Indochina Monographs

The U.S. Adviser

by

General Cao Van Vien/Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong

Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen/Maj. Gen. Nguyen Buy Hinh

Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho/Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung

and Lt. Col. Chu Xuan Vien

19970423188

U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CnC QUALITY INSPECTED 1
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

The U. S. adviser.

(Indochina monographs)

Supt. of Docs, no.: D U^.l8:Ad9

4. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--United States.

2. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

I. Vien, Cao Van. II. Series.

DS558.2.U17 959-70V33'73 8O-607108

This book is not copyrighted and may be reproduced In

whole or in part without consulting the publisher

First printing 1980
Indochina Monographs

This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center

of Military History. They were written by officers who held

responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South

Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General

Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessary support under an Army contract with the Center of Military History. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the

views of their authors—not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or

the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write

definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in Southeast Asia.

Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a

forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam; From Cease-Fire

to Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao

Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General

Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent

of Documents.

Taken together these works should provide useful source

materials for serious historians pending publication of the more definitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam.

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

1X1
Preface

The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed

many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic

of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional

duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had

not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote

his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US

Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed

directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the

Vietnamese Armed Forces.

To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise

and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be

subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to

those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always

performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades,

these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam.

To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in

its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly

and effectively by a single author since there were several types of

advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to

a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the

Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant

contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.
As the last Chairman of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, a position

I held for a decade, I have contributed the chapter concerning the relationship between The JGS and MACV. As I see it, the advisory effort

at that level was largely a matter of personal relationship which set

the tone and example for the entire system. I am sure that the tributes

I pay to the successive MACV commanders, living or deceased, are but a

small part of their towering contributions and achievements.

Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, former commander of the 1st

Infantry Division and IV Corps and the last commander of I Corps, has

provided our evaluation of The Tactical Adviser, a subject for which I

am sure no one else is better qualified. A professional soldier who held

command positions at every tactical echelon during his distinguished

career, General Truong presents a candid appraisal of the US tactical

adviser, his role, and his contributions at every level, drawing from

his invaluable combat experience. Tne Intelligence Adviser has been

prepared by Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, former chief J-2, JGS and our foremost expert in RVNAF intelligence. In his assessment of the US intelligence adviser, Colonel Lung is backed by years of cooperation with US

Army intelligence agencies. Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, commander of the Central Logistics Command, RVNAF, and the last Chief of

Staff, JGS, has produced The Logistic and Technical Adviser. His truthful account of the US logistical advisory effort reflects the long experience of a man involved with the system he helped develop from the start

with the assistance of US advisers. The Pacification Adviser has been

written by Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, the last commander of the ARVN

3d Infantry Division, who draw& from his experience as Chief of Staff of

III Corps and I Corps, Deputy Commander for Territorial Security, IV Corps

and as Chief of Staff of the RF and PF Command during the middle 1960's.

Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, has developed our contribution on The

Training Adviser, drawing on his experience as a division and corps G-3,

and seven years as the J-3 of the Joint General Staff.

To provide cohesiveness and unity for the monograph, the authors

and I have relied on the editorial services of Lieutenant Colonel Chu

Xuan Vien, our last Army Attache serving at the Embassy of Vietnam in

vi
Washington, D.C. Colonel Vien, a knowledgeable analyst with a keen

sense of military history and an author in his own right, compiled the

introductory and closing chapters. The observations and conclusions

are an excellent compendium of suggestions and comments made by the

individual authors who, like myself, all feel we owe him a special debt

of gratitude.

Finally, we are all indebted to Ms. Pham Thi Bong, formerly a

Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member

of the Vietnamese Embassy staff who spent long hours typing, editing

and in the administrative preparation of this manuscript in final form.

McLean, Virginia Cao Van Vien

31 May 1977 General, ARVN

vix
Contents

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A Brief Comparative Historiaal Account 1

The U.S. Advisory System 9

Vietnamese Requirements For Advisory Assistance and

Support to the U.S. Advisory Effort 16

II. THE JGS AND MACV 22

A Matter of Personal Relationship 22

Reorganization and Development of the RVNAF 24

Highlights of a Fruitful Relationship 31

Procedures for Cooperation 38

An Evaluation 42

III. ARVN BATTALION TO CORPS AND THE TACTICAL ADVISER 46

The Tactical Advisory System 46

The Tactical Adviser's Responsibilities • . . 53

The Adviser's Role in Operational Planning and

Combat Intelligence 58

U.S. Support and the Problem of Leverage 65

Observations on Tours of Duty and Relationships .... 69

An Evaluation 73

IV. THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISER . . 77

A Pioneering Effort 77

Increasing Commitment 79

The Period of Full-Fledged Cooperation 83

Anatomy of a Relationship 89

V. THE LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISER 96

Significant Milestones 96

The Base Depot Upgrade Program 106

Path-Finder I and Path-Finder II 107

Observations of the U.S. Logistical Advisory Effort . . 110

Some Lessons Learned 119

ix
Chapter Page

VI. THE PACIFICATION ADVISER 122

The U.S. Response to Insurgency 122

CORDS Organization and Operations 126

Relations and Contributions 137

Some Lessons Learned 153

VII. THE TRAINING ADVISER 157

A Monumental Achievement 157

I Organization for Training and Training Support ... 162

i Training Advisory Activities 168

Observations and Comments 181

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 186

Appendix

A. PRINCIPLES AUTHORIZING TRIM ADVISERS WITH UNITS AND

FORMATIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMED FORCES ... 199

B. THE ASSISTANCE OF AMERICAN ADVISERS 202

GLOSSARY - 204

Charts

No.

1. Organization, U.S. Advisory System, 1970 11

2. Organization, MACV Headquarters Staff Advisers, 1970 . . 12

3. Organization, Military Assistance Advisory Group,

Vietnam, 1956 26

4. Organization, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 1972 35

5. Organization, Joint General Staff and Armed Forces

Structure, 1972 . . ". 36

6. Organization, U.S. Army Advisory System, Corps Tactical Zone 48

7. Organization, Regional Assistance Command, 1971-1972 . . 50

8. Organization, Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 1956 97

9. CORDS in MACV Command Channel 127

10. Organization, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for

CORDS, MACV 129

11. Organization, CTZ/Region CORDS 130

12. Advisory Relationships, Corps, Province and District Levels 132

13. Advisory Relationships, ARVN Hierarchy 150

14. Organization, MACV Training Directorate 166

15. Organization, Central Training Command 167

Maps

1. Location, Military Academies and Service Schools .... 163

2. Location, National Territorial Force Training Centers . . 164

x
Illustrations

No. Pa9

e

FRAC Ending A Fruitful Relationship with I Corps, 20 March,

1973 ' 52

An Odd-Looking But Harmonious Couple: The ARVN Tactical

Commander and His Adviser 54

ARVN Rangers Going Out on a Patrol with U.S. Adviser

(Ba To, Quang Ngai, Dec. 1970) 55

CIDG Troopers and U.S. Special Forces Adviser Back From

Patrol (Ban Me Thuot, March 1962) 56

ARVN 8th Marine Bn Staff Discussing Operational Plan with

U.S. Adviser (Quang Tri, Sept. 1970) 59

ARVN Battalion Commander (9th Infantry Division) Reviewing

Position with His Adviser During Combat Operation (Kien

Phong, Dec. 1970) 60

U.S. Advisers Briefing ARVN Rangers Prior to Long Range

Reconnaissance Mission (Near Cambodian Border, Nov. 1970). . 67

On-The-Job Training Provided by U.S. Photography Technician

(Oct. 1970) 102

Civilian Technicians and Specialists of the U.S. Army Materiel

Command as Advisers to the Army Arsenal, 1972 105

MAT In Action: On A Firing Range with PF Troops

(Long An, December 1970) 133

MAT Members Checking Targets After PF Troops Practice Firing

the M-16 Rifle (Long An, Dec. 1970) 134

A First-Aid Class for PF Troopers by MAT Member (Dec. 1970). . 135

MAT Member as Adviser to Vietnamese NP Field Force (Da Nang,

1970) 136

U.S. Adviser Instructing ARVN Troops on Helilift Procedures

(March, 1962) 160

ARVN Paratroopers in Combat Assault Training, 1966 161

Assisting Students at the RVNAF Language School (Dec. 1970). . 170

The National Military Academy at Dalat: A Significant

Contribution of U.S. Advisory Effort 173

The Cadets of Dalat NMA: A Source of Pride for the RVNAF . . 174

Training ARVN Rangers How to Use Compass to Bring In a

Helicopter for Landing (Oct. 1970) 179

Advisers Looking On as Ranger Student Successfully Guides

Helicopter on Landing Pad (Oct. 1970) 180

XI
CHAPTER I

Introduction

A Brief Comparative Historical Account

To understand and appreciate the full impact of the United States

adviser on the RVN Armed Forces from the Vietnamese viewpoint, it is

desirable first to review briefly the evolution of the advisory system

to include how it was organized, supported and how it functioned at

different echelons.

The United States began providing direct military advisory assistance to the Vietnamese National Army in early 1955. However, American

commitment in Indochina had started five years earlier when, coming to

the help of a hard-pressed war ally, the US supplied war materiel to

the French Expeditionary Corps which was fighting a dubious war against

the Communists-led Viet Minh, then the champion of a strong cause for

national independence.

When the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina

was established in late 1950 under Brigadier General Francis G. Brink

to administer this aid, the new state of Vietnam had been born only a

year earlier as a result of compromises between ex-Emperor Bao Dai,

Chief of State, and the French who sought to set up a regime capable of

competing with the Viet Minh. The US had promptly recognized Bao Dai

and signed with France and the "Associated States" of Indochina (Vietnam,

Cambodia, Laos) in December 1950 what came to be known as the Pentalateral

Agreements. These agreements formed the basis of US economic and

military aid for Vietnam, the first step toward a growing commitment

which terminated only a quarter of a century later.

As an Associated State of the French Union, Vietnam was granted

some degree of autonomy, but not total independence, which came only
in the aftermath of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. It

was during this period that the National Army of Vietnam came into being,

its creation sanctioned by the French need to Vietnamize the war. The

Vietnamese Army, which initially consisted of auxiliary elements recruited, trained, and led by French cadre, was gradually upgraded into

infantry battalions, then mobile groups by 1953, all under the command

of Vietnamese officers. During 1952, command and control of the new

national army was established, first with the General Staff, then four

military region headquarters, but these bodies were still heavily staffed

by French officers. During all this time, the United States Military

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) remained far removed from the scene.

Its main function was to make sure that US equipment was delivered and

properly maintained through liaison with the French High Command. Most

Vietnamese tactical commanders in the field were even unaware of its

existence until 1953 when they received the first visits by MAAG officers.

The nature of US commitment in Vietnam radically changed after the

1954 Geneva Accords to become a true military assistance and advisory

role with the advent of South Vietnam, now a separate nation south of

the 17th parallel. This came about as a result of an agreement reached

between General J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower's special envoy

and General Paul Ely, the French High Commissioner and Commander-inChief of the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina. Under the terms

of the agreement, the Vietnamese Armed Forces were to receive organization and training assistance from the MAAG as of 1 January 1955 and to

become fully autonomous six months later. By this time, the General

Staff had become all-Vietnamese under Major General Le Van Ty and after

the regrouping of the 3d Military Region units from North Vietnam, the

entire Vietnamese Armed Forces strength stood at 215,997, to include

179,197 regular troops who made up about 168 infantry battalions. The

day the Collins-Ely agreement went into effect was also the day that

three infantry divisions, the 11th, 21st and 31st, were activated

for the first time.

Such was the. general status of the Vietnamese Army when the MAAG began

its organization and training efforts. In cooperation with the French,
Lieutenant General John W. 0'Daniel, who replaced Major General Thomas

J. H. Trapnell as Chief MAAG in April 1954, organized the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) on 1 February 1955. TRIM was essentially an American concept but for the purpose of political convenience,

its staff also included French officers who performed mostly in a consultant's role. The first TRIM advisory training teams, largely composed of US Army officers, began their field assignments in April 1955.

They were attached to infantry divisions, the airborne brigade, service

schools and training centers. One month later the first US advisers

were placed at military region headquarters.

As defined in a memorandum published by the Vietnamese General

Staff on 10 April 1955, the mission of TRIM advisers was "to assist and

advise, on strictly technical aspects, Vietnamese military commanders to

whom they were assigned, in order to rapidly and effectively rebuild the

Vietnamese Armed Forces on a new basis."1The insistence on "strictly

technical aspects" set the tone and direction for the US Army advisory

effort which was to remain technically-oriented throughout its existence.

The "new basis" for reorganization needed no clarification: it was

understood to be the doctrine of the US Army.

These combined arrangements for training and reorganizing the Vietnamese Army continued for more than a year. When the French High Command

in Indochina was deactivated on 28 April 1956, TRIM personnel were immediately reassigned to the MAAG's Combat Arms Training and Organization

(CATO) Division. It was only then that the Vietnamese Armed Forces

became fully autonomous after taking over all military responsibilities

from the departing French. But French officers continued advising and

training the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force for another year, until asked

by the Government of Vietnam to terminate their mission in May 1957.

Memorandum No 1891/TTM/MG, dated 10 April 1955, and signed by

Major General Le Van Ty, Chief of the General Staff.
During this period, the major difficulties of MAAG stemmed from

the ceiling imposed on US military personnel by the Geneva Accords.

Faced with an increasing commitment to training activities and growing

logistical problems, the MAAG was authorized only 342 spaces, of which

about two-thirds were devoted to training. The Vietnamese General Staff

was also hard pressed by the same problem of a ceiling which was imposed,

not by the Geneva Accords, but by the MAAG at the 150,000 level.

With the support of direct US economic and military assistance,

South Vietnam confidently began its task of nation-building. On 26

October 1955, Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed the Republic of

Vietnam and installed himself as President and Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces. The National Armed Forces of Vietnam became the Republic

of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the National Army took on its acronym

ARVN so familiar to US Army advisers. At about the same time, MAAG,

Indochina was redesignated MAAG, Vietnam, marking the separation of

duties for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The final pullout of the French Expeditionary Corps from South

Vietnam resulted in logistical problems which plagued both the RVNAF

General Staff and the MAAG. Not being adequately organized and trained for

the handling of logistic support, the RVNAF found themselves unprepared

for it. On his part, the new Chief MAAG-V, Lieutenant General Samuel T.

Williams, who succeeded General 0'Daniel in November 1955, had to face

problems caused by the difficulty in locating, recovering and shipping

out excess MDAP equipment left behind unaccounted for by French forces.

The RVNAF did not even know exactly how much equipment there was in the

inventory. These requirements led to the creation of the Temporary

Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in June 1956 to clean up the logistical

mess and to assist the RVNAF in establishing a workable logistical support system. TERM personnel were later integrated into MAAG-V, which

brought total US advisory strength to 692 by 1960.

In the meantime, the Vietnamese Army undertook a long and arduous

process of reorganization under the auspices of MAAG advisers. During

the first stage, it was agreed that ten infantry divisions (6 light and

4 field) would constitute the ARVN backbone. This was accomplished by
the end of 1955. The search for an optimum-type division for the ARVN,

however, continued to preoccupy the MAAG for the next three years.

After discarding hundreds of tentative TOEs, it was decided in 1958 that

seven regular infantry divisions of 10,500 men each were required by RVN

to defend itself against overt aggression from the North. To solve the

problem of auxiliary forces which were not eligible for US military assistance, the GVN instituted the Civil Guard and People's Militia (or

Self-Defense Corps) under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.

By the time the ARVN reorganization was completed, the Republic of

Vietnam had consolidated its political and economic base. The resettlement of nearly one million refugees fleeing the North had been accomplished,

dissidents defeated and central authority firmly established. Against

the chaotic background of its formative years, the emergence of a strong

and stable South Vietnam was indeed a miraculous achievement that surprised

friends and foes alike, particularly North Vietnam. Determined to gain

control of the South after missing the chance of a legal take-over through

elections in 1956, the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party

proceeded to wage a "war of liberation" by reintroducing selected personnel who had previously lived in the South and directing local Viet

Minh agents into action. The insurgents became known as the Viet Cong

(literally, Vietnamese Communists) who fought under the political aegis

of the National Liberation Front, created by Hanoi in December 1960.

Beginning in 1957, the Viet Cong expanded and intensified guerrilla

warfare actions, to include terror, sabotage, kidnapping and assassination,

severely threatening the GVN control in the countryside. Faced with this

mounting crisis, the RVN outlawed Communist activities and requested

additional US military assistance. Recognizing the unconventional nature

of the war, the GVN successively created a 5,000-man Ranger Command and

the Special Forces in 1960. The US, on its part, began re-evaluating

its advisory effort which resulted in a comprehensive Counterinsurgency

Plan allowing an increase in the RVNAF strength from 150,000 to 170,000

men, MAP support for a 68,000-man Civil Guard and a 40,000-man People's

Militia, and providing more US advisers. As a result, for the first

time, US advisory teams were assigned to ARVN battalions on a selective
basis and US Special Forces teams initiated the training of ARVN Ranger

companies.

The new Kennedy administration not only approved the Counterinsurgency Plan in early 1961 but also organized a special staff, called Task

Force, Vietnam, to look after the Vietnam problem and recommend appropriate actions. In Saigon, the US Ambassador, the Chief, MAAG, and heads

of US agencies also made up a similar task force to direct the US assistance and advisory effort. President Kennedy's concern over Vietnam

was further reflected by his sending two survey missions to Saigon during

1961, one headed by Dr. Eugene Staley and the other by General Maxwell

D. Taylor and Dr. Walt W. Rostow. Both missions seemed to confirm that

counterinsurgency should be a concerted military-economic effort and

that assistance should be substantially increased in terms of advisers,

combat support, and expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces. Most

particularly, the Taylor-Rostow mission recommended US support for the

GVN strategic hamlet program which was a pacification strategy based

upon fortifying vulnerable, isolated hamlets. By the end of 1961, the

US advisory effort had expanded to most ARVN battalions and to provinces

as well. In the central highlands, US Special Forces teams were organizing,

arming, and training Montagnards to fight as units which became known as

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). In addition, to direct the

increased military commitment effectively, it was decided to establish

the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Paul D.

Harkins was selected as commander. The Military Assistance Advisory

Group was still retained, however, under Major General Charles J. Timmes

who continued directing the military assistance program and the advisory

and training effort for the RVNAF.

A month after General Harkins activated Headquarters, MACV in early

February, 1962, the GVN launched the strategic hamlet program with the

objective of pacifying the countryside. Although termed a success by

the GVN, the program was not popular with the rural population because

it required many to leave their own farms in insecure areas and move

to fortified areas, and it did not receive substantial support from

the United States.
The introduction of US tactical aircraft and helicopters brought

total American advisory and support personnel to approximately 11,000

by the end of 1962, including 26 Special Forces teams. ARVN units were

initiated to airmobile operations transported in US Army helicopters

which were operationally controlled by US adviser's.

In spite of this progress, the military coup that overthrew the

Diem governnment on 1 November 1963 ushered in an era of political

turmoil and instability which proved nearly fatal to South Vietnam. The

enemy took advantage of this opportunity to speed up a military victory.

He began infiltrating regular units from the North and systematically

wrecked the largely neglected strategic hamlet program. By the end of

1964, the situation had so deteriorated that President Johnson had to

make the fateful decision in early 1965 to bomb North Vietnam and engage

in the ground war in the South. The US advisory system had by now

extended to the district level. To streamline command and control, MAAG

was dissolved in May 1964 and the military assistance and advisory effort

placed under direct control of MACV. A month later, General William C.

Westmoreland took over as commander, USMACV.

The buildup of US forces which started in mid-1965 and the intensification of the war during the next few years towered above the advisory effort and turned US advisers into liaison officers whose primary

role was to maintain coordination between ARVN and US units and to

obtain US combat support for the ARVN. To help the ARVN carry out

effectively its assigned role of pacification support, Mobile Training

Teams (MTT) were organized to train and motivate ARVN maneuver battalions

for their new task. The US renewed interest in pacification also led

to the establishment in 1967 of the Civil Operations and Rural Development

Support (CORDS) system which paralleled and advised the GVN system of

Pacification and Development Councils. The MACV commander was given

overall military-civilian control for the conduct of the war and was

assisted by a Deputy CORDS, an official of ambassadorial rank. At the

field level, the US Field Force commander as senior adviser to the ARVN

corps commander was also assisted by a Deputy CORDS. During 1967 a

total of 4,000 military personnel and 800 civilians were involved in
the CORDS organization. Subsequent increases in US advisory strength was

devoted to training and advising the Regional and Popular Forces

(formerly Civil Guard and People's Militia, respectively).

By 1968, MACV had about 2,500 fewer advisers assigned than authorized

and these shortages fell mostly in the CORDS and RF-PF advisory areas.

To assist in offsetting this, MACV used five-man Mobile Advisory Teams

(MAT) that rotated among RF-PF units to train and advise them. This

expansion of the RF-PF advisory effort was done incrementally, however,

with in-country resources and reaching toward a planned goal of 354

such teams by the end of 1968. When Vietnamization was officially

proclaimed in mid-1969, total US Army advisory strength stood at about

13,500, half of which was assigned to CORDS organizations. In Saigon,

General Creighton W. Abrams had succeeded General Westmoreland as

Commander, USMACV since July 1968.

The advent of Vietnamization radically changed the direction of

the US advisory effort. The "goal now was to expand and improve the

RVNAF combat effectiveness to such an extent that they were capable of

taking over combat responsibilities from US forces which were gradually

being withdrawn by increments. As a result of successive force structure

increases, total RVNAF strength was brought up to 717,214 for 1968, then

jumped quickly to the 1.1 million mark within the space of the next four

years. ARVN force structure, meanwhile, accounted for only a modest

increase, from 321,056 in 1968 to 448,953 by the time of the cease-fire.

During this period, US advisory strength was gradually reduced in keeping

with the phasing out of the US presence in South Vietnam.

Efforts at improving the RVNAF combat effectiveness and enabling

them to replace US forces in all aspects of combat and service support

had been undertaken at an accelerated pace under several programs since

1969. Most noteworthy among them were the combined operations programs

initiated by US Field Forces such as the Dong Tien and Pair-Off campaigns,

and the extensive on-the-job training programs conducted by the US 1st

Logistical Command for the benefit of ARVN logistical and technical

service units. It was during this period that the RVNAF really came

of age, operationally as well as logistically. The development and
maturity of the ARVN were particularly proved during the two major

cross-border campaigns, in 1970 and 1971, conducted without the parti2

cipation of US advisers. The ARVN also took over the operation of major

US logistical facilities without serious problems. As a result of the

standdown and redeployment of US forces, Regional Assistance Commands

(RAC) were activated to replace US Field Forces in the four corps

areas during 1971 and 1972, signifying the end of the US combat role

in South Vietnam.

The US advisory effort terminated on the cease-fire day, 28 January

1973. To manage the continuing Security Assistance Program for the RVN,

the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) was established with a very limited

number of military personnel. But its relationship with the RVNAF was

essentially one of co-workers, not a relationship between advisers and

advisees as it had been. All CORDS functions were taken over by USAID

and its residual personnel absorbed into four US Consulates General, one

for each military region. At the province level, US civilian personnel

were grouped into 20 area offices, responsible for civil operations.

But even these offices were subsequently dissolved and finally the US

presence in each province was reduced to a small liaison team.

The U.S. Advisory System

Despite the evolution of the system, the objectives contemplated

by the US advisory effort in South Vietnam remained essentially consistent

throughout its existence. These objectives were to organize, train,

and equip the Vietnamese armed forces and develop their combat effectiveness to such an extent as to enable them to maintain internal security

and to defend the nation against outside aggression. The presence of

such a military force was vital for the GVN in its task of nationbuilding and national defense in the face of a hostile North Vietnam

2

American advisers accompanied ARVN units in the initial phases

of the Cambodian operation but were gradually withdrawn until by

1 July, all ARVN units operating in Cambodia were without advisers.
whose avowed goal was to dominate the South.

The United States advisory system was firmly established only

after the creation of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and its

subsequent reorganization in 1964 when it took over all military assistance

and advisory functions from the MAAG which was dissolved. (Chart 1)

MACV's mission in South Vietnam derived basically from the American

advocacy of the self-determination principle which would allow countries

to determine their own future without outside interference. Up to 1969,

however, in keeping with the US policy of confrontation towards the

hard-line Communist countries MACV was assigned the mission of assisting

the GVN and its armed forces to defeat the VC/NVA forces and to attain

an independent, secure, non-Communist society in South Vietnam. With

the advent of Vietnamization and a switch of US policy to negotiation,

MACV's mission was reworded as "To assist the GVN to defeat externally

directed and supported Communist subversion and aggression in order to

attain an environment which would allow the people of the RVN to deter3

mine their future without outside interference."

The scope of MACV's mission thus defined transcended the military

advisory and training functions previously assigned to MAAG-V during

nearly a decade of its existence. It clearly encompassed the civil

operations in support of the GVN pacification and development program.

The difference in mission between MACV and MAAG-V also stemmed from the

fact that MACV also functioned as a US theater-type troop command. As

a result, only part of MACV Headquarters staff personnel actually served

in a true advisory capacity. In 1970, for example, only 397 out of 1668

authorized spaces in MACV's 15 staff agencies were designed officially

as "advisers" to the GVN and the JGS/RVNAF. (Chart 2) The MACV

command group consisted of only three advisers: the commander, MACV,

the deputy commander and the deputy CORDS.

MACV Directive No. 10-11, dated 4 May 1971.

10
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12
Only three MACV staff agencies were exclusively involved in advisory

and support efforts: the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for

Military Assistance (MACMA), established in 1967 to serve as a focal

point for all advisory matters for the Army, Navy, and Air Force advisory groups; the Training Directorate (MACT) which evolved from the

original CATO Division, MAAG-V, and served as principal US adviser to

the Central Training Command/JGS; and CORDS.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS was the principal staff

assistant to the MACV commander on US civil/military support for the

GVN pacification and development program. Within CORDS, there were

staffs for each component of the program. Those concerned with civiloriented programs, such as Refugee Resettlement, Chieu Hoi (the effort

to encourage enemy defections and to exploit and care for those who did)

Public Safety and Community Development, were staffed mainly by USAID

and State Department civilians and their directors served as advisers

to counterpart GVN agencies. The mission of advising the RF/PF was

assigned to the Territorial Security Directorate, which was staffed

mostly by military personnel. In addition, there were Department of

4

Defense civilians working with RD cadre and in the Phoenix program.

MACV general and special staff agencies were all involved in the

advisory effort to a certain extent. The Assistant Chief of Staff for

Personnel (MACJl) was the principal adviser to the Minister of War

Veterans, GVN, the Director General of Mobilization, Ministry of Defense,

and to the J-l, JGS on personnel matters. The Assistant Chief of

Staff for Intelligence (MACJ2) was the principal adviser to his counter-.

part, the J-2, JGS on RVNAF intelligence programs, training, and actions

relating to the improvement and modernization of RVNAF intelligence

elements. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (MACJ3) was

the principal adviser to the JGS on all matters pertaining to operations

and current plans. He exercised supervision and control over the

Rural Development (RD) cadre were teams of specialists and

technicians deployed to villages to assist the people in improving

local conditions, primarily in agricultural and management fields. The

Phoenix program was designed to root out the VC infrastructure.

13
Railway Security Advisory Detachment and airborne advisers to the ARVN

Airborne Division, and provided primary liaison and assistance to the

RVNAF General Political Warfare Department. The Assistant Chief of

Staff for Logistics (MACJ4) was the principal adviser to RVNAF on

materiel systems development, logistics operation, organization, and

plans, and directed the advisory effort of the RVNAF Central Logistics

Command, the Technical Service Advisory Divisions, and the Area Logistics

Command, the Technical Service Advisory Divisions, and the Area Logistics

Commands (ALC) advisory teams. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans

(MACJ5) provided advisory assistance, conducted combined contingency

planning with the JGS, and exercised joint staff supervision for the

Free World Military Assistance Organization (FWMAO). The Assistant Chief

of Staff for Communications-Electronics (MACJ6) was the senior adviser

to the GVN arid RVNAF on matters pertaining to the improvement and modernization of communications-electronics and provided direct advisory

assistance to ARVN C-E staffs" and signal units directly under the operation;

control of the JGS and ARVN Signal Department. The Comptroller (MACCO)

served as an adviser to the RVN on the development and execution of the

defense budget and as the senior adviser to the GVN Ministry of Defense

on accounting and finance matters. Other special staff agencies such as

Provost Marshall, Inspector General, Chaplain, etc. all performed advisory functions in addition to their normal staff duties of a United

States military headquarters.

At the corps level, the US field force commander served as senior

adviser to the ARVN corps commander. In this capacity, he was assisted

by two deputies: -a deputy for CORDS and a deputy senior adviser who

was actually the chief of the US Army Advisory Group attached to the

ARVN Corps headquarters. The Deputy CORDS was the principal adviser

to the ARVN corps commander for his responsibilities as chairman of the

Corps Pacification and Development Council. His advisory duties were

related to territorial security, i.e., improving the effectiveness of

the RF/PF, National Field Force Police, and armed RD cadre and PSDF.

Armed RD Cadre accompanied the RD teams to protect them in the

insecure hamlets in which they worked. The People's Self Defense

Forces (PSDF) were the local, lightly armed militia organized solely to

protect their own hamlets from VC incursions.

14
He was also the direct supervisor of the senior advisers assigned to

the provinces. The Deputy Senior.Adviser directed and supervised the

US Army Advisory Group (USAAG) at corps headquarters whose mission was

to provide advice and assistance to the ARVN corps commander and his

staff in command, administration, training, combat operations, intelligence, security, logistics, political warfare, and civil affairs. He

determined requirements for and coordinated US tactical air, airlift

support, helicopter, and artillery support for the ARVN corps, and also

coordinated with US and FWMAF on joint plans, operations, and training.

In addition, he was responsible for establishing, maintaining, operating,

and providing advisory functions for a combined Corps Tactical Operations

Center/Direct Air Support Center (TOC/DASC) in conjunction with RVNAF

elements.

In 1971-1972, to consolidate the corps advisory system during the

reduction of US personnel, US Field Forces were replaced by Regional

Assistance Commands (RAC). The Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC)

had been established first in late 1969 as the brigade of the US 9th

Infantry Division withdrew from IV Corps area. It was redesignated DRAC

in 1971. Then in early 1972, the First Regional Assistance Command

(FRAC), the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) and the Second

Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) were successively established.

The mission of Regional Assistance Commands was to: (1) Provide

assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military

capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary

commanders and staffs at all levels in military operations, training,

intelligence, personnel management, and combat support and combat service support activities; (2) Provide advice, assistance, and support to

RVNAF at corps, division/special zone, sector, and subsector level in

planning and executing coordinated pacification and development programs,

to include civic actions by US units, and; (3) Develop, in coordination

with the ARVN corps commander, recommendations for RVNAF and paramilitary

force materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements in the

military region. As the corps senior adviser, the RAC commander exercised

operational control over the corps US Army Advisory Group and the CORDS

organization for the military region.

15
The division advisory team's mission was to advise and assist the

ARVN division commander and his staff in command, administration,

training, tactical operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and

certain elements of political warfare. The team assisted the ARVN

division commander in obtaining and coordinating US combat support.

It obtained necessary MAP materiels and equipment for ARVN and kept higher

headquarters informed on the combat effectiveness of the division; it

also assisted in the operation of the division Tactical Operations Center.

The division senior adviser exercised control over regiment and battalion

advisory teams, each composed of from three to five US Army personnel.

At the province level, the senior adviser (PSA) was either military

or civilian depending on the security situation. Of the 44 province

advisers, in 1970, there were 25 military and 19 civilians. If the PSA

was military, his deputy was a civilian and vice versa. The PSA's

counterpart was the province chief, usually a military officer who commanded the RF/PF as well as GVN administrative personnel. The PSA

maintained direct control over each of the district senior advisers

(DSA) and with his staff, provided support services and guidance to

district and mobile advisory teams.

In 1970, there were 236 districts authorized a DSA and staff. Most

of the DSAs were military. The advisory staff at district level usually

had eight members but the size varied according to the district

particular needs and situation. For example, the DSA for Binh Chanh District

(Gia Dinh Province) had a 14-member team to advise and assist the district

chief on military and civil aspects of the pacification and development

program. In addition to the advisory relationship with the district

chief, the DSA had operational control of the mobile advisory teams (MAT)

working in the villages and hamlets of that district.

Vietnamese Requirements For Advisory Assistance

and Support to the U.S. Advisory Effort

The US advisory effort in South Vietnam was a gradual buildup that

responded to the needs of the RVNAF and the military situation. Strange

as it may seem, the RVNAF requirements for US advisory assistance were

16
never determined by the Vietnamese themselves. From the beginning to

the end of the US advisory effort, the RVNAF never requested a specific

quota of advisers nor were they ever able to determine completely what

types of advisers were required for their own needs.

The process of determining the requirements for advisory assistance,

therefore, was largely based on estimates and progress and it was always

a function performed by the US senior military headquarters in South

Vietnam. Up to 1960, MAAG-V was bound by a strength ceiling imposed

by the Geneva Accords which seriously limited the extent and range of

its advisory effort. As of 1961, and in particular with the establishment of MACV, the US advisory effort seemed no longer restrained by

the Geneva provisions after North Vietnam publicly vowed to conquer

the South. During the Diem administration, however, despite the 1961

Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with the US, the GVN tended to

view the growing US advisory effort with a suspicious eye, particularly

as it related to the assignment of advisers to provinces and to the

activities of the United States Special Forces. This suspicion seemed

to derive from the fact that as an autocratic ruler, President Diem was

reluctant to let any outsider be privy to the way he ruled the country

from his palace.

The successive military governments after Mr. Diem took a more

realistic view of the US advisory assistance effort which the military

especially regarded as indispensable after the 1964 near-disaster. The

expansion of the US advisory system during the following years came as

a natural response to the growing Communist threat. Still, neither

the GVN nor the JGS ever recommended how many or what types of advisers

would be required to help South Vietnam achieve the desired objectives.

There were several reasons for this. First, the decisions to

deploy more or fewer United States personnel were always made by US

leaders after general consultation with the GVN which was never in a

position to disagree. Second, neither the GVN nor the JGS was familiar

with the different categories of US Army occupational specialties, much

less with the US government civil service system. Third, the JGS never

knew for certain how much financial and material aid the RVNAF would

17
receive from the Military Assistance Program each year in order to plan

accurately for force structure increases or other improvement programs,

hence the requirements for additional advisory assistance. It seemed

as if the JGS was always resigned to the position of a blind-folded

recipient of military aid and advisory assistance, leaving all the

details of programming and funding to the donor.

The requirements for US Army officers assigned to advisory duties

in Vietnam seemed to be based on three major criteria: language ability,

branch of service, and training. Some degree of fluency in Vietnamese,

for example, was required of officers assigned to the RF/PF, particularly

those advising the PF training centers and the district chiefs.

Experience, however, showed that this linguistic requirement was seldom

restrictive and that these advisers rarely achieved a desirable fluency

for effective professional communication. US Army officers selected

for staff or technical service advisory duties were usually matched

branch for branch, but here again, this requirement was sometimes not

strictly observed, chiefly when the advisory position was classified asbranch-immaterial. The training criterion applied mostly to key advisory

positions or specialized areas of duty. Depending on the level, graduates of the National or Army War Colleges, Command and General Staff

College, branch Career or Advanced courses were required. Specialized

areas of duty usually related to such courses as Counterinsurgency and

Special Warfare, Psychological Operations, Special Forces, Civil

Affairs, etc. The majority of advisory positions, however, required

graduates of the Military Assistance Institute or Military Assistance

Training Advisory Course. But regardless of position or specialization,

the one-year tour seemed not conducive to more extensive preparation

of US officers for advisory duties other than perfunctory requirements

and a brief orientation course prior to field deployment.

