U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

91–662PDF 2014

HONG KONG: A BROKEN PROMISE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 2, 2014

Serial No. 113–226

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Davis 

Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation ........................................................................................................................ 9

Sophie Richardson, Ph.D., China director, Human Rights Watch ...................... 24

Ms. Kelley Currie, senior fellow, Project 2049 Institute ...................................... 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Dean Cheng: Prepared statement ................................................................... 12

Sophie Richardson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 26

Ms. Kelley Currie: Prepared statement ................................................................. 37

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 62

(1)

HONG KONG: A BROKEN PROMISE? 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon. The committee will come to order. 

And before we begin this afternoon, I would like to take a moment 

just to say a few words about my good friend, the ranking member, 

Eni Faleomavaega. As this is likely to be the last hearing, we 

think, of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee in this Congress, this will 

be the last time that I will have the honor to sit on this dais next 

to my good friend Eni, from American Samoa. And I can tell you 

I am going to miss that experience, opportunity, and real honor it 

has been. He is truly one of the class acts of the United States Congress. 

I have served on this committee for 18 years now. And that pales 

in comparison, I think, to how long Eni has been on the committee. 

But I have gotten to know him quite well over the years and have 

gotten to know him even better after 2001. During that year, Eni 

and I both served as the representatives from the Congress to the 

U.N. We went to the U.N. headquarters a number of times and 

worked on various issues right after that year. It was right after 

September 11, so it was a very active time when it comes to international affairs. 

And our friendship has grown over the years as we have traveled 

on a number of occasions to different parts of the world, mainly in 

Asia. This last year, we were in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, 

where we met with heads of state, including in a prison with 

former President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan. I think we both agree 

he has been in prison long enough, and for whatever he did he certainly served a penalty for that. We certainly think that justice has 

been served, and he should get humanitarian parole. I didn’t want 

to get sidetracked too much on that, but I feel very strongly about 

that particular issue, and I know Eni does as well. 

Because world leaders have dealt with him before, they have 

seen him in action, and they know the humanness of this person, 

you find out during these trips the high regard that Eni is held in 

the eyes of world leaders all over this globe. He really does care 

and he cares about the people of American Samoa. But he cares 

2

about American Samoa just as much as he cares about the whole 

world because he is truly a man of the world and has made this 

world a better place. 

As I think most people know, he served our country honorably, 

wearing the uniform of our country in Vietnam. A lot of us talk 

about these things, but Eni has experienced them firsthand. We 

don’t always agree on everything. I am a little bit on the right, and 

he is a little bit on the left. Probably people would say I am way 

out on the right and he is maybe a little further to the left than 

a little out on the left. But that being the fact, this is a time when 

bipartisanship really has worked in many ways. 

And so I want to thank him for his friendship, his leadership on 

this committee, and his leadership in Congress. He will truly be 

missed and truly not forgotten. He is one of the few Members that 

has a photo of himself on the wall with Elvis Presley, and as I 

think somebody mentioned, was in a movie with Elvis Presley. I 

mean, that is pretty impressive stuff. 

But, again, in all seriousness, we appreciate your service to our 

country and to this committee, Eni. And I also want to say that in 

his absence when he had health issues, Ami Bera stepped up and 

really did a very commendable job coheading the committee with 

me. That is really what happens around here, is we work together 

on these things in the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Before I get into my opening statement, I would welcome any 

other members that might, should the spirit move them, like to say 

something. 

Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. I would just echo the statements. As a freshman Member of Congress, Eni has been a great role model, and helped me 

navigate the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

And you are not disappearing. You will still be around as a resource, certainly, to this freshman Member of Congress, and soon 

to be sophomore Member. So thank you for everything you have 

done, and I do look forward to continuing to work with you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman from Pennsylvania like to say 

something. 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. Also appreciate and want to echo the chairman’s remarks. We have not served together long and only on few 

occasions in this subcommittee, mostly in the course of the full 

committee. But I have appreciated your perspective. And whether 

we agree or disagree, there is no doubt that you are a strong advocate for your constituency at home, and that is what they expect. 

And so I applaud you for standing firm for what you believe and 

for your constituents. We hope that we can all serve with the same 

measure. So I wish you God’s speed. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California, who has served for quite some 

time not only with myself, but with the gentleman from American 

Samoa. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Echo your comments, Mr. Chairman. I have been 

on the full committee with Eni for 18 years. I have learned more 

about American Samoa than I ever thought possible and more 

about the issues of the Pacific and of Asia. And I would say he is 

going to be missed, but hopefully he will still be here. That will be 

3

the one thing that prevents him from being missed. So, we look forward to gaining Mr. Faleomavaega’s counsel and input on foreign 

policy as the years go forward. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And if the gentleman would like to say anything, he is welcome 

to now or he can wait till the opening statement. 

Okay. Thank you very much. I will now proceed with my statement. 

For 2 months, the people of Hong Kong have come together to 

protest Beijing’s decision to deny the city’s 7.2 million people the 

right to directly elect their Chief Executive, putting the future of 

democracy in Hong Kong at great risk. The demise of the ‘‘One 

Country, Two System’’ framework of governance is a stark reminder that Beijing’s promises can be revoked at the drop of a hat. 

What we see in Hong Kong today, however, is not an isolated 

event. It is the latest chapter in the story of an increasingly aggressive China that began 2 years ago when President Xi Jinping assumed power. Under Xi’s leadership, a new brand of Chinese nationalism has emerged, and it is one where China takes the center 

stage in international affairs by asserting its hegemony in the region and directly challenging the United States. 

