### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs A ugus t 14 , 200 7

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CARLOS A. BRANCH an d EDWARD ALLE N, JR.
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2005-D- 3309 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2006- 01686-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Janu ary 31, 2008

Ap pe lla nts , E dw ard

Ea rl Al le n, Jr. a

nd Carl os A. B ra

nc h, e nte re d b e st i nte re st guil ty ple a s in Davidson Co unty

to one count of a g g ravated assault and one count of possession of a wea pon on school proper

ty afte r an inc ident at Vande rbilt University . The plea ag ree ment did not specify the le ng th o r m ann e r o f s e rv ic e of the se nte nc e s but spe c if

ie d that the se nte nc e s w ou ld r un c on c ur re ntl y to eac h other. Af

ter a s en t en ci n g h ear ing, the trial court se ntence d Appellants to six y ear s for ag g ravated assault and two y ear s for possession of a we apon on school prope rty , as Rang e I Standard Offe nders. Appe llants seek a revie w of their sentence on appeal. B eca use the re cord suppor

ts the sentenc es and the trial court pr operly denied a lternative se ntencingas to Appel la nt Bra nch, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Tr ialCo ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Ha ro ld D onne lly , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Carl os A. B ra

nc h and Ric ha

rd D. Duma s, J r., Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Edwa

rd Allen, Jr.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ney Gen e ra l & Re po rt e r; L a c y Wilb ur , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Vi c tor S. Joh ns on , D istri c t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, a

nd Jame s Sle dg e , A ssi sta

nt D i s t r i c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

Factual Back

ground

I n October

of 2005, Appe llants were i n d i cted by the Davidson County

Gra nd J ury for ag g ravated assault, rec kless endang erme nt, a nd possession of a wea

pon on school proper

ty afte r an incident follo wi n g a fo otball ga me on the Va

nderbilt University

campus. On Ma

y 30, 2006, Ap pe lla nts Al le n a

nd B ra nc h e a c h e nte re d a

be st i nte re st p le a , in

wh ic h th e y

ple d guilty

to ag g ravated assault and posse ssi on of a w eapon on sc hool property . The State nolle prosse d the
rec kless endang erme nt char g e. At the plea hear ing, c ounsel for the State summarized the fac ts of the c a se a s f

oll ow s: On September

the 25 o f l ast y ear , of 2005, in the ea rly morning hours, at th

a pp ro xima te ly

1:3 0, 1:4 5 a .m. , lo c a te d in Mo rg an Ha ll on the c a mpu s of Va nd e rb ilt University , located a

t 1408 Twenty -F ifth Avenue South in Nashvi l l e, Davidson C o u n t y.
The Vanderbilt - - part of t he Vanderbilt football team wa s having a par ty on the 10 and the 11 floor of Mor gan Ha l l , cele bratingtheir four th consec utive th th victory . [Appellants] enter ed Morg an Ha ll with or behind a fe male student who used her I .D. ca

rd to g et into the building.

. . . They went to the tenth floor. T here was a conf rontation bec ause the y

wer en’t invited guests. They left the tenth floor. The [s]tate [me nts ] wil l be ma de , - - - wo uld have be e n mad e , th a t th e y the n le ft the te nth floor and w ent to the eleve nth f loor and stay ed for a while with one of the guests on the e le ve nth

fl oo r [w ho ] too k s til l ph oto g ra ph s o f t he de fe ndant , wh ic h b e c a me important later whe n Detect i v e Jason Proctor was a ssigne d to this case and sta rted the investig ation.

. . . . After leaving the eleve nth f loor, they returne d to the tenth floor whe re he ated wor ds
wer e exchang ed with seve ral Va nderbilt football play ers who ha d told them to leave previous l y

. They

- - they being the [Appellants] g ot on the elevator, which wa s taped, a nd while on the elevator, the tape shows Mr. Allen with a handgun pointed out of the elevator shooting into a crow d. And it shows Mr. Br anch holding the gun ou t and fi ri ng int o the c ro wd

. Mr

. B ra nc h ha s tol d the po lic e he did n’ t f ir e . T he state does have witnesses to say that both people fire d.

