a major combat operation. But 

Navy and Marine Corps have agreed that that is acceptable risk. 
17 

Now inside of that, when you take a look at the LSD–41/49 class 

and you say, well, should we continue with the LPD 17 hull form 

as replacement for LSD–41/49 class, the answer is that is a lot 

more capability than the LSD–41/49 have today. 

But the other thing that the Marine Corps is wrestling with is 

their vehicles, their equipment that they deploy with is a lot more 

than they had when the LSD–41/49 class was being built. 

So I think General Glueck and his team have worked—worked 

hard in terms of trying to determine what the future lift requirements are. And, you know, under those parameters, the LPD–17 

hull form is a better fit for the Marine Corps requirement, independent of that 38, 33, total number of ship requirement. 

Now, the other thing we have to balance that with is affordability. And that has been one of the challenges. So, right now, we 

are completing the analysis of alternatives [AOA] for the LSD–41 

replacement, referred to as LXR, and the LPD–17 is prominent in 

that analysis of alternatives. And what we have to wrestle with is, 

how do we get to a hull form that does provide the degree of lift 

and capability that the LPD–17 does but within an affordable top 

line. 

And then the last, the last thing that we are wrestling with, 

which doesn’t show up in the AOA, it doesn’t show up in terms of 

Marine Corps requirements, is the industrial base considerations. 

Now, when we look at shipbuilding, the area where we are most 

fragile is in our amphib ship construction. And it is just the nature 

of the beast. LPD–17 production, you know, we have built out—we 

are building out our last of the LPD–17s. We don’t require construction of the LXR to start until about the 2020 timeframe. And 

so this gap cannot be filled simply with big-deck amphibs. So we 

are wrestling with how to best mitigate the gap in production, how 

to deal with the affordability issue that this budget stresses, and 

then how to meet the Marine Corps’ requirement in terms of lift 

capability that an LP–17 would bring to the fight. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And aloha, Vice Admiral. Good to see you again. 

Mr. Stackley, one of the things that has always plagued us is 

really the question, what is the number? What is the number that 

we need? You know, we have heard 306. We have—we are at 283. 

We had former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman here, who was 

the famous almost 600. He corrected us and said he wasn’t quite 

at 600. And of course, Admiral Roughead was here, too, and they 

were, like, 346, 348 or vice versa. 

But then when the question then rises, okay, what comprises 

that number? Then everyone sort of says, well, it depends on what 

we need it for. 

But we have got to acquire, as you know, and the build out is 

going to be determined, I call it policy by acquisition, because 

whatever we buy and we acquire kind of sets it for the future. 

So what is the number? What is the number that we need? We 

have got to pivot to Asia-Pacific that Admiral Locklear has made 
18 

very clear that he doesn’t feel like he has got enough ships to do 

that. So what is it? Where are we going to go? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Let me start with just the documented requirement. The Navy has a document referred to as the 

Force Structure Assessment. It was last completed in 2012, delivered to the Hill last year, signed out by the CNO, and that is for 

a balanced force of 306 ships: 11 aircraft carriers, 33 amphibious 

ships, 88 large surface combatants, 52 small service combatants, 48 

attack boats, et cetera. 

So 306 is the balanced force structure. But clearly, it factors in 

affordability. So in his—in one of his hearings earlier this year, the 

CNO, when answering this question, described that, well, to meet 

the combatant commanders, the full range of combatant commanders’ demands or requirements, it would take a 450-ship Navy. 

And nobody is contemplating a 450-ship Navy today. 

So what we are struggling with is what can we afford and ensure 

that it is a balanced force. And then how do we take that 306-ship 

Navy that is in the Force Structure Assessment and meet to the 

best of our ability the combatant commanders’ demands. And that 

has going towards things like forward-deploying ships, so you get 

greater operational availability, greater presence. Take the LCS 

[littoral combat ship] class and look at 52-ship class and having 26 

of them deployed at any one time, and just getting more mileage 

out of the ships that are in the force, recognizing that we are going 

to be limited in terms of the force structure that we can build with 

the budgets that we have. 

Ms. HANABUSA. The Army has said that they have more ships 

than the Navy. Is that true? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, first, I would describe that the ships 

that the Army is referring to are predominantly lift ships, 

prepositioning ships. But, otherwise, beyond those larger ships, 

what the Army would call a ship wouldn’t meet the Navy’s definition of a ship. And I will just stop right there. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But the question is, for those that might meet 

the definition of a ship, how many are we talking about? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy—the maritime, which includes 

Military Sealift Command, the Navy, we have a portion of our fleet, 

which is referred to as maritime prepositioning ship. And so we 

have a number of ships that are prepositioned with equipment 

loaded out in the event of a need for immediate response to a crisis. 

Beyond that, we have a Ready Reserve Fleet that are ships that 

could be called up in the event that the Nation determined that we 

wanted to activate these Ready Reserve ships. Total number of 

those, I would have to get back to you with an exact number. It 

is pretty well accounted for. But you are in the double digits. A few 

years ago, it was about 50-plus Ready Reserve ships and 19-odd 

pre-pos [prepositioning] ships. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Before we broke, the statement you made that, 

of course, I find troubling—I represent Hawaii—is the fact that you 

said that even the Virginia-class subs would be at risk, the two 

Virginia-class subs, at the sequester, if we don’t do anything with 

the sequester in 2016. So when you say that, what do you mean? 

That we are not going to be able to build the two? Or the two are 
19 

not high enough in terms of priority that they will be continue to 

be considered what we need? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me start with the requirement. So we 

have a requirement for 48 attack submarines inside of that Force 

Structure Assessment. Today we are at 54. So today it looks like 

we have a surplus to the requirement, but the reality is that during the period of the 1990s, we fell short in terms of building out 

submarines. And so we need to sustain a two-boat-per-year pace to 

minimize the shortfall that we are going to be staring at in the 

2020s. 

So in the latter portion of the 2020s, 2029 timeframe, we are 

going to—our projection right now is we will have 41 attack submarines against a 48-boat requirement. So that is a screaming 

need. 

So within the budget that we have submitted, we do, in fact, sustain two boats per year. And our intent is to sustain two boats per 

year except for those years in which we will be procuring the Ohio 

replacement program submarines. So there will be years when we 

are procuring one Virginia per year. 

When I discussed what happens at the BCA levels, again, these 

are the deliberations that we are going through right now as we 

build the 2016 budget and we take a look at the choices that we 

would have to make if we are down to the BCA levels. A Virginia 

is under discussion in terms of whether or not it would fit within 

our top line, along with the three DDG–51s, along with the CVN– 

73 RCOH, along with a number of other ships and aircraft in our 

program. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

I have exceeded my time. I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General, you have been saying that you need a track replacement 

for the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle fleet as your number 

one priority for a long time. Now you have shifted plans to buy a 

wheeled vehicle. Can you explain to the committee, for the record, 

what has changed and where your priorities are now? 

General GLUECK. Thank you for that question. 

Our requirement has all been based on the requirement to replace the AAV, which is a track vehicle that is coming up on over 

40 years of age. 

Back 25 years ago, we developed a concept called Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. And three elements of that were the MV–22, the 

LCAC [Landing Craft Air Cushion] and then an AAAV [Advanced 

Amphibious Assault Vehicle], which was a high-speed vehicle, track 

vehicle. 

After a quarter of a century of research, and we looked at this 

in many different ways, and actually a program name changed to 

the EFV, you know, it was canceled. And it was unaffordable. 

We kept up an ACV directorate at that time, an advanced combat vehicle directorate, that was focused on doing the research on 

high speed technology to see if it was actually realistic to achieve 

that goal in an affordable way, would give us the operational capability that we wanted. 

After 2 years of research, we found that a track vehicle was able 

to get up on the plane and it could give us the 25 knots. However, 
20 

there were very many tradeoffs to be able to do that. And those 

tradeoffs were considered to be unacceptable in performance potential to actually assure where 90 percent of the vehicle would have 

its life ashore. So it was optimized for 10 percent of its mission and 

not optimized for 90 percent of its mission. 

So we went out to the Nevada test facility out in Carson City, 

Nevada. And they have all the vehicles out there, all the track vehicles we own, as well as all the wheeled vehicles that we have in 

the inventory today and included the MPC, which is a program 

that we had earlier that we were working on, Marine Personnel 

Carrier. And we got a chance, took the Commandant out there. We 

drove in every one of the vehicles. Went over their course. And, you 

know, we saw that the difference between the wheel technology 

and track technology. And, quite frankly, over the past 20 years, 

the advancement in wheel technology has far exceeded that of 

track technology because of the commercial demand. 

