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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED MAY 30, 2001
 

In re HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWN (AFTER REMAND)


Judge of the Fiftieth District Court,


Pontiac, Michigan. No. 111840
 

PER CURIAM 


This judicial disciplinary matter is before this Court
 

after remand to the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) to
 

determine whether statements made by respondent following an
 

automobile accident resulted in judicial misconduct that was
 

clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. In In
 

re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), this Court set forth several
 

factors that were among the criteria to be used in evaluating
 

judicial discipline cases. We then remanded the present
 
matter to the JTC for an application of the suggested factors
 

to the facts of this case. The JTC, in a June 23, 2000
 

supplemental decision and recommendation, found that
 

respondent was “attempting to use the prestige of [his] office
 

to gain a personal advantage” and, thus, recommended a
 

sanction of suspension from the discharge of all judicial and
 

administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen
 

days. Upon review, we hereby adopt the JTC’s recommended
 

sanction of suspension from the discharge of all judicial and
 

administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen
 

days.
 

I
 

These proceedings arise out of statements made by 50th
 

District Court Judge Christopher C. Brown, respondent,
 

following an automobile accident involving respondent and
 

another driver. The JTC filed a complaint and an evidentiary
 

hearing was held. Following the hearing, the master concluded
 

in a report that respondent did not abuse his office. The
 

JTC’s examiner then filed written objections to the report
 

with the JTC. On review, the JTC made the following findings
 

of fact:
 

(1) Respondent, at all times hereinafter mentioned, was
 

a Judge of the 50th District Court in the City of Pontiac,
 

County of Oakland, State of Michigan.
 

2
 
 

(2) Respondent was involved in an automobile accident
 

with Sue Lambouris on April 26, 1996.
 

(3) The Pontiac Police Department was notified of the
 

accident, and that officers Darryl Cosby and Craig Pesco
 

responded to the location of the accident.
 

(4) Respondent knew police officer Darryl Cosby.
 

(5) Respondent told the police officers that Sue
 

Lambouris was speeding. Specifically, Respondent stated that
 

Mrs. Lambouris was “doing 85 miles per hour.”
 

(6) Respondent requested that Mrs. Lambouris’ name be
 

“run on L.E.I.N. [Law Enforcement Information Network] and
 

ticketed.”
 

On the basis of its findings of fact, which we adopt for
 

purposes of this per curiam opinion, the JTC determined that
 

respondent was “attempting to use the prestige of [his] office
 

to gain a personal advantage” and that such conduct was
 

“clearly prejudicial” to the administration of justice in
 

violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1, 2A, 2B
 

and 2C. The JTC then recommended that respondent be suspended
 

from the discharge of all judicial and administrative duties
 

without pay for fifteen days.
 

Upon review of the JTC’s decision and recommendation,
 

this Court remanded this matter to the JTC for the
 

“articulation of standards of judicial discipline, and for the
 

3
 
application of those standards to the instant case.” In re
 

Brown, supra. As we stated in that case, the development of
 

standards by the JTC will better enable the JTC to respond to
 

“equivalent cases in an equivalent manner.” Furthermore, the
 

application of standards by the JTC will allow this Court to
 

more meaningfully review the JTC’s disciplinary
 

recommendations. In Brown, supra, we articulated several
 

factors that were among the criteria to be used in evaluating
 

judicial discipline cases. The recommended factors are as
 

follows: 


(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or


practice is more serious than an isolated instance


of misconduct;
 

(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more


serious than the same misconduct off the bench;
 

(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the


actual administration of justice is more serious


than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the


appearance propriety;
 

(4) misconduct that does not implicate the


actual administration of justice, or its appearance


of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct


that does;
 

(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is


less serious than misconduct that is premeditated


or deliberated;
 

(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of


the justice system to discover the truth of what


occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the


most just result in such a case, is more serious


than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;
 

(7)	 misconduct that involves the unequal
 

4
 
application of justice on the basis of such
 

considerations as race, color, ethnic background,


gender, or religion are more serious than breaches


of justice that do not disparage the integrity of


the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.


[461 Mich 1292-1293.]
 

After remand, the JTC filed a supplemental
 

recommendation. In this recommendation, the JTC determined
 

that respondent was “attempting to use the prestige of [his]
 

office to gain a personal advantage.” Consequently, the JTC
 

again recommended that this Court suspend respondent from the
 

discharge of all judicial and administrative duties for a
 

period of fifteen days. The JTC, however, did not expressly
 

apply the recommended factors as set forth in In re Brown for
 

the reason that its membership had changed between the
 

original recommendation and the remand. Therefore, before we
 

“adopt, reject, or modify” the JTC’s recommended discipline,
 

we will engage in a brief analysis of the Brown factors as
 

applied to Judge Brown himself. 