On the fl oo r i n th e e le vator

kin d o f w e dg e d wa s dis c ov e re d a .3 80 a uto matic sh e ll c a sin g

. . . . Th e ne xt se ve ra l day s, ov e r t he ne xt fo ur

or fi ve da y s, the re wa s a blitz of media attention to this particula r offe nse, with vide otapes or C

. D. ’s , or-3-

wh a te ve r, ima g e s f

ro m th e e le vator

be ingsh ow n o n th e t. v. channe ls a nd Cr ime Stoppers started g etting a lot of calls. One of the distinctive featur es of one of the shooters we re his tattoos. I n fac t, Detec tive Proctor took still phot og raphs with the he lp o f t he Va nd e rb ilt Un ive rs ity

Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt of tho se tatto os and wa s a ble to g et them identified, spec ifically , as to Carlos B ranc h. And then C ri me Stoppers started g etting c alls on Mr. Allen and Mr . Br anch a nd ever y body else.

On the 29 of S eptember , some four day s later, Mr . Br anch a ccompa nied by th his, then, attorney , . . . , turned himself in to Detec tive Proctor and the Me tro Police Depa rtment. A short time later, an d I don’t reme mber the spe cific date, Mr. Allen who was stay

ing w ith his girlfrie nd in a nother part of N ashville, their apa rtment was approa ched by

Metro Police De partment. Mr. Al l en was taken into custody on outstanding w arr ants. As he got out of the showe r, the .380 L orsen, se mi-automatic,
wa s f ound un de r t he mattr e ss. An d h e ma de a state me nt t o th e Pol ic e De pa rtme nt.

Sentenc ing Hearing State’s Proof

At the sentenc ing he aring , the State p re sented the te stimony of the victim, Geor g e Smith, wh o w a s sho t in the ri g ht b ic e p d ur ingthe inc ide nt. Mr . Sm ithte sti fi e d th a t he wa s a Va nd e rb ilt Un ive rs ity

fo otb a ll p lay e r a

nd a tte nd e d a par

ty in Mor g an Ha ll a ft e r t

he Ric hmo nd

fo otb a ll g a me in the fa ll of 2005. Appellants came to the par ty uninvited a

nd wer e aske d to leave the party by sever al people. When Appe llants did not leave, sever al of the football play ers, includingZ ach L og an, beg an acting“ag g ressively

in a ver bal way” toward Appellants. Appellants bac ked down the ha llway and g ot o nto the e le vator . M r. Smith w a lke d out i nto the ha llw ay tow ard the e le vator

a s App e lla

nts retre ated f

rom the par

ty . Mr. Smith was not invol ved in the ver bal alter ca t i o n b u t went into the hallway to be a “ peac emake r.” The Appellants stood in the elevator with the door open while they exchang ed ver

bal t hreats with sever al of the people from the party . At one point, Mr. Smith reache d out to pull M r. L og an bac k awa y from Appellants, who rema ined in the elevator. Soon therea fter, Mr . Sm ithhe ard

a g un sh ot. Ev e ryon e too k o ff ru nn ingand Mr . Sm ith was un sure if the re wa s a second shot fire d.

De te c tiv e Jaso n Pro c tor of the Me tr o Na sh vil le Pol ic e De pa rtme nt inv e sti g a te d the inc ide nt. He obtaine d the videotape from the e levator, which showed both Appe llants with handg uns drawn in the elevator. Acc ording to Detec tive Proctor, Appe llant Bra nch admitted havinga gun on campus but was unsure whether

the g un had fire d beca

use of the “e m o t i o n o f the moment.” A ppellant Br anch told police he possessed a sing le shot .22 derr inge r. Appellant Allen’s Proof Appellant Allen testified at the s entenc ing hear ing. He c laimed that he a nd Appellant B ranc h
wer e invited to the par

ty by a fe male Va

nderbilt stud ent. Acc ording to Appellant Allen, he a nd Appellant Branc h wer e only at t he party for a short time befor e beingconfr onted by Mr. L og an, who-4-

was “ scre aming obscenities” at them. Appellants Allen and B ranc h felt “thre atene d,” so they started backingdown the hallway toward the elevator. They wer e followe d by

Mr. L og an and se vera l other football play ers. Appe llant Allen tried to sh u t t h e elevator door, but something cause d it to open ag ain. Appellant Allen did not know who f ired the f irst shot but admitted that he later fired a shot down t he hallway . Duringhis incarc eration, Appellant Allen obtained his GED a nd completed a

n ang e r m ana g e me nt p ro g ra m. App ell ant A lle n a

po log ize d to the c ourt

fo r c arr yinga we a po n o nto
sc ho ol g ro un ds and

to t he vic timfo r h is i nju

ri e s. Appellant Allen’ s mother t estified that if Appellant Allen r ece ived probation, he could live wi th h e r i n M e mph is. Appellant Branch’s Proof Appellant B ranc h’s mother testified that she an d Ap p el l ant B ranc h have joint custody of App el l an t Branch’ s three c hildren. Appe llant Bra nch is marr ied but separ ated f rom his wife who is the mother of his three children. Acc ording to Mr s. Br anch, Appellant Br anch’ s incar cer ation has had a ne g ative ef