And so we found that because of the great leverage that we have 

gotten from the commercial industry, that the capability of the 

wheeled vehicle far exceeds that of a track vehicle. So that is where 

we set up the program now to go ahead and pursue the ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] as a wheeled vehicle. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Can any of you explain to us what the GEF, the Global Employment of the Force? 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, that is a classified portion of—it falls out 

of from a planning guidance that basically says, when I have so 

many assets, how do I break down what I would send for where? 

So it is created by the Joint Staff working with the Secretary of Defense and then the services as a classified annex of how you would 

use the force. But it also then drives to you later the states you 

have to set up. So we could certainly provide something in writing 

back in terms of more about what that is. But it is less in the 

resourcing area. It is definitely in the planning area. But ultimately it does drive us for a long-term view about what you have 

to have. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, do the combatant commanders have any 

role in that, in creating that? 

Admiral MULLOY. I know they are involved with when it gets reviewed and developed. I believe it is developed by OSD [Office of 

the Secretary of Defense] Policy and the Joint Staff. It is staffed 

out for them to look at it. But I would—I have to get back to you 

with the exact specifics of their role. But almost everything we do 

under the reorganization, going all the way back to Gramm-Rudman, is the combatant commanders have a direct input to the Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of items. So they do look at 

that. 

Mr. FORBES. The question I would ask each of you, if you would, 

for the record for this committee, if you would provide a time when 

this committee could review that in a classified setting, and we are 

happy to do it in a classified setting. We have made those requests, 

and so far just haven’t been able to look at that. But we would like 

to do that. I think most of our members would. 

The second thing that I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary, and I 

know this is no surprise to you, is aircraft carriers. We talked 
21 

about earlier where you said there is a statutory requirement for 

11 carriers. And I know that you appreciate that. Secondly, we 

know that Congress had allocated and appropriated money for at 

least the planning phases of that carrier for this cycle, which I 

think was about $243 million. Am I off a little bit on that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. 245. 

Mr. FORBES. 245. It is my understanding now, correct me if I am 

wrong, that the Navy has basically said, we are not going to utilize 

that, those planning dollars now. Is that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Partially. So, of the $245 million for planning, a portion of that was associated with defueling the aircraft 

carrier, a portion of it was associated with modernizing the aircraft 

carrier, and a portion of it is associated with the refueling piece. 

And so we are moving out on the defueling piece because it is applicable to either path, whether we inactivate or do the complex refueling overhaul for CVN–73. So that is moving out. That is about 

$63 million. That leaves $182 million that we have unobligated 

today that is pending a determination of which path are we on, inactivate or refuel. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, help me with this, if you would. And, again, 

please don’t think I am talking about any one of three of you because I know this is not necessarily your decisions. 

But I remember when we looked at sequestration for a long period of time and the President’s budget continually ignored sequestration. And we would ask, how come your budgets aren’t reflecting 

sequestration? And the answer we got from the Pentagon was consistently, oh, this is so horrible, we can’t possibly look at it because 

it would be too impactful, so we are just assuming it is going to 

go away. 

And then we hear now as we look at the President’s budget, I 

think your statement was, and the nomenclature doesn’t matter, 

but we are going to take a pause because we are going to see what 

happens to sequestration. 

And when I am looking at the President’s budget, why didn’t the 

President include enough money to bump up to do that carrier in 

his budget? Because if it was the law, if it is, as everyone says, so 

strategically important for us as a Nation, the President didn’t 

limit himself to what sequestration called for, he bumped up those 

numbers. Why wasn’t the carrier dollars included in that budget 

that the President sent over? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I am going to start this response and then 

I am going to have Admiral Mulloy join in here. 

My simplest description for this is last year, I think we built six 

different budgets. And whereas normally we would build a budget 

and refine it over time, last year we were literally building a half 

a dozen different budgets. And this is and around things like government shutdowns and furloughs and everything else that was 

taking place. 

And so we did not have clarity in terms of what budget was 

going over to the Hill because we had not, one, received the BBA 

had not been enacted yet, so we weren’t sure which direction Congress was heading in with 2014 and 2015. So there was a lot of uncertainty very late in the day in terms of our budget build process. 
22 

And when the determination—when the BBA became clear, and 

the determination was we are going to retain that carrier if we can 

retain this top line, frankly, at that stage of the budget process, it 

was too difficult to move 7 billion into—inside of that top line. And 

that is my simplest, clearest explanation of where we are and how 

we got there. 

And Admiral Mulloy can probably improve upon that. 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir. I would say it all comes down to the 

timing. They were developing the plan to—when 2014 and 2015 

locked in, as the Secretary pointed out, 2015 was a dramatic cut, 

but we were able to balance and work with OSD to be able to— 

and also appreciate the fully funding of the 2014 submarine that 

was done by the Hill. And so items came up that freed some 

money, but not to the level we needed to have. 

As OSD went down and looked at how do they lock all these— 

the DOD [Department of Defense] budgets, the Navy point was, 

here is money, we are going to fix some parts of shipbuilding. But 

the carrier became a key component at the end. We have been directed to continue to develop as work in POM–16 [Program Objective Memorandum-16], given the DOD budget, across the FYDP of 

that, what they call the green dash line, is that DOD will work for 

resources to solve problems. The Marine Corps end strength was 

one small component. The Navy, which is the clearest and largest 

component that starts in 2016. 

And so I think they are looking for what happens in the 2015 

going to 2016 from the Hill. What does that look like. And then 

economically. But we are going to develop a plan that has the carrier in there as part of the Department of Defense budget. 

Mr. FORBES. I guess I still scratch my head a little bit on if this 

carrier was a priority and if it was necessary to meet the strategic 

guidance for 2012, which I assume it is, because we have constantly been told it was, I don’t—I am still grasping with why the 

President didn’t include it in his budget when it came over here. 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, all I can say is, again, as Mr. Stackley 

pointed out, we had six different budgets. If you remember, last 

summer, DOD could not believe that we could not cut two or three 

carriers. The Navy, through a tremendous effort led by Mr. 

Stackley in the area of what it called good stewardship. And of all 

the areas we tried to tighten, myself as budget officer with execution and where can we make money, we freed up money out of the 

Navy budget to be able to reduce that number down. And it really 

came down to being as you are spinning a lot of plates at the end 

as you lock this in January, I believe that it was the Navy is saying is, you know, this really isn’t there yet, this is our budget. And 

everyone said, we really want it in. We will go back and do it 

again. Because it is—2015 was tight with the BBA. And we had 

the room, as we showed you before, was, we can slide the carrier 

because the Stennis comes later. We can make a decision in 2016 

to start the ship and just still get it done. Basically it will—we can 

still get down out of the dry dock in Newport News before the Stennis comes in. It is pending upon economic requirements. And that 

is really all I can tell you right now, sir, on my understanding of 

my money as I lock that budget. 
23 

Mr. FORBES. And we appreciate all that you guys have done and 

the terrible situation you have been in with budgets. 

It is just as we look at the carrier and we hear the rhetoric kind 

of coming out of the White House of why we haven’t made a decision, but we see you taking the appropriated dollars that we had 

for the planning, for the refueling, not utilizing those, we see no 

money in for the request to do the acquisitions that would need to 

be done this year, and we don’t see it in the FYDP, but we saw 

it in before, it is kind of like that old adage, if it walks likes a duck 

and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck. It looks like to us 

the decision has been made to take the carrier out. But you are 

saying, ‘‘but we could put it back in,’’ as opposed to saying, ‘‘we 

have delayed the decision.’’ 

And I hope that is wrong. And I hope Congress perhaps can send 

a message that we need to correct that. But we certainly don’t fault 

any one of the three of you for that. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, the only thing I would add to what you 

just described was the statement was actually a little bit more 

clear in terms of we could put it back in. The statement was we 

would put it back in if we can hold on to the budget levels that 

we submitted with this budget. 

Mr. FORBES. Last two questions. And then I want to get Mr. 

Langevin’s questions in. 

Cruisers, you know, that is a big question. None of us so far with 

the plans we have got have a comfort level that we can—will ever 

see those cruisers come back out, at least on the plan that we have 

now. 