The RVNAF support for the US advisory effort dated back to the

early days of TRIM. However, this support was adequate and significant

only during the existence of MAAG-V. The advent of MACV and the subsequent growth of the United States advisory effort gradually transcended

the RVNAF capabilities to provide support. As a result, Vietnamese

18
support to the advisory effort was only modest, in view of its limited

assets.

When the first US advisers were assigned to field duties back in

1955, they were almost exclusively supported by the ARVN units to which

they were attached. In fact, a basic directive issued by the Vietnamese

General Staff in 1955 and reiterated three years later concerning support

for US advisers emphasized that it was the responsibility of Vietnamese

Armed Forces officers to ensure that US advisers were provided with:

(1) Security; (2) Satisfaction in their operational requirements, and

(3) Billets, office space, vehicles, drivers, mess personnel, interpreters, communications and emergency medical service.

During the first few years when advisory personnel were limited

and mostly concentrated in the Saigon area, service and logistical support was provided for them by the 1st ARVN Headquarters and Service

Battalion. Its responsibilities included the administration of Vietnamese

base facilities made available to MAAG-V such as General Staff's old

headquarters at 606, Tran Hung Dao Boulevard which was used for

several years as the MAAG-V Headquarters, the operation of MAAG-V motor

pool, including the control of Vietnamese drivers, and the provision of

security personnel for MAAG-V Headquarters and personnel billets. In

billeting support, the RVNAF provided a multi-story, downtown building

which had been constructed and turned over by French Forces. This

building was used as BOQs for US officers for many years and was named

after the first MAAG chief, Brigadier General Francis G. Brink. Subsequently, as US forces increased many times and because of RVNAF

limited assets, all billeting quarters arid office requirements for US

personnel in the Saigon area were provided by MA.CV.

In the field, US advisory teams permanently attached to ARVN units

and schools were accommodated in Vietnamese facilities, to include office

space, billets and mess service. These facilities were usually located

in the same building complex occupied by the ARVN unit. In a few

places where ARVN facilities were very limited, living quarters and a

mess for US advisers were located in a separate area in town, however,

offices were always co-located within the ARVN unit compound. A

19
substantial construction fund was set aside by the Construction

Directorate, RVNAF for the purpose of improving facilities reserved for

US advisers. Standards for this improvement work were normally higher

than those for ARVN facilities.

Vehicles and communications facilities were usually provided by

the ARVN unit out of its organic equipment. Drivers, interpreters, mess

and utility personnel were all ARVN servicemen from the unit's organic

personnel. Members of the advisory team were treated at the unit's

medical facility in case of minor illness and injury. In all aspects

of support, the United States advisory team was considered as an element

of the unit and the ARVN unit commander was held responsible for the

team's security and well being. The most significant difficulty for

most ARVN units with a US advisory team during the early years was

that neither vehicles, particularly 1/4 ton trucks, nor personnel

involved in the support of these US advisers were authorized within the

unit TOE.

By 1961, the advisory system had expanded to such an extent that it

was beyond the capability of RVNAF and the ARVN unit to provide adequate

support. As a result, vehicles, communication equipment and personnel

required for the support of US advisers were programmed and gradually

provided by MAA.G-V. After MACV was established in 1962, all support

requirements for field advisory teams were processed through US support

channels. Vehicles and radio equipment that were earmarked for US

advisers were programmed for separately, but upon arrival in Vietnam

they were placed under RVNAF control. However, their distribution was

subject to orders issued by MA.CV J-4. Once these vehicles and radio

equipment had been issued, they were accounted for and maintained by

the ARVN unit to which the US advisory team was assigned.

For office and living quarters, US adviser's requirements were

handled by MA.CV either through new construction or leasing. Priority

in construction was given to office buildings located within ARVN compounds if land and space was available. The use of land outside ARVN

jurisdiction had to be approved by an Interministerial Commission on

Real Estate. Maintenance work on newly constructed buildings was the

20
responsibility of US support units. As to interpreters and drivers,

requirements that seemed to multiply every year, an arrangement was

made whereby if locally US recruited and paid civilians were not

adequate, they were augmented with ARVN servicemen as appropriate.

By 1965, in view of the US force buildup, the support for United

States advisers was provided entirely by MACV. It no longer was the

responsibility of the RVNAF as had been initially determined. Conversely in 1972, to prepare for the pullout in the event of a cease-fire

agreement, all facilities and equipment used by US advisers for their

day-to-day operations were title-transfered to the RVNAF and became

Vietnamese properties. US advisers signed for their temporary use

and finally returned them to the RVNAF when they departed South Vietnam

in compliance with the Paris Agreement of 28 January 1973.

Such was, in very broad terms, the evolution of the US advisory

effort in South Vietnam from the day the Vietnamese armed forces became

fully autonomous until the event of an illusory cease-fire forced its

termination. The following chapters seek to analyze and evaluate the

system from the Vietnamese point of view in terms of its achievements

in every area of endeavor, its relations with the counterpart military

organization at all levels and in terms of the constraints imposed upon

it by national policies and cultural differences.

21
CHAPTER II

The JGS and MACV

A Matter of Personal Relationship

When I assumed the command responsibilities as Chief of the Joint

General Staff (JGS) in October 1965, I did not really expect to serve

in that capacity for nearly a decade. So eventful was my tenure of

office that I hardly noticed the passing of time until the very last

days of the Republic. During this period, I had the privilege of being

a counterpart to three successive MACV commanders, General William C.

Westmoreland, General Creighton W. Abrams, and General Frederick C.

Weyand, all distinguished professional soldiers whom I admire and respect

not only as military leaders but also as friends and advisers.

The decade of my command saw the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

truly come of age in every respect. Within the space of eight years,

they had more than doubled in force structure to become a strong, modern

three-service military organization with 1.1 million men under arms by

the time of the cease-fire. In early 1965, they were on the verge of

losing the military war. In 1968, they stood up valiantly against a

most vicious enemy offensive and turned it into a military victory. Twice

in 1970 and 1971, they crossed the national borders and struck devastatingly against the enemy's inviolable sanctuaries and infiltration corridor.

In 1972, they stalled and finally broke up a most ferocious and determined invasion by NVA regular divisions on three different fronts. All

these exploits, although achieved with substantial support from American

firepower, testified to the success of the U.S. military assistance and

advisory program.

22
The relationship between the JGS and MACV had been purely advisory

in nature until United States forces started to participate in the ground

war. The buildup of U. S. combat forces beginning in mid-1965 added a

new dimension to this relationship by making it one of coordination and

cooperation for the conduct of the war since MACV-had become a theater-type

command. General Westmoreland was genuinely concerned, as all military

strategists should, about the feasibility of a United Nations-type

unified command and he sketched the idea to my immediate predecessor,

Lieutenant General Tran Van Minn, and Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu,

then Minister of Defense, who was soon to become Chairman of the National

Leadership Committee. As military men themselves, both understood his

concern but were disturbed at the idea of sacrificing the national cause

for the sake of the military war in the event an American general became

supreme commander. After all, this was a Vietnamese conflict and national

sensitivities aside, there was also the question of how world opinion

would react if it was fought under the American banner. The matter was

not discussed further and when I was appointed Chief of the JGS, the

coexistence of two separate commands looked like the most natural way to

manage the war effectively. Never again did General Westmoreland bring

up the subject, as least as far as I was concerned.

I enjoyed the same kind of working relationship with the next MACV

commander, General Creighton W. Abrams whose responsibility was to improve

the RVNAF, oversee the gradual U.S. troop pullout and ensure that the

RVNAF had the capabilities to assume the combat burden. His leadership

and devotedness helped the RVNAF rapidly develop in strength and fighting

ability. It was largely General Abram's idea of putting them to test.

I most welcomed his suggestion of a spoiling attack against the enemy's

supply bases and infiltration routes which resulted in the Cambodian

Incursion of 1970 and LAM SON 719 in lower Laos in 1971. It was he

again who, in the confusion of the first few hours after the NVA crossed

the DMZ in early April 1972, personally informed me of the critical

situation and the debacle of the 3d ARVN Infantry Division. Had it not

been for his insight and solicitude, the JGS would have found itself in

an embarrassing position after I Corps had apparently lost effective

control. The next and last MACV commander, General Fred C. Weyand,

23
who had served as II Field Force Commander, had only a brief tour, but

was instrumental in bringing the RVNAF up to the required strength and

combat capabilities. His finishing touch, the Enhance Plus program, which

gave additional mobility and firepower to the RVNAF, brought the Vietnamization process to a successful conclusion.

Looking back over the years of U.S. advisory assistance and cooperation, I think that success owed a great deal to the personal relationship cultivated between the adviser and his counterpart. At the JGS

and MACV level, this relationship was of utmost importance since it

reflected on the entire system and could make or break the common war

effort. But since its beginning, the U.S. advisory system had been built

on solid ground as evidenced by the productive decade that preceded my

tour of duty as Chief of the JGS. My predecessor, the venerated and

paternal Marshal Le Van Ty, who presided over that earlier decade, was

truly the pioneer who laid a solid foundation for the development of a

fruitful U.S.-RVNAF relationship. What I later enjoyed was only the

legacy of his exemplary leadership. During his time, he faced much less

complex but more fundamental problems. What he had accomplished with

the advisory assistance of various MAAG chiefs was to remain forever the

basic framework on which the RVNAF were later developed.

Reorganization and Development of the RWAF

It was in late 1954 that the Vietnamese General Staff became allVietnamese for the first time, without French officers and NCO cadre.

Major General Le Van Ty, then commander of the 1st Military Region, was

appointed Chief of the General Staff, a position he held until his death

in 1964. It was also then that Vietnamese began to be used as the

official language in the armed forces in the place of French.

The first Vietnamese officers appointed to key staff positions were:

Colonel Tran Van Don, Chief of Staff; Lt. Colonel Tran Thien Khiem, Deputy

Chief of Staff; Major Tu Cau, G-l; Major Trang Van Chinh, G-2; Lt. Colonel

Nguyen Van Manh, G-3; Major Cao Van Vien, G—4; Major Tran Tu Oai, G-5

(Psywar); Lt. Colonel Tran Ngoc Tam, Training Bureau.

24
From the beginning, the General Staff of the Vietnamese National

Armed Forces was predominantly army despite the existence of service

components. The Deputies Chief of the General Staff for the Navy and

Air Force were also the commanders of their respective components. When

assuming its advisory and training role, the MAAG directed its primary effort

toward the Vietnamese Army which was in fact the most important and by

far the largest service. Within the MAAG organization, the Combat Arms

Training and Organization (CATO) Division was the principal agency responsible for the reorganization and training of the Vietnamese Army.

(Chart 3) This nucleus of training advisers was to develop in time into

the Training Directorate under MACV.

The most pressing task faced by the Vietnamese General Staff after

its creation in late 1954 was to take over responsibilities from the

departing French forces by establishing a cohesive territorial system

of command and organizing a regular combat force composed of nine infantry divisions and an airborne brigade in order to face the eventuality of

renewed aggression by North Vietnam.

On 1 January 1955, the first three infantry divisions, the 11th,

21st, and 31st were activated. But this organizational momentum was soon

impeded by the problem of a strength ceiling imposed by the MAAG. The

Vietnamese forces' total strength by that date stood at 210,000 to

include 172,000 of the regular forces and 37,800 assorted auxiliary troops

(regional forces, French Union forces, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao armed units

2

absorbed into the Vietnamese Army). While the General Staff advocated

2

There were about 25,000 Vietnamese serving in French Union forces

to include 1,200 paratroopers and 3,000 commandos. Upon their departure,,

the French insisted that they be all reintegrated into the Vietnamese

National Army. Only 10,000 were accepted by the Vietnamese General Staff.

The remainder was either disbanded or rejoined French Forces in Algeria.

The Cao Dai was a religious sect in Tay Ninh Province that maintained a

private quasi-military force. About 2,400 of these men were absorbed into

the Army. The Hoa Hao was a religious sect located in the Mekong

Delta Province of Long Xuyen and 2,400 men of its private army were also

integrated into the ARVN. Another military organization was maintained

by the Catholics of Bien Hoa Province - the Unite Mobile de Defence

de la Chretiente" (UMDC) - and 840 of these men were absorbed in the

Vietnamese Army.

25
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26
a 150,000-man regular force, the MAAG adamantly agreed to only 100,000

and further recommended that the strength reduction be made within six

months.

In compliance with the MAAG's recommendations, the Vietnamese

General Staff proceeded first to discharge the auxiliary forces, then the

disabled, old, sick or wounded, mostly troops native of and regrouped

from North Vietnam. This coercive measure generated a feeling of frustration among the troops which resulted in two riots by discharged servicemen, one in Nha Trang during February and the other in Hue in March,

1955, in protest against the discharge.

Hard-pressed by the mandatory strength ceiling and the problems

created both by discharged servicemen and the need to maintain sufficient

forces to combat the dissident sects, the government of Vietnam established the Civil Guard in April 1955 to absorb the veterans. By midJune, when the MAAG approved the new 150,000-man force structure, the

discharge orders were rescinded. The 150,000-man force structure was

maintained, with slight fluctuations, as the'basic strength of the Republic

of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) for the next five years, then gradually

increased to about 290,000 by the time the U.S. introduced combat forces

for the ground war in South Vietnam in 1965.

With the new force structure plan approved, the MAAG and the General

Staff agreed to build a national military force whose major combat components consisted of 10 infantry divisions (4 field and 6 light), 1 airborne brigade, 13 territorial regiments, 11 artillery battalions (including

one 155-mm. artillery battalion), 4 armor regiments and 3 engineer combat

groups. The navy and air force, meanwhile, had about 4,000 men each,

poorly equipped and poorly trained. Following a MAAG suggestion, in

October 1955, a standardized designation system was adopted for the

infantry divisions. Thus the four 8,100-man field divisions were

designated 1, 2, 3, 4 and the six 5,800-man light divisions were numbered

from 11 to 16.

The period from 1956 to 1958 was devoted to extensive field tests

initiated and conducted by the MAAG in search for an optimal type division

for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The restructuring effort

27
was undertaken with the basic assumption of an overt invasion from the

North and the organizational approach to it was purely conventional,

undoubtedly under the influence of the Korean war experience. Tables of

organization and equipment were prepared and tested. The guinea pig

for these experimentations was the 4th Field Division (later redesignated

7th) at Bien Hoa.

By the end of 1959, the ARVN was reorganized into seven standard

divisions of 10,450 men each and three army corps headquarters. In 1961,

to cope with the mounting Communist insurgency, two new infantry divisions

were activated, the 9th and 25th, and a fourth army corps headquarters

was established. Still, each division had only one artillery battalion

and company-size support units. The U.S. was then prepared to provide

support for a regular army of 170,000 and an auxiliary force (Civil Guard)

of 68,000.

Encouraged by the U.S. willingness to provide support as required,

the JGS asked for a 15-division, 278,000-man regular army in mid-1961, a

plan it had coveted to provide the ARVN with a strong combat backbone.

The U.S. agreed to only 200,000 but began to send in more U.S. combat

support assets to enhance the RVNAF capabilities in heliflift, air

reconnaissance, and coastline and river patrolling. The strength of

MAAG—V was also increased and it began attaching advisers to ARVN combat

battalions. In view of consolidating the U.S. advisory and assistance

effort in terms of command and control, the U.S. decided to establish

the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in February 1962,

under Lieutenant General Paul D. Harkins. The MAAG continued to function

as a separate headquarters responsible to MACV for advisory and operational

support matters under Major General Charles J. Timmes who had

succeeded Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr.

The years 1961 and 1962 were devoted to extensive training, field

and command post exercises by infantry divisions, and emphasis was placed

on improving the Civil Guard and People's Militia. The JGS itself

underwent a radical change in organization when in mid-1962 it was

decided to create an Army Command under Lieutenant General Tran Van Don,

following an over-all defense structure reorganization which saw the

establishment of four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ), and Division Tactical

28
Areas (DTA). The JGS was to function as a genuine joint service

general staff with personnel attached from the Air Force and Navy. At

the same time a joint communications-electronics staff division, J-6,

was created under the JGS for the first time.

The concept of a separate army component proved unsuccessful and

the experimental Army Command was disbanded about six months later.

It was concluded that the Army Command merely duplicated the functions

being performed by the JGS which in fact remained essentially an army

general staff with limited joint authority despite the inclusion of a

handful of air force and naval staff officers.

After the November military ooup d' etat of 1963 which overthrew

President Ngo Dinh Diem, the JGS vas transformed into an Armed Forces

High Command under General Tran Thien Khiem and later, General Nguyen

Kann but its role and functions remained unchanged. This was a period

of political uncertainty which saw several governments come and go in

rapid succession. The new MACV commander, General William C. Westmoreland,

must have had a hard time dealing with politically-ambitious ARVN

generals who made up the Armed Forces Council and effectively controlled

the RVNAF. After civilian rule was restored in early 1965, with the

ousting of General Nguyen Khanh, the Armed Forces High Command was

placed under the command of Lieutenant General Tran Van Minh. When the

National Leadership Committee was formed in mid-1965 to rule the country

under Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air "Vice Marshal"

Nguyen Cao Ky, I was called upon to serve as Chief of the Joint General

Staff, a position I held until the final days of South Vietnam. By this

time, the RVNAF total strength had reached 435,000 to include 225,000

for the ARVN, a regular force still basically composed of nine infantry

divisions.

The period from 1965 to 1969 saw a rapid expansion and modernization of the RVNAF. It was also a period of intensified fighting during

which U.S. ground forces, introduced since mid-1965, took the lead in

combat while the RVNAF assumed the more modest role of pacification support.

Successive force structure increases brought total RVNAF strength to

633,645 in 1967, 685,739 in 1968, 875,790 in 1969, 953,673 in 1970,

992,837 in 1971, and finally to around 1.1 million men at the time of

29
the cease-fire in January 1973. In the meantime, two new infantry

divisions were created, the 10th (later redesignated 18th) in 1966, and

the 3d, in early 1972. Having to cope with training and logistical

support problems occasioned by the rapid force structure expansion, the

JGS decided to create the Central Training Command and the Central

Logistics Command in 1966 in an effort to consolidate and improve

command and control regarding these major functions. To exercise

supervision over the territorial (Regional and Popular) forces, which

had become part of the RVNAF in 1964 and by 1966 made up about one half

of total RVNAF strength, there was created the position of Deputy Chief

of the JGS for Regional and Popular Forces.

With the institution of the Second Republic in 1967 under President

Nguyen Van Thieu, who also effectively assumed his constitutional powers

as Commander-in-Chief of the RVNAF, the role of the JGS greatly diminished

in importance. Although by official decree it was the command body of

the RVNAF, the JGS for all practical purposes was reduced to planning

and supervising. The President reserved for himself the prerogative of

appointing and promoting senior commanders, to include division commanders,

technical service chiefs and province chiefs, and not infrequently he

himself gave direct orders to field commanders. This state of things,

unfortunately, continued until the collapse of the regime in April 1975.

In keeping with the turnabout of U.S. policy toward Vietnam,

General Creighton W. Abrams succeeded General Westmoreland as Commander,

USMACV in July 1968, with the mission of overseeing the accelerated

program designed to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF, thus

preparing groundwork for the Vietnamization program which was formally

announced in mid-1969. General Abrams also presided over the gradual

redeployment of U.S. combat forces until he left Vietnam in April 1972

after accomplishing his difficult mission and reassuring the U.S.

President that the RVNAF could "hack it" alone. He was replaced by

General Fred C. Weyand who remained until MACV was disbanded

after the cease-fire.

30
Highlights of a Fruitful Relationship

At the beginning of the U.S. advisory effort in South Vietnam which

was initiated under TRIM, most U.S. field advisers were deployed to ARVN

infantry division headquarters and major training centers. None of them

had a rank higher than lieutenant colonel. An arrangement was made whereby

if an American officer was appointed as senior adviser, he was assisted

by a French deputy and vice-versa. At the General Staff and military

region levels, the organization for advisory assistance at this state

was skeletal and informal. All problems were solved through personal

contracts or during meetings between the counterpart staffs.

The major obstacle then was the language barrier. Since most ARVN

officers only spoke Vietnamese or French, there was the indispensable

need for interpreters during every contact with U.S. advisers. In

addition to language, there were also problems of dissimilar military

background and training. Most ARVN officers then had only a scant

knowledge of U.S. Army doctrine, organization, and operational technique.

Added together, these problems complicated the task of reorganizing the

ARVN and made it a time-consuming process. During discussions on new

tables of organization and equipment, a minor difference in opinion was

apt to take days to resolve. For example, while ARVN staff officers of

the General Staff maintained that the only individual weapon a company

commander ever needed was a cal .45 pistol, U.S. advisers contended

that since a company commander was also required to fight like anybody

else in the company, he had to be equipped with a cal .30 carbine.

This type of problem gave rise to lengthy discussions which took twice

as much time to get a point through because translation was required.

It was realized that for the advisory effort to be really beneficial,

the problems of language and military knowledge, particularly about U.S.

Army doctrine and organization, should be expediently resolved. Strange

as it may have seemed, the subject of teaching Vietnamese or French to

U.S. advisers was never brought up. A few advisers took private lessons

on their own initiative but only for personal reasons and most never progressed beyond the greeting stage. Even later, over the war years,

I know of no single instance in which a U.S. adviser effectively discussed

31
professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnamese. The learning

and development of a new language seemed to have no appeal for U.S.

advisers who must have found it not really worth the effort because of

the short tour of duty in Vietnam. So the effort was directed at giving

English lessons to Vietnamese servicemen. English courses conducted

after duty hours by U.S. advisers mushroomed in units and headquarters.

These were later complemented by regular courses given by the Vietnamese

American Association in Saigon.

In addition, a special command and staff course was conducted at

the 1st Training Center (later redesignated Quang Trung) in June 1955

for the benefit of ARVN officers who familiarized themselves with U.S.

Army doctrine and command and staff procedures for the first time. A

number of ARVN officers who spoke English well were also selected to

attend training courses at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning, and other U.S.

Army service schools beginning in August 1955,. to be followed by specialized

offshore courses in the Philippines, Okinawa, and orientation tours in

Hawaii. All of these officers and specialists were earmarked for

assignments as instructors or staff officers upon graduation and return

to Vietnam.

When French advisers at the General Staff departed in early 1955

they were not immediately replaced by United States advisers. In the

interim an increased liaison was assumed by the Chief MAAG, Lieutenant

General Samuel T. Williams, himself, who usually met with the Chief of

the General Staff or his Chief of Staff for matters of mutual concern.

With the activation of TRIM and the assignment of field advisers, however,

there was a requirement for defining the specific mission, functions,

authority and responsibilities of TRIM advisers and the ARVN commanders'

duties and responsibilities toward U.S. advisers. This was the subject

of a memorandum published in April 1955 and signed by Major General Le Van Ty,

Chief of the General Staff. The memorandum laid the foundation and

set the tone for US-ARVN relations by defining, among other things:

(1) the general advisory mission which was to assist and advise ARVN

commanders on "strictly technical aspects"; (2) the advisers' responsibilities

which gave them no command nor supervisory authority, and (3) the ARVN

32
commanders' responsibilities which included providing security and

support, inviting necessary counsel and exercising their own judgment

in making use of the advice offered. The memorandum finally stressed

a "courteous, inter-allied cooperative spirit" as the hallmark for a

3

successful relationship.

In some respects, this was indeed a solid milestone in US-ARVN

relations, which was to develop into a most fruitful cooperation during

the following years. It was also remarkable by the fact that this was

the first official document ever published by the JGS concerning the role

of U.S. advisers. Three years later, a second memorandum, similar in

content and referring to the previous one as a reminder, emphasized the

continued need for U.S. advisory assistance and admonished ARVN commanders

to show "due consideration" to MAAG officials and all ARVN officers to

4

be "civil and courteous" in their daily contact with American advisers.

Although it simply reiterated ARVN commanders' duties and responsibilities

toward American advisers, the document was intended only for officers

and stressed civility and courteousness as the basis for cooperation

and association. This cooperation, in fact, worked so well during the

following years that there was never a requirement to publish any other

documents concerning this subject.

During this early period, U.S. officers served both as staff officers

in their organization (TRIM, and later CATO, under MAAG) and as advisers

for ARVN counterparts in the same branch of service. For example, the

advisers attached to G-2, General Staff at that time came from the

Combat Information Techniques Section, Training and Operations Branch.

Memorandum No. 1891/TMT/MG, dated 10 April 1955, signed by Major

General Le Van Ty, for general distribution.

Memorandum No. 1442/TTM/TNCKH/KH/MK, dated 24 April 1958, signed by

Lieutenant General Le Van Ty, for restricted distribution (officers only).

33
Field advisers, also under control of CATO, were assigned to infantry

divisions, military schools and training centers while personnel from

TERM served as advisers for ARVN logistical agencies. By the time the

MAAG was reorganized with additional personnel in late 1960, absorbing

TERM personnel in the process, the advisory system was well established

throughout the RVNAF hierarchy even down to the battalion level on a

selective basis. Cooperation between advisers and Vietnamese counterparts became closer and more effective since the initial barriers,

language and unfamiliarity with the U.S. system, had been greatly

reduced.

In February 1962, in keeping with the growing operational support

role in South Vietnam, the United States activated the Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam (MACV). However, the MAAG continued to function as a

separate headquarters with its advisory role unchanged until it was

dissolved and integrated into MACV in May 1964. Subsequently MACV

underwent many organizational-changes. (Chart 4) Its principal

counterpart, the Joint General Staff, also went through some comprehensive

reorganizations in keeping with the continually growing RVNAF force

structure and functional changes in the overall defense structure.

(Chart 5) Although the MACV commander dealt with three different

levels of RVN defense organization (the President or Prime Minister,

the Minister of Defense, and the Chairman, JGS) his principal counterpart

was the Chairman of the JGS.

During the period from 1965 to 1972, MACV functioned not only as a

sub-theater command which controlled U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam,

but also in an advisory and assistance capacity with regard to the JGS.

Thus, MACV staff division chiefs had the additional responsibility of

serving as senior advisers to their JGS counterparts. In the MACV-JGS

arrangement for coordination and cooperation, which practically amounted

to a paralleled organization in terms of constituent components save for

a few exceptions, all JGS general and special staff divisions, subordinate

commands, arms and services benefited from the advisory effort. However,

the number of U.S. advisers assigned to work with each JGS component

or agency varied, depending on the relative importance or workload of

34
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that component or agency.

A few examples suffice to illustrate this working arrangement. The

senior adviser to the Chief J-2 (Intelligence), JGS, was of course the

MACV Assistant Chief of Staff J-2. But his permanent representatives at

the Office of the J-2, JGS consisted of a liaison team composed of 4

officers (2 Army, 1 Air Force, 1 Navy) and 1 NCO. Also, at each of the

four combined intelligence centers, there was a U.S. element working

constantly in close coordination with the ARVN element sharing the same

facilities and almost paralleling the ARVN organization. The only

difference was that the U.S. element had more personnel and a greater

variety of specialists. The US-ARVN relationship at this working level was

more of a co-worker than a regular advisor-counterpart arrangement, since

the U.S. personnel assigned to these centers belonged to the 525th U.S.

Military Intelligence Group, an operational unit under the command

and control of MACV J-2.

At the J-3 division, JGS, there was also a liaison team of 4

officers and 1 NCO who worked directly with the Joint Operations Center.

But the senior adviser to the Chief J-3, JGS was the MACV Assistant

Chief of Staff J-3.

Prior to 1966, the J-4, JGS worked with both MACV J-4 and Headquarters U.S. Army, Vietnam, the former providing advisory assistance

and the latter, materiel support. When the Vietnamese Central Logistics

Command (CLC) was activated in 1966, all J-4 JGS functions were assumed

by the Commander of CLC. The MACV J-4 then served as senior adviser

and only point of contact for the Commander, CLC.

Some JGS staff divisions or agencies worked with more than one U.S.

counterpart. For example, the J-7 division which was responsible for

signal intelligence worked with both MACV J-2 and the U.S. Embassy.

The same was true with some MACV staff divisions such as CORDS which provided

The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), the Combined

Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), the Combined Military Interrogation

Center (CMIC), and the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC).

37
advice and assistance not only to J-3, JGS but also to the Central

Pacification and Development Council and various ministries of the GVN.

But those were exceptions rather than the rule.

Procedures for Cooperation

By the time the United States decided to commit combat troops to

help fight the war in South Vietnam, the initial language barrier and

Vietnamese unfamiliarity with American military doctrine and organization

were no longer stumbling blocks for the advisory effort. An Armed

Forces Language School had been added to the ARVN school system and it

was expanding. U.S. Army school curricular and instructional materials

were extensively used throughout the ARVN school and training center

system. Most ARVN officers were now able to communicate in English and

they were well familiar with U.S. military doctrine and organization.

The switch to the new system and language had been swift and thorough.

Still there were no detailed written procedures as to how US-ARVN

cooperation should be conducted. Most adviser-counterpart relations were

informal and unrestrained, shaped largely by improvisations and personalities. At the MACV-JGS level, for example, the procedures for cooperation

were determined by ad hoc verbal agreement between the Commander, USMACV

and me, his counterpart, the Chairman of the JGS. We agreed to meet

alone every Monday at 2:30 in the afternoon at the JGS for personal and

problem-solving discussions. During the week before the meeting I would

make notes as problems or issues arose that I wished to discuss with

General Westmoreland or General Abrams at our Monday meeting. Meanwhile,

my Chief of Staff would have the staff preparing fact sheets concerning

any matter they thought I should bring up with COMUSMACV. The chief

would bring these to me on Friday or Saturday and I would decide whether

or not to include them in our discussion. Sometimes I would direct

the staff officer to work out the matter with his counterpart first,

before I would broach it to COMUSMACV. I am sure that General Abrams

prepared for our meetings similarly, since he often passed to me fact

sheets prepared by his staff. We would settle some of the simpler

questions at our meetings, but often we would agree only to direct our

38
staffs to work together and present to us an agreed position at a later

date. After each meeting I would inform my chief of staff of any

answers or decisions reached and, of course, tell him what was necessary

to get the staff working. In other words, the outcome of these meetings

was a basis for the combined US-RVN military effort and all decisions

jointly made by the two commanders were communicated to their chiefs

of staff and related staff divisions for execution or further study.

In addition to the regularly scheduled weekly meetings, it was also agreed

that in case of an emergency, the two commanders would meet at any time,

day or night. Less important problems in the meantime could be always

solved by personal phone calls.

Many different types of issues and problems were raised, discussed

and often solved during these weekly meetings, including a thorough

review of the overall situation and appropriate follow-up actions. An

extensive and complicated problem such as desertions in the RVNAF, as

one example, was apt to require lengthy discussions before appropriate

action was determined. The JGS was well aware of this debilitating

problem and had initiated several measures of its own to alleviate it.

But it was still a matter of deep concern for the MACV commander who

submitted several recommendations for more effective control of

personnel. His recommendations were discussed at length, possible solutions

compared between the two staffs and agreements were reached on how best

to solve the problem, either by initiating new actions or improving old

ones. Most problems concerning personnel management were resolved in this

way. However, COMUSMACV usually abstained from making specific recommendations concerning assignments, transfers and promotions of ARVN

officers except for a few he had personally observed or his advisers

in the field felt strongly should be promoted or assigned to key

positions in view of their demonstrated merits. These recommendations

were always reviewed carefully before any action was taken in order to

avoid favoritism or to prevent insidious manipulations of U.S. advisers

by ARVN officers.

With regard to reporting to me about Vietnamese officers that the

American advisers considered ineffective, inept, or otherwise unsuited

39
for command, Generals' Westmoreland and Abrams operated quite differently

one from the other. It was General Westmoreland's practice to inform

me, in detail, of any case where the U.S. adviser had determined that

his counterpart should be relieved and he reached down as far as

battalion commanders with this advice. Invariably I would have my

chief of staff or J-l investigate each case and, if the situation

warranted, I would see that the appropriate changes were made. In the

case of General Abrams, however, when he and I travelled together on

field inspections he would often comment tersly on the state of the

command and the ability of the commanders as he saw it. But he never

suggested either the promotion or the relief of anyone.

In its limited role, the JGS usually provided combat support for

ARVN corps through reinforcements from the general reserve force under

its control, or by allotting the corps concerned additional tactical air

missions. All operational support actions thus taken were immediately

communicated to MACV; they did not always require joint discussions beforehand. B-52 missions flown in support of ARVN corps combat operations

were allocated by COMUSMACV. But once they were allocated, the Chairman

of JGS and the corps commanders were informed.

Plans which required extensive study were subject to a formal

exchange of letters between the two headquarters. Studies were then

made independently by each staff before being submitted for presentation

and discussion at a joint meeting which would result in an agreed

decision and general approach by the MACV Commander and the Chairman, JGS.

Prior to the direct participation of U.S. combat forces in the war, the

JGS developed an annual plan for the RVNAF conduct of the war in consultation with MACV. The resulting campaign plan, compiled under the

supervision of J-3, JGS was then disseminated to ARVN Corps and other

commands for implementation. This was the most important basic document

published by the JGS which pertained to the strategic conduct of the war

and was designed to defeat Communist aggression.

Beginning in 1965, with the active participation of U.S. and Free

World Military Assistance Forces, this annual planning was undertaken

jointly by the JGS and MACV and resulted in a Combined Campaign Plan.

40
Since the military effort in South Vietnam involved the coordination and

cooperation of several national forces and agencies, the Combined

Campaign Plan was developed by a joint MACV-JGS staff committee composed

of representatives of the general staff divisions, usually J-2, J-3,

J-4/CLC, and other U.S. and RVN agencies as required. The committee

functioned under the joint chairmanship of the Assistant Chief of Staff

for Operations, MACV and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, JGS.

Preparation and coordination usually took from two to three months to

complete and the final draft was then submitted to the Commander,

USMACV and the Chairman, JGS for approval. Finally, a simple ceremony

was held at the JGS compound during which the Commander, USMACV,

commanders of other FWMAF and myself as Chairman of the JGS formally

approved the plans and signed the document.

In general, all JGS staff divisions followed a similar approach for

effective coordination and cooperation with their MACV counterparts although there were some slight variations to suit the individual taste of

personalities. There were no formally prepared standing operating procedures and none were required for these two highly professional headquarters. On the JGS side, there was never a need nor any compulsion

for issuing instructions on how to take advantage of advisory assistance

or how to obtain the most from an adviser.

It was common procedure for me, as the Chairman of the JGS, to devote

two days each week for visits to field units, but these visits became

sporadic after the cease-fire. Often I was accompanied by the Commander,

USMACV. During these field trips we made a point of solving unit

problems on the spot. Initially every month and later, every quarter,

both commanders visited ARVN corps headquarters where they reviewed

together the progress made by ARVN units in each corps area as projected

in the Combined Campaign Plan.

To further enhance close coordination and cooperation General

Westmoreland, when serving as COMUSMACV, assigned a general officer

as his personal representative and liaison officer to the JGS. This

general officer also served as senior adviser to the Assistant Chairman,

JGS for Territorial Security and Pacification. Later, this position-was

41
reduced to a liaison function and assumed by a colonel.

The JGS and MACV never shared the same military compound or any

common facilities. Initially the MAAG headquarters was located in

Cho Lon; then in 1957 it moved to the compound vacated by the JGS on

Tran Hung Dao Boulevard in Saigon. When MACV was activated in 1962,

its headquarters was first located in a crammed apartment building on

Pasteur Street. In 1966, it moved to a newly-built, modern headquarters

complex near Tan Son Nhut, about one mile from the JGS headquarters.

Although the two headquarters were physically separated, there was never

any problem involved in liaison and communications which remained very

close and effective throughout the war years.