fec t on the children. Appellant B ranc h’s father, a minist er, a lso testified. Mr. Br anch a cknowledg ed his son’s
va ri ou s p ro ble ms w ithlaw e nf or c e me nt. Ac c or din g to M r. B ra nc h, Ap pe lla

nt b e g an gett ingin trouble af ter he and Appe llant’s mother sepa rate d in 1996. Appellant B ranc h testified that, at the time of the hea ring , he wa s twenty -six y ear s old and had obtained his GED . Appellant B ranc h apolog ized for having a g un on the Vande rbilt campus and for shooting the victim. Appellant B ranc h’s testimony corr oborate d Appellant Allen’s sy nopsis of the party . They
we re inv ite d to the pa

rt y by a fe ma le Va

nd e rb ilt stu de nt a

nd we re c on fr on te d b y

Mr . L og an s ho rt ly afte r ar riving at the par

ty . Mr. L og an beg an bac king A ppellants Br anch a

nd Allen down the ha llway and into the elevator. Appellant B ranc h drew his gun ag ainst threats made by Mr. L og an, and sw ore initially that he did not shoot his we apon. At the sentenc ing he aring , Appellant stated that he later
rea liz ed that he ha d discharg ed his wea pon into the crowd.

Ru lin g o f th e Tria l Co ur t

Ba sed on the e vidence prese nted at the se ntencing h ea ri n g, the trial cour t sentence d Appellants to six y ear s in incarc eration for ag g ravated as s au l t and two y ear s in incarc eration for po sse ssi on

of a we a po n o n s c ho ol pr op e rt

y

. Th e tr ia l c ourt

a pp lie d s e ve ra l e nh anc e me nt f a c tor s to enhanc e Appe l l ant B ranc h’s sentenc e to the maximum in the rang e. The trial court a pplied one enhanc ement fa ctor to Appellant Allen’s sentenc e, ag ain enha ncingit to the max imum in t he ra ng e. The trial c ourt found that no mitigating f actor s applied.-5-

On appe al, Appellant Bra nch contends that the t rial cour t improperly

applied enha

nceme nt fa c tor s, fa ile d to a

pp ly mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, and that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y de nyingan a lte rn a tiv e to incar cer ation. Appellant Allen, on the other hand, ar g ues that the trial c ourt improperly applied an enhanc ement fac tor to inc rea se his sentenc e to the maximum in the rang e and that the trial court’ s se nte nc e sh ou ld n ot b e re vie we d w itha pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss b e c a

us e the tr ia l c ourt fa ile d to proper ly consider se ntencingprinciples.

An aly sis Sentenc ing We beg in our ana ly sis with a br ief discussion of re cent c hang es in Tenne ssee’ s sentencing statutes. I n response to the United States Supreme Court’s de cision in Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U. S. 2 96 (2004 ), the T e nn e sse e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ame nd e d th e T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0 s o th a t a ll felonies now have a presumptive sentence beg inning at the minimum sentenc e within the sentenc ing rang e. Com

pa re T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2003) with T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( c ) ( 20 06 ); see also 2005 Tenn. Pub. Act c h. 353, § 18. T his amendment bec ame e ffe ctive on June 7, 2005. The Gene ral Assembly also provided that this amendment would apply to defe ndants who committed a cr iminal offe nse on or afte r J une 7, 2005. 2005 Tenn. Pub. Ac ts c h. 353, § 18. I n t h e c as e s u b j u dice, Appellants committed the cr iminal offense s at issue in Sept em b er o f 2 0 05; theref ore, the new a ct ap p l i es t o o u r r ev i ew o f t h ei r s en t en ci n g.
At the outset it should also be n o ted that the 2005 ame ndments to our sentenc ing la ws curta iled to some deg ree the g rounds that may form the ba sis on an appea l of a sentenc ing de cision. Com pa re T.C.A. § 40-35-401 ( 2003) with T.C.A. § 40-35-401 ( 2006). The a mended T.C.A. § 40 -3 5- 40 1( b) (2 00 6) dif

fe rs on on e ke y po int : (b ) A n a pp e a l f ro m a se nte nc e may

be on on e (1 ) o r m or e of

the fo llo wi ngg ro un ds : (1) The sentenc e wa s not imposed in accor dance with this chapter; (2) The sentenc e i s ex ce s s ive under the sentenc ing c onsiderations set out in §§ 40-35-103 a

nd 40-35-210; or (3) The sentenc e is inconsistent with the purposes of se ntencingset out in §§ 40-35-102 a

nd 40-35-103.