Domestically, the stifling of dissent has risen to new levels extending even to the economic front where the government’s 

antimonopoly laws are targeting American companies. Beijing is 

also working diligently to silence political opposition by suppressing social media, imposing strict Internet and instant messaging regulations, and banning academic research and teaching on 

topics such as civil society, universal values, citizens’ rights, freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary, and capitalism. 

In 2013, China unilaterally imposed an air defense identification 

zone over the East China Sea, imposing unnecessary risk to international civilian air traffic. Less than 1 year later, China turned 

a tin ear to its neighbors concerns by placing a drilling platform 

in disputed waters off Vietnam. Around the same time, Chinese 

naval vessels and its air force began to behave aggressively attempting to intimidate U.S. naval vessels and aircraft operating in 

international waters and airspace. 

Many consider current U.S.-China relations to have reached the 

lowest point in a decade. And, amazingly, there is no senior administration official that leads the China portfolio. So it comes as no 

surprise that the Obama administration’s response to Hong Kong’s 

cry for help did so little to instill confidence with the people of 

Hong Kong. 

The U.S. must never stand idle when democracy is being challenged. When the glow of press conferences has faded, we must remember that what is happening in Hong Kong is not an isolated 

event. President Xi is dismantling the ‘‘One Country, Two System’’ 

governance arrangement—a strategy orchestrated by Beijing that 

certainly has put our friend and ally Taiwan on notice that any accommodation or agreement may be revoked at moment’s notice and 

is not worth the paper it is written on. 

If the Obama administration is so serious about its pivot to Asia, 

how can it go so long without offering credible support to the people of Hong Kong and their democratic aspirations, which are in 

4

fact written and promised in law? Saying that the U.S. does not 

take sides in the political development of Hong Kong and doesn’t 

support any particular individuals or groups involved, as the U.S. 

Consulate in Hong Kong stated, is not acceptable or correct for that 

matter. This response is a capitulation to China and abandonment 

of our promises to Hong Kong that U.S. support of democratization 

in Hong Kong is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy, as 

are the human rights of the people of Hong Kong. 

While hundreds and thousands of protesters have stood their 

ground against attacks by thuggish China Communist Party supporters and waves of tear gas and pepper spray from police, the 

Obama administration has stood on the sidelines. Are the wishes 

of the Hong Kong people not clear enough? And after a period of 

calm, protests are once again escalating, and nearly 200 people 

have been arrested, including many of the Umbrella Movement’s 

leaders. Now is not the time to remain silent and reticent in support for Hong Kong’s democratic future. The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy 

Act of 1992 states that the U.S. should play an active role in maintaining Hong Kong’s confidence and prosperity. These aspirations 

are progressively diminishing as a result of China’s growing control 

over Hong Kong’s Government and the civil rights of its people. 

We are at a pivotal moment for democracy in Hong Kong. No 

matter how long China tries to suppress basic human rights, ban 

the pursuit of democratic ideals, and quash civil society, we must 

not let Beijing succeed in destroying the values the people in Hong 

Kong are fighting so hard to keep. The Obama administration 

needs to more vocally support the pro-democratic aspirations of the 

Hong Kong people. We must not let Beijing’s accusations of foreign 

influence bully us into silence over upholding human rights and 

supporting the right of the Hong Kong people to choose their own 

political future. 

The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act stipulates differential treatment 

of Hong Kong only as long as it is considered sufficiently autonomous from China. Considering Beijing’s orchestration of the Hong 

Kong Government’s responses to the crises, and dictation over who 

can and cannot enter or leave Hong Kong, it may be time to reassess Hong Kong’s autonomous status, and those benefits that come 

with that status. 

I thank our witnesses for being here this afternoon. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on how the situation in Hong Kong 

may evolve in the coming weeks and months. I now recognize our 

ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for 

holding this timely hearing in light of the serious protests in response to conditions set by China for the 2017 elections for Hong 

Kong’s Chief Executive. 

For years, Mr. Chairman, I have been critical of our U.S. foreign 

policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. While not taking anything 

less of importance as far as Europe and the Middle East is concerned, I have always said that we are not paying enough attention 

to the Asia-Pacific region, especially when two-thirds of the world’s 

population is in the Asia-Pacific region. You can talk about the armies, you can talk about the economics, and I think it is well said. 

5

As President Ma states, Hong Kong is an extremely important 

global financial center, and any political turmoil that occurs there 

will impact not only Asia but the entire world. President Ma points 

out that Taiwan has had universal suffrage for some time, and believes that if a system of universal suffrage can be realized in Hong 

Kong, both Hong Kong as well as Mainland China would benefit. 

I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the Asia-Pacific region and the 

United States would also benefit, as would the entire world. I ask 

to include President Ma’s statement in the record for the historical 

purposes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As this will be my last subcommittee hearing, I want the publicly express my appreciation for you, Mr. 

Chairman. I have served as both chairman and ranking member of 

this subcommittee, and I have served with many others over the 

years. One of my most cherished honors has been serving with you. 

You, as a member of the committee, Chairman Chabot, are a loyal 

and principled man who serves your constituents in the Asia-Pacific region with distinction and honor. No matter where I go from 

here, I will always take your friendship with me. I am going to 

miss you. 

I am also going to miss each and every member of this subcommittee who served with us, including my dear friend Dana 

Rohrabacher, who is my buddy, truly my buddy. I especially thank 

Mr. Bera for the gracious support he and his staff provided by filling in for me during my time of recovery. 

