NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EX PIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT TERN BAY COMMUNITY ) DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D13-4436 ) RYANGOLF CORPORATION, ) ) Appellee. ) __________________________________ ) Opinion filed December 31, 2014.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County; Joseph G. Foster, Judge. Scott D. Clark and Mitchell E. Albaugh of Clark, Albaugh & Rentz, LLP, Winter Park, for Appellant. Paul Woodson of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Coconut Creek, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Tern Bay Community Development District (CDD) challenges a judg ment entered after a jury awarded damages to Ryangolf Corporation on its breach of contract claim. We reverse a portion of the damages award, and we also direct the court to-2- strike the provision that purports to allow Ryangolf to execute on CDD's property. We affirm the judgment in all other respects without further discu ssion. Two entities were involved in developing Tern Bay, a project th at was envisioned as a residential community with a golf course and ot her amenities. Tern Bay, LLC (LLC), a private company, was responsible for creating the golf course, pools, tennis courts, clubhouses, privat e roadways, fountains, hardsca pe, and security. CDD is a community development district created by the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to chapter 190, Florida Statutes (2004). I t was in charge of developing the Tern Bay project’s infrastructure, i.e., public roadways, water management, wetlands, utilities, landscape, and professional se rvices. In 2004, both CDD and LLC contracted with Ryangolf to construct the improveme nts to the property. The development was never compl eted. In December 2007, Ryangol f

sued both CDD and LLC for breach o f contract, alleging that the y had failed to pay in excess of $2,000,000 owed for work done on the property. Ryang olf also filed a claim of lien against the property and sought to foreclose that lien against LLC. It eventually dropped LLC from the lawsuit in 2010, presumably because that c ompany was insolvent. Meanwhile, in 2008 CDD sued LLC for amounts it was owed and to foreclose LLC's interest in the property, joining all lenders and contrac tors that had liens against the property. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure in C DD's favor in 2010. Ryangolf's suit was put on hold while CDD's action against LLC was pending, but it resumed when the foreclosure action was complet ed. By the time the case went to the jury, Ryangolf had honed its request for money damages to-3- $389,881.27, comprising $109,061.50 for additional work perform ed on CDD's behalf and $280,819.77 for money allegedly owed by CDD for invoices th at had been mistakenly charged to LLC due to coding errors. The jurors awa rded the exact amount requested. We affirm without comment the damages awarded for a dditional work. We reverse the award for $280,819.77.

The evidence at trial disclosed that during the course of const ruction, Ryangolf periodically submitted itemized payment applications t o the project manager. For each item in an application, the manager determined whether CDD or LLC was responsible for payment and charged the entities accordingly. After thirteen invoices were paid, the property manager requested that Ryangolf begin s ubmitting separate

invoices—one for work done for CDD, another for work done for L LC. No one disputes that the first thirteen applications were paid in full. At tri al, an auditor established that the property manager had miscoded so me requests in applications five through eight (or ten—the auditor's testimony was somewhat unclear). The result of these coding errors was that LLC paid Ryangolf for work that should have been bille d to CDD, in the amount of $280,819.77. Having been paid for these items of work, albeit by the wrong e ntity, Ryangolf was not entitled to recover for them again in its laws uit against CDD. If LLC paid Ryangolf for services rendered on behalf of CDD, then LLC, not Ryangolf, had a claim against CDD. LLC’s paym ent of CDD’s debt to Ryangolf ess entially resulted in an equitable subrogation in which "the party discharging the debt stands in the shoes of the person whose claims have been di scharged and thus succeeds to t he right and-4- priorities of the original credi tor." See Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 646 (Fla. 1999). Compensating Ryangolf for the sam e work from both LLC and CDD resulted in a double payment. We are mindful of Ryango lf’s assertion that LLC failed to pay far more than this amount on its contract. B ut the fact that Ryangolf cannot collect from LLC because it is insolvent could not justi fy an award of damages for money it has already been paid. Accordingly, we reverse th e judgment to the extent that it awards Ryangolf compensat ion from CDD in the amount of $280,819.77. We also reverse the portion of the judgment that permits Ryango lf to execute its judgment against CDD’s property. Section 190.044 p rovides that all property owned by a community development district "shall be ex empt from levy and stay by virtue of an execution, and no execution or other judic ial process shall issue against such property." Accordingly, the provision in the judg ment stating "let execution

issue" is erroneous and must be stricken. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further pr oceedings in accordance with this opinion.

ALTENBERND and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.