You know, and some of us are concerned that really what we see 

is an elaborate way to bring about early retirement of these cruisers after Congress has twice rejected this idea. 

What comfort level can you give to this subcommittee that these 

cruisers are going to come out? 

Because everything we see is you telling us, as you just said with 

the carrier, we will put it back if we get more money. We know destroyers are next on the chopping block perhaps to put some in, 

you know, next time. Give us that comfort level that this committee 

would have that these cruisers will see life again. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start with a few key points. One, today, we have $2.2 billion inside of the Ship Modernization 

Overhaul and Sustainment Fund that Congress established. In the 

last 2 years, when the Navy was struggling with what our budget 

levels would be and our ability to retain those cruisers, that fund 

was not in a working condition where we could actually put it to 

work. What you all did with last year’s budget in terms of giving 

it life out to 2021 gives us the ability now with certainty to put 

that money to work. 

So a key part of the cruiser modernization plan, which, one, gives 

you the ability to hold us accountable but, equally important, gets 

us going, is we need to—our proposal is that we take those 11 

cruisers and we commence effectively immediately CG–64 goes into 

her modernization at the end of this year, and we would bring the 

other 10 cruisers into the first phase of the phased plan, which 

starts with the hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. And we 

would not wait a number of years, but we would go into the 10 
24 

ships, baseline their material conditions, get the material on order, 

and then, working across the industrial base, phase and schedule 

those ships to when they can most efficiently be modernized for the 

hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. That is the front end of 

the program; $2.2 billion won’t get us all the way there. We have 

some additional funding in the FYDP. And, frankly, we need to 

work with you all to come up with a mechanism to replenish the 

fund that has been established. 

But in the near term, what we would be executing is a modernization program for the cruisers that will bring their material 

condition up to the level that it needs to be to get them their extended service life. And then when you look downstream in the 5- 

year period from now when they are completing their HM&E modernization, then the Nation has choices. 

What we are proposing is we would complete the combat systems 

portion of the modernization so that we can lockstep replace retiring cruisers, the first 11, one for one, with the fully modernized 

cruiser from the last 11 and then be able to keep 11 cruisers tied 

to our battle groups out into the 2040s. 

So, in terms of confidence and commitment, I think what we propose to do is work with you on the details, detailed on the front 

end. On the back end, what we would be dealing with is, okay, the 

funding stream that would go with that plan—and, frankly, we are 

relying on our ability to draw down the manpower associated with 

the cruisers and the operating and support costs during this period 

to help finance the combat systems modernization on the back end. 

So we are committed to giving you the level of detail that you need 

to give you confidence that we are going to execute. 

I think we can do this in a stepwise fashion so each step of the 

process Congress has a clear eye on the condition of those cruisers 

and our ability to complete the phases and so we do not lose momentum as we go through the entire process. 

Mr. FORBES. And we will look forward to kind of walking through 

that plan. We trust each one of the three of you, but we don’t necessarily trust everybody else that might be dictating that. And we 

don’t trust all of our colleagues in what they may do in budget discussions. That is why we want to make sure that we have a plan 

that is going to be workable. 

Last question I have is, has DOD performed a new analysis of 

mission needs to identify what capability gaps the Navy might 

need to address through a new shipbuilding program to replace the 

littoral combat ship? If not, then how can DOD know that it needs 

a new ship generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate? 

Where is the properly validated requirements for this new program? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I am going to start, and Admiral Mulloy finish. 

The requirements for the LCS program are well documented. 

And right now we are moving smartly through the execution of 

that program in terms of the basic hull and then the mission packages. 

What the Secretary of Defense described in his guidance to us 

and then his subsequent announcement was that the Department 

is looking to increase the lethality of the LCS and something simi-
25 

lar to a frigate. So we do have a requirements team taking a hard 

look at exactly what would that mean. What missions, what roles, 

what is the concept of operations, looking forward beyond first 32, 

to those next 20 small surface combatants. What is that concept of 

operations and the additional lethality that it would require, similar to a frigate. 

I don’t want to predetermine the outcome of that review. The 

team, frankly, is locked up in a war room that we have set aside. 

What I would welcome and invite is your staff to visit, to join, to 

take a look at the process, take a look at their findings, interim 

findings along the way. And this then will be used as we put together our 2016 budget and look at either modifying the LCS or, 

if need be, a new ship class. 

In either case, when it comes to modifying an LCS, we have always contemplated future flights of LCS. So this could be a very 

simple, straightforward, in-stride modification, just like we do with 

other ship classes. 

If it equates to a new ship class, that is a very different picture. 

And so, again, just like every other discussion we have had today, 

a piece of this requirements definition is going to include affordability. So we have to strike the right balance between what is that 

degree of added lethality, added capability to an LCS that we need 

for the CONOPS [concept of operations] in which you will be operating, which includes with the rest of the battle force. And then 

what does that mean in terms of cost? And what does that mean 

in terms of schedule, when we would be able to introduce that capability for the small service combatant. 

Mr. FORBES. We are caught between two very powerful currents 

that both want to go in different directions. I don’t know where the 

subcommittee ends up coming out. But we have got to make sure 

they have the right analysis so we can make that decision. 

Admiral, if you want. 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir. What I would say is that the requirements paperwork almost has to come after. But as the Secretary 

pointed out, we do a lot of changes in other classes of ships. I 

mean, as you look at the North Dakota, the first of Flight IV, or 

the flight—I mean, the flight we are doing now with the South Dakota, is, there have been changes. I mean, the North Dakota is 

being built with vertical launch tubes in the bow and a wraparound 

array. Nothing to do with the original MNS/ORD [mission needs 

statement/operational requirement document] when the Virginia 

was designed had that in it. Yet the combat power and the design 

of that ship is fundamentally changing. Flight III Burkes are not 

having a whole new set, but they are fundamentally very different 

than Flight I when the Burke was built. 

So the Navy has a pattern of making changes to improve ships. 

So we really have to get the tiger team, with which I have some 

of my people on the staff, Admiral Aucoin does, Mr. Stackley is 

leader, is this key component. And then is it a change to the ship? 

Is a whole new ship? Either way, we can write some paperwork 

faster than we have to. 

I have a copy of the Nautilus, initial paperwork design written 

by—in the 1950s. It is 6 pages long to build naval nuclear power. 

It is not the document you would see that had for Virginia class. 
26 

So I am not sure we have to go back to 6 pages. But I know we 

can work faster on that once we define what we have. And I think 

some of your staff coming to see this team or meet some of the people would be outstanding. Because the Secretary has taken it very 

seriously that we need to figure out what those next 20 are. But 

we need small surface combatants, going back to the FSA design, 

is small surface combatants fill a range of needs. They are not all 

at the high end, but they magnify and amplify phase 1 convoys, 

ASW [anti-submarine warfare]. They also support phase zero operations around the world in engagement. And that is what we need 

to go back to, what does the ship have to bring? And what does it 

have to have for the little higher end capability but mesh it into 

the whole class? 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin, recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. And we appreciate the benefit of your testimony. And grateful for your service. So thank you all. 

Mr. Secretary, let me start with you. In your testimony, you referenced the coupling of the Ohio replacement and the U.K. [United 

Kingdom] Successor programs and the need to maintain the current schedule and funding profile. Could you outline for us your 

progress in driving costs out of this system as well as some of the 

serious risks that would occur if there was any further slippage to 

the program? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me first describe that today we 

are on schedule in terms of both the Ohio replacement program 

schedule and supporting the Successor. We have effectively prosecuted the design of the common missile compartment, which is the 

major portion of the design between us and the U.K., ahead of 

when it would normally have been designed, developed and designed, if we were just doing it for the Ohio replacement. But that 

was done to support their schedule, but it also helps us in terms 

of retiring some of our risk ahead of the Ohio replacement. 

In terms of progress regarding cost, we are going after two pieces 

of the cost. We are going after the development costs, and we are 

going after the unit costs for the submarine itself. And we have a, 

what is referred to as a design for affordability program in place 

between the Navy, Electric Boat, and Newport News all participating, just taking a fundamental look at, how is this new boat 

going to be designed? Where are there opportunities to reduce its 

cost, either in terms of the way we build or the way we buy? 

But most fundamentally, the key portion in terms of keeping cost 

and schedule under control is reusing technology to the extent possible. So we are porting over as much of the Virginia systems as 

we can that will apply to the Ohio replacement as well as and 

equally important the strategic programs associated with missile 

launch. 

