The Creek War

 1813–1814

THE U.S. ARMY CAMPAIGNS

OF THE WAR OF 1812
Cover: The Georgia militia under General Floyd attacking the 

Creek Indians at Autossee, a colored engraving by an unknown 

artist, c. 1820 (Courtesy of Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript 

Library, University of Georgia Libraries) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

CMH Pub 74–4
•••

The Creek War

1813–1814

by

Richard D. Blackmon

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Center of Military History

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 2014

•••• 5 ••••

•••

Introduction

The War of 1812 is perhaps the United States’ least known 

conflict. Other than Andrew Jackson’s 1815 victory at New Orleans 

and Francis Scott Key’s poem “The Star-Spangled Banner” written 

in 1814 during the British attack on Baltimore, most Americans 

know little about the country’s second major war. Its causes are 

still debated by historians today. Great Britain’s impressment of 

American sailors, its seizure of American ships on the high seas, 

and suspected British encouragement of Indian opposition to further 

American settlement on the western frontier all contributed to 

America’s decision to declare war against Great Britain in June 1812.

None of these factors, however, adequately explain why President 

James Madison called for a war the country was ill-prepared to 

wage. Moreover, the war was quite unpopular from the start. Many 

Federalists—chiefly in the New England states—opposed an armed 

conflict with Great Britain, continued to trade with the British, 

and even met in convention to propose secession from the Union. 

Some members of the president’s own Republican Party objected 

to the war’s inevitable costs and questionable objectives, such as the 

conquest of Canada.

To declare war was one thing, but to prosecute it successfully 

was a different matter. Much of the story of the War of 1812 is about 

the unpreparedness of America’s Army and Navy at the conflict’s 

outset, and the enormous difficulties the new nation faced in raising 

troops, finding competent officers, and supplying its forces. Most 

of America’s military leaders were inexperienced and performed 

poorly, particularly in the first two years of war. Only gradually 

did better leaders rise to the top to command the more disciplined 

and well-trained units that America eventually fielded. But despite 

costly initial setbacks, by the time the fighting stopped American 

arms had won key victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and New 

Orleans under excellent officers such as Winfield Scott, Jacob 

Brown, and Andrew Jackson. Although the United States achieved 

few of its political objectives in the War of 1812, its Regular Army 

emerged more professional, better led, and fit to take its place as the 

foundation of America’s national defenses.
•••• 6 ••••

I encourage all Army leaders and soldiers to read this pamphlet 

and the others in our series of campaign pamphlets in commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812. We can all profit from 

greater knowledge about the beginnings of our Army: an Army 

forged in victory and defeat during what has often been called the 

second war of American independence.

RICHARD W. STEWART

Chief Historian
•••• 7 ••••

•••

The Creek War

1813–1814

About a year after the United States declared war on Great 

Britain in June 1812, a conflict erupted in the American South 

that would become known as the Creek War. The Creek War was 

a complicated affair. It was both a civil war between two factions 

within the Creek Nation and an international struggle in which the 

United States, Spain, Britain, and other Indian tribes played a part. 

America’s ultimate victory in the conflict helped shape the outcome 

of the broader war with Britain and gained significant new territory 

for white settlement in the American South.

Strategic Setting

After the end of the American Revolution in 1783, Georgia 

experienced an explosion in population, and many new settlers 

looked for opportunities to acquire land in the western part of the 

state, largely occupied by Creek Indians. Their homeland included 

riverside towns, crop fields, and hunting grounds that extended into 

what is now Alabama. The Creeks were historically and culturally 

divided into two groups: the Upper Creek towns, located primarily 

along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers and their tributaries in what 

is now Alabama, and the Lower Creek towns, found in the Flint and 

Chattahoochee river valleys of western Georgia. 

 Before 1790, Georgia made several treaties in which Lower 

Creek headmen ceded the land between the Ogeechee and Oconee 

Rivers to the state, but Upper Creek leaders refused to acknowledge 

the validity of these agreements. This disagreement resulted in 

frequent Creek attacks on Georgia settlers in the disputed territory. 

In 1790, the U.S. government made its first treaty with the Creeks, 

one in which both Lower and Upper Creek leadership participated. 

In subsequent treaties, the Creeks ceded more lands to the United 

States until the Ocmulgee River became the boundary between the 

Creek Nation and Georgia in 1805.
•••• 8 ••••

Federal officials also instituted a “civilization program,” 

implemented and promoted by the 

Indian agent for the United States, 

Benjamin Hawkins. His program 

of teaching agriculture and “domestic arts” to the Creeks succeeded primarily with the Lower 

Creeks. Their conversion from a 

hunting/bartering economy to a 

market economy produced great 

wealth among many of them, particularly those of mixed-blood ancestry who claimed a white father 

(usually a trader or merchant) and 

a Creek mother. This, however, 

caused resentment between those 

economically successful Lower 

Creeks and many Upper Creeks 

who opposed assimilation.

Hawkins created a governing 

body for all Creeks, the National 

Council, which intentionally circumvented the previous polity 

of town headmen. The council redistributed political power from the 

town level to the national level. Benjamin Hawkins naturally exercised 

great influence over who sat on the council and selected those Creeks 

sympathetic to the United States. Traditionalist Creeks resented the 

National Council and sought to eliminate it.

Further cause for division occurred when the United States sought 

to extend the Federal Road through Creek territory to connect Georgia 

with the Mississippi Territory (Map 1). William McIntosh, a powerful 

Lower Creek leader with strong ties to the U.S. government, convinced 

those Creeks opposing the road to support the project in an 1805 treaty. 

Though the pathway provided some Creeks with a source of income 

from tolls and businesses along its route, the track also brought a flood 

of settlers to the Mississippi Territory, adding another cause of friction 

between whites and Indians. As tensions between the United States and 

Great Britain increased, in 1811 the U.S. government authorized the 

further expansion of the Federal Road to facilitate the rapid movement 

of military forces to the Gulf Coast. The National Council Creeks 

supported the project while traditionalists opposed it.

Benjamin Hawkins

(New York Public Library)

•••••••••••••••
Tennessee R

Pearl R

oT b m gi e b R e

Mississippi R

B al ck Warr oi r R

Fl ni t R

pA l a c a i h oc al R

Coosa R

Ocmulgee R

Chattahoochee R

Oconee R

Ogeechee R

A al b

ma a R

aC ah ab R

Savannah R

Tallapoosa R

F E D E R A L R O A D

Fort Gadsden

Fort Stoddert

Fort Lawrence

Coweta

Coosa

Tuckabatchee

Okfuskee

Augusta

Macon

Mobile

Huntsville

New Orleans

Natchez

Pensacola

MILLEDGEVILLE

WASHINGTON

BATON ROUGE

CHICKAS A W

N A TION

CHOCT A W

N A TION

CREEK

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CHEROKE E

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GEORGIA

L O UISIANA

S P A NIS H

EAST FL O RID A

S P A NIS H

WEST FL ORID A

TENNESSE E

SOUTH

CAROLINA

MISSOUR OUISIANA L I

Y O R TERRIT

M ISSISSIPP I

TERRIT O R Y

MISSOURI

TERRIT O R

CREEK NA

Y

TION

1813

0 100 25 50 75

Miles

Indian town

Indian land boundary

(approximate)

Map 1
•••• 10 ••••

The United States had 

legitimate concerns regarding 

the possibility of foreign military 

action in the region. Since the beginning of colonization in North 

America, European powers had 

regarded the Gulf Coast as a key 

asset. In the post-Revolutionary 

years, the British had attempted 

to stem the westward flow of 

American settlers by supporting 

Indians from coastal trading 

posts. Spain, in possession of 

the Floridas, also had an uneasy 

relationship with the United 

States, and had long sought to 

influence local Indians to shield 

its territory from American 

encroachment.

Into this turbulent situation in the fall of 1811 came 

Tecumseh. A Shawnee warrior 

from north of the Ohio River, 

Tecumseh and his brother “the 

Prophet” (Tenskwatawa) had 

forged an alliance between the 

British and many northern tribes. Tecumseh advocated an armed 

uprising by all Indians against the encroachments of American 

settlers. In the summer of 1811, Tecumseh sought to expand his 

pan-Indian alliance into the South. He first visited the Chickasaws. 