I also want to pay special tribute to Kevin and Priscilla. You 

chose well when you chose those as staff director and professional 

staffs, respectively. I am deeply appreciative of the support they 

have given to you and me and to my staff as well. Their knowledge 

and expertise in the Asia-Pacific region has influenced many, and 

I will remember them both for their extraordinary goodness, and 

I know that my staff feels the same way toward them. 

So, Mr. Chairman, to you, to our subcommittee members and 

staff, I extend my highest and kindest regards. May God be with 

each of you till we meet again. Soifua. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. 

If the gentleman from Pennsylvania wouldn’t mind if we go out 

of order and have Mr. Rohrabacher speak now. Gentleman from 

California is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And this is, of course, 

a very symbolic hearing today in that we are discussing how important the Pacific and the Asia and Pacific Rim is to the United 

States of America, and how the people there on that part of the 

world need to know that we are paying attention that we are on 

the side of those people who are struggling to make the word a better place. And here it is, the last day, Eni’s last day, a man who 

has been working all these years. 

And how many years altogether, Eni? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Too many. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Too many. Well, I think I was 24 when we 

were running overseas in all kind of wild places in the world. 

But Eni has dedicated his life, from the time he was a young soldier in Vietnam till this very moment, toward making this a better 

6

world. And while we have had a few disagreements, we have also 

shared the great common value of a commitment to making it a 

better and freer world, and toward bringing the people of the Pacific and of Asia into that type of relationship with the people of 

the United States. 

So, Eni, God bless you and Godspeed. 

Just a few thoughts about this hearing. 

I think one of the greatest mistakes that was ever made by any 

President of the United States in my lifetime was made by a Republican President, Herbert Walker Bush. After Ronald Reagan 

cleared the path toward a great expansion of democracy, and China 

at that time seemed to be heading toward democracy, Herbert 

Walker Bush betrayed the people in Tiananmen Square, betrayed 

the democratic movement, and let them be slaughtered. We never 

did we have the retaliation against this evil regime in Beijing that 

we should have had after Tiananmen Square. We would have had 

a far better world today had the democracy movement won at that 

time. Herbert Walker Bush was to blame for that loss. Instead, we 

have a government that is the world’s worst human rights abuser. 

But today, we send a message to the young pro-democracy activists now in the streets of Hong Kong: You are not alone. We think 

of you. We are with you. All people have the right to be free. But 

it has to be earned. And today we recognize the brave young men 

and women in the streets of Hong Kong who are earning their freedom, earning their right to democracy, and to control their own 

destiny through the ballot box. 

So today we say to the young people in Hong Kong, we are with 

you, don’t fear, and we will try our best not to make the mistake 

that we made at Tiananmen Square. This time we stand strong for 

our values. And even though Eni won’t be with us to make sure 

that we are keeping that promise, I can assure you that he will be 

behind us, giving us telephone calls, and thus we meet our responsibility. 

So thank you very much, Eni. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized. 

Mr. BERA. I will just maybe some brief comments. 

When we look at Hong Kong, when we look at the protests that 

are taking place, when we look at the promise of the 1997 treaty, 

I am interested in hearing the witnesses’ testimony and getting to 

the bottom of how this transition is taking place and getting to a 

point where we can get to one person, one vote and you have a true 

democracy. Because ultimately at the foundation of freedom and 

democracy is the ability to express your voice through your votes 

and pick your own leadership. 

So I am curious to see how that transition is going, where we are 

today, and how we get to where we want to be in 2017. So I am 

looking forward to that testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Arizona is recognized. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

7

First and foremost, I want to echo the sentiments that have been 

expressed toward Mr. Faleomavaega. This is my second opportunity serving with him, once was in the 1990s and now again. 

There has never been a more tireless supporter of the indigent peoples of various nations than Mr. Faleomavaega. 

And we are going to really miss you. You are a wonderful man 

and your heart is a good one and you have always strived to do the 

right thing, not the partisan thing, and I appreciate that. 

As far as Hong Kong is concerned, I was there for the handover 

ceremony of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China and met with 

Martin Lee and other folks that were very, very dubious about 

what would happen with this ‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’ that 

China was proposing. And I am sad to say that some of those fears 

that Mr. Lee expressed at that time have been realized. That Beijing, who has said that they were going to let Hong Kong be autonomous, then puts down all their rules and regulations about how 

the vetting process is going to be done by Beijing to decide who 

gets to run and who doesn’t. 

I congratulate these young people for standing up for freedom 

and standing up for their beliefs. It is not always easy. And I want 

to echo the sentiments of Mr. Rohrabacher. We need to be strong 

in our response in defending freedom anywhere across the globe. 

And if these young people run into harm’s way, let our voice and 

our actions be very, very clear that we are on the side of freedom 

and democracy. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Gentlemen’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, it was good to be with you, Dana 

Rohrabacher, and of course the chairman of the committee back in 

February in Hong Kong where we had a chance to meet those who 

have really devoted their lives to trying to give democracy to the 

Hong Kong people. 

We had a chance to meet with Martin Lee, just as the gentleman 

from Arizona met with him at the time that this all began, when 

we were promised ‘‘One Country, Two Systems.’’ But when it came 

to political rights and freedoms, it looks like it is one country, one 

system. One person, one vote, and one committee that decides who 

you are allowed to vote for. 

I think that we should speak out in favor of the Hong Kong people. But let us be frank. We can’t take military action. We are unlikely to take trade action. And oratorical support is the most we 

can provide or are likely to provide. But as we negotiate so many 

transactions with China, we should remember that the promise to 

millions of its own citizens has been broken and we should be very 

careful in transacting business with a country that has behaved 

like this. 

