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S. HRG. 111–883 

THE PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESS: CLOSING THE 

DOOR TO FRAUD, PART II 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 29, 2010 

Serial No. J–111–104 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRIAN A. BENZCOWSKI, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JON KYL, Arizona 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BILL VAN HORNE, Democratic Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ............. 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations Unit, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. ........... 4 

Sprague, Brenda S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. ......... 6 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Gregory D. Kutz to questions submitted by Senator Cardin ......... 22 

Responses of Brenda S. Sprague to questions submitted by Senator Cardin ..... 27 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Arnold, Robert, National Vice President, National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), Washington, DC, statement .................................................... 45 

Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations Unit, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., statement ...................................................................................................................... 60 

Sprague, Brenda S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

statement .............................................................................................................. 74 

(1) 

THE PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESS: CLOSING 

THE DOOR TO FRAUD, PART II 

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Cardin, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Hatch and Kyl. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland 

Security will come to order. I want to thank our witnesses for being 

here today. I want to first thank Senator Kyl and Senator Feinstein for their strong interest and continuing interest in this issue 

of the integrity and security of the passport issuance process. 

On May 5, 2009, over 14 months ago, I chaired the Terrorism 

Subcommittee hearing entitled The Passport Issuance Process: 

Closing the Door to Fraud. Today we are holding part two of that 

hearing. And quite frankly, I didn’t anticipate that we were going 

to need a second hearing on this subject when I convened the first 

hearing 14 months ago. 

During that hearing last year, we learned about the Government 

Accountability Office’s undercover investigation that had been requested by Senator Kyl and Senator Feinstein to test the effectiveness of the passport issuance process, and to determine whether 

malicious individuals such as terrorists, spies and other criminals 

could use counterfeit documents to obtain a genuine U.S. passport. 

What we learned at that time concerned me a great deal. GAO 

reported to the Subcommittee, and I’m going to quote from its 2009 

report, ‘‘Terrorists or criminals could steal an American citizen’s 

identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create fraudulent documents for the identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. passport.’’ 

‘‘GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach and was 

successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case. In all 

four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained documents.’’ 

The May 2009 GAO report went on to note that the State Department and U.S. postal employees did not identify GAO documents as counterfeit. And further noted, and I’m quoting, ‘‘GAO investigators later purchased an airline ticket under the name used 

2 

of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports and then used that 

passport as proof of identity to check into his flight, get a boarding 

pass and pass through security checkpoints at a major metropolitan area airport.’’ That was the 2009 report. 

But it was not the first report to identify problems with the passport issuance process. In 2005 and 2007, GAO brought these issues 

to light. As a result, the GAO’s 2009 report stated, and again I’m 

quoting from the GAO report, that ‘‘State Department officials have 

known about the vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process 

for many years but have failed to effectively address these 

vulnerabilities.’’ 

Those were very serious findings back in May of 2009 because 

the U.S. passport is the gold standard for identification. A U.S. 

passport can be used for many purposes in this country and it gives 

an individual the ability to travel internationally which is an important tool for someone who wants to do us harm, including terrorists, spies and other criminals. 

So the integrity and security of the passport issuance process is 

extremely important because it can have a profound impact on the 

national security of the United States. 

More than 14 months have lapsed since the first GAO report, 

and today we will be learning about a new GAO undercover investigation that I requested along with Senators Kyl, Feinstein, Lieberman and Collins. 

In this new investigation, a GAO undercover, used fraudulent 

identity documents including fake drivers licenses and birth certificates to see if they could obtain genuine U.S. passports. So what 

happened this time? 

Well, once again U.S. postal and State Department employees 

failed to detect the use of fraudulent identity documents. GAO undercover investigators sought seven passports. Most of them were 

approved by the State Department. Moreover, four of the passport 

applications that were submitted used a photograph of the same 

GAO undercover agent, and two passport applications that were 

initially approved used Social Security numbers of deceased persons. 

There is some news that is a credit to the State Department because the State Department detected two fraudulent passport applications before they were approved. However, what happened, 

happened before, and we were all under notice that this needed to 

be changed. 

As the Subcommittee attempts to get to the bottom of this, we 

must not forget that dedicated people are working very hard to correct these problems and they take their responsibilities seriously. 

But we must do better, much better. 

Congress can help by giving the State Department all the tools 

it needs. In that regard, I am introducing, along with Senators 

Feinstein and Lieberman, legislation that will help to close the 

door to passport fraud. Today I’m introducing the Passport Identity 

Verification Act. This legislation is a common sense solution that 

will give the State Department the legal authority that it needs to 

access information contained in Federal, state and other data 

banks that can be used to verify the identity of every passport apVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:37 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064705 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64705.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
3 

plicant and to detect passport fraud without extending the time 

that the State Department takes to approve passports. 

I also will be submitting for the record a letter from the National 

Federation of Federal Employees which has previously made a 

number of recommendations to the State Department as to how to 

improve the passport issuance process. 

And from my perspective, management in the State Department 

needs to partner with its employees to ensure that their helpful, 

constructive ideas are implemented. I understand that there is 

pressure on passport examiners to act quickly. I’m sure some of 

that pressure comes from Members of Congress on behalf of our 

constituents and I understand that the American people can become concerned when their travel plans, whether for leisure or 

business are linked to their ability to obtain a passport in a timely 

fashion. 

But we’ve got to get this right. It is not simply a question of process, techniques and training. We need to make sure that the agencies that are responsible for processing passport application documents are concerned about national security as well as customer 

service and we need to make sure that they have the legal authority, the resources and the technology to verify the identity of passport applicants and to detect passport fraud. We simply cannot 

issue U.S. passports in this country on the basis of fraudulent documents. There is too much at stake. We have the technology, and 

we have the information to prevent such abuses. 

We have with us today two witnesses, one from the GAO and one 

from the State Department. Before I introduce our two witnesses, 

let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Kyl, and once again 

before recognizing Senator Kyl, I want to thank him for his interest 

in this issue, not only his interest but his leadership and the fact 

that he brought this issue to the Senate’s attention. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate your 

holding this hearing and the work you’ve done on the legislation 

that you discussed. I also want to thank Senator Feinstein who 

can’t be here because of a scheduling conflict. But as the Chairman 

noted, she too has a continuing commitment to continue to pursue 

this issue surrounding fraudulent passports. 

