# EUR-Lex - 52013DC0257 - EN

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# 52013DC0257

**REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Report on Competition Policy 2012 /* COM/2013/0257 final */**

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INTRODUCTION

The European
Union (EU) is the world's largest economic and trading area. The EU's unique
asset and distinct comparative advantage on the global scene is its Single
Market, which encompasses over half a billion consumers and more than 20 million
firms.

Since its
inception, the on-going process of improving and expanding the Single Market
has gone hand in hand with the development of EU competition policy. The first
seminal antitrust cases targeting impediments to trade in the Single Market date
back to the 1960s, notably the pioneering decision in 1964 against Grundig-Consten.
That case concerned an agreement to partition the market, which had resulted in
substantial price differences between France and Germany. The Court of Justice
upheld the Grundig-Consten decision and reiterated its position on
private impediments to cross-border trade and competition in subsequent
judgments[1].
The adoption of the merger control regulation in 1989 represented a qualitative
leap in EU competition policy reflecting the development of the internal market
after the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987. EU competition
policy took into account the new market realities of increased opportunities
for European firms to merge and acquire assets across national borders.
Likewise, State aid control has also gradually become an essential pillar of
the Single Market, ensuring that companies are able to compete on equal terms
independently of where they are located and providing safeguards against Member
States engaging in mutual subsidy races at the expense of each other and of the
general European interest. Finally, the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 ten years
ago marked a new era in the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules, in which
national competition authorities (NCAs) have become very active players. The
enforcement of the EU antitrust rules is now carried out by a multiplicity of
enforcers in the Single Market according to the same standard of assessment.
That regime has significantly enhanced the level of enforcement of the EU
antitrust rules and underpins the level playing field for companies operating
cross-border in Europe.

Without an
effective EU competition policy, the Single Market cannot reach its full
potential. There would be nothing to prevent private barriers to trade and
competition from replacing the public barriers that free movement rules have
dismantled over more than half a century. Nor would Member States be prevented
from distorting trade and competition through a myriad of subsidies, a scenario
which naturally favours the fiscally stronger. Weakening EU competition policy
would undermine the Single Market to the detriment of the growth potential of
the EU, the individual economies of which – in particular in the eurozone – are
increasingly interdependent. At the same time, competition policy is also
crucial in allowing the EU to crack down on abuses of dominant position,
cartels and concerted practices that harm consumers.

In 2012 the
European Commission continued to ensure the sound functioning of the Single
Market, despite occasional calls for a softer stance towards anticompetitive
conduct by firms or Member States in view of the economic crisis.

No time to relax the enforcement of competition
rules

The
decade-long world-wide cartels for colour display tubes and for colour picture
tubes, which exhibited all the worst kinds of anticompetitive behaviour in the
Single Market, is a case in point. Colour display tubes and colour picture
tubes are key components that go into the making of television and computer
screens, accounting for 50 to 70% of the price. On 5 December 2012, the
European Commission fined seven international groups of companies a total of
EUR 1 470 515 000 for the two cartels.

Throughout
2012, all the tools of the EU competition policy – antitrust and merger
enforcement as well as State aid control – continued to be deployed as levers
across significant parts of the Single Market. The year 2012 also marked the
20th anniversary of the relaunch in 1992 of the European Single Market. This
Report on competition policy thus focuses on the role of competition policy in
leveraging the Single Market for growth. In 2012, the Commission also continued
working with national competition authorities (NCAs) to ensure a coherent application
of the EU antitrust rules. In particular, the Commission engaged in close
cooperation with the national competition authorities within the European
Competition Network (ECN), including efforts to foster convergence of national
procedures for the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules which are not
generally regulated by EU law.

This past
year EU competition enforcement focused in particular on sectors of systemic
and cross-cutting importance to the EU economy: financial services; key network
industries such as energy, telecoms and postal services; as well as
knowledge-intensive markets such as smartphones, e-books and pharmaceuticals.
In those sectors, EU competition enforcement (which mainly operates ex post)
complements Single Market regulation.

Many of the
issues addressed in this Report were already examined in the course of the
Commission's continuous structured dialogue with the European Parliament
throughout the year (see section 5 on Competition Dialogue with Other
Institutions and, for further detail, the Commission Staff Working Document
(SWD) accompanying this Report).

1. COMPETITION
POLICY SUPPORTING A FAIRER AND MORE TRANSPARENT FINANCIAL SECTOR

A viable,
transparent and competitive banking system providing finance to the real
economy is a necessary precondition to restore sustainable growth. The current
financial and economic crisis has its origins in the financial sector and any
exit strategy necessarily requires addressing the root causes of the crisis.
With that in mind, in 2012 the European Commission continued to apply the State
aid rules to control the parts of the EU banking sector concerned. The bulk of
the activity involved the restructuring of banks, so that no more taxpayer
funding will be needed for the foreseeable future. In cases where banks were
beyond restructuring, State aid control continued to be used as a de facto resolution
mechanism in anticipation of more comprehensive Single Market legislation[2].
Merger and antitrust rules were also employed to ensure that the Single Market
is underpinned by a transparent and competitive financial sector[3].

The
temporary emergency regime as a tool for bank restructuring and de facto
resolution

At the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, State aid control became –
more by default than by design - the principal tool at EU level to tackle the
unprecedented situation. The Commission promptly put in place a special State
aid regime to control government bail-outs of distressed banks to safeguard the
stability of the wider financial system.[4] The special regime
was also designed to ensure the sound functioning of the Single Market. The
existential threat to the Single Market was evident from the sheer scale of
government intervention. Between 1 October 2008 and the end of 2011, approximately
EUR 1.6 trillion were transferred to banks. The amount pledged by EU
governments was in fact three times greater. The bulk of that amount took the
form of government guarantees of banks' liabilities and other forms of
liquidity support, accounting for over 9% of EU GDP, while recapitalisations
and impaired-asset support totalled over 3% of EU GDP. The special temporary
regime continued to ensure that the banks concerned were supported on the same
conditions across the Single Market. Under these temporary rules, which remain
in force as long as market and economic conditions require, EU banks in
distress can receive government support on the condition that they restructure.