An Evaluation

The Republic of Vietnam depended on U.S. military aid to fight the

war against Communist aggression. Its military force, the RVNAF, was

organized and operated in accordance with U.S. military doctrine and

equipped with U.S. materiel. The presence of U.S. advisers at all echelons

of the RVNAF hierarchy therefore was an obvious necessity. Consequently,

a definite requirement always existed for close coordination, cooperation,

and effective U.S. advice at the JGS and MACV echelons.

Throughout the war years, the U.S. Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam effectively assisted the JGS in developing its plans and programs

and provided the support required to implement them successfully. Its

advice, assistance, and material support were most conspicuous in the

areas of intelligence and logistics and made possible the expansion

and modernization of ARVN intelligence and logistics agencies. These

two accomplishments might be regarded as the most spectacular achievements.

In addition, MACV also helped the JGS with the means and resources

to exercise better control over subordinate agencies and field units,

particularly in times of operational emergencies. The most striking

example of this help came in early 1972 when NVA forces crossed the DMZ

and attacked Quang Tri. An event of such importance unfortunately remained unknown initially to the JGS because the I Corps commander at

that time failed to report it. The JGS, as a result, was unable to take

appropriate action until General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander USMACV,

personally informed me of the offensive. It was also he who later

42
correctly assessed and informed me that the commander of the 3d ARVN

Infantry Division was no longer able to control his units and let Quang Tri

fall into the hands of the enemy. These reports from MACV enabled the

JGS to muster reinforcement troops, armor forces, tactical air, and

request B-52 support missions for I Corps in a timely manner to effectively

stop and eventually defeat the NVA advance.

At the field and unit level, there were of course some inevitable

frictions and even head-on collisions between advisers and ARVN commanders.

This was human and understandable, given the tremendous pressure

placed on each adviser and commander by the tactical situation. But the

problem was largely local and highly individual; it was limited to only

a few cases of any importance. Two cases come to mind. The first concerned

the commander of an ARVN division in 1967. This commander was an experienced, strong-willed officer who appeared aloof and reluctant to accept

advice from his advisers. The Americans, frustrated in their attempts to

influence the division commander, reported their difficulties through their

channels and some pressure was exerted to secure his relief. Nevertheless,

the Leadership Committee, which was the government at the time, was satisfied with the commander's performance and he remained in command for the

normal tour. A succession of dissatisfied advisers passed through his

headquarters during his tenure in command. Interestingly enough, this

commander's attitude changed completely in later years and he was regarded

by his American counterparts as being very cooperative and easy to deal

with.

The other case involved a corps commander and his counterpart, the

regional assistance command commander. It was during the 1972 Communist

offensive when three major NVA thrusts threatened vital regions of the

country. The American general, an aggressive man with a distinguished

combat record, believed, essentially, that the corps commander was not

performing an active enough role in the day-to-day command of the desperate

battle then being waged in one sector of his area of responsibility. The

American then took it upon himself to play the role of combat coordinator

in the battle area and, meanwhile, reported his dissatisfaction with the

corps commander to General Abrams. On his part, General Abrams never

43
discussed this matter with me and I do not know if he spoke to President

Thieu about it. I doubt it, however. In any event, the corps commander

remained in command for the normal tour. No such problem ever happened

at the MACV and JGS level; cooperation between advisers and counterparts

constantly remained close and sincere. The success of this productive

relationship derived from two cardinal factors: self-respect and mutual

respect. Despite differences in culture, language, traditions, customs

and personalities, the relationship remained unaffected because of the

common realization that without cooperation and unity, the combined military effort would stand no chance of success.

The advisory task was an effort involving human relations. To

ensure success, it had to be carried out with a full understanding of

human psychology, a deep devotion to duty, a knowledge of strengths and

weaknesses and in a tactful and courteous manner. The same rule applied

to the indigenous people who received advice and assistance.. To achieve

this, MACV made commendable efforts in providing advisers with background knowledge on Vietnamese culture, traditions, and customs and

manners.

Throughout the years of JGS-MACV association, many Vietnamese officers

assigned to the JGS believed that their advisers were unduly restricted

and restrained by United States security regulations. As a result, and

despite the common effort, they never divulged the contents of highly

classified U.S. documents to their counterparts even though the information

could be of mutual concern. Perhaps because of these security constraints,

MACV never discussed nor ever informed the JGS of its annual military

assistance programming for the RVN. The JGS never knew how much force

structure increase, equipment or money were being programmed for a certain

year until after Washington had approved. Even then, whatever information

the JGS could obtain from MACV was usually sketchy and did not help very

much in making detailed plans for the judicious use of money and assets.

The common practice over the years was that all JGS recommendations

and requests regarding military aid were received with due respect but

never completely satisfied. MACV seldom provided an explanation concerning the logic or reasons which resulted in this curtailment of support.

44
This state of things changed only after the Paris Agreement was signed and

MACV no longer existed.

In 1973 and 1974, the Ministry of National Defense, and to some extent,

the JGS, became responsible for submitting to the USDAO—the American

agency responsible for administering the military assistance program—

a plan for maintaining, equipping, and fiscal management of the RVNAF.

We had to do this without the benefit of advisers, but the USDAO did, of

course, tell us how much money was available and whether what we asked

for in the way of equipment was permitted under the Paris Agreement.

45
CHAPTER III

ARVN Battalion to Corps and the Tactical Adviser

The Taotioal Advisory System

As a result of the expanded US advisory effort to help the RVNAF

cope with aggravating insurgency problems, and with the approval of

the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, the Military Assistance Advisory

Group, Vietnam began to deploy advisers to selected ARVN battalions

around the middle of 1961. The mission given to these tactical advisers

was to help Vietnamese battalion commanders in operational, communications

and logistic support matters with the understanding that they were

not to engage in actual combat.

By the end of 1961, the US tactical advisory system was reflected

in every ARVN combat arm and service battalion, sometimes down to

company-level as in the case of armor units since they usually operated

separately. The battalion was chosen as the lowest tactical level to

receive advisers since infantry battalions made up the bulk of ARVN

combat forces. The infantry battalion was also the lowest level unit

to have a headquarters with planning and control capabilities and it

was also the largest organization to be normally employed as a tactical

unit. Therefore, the advisory effort, with its emphasis on operational

and logistical matters was directed at the level which, it was believed,

would most benefit from it.

A battalion advisory team consisted of three US Army personnel,

a captain, a first lieutenant, and a sergeant. This was a logical arrangement to ensure that there would be at least two advisers to accompany the battalion in operations at all times if one should be sick,

wounded or required rest and rehabilitation. Usually, one team member

was detailed, in addition to his regular duties, to perform administrative

matters for the team.

46
The advisory command system in the field paralleled the ARVN tactical chain of command in most cases. A senior adviser was assigned

for each corps tactical zone (CTZ) and controlled division senior

advisers. The division senior adviser was responsible for the regimental

and battalion advisers. On the territorial side, the corps senior adviser also exercised control over province and district advisers. (Chart 6)

The field advisory system had its own communications network which, like

its Vietnamese counterpart, linked the various echelons together, from

MACV headquarters to corps, divisions, regiments and battalions.

As of 1965, with the introduction of US ground combat forces in

South Vietnam and following the establishment of US field commands in

corps tactical zones, the US advisory system was modified appropriately

in order to bring about better coordination and cooperation between

ARVN and US forces in the.military effort. When the US III Marine

Amphibious Force closed in Da Nang, its commanding general was designated

senior adviser to the I Corps commander, and the I Corps advisory group

was placed under his operational control. The former senior adviser,

a colonel, became his deputy. Similar arrangements took place in II and

III Corps Tactical Zones when US Field Forces I and II were activated.

Their commanding generals were designated senior advisers to II and III

Corps respectively while the resident senior advisers now became deputies.

This change in title in no way affected the conduct of advisory activities.

US field force commanders, as a matter of fact, were more preoccupied

with US units and their command and control problems than their advisory

duties, which for all practical purposes, continued to be assumed by

the former senior advisers - now deputies, as if nothing had been

changed. It was in fact the deputy senior advisers who were in constant

and direct contact with ARVN corps commanders.

In the Mekong Delta or IV Corps Tactical Zone, the advisory relationship with IV Corps underwent no change since there was no major US

combat unit deployed to the area. In April 1969, however, the IV Corps

advisory group was upgraded into the Delta Military Assistance Command

(DMAC) to assume control responsibility over US Army units operating

separately in the Mekong Delta, including one brigade of the US 9th

Infantry Division.

47
Chart 6 — Organization, US Army Advisory System,

Corps Tactical Zone

US ARVN

Corps

Army Advisory

Group

Corps

Division

Advisory

Team

Division

Province

Advisory

Group

— Province

(Sector)

Regimental

Advisory

Team

Regiment

District

Advisory

Team

District

(Subsector)

Battalion

Advisory

Team

Battalion

COMMAND — — — — ADVICE

48
At the end of 1968, an evaluation was conducted of a new concept

in organization for advisory assistance, called combat assistance teams

(CAT). Its purpose was to determine the feasibility of replacing division

advisory groups with smaller combat assistance teams. Immediate results

of the experiment indicated that the CAT concept might help enhance

leadership and initiative in ARVN units and also increase their independent capability to use US combat support assets. As a result, the

commander, US MACV authorized corps senior advisers to reorganize tactical advisory elements in accordance with the CAT concept. However,

subsequent evaluations of the concept failed to reveal any significant

gains or a desired level of progress by ARVN units. It was apparent

that a substantial permanent advisory effort was still needed, especially

during major combat operations.

A re-evaluation of the CAT concept at regimental level, on the

contrary, revealed the requirement for an even larger advisory staff

because of two reasons. First, ARVN regimental staffs were relatively

weak and second, ARVN regiments were being employed with greater

frequency as major maneuver elements of divisions on large, extensive

operations. Thus, the differences in missions, geographical areas

of operation and available combat support assets precluded any attempt

at standardizing the advisory effort, especially as it pertained to

the division and special zone levels.

Finally, during the last two years of direct American involvement,

1971 and 1972, when most US ground combat units had redeployed from

South Vietnam, Regional Assistance Commands (RAC) were established in

the four corps areas, implying that the US combat role was terminated.

(Chart 7) The Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) was established

first in MR 4 on 30 April 1971, being a redesignation of the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC). It was followed by the Second Regional

Assistance Group (SRAG) which was activated as of May 1971 to replace

Headquarters, I Field Force. SRAG was an exception in that its chief

was a civilian, Mr. John Paul Vann, former deputy CORDS for DMAC, whose

responsibility encompassed both military and civilian activities in MR 2.

His deputy for military functions, Brigadier General Dewitt C. Armstrong

III, was also commanding general of US Army forces in MR 2. After

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Mr. Vann's death in a helicopter accident, SRAG became a command as

of 10 June 1972 like the others. In MR 1, the US XXIV Corps was replaced by the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) on 19 March 1972.

Then on 30 April 1972, II Field Force in MR-3 was the last US field command to convert to the new organization and was designated the Third

Regional Assistance Command (TRAC).

Regional assistance commanders naturally served as senior advisers

to ARVN corps commanders as their predecessors, the field force commanders, but maintained a more direct relationship with their counterparts.

They also exercised operational control over designated US forces and

were responsible for CORDS activities in support of pacification and

development in their respective areas.

In addition to corps infantry and combat arms units, US advisers

were also assigned to other combat forces such as the Airborne and Marine

Divisions of the general reserve, Ranger and Special Forces units, and

civilian irregular defense groups (CIDG). Advisory personnel assigned

to Special Forces units and CIDGs, came from the US Army 5th Special

Forces Group. Unlike the regular advisory system, the US Army Special

Forces organization for advisory assistance was tailored to the specific

missions assigned to each type of unit. Since these missions were

predominantly border defense and unconventional warfare, US Special

Forces advisory teams were sometimes deployed to platoon level, especially

in Airborne Ranger companies and mobile strike task forces (Mike). In

keeping with the Vietnamization program, the US 5th Special Forces Group

stood down as of June 1970 and left South Vietnam on 1 March 1971 after

converting CIDGs to ARVN Ranger units and regional force units.

With regard to territorial security and defense, the US advisory

effort became particularly significant with the assignment of advisory

teams to districts (subsectors) and the expansion of advisory personnel

at province (sector) level in 1965. The buildup of US combat forces

John Paul Vann chose to remain in Vietnam for many years as an adviser

following a military assignment there. He was an aggressive professional who

virtually assumed command of II Corps during the critical days before and

during the battle of Kontum. The ARVN corps commander proved incapable

of command during this crisis. His collapse was recognized by President

Thieu, as well as by the JGS and Mr. Vann, and he was finally replaced.

51
FRAC Ending A Fruitful Relationship with I Corps,

20 March, 1973

52
and the emphasis placed on pacification made the role of these advisory

teams especially important since it involved providing assistance to

province and district chiefs in all matters related to the planning and

execution of the pacification program, and the employment of territorial

forces in support of the military plan.

The advisory effort in the provinces and districts was implemented

in various ways, depending on requirements, the nature of the type of

effort to be carried out and the specific areas of interest. In certain

localities, the primary responsibility might focus on establishing or

restoring local security; in others, the major task might be directed

at improving the combat effectiveness and employment of RF and PF units.

Still, in certain others, the principal emphasis might be placed on

improving the political, social and economic institutions required by

the central government. These differences in local situations naturally

required different types of advisory personnel and a flexibility in

organization which could readily meet the specific local requirements.

In general, the US advisory effort in the field, be it in tactical or

territorial organizations, was so deployed that it was reflected in

almost every position or level of tactical endeavor.

The Taotioal Adviser's Responsibilities

US Army advisers did not command, nor did they exercise operational

control or responsibility for any part of the Army of the Republic of

Vietnam (ARVN). Their mission and functions were to provide professional military advice and assistance in those specific areas of endeavor

assigned by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, namely to advise

and assist the counterpart ARVN commanders and their staffs in personnel

management, training, combat operations, intelligence, security, logistics

and psychological/civil affairs operations.

In each corps/military region, the US senior adviser supervised the

activities of an Army Advisory Group (AAG) assigned to that particular

corps/military region headquarters and exercised command of subordinate

advisory teams (division, province). He was responsible for:

53
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The ARVN Tactical Commander and His Adviser

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1. Providing liaison between the ARVN corps commander and United

States and free world military assistance forces.

2. Establishing and operating US advisory tactical communications

networks and providing assistance for the operation of ARVN networks.

3. Determining requirements for and coordinating US tactical air,

airlift support, helicopter and artillery support.

4. Coordinating with US and FWMA forces on joint plans, operations,

and training.

5. Establishing, maintaining, operating, and providing advisory

functions for a combined corps tactical operations center/direct air

support center (TOC/DASC) in conjunction with RVNAF elements.

6. Accompanying the ARVN corps commander and his staff, as appropriate, on field inspection trips and operations as required.

Despite organizational changes of the advisory effort at the tactical

levels, which were dictated by the local situation or progress made by

ARVN units in terms of combat effectiveness, the adviser's role remained

essentially unchanged. He continued to be an adviser, a coordinator of

support for the benefit of ARVN units, and a liaison officer with US

combat forces.

Restrained as it was by limitations in personnel, the US advisory

effort was largely instrumental in the gradual improvement of ARVN units.

Limitations in personnel did not discourage US advisers from doing all

they could and striving constantly to make the units they sponsored

better every day. In addition to providing the various assets that they

could muster for the support of ARVN operational requirements, the

adviser's professional knowledge and skills in planning, operations,

tactics and technology contributed substantially to the performance of

units in several instances. Their ARVN counterparts learned a great

deal from them. In fact, the presence of advisers acted not only as a

catalyst through which changes and improvements were attained, but also

provided the incentive that stimulated and spurred actions on both the

unit and its commander. The results obtained throughout the years

2

USMACV Command History, p 69,

57
of US involvement showed that leadership and the management of units

underwent a definite improvement and that combat effectiveness increased

remarkably.

On the other hand, the adviser's overriding influence sometimes

tended to stifle the ARVN commander's own initiative and diminish his

authority and prestige. Usually the adviser confined himself to his

advisory role; his relationship with the counterpart was essentially

one built on and limited to mutual trust and respect. There were compelling instances, however, that required the adviser to trespass the

line drawn and by so doing, he practically acted as a commander — on

the latter's behalf, naturally. This was what actually happened in a

few ARVN units whose weak commanders wavered and were unable to make

decisions under battlefield pressure. The prestige and power of the

tactical adviser in such circumstances tended, in the long run, to tarnish

the role of the ARVN commander in the eyes of his troops. Unit activities,

for example, tended to follow exactly what the advisers had recommended;

in other instances, the adviser was the one who solved the indecisive

battle by bringing US tactical air and fire power to bear on the enemy;

it was he who won the battle for the unit. Gradually, the ARVN commander's

passivity made him excessively reliant and sometimes totally dependent

on his adviser. The end result was that the commander's initiative,

sense of responsibility and personal authority became seriously affected

and in the long run, the adviser's presence had the undesirable effect

of reducing his counterpart's chances for asserting and developing his

command and leadership abilities.

The Adviser's Role in Operational Planning

and Combat Intelligence

Poor planning was one of the most glaring deficiencies of ARVN

units. This deficiency was most serious at regimental and battalion

levels. There was not enough formal training in the ARVN to develop

planning skills and the lack of capable personnel at these levels accounted

for the absence of improvement in staff work. Whatever the reasons, the

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60
responsibility for this deficiency fell squarely on the unit commander, and

if he were not demanding or aggressive, his staff would be less disposed to

do acceptable staff work. Most ARVN tactical commanders at these echelons

fought their battles without formal, detailed plans, but by personal improvisation. The commander was all and everything in the unit; his staff's

contributions to the performance of the unit were minimal. It was the

commander who decided everything, told them what to do, where and when

to go, and how to conduct the operation from the beginning to the end.

When he was absent, there was little his staff could do without his specific

orders. Unfortunately, more often than not, if the commander was not

there, his staff simply abstained from taking actions even if they knew

what to do.

Because of these critical shortcomings, US advisers at nearly every

level were compelled to participate in or even initiate planning for operations. Their contributions became even more important during the active

participation of US forces, when almost all combat support assets were

provided and controlled by US advisers. In these circumstances, there

was little the ARVN unit commander could do except make decisions based

on his adviser's recommendations, regardless of his own initiative. But

regardless of how hard US advisers would like to push, they usually had

to act in a most tactful manner in order to keep the relationship intact

and maintain harmony.

There were instances in which US advisers presented their counterparts with a drafted plan with the hope that this plan would be translated

into Vietnamese and implemented. Such an approach to the problem was

tantamount to actually asking the ARVN commanders to take action and it

usually worked. ARVN commanders felt bound, if not by the ready-made

plan, at least by special consideration for their advisers.

There were also instances in which an adviser would just briefly

make some remark or suggest an idea as to the course of action that the

ARVN commander could take. The adviser thus tactfully encouraged his

counterpart to elaborate on a suggested idea and develop his own plan

based on it. In this way, the plan appeared to be a product that the

ARVN commander had originated on his own initiative, something that bore his

61
personal mark rather than the adviser's. This approach indeed helped the

ARVN commander and his staff initiate their own effort and work toward

accomplishing it. But it was not always easy for the US adviser to achieve

this because he had to abstain from claiming any credit for the ideas that

he had suggested.

In other instances, US advisers simply put their assessment of the

tactical situation in writing, but refrained from any specific recommendation with the deliberate purpose of leaving the matter up to their counterparts to see for themselves and develop their own planning and courses

of action. This method seemed to work best when an ARVN commander was

assisted by an able staff and when the adviser was reasonably certain that,

together, they could work out an adequate plan and carry it out to completion without assistance.

Generally speaking, US advisers contributed a great deal to the

operational planning conducted by ARVN units. By and large, they proved

remarkably adept and knowledgeable in this area of endeavor and their

advice was particularly effective when they had a thorough understanding

and appreciation of the situation.

During combined operations conducted by ARVN and US forces, US advisers

served as the point of contact for cooperation and coordination between

operational forces. They were also the liaison officers who put US

forces in touch with local governments in area security activities.

Usually, advisers coordinated with US unit staffs and provided essential

elements of information concerning the ARVN side to assist with the operational planning for US units. Sometimes they also provided specific

recommendations as to how the US unit could make the best contribution to

the combined operation.

The relationship between US advisers and US units depended partly

on the nature of the effort to be achieved, and partly on the individual

prestige enjoyed by each adviser. With regard to tactical advisers, especially at regimental and battalion levels, this relationship was not

always a happy one. For one thing, at the same unit level, the adviser

was usually outranked by the US commander. For another, some advisers

had not commanded troops in actual combat, even a unit at a lower level.

62
As a result, they became self-conscious of their standing and, therefore,

were somewhat hampered in their coordination effort. US unit commanders

sometimes tended to look down upon the US advisers whom they did not

consider as co-equals. This was similar in some respect to the haughty

attitude shown, for example, by an ARVN battalion commander toward a

district chief, an attitude wholly unjustified and misleading for the

simple reason that a district chief's responsibilities were much more

complex and heavier by comparison. The district chief as well as the

district adviser were required to have a solid professional capability in

several respects and a tenacious determination to accomplish their difficult mission. By contrast, much of the tactical unit commander's

advantage seemed to derive from a reliance on combat assets and readymade standing operating procedures. It was really unfortunate that

despite their heavy responsibilities, US advisers seemed to enjoy less

prestige and less opportunities for personal advancement than US unit

commanders. This lack of respect toward US advisers, added to certain

prejudices against ARVN units in general on the part of some US unit

commanders, often hindered effective coordination and cooperation efforts

between ARVN and US forces.

With regard to coordination and cooperation with Free World Military

Assistance units, especially with South Korean forces whose combat

strength was the most sizeable after US forces, US advisers at ARVN

divisions and down the tactical hierarchy usually played only a secondary

role. Required planning, cooperation and coordination for combined

operations in which forces of several nationalities participated were

almost always worked out in complete detail at the corps level, except

for routine activities concerning area security. In the II Corps area

where two South Korean divisions were deployed, for example, plans for

operational coordination were accomplished during monthly meetings attended

by the field commanders of all three forces, the US I Field Force, II

Corps and ROK forces in the II Corps area. In addition, a combined

US-ARVN-ROK staff, made up of G—2 and G—3 representatives, was formed to

discuss combined operational plans and report the results to their respective

commanders for approval. This combined staff procedure prevented possible

63
embarrassment to ARVN and ROK commanders. It was also determined throughout the war to be the best method of achieving effective cooperation.

Even though the complex nature of the war and terrain which favored

the enemy tended to complicate friendly intelligence activities, the

assistance provided by US advisers still brought about significant improvements and achievements in combat intelligence. This was possible because

cooperation and coordination in intelligence activities were truly a

combined effort based on mutual support and common objective.

At the tactical level, both the US and RVNAF combat intelligence

systems had strengths and weaknesses. The US advisers enjoyed the backing

of a system whose advantages were based on superior technology, abundant

and sophisticated assets, a modern and extensive organization, rapid communications and well qualified experts. By contrast, the RVNAF system,

while not as endowed as the US system, enjoyed a certain advantage in

terms of intimate knowledge about the enemy, his psychology, his methods,

and his culture and language. Thus, the two systems eventually complemented

and reinforced each other to perfection, like a dovetailed joint.

At the corps level, G-2 advisers usually provided their counterparts

with intelligence data collected through technical sources, aerial photography and reconnaissance and exploitation by US combat units. In return,

the ARVN G-2 supplied his adviser with data collected through ARVN sources,

primarily from prisoners of war and returnees, exploitation of documents

and intelligence reports provided by ARVN agents. A similar procedure

of coordination and exchange of intelligence data was also instituted

at division and lower levels.

It was obvious that ARVN units relied heavily on US-supplied intelligence data in view of its reliability, validity and timeliness. Since

their trust in these special reports was nearly absolute, the prestige

of US advisers was particularly enhanced, not only because of their professional capability or knowledge of the enemy situation but because

they were the providers of accurate information. The high validity that

Vietnamese commanders usually attributed to US technical sources led to

their inference that US advisers at higher levels should be completely

knowledgeable about the enemy's policies and plans. Some ARVN tactical

64
commanders believed, for example, that MACV and US Field Forces knew well

in advance the enemy's plan for the 1968 Tet offensive but kept this

information to themselves for political reasons and only divulged it to

some degree to a few ARVN confidants.

In addition, with its methodical efficiency and abundant resources,

the US intelligence advisory system helped its counterpart improve its

own coordination and exchange of information in order to make intelligence

more timely for the users. It also assisted its counterpart by providing

guidance on certain scientific analysis techniques such as the pattern

analysis method which was widely acclaimed by ARVN units.

The language barrier was probably the most obvious limiting factor

affecting the US intelligence advisory effort. Language proficiency

was not only required for daily contacts and coordination between advisers

and counterparts but was also deemed indispensable for the accurate understanding and dissemination of intelligence data and to avoid misunderstanding or confusion when precise terminology, especially as used by

the enemy, was concerned. To offset the language shortcoming, US advisers

used indigenous interpreters who, at the tactical levels, were helpful

with general ideas, but when it came time to interpret accurately Communist terminology, they were generally not proficient enough for lack

of a sufficient intelligence background. The fact was, although they

are Vietnamese, Communists, especially North Vietnamese Communists, use

a vocabulary which includes several terms whose connotations entirely

escape the South Vietnamese layman's ability to comprehend, much less

render it in another language.

U.S. Support and the Problem of Leverage

The ARVN logistics system was well established at every level in

the field but it was primarily an area-type organization more oriented

toward providing support for garrison activities rather than for mobile

operations. Major logistic requirements for these activities usually consisted of rice and common types of ammunition which, because of the

shortage in transportation facilities.and frequent road interdictions

65
by the enemy, were stocked in field depots at a high level of supply.

When ARVN units went on operations — generally for short periods of time —

their troops usually carried with them their individual allocation of rice

and basic load of ammunition. This practice of self-support became a

matter of routine in the long run and as a result, very few tactical

commanders required their logistical staffs to take part in operational

planning. Even if they did, there was not much their supply officer's

could contribute except to be alert for contingencies.

As mobile operations were increased in frequency and size during the

years following Vietnamization and with the increased participation of

all combat arms, logistical support was hampered by severe limitations,

especially when the area of operation was far removed from field depots

and lines of communication. In such operations, almost all supplies and

support assets had to be moved by helicopters and this was the primary

reason why ARVN units had to depend on US advisers and through them, on

the support provided by US forces. This dependence centered chiefly on

airlift assets and certain critical operational supplies such as ammunition,

fuels, barrier materials for the construction of fire support bases and

other items that the ARVN logistics system either did not carry or could

not provide in time to meet requirements.

US advisers were usually solicitous and zealous concerning the logistic

support for their units. Naturally, no adviser could tolerate watching

his unit fail to accomplish a mission merely because of a lack of supplies

or equipment. That was why ARVN units could always depend on US advisers

for whatever supplies they needed in any combat situation. And if an ARVN

commander for some reason requested more than was required for his combat

needs or even for non-combat needs, his adviser usually complied to the

extent he felt reasonable, often out of compassion. Thus, to ensure

adequate support for combat operations, US advisers usually had to accomplish all coordination activities from planning to actually delivering

the support assets or supplies, especially in large-scale operations

requiring a sizeable amount of logistical support.

The US advisory effort in the field, therefore, brought about much

relief and confidence for ARVN combat units. ARVN commanders were most

66
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gratified by the adequate and timely logistic support that US advisers

always provided for their needs. But in a few instances, the solicitude

and largesse of US advisers seemed to backfire because certain ARVN units

gradually developed a propensity for wasteful use of supplies and overreliance on the US system. This did not go unnoticed, however, for US

advisers subsequently limited themselves to monitoring and following up

on ARVN logistic support actions and procedures with the implied goal of

requiring ARVN units to learn how to take care of themselves logistically

and to develop their own system. No longer would US advisers and units

readily and willingly meet every ARVN requirement as they had before except

in those emergency cases when the ARVN system was unable to respond.

Despite the gradual and remarkable improvement in the ARVN logistic

system and the fact that all logistic requirements were to be handled by

it, ARVN units still desired to have an advisory system as backup. This

was not because they wanted to remain perpetually dependent but primarily

due to the fact that they did not entirely trust their own system which

was too inflexible and not responsive enough to meet the fast changing

tactical requirements effectively.

US advisers did not command. Nevertheless, they were in a position

to influence their counterparts and make them accept their advice and

recommendations. There were several ways a US adviser could exert his

leverage. As a provider, he might choose to withold the assets required

by the ARVN unit to accomplish its mission pending satisfactory compliance with what the adviser thought was desirable. This always seemed

to work — for whatever immediate purpose — since the adviser controlled

most of the support assets. Additionally, the US adviser, in view of

his broad professional knowledge, was apt to win over his counterpart by

force of reason or logic.

As a result, during the years of intensive combat, from 1966 through

1968 when US advisers provided substantial support, their influence was

undeniably strong especially during combat operations. But when the

reduction of US support assets was initiated in early 1969 as a part of

the Vietnamization program, whatever leverage US advisers could still

use to influence their counterparts became essentially a matter of

68
personal relationship and individuality. Some ARVN commanders genuinelyliked Americans and continued to cooperate in a commendable spirit of

harmonious teamwork. They felt they still needed the assistance of US

advisers whose professionalism and experience was respected and held in

high esteem. Others, however, guessing a reverse in wind direction,

deliberately left US advisers out of the picture and failed to consult

them or even inform them of unit activities. Fully aware of this changing attitude, some advisers became cautious and reluctant to give advice

and abstained altogether from critical comments. Obviously, they knew

that their counterparts, like most ARVN commanders, were extremely

sensitive to criticism and if there was a need to contribute to the

accomplishment of certain tasks, these advisers would only offer, tactfully

and suavely, constructive remarks lest the rapport and mutual trust be

negated.

Experience showed that the adviser who skillfully utilized his

leverage with support assets in combination with his personal persuasive

logic and reasoning in order to influence his counterpart usually succeeded in improving his working relationship and his counterpart's effectiveness. It was also true that leverage, if based only on the provision

of support assets, simply resulted in temporary gains by the adviser who

additionally never learned much from a true working relationship. In

this case, the adviser ceased to be an adviser and his true role was not

being accomplished. On the other hand, the tendency to "let the adviser

do it all," in the few cases where it might have existed, seemed to stem

from a negative attitude of ARVN Commanders reacting to excessive and

rough leverage. In general, when an adviser began his second tour of

duty, he was an artful master of his job and knew how to make things

work effectively.

Observations on Tours of Duty and Relationships

With the exception of key positions at the command level, the normal

tour of duty for ARVN advisers as well as for US combat troops in South

Vietnam was one year. But not all US tactical advisers in the field stayed

69
on the same job for the entire year. Advisers in ARVN battalions, for

example, were rotated every six months if the combat situation permitted.

This limited tour policy seemed to benefit the American servicemen in

many respects. Its impact on the effectiveness of the advisory effort,

however, is a matter worth discussion.

US advisers assigned to ARVN tactical units, especially battalions

and regiments, usually worked hand in hand with their counterparts at

all times. They lived and fought in an isolated environment which hardly

afforded them any material or physical comfort. The constant mental

pressure and physical exertion required were not conducive to their

maintaining a high degree of efficiency for sustained periods of time.

Had they been required to serve for a long or indefinite period of time,

certainly their efficiency would have diminished. But the tour was limited.

They all knew exactly when they could go home and this was not only an

incentive that spurred them to devote all their time and energy to their

job but also a tremendous psychological boost for their families.

The good performance of a tactical adviser, however, seemed to depend

on a certain continuity and stability of effort devoted to a unit. This

would require him to stay at least 18 months with a unit, but two years

would have been better. The one-year tour, six-month rotation policy,

despite its advantages, did not maintain enough continuity to make the

advisory effort as effective as desired. For an adviser's activities were

not simply confined to the unit to which he was assigned; they also

encompassed the social environment in which the unit operated and to which

he was bound. It took an adviser several months to familiarize himself

with that environment and by the time he became really productive, it

was already time to pack and leave.

When an adviser left a unit, he carried with him a wealth of knowledge which was still required by his teammates. His experience and

adeptness were personal and could not fully be transferred to his replacement. The void created by the departure of an adviser was most acutely

felt at the small-unit level where advisers were few but problems and

voids in knowledge of the local situation were many. Standing operating

procedures were helpful to some extent and enabled the new adviser to get

70
a quick feel of his job but they could not substitute for the experience

and knowledge required to identify and solve the many complex problems.

This was where continuity was needed. This also explained why district

advisers, whose tour of duty was 18 months, were more effective in their

efforts to help local units and the local population. The difference

was obvious; they had more experience and knew more about the local

environment.

Time was also required for the adviser to demonstrate his abilities,

obtain confidence and to establish his influence within a unit. He needed

opportunities to prove himself and to show the ARVN troops what he could

do for them. Only then would his advice be welcomed and his recommendations

heartily accepted. Otherwise he would remain just an adviser whose suggestions were courteously received but not always heeded. In several

instances, a long cooperation and association usually brought about

better understanding, mutual trust and true harmony between the adviser

and his counterpart. And when a relationship evolved from mutual trust

and respect, there seemed to be nothing the adviser and his counterpart

could hot work out between themselves for the benefit of the unit.

Experience showed that wherever there was a good working relationship

between the ARVN commander and his adviser, the unit always operated in

a relaxed atmosphere of efficiency and it was easier to bring it to the

desired degree of effectiveness.

An adviser, no matter how efficient he was in his role, could not

substitute for the ARVN commander. But the influence he exercised had

a great impact on the unit's effectiveness.. For this effectiveness to

continue undisturbed, a certain stability of command and leadership as

well as advisory effort was required. To the extent that it was possible,

the adviser, just like the ARVN commander, should stay on with the same

unit as long as it was deemed necessary.

Cooperation between US advisers and their counterparts in ARVN

tactical units was usually close except in a very few cases. This relationship was founded on mutual trust and respect. In almost all units, the

adviser acted as an assistant to the ARVN commander. He never transgressed

his advisory role and certainly never thought of taking over command

71
authority except in a few cases when the situation required. But this

happened only in small units.

Command is a difficult art. Besides professional competence, a

commander must also possess certain qualities to exercise the art of

command effectively. It is the same with an adviser. The role of the

US adviser, in view of its relative complexity, was not an easy one.

Certainly there were several dissimilarities between the US adviser

and the ARVN commander. Some of these could be found in their approach

to leadership, their culture and way of life. Other differences were

either technical or procedural; these could easily be eliminated. There

were, however, certain differences resulting from human nature that were

impossible to reconcile within a short time. Naturally, the keys to

success in every human partnership lies in the character and attitudes

of the men themselves. Personality, therefore, played an important role

in the adviser-counterpart relationship. It was obvious that unless both

partners wanted to get involved and unless they subordinated their personal

desires for the good of the unit, there was no chance for them to foster

a true relationship. But once a good relationship had been established,

the enthusiasm with which each strived to work together toward a common

goal was apt to induce better cooperation and coordination between their

staffs and subordinates. Over the years, this became the rule rather

than the exception.

In several instances, US advisers grew impatient with the seemingly

sluggish approach to work displayed by the Vietnamese in general. This

was understandable. Having a relatively short tour of duty, US advisers

tended to try to accomplish as much as they possibly could within that

time. An adviser was apt to deluge his counterpart with ideas, plans

and programs as fast as he could think of them. To his counterpart,

however, it was not always easy to cope with all of them at the same

time, because there were certain things the adviser would fail to recognize

as difficult or impossible unless he was a Vietnamese commander.