I agree with Chairman Cardin that the GAO, and the GAO, that 

the State Department’s continued inconsistent application of data 

verification and counterfeit fraudulent detection techniques must 

be corrected. 

This information from GAO makes us all continue to wonder just 

how many individuals are fraudulently obtaining U.S. passports. 

GAO I think accurately calls this the most sought after travel document in the world. So we’re talking about something very important. 

Back in February of 2008, partially a result of the 2007 Joint 

Homeland Security FBI Threat Assessment, Senator Feinstein and 

I asked GAO to report on passport fraud. In March of 2009, it reported on state’s weaknesses surrounding the issuance of passports. Senators Cardin, Feinstein, Lieberman and I asked them in 

4 

early 2010 for an update on the issue and that is what we are receiving today. 

There are a myriad of corrections the State could make to correct 

some of the vulnerabilities in the passport process. Irrespective of 

whether State Department passport adjudicators have law enforcement authority, State could work more collaboratively with Social 

Security Administration to ensure that accurate and appropriate 

and near real time information about Social Security members is 

pursued by those approving passport applications. 

Additionally, the State Department could work more proactively 

with the Department of Homeland Security to make sure that the 

electronic vital events system project, which digitizes birth records, 

is completed and the State Department in my view should always 

work to confirm a birth certificate’s authenticity. 

It is troubling that DHS was required to complete a spending 

plan for 2010 for the $10 million in appropriations for that consortium project but only yesterday, 10 months into the fiscal year 

2010, sent the spending plan up to Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up with some more specific questions for our witnesses, but I do want to make clear that the problems that GAO has effectively highlighted both before and today 

are really indicative of overall identity theft issues that we face as 

a nation. We’ve got to continue to work to make sure that individuals cannot fraudulently obtain drivers licenses, passports, visas, 

border crossing cards and other documents in this country. 

I very much look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and 

again I appreciate your calling this hearing. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kyl. Today we 

will be hearing from two witnesses. 

Greg Kutz is the Managing Director of GAO’s Forensic Audits 

and Special Investigation Unit which conducts forensic audits, 

evaluates security vulnerabilities and conducts investigations of 

fraud, waste and abuse for Congress. He is also a certified public 

accountant and certified fraud examiner. 

He has been with GAO for nearly two decades and prior to his 

present position, he was Director of Financial Management at 

GAO. 

Brenda Sprague is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services in the Consular Affairs Bureau of the Department of State. 

Ms. Sprague has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State since 

July 20, 2008 and she previously served in the State Department’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its Office of Language Services. 

She has also served in the foreign service. Ms. Sprague testified 

in our hearing on May 5th, 2009. We’ll start with Mr. Kutz. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR FORENSIC AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT, U.S. 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Kyl, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss passport fraud. Today’s testimony 

highlights the results of our most recent investigation. 

My testimony has two parts. First I will discuss what we did and 

second I will discuss the results of our undercover testing. 

5 

First in March of 2009, we reported that State’s passport 

issuance process was vulnerable to fraud. Specifically, we obtained 

four genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit and fraudulently obtained documents. This is important because as you mentioned and 

as this posterboard shows, with a U.S. passport, the world is yours. 

One year later at your request, we submitted seven fraudulent 

applications simulating the use of identity theft. For these tests, we 

used counterfeit and fraudulently obtained documents such as drivers licenses and birth certificates. These documents were prepared 

using publicly available hardware, software and materials. 

We also used seven different Social Security numbers from fictitious and deceased individuals. Two undercover agents applied for 

passports at six postal service and one State run location. Our tests 

were done in five different States and here in the District of Columbia. 

Now that I have said what we did, let me turn to the results of 

our undercover testing. As the Chairman mentioned specifically, 

State issued passports for five of our seven tests. 

I have in my hand the three genuine passports that we obtained. 

The posterboard shows on my right the actual breeder documents 

that we used to obtain these genuine U.S. passports. Some of the 

key flags that State missed include a 62-year-old using a Social Security number issued in 2009, counterfeit drivers licenses and birth 

certificates as shown on the monitor to my right there, one application with a vast age difference between the passport and drivers 

license photo and one application with a California mailing address, a West Virginia permanent address and drivers license, and 

a Washington, D.C. telephone number. 

This time as you mentioned there was improvement as State denied two of our applications after determining that they were 

fraudulent. For the first one denied according to State, they identified issues with our Social Security number. Subsequently they determined that our Florida birth certificate and our West Virginia 

drivers licenses were bogus. 

For the second denial, State identified discrepancies again in our 

Social Security number on our application. This time there were 

discrepancies against the birth date and Social Security records. 

Once again they determined that our drivers license and birth certificate were bogus. 

It also appears in this case that they had questions as to why 

the application was filed in Illinois, but the mailing address and 

drivers licenses were from Virginia and West Virginia. 

For the last two applications, physical passports were issued. 

However, according to State, these two passports were flagged 

when facial recognition technology linked the photos to our prior 

applications. State then recovered these two physical passports 

from the mail system. 

It is not clear why State was in some instances able to identify 

fraud and in other instances was not. As you both mentioned, one 

of the reasons for us being here today is to provide you with a status report on State’s progress and its improvement initiatives. Another important benefit from today is for State to take these seven 

applications, and use them to improve their human capital, processes and the use of technology. 

6 

In conclusion, significant concerns remain about State’s ability to 

prevent passport fraud. With hundreds of different drivers licenses 

and birth certificates out there, recognizing counterfeits is a significant challenge. 

We look forward to continuing to work with this Subcommittee 

and State to improve passport fraud prevention controls. 

Mr. Chairman, that ends my statement, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much. Ms. Sprague. 

STATEMENT OF BRENDA S. SPRAGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of State’s response to concerns raised by the Government 

Accountability Office in their latest undercover investigation of 

passport operations. 