Finally, if China thinks that Taiwan would voluntarily reunite 

with the mainland, I don’t think the slogan they are going to use 

is ‘‘One Country, Two Systems.’’ I think that slogan has been tarnished. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

8

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say I appreciate this hearing on this very timely and important subject. I look 

forward to the testimony of the presenters here today. I think 

today is a good time to think about our pivot or our alleged pivot 

as a Nation to Asia and what that means. Today I also think about 

the cost of freedom, how it must be earned and won and how it 

must be renewed. Today I also want to reiterate how fragile democracy is, and the freedom that we experience, that we love and cherish today. By watching the events in Hong Kong, especially, you 

can tell that it won’t be taken away in one fell swoop, but by increments. We can learn a lot from that in our own society today. 

So I am very much looking forward to the answers and the questions regarding this. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

Are there any other members that seek to make an opening 

statement? If not, we will go ahead and introduce our panel here 

this afternoon. 

We will begin with Dean Cheng, who serves as a senior research 

fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation. His 

portfolio includes Chinese political and security affairs with an emphasis on China’s military policy and U.S.-China policy. He previously worked as a senior analyst for Science Applications International Corps, where he handled defense and homeland security 

issues. He also worked with the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analysis. Before that, Mr. Cheng served as a China 

defense analyst for the Office of Technology Assessment’s International Security and Space Program, where he studied China’s defense-industrial complex. Mr. Cheng has provided analysis for a 

number of news media sources and is a contributor to the BBC 

World Service, National Public Radio, Washington Post, and Time 

magazine, amongst others. Mr. Cheng is a regular speaker on 

China defense issues and U.S.-China policy. Mr. Cheng holds a 

bachelor’s degree in political science from Princeton University and 

studied for a doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

We welcome you here this afternoon. 

Our next witness will be Sophie Richardson, who serves as the 

China director at Human Rights Watch. Dr. Richardson is the author of numerous articles on domestic Chinese political reform, democratization, and human rights in Asia. She has previously testified before the European Parliament and both the U.S. House of 

Representatives and the U.S. Senate. She provides regular commentary to news media outlets. In 2009, Dr. Richardson, published 

the book ‘‘China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.’’ Dr. Richardson has received degrees from the University of Virginia, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Hopkins-Nanjing Program, and Oberlin College. And we 

welcome you this afternoon, Doctor. 

Lastly, our final witness is Kelley Currie, who is a senior fellow 

with the Project 2049 Institute. Her portfolio includes democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region. Prior 

9

to joining Project 2049, Ms. Currie served as an Asia policy advisor 

to the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs 

and Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, Paula Dobriansky. She 

has also served as senior advisor to the International Committee 

of the Red Cross, director of Government Relations for the International Campaign for Tibet, and deputy director for Asia at International Republican Institute. Ms. Currie was the foreign policy advisor to Congressman John Porter and concurrently served as the 

majority staff director of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. 

Ms. Currie received a JD from Georgetown University Law Center 

and an undergraduate degree in political science from the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. She has 

appeared as an expert commentator on CNN and the BBC and has 

written on Asia policy issues for national and international publications. 

We welcome all three of you here this afternoon. We look forward 

to your testimony. I am sure you are all familiar with the 5-minute 

rule. You will each have 5 minutes to testify. A yellow light will 

come on letting you know you have 1 minute, and the red light 

tells you to wrap up, if at all possible. We give you a little leeway 

but not a whole lot. 

Dr. Cheng, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE 

FOUNDATION 

Mr. CHENG. Chairman Chabot, distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here this afternoon. 

Ranking Member Faleomavaega, thank you for the fortuitous opportunity to address you on your last session here. My comments 

today are my own and should not be construed as representing any 

official position of the Heritage Foundation. 

Since the 1980s, when the U.K. Began negotiating with the People’s Republic of China over the return of Hong Kong, the territory 

has been something like the proverbial canary in the coal mine. 

How Beijing would handle this territory and its population of 7 

million would reflect broader issues of internal Chinese governance, cross-straits relations with Taiwan, and prospects for the 

broader Asia-Pacific region. 

Key questions here were, could the PRC allow pluralism to exist 

within the context of its political system, which is dominated by the 

Chinese Communist Party? Would it allow Hong Kong to continue 

to flourish after it had been returned to Chinese sovereignty? And 

might Hong Kong serve as a bridge for a modernizing, increasingly 

wealthy PRC to liberalize itself? 

In this regard, Hong Kong was seen as the perfect experiment. 

In the first place, Hong Kong already enjoyed certain key institutions, including a free press, an independent judiciary, and the rule 

of law. Beijing would not have to create these from whole cloth. Instead, it merely needed to allow the system within Hong Kong to 

continue and not interfere. 

To further reinforce this point, the PRC was also obligated to respect Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration between London and BeiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:18 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120214\91662 SHIRL
10

jing, as well as the Basic Law of Hong Kong, were both formal obligations undertaken by the PRC that guaranteed Hong Kong’s system for 50 years. These documents were seen as codifying the idea 

of ‘‘One Country, Two Systems,’’ the principle under which Hong 

Kong was to be returned to Chinese sovereignty yet retain its own 

characteristics. 

Finally, there was the assessment of enlightened self-interest. 

Hong Kong was already a major financial hub and a major economy in its own right when it reverted to Chinese control. Nor was 

there any question that after 1997 that Hong Kong was, in fact, 

under Chinese control. The PRC was, therefore, seen as having 

every reason to want it to succeed, and it was presumed would 

therefore not interfere with its operation. 