So key components that drive both cost and risk are being tackled through mature designs and reuse. And then what that leaves 

is the balance of the boat and new development that is associated 

with improving survivability of the Ohio replacement to last well 

into this century. That development has very dedicated efforts to 
27 

retire the risk. And that is where a lot of our current research and 

development is focused. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for that answer, Mr. Secretary. 

On another program, as we watched the deployment of the updated laser weapon system onboard the USS Ponce this year, I 

know that the Navy is also working on other solid state laser technical maturity program technologies to put a higher power integrated weapons system to sea in 2016, as I understand it. 

I particularly applaud the inclusion of a dedicated funding 

stream in the budget for integration of these capabilities onto existing platforms. I think that is a very positive development, positive 

move in the right direction. 

Could you offer an update from your perspective on the status 

and the promise of these directed energy capabilities at sea as well 

as other high energy weapons systems, such as railguns. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. In terms of directed energy, lasers 

and rail—electromagnetic railguns are the two principal weapon 

systems that we are focused on right now. They both have great 

promise matched by great challenges. So in terms of laser development—in fact, we have gone down several paths trying to get to a 

laser weapon system that would be appropriate for shipboard 

weapons system. 

The solid state laser broke through in terms of the greatest potential. And what we are literally doing on Ponce is we are not 

going to wait for the normal, natural development timeline. CNO 

has basically said, let’s get it out there. Let’s get it out there. Let’s 

get it into the sailors’ hands, let’s start to figure out what it means 

to operate in a marine environment onboard ship a laser weapon 

system. 

So we are going to run into all sorts of challenges that we didn’t 

fully anticipate. But the learning that is going to come with putting 

that smaller scale laser weapon system on the Ponce is going to accelerate the longer-term potential and promise that lasers bring. 

Not 2016, sir. We have got a ways to go in terms of maturing 

the technology for the broader shipboard application. But it is also 

on our priority list because of the potential it provides. 

Railguns are a bit different. Railgun is an extremely unique technology. You are probably well aware we have demonstrated its capability down at Dahlgren, the Naval Surface Warfare Center. But 

we have several areas that we have got to tackle in order to 

weaponize that potential. One is something as simple as the barrel 

of the gun. We are dealing with large electrical power. And so the 

barrel of the gun has got to be able to handle, frankly, the 

megajoules that we are looking at there. 

A second is the projectile itself. You know, we are going to be firing a projectile Mach 7. We need to ensure that—there is a lot of 

testing that goes to developing a Mach 7 projectile coming from the 

barrel of a gun. And a third part of the kill chain is simply the fire 

control system. 

So we have got a gun right now that on land, we can point, we 

can fire a slug at Mach 7. What we have got to do is get to a fire 

control system associated with this gun that can spot the target 

and put the round on the target. 
28 

So those are three of the key technologies that we are continuing 

to work while we demonstrate the basic technology. We are going 

to, just like the laser weapon system, we are going to get a smaller 

scale railgun and outfit onboard one of our joint high speed vessels 

again to get it into the fleet’s hands, to demonstrate, and to create 

more momentum behind that development. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Well, I am a strong supporter of these 

type of technologies. I think are they are game changing, and they 

are going to help the fleet be much more effective as—and that 

goes across the services once these technologies are further developed and ready for deployment. 

Last question I have is we have invested billions of dollars to ensure that our aircraft carriers project—can project power anywhere 

on the globe. And it is critical that we continue to make the investments to ensure that we are leveraging our carriers’ capabilities to 

the maximum extent possible. 

How do you envision Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance 

and Strike enhancing the carrier wing? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I will start this response, and I will 

have Admiral Mulloy cap it off. 

So, today, we have this demonstrator called UCAS, the Unmanned Combat Air System, that has basically demonstrated the 

ability to operate unmanned fixed wing on and off of an aircraft 

carrier. 

The next big thing we have got to figure out is how to integrate 

it in the air wing. So it, in fact, does bring to bear its capabilities 

in increasing the overall air wings’ capabilities. 

In the near term, you described the Unmanned Carrier Launched 

Aerial Strike and Surveillance system which we simply call 

UCLASS. We are working on the request for proposal to go out and 

compete the development of UCLASS so that we can deploy nominally a half a dozen of these aircraft on a carrier late in this decade 

to, in fact, not just integrate it in the air wing but start to exploit 

some of the capabilities that it will bring. 

Clearly, its high endurance is going to give the Navy the ability 

to provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] capabilities for the carrier 24/7. It is going to give us the ability to provide orbits, 6 to 1,200 miles away from the carrier, 24/7, in the case 

of the 600-mile type of a range. But beyond that, we are going to 

give it a strike capability and then have the ability to start going 

after targets of opportunity. 

Beyond that, what I would propose is that we offer you a classified brief so you can see where, in fact, we are looking to go with 

this capability in the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would certainly welcome that. 

And, Admiral, did you have something to add? 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir. I would like to further emphasize that 

in the two parts of Mr. Stackley talked about risk reduction. Right 

now, we are working with the UCAS, and we have decided to extend that program, so we are working above threshold program to 

come to the Hill in 2014, and you will see in 2015 an added item 

to continue to fund for $50 million until we actually get the 

UCLASS vehicles from this RFP [request for proposal] to start coming. Because it comes in three sections, sir. There is the air vehicle 
29 

itself, which we are expecting RFP. There is the carrier segment, 

which is onboard handling of the vessel. And there is a communication and command and control. Do you operate in the area? Does 

the CAG [carrier air group] operate it? Does it turn over to a combatant commander for the use, if we get extended range on it? So 

all three sections have to come together. And the UCAS allows us 

to work those. Some of it will be on an aircraft carrier. Some of it 

will be actually flying at Pax River [Naval Air Station Patuxent 

River]. Some may go to Fallon to work into the air wing. So we are 

asking for the support. 

So we are asking for the support for the ATR [above-threshold 

reprogramming] and for this budget item for UCAS. They all directly lead into the UCLASS program to retire the risk of all these 

segments. We really are excited that we acknowledged as a requirement in I think it was last year’s NDA they said get six vehicles first, and that is where we are going on that was to get out 

there and get that on a carrier and operate and see where it can 

go. But on those, what are called key performance parameters, 

there are six and six key supported parameters, there is the key 

system attributes that all relate to the lethality, connectivity, 

modularity of that and the ability that it can operate on a ship, 

that it has to be able to operate at sea state 3 and be able to get 

to sea state 5. It has to carry weight, it has to fly long enough that 

it doesn’t interfere with the air wing. You ideally want to make 

sure this goes off early and can either stay out of one full cycle or 

go out long enough that it doesn’t interfere with the flight deck, 

that it supports the CAG and the air wing by being up all the time 

and not exhausting the crew. So you have to marinize it, it is different than a land-based item. It has to fit into what I call the flow 

of life in the battle group, that it enhances the battle group, and 

therefore, it enhances the combatant commander’s needs, and that 

is what we are working through with the RFP directly ties to those 

parameters, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, thank you for that answer, and I applaud the Navy’s work in this area and being so forward thinking 

and working so aggressively to integrate this capability into the 

carrier wing so it can enhance our capabilities exponentially. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you for your patience. 

As you know, one of the most important things of this hearing 

is the transcript we create, not just your testimony. We have submitted your written transcript or your written testimony, but I 

would like to give you any time you need now if there was something that we did not discuss that you think is important that we 

get in that transcript for you to be able to elaborate on now or 

something that perhaps was confusing that you want to correct. 

The other request I would make, not that you have to respond 

to this now, but if you would respond back to the committee, perhaps in writing, of those six budgets you described, which of the 

budgets did not include CVN–73 in the planning? Was it just the 

sequestration budget? And then if you can, give us a little written 

explanation. We are still kind of fumbling around to understand 

why we had time to plan for the $115 billion and the $26 billion, 
30 

almost $141 billion extra, but we didn’t have time to plan for the 

carrier. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 75.] 

Mr. FORBES. And so, with that, General, would you like to start 

off with any comments that you think that the Marine Corps needs 

to make sure we get in this transcript that wasn’t in your testimony? 

General GLUECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would say that we request your support in a couple areas. One 

is the funding flexibility in the ACV way ahead. As you know, the 

program has been evolving, and we have some money in the budget, and what we would like to do is to be able to move some of that 

money around to be more effective and efficient with the funds that 

do exist, not asking for anything more. 