Prior to 2005, T.C.A. § 40-35-401( b) (2003) stated, “A n appea l from a se ntence may be on one ( 1) or more of the foll owing g rounds: (1) The sentenc e was not imposed in acc ordanc e with this chapter ; or (2) The e nh an c e me nt a nd mi tig ati ng fac tor s we reno t we igh e d p ro

pe rly , a nd the s e nte nc e is excessive under

the sentenc ing c onside rations set out in § 40-35-103.” T.C.A. § 40-35-401( b) (2003) ( emphasis adde d).-6-

We now analy

ze the amende d statute to determine on what g rounds a c riminal defe ndant may seek r elief f

rom the sentence imposed by the trial cour

t. Gener ally , when c onstruing a statute, eve ry word within the statute is “‘pr esumed to have meaning and purpose and should be g iven full eff ect.’ ” State v. Odom , 9 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 8 , 2 9 -3 0 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Marsh v. He nderson , 424 S.W .2d 193, 196 (Tenn. 1968) ). This Court’s primary duty in construing a statute is “to ascerta in and g ive ef fec t to t he le g isl a tiv e int e nt w ith out un du ly restr ic tin g or

e xpand inga

statut e ’s c ov e ra g e be y on d it s intended scope .” Ow e ns v . S tate , 9 08 S.W. 2d

92 3, 92 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; se e als o Sta te v . D av is , 940 S.W .2d 558, 561 (Tenn. 1997)

. L eg islative intent should be g leane d “fr om the natura l and ordinar y meaningof the languag e used, w ithout a force d or subtle construc tion that would lim it or ext end the meaningof the languag e.” Car te r v . S tate , 9 52 S.W. 2d

41 7, 41 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . F ur the rm or e , th is Court should construe a statute “ so that its component parts ar e consistent an d re asonable ,” and inconsistent parts “should be ha rmonized, where possible.” Odom , 928 S.W .2d at 30. When the Gene ral Asse mbly

has ame nded a statute, “[i] t is a proper method to deter

mine what the intention of t he L eg islature was for us to look at prior acts . . . .” Sta te v . D av ids on Cou nty , 277 S.W .2d 396, 401 (Tenn. 1955). I n addition, “[w] hen the leg islature make s a cha ng e in the languag e of a

statute, we must assume that it was de liberate .” State v. Turner , 193 S.W .3d 522, 527 (Tenn. 2006)

. The fa ct that the Ge nera l Assembly deleted the lang uag e re g arding the w eig hing of
e nh anc e me nt a

nd mit ig a tin g fa c tor s d emo ns tr a te s th a t th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y int e nd e d th a t a de fe nd ant m ay

no lon g e r a lle g e a s g ro un ds fo r r e lie f o n a pp e a l that th e se nte nc ingc ourt e rr on e ou sly
we ig he d s e nte nc inge nh anc e me nt f a c tor s.
“When re viewing sentenc ing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduc t a de novo r eview on the r ec o rd o f t he issues. The r eview sha ll be conducte d with a pre sumption t hat the deter minations made by

the cour

t from w h i ch the appe al is taken a re c orre ct.” T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d). “This pre sumption wil l be virtually irrebuttable if there is a fac tual basis for the consideration of the enha

nceme nt fac tor, the enha

nceme nt fac tor consider ed is not an ele ment of the offe nse, and, in a ddition, t h e co n sideration of the fac tor is not inconsistent with t he purpose s of sentenc ing considerations set out in T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103 a nd -210.” State v. TerrancePatterson , No . W200 5- 01 63 8- CCA -R 3- CD , 200 7 WL 27 00 16 0, a t *1 0 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. , at Jac ks on , Se pt. 17, 2007) (pe rmission to appeal filed Nov. 16, 2007)