As a result, to enable his counterpart to perform effectively, the

adviser would have to assign priorities, to sort out and organize suggestions

and find an appropriate time for consultations. If the adviser kept

72
harassing a counterpart with uninterrupted suggestions, regardless of

substance, he was apt to discover that he could accomplish very little

and that his effectiveness as an adviser was greatly reduced. On the other

hand, if he deluded his counterpart with excessive flattery or just left

him alone and was too easy going, his advice was apt to be taken lightly

even though it was founded upon experience and professional competence.

In general, achievement depended a great deal on the advisercounterpart relationship. Whether this relationship worked depended again

on several things. However, the keys to success were the adviser's

personal attitude and his genuine desire to help his counterpart. Mutual

respect and understanding were always required. For withdut mutual respect,

nothing could be achieved and no advisory technique could help.

An Evaluation

By early 1973, when the last US advisory teams departed South Vietnam,

most ARVN commanders had worked closely with several different advisers.

On an average, each tactical commander had experienced some relationship

with from 20 to 30 different advisers over the war years.

During the initial period of the war, the United States advisory

role was confined to delivering equipment and training ARVN units. As

the war escalated in tempo and intensity, advisers became increasingly

involved in tactical training and advising ARVN unit commanders on how

to conduct combat operations. In this new tactical role, the efforts of

advisers initially met with some inertia on the part of some ARVN commanders. These commanders had long combat records resulting from the

years they fought alongside French forces. The habits they had developed

under French influence were hard to change or modify overnight. They

found American training methods too constraining, too conventional and

ill-suited to the war conditions in Vietnam. Whereas the French emphasized

commando tactics, characterized by rapid movement and hasty raids with

little or no combat support, the American way was methodical, careful

and thorough, characterized by detailed planning and preparation. In a

word, it was by the "book." Intermediate objectives were chosen, fire73
plans prepared, and all moves were made step-by-step. When the objective

was seized, a careful search was always made for documents; all scraps of

paper were recovered and analyzed. To the combat-experienced Vietnamese,

much of the American way of doing things was too slow and too "academic."

They were complacent with their war records, thinking that they were

adequately experienced or at least knew how to fight this type of war.

American tactical training, they felt, was something they did not require

3

at that txme.

In some respects, the aversion to accepting US advice on tactical

matters was not entirely attributable to pride or self-consciousness.

In fact, during the early 1960's, most US Army company-grade officers

assigned to field advisory duties in South Vietnam had no real combat

experience, except for the few career officers who had fought in Korea

a decade earlier. In the eyes of experienced ARVN regimental and battalion commanders, the standing and value of these young advisers were

not very high. Their role, therefore, was particularly difficult and

the range of their effectiveness greatly limited. During this period,

US advisers mostly concerned themselves with the utilization of equipment, weapons and equipment maintenance, and assisting ARVN units in

technical or logistical matters, but rarely in combat or tactical matters.

The role of US tactical advisers, however, underwent a radical change

during the mid-1960's when US combat support assets, especially airlift,

helilift and tactical air were introduced into South Vietnam in increasing

quantities each year. For the first time in many years, ARVN unit commanders felt vulnerable because of their reliance on US advisers who provided and controlled these combat support assets. The advisory role

definitely became more significant and its effectiveness increased visibly

when heliborne operations and US tactical air support made their appearance. The outlook and intensity of the war seemed to add more purposefulness and a closer rapprochement to the relationship between advisers

and their counterparts.

3

This subject is also discussed in the monograph of this series,

RVNAF and U.S. Operational Cooperation and Coordination, Chapter 7.

74
If the impact of the advisory presence was to be evaluated in terms

of the specific contributions it brought to the ARVN war effort, then

it can be said that every level of ARVN organization for combat needed

advisers for some reason, and the usefulness of advisers varied from level

to level. At the battalion level, the role of advisers was particularly

important as providers and coordinators of combat support; it was less

prominent in intelligence since battalion advisers were not as well versed

in the terrain or the enemy situation as the ARVN commanders. The critical

importance of combat support planning and coordination, and the weakness of

ARVN commanders in these skills, were painfully demonstrated in the ARVN

operations toward Tchepone, in Laos, in 1971. US advisers did not accompany

their battalions and regiments in this campaign and the optimum employment of US firepower and helilift could not be achieved without them.

As we moved up the tactical hierarchy, the need for advisers was more

acutely felt in two specific areas: planning and leadership. The basic

weaknesses of ARVN units at regimental and sometimes at division level

in those areas seriously affected the performance of subordinate units.

However, the strength of US advisers whose adeptness in planning and

leadership was particularly prominent played a major part in improving

these problem areas.

The ARVN trooper by nature was a good soldier, enduring, brave,

and resilient in combat. Small unit cadres were also audacious, enthusiastic

and easily trained. The problem was that these soldiers and cadres did not

always receive the benefits of good leadership. When the performance of a

certain unit was poor, chances were the commander had failed to provide

proper guidance and take corrective actions. The deficiency was in no

way attributable to the men themselves who, like Panurge's herd of sheep,

only followed the leader regardless of where he might go. The leverage

of US advisers, meanwhile, seemed to be more effective at the lower levels

than at the higher echelons where it would have provided better results.

At higher levels, the advisory effort tended more toward fostering good

rapport than applying leverage to get results. Consequently, it was not

altogether responsive to the requirement for assisting ARVN to overcome

its shortcomings. These major shortcomings were in all phases of staff

75
planning, in the operation of communications systems for effective command

and control, and in realistic personnel policies that would permit the

timely elimination of incompetent commanders. It is unfortunate that

US advisers at the top echelons of the structure did not push hard enough

for improvements in these fields. The advisory effort should have endeavored first to bring about an effective command, control and leadership

system for the ARVN before trying to improve the combat effectiveness of

small units. If this priority had been established, the entire advisory

effort would have been more beneficial.

During the last two years of US advisory presence, 1971-1972, the

regional assistance commands seemed to be more suited and more responsive

to ARVN tactical requirements. In each corps area, the regional assistance

command commander and his staff provided direct assistance and support to

the ARVN corps, especially in planning and directing its combat efforts.

It was the new direction and emphasis of the advisory effort at this level

that were responsible for the marked improvement of ARVN performance in

the field despite the fact that US advisers and combat support assets at

lower levels were being greatly reduced. The performance of ARVN units

during the enemy's 1972 Easter offensive was eloquent testimony to the

effectiveness of the regional assistance command concept. It was this

emphasis on cooperation and support provided by regional assistance commands

to each ARVN corps that helped the RVNAF hold out and avoid defeat and

collapse.

In retrospect, our war experience indicates that at the corps level

there should have been a strong advisory system at the beginning to work

directly with the corps commanders and help them improve their staffs.

Each ARVN corps would have been responsible to produce results with the

assistance of a limited field advisory system, consisting of the ablest

personnel and reaching down to only a few key positions at lower levels.

It could have been augmented by a number of mobile training or assistance

teams under the direct control of the regional assistance command commander

to be used when required to meet ARVN tactical and training needs as they

surfaced in each individual unit.

76
CHAPTER IV

The Intelligence Adviser

A Pioneering Effort

The development of the RVNAF as a modern, westernized armed force

began during the First Republic, 1955-1963. During the earrly years of

this period, the intelligence branch, like other arms and services, had

to be almost entirely self-sufficient in developing organizational and

operational improvements, although its own means and resources were

meager and outdated.

The first major problem that the ARVN intelligence branch had to

solve was the shortage of trained personnel. There was a need for cadres

at every echelon and in every branch of the ARVN and the competition

for this limited resource meant that only a nucleus of cadre could be

spared for the intelligence branch. The selection of personnel for

assignment to intelligence positions was based not so much on actual

professional competence or experience as on expectations, sometimes

based on hardly more than an estimate of the individual's development

potential.

To help the ARVN intelligence branch overcome this problem, the

US Army Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) set about in

early 1955 to organize an accelerated two-month intelligence course for

ARVN officers. This course was conducted in the Philippines and was

the first intelligence assistance provided by the US Army. Most graduates of this course were assigned as instructors to the ARVN Intelligence School in Cay Mai in the Cholon district of Saigon, which conducted its first course for ARVN intelligence officers in November 1955.

The only training materials available at that time for the instructors

and their students were transcriptions of the notes the ARVN instructors

77
had taken during their two-month training. The urgent need for more

and better instructional materials led to the assignment of the first

US Army intelligence adviser in South Vietnam; the Cay Mai Intelligence

School was the first ARVN organization to welcome him.

The first American adviser was regarded with considerable awe by

the ARVN officers at the Cay Mai School. Not only was this "first" a

novel event, but the word "adviser" itself created some impressions in

Vietnamese minds that probably would have greatly surprised the American

involved. In Vietnamese minds, "adviser" was associated with the position of "conseiller" which implies some supervisory powers such as enjoyed by former Emperor Bao Dai when he served as counselor for the

first Viet Minn government in 1945. Some derogatory connotations were

also visualized, for it was remembered that in the early 50's, Red Chinese advisers to the Viet Minh were acclaimed by the Communists as their

"prodigious adviser comrades." Thus the position of an adviser, as far

as intelligence officers of the ARVN were concerned, invariably evoked

an aura of authority and of scholarly knowledge, especially since it was

compared with Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, the then all-powerful political counselor

to his brother, President Diem.

At the Cay Mai Intelligence School, the man most preplexed by the

event was the commandant himself. He had been summarily informed by the

Training Bureau, General Staff, that a US Army advisier would be assigned

to his school to provide assistance in training. Nothing more was

learned about his mission, functions, authority, or the scope of his

activities. These were the things that the commandant wanted to know

in detail but could not obtain from the General Staff. The first action

he took was to order the establishment of a separate office for the

adviser in the school headquarters compound and he issued positive instructions to all school personnel that only the two assistant-commandants

were permitted to deal with the adviser, and then only in his absence.1

I was one of his two assistant-commandants,

78
Despite the commandant's initial misgivings, the adviser's presence

was an instant success since through his efforts the school immediately .

obtained US Army intelligence training texts which it needed so desperately. In general, the entire school staff was favorably impressed by

the adviser's activities and the way he conducted himself. His suggestions helped solve the problem of training aids and he tactfully kept an

eye on the instruction being given in various classrooms, the performance

of ARVN instructors, and how the students reacted and progressed. He

make a point of jotting down his observations and comments and drafted

them into memoranda for the personal attention of the school commandant.

He also played an active role in helping the commandant run the administrative aspects of the school by offering suggestions on the maintenance

of vehicles, weapons and other equipment. He accompanied the commandant

on the weekly inspections, visiting barracks and student sleeping quarters

and even participating in social and ceremonial functions held by the

school.

The school commandant was elated. His adviser was truly an adviser;

the way he performed his duties left no doubt about his sincere desire

to help, to assist. He did not exercise any authority nor did he encroach

on the commandant's command duties. The school staff members were greatly

gratified by the free English lessons that he conducted and they felt no

complications when performing their daily work in his presence. On their

part, the students remained intensely curious about the American adviser

and tried to learn as much as they could about his role and his relationship with, and attitude toward the school. They were enlightened and

pleased with their findings which assisted them several years later when

they welcomed US advisers into their own units.

Increasing Commitment

In September 1960, for the first time since the Geneva Accords, the

Communists in South Vietnam increased activity in Kontum and openly attacked the provincial capital of Phuoc Binh, 100 miles north of Saigon.

These enemy actions took everybody by surprise. It became obvious then

79
that there was a lack of hard intelligence on the Communists; this lack

was acutely felt by both Vietnamese and Americans. With the concurrence

of the RVN government, the United States agreed to deploy US Army advisers

to all ARVN intelligence organizations from the Joint General Staff (JGS)

level to corps, divisions and sectors (provinces).

At the JGS, the US intelligence advisory team which was assigned

to J-2 in April 1962 was a pioneering effort at this level.. The team

consisted of nine officers, two of whom served as senior and deputy

senior advisers to the chief, J-2. The others were assigned to each of

the operating divisions of the J-2: collection, training, interrogation,

aerial photo, order of battle, and technical intelligence. The mission

assigned to the team was not so much to provide advice to the J-2 personnel but rather to help keep track of and record intelligence data on the

enemy situation throughout South Vietnam, especially information pertaining to the enemy's order of battle and infiltration from North Vietnam, as collected by ARVN sources. It did have an advisory role, however,

and the US team with J-2 suggested ideas concerning policies and procedures to improve ARVN intelligence activities at all levels in three

aspects: organization, training and operations. The team thus functioned

in a dual capacity, collecting intelligence data and providing advice at

the same time. To the J-2, JGS, the US team was particularly useful in

providing training assistance since through its efforts, all intelligence

courses, both in-country and offshore, were conducted with regularity

and responded effectively to ARVN intelligence training requirements.

What the J-2, JGS needed most from the US advisers at that time

was assistance in obtaining modern equipment, especially for imagery interpretation, to replace obsolescent equipment. Another urgent need was

for US-produced intelligence information. The US team's failure to

respond immediately to these requirements made its advisory effort look

suspicious in the eyes of ARVN intelligence officers. But gradually the

team's contributions to ARVN intelligence, in terms of agent reports and

signal intelligence, became significant.

Unit 300, which was activated in 1962 as a collection agency subordinate to J-2, JGS, was assisted in its operations by the 1st Detach80
ment, US Army 500th Military Intelligence Group. The US Army detachment

assumed an advisory role in addition to coordinating its collection

activities with Unit 300. The ARVN human intelligence collection system

was organized into groups, teams and nets operating at all echelons in

the field from corps to subsectors (districts). Agents operated under

civilian cover in professions or businesses appropriately selected for

each type of objective or operation. These organizations cooperated

with US Army intelligence advisers who were deployed to the sector

(province) level.

This form of coordination proved very effective. On the one hand,

ARVN agents were provided detailed guidance for every step of their

operations and they were able to absorb quickly the fine points taught

by practical experience. On the other, by operating together, US advisers

readily shared the difficulties and challenges met in each specific

local environment by ARVN operatives whose successes or failures affected

US operations as well. A drawback of the system was the poor credibility

of the US cover. Although US Army advisers also posed as civilians, their

cover was ineffective. To the highly suspicious Vietnamese population

of that time, most American civilians were considered intelligence

operatives and those Vietnamese who associated with them were, ipso

facto, considered their agents.

By 1962, technical exploitation of materiel was still a novelty

within the ARVN intelligence system. Communist materiel and armament

during that time were a heterogenous assortment of different types and

models making the task of exploitation and classification extremely difficult. In addition, the Communists also employed locally-produced

weapons,' grenades and mines whose effect was more propagandists than

practical, but whose use created additional work for the technical intelligence branch. The testing and exploitation of enemy materiel and

weapons were made easier by the wealth of technical data provided by US

Army advisers, especially those pertaining to new Communist weapons.

These data proved extremely useful to ARVN units. The advisers also

provided professional guidance to the Technical Intelligence Section,

J-2, JGS, on the methods used in exploiting technical data from captured

war materiel.

81
In counter-intelligence activities, the US Army 704th Intelligence

Detachment provided advisers for the ARVN Military Security Service

(MSS). Although the mission and functions of these advisers were similar

to those performed by the intelligence advisers in the J-2 system, the

US-ARVN relationship in counter-intelligence was more restricted in

scope. A major reason for this was that the Military Security Service

was also responsible for political intelligence and served as a security

watchdog for the regime. The MSS therefore reported directly to the

office of the President or to his political adviser, from whom it also

received directives and orders. It was obvious in those circumstances

that cooperation and coordination in the exchange of information with

US advisers were limited to counter-intelligence operations against

Communist activities and could not include the full range of MSS domestic

intelligence and security functions.

In the area of signal intelligence, a US Army Radio Research Unit

(RRU) was deployed to South Vietnam in 1962. The US Army 3d RRU performed as a collection agency for MACV J-2 rather than as an advisory

body for the ARVN 1st Signal Exploitation Company which was the sole

Vietnamese communications monitoring unit at that time. Nonetheless,

this ARVN unit was able to absorb through its close association with

the 3d RRU some modern techniques which proved far more effective than

those learned from the French.

In general, during the period of the increased US commitment,

1962-1965, although US advisers were deployed throughout the ARVN intelligence system, their.relationship with ARVN intelligence counterparts

seemed to be cautious, especially during the period of political upheavals leading to the military coup of 1963. The Diem government

suspected that the US Embassy was supporting the rebellious Buddhists

and that US intelligence agents stimulated them into action. As a result,

the relationship between Vietnamese intelligence personnel and US advisers

was seriously affected. Understandably, no Vietnamese intelligence

official would want to incriminate himself by maintaining too close a

relationship with US intelligence personnel who were suspected of plotting against the government. The subsequent political turmoil during

82
1964 did not help improve this relationship and the Vietnamese continued

to be cautious and reluctant to become too closely involved.

At the corps, division and sector levels, however, the US-ARVN

intelligence relationship was not affected in any way by political events

in Saigon. The extent of cooperation and the directness of the advisory

effort in intelligence was most conspicuous in II Corps Tactical Zone

following the introduction in September 1962 of a US Army Mohawk OV-1

squadron which operated from Nha Trang and Qui Nhon. This squadron

provided valuable assistance in aerial photography to ARVN intelligence

since the Vietnamese Air Force RC-45 and RC-47 planes during that time

did not have photographic capabilities suitable for use over the Highlands. Objectives for aerial photography were developed by the II Corps

G—2 and approved by the corps senior adviser before becoming missions

flown by the US Army 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment. Most

remarkable was the use of these Mohawks in tactical support missions, as

suggested by ARVN commanders, since the plane could be equipped with

rockets and cal .50 machineguns. Although unorthodox, this use of an

observation aircraft was approved by the US advisers in view of urgent

2

and specific tactical requirements.

The Period of Full-Fledged Cooperation

The role of US Army intelligence advisers and" the US-ARVN cooperation and coordination in intelligence activities took a vigorous step

forward in 1965 when US combat troops were introduced into South Vietnam.

The war had entered a new phase and in the face of stepped up Communist

attacks and infiltration, United States efforts and capabilities to

monitor the enemy situation were inadequate.

The Mohawks were disarmed in early 1965 when the US Army Chief of

Staff, General Johnson visited Vietnam and discovered the armed Mohawks.

He wanted to avoid a squabble with the USAF that might jeopardize the

use of US Army armed helicopters.

83
This was a period of large-scale, division-size combat operations

pitting US forces against main force units of the North Vietnamese Army

(NVA). In keeping with the force buildup, United States collection

agencies and intelligence units were gradually brought into South Vietnam.

For the first time, modern US techniques such as the OV-1 side looking

airborne radar (SLAR) and infra-red imagery (Red Haze) were put to use.

Other airborne detection devices, such as the "people-sniffer," were

also employed. Air reconnaissance and aerial photography missions were

flown by sophisticated USAF jet aircraft such as the RF-4C and the RF-101.

The number of Mohawks increased to 115 by 1968. All these modern assets

contributed to improving knowledge about the enemy to an extent never

before reached during the war. In signal intelligence, the use of airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) helped pinpoint enemy units with

accuracy and continuously keep track of their movements.

Effective as it was. in collection, through the use of modern technology, the US intelligence effort during these early months seemed to

be somewhat deficient in analysis and lacked depth when it attempted to

assess the true nature of the war and the determination of the enemy.

This was understandable since never before had the United States faced

such a pernicious enemy on terrain which thoroughly favored him and

under a form of warfare in which he made the rules. Other constraints

in language and culture added to the difficulties faced by US intelligence

personnel in South Vietnam. These weaknesses, by contrast, were the

very strengths of the Vietnamese who unfortunately did not have the

technological capabilities possessed by the Americans. It appeared then

that if they joined forces in intelligence work, a perfect union could

be achieved from which both would benefit. At the very least, this union

could alleviate some of the difficulties encountered by Americans and at

the same time would help the Vietnamese attain maturity in advanced

intelligence collection operations.

The requirement for cooperation and the concept of mutual compensation were recognized by the Vietnamese and the Americans and led to a

substantial increase in US advisory personnel in the field, from corps

level to the district, and to the establishment of combined intelligence

84
agencies. The number of US Army intelligence advisory personnel at

sector level, for example, increased from three to seven. More important,

however, was the activation of four combined intelligence agencies: the

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), the Combined Document

Exploitation Center (CDEC), the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center

(CMEC) and the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC). The

operation of these centers by a mixed Vietnamese-American staff with

US-provided modern assets and Vietnamese indigenous resourcefulness

greatly enhanced collection and analyses activities and provided effective intelligence data support for MACV J-2, J-2, JGS, and combat units

for all allied forces at all levels. (

The senior intelligence adviser for an ARVN corps was usually a

colonel or a lieutenant-colonel. His counterpart, the corps G-2, until

1971, was almost always a major or lieutenant colonel. Though not

seriously impeded by rank discrepancy, the relationship was somewhat

affected by it. The corps intelligence adviser regularly provided his

counterpart with intelligence data collected by US sources such as ARDF,

SLAR, Red Haze, Sniffer and aerial photography. He also made available

to the corps G-2 human intelligence gathered from prisoners and ralliers

under temporary US custody and certain agent's reports. Information

obtained from communications intelligence, however, was not subject to

systematic dissemination by US advisers. If and when such information

was made available to the corps G-2, it was usually carefully edited

and restricted to general information. It was apparent that in this

respect, US advisers were bound by national security codes which precluded

complete disclosure of this type of intelligence even to an ally in war.

During this period, US intelligence advisers also provided liaison

between G-2, ARVN corps and G-2, US Field Forces. As such, they played

a key role in all intelligence activities in the corps area. To ARVN

tactical commanders, the most valuable and useful intelligence data

were those concerning enemy unit locations or movements as detected by

ARDF. Fully aware of this fact, US commanders often provided this

information directly to ARVN corps commanders. Therefore, one of the

corps G-2's major concerns was how to obtain this same data before or at

85
least at the same time as his commander received it from the US Armycorps senior adviser. Obviously, no G-2 enjoys being fed intelligence

data by his own commander. Thus, for a relatively long time, US intelligence advisers were evaluated by their ARVN G-2 counterparts on the

basis of their ability to supply timely, critical intelligence.

But the role of the American adviser was not confined to the exchange

and provision of intelligence data. It also encompassed US supply and

support of intelligence equipment, and funds needed to operate an

effective ARVN humint system. The amount of this support, however, was

not equally available to all ARVN units. It depended greatly on each

individual senior adviser, his interest in intelligence operations, and

his own evaluation of ARVN agent net-effectiveness.

During daily working contacts, US intelligence advisers seldom made

professional remarks concerning their counterparts' way of doing their

job. Advisory comments, if any, usually consisted of explaining US techniques and procedures which had been found effective. This non-meddling

attitude reflected a tactful respect toward ARVN intelligence officers

who reciprocated in kind. A mutual respect developed which helped maintain a good working relationship and rapport between the adviser and the

advisee.

At the division level, US intelligence advisers earned extra esteem

and enhanced their professional standing through direct participation in

combat operations with the division operational staff and by giving a

helping hand to the division G-2, supplying him with US intelligence data

or interceding for the employment of US collection resources. The sharing

of the increased intelligence workload occasioned by combat operations

resulted in making the rapport between the US adviser and his counterpart

closer and more firmly founded.

In contrast to tactical units, the ARVN territorial commands at

province and district levels had much more complex intelligence organizations which made the role of the US intelligence advisers many times

more difficult. At the provincial level, for example, the intelligence

structure encompassed a vast array of committees and units operated by

different agencies, such as the provincial security committee, the

86
provincial intelligence-operations coordination committee (PIOCC), the

Phoenix committee, the province intelligence and security platoon, the

province reconnaissance unit (PRU), etc. Each committee in which the

sector S-2 participated was oriented toward a different set of objectives

and problems and involved such different resources and intricate procedures that it would take an adviser a long time to familiarize himself

with his task and the local intelligence activities. Most US intelligence

advisers at sector level were army officers whose professional background

sometimes consisted solely of an intelligence officer basic course at

Fort Holabird, Maryland. Their professional experience was consequently

minimal and whatever knowledge they had was primarily technical or procedural. Naturally, the advice they provided was based on the US Army

manual on combat intelligence, FM 30-5, and often had little applicability

to improving intelligence effectiveness at the sector level. The problems

faced by the sector were usually beyond the scope of US Army field manuals.

The problems faced by US intelligence advisers at the district level

were even more difficult and made their advisory role more demanding.

As an adviser attempted to have a closer look at the intelligence problems

at the grassroot level, he came to grips with so many complexities inherent

in the enemy's infrastructure that it usually took him months to understand the basics. He learned to differentiate, for example, between a

resident guerrilla and an unattached guerrilla, between a tax collecting

agent and an econo-finance cadre, a liaison-communication cadre and a

simple messenger, between front organizations and sympathizers, etc.

Meanwhile the district resources and assets available for the collection

of intelligence were severely limited. The district S-2 was usually a

young second lieutenant or aspirant fresh out of school and still groping

around in his job. What little guidance and supervision that both the

S-2 and his adviser received from above came mostly from the sector

headquarters, which was usually too preoccupied with its own problems

to devote much time to district intelligence affairs. For both the ARVN

and US systems, guidance and support seemed to stop at the sector (province) level. The result was obvious. Left to themselves in a totally

strange environment, US intelligence advisers in the districts could

87
do little more than learn from experience and try to adapt as rapidly

as possible to the new environment.

Intelligence cooperation and coordination at the central level were

entirely different from those in the field. They constituted an effort

which was more of a co-worker partnership than an adviser-advisee relationship. Most indicative of this relationship was the way the four

combined intelligence centers referred to above were organized and

operated. In each center there were separate United States and Vietnamese

elements organized along the same functional lines and almost paralleling

each other but under separate commands. But section by section, personnel of the two elements sat together and worked together. Although the

work schedule was separately established by each element, it was usually

the same since both elements had the same tasks and worked toward the

same objectives. The advantages of this co-working system were apparent;

it accelerated and enriched the exchange of data and enabled ARVN personnel, through exposure to US work methods and practice, to learn new

techniques and a modern approach to their profession. For example, ARVN

intelligence personnel learned from their counterparts how to develop

an activity pattern analysis for a certain area, how to keep track of

the situation in a Communist base area, how to use automatic data processing to store and retrieve intelligence data, how to exploit and copy

these data when required, how to test new materiel captured from the

enemy, etc. As a result, and with the assistance of modern US technology

and assets, the production and dissemination of intelligence became more

methodical and faster and since intelligence was made available to all

units on an equal basis, the professional relationships among American

and ARVN commanders and staffs at all echelons were greatly enhanced.

At the four combined intelligence agencies, US personnel usually

outnumbered their counterparts. Nonetheless, their working relationship

was generally good from the very start and caused no problems over the

years. This happy and productive cooperation was possible for two

reasons: First, the relationship was based on a formal agreement reached

between MACV and the JGS, which determined the procedures for cooperation

covering a wide range of subjects, such as the sharing of office space

88
and facilities, guard and security duties, the authority of each element

commander, and the approach to be used in problem-solving. Second, and

more important was the exemplary spirit of cooperation displayed by the

top intelligence officers of both sides, the MACV Assistant Chief of

Staff J-2 and his counterpart, the ARVN chief, J-2, JGS. On his initiative, for example, Major General William E. Potts, US Army, ACS/J-2, MACV

held regular meetings in which he briefed the MACV commander, the Chief

of the JGS and his Chief of Staff and J-2 on the current enemy situation

as viewed from the US side. This innovation in US-ARVN intelligence

cooperation set the tone for the pervasive spirit of cooperation at all

echelons. It also provided the opportunity for General Abrams, COMUSMACV,

and General Vien, Chief of the JGS, to discuss in detail the current

enemy situation, trends and intelligence estimates for the future.

Anatomy of a Relationship.

The formal MACV-JGS agreement on combined intelligence activities

served as a useful basis for coordination and cooperation. It provided

the RVNAF a number of basic guidelines regarding the American advisory

role which had been mentioned only summarily in a JGS memorandum in

April 1955. In April 1958, the JGS published another memorandum intended as a "reminder" to ARVN unit commanders concerning their duties

and responsibilities toward American advisers. Both documents only

indicated briefly what ARVN commanders should do to provide support and

assistance to US advisers but failed to tell them how to work with their

advisers to obtain maximum results. As a result, each ARVN commander

had to figure out for himself how he would approach the delicate problems

of the relationship, learning as he went from his own experience or from

others.

By and large, the attitude of each Vietnamese commander toward his

adviser depended on his own enlightened experience and education. It

was largely a matter of personal improvisations, never the subject of

formal guidance. By contrast, every US adviser was briefed and aided

by handbooks on the role he was going to assume, on the country where

89
he was to live, its geography, history, social customs and manners and

on the specific branch or unit with which he was going to work.

In addition to this general background, the US adviser sometimes

even had advance knowledge on the very person he was going to advise,

his biography and his character as reflected by the remarks or comments

of his predecessor.

Despite the hospitable and accommodating nature of Vietnamese in

general and all the preparatory work that US advisers accomplished prior

to their assignment, the relationship between them seemed to be affected

by certain unfounded prejudices or misconceptions, especially during the

early years of US direct participation, instilled perhaps by superficial

reports of the communications media—movies and television in particular.

The fact was, due to cultural differences and the language barrier, Vietnamese were generally inhibited and almost never took the first step in

dealing with foreigners. Whatever contacts they maintained with US

advisers were made primarily by commanders or responsible staff officers

since they were the orlly persons qualified both by the requirement of

their jobs and a certain ability to speak the English language.

The cultural inhibition of ARVN personnel seemed to be a reason why

some US advisers complained about the lack of enthusiasm and the apparent

lethargic approach to work on the part of the Vietnamese. Whatever their

merits, critical remarks along these lines certainly did not improve

adviser relationships. In defense, the Vietnamese usually argued that

US advisers served only one year, enjoyed a good life and were not immediately concerned about family affairs or anything other than their

jobs. As a result, they reasoned, the Americans were able to devote all

their energies to their short tours while they themselves had to live

with the war for all their lives.

One year was indeed short as a tour of duty since it included the

unproductive time spent in familiarization with environment and job,

usually about three months. In some instances, an adviser would be

transferred to another job even before completing his one-year tour.

As a result, it was impossible for some ARVN commanders to work with

any particular adviser long enough to develop a fruitful relationship.

90
The commander of one combined intelligence agency once observed that

during the period of a year he had had six different US counterparts.

This high turnover rate for advisers seriously affected the combined

effort, especially since it was a long-range effort requiring a certain

continuity in job relationship. Some ARVN commanders even found, to their

dismay, that what had been agreed previously by a certain adviser was

not necessarily palatable to his successor. As a result, both sides

often abstained from committing themselves to any long-range undertaking.

In view of the nature of intelligence work, which required steadiness

and continuity, a longer tour of duty for those advisers assigned to

intelligence duties would have been advisable. Eighteen months

would have been reasonable but two years would have certainly been better

for the sake of the combined effort. I was especially fortunate that

my counterpart, Major General Potts who had completed previous tours in

Vietnam, was held in his position of MACV J-2 for almost four years.

This is a good indication of the emphasis placed on the importance of

the intelligence program by General Abrams.

Although US intelligence officers were uniformly well versed with

what they were supposed to do as advisers, there were greatly diverging

personal approaches or techniques, especially in the exchange of intelligence data with ARVN counterparts. This was most noticeable at the

sector and division levels. Some operated on a broadly conceived approach

to their duties by striving to meet ARVN essential requirements by all

means even when this involved bending some rules or regulations. They

could always manage to do this, for example, by direct voice communication.

Others, however, tended to be overcautious. For example, the cautious

ones always made a point of checking with superiors before releasing any

piece of intelligence or only supplying it upon request and after the

counterparts had learned about it through another source.

Because of this cautiousness, the general belief among ARVN intelligence officers was that their advisers often withheld information from

them for some unknown but possibly sinister reason or another. Several

ARVN intelligence officers indeed suspected that in early 1968, their

advisers were unwilling to release intelligence reports concerning the

91
enemy's preparations for the general offensive. They reasoned with the

dangerous conviction that by withholding this vital information, the US

apparently wanted to quickly solve the war through a major ARVN defeat.

This misapprehension naturally dissolved with time but a certain suspicion

still persisted among some ARVN intelligence officers that under certain

circumstances, US advisers were not free to exchange essential information

with ARVN ounterparts.

Some ARVN units were also convinced that certain United States

intelligence reports were solely disseminated to US advisers to the

exclusion of their counterparts, especially when the tactical situation

became imminently dangerous. It was then that the attitude and countenance of the senior adviser and the intelligence adviser were apt to have

a decisive psychological impact on their counterparts. It was as if US

advisers were some kind of guardian angels without whom all hell would

break loose. The examples were few but convincing enough. The evacuation of US advisers from the forward CP of the ARVN 22d Infantry Division

at Tan Canh early in the morning of 23 April 1972, minutes before enemy

tanks and troops overran the CP, was a deadly blow to the morale of

the ARVN defenders. Then, in Quang Tri, the disorderly retreat of the

3d Infantry Division, which took place even before any orders were given,

appeared to be the only sensible thing to do once US advisers had been

hastily extracted from the CP.

Normally, when an adviser was assigned to an ARVN intelligence unit,

the ARVN counterpart usually tried to evaluate him, not on the basis of

the courses he had attended but in the light of intelligence duties he

had previously assumed and the length of time he served in these assignments. Much of what he later offered as advice would be weighed on

the basis of his professional experience.

As for the ARVN staff and personnel, company-grade officers, NCOs

and privates alike, those who did not have the chance to be in close

touch daily with the adviser, what really counted in their eyes was the

latter's behavior toward their commander and how he treated them. If he

spoke some Vietnamese, something that most US advisers tried to do, the

troops were certainly delighted and the ice would be broken, if only

92
because his weird accent brought them some amusement. The same was true

with his counterpart even if the latter could speak English. In most

all cases, however, the adviser's Vietnamese proficiency did not carry

him beyond an exchange of courtesies.

In general, most US advisers were defeated in their effort to use

spoken Vietnamese in work discussions. This was understandable, first

because Vietnamese, being a tonal language, was phonetically difficult

for most Westerners to master in a short time. Then, the eagerness of

the Vietnamese to practice their English—which most of the educated

spoke with some degree of proficiency—really discouraged the US advisers to carry on his Vietnamese language practice. For an American

intelligence officer to be really effective in his job, especially when

it required a profound knowledge of the Vietnamese Communists, the

mastering of Vietnamese was essential. But then not every US Army

officer had the time or inclination to develop this ability and in view

of the variety of intelligence objectives, only a few truly proficient

in the language were required.

Outward appearances were sometimes a matter of importance to ARVN

personnel. Experience showed that in combined intelligence agencies,

ARVN personnel usually watched US advisers come and go to see if proper

military courtesy was rendered to higher ranking ARVN officers. To

them, this was a way to find out for certain whether US personnel considered their ARVN counterparts as rank-for-rank equals and whether they

had any respect for the ARVN in general. Concerned about equality and

discrimination as they were, ARVN personnel usually felt gratified when

they could share every facility, whether at work or at rest, with Americans on an equal footing. The examples given by US personnel always

worked on their counterparts. For example, in a jointly-shared facility,

if US troops did house cleaning every morning by themselves, ARVN personnel automatically joined them and usually tried to perform just as well.

In general, in their relations with US advisers or co-workers

throughout the years, ARVN personnel usually came to the same generalizations as they judged their counterparts. They were convinced that US

personnel were:

93
1. Very punctual, always neatly dressed, highly disciplined, and

respectful of orders.

2. Responsible and professionally competent.

3. Sociable and compassionate.

4. Tactful for the most part. They were well aware that advisers

did not command.

5. Very well trained, especially the technicians and specialists.

Other qualities that ARVN personnel found common among US intelligence advisers were: they usually monitored events in minute detail

and promptly reported them to superiors; they were also willing to help

their counterparts overcome difficulties, especially those related to

resources needed in the performance of their tasks and this assistance

was always swift.