Today I also seek your support for initiatives to assist the Bureau of Consular Affairs to detect and prevent passport fraud. 

We are fully committed to continually improving our system in 

order to maintain the most secure passport issuance system possible. That system, however, is not yet foolproof. We have made 

dramatic improvements over the past year and we will continue to 

work diligently to improve training, procedures and oversight of 

the passport application and adjudication processes. 

Through existing fraud detection procedures, we recently discovered that the GAO was conducting an undercover investigative operation of passport services. Investigators trained in document 

fraud submitted seven passport applications. They used legitimately issued Social Security numbers, counterfeit birth certificates and fake drivers licenses. 

We immediately identified fraud in two of their applications and 

identified fraud in two more prior to delivery. However, they successfully obtained three passports. 

Immediately upon discovering this GAO undercover operation, 

we took action. We placed all personnel involved in the issuance of 

those passports on 100 percent audit, conducted fraud training for 

all adjudicators and for the acceptance facilities involved, accelerated an aggressive deployment schedule of enhancements to our 

issuance system, which incorporated facial recognition technology, 

strengthened requirements for use of out of state identity documents, and developed a training module for all adjudicators on the 

adjudication and fraud issues raised by the GAO probe. 

We also initiated several longer range projects which include conducting a pilot of commercial database identity scoring, acquiring 

forensic document expertise in the development and delivery of our 

training programs, developing standardized on-line fraud indicator 

check sheets for our adjudicators and incorporating enhanced front 

end data checks into our document issuance system. 

Following a similar GAO operation 2 years ago in which we 

failed to detect any of the four applicant’s fraudulent applications, 

we made process improvements and were more successful in detecting GAO’s latest efforts. Even one passport issued in error is one 

7 

too many and I am more upset than anyone that this has occurred. 

However, it was exactly the improvements which we put in place 

after the 2009 GAO operation that allowed us to recognize this operation before the GAO notified us. 

Following the first GAO investigation, we undertook the systematic review of our operations and developed a remedial plan that 

included revising adjudication standards and processes. Recalculating production standards, doubling the number of personnel devoted to fraud detection, enhancing data checks as part of our front 

end processing, introducing facial recognition technology and expanding the training provided to both specialists and supervisors 

in adjudication and in fraud detection. 

We have done much to address the vulnerabilities, but let me ask 

your help to eliminate them. The greatest threat to the integrity 

of the passport issuance process is document fraud. We need additional tools and stronger authority. 

First, we seek your assistance to pass legislation to designate 

Consular Affairs as a law enforcement entity for the purpose of 

data sharing. We need full access to state registries of births and 

death, and other identity information. Currently our access is restricted by the lack of such designation. 

Second, we seek the subcommittee’s support to encourage standardization of the birth documents that we accept as proof of citizenship. There are more than 6,400 jurisdictions issuing birth certificates in the United States with more than 14,000 versions in circulation. 

Thirteen states allow open access to birth records allowing virtually anyone to purchase copies of birth certificates on file. Differences in paper, format, signatures and security features make 

the detection of fraudulent birth certificates daunting. 

This is a challenge we face, and we face it every day. It is crucial 

that Congress encourage standardization of the birth documents 

that we accept as proof of citizenship. 

Third, we request your support to pass legislation to mandate 

that all passport applicants provide their Social Security numbers. 

In addition to birth documentation, we rely heavily on Social Security data to verify the identity of passport applicants. We seek legislation mandating that applicants provide Social Security numbers. 

Finally, we need your support for continued retention by the 

State Department of the WHTI surcharge as requested in the 

President’s fiscal year 2011 budget. We need these funds to 

strengthen our systems and to combat fraud. Our request is part 

of a larger fee retention package which is in the President’s 2011 

budget. 

Distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the 

constructive approach of this committee. I believe that all of us in 

the federal government are committed to enhancing our services so 

that they are safe, secure, efficient, equitable and responsive to the 

needs of the American people. 

I hope that you will support the initiatives I discussed, for they 

are essential to detecting and preventing passport fraud. I am 

ready to take your questions. Thank you. 

8 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for your testimony. Mr. Kutz, 

let me at least clarify one part of the investigation so I understand 

it. 

In all seven of the efforts there was a false drivers license used, 

am I correct on that? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes. Six from West Virginia and the one in D.C. we 

used an actual D.C. counterfeit, correct. 

Senator CARDIN. And none of these fake drivers licenses triggered the rejection of a passport, is that correct? 

Mr. KUTZ. Not initially. We understand the two that were caught 

were initially because of the Social Security number discrepancies 

that then led to further investigation. That’s our understanding. 

Senator CARDIN. So it was the Social Security number that triggered the first two, and then there were facial differences I understand it on the next two that—— 

Mr. KUTZ. Not a facial difference, a facial match. In other words, 

we had multiple people, same faces with multiple passports. That’s 

what we understand triggered the other ones. 

Senator CARDIN. None of the triggering was, I guess my point is 

that you were able to use false, fake drivers licenses without getting detected basically? 

Mr. KUTZ. The initial intake of those documents you see on my 

right, we don’t believe anyone ever recognized those as counterfeits, 

that’s correct. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, that’s helpful. Ms. Sprague, let me 

take you back to the May, 2009 hearing. You expressed some of the 

same sentiments at that hearing as you are now about how disappointed you are that you’re not 100 percent, and that you take 

these issues very, very seriously. 

You also said that you were going to use your own red teams because you knew that the GAO would be back looking and you wanted to make sure that you were ready for that. Did you use red 

teams? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes, we did. 

Senator CARDIN. How well did you do? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. There were six attempts and we caught five of 

them. 

Senator CARDIN. So GAO is better than your red teams? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. GAO can get real Social Security numbers and diplomatic security can’t. 

Senator CARDIN. So I guess the other thing that has me a little 

bit concerned in your response is that you said that you detected 

the two, therefore you knew that GAO was after you, or at least 

was doing their investigation, and then you changed your procedures it looks like in order to counter what GAO was doing, which 

is fine. 

But we thought you would have the procedures to detect what 

terrorists, criminals, those who want to harm us, or those who just 

want to get a passport who are not entitled to a passport would do. 