.
I n making i t s s en t en cing deter mination, the trial court, at the c onclusion of the sente ncing hear ing, f irst determines the r ang e of se ntence an d t h en deter mines the specif

ic sentenc e and the appropr iate combination of sentenc ing a lternatives by considering : (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the sentenc ing he aring ; (2) the pr esente nce r eport; (3) the principles of sentenc ing a

nd arg u me n ts a s to s e n te n c in g a lt e r n a ti v e s ; ( 4 ) th e n a tu

r e an d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f

th e c r im in a l c o n d

u ct involved; (5) evide nce a

nd information offe red by the par t i es o n t he enha

nceme nt and mitigating fac tors; (6) any

statistical information provided by the administrative off

ice of the cour ts reg arding sentenc es for

simil ar offe nses; (7) any statements the defe ndant wishes to make in the defe ndant’s behalf about sentenc ing; a

nd (8) the pote ntial for re habilitation or treatme n t

. T.C.A. §§ 40 -3 5- 21 0( a ), (b ), -1 03 (5 ); State v. W illiams , 920 S.W .2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.A s no t ed previ o usl y , T enness ee’ s sent enci ng s t at ut es have been si gni f i cant l y am end ed

. T he enh a n c em ent 1 fac to rs w e re a m e n d e d e ff e c tive J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 , p rio r to the se n te n c ing o f A p p e ll a n ts h e re in. See T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 114. Fa ct o r (17 ), a s ap p l i ed by t h e t r i al c ou r t t o Appel l an t B r an ch , doe s n ot a ppea r a s a n e n h an ce men t f ac t or i n t h e 2005

a m e n d m e n ts to T .C .A . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4

. -7- Whe n im po sin g the se nte nc e wi thi n th e a pp ro pr iate se nte nc ingra

ng e fo r t he de fe nd ant: [T] he cour

t shall consider, but is not bound by , the fol l o wi n g ad v iso ry sentenc ing g uid e lin e s: (1 ) T he min imum se nte nc e wi thi n th e ra ng e of punis hme nt is the se nte nc e that sh ou ld be imposed, b ec au se the g ener al assembly set the minimum l eng th of sentenc e for
eac h felony

class to re flec t the relative s er i o u s ness of e ach c riminal offe nse in the felony classifications; and (2) The sentenc e leng th within the rang e should be a djusted, as appropriate, by the prese nce or abse nce of

mitigatingand enha

nceme nt fac tors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35- 114. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2006) (e mphas i s ad d ed ). With t his backg round in mind we turn to the propriety of Appe llants’ sentenc es in this case.

Sentenc ing in the Case Sub Judice Appellant Branch

At the s entenc ing hear ing, the trial court found that there w as ample f actua l support for the consideration of four e nhance ment fac tors with respec t to Appellant Br an ch

. T h e trial court considere d the following fac tors: (1) the defe ndant has a previous history of criminal convic tions or
c ri min a l be havio r i n a dd iti on to t hat ne c e ssa

ry to e sta bli shthe a

pp ro pr iate ra

ng e ; (8 ) t he de fe nd ant, be fo re tr ia l or

se nte nc ing , f

a ile d to c omp ly

wi th t he c on dit ion s o f a

se nte nc e inv olv ing re le a se int o the c omm un ity ; and

(1 0) the de fe nd ant had no he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me wh e n th e ri sk to h u ma n li f e w a s high. See T. C. A. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 ), (8 ), & (1 0) (2 00 6) . T he tr ia l c ourt a lso de te rm ine d th a t th e c ri me wa s c omm itt e d und er cir cum sta nc e s in wh ic h th e po te nti a l f

or bo dil y injury to a victim was g reat. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 17) (2003). The trial court did not a pply any 1 mi ti g a ti n g f

a c to r s

. F o ll o w in g th e s e f

in d in g s , th e tr ia l c o u rt o r d e r e d Ap p e ll an t B r an c hto s e r

v e a s ixy ea r s en t en ce as a R an ge I of fe n d er fo r t h e a ggra v at edas s au l tco n v i ct i o nan d t wo y ea rs as a R an ge Ioffe nder f

or the c arr

ying a wea

pon on school proper

ty conviction. In other wor ds, the trial cour t sentenc ed Appe llant Bra

nch to the maxi mum se ntence in the rang e for eac h offe nse. SeeT.C.A. § 40-35-114( a).