Fast forward 17 years and the Chinese position regarding universal suffrage and how the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region would select its Chief Executive in 2017 suggests that, unfortunately, these assumptions and views were far too optimistic. 

China has gone from a still-developing country in 1997 to the 

world’s second-largest economy, and in the process its attitude toward Hong Kong and indeed toward much of the region has hardened. 

As the June Chinese white paper on Hong Kong made clear, Beijing now emphasizes the ‘‘one country’’ part of ‘‘One Country, Two 

Systems,’’ and made also clear that Hong Kong will maintain its 

own system only at Beijing’s sufferance. 

China’s approach to Hong Kong as seen in the suffrage issue 

highlights several key areas of concern. First, there is little reason 

to expect political reform in the PRC for the foreseeable future. 

Some had hoped that Xi Jinping might be a closet political reformer, but his approach to Hong Kong hardly supports this view. 

Instead, his handling of the Hong Kong situation with little violence and certainly no repetition of the scenes and costs associated 

with Tiananmen Square, now 25 ago, has probably strengthened 

his domestic credibility, helped in his consolidation of power, but 

given him little reason to liberalize his policies. 

Second, China is demonstrating once again its aptitude for political warfare. Political warfare is the hardest form have soft power. 

Much as Russia has employed hybrid or ambiguous warfare in its 

Crimea intervention, China is doing the same in Hong Kong and 

elsewhere in the region. And in particular, we can see the exercising of the three warfares: Legal warfare or lawfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare. 

China’s approach to the franchise and suffrage in Hong Kong has 

been consistent with its writings on legal warfare, which focus on 

the use of the law as an instrument for justifying or furthering national aims. This is a much more offensive approach, employing the 

law to achieve previously established ends rather than defensively 

limiting or otherwise constraining one’s own activities. 

This lawfare approach also complements Chinese public opinion 

warfare methods. Social and news media in China are tightly controlled by the government, and once the protests began, Chinese 

Weibo messages, the local equivalent of Twitter, were immediately 

censored. 

11

Meanwhile, the harassment of Hong Kong activists is integral to 

Chinese psychological warfare methods. The fact that even the average protester has been detained or had their travels limited 

serves notice that anyone who protests has likely been recorded 

and will suffer consequences. 

Third, this approach to Hong Kong, and especially the ‘‘One 

Country, Two Systems’’, the way it is now defined, is likely to lead 

to greater tensions with Taiwan. The approach of ‘‘One Country, 

Two Systems’’ was always intended to appeal the people of Taiwan 

to persuade them to accept reunification, but the message from recent events in Hong Kong is a cautionary, not an encouraging tale. 

For the United States, this has three implications. China’s assiduous practice of political warfare is a warning about engaging the 

PRC without carefully thinking through all of the angles. We 

should engage the PRC much as we approach contract talks, with 

no assumption of shared outlooks, although both sides are interested in reaching an agreement and avoiding a strike. 

In addition, the prospect of heightened tensions across the Taiwan Straits means that the Asia pivot needs to be made more 

meaningful. This includes the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade 

Agreement to underscore that America offers more than military 

solutions. 

But one final element is to strengthen the American military 

presence, including a more robust training and exercise schedule 

with friends and allies, but also expanding the provision of more 

advanced equipment to those same friends and allies, whether it is 

missile defense cooperation with Japan and South Korea, military 

sales to Vietnam, or acting on the sale of fighter aircraft and submarines to Taiwan. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]

12


91662a-1.eps
13


91662a-2.eps
14


91662a-3.eps
15


91662a-4.eps
16


91662a-5.eps
17


91662a-6.eps
18


91662a-7.eps
19


91662a-8.eps
20


91662a-9.eps
21


91662a-10.eps
22


91662a-11.eps
23


91662a-12.eps
24

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Richardson, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, PH.D., CHINA 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thanks for inviting me to testify today. I would like 

to take my 5 minutes not to go into details about what has happened in the last few weeks, but rather to talk about the kinds of 

recommendations that will protect human rights in and the autonomy of Hong Kong where tensions between police and protesters 

really have reached a breaking point. 

The extraordinary demonstrations by a cross-section of people in 

Hong Kong are in our view not simply about the composition of 

Hong Kong’s nomination committee. After waiting patiently for 

years for China to fulfill its promise of democracy, many are angry 

at Beijing’s political overreach and at the Hong Kong Government’s 

growing tendency to marginalize the interests of the majority on 

issues ranging from education policy to urban planning. 

In the broadest sense, the current tensions are local and logical 

reactions of people who have enjoyed civil liberties and a reasonably responsive government but who now see these freedoms increasingly threatened and who have a very clear sense of how 

those rights are denied just across the border. In our view, physically removing demonstrators from the streets of Hong Kong will 

do little to answer their underlying grievances and will arguably 

serve to exacerbate them. 

The most critical and urgent step the central and Hong Kong 

Governments can take is to revisit the territory’s undemocratic 

electoral arrangements and ensure that the appropriate ones are 

fashioned, as required by Article 45 of the Basic Law, ‘‘in light of 

the actual situation,’’ where the majority has repeatedly made clear 

that it favors genuine democracy. 

We urge that both take immediate action, including by developing a time-bound and detailed plan to put into practice universal 

and equal suffrage. Any proposals for methods of nominations 

should conform to international human rights standards, including 

those in the ICCPR, which pertains in Hong Kong. 

Hong Kong authorities also can and should immediately meet 

with protest leaders and submit a new report to the central government acknowledging broad support for genuine democracy and asking the National People’s Standing Committee to clarify or retract 

its August 31 decision. 