My point is wouldn’t you have taken these precautions from the 

beginning rather than just as a preemptive measure against a GAO 

investigation? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Detecting passport fraud and making certain that 

passports don’t go to people who aren’t entitled to them is our numVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:37 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064705 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64705.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
9 

ber one priority. However, we are taking advantage, if that’s the 

appropriate word, of what we learned from these tests to make our 

process better. 

We also learned from what diplomatic security did and we were 

able to make our process better, so in that sense. But I do want 

to clarify one thing and that is that we are in the process of rolling 

out facial recognition. It is not rolled out across the entire system. 

After we realized that, or we believed that it was GAO in process, we wanted to check our system and see if there was anything 

more, and we were able at the headquarters level using software 

that is at a very early stage to go out and identify that in fact there 

were seven pictures that matched prior attempts. So that’s how we 

identified the additional two. 

It wasn’t that we changed our procedures because of the GAO. 

It was that we took advantage of a tool that is still in the developmental phase although it is well along and will be in complete operation by the end of September at all our agencies. It is already 

at six of them. Unfortunately those six were not tested. They were 

tested at ones where they were not yet functioning. But we didn’t 

change anything just because of the GAO, except that I’d certainly 

like to think that we get smarter as we go through these things. 

Senator CARDIN. But you did use that technology that was being 

used at other locations, you I guess switched them to where GAO 

was active. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. No, what we are doing across the board is to have 

facial recognition of all incoming passport applications. We are rolling that out gradually across the network. 

However, we have a second tool which is facial recognition on demand where we can take a single photograph when we suspect 

fraud and run that against the entire database. 

As of this moment, it is rolled out to all the agencies. It wasn’t 

there in April and May, but it is a secondary tool. There are actually two parts to our facial recognition technology. One, to do it as 

part of the up front of the application process, and the other one 

is to have a secondary check when we encounter a fraud that we 

can go back and look and see if it’s there. 

Senator CARDIN. And the purpose of the facial identity is to see 

whether there is duplicate requests or that you have a visual identification of someone who is not entitled to a passport? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The real thing it does is to identify if there have 

been multiple issuances to the same individual. So far at the agencies we have, we have not identified anybody using this. 

On the facial recognition on demand, we have successfully where 

we suspected fraud actually identified people not who had passports already, but who were in our Visa lookout file. 

So we have used that here and there on spot occasions. That tool 

is now available to all our fraud managers. It has been in development and it was only available to a handful before this. 

Senator CARDIN. Just one more question on this. This technology 

is used where you suspect there is a problem, it is not used routinely? Even when it is fully implemented it won’t be used routinely for every application? Or will it be used for every application? 

10 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The facial recognition that was part of our front 

end process will involve every application that is—— 

Senator CARDIN. And when will that be fully implemented? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. By the 15th of September. 

Senator CARDIN. I guess my last question is what should our expectations be here? What is a realistic goal? Are you saying that 

you can get to 100 percent? I know there is always things that can 

get by, but should we be expecting that you have the capacity to 

stop the type of fraudulent applications that GAO is participating 

in, or is this just a hopeless cause? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I certainly hope it’s not a hopeless cause. 

Senator CARDIN. It’s our fourth investigation. It is my second as 

Chairman and it is disappointing to see that there was the success 

in again compromising our system. 

I guess—I have confidence in the work that our people are doing 

but I think we need to have an honest assessment as to whether 

our passports are going to be safe or not. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I think we have to look at all the aspects of passport safety. First of all, we have achieved great success against 

counterfeiting of our passport document with our new E-passport 

and that has been corroborated by studies and we are very proud 

of it. 

But as we have made our documents more and more counterfeit 

proof, and I realize somebody is out there right now trying to figure 

out a way to counterfeit it, it makes it harder on the adjudication 

side because people attempt to obtain good passports with bad 

breeder documents. This is a problem that we discussed in the 

international forum at ICAO and others. It is common to all countries that are issuing travel documentation. 

We have got a lot of people working against us and we are always going to be addressing vulnerabilities. Can we get to 100 percent? That is certainly our objective. It is an uphill climb. It requires lots of work, it requires focus every day, it requires resources and we’re willing to address all of that. 

Senator CARDIN. It just seems to me that a drivers license is a 

common instrument used and that there needs to be a capacity at 

the State Department to identify fraudulent drivers licenses. To me 

that seems like a basic security issue. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. And it seems like a basic security issue to me, too. 

But let me explain to you where we are that we weren’t last year. 

We have with the sponsorship of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, we have received limited access to the nationwide verification 

system known as N-LES. We don’t have access to all 50 states yet, 

but we have access to 43. Only one state has turned us down flat. 

It is a big leap for them to have done this because we do not 

have law enforcement identification or identity. I am missing the 

word there. But they have given us limited access. 

Unfortunately, that access, we only have 242 accounts for the 

whole world and I have 1,200 passport adjudication specialists. So 

we have focused those both here and overseas in the fraud offices. 

When we suspect fraud, we can go in and do a limited check of 

those drivers licenses. 

The second thing that is available to us on drivers licenses is 

that there are machines available. We have done some tests with 

11 

them and we are moving forward with the procurement right now 

for our passport agencies where they will have the ability to see if 

the drivers license has been tampered. 

I have to be honest with you, we did two pilots with them and 

we didn’t catch any counterfeit drivers licenses. We are going to go 

ahead anyway. But we only see one of ten drivers licenses. The 

other nine go to the postal acceptance agencies or the non-postal 

acceptance agencies. They don’t have that capacity. Since our largest partner here is the postal service, they really aren’t in a position to invest in this technology. 

We would have to help the postal service in some way. I would 

see that as the beginning of the solution. It would detect counterfeit. It would not detect those drivers license which people obtain 

in another identity other than their true identity. Those will come 

through as perfect drivers licenses. That is a much harder challenge for us and that requires each of the states to tighten their 

regulations. 

Some states like Colorado and Virginia have done a fantastic job. 