I n conductingour re view of the trial court’s sentenc ing deter minations, we must c onsider the appellant’ s potential for re habilitation, the trial and senten ci n g h ear ing e vidence , the pre sentenc e-8-

repor t, the sentenc ing pr inciples, sentenc ing a lternative a rguments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the e nhancingand mitigating f actor s, an y statistical information prese nted by the administrative offic e of the courts re g ardingsentenc ing pr ac tices for simil ar of fense s in the state, and the def endant’ s statements. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b) (2006)

. After revie wing the re cord in this case , we find ample evide nce to support the tr ial court’s
c on sid e ratio n o f e nh anc e me nt f a c tor s ( 1) , (8), and (1 0) , th e re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt c ou ld p ro pe rl y consider the m with reg ard to Appe llant Bra nch’s convictions. Fa ctor (1), Appe llant has a pre vious history of cr iminal convictions, is il l u s t rated by a list of previous convic tions in hi s prese ntence repor t, including, a

mong othe r thing s, five assa ults, one ag g ravated assault, and two w eapons of fe ns e s. Th is f

a c tor wa s p ro pe rl y

c on sid e re d as to both co un ts. Th e c on sid e ratio n a s to bo th c ounts of fac tor (8), failure to c omply with the conditions of a sentenc e involving rele as e i n t o t he community , is supported by the re cord. The rec ord indicate s that Appellant B ranc h violated probation in 2000. The c onsideration of f actor (10), Appe llant had no hesitation about committing
a cr ime wh er e the risk to human life was hig h, is supported by the fa ct that Appellant f

ired a g un from an e levator into a c rowde d hallway on a colleg e ca

mpu s

. T h e trial c ourt also applied f actor (17), Appe llant co m m i t t ed the c rime under circ umstances in which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was g reat. See T.C.A. § 4 0 -35-114( 17) (2003) . I rre spective of whether the trial cour

t should have a

pp l i ed enhanc ement fa ctor (17) , we de termine that the thre e prope rly considere d enhanc ement fa ctors support Appe llant Bra nch’s se ntence

. Ap pe lla nt B ra nc h a lso c omp la ins that th e tr ia l c ourt fa ile d to c on sid e r a

ny mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. O u r r e v ie w o f

th e r e c o r d

r e v e a ls th a t c o u n s e l f

o r Ap p e ll an t B r an c hs u

b mi tt e d s e v e r a l m it ig ating fa ct o rs t o t h e t ri al co u rt p ri o r t o t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. S p ec i fi ca l l y , a t t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, counsel for

Appellant B ranc h argued that the f o ll owing mitigatingfac tors applied: (3) that there w ere g rounds to excuse or justify the cr iminal conduct; (5) Appe llant Bra nch ac ted under

strong provocation; (10) Appellant B ranc h assisted the authorities; (11) the offe nse wa s committed under such unusual cir cumstance s t h at i t i s unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated Appellant B ranc h’s conduc t; (12) that Appellant B ranc h acte d under dur ess or domination of another ; and (13) othe r fa ctors consis t en t wi t h the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989 including strongfamily

ties, expression of remorse , and the need to he lp r aise his childre n weig hed in favor of

mitigation. SeeT.C.A. § 40-35-113( 3), (5), (10)- (13). I n pronouncing the sentenc e, the tr ia l c ourt did no t st a te on

the re c or d w he the r i t sp e c if ic a lly c on sid ered th e mit ig a tin g fa c tor s in deter mining Appe llant Bra

nch’s se ntence . The trial c ourt, howeve r, did st at e that it had “no toleranc e” f

or the a ctions of Appellant B ranc h while re cog nizi ng that Appellant B ranc h was “apolog etic” a

nd that his family

said “g ood things” about him. Ultimately , the trial cour t concluded that Appellant B ranc h had to “pay the penalty ” for his actions. After our de novo r eview of the trial court’s sentenc ing deter

minations he rein, we deter mine that the g ravity of Appella n t Br an ch’s actions in ca

rry ing a firea rm to a party on a university campus, crashing that party , ref using to lea

ve when r equeste d, and firinginto a g roup of pe ople wounding a person, far outweig hs any weig ht that Ap pe lla nt B ra nc h’ s p ro ff

e re d mi tig a tin g fa c tor s mi g ht p ro vid e . T his iss ue is w ith out me ri t.-9- Appellant Allen

At the sentenc ing hear ing, the trial court found that there was ample fac tual support for the consideration of one enha nceme nt fac tor with respe ct t o Appellant Allen. The trial c ourt consider ed the fo llo wi ngfa c tor : ( 10 ) t he de fe nd ant h a d n o h e sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt inga c ri me wh e n th e ri sk to human life wa s high. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 10) (2006). The trial c ourt also mentioned the f act that Appellant Allen use d a g un but did not uti liz e an e nhance ment fac tor in that reg ard. The trial court did not apply

any mitigating fac tors. Following t h es e fi n dings, the trial court or dere d Ap pe llant Al len to se rv e a six- y e ar s e nte nc e a s a