While it is reassuring to see Hong Kong authorities investigate 

several police officers who were caught on camera viciously beating 

a protester, that confidence is undermined by repeated incidents of 

excessive use of force, including in recent days where police have 

used pepper spray at close range, hit with batons people who were 

clearly trying to leave protest areas, or tackle and arrest without 

warning student protest leaders. We urge the establishment of an 

independent investigative body to look into the now 1,000-plus 

complaints regarding police conduct. 

At a political level, it would be encouraging if the senior leadership in Beijing could accept the idea that people in the mainland 

and in Hong Kong want democracy and not construe people’s deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:18 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120214\91662 SHIRL
25

mands for that as a threat to national security. At an absolute minimum, Beijing should stop arresting people in the mainland for 

their peaceful expressions of support to the demonstrators and lift 

whatever restrictions have been put in place for demonstrators to 

enter the mainland. 

The United States has expressed concern about violence, the 

right to peaceful assembly, and the rights to vote and to run. 

American officials have said that they have expressed these concerns directly to the highest levels of the Chinese Government. But 

much of the commentary, including President Obama’s remarks 

while in Beijing, has been so calibrated as to be convoluted. Other 

remarks are superficially sensible, calling, for example, that difference between protesters and authorities be resolved through 

peaceful dialogue, but seem to deny the reality that Hong Kong 

people’s efforts to do just that have been ignored. 

The U.S.’s repeated denials that it had had any role in fomenting 

or sustaining the demonstrations suggests to us that it is more concerned in assuaging Beijing’s irrational fears than standing up 

robustly for democratic rights. It is appropriate to ask why President Obama could be so publicly restrained on the topic of elections 

and democracy in Hong Kong while he was in Beijing, yet just few 

days later offer up extensive commentary and support on the same 

subject in Burma and later from Australia. 

One recalls Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland handing 

out bread to demonstrators in Maidan Square, American Ambassadors observing elections in other parts of Asia, or the U.S. vociferously decrying rollbacks of democratic rights in other parts of the 

world. Why not in Hong Kong? Such an approach undermines in 

our view the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, and it enables other governments, which, for better or for worse, take their cues on these 

issues from the U.S., to remain virtually silent. 

Arguably most problematic in our view, it telegraphs to pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong and the mainland that they can 

likely only count on perfunctory support or recognition from the 

United States. 

So it is encouraging to us to see the reestablishment of a Hong 

Kong Caucus here in the Congress and the introduction of an updated Hong Kong Policy Act. We believe this to be a very important 

tool. We believe that increased U.S. Government scrutiny and regular reporting are and should be seen as a positive obligation, an 

opportunity to identify critical developments and points of leverage 

in a territory of extraordinary diplomatic, economic, and strategic 

interest to the United States. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]

26


91662b-1.eps
27


91662b-2.eps
28


91662b-3.eps
29


91662b-4.eps
30


91662b-5.eps
31


91662b-6.eps
32


91662b-7.eps
33


91662b-8.eps
34

Mr. CHABOT. Ms. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KELLEY CURRIE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Ms. CURRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

members of the committee, in particular Mr. Faleomavaega. 

It is an honor to be here on your last hearing and have the opportunity to speak on this subject. It is a real challenge, however, 

to follow my two colleagues who have so ably covered so many of 

the issues here. I will try to add something with my remarks. 

I have got a written testimony that I would like to submit for the 

record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. CURRIE. When Mr. Salmon talked about traveling to Hong 

Kong in 1997, he traveled with my former boss, John Porter, on 

that trip. My involvement in Hong Kong began with working for 

Mr. Porter for 5 years in the early and mid-1990s—and late 1990s 

too, I guess—and his leadership on that issue inspired me to continue to follow the events in Hong Kong and inspired my respect 

for the people of Hong Kong and the efforts that they have made 

over the past 30 years since the signing of the Joint Declaration 

to preserve their democratic rights and freedoms. 

And watching what has happened over the past 2 months and indeed in recent years, as Beijing has carefully tried to rachet back 

the democratic prerogatives and freedoms of the Hong Kong people, 

has been a very frustrating act. When I worked in the Congress—

and Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Salmon, and others will remember these 

days—the Congress was quite active on Hong Kong issues and took 

a leading role in pushing the administration forward in defending 

the rights and prerogatives of Hong Kong people. 

Unfortunately, in recent years both the Congress and the administration have gone relatively silent on Hong Kong. In particular, 

as the situation has evolved, we have not seen the kind of activism 

that marked those years around the handover. That is natural because that was a particularly important time. But the times now 

have shown that we need to maintain a focus on what is going on 

in Hong Kong and continue to follow up on the promises that the 

United States made when it took up the mantle as Hong Kong’s 

guarantor in 1997 as the British retreated. 

I believe that this is a role that the United States took up willingly and because it has interests in Hong Kong, as Mr. Cheng as 

so ably outlined. But it also is aligned with our values. And that 

is why it is so disappointing to see how the U.S. has not stood up 

for the values of the Hong Kong people as well. 

I would like to just go to follow up on some of the recommendations that Sophie has mentioned about how the Congress can be 

more active. 

The U.S. handling of Hong Kong has hardly been the only example where our reticence has encouraged the worst impulses of the 

Chinese regime. Our Hong Kong policy approach takes place 

against a broader backdrop of reluctance to publicly call Beijing out 

over abuses that are rooted in the structural authoritarian nature 

of the regime. 

35

Beginning with the period leading up to the 2008 Olympics, there 

has been a perceptible change in U.S. willingness to publicly, consistently, and vigorously stand up for the rights of Chinese dissidents, Tibetans, Uighurs, and other persecuted groups. All democratic governments have become more reluctant to speak out over 

this period, but the absence of a strong U.S. voice has exacerbated 

this long-term trend. 