Other states have not stepped up to the plate. That is a problem 

that I cannot solve. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. What state turned you down flat? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. South Dakota. But in fairness to the good people 

of South Dakota, they have a very rigid privacy restriction and 

they absolutely cannot share anything with someone who is not a 

law enforcement entity. 

Senator KYL. By the way, is it Kutz? I don’t want to mispronounce your name. 

Mr. KUTZ. It is Kutz. 

Senator KYL. Kutz. I’m sorry, sir. Well, Mr. Kutz, my understanding is that in your testimony here you have not recommended 

any additional recommendations because of the view that the previous recommendations have not been implemented. 

I wonder if you could tell us your evaluation of the degree to 

which there has been implementation of your prior recommendations. 

Mr. KUTZ. With respect to training, we understand there has 

been training with respect to passports and the breeder documents 

that go into getting those. So to the extent that they have done better recognizing those, I think in most cases they are not recognizing the counterfeit breeder documents and that is difficult because there are hundreds or thousands of different birth certificates and drivers licenses out there. 

We do understand that they are doing more of a match with Social Security and the death records. Two of the cases here we understand they caught based upon a match. Last time they weren’t 

checking the death file, for example, so we think that they’ve made 

some progress there. 

She talked about getting the ability to validate with the DMVs 

and the Vital Statistics on birth certificates. Those are critical elements of being able to authenticate the hundreds of different drivers licenses and birth certificates. We certainly support them doing 

red team. That was one of the things we recommended. We would 

suggest doing more than six tests a year, but certainly it is up to 

12 

their discretion to what they do, but that’s a valuable exercise to 

do the exact same thing that we do to continually test yourself, especially because things here are going to emerge. 

One of the things I will just mention because there are a lot of 

them, but requiring Social Security numbers of people is important. 

They don’t have the authority at this point to require a Social Security number. So you have people who can actually get a U.S. 

passport without having to provide a Social Security number. That 

seems to be a significant issue to us. 

Senator KYL. Let me ask you both. Ms. Sprague, you indicated 

I think three specific things here that would be helpful to you. The 

standard birth certificate, a legal requirement for Social Security 

numbers and I’m not sure what specifically with respect to real ID 

drivers licenses, but some further support for assurance that drivers licenses were not bad breeder documents, is that correct? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We are asking for designation as law enforcement 

so that we can get access to state and local records verification 

which we are precluded from because of privacy. 

Senator KYL. Understood. But even if you had that, if you had 

bad breeder documents, you’re going to have the same problem that 

other agencies have in verifying the fraudulent nature of the document. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It would only help us with counterfeits. It would 

probably not identify breeder documents routinely. 

Senator KYL. Right. But the standard birth certificate might help 

in that regard. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It might. And I want to clarify that I am not asking for a national birth certificate that every state has to follow. 

The states, if we just were dealing with 50 birth certificates, it 

would be heaven. 

Senator KYL. If they were digitized. In fact maybe you could, either one of you can relate to this program for digitization of the 

records. How far would that go toward satisfying this requirement? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Well, certainly one of the things that is holding 

back EVVE is that the states are in such different places in terms 

of how they have recorded and stored their data. If EVVE could get 

up and running, that would be a God send to us because we would 

be able to verify at least that a document was not counterfeit. You 

can only do that electronically. 

So to the extent that the records have not been presented in a 

somewhat common electronic format, EVVE’S task is daunting. 

Senator KYL. With respect to the breeder documents that go into 

drivers licenses, what recommendations would you have to ensure 

that the document that you receive is a valid document? This appeared to be 100 percent of the cases you had a bad drivers license. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes. All the drivers licenses were counterfeit. The one 

in D.C. actually would have traced back to a real drivers license 

we got using counterfeit breeder documents from another test. So 

if they did a match on that, they would have actually determined 

that that person appeared to be real, but the actual drivers license 

we presented here in D.C. was a counterfeit drivers license. 

Senator KYL. OK. So can you answer my question then, ma’am? 

13 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would really like someone who is smarter than 

I am about the specifics of that to get back to you on it. But I can 

say in short that we would like the states to make a serious effort 

to verify that the person who is standing in front of them is in fact 

the person that they say they are. 

I can only speak, for example, for the State of Virginia or the 

State of Colorado which we are very familiar with because they 

have worked with us. In the State of Colorado they actually fingerprint people. They do facial recognition. Facial recognition would be 

terrific for drivers licenses because it would get people who do repeat drivers licenses. 

In addition, in the State of Virginia you have to have proof of 

residence, you have to come up with documents that link you and 

that gives us a much better trail to go back and say that the people 

are who they say they are. 

Of course what happens now is that people just avoid states that 

are tough and go to states that have a reputation for being more 

lenient. 

We also very much like those states, Colorado does it, where they 

indicate when you first got that drivers license so you’re just not 

going that this is a renewal. You can see that the State of Colorado 

can corroborate this identity back to when someone was 16 years 

of age. Our passport specialists love that. 

Senator KYL. Obviously the percentages in cases where your 

folks were fooled are not good percentages. I gather there is no way 

of knowing how many fraudulent or how many genuine passports 

you might be issuing that are based upon fraudulent data. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Any study that we have done post issuance or 

when we did our live audit last year, we did not, were not able to 

discover even when we were going back a significant number. That 

means either that we’re really not doing very many and I believe 

that is true, but I also believe it is true that once someone gets a 

good passport with bad documents, it is hard for anybody to find 

it. 

So I don’t know what the numbers are. I would like to believe 

that they are low. Every evidence I have is that they are low, but 

even one is too many. 

Senator KYL. Would you say that if someone, say a terrorist, is 

bound and determined to get a U.S. passport and has a working 

knowledge of the kinds of things that you’ve been talking about 

here that it is more likely than not that if they use the techniques 

available to them, including the use of bad breeder documents for 

obtaining a drivers license, that they would be able to get a genuine passport from the State Department? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would say, I would remind you that there are 

two things that we determine. One is identity and the other is citizenship. 

I think it is much more difficult for people to try and pass themselves off as Americans than it is for Americans to pass themselves 

off as other Americans. So if we are looking at homegrown terrorists who wanted to have a separate identity, that causes me tremendous concern. 