The traits that the Vietnamese attributed to intelligence advisers

were perhaps similar to those found among all advisers, regardless of

their branch or specialty. However, objectively speaking, intelligence

advisers were more successful in their role than most others. This was

perhaps due to the fact that the intelligence advisory effort was undertaken in a most tactful but very effective manner in which the adviser

acted both as a co-worker and an adviser. This dual approach to advisory assistance made both adviser and counterpart understand each

other better since they shared a common task and worked toward the same

objective in a similar environment. As a result, the advice given was

more realistic, more essential to the common task and apt to be more

willingly accepted. This approach also made the advisory effort a twoway, mutually-benefitting enterprise since it compensated for the inherent

shortcomings found among advisers such as constraints imposed by culture,

language, a short tour of duty and lack of continuity.

During the course of cooperation and coordination, certain sensitive

problems concerning the authority of each partner were all solved in a

rational and formal manner, thus averting possible conflicts and disagreements. The differences that remained and occasionally arose were

usually resolved with relative ease due to a similarity of intelligence

94
concepts, procedures and organizations and more importantly, to a spirit

of genuine cooperation built on mutual assistance and respect.

As a result of this assistance, ARVN intelligence improved markedly

with every passing day and proved responsive to the requirements placed

on it by the need to know more about the enemy even during the postcease fire period when the US advisory role was terminated. The spirit

of cooperation and coordination, despite this, was maintained up to the

very last moment when South Vietnam collapsed.

95
CHAPTER V

The Logistic and Technical Adviser

Significant Milestones

When the first US field advisers were deployed to major units and

military schools of the Vietnamese National Army in early 1955, the

Vietnamese Army logistic system still functioned under the aegis of

French officers and NCOs who assumed most of the key command and staff

positions. The Vietnamese Army logistic system was then at its embryonic

stage. It functioned as a separate organization but its young cadre

only served in an assistant capacity.

In 1956, the French High Command was dissolved. In its wake, the

French Expeditionary Corps and all French cadre of the Vietnamese Army

logistic system departed in haste. It was only then that the US Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) was established and the Vietnamese

Army logistic system began to receive US advisory assistance through

TERM. (Chart 8)

A senior US Army colonel of the Quartermaster branch was introduced

to the Chief, G-4, General Staff. He was to work with this staff division and assist in developing a workable logistic support system for the

Vietnamese Army. An office was immediately installed for him within the

G-4 compound, staffed by a Vietnamese NCO who spoke good English. The

adviser's office became part of the G-4 staff division in all respects,

and its occupant became known to the Vietnamese personnel as the "AdviserColonel." The adviser-colonel seldom stayed in his office. He came and

went with unpredictable irregularity, sometimes showing up every day,

sometimes appearing only once every two or three days. But the G-4

staff knew that he was extremely busy and worked with total dedication.

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Every time he came to his office, he brought something new and a

lot of work for the G-4 staff. At first, there were stacks upon stacks

of manuals, pamphlets, and assorted publications. Then came unsigned,

typewritten memoranda containing certain recommendations that he suggested might improve the organization and operation of the system.

Sometimes, there were pictures taken of glaring deficiencies in preventive maintenance and storage, accompanied by still more memoranda,

usually unsigned, but sometimes bearing his signature. He and Vietnamese logisticians held many discussions, always through the intermediary

of the NCO-interpreter.

It was with a deep sense of appreciation that Vietnamese logisticians

welcomed the growing pile of manuals and memoranda because they responded

exactly to what he had always sought: a new direction for the Vietnamese

logistic effort. Months of hard work for all of us would follow each

time he came. We were gratified but felt greatly frustrated by our own

inability to understand the language. He seemed to share our eagerness

to learn, not only the new things but also the language through which

they were to be learned. He cheerfully gave us English lessons in the

afternoon after duty hours. Communication between us therefore improved

with every passing day as we progressed. The first difficult steps had

been taken; they were in the right direction. With his devoted help, we

felt confident we could overcome any obstacles that lay in the way of

our new direction toward progress.

By the end of 1957, the logistical structure of the Army of the

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, as it became known to all US advisers) had

been realigned to the technical service concept then being used by the

US Army. Standing operating procedures for the new system were prepared

and enforced. At technical services, TERM officers helped in the task

of inventorying, storing and maintaining equipment and supplies that

the departing French forces had left behind. Excess and unserviceable

equipment were turned in to TERM for disposal. And in the reorganization

task undertaken under the General Staff G-4's supervision, technical

service chiefs received the same kind of advisory assistance that had

benefited G-4. The eagerness to learn, to improve on the part of most

98
technical service chiefs was to a great extent influenced by the exemplary

'close cooperation between the G-4 division and its US advisers. It gave

impetus to the progress being made throughout the system.

Because of stepped up activities, the MAAG began in 1961 to attach

technical advisory teams to ARVN base depots to assist their commanders

in the operation and control of stock and storage. Each advisory team,

whose members included civilian technical representatives (techreps),

was considered an element of the base depot organization. Its mission

was to train ARVN depot personnel in addition to working as specialists

or technicians themselves. At each base depot, US advisers were paired

off with ARVN section chiefs with whom they shared the same office,

usually adjacent to the depot commander's.

The pair-off concept applied to work as well as to recreation.

During coffee-breaks, for example, US advisers and their counterparts

retired to the same officers' club or cafeteria on the base for refreshments. They usually contributed to the operation of these facilities by

donating PX items as gifts such as coffee-makers., paper cups and plates,

napkins, etc. Sometimes they also lived in quarters close to each other

on the base. For all practical purposes, they displayed an admirable

spirit of teamwork.

The only thing that usually caused disagreement between advisers

and counterparts was the amount of aid equipment to be requisitioned.

ARVN officers frequently complained about the excessive cutbacks made

by US advisers in their requisitions; the adviser would usually cite

the limitations in the aid budget without disclosing the figures, except

in a few instances to prevent hard feelings.

From 1962 to 1965, with the activation of Area Logistics Commands

(ALC) and in keeping with increased activities of ARVN field support

units, US logistical and technical advisory teams were deployed to ALCs,

field depots and direct support units. Technical advisory teams were

directly controlled by the ALC's senior adviser; they served both as

the senior adviser's technical staff and as advisers to ARVN logistical

units. Logistical and technical advisory teams shared the same cantonement

with the ALC and ARVN technical service units. In each instance, the senior

99
adviser was provided a separate office but his staff shared office

space with ARVN personnel. This greatly facilitated communications and

made daily work more effective and productive. While logistical advisers

were primarily concerned with planning and staff work, technical advisers

would mainly look after stock control, maintenance shop activities and

the preventive maintenance performance within troop units. Staff and

command visits augmented by "end use inspections" were the normal operating procedures of US advisers, whether performed separately or with

the participation of ARVN counterparts. Each end-use inspection was

followed by written reports but staff and command visits normally resulted only in oral reports accompanied by discussions.

As of 1965, following the direct participation of US combat forces

and the activation of the US 1st Logistical Command and US Army, Vietnam

(USARV), the logistical advisory responsibility was transferred from

MACV J-4 to USARV headquarters, in keeping with the service component

principle. As a result, advisory teams working with ARVN technical

services reported to USARV instead of MACV J-4. The problem with this

new arrangement was that it did not exactly correspond to the way the

Joint General Staff (JGS) of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

was organized and operated. The JGS was both a joint service and an

Army general staff. Consequently, the commander of the Central Logistic

Command (CLC) which was activated in 1966 to replace G-4, was both Deputy

Chief of Staff for Logistics of the JGS and the ARVN. In this capacity,

he received advisory assistance from two US headquarters, MACV and USARV.

For all practical purposes, however, the MACV logistical liaison team

which had been attached to the JGS since the early days continued to

function as an advisory team for the CLC; the only difference noticeable

was the augmentation of its staff with personnel.

As was the case with most other ARVN agencies, the senior logistic

adviser was accommodated in a separate office adjacent to the CLC commander's but his staff members were scattered among the CLC divisions,

particularly the Supply and Maintenance Division, the Movement Control

Division and the Base Development Division whose operations required

the permanent presence of US advisers since they dealt with the

100
coordinated employment of both Vietnamese and American assets. In

1968, the sole responsibility for providing advisory assistance to the

ARVN was assumed again by MACV J-4.

Also, as of 1965, in each of the five logistical support areas,

there were US field logistical support units under the control of the

US 1st Logistical Command which supported US combat units under US

Field Forces. Although these field support units were not responsible

for providing advisory assistance, they contributed a great deal in

helping to expand the ARVN logistical support system. In particular,

at the beginning of the Vietnamization program and during the following

years, 1969-1972, US general and direct support units under the 1st US

Logistical Command provided, through the intermediary of US advisers,

on-the-job training for a large member of ARVN personnel from support

units of the same or corresponding level. This training task focused

on the operation and maintenance of new types of equipment and the effort

was intended to prepare RVNAF to cope both with the increasing requirement

for specialists and the receipt of new equipment from US combat units

when they were phased out as a part of the Vietnamization program. American

POL units for example received and trained ARVN field depot personnel in

the operation of 5,000-gal tank trucks and fuel pumping stations. US

general support units received and trained ARVN Ordnance direct support

units' personnel in the maintenance of M48A3 medium tanks and 175-mm

guns while ARVN engineer direct support units' personnel received

training in the maintenance of road building machines and bulldozers

such as DC-6 and DC7E, Rome plows and 75-ton rock crushers. ARVN signal

direct support units' personnel, meanwhile, learned on the job how to

maintain new types of field radio sets such as the AN/GRC-122, -106, and

AN/TRC-35.

At US logistic support units, which were to transfer their operational

responsibility, bases, and facilities, such as fuel pumping stations,

river groups (LCM-8/LCU), floating cranes, transportation, terminals at

Saigon, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang, integrated communications

terminals and relay sations, ARVN personnel were authorized, upon completing

training, to stay and work at the US bases until they eventually took over.

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In addition to providing on-the-job training for ARVN personnel,

US Army logistic support units were also models of functional efficiency

for ARVN unit commanders. For area logistics commanders in particular,

the US Army Support Commands at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Saigon

provided them the opportunity to learn staff planning and asset management through liaison visits. US transportation battalions also provided

ARVN transportation groups the opportunity to learn through combined

operations how to organize truck convoys efficiently and how to manage

efficiently their assets. Additionally, US Army logistic units provided

effective advice to assist ARVN units in solving their temporary difficulties in supply and transportation especially for the support of

combat operations.

As of 1970, in keeping with the gradual redeployment of US forces

and the progress made by ARVN cadres and specialists, US logistic and

technical advisers were reduced at the Area Logistics Command and unit

levels. As a result, a US technical advisory team had to work with

several ARVN technical service units at the same time and the team

chief was no longer assigned to any particular unit but rotated among

the units he advised. The team still kept a home office but this office was now installed at the direct support group or field depot

headquarters or at the ALC advisory group headquarters. US advisory

teams working at the central base depot echelon were.little affected

by the redeployment plan, however.

To keep pace with the momentum of Vietnamization, ARVN logistic

units, with the assistance of US logistic and technical advisory teams,

feverishly worked with US advisers and units concerning plans "for the

reception and operation of integrated communications, calibration, lines

of communication and ports. By the end of October 1972, preparatory

work for the turnover of these systems accelerated to an even more

hectic pace in view of a possible cease-fire agreement

The operation of major base depot maintenance facilities requires

the use of advanced test, measurement and diagnostic equipment. This

equipment must be precisely calibrated to be of any use. Intensive

training of RVNAF personnel was necessary to prepare them to take over

this vital function. For more on this subject, see pp 112-114, RVNAF

Logistics, a Report in the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program,

by Dong Van Khuyen.

103
This agreement, however, did not materialize until three months

later, on 27 January 1973. In full implementation of the agreement,

all American advisers and military specialists were withdrawn from

South Vietnam during the following two months. The US Defense Attache

office (USDAO) which was activated on 28 January 1973, took over the

MACV compound but not MACV advisory functions. Its responsibility was

to manage the continuing Security Assistance Program in coordination

and cooperation with the RVNAF. Its role was that of a co-worker,

not an adviser. Due to strength limitations, imposed by the Paris

Agreement, USDAO had to rely on American civilian contractors to perform

certain management tasks. With the objective of facilitating cooperation,

a small number of USDAO personnel and most contractor personnel were

assigned to those RVNAF agencies responsible for establishing military

aid requirements such as the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA)

and the Logistic Data Processing Center (LDPC) where they helped translate these requirements into a dollar program. Although they did not

have advisory responsibilities, members of the USDAO and personnel re- .

presenting contractors were always provided necessary management data

by the ARVN agencies with which they enjoyed a close relationship.

In contrast to the practice of US advisory teams, USDAO personnel and

employees did not make regular visits to ARVN logistical units in the

field, but they frequently received reports on ARVN activities through

US consular personnel posted in each of the military regions. USDAO

officers occasionally visited ARVN logistic installations in the Saigon

area and in the field, sometimes as members of the tours conducted for

foreign military attaches. Like the foreign attaches, they also brought

along cameras and mixed well as a group. The big difference was that

they asked more informed and intelligent questions and were more

systematic. Despite the formal relationship occasioned by the new

circumstances which prohibited the Americans from acting as advisers,

ARVN logisticians placed their total confidence on USDAO officers and

treated them as if they were advisers. In difficult moments, they could

always count on frequent visits by USDAO officers, and this further

bolstered their confidence in continued United States assistance.

104
ARMY AMSCNtL ft«.

Civilian Technicians and Specialists of the U.S. Army

Materiel Command as Advisers to the Army Arsenal, 1972

105
The Base Depot Upgrade Program

During 1969, among the major tasks tackled by ARVN logisticians in

an effort to improve logistical operations was the modernization of

three major base depots, the 80th Ordnance, 40th Engineer and 60th

Signal. This upgrade effort was aimed at increasing in-country rebuild

capabilities and curtailing overseas rebuild programs. As part of the

Vietnamization plan, the base depot upgrade program was a complex enterprise involving many areas of endeavor and many different agencies

and organizations. To be successful, the program needed to be carefully

studied and developed prior to implementation.

Major General R. Conroy, MACV-J-4 and I, as CLC commander and his

counterpart, agreed to establish a combined US-ARVN committee to study

the program. Chaired by Colonel McNair, senior ordnance adviser, the

committee included several US and ARVN signal and engineer officers as

permanent members and a few specialists of the US Army Materiel Command.

After initial guidance given by both the MÄCV J-4 and myself during the

first meeting, the committee settled down to work at the office of the

senior ordnance adviser. Every month the committee reported in a joint

session to General. Conroy and myself concerning progress being made and

received additional guidance. After three months of work, the results

of the study were submitted, with our endorsement, to the Commander

USMACV and Chairman of the JGS for approval.

When the program was implemented in 1970, the combined study committee was transformed into a program management committee which continued

to utilize the same successful staff procedures: combined staff meetings

for review of progress and joint action to obtain desired results. The

committee was disbanded in early 1972 when modernization objectives had

been achieved.

Funded at US $17 million, construction at the three base depots

included new warehouses, rehabilitation of the existing warehouses,

a refrigerated storage system, a drainage system, latrines, utilities,

and road and open storage surfacing. The entire upgrade project cost

US $25 million and included machinery installed in 1970 and 19 71.

106
The program transformed the old, run-down facilities into modern

industrial plants that were similar to those in the most advanced

countries. Under the tutelage of the American adviser-specialists,

the ARVN technicians, military as well as civilian, trained hard and

learned the skills they knew they would need when the Americans

2

departed.

The ingredients of success in this program were hard work and a

sincere desire to cooperate. On their part, US advisers were motivated

by a desire to help the RVNAF acquire modern rebuild facilities. ARVN

officers also fully devoted themselves to the task and were driven by

an eargerness to learn at every stage of the program. Finally, the

success of the program could be attributed to the harmonious atmosphere

of cooperation in which every problem was studied and every decision

made as a combined action.

Path-Finder I and Path-Finder II

During the years 1968 and 1969, ARVN logisticians were greatly

encouraged from the results obtained through the reorganization of

logistical support along functional lines for the infantry division.

This was followed by the consolidation and automation of the RVNAF

supply system through the establishment of the National Materiel

Management Agency (NMMA) and the Logistic Data Processing Center (LDPC),

both of which constituted the new Republic of Vietnam Automated Materiel

Management System (RAMMS). Elated by this progress and in view of the

eventual turnover of US logistical bases and facilities to the RVNAF,

I was convinced that this was the time to reorganize the whole RVNAF

logistical system along functional lines. During a meeting with Major

General Maples, then MACV J-4, I outlined my idea and obtained

9

For more on the depot upgrade program, see pp. 109-112, RVNAF

Logistics, op. cit.

107
his concurrence for planning purposes.

At the request of MACV J-4, a group of specialists from the US

Army Materiel Command came to Saigon with the specific mission of

studying the feasibility of my reorganization project. The group formed

a committee which became known as Path-Finder I. After two weeks of

study and observation, the committee submitted its findings to MACV

J-4 and the CLC. The report concluded that my proposed reorganization

was entirely feasible in view of the success obtained at the division

level and the availability of modern facilities which were soon to be

transferred to RVNAF. It recommended the consolidation of supply base

depots into three general depots to be located at (1) Da Nang, for the

support of MR 1; (2) Qui Nhon, for the support of MR 2, and; (3) Long

Binh, for the support of MR 3 and MR 4. At the same time, technical

service field depots were to be deactivated. The committee also

recommended a standardized form to be employed by direct and general

support units for the purpose" of evaluating and reporting achievements.

Path-Finder I's assessment and recommendations were considered

rational and useful, particularly with "regard to the reporting of supply

activities. Both MACV J-4 and the CLC approved the use of the new

reporting form and directed that the functional reorganization be planned

in detail pending an appropriate opportunity for implementation.

The opportunity arrived sooner than expected because of the accelerated redeployment of US logistic agencies from South Vietnam. To

implement the reorganization, Major General Jack Fuson, MACV J-4 and I

agreed to establish a combined US-ARVN committee known as Path-Finder

II. The committee's missions were to (1) continue the studies and

review the recommendations made by Path-Finder I; (2) review the entire

ARVN supply system and procedures with particular emphasis on weak

areas; and (3) recommend improvements in order to bring about maximum

efficiency with existing facilities.

The Path-Finder II committee was chaired by Colonel Vu Van Loc,

assisted by Colonel H. W. Sheriff from the Office of the Deputy Chief

of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army. It included as members

several ARVN technical service officers, MACV staff officers and American

108
civilian specialists in supply, storage, logistic planning, communications

and automatic data processing. The committee established an office at

the CLC and spent the first four weeks visiting and holding seminars in

ninety logistical units across the country from the sector level to the

JGS. Each month, the committee held a meeting with ARVN technical

service chiefs; General Fuson and I attended as co-chairman. The meeting

was intended to review progress and provide guidance for the work being

done. After three months of intensive work, during which the ARVN and

American logisticians worked side-by-side, the committee submitted its

final report on 16 October 1972; it concurred with all Path-Finder I

recommendations and presented a total of 21 recommendations of its own

concerning organizational and management improvements. All recommendations

were approved by MACV J-4 and the CLC.

The ARVN logisticians, who were to be charged with implementing the

Pathfinder improvements, had learned much during this 90 days of intensive

study of logistic organization, doctrine and operations. In intimate

contact with experienced American logistics specialists, they learned

by exchanging views, observation, and by sharing in the preparation of

the final report.

The US element of Path-Finder II left South Vietnam upon completion

of the report but the ARVN committee members were retained and given the

responsibility for implementation of the improvement program until it

was completed near the end of 1973. The most significant achievements

were centralized and automated management under CLC, the creation of

divisonal logistics battalions and the consolidation of technical

3

service field support units, all under the functional concept.

Two notable differences between the Base Depot Upgrade program and

Path-Finder II mentioned above pertained to the chairmanship of the

Joint committees and in program management during implementation. In

3

For more on Pathfinder, see pp. 139-141, RVNAF Logistics,

op. cit.

109
Path-Finder II, the chairmanship was assumed by an ARVN officer; his

deputy was an American officer who, despite an equal rank, was more

senior in terms of professional experience and age. This was perhaps

a unique instance during the entire process of cooperation between US

advisers and ARVN logisticians. Normally, a US officer would serve as

chairman or at least co-chairman of such a committee since US officers

were in general more professionally experienced and knowledgeable than

their younger counterparts. The merits of this unique arrangement, which

was encouraged by the MACV J-4 himself, were self-evident. Responsibility

helped ARVN logisticians meet the challenge and reach maturity with the

backing of experienced, knowledgeable US technicians. As a result, ARVN

committee members effectively managed this project until final success

even though US advisers were no longer at their side. Path-Finder II

was a resounding success during both the study and the implementation

phases.

Observations of the U.S. Logistical Advisory Effort

Over the years, the US arrangement for advisory command and control

underwent several changes as a result of the military situation, US

authorized strength, and the organization of US combat forces and logistical support in South Vietnam. Apart from a gradual expansion in

strength and deployment, the logistic advisory organization was at first

placed under the MAAG, then under MACV control. For some time, US advisers

were separately controlled by each service component: Army, Navy, Air

Force, but finally control was unified under MACV J-4. Each change was

made with the apparent purpose of streamlining command and control

on the United States side. But the final arrangement seemed not be be

in keeping with the objective for better and more effective advisory

service. To ARVN logisticians, what really mattered was whether or not

the arrangement provided for better and more effective support for the

RVNAF. The question was: Were the RVNAF better served if US logistical

and technical advisers were placed under the Commanding General of USARV

or MACV J-4?

110
A definite advantage resulting from US advisers being placed under

'USARV was that field support and assistance were swifter because most

US Army logistical facilities were deployed in close proximity to ARVN

logistical units. Therefore, any intercession on the part of US

advisers for the benefit of ARVN units, regardless of the purpose, would

be direct and made easier by the fact that advisers operated within the

same USARV structure. However, this arrangement seemed to be incompatible

with the relationship between MACV and the JGS. First, there was no

Vietnamese counterpart to USARV. The JGS was in fact both a joint staff

and an Army general staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,

JGS, therefore, performed the combined duties of J-4 of the joint staff

and G-4 of the Army general staff in addition to being commander of the

Central Logistics Command. In this capacity, he had to work with MACV

J-4 and USARV G-4 at the same time instead of a single agency. The coordination and monitoring of all military assistance activities, as far

as the JGS was concerned, were not facilitated by this dual arrangment.

And in case a transfer of responsibility was required when USARV and

US logistical units stood down for redeployment, the transition was apt

to cause delays and discontinuity to logistical support activities.

On the other hand, the consolidation of all logistic and technical

advisory efforts under MACV J-4, although not conducive to better support

in the field, was fully compatible with the JGS organization in that it

provided for a single agency responsible for co-ordinating and monitoring

military assistance activities and ensured continuity in the face of

eventual changes in US force structure and deployment.

Regarding advisory strength and the diversity of specialties

required for the advisory effort, there was an opinion that since all

requirements were initiated by the US and not actually based on RVNAF

estimates, there may have been an excess in some areas of US technical

advisers. That was only partially true. It was true that estimates of

US advisory strength and specialties were all made by MACV (or the

MAAG) and that the JGS indeed never formally asked for any specific

number of advisers or specialties. But it would be wrong to say that

this had never been discussed nor had any agreement been reached between

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MACV and the RVN leadership concerning general logistic advisory

requirements. The fact was ARVN logisticians were unable to determine

the RVNAF needs in terms of advisory strength and advisory specialties

for the simple reason that they had neither the experience nor the

knowledge in these matters. If MACV had asked what kinds of US

specialists the RVNAF would require for assistance in operating and

maintaining the new M-48A3 medium tank, for example, the best that ARVN

logisticians could have done was to state in very general terms that

assistance in supply and maintenance would be required at all echelons,

nothing more. As to a specific MOS and how many of them would be

required, ARVN logisticians always considered that only the MACV staff

would have both the knowledge and the experience to provide this

information. As a result, specific estimates and requirements for

advisory assistance were always provided by MACV.

Could there have been an excess of technical advisers? I doubt it.

Being on the receiving end of US military aid and advisory assistance

for over twenty years,through periods of relative calm as well as

intense fighting, my colleagues and I only found a shortage, never an

excess, of advisers. As has been said, for many years it was impossible

for ARVN logisticians to determine the type and number of advisers

required, however, it was equally true that in time, they learned to

estimate their own needs in categories of specialists. Consequently,

during the period 1973-1975, they contributed effectively in establishing,

in cooperation with USDAO, programs for the replacement and reduction of

American specialists working under contract with ARVN logistic agencies.

The effectiveness of advisers depended in a large measure on how

long they stayed in their jobs. This was especially true of logistic

and technical advisers. The one year tour was definitely too short for

these advisers to acquaint themselves with the environment, the procedures,

the human relations aspect of their assignment in order to effectively

contribute their experience and know-how to the task of helping improve

the RVNAF logistics system. It is my personal opinion that, now having

to face the same harshness and hazards as their tactical colleagues,

logistic and technical advisers would have contributed much more to the

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RVNAF if their tours had been longer, 2 years at the ALC level and 3

years at the central level. But perhaps this would have placed too

much of a strain on their families. A balance, therefore, should have

been struck between the results desired in South Vietnam and the personal

sacrifices.

The success of giving advice or receiving it is an art that depends

a great deal on personal virtues and the individual's approach to human

relationships. Professional competence and experience did not always

make a good adviser if he was not at the same time a man of tact and good

manners. Irascibility and haughtiness would not solve problems, but

only make them worse. The key to success depended on flexibility,

restraint and understanding. A good adviser was neither too passive nor

too aggressive. He would accomplish little if he waited for his counterpart to come to him for advice and only provided it when asked. On the

other hand, if by overzealousness, he flooded his counterpart with a

cascade of problems, real or imagined, and aggressively told him to do

this and that or tried to do everything by himself, his good intentions

would be defeated. For unmeasured aggressiveness sometimes gave a

counterpart the impression that he was being spied on or under scrutiny

or surveillance. His self-preservation instincts would prevent him

from cooperating wholeheartedly or worse, push him into rebellion and

he would refuse to cooperate and let the adviser do it all.

From my experience in dealing with advisers, I think that discussions

between advisers and counterparts would lead nowhere if, in the heat

of debate, the advisers adamantly stuck to their positions and by

criticizing the arguments of their counterparts, sought to impose their

own solutions to the problem at hand.. The best approach to convince

counterparts in this case was tactful persuasion. If the discussion

was in deadlock, the advisers could always suggest postponement and

further study of the problem by both staffs. After taking time to

reconsider all arguments and in the absence of immediate pressure, the

counterpart would readily accept what they had earlier rejected.

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To all Vietnamese and most Asian people, face is important and it

is difficult to convince a RVNAF counterpart if he feels he would lose

face by yielding. A useful rule of thumb for advisers was that they

should never impose ideas or preconceived solutions. What they should

do was to tactfully induce their counterparts to become cognizant of

the problem and through suave discussions and cool persuasion, lead

them to willing agreement.

Daily personal contacts between advisers and counterparts were the

best and fastest means of getting things expedited at the lower levels.

At higher echelons, periodic and even impromptu meetings also served

well the advisory effort. But written memoranda often proved the least

effective, chiefly when they were signed by a higher authority. Experience shows that these memoranda were usually received with nonchalance

and some irritability by ARVN commanders despite the good words and well

thought-out ideas. But if correspondence was a must to place important

recommendations on record or "to confirm some verbal communication with

a view to keeping higher commands informed, the contents should have been

thoroughly discussed with the counterpart and prior agreement achieved

if possible. Only in this way, would the counterparts gladly and willingly comply with the ideas and recommendations contained in the

official letter. The important thing was to avoid taking the counterpart

by surprise with the unexpected.

During the first few years of the advisory effort, however, written

memoranda were the only working instrument for US advisers. It was a

transitional period during which ARVN logisticians were still not

familiar with the American language and methods. In these circumstances,

written suggestions and recommendations became necessary and useful.

But as ARVN officers became proficient with the language and thoroughly

familiarized themselves with American doctrine and techniques through

US manuals or courses at US service schools, they preferred to deal with

advisers directly rather than through written communications.

Personal contacts between the US senior adviser and his counterpart

at either one's office also provided a good opportunity to discuss the

problems of leadership or efficiency concerning the counterpart's subor114
dinates. Since this was a delicate matter, it could not be the subject

of an exchange of letters but kept confidential and informal between the

two principles. Most subjects of leadership brought up by US advisers

usually pertained to commendations of meritorious ARVN personnel, weaknesses of ARVN commanders, misuse of equipment, inefficient control,

and of supply pilferage.

With regard to personnel commendations, US advisers were extremely

straightforward in recommending promotions or awards for those ARVN

personnel they considered particularly deserving. As to the question

of an ARVN commander's weaknesses, the subject was usually tactfully

brought up with the implication that it was up to the ARVN to decide.

US advisers usually abstained from recommending disciplinary measures

or relief from command as a remedy but despite their customary

hands-off policy, they usually kept a close eye on ARVN-initiated

measures to correct situations until there was a significant improvement

or the officer in question improved or was replaced. US advisers

had to contend with the fact their suggestions to remove some unworthy

commander were seldom acted on immediately. The ARVN procedures for

removal involved lengthy investigations and the faulty commander was

always given a chance to improve. Only when improvement failed to

materialize were disciplinary measures taken which might include removal

from office.

Problems of equipment misuse and lack of control were usually

discussed by US advisers and substantiated by photos or local and foreign

press articles. These cases involved such irregularities as private

use of military vehicles, pilferage at ports or sale of military gasoline.

Particularly during the years of US force redeployment, US advisers

complained about widespread vehicle thefts from American units, mostly

utility vehicles and prime movers. They sought to enlist the cooperation

of ARVN logisticians and Vietnamese authorities to curtail military

vehicle thefts and gain more effective control of the commercial vehicles

used by US forces. The most important statement on this subject was by

a high-ranking US adviser during one of our meetings:

115
Losses and pilferages during the course of clearing up

a war are a normal thing. This is true of any war anywhere. I only ask that you do your best to help stop

this vice and return to our forces whatever lost items

you happen to find. But if there is nothing you can do,

then Vietnamese authorities should be alerted to keep

these lost materiels from being sold abroad. In this

way, you can help both curtail the drain of foreign

currency and contribute toward restoring the national

economy.

The subjects of misuse, abuse or theft of military property were

only briefly raised by US advisers and never discussed at length. US

advisers also deliberately avoided using the term "corruption" in conversations. It was as if they felt the allusion to corruption was untactful and might hurt ARVN logisticians' feelings. But it was true

that ARVN logisticians were never self-conscious about the subject

whenever it was brought up. Indeed, -they always admitted, without

irascibility, the existence of corruption as an inevitable social vice

occasioned by a long, destructive war and general impoverishment. They

always appreciated the concern of US advisers about this debilitating

vice that they themselves and the RVNAF in general tried hard to combat

and eradicate. So it was with full cognizance of the problem, with

candor and openness that ARVN logisticians discussed corruption with

US advisers and even asked for their cooperation in combating it. During

the intensive anti-corruption drive, US advisers were always kept informed

of investigative results and disciplinary measures being taken. But US

advisers seemed to make a point of never making allegations nor helping

identify any corrupt individual on the. basis of hearsay or rumors. In

fact, they abstained altogether from providing names.

Some advisers were too reticent about reporting what they believed

to be instances of misuse or misdirection of equipment or supplies.

On the other hand, others saw it as part of their mission to observe

and report on how US-supplied military assistance was being employed

and they tactfully reported irregularities to their counterparts.

In cases where they believed the counterpart might himself be involved,

the proper course would have been to see to it that the counterpart's

superior was made aware of the matter. In all instances where allegations

116
of this nature were made, prompt and fair investigations were ordered

by the ARVN authorities and appropriate action followed.

Field visits regularly conducted by US advisers and ARVN counterparts were by far the best and most effective means of getting things

accomplished. Such "pair-off" visits not only helped US advisers,

and ARVN counterparts to obtain a clear understanding of unit activities,

achievements and problems, but they also provided excellent examples of

cooperation and inspired confidence among subordinates by the extent of

concern and solicitation with which US advisers helped ARVN units overcome difficulties, especially with the supplies that only US advisers

could provide. Apart from joint visits, US advisers frequently made

separate visits to ARVN units where they were also warmly welcomed.

Other effective devices of advisory assistance were monthly or

quarterly full-fledged staff meetings during which the senior adviser,

his ARVN counterpart and staff members of both sides reviewed progress

made by units, discussed shortcomings and decided on actions to be

taken. These meetings helped pinpoint and analyze ARVN weaknesses

and place emphasis on measures required for remedy or improvement.

With regard to important and extensive problems requiring careful

study and research, experience revealed that full cooperation under the

form of combined study committees worked far better than if the problem

was tackled separately by each side. The question of who chaired the

committee was insignificant as long as principles and working methods

were jointly established and approved. Reciprocity and mutual respect

were the keys to success in these ventures and were consistently applied

to every phase of the project, whether it was progress review or

providing guidance for the next step. If a committee chairman was

required, I felt this position should be assumed by the side who was

actually responsible for implementing the project. This not only made

sense politically, it was also psychologically sound since once given

the primary management responsibility, ARVN officers were naturally

inclined to work harder, and were more deeply involved in obtaining

success. They were also able to learn more, make progress and gain

self-reliance which after all was exactly what the advisory effort sought

to achieve.

117
A prerequisite of good management was the adequacy of information.

By contrast with US advisers who were usually supplied with all required

information concerning ARVN logistical activities either by ARVN

logistical units or through their own system, ARVN personnel were usually

denied management information by the US side. Vietnamese logisticians

resented this fact but could not explain it to themselves except by

assuming that the Americans were bound by security regulations which

forbade them to disclose certain management data to ARVN counterparts.

A case in point was information related to the Military Assistance

Program and other special programs of military aid. ARVN logisticians

were usually kept in the dark as to annual appropriations and quarterly

allocations to each technical service. As a consequence, ARVN

logisticians were unable to make timely decisions and take appropriate

actions in keeping with authorized capabilities. In time, they developed

the idea that US resources were inexhaustible and tended to request far

more than was actually needed. They did so with the sure expectation

that the advisers would cut the requests to fit the program.

During the post-cease-fire period, 1973-1975, the need for management data required by USDAO and the CLC became more acute since they

were both held responsible for justifying military aid requests and had

to be prepared to face eventual cutbacks. The type of information that

had previously been supplied by US advisers was no longer available.

As a result, USDAO depended on ARVN logisticians for information. Since

military aid was a matter of life and death to the RVNAF, USDAO felt

that there should be very close cooperation and that we should share

the responsibility for results obtained. Consequently, USDAO gave ARVN

logisticians all the management data required. This cooperation took

the form of a management data center installed at both USDAO and the CLC

during the second half of 1974 with the objective of exploiting all data

pertaining to the RVNAF and US military aid. The center became a meeting

place for the US Defense Attache and the CLC commander to discuss and

solve the many problems occasioned by US military aid cutbacks. The

success with which USDAO and the CLC kept the RVNAF adequately supplied

on the battlefield, although not at a level comparable to previous

118
periods, could be attributed to the adequacy and timeliness of management data supplied by both sides.

Some Lessons Learned

United States advisers were assigned an exalted but most difficult

task. To succeed in this task, they had to perform it with tact and

diplomacy. On the other hand, making full use of each adviser's service

was not easy either. It required the same ingredients for success

from the Vietnamese.

In addition to human relations and cooperation, two factors seemed

to affect the effectiveness of the US advisory effort to a certain

degree: language and culture, and standing operating procedures concerning US advisers. But despite its limiting effect on communication,

the problem of language was effectively solved through the use of interpreters and a constant effort by ARVN personnel to learn to speak

English. Language, therefore, was eventually no big problem. The

understanding of local customs and manners naturally helped US advisers

establish good rapport with Vietnamese counterparts. The same could be

said of Vietnamese officers if they knew American customs and manners.