II
 

Upon review, we conclude that factors 1, 2, 4, and 5 are
 

relevant to this case. In particular, factors 1 and 4 support
 

the JTC’s recommended discipline of respondent. Pursuant to
 

factor 1, we find that respondent’s conduct was part of a
 

pattern or practice of misconduct rather than an isolated
 

instance of misconduct. As the JTC stated in its
 

recommendation for discipline, respondent had been admonished
 

5
 
 

 

 

 

by the JTC on four prior occasions for acts of misconduct.1
 

Additionally, pursuant to factor 4, respondent’s conduct
 

implicated the appearance of impropriety. The record shows
 

that respondent knew one of the investigating officers who
 

arrived at the scene. This existing relationship, coupled
 

with respondent’s attempted direction to the officer
 

concerning the type of investigation that he should conduct
 

with regard to the other driver, gave rise to an appearance of
 

impropriety and had the potential to erode the public’s
 

confidence in the judiciary.2
 

1 Even if the dissent is correct that respondent’s


behavior is not properly characterized as part of a “pattern


or practice” of misconduct, there is nothing at all
 

inappropriate in the JTC taking into consideration in its


proportionality decisions altogether unrelated instances of


misconduct.
 

2 We do not disagree with the dissent’s characterization


of the rules of conduct with regard to “judge-victims.” Post
 

at 7. However, unlike the dissent, we believe that
 

respondent’s conduct went well beyond a mere “report[ing] the


underlying facts involved in the crime.” Post at 4. Rather,


in this case, the respondent directed the officer to take two


very specific actions: (a) run Ms. Lambouris’ name through the


LEIN system, and (b) issue Ms. Lambouris a ticket. Though a


fine line cannot always be drawn in these matters, the


respondent’s direction to the officer, in our judgment, was


not in the nature of a mere call to investigation, it was not


simply a spontaneous expression of anger or pique, and it was


more than a generalized call to the officer to do something


about an unfortunate situation. Rather, when made to an


officer who was aware of respondent’s judicial status, such


direction, in our opinion, invoked respondent’s judicial


status in an inappropriate manner.
 

6
 
 

 

On the other hand, factors 2 and 5 mitigate against
 

increasing respondent’s sanction. Pursuant to factor 2, it is
 

important to highlight that the misconduct at issue arose out
 

of statements made pursuant to an automobile accident. The
 

misconduct did not occur while respondent was on the bench.
 

Additionally, pursuant to factor 5, the remarks made by
 

respondent appear to have been made spontaneously and under at
 

least some stress, with respondent having just been involved
 

in an automobile accident. When the police officers arrived,
 

respondent told the officers that Mrs. Lambouris was speeding
 

at eighty-five miles an hour. With regard to this remark, the
 

JTC found that “[r]espondent knowingly made a false
 

statement.” However, pursuant to the circumstances of this
 

case, this Court concludes that this remark was merely a
 

speculation concerning the rate of speed of the other driver.
 

Concerning respondent’s request that the officers search Mrs.
 

Lambouris’ name in the LEIN system and ticket her, we reach
 

the same conclusion. Respondent’s remark was merely a
 

spontaneous reaction in the immediate aftermath of an
 

automobile accident. After weighing the above factors, and
 

applying them to the circumstances of this case, we believe
 

that respondent’s past disciplinary indiscretions, as well as
 

the appearance of impropriety that resulted from respondent’s
 

statements to the police officers, one of whom he knew,
 

7
 
regarding the type of investigation that the officers should
 

engage in was sufficient misconduct to warrant the adoption of
 

the JTC’s recommendation of discipline. Thus, we hold that
 

respondent be suspended from the discharge of all judicial and
 

administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen
 

days.
 

Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to
 

issue the judgment order forthwith.
 

CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,
 

concurred.
 

8
 
_________________________________ 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

In re HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWN (AFTER REMAND)


Judge of the Fiftieth District Court,


Pontiac, Michigan. No. 111840
 

CORRIGAN, C.J. (dissenting).
 

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to
 

suspend respondent for fifteen days for certain statements he
 

made in the aftermath of an automobile accident. I would hold
 

that respondent’s actions, while certainly not exemplary, did
 

not constitute judicial misconduct because his conduct was not
 

clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.
 

I
 

These proceedings arise from a car accident involving
 

respondent and another driver in Pontiac. Pontiac police
 

officers responded to a call for assistance and investigated.
 

Respondent told an officer with whom he was acquainted that
 

the other driver had been traveling at eighty-five miles an
 

hour. He then requested that the officer run the other
 

driver’s name on the Law Enforcement Information Network
 

(LEIN), and urged the officer to ticket the other driver. The
 

officer did not, however, issue a ticket. The owner of the
 
other car later brought an action in 50th District Court to
 

recover his insurance deductible.
 