Given the strong message that the people of Hong Kong have 

sent the world through the Umbrella Movement, however, it is 

clear that the U.S. needs to start acting both on its values and its 

interests in Hong Kong in a more forceful way. The recent efforts 

to again require annual reports on Hong Kong are a good start. But 

Congress needs to hold the administration accountable for making 

these reports a serious policy effort, not just a useless box-checking 

exercise, which they had become toward the end when they ended 

after 2007. I don’t know if you have read the old reports recently, 

but they are almost content-free, and they virtually ignore what 

was happening on the ground in Hong Kong, both in terms of the 

democracy movement that was emerging there and the growth of 

civil society and the role that Beijing was playing. 

I believe that in order to achieve a more meaningful report, the 

Hong Kong Policy Act should be amended so that the next review 

or the next report the executive branch is required to conduct a full 

interagency review pursuant to the presidential determination authority in Section 202 that relates to Hong Kong’s autonomous status and whether it continues to be preserved and include detailed 

findings regarding whether Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous 

to continue receiving the beneficial treatments that it currently receives. 

In addition to findings on detailed issues in cooperation with 

counterparts in Hong Kong, the report should also focus on the 

overall political context and progress for its genuine democratic reforms. The House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations 

Committees should consider holding annual joint hearings on the 

reports as well. And Congress should also speak out more directly 

on its concerns through passing of resolutions and legislative action 

as needed. 

The administration also needs to speak up in defense the Hong 

Kong more publicly, more often, and more clearly. It should stop 

issuing the kind of confused statements that Dr. Richardson mentioned and that ignore China’s failure to live up to the promise of 

‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’. We should also not forget those on 

the mainland who were detained solely for expressing support for 

the Umbrella Movement. 

The U.S. should work with his partners in the U.K. To address 

China’s implementation of the Joint Declaration through efforts 

such as joint commissions of inquiry and joint demarches. The U.K. 

Is our closest ally and international partner, and their credibility 

is on the line here as well, due to their failure to stand up for liberal values in Hong Kong. 

Likewise, we should look for opportunities where they may exist 

at the U.N., bearing in mind the low likelihood of any effective action. However, Beijing deeply dislikes being confronted at the U.N., 

36

so those opportunities at least do put the issues in a forum where 

they have to respond to them. 

The U.S., the U.K., and Commonwealth countries such as Canada and Australia, should also develop a joint protocol and treatment of student visa applicants who have been arrested for peaceful political activity. This is a very important issue because of the 

importance of education and study abroad for Hong Kong students 

and our requirement that if you have been arrested you have to list 

this on your visa application. We shouldn’t penalize people for engaging in civic activity in Hong Kong. 

Mr. CHABOT. Is your testimony about done? 

Ms. CURRIE. Yes. I am done. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Ms. CURRIE. Finally, any cuts in Cantonese broadcasting on RFA 

and VOA should be restored so that we can continue to get a positive message out as media censorship rachets up in Hong Kong and 

outlets for genuine expression continue to be closed down there. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Currie follows:]

37


91662c-1.eps
38


91662c-2.eps
39


91662c-3.eps
40


91662c-4.eps
41


91662c-5.eps
42

Mr. CHABOT. And we thank all the witnesses for the testimony. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

It is disconcerting to know that while protests in Hong Kong continued, the administration was working behind the scenes to finalize deals and new initiatives with China which were announced following the APEC Summit last month, deals that raise a lot of questions themselves. I think it is logical to conclude that one of the 

reasons for the administration’s weak responses and tepid support 

for pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong was to ensure that these 

deals didn’t fall through. 

Looking ahead, what are the potential tradeoffs for U.S. policymakers between more forcefully pursuing democratic reform in 

Hong Kong on one hand versus pursuing other goals with Beijing? 

Do you think the administration’s tip-toeing on providing support 

for the people of Hong Kong is ultimately more harmful for our role 

in Asia than helpful? 

And I would welcome any of the panel members. Dr. Cheng, 

would you like to take that? 

Mr. CHENG. Well, sir, to begin with, I think that one of the great 

flaws of the approach that you have outlined that the administration is pursuing is the fact that many of these agreements, at least 

at this point, have few published details. And the devil, as they 

say, is in the details, especially because the Chinese have demonstrated with the issue of suffrage their adeptness at legal warfare. 

So with the example of the climate change regulations, who will 

measure China’s emissions? Whose statistics will they use? We 

know that Chinese statistics are often only perhaps glancingly associated with reality. As a result, we seem to be placing ourselves 

at the, essentially, mercy of Chinese statistics. To trade off our 

longstanding commitment on the issue of values, as my fellow witnesses have highlighted, in exchange for a promise of Chinese compliance based on their statistics makes buying a pig in a poke a 

sure guaranteed bargain by comparison. 

At the same time, it raises questions among many of our allies 

about the kind of allied and commitment we have to them. If we 

are not going to stand up for our principles, things of longstanding 

interest, in exchange for airy promises, what happens when it is 

the potential commitment of U.S. force, whether it is to places like 

the Senkakus or to ensuring freedom of the seas in the South 

China Sea? 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me ask a different question to the other two 

witnesses if I can here, because my time, I am through it already. 