Rang e Iof

fe nd e r f or the a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult conviction and two y ear s as a Rang e I offe nder f

or t he convic tion for ca

rry ing a wea pon on school proper ty

. I n other words, the trial court also sentenc ed Appellant Allen to the maxi mum sentence in the rang e for

eac h offe nse. See T.C.A. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 (a ). Apparently , the trial cour t ga ve g reat
we ig ht t o th is s ole e nh anc e me nt f a c tor and thi s d e c isi on

is p re sumpt ive ly

c or re c t. T his issue is without merit. Denial of Alternative Sente nce
A p p e l l an t B r an c h c h a l l e n g e s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d e n i a l o f an a l t e r n at i v e s e n t e n c e

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, he ar g ues that the trial c ourt based the denial of a n alternative sentenc e on the se riousness of the offe nse but did not find that his offense was “ espec ially violent, horrifying, shoc king, r epre hensible,
o f f e n s i v e , o r o t h e r w i s e o f ane x c e s s i v e o r

e x a g g e r a t e d

d e g r e e , ” a s r e qu i r e d

b y State v. Hartley , 818 S.W .2d 370, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). The S tate counters t hat t he trial c ourt proper ly denied alternative sentenc ing.

I n r e g ard s to a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing , T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -1 02 (5 ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

I n rec og nition that st ate pr ison capa cities and the funds to build and maintain them
are lim i t ed , convicted felons committing the most sever e off enses, possessing criminal hi stories evincing a clear disreg ard for t he laws and morals of society , and evincing failure of past eff orts at reha

bilitation s hall be g iven first priority reg arding sentenc ing involving incar cer ation.

A def endant who doe s not fall within this class of of fende rs “a

nd who is an espe ci al l y

mitigated of fe nd e r o r s tand ard of

fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C , D or

E f e lony is p re sume d to be a

fa vo ra ble candidate for a lternative se ntencingoptions in t he absenc e of evidenc e to the contra ry .” T.C.A. § 40 -3 5- 10 2( 6)

. F ur

the rm or e , un le ss su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e re buts the pr e sumpt ion , the tr ia l c ourt mus t presume that a defe ndant sentenc ed to e ight y ear s or less is a n offe nder for whom a sentenc e other than incar cer ation would result in succe ssful reha bilitation. Sta te v . B

y rd , 861 S.W .2d 377, 379-80 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); see also T.C.A. § 40-35-303( a).

Appellant B ranc h pled g uilty to one count of ag g ravated assault, a C lass C felony , and one count of possession of a

wea pon on school g rounds, a Class E felony . Be cause Appellant B ranc h-10-

wa s c on vic te d o f C la ss C and E f e lo ni es and sente nc e d to fe we r t ha n e ig ht ye ars fo r t

he of fe ns e s, Appellant B ranc h was e ligible f or p ro b at i o n and was presumed to be a fa vorable candidate for al ternative sentenc ing. SeeT. C.A . § § 4 0- 35 -1 02 (6 ) & -3 03 (a ); By rd , 861 S.W .2d at 379-80. Ho we ve r, a ll o ff

e nd e rs wh o me e t th e c ri te ri a are no t ent itl e d to re lie f; ins te a d, se nte nc ingiss ue s mu st be dete rmined by the fa cts and c ircumstance s of ea ch ca se. See State v . Taylor , 744 S.W .2d 919, 922 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 7 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . M os s , 7 2 7 S

. W .2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986) ). Even if a d ef endant is presumed to be a f avora ble ca ndidate for

alternative sentenc ing unde r T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 6), the statutory presumption of an a lternative se ntence may be over come if:

(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe ndant who has
a lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essar y to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offe nse or c on fi ne me nt i s pa

rt ic ula rl y su ite d to pr ov ide an e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strictive than conf inement have fre quently

or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant . . . . T.C.A. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) -(C). In choosing among possible sentencingalternatives, the trial cour t should also consider T.C.A. § 40- 35-103(5) , which states, in pe rtinent part, “[t] he potential or lac k of potential for

the re habilitation or treatment of the defendant should be considered in dete rmining the se nte nc e a lte rn a tiv e or le ng th o f a te rm to be imp os e d. ” T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 10 3( 5) ; State v. Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.

At the conclusion of the sentenc ing hear ing, the trial court noted that Appellant Br anch w as pr e sume d e lig ibl e fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . H ow e ve r, the c ourt no te d th a t:

[C ]onfinement is necessa

ry here to avoid depre ciatingthe seriousne ss of the off ense. And I consider this to be ser ious.