If you are asking me if I thought a foreigner could come in and 

easily obtain a passport in his own or another name, I would like 

14 

to believe that that would be a far more difficult challenge. We 

focus a lot of attention on verifying citizenship. 

I think that, I would return to my comment. It is easier for an 

American to pose as another American than it would be for someone who is not an American to pose as one. 

Senator KYL. All right. You might need to be careful in view of 

the judge’s decision in Arizona yesterday putting an extra burden 

on the United States government when you seek to verify U.S. citizenship. They seem to be very fragile in this regard, at least according to the affidavits that were submitted in the case I say facetiously, thank you very much for both of you testifying. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of my 

questions may have been asked because I got here just a little bit 

late, so if they have, I apologize. Just say they’ve been answered. 

You suggest that the Bureau of Consular Affairs be designated 

a law enforcement entity in order to access data sharing among 

Federal, state and local governments. 

How would this help your consular officers in combating passport 

fraud? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I mentioned before but I’m happy to mention it 

again because I really would like to leave a very strong impression. 

This is, the various states have privacy regulations and that is 

appropriate. Almost all of them have an exception that data from 

their vital statistics, be it drivers licenses, birth certificates or 

death records can be shared with law enforcement. 

For us, the most effective way to hit against those databases is 

at the front end of the process. We can’t do that at this time because there is not an easy work around with each of the 50 states, 

the District of Columbia, the city of New York, the Commonwealth 

of Puerto Rico to get that other than as a blanket exception that 

we are involved in a law enforcement function. 

We are not interested in law enforcement for anything other 

than for getting access to records which are otherwise protected 

from disclosure because we need them to protect the people of the 

United States more than anything else. 

Senator HATCH. Now you, I understand you’d like to require Social Security numbers on all passport applications and I regularly 

hear from my constituents about identity theft and privacy concerns which often stem from the fraudulent use of Social Security 

numbers. 

So it is hard for me to advocate for another opportunity for potential misuse. But that being said, I would like to hear how requiring Social Security numbers would combat fraud within the 

passport issuance process, and we know there are so many false 

Social Security numbers out there. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Although there are many false Social Security 

numbers out there, the Social Security database is still a source of 

tremendous, is a tremendous resource for us because it enables us 

to quickly identify legitimate Americans, people who have longstanding identities and that we can issue their passports expeditiously. 

15 

It also enables us to single out into a smaller subset people about 

whom we have some question, particularly if someone is operating 

with a false Social Security number. 

Right now if someone does not submit a Social Security number, 

we certainly give that application additional scrutiny. It takes 

them longer to get through the process. But our hands are tied because this data is so useful to us and we don’t have it available to 

us. 

The Social Security Administration is able to confirm back to us 

and does on an overnight basis the name, the date of birth, the Social Security number, whether or not they are dead, which is obviously an important thing, and their gender. We lose all those 

things if we don’t have the Social Security number up front. 

I would agree that we have tremendous concerns about the misuse of Social Security data or privacy data in general and I will be 

very candid with the committee. A passport application is the 

mother load for somebody who wants to commit identify theft. It 

is all there. For that reason, we have been very, very attentive to 

the need to protect that data. 

Not only by ourselves, but by our colleagues in the acceptance facilities. This year we required that they begin to send us all their 

applications by traceable mail. Our new acceptance facility oversight program, that is one of the primary points of their investigations to make sure that this data is being appropriately protected 

in the post office. 

So your constituents are right to have legitimate concern about 

this. We do, too. But we don’t know how else we can find out who 

they are before we issue them a passport. 

Senator HATCH. Part of the initial passport application process, 

acceptance agents as the U.S. postal facilities must review various 

applicants’ identity and citizenship documents as well as their submitted photos. 

These agents are also required to fill out an observation checklist 

regarding any concerns about the validity of the applicant’s documents. 

In your experience, what are the challenges presented by using 

a U.S. postal acceptance agent in the passport process? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The post office and the clerks of court who support 

us, 9,400 of them around the country, are good partners. Obviously 

it is always a risk when you are entrusting such an important duty 

to someone who doesn’t work for you directly. 

But I would have to say that almost universally, especially the 

postal service has tried very hard to meet our expectations. Our 

new acceptance facility oversight program has gone out. They have 

been received. In only a little over 6 months we have done over 

1,300 inspections. We have been received enthusiastically. People 

are anxious to learn, they are anxious to do it right. 

Having said that, they have their own challenges. Particularly 

the postal service has many financial strains. As people leave, the 

new people are not trained immediately, it causes them to have a 

disruption in being able to provide the service. Some of the people 

take to this better than other people and that’s why we have the 

new acceptance facility oversight program because we are very anxVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:37 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064705 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64705.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
16 

ious to make sure they are doing the best possible job. They don’t 

work for us but they do a very good job of working with us. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for your questions. Let me come 

back to the point that you raised about greater access to identification information. 

Obviously if someone has used fraudulent documents to get an 

ID document, that’s not going to show up if you have a valid drivers license that was obtained through fraudulent means. But that 

was not the essence of the concerns at least expressed by GAO and 

that is that there is fraudulent documents being used to obtain a 

passport. 

Looking at drivers licenses, looking at the birth certificates and 

also Social Security numbers, that technology exists to be able to 

verify that information. Admittedly there is just so many types of 

birth certificates that you point out and we have at least 50 jurisdictions with drivers licenses. And then I think you pointed out, 

Ms. Sprague, that the postal services do not have that equipment 

readily available. 

My question is why not? Why shouldn’t we have the ability to 

verify the information from a drivers license? We can swipe cards 

today pretty quickly. Why don’t we have that similar type of technology that’s implemented in terms of passport verification? The 

legislation that I mentioned in my opening statement would designate you as, the Consular Affairs as law enforcement, so it does 

take care of the issue that you raised initially and with Senator 

Hatch. It also gives you access to a lot of these databanks. 

The question is would you have then the capacity to use that information? It seems to me, and I guess I’ll start with Mr. Kutz 

first, isn’t that the key here? Doesn’t the examiner have to have 

access to the databanks in order to be able to verify the validity 

of the documents that are being used? 