Secondly, we would like to get your support on the funding of the 

development of our high speed connector technology as we move 

forward. Since we walked away from the high speed vehicle, we 

now continue to pursue the high speed connector technology. 

And lastly, support of increased amphibious ship investment as 

well as the maintenance and inventories. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir, I appreciate the chance to be here. 

This is my first hearing, so I was very excited to be over here, but 

I will say even better than I thought, I look forward to talking to 

my family when I get home. 

I would say the areas to expand, not so much directly related to 

the cruiser but talking about ballistic missile defense, is the Navy’s 

path ahead is the DDG program. We are building DDGs. Every one 

we are building now from the bottom up is BMD [ballistic missile 

defense] compliant, and we are looking forward to in fiscal year 

2016 the very first of the Flight III, which will have the advanced, 

the AMDR [Air and Missile Defense Radar] radar and even greater 

capability to provide that. And so the path ahead for us is to have 

the ships converted, which is the Flight IIAs, we start the first one 

in 2016. You will see in this budget is funding for three sets. We 

have to do the 2 years ahead of OPN [Other Procurement, Navy], 

and then we want to start a path. So we acknowledge converting 

the BMD Flight I and II ships, but we need to start doing the IIAs 

because they are not any BMD capable. Flight Is and IIs have 

some capability. The total need for the combatant commander is to 

raise the number of capabilities, and it is really not a cruiser issue; 

they are AAW [anti-aircraft warfare] ships. It is a DDG issue, and 

that is our path to fund that. 

The other one is linking up with our Marine Corps is, we support 

the tremendous efforts last year of the committees to allow us to 

move the second AFSB [Afloat Forward Staging Base], to fund it 

for SOF [special operations forces], other modifications, and to finish that design, which will also support our Marine Corps team. 

We are now looking at the capability of integrating AFSBs and 

MLPs [Mobile Landing Platforms] into more than just being a 

MPSRON [Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadron] or the maritime squadron offload. These will be able to go out and do exercises 
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and advancements, and we are very excited about this connectivity 

of an AFSB, afloat staging base, would be a place for a Marine 

Corps Special Purpose MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] to 

operate as well as our special forces. So the CNO and SECNAV 

[Secretary of the Navy] are very excited about, where can we take 

this kind of technology of those ships to support our national force, 

whether it is a national mission force or our Marine Corps team 

to react to problems around the world that then frees up the 

amphibs to remain tied to the amphibious group? So I think you 

will see more on that as we go, and you will see in the budget, we 

have added a third one in 2017 because we see a need for three 

of these around—Ponce has been there; she is a great ship. I was 

on her as a third-class midshipman, and she is still out there working, but we need to have a solution that solves problems. AFSBs 

are part of that. So, other than that, sir, I thank you very much 

for your time. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you and thanks for being here for 

the hearing, and you did a great job. And, you know, our hearings 

are always fun and exciting, so they are always enjoyable. 

So, Mr. Secretary, we will let you finish up. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, I am probably just going to run 

through a list here just to cap off a few topics. 

Admiral Mulloy discussed the DDG mod program to get us up 

through the Flight IIs, IIAs. We are on track for that. This comes 

back a little bit, though, to the cruiser modernization discussion as 

well. So when we come back to you with more details on cruiser 

mod, what I would like to do is put that side by side with destroyer 

mod so you can see a few things. One, you will see how we are following through on that commitment on the destroyers. I discussed 

the John Paul Jones, you know, tracking and knocking out a ballistic missile target, at the same time working a cruise missile target. That is breakthrough capability. That came out of the destroyer modernization program. That is the Aegis Baseline 9 that 

she was, she was the first one to go through. So we are moving 

through that smartly. When you overlay a cruiser mod on top of 

that, a couple things will emerge. One is going to be capacity. So 

when we talk about scheduling cruiser mod, both the HM&E and 

the combat systems piece, what you need to take a hard look at is 

the capacity and when do we have the time to do that, when is it 

best to do cruisers versus destroyers, and that is going to be part 

of our calculus as opposed to dealing with one in isolation from the 

other. 

Second is we talk about upgrading through the Flight IIA. Flight 

III. Flight III is a great news story. We have awarded the AMDR 

missile—I am sorry, the AMDR radar development contract, and 

we are on track for the preliminary design review for that radar 

later at the end of this calendar year, early in fiscal year 2015. 

Similarly, we are doing the preliminary design review [PDR] for 

the ship to take a look at the ship impacts, and all of the concerns 

that had been previously raised regarding shipboard margins for 

power cooling, stability, and weight, those are all being clearly addressed, and so we see the ship PDR coming along very well. We 

see the development on the radar coming along very well, and we 

look forward to coming back next year in our 2016 budget request, 
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where we will include the Flight III. Between now and then, we 

will continue to work with your staff to demonstrate the maturity 

of that design as it comes along. 

General Glueck discussed the amphibs, we discussed the 

amphibs. That is—when we look at all the industrial base issues 

that we have in shipbuilding, that is one that is most pressing, and 

it does not have a simple solution for all the reasons that we have 

discussed, but we do look forward to continuing to work with your 

subcommittee on this issue because it is so important to us. 

We have talked the CVN–73 at length, and I know we will continue to talk it, discuss the issues surrounding that as we go 

through the budget cycle, and you all deliberate on the 2015 bill 

that you ultimately pass. 

Thank you for the discussion on LCS, I do hope that your staff 

or yourself get the opportunity to come over, visit our war room for 

those discussions. 

The last two things I want to wrap up on, one is our acquisition 

workforce. We are engineering-centric, rightfully so. Last year was 

tough, tough, tough on our workforce. All the pressures of the 

budget, all that churning of the budget, all the uncertainty, the layoffs, the furloughs put our workforce under great strain, but they 

hung in there. They hung in there, and they are back at it this 

year unfazed, very dedicated. What we have to do, and I look for 

you to keep a watchful eye on us, is to preserve our investment in 

that workforce as we go forward. 

Congress put in place the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund that has been very instrumental for us to be able to 

build up that skill set and get our engineering force and our contracts officers, program management team up to the level needed 

to succeed in the development of these difficult programs. What we 

have to ensure is, as we face these budget pressures, that we don’t 

go back to where we started and see the same type of fallout in 

terms of our shortfalls in program management and development 

that we had seen about a decade ago. 

Last is our development, our research and development. A lot of 

this discussion today was on major programs, building—sustaining 

the current fleet and building the next fleet, but what we have to 

likewise keep an eye on is the fleet after next, our R&D investments. Those capabilities that we are looking at today, that we 

have to get across the long haul to deal with the threat which, 

frankly, is investing heavily right now. The threat is investing 

heavily right now in dealing with our vulnerabilities. We have got 

to ensure that as the budget pressures mount, we don’t look at the 

R&D, we don’t look at cutting that R&D stream and forgoing the 

capabilities that we have got to put in the hands of future sailors 

and Marines so that they can enjoy the same degree of superiority 

that we enjoy today. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, our country is very fortunate to have 

the three of you serving in the capacities in which you are serving. 

Thank you for giving us your time today, and with that we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 26, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 26, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The Department of the Navy (DON) 

wants to retain CVN 73 if funding allows, as she remains critical to maintaining 

presence, surge capacity, the condition and service life of our other carriers, and the 

industrial base. The President’s budget (PB) request for 2015 maintains the option 

to refuel or inactivate CVN 73. The Department noted a decision regarding inactivation or conducting a refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) is deferred to PB 2016. As 

the Navy begins development of PB 2016 estimates, alternatives regarding plans to 

commence RCOH planning are under consideration, influenced by Congressional action in FY 2015. The Navy has proceeded with ‘‘next steps’’ associated with the CVN 

73 RCOH; specifically, the allocation of 2014 funding to expand planning efforts in 

support of the RCOH. 

In developing PB 2015, the fiscal uncertainty challenged and continues to challenge our ability to plan and budget over the long term. As we developed the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for the FY 2015–2019 Future Years Defense 

Program during calendar year 2013, the DON was faced with FY 2013 sequestration, civilian furloughs, a government shutdown, and continuing resolutions. The 

Secretary of Defense directed a Strategic Choices and Management Review to 

produce options and identify choices necessary to comply with the revised discretionary caps of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). Until the Bipartisan Budget 

Act of 2013 (BBA) was passed in December 2013, the DON was preparing for sequestration in FY 2014 and beyond. 