Rebuffed, he continued on to the Choctaws, but one of their chiefs, 

Pushmataha, was a staunch friend of the United States and countered Tecumseh’s efforts. He then ventured on to the Creek Nation, 

where he encountered a more receptive audience. Admonishing his 

adherents not to strike until the pan-Indian alliance was ready to 

act in unison, Tecumseh returned to his home in the north before 

the end of the year.

In the spring of 1812, a few of Tecumseh’s Creek followers killed 

several white travelers on the Federal Road. Hawkins responded by 

calling a meeting of the National Council in June. The council condemned the perpetrators to death and sent out warriors to execute 

the sentences. That same month, news filtered into the backcountry 

William McIntosh,

by Albert Newsam from a 

painting by Charles Bird King

(National Portrait Gallery, 

Smithsonian Institution)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 11 ••••

that the United States had 

declared war on Great Britain 

and that a party of Creeks, led 

by Little Warrior, returning 

from a meeting with Tecumseh 

in the north, killed two white 

families along the Duck River in 

Tennessee. Small-scale attacks 

against settlers continued sporadically during the remainder 

of 1812, as did condemnation 

and retaliatory justice by the 

National Council. A serious 

rift soon developed in the Creek 

Nation. One faction consisted 

of those leaders who received 

monetary emoluments from the 

United States, who supported 

the National Council, and who 

rejected Tecumseh’s call to war. 

Members of the other faction, 

known as Red Sticks, disliked 

the council’s challenge to local 

autonomy, resented the growing 

influence of white culture at the 

expense of traditional values, 

and embraced Tecumseh’s political vision and the Prophet’s 

religious teachings. As the year wore on, the animosity between 

these two factions became intense.

President James Madison’s initial response to the growing tensions 

on the Southern frontier focused not on the Creek Nation, but on 

Spanish West Florida. Although the United States and Spain were 

not at war, Spain was an ally of Great Britain in Europe. Madison 

feared that the Spanish might either stir up the Southern Indians 

against the United States or allow the British to use the West Florida 

ports of Mobile and Pensacola as bases from which to attack New 

Orleans. As few federal troops were available in the South, Secretary 

of War William Eustis asked Tennessee Governor William Blount 

to organize an expedition against West Florida. Blount turned to his 

state militia commander, Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson, who quickly 

raised two thousand volunteers to reinforce New Orleans and to 

attack the Spanish. 

Tecumseh

(Library of Congress)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 12 ••••

On 8 January 1813, Jackson 

and his infantry departed 

Nashville, Tennessee, by boats 

down the Cumberland, Ohio, 

and Mississippi Rivers, while 

the Tennessee cavalry under the 

command of Col. John Coffee 

rode down a trail known as the 

Natchez Trace. In February, 

the two columns converged at 

the capital of the Mississippi 

Territory, Washington, located 

six miles east of the Mississippi 

River town of Natchez. There, 

Jackson waited for further instructions concerning the movement on West Florida. By this 

time, however, the mood had 

changed in Congress and the 

administration shelved plans to 

invade West Florida. Informing 

Jackson that “the causes for 

embodying and marching to 

New Orleans the Corps under 

your command having ceased to 

exist,” the Secretary of War John Armstrong instructed the general 

to dismiss his volunteers from service, to turn over all equipment to 

U.S. Army authorities of the 7th Military District (which included 

Louisiana, Tennessee, and the Mississippi Territory), and to return 

to Tennessee. 

When Jackson received Armstrong’s letter in mid-March, he 

became enraged. He immediately fired off a reply informing him 

that he would disobey the order to turn in equipment and tents, 

which his men would need for their return journey. Since the U.S. 

government would not pay for rations on their return trip, Jackson 

arranged to procure them himself. He led his two thousand volunteers back to Tennessee on foot, giving up his own horse to carry 

the sick. Jackson’s men dubbed him “Old Hickory” for the strength 

of character and fortitude he displayed. 

Tensions along the frontier had not abated, however. In March, about 

the same time that Jackson started his trek back to Tennessee, Little 

Warrior, returning from another meeting with Tecumseh, murdered 

William Blount

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
•••• 13 ••••

seven families at the mouth of the 

Ohio River. Moreover, Red Stick 

warriors began targeting Creeks 

friendly to the United States. The 

Madison administration reversed 

course yet again and ordered Maj. 

Gen. James Wilkinson, who was 

based at New Orleans, to capture 

Mobile to stop British merchants 

located there from supplying the 

Red Sticks with arms. Wilkinson 

complied, capturing Mobile without a fight in April. The fall of 

Mobile left Pensacola as the only 

source of weapons and ammunition available to the Red Sticks. 

By June 1813, the Creek 

Nation was descending into 

civil war. Having won the backing of the majority of Creeks, 

the Red Sticks began gathering 

their forces near the confluence 

of the Coosa and Tallapoosa 

Rivers. There they executed several Creeks who had enforced the 

National Council’s orders to bring perpetrators of violence to justice. 

Red Stick leaders announced that they intended to kill Hawkins and 

all headmen who supported the United States. They also planned 

to destroy both the national Creek capital of Tuckabatchee and the 

Lower Creek capital of Coweta. 

In July, a Creek youth by the name of Latecau, who claimed 

to be a prophet, gathered a group of followers and traveled to the 

Creek town of Coosa. There, he invited all of the National Creek 

headmen who did not support the Red Stick movement to come and 

experience his religious powers. Many headmen from surrounding 

towns gathered to witness the proceedings. Latecau and other Red 

Stick believers began by performing the dances Tecumseh had 

taught them. During the dances, Latecau and his followers suddenly 

attacked the National Creek headmen, killing three. The other 

headmen fled Coosa, gathered together their warriors, and returned 

seeking revenge. The National Creeks managed to kill Latecau and 

eight of his followers at Coosa before moving on to Okfuskee and 

John Coffee

(Alabama Department of 

Archives and History) •••••••••••••••
•••• 14 ••••

attacking more Red Stick followers. Fighting quickly escalated 

between the opposing factions as did the danger posed by the Red 

Sticks to whites traveling through or living near Creek lands. The 

governors of Georgia and Tennessee could not support the council 

since states could not send their militia into federal territory without 

the permission of the U.S. government.

Operations

Battle of Burnt Corn, July 1813

With open warfare now all but assured, Red Stick leader Peter 

McQueen traveled to Pensacola with three hundred fifty Red Stick 

warriors to obtain arms and ammunition. At Pensacola, McQueen 

presented the Spanish governor, Mateo González Manrique, with 

a letter from a British general in Canada recommending that the 

Spanish supply the Red Sticks with weapons and ammunition. After 

hesitating at first, Manrique gave McQueen three hundred pounds of 

gunpowder and a proportionate amount of lead. While in Pensacola, 

the Creeks made statements that they intended to attack white settlements once they returned home. As verification of their statements, 

they spent several days engaged in dances and other ceremonies 

usually performed before going to war.

News of these developments quickly made its way to the settlers 

living in the Tensaw District of the Mississippi Territory, and the local 

militia commander, Col. James Caller, mobilized his force. He decided 

to intercept McQueen and his party on their return trip from Pensacola 

before they could deliver the war supplies to the main Red Stick forces. 

Setting out on 25 July, Caller took three companies of mounted militiamen armed with their own rifles and shotguns. Another company under 

the command of Capt. Samuel Dale joined Caller. After crossing the 

Alabama River, Caller received additional reinforcements. He now 

commanded about one hundred eighty militiamen and National Creeks.

On the morning of 27 July, Caller’s scouts reported that the Red 

Sticks were camped a few miles ahead on the Pensacola Road in 

what is now northern Escambia County, Alabama. A council of war 

decided to divide the militiamen into three columns for the purpose 

of surrounding the Creek encampment, which was situated in a bend 

of Burnt Corn Creek. The hilly terrain hid the approach of Caller’s 

troops, and the three-pronged assault surprised the Red Sticks and 

forced them to evacuate their camp. The militiamen then became 

occupied in leading off the Indians’ packhorses. After McQueen 
•••• 15 ••••

realized that the militia had stopped pursuing him, he regrouped his 

warriors and counterattacked, forcing the militiamen to flee. Both 

sides lost about a dozen men, but the militia escaped with most of the 

Indians’ supplies (see Map 2).