Mr. KUTZ. Well, the first line of defense is at the post office. Most 

of these passports the post office is the initial contact. For example, 

in all of our cases we went to the six post offices and one of the 

first things they did was took our drivers license, went to a copy 

machine and made a copy of it and gave the original back. 

So right there you are operating with a copy of a counterfeit document. There is no way you could ever determine a copy of a counterfeit. So that is something that is very important why I think 

you’re talking about having the ability to match with other state 

records. 

If you had real time access to match the drivers license number 

with the state database while that person is sitting right in front 

of you, that would be critical. That would deter people from coming 

in in some cases if they knew that someone was going to actually 

do that or if they had the machine there that was going to actually 

try to authenticate the drivers license, that might deter people 

from even coming in in the first place which to me, prevention is 

the most important part of this. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I agree. I think that’s the point. If you 

make a copy, as you pointed out, make a copy of a fraudulent document, to be able to trace that later is going to be very difficult. You 

17 

have got to do it while the person is there. The technology exists. 

So is this a funding issue? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It is a funding issue, but it is also an access issue. 

I cannot envision a circumstance in which N-LETS would enable 

us to have that kind of verification access at point of sale, if you 

will, for the post office. 

However, if they can determine if it is counterfeit or not, which 

they could do with a very simple device that is available commercially, that would take us a long way. We would get to the counterfeit. 

Then when the actual drivers license comes into us, we would be 

able to hit against N-LETS and at that point we would be able to 

figure out if it was in fact a validly issued drivers license. So you 

eliminate the counterfeit right at the beginning and then at the NLETS point of view as it comes into passport, we’re able to identify 

it. 

We really don’t want our postal people to try and confront people 

who are committing a fraud. We would rather that be taken on by 

skilled professionals. In fact, even at our agencies when we have 

someone who is committing fraud, we bring in reinforcements from 

diplomatic security and our guards onsite to handle how that particular apprehension will take place. 

Senator CARDIN. So just so I understand before I get Mr. Kutz’s 

response to this, if I might. If the intake person at the postal service determined that the drivers license was fraudulent, what would 

that person do? Allow the applicant to leave? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. They would, and we would, they would provide us 

a check sheet and then we would take it from there. We do that 

whenever they suspect fraud and we have had some terrific leads 

from postal people and the people in the clerks of court who have 

spotted somebody as being suspicious, provided that back to us and 

we have successfully traced it back. 

Remember, the person really wants to get their passport, so they 

are going to be somewhere where they can pick that passport up. 

So we do have a second chance at them if we do want to apprehend 

them. 

In passport fraud, obviously whenever we can, we work with the 

U.S. Attorney to prosecute, and that is the best outcome. But if we 

are successful in preventing the issuance of the passport and identifying the person as a fraud, that is too a very good outcome. 

So considering the disbursion and the sensitivity of the data and 

the sensitivity of the states to the exposure of their data, I think 

that that model would be successful for us. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Kutz, do you have a view about that? 

Whether at the intake make a determination on fraudulent on the 

drivers license, but then the rest being done at a centralized location? 

Mr. KUTZ. I would just say this. I think that if you look back at 

history, this goes back, it is almost set up like a pre-9/11 process 

in a post-9/11 world. If you were to start this all over again, would 

you set this up at the post office from the security standpoint? Perhaps not. 

But we have what we have at this point, so two layers of defense 

here. If you had the machines to authenticate the drivers license 

18 

and subsequent we have the ability to validate or authenticate with 

the DMVs, to me those two together would work in this environment. 

Senator CARDIN. So how far away are we from having that equipment located at the service centers? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. At my counters and agencies, as soon as the procurement is finished we will have it done. It’s relatively straightforward for us to move ahead with that. 

The post office wants to do it. They have showed us a machine 

that they’d like that actually does a whole lot more than that, but 

they simply don’t have the capital to invest in that. 

Now, they are paid for what they do for us. The passport appli- cant gives them $25 and they use that to cover their costs. The 

problem is they need some way to capitalize it up front. 

I am not an expert on these things, but in the back of my mind 

I have thought if we could set up some sort of rotating capital fund 

which they could reimburse with what they collect from the applicants, because of course everything we do in passports and in fact 

most of what we do in Consular Affairs is funded, so that we are 

able to establish what it costs and that and only that is what we 

charge to the users of it whether it is visa applicants, overseas or 

Americans who are seeking services. 

Senator CARDIN. Would you just make available to our Subcommittee the cost issues here? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would be happy to do that. 

Senator CARDIN. Just so we get a better understanding of that 

cost. 

Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if maybe we 

could work with the Committee that Chairman Lieberman and 

Ranking Member Collins, Homeland Security, to determine whether or not postal service has ever requested any assistance from the 

Congress, and if so, what has happened to it. If not, why not and 

then work with you all to see if we could obtain that. 

If it’s just a matter of funding for a commercially available program and it could be as effective as you say it is and the ramifications of not finding these things are as serious as the GAO has said 

and we totally agree with that, then this is something we ought to 

pursue. 

Do you agree with GAO’s assessment that you have not implemented, not you, but the department has not implemented the previous recommendations of the GAO? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would say that we have implemented a great 

many of them, but we haven’t solved all our problems. For example, the acceptance facility oversight program is something that 

was first recommended in 2005. We rolled it out this year. I’m very 

proud of it. 

It took us too long, but it’s a good program. Some of our 

verifications with Social Security we got beat up and we should 

have been beat up because we didn’t have it a year ago. 

We have got an excellent relationship with Social Security. They 

are working with us right now to have real time access. Right now 

we get 24 hours. They are going to give it to us real time. We are 

actually at the point of figuring out how much it is going to cost 

19 

and making exchanges of business requirements and we are very 

optimistic that we will get this problem solved. 

The only reservation I have when I talk about what we can and 

cannot do is, neither the Social Security Administration nor the 

states can give us what they don’t have. 

For example, the death master file is a wonderful thing and in 

fact Social Security in our 24-hour turnaround gives us access to 

all of the death data that they have. But it isn’t complete. In the 

case of two of the applications that we looked at, the people who 

died were not in the Social Security death master file. 