If both were able to understand each other culturally, then mutual

respect and affection would develop naturally.

As previously mentioned, during the 20 years of benefiting from the

US advisory effort, the RVNAF published only two short memoranda, in

1955 and 1958, concerning the relationship of US advisers and ARVN

officers. From 1958 on the US-ARVN relationship was the subject of no

further directives or instructions. This was indeed an omission of

great consequence which gave rise to many unsettled complaints by both

sides. Some ARVN commanders thought that US advisers spied on them while

some US advisers contended that ARVN commanders deliberately withheld

information concerning their units. But these complaints would have

been infrequent had a comprehensive set of instructions been published

by the JGS telling each ARVN officer exactly what to do and how to

benefit from the program. It was indeed regrettable that this subject

was neglected.

119
The fact that most US officers selected for advisory assignments

had to attend an orientation course in the US prior to reporting

overseas was an excellent means to prepare them for advisory duties.

But US logistic advisers could have benefited even more if a similar but

shorter course had been conducted in Vietnam under the CLC sponsorship.

Such a course would have greatly enhanced the US adviser's knowledge

in terms of Vietnamese culture, the RVNAF logistic structure, operations,

and dissimilarities with the US system. Such a course would have made

US advisers thoroughly conversant with current programa and problems

and the most effective techniques to be used. It certainly would have

made the US advisory effort more successful.

An orientation program for advisers such as this could have been

jointly prepared and updated by MACV J-4 and the CLC. Lectures on

important subjects could have been given by the MACV J-4 and the CLC

commander or by both ARVN and US staff members. If properly conducted,

such a program would have had a tremendous effect on the RVNAF logistical

system since it emphasized the ARVN interest in the advisory system and

inspired a strong cooperative spirit among ARVN logisticians.

Before terminating his tour of advisory duties, each adviser

should have been required to write and end-of-tour report to record with

candor his own assessment of performance and results and the strengths

and weaknesses of the unit he had advised with particular emphasis on

special areas for improvement. This report should have been made

available to his successor who could have used it as a basis for continuing what had been achieved between him and his counterpart. Copies

of this report should also have been sent to MACV and the JGS to serve

as confidential documents on which to base actions and plans for future

improvement. Such end-of-tour reports were indeed made by all senior

advisers upon their depature from South Vietnam but unfortunately they

were not made available to the JGS.

In conclusion, the logistical advisory system as it was established

for the benefit of the RVNAF was extremely effective and entirely

responsive to our requirements. Despite a difficult task, logistical

120
advisers always accomplished their missions and duly earned the respect

and enthusiastic cooperation of ARVN logisticians. The allegation that

US advisers acted as policemen only existed among a few near-sighted

ARVN commanders who invariably were either incompetent or lacked

confidence. In any case, the major offense of US advisers in the eyes

of Vietnamese was perhaps an overanxious propensity for immediate

results and overzealousness. US advisers were indeed indispensable

to the RVNAF as long as we depended on US war materiels. The quantity

and categories of advisers of course could vary according to the progress

and experience gained by ARVN logisticians, but the RVNAF could not get

along without American military aid budget managers and supply and maintenance managers at the central level whenever new types of equipment entered

the RVNAF inventory.

121
CHAPTER VI

The Pacification Adviser

The U.S. Response to Insurgency

Only one year after the Geneva Armistice was signed in 1954, which

allowed South Vietnam to stand on its own pending reunification, the

Communists initiated subversive activities. As early as July 1955,

signs of security deterioration were appearing in the provinces of

Quang Tri and Quang Nam. In October of the same year during the

country-wide referendum, many polling stations were targets of sabotage.

Then in 1957 there was a significant increase in guerrilla operations,

assassinations, kidnappings, .and sabotage directed primarily against

GVN officials in the countryside. By the fall of 1959, the insurgents

seemed to have gained the upper hand despite all security measures taken

by the Government of Vietnam; their actions gradually became bolder.

In September 1959, they ambushed two companies of the 23d Infantry

Division in the Due My area and in early 1960, they launched attacks

against the rear base of another division located in Tay Ninh. It was

obvious that GVN control was eroding and the cities were being isolated

from the countryside where the Communists seemed to be able to operate

freely.

In the face of this mounting crisis, US officials in Saigon began

to show more concern for security in the rural areas and improving GVN

representation and control. The US Ambassador, together with the Chief,

MAAG and other senior officials of the "Country Team," developed a

This referendum resulted in a vote of confidence for Ngo Dinh

Diem and the rejection of Bao Dai as chief of state.

122
Counterinsurgency Plan outlining the political, military and economic

efforts required to help the GVN combat insurgency. Many reforms,

mostly political and social, recommended by the US-conceived plan

unfortunately were ignored by the Diem administration. Militarily,

however, the GVN was eager to accept an expansion"of the US advisory

effort and increased military aid. The US Military Assistance Advisory

Group immediately placed new emphasis on counterinsurgency training and

began attaching field advisers to ARVN battalions on a selective basis.

At the end of 1960, the MAAG also initiated training and support for

the Civil Guard and People's Militia. In addition, US Special Forces

teams undertook the training of the newly-created ARVN Ranger companies.

It was very obvious at that time that the US was increasing its commitment in South Vietnam.

After President John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961, his

new administration increased support for the RVN in the face of stepped

up Communist aggression. The formation of the National Liberation Front

(NLF) which was announced in Hanoi in December the previous year left

no doubt as to North Vietnam's ultimate objective in the South. Soon

after the visit of Major General Edward G. Landsdale to South Vietnam

in January, the United States Government created an interdepartmental

action group known as Task Force, Vietnam, with the mission of studying,

planning and coordinating actions for the support of South Vietnam against

the Viet Cong. In Saigon, a corresponding task force was also established;

2

it included all members of the country team.

The security situation throughout South Vietnam, meanwhile, continued to deteriorate. During a twelve-month period ending in May 1961,

there were well over 4,000 GVN officials at the grass-roots level killed

by Communists. In September, during an attack against the provincial

city of Phuoc Thanh, the Communists employed a concentrated force of

several battalions. It was obvious that the war of insurgency being

2

Major General George "S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950-1969,

Vietnam Studies (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.: 1974) pp. 20-22.

123
waged by the Communists in South Vietnam had taken on a double aspect:

that of guerrilla warfare augmented by conventional attacks. To assist

in countering this double crisis, the GVN instituted the strategic

hamlet program, its first politically-cohesive pacification effort to

combat insurgency and restore control over the countryside. At the

same time, a mission to South Vietnam headed by General Maxwell D. Taylor

recommended a further increase in US advisory effort and combat support,

continued expansion of the RVNAF, and support of the GVN strategic

hamlet program. These proposals provided a new direction and emphasis

to the US military effort during the following years. To improve

command and control of the expanding effort, the United States established

the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and assigned General

Paul D. Harkins as its first commander on 8 February 1962.

At this time it appeared that United States support for RVN in .

terms of advisory assistance for pacification and security was operated

by and channeled into two uncoordinated systems: civilian and military.

The US Ambassador received from the US State Department policy guidance

as it pertained to political and economic problems while the MACV commander was responsible for military matters and reported to the

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINPAC). However, as the senior US representative in South Vietnam, the US Ambassador had the overall responsibility of coordinating and supervising all American efforts, military

and civilian. His relationship with the MACV commander was one of

coordination, consultation and information; all disagreements between

3

the two were to be referred to Washington.

Until the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963,

the strategic hamlet program received only modest support from the

United States on the civilian side. At the start of Operation "Binh

Minn" (Sunrise), which launched the program in March 1962 in Binh Duong

3

Ibid, p. 29.

124
Province, for example, the United States Operations Mission (USOM)

initially supplied only $300,000 for support of resettled families.

Another type of contribution was the printing by USIS of a small pamphlet

depicting the new "Good Life" in strategic hamlets. But military support for the program was much more significant in that it nearly doubled

the force structure of territorial forces, so vital to the maintenance

of security in the provinces and districts, to a total of 108,000 in

addition to providing them with proper training and equipment. However,

the political instability that immediately followed President Diem's

overthrow in late 1963 almost shoved the pacification effort into complete disarray.

In the face of this setback and increased Communist subversive

activities, the US decided to revitalize its support and dispatched a

new team to South Vietnam composed of Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor,

Deputy Ambassador Alexis Johnson and General William C. Westmoreland.

Together with the Directors of the US Agency for International Development (USAID, Formerly USOM), the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO,

which absorbed USIS in its organization), and the Office of the Special

Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA or CIA), the new team formed what was

known as the "Mission Council." Like its predecessor, the Task Force,

the Mission Council served as an advisory body for the US Ambassador.

At about the same time, MACV also established a new staff division, the

Rural Development Support Division to respond more efficiently to support

requirements for pacification.

The deterioration of security throughout South Vietnam reached such

proportions in late 1964 that the US introduced combat troops for the

ground war and in 1965 began a sustained bombing campaign of North

Vietnam. Consequently, the immediate danger of South Vietnam's collapse

was averted and with improvement in the military situation, there was a

need for further consolidating US activities in support of pacification.

When Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was reassigned to Saigon in early 1966,

he placed Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter in charge of coordinating

all pacification support activities. In Washington, President Johnson

appointed Mr. Robert W. Komer as his special assistant to look after the

125
"other war" in Vietnam. Later in the year, the US Embassy created

the Office of Civil Operations (0C0) in an effort to consolidate the

activities of all US civil agencies in support of pacification. On

the military side, MACV elevated its Revolutionary Development (RD)

Support Division into a Directorate and assigned a general officer

as director. Also, to increase civil-military coordination, another

general officer was assigned to the office of Deputy Ambassador Porter.

CORDS Organization and Operations

As the fighting escalated, it became obvious that progress in pacification depended primarily on the military effort; it was impossible to

pacify a rural area in the face of an enemy battalion. Its prospects of

success necessarily depended on effective coordination of civil and military operations. Recognizing this need for an unified effort, President

Johnson in early 1967 placed the MACV commander in charge of all pacification support activities, a move which was announced -by the new US

Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, in May 1967. The Office of Civil Operations was merged with the MACV RD Support Directorate to form the Office

of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support (ACS/CORDS), headed by a civilian. ' At the same

time, Mr. Robert W. Komer, Presidential Assistant, was appointed Deputy

Commander MACV for CORDS with ambassadorial rank. (Chart 9)

The advent of CORDS and the new arrangement for command and control

within MACV represented a unique effort especially tailored to the requirements of the war being fought. Perhaps this was a major test to

see whether civilian and military elements could mesh together in an

integrated effort designed to provide support for a special aspect of

the war. An unprecedented arrangement, CORDS quickly solved and eliminated all problems which usually characterized civilian and military

organizations working together.

The CORDS organization also reflected a certain flexibility of

response in the face of complex requirements occasioned by the pacification task. Its staff elements were in charge of supporting almost all

126
Chart 9 - CORDS in MACV Command Channel

I oco

I U.S. EMBASSY

I I

COMUSMACV

DEPCOMUSMACV

OEPCOMUSMACV

FOR CORDS

CHIEF OF STAFF

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

1 1

1 *

J

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L

R.D.SUPPORT I

DIRECTORATE |

127
the major GVN programs associated with pacification. Other specialized

areas such as economic development, agriculture, farm credit, land reform,

etc. continued to be supported by USAID. (Chart 10)

At the corps tactical zone level (military region after 1970), a

similar arrangement was instituted. The senior advisers — III Marine

Amphibious Force and Field Forces I, II commanders and the commander,

Delta Military Assistance Command — were each assigned a civilian

Deputy for CORDS and their CORDS staff organizations were also a mixture

of civilian and military personnel under the control of his Assistant

Chief of Staff for CORDS. (Chart 11)

The Deputy for CORDS was responsible for the establishment and

implementation of all plans and operations in support of the GVN pacification program, including civil operations conducted by US units within

the CTZ/Region. The Deputy Senior Adviser assisted him with problems

concerning the ARVN forces employed in pacification support.

The Division Tactical Area (DTA) or Special Zone (SZ) was a level

immediately under the CTZ/Region in the pacification support structure.

However, its role was tactically oriented and mostly confined to providing regular force units for the support of pacification. In 1970, the

DTA was abolished and as of that time ARVN infantry divisions no longer

played a direct role in the conduct of pacification. As a result, US

tactical advisers assigned to ARVN divisions were not as active in

pacification activities.

By far the most important and extensive organizations for pacification support was the US advisory effort at the province and district

level. As early as 1962, following President Kennedy's decision for

increased emphasis, US military advisers were deployed to all provinces

at the same time as USOM field representatives. The need for increased

assistance in restoring security during the following year led MACV to

test-assign US advisers to the 13 districts surrounding Saigon in April

1964 as the Hop Tac pacification campaign was launched in this area.

Results produced by this pilot program proved so encouraging that two

months later, the US Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, concluded

that more districts should have advisers. By the end of 1965, when the

128
Chart 10 - Organization, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS, MACV

ACofS, CORDS

Deputy ACofS

Pacification

Studies Group

Management

Support

Directorate

Exec for

Civil Opns

Plans, Policies

& Programs

Directorate

Community

Development

Directorate

Municipal

Development

Directorate

Research &

Analysis

Directorate

Chieu Hoi

Directorate

Phung Hoang

Directorate

Public Safety

Directorate

Territorial

Security

Directorate

War

Victims

Directorate

129
Chart 11 - Organization, CTZ/Region CORDS

Force

General Staff

Force Commander/Senior Advisor

Deputy Force

Commander

Deputy For

CORDS

Chief of Staff

x-x-x-x-x-x

Asst Chief of Staff

for

CORDS

Mgmt.

Support

Plans &

Programs

Chieu

Hoi

NLD RD

US

Units

X-X-X-X-X-X-X

x-x-x-x-x-x Deputy Senior

Advisor (Military)

Reports

Refugee Psy Ops Public

Safety

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

ARVN Div

Advisory

Team

Province

Advisory Team

X-X-X Coordination - Military and CORDS matters.

130
RVNAF assumed the primary role of pacification support, the total number

of US advisers had increased substantially in provinces and districts.

With the advent of CORDS in May 1967, the US civilian and military

advisory efforts at the province and district levels began to consolidate

into a single organization. The province senior adviser could be a military officer or a civilian. If he was a military officer, his deputy

would be a civilian, and vice versa. Although he was the senior adviser

to the Vietnamese province chief, the specialized advisers who made up

his staff were authorized, each in his own area of interest, to make

recommendations to the province chief. At the district level, most

senior advisers were military officers. When ARVN regular force units

operated ina province in support of pacification, their US advisers

were operationally controlled by the province senior adviser. (Chart 12)

By the time the CORDS organization was well established throughout

South Vietnam, the total US pacification advisory strength included

about 4,000 military personnel and 800 civilians. By mid-1967, these

figures increased even more but the additional strength was devoted to

the task of advising and training the Regional and Popular Forces (RF

and PF, formerly Civil Guard and People's Militia, respectively). Most

of the additional advisory spaces were used to create a total of 353

Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) whose mission was to train RF and PF units.

Each MAT was authorized two officers, three non-commissioned officers

and one interpreter; it was tasked to train from three to six RF companies

and an additional number of PF platoons. The training provided by these

MATs emphasized small unit combat tactics and pacification support. At

the same time Mobile Advisory Logistic Teams (MALT) were also organized

to help improve logistical support for the RF and PF.

In addition to field advisers attached to provinces and districts

and mobile advisory teams, the US pacification advisory effort also

included training advisers assigned to RF and PF training centers across •

the country, and by extension, the Marine squads that participated in

the Combined Action Program in I Corps area and the US Special Forces

personnel who advised and trained the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups

(CIDG). The accomplishments of the Combined Action Program and the

CIDGs will be discussed later in this chapter.

131
Chart 12 — Advisory Relationships, Corps, Province

and District Levels

Force

General Staff

Force Commander/Senior Advisor

Deputy Force

Commander

Deputy For

CORDS

Chief of Staff

x-x-x-x

us

Units

x-x-x-x-x

Asst Chief of Staff

for

CORDS

Province

Advisory Team

District

Advisory Team

X-X-X-X

xxxxxx

Deputy Senior

Advisor (Military)

ARVN Div

Advisory

Team

ARVN Regt

Advisory

Team

ARVN Bn

Advisory

Team

X—X—X—X Coordination - Military and CORDS matters.

XXXXXXX Operational Control when unit assigned on RD

direct support mission.

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136
By 1969, total US advisory strength in South Vietnam was about

16,000, including 1,000 civilians. By mid-1969, US Army advisers alone

numbered about 13,500, including 6,500 in CORDS organizations; 95% of

these pacification advisers were assigned to field duties outside Saigon,

to provinces and districts and to mobile advisory teams. This was

perhaps the greatest emphasis ever devoted by the US in support of the

RVN pacification program.

After the cease-fire of 28 January 1973, as US military units were

phased out, MACV was dissolved and replaced by the US Defense Attache

Office (USDAO) whose mission was to continue to manage the Security

Assistance Program for the RVN. The CORDS organization was terminated

at the same time as the United States advisory effort. Those CORDS

functions related to economic affairs and development were transferred

to USAID. To supervise and coordinate civilian operations across South

Vietnam, the US Embassy created the Office of the Special Assistant to

the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFO).

At each of the military regions, a US Consulate General was established which absorbed all the residual elements of regional CORDS. At

the district level, all advisory teams were redeployed after the ceasefire. The province advisory teams, however, were consolidated into 20

area offices after the removal of military personnel. Each area office was

responsible for civil operations within from two to four provinces except

for the more important provinces such as Binh Dinh which was covered by

one area office. But area offices were subsequently disbanded and

finally the US presence in each RVN province was reduced to a small

"civilian liaison team."

Relations and Contributions

American aid and assistance provided to South Vietnam immediately

after 1954 effectively assisted the nascent nation in overcoming its

initial difficulties. With this aid, South Vietnam was able to resolve

many of its economic problems, especially those concerned with the

resettlement of nearly one million North Vietnamese refugees fleeing South.

137
These accomplishments, coupled with a considerable reduction in internal

dissention, gave the new administration of Ngo Dinh Diem a solid basis

of popular consent. And after regaining political stability by defeating

rebellious sects and setting aside the difficult problem of reunification

for the moment, the RVN was well on its way toward healing the wounds of

war and developing its national economy.

To achieve its national goals, the RVN desperately needed US economic

and technical assistance. Through the United States Embassy in Saigon

and its specialized agencies, the US systematically channeled aid required

into programs undertaken by the GVN ministries. However, North Vietnam

was determined that its foe south of the 17th parallel would not develop

too rapidly. Subversive and sabotage activities directed from the North

increased throughout South Vietnam. To counter this growing Communist

threat, the Ngo Dinh Diem government implemented certain anti-subversive

measures involving some degree of participation by the total population.

But US support did not become deeply involved in such political programs

as People's Action, Communist Denunciation and even in developmental

projects such as Agrovilles and Land Reform. It was obvious that during

this time, the emphasis of US aid was more economic than military.

Indeed, owing much to American financial and economic aid, the RVN

was able not only to overcome its budgetary deficits but also to initiate

several economic development projects. As a result, productivity in

rice, rubber and several secondary crops and cattle breeding was slowly

but consistently on the rise. Rice production in 1959, for example,

reached the 5 million ton mark, doubling the figure of 1954. At the

same time, roads, canals, railways, and ports were rehabilitated or

reconstructed to assist in providing a strong economic infrastructure.

On the other hand, in cooperation with the Vietnamese General Staff,

the MAAG devoted its efforts to building, training and modernizing the

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Predicated on its experience of the

Korean War, the US provided support for a conventional 150,000-man force,

predominantly army and composed of well equipped infantry divisions. All

organization, equipping, and training efforts were directed toward the

objective of countering an overt, conventional invasion from North Vietnam.

138
By the early 1960's, the Communist subversive threat had become so

critical that the United States increased its assistance to the RVN.

To help the RVN fight the unconventional war, the MAAG agreed in mid1960 to support and train Ranger companies and subsequently Ranger

battalions. In Saigon, the Country Team under the US Ambassador's

direction, developed a Counter-Insurgency (CI) plan which was perhaps

the first cohesive and determined effort aimed at meeting the insurgent

challenge. Among other things, this CI plan recommended a 20,000-man

increase in the RVNAF force structure and some reforms in the securitykeeping apparatus of the RVN.

The Counter-Insurgency plan was approved by Washington as soon as

President Kennedy took office in early 1961. The ARVN was therefore

increased to 170,000. Also, in keeping with the plan, the US provided

support for an authorized 68,000-man Civil Guard and a 40,000-man People's

Militia (these forces were eventually redesignated Regional and Popular

Forces, respectively). Subsequently, the US signed with President Ngo

Dinh Diem a Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations and sent Vice President

Lyndon B. Johnson on an official visit. In rapid succession, two factfinding missions, one led by Dr. Eugene Stanley and the other by General

Maxwell D. Taylor and Dr. Walt W. Rostow, confirmed the US determination

to pursue its economic and military support for the RVN along the lines

suggested by the CI plan. More US advisers were assigned to ARVN units

and the revitalized territorial forces. By the end of 1961, all the

RVN provinces had received an advisory team, to include civilian advisers.

In 1962, the revised CI plan became the Comprehensive Plan for South

Vietnam. Its principal goal was to support the Strategic Hamlet program

which had been conceived by the Diem administration in late 1961. With

increased American aid, and the development of strategic hamlets, the

general security situation throughout South Vietnam by the end of 1962

had taken on a brighter outlook.

But the prospects were soon darkened by the Buddhist uprising in

the summer of 1963 which led to the coup of 1 November 1962 in which

President Diem was killed. During the rapid succession of military

governments which followed, South Vietnam was edged into a period of

utter political instability and turmoil which found the Strategic Hamlet

139
program disrupted and finally neglected. The countryside, therefore,

was plunged again into insecurity despite US advisory and assistance

efforts.

As the' situation deteriorated, US authorities in Saigon became more

concerned with pacification but it was impossible for pacification to

make desired progress as long as the regime remained shaky. The

"Victory Plan" which was implemented in 1964 did not achieve any significant results. Also, the Hop Tac pacification campaign around Saigon

was not fully successful because of the lack of interest among GVN pacification authorities. But the US experiment of assigning advisers to

districts did prove successful and soon developed into an extensive

program.

During the years following 1965, while US combat troops were pouring

into South Vietnam, US authorities also endeavored to help the GVN solve

its pacification problems. But during the initial period of US buildup

and subsequent intensification of the fighting, most resources were

devoted to the military effort which outwardly overshadowed the "other

war." However, as the GVN regained political stability when Generals

Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky were installed in power, pacification

became again a matter of national priority with the creation of the

Ministry of Rural Construction. During the Honolulu Conference of

February 1966, RVN leaders expressed their special concern over pacification and the US promptly gave its commitment for additional support.

Under the US-inspired idea of Revolutionary Development, the Ministry of

Rural Construction (also called Revolutionary Development) headed by

Major General Nguyen Due Thang set about organizing cadre teams and

establishing a large training center at Vung Tau for training personnel.

At the same time, USAID channeled substantial funds into "New Life"

development projects and also began helping the National Police activate

its Field Police forces. Major General Edward G. Landsdale was designated

by Ambassador Lodge as senior adviser to General Thang for the revolutionary development effort.

As US and RVNAF forces were gaining the upper hand in military

operations across the country, US authorities also kept the pressure on

140
the GVN to emphasize its pacification effort more vigorously. At the

Manila Conference in October 1966, South Vietnamese leaders were willing

to commit up to 60% of ARVN infantry battalions to the task of pacification support. The Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 (AB-142), translated

this idea into action and formally assigned the primary mission of

pacification support to the ARVN. Subsequently, ARVN infantry battalions

underwent special training courses in pacification support in order to be

able to carry out this mission more successfully.

Concurrently, on the US side, a significant effort was made to

consolidate advisory and support activities. First, the Office of Civil

Operations was created in late 1966. It was soon superseded by CORDS,

a new civil-military organization which was made an integral part of

the MACV command structure in May 1967. With the advent of CORDS, Vietnamese authorities found it easier to coordinate and cooperate. As US

support for pacification was unified under a single-manager system, its

relationship with the GVN pacification structure also became closer and

more responsive.

Inspired by this move, the GVN instituted a system of interministerial Revolutionary Development (later r'edesignated Pacification and

Development) Councils throughout the governmental hierarchy down to

districts. At the central level, the fact that the council was chaired

by the Prime Minister and later by the President of the Republic himself

emphasized the national priority and duly gave pacification a strong

incentive for progress. By mid-1969, the pacification and development

(PD) councils at every level down to province were effectively assisted

by centers for the coordination of PD which served as permanent staff

organizations in charge of plans, coordination, and evaluation of pacification operations.

In retrospect, from the Vietnamese point of view, US contributions

to pacification in South Vietnam were immense and all-incompassing.

They covered all areas of endeavor and included every aspect of support,

from financial and material to ideological and technological. Their

impact on the program was far-reaching at all levels, in all areas of

effort, and much of this credit must be given to the US pacification

adviser.

141
By far the most important and outstanding among US contributions

was the expansion and upgrading of the Regional and Popular Forces which

in time made up over one half of the RVNAF total strength and became as

modernized in armament as the regular forces. This achievement was

directly attributable to CORDS authorities who untiringly worked toward

developing the RF and PF and providing them adequate support. Upgrading

the combat effectiveness of these forces was also a prominent program

conducted with dedication by US advisers at provinces and districts and

in RF/PF training centers. For many years, US mobile training teams

— MATs and MALTs — tenaciously devoted themselves to their difficult

task under the most spartan conditions and in the roughest areas of

South Vietnam. Other cohesive efforts such as the Marines' Combined

Action Program in MR-1 and pair-off or combined activities programs in

MR-2 and MR-3 also significantly contributed to the marked improvement

of territorial forces, the mainstay of security and pacification.

The next significant US contribution to pacification was the sizable

expansion of national police forces which ranked among the most important

elements of pacification. With USAID support, the national police developed into a formidable force, 121,000-man strong by 1972. Its combat

elements, the field police units which were created in 1966, became the

main operational force against the enemy infrastructure. Police advisers

who were assigned to practically every aspect of policy operations,

constantly strived to develop this para-military force into an effective

instrument for the identification and destruction of the VC infrastructure.

Many other contributions made by US advisers directly or indirectly

to the pacification effort were equally signficiant. They.included

civilian or para-military forces that US advisers helped activate, train

and provide operational guidance; RD cadres; Provincial Reconnaissance

Units (PRU); Census Grievance Teams; and more significant, the Civilian

Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG).

The idea of forming RD cadres, a Communist-inspired concept, was

adopted by US advisers and implemented with the backing of the CIA. The

first RD cadre groups, characteristically enough, were activated in late

1965 with locally recruited youths in the province of Binh Dinh, a former

142
stronghold of the Viet Minh for many years. US advisers also helped

activate and train the Truong Son or Montagnard RD cadre. Two RD cadre

•training centers were established with American funds, support and

advisers, one in Pleiku for the Truong Son cadre and the other in Vung

Tau, the bigger of the two. The Vung Tau RD training center later became

a national center for the training of village and hamlet administrative

cadres. By 1968, total RD cadre strength including the Truong Son cadre

numbered 50,000 but after 1970 this figure decreased when the Ministry

of RD was dissolved.

Census grievance teams and provincial reconnaissance units were

entirely an American creation. They were organized with the purpose of

polling popular attitudes toward the GVN and carrying out unconventional

activities required for the identification and elimination of the Communist infrastructure. PRUs were eventually placed under the control of

the National Police to obtain desired results. Their members included

some carefully selected personnel who were recruited from Communist

ralliers.

The CIDG program was a substantial US effort to help organize and

train Montagnards for the defense of border areas that dated back to

the early years of the insurgency. These groups were a para-military

force created in 1961 by the US Embassy with the purpose of rallying

the support of and controlling the Montagnard tribal groups living in

the central highlands and border areas. In 1962, US Special Forces

detachments assumed the responsibility for training CIDGs but the program

was turned over to MACV control as of 1963. Over the years, the CIDGs

expanded considerably in strength, reaching a record high of 42,000 in

1968. Although they were a para-military force, CIDGs were well trained,

well equipped and well supported. They also included in their ranks

a number of ARVN deserters seeking higher pay and more adventure. In

view of the traditional suspicion of Montagnard motives and the connection

of a few CIDG units with the rebellious FULRO movement, the GVN was always

concerned with this para-military force and even suspected the involvement

of some US advisers in the CIDG rebellion which erupted in Ban Me Thuot

in 1964. But as a combat force, the CIDGs contributed significantly to

143
the control of enemy infiltration routes along the border. This was

one reason why the GVN did not oppose the presence of this separate

military force which it did not initially control. To resolve the political sensitivity of this problem, MACV eventually transferred the CIDGs

to GVN control. CIDG troopers subsequently became rangers or regional

troops and were integrated into the RVNAF.

Throughout the years of the war in South Vietnam, US forces undoubtedly contributed much to the pacification effort, directly or indirectly,

through tactical operations on the ground, in the air, or at sea and

by providing combat support to ARVN forces such as helilift, gunships,

medical evacuation, and helping destroy and clear enemy base areas. As

to US advisers, although they did not participate significantly in all

pacification activities such as the People's Self Defense Force program,

there were specific areas of pacification which could not have been successfully undertaken by the GVN without their assistance and contributions,

The Phoenix program was an excellent example. Eliminating the enemy

infrastructure had been a major'concern and objective of the GVN since

the beginning of insurgency. But the program had lacked cohesiveness,

purposefulness and an efficient organization. At the instigation of

US authorities associated with CORDS, the Phoenix program was initiated

with a view to consolidate and provide a more effective effort against

the VCI. But even after Phoenix was established at the central level,

it would have been extremely difficult to activate in the provinces and

districts had it not been for the contributions made by US pacification

advisers in terms of facilities and resources. For the PIOCC and DIOCC,

for example, US advisers in addition to their regular duties even had

to supply the typewriters and typists. Despite assistance and guidance

provided by US advisers, the National Police, primary executor of the

program, did not appear to be effective enough for the task at hand.

A major shortcoming was the lack of specialized cadre, chiefly in the

4

The primary role of CIDG, strike-forces and border security, is

discussed on p. 51.

144
Special Police branch which was responsible for collecting information

and identifying members of the enemy infrastructure. All efforts at

solving this and other shortcomings of the program were never completely

successful.

Other pacification-related programs such as Chieu Hoi and most

particularly, refugee relief and resettlement, and land reform benefited

substantially from US support and the work of US advisers. The Chieu

Hoi (Open Arms) program was rather a slow starter in the RVN anti-subversive effort because of the rigid anti-Communist stand adopted by the

Diem administration which outlawed Communism altogether and also because

of the lack of resources. The program became a full-fledged effort only

after 1963 when through US advisers, the GVN learned that the Philippine

amnesty policy had produced handsome dividends. The RVN Chieu Hoi effort

made excellent progress after 1967 when a ministry was created to give

it cohesive direction. In this effort to win over the enemy, the Joint

US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) made substantial material contributions,

helped print and drop leaftlets, conducted broadcasts and provided money

for the ralliers. The US also provided funds for the establishment of

Chieu Hoi centers and vocational training courses. As a result, the

number of enemy personnel rallying to the GVN side increased steadily

and reached an all-time high (47,000) in 1969. Over the years of its

existence, the program resulted in a total of over 200,000 ralliers,

which was a remarkable return for the costs involved.

But US contributions were even greater in the relief and resettlement of refugees and the land reform program. As the fighting intensified in 1965 and during the following years, the number of refugees

also increased manyfold. With its meager resources, the GVN was unable

to handle this growing influx of refugees in a satisfactory manner without

US support. The direct participation of US combat troops in the war led

US authorities to take a greater interest in the refugee problem. With

increasing financial and material aid from the US government and private

US charity organizations, the GVN built camp facilities, and brought

relief to and helped resettle millions of refugees. The biggest inflows

of refugees happened during 1968 and 1972, the years of Communist general

145
offensives, reaching a record high of nearly four million in 1972. US

financial contributions amounted to approximately $100 million every

year but were gradually reduced after 1971. Still, they made up about

80% of total GVN budgetary outlays for refugee relief and resettlement.

The land reform program which was regarded as an unprecedented and

most resounding success was partially the product of studies and research

conducted by US experts who advised the GVN. The resulting "Land to the

Tiller" act which was proclaimed on 26 March 1970, sought to distribute

about 1 million hectares (2.47 million acres) of farmland to landless

farmers within a period of 3 years. Three years later, this objective

had been met on schedule. The GVN paid out a total of 15 billion piasters

in cash and another 82 billion piasters in bonds to land owners. The

rapidity with which this ambitious program was successfully implemented

was largely attributable to the effective assistance provided by US

expert-advisers in the areas of land survey and cost computation. In

addition, the United States provided over $500 million for the entire

program, and more importantly, made certain'that its advisers at the

province and district levels helped guide the land distribution and

compensation effort to success.

Aside from these more conspicuous achievements of pacification

attained with US money and advisory assistance, there were imperceptible

but no less beneficial contributions that helped the RVN administration

and armed forces improve their day to day operations and bring more

scientific knowledge to bear on the conduct of national affairs. The

progressive reforms in management and administration achieved throughout

the RVN governmental hierarchy were but one of many examples. By exposure

to American methodology and procedures, GVN officials learned how to

apply modern management techniques to their own operations. And to keep

up with the rapid pace of American business practice, GVN agencies

naturally had to adjust their own routine so as not to be left behind

in the race toward common objectives. The constant stimulation and

encouragement of US advisers were largely responsible for this marked

improvement. As a result, the traditional functionary lethargy of

colonial times was deeply shaken and gradually gave way to a much more

efficient bureaucracy in every aspect.

146
The same learning and adaptation process was the major reason for

improvement in planning by the military staffs at the JGS and field levels.

Several years had elapsed since the CI plan of 1960 and the Comprehensive

Plan for South Vietnam of 1962 were published before the RVNAF conceived

and developed a program worth calling a national plan. The first cohesive

planning effort, the Victory Plan of 1964, although militarily oriented,

led the way toward comprehensive planning on a national scale for the

years that followed. Successive Combined Campaign Plans, initially drafted

by the MA.CV staff and subsequently by the JGS, gradually bore testimony

to the improving RVNAF planning capabilities. Without the cooperative

guidance of US advisers, this improvement would never have been achieved.

Beginning in 1968, pacification planning came of age and was perfected

with every passing year. The most notable national-scale product was the

Four-Year Community Defense and Local Development Plan, 1972-1975, an

effort which was entirely Vietnamese but bearing the indelible mark of

several years of US contributions.

Another very significant contribution by the CORDS staff and US

pacification advisers that radically improved the assessment of pacification progress was the modern evaluation system which used scientific

analytical methods and advanced operations research technology. The

problem included the requirement to effectively manage and evaluate complex

pacification operations conducted under scores of programs and encompassing

44 provinces, 250 districts, over 2,000 villages and 10,000 hamlets, all

with the participation and support of hundreds of thousands of troops,

policemen and cadres. It was obvious that only scientific management

methods and timely reporting procedures could help our Vietnamese leaders

fully understand the situation throughout South Vietnam and make appropriate decisions. Responding to this critical requirement, CORDS experts

and advisers carefully and methodically developed several evaluation and

reporting systems, all in apparent cross-connection with one another and

covering almost every area of pacification-related activities: PSDF,

Chieu Hoi, National Police, Refugees, RD Cadre, Information, Self-Help

projects, land reform, Communist terrorism, and Territorial Force Management. A pacification data bank was established in Saigon to store the

147
experience of several years of performance. Among the systems used to

assist in the evaluation of territorial forces was the MACV originated

Territorial Forces Evaluation System. The advisers furnished the data

for this system which provided ARVN commanders with reasonably valid

assessments of progress and shortcomings in the territorial forces.