The Fort Mims Massacre, 30 August 1813

Immediately after the action at Burnt Corn Creek, the Red 

Sticks initiated a war on white settlers in the Tensaw District. The 

attacks caused many settlers to leave their remote homesteads for 

settlements near the confluence of the Tombigbee and Alabama 

Rivers. Scattered throughout the region were small stockade forts 

that generally consisted of a palisade erected around a settler’s 

dwelling and other nearby structures. Each fort usually boasted at 

least one blockhouse in a corner to provide some cross-fire capability. 

In response to the Creek attacks, Mississippi Territory authorities sent Brig. Gen. Ferdinand L. Claiborne to the Tensaw District 

with a large force of Mississippi Territory militia. Claiborne 

distributed his men so that every stockade fort would have at least 

some semblance of a garrison. He stationed 175 militiamen under 

the command of Maj. Daniel Beasley to one of the largest of the 

posts, Fort Mims, built around the house of local planter Samuel 

Mims about forty miles north of Mobile. 

Fort Mims sheltered several hundred white and mixed-blood 

settlers along with their slaves. The fort consisted of a compound 

of about one acre surrounded by a stockade. A lone blockhouse 

had been partially constructed on the southwest corner and some 

five hundred loopholes cut in the stockade about three and a half 

feet off the ground. A building attached to the north palisade wall, 

referred to as “the bastion,” had additional picketing around it. 

Although the fort sat on a small hill, potential attackers could approach close to the walls without being detected due to the nature 

of the surrounding terrain.

General Claiborne visited Fort Mims in early August. To his 

dismay, he found that the population of the settlement had become 

complacent. The general ordered Beasley to strengthen the palisade, to 

construct two additional blockhouses, and to send out regular patrols. 

By the end of August, Major Beasley still had not made the improvements ordered by General Claiborne and had even grown so careless 

as to allow the fort gates to be left open.

On 30 August, about one thousand Red Stick warriors rushed 

the open eastern gate to Fort Mims in a noon assault. Before the garrison realized the danger, the warriors had control of three-fourths 
TALLUSHATCHEE

3 Nov 1813

TALLADEGA

9 Nov 1813

ENOTACHOPCO

24 Jan 1814

EMUCKFAU

22 Jan 1814

NUYAKA

17 Dec 1813

TOHOPEKA

[HORSESHOE BEND]

24 Mar 1814

HILLABEE

18 Nov 1813

OLD TOWNS

Feb 1814

Tennessee R Tennessee R

B al ck Warr oi r R

aC

ah

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R

Coosa R

R

a

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Fort Strother

Fort Williams

Fort Deposit

Fort Jackson

Hickory Ground Tuckabatchee

Okfuskee

Coosa

Huntsville

CHICKAS A W

N A TION

CHOC T A W

N A TION

CHEROKEE

N A TION
AUTOSSEE

TALLASSEE

29 Nov 1813

ECCANACHACA

[HOLY GROUND]

23 Dec 1813

BURNT CORN CREEK

27 Jul 1813

FORT MIMS

30 Aug 1813

CALABEE CREEK

27 Jan 1814

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Ch

a

ttahoochee

R

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eli

A al bama R

F E D E R A L

R O A D

Fort Hull

Fort Mitchell

Fort Burrows

Fort Decatur

Fort Deposit

Fort Stoddert

Fort Bowyer

Fort St. Stephens Fort Claiborne

Coweta

Fushatchee

Othlewallee

Pensacola

Mobile

CREEK

N A TION

MISSISSIPPI

TERRI T O R Y

S P ANISH

WEST FL ORID A

THE BAT TLEGROUND

CREEK W A R

1813–1814

BattleIndian town

0 50 25

Miles

Indian land boundary

(approximate)

Map 2
•••• 18 ••••

of the palisade loopholes and had struck down Major Beasley as 

he tried to close the gate. Capt. Dixon Bailey assumed command 

of the garrison and attempted to mount a defense, but he could not 

shift troops sufficiently to regain portions of the fort. Instead, the 

garrison divided into small groups and retreated toward the Mims 

house in the center, the unfinished blockhouse in the southwest 

corner, and the bastion on the north wall. Eventually, the warriors 

overran the blockhouse but could not budge the defenders from the 

Mims house and the bastion. The defenders continued to fight off 

attacks on the remaining two enclaves until late afternoon when 

the Creeks withdrew. During this lull, the garrison regrouped and 

prepared as best it could for a renewed assault, which came almost 

immediately.

During the second assault, the Red Sticks shot flaming arrows into 

the two remaining defensive positions. These had the desired effect of 

flushing out the defenders of the Mims house into the open where Red 

Sticks shot them down. With most of the fort now in flames and only 

An engraving of the massacre at Fort Mims, depicting an attack 

on settlers and allied Creeks by the Red Sticks

(Alabama Department of Archives and History) •••••••••••••••
•••• 19 ••••

a few whites left alive, Captain Bailey directed the survivors to escape 

as best they could. The battle was over by 1700. The warriors took no 

prisoners, killing the inhabitants without mercy.

Tennessee and Andrew Jackson

Before the attack on Fort Mims, Benjamin Hawkins had assured 

Secretary of War Armstrong that the Red Stick hostilities could be 

dealt with by the National Council and those Creeks who supported 

it. Tennessee’s Governor Blount, however, had suggested in June 

1812 that the best means of preventing further Red Stick hostilities 

might be to mount a military expedition into Creek territory. The 

continued attacks by Red Stick warriors throughout the summer 

also made the secretary realize that force might be necessary. He 

wrote to Georgia Governor David B. Mitchell on 13 July 1813 

requesting that he organize an army of fifteen hundred militiamen 

for operations in the Creek territory. Armstrong delineated a plan 

for the Georgia militia to cooperate with Tennessee forces and the 

3d U.S. Infantry Regiment stationed at Mobile. He sent a similar 

letter to Governor Blount. This three-pronged pincer movement 

from the north, east, and southwest would, the secretary hoped, 

overwhelm the Red Sticks. Armstrong asked the governors to give 

him a timeline of when they could have their forces ready to take 

the field so that he could coordinate their movements with those of 

the 3d Infantry.

Like Mitchell, Blount planned to raise fifteen hundred militia 

for the coming campaign. Naturally, he turned to the commander 

of Tennessee’s militia, General Jackson, to lead the foray. Friends 

of Jackson in Washington, D.C., had already informed him of 

the government’s decision to send military forces into Creek 

territory. Before Blount could advise Jackson, the general wrote 

to the governor offering suggestions as to Tennessee’s role in the 

pending conflict. He suggested that the need to guard supply lines 

and the possible involvement of the British and Spanish meant that 

Tennessee should provide three thousand to five thousand militia. 

He recommended that the manpower be drawn evenly from the 

eastern and western militia districts of the state.

When news of the Fort Mims disaster reached Nashville on 

18 September 1813, Jackson was bedridden with wounds received 

from a recent duel. He nevertheless assured Blount and the town’s 

leading citizens that he would personally lead the expedition into 

the Creek lands. Heeding Jackson’s advice, Blount directed the 

general to raise twenty-five hundred militia from the western part 
•••• 20 ••••

of the state and a like number from the eastern part. The next 

day, Jackson issued orders calling out the state militia. Knowing 

that assembling men from around the state would require time, he 

ordered the immediate formation of a cavalry regiment and sent 

it south to the Creek frontier. He entrusted the command of the 

mounted unit to Colonel Coffee, hoping that the horsemen would 

be able to stabilize the frontier until he arrived with the main 

army. Jackson directed Coffee to move south toward Huntsville in 

what is now the state of Alabama. Jackson personally planned to 

lead the western militia then gathering at Fayetteville, Tennessee, 

eighty miles south of Nashville. The eastern militia gathered at 

Knoxville, Tennessee, under the command of Maj. Gen. John 

A. Cocke.

Jackson arrived at the Fayetteville militia camp on 7 October 

1813. Friendly Cherokee warriors also joined his assembling army. 

Soon after his arrival, he received word from Coffee that Red Stick 

warriors were moving northward toward the Tennessee River. The 

colonel feared that his regiment of five hundred mounted militiamen might be overwhelmed if not immediately supported. On 11 

October, Jackson and his army reached Huntsville, having traveled 

over thirty miles in ten hours. The alarm proved to be false, but 

Jackson now had his army close to the Creek towns.