An d c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula rl y su ite d to pr ov ide an e ff

ect iv e deter

re nt t o others who would be likely to commit a simi lar off

ense. So the Court’s of the opinion that it’s [ s i c] too serious to depre ciate it by putting these men on probation. They can se rve the ir sentenc es.
Thus , it a pp e ars that th e tr ia l cou rt det e rm ine d th a t c on fi ne me nt w a s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id depre ciating the serious n es s o f the off ense a nd for de terre nce. A s noted by Appellant B ranc h, probation may

be denie d based solely

upon the ci rc u m s t an ce s surroundingthe offe nse. State v.-11-

Hartley , 8 18 S.W. 2d

37 0, 37 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). To de ny pr ob a tio n s ole ly on

the se g ro un ds , howeve r, the off

ense “ must be espec ially violent, hor rifying, shocking , repr ehensible, offe nsive or otherwise of

an excessive or

an exag g erated deg ree .” Id. Appellant Br anch argues that his offense s do not rise to this level. We do not ag ree . I n State v. Trotter , 2 0 1 S

. W .3d 651 (Tenn. 2006) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court looked t o the record to consider the circ umstances of the offe nse ver us the favorable fac tors fo r alternative sente ncingto determine whether the denial of

an alter native sentenc e on the ba sis of the seriousness of the offe nse was appropr iate. 201 S.W.3d at 655. I n that
case , the cour

t determined that the circ umstances surr ounding the theft of ne arly $5 0 0 ,000 by

the defe ndants from one of the de fenda nt’s employ ers wa s so “re prehe nsible, offe nsive or other wise of
an e xce ssi ve or

e xag g e rate d d e g re e ” that it outw e ig he d th e mit ig a tin g e vid e nc e of the de fe nd ants ’ g ood char acte r and r emorse. Id. Th e c ourt no te d “ the same c on c lus ion [ha d b e e n r e a c he d b y

c ourt s of this State] upon le ss eg reg ious facts.” Id. (c i t i n g Sta te v . D av is , 940 S.W .2d 558, 559-561 (Te nn. 1 9 9 7 ) ( u p h o l d i n g t h e d en i al o f p ro b at i o n fo r t h e o ff en s e o f v an d al i s mwh er e t h e e s t i m at edd am age was twe lve hundre d dollars base d on the trial cour t’s considering the seriousness of the offe nse and g ener al deter

renc e whe re the vandalism was in re taliation for cr ossing a picket line).

I n the ca se her ein, Appellant Br anch walked onto a colleg e ca

mpus carr ying a conce aled gun and attende d a par

ty in a dormit ory

. When asked to leave the pa rty , Appellant B ranc h brandished his gun and fired shots f

rom an elevator into a hallway crow ded with partying c olleg e students. The
s h o t s t h at we re fi re d s t ru ck M r. S m i t h i n t h e arm , cau s i n g h i m i n j u ri es

. At t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, t h e t r i a l c o u rt n o t e d A p p e l l an t B r an c h ’ s p r i o r c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s

. Ap p e l l an t B r a nc h h ims e lf admitted that he had been on probation one or t wo t imes and had a violation of probation in 2000. Appe ll an t B r an c h d id

e xp r e s s r e mo r s e f

o r th e c r im e an d

f o r th e in ju r ie s s u s ta in e d

b y M r

. Smith. Whil e we acknow ledg e that Appe llant B ranc h may have the potential for r ehabilitation, in our view, the evidenc e of the crime is “ repr ehensible, offe nsive or otherwise of an e x cessive or exagg erated deg ree ” to the extent that it outweighs Appe llant’s mitigating circ umstances. Id.

Be cause we have conc luded that the circ umstances here are indeed of fensive, e x cessive, a

nd of an e x ag g erated deg ree , we c onclude that the seriousness of the offe nse alone supports the denial of alter native sente ncing and that a se ntence of confinement i s nece ssary to avoid depr eciating the seriousness of the offe nse.

Moreove r, the re cord indicates t h at Appellant ha s a “history of cr iminal conduct” a

nd that “mea sur e s le s s r e s tr ic ti v e th an c o n f in e me n t h a v e

. . . r e c e n tl y b e e n a p p li e d u n s u c c e s s f

u ll y to the defe nd an t

. . . .” T.C.A. § 40-35- 103(1)( A) & (C). Ac cording ly , we de termine that Appe llant Br anch has failed to show that the trial court’s denial of probation was improper. Conseque ntly , we conclude that the trial cour t properly order ed Appe llant Bra

nch to serve his sentenc e in incar cer ation. Th is i ssu e is w ith out me ri t.-12- Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

__________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE