2002 Davis-Besse

Reactor Pressure 

Vessel Head 

Degradation 

Knowledge 

Management Digest

NUREG/KM-0005

February 2014

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Overview of the 2002 Event 2

Lessons Learned from the 2002 Event 6

NRC Actions Based on Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Legal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

The 2010 Event 14

Retrospectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1

Introduction

“Knowledge is power” 

- Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has an active knowledge 

management program that captures important historical events and critical 

information and preserves this knowledge for future generations.

The 2002 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head incident at Davis-Besse Nuclear 

Power Station (DBNPS) in Oak Harbor, OH, was one of the most serious nuclear 

safety events in United States history. In March 2002, severe degradation of the 

reactor pressure vessel head was discovered during a refueling outage at DavisBesse. Boric acid had eaten away the carbon steel of the RPV head, leaving only 

a thin layer of stainless steel cladding to withstand the full operating pressure 

of the coolant in the reactor core. This could have led to a rupture of the reactor 

pressure vessel head and caused a major public safety event.

Eight years later, in 2010, Davis-Besse experienced another serious safety event 

involving the reactor pressure vessel head. During an NRC-mandated inspection, 

plant staff found cracking of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles.

Had the plant staff not performed the inspection and found the cracking, the event 

would have progressed and could have led to a situation similar to the 2002 event.

Fortunately, in both 2002 and 2010, the problems at the Davis-Besse were 

discovered before they caused a major public safety event. These near-miss 

accidents have driven NRC policies and research to ensure the continued safe 

operation of the entire U.S. nuclear fleet.

This knowledge 

management digest 

and accompanying 

DVD contain historical 

documents relating to the 

technical and regulatory 

aspects of these incidents.

Brian Sheron, Director of the 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research at the 2013 special 

seminar on Davis-Besse.
2 Protecting People and the Environment

These documents can be accessed on the DVD through the interactive timelines 

or directly through the document listings.

The DVD also includes a multimedia presentation of the special NRC seminar 

“2002 Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Degradation” held in January 2013, 

which offers a retrospective view of the 2002 incident.

Overview of the 2002 Event

Background

The reactor pressure vessel heads of pressurized-water reactors (PWR) contain 

penetrations for CRDM and instrumentation systems. These penetrations are 

made from nickel-based alloys (e.g., Alloy 600) and related weld metals. Primary 

coolant and the operating conditions of PWR plants have been known to cause 

cracking of the nickel-based alloys and weldments through a process called 

primary water-stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). In response to the detection of 

PWSCC at several plants, the NRC issued NRC Bulletin 2001-01, “Circumferential 

Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles,” that requested 

information related to licensees’ programs for inspection of vessel head 

penetration (VHP) nozzles. Bulletin 2001-01 and Davis-Besse’s responses 

can be found on the DVD (see the 2002 Regulatory Timeline or Events 

Leading Up in the documents section).

Through-Wall Cracking Detected

On February 16, 2002, in response to Bulletin 2001-01, the Davis-Besse Nuclear 

Power Station began a refueling outage with the intent to perform work that 

included remotely inspecting the VHP nozzles from underneath the head focusing 

on the CRDM. The licensee found that three CRDM nozzles had indications of 

through-wall axial cracking. Specifically, the licensee found these indications in 

CRDM nozzles 1, 2, and 3, which are located near the top of the reactor pressure 

vessel head. Condition reports discussing these findings are on the DVD (see the 

2002 Regulatory Timeline or Events Leading Up in the documents section).

Repair Attempts

The licensee attempted to repair these VHP nozzles remotely by approaching 

from underneath the pressure vessel head. On March 6, 2002, the licensee 

terminated the repair process on CRDM nozzle 3 to determine the cause of 

unusual equipment operation and removed the machining apparatus from the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3

Typical pressurized water reactor

Detail of vessel head penetration nozzles
4 Protecting People and the Environment

nozzle. During the removal, the nozzle tipped in the downhill direction until it 

rested against an adjacent CRDM. If the surrounding steel had been structurally 

sound, it should have held the nozzle in position.

Investigation

The licensee investigated the condition of the reactor pressure vessel head 

surrounding CRDM nozzle 3. The investigation included removing the CRDM 

nozzle and removing large boric acid deposits from the top of the reactor pressure 

vessel head. Upon completing the boric acid removal on March 8, 2002, the 

licensee conducted a visual examination of the area and identified a large cavity 

in the reactor pressure vessel head on the downhill side of CRDM nozzle 3. The 

corrosion was caused by borated water that leaked from the reactor coolant system 

onto the vessel head through cracks in the nozzle and the weld that attached nozzle 

3 to the reactor pressure vessel head. The licensee discovered the remaining 

thickness of the reactor pressure vessel head in the wastage area to be about 

9.5 mm (3/8 inch). This thickness consisted of only stainless steel cladding on 

the inside surface of the reactor pressure vessel head, which is nominally 9.5 mm 

(3/8 inch) thick. The stainless steel cladding is resistant to corrosion by boric acid, 

but it is not intended to provide structural integrity to the vessel. Failure of the 

stainless steel cladding would have resulted in a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).

The LOCA would have resulted in actuation of the plant’s emergency systems.

Condition reports and technical reports can be found on the DVD (see the 2002 

Technical Timeline or Davis-Besse Degradation in the documents section).

NRC Actions

The NRC issued a confirmatory action letter that (1) required Davis-Besse to 

remain shut down until the situation could be satisfactorily addressed and 

(2) invoked the process outlined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, “Oversight 

of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance 

and/or Operation Concern.” This process establishes guidelines for the oversight 

of licensee performance during the shutdown. The process requires that the 

licensee must meet specific criteria before the plant can restart. Meeting these 

criteria ensure that the plant is operated in a manner that provides adequate 

protection of public health and safety. The confirmatory action letter can be 

found on the DVD (see the 2002 Regulatory Timeline or NRC Actions in 

the documents section).
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5

Region of the vessel head degradation.

Photo of the cavity after it was removed from the vessel head.
6 Protecting People and the Environment

Lessons Learned from the 2002 Event

Operational Experience

During the early 1990s, the NRC and industry recognized the potential for boric 

acid corrosion of a reactor pressure vessel head. In 1993, the industry and NRC 

specifically addressed the possibility of extensive reactor pressure vessel head 

wastage stemming from undetected VHP nozzle leaks involving axial cracking 

caused by primary water-stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). The industry 

concluded and the NRC agreed that the likelihood of this happening was low 

because VHP nozzle leaks would be detected before significant reactor pressure 

vessel head degradation could occur. Nevertheless, in spite of this awareness 

and contrary to this conclusion, the 2002 Davis-Besse event happened. A history 

of NRC publications regarding boric acid corrosion and primary water stress 

corrosion cracking can be found on the DVD (see the 2002 Regulatory Timeline 

or Events Leading Up in the documents section).

Lessons Learned Task Force

The NRC’s Executive Director for Operations (EDO) at the time, Dr. William 

D. Travers, directed the formation of an NRC task force to respond to the 2002 

Davis-Besse event. The objective of this task force was to independently evaluate 

the NRC’s regulatory processes related to assuring reactor pressure vessel 

head integrity to identify and recommend areas for improvement that may be 

applicable to either the NRC or the nuclear industry. Consistent with its charter, 

the task force reviewed five general areas including the following: (1) Reactor 

Oversight Process issues, (2) regulatory process issues, (3) research activities, 

(4) international practices, and (5) the NRC’s Generic Issues Program.

Task Force Conclusions

The lessons learned task force concluded that the Davis-Besse VHP nozzle 

leakage and reactor pressure vessel head degradation event was preventable.

Although this review was primarily introspective, this question could not be 

answered without considering industry activities and Davis-Besse’s performance.

At Davis-Besse, early indications of reactor pressure vessel corrosion were 

missed. These indications include the clogging of radiation element system filters 

by boric acid, the buildup of boric acid deposits on containment air cooler fins, 

and the buildup of large amounts of boric acid deposits on the RPV head. The task 

force concluded that the event was not prevented because: (1) the NRC, DavisBesse, and the nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow 

up on relevant operating experience; (2) Davis-Besse failed to ensure that plant 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7

safety issues received appropriate attention; and (3) the NRC failed to integrate 

known or available information into its assessments of Davis-Besse’s safety 

performance. Moreover, an NRC investigation concluded that Davis-Besse did 

not adequately execute the boric acid corrosion control program in response to an 

NRC generic communication, and the NRC did not adequately review the industry 

implementation of long-term commitments such as the commitment to maintain a 

boric acid corrosion control program. The lessons learned task force report can be 

found on the DVD (see NRC Actions in the documents section).

Reactor pressure vessel head flange area 

showing significant amounts of boric acid 

deposits (photo taken during the 2000 refueling 

outage at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station).

Close-up view of the cavity.

Boric acid deposits accumulating near a 

CRDM nozzle (still photo of video taken 

during the 2000 refueling outage at DavisBesse Nuclear Power Station).

Oblique view of the cavity partially 

showing the J-groove weld at the bottom of 

the cavity.

NRC Actions

As a result of its review, the task force determined that the NRC should take 

specific actions to address contributing factors that led to the 2002 Davis-Besse 

event. The task force recommendations involved the following areas: 

(1) stress corrosion cracking, (2) reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity, 

(3) operational experience, and (4) inspection and program management.
8 Protecting People and the Environment

NRC Actions Based on Lessons Learned

The lessons learned task force developed recommendations in key technical and 

programmatic areas. The following are examples of some of the actions taken by 

the NRC to address the recommendations of the task force.

Stress Corrosion Cracking

The agency issued NRC Order EA-03-009 requiring all licensees with plants 

susceptible to reactor pressure vessel head degradation to visually inspect 

the reactor vessel head surface area for indications of leakage and boric acid 

accumulation and to inspect head penetrations using methods to detect cracks 

before leakage starts.

The NRC worked with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 

to develop Code Case N-729-1 to incorporate long-term inspection requirements 

of reactor pressure vessel heads into the ASME Code. The NRC will incorporate 

the finalized inspection requirements 

into Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a, 

“Codes and Standards,” and allow the 

rescission of NRC Order EA-03-009.

Order EA-03-009 can be found on 

the DVD (see the 2002 Regulatory 

Timeline or NRC Actions in the 

documents section).

Left photo: Top view of the J-groove weld with an arrow pointing to a crack. 

Right photo: Polished cross section of the area shown in the top photo showing the 

through-wall crack in the J-groove weld.

Schematic of the nozzle penetration cross section 

showing the leak path of the reactor coolant.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9

Operating Experience

In December 2004, the NRC codified a new operating experience program 

in Management Directive 8.7, “Reactor Operating Experience Program,” 

to systematically collect, communicate, and evaluate operating experience 

information, including foreign operating experience. The program makes 

significant use of information technology to make operating experience 

information available to internal users and members of the public through a 

single Web access page.

The NRC established an organization within the agency to act as a clearinghouse 

that collects, communicates, and evaluates operating experience and applies 

the lessons learned to the core regulatory functions of oversight, licensing, 

rulemaking, and incident response. It also conducts a daily screening meeting 

at which incoming event reports and other operating experience items are 

reviewed. A recently established new operating experience information gateway 

consolidates a large collection of individual databases and web sources of 

information onto a single web access page. Through this gateway, all reported 

events can be reviewed and managed.

To ensure plant experience is adequately considered in licensing decisions, the 

NRC established new or revised expectations with regard to the duration of 

a licensing project manager assignment to a specific plant, frequency of site 

visits, communication with the resident inspector staff, and maintenance of a 

questioning safety attitude about plant events. Management Directive 8.7 can be 

found on the DVD (see NRC Actions in the documents section).

Inspection and Program Management

The staff made several changes to the process to enhance the NRC’s ability to 

detect declining plant performance, including the specific issues identified at the 

Davis-Besse. For example, the review of the event indicated the deteriorating 

condition had been underway for several years and that the planned inspection, 

maintenance, and modification activities that could have prevented or enabled 

earlier discovery of the condition were frequently deferred.

The NRC increased the evaluation of licensees’ programs and actions relating 

to longstanding unresolved problems. In addition, the NRC now audits the 

licensees’ commitment management programs every 3 years by assessing the 

adequacy of the licensees’ implementation of a sample of commitments made to 

the NRC in past licensing actions and activities.

The NRC inspector training program has been enhanced by a web-based system 

to provide more timely dissemination of information to the inspection staff and 
10 Protecting People and the Environment

a method for individual study. New training modules were developed to address 

lessons learned from the 2002 Davis-Besse event, such as the effects of boric acid 

corrosion and the importance of maintaining a questioning attitude toward safety.

The agency determined that safety culture weaknesses at Davis-Besse were at 

the root causes of the reactor vessel head degradation event. Therefore, the NRC 

took significant steps within the reactor oversight process to strengthen the ability 

to detect a weak safety culture in inspections and performance assessments. In 

this context, safety culture is defined as “that assembly of characteristics and 

attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 

priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 

significance.” The NRC continues to seek ways to improve this and other aspects 

of its oversight processes.

The NRC has enhanced program management aspects of the reactor oversight 

process. For example, the guidance for managing NRC resources devoted to 

plants in an extended shutdown as a result of performance issues was revised to 

ensure less impact on routine oversight at other plants. Also, to ensure continuity 

of regulatory oversight, the staff developed and issued a site staffing metric to 

monitor gaps in permanent resident and senior resident staffing at reactor sites 

and established the criterion of maintaining a minimum of 90-percent coverage.

Timeline

The timeline of the 2002 incident has been broken down into three sections, a 

technical timeline that covers the technical aspects of the incident, a regulatory 

timeline that covers NRC actions related to the incident, and a legal timeline 

that provides a summary of criminal and civil cases stemmed from this incident.

Interactive timelines with additional information and links to relevant documents 

can be found on the DVD (see the 2002 Timeline).

Technical

Boric acid was first noted on the reactor pressure vessel head flange during an 

inspection in April 2000. The plant removed buildup and made repairs. The 

following year, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01 mandating licensees perform 

special inspections of CRDM nozzles and report results to the NRC. Davis-Besse 

staff requested to delay the inspections until the next refueling outage scheduled 

to take place in early 2002 to limit worker radiation dose. The NRC approved 

the requested delay after Davis-Besse provided justification that delaying the 

inspections would present a limited risk.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11

The 13th refueling outage started on February 16, 2002. In the subsequent weeks, 

the Davis-Besse staff performed multiple inspections. Boron crystal buildup on the 

reactor pressure vessel flange was found in the same area as the boric acid buildup 

noticed in 2000 but in larger quantity. Inspections of the CRDM nozzles found 

axial cracking in 5 nozzles and a 30-degree circumferential crack in one nozzle.

On March 7, 2002, during a repair attempt of CRDM nozzle 3, the repair 

equipment shifted unusually, prompting an examination of the reactor 

pressure vessel head. Davis-Besse staff discovered extensive degradation of 

the reactor pressure vessel head, and notified the NRC of the situation. The 

licensee assembled a corrective action plan to address issues identified with the 

plant’s operation, including replacement of the reactor pressure vessel head; 

implementation began in June 2002.

Regulatory

As early as the 1980s, boric acid corrosion and primary water-stress corrosion 

cracking (PWSCC) were known phenomena and had been observed in commercial 

U.S. reactors. The NRC had begun addressing these issues through regulations 

such as Generic Letter 88-05, “Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor 

Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants,” which mandated that licensees 

implement a program to address boric acid corrosion of carbon steel components.

Timeline of the 2002 reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. Red indicates 

technical aspects and green indicates regulatory aspects.
12 Protecting People and the Environment

In 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor 

Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles”, in response to circumferential 

cracking discovered in CRDM nozzles at a U.S. commercial reactor. The bulletin 

required that licensees perform inspections on their CRDM nozzles to check for 

cracking. Severe boric acid corrosion of the carbon steel reactor pressure vessel 

head was uncovered during these inspections. Following this discovery, the NRC 

issued Confirmatory Action Letter 03-02-001, which shut down operations at 

Davis-Besse until further notice.

Bulletin 2002-01 was issued on March 18, 2002, and it requested information 

from licensees regarding their vessel head inspection and maintenance programs to 

ensure they adequately protect against issues that would affect the reactor pressure 

vessel head integrity.

In February 2004, about 2 years after the degradation was found, NRC Order 

EA-03-214 allowed the restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station provided 

the licensee met certain conditions. The order also required Davis-Besse to comply 

with additional requirements over the next 5 years including contracting with 

an outside organization to conduct annual comprehensive assessments of the 

operations at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The licensee accepted these 

terms. In 2009, the NRC acknowledged that the licensee had met all the conditions 

of the Order and it was no longer in effect.

Legal

Davis-Besse Criminal Summary

On January 19, 2006, The United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Ohio issued a criminal indictment to the following individuals: David Geisen, 

Rodney Cook, and Andrew Siemaszko. The indictment charged each with five 

counts: one count for concealing material information and three counts for false 

statements.

On January 20, 2006, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), agreed 

to pay $28 million in penalties, restitution, and community service projects as 

part of an agreement to defer criminal prosecution of the company. Under this 

deferred prosecution agreement, FENOC admitted that the Government could 

prove that FENOC employees, acting on the company’s behalf, knowingly by 

making false representations to the NRC in the course of attempting to persuade 

the NRC that its Dave-Besse Nuclear Power Station was safe to operate beyond 

December 31, 2001.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 13

On October 30, 2007, a jury in the Northern District of Ohio found two of the 

three indictees, David Geisen and Andre Siemaszko, guilty of three counts each 

of concealing a material fact and making false statements to the NRC. However, 

the jury found the third indictee, Rodney Cook, not guilty of all charges against 

him. The court placed David Geisen on probation for a term of 3 years on 

each of the 3 counts to be served concurrently with standard and additional 

conditions as noted. In addition, the court imposed a fine of $7,500.00 and a 

special assessment in the amount of $300.00 against Mr. Geisen. As for Andrew 

Siemaszko, the court placed him on probation for a term of 3 years on each count 

to run concurrently with standard and additional conditions as noted. The court 

also ordered that Mr. Siemaszko pay a fine of $1500 for each count (for a total of 

$4500) and a special assessment in the amount of $300.

On May 2, 2008, David Geisen filed an appeal to the United States Court of 

Appeals for the 6th Circuit from the judgment entered against him. Likewise, on 

February 6, 2009, Andrew Siemaszko also filed an appeal to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit appealing the decision in district court.

However, on July 15, 2010, The Court of Appeals held and affirmed the district 

court’s decision on both matters.

Davis-Besse Civil Summary

In addition, to criminal charges against the company and individual employees, 

the NRC also pursued civil penalties against responsible parties. Based upon an 

NRC investigation, the NRC found that four individuals engaged in deliberate civil 

misconduct in the Davis-Besse matter. On April 21, 2005, the NRC issued an order 

to three of these four individuals (Andrew Siemaszko, Dale Miller, and Steven 

Moffitt), banning them from NRC licensed activities for 5 years for deliberately 

providing inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. On January 4, 2006, 

the NRC issued an order a fourth individual, Mr. Geisen, similarly imposing a 

5 year ban against him. In addition, the NRC issued “Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties” which fined Davis-Besse $5.45 million for 

its performance deficiency including the failure to properly implement its boric acid 

corrosion control and corrective action programs.

The company paid the civil penalty. The individuals, however, filed 

administrative appeals of the NRC orders issued against them. In the fall of 

2006, Mr. Miller and Mr. Moffitt entered into settlement agreements with the 

NRC. They agreed to take various actions that will serve both to deter others and 

encourage compliance with NRC regulations in the future. In June 2009, Mr.