After several days at Huntsville, Jackson sent Coffee’s cavalry 

along the upper reaches of the Black Warrior River to raid Red Stick 

towns located in that region. Meanwhile, he moved the infantry up 

the Tennessee River to establish a new supply base, Fort Deposit, 

in the northern part of the Mississippi Territory. He intended to 

march south down the Coosa River to the important Creek town 

of Hickory Ground, located near the junction of the Coosa and 

Tallapoosa Rivers, hopefully in coordination with Brig. Gen. John 

Floyd’s Georgians supposedly advancing from the east. Moving 

from Fort Deposit, Jackson and his Tennesseans had to negotiate 

the southern end of the Appalachian Mountains, building a road as 

they went so that supply wagons could follow them. Once over the 

mountains, Jackson reached the Coosa River at the Ten Islands on 

1 November. There, he had Fort Strother constructed as a forward 

supply point.

In the meantime, General Cocke and his army of East 

Tennessee militia made their way down the Tennessee River, 

to present-day Chattanooga, then overland through northwest 

Georgia. As commander of Tennessee’s militia, Jackson clearly 

intended Cocke to join his own forces, but Cocke held the same 
•••• 21 ••••

rank in the state militia and did not feel obligated to subordinate 

himself to Jackson’s authority. He considered Jackson a political 

rival and wanted any victories won by the East Tennessee forces 

attributed to himself, and not Jackson.

While his men built Fort Strother, Jackson learned of a large 

Red Stick force located at the Creek town of Tallushatchee, some 

fifteen miles distant. He ordered Coffee to attack the town with 

about one thousand mounted militia. Coffee surrounded the village 

on 3 November, and then sent two companies to lure the warriors 

out of their position. The Red Sticks took the bait and rushed out 

of the town and into the ring of Tennessee militia. The subsequent 

militia attack forced the Red Stick warriors back into the town as the 

dragoons tightened the circle. After the battle the horsemen set fire 

to the buildings. Red Stick losses amounted to 186 warriors killed 

and some 80 women and children captured, while Coffee sustained 

less than 50 casualties.

After Coffee’s victory at Tallushatchee, many nearby Creek 

towns pledged their loyalty to the United States. About one 

hundred loyal Creeks sought refuge at Fort Leslie near the Creek 

town of Talladega in what is now the state of Alabama. About one 

thousand Red Sticks led by William Weatherford surrounded Fort 

Leslie, stating that he would kill all inside unless the occupants 

joined him in warring against the United States. A Creek Indian 

from the fort managed to elude the besiegers and carry word of 

the situation to Jackson at Fort Strother.

Although low on food and supplies, Jackson thought that a 

victory at Talladega might end the war. Learning that a contingent 

of East Tennessee militia under Brig. Gen. James White was approaching, Jackson ordered White to hasten to Fort Strother and 

secure the post. He then left a small guard and the wounded from the 

Tallushatchee fight behind and immediately marched to Talladega, 

about twenty miles farther south, with twelve hundred infantry and 

eight hundred cavalry. On the night of 8 November, a courier from 

Fort Strother arrived with a letter from White informing Jackson 

that his East Tennessee militia would not be arriving at Fort Strother 

because General Cocke had ordered his troops back to their main 

camp in western Georgia. Undeterred, Jackson continued with 

his offensive. On 9 November, his two thousand Tennesseans approached Talladega. Through an error, his force failed to encircle 

the town as Jackson had intended. Weatherford escaped with about 

seven hundred warriors, leaving three hundred men to perish in 

a furious battle when Jackson’s troops attacked. Jackson’s army 
•••• 22 ••••

sustained about one hundred casualties. The general complained 

afterward that “had we had provisions, this stroke by following it 

up would have put an end to the war.”

The battles at Tallushatchee and Talladega significantly diminished Red Stick strength, and by rescuing friendly Creeks at Talladega, 

Jackson further cemented the relationship between National Council 

Creeks and the United States. Impressed by American power, the 

Creeks of the Hillabee towns, located in the northern Creek territory, 

pledged not to war any further against the United States. In return, 

General Jackson promised not to attack their towns.

Unfortunately, General Cocke knew nothing of these arrangements. On 10 November, he directed General White with his 

mounted East Tennessee militia and some three hundred Cherokee 

warriors to attack the Hillabee towns. Since the Creeks did not 

expect an attack, they were completely defenseless when White attacked on 18 November. In fact, when White attacked at first light, 

many residents came out to greet the Tennesseans and Cherokees. 

The towns contained many warriors wounded from the battles at 

Tallushatchee and Talladega as well as women and children. White 

took the women and children prisoners and reported killing sixtynine Creek warriors. His own command sustained no casualties. 

When Jackson heard of the attack he became furious. He viewed 

the slaughter as evidence of Cocke’s insubordination. The surviving 

Hillabees believed they had been double-crossed by Jackson and 

henceforth pledged to war against the United States.

His string of victories notwithstanding, Jackson struggled to 

keep a respectable military force assembled. Upon his return to Fort 

Strother after Talladega, he found that supplies had not reached 

that post from Fort Deposit as intended. The men grumbled about 

the lack of supplies and threatened to leave camp. Jackson issued a 

proclamation imploring the militiamen to remain at Fort Strother, 

stating that the campaign would end thirty days after sufficient 

supplies had arrived. Assuming the supply train from Fort Deposit 

would arrive momentarily, he promised his troops that if provisions 

did not arrive in two days, he would personally lead them back to 

the Tennessee River.

When no supply train arrived, Jackson led his troops northward 

toward Fort Deposit on 17 November, where he knew there would 

be provisions. The column had only marched about twelve miles 

when it met a supply column from Fort Deposit consisting of nine 

wagons carrying flour and one hundred fifty head of cattle. Jackson’s 

troops halted and gorged on the supplies.
•••• 23 ••••

After the hungry troops had eaten, Jackson ordered the column 

back to Fort Strother, but some militia units decided to continue 

their march home. Jackson and his staff blocked the road and the 

troops, in “a turbulent and mutinous disposition,” backed down. 

After having to stop a second mass desertion, this time with loaded 

muskets, Jackson rode to Fort Deposit, accompanied by Coffee 

and his mounted troops, to investigate the supply situation. At Fort 

Deposit, Jackson sent Coffee northward to the Huntsville area so he 

could obtain remounts and forage his horses in greener pastures. He 

also wrote to Maj. Gen. Thomas Flournoy, the commander of the 

7th Military District that included the Mississippi Territory, asking 

for supplies and reinforcements.

The Georgia Militia and the Offensive from the East

During the summer of 1813, Governor Mitchell had appointed 

Brig. Gen. John Floyd to lead Georgia’s contribution to war against 

the Red Sticks. Floyd established his headquarters at the state 

capital at Milledgeville to supervise logistical preparations and the 

assembling of the troops. Like Jackson, supply shortages bedeviled 

the Georgian leader. He quickly discovered that Maj. Gen. Thomas 

Pinckney, the commander of the 6th Military District that included 

Georgia, had no tents or camp equipment for his use. Additionally, any 

rations provided to the army could only be transported as far as the 

western limit of the state. Beyond that, Floyd would have to arrange 

wagons, horses, and drivers. As summer faded into fall, Georgia officials struggled to feed Floyd’s growing army, and to accumulate the 

thirty days’ supply of food stocks Floyd deemed necessary to sustain 

the campaign once it began. With so many men assembled in closely 

confined camps, sanitation became an issue and disease broke out.

With his force only partially trained and the supply problem still 

not overcome, Floyd moved out of Milledgeville on 29 October. He 

carried with him only a twenty days’ supply of flour and three days 

of beef for his army, but anticipated being overtaken by additional 

supply trains. On 3 November, the day Coffee’s mounted Tennesseans 

defeated the Red Sticks at Tallushatchee, Floyd arrived at Fort 

Lawrence on the Federal Road west of the Flint River, roughly 

twenty miles from Macon, Georgia. He intended to use this post 

as the major supply point for his campaign and as the final staging 

area for his forces. Within two weeks, he had accumulated enough 

supplies for twenty days and began marching toward Coweta on the 

Chattahoochee River that was under siege by the Red Sticks. He had 

almost fifteen hundred men and two cannon with him, having left 
•••• 24 ••••

over two hundred fifty sick men at Fort Lawrence. By the time Floyd’s 

column reached the town, however, the Red Sticks had learned of his 

approach and had abandoned the siege.

After picking up some interpreters from Benjamin Hawkins, the 

Georgians crossed the Chattahoochee River on 24 November 1813. 

There, Floyd established Fort Mitchell in what is now Alabama to 

act as a forward supply center. At this point, Floyd decided to attack 

the Red Stick town of Autossee, situated along the Tallapoosa River 

about sixty miles to the west. Without waiting for Fort Mitchell to 

be completed, he led his army westward and arrived within eight 

miles of Autossee late in the day of 28 November. Curiously, the 

Red Sticks did not attack. Floyd rousted his army in the middle 

of the night and arrived outside the town around daybreak on the 

twenty-ninth. He wanted to surround the town so that no warriors 

could escape, but on surveying the area, he discovered that another 

settlement, Tallassee, lay contiguous to Autossee. Together, the 

villages were too large for him to encircle. He therefore divided 

his forces to attack the two towns simultaneously. After two to 

three hours of exchanging small arms fire, neither side had gained 

a decided advantage. Floyd then employed his two field pieces with 

telling effect. After the artillery had made its impression, he ordered 

a bayonet attack that finally cleared the towns. The chiefs of both 

Autossee and Tallassee perished in the combat along with about 

two hundred others, but many other warriors escaped. The Georgia 

casualties amounted to over sixty, including Floyd, who retained 

command despite a serious wound in the knee.

Floyd allowed his Creek allies to plunder the villages before 

putting them to the torch. Like Jackson, the victorious Georgian 

did not have the resources to maintain a sustained campaign, and 

he ordered his army to withdraw. A few Red Stick warriors attacked 

his rear guard, but the Georgians quickly dispersed them. Once 

back at Fort Mitchell, Floyd set about tending to the wounded and 

stockpiling supplies for a second campaign.

While General Floyd and the other wounded Georgians recuperated, General Pinckney ordered Maj. Gen. David Adams with 

his independent command of five hundred Georgia militiamen to 

keep the Red Sticks on the defensive and disrupt their food supplies. 

Adams led his men westward toward the Tallapoosa River, and on 

17 December he struck the town of Nuyaka. The Georgians found 

the place deserted. Adams surmised correctly that the Red Sticks 

had learned of his approach and had fled rather than offer battle. 

After burning the town, Adams led his troops back to Georgia.
•••• 25 ••••

The Mississippi Militia

The third thrust into Creek 

lands by American forces in the 

fall of 1813 originated in the 

southern part of the Mississippi 

Territory. In response to a 

request from Jackson, General 

Flournoy ordered General 

Claiborne to advance northward 

with his Mississippi militia up 

the Alabama River. Claiborne 

advanced with about two hundred fifty men under Col. Joseph 

Carson, another one hundred 

fifty Mississippi militia under 

Maj. Benjamin Smoot, one hundred fifty mounted Mississippi 

militia under Major Cassels, 

and one hundred fifty Choctaw 

warriors under Pushmataha—

in all about seven hundred men. 

In mid-November, Claiborne 

built a fort on the Alabama 

River at Weatherford’s Bluff, 

situated about halfway between 

present-day Montgomery and 

Mobile, Alabama. While gathering supplies at the new post, named 

Fort Claiborne, he also conducted operations against Red Stick 

communications with the Spanish at Pensacola. In late November, 

about fifty Choctaw warriors under Chief Pushmataha ambushed 

a Red Stick force at the old Burnt Corn Creek battleground.

On 28 November, the same day Floyd camped near Autossee, 

Col. Gilbert C. Russell arrived at Fort Claiborne from Mobile 

with four hundred regulars of the 3d Infantry. Russell and 

Claiborne devised a strategy that called for a quick strike deep 

into Red Stick territory. Their primary target was the most 

important Red Stick town, Eccanachaca, or the Holy Ground, 

located on a bluff on the Alabama River ten miles east of presentday Montgomery. A group of militia officers drafted a petition 

against the intended offensive, citing the approaching expiration 

of their enlistments, supply shortages, wintry weather, and the 

Pushmataha, by John 

William Gear from a painting 

by Charles Bird King

(National Portrait Gallery, 

Smithsonian Institution)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 26 ••••

lack of warm clothing. Not wanting to be accused of mutiny, 

however, the officers concluded their remonstrance with an affirmation that they would continue to serve if Claiborne decided 

to conduct the offensive.

Claiborne indeed opted to attack Eccanachaca, and he marched 

his army eighty miles northward to establish another depot he 

dubbed Fort Deposit (not to be confused with the post of that name 

established by Jackson on the Tennessee River). He left his supply 

train and all unnecessary baggage there and continued his march 

to the vicinity of Eccanachaca. Six days after Adams’ Georgians 

had attacked Nuyaka, Claiborne’s men began their final march on 

Eccanachaca. Around 1100 on 23 December, Claiborne halted some 

two miles from the village and issued his last orders. Choctaw scouts 

advised him that only about six hundred Creeks were in the village. 

At that point, Claiborne thought he could completely encircle the 

town and made his dispositions accordingly. He divided his force 

into three columns. He placed the 3d Infantry and the reserve in 

the center under his personal command, positioned the Mississippi 

militia led by Colonel Carson on the right, and posted a battalion 

of militia under Major Smoot with Pushmataha’s Choctaw warriors 

on the left. He directed the mounted militia to place itself between 

the town and the Tallapoosa River, while Carson circled around to 

attack the town from the north.

Carson encountered difficult terrain that prevented him from 

executing the envelopment maneuver. When his troops finally 

emerged northeast of Eccanachaca, Red Sticks lying in defilade 

ambushed them. Undeterred, the Mississippi militia absorbed the 

volleys and continued with their attack. About half an hour later 

the Red Sticks withdrew. 

By this time, the central column under Claiborne and the left 

column under Smoot and Pushmataha had engaged the Red Sticks at 

Eccanachaca. As Claiborne’s militiamen and the 3d Infantry began to 

push the enemy warriors from the south, Smoot and Pushmataha also 

pressed their attack from the west and north. The three-sided attack 

proved too much for the Red Stick warriors who gradually fell back 

into a smaller circle of defense. After a while the Red Stick warriors 

lost all cohesion. Those who had been in the town began to flee. Some 

crossed the Alabama River, while others escaped into the marshland. 

Claiborne allowed Pushmataha and his Choctaw warriors to 

pillage the town, while his soldiers searched for hidden inhabitants. 

He then burned the community. His soldiers had killed thirty-three 

Red Stick warriors while sustaining only one killed and twenty 
•••• 27 ••••

wounded. Though not as complete a victory as Claiborne had hoped, 

the engagement at the Holy Ground boosted the morale of his men. 

It also showed the Red Sticks that they could be attacked in remote 

places that they had presumed to be immune from assault.

The army spent the night at Eccanachaca and the next day began 

a sweep through the area destroying everything that could aid the 

Red Sticks. Claiborne headed to the plantation of Red Stick leader 

William Weatherford. Claiborne discovered a letter of Weatherford’s 

that proved the complicity of the Spanish in supplying arms, ammunition, and other provisions to the Red Sticks. He also found 

a letter from the Spanish governor of Pensacola congratulating 

Weatherford for the destruction of Fort Mims and advising against 

a contemplated Red Stick attack on Mobile.

After spending a cold, miserable Christmas huddled around 

campfires in a drenching rain with nothing to eat but parched 

corn, the Mississippians and Choctaws began their return march 

to Fort Claiborne. Most of the enlistments of his militiamen 

had already expired, but the men had stayed in the field out of 

devotion to Claiborne. Once back at the fort, the now exhausted 

militiamen eagerly returned to their homes. The Choctaws under 

Pushmataha also departed, as did Claiborne, who received permission to return home due to illness. This left Colonel Russell 

with his regulars of the 3d Infantry and a company of Mississippi 

militia whose enlistments had not yet expired as the only cohesive 

American force in the Tensaw District. Refusing to remain idle, 

Russell dispatched a force of Chickasaws under the command 

of John McKee to raid Red Stick towns located along the Black 

Warrior River north of Fort Claiborne. McKee advanced as far 

as present-day Tuscaloosa, but he found all the towns abandoned 

and returned to Fort Claiborne.

Jackson and the Tennessee Volunteers

While Generals Floyd and Claiborne harried the Red Sticks 

from the east and south, respectively, during the closing weeks of 

1813, supply shortages had kept General Jackson idle in the north. 

After spending several weeks at Fort Deposit wrestling with logistical matters, Jackson returned to Fort Strother in early December 

confident that he and Governor Blount had finally alleviated the 

army’s supply problems. Eager to resume the offensive, to his dismay 

Jackson found the army in a mutinous mood, with many militiamen asserting that their enlistments would expire on 10 December. 

Fearing that he would lose most of his men, Jackson ordered General 
•••• 28 ••••

Cocke to bring his East Tennessee militia to Fort Strother and asked 

Blount to raise more militia. He also warned Coffee, whose mounted 

militiamen were recuperating near Huntsville, to be prepared to 

prevent defectors from returning to Tennessee.

On 10 December, those militiamen who sought to return home 

found their way barred by Jackson, a small body of loyal troops, 

and two pieces of artillery. “Old Hickory” threatened to shoot the 

first man who attempted to leave camp, and to show that he meant 

what he said, he ordered the artillerymen to light their matches in 

preparation for firing the guns. The mutineers backed down and 

returned to camp.

A few days later, Cocke arrived at Fort Strother with some fifteen 

hundred men. Reinforced, Jackson allowed his own volunteers to 

begin their way home. Soon afterward Cocke informed Jackson 

that the enlistments of most of his troops would expire in one week 

and none of his soldiers would be in the field past mid-January 1814. 

Disheartened, Jackson had even more reason to be concerned when 

he received a letter from Coffee informing him that many of his 

troopers had also opted to return home. Coffee could do nothing 

to prevent them as he had been ill and confined to bed. The new 

year thus marked a low point for Jackson. “My situation for several 

Jackson Quelling the Mutiny (Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
•••• 29 ••••

weeks past has been exceedingly unpleasant,” he wrote, with “discontented troops . . . scarcity of provisions and an enemy before me 

whom I could not advance [against] to conquer.” Governor Blount 

responded to Jackson’s request for more militia by suggesting that 

Jackson return to Tennessee with the “handful of brave men” that 

remained with him. Jackson, however, was adamant. He remained 

at Fort Strother with a little over one hundred troops, condemning 

Blount for not supporting him and swearing that he would either 

defeat the Creeks or die trying, with or without reinforcements. 

A New Year and a Renewed Effort 

To date, long distances, fragile communications, rough terrain, 

and competing visions had made it difficult to coordinate the various 

independent arms of the American war effort in the south. To improve coordination, in November 1813 Secretary of War Armstrong 

had directed General Pinckney to leave his headquarters in South 

Carolina and to travel to Georgia to assume overall command of 

war against the Red Sticks. Rather than take to the field himself, he 

chose to provide recommendations and advice to his subordinates for 

how they could better implement the government’s strategy of using 

converging columns to penetrate the Creek homeland. By the time 

he was in place and in communication with all of his subordinates, 

it was too late to impact events in 1813, but his presence would 

facilitate operations in the new year. His primary contribution was 

the establishment of more effective communications between the 

Georgians at Fort Mitchell and Jackson at Fort Strother by using 

allied Creeks as runners. He also created a company of allied Indians 

as scouts, which he attached to Jackson’s command. 

By mid-January 1814, the Tennesseans and Georgians were 

ready to embark on a renewed effort. Their ultimate objective was 

the Red Stick bastion of Tohopeka, a town located on a curve of the 

Tallapoosa River known as the Horseshoe Bend. Once they captured 

the town, the combined armies would be positioned to dominate the 

rest of the Creek heartland. Assisting them would be a third column 

advancing from Fort Claiborne in the south.

At Fort Strother, the arrival of the remnants of Coffee’s command 

and about eight hundred new volunteers boosted Jackson’s forces to 

about nine hundred thirty men. Having experienced the disadvantages 

of campaigning with raw recruits whose enlistments were about to 

expire, Jackson asked that he be allowed to use the 39th U.S. Infantry, 

a well-equipped and disciplined regiment then recruiting in East 

Tennessee. General Flournoy agreed to the request, but Jackson did 
•••• 30 ••••

not have time to wait for its arrival. Pinckney had notified Jackson 

that the Georgians were about to march, and knowing that he must 

act before his volunteers’ two-month enlistments expired, Jackson 

broke camp on 17 January and headed south toward the Tallapoosa 

Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812, by Mallon & Hanson

(Library of Congress)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 31 ••••

River without the 39th Infantry. The following day, about two hundred 

Indian allies joined his ranks. By the twentieth, Jackson reached 

Emuckfau Creek, several miles north of Tohopeka. 

On the same day that Jackson left Fort Strother, Floyd departed 

his base at Fort Mitchell with some seventeen hundred militiamen, 

three hundred allied Creek warriors, and a couple of cannon. On 

the twentieth, he halted his army to construct Fort Hull as a supply 

point five miles southeast of present-day Tuskegee, Alabama, and 

about forty miles south of the Horseshoe Bend. Realizing that they 

would have no chance should Jackson and Floyd join forces, the Red 

Sticks decided to go on the offensive. With Floyd engaged in building 

Fort Hull, the Indians opted to strike the most immediate threat. 

During the night of 21 January, scouts reported to Jackson that 

the Red Sticks had advanced from Tohopeka and intended to strike 

him before dawn. The Red Sticks sniped at the camp throughout 

the night to prevent the Tennesseans from resting. The warriors 

then mounted a determined predawn attack, which the Americans 

repulsed. Jackson reported that in the face of a Creek assault, his 

troops “though raw met their bold and ferocious attack with firmness 

and undaunted resolution.” After dawn, part of Jackson’s troops 

“where the battle waxed hottest” showed signs of breaking. Jackson 

ordered his small body of reserve troops to bolster the weakening 

line, and a sudden charge led by Coffee forced the Indians to leave 

the field. The Tennesseans repulsed a renewed Red Stick attack later 

in the day “with stubborn firmness.”

The Red Sticks did not renew their assault on the Tennesseans’ 

camp on the twenty-second, which gave Jackson time to consider 

his next move. He received intelligence from his scouts that the 

Red Sticks had constructed strong defensive works at Tohopeka. 

In addition, Coffee had suffered a serious wound, and Jackson’s 

nephew and aide, Maj. Alexander Donelson, had been killed in the 

fighting. A shortage of supplies exacerbated the situation as well, 

and Jackson decided to return to Fort Strother.

Jackson began his withdrawal on 23 January, with the Red Sticks 

harassing the column as it retired. After allowing most of the column 

to cross Enotachopco Creek on 24 January, the Red Sticks attacked 

in force. Jackson had anticipated such a move, however, and had 

reversed the march of the column, which brought a sizable force to 

bear along the east bank of the creek. Many of his men fled during 

the Indian attack but enough soldiers remained, supported by two 

artillery pieces, to prevent the Red Stick warriors from crossing the 

creek. The militiamen then pursued the Red Sticks for several miles.
•••• 32 ••••

Following the battle of Enotachopco Creek, the Tennesseans 

returned to Fort Strother without further incident. Their safe passage 

reflected a strategic decision on the part of the Red Stick leadership. 

Having repulsed one arm of the advancing pincer, the Red Sticks 

turned to meet the second threat to the Tallapoosa towns, that posed 

by the Georgians approaching from the south. 

After spending several days building Fort Hull, Floyd arrived 

south of Tohopeka on 25 January, the day after the engagement at 

Enotachopco. Rather than rush to the attack, he stopped to drill 

his army. He then marched his men a mile and a half on the twentysixth only to stop again when he received word of a large Red Stick 

force moving toward him. Unwilling to risk an open engagement, 

General Floyd chose to construct a fortified encampment dubbed 

Camp Defiance, on Calabee Creek.

The Red Sticks struck Camp Defiance during the predawn 

hours of 27 January. About thirteen hundred warriors crept through 

the swamps of Calabee Creek undetected. When they reached the 

sentinels, they fired on them and rushed into the camp. Completely 

surprised, the pickets nevertheless made a stout resistance behind 

barricades, giving time for the rest of the troops to fall into the formations Floyd had taught them two days earlier. The Georgians soon 

realized that they could not maneuver effectively within the small 

encampment. Fortunately for them, daybreak allowed them to target 

the Red Stick warriors more effectively. Supported by their artillery, 

the Georgians gained the advantage and the Red Sticks withdrew.

Floyd’s losses were terrible for the Creek War, twenty-five killed 

and one hundred fifty wounded. The attack had wrought so much 

damage that the Georgians and their Creek allies spent the next six 

days recuperating. Floyd and his army then limped back to Fort 

Hull. With the enlistments of many of his militiamen about to expire, 

the general left a small garrison at Fort Hull under the command of 

Col. Homer Milton and brought the rest of the force back to Fort 

Mitchell where much of it disbanded. Although they had suffered 

heavy losses, the Red Sticks had by aggressive action defeated each 

of the two thrusts directed at Tohopeka. 

As Jackson’s and Floyd’s columns recoiled, the third column, unaware of their fate, got under way. In early February, Colonel Russell 

and his regiment of six hundred regulars departed Fort Claiborne 

on the lower Alabama River to attack the Old Towns located on the 

Cahaba River. Rather than use supply wagons, Russell sent a barge 

loaded with supplies to rendezvous with his column. He intended for 

the barge, commanded by Capt. James Dinkins, to meet him and 
•••• 33 ••••

his troops at the Old Towns. Somehow, Dinkins missed the turnoff 

for the Cahaba River and did not make the rendezvous. Though the 

troops moved quickly without the encumbrance of wagons, the Red 

Sticks still learned of Russell’s advance and abandoned the towns. 

Lacking supplies, the troops lingered in the Old Towns for two days, 

destroying them before beginning the return march to Fort Claiborne. 

Russell’s winter expedition marked the last U.S. military operation 

against hostile Creeks in the southern part of the Mississippi Territory.

Andrew Jackson and the Final Campaign

Back at Fort Strother, Jackson busied himself with preparations 

for a new offensive. In addition to gathering supplies, the general 

received most welcome reinforcements on 6 February when Maj. 

Lemuel P. Montgomery arrived at the head of the 39th Infantry. 

About twenty-five hundred volunteers from Tennessee also arrived 

that week. Meanwhile, Pinckney informed Jackson that he was 

organizing new columns to advance from Forts Claiborne and 

Mitchell in a reprise of the January campaign. 

After having gathered a sufficient quantity of supplies, Jackson 

marched out of Fort Strother on 14 March with twenty-two hundred 

infantry, Coffee’s seven hundred mounted troops, and six hundred 

American Indian allies (five hundred Cherokees and one hundred 

National Creeks). The army also had two cannon, a 6-pounder and 

a 3-pounder. The troops moved south along the Coosa River with 

the 39th Infantry following the bank of the river guarding the supply 

barges. About sixty miles from Fort Strother, Jackson halted his 

army and built a supply post named Fort Williams.

On 24 March, Jackson’s column left Fort Williams and approached 

Tohopeka after a three-day march. What Jackson found impressed 

him. “It is difficult to conceive a situation more eligible for defense than 

the one they had chosen,” he reported to Pinckney. At the large bend 

of the river, the Red Sticks had built across the peninsula a zigzag log 

fortification, five to eight feet high, which could allow them to enfilade 

attackers as they got close to the wall. The Red Sticks had constructed 

the barricade so that their fire could be delivered through loopholes, 

minimizing their exposure to enemy musket fire. Menewa, “the Great 

Warrior,” acted as overall Red Stick commander at Horseshoe Bend.

Jackson, “determining to extinguish them,” wanted to encircle 

the Red Sticks so none could flee the area and continue the war if 

defeated. Accordingly, he sent Coffee with his mounted volunteers 

and Indian allies to line the southern bank of the Tallapoosa River 

to cut off the enemy’s line of retreat. He deployed his main force with 
•••• 34 ••••

the 39th Infantry in the center and the two regiments of Tennessee 

volunteers on either flank. At 1030, he “planted” his two artillery 

pieces on an eminence about eighty yards from the barricade and had 

his chief engineer direct a point-blank artillery barrage on the center 

of the barricade. The Red Sticks attempted to shoot down the artillery crews, but the American troops laid down such a suppressing 

fire that the Red Sticks could not aim effectively. After a two-hour 

bombardment, the artillery had caused only a few casualties among 

the Red Sticks and only minimal damage to the barricade itself.

To the south of Horseshoe Bend, the impetuous Cherokee warriors 

became impatient listening to the artillery fire. Many swam the waters 

of the Tallapoosa River under a covering fire from their comrades. 

Once on the south bank, they captured the canoes the Red Sticks had 

left at the riverbank. Soon about one hundred fifty to two hundred 

National Creeks under William McIntosh and many of Coffee’s 

volunteers crossed the river as well, capturing the town and setting it 

on fire. They then advanced into the wooded hills that lay between 

Battle Plan of Horseshoe Bend from Benson John Lossing’s

The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812

•••••••••••••••
•••• 35 ••••

the town and the rear of the barricade. With the barricade’s defenders 

now surrounded, Jackson ordered his infantry to storm the defenses.

At about 1230, the drums of the 39th Infantry began to beat the 

long roll to arms. Major Montgomery took the lead with his regiment 

in the center and the Tennessee volunteers on either flank, the whole 

looking like a large wedge of troops. “The spirit which animated them 

was a sure augury of the success which was to follow,” Jackson observed. Montgomery reached the barricade first, but fell with a bullet 

Battle of Tohopeka—Death of Major Montgomery

(New York Public Library)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 36 ••••

to the head. In an instant, the entire 39th had mounted the barricade 

and became embroiled in savage hand-to-hand combat with the Red 

Sticks, “in the midst of a most tremendous fire.” One of the first to 

make it over the barricade was Ens. (3d Lt.) Sam Houston. Moments 

after entering the Creek position, Houston received an arrow in his 

upper thigh, piercing the groin and taking him out of the action. 

The Red Sticks fought fiercely, but they were soon overwhelmed. 

They fled the breastwork and scattered throughout the peninsula. 

Many made their way to the Tallapoosa and attempted to cross 

it, but Coffee’s volunteers and Indian allies ensured that few Red 

Sticks made it to the opposite bank alive. It took five hours for the 

volunteers and regulars to hunt down the surviving enemy warriors, 

with Jackson writing to his wife that “it was dark before we finished 

killing them.” The next day, his men counted 557 enemy warriors 

“left dead upon the peninsula,” not counting the several hundred 

casualties inflicted by Coffee’s command. Only about 200 of the 

1,000 defenders escaped. Jackson and his Indian allies suffered 

about 260 casualties. The victors also rounded up some 350 women 

and children as prisoners. Jackson later boasted that “the history of 

warfare furnishes few instances of a more brilliant attack.”

After securing the prisoners and tending to the wounded, Jackson 

turned his army toward Fort Williams. From there he could plan the 

next phase of the war. He believed that the remaining Red Stick warriors would regroup near the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa 

Rivers, about forty miles from the Horseshoe Bend. Expecting to be 

joined soon by a new militia army advancing from Georgia under 

the command of Colonel Milton and Colonel Russell’s 3d Infantry 

from Fort Claiborne, Jackson intended to sweep the country of the 

lower Coosa River from Fort Williams to the old Fort Toulouse site 

(near modern Montgomery) to eliminate all resistance. Jackson set 

his sights on the last major Red Stick stronghold at Othlewallee on 

the Tallapoosa River, near present-day Wetumpka, Alabama. He 

thought Weatherford, who had not been at Horseshoe Bend, might 

make a stand there. He wanted to march his army down the Tallapoosa 

River to the Hickory Ground while having Milton’s force, marching 

from Fort Hull, join him along the way. Although short on supplies, 

Jackson had been reassured by General Pinckney that Milton had 

stockpiled sufficient provisions at Fort Hull to support the operation, 

and Colonel Russell was to advance supplies up from the south as well.

On 7 April, Jackson began his march with the 39th Infantry, 

over six hundred fifty mounted Tennesseans under Coffee, and 

almost two thousand Tennessee volunteers. Six days later, he reached 
•••• 37 ••••

Fushatchee on the Tallapoosa River and found it deserted. He also 

found Othlewallee deserted. After putting both towns to the torch, 

Jackson marched his troops toward the Hickory Ground. By the 

time he reached it on 17 April, Milton had already arrived. Jackson 

had his troops build another fortification on the site of old Fort 

Toulouse, which they named Fort Jackson in his honor.

The absence of further resistance signaled an end to the Creek 

War. Secretary of War Armstrong selected General Pinckney to 

represent the United States in peace negotiations with the Creeks, 

with Hawkins as his adviser. Pinckney ordered Jackson to march his 

troops back to Tennessee, and “Old Hickory” arrived at Nashville in 

May with most of his men. Soon thereafter, the now-famous Jackson 

received a brevet major general’s commission in the U.S. Army and 

command of the 7th Military District. The government also made 

him its representative at the upcoming treaty conference instead of 

Pinckney. In July, the Tennessean ordered Hawkins to have all the 

Creek headmen meet at Fort Jackson on 1 August 1814.

The federal government dictated to Jackson what the terms of 

the peace treaty would be. The Creeks would have to cede enough 

Interview between Gen. Jackson & Weatherford, engraving by 

John Reuben Chapin, depicting Weatherford's surrender after the 

Battle of Horseshoe Bend (Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
•••• 38 ••••

land to pay for the expenses of the war (Map 3). Since the Spanish had 

supplied the Red Sticks, the Creeks could have no further interaction with them and trade only with the United States. Furthermore, 

the Creeks had to grant the United States the right to build roads, 

forts, and trading posts, and to have free navigation of all waterways 

through their remaining territory. Last, the Creeks had to turn over 

all the surviving Red Stick leaders, including the religious prophets 

whom the United States held responsible for inciting the war.

At the treaty negotiations, Jackson stunned the Creek headmen 

by adding to the list of concessions a requirement of his own—the cession of 23 million acres of land, fully one-half of the Creek territory. 

He made no distinction between those Creeks who had been his allies and those who had fought against the United States. The Creek 

Map 3

GEORGIA

S P ANIS H

EAST FL ORID A

S P ANISH

WEST FL ORID A

TENNESSEE

S OUTH

CAROLIN A

MISSISSIPPI

TERRIT O R Y

CREE K

N A TION

CREEK NATION

1814

Territory ceded by

the Treaty of Fort Jackson

0 100

Miles
•••• 39 ••••

headmen rejected the demand, but Jackson was adamant. After 

delaying for a week, the Creek headmen realized that they could 

not resist him further, especially with his army still in the field. On 9 

August 1814, the thirty-six Creek headmen present signed the treaty. 

Because of his unyielding manner in obtaining the harsh terms, the 

Creeks dubbed Jackson “Sharp Knife.” 

The treaty signing occurred just in time. Several days later, a 

British expedition arrived in the Gulf of Mexico at the Apalachicola 

River and in Pensacola. With the Creek War at an end, Jackson could 

turn his full attention to the new adversary. He marched his army 

to Mobile where he repelled a British attack in mid-September 1814. 

He then marched to Pensacola and forced the British to withdraw 

completely from the Gulf Coast. Anticipating a British attack on 

New Orleans, he then marched to Louisiana, giving Pensacola back 

to the Spanish.

Analysis

The volunteer militias of Georgia, Tennessee, and the Mississippi 

Territory bore the brunt of the Creek War. Augmenting them were 

two regiments of regulars, the 3d and the 39th U.S. Infantry; and 

friendly Choctaws, Cherokees, and Creeks who, while outnumbered 

by the militia, nevertheless played important roles in determining 

the outcome of the conflict. In terms of combat effectiveness, the 

volunteer militia proved brave if inexperienced and undisciplined. 

The greatest handicap posed by the militiamen was their frequent 

unwillingness to serve for longer than their initial term of enlistment, 

which was often six months and sometimes less. Short-term enlistments became serious obstacles since the tasks of raising, organizing, and moving a force into the Red Stick territory; establishing 

supply points; and conducting operations proved time consuming. 

This was particularly true given the daunting terrain, which ranged 

from swamps and creeks in the lower Mississippi Territory to the 

mountains of northern Alabama, with few roads on which to bring 

in supplies. Inclement weather also impeded progress, especially 

during winter when soldiers frequently lacked proper shelter and 

camp equipment. Taken together, short enlistments, inadequate 

logistical arrangements, and the challenges posed by terrain and 

weather hamstrung many American operations.

During the Creek War, the Americans followed a strategy that 

they had often employed against Indians east of the Mississippi River. 

Targeting Indian settlements forced the Red Sticks to make difficult 
•••• 40 ••••

choices—either they could stand and fight to protect their property 

at the risk of suffering heavy casualties in battle or they could 

abandon their settlements, avoiding casualties but losing the shelter, 

property, and food stores that the towns provided, particularly in 

winter. Whatever course the Indians chose, over time they would 

suffer sufficient attrition in either men or resources to break their 

will to resist. Using several columns to converge simultaneously on 

the Creek heartland only magnified the dilemma facing Red Stick 

leaders. 

Though their strategy was fundamentally sound, American 

commanders found that it was difficult to execute given all the 

impediments enumerated above. Poor communications and loose 

command arrangements further increased the challenges. Personal 

rivalries prevented Jackson and Cocke from waging a successful 

combined campaign in 1813, while communication obstacles impeded the coordination of the Tennesseans’ movements with those 

of the Georgians and Mississippians. The appointment of General 

Pinckney as overall commander somewhat reduced but did not 

overcome the barriers to successful coordination. In January 1814, 

Floyd and Jackson came close to affecting a juncture at Tohopeka, 

but sufficient time and space between their movements allowed 

the Red Sticks to exploit their central position and to repulse each 

of the columns in turn. Had the movements of Jackson and Floyd 

been more in sync, or had Tohopeka’s defenders not responded to 

the converging threat aggressively, the war might have ended a few 

months earlier than it did. 

Taking to the offensive also seemed to be the best tactic for the 

Red Sticks. When on the attack as at Fort Mims and at Calabee, 

Emuckfau, and Enotachopco Creeks, they emerged victorious 

either by inflicting more casualties or by turning back the advancing Americans. When the Red Sticks remained on the defensive, 

allowing the Americans to attack them in their towns, they usually 

incurred stinging defeats. It is curious then why they allowed themselves to be attacked at Tohopeka in March 1814. Notwithstanding 

its impressive fortifications, the town proved to be a deathtrap for 

the Red Sticks.

Total deaths for U.S. forces, regulars and militia, are estimated 

at 575. About 1,600 Red Stick warriors died. Many Indian civilians 

died of starvation or disease brought on by the loss of their homes 

in winter. While some Creeks moved westward or into Florida after 

1814, most stayed on their greatly diminished territory in present-day 

Alabama. In 1832, the Treaty of Cusseta transferred the ownership 
•••• 41 ••••

of Creek lands from the tribe to individual Indians. Sales by the 

owners of these individual allotments to white settlers and land 

speculators, as well as illegal encroachment, caused continued 

friction and eventually sparked the Second Creek War of 1836. 

The conflict provided Jackson, now president of the United States, 

with the pretext to force all of the remaining Creeks to emigrate to 

Indian Territory (modern-day Oklahoma) west of the Mississippi 

River during August and September 1836.
•••• 42 ••••

•••

The Author

Richard D. Blackmon is an independent author and historian 

who has recently published Dark and Bloody Ground: The American 

Revolution Along the Southern Frontier. His current projects include slavery in the Western Hemisphere, Southern literature, the 

American Civil War, and the Second Seminole War.
•••• 43 ••••

•••

Further Readings

Bunn, Mike, and Clay Williams. Battle for the Southern Frontier: 

The Creek War and the War of 1812. Charleston, S.C.: History 

Press, 2008.

Griffith, Benjamin W., Jr. McIntosh and Weatherford, Creek Indian 

Leaders. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988.

Halbert, Henry S., and T. H. Ball. The Creek War of 1813 and 1814. 

Chicago: Donohue & Henneberry, 1895.

Holland, James W. Andrew Jackson and the Creek War: Victory at 

Horseshoe Bend. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990.

Owsley, Frank Lawrence, Jr. Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The 

Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815. Gainesville: 

University Presses of Florida, 1981.

Waselkov, Gregory A. A Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Red 

Stick War of 1813–1814. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 

Press, 2006.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the War of 1812, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812 series 

published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

(www.history.army.mil)
PIN : 104506–000

CREEKS 1813-1814