Due to this uncertainty, the DON was directed to produce several POM 2015 

budget options, including one at the PB 2014 level (the higher caps of the BCA), 

one at the lower caps of the BCA (referred to as Alternative POM), and one at the 

PB 2015 level. The PB 2014 level provides the resources necessary to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and included the refueling of CVN 73. Under sequestration, we would not be able to meet the DSG and were compelled to inactivate 

CVN 73 in the Alternative POM scenario. 

While the BBA provides some relief from sequestration in FY 2014 and FY 2015, 

the funding level is lower than our PB 2014 request and sequestration remains the 

law in FY 2016 and beyond. Because of the time necessary to plan and execute such 

a significant force structure reduction while preserving capability in the process, the 

Secretary of Defense made the strategic decision to program for sequestration levels 

in the later years of our PB 2015 submission for large force cuts, including carrier 

strike groups. Past drawdowns have reduced force structure too fast with too little 

planning. The resulting problems required significant amounts of time and money 

to fix. [See page 30.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 26, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The budget request included funding to support the inactivation of 

the USS George Washington but did not include funding request to support the complex overhaul or the investment requirements for the associated aviation wing. If 

the House of Representatives moves to restore funds associated with the proposal, 

will the Navy initiate the requisite contracts to obligate funds previously appropriated for the USS George Washington’s complex overhaul? What is the tipping 

point for Navy to begin investment in this critical resource? What is the damage 

in terms of cost and schedule in delaying the award of the USS George Washington 

complex overhaul? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The President’s budget (PB) request 

for 2015 maintains the option to refuel or inactivate CVN 73. The Department noted 

a decision regarding inactivation or conducting a refueling complex overhaul 

(RCOH) is deferred to PB 2016. As the Navy begins development of PB 2016 estimates, alternatives regarding plans to commence RCOH planning are under consideration, influenced by Congressional action in FY 2015. As discussed in recent testimony regarding the 2015 Budget request, the Navy has proceeded with ‘‘next steps’’ 

associated with the CVN 72 RCOH; specifically, the allocation of 2014 funding to 

expand planning efforts in support of the RCOH. 

Mr. FORBES. The Chief of Naval Operations approved a program of record decrease to the total aircraft procurement quantity for only 109 P–8 aircraft, despite 

the validated steady-state rotational and warfighting contingency requirement for 

117 P–8 aircraft. Please describe the risk incurred by this decision, and how does 

the Navy plan to mitigate the increased risk by procuring less P–8 aircraft than the 

validated requirement? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The Navy was compelled by fiscal constraints to lower the final P–8A inventory objective from 117 to 109 aircraft. This 

change in the Program of Record does not alter the P–3C-to-P–8A transition. With 

109 P–8A aircraft, the Navy can meet warfighting contingency requirements for 

major combat operations and assumes acceptable risk in maritime homeland defense. To mitigate this risk, the Navy will maintain an appropriate capacity of nondeployed aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and other aircraft 

for homeland defense missions. Further, this decision is clearly ‘‘reversible’’ as P– 

8A production continues through this decade. If the calculus associated with this decision changes due to either a change to security requirements or a change to the 

budget outlook, then the Navy has many opportunities to appropriately revise the 

P–8A inventory objective. 

Mr. FORBES. There has been much debate over the past several months, primarily 

within the Department of Defense, to characterize and codify what the air vehicle 

attributes of the UCLASS system requirements should be as an unmanned, fixedwing, carrier-based aircraft. Can you describe for us some of the primary Key Performance Parameters of the UCLASS air vehicle and how you expect some of those 

KPP’s to mature over time after source-selection and after the aircraft is fielded? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. All UCLASS requirements have been 

fully vetted and stable since the Capabilities Development Document was approved 

by the Chief of Naval Operations in April 2013. The Key Performance Parameters 

(KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs), as reviewed and concurred with by the 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), address endurance, sensor payload, weapons payload (including mandatory future growth capability), survivability 

(including mandatory future growth capability), aerial refueling (give & receive), affordability, and schedule. The Navy and industry have conducted extensive trade 

studies based on the latest and evolving threat intelligence to ensure the threshold 

to objective growth in those KPPs and KSAs are obtainable with the current fiscal 

constraints. The resulting UCLASS acquisition strategy leverages industry’s ability 

to deliver, within 4–5 years from contract award, a capable and survivable air vehicle while achieving the $150M cost per orbit KPP and preserves the ability to incrementally increase future Air Vehicle (AV) capability to match evolving threats. The 

in-depth technical interchange that has been ongoing between the Navy and industry has been instrumental in developing a comprehensive draft Request for Proposal 
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(RFP) presently under review. Once early operational deployments are conducted 

and fleet inputs have been obtained on the UCLASS concept of operations, the KPPs 

and KSAs in the Capabilities Development Document will be updated to support the 

next acquisition Milestone Decision. 

Mr. FORBES. The committee understands that the Navy is embarking on two separate analysis of alternative assessments to potentially develop a Next-Generation 

Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), and to develop a surface-launched Offensive AntiSurface Warfare (OASuW) weapon. Can you describe for us why two separate analyses are being performed to essentially fulfill what appears to be similar requirements, and what risk is there involved in terminating Tomahawk Block IV production after fiscal year 2015 while the analyses is on-going? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The Department has two separate mission areas that require assessment: 1. The follow-on to the Tomahawk Weapon System (land-attack) and 2. Long-term OASuW (anti-surface warfare). The Navy has 

commenced study efforts that will lead to a material development decision (MDD) 

in Fiscal Year 2015 to determine whether the Department will enter the Material 

Solution Analysis Phase for two separate weapon systems (one land-attack weapon 

and one anti-surface warfare weapon) or one weapon that performs both missions. 

The analyses in progress take into account multiple factors, to include launch platforms, target sets, warfighting scenarios, CONOPS, kill-chains, technology maturity, 

and cost. These analytical efforts place the Department on a path to address both 

mission areas. 

Separately, the Navy has programmed for continued modernization of the current 

inventory of Tomahawk weapons to improve their effectiveness against the challenges posed by the increasingly capable A2/AD threat environment. Ultimately 

however, although our Tomahawk inventory is more than sufficient to address worst 

case operational planning scenarios, the limits to our ability to modernize Tomahawk dictate that we develop and deliver the next generation at sufficient rate to 

replace the current Tomahawk inventory before it proves obsolete. 

Mr. FORBES. The Navy decided to procure 7 less E–2D aircraft in the 5-year 

multi-year procurement authorized in the FY14 National Defense Authorization Act. 

Why did the Navy make this decision and what is the impact of procuring 7 less 

aircraft during the 5-year multi-year contract? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The Navy’s budget across the Future Years’ Defense Plan (FYDP) was reduced by $38 billion compared to the FYDP submitted to the Congress when the higher levels of E–2D procurement were planned 

within the multiyear procurement (MYP). This budget reduction drove reduced procurement quantities across virtually every program and resulted in the decision to 

delay the purchase of seven E–2D aircraft into years outside of the current MYP 

contract (FY 2014–2018). The impact of delaying the procurement of these aircraft— 

a cost increase per MYP aircraft of $7.4M due to reduction of economies of scale 

and delay to Full Operational Capability from FY 2023 to FY 2025—is poignant example of the negative impact and inefficiencies caused by the Budget Control Act 

reductions. 

Mr. FORBES. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for the Secretary 

of Defense has recently been critical of the P–8’s initial operational capability as 

only being equivalent to what the P–3 provides the Navy today. Will the P–8’s capability remain at P–3 levels during its service-life, or does the Navy have plans to 

increase its capability above what the P–3 currently provides? If so, what capability 

increases will occur as compared to the P–3 today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The P–8A Poseidon program is structured as an evolutionary 

acquisition program delivering capability in three separate increments. The overarching purpose of Increment 1, as defined in the program’s requirements documentation, is to replace the aging P–3 airframe with a mission system that is at 

least equivalent to its P–3 predecessor. The Increment 1 configuration successfully 

completed Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) in 2013 and has subsequently deployed operationally. Though Increment 1 relied primarily upon NDI sensor technology and evolutionary upgrades to existing P–3 systems in order to minimize cost, schedule and technical risk, the Increment 1 baseline still delivers significantly greater mission capability than the P–3 in several important regards. First, 

the basic airframe’s significantly greater speed, range, and endurance relative to the 

P–3 are of great operational benefit especially across the broad areas encompassed 

by the Pacific Fleet’s Area of Responsibility. Second, both the basic airframe and the 

installed mission systems are substantially more reliable than their predecessor systems, especially in the case of the acoustic ASW subsystem. Finally, several key 

mission systems improve on the performance of their predecessors as a consequence 

of the continuous advancement of basic mission computing and sensor technologies. 