Siemaszko agreed to the 5 year ban. With respect to Mr. Geisen, after the conduct 
14 Protecting People and the Environment

of an evidentiary hearing, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board set aside the 

NRC’s order on the basis that it had not been shown by a preponderance of 

evidence that Mr. Geisen acted knowingly regarding the falsity of the information 

he provided to the NRC. The Commission affirmed the Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board’s decision on appeal.

The 2010 Event

On February 28, 2010, Davis-Besse operators shut down the reactor to 

commence the 16th refueling outage. As part of the outage, the licensee 

conducted NRC-required inspections of the CRDM nozzles penetrating the 

reactor pressure vessel head. The inspections included direct visual and ultrasonic 

testing examinations of 100 percent of the CRDM nozzles. Small amounts of 

boric acid buildup were found on the reactor pressure vessel head, but it was 

determined that the boric acid had not compromised the structural integrity of the 

reactor pressure vessel head. Indications were identified through nondestructive 

evaluation, including ultrasonic testing, in 24 nozzles.

The flaws were consistent with primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) 

although its onset was unusually rapid since the head had been replaced 

following the 2002 incident. This early onset of PWSCC is largely attributed to 

the vessel head temperature being slightly higher than expected during the most 

recent operating cycle. It was determined that poor material microstructure was 

also likely a factor in the quickened pace of PWSCC onset.

The NRC commissioned a Special Inspection Team (SIT) to independently assess 

the licensee’s evaluation of the CRDM nozzle flaws and safety analyses. The SIT 

concluded that licensee actions met NRC requirements and that the vessel head 

was in a suitable condition to return to service; however, the NRC also decided 

that licensee had to replace the head again in 2011. The SIT report can be found 

on the DVD (see NRC Actions in the documents section).

Retrospectives

In 2013, the NRC held a special seminar titled, “2002 Davis-Besse Reactor 

Pressure Vessel Head Degradation—A Retrospective View of the Event, the 

Actions that Followed, and the Lessons Learned.” The seminar featured several 

presentations including a regulatory perspective from Jim Dyer, former Regional 

Administrator of NRC’s Region III office, an analysis of political impacts from 

former NRC Chairman, Dr. Richard A. Meserve, and lessons learned from 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 15

Dr. Brian Sheron, 

Director of the 

NRC’s Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory 

Research. A full 

agenda of the 

seminar as well 

as video and 

slides from all the 

presentations are 

available on the 

DVD included with 

this brochure.

NRC Deputy Regional Administrator, Cindy Pederson, speaks at 

the 2013 special seminar on Davis-Besse.

NRC Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal and 

Compliance Program, Mr. Mike Weber, introducing the January 2013 special seminar “ 

2002 Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation—A Retrospective View of 

the Event, the Actions that Followed, and the Lessons Learned.”
16 Protecting People and the Environment

DVD

To help navigate the DVD, the outline below provides topics and headings that 

the user can access directly from the interactive window.

Important Note: Many of the documents on the DVD are historical in nature 

and may contain information that is obsolete or superseded by today’s regulations and research. Please refer to the NRC’s public Web site (www.nrc.gov) for 

current information on regulations, Commission policy statements, regulatory 

guidelines, regulatory processes, and research results.

Main DVD

• Timelines

2002 Event

PWSCC

• Seminar

Agenda

Part 1

 • Video

 • Slides

Part 2

 • Video

 • Slides

• Documents

2002 Event

 • Events Leading Up

 • NRC Actions

 • Industry Response

2010 Event

 • Events Leading Up

 • NRC Actions

 • Industry Response

Tech Reports

 • Davis-Besse Degradation

 • PWSCC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 17

2002 Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure

Vessel Head Degradation

Knowledge Management Digest

Prepared By:

Jack Riley

Brian McGrattan

Raj Mohan Iyengar

Sabrina Allen

Jeanne Dion

Joshua Kusnick

Don Marksberry

Felix E. Gonzalez

Jay Collins

Mel Holmberg

Catherine Scott

Aladar Csontos

Mark Henry Salley

This DVD was developed using Visual Basic Express 2010.

Make sure you have Windows XP or newer and Visual Basic Framework 3.5 

for the DVD to work correctly.


NUREG/KM-0005

February 2014