Repairing
the financial sector to support the real economy while protecting taxpayers

The
restructuring of individual banks continued to be guided by the imperative of
ensuring viable business models that support the real economy. Decisions
involving cost-cutting, divestments and focusing on core activities were taken
in relation to inter alia some of the German Landesbanken (NordLB
and BayernLB), the Spanish banks CAM and UNNIM and the Latvian
mortgage bank.[5]
Particular care was taken to ensure that taxpayer money is used to return banks
to long-term viability and that in the medium term the taxpayers will be paid
back without losses; indeed, some aid beneficiaries have already started to
repay the support they received to their governments[6].

As part of
the economic adjustment programmes for Ireland, Portugal and Greece, State aid control continued to contribute significantly to the
restructuring[7]
of those countries ́ entire banking sectors as part of a wider effort involving
not only the Commission but also the ECB and in most cases the IMF. Again, a
key concern was to ensure the integrity of the Single Market in a context of
massive public financial support.

Restructuring the Spanish banking sector

In
July 2012 the Eurogroup agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a
sector programme for the Spanish financial sector. Under the MoU, a rigorous
stress test was carried out covering a three-year period through 2014. The
stress test identified a capital shortfall of around EUR 60 billion in ten
banks. Two of those banks, Banco Popular and Ibercaja, raised the necessary capital
on the market or through management actions. The eight remaining banks that
could not meet the shortfall through private resources were recapitalised with
programme funds and are being restructured or resolved in line with the State
aid rules. A first group involved banks already controlled by the Spanish
authorities: BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, Nova Caixa Galicia
and Banco de Valencia. The restructuring plans for those banks were
approved on 28 November 2012. For a second group, including Banco Mare Nostrum,
Banco CEISS, Caja3 and Liberbank, restructuring decisions were adopted on
20 December 2012. As a result, the whole Spanish financial system was fully
capitalised by the end of 2012. The restructuring plans for those banks aim to
restore their viability and capacity to provide credit to the real economy,
while minimising the cost to taxpayers and limiting to the minimum distortions
of competition. Of the EUR 57 billion capital need for the eight remaining
banks, EUR 37 billion will come from the EU programme for the Spanish
financial sector. As regards to the remaining EUR 18 billion, EUR
12 billion is in the form of burden-sharing by junior debt holders, EUR
5 billion from asset disposals by the banks and EUR 1 billion is in
the form of the transfer of real estate loans to SAREB, the bad bank set up by
the Spanish authorities.

Competition policy
accompanies EU Single Market legislation aimed at increasing the transparency,
fairness and soundness of financial markets

An ambitious
Single Market regulation package is being put in place to make financial
markets more transparent to address the roots of the financial crisis in areas
such as derivatives. EU competition policy naturally supports that legislative
effort. Transparency is essential for competitive markets.

In 2012, the
Commission continued to investigate a number of antitrust cases relating to the
Libor, Euribor and Tibor benchmark rates. A number of
banks and brokers are subject to the investigation. The importance of financial
derivative products linked to these benchmarks cannot be overstated. According
to the bank for International Settlements (BIS) the outstanding gross market
value of the interest rate derivatives in all currencies was USD 19 trillion in
June 2012.[8]
Those products play a key role in the management of risk in the Single Market.
The Commission's antitrust investigations were launched before the Libor
scandal which was triggered by the revelations of manipulation of the
Libor/Tibor and later on the Euribor benchmark rates, which also gave rise to
criminal investigations and investigations under financial regulation across
many jurisdictions. In July 2012 the Commission amended a previous legislative
proposal so as to cover the sort of manipulation that is emerging from the
Libor scandal, making it a criminal offence.

The
Commission also pursued two antitrust investigations in the credit default
swaps (CDS) market which were opened in 2011. The Commission has continued to
analyse, in particular, the cooperation between a number of leading investment
banks and an information service provider. The purpose of the investigation is
to establish whether those players acted to preserve their stronghold in the
profitable Over-The-Counter (OTC) CDS market by hindering the development of
exchange traded CDS derivatives in a way which may have infringed EU
competition law.

The concerted
attempts by the Commission and the EU legislature to increase transparency in
financial markets through Single Market legislation can be subverted by
anticompetitive collusion and abuses. EU competition policy can be, and is,
deployed as part of a wider mix of remedies[9].

The
Commission also used in 2012 its merger control tools to ensure competitive
prices for companies which manage their risks by investing in derivatives in
the EU. On 1 February 2012, the Commission prohibited the proposed merger
between Deutsche Börse and New York Stock Exchange Euronext. The
Commission came to the conclusion that the merger would eliminate competition
and lead to a quasi-monopoly in some derivatives markets, in particular the
worldwide markets for European single stock and equity index derivatives and
European interest rate derivatives. In those areas, the two exchanges were de
facto the only credible global players. The Commission took the view that
the merger was likely to lead to higher prices and less innovation for
derivatives customers and that the remedies proposed by the parties were
insufficient to address these concerns.

Facilitating
transactions across the Single Market through better functioning payment
systems

In 2012, the
Commission pursued its antitrust enforcement action against anticompetitive
behaviour relating to the multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) charged by
credit card companies, in particular Visa's and MasterCard. MIFs make up a
significant part of the total cost that retailers must pay for accepting
payment cards. In 2010, 35 billion card payments were made in the European
Economic Area (EEA), totalling EUR 1.8 trillion.

Visa's credit
and debit cards represent approximately 41% of all payment cards issued in the
EEA. Over five million merchants accept Visa's payment cards. In 2012, the
Commission sent a supplementary statement of objections to Visa relating
to the MIFs it charges for transactions with consumer credit cards in the EEA[10].
The Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that these MIFs reduce price
competition between acquiring banks, inflate the cost of credit card acceptance
for merchants and ultimately increase consumer prices. The Commission also
found that the obligation on cross-border acquirers to pay MIFs applicable in
the country of transaction hindered cross-border acquiring and maintained the
segmentation of the Single Market into national markets, preventing merchants
from benefiting from lower MIFs in other Member States.

The
Commission's analysis in the Visa case closely followed the judgment of the EU
General Court in May in the MasterCard case, which fully upheld the
Commission's findings on the anticompetitive nature of MIFs[11].

2. STATE AID
REFORM TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE SINGLE MARKET AND SUPPORT GROWTH IN A CONTEXT OF
SCARCE PUBLIC RESOURCES

The past year
saw the first decisions applying the new framework on State aid for Services of
General Economic Interest (SGEIs) adopted in 2011. In May 2012, the Commission
launched an even more ambitious reform agenda: State Aid Modernisation.

Entry into
force of new rules on SGEIs: extracting the maximum from scarce public budgets
in support of the European social and economic model

SGEIs are
public services that would not be provided by market forces alone or at least
not in a form that would be available to all. SGEIs are an integral part of the
European social market economy model.

The new SGEI
rules (effective as of 31 January 2012) assist public authorities in designing
smarter, more efficient and more effective services in areas such as energy,
transport, telecommunications and postal services. The new approach means that
the Commission will focus on SGEIs that receive large government funds and,
therefore, are more liable to distort competition in the Single Market. The
first decisions (e.g. Post Office Limited)[12] illustrate how the State
aid rules can guarantee continued delivery of postal and other essential public
services while ensuring fair competition in the Single Market[13]
(see also section 3.3 below).

State Aid
Modernisation: Tackling the twin challenges of growth and budgetary constraints
while safeguarding the Single Market

On 8 May 2012
the Commission launched the State Aid Modernisation (SAM), a reform of the
whole of State aid policy. Prioritising enforcement on cases with a significant
impact on the Single Market is one of the keys objectives of the SAM. Another
key objective is to ensure that scarce public budgets are targeted at real
market failures, i.e. that they are not wasted on projects that would have been
carried out in any case. In other words, SAM's aim is to facilitate the
treatment of aid which is well-designed, targeted at identified market failures
and objectives of common interest, and least distortive. Aid which does not
provide real incentives for companies crowds out private investment and keeps
inefficient and non-viable companies on life support ("bad aid")[14].
Good aid strengthens the Single Market while bad aid weakens it. State aid is a
horizontal tool which extends its scope across the Single Market, not least the
recently liberalised network industries. Thus, it can and must be designed and
leveraged so as to help Member States re-launch growth while ensuring fiscal
sustainability.

The process
of translating SAM into reality began through revisions of a number of key
State aid guidelines and frameworks. The objective is to bring them all in line
with a coherent overall philosophy and methodology. To this end, the Commission
launched public consultations on the current rules on State aid to broadband
infrastructure, environmental protection and regional development. Work also
progressed on reviews launched earlier on aid for research, development and innovation,
risk capital and rescue and restructuring. The intention is for the bulk of the
SAM related rules to be in place by the end of the term of the current European
Parliament[15].

3. PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES: THE BACKBONE OF THE SINGLE MARKET

3.1
Integrating energy markets in support of sustainability

Removing the
remaining obstacles in gas and electricity markets requires Single Market
legislation supported by competition policy

In 2005, the
Commission carried out an in-depth sector inquiry into gas and electricity
markets which revealed that - despite efforts to integrate the Single Market
since the late 1990s through EU sectoral regulation - serious obstacles to
competition remained, in particular concentrated markets with high entry
barriers, often dominated by vertically integrated incumbents. The problems
were compounded by limited interconnection capacities between Member States.
That state of affairs had led to divergent prices and conditions of supply
throughout the Single Market. The Commission followed up its inquiry through
antitrust enforcement often using decisions accepting commitments offered by
dominant gas and electricity players in several countries[16].

EU
competition policy cannot on its own integrate the EU gas and electricity
markets, ensure competitive prices and security of supply. A third legislative
package on gas and electricity was therefore adopted in 2011 and is currently
in the process of implementation with a view to creating an EU-wide Single
Energy Market by 2014.

Shifting the
focus of antitrust enforcement in the energy sector eastwards

Most
antitrust investigations and decisions in this area, since the publication of
the sector inquiry into gas and electricity in 2005, have focused on western
European markets. Recently, and in particular during 2012, the emphasis has
shifted eastwards. Central and eastern European gas networks tend to be less
interconnected across borders than western European networks.

In the CEZ
case, concerning an alleged abuse of a dominant position by the Czech
electricity incumbent, the Commission market-tested in 2012 structural
commitments aimed at remedying foreclosure of the Czech electricity market. In Bulgaria, the Commission is investigating potential foreclosure by the national company BEH
gas, as well as obstacles to cross-border trade in electricity. In addition, on
11 December 2012 the Commission opened formal antitrust proceedings against
OPCOM, which allows producers and buyers to trade electricity in Romania, and
its parent company Transelectrica, a state-owned enterprise which controls the
power grid in that Member State. The Commission has concerns that OPCOM may be
abusing its dominant position by discriminating against companies on the basis
of their nationality or place of establishment. Power exchanges are crucial for
the transparent and reliable formation of electricity prices.

In 2012, the
Commission also opened antitrust proceedings against Gazprom in relation to its
alleged conduct in a number of central and eastern European gas markets. The
opening of the proceedings was due to the Commission's concerns that Gazprom
may have and may be abusing its dominant position in upstream gas supply
markets in central and eastern Europe, in some of which Gazprom is virtually
the sole supplier. The proceedings focus on whether Gazprom has divided gas
markets by preventing the free flow of gas between EU countries and whether it
is imposing conditions relating to the use of infrastructure that prevent the
diversification of sources of gas supply. The scope of the proceedings also
covers the possible imposition of unfair prices on customers.

Taking
account of energy-intensive firms in the context of the EU Emissions Trading
System

Protecting
energy-intensive industry against carbon leakage while safeguarding the
integrity of the Single Market

The
Commission also adopted important State aid rules related to electricity
markets. The reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) agreed in 2009
which takes effect from 2013 onwards means that electricity production will no
longer receive free allowances to emit CO2, which could lead to higher
electricity bills for companies in the EU. The rules adopted allow Member
States to compensate installations in the most electricity-intensive sectors
for part of any higher electricity costs resulting from the ETS, as from 2013.[17]
The rules were shaped so as to minimise competition distortions in the Single
Market in the form of subsidy races at a time of economic uncertainty and need
for budgetary discipline; for example, by not allowing full compensation for
higher electricity prices and by reducing the compensation over time. At the
same time they were designed to preserve the EU objective of decarbonising the
European economy. The sectors eligible for compensation include producers of
aluminium, copper, fertilisers, steel, paper, cotton, chemicals and some
plastics. The new aid regime enables Member States to prevent production shifts
from the EU to third countries with less environmental regulation, which could
undermine the objective of a global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

3.2
Accompanying Single Market legislation in telecoms

Over the past
15 years, EU Single Market legislation has made great strides in injecting
competition into telecoms markets. Today, incumbents no longer hold monopolies
and must provide wholesale services and network access to alternative
operators. However, many ex-monopolists still maintain strong market positions
by virtue of their ownership of the fixed networks they rolled out during the
monopoly era.

Moreover, as
regards mobile networks, four out of five EU citizens possess mobile
subscriptions with one of four major groups. At the same time, many features of
the telecoms markets remain predominantly national such as licensing of
operators and the spectrum for mobile services. We are still far from realising
the EU Single Market for telecoms; instead we are confronted with many
operators active in 27 separate markets. Furthermore, there are still persistent
barriers that limit consumers' ability to take full advantage of market
liberalisation. A recent study on Internet service provision[18] shows that
the lack of transparent and comparable information as well as contractual
barriers (such as long contract duration and charges for early contract
termination) discourage consumers from switching.

Tackling
market power and fragmentation in telecoms markets in parallel with Single
Market legislation

Against that
background, ex post EU competition law enforcement is required to
accompany Single Market ex ante regulation, in particular to ensure
equal access conditions for new entrants.

In 2012, the
Union Courts upheld[19]
a 2007 Commission decision fining Telefónica for an abuse of its
dominant position in the Spanish broadband market. The prices that Telefónica
charged its wholesale clients – which were at the same time competitors at the
retail level - forced them to make losses if they wanted to continue to operate
on the market.

The
Commission pursued an antitrust case relating to potential anticompetitive
conduct by Slovak Telekom on several wholesale broadband markets in Slovakia and investigated whether its parent company Deutsche Telekom may be held
liable for Slovak Telekom's conduct.

The
Commission also pursued an antitrust case against Telefónica and Portugal
Telecom concerning their agreement not to compete with each other on the
Iberian telecommunications markets. This is the first antitrust case in the
telecoms sector which concerns a cross-border market sharing agreement. It is
of particular importance for the Commission to investigate this issue in order
to avoid that the Single Market is artificially compartmentalised along
national borders.

The
Commission also examined the manner in which five large telecom operators (the
"E5": Deutsche Telecom, France Télécom, Telefónica, Vodafone and
Telecom Italia) as well as the mobile sector association GSMA developed
standards for future mobile communications services. The Commission's action
was meant to ensure that the standardisation process was not being used to
foreclose competitors.

Under the EU
Merger Regulation, the European Commission unconditionally approved the
creation of a joint venture between Vodafone, Telefónica and Everything
Everywhere in the field of mobile commerce in the United Kingdom. Mobile commerce or "mobile wallets" is a nascent fast-moving
sector. The Commission's central concern was to ensure that these types of
markets remain open so that a number of competing solutions can emerge without
undue obstacles. The investigation revealed that a number of alternatives
already existed and many more were very likely to emerge in the near future to
ensure adequate competitive pressure on the UK joint venture's mobile wallet
platform.

In December
2012, the Commission also approved the acquisition by Hutchison 3G Austria
of its competitor Orange, the reducing the number of operators from to three.
The approval was subject to a number of conditions. Hutchinson committed to
making spectrum available, a necessary condition for the entry of new mobile
network operators. Hutchinson also committed to make wholesale access available
to up to 16 virtual operators without a full network of their own. Before the
implementation of the merger the parties had to conclude an agreement with the
upfront entrant.

Supporting
the roll-out of broadband infrastructure across the Single Market

The
roll-out of new infrastructure for broadband networks across the Single Market
was another strategic focus of EU competition policy in 2012. Here the main
challenge was that while commercial operators are shouldering most of the
investment, they have little incentive to extend the reach of their networks
into remote, sparsely populated and rural areas where the market alone will not
bear their costs. At the same time the Digital Agenda – one of the Europe 2020
Strategy Flagship Initiatives – aims to bring basic broadband to all Europeans
by 2013 and seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to
much higher internet speeds (above 30 Mbps) and (ii) 50% or more of European
households subscribe to very fast internet connections (above 100) Mbps. It is
clear that government subsidies are required in some instances to address the
market failures; indeed, over the past two years the Commission approved aid of
about EUR 4 billion, verifying inter alia that public funds do not crowd
out private investment.

During
the year – as part of the comprehensive State Aid Modernisation project - the
Commission completed its update of the rules on State aid for broadband
infrastructure, i.e. the Broadband Guidelines, to bring them further in line
with the ambitious Digital Agenda objectives of promoting very fast broadband
connections throughout the EU. To this end, the new Guidelines aim to achieve
the right mix between public and private investment while building a
pro-competitive environment (e.g. by ensuring open access to all operators in
the Single Market to State funded infrastructure). National incumbents still
dominate broadband markets, except in the few countries where a nationwide
cable infrastructure has been put in place. To help achieve the Digital Agenda
objective of delivering very fast connections (of more than 100 Mbps) to half
of European households by 2020, the revised guidelines will allow public
funding also in urban areas but subject to very strict conditions to ensure a
pro-competitive outcome.

The
European Commission also adopted a proposal to amend the Enabling Regulation of
1998. This would allow the Commission to exempt certain categories of aid for
broadband infrastructure from prior notification to the Commission and simplify
the approval of certain type of projects. This concerns notably:

•            
aid covering basic broadband in regions where there is no broadband
infrastructure and where no such infrastructure is likely to be developed in
the near future (‘white’ areas), and small individual aid measures covering
very high-speed next-generation access (‘NGA’) networks in ‘white NGA’ areas;

•       
     aid for broadband-related civil engineering works and passive broadband.

3.3 Promoting
efficient cross-border postal services while ensuring public service

Postal
services are another classic network industry crucial to the functioning of the
Single Market. Many European firms rely increasingly on just in-time deliveries
to keep inventory costs at an optimal level. They often use parcel express
delivery services as part of their logistic chains, notably for cross-border
shipments. From a growth perspective, it is essential that cross-border postal
deliveries operate as efficiently as possible. Efficient postal services are
also a tool to tap the growing potential of cross-border e-commerce.

At the same
time, the postal sector constitutes a fundamental service of general economic
interest (SGEI) which may need State aid in situations where the market by
itself would not guarantee universal and affordable services. EU competition
and Single Market rules reconcile those two imperatives.

Phasing in
the new rules ensuring the viability of SGEIs and fair competition across the
Single Market

Indeed, the
first application of the new framework for State aid for SGEIs which came into
effect on 31 January 2012 concerned the postal sector. In March 2012, the
Commission adopted two decisions concerning UK Post Office Limited based
on the new SGEI framework. The Commission found that the aid did not exceed the
net cost of the public service mission entrusted to the Post Office Ltd and
that its entrustment complied with public procurement rules. Moreover, the
entrustment letter and funding agreement governing the payment of the
compensation contained appropriate provisions to incentivise an efficient
provision of the public service, in line with the Post Office Ltd's strategic
plan for the period 2012-2015 which aims at modernising and improving the
provision of services over its network according to yearly efficiency
milestones.

Similarly,
the Commission approved a tax relief measure of EUR 764 million granted by
  France to La Poste, the French incumbent, to enable it to cover costs
related to maintaining a high density of postal services from 2008 to 2012. It
also authorised compensation of EUR 1.2 billion for the costs incurred by
La Poste in carrying out its task of transporting and delivering the press over
that same period of time. The two aid measures were found to be compatible with
EU State aid rules as they only partially offset the net costs of the important
public service tasks incumbent on La Poste and thus did not give it any unfair
competitive advantage in the Single Market.

The postal
sector deserved particular scrutiny given that the sector was fully liberalised
across the EU by the end of 2012. To that end, the Commission adopted four
major decisions on State aid granted by Germany, Belgium, France and Greece to their respective incumbent postal operators. For Germany and Belgium, the Commission ordered the recovery of substantial amounts of incompatible aid,
whereas it approved the French and Greek support. Deutsche Post and the Belgian
Post had received an amount of aid that exceeded the level of compensation
required for the provision of the SGEIs that public authorities had entrusted
them with. For that reason the Commission decided that that extra aid was
incompatible with the Single Market since it gave those two companies an
advantage over their competitors in commercial activities beyond their public
service mandate.

Merger
scrutiny to ensure continued competition in cross-border parcel markets

Developments
in the postal sector were also subject to merger scrutiny. The proposed merger
involving the takeover by UPS of TNT would have reduced the
number of companies that control pan-European express
parcel-transport networks from four to three. On 20 July 2012, the
Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the planned merger and finally
prohibited the proposed acquisition on 30 January 2013. The transaction would
have restricted competition in fifteen Member States in the express delivery of
small packages to other European countries. In those Member States, the
acquisition would have reduced the number of significant players to only three
or two, sometimes leaving DHL as the only alternative to UPS. The concentration
would therefore have likely harmed customers by causing price increases and by
removing the competitive constraint exercised by TNT. The Commission carried
out an in-depth assessment of the proposed remedies including a market test
where customers and other interested parties were consulted. However, those
remedies proved inadequate to remove the identified competition concerns.

4. HELPING TO
UNLOCK THE POTENTIAL OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

4.1
Preventing misuses in nascent and fast-moving digital sectors

In digital
industries, network effects and lock-in can create entrenched market positions
which could be used to exclude competitors or new entrants. The Commission has
previously taken decisions in high-tech sectors, preventing dominant companies
from abusing proprietary technologies or engaging in other forms of
anticompetitive behaviour[20].
A central challenge in digital economy cases is that the markets in question
usually move at great speed, necessitating timely and effective intervention[21].
As stated by the ECJ in its Telia Sonera ruling: "the [...]
application of [competition rules] cannot depend on whether the market
concerned has already reached a certain level of maturity. Particularly in a
rapidly growing market, Article 102 TFEU requires action as quickly as
possible, to prevent the formation and consolidation in that market of a
competitive structure distorted by the abusive strategy of an undertaking
[...]”[22].

Enabling
continued innovation in digital sectors from smartphones to music

Potential
misuse of standard-essential patents in the so-called patent wars among
smartphone manufacturers were a particular focus during the year. The
Commission considered the issue of standard essential patents under the EU
merger regulation in its approval of the acquisition of Motorola by Google[23].
It also opened three proceedings[24]
concerning possible abuses by Samsung and Motorola of their
standard essential patents, partly in order to provide more clarity in this
field where the Commission received numerous complaints during the year. In On
21 December 2012, in respect of one of those three proceedings, the Commission
sent a statement of objections to Samsung, informing it of the Commission’s
preliminary view that Samsung's seeking of injunctions against Apple in various
Member States on the basis of its mobile phone standard-essential patents
amounts to an abuse of a dominant position[25].

The
critical importance of standard-essential patents to innovation in the ICT
sector

Standard-essential
patents are relevant for innovation across entire sectors. Such patents are, by
definition, part of a standard and the holders of those patents have committed
to licensing them on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. A
possible worst-case scenario is when a company willing to take a licence for
standard-essential patents on FRAND terms is locked out of the market through
court injunctions. Such litigation or threats thereof may thus hold up
innovation in the entire industry. Standards can be enormously beneficial for a
number of interconnected markets, fostering interoperability and enabling
economies of scale and scope in the Single Market and beyond.

On the merger
front, the Commission approved the takeover by Universal - the world ́s
leading record company - of EMI ́s recorded music arm after having verified
that the concentration would not produce negative effects for digital customers
and the development of new digital services. This is one of several sectors
being transformed through digitisation. The Commission had concerns that the
transaction, as initially notified, would have allowed Universal to
significantly worsen the licensing terms it offered to digital platforms that
sell music to consumers. To meet those concerns, Universal offered substantial
commitments (essentially consisting of the divestiture of a significant portion
of EMI's repertoire in the EEA, including top-selling active and catalogue
artists, as well as of a commitment by Universal not to include so-called
"Most Favourite Nation" clauses in its licensing agreements with
digital music services in the EEA for a period of ten years). In light of these
commitments, the Commission concluded that the transaction did not raise
further competition concerns.

Commitment
decisions as a flexible alternative to ensure the rapid restoration of
competition in fast-moving digital markets

Commitment
decisions such as the one used in the e-books case (see below) can obviate the
need for lengthy proceedings and enable the Commission to obtain concrete
results for consumers. However, such an approach only works if the commitments
entered into are scrupulously complied with. If not, the Commission has the
power to impose fines.

On 12
December 2012, the Commission adopted a commitment decision in the e-books
sector, another nascent and fast-moving part of the digital economy, that
rendered legally binding commitments offered by Apple and four international
e-book publishers: Simon & Schuster (CBS Corp.), Harper Collins (News
Corp.), Hachette Livre (Lagardère Publishing) and Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck
(owner of inter alia Macmillan).

The
Commission had opened proceedings in December 2011 against these companies, as
well as a fifth international e-book publisher, Penguin (Pearson Group). While
the December 2012 decision was not addressed to Penguin as that publisher chose
not to offer commitments to the Commission, the Commission is currently engaged
in constructive discussions with Penguin on commitments that would allow an
early closure of proceedings also against that publisher.

In its decision, the Commission expressed
concerns that Apple and the four international e-book publishers may have
colluded to limit retail price competition for e-books in the European Economic
Area (EEA), in breach of EU antitrust rules. Prior to January 2010, e-books
were sold by publishers to retailers mainly under the so-called "wholesale
model", whereby retailers would buy e-books from publishers and then
freely determine the retail prices for those e-books when sold to consumers. In
January 2010, Apple and the four international e-book publishers jointly
switched to agency contracts that all contained the same key terms, with the
result that retailers became sales agents for publishers who wanted to sell
directly to consumers. Under this "agency model", the four publishers
determined the retail prices for e-books according to pricing rules in the
agency contracts. Those pricing rules were designed in a way that resulted in
higher retail prices than those offered by certain major retailers at the time.
In some countries in the EEA, they were designed in such a way as to exclude
any possibility of lower prices being offered to consumers in the first place.

In order to address the Commission's concerns,
Apple and the four international e-book publishers agreed to terminate all
their existing agency agreements that included the retail price restrictions
and the pricing rules the Commission had objected to. Apple and the four
international e-book publishers also committed, for a period of five years, not
to enter into any new agreements containing the pricing rules the Commission
had objected to. The four international e-book publishers further agreed, for a
period of two years, to allow retailers to offer retail price discounts for
e-books up to an amount equal to the commission the retailer receives from the
publisher over a one year period.

The commitments ended the practices that were at
the origin of the Commission's concerns and restored conditions that will allow
the e-books market to reset itself. Where permitted by national retail price
laws for e-books, this has the potential to result in lower e-book prices for
consumers in the EEA.

A case
involving an alleged abuse of a dominant position concerns Google. The
Commission has expressed concerns that four types of Google business practices
may constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article
102 TFEU, namely: (i) the way in which Google’s vertical search services are
displayed within general search results as compared to services of competitors;
(ii) the way Google may use and display third party content on its vertical
search services; (iii) exclusivity agreements for the delivery of Google search
advertisements on other websites; and (iv) restrictions in the portability of
AdWords advertising campaigns. Google submitted a detailed commitment text at
the end of January 2013. The Commission's services are currently analysing
Google's proposal with a view to deciding whether it would allow the Commission
to start the process for the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 9 of
Regulation 1/2003.

Non-compliance
with a previous commitment decision was at issue in a case concerning Microsoft.
In December 2009, the Commission made legally binding on Microsoft
commitments offered to address competition concerns related to the tying of
Microsoft's web browser, Internet Explorer, to its dominant client PC operating
system Windows. Specifically, Microsoft committed to make available for five
years (i.e. until 2014) in the European Economic Area a "Choice Screen"
enabling users of the Windows operating system to choose in an informed and
unbiased manner which web browser(s) they wanted to install in addition to, or
instead of, Microsoft's web browser. The choice screen was to be provided as of
March 2010 to European Windows users who have Internet Explorer set as their
default web browser.

However, in a
decision adopted on 6 March 2013, the Commission found that Microsoft had
failed to roll out the browser choice screen with its Windows 7 Service Pack 1
from May 2011 until July 2012, with the result that 15 million Windows users in
the EU did not see the choice screen during this period. Microsoft has
publically acknowledged that the choice screen was not displayed during that
time.

4.2
Preventing misuses of IPRs in the pharmaceutical sector

Pharmaceuticals
are another sector where knowledge, inventions and ideas and the intellectual
property rights (IPRs) they embody are of central importance. However, in that
sector, patent holders  and generic companies may be tempted to enter into
anticompetitive agreements delaying the entry of cheaper generic medicines,
especially when the basic patent protection around the active substance nears
expiry or after expiry. At the same time, many such patent settlements may be a
rational and socially beneficial way to reduce uncertainty and avoid litigation
costs.

Against this
background, the Commission launched an inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector
in 2008, the results of which were published in July 2009[26].
During 2012, the follow-up to the inquiry advanced on several fronts. In terms
of antitrust enforcement, on 25 July and 30 July 2012 the Commission sent
statements of objections to more than fourteen companies in two major cases
involving possible anticompetitive agreements and unilateral practices.

Statements
of objections in respect of conduct potentially delaying the entry of generic
antidepressants and cardiovascular medicines in the Single Market

One
of the statements of objections concerned the Citalopram case where the
originator company Lundbeck and several generic competitors entered into
agreements which may have hindered the entry of generic citalopram into markets
in the EEA. Citalopram is the active substance of a class of antidepressants.
The statement of objections was also addressed to Merck KGaA, Generics UK,
Arrow, Resolution Chemicals, Xellia Pharmaceuticals, Alpharma, A.L. Industrier
and Ranbaxy, all of which belonged to the generic groups that concluded
the agreements. The sending of a statement of objections does not prejudge the
final outcome of the investigation.

The
companies concluded these agreements when generic entry in principle became
possible due to the expiry of certain of Lundbeck's citalopram patents.
According to the preliminary findings in the statement of objections the
agreements foresaw substantial value transfers from Lundbeck to four generic
competitors. In turn, the generic companies abstained from entering the Single
Market to sell generic citalopram. Lundbeck's value transfers to the generic
competitors included, among other things, direct payments purchases of generic
citalopram stock for destruction as well as guaranteed profits in distribution
agreements offered to the generic firms. The Commission took the preliminary view
that this conduct, if proven, may have caused substantial consumer harm, since
generic entry could have been delayed and prices kept higher as a result of the
agreements.

The
second statement of objections concerned the Perindopril case where Les
Laboratoires Servier and several generic competitors entered into
agreements which may have hindered the entry of generic perindopril in the
Single Market. Perindopril is the active substance in a class of cardiovascular
medicines. According to the preliminary view set out in the statement of
objections, in exchange for payments by Servier, the generic companies agreed
not to enter the market with their cheaper generic products and/or not to
further challenge the validity of the patents that protected Servier's more
expensive medicine. Similarly, Servier may have implemented a comprehensive
strategy to prevent market entry of cheaper generic versions of perindopril at
the time when the patent protection for Servier's perindopril was nearing
expiry. The practices under analysis include acquisitions of patents that could
potentially exclude competitors from the market as well as patent settlements
with other companies that included the type of reverse payments at issue in the
Citalopram case.

The
practices at issue in the Citalopram and Perindopril cases could, if the
allegations were to be proven, involve significant harm as national health
services and insurance schemes would be forced to continue paying longer for
the more expensive patent protected versions of a medicine.

Sanctioning
such anticompetitive practices is necessary to preserve incentives to innovate
in this sector. Anticompetitive conduct should not be used to artificially
prolong patent protection which by definition is limited in time. That
limitation is essential to preserve incentives for continuous innovation in
knowledge-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals.

The
Commission continued to monitor potentially harmful patent settlement
agreements between originators and generic firms

In July 2012,
the Commission issued its third monitoring report on patent settlements in the
pharmaceutical sector[27].
The report confirmed that, while the overall number of concluded settlements
significantly increased, the proportion of settlements that may be problematic
for competition fell by half as compared to the levels observed at the time of
the sector inquiry. The proportion of potentially problematic settlements
stabilised at 11% compared to the 21% identified by the sector inquiry. At the
same time, the total annual number of concluded settlements increased by 500%
to 120 compared to the findings of the sector inquiry. Most settlements appear
to be unproblematic from an antitrust perspective. The figures show that the
Commission's scrutiny has not hindered companies from concluding settlements in
the Single Market, contrary to some initial fears expressed by certain
stakeholders.

In its
judgment in the AstraZeneca case the Court of Justice ruled that EU competition
law complements Single Market rules

In June 2005,
the Commission adopted a decision sanctioning AstraZeneca (AZ) for two
infringements of Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the European Economic Area
(EEA) Agreement. The decision found that AZ had misused public procedures and
regulations in a number of EEA states aimed at excluding generic firms and
parallel traders from competing against AZ’s bestselling antiulcer product
Losec.

In a judgment
of 6 December 2012 (Case C-457/10 P) the Court of Justice upheld the General
Court ́s judgment of 2010 which had, to a very large extent, dismissed
AstraZeneca ́s appeal against the 2005 Commission decision, the first decision
imposing fines for an abuse of a dominant position in the pharmaceutical
sector. In particular, the General Court had confirmed that misuses of
regulatory procedures can under certain circumstances constitute abuses of a
dominant position.

The Court of
Justice found that in a majority of cases abuses of dominant positions consist
of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under branches of law other than
competition law. This confirms that EU competition policy is complementary, and
not subordinate, to other branches of EU law, including Single Market rules.

5.
COMPETITION DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS

5.1
Structured dialogue with the European Parliament

DG
Competition engages in a continuous structured dialogue on competition issues
with the European Parliament, and its Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)
Committee in particular.

Structured
dialogue with the ECON Committee

As
part of the structured dialogue, the Vice President in charge of Competition
visited ECON twice in 2012. In June, he presented the Annual Report on
Competition Policy and in October, the Commission Work Programme for 2013. The
Vice President also maintains regular contacts with the European Parliament
outside the structured dialogue. On 22 May 2012, he attended a workshop on the
European Competition Report on the food sector[28]. On 24 September
2012, he participated in a hearing on LIBOR-EURIBOR market manipulation. The Vice
President also attended a workshop on State aid modernisation (25 September
2012) and an event on data protection and competition rules (26 November 2012).

In the context of the cooperation, on 7 June
2012 DG Competition organised a seminar for assistants and political advisers
of the members of the ECON covering the main themes in the 2011 Competition
Work Programme[29].
The Vice President exchanged views with the IMCO committee on 28 February 2012
on competition and growth. DG Competition regularly informs the relevant
committees of public consultations and the adoption of new guidelines. All in
all, the Vice President made eight appearances before the European Parliament
(see table).

Date || Meeting || Issue

28/02/2012 || EP IMCO committee || Exchange of views on competition and growth

22/05/2012 || EP ECON Competition Working Group || ECN report and CAP reform

19/06/2012 || EP ECON structured dialogue || Presentation of Annual Competition Report 2011

11/09/2012 || EP Plenary Question Time || State of play of the energy market acquis (3rd package) implementation - Gazprom

24/09/2012 || EP ECON Public Hearing - Libor || Market manipulation - Libor

25/09/2012 || EP ECON Workshop – SAM || State aid modernisation

08/10/2012 || EP ECON structured dialogue || Presentation of work programme for 2013

26/11/2012 || EP Event – Privacy Platform || Competition and Privacy in Markets of Data

Public
consultations and Impact assessments

DG
Competition provides information on the launch of public consultations to the
secretariat of the ECON  and more generally welcomes timely contributions by
the members of the EP. Its services are available to brief MEPs on aspects of
particular interest. Public consultations and the responses thereto, studies
related to competition policy, studies which are commissioned, Impact
Assessments in the area of competition policy as well as any related Staff
Working Papers are published on DG Competition's website[30].

In response
to the interest expressed by the members of the ECON committee in the
Commission's State aid modernisation communication, the Vice President and DG
Competition officials attended a State aid modernisation workshop in Parliament
on 8 October 2012.

As part of
the discussion on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, MEPs called on
the Commission to have a closer look at the issue of producers' bargaining
power vis-à-vis retailers in the food supply chain. While the Commission did
not identify particular competition problems in the retail sector, as expressed
in the report published by the European Competition Network[31], it
nonetheless launched a study to assess the impact of retail market structure on
product innovation and choice in the food sector in December 2012.

MEPs
frequently ask the Commission questions on individual on-going competition
cases. The Commission is unable to reply on certain aspects of those cases due
to the confidentiality requirement of the investigative procedures.

On-going
investigations and sector inquiries

DG
Competition staff regularly meet MEPs at their request to explain the procedural
steps in an investigation and to engage in a general discussion on a particular
sector, as far as possible under the confidentiality obligation in relation to
the parties. DG Competition has a range of tools at its disposal for the
enforcement of EU competition law and making markets more competitive by other
means, such as investigations in individual cases, sector inquiries and working
with other Directorates General on regulatory measures impacting competition in
the Single Market.

5.2
Follow-up to Parliament's Resolution on the 2010 Report on Competition Policy

In January
2012, the Parliament adopted its Resolution on the 2010 Report on Competition
Policy[32],
making a series of requests to the Commission. In addition to the official
response by the Commission to Parliament's Resolution, the Commissioner for
Competition responded in April 2012 through a letter to the Chair of the ECON
committee, and DG Competition also submitted a detailed response to all of the
points made in the Parliaments Resolution.

Topics covered by the European Parliament's
Resolution

The
Parliament was particularly interested in the DG Competition's activities
linked to the financial and economic crisis and the role of State aid
control in that context. In its response, the Commission stressed the types
of conditions routinely imposed as part of the application of the temporary
State aid rules applying to the banking sector for the time being. That
so-called conditionality includes burden sharing and restructuring imposed on banks
and financial institutions to ensure that their viability is restored on a
long-term basis while preserving the integrity of the Single Market.

In its
Resolution, the Parliament also recalled its earlier requests[33] for
the Commission to bring forward legislation to facilitate effective compensation
for damages resulting from breaches of antitrust law. The Commission's Work
Programme for 2012 includes a proposal on antitrust private damages actions.
The Vice President in charge of Competition confirmed that such a proposal will
be tabled in 2013. In response to the Parliament's call to investigate
competition in the food sector, DG COMP set up an internal task force on the
food sector which coordinated a European Competition Network study on the food
sector. In addition, in December 2012 the Commission launched a study on modern
retail sector impact on food product choice and innovation.

5.3
Competition DG Competition's engagement with the EESC and the CoR

The
Commission also informs the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and
the Committee of the Regions (CoR) about major policy initiatives. It also
participates in study group and section meetings. On 4 September 2012, Vice
President Almunia met the EESC rapporteur on the State Aid Modernisation
initiative and, on 7 December 2012, the CoR rapporteur on the revision of the
Regional aid guidelines. On 14 November 2012, the EESC adopted an opinion on
the State aid modernisation initiative[34] and, on 4 December 2012, the INT section of the
EESC adopted an opinion on the Annual Competition Report 2011[35]. On
29 November 2012, the CoR adopted an opinion on the State Aid mModernisation
initiative[36]
and, on 7 December 2012, the COTER commission of CoR adopted an opinion on the
Regional aid guidelines[37].

[1] Joined Cases C-56/64 and
C-58/64 Grundig-Consten [1966] ECR 299, Judgment of 13 July 1966. See
also Judgment of 4 October 2011 in Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C‑429/08 Football Association Premier
League and Others, judgment of 4 October 2011

[2] The Commission will come
forward with a proposal for a single resolution mechanism for banks. The
December 2012 European Council agreed that this proposal "would be to be
examined by the co-legislators as a matter of priority with the intention of
adopting it during the current parliamentary cycle"

[3] Responding to European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee calls for action in favour of
fair, well-regulated and transparent financial markets

[4] In essence the special rules
mean that the normal rules for aid for rescue and restructuring do not apply to
the financial sector (see IP/11/1488)

[5] For a comprehensive picture,
see Annex 2 to the Staff Working Document accompanying this report

[6] See, among others cases,
SA.28487 (see press release IP/12/847)

[7] As well as resolution when
needed, as in the case of the Agricultural Bank of Greece

[8] Bank for International
Settlements, November 2012, available at
http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm, figures available at
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt21a21b.pdf

[9] As called for by the European
Parliament

[10] Following the opening of
proceedings in March 2008, the Commission sent Visa a statement of objections
in April 2009 concerning multilateral interchange fees ("MIFs") for
consumer debit and credit card transactions (see MEMO/09/151). Visa Europe offered commitments to cap its debit card MIFs at 0.20%, which the Commission made
binding in December 2010 (see IP/10/1684). The proceedings regarding consumer
credit MIFs continue

[11] Case T-111/08, judgment of 24
May 2012, not yet published

[12] Case COMP/SA.33054 Post
Office Limited: Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially
viable network for the period 2012-15 and the continuation of a working capital
facility (see IP/12/320).
The case was assessed under Article 106 TFEU

[13] Responding to calls from EP
and ECOSOC

[14] Speech of Vice-President
Almunia on 8 October 2012 (see SPEECH/12/701) at the European Parliament
Presenting the Competition Policy Work Programme for 2013/14. Available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-701_en.htm

[15] Idem

[16] For example, as a result of
the Commission's antitrust investigation, Germany’s E.On committed to sell its
electricity generation assets and its high-voltage transmission grid business
in 2008, a milestone in opening up the market in Germany. Other investigations
have helped lift restrictions on cross-border trading of gas and electricity.
For instance, the Commission's investigation resulted in changes to the Swedish
electricity transmission system that was hindering exports by limiting
interconnection capacity with neighbouring countries

[17] The rules allow subsidies of
up to 85% of the increase faced by the most efficient companies in each sector
from 2013 to 2015, a cap that will gradually fall to 75% in 2019-2020

[18] The functioning
of the market for internet access and provision from a consumer perspective in
the European Union. Study on behalf of the European Commission, Directorate
General for Health and Consumers (expected to be published in April 2013)

[19] Case
T-336/07, judgment of 29 March 2012, not yet published

[20] Notably the Article 102 TFEU
cases involving Microsoft (see Commission Decision

of 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/Case COMP/C-3/37.792) and
Intel (see Commission Decision

of 13 May 2009 in Case COMP/C-3/37.990)

[21] See speech by Joaquin Almunia
Vice President of the European Commission of 8 October 2012
(SPEECH/12/701)

[22] C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige 
[2011] ECR I-527

[23] Case
COMP/M.6381, Google/Motorola Mobility (see IP/12/129)

[24] Initiation
of proceedings against Samsung on 30 January 2012 (Case COMP/C-3/39.939);
initiation of proceedings against Motorola on 2 April 2012 (Cases
COMP/C-3/39.985  and COMP/C-3/39.986)

[25] See
press release at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm

[26] See IP/09/1098 and
MEMO/09/321

[27] See MEMO/12/593

[28] http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf

[29] Issues covered included State
aid in the financial sector the food sector, the aviation sector, the financial
sector and the State aid modernisation initiative

[30] http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

[31] http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf

[32] P7_TA(2012)0031

[33] Resolutions by the European
Parliament in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011

[34] Available at
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.23584

[35] Available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.24209

[36] Available at
http://www.toad.cor.europa.eu/corwipdetail.aspx?folderpath=ECOS-V/035&id=21619

[37] Available at
http://www.toad.cor.europa.eu/corwipdetail.aspx?folderpath=COTER-V/034&id=21792