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) complaint alleged
 

misconduct arising from (1) respondent’s conduct at the
 

accident scene, (2) respondent’s transfer of the district
 

court action to another judge, and (3) respondent’s conduct
 

during the hearing on the district court lawsuit. The
 

complaint also alleged misconduct arising from respondent’s
 

conduct during an unrelated criminal case and his unrelated
 

actions in presiding over uncontested and default matters
 

involving his court officer.
 

At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the master
 

determined that the examiner failed to establish judicial
 

impropriety and that respondent did not violate the code of
 

judicial conduct, court rules, or the constitution. The
 

master found that respondent “informed the officers of [the
 

other driver’s] excessive speed (the testimony varies between
 

85 and 50 miles per hour) and . . . stated his desire to have
 

[the other driver] run on a lien [sic] machine and ticketed
 

. . . .” The master further found that reason existed to
 

believe that the other driver had been speeding, although the
 

evidence did not support respondent’s claim that the car had
 

been traveling at eighty-five miles an hour. The master
 

characterized respondent’s statement that the other car was
 

2
 
traveling “85 miles per hour” as a “hyperbolic exaggeration
 

and not a deliberate falsification, similar perhaps to
 

claiming that ‘she was going like a bat out of Hell.’” The
 

master rejected all the remaining allegations in the
 

complaint.
 

The JTC affirmed the master’s finding that respondent
 

made the statements at the accident scene, but rejected the
 

master’s conclusion that respondent had not abused the
 

prestige of his office. The JTC found that respondent’s
 

conduct violated Canons 1 and 2(A)-(C) of the Code of Judicial
 

Conduct.3 It found that respondent’s conduct constituted
 

1 Canon 1 provides in part that “[a] judge should


participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and


should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that


the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be


preserved.”
 

Canon 2(A)-(C) provides:
 

A. Public confidence in the judiciary is


eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by


judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and


appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to


be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A
 

judge must therefore accept restrictions on conduct


that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary


citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
 

B. A judge should respect and observe the
 

law. At all times, the conduct and manner of a


judge should promote public confidence in the


integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.


Without regard to a person’s race, gender, or other


protected personal characteristic, a judge should


(continued...)
 

3
 
misconduct under MCR 9.205(C)(4) because it was clearly
 

prejudicial to the administration of justice. The JTC adopted
 

the master’s findings and conclusions regarding the other
 

allegations of misconduct. It recommended that this Court
 

suspend respondent for fifteen days.
 

II
 

In this case, the JTC recommends discipline solely on the
 

basis of respondent’s conduct at the accident scene. Thus,
 

while the complaint certainly alleged other misconduct, I have
 

confined my review solely to judicial misconduct arising from
 

respondent’s statements to the investigating officers because
 

this Court may discipline a judge only “[o]n recommendation of
 

the judicial tenure commission.” Const 1963, art 6, § 30; see
 

In re Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 524-527; 243 NW2d 86 (1976). I
 

conclude that the JTC failed to prove by a preponderance of
 

the evidence4

 that respondent attempted to use the prestige of
 

(...continued)


treat every person fairly, with courtesy and
 

respect.
 

C. A judge should not allow family, social,
 

or other relationships to influence judicial


conduct or judgment. A judge should not use the


prestige of office to advance personal business


interests or those of others. A judge should not


appear as a witness in a court proceeding unless


subpoenaed.
 

2 In re Loyd, 424 Mich 514, 521; 384 NW2d 9 (1986).
 

4
 
his office to gain a personal advantage and that his conduct
 

was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.
 

In my view, the determination whether respondent’s
 

conduct was clearly prejudicial to the administration of
 

justice hinges on respondent’s intent in making statements to
 

the officers at the accident scene. The master found that
 

respondent was “shaken, excited and emotional” after the
 

accident. The master further characterized respondent’s
 

statement regarding the speed of the other driver’s car as
 

“hyperbole.” I would defer to those findings because,
 

although this Court reviews the record de novo, In re Loyd,
 

424 Mich 514, 521; 384 NW2d 9 (1986), we accord deference to
 

the master’s ability to observe witnesses’ demeanor and
 

evaluate their credibility. Id. at 535. I thus defer to the
 

master’s credibility finding that respondent did not
 

intentionally lie to the officer. I am frankly puzzled by the
 

JTC majority’s finding of an intentional falsehood. They gave
 

no reason for concluding that the master erred in his contrary
 

credibility determination.5
 

3 Under MCR 9.221(B), the JTC must make written findings


of fact and conclusions of law along with its recommendations


for action, but may adopt the master’s findings, in whole or


in part, by reference. In light of the master’s superior


position for purposes of evaluating the credibility of


witnesses, however, it is incumbent on the JTC to explain its


reasons for rejecting a master’s finding that turns on such a


determination. Moreover, absent a hearing at which the


(continued...)
 