Consequently, though only required to equal the capability of the P–3’s acoustic sys-
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tem, the P–8’s acoustic system can monitor twice the number of sonobuoys as the 

P–3, and can display acoustic data using twice the available display area, to a larger 

number of operators, and with far better integration to the aircraft’s other sensors. 

These P–8A Increment 1 improvements to the P–3 baseline result in larger search 

areas while improving the operator’s ability to recognize ASW contacts when they 

are detected. Similar Increment 1 improvements vs. the P–3 baseline exist for the 

P–8’s ESM and Self Protection systems. Collectively, these integrated Increment 1 

systems provide an excellent foundation upon which the P–8 Increment 2 and Increment 3 efforts will build. 

P–8A Increment 2 begins a series of pre-planned upgrades that deliver new capability to the Fleet on a recurring periodic cycle. The first of these capability upgrades are on-track to deliver in 2015, when the broad area Multi-static Active Coherent (MAC) acoustic ASW capability is fielded as part of the first of three planned 

Increment 2 software deliveries. Following this delivery, Increment 2 will deliver a 

high-altitude ASW search capability, an integrated Automatic Identification System 

(AIS) to interrogate shipboard transponders, enhanced MAC processing techniques 

to further increase the detection performance of the baseline MAC system, a portfolio of other acoustic signal processing upgrades vetted through the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance community’s Rapid Capability Insertion (RCI) process, and 

a High Altitude ASW Weapon Capability (HAAWC). The air-to-air refueling capability already resident in the basic airframe will also be tested and certified for fleet 

use during this period. All of these capabilities, which exceed the capabilities of the 

P–3 baseline, will be fielded prior to the end of 2017. 

Finally, Increment 3 is a critical piece of the P–8A evolutionary strategy which 

will continue following the final Increment 2 software release and which is designed 

to introduce the most extensive of all currently planned P–8A capability upgrades. 

Elements of Increment 3 include the integration of Higher-Than-Secret (HTS) data 

processing architectures, a fully Net Enabled ASuW Weapon, and extensive upgrades to the following sensors and communications systems: Radar, Acoustics, 

Link-16, Common Data Link, and SATCOM. Increment 3 also provides extensive 

Net Centric capabilities through an Applications Based Architecture (ABA) that is 

optimized to promote participation and competition by 3rd party vendors and small 

businesses. Increment 3 is currently conducting pre-EMD activities with a scheduled 

IOC for this complete capability package of 2021. 

Mr. FORBES. The fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act limited to 

six the number of air vehicles the UCLASS program could acquire prior to Milestone 

B to limit the cost and risk exposure of the taxpayer until the Navy could determine 

how it was going to use the UCLASS aircraft system. Do you anticipate any challenges associated with limiting the UCLASS aircraft to six prior to achieving Milestone B in the program? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The 2014 NDAA language associated with limiting the quantity to six prior to Milestone B does present challenges to the UCLASS program’s 

ability to meet schedule and Early Operational Capability (EOC). The Department 

intends to develop a UCLASS system and associated CONOPS to achieve the JROC 

(JROCM 196–12) directed capability of sustaining two unrefueled orbits (defined as 

24/7 constant coverage) at 600nm radius per CVN. Under the current plan, the Department will use these developed CONOPS to refine the system requirements to 

ensure affordability and continue to limit taxpayer exposure during procurement. 

Based upon information obtained during Preliminary Design Reviews, the Department estimates that six air vehicles per CVN will be necessary to achieve the 

unrefueled orbit requirement. At least two dedicated test air vehicles (nondeployable) are needed to complete the required UCLASS test and certification 

events to fully verify the flight, weapons release, and sensor performance envelopes 

of the UCLASS system. The limit of six air vehicles prior to Milestone B will leave 

only four air vehicles for the EOC deployments, which will be insufficient to fully 

evaluate the system’s intended capability and develop the associated CONOPS. 

Based on the need to support the EOC deployments with a full UCLASS system 

while simultaneously conducting post-EOC testing, the Department recommends 

that the number of air vehicles that may be procured prior to Milestone B be increased to eight. We will continue to work with the respective Committee staffs to 

address all concerns associated with requirements, technical maturity, and acquisition strategy with the intent of gaining concurrence on the substantive issues in 

order to successfully deliver this needed capability. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand the Marine Corps has restructured the ACV program, 

to include a wheeled armored personnel carrier, and that this vehicle will be fielded 

before the high water speed amphibious assault vehicle variant. Will the wheeled 

vehicle that will be procured prior to the high water speed solution be a commercialoff-the shelf solution? How many of these wheeled vehicles do you plan to procure? 
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Secretary STACKLEY. No, the wheeled armored personnel carrier will not be a commercial-off-the-shelf solution. Given the maturity of this type of vehicle in the combat market and because of the engineering and requirements work we have done 

with the industry over the last 8 years, we believe that a solution that meets our 

essential operational requirements will be available without significant research and 

development costs that have to be borne by the taxpayer . We intend to field this 

vehicle in phases, ultimately outfitting at least six of our ten Assault Amphibian 

companies. This will require approximately 700 vehicles. We will refine the requirement for future phases as we determine the capacity of each individual vehicle. 

Mr. FORBES. CBO has estimated that an average of $19.3 billion per year over 

the next 30 years is required to meet the 306-ship goal. Is your sense that 306 ships 

is a realistic goal? With the programming average of $16.8 billion over the next 5 

years, has the Navy invested sufficient resources to meet the 306-ship goal? 

Admiral MULLOY. The 306 ship battle force is not a goal but rather a requirement. 

The 2012 Force Structure Assessment (FSA), a comprehensive and rigorous analytical assessment, determined a post-2020 requirement for 306 ships in the battle 

force and emphasized forward presence while re-examining resourcing requirements 

for operational plans and defense planning scenarios. 

Yes, the FY2015 President’s Budget invests sufficient resources to meet the FSA 

requirement as the battle force will increase to 309 ships by the end of FY2019. 

While we can meet today’s resourcing needs, the impact of funding the Ohio Replacement SSBN, which is what drives the CBO average so high, will be dramatic. 

Moving the Navy SCN funding to an average of $19.3B per year for the next 30 

years, without shorting Navy account of readiness, manpower, and modernization 

funding, is not possible without outside support. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Locklear provided testimony earlier this month to the House 

Armed Services Committee and provided the following information with regards to 

the potential reduction of an aircraft carrier, ‘‘You have about 10 [aircraft carriers] 

now. We can’t support the global demand.’’ He went on and said ‘‘One thing for sure, 

in my experience is that—that part of the U.S. global leadership is maritime dominance, where we choose to have it. And at the front of that maritime dominance, 

which starts to become very important, particularly in the world we’re in today, are 

the capabilities that aircraft carriers bring.’’ What is your assessment about a potential reduction in aircraft carrier force structure and the impact to the supporting 

combatant commander requirements? 

Admiral MULLOY. With an 11-carrier force the Navy has met, on average, 50% of 

Combatant Commander (COCOM) demand for aircraft carriers since FY13. A permanent force structure reduction to 10 aircraft carriers would further impact Navy’s 

ability to meet COCOM presence requirements. The impact of not meeting the 

COCOM demand and presence requirements resides primarily in managing risk. 

That risk is defined by uncertainty in Navy’s ability to meet some portion of security 

objectives and prompt response to a crisis with forces already in theater. As mitigation, the Department of Defense would continue to employ the Global Force Management process to most effectively allocate Naval forces to the highest priority 

COCOM requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand the Marine Corps has restructured the ACV program, 

to include a wheeled armored personnel carrier, and that this vehicle will be fielded 

before the high water speed amphibious assault vehicle variant. Will the wheeled 

vehicle that will be procured prior to the high water speed solution be a commercialoff-the shelf solution? How many of these wheeled vehicles do you plan to procure? 

General GLUECK. It will not be a commercial-off-the-shelf solution. However, given 

the maturity of this type of variant in the combat vehicle market and in light of 

the engineering and requirements work we have done with the industry over the 

last eight years, we believe that a wheeled solution that meets our essential operational requirements will be available without significant development. We intend 

to procure approximately 700 of these vehicles in phases. We will refine the requirement for future phases as we determine the capacity and capabilities of each individual variant. 