But the most noteworthy and more important was perhaps the Hamlet

Evaluation System (HES). Despite some adverse criticism, this system

proved the best and most valuable tool ever devised for the purpose of

efficiently managing a program as complex as pacification. Not only

did it contribute to a better evaluation and management of pacification,

it also taught our Vietnamese pacification authorities more about their

overall program.

I have presented in general terms and from the Vietnamese point of

view some of the most discernible contributions made by United States

advisers to the pacification program in South Vietnam. Most of these

contributions, although made at top levels, had a major impact in the

field. But at the field level, there was another aspect of US contributions, more human and personal in nature, where the United States

pacification adviser was personally assisting his counterpart in solving

daily problems.

At the corps level, US contributions were more evident in that they

complemented admirably the inherent shortcomings of ARVN commanders and

staffs with regard to pacification. Long the participants of a continuous, armed but predominantly ideological conflict, many ARVN field

commanders had become, strangely enough, strictly professional, militarily-minded soldiers. Although there was nothing wrong with this, it

seemed that the many lessons learned concerning pacification during both

the First Indochina War, 1946-1954, and the years of counter-insurgency

in South Vietnam were all forgotten by them. Most ARVN field commanders

acted as if they were totally detached from the problems of pacification

and concerned themselves solely with military matters. The truth was,

after fighting alongside US units, ARVN -commanders and their staffs had

become more professional in an orthodox manner and had successfully

mastered the modern tactics of conventional warfare, but they were

148
woefully inadequate as contestants of the "other war." For one thing,

pacification demanded much more than the ability to use conventional

military techniques and tactics. It required from military commanders

a strong awareness of the political and socio-psychological problems

involved in winning the battle of the "hearts and minds" or at least

an attitude favorably disposed toward these problems. Consequently,

under such leadership, ARVN Corps staffs were hardly prepared to tackle

the complex tasks of pacification without constant assistance and guidance

from a well qualified US adviser.

Another glaring deficiency was the ARVN Corps staff's weakness in

the ability to conduct addquate planning for the military support of

pacification and the review of provincial pacification plans. This

weakness was attributable to the fact that most ARVN Corps commanders

were neither demanding enough nor endowed with planning habits. Inevitably, when staff studies or evaluations were desired ARVN staffs were

not qualified to produce desired results. Some attributed this to the

lack of training and the inadequacy of an educational system which did

not emphasize research and analysis. Regardless of the reason, it appeared that most ARVN officers were not prepared for the planning task

nor were they required by their commanders to think and plan ahead. The

presence of US advisers, however, immediately assisted in correcting

this shortcoming. Initially in many cases, they drew up plans for the

benefit of the ARVN staffs who simply adapted them for ARVN purposes.

But through constant exposure to and learning from US advisers, ARVN

staffs gradually improved and became entirely self-reliant when US advisers were no longer available. This is one example of the productive

aspect of a close personal relationship which existed at those levels

of the ARVN hierarchy requiring staff work and planning. (Chart 13)

With respect to operations and management, US advisers also assisted in filling most gaps found on the Vietnamese side. Because of

close cooperation with US advisers and commanders, ARVN commanders were

able to discharge their duties in a more satisfactory manner. Thanks

to accurate reports such as HES and periodic evaluations of pacification,

ARVN commanders had a clearer view of the situation and could better

149
Chart 13 - Advisory Relationships, ARVN Hierarchy

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150
determine what actions to take. This was the result of mutual support

and the exchange of information between CORDS and the Corps Center for

• Coordination of Pacification and Development. Regional CORDS staffs

were usually creative and always planned ahead for every foreseeable

requirement. Therefore, they sometimes seemed to-lead the way for their

ARVN counterparts by presenting them with drafted plans to include recommendations for consideration.

For the pacification program, the province and the district were the

key levels in the command and control structure. The success of the

entire program depended on the success of the Vietnamese and their

advisers at these two echelons. The district was the lowest level to

have the benefit of US advisers. The province was the level which was

responsible both for planning and execution. In terms of US-RVN cooperation, it seemed that the lower the level, the closer the relationship.

Indeed, it seemed that the province chief, the district chief, and their

advisers were always together- and it was a rarity when a province chief

or a district chief was seen making visits without his adviser. Their

close cooperation was reflected in every phase of pacification activities

to include staff planning, determination of objectives and requirements,

employment of forces and assets, follow-up, evaluation and field inspections .

The Vietnamese province chief was usually a senior, combat-experienced

officer. Several of them stayed in office for many years. Therefore,

they were very familiar with their provinces and were highly capable as

leaders and administrators. But the province senior adviser, except for

those few who came back for a second or third tour of duty, was seldom

familiar with the local environment and since the majority of them were

military officers, they would usually confine themselves to military

matters. By and large, however, the province US advisory staff, especially

provincial CORDS, was usually much more capable than the sector staff or

the provincial bureaucratic staff. The reasons for this were the same

as mentioned above. In addition, at the province-sector level, staff

members were for the most part Regional Force officers and the few regular

officers who served at that level were usually the unwanted black sheep

151
of the ARVN family. The employment of forces and resources at the

province level was also a very complex task in view of its extensiveness.

Finally, the province chief was usually busy with his many responsibilities

and could not devote enough time for any particular area of major interest,

whether it be military, political, social or economic.

At the district level, the situation was even more difficult. The

district staff was usually limited and inexperienced. It was routine

to find that the more remote district headquarters would always have the

most problems with pacification. Apart from a few experienced and capable

field-grade officers, most district chiefs were young officers. Although

their youth provided a certain enthusiastic, gung-ho approach to their

jobs, they were usually not qualified for the task of managing a sizable

pacification apparatus comprising an average of from 3 to 6 RF companies,

40 PF platoons, and a few thousand PSDF, not to speak of hundreds of

village and hamlet officials, RD cadre, policemen, and other people's

organizations. A district chief, like his superior at the province,

was faced with myriad tasks, from combat operations, hamlet security,

to Phoenix activities and developmental projects in every imaginable

area of endeavor. The presence of district advisers, therefore, was

most useful. District advisers were usually military officers but

performed the dual role of military and civilian advisers. Many district

advisers succeeded in developing an excellent rapport with the local

population; they were well liked and respected.

In general, the presence of US pacification advisers at the province

and district levels effectively increased the local government's capabilities of managing complex tasks, and made the employment of forces

and resources more effective for the pacification effort. The presence

of US advisers at these levels also indicated that support from US forces

was readily available on call, whatever the purpose. Finally, until

they were removed from the scene, US advisers constituted the main source

of stimulation, incentive for better performance and more devotion by

all Vietnamese concerned with the pacification program.

152
Some Lessons Learned

United States involvement in Vietnam spanned two long decades,

progressing from providing materiel and economic aid to active participation by its own combat troops, all for the purpose of helping South

Vietnam counter Communist aggression. In terms of pacification and

development, the progress made by the RVN over the years had its ups

and downs depending on the tempo of the hot war and United States interest

and emphasis concerning the other war. If there were depressing periods

such as the first insurgent war years, 1960-1961, the hopeless deterioration of 1964-1965 and the tense months during 1968 and 1972, there

were also brighter times when pacification seemed to have firmly stood

on the pedestal of glorious success. The short-lived Strategic Hamlet

program, 1962-1963, for example, despite its shortcomings and modest

US support really reflected the way for effective counterinsurgency.

For some time, it succeeded in depriving the Communist fish of some

of its water, but it was only a modest achievement. The next period

1966-1967 saw the military initiative and advantage firmly held by

US-Free World-RVNAF combat forces who gradually drove enemy main force

units across the border and prepared the stage for pacification to

proceed. But four long years had elapsed during which the other war

seemed to have been completely forsaken. Pacification was given a new

and positive start in 1967 and its momentum was accelerating when the

enemy chose to launch the Tet general offensive of 1968. This major

effort by the enemy again delayed the pacification program. However,

new hopes were restored in 1969 and during the following years, conditions in the countryside radically improved and prospects for the

future were never so bright. Under the protective shield of military

advantage, the total pacification effort was making rapid progress

throughout all of South Vietnam. What lessons then could be learned

from our experience? What in fact were the merits and demerits of the

advisory effort at the field and local levels which were the main battlegrounds where the pacification war was fought?

153
First and foremost, the United States organization for pacification

support, CORDS, proved to be an elaborate, efficient structure which

was resourceful and flexible enough to meet all requirements, current

and foreseeable, generated by the double war in South Vietnam. The

commander, USMACV, who exercised exclusive control of all combat assets

for the miltiary war, also had at his disposal the resources with which

to fight the other war which was more political and socio-psychological

in nature. From the Vietnamese point of view the consolidation of command and control over both military and civilian resources under the

USMACV commander was a sound and productive concept. Our experience

seemed to indicate that although under military control, CORDS had enough

flexibility and delegated authority to meet all requirements effectively.

Next, the ubiquitous US advisory presence in all provinces and

districts was a most realistic and effective response to an emergency

situation in which the enemy had made inroads into practically every

corner of the countryside. When the United States brought in combat

troops, the so-called "war of liberation" waged by the Communists had

entered its phase of mobile warfare. Most of the South Vietnamese rural

areas had by then become cancerous tumors in which the Viet Cong infrastructure cells were eating away at the GVN control body. The best that

a conventional military force could do under such circumstances was to

push back and defeat the predators, the NVA main forces units. But the

scavengers — the VCI and the guerrillas — were still there. To join

in the battle of clearing the countryside, restoring security, and

reestablishing control, the presence of US advisers at all local levels

was indeed a vital necessity. As has been said, the ARVN basic weakness

in leadership and staff work, particularly in connection with the pacification effort, could have only been offset by the US advisers whose

involvement rapidly turned the tide in favor of the GVN.

A common observation among ARVN commanders and province and district

chiefs was that a US adviser in pacification was really effective only

when he began his second tour of duty. It was true that generally

speaking, most advisers needed a certain familiarization period after

arriving in the country. This period of time depended on the nature of

154
the assignment and the environment. Not only was Vietnam a totally alien

country, the nature of the war being fought there was also unfamiliar

.to American military experience. While US officers assigned to staff

duties were able to perform satisfactorily as advisers during their short

first tours, it appeared that senior advisers at all levels and key

positions could have contributed much more to the common effort had they

stayed longer in a single tour or better still, returned to the old

scene for additional tours. A pacification adviser's role was usually

all encompassing. To be truly efficient and productive in every aspect

of that role, a living experience was required. One year was certainly

not enough to acquire that experience.

Before his assignment, a US officer selected for pacification

advisory duties had to undergo a brief orientation course on Vietnam.

He was given a fast glimpse of Vietnamese history and culture and the

war at the grass-roots level. This preparatory work was useful for all

advisers. But for advisers assigned to the pacification program, especially those expected to have contact with the local population, it was

not enough. Pacification advisers at the province and district levels should

have been required to speak the language too, because this was the only

means of obtaining an insight into the local problems of pacification

and developing the kind of rapport with the local people that was conducive to success. Although US advisers could usually communicate with

their counterparts in English, they were always at a disadvantage when

meeting with the local population and GVN officials in villages and

hamlets. Experience showed that even with a smattering of conversational

Vietnamese, a US adviser could always establish instant rapport and affection. The ability to speak the language, therefore, was a most effective tool of winning the battle of the "hearts and minds."

Finally, because of constant exposure to the local population who

for the most part lived under the most spartan conditions, there was

a requirement for US advisers to be modest and self-effacing in their

way of life and work. Not only were the Vietnamese extremely sensitive

to the presence of foreigners, they were also self-conscious about their

condition. The reputation of the American adviser among them was made

155
even more difficult by vicious slanderings of Communist propaganda.

Although not every adviser was expected to live as a Vietnamese, it

certainly helped him mix with people more easily if he cautiously concealed the material opulence of the American way of life. With his

counterparts, it was important that he exercise tact and persuasion

instead of leverage to get things done, because no Vietnamese could

stand a loss of face. The best approach for any adviser was to mention

a problem, let his counterpart think about it and in the process, inject

suggestive ideas as to how he thought the problem could best be solved.

After this process was completed the adviser should then let the Vietnamese voluntarily initiate actions as if they were his own ideas. In this

way, a counterpart would be more inclined to listen to his adviser

since his authority as a leader was not impaired.

In general, apart from a very few exceptions, all US advisers

assigned to the pacification program at all levels discharged their

responsibilities in a most admirable way. Many were highly respected

and well liked. Over the years, several individual-relationships

developed into lasting personal friendships. Taken together, all of

these individual performances contributed to the overall success of the

US advisory effort, especially with regard to pacification. Credit for

much of the success of pacification, in the final analysis, must be

given to US advisers with a special tribute to those at the district

and province levels.

156
CHAPTER VII

The Training Adviser

A Monumental Achievement

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Murphy, a crew-cut, dark-tanned tall man

with a Texan drawl and in khaki shorts reported to the Inter-Arms School

of Thu Due in February, 1955. A lone figure among the dozen or so

French instructors who still remained there, he really did not know where

to begin. He did not speak French and the commandant of the school did

not speak English. A young Vietnamese instructor who spoke English well

was called upon to help them eliminate the language barrier, but the

communication process was slow. However, only a short time later,

Colonel Murphy accompanied Vietnamese instructors in the field where he

demonstrated, using sign language, marksmanship techniques and the correct use of the Garand M-l. Thus was the beginning of a long training

assistance program which would terminate eighteen years later. Colonel

Murphy was one of the first US training advisers assigned to the nascent

Vietnamese National Armed Forces and a pioneer for the many Americans

who would subsequently assume similar responsibilities.

Less than a year before, when all troops of the 3d Military Region

had regrouped from North Vietnam after the Geneva Armistice, the Vietnam

National Armed Forces numbered about 210,000 men, including nearly

40,000 regular troops. Predominantly army, this force consisted basically

of infantry battalions, some of them grouped into larger tactical

formations, the mobile groups, a French organizational concept. Most

of the Vietnamese mobile group and battalion commanders came from the

There were two mobile groups, the 31st and 32d.

157
French Union forces where most had started as non-commissioned officers.

Only a few had graduated from the first Reserve Officer Candidate

School activated when the partial mobilization law became effective in

1951. These few young officers of the new generation later became key

leaders of the armed forces and the nation, but regardless of their

origin, they had been trained by French cadre and had learned the

military doctrine and tactics of the French Expeditionary Corps.

During this period the basic infantry armament of the Vietnamese

National Armed Forces consisted of World War II vintage and older weapons

of assorted types from America, France and England. Combat Support

assets were few, ineffective and included 105-mm howitzer battalions

and four armor squadrons which were equipped only with AM-8 scout cars

and half-tracks. At this time the Air Force and Navy were insignificant,

embryonic forces, numbering about 4,000 men each, equipped with a few

trainers and transports and small landing craft and river boats, all

turned over by French forces.

The first task given the Training Relations and Instructions Mission

(TRIM) created under MAAG was enormous since it involved reorganizing,

refitting and re-training a sizable military force in accordance with

US Army doctrine and tactics. First priority was given to trimming

down this force to a manageable and supportable peace-time level of

150,000, a move that received strong opposition from the Vietnamese

General Staff which was hard-pressed with problems of surplus auxiliary

troops and operations against dissident sects. A .second priority involved

a longer range process of upgrading the battalion-based Army of the

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) into a modern force composed of major,

self-supporting units, capable of assuring internal security and

countering an overt invasion from North Vietnam. Influenced by lessons

of the Korean War, the Chief MAAG, Lieutenant General John W. 0

fDaniel

and his staff advocated the activation of divisions tailored to the

local environment and requirements. His opinion was not fully shared

by several key members of the Vietnamese General Staff who thought that

a more flexible type of unit, such as the mobile group, would be more

responsive to the kind of war that would probably be fought should

158
aggression occur. MAAG's insistence on the division prevailed but a

compromise was reached with the activation of "light" divisions, a

stripped-down version of the "field" or regular division. The search

for the optimal division continued into the following years, and finally,

after many tests and trials, the 10,500-man infantry division was

selected in 1957 as the major unit for the ARVN.

After this basic pattern for organization had been established,

subsequent force structure increases simply added more combat support

assets to the infantry division, activated more divisions and their

tactical control headquarters, the corps. As reorganization progressed,

ARVN units also became uniformly equipped with standard US equipment

and armament and trained in US Army doctrine and tactics. In 1961, as

insurgent activities increased, the United States began to introduce

combat support assets, mainly airlift and helilift, to augment ARVN

mobility and limited tactical air support of combat operations. Support

and training assistance for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

increased most significantly when the auxiliary Regional and Popular

Forces (formerly Civil Guard and People's Militia) became eligible under

the Military Assistance Program (MAP) as an integral part of the RVNAF.

And in keeping with subsequent increases in military aid under various

improvement and modernization plans, the RVNAF gradually expanded, both

in force structure and in combat support assets, reaching a total strength

of 435,000 by the end of 1964.

This expansion and modernization trend accelerated significantly

following the Tet offensive of 1968, resulting in new weapons for

the RVNAF arsenal and the addition of several new units to the force

structure. But this trend was accelerated most dramatically by the

momentum provided by the Vietnamization program, officially announced in

1969, which ultimately brought the RVNAF total strength to 1.1 million

by the end of 1972. By this time, the RVNAF had become the largest and

most modern military force in Southeast Asia, equipped with over one

million M-16 rifles and M-60 machineguns, over 1,500 armored vehicles,

including M-48 medium tanks and over 1,500 pieces of artillery, including

long range 175-mm guns. The Vietnamese Air Force in the meantime had

159
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161
increased in strength to 61,000, equipped with over 1,700 aircraft of all

types, including about 500 UH-1 helicopters. The Navy had also expanded

its strength to 41,000 and controlled about 1,600 ships and craft of

various sizes.

During these eighteen years of dramatic development, the RVNAF had

been transformed into a modern combat force, total strength increased

more than fivefold and new organizations, doctrine and operational techniques adopted. In terms of human effort and material support, this

achievement surpassed anything the United States had contributed to any

country since the end of the Korean War. Throughout this period the

United States training adviser played a major role and made a most

significant contribution to the RVN Armed Forces. As a former Division

G-3, Corps G-3 and the last J-3 for the RVNAF Joint General Staff, a

position I held for seven years, I was personally involved daily in the

improvement and effectiveness of the RVNAF and will present from the

Vietnamese point of view an evaluation of the US training adviser as he

performed his challenging assignment.

Organization for Training and Training Support

To accomplish its mission during the continuous process of expansion

and modernization of the RVNAF, the ARVN school system grew and developed

considerably over the years. From a skeletal frame of small service

schools and local training centers, this system developed into a complete

array of modern facilities accommodating well over 100,000 students at

any one time. RVNAF training facilities fell into three major categories:

(1) military and service schools, of which there were 33; (Map 1) (2)

national and regional training centers (for ARVN and territorial forces,

respectively), of which there were 13, (Map 2) and; (3) divisional

training centers, of which there were 14, to include the Airborne Ranger

Group Training Center.

This extensive system of schools and training centers was under the

control and supervision of the RVNAF Central Training Command (CTC). This

major command was established in 1966 to replace our Training Bureau in

an effort to consoliate training functions and provide better training

support. The CTC was advised and supported by the MACV Training Direc162
Map 1 - Location, Military Academies and Service Schools

Oa Nang

Command and

General Staff College,

Logistics School,

Long Binh

Intelligence School

Adjutant General School

Quatermaster School

Administration and

Finance School

Military Band School,

Thu Due

n_

NCO Academy,

Nha Trang

iCam Ranh

Infantry School,

Armor School,

Long Thanh

National Defense College

Servicewomen School

Armed Forces Languages

School

Transportation School

Ordnance School

Medical School, Saigon

Junior Military Academy

Signal School

Military Police School,

Vung Tau

163
Map 2 — Location, National and Territorial Force

Training Centers

Oa Nang

A National Training Center

• RF Training Center

• PF Training Center

Ranger Training Center

Quang Trung

Chi Lang

Dong Oa

Hoa Cam

Phu Cat

Lam Son

Cam Ranh

Ninh Thuan

Van Kiep

Dinh Tuong

164
torate whose staff divisions paralleled the major supervisory functions

performed by the CTC except for direct advisory and training support for

the Armor, Artillery and Ranger Commands. (Chart 14) The CTC training

support functions were performed by two permanent committees, one for

Doctrine and Manuals and other for Battlefield Studies in addition to a

Training Aids Center, which were all part of its organization. (Chart 15)

The CTC commander was responsible for all matters pertaining to

training and training support in the RVNAF, including (1) plans, policies

and programs for the training of RVNAF regular and territorial forces,

combat arms and services and para-military forces; (2) development and

modernization of training facilities; (3) preparation of ARVN military

doctrine, manuals and training materials for the school system; (4)

research of combat experience and development of tactics; (5) conduct

of special training courses as required, demonstrations and field exercises,

marksmanship competition; and (6) programming of offshore training courses

2

and selection of students.

The Director of Training, MACV was the principal adviser to the Commander,

CTC and coordinator of the United States training advisory effort. To

assist the latter in performing his duties, the Director of Training,

MACV, was responsible for: (1) providing advice and assistance in the

development of an effective military training system for the RVNAF, to

include evolving doctrine and training literature, annual training

ammunition requirements, training budget and facilities development

programming; (2) planning, preparing, and executing the Army portion

of the military assistance training programs; (3) coordinating training

matters involving combined US and RVNAF participation and exercising

coordinating authority over the MACV advisory effort on RVNAF training

matters, and; (4) providing advice and assistance in the organization,

training and utilization of the Armor, Artillery and Ranger Forces.

2

The commander of CTC exercised control and supervision over most

training centers and schools. Exceptions were made in cases where the

center or school was commanded by an officer senior in rank to the CTC

commander. In these cases, such as the Thu Due Training Center and the

CGSC, the commandants reported directly to the Chief, JGS. Nevertheless,

the CTC commander supported and inspected these facilities on behalf of

the chief, JGS. The source of the information on the CTC was an interview

with Lieutenant General Nguyen Bao Tri, the last commander of CTC.

165
Chart 14 — Organization, MACV Training Directorate

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE

CHIEF OF STAFF

SERVICE SCHOOL

DIVISION

TRAINING CENTER

DIVISION

PLANSAND PROGRAM

DIVISION

ARMORCMD

ADVISORY OET

ARTILLERY CMD

ADVISORY DET

SUPPORT

DIVISION

RANGERCMD

ADVISORY DET

166
Chart 15 — Organization, Central Training Command

COMMANDER

DEPUTY

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE

CHIEF OF STAFF

SERVICE SCHOOL

DIVISION

TRAINING CENTER

DIVISION

TRAINING AIDS

CENTER

TRAINING RESEARCH

DIVISION

SUPPORT

DIVISION

DOCTRINE & MANUALS

COMMITTEE

BATTLEFIELD

STUDIES COMMITTEE

167
For the convenience of advising the CTC and coordinating the US

training advisory effort with RVNAF training activities, the MACV

Training Directorate was located adjacent to the Central Training Command

in the Joint General Staff compound from where it-exercised coordinating

authority over US advisory teams, fixed and mobile, detached to ARVN

service schools and training centers. In full cooperation and coordination, the CTC and MACV Training Directorate jointly developed plans,

policies and programs for the training of both ARVN regular and territorial forces and for the development and improvement of ARVN training

facilities. At the schools and training centers, US advisory teams assisted ARVN commandants in preparing and conducting training programs

and monitored the progress and results achieved.

Training Advisory Activities

The training of leadership'cadre and specialists for the Vietnamese

Armed Forces began in earnest in early 1955 in conjunction with the

reorganization process. In order to familiarize ARVN officers and NCOs

with US Army doctrine, operational techniques and methods, an effort was

made by TRIM, then CATO, to send selected personnel (English proficiency

was the primary requirement) to US service schools beginning in July

1955, except for intelligence students who attended special courses in

the Philippines. At about the same time, a Command and Staff course

was initiated by US advisers at the 1st Training Center (later redesignated

Quang Trung) for Vietnamese field-grade officers with the objective of

introducing more senior personnel to US doctrine and tactics.

One of the major problems for the training advisory effort during

this early period was language. Except for a very limited number, the

only foreign language most ARVN officers spoke was French, and that with

varying degrees of proficiency. The selection of students for US service

schools, necessarily, based on English proficiency, was very limited.

The first contingent of ARVN officers who attended US service schools

during the second half of 1955, for example, totaled only a dozen. To

provide training for a greater number of ARVN officers, it was decided

168
in early 1955 to send officer-interpreters to some US service schools

such as the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, the

Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and the Artillery School

at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Concurrently, US advisers attached to

Vietnamese schools and major units began giving English lessons on

an improvised basis and with the encouragement of the MAAG, a large

scale effort was made by the Vietnamese General Staff to conduct English

courses at the Language School, established in 1957. The period from

1955 to 1969, therefore, was devoted primarily to training instructors

for the ARVN school system since it received priority assignment of

ARVN officers returning from US schools. During this period, over 5,000

ARVN officers and NCOs received training in the United States in addition

to 952 others who were given short orientation tours.

Next to the need of introducing US Army doctrine and tactics to

the ARVN leadership, and training instructors for the ARVN school system,

there was a requirement to expand and improve the ARVN school system

which had been established, equipped and turned over by French forces.

When French representation departed in 1956, there were only six major

training facilities for the entire Vietnamese Armed Forces, including

the Military Academy of Dalat and the Inter-Arms School of Thu Due.

With US support and adviser assistance, only two years later the number

of ARVN training facilities had increased to 18.

The next decade, 1958-1968, saw a rapid expansion of the ARVN

school system whose facilities increased manyfold. This expansion was

made possible by US funds channeled into the Military Assistance Service

Funded/Military Construction Program (MASF/MILCON). The year 1968 was

a significant milestone of this construction program since, in keeping

with the rapid increase in force structure, the RVNAF were provided funds

to proceed with the large-scale building of training centers not only

for the ARVN but also for the RF and PF. By the time the program was

completed, there was a RF and PF training center for almost every province

of the RVN, and the total ARVN-RF/PF training center system throughout

the country was capable of handling up to 12,000 students at any one

time, a six-fold increase over the capacity of the previous decade.

169
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To assist RVNAF in handling this upsurge of training activities,

• US training advisory personnel in the field were increased accordingly

with particular emphasis on infantry unit and leader training. By 1966,

for example, of the eight advisory detachments assigned to ARVN service

schools, the more heavily staffed were those at the Thu Due Infantry

School and NCO Academy in Nha Trang. But the US training advisory

effort was most significant at the eight ARVN National Training Centers

where emphasis was placed on ARVN basic individual and unit training.

The largest advisory detachments were those attached to the Lam Son and

Quang Trung National Training Centers which also handled the largest

contingents of recruits. For the training of the RF and PF, an equally

significant advisory effort was expended at the six RF leader and unit

training centers and 38 combined RF/PF or PF training centers where US

advisory detachments varied in strength from two to 14 personnel. At -

each of these schools and training centers, the role of US advisers was

particularly important. They advised faculty members and instructors

on training techniques, assisted them in organizing instructional

materials and conducting classes, and provided them with the stimulus

needed to inspire cooperation and diligence among students. Although

not always directly exposed to the students, US training advisers invariably earned their respect and affection. They were particularly

held in high esteem by the Vietnamese private soldiers and NCOs.

Programs of instruction were also subjected to extensive revision

by US training advisers and the MACV Training Directorate to provide

updated currcula for over 650 various courses. Most noteworthy of this

combined MACV-JGS effort was the establishment in 1970 of a five-year

training program for the entire RVNAF and the joint budgetary planning

and programming for its support. In addition, a sponsorship program was

initiated whereby ARVN service schools became directly affiliated with

their counterparts of the US Army. The Dalat National Military Academy,

for example, was affiliated with its American sister, the US Military

Academy of West Point where one Vietnamese cadet was accepted for the

first time in 1970.

171
In 1970, MACV Training Directorate initiated a new program for the

continued improvement of all training centers. This plan consolidated

the training base by merging some under under-utilized facilities and

instructor staffs in order to reduce expenditures and turn National

Training Centers into more modern facilities. The MASF/MILCON program

provided a fund of US $28 million for this program which was completed

in late 1972. In 1971, MASF/MILCON funded the construction of the Infantry

School at Long Thanh at a cost of US $7 million. Upon completion in

early 1973, this new facility became the home of the Infantry School

whose basic mission was to train reserve officers. The old training

complex at Thu Due was used to accommodate other requirements such as

the Quartermaster, Finance and Administration, Adjutant General, and

Intelligence Schools.

Among ARVN service schools, the most celebrated was the National

Military Academy at Dalat whose concept and construction received full

support from General Westmoreland, US MACV commander. New construction,

which was completed in 1966, provided modern facilities for the academy

to replace old French-built barracks. As a major science and engineering

institution, the academy was equipped with the most modern laboratory

facilities which even the University of Saigon did not have. The cadets

who graduated from the Academy's four-year curriculum, instituted in

1966, received a Bachelor of Science degree in addition to an officer's

commission and a solid military background. The institution of the

four-year curriculum, patterned after West Point, gave the Dalat Military

Academy a standing equal to other modern academies in the world. In

fact, rated as one among the best in Asia, it became a source of pride

for the RVNAF and a showcase for foreign dignitaries and visitors. Much

credit for this accomplishment must also be given to the US training

advisers assigned to our military academy. A detachment or team of six

officers, one warrant officer and two enlisted men was authorized by

MACV to assist with almost every requirement to include academic, military and the cadet regiment. It was obvious to all Vietnamese that

these personnel had been carefully selected, were thoroughly familiar

with academic programs and the procedures of West Point and were highly

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The Cadets of Dalat NMA:

A Source of Pride for the RVNAF

174
dedicated and professional in every respect. They held the admiration

and esteem of the staff, faculty and cadets and were always most

helpful in anticipating and solving any problem.

In early 1968, with the full support of General Abrams, the

National Defense College was established. It was the first military

school at the national level created with a one-year curriculum and

devoted entirely to the study of national defense and national security

activities. The first class began in May 1968 with 21 high-ranking

military officers and civil servants. Students were selected from

candidates among outstanding colonels and general officers and highranking civilians earmarked for key positions affecting national

security. Guest lecturers for the National Defense College included

high-ranking US general officers and officials, top Vietnamese

university professors and cabinet ministers. As one requirement for

graduation, students had to submit individual research papers on

national defense matters. Some of these papers turned out to be the

best studies ever made on these-important subjects.

The US training advisory effort took a vigorous step forward as

US forces began to redeploy in accordance with the Vietnamization

program. The goal to be achieved, according to General Abrams, was

to expand and improve the RVNAF to the extent that they could "hack it"

alone. As a result, MA.CV endeavored on the one hand to increase US

advisory strength and select the best qualified officers for advisory

duties on the other. By 1970, advisory strength, especially for the

training effort, was filled 100%, as compared to 55% during the preVietnamization period. Among these training advisers, whose total

strength reached 3,500 by the end of 1971, about 90% had received

combat experience in Vietnam.

To accomplish the objective of improving combat effectiveness of

RVNAF so that they could gradually take over from US forces and also to

provide for a smooth redeployment, MACV implemented three major programs:

(1) on-the-job training, (2) combined operations, and; (3) mobile

training.

175
The on-the-job training program was primarily designed for ARVN

technical and logistical units which, under the Vietnamization program,

would take over the operation and maintenance of US logistical facilities, including ports, terminals, bases, communications systems, and

transportation assets. Under the code name "Operation Buddy," the

program was initiated by the US Army 1st Logistical Command and its

subordinate support commands and units. To ARVN logisticians at that

time, however, the code name was unknown. Faced with the redeployment

of US units, they were only preoccupied with the transfer of assets and

the problem of how to provide adequate technicians and specialists to

operate and maintain the modern facilities.

Operation Buddy was built on the principle that each US technical

or logistical unit would sponsor a counterpart ARVN unit and train its

specialized personnel until they were fully qualified. Under this

program, selected ARVN personnel were sent as apprentices to US units

where they would be provided on-the-job training by US specialists. For

those ARVN units which were to take over operational responsibilities

such as signal operating battalions, their personnel were allowed to

stay on the US premises where they practiced their future jobs until

they were able to handle them effectively. Later, when each facility

was transferred, it often appeared as if it had always been under ARVN

control. The smoothness with which the transition was accomplished from

US to ARVN control testified to the success of this program. Due to the

magnitude and importance of the program, an on-the-job training division

was jointly established by the CTC/JGS and MACV Training Directorate to

monitor, coordinate and evaluate OJT activities being conducted by US

units. The program was terminated in late 1972. By this time the RVNAF

had become almost totally self-reliant, operationally and technically.

To enhance the combat effectiveness of ARVN units to the extent

that they could assume more of the tactical burden and eventually replace

US forces, MACV initiated the concept of combined operations and increased

this emphasis as soon as Vietnamization was officially proclaimed. This

concept was implemented by US Field Forces under different names but the

programs they sponsored were essentially the same. The US I Field Force,

176
for example, launched combined operations with II Corps units under the

"Pair-Off" program while the US II Field Force cooperated with III Corps

in the Dong Tien (Progress Together) program. Regardless of program

names, combined operations were the most pragmatic and most effective

technique for training through actual combat on a large scale.

The concept behind these programs consisted of pairing off US and

ARVN major tactical units within the same area of responsibility where

they jointly planned and conducted operations in mutual support of each

other. The operational headquarters of US and ARVN units were either

co-located or located in close proximity to each other. Their subordinate elements either operated alongside each other or were cross-attached,

sometimes even down to the platoon level. Through constant exposure

to US conduct of operations and combat tactics, ARVN units were able to

learn much in the areas of operational planning, estimates of the situation and combined arms tactics, especially heliborne operations and tactical air support. The results brought about through these programs

were self-evident. In 1970, III Corps units were able to operate suc3

cessfully in Cambodia without US advisers. Again, in early 1971 I Corps

forces launched Operation Lam Son 719 into lower Laos with only heliborne and tactical air support from US XXIV Corps.

The mobile training concept was implemented by the MACV Training

Directorate under an extensive program for the benefit of Regional and

Popular Forces whose principal mission was to ensure territorial security,

a prerequisite for the process of pacification. As of 1967, when the

pacification program was pushed vigorously forward, the role of RF and

PF became even more important and in view of their basic weaknesses,

there was an urgent requirement to improve them in all aspects, to

include administration and logistic, support. Because of the sizable

number of RF and PF units, whose aggregate strength in time made up

about 55% of the total RVNAF force structure, and their scattered deployment throughout the country, mobile training and advisory teams were the

most affordable means to obtain desirable results within a limited time.

Some US advisers accompanied ARVN units in initial phases of the

Cambodian operation, but all were withdrawn prior to 1 July. ARVN units

remained in Cambodia until November 1971.

177
Mobile training teams, each consisting of from three to ten US

personnel, were provided by US Field Forces. Each team was responsible

for a certain number of RF companies and PF platoons in a certain area.

Its members rotated among these units and trained them until, according

to the team's evaluation, they performed satisfactorily. Despite the

extensive efforts of MTTs, these territorial forces still needed more

improvement to qualify as combat worthy.

Another program of mobile training, initiated by MACV Training

Directorate, was based on the MTT experience but undertaken on a larger

scale and modified to suit the diverse requirements of territorial

forces. It was the Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) discussed in Chapter

VII.

The mobile advisory effort was emphasized during 1969 and also

expanded to assist district governments in enlarging their control.

By the end of 1970, when RF and PF units had greatly improved in terms

of combat effectiveness, the MATs were still maintained to help coordinate

activities between territorial and para-military forces such as the

PSDF, National Police, RD cadres, etc. In addition, the MATs also

contributed significantly to the development of villages and hamlets

under the pacification program.