After the fact, we couldn’t figure out why their Social Security 

number came up as an absolute perfect match. We did a little bit 

of research and our managers figured it out, and it was that they 

weren’t in the death master file. In this particular instance we figured out how we can address it. But the death master file is not 

perfect. Social Security makes no claims that it is perfect. 

Another tool that we use, and in this instance was not as successful as we would have hoped, is the SSN validator is what we 

call it where you can figure out by using an algorithm when and 

where the Social Security number was issued. The GAO likes to 

beat us up with that and they beat us up with that again this time. 

Social Security doesn’t maintain that. It is sort of a separate entity and we have to maintain it as separate from what we get back 

from Social Security. But it doesn’t matter because Social Security 

is going to abandon that algorithm for very good reasons, but it is 

going to leave us in a hole in terms of any newly issued Social Security numbers. It is not only children, it is also immigrants, remember. We won’t be able to tell when it was issued because it 

won’t be in the algorithm. 

Social Security doesn’t maintain their data in that way that they 

can share it with us. So we’ve got a big problem that we can figure 

out a solution to. We are working very closely with Social Security, 

we hope we can find a solution, but we are anxious about that. 

Senator KYL. Mr. Kutz, do you have a response to what Ms. 

Sprague has just said? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes. I would say in one area that they did improve, 

we used the first four we got last time, one of them was a child, 

a legitimate SSN we got with counterfeit documents several years 

ago. They didn’t catch that last time. 

This time we used another child we have that had a legitimate 

Social Security number and they did catch it, so that was an improvement in that Social Security matching. So that’s why I think 

they’re making progress in that issue of validation of deceased or 

regular Social Security numbers. 

It is not easy, but I think the real time, as real time as you can 

get on that access, that is an important element of this. 

Senator KYL. It just strikes me that you are now identifying 

some additional problems that you’re going to have to contend with 

and you’ve told us that you are working with Social Security to try 

to resolve this last problem that you mentioned. 

I think it might be helpful for us if you could give us a brief report, memorandum, that tells us all of the things that you think 

are necessary for you to do your job the very best in issuing passports to people only who are entitled to them and then to the exVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:37 Mar 09, 2011 Jkt 064705 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\64705.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
20 

tent that some of those things require the executive branch to get 

people together, perhaps it can do that. To the extent legislation 

might be necessary, we can address that. 

To the extent that GAO has identified things that your department can do better, address that in the memo as well. If you think 

yes, they’re right, you can do better, fine. If you think there is some 

reason why you can’t would you put that in the memo for us? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would be happy to do that. 

Senator KYL. I know I’m asking you to do something here that 

the Chairman hasn’t requested, but I think probably all of us could 

benefit by such a report. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would be happy to do that. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. I’m happy with what I heard. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me just underscore the point that Senator 

Kyl made on information. As I try to analyze, and the question I 

asked at the end of the first round is what should our expectations 

be and it was a serious question. 

I understand that this is a process that we can do a lot better 

and we need to do a lot better, but what is reasonable for us to 

expect here as far as performance is concerned? I think there have 

been many worthwhile suggestions that have been made that don’t 

seem to be overly burdensome from the point of view of the timeliness of the passport applications and the cost for processing it. 

As you pointed out, Ms. Sprague, this is a fee generated reimbursement structure, so therefore the people of this Nation are entitled to get the services for the fees that they are paying. 

What it seems to me is that there are different layers of protection here. Each one helps us. On the drivers licenses, it seems to 

me that the technology is there to be able to determine a fraudulent document through a relatively efficient process at the application stage that should be implemented. It also seems to me that access to the databanks will also help you detect fraudulent applications. Now, that may need to be done at a centralized location, but 

it is a second layer. 

On the Social Security numbers, the records kept on those who 

are deceased is one method, but as you point out, it’s not foolproof. 

So therefore you look at the Social Security number which gives 

you some indication, but that’s not foolproof. So it seems to me you 

have to combine all these issues in the most efficient way and by 

doing this, the net will be tight enough that you’re going to increase dramatically the denial of those fraudulent applications. 

Then when we get to the birth certificates, I couldn’t agree with 

you more that this is a task that we really need to work with local 

governments, and try to figure out a more effective way of 

verification of birth certificates that are fraudulent. Because again, 

that information is available, it is just not in a very useful way and 

it seems to me we need to make greater progress there. 

As I have been informed, there are other identification documents that we haven’t really gotten to today, but it seems to me 

that those are less problematic than some of these other forms that 

we’re talking about. 

21 

I would ask that you get us the information that we requested. 

We do have legislation that we’re looking at. I really do know that 

the people are working extremely hard to get this right and we 

know it’s not an easy task. Congress doesn’t always show its appreciation in the right way when we have our budgets that we can 

take up, but we need to do better. 

I think GAO has pointed out that we can do better. It is not that 

we should be doing better. So I think all of us are going to have 

to sort of work together and figure out a way to reduce the error 

rates and to make the passport, which is considered the gold standard, really the gold standard, minimizing any fraudulent applications being successful. 

Mr. Kutz, I thank you very much for the work that your agency 

does. I think it is done in a very up front way with the Congress. 

Ms. Sprague, I thank you for the seriousness in which you have always treated the information, and your presentation and cooperation with this committee. And we look forward to working with you 

for better results. 

Senator KYL. May I just add one more thing? If there is another 

9/11 and people obtain fraudulent documents as they did in that 

case like drivers licenses, for example, and people ask why it happened, I think every one of us has to be able to say we did everything we could to prevent it from happening. 

I think maybe we take it too lightly because it has been a long 

time now, but we tend to forget what happened back then and why 

it was that people could operate freely in this country because they 

had obtained fraudulent documents. 

So I think some degree of urgency is required here as well. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. The hearing record will remain open for 1 week 

for additional statements and questions for the record. If there are 

additional questions that are propounded, I would ask the witnesses to respond in a timely manner to any of those written questions. With that, the Subcommittee will stand adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

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Æ 


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