Mr. FORBES. Will the wheeled vehicle that will be procured prior to a high water 

speed solution use ACV funding lines? 

General GLUECK. Yes. We intend to test and procure these vehicles in phases. It 

is our desire to use ACV funding lines for necessary RDT&E now and for procurement to provide an initial operational capability in the early 2020s. 

Mr. FORBES. Based on this new ACV acquisition strategy, does this mean the Marine Corps will plan to look more at ship-to-shore connector solutions for high water 

speed requirements? 

General GLUECK. Yes. Due to Expeditionary Force 21, our new capstone concept, 

as well as threat capabilities, our operating forces, in coordination with the Navy, 
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must be prepared to operate from a sea base established at distances greater than 

50 nautical miles from the shore. For high speed, we will be dependent upon multiple and flexible ship-to-shore connector solutions to support closing that gap as 

rapidly as possible. As a result connectors such as the LCAC and LCU, their 

planned replacements, and their complementary effects with the ACV become required critical capabilities to support maneuvering combat and combat support 

forces and equipment ashore at relatively high speeds. 

Mr. FORBES. How is the wheeled vehicle that will be procured as part of the ACV 

program different from that of current Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicles? Why 

not modified those existing vehicles to meet the phase 1 requirements? 

General GLUECK. The Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV–25) is a reconnaissance vehicle designed to support the Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion Mission and is designed to be employed by a 3-Marine crew and carries a 4- 

Marine reconnaissance scout section. The LAV–25 has been in the Marine Corps inventory since 1983 and has reached the end of its growth margin due to several 

modifications made over its lifespan. We intend to continue to employ our LAVs in 

LAR Battalions well into the 2030s until we can replace them. The ACV is required 

to equip the Marine Assault Amphibian Battalions who have the mission to provide 

amphibious and armored mobility to Marine Corps infantry and selected other elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The ACV will have the basic requirement to carry at least 10 infantrymen in addition to a three Marine crew and multiple days’ supply of food, water, munitions, etc. In addition to this expanded carry 

requirement, it must be highly mobile on land under load and with significant ballistic and underbelly IED protection. It will also need a robust swim capability to 

operate effectively in the littorals, with a shore-to-shore capability, to permit seamless maneuver through rivers, lakes, and in the ocean with the capability of safely 

negotiating surf zones. The LAV is not capable of these requirements. The ACV will 

provide a balanced protection, payload and performance capability to embarked infantry with improved armor-protected mobility to the objective. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Given the current state of combatant ship numbers, how significant is the ‘‘risk’’ to mission for maintaining security for freedom of navigation and 

commerce? What is the breaking point for not being able to fulfill this capability? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. Freedom of Navigation (FoN) operations involve naval units transiting disputed areas to avoid setting the precedent 

that the international community has accepted these unlawful claims. Since these 

FoN operations typically involve only a few ships, as long as the Navy continues 

routine overseas deployments, our ability to provide forces for this mission is not 

at risk with our current force structure. 

Freedom of commerce is similarly assured by our ships on routine deployments, 

through both normal presence and periodic transit of strategic chokepoints and high 

threat areas (such as areas subject to threat of piracy). 

Current Navy force structure provides assurance to our allies of our resolve to 

support freedom of navigation including transit of disputed or high-threat areas, 

and signals to potential adversaries that the U.S. is committed to maintaining freedom of navigation and the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In the frame of capacity building with regional partners in combination with a lowered U.S. naval capacity to provide sustained forward presence, 

how will the U.S. dependence increase for partner-nations for providing regional 

maritime security and ensure safe sea lanes for U.S. commerce? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. Navy’s adoption of the Optimized Fleet 

Response Plan (O–FRP) and increased use of forward deployed Navy assets has stabilized Navy’s ability to continue providing forward presence at approximately the 

same level as in recent years. By 2020, ship presence in the Asia-Pacific region will 

increase to about 67 ships, up from about 50 on average today. Presence in the Middle East will increase from about 30 ships on average today to about 41. Efforts to 

partner in maritime security missions are desired and encouraged as they build confidence and interoperability between nations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Please address the benefits that timely AP funding can have especially in successful shipbuilding programs like the ongoing Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat Forward Staging Base shipbuilding program? 
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Secretary STACKLEY. Advanced Procurement (AP) funding for advanced planning 

efforts and procurement of long lead time material (LLTM) has been successfully 

employed on a number of shipbuilding programs to meet ship construction schedules. Further, such funding provides critical stability across the shipbuilding industrial base—from key vendors manufacturing unique equipment and components to 

our shipbuilders—by enabling workload stability and level loading, thus avoiding 

debilitating production breaks that threaten layoffs, loss of skilled labor, and cost 

growth. In addition, some shipbuilding programs have employed economic order 

quantities (EOQ) associated with multiyear procurement contracts to achieve increased savings. 

With respect to the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) program, advanced planning 

and the procurement of LLTM components occurred on MLP 3 AFSB. The Navy requested AP funds for detail design efforts for MLP 4 AFSB in the FY 2013 President’s Budget Submission. However, no AP funds were appropriated, and the ship 

was fully funded in FY 2014. 

Mr. HUNTER. Since a determination was made that having a third Afloat Forward 

Staging Base ship is required, and since funds were sought, authorized and appropriated in FY14 to procure the second Afloat Forward Staging Base ship, wouldn’t 

it make sense to work to allocate some meaningful level of AP funding this coming 

fiscal year, FY15, or certainly no later than next fiscal year, FY16, in order to support the cost-efficient and timely production of this required ship with the specialized supplier base and shipbuilder? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Advanced Procurement (AP) funding is budgeted on a leadtime basis for material and design efforts necessary to meet ship construction schedules. FY 2015 AP is not required for the FY 2017 ship. The Department will take 

the matter of FY 2016 AP for the FY 2017 ship into consideration during development of the FY 2016 budget submission. However, past efforts to budget for AP for 

the purpose of efficiencies and to avoid production gaps have not historically been 

supported by the Appropriations Committee and are therefore considered high risk 

by the Department. 

Mr. HUNTER. Given that your recent testimony and PB15 budget exhibits confirm 

that there would be a 3-year interval between start-of-construction of the FY14 

funded AFSB ship and start-of-construction of the budgeted FY17 AFSB ship, what 

actions could the Navy and Congress take—including but not limited to the allocation of timely AP funding—to minimize a production gap between these two urgently required ships? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Upon its award, the fourth Mobile Landing Platform (MLP 

4) will provide new construction workload for the shipyard through 2017. A production gap would exist between the completion of MLP 4 and start of construction of 

MLP 5 (if awarded in FY 2017). While FY 2016 Advanced Procurement (AP) funding 

could possibly help to mitigate the gap, FY 2015 AP is not required for the FY 2017 

ship. The Navy will take the matter into consideration during development of the 

FY 2016 budget submission. However, despite the benefits provided by Advanced 

Procurement in terms of cost efficiency and production stability, the historical lack 

of support for AP by the Appropriations Committee is a significant factor in the Department’s determination of whether or not to request such funds in our budget submission. 

Mr. HUNTER. Additionally in relation to the TAO(X) fleet oiler recapitalization 

program, wouldn’t it make sense to work to allocate some AP funding in the FY17 

timeframe for the second TAO(X) fleet oiler slated for FY18 procurement in order 

to help achieve desired programmatic and acquisition objectives and in the industrial base? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Advanced Procurement (AP) funding for advanced planning 

and procurement of long lead time material (LLTM) may be appropriate in FY 2017 

to support the timely and efficient production of the second T–AO(X) ship in FY 

2018. On more complex war ship designs, the Navy typically includes a ‘‘gap’’ year 

following award of the lead ship to properly allow the design to reach sufficient maturity, and to avoid ‘‘two’’ lead ships. T–AO(X) is planned as a commercial-oriented, 

non-developmental design, and would likely benefit from AP funding in FY 2017 and 

the resulting improvement in production efficiency. The Navy will take AP into consideration during the development of the FY 2017 budget. However, despite the benefits provided by Advanced Procurement in terms of cost efficiency and production 

stability, the historical lack of support for AP by the Appropriations Committee is 

a significant factor in the Department’s determination of whether or not to request 

such funds in our budget submission. 

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