Aside from US Army programs undertaken by MACV Training Directorate

and US Field Forces, the Marines also made a significant contribution

in I Corps area toward improving the Popular Forces through their unique

Combined Action Program (CAP). From 1966 to the time US Marine units

were totally redeployed, the CAP expanded considerably in all five

provinces of I Corps area. The CAP concept united a US Marine squad

with a PF platoon to form a combined platoon. Marine squad members

lived together with PF troopers in a village for an extended period of

time up to six months until the PF platoon was capable of defending the

village by themselves. Operating together under the concept of mobile

defense, PF troopers learned a great deal about the most effective small

unit tactics under the Marines' tutelage. The success of this program

was undeniable.

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Another major contribution made by the US advisory effort was the

training of ARVN Rangers, and the organization, training, and continued

development of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), which were

not a part of the RVNAF until 1969. These major efforts began as early

as 1960 when US Special Forces took under their tutelage the 65 ARVN

Ranger companies that the GVN formed for counter-insurgency purposes.

Training by US Special Forces and US civilian specialists was conducted

at three training centers at Song Mao, Hoa Cam and Due My. Concurrently,

US Special Forces also devoted their effort to organizing, arming and

training Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDC) composed of ethnic

Montagnards for the defense of the central highlands and the control of

its approaches. Beginning in 1961, CIDGs were deployed to base camps

along the border for the control of Communist infiltration routes. By

1968, total CIDG strength had reached 42,000, totally equipped and supported by the US. As of 1969, CIDGs were gradually turned over to

RVNAF control. Their members either became Rangers or regional troopers.

With this manpower, the RVNAF were able to activate 25 Border Defense

Ranger battalions. This brought up the total Ranger force structure to

45 battalions deployed to all four corps areas under the control of 15

group headquarters. The individual training advisers of the US Special

Forces were highly professional officers and enlisted men who demonstrated

the utmost in professional talent and devotion to duty.

Observations and Comments

In general from the Vietnamese point of view US advisers assigned

for duty at ARVN service schools and training centers were apparently

selected with great care and they all instilled a good impression on

ARVN staffs, faculties and students. Their outward appearance alone

inspired discipline and studiousness. Tall, healthy, invariably handsome

in their starched uniforms and shining boots, they conveyed the perfect

image of neatness and military elegance, a far cry from the usually

carefree French instructor of former times in ill-fitted shorts and

civilian shoes. Simply by looking at them, the average ARVN student

181
was struck by admiration and an ardent desire to imitate. This alone

produced a good effect on the students. Another good habit of US training advisers was their punctuality which directly accounted for the

cutback in tardiness among ARVN instructors.

Most training advisers were endowed with broad professional competence; they were entirely knowledgeable in their special areas of

interest. The difficult points in instruction or questions raised by

ARVN instructors were all explained carefully by advisers who always

made a point of being precise and never ad-libbing. If they were in doubt

of something they always took time to consult manuals or associates and

invariably came back with the correct answers. This intellectual probity

exerted a good influence on our ARVN instructors who gradually ridded

themselves of the poor habit of improvising answers in classrooms, apparently to save face.

In my opinion the most resourceful and effective training advisers

were those of the US Special Torces who developed the CIDGs and advised

the ARVN Ranger forces. Expedient, organizational-minded and experts in

small unit tactics, US Special Force advisers were also highly capable

in training and staff work. During over a decade of deployment, they

single-handedly organized and trained various groups of Montagnards in

the central highlands and contributed significantly to the defense and

control of the border areas, a perilous and most difficult task.

As US forces began to redeploy from South Vietnam in 1969, MACV

increased its emphasis on the quality of US officers assigned to training

centers. Since there was no longer a requirement for replacements in US

units, more combat-experienced personnel were diverted to advisory duties,

many of them having served several combat tours. Being familiar with

the war, and having lived in various combat situations, they were thoroughly conversant with problems faced by tactical units. Their assignment to ARVN schools and training centers tremendously benefited not

only ARVN students but also our instructors.

182
When arriving in country for the first tour of duty, every US

training adviser had a difficult time familiarizing himself with the

new environment, local culture and manners and the ARVN unit to which

he was attached. It took him at least a month, frequently longer, to

make himself feel at home in the new environment and job and to be productive. An adviser's usefulness, therefore, was short-lived, given

his normal one-year tour. His personal experience could not be completely

transferred to his successor. It was as if everything had to start anew

every year as far as his counterpart was concerned. Obviously, the

annual turnover of US advisers brought about many inconveniences for

ARVN units. For one thing, Vietnamese commanders were never sure how

they would approach a new adviser and whether the new relationship would

be as good as the old one.

Some ARVN school commandants recommended that US training advisers

should be assigned for longer tours with their schools. After all, they

argued, there was no problem of insecurity or hardship since almost all

service schools and training centers were located in the Saigon area,

in cities or secure areas. By comparison with their colleagues in tactical units, US training advisers often had a much more comfortable life

and a less demanding job. In terms of self-interest, naturally these

arguments were valid and it appeared that the longer an adviser stayed

with a school or a training center, the better his services would be.

However, these arguments failed to take into account the strain imposed

on these US officers and enlisted men living in prolonged separation

from their families. If only this problem could have been resolved

in some convenient way, the prolonged tour would have been easier for

most US advisers. And as far as the RVNAF were concerned, it would have

been a most welcome event.

Should a US training adviser try to be intimate with his Vietnamese

counterpart or keep him at a certain distance? Some argued that too much

intimacy might lead to disrespect or disdain which adversely affected a

good working relationship. It was true that all excesses were harmful.

But to the extent that I knew of this problem, there was never too much

intimacy between US officers and ARVN counterparts. It was equally true

183
that if an adviser was too reserved he was not only artificial but it

also created undue difficulties for both sides, not to mention a tendency

to suspect and misunderstand each other. Both extremes had to be avoided

if a good working relationship was the objective to be attained. To

Vietnamese officers of all grades in general, neither excessive intimacy

nor too much distance, was acceptable. What was important to them was

sincerity, compassion and mutual respect. To them, a respectable adviser

was someone who would not go beyond his advisory area, kept to his duties

and never interfere with command responsibilities. A sincere adviser

was someone who never put on an affected personality, abstained from

showering his counterparts with superlative words of praise and always

behaved true to his feelings and nature. A good, understanding adviser

always tried to think as if he were in his counterpart's shoes, measured

his own opinions and got things done by induction and persuasion, never

by threats of leverage. Professional competence and experience alone

would not necessarily make a ~well-heeded adviser, but tact and compassion

helped him accomplish his difficult mission. Vietnamese in general were

sentimental and sensitive. Rudeness, vulgarity, abrasive words were apt

to hurt and alienate them. During the incipient period of US advisory

effort when language was still an important barrier and the problem of

culture largely ignored by both sides, most Vietnamese could not understand these American jokes and certain gestures and words were considered

insolent. But these cultural misunderstandings gradually diminished as

we learned the English language and familiarized ourselves with American

culture through offshore courses and as US training advisers learned more

about Vietnamese culture.

Important as it was, language was not an absolute requirement for

an adviser's success. This was increasingly true during the later years

of the US advisory effort in Vietnam. The ability to speak Vietnamese

was certainly valuable if a high degree of proficiency was attained.

Even a smattering knowledge of conversational Vietnamese helped break

the ice faster than anything else. But this was not a must as far as

an adviser's usefulness was concerned. He could always communicate

through the intermediary of a good interpreter and his effectiveness was

184
in no way affected by his inability to speak Vietnamese. Most Vietnamese,

in fact, thought that it was better for them to learn English since this

helped widen their horizons of knowledge. So US training advisers

complied by giving English lessons and gradually, with the establishment

of the RVNAF Languages School and the mushrooming of private English

courses, many Vietnamese servicemen became in time proficient with the

language. By the time US combat forces arrived in Vietnam, language

was no longer a major problem. There were few US advisers who could

speak Vietnamese as a native but those who did, mostly district advisers,

really enjoyed great popularity among the local officials and population.

The contributions of training advisers to the enlightment and

improvement of the RVNAF were indeed monumental achievements. Their

tenacious efforts spanned two long decades of war and hardship. If

there was a proper epitaph dedicated to the US training adviser of the

Vietnam war, this.epitaph ought to be: "The First to Arrive and the

Last to Depart."

185
CHAPTER VIII

Observations and Conclusions

The Paris Agreement of January 1973 ended eighteen years of American

military advisory effort in South Vietnam. Looking back on the evolution of the system and the achievements of the effort, no one can escape

the feeling that this was indeed the most ambitious program the US Army

and its sister services had ever undertaken for the benefit of an

allied military force. That this effort had been a success, there was

no single doubt. By the time the last US advisers departed, the RVNAF

had become a formidable instrument of peace enforcement with its 13

well-equipped, well-trained army divisions, a strong and modern air

force, and an efficient logistical support system. Under better leadership and with continued American support, this modern military force

could well have been an invincible opponent against any invasion.

In terms of system and mission evolution, the US advisory effort

appeared to have developed in four distinct phases or periods which all

reflected the changing US policies toward Vietnam. From 1955 to 1960,

this effort was modest but far-reaching in consequence. This was a

period of reorganization and retraining during which the nascent Vietnamese Army was molded into what could be called the mirror-image of

the US Army, structurally and doctrinally. While there appeared to be

a strong strategic sense in the creation of a division-based army with

ancillary combat and service support units, this conventionally trained

and organized military force was ill-prepared for the type of counterinsurgency warfare it was called upon to fight in the late 1950's. If

the lessons of the First Indochina War had been of any use, it would have

been much better to develop at the same time the kind of territorial

186
forces that were to play such an important role during the latter stages

of the war. But support for these forces was late in coming and not

until 1961 was there any conscious effort to expand and train the Civil

Guard and People's Militia (later to become Regional and Popular Forces).

The period from 1961 to 1965 was devoted to developing counterinsurgency capabilities on the one hand and to providing combat support assistance to the regular forces on the other. The role of the US

Special Forces was most significant at this juncture in the training of

the CIDGs and strike forces. Despite the usefulness of these organizations, they were an irritation to the GVN which did not find its image

enhanced by the presence of US-paid and supported auxiliaries. Some RVN

leaders even suspected American motives behind the program, and when the

Rhade rebellion broke out in 1964, they were convinced that it had been

condoned by some Americans. US Special Forces also provided training and

advisers for the ARYN Ranger forces whose creation met with initial

opposition from the Military Assistance Advisory Group which apparently

suspected a political motive behind it. American concern over counterinsurgency further led to the assignment of US advisers to work with

Vietnamese province chiefs and assist them in the training and employment

of territorial forces. But this effort was at first viewed by the Diem

government as a move to control GVN activities in exchange for extended

support. Therefore, the expansion of the US advisory effort to the

district level in 1964, albeit occasioned by circumstantial needs,

would have met with GVN opposition had Mr. Diem survived as President.

In the area of combat support, US Army aviation units, although not

operating in an advisory capacity, did familiarize ARVN troops and

commanders with heliborne tactics and gave them the additional mobility

required by counterinsurgency warfare.

The next period, 1965-1969, saw the role of US advisers almost

completely overshadowed by the presence of US combat units and their

active participation in the ground war. Despite a gradual force structure

increase, the RVNAF were relegated to the role of pacification support

in view of their limited capabilities. During this period, the advisory

effort seemed to be reduced to maintaining liaison and obtaining US

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logistical and tactical support for the benefit of ARVN units. The

generosity with which this support was dispensed could be attributed to

the US advisers' eagerness to oblige and to be useful. Its adverse

effect was felt only much later when the RVNAF had to rely on their

own means. Training continued but was impeded and sometimes suspended

altogether by operational requirements. But it was during this period

that the US advisory effort expanded considerably in another direction:

pacification support. It was this expansion that made available direct

advisory benefits to the growing territorial forces for the first time

and the gradual upgrading of these forces began. This training advisory

effort alone, to include all the MATs and MALTs, absorbed a sizeable

portion of total US advisory strength in the field, but it was an effort

well expended.

The advent of Vietnamization brought back to US advisers their

proper role and to the advisory effort, a new sense of dedication.

Improved selection of US field advisers coupled with various programs

to enhance the RVNAF tactical and logistical capabilities quickly yielded

remarkable returns. The RVNAF, on their way to full growth, welcomed

the effort but were overwhelmed by the speed with which the programs

accelerated. It appeared as if the US was more concerned about getting

out than willing to take the time for the entire process of Vietnamization

to produce solid, lasting results; although it was true that by the time

the last US adviser departed, the RVNAF had been left with substantial

amounts of assets and had grown into a military giant. The trouble was

that the flood of equipment in the few months before the cease-fire

engulfed the RVNAF logistical and operational system which still lacked

the technicians needed to store, control or maintain the more sophisticated

materiel. Disaster was averted, however, by the provision of the large

contractor-operated technical assistance system under the USDAO.

In general, except for the first few years, almost all US advisers

seemed to have been well prepared for their role which they usually

performed with dedication and effectiveness. Depending on the level and

specialized area of interest, there were certain dissimilarities in

approach and techniques but the objectives to be achieved remained essentially the same. In this regard, it was difficult to tell the difference

188
from one adviser to another for they were all dedicated to a similar

cause. However, it appeared that the higher the echelon, the less

emphasis was placed on advising. In fact, only at the division and

lower levels did US advisers truly act as advisers in the sense that

they directly assisted in day-to-day operations and completely devoted

their time and energy to advisory duties.

At the top level, the relationship between the JGS and MACV was

both advisory and cooperation. The successive MACV commanders and staff

division chiefs and members were professional diplomats, tactful and

respectful of the authority and professional competence of their counterparts. Advice was usually provided during informal meetings and discussions. Combined planning activities were always conducted by combined

committees under combined chairmanship. The relationship, therefore,

resembled a partnership between co-workers in which neither side assumed

the predominant role. It was as if in the eyes of MA.CV commanders, the

JGS needed little advice as a control body for the entire RVNAF. But it

was true that during the period of US active participation, MACV became

a theater command and was more concerned about the conduct of the war

and the control and support of US forces. Therefore, only a small

fraction of MACV staff members were actually involved in advisory duties.

Despite this and because of their extended tours, MACV commanders and

staff division chiefs always had a deep insight into RVNAF problems,

their strengths and weaknesses, and were thoroughly familiar with every

major ARVN unit.

In its advisory relations with the JGS, MACV seemed to be bound by

certain security regulations and restrained by US policies. As a result,

the JGS was not always fully informed even though the information was

desired for planning purposes. Also the JGS was never allowed to participate in or even comment on certain planning and programming actions of

which it was the primary beneficiary and executor. The Military Assistance Program recommended funding was a case in point. Other JGS-initiated

recommendations deemed vital to the improvement of the RVNAF, such as

requests for the M-16 rifle, M-48 tank, 175-mm gun, etc., were satisfied

only when such requirements had become all too evident. But these

189
shortcomings apparently resulted from the dictates of US policies and

procedures.

At the field level and in combat units, the usefulness of tactical

advisers was not acutely felt during the period prior to the US participation in the war since their role was mostly confined to training assistance, and end-use and maintenance inspection. During the formative years

of the RVNAF, the presence of tactical advisers was sometimes a source

of irritation for a few ARVN commanders who felt that their own combat

experience was far superior to the advice they could expect from a young

American officer. As of 1965, however, stepped up combat activities and

the increased reliance on US combat support assets such as airlift, helilift, tactical air and artillery support made the US advisers indispensable

in ARVN combat units. At the battalion and regimental level, in addition

to serving.as intermediaries in obtaining US combat support, tactical

advisers compensated for the basic weakness of ARVN units in operational

planning not only by assisting and advising but sometimes by actually

doing the work. In a few extreme cases, US advisers were also compelled

to make decisions for their counterparts. Although not generalized,

this tendency to overtake and patronize seemed to edge ARVN commanders

toward a passive role, chiefly when modern warfare required so much skill

in the employment of US-controlled combat support assets. At the division

and corps levels, US advisers were also extremely useful in assisting

ARVN staffs in developing plans and studies, a field in which ARVN officers

were usually not strong. While the division senior adviser was able to

devote his full time and effort to his advisory duties, the corps senior

adviser was not, for the simple reason that he also commanded US troops.

As a result, the corps staff benefited most from the work of the advisory

group attached to the corps. Not being exposed to a counterpart US staff

in action, ARVN staff officers naturally could not learn the fine points

of American planning and coordination in combat situations.

In general, in ARVN combat units, US advisers stayed for only six

months. The fact that an ARVN battalion commander had to accommodate

several different advisers during this time of command did not help build

the kind of working relationship conducive to steady progress and improvement.

190
If the tactical advisory effort were to be more effective, then it

appeared that not every ARVN battalion needed an advisory team for the

mere sake of it. This effort should have been selectively made and

perhaps would have been more beneficial if confined to higher levels

of command where the need for US advisers was more strongly indicated

in order to help build a solid command, control and planning system for

the entire RVNAF.

With regard to training, the task of US advisers was particularly

difficult during the early years. In a certain sense, training the

Vietnamese Army during that time was not unlike preaching a new gospel,

but US advisers acquitted themselves admirably. The early effort of

sending Vietnamese cadres to US service schools and making them instructors

proved to be a sound policy since it alleviated the training burden placed

on a limited number of US training advisers. At ARVN schools and training centers, in addition to providing training support, US advisers closely

monitored individual and unit training results, the utilization of graduates, and carefully evaluated practical performances as compared to

text book teachings. This evaluative contribution was most useful for

ARVN service schools to update their training programs. Training manuals

and materials made available through the advisory system were up-to-date

and valuable for the training of a conventional military force to fight

a conventional warfare. They should have been complemented by comprehensive literature on unconventional warfare and tactics.

The most tangible contribution of the US advisory effort to the

RVNAF training base was the expansion and modernization of service

schools and training centers. Some of the facilities were so modern

that they ranked among the best in Southeast Asia. The RVNAF were particularly proud of the Dalat National Military Academy and the high

caliber of its graduates.

In the area of intelligence, the US-RVNAF relationship took the

unusual form of both advising and co-working. This relationship made

both the adviser and the advisee feel close together since it implied

an exchange which benefited both. Due to the close working relationship

and better understanding of each other's strengths and weaknesses,

191
the adviser was able to offer more practical advice and the advisee

was also able to contribute something useful in return. ARVN intelligence

officers did learn a great deal from US advisers, particularly in the

highly sophisticated areas of signal and technical intelligence. They

also benefitted from American experience in human intelligence which

was a particularly difficult task of collection in Vietnam. In return,

US intelligence officers gained deeper insight in their knowledge of the

Vietnamese Communists through association with their ARVN counterparts.

US intelligence advisers performed their role extremely well in

all areas of endeavor and at all levels, except for the sector and

subsector where they had to handle problems not usually related to intelligence. A major constraint of the intelligence advisory effort was the

one-year tour of duty. Although it applied equally to all branches of

service, the one-year tour .was most disadvantageous for intelligence since

a new adviser usually required a longer time to familiarize himself with

the intricate Vietnamese intelligence organization and the equally

complex and extremely fluid enemy situation. The US intelligence adviser

was, therefore, really useful only after his third month in the country.

In general, the growth and maturity of ARVN intelligence was largely

attributable to US advisers.

In the area of logistics, the importance and value of US advisers

seemed to grow in proportion with the increase in US military aid and

the ever enlarging stock of modern equipment. In daily contacts and

working sessions, US logistical and technical advisers all proved to

have a solid professional background, and were dedicated to their duties.

They utilized every procedure and technique for providing advice, from

written memoranda to joint visits, private meetings, review conferences

and joint staff studies. During the period of US active participation,

US advisers were the essential intermediaries between ARVN and US

logistical units. They helped provide the additional support ARVN logistical units required to fulfill their mission. Over the years, ARVN

logisticians were able to learn many modern operational concepts from

US advisers, such as functional organization, automated materiel management, cost programming, etc. Under the sponsorship and tutelage of US

192
advisers, they also worked out significant plans and programs for the

improvement and modernization of the ARVN logistic system, such as Path

finders I and II, the Depot Upgrade Program, etc. All in all, US logistical and technical advisers succeeded remarkably in their missions.

They had helped the RVNAF build a modern, functional, cost-effective

logistical system and were instrumental in improving every aspect of

its operations.

A significant aspect of the US advisory effort in the Vietnam war

was pacification support. This support was more demanding because it

involved many non-military areas as well. The role of the pacification

adviser was, therefore, a dual military-civilian one requiring numerous

skills and endurance. In view of its impact on the population, this role

was also more difficult and more delicate than that assumed by purely

military advisers. Although advisers began operating at the district

level in 1964, the pacification support effort really made significant

headway only as of 1967 with the advent of CORDS which gave it more cohesive direction and provided more systematic advisory assistance to the RF

and PF, the mainstay of territorial security. The spectacular achievements obtained during the following years were largely attributable to

US advisers, military and civilian, who helped push the program to

success. Their contributions were monumental and affected every aspect

of the program, from planning to execution, monitoring and evaluation.

Without their efforts and the sizable American financial and materiel

support, the pacification program would have progressed much more slowly.

There was no doubt that US pacification advisers performed their

role with dedication and resourcefulness. But it seemed that in the

context of an ideological conflict in which a solid popular base was the

key to ultimate success, US advisers could have contributed much more

had they been in closer contact with the population, and known more

about their true aspirations and problems. It was no secret that the

most successful and popular advisers were those who came back for a second

or third tour and spoke the native language well. For a task as demanding and as people-oriented as pacification, those who were involved should

have been carefully prepared for it and should have learned to speak the

193
language and to live among rural natives as well. In no other areas

were language and cultural adaptation so vital as in pacification because the sensitivity of the local population toward Americans stemmed

primarily from differences in way of life and most particularly, the

wide gap between American and Vietnamese modes of living.

Despite the constraints imposed by linguistic and cultural differences and a relative short tour of duty, most US advisers were successful in the performance of their role regardless of the level of assignment

and the area of specialty. This success was chiefly due to preparation

and the fact that every adviser was most conscious of his delicate and

difficult mission. In the eyes of the Vietnamese servicemen, there were

three things about US advisers and the advisory effort that were most

important: the adviser's personality, his procedures and techniques,

and his professional competence.

The issue of professional competence raised another often-asked

question about the suitability of US Army professionalism to the kind

of war fought in Vietnam. Predicated on technological and material

superiority, perhaps it was not suited for the ideological aspect of

the conflict. Perhaps because of this, no US adviser was ever assigned

to assist in RVNAF political warfare activities. But the Vietnam conflict, despite its ideological overtones, was still very much of a

military war which was fought with increasingly modern armaments by

both sides. During the later stages, it was primarily a showdown of

sheer military might. This was where and when US military assets and

professional know-how mattered and even became decisive. Of particular

importance for the RVNAF to fight this war was the technological advance

gained from the US Army in signal and technical intelligence, long and

short range communications, heliborne tactics, and logistic support

operations. If US Army professionalism seemed ill-fitted to the early

stage of the war, it proved to be indispensable as soon as warfare

escalated to the division level.

When US advisers first came into direct contact with the Vietnamese

armed forces eighteen years earlier, their problems were much less complicated. Then they were primarily concerned about the language barrier

194
and how to get along with their counterparts on a personal basis. In

time, they learned to cope with both problems but only after going through

a painful period of trials and errors.

The ability to communicate in Vietnamese or French was never a must

for an "adviser except in some specialized areas*. In the early days, some

US advisers spoke French and could communicate fairly well with Vietnamese

officers of the older generation if the conversation did not involve

military or technical terminology. But then only a few US advisers and

not all Vietnamese officers could speak French, which was also banned

as the official language in late 1955. The trend then was clearly

indicated: it was either English or Vietnamese. It so happened that in

view of the strong anti-colonialist feelings of that time, most high

school students opted for English which had officially replaced French

as the primary mandatory foreign language in their curriculum; and in

time, the majority of these students became military officers. The

same determination to learn English caught on with the military, who

saw in it the immediate advantage of attending US service schools. And

so, without formal planning and even unconsciously, the trend toward

learning English picked up momentum on a national scale.

Learning Vietnamese proved to be difficult for the few US advisers

who endeavored to master the language. Although syntactically simple,

Vietnamese as a tonal language proved phonetically hard for Westerners.

Even those who methodically took lessons for many months could only

produce toneless, hence unintelligible, utterances. Then there was the

problem of regional accents and vocabulary which differed to the point

of incomprehensibility even among the natives. Experience indicated

that very few Americans ever achieved a useful degree of fluency and

even if fluency was attained, the colloquial vocabulary they used was

hardly sufficient for professional communication. It was also true

that Vietnamese had not yet developed a comprehensive and consistent

technical terminology in such advanced areas as electronics, mechanical

engineering, aerodynamics, etc. So the efforts of learning Vietnamese

as an instrument of professional communication, even through the process of intensive training, was largely defeated not only by phonetic

difficulties, but also by the limitations of the language itself.

195
Besides, since the Vietnamese were eager to learn English which somehow

was easier for them to master linguistically and since all technical

manuals were in English, there was added inhibition for US advisers to

pursue language learning. To most Vietnamese, the value and usefulness

of an adviser did not require his ability to communicate in Vietnamese.

He could always communicate effectively through interpreters. Besides,

more and more Vietnamese became proficient in English and language, in

time, ceased to be a barrier altogether. In the areas of human intelligence and pacification, however, the ability to understand and communicate in Vietnamese was paramount to the effectiveness of US advisers.

Thorough knowledge about the Vietnamese Communists required direct

exposure to their language and culture which could not be obtained through

interpretation. In pacification work, even a smattering of colloquial

Vietnamese could earn a US adviser instant rapport with the local population. And if he knew the language well enough to communicate directly

with them, then he could be assured of certain success. This was particularly true with the case of district level advisers.

How to get along with a Vietnamese counterpart and have him receptive required the whole art of human relations and depended on how well

the US adviser knew the Vietnamese character and temperament. Too much

intimacy or the total lack of it was unadvisable. Both were extremes

to be avoided. But too much intimacy was definitely better than a total

lack of it. What really mattered in the eyes of Vietnamese was a correct

attitude, sincerity and mutual respect. A warm personal friendship

would not necessarily lead to disrespect or disregard if it was based

on mutual affection, mutual compatibility and mutual respect; it need

not involve too much intimacy which, culturally, was repulsive to most

Vietnamese, nor did it detract the partners from the pursuit of their

business if both did not seek it as an end in itself.

The inability of some Americans to adjust to local living conditions

naturally led to the recreation of American environments. This was a

cultural trait that distinguished Americans from the French who mixed

more easily with the Vietnamese. It seemed that no American could

survive without his PX, his compound and his daily bath. In time,

196
American compounds and PXs became monumental institutions of American

culture in Vietnam. To the underprivileged Vietnamese, these constituted

a whole world apart, a world so distant that Vietnamese seldom really

felt close to Americans in a cultural sense. Exposure to American

material opulence induced envy and greed that led to the practice of

illicit business. This, added to the insecure psychology of wartime,

the miseries of economic life and the largesse of American aid, contributed to corruption. "American money corrupts" the Vietnamese press

used to say. Although there was some slanting insinuation in it, the

fact should be admitted that the presence of Americans and their conspicuous display of materialistic wealth created the conditions for, and

not infrequently invited, corruption. There were never any written procedures on how to obtain goods through the adviser but the good-natured

and dedicated adviser was usually eager to assist his counterpart if

asked.

The American propensity for living well was a cultural trait that

Vietnamese officers freely admitted as a difference they could do nothing

about, nor did they feel annoyed by it. In a determinist sense, they

were resigned to their economic condition and never expected that

Americans should live otherwise. But exposure to an unattainable good

life somehow instilled, on their part, a certain complex of inferiority

and sometimes bitterness, which accounted for the distance they always

tried to keep from American advisers in order not to be hurt. And this

was not good for the pursuit of a common goal. An ARVN officer, if

criticized for not keeping pace with American drive, was usually heard

retorting, "If I lived that kind of life, I could do the same." To

give a proper advisory example, not every adviser was required to live a

spartan Vietnamese way of life since this was not only unnatural but

also conveyed some hypocritical undertone. But it certainly helped

reduce the cultural gap if the American way of life could be kept as

inconspicuous and low-keyed as the environment permitted.

There was no doubt that US Army advisers did an excellent job and

the US advisory effort in South Vietnam indeed helped the RVNAF attain

remarkable achievements in terms of combat effectiveness and technical

197
and managerial skills. But there was one thing that this effort seemed

never able to achieve: the inculcation of motivation and effective

leadership. This was, after all, neither the fault of US advisers nor

a shortcoming of the advisory effort, but a basic weakness of our

political regime. The US adviser, as an individual, did all he could

to fulfill his mission, and he did it well.

The majority of US Army advisers came out of their tour of duty

with a better, more sober, understanding of the problems the RVNAF

had to face in the war. More importantly, they invariably came away

with profound compassion and a heart felt affection for their counterparts with whom they had shared the hazards and spartan conditions of

combat. Many such relationships had developed into lasting personal

friendships. This was perhaps the least publicized human aspect of

the US advisory effort that had brought two entirely different nations

together for some period of their histories.

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APPENDIX A

State of Vietnam

Ministry of National Defense

General Staff

MEMORANDUM The Chief of Staff

Telephone: Aubepine 10

No. 1891/TTM/MG

APO 4002, 10 April 1955

PRINCIPLES AUTHORIZING TRIM ADVISERS WITH UNITS AND FORMATIONS OF THE

VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMED FORCES.

I/- GENERAL

The Vietnamese, French and American Governments, in a common

agreement, have decided to create "A Liaison Mission" (TRIM) to train

and instruct the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

Composed of American and French Officers assigned according to

their particular abilities, TRIM will be personally directed by the^

Chief MAAG (US Military Assistance Advisory Group) under the authority

of the Commander in Chief.

This organization includes a Staff and subordinate Advisory Teams

placed at the principal echelons of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

11/- TRIM GENERAL ADVISORY MISSION

The TRIM advisers' mission is to assist and advise, on strictly

technical aspects, the Vietnamese military authorities to whom they are

assigned, to rapidly and effectively rebuild the Vietnamese Armed Forces

on a new basis.

Ill/- TRIM ADVISERS' AUTHORITY

TRIM advisers are empowered to:

- Represent the Chief TRIM among the Vietnamese organizations to

which they are assigned to the exclusion of all others.

- Advise, in the event of need, and assist, when requested by the

Vietnamese officers to whom they are attached, in the preparation and

execution of tasks which are their responsibilities.

- Visit the Vietnamese organizations of interest in the presence

of their commanders or delegated representatives, upon request.

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- Be kept informed of current regulations, orders and documents

not strictly confidential or secret which are deemed absolutely indispensable for the execution and effectiveness of their mission.

- Submit written reports to the Chief TRIM on the organization

dtatus of the units they advise, particularly from an instructional

point of view, their training, equipment, morale, combat effectiveness

aptitude on the condition that the same copies be forwarded to the

interested Vietnamese unit commanders. These reports will be identified

by a special numbering marker (such as single or double underline).

IV/- TRIM ADVISERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

a. TRIM advisers have no command or supervisory authority over the

Vietnamese Armed Forces organizations or activities.

b. On the other hand, the senior adviser of each team is responsible

only to his TRIM superviser for the organization and use of his subordinates. In addition, he has the particular duty of having his personnel

respect the regulations established by the Vietnamese Armed Forces concerning organizational security, for which the Vietnamese Military is

responsible.

V/- VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES OFFICERS' RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD THEIR

TRIM ADVISERS

a. Only Vietnamese Armed Forces officers will assume command

authority, and are entirely responsible for the performance and results

obtained in the Vietnamese organizations.

b. It is their responsibility to assure TRIM advisers of:

Security

- Satisfaction in their operational requirements, billets,

office space, vehicles, drivers, mess personnel, interpreters, signal

and emergency medical services.

Specific instructions pertaining to this subject will be published

by the General Staff, Vietnamese Armed Forces.

c. With regard to TRIM advisers, Vietnamese Armed Forces Officers

are required to:

- Facilitate to the maximum of their ability, the performance

of their tasks, particularly on the following points: the routing of

documents essential to their mission, whether coming from higher, subordinate or lateral echelons, orders issued consequently, activity programs,

visits to units, assistance at firing range, maneuver instruction

sessions, etc.

- To invite necessary counsel, particularly in the areas of

new and misunderstood techniques, instruction, training, logistics and

organization.

200
- To examine with care the recommendations made by TRIM advisers, and using their own-judgement, to make use of those that appear

to be the most propitious to develop the effectiveness of the organizations under their command.

d. Relations between Vietnamese Armed Forces officers and TRIM

advisers will naturally develop through daily contacts and official

ceremonies, and particularly, through an inter-allied spirit, cooperative,

courteous and appropriate for maintaining the Vietnamese Armed Forces

Officer Corps' prestige.

LE VAN TY

Brigadier General

Chief of Staff

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION Vietnamese Armed Forces

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APPENDIX B

Republic of Vietnam

Ministry of National Defense

General Staff

MEMORANDUM Bureau of

General Studies and Plans

Telephone: 30.857

No. 1442/TTM/TNDKH/KH/MK

APO 4002 dated April 24, 1958

SUBJECT: The Assistance of American Advisers

REFERENCE: Memo No. 1891/TMT/MG April 10, 1955

I. In their organization process the RVNAF need the- continued

assistance of American advisers. They are our truthful friends who

wish to use their'accumulated experience' to guide and help reorganize

our armed forces into an efficient anti-Communist force. Consequently,

it is the duty of every unit commander to help them accomplish their

mission.

II. This memorandum serves as a reminder to unit commanders of

their duties and responsibilities towards American advisers assigned to

their respective units.

Unit commanders should:

- Provide security for American advisory teams.

- Satisfy, with available means, their needs concerning lodging,

transportation, driver, office, mess personnel, interpreter, mail,

information and medical emergencies.

- Provide documents necessary for their advisory works.

- Provide information concerning the unit's projects, decisions

from higher echelon authorities, and related orders issued to its own

subordinate units.

- Confer with them on all problems concerning technical, organizational and training matters.

- Thoroughly study their advice and opinions and make efficient

use of them.

Moreover, to demonstrate their understanding of responsibilities

and duties unit commanders should show due consideration to MAAG highranking officers making visits to their units, and brief them on

202
the activities and the actual status of their units.

III. It is also requested that officers be civil and courteous

in their daily contacts with American advisers in order to contribute

to friendly Vietnamese-American relations.

Lt. General LE VAN TY

Chief, General Staff

RVNAF

Restricted Distribution

(officers only)

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Glossary

ARVN

CAP

CAT

CATO

C-E

CIDG

CLC

CORDS

CTC

CTZ

DMZ

DSA

GVN

JGS

JUSPAO

MAAG

MACV

MAP

MAT

MALT

MDAP

MR

MSS

MTT

NVA

PSA

PSDF

Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Combined Action Program

Combat Assistance Team

Combat Arms Training and Organization

Communications-Electronics

Civilian Irregular Defense Group

Central Logistics Command

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

Central Training Command

Corps Tactical Zone

Demilitarized Zone

District Senior Adviser

Government of the Republic of Vietnam

Joint General Staff

Joint United States Public Affairs Office

Military Assistance Advisory Group

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Military Assistance Program

Mobile Advisory Team

Mobile Advisory Logistic Team

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

Military Region

Military Security Service

Mobile Training Team

North Vietnamese Army

Province Senior Adviser

People's Self Defense Forces

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RAC Regional Assistance Command

RD Rural (or Revolutionary) Development

RF-PF Regional and Popular Forces

RVN Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

TERM Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission

TRIM Training Relations and Instruction Mission

USAAG United States Army Advisory Group

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USARV United States Army, Vietnam

USDAO United States Defense Attache Office

USOM United States Operations Mission

VC Viet Cong

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