5
 
I further agree with the majority’s characterization of
 

respondent’s statement at the accident scene as a “spontaneous
 

speculation” induced by “stress” in the immediate aftermath of
 

an automobile accident. I accept and see no clear error in
 

the finding of the Master that Judge Brown’s statement was
 

hyperbole. Further, I accept the master’s finding that Judge
 

Brown had no insidious motive.
 

In light of this conclusion, I would not hold that Judge
 

Brown knowingly and intentionally attempted to use the
 

prestige of his office to gain a personal advantage. I cannot
 

say with any degree of certainty that he attempted to misuse
 

the prestige of his office to gain a personal advantage. His
 

conduct seems to me equally likely the spontaneous reaction of
 

a shaken accident victim.
 

The majority rule is that a judge-victim who is
 

acquainted with the police officers who are conducting an
 

investigation may provide a report about the relevant facts,
 

but cannot recommend any action on the basis of those facts.
 

Thus, a judge who is a victim of an armed robbery may report
 

the underlying facts involved in the crime, but may not say,
 

(...continued)


witnesses actually testify before the JTC, MCR 9.219, I


question whether this Court should reject the master’s finding


in favor of a contrary finding by the JTC.
 

6
 
“There’s the robber—arrest that man.”6 The direction to
 

arrest may demonstrate a misuse of office to advance personal
 

interests in recovering the judge’s stolen property.
 

Next, I cannot join the conclusion that Judge Brown’s
 

statements at the accident scene were part of a “pattern and
 

practice” of misconduct on the basis of prior JTC admonitions
 

against Judge Brown. Judge Brown’s excited utterances at the
 

accident scene were unique, isolated events, different in kind
 

from the events and statements that formed the basis of the
 

prior JTC admonitions. I cannot join the conclusion that
 

Judge Brown’s conduct at the accident scene demonstrates a
 

pattern and practice of misconduct.
 

I would reject the JTC recommendation in this case
 

because respondent’s conduct at the accident scene was not
 

clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. The
 

record does not reflect that the other driver heard
 

respondent’s remarks. Nor does it establish that respondent’s
 

statements influenced the officer’s decision to issue a
 

ticket. That a motorist whose vehicle has been struck in an
 

accident would request in the immediate aftermath that the
 

responding officer ticket the driver of the other car is not
 

unusual. That a judge, still shaken from the accident, would
 

6
 While an armed robbery is a crime, not an accident,


both are startling events likely to trigger in the victim


spontaneous, excited utterances.
 

7
 
make a similar request is not prejudicial to the
 

administration of justice. Moreover, respondent’s comment
 

requesting a LEIN check does not, under the circumstances of
 

this case, elevate respondent’s conduct to a level that
 

clearly prejudices the administration of justice. The master
 

found that respondent acted without an insidious motive.
 

Accordingly, I would decline to impose discipline on the basis
 

of respondent’s conduct at the scene of the accident.7
 

7Assuming that respondent’s actions constituted
 

misconduct, the misconduct would not warrant a suspension. I
 

also part company from my colleagues in their application of


the governing principles set out in our prior order to these


facts:
 

While we do not purport to substitute our


judgment for that of the JTC in this regard, some


of these standards are obvious. For example,


everything else being equal:
 

(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or


practice is more serious than an isolated instance


of misconduct;
 

(2) misconduct on the bench is usual more


serious than the same misconduct off the bench;
 

(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the


actual administration of justice is more serious


than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the


appearance of propriety;
 

(4) misconduct that does not implicate the


actual administration of justice, or its appearance


of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct


that does;
 

(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is


less serious than misconduct that is premeditated


(continued...)
 

8
 
III
 

I conclude that respondent’s were not clearly
 

prejudicial to the administration of justice. I would
 

therefore reject the JTC recommendation to discipline
 

respondent. Accordingly, I dissent.
 

7(...continued)


or deliberated;
 

(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of


the justice system to discover the truth of what


occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the


most just result in such a case, is more serious


than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;
 

(7) misconduct that involves the unequal


application of justice on the basis of such
 

considerations as race, color, ethnic background,


gender, or religion are more serious than breaches


of justice that do not disparage the integrity of


the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.


[461 Mich 1294-1295.]
 

Application of these factors to this case suggests the


lightest form of discipline for those members of this Court


who conclude that respondent was engaged in judicial


misconduct—a censure. Respondent’s acts were spontaneous,


isolated, occurred off the bench, and, at most, gave the


appearance of impropriety. Respondent’s conduct did not


implicate the actual administration of justice, and did not


affect the ability of the justice system to discover the truth


in a case. Moreover, the alleged misconduct does not involve


the unequal application of justice. Under the circumstances
 

of this case, a suspension is not appropriate.
 

9