This past weekend, the most well-known student leaders were 

arrested, including Joshua Wong and Lester Shum, in a manner 

that demonstrated an alarming level of force from the Hong Kong 

police. Ms. Richardson or Ms. Currie, do either of you have an update on the status of these individuals or do you have a sense of 

whether they will be charged, and if so what they might be charged 

with? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thanks for the question. The footage of their 

detention was indeed alarming. There appears to have been no 

provocation. They did not seem to be presenting any sort of imminent threat to the police. They are also hardly, if they were standVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:18 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120214\91662 SHIRL
43

ing right here, I think we could say that they are not especially 

physically threatening people. And so the way in which they were 

arrested that day is particularly alarming. They were tackled to 

the ground, they were cuffed, no warning was given, and no request seems to have been issued that they effectively surrender 

themselves. 

They have both been released. It is not clear whether charges are 

going to be pursued. It is worth nothing that Mr. Wong was actually previously detained for about 48 hours until a judge, in really 

the finest we expect of Hong Kong’s judges, essentially said the police have absolutely no basis to have detained him and let him go. 

But that was not until he had been detained and his computer had 

been seized and searched. 

It is hard not to see tactics like this as both evidence of lack of 

discipline in some circumstances on the part of the police, but also 

a way of telegraphing to other student leaders that this is what 

might be in store for them as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Let me squeeze one last question here and a quick response, if 

I can. Today the founders of the pro-democracy campaign asked 

student protesters to retreat over concerns of growing violence at 

the hands of the police, who have used batons and pepper spray 

and teargas to drive back crowds. 

If they do indeed back down and return home, where do we go 

from here? Will that essentially indicate that they are capitulating 

to China or, as the founders stated, is it rather a silent denunciation of a heartless government? 

Ms. CURRIE. I am going to go with the latter. I think that what 

has been amazing, not just the past 2 months but Scholarism and 

the Occupy Hong Kong With Love and Peace movements that predate the past 2 months. And the activities that they have undertaken have shown a level of civic commitment, discipline, and just 

plain politeness and competence in engaging the authorities, I 

think that many people have been surprised by the youth of Hong 

Kong and heartened by how they have stepped forward and filled 

in this space. 

I think that Beijing fell back on its usual Marxist-Leninist tactics 

of ignoring the moderate opposition of Martin Lee, Emily Lau, 

Anson Chans of Hong Kong who wanted to engage them through 

official channels and do things moderately. And that didn’t create 

enough of a crisis in order to justify heavyhanded rule, so they had 

to force a confrontation. But, unfortunately for Beijing, the demonstrators and the people involved in the Umbrella Movement have 

shown themselves to be of the highest caliber of character for the 

most part, with a few exceptions, obviously, but when you have 

that many people involved there will be. 

But I don’t think they are going anywhere. The ideals they represent and the voices they represent and the issues that they represent aren’t going anywhere, so they aren’t either. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired. Let me just conclude by saying very briefly that I am very heartened by the people 

of Hong Kong and the bravery and the standing up for their rights 

that we have seen. I have to say I am disheartened by the adminisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:18 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120214\91662 SHIRL
44

tration’s lack of support there, just as I was in the Green Revolution in Iran a few years back. 

And my time has expired. I will now yield to the ranking member for his questions. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I certainly want to thank all our three witnesses this afternoon 

for their statements and the positions they have taken concerning 

this important issue. 

Just wanted to ask all the three members of panel, the administration supposedly says that they do not take a position at this 

time toward the situation now in Hong Kong. Do you support universal suffrage or do the protesters there in Hong Kong, what is 

your perception? If I were Chinese, I would say this is a local matter, what is it there for Americans to tell me what to do and how 

to do it? And I would like to ask the three panelists for your response to that. 

Ms. CURRIE. There are internationally recognized standards for 

what universal suffrage is. And it includes, as one of the members 

earlier referred to, one person, one vote. And it also includes the 

right of people to choose their own leaders. 

This is very important. In Burma, President Obama talked about 

this in the context of the Burmese elections, about the need for the 

Burmese people to be able to choose their own leaders. But yet in 

the Hong Kong context the administration says we don’t take sides. 

This is deeply problematic. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Just another point about international law, 

which is equally unbelievably clear that people have the right to 

run. There cannot be restrictions, undue restrictions on who is able 

to run, which is really the crux of the August 31 decision. 

I think people in Hong Kong have made it painfully clear that 

they want to be able to vote, they want to be able to choose who 

they are voting for and how these people represent them. I think 

this is really not just about the finer points of electoral arrangements. I think people feel that the Hong Kong Government progressively less responsive to them and that this is another way in 

which their ability to control or have input into public policy is 

eroding. 

But I think the important point is that they have made it clear 

what they want. Also, look, let’s just be very clear, the administration is perfectly capable of taking sides either in choosing party A 

or party B when it suits it. It is also perfectly capable of answering 

this question with respect to principle, and it has been awfully 

squeamish in both regards. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Cheng. 

Mr. CHENG. I would also just note here that the National People’s Congress’s white paper in June and its statement on August 

31 would seem to constitute at best an infringement, if not a violation in many ways of both the Joint Declaration and the Basic 

Law. Now, it is up to the National People’s Congress to interpret 

these aspects, but to come up with an interpretation that is almost 

directly 180 degrees from what is stated really calls into question 

China’s commitment to upholding international agreements. 

45

So the issue here is as much one of do you live up to your international commitments, and, if you don’t, then it is for the United 

States, a key trade partner, a key presumably negotiating partner, 

to call you on this as part of enforcing international order. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So will there be an agreement among the 

three members of the panel that there should be universal freedom 

to that extent, allowing the people of Hong Kong to decide for 

themselves their future politically and economically? Does that 

seem to be your position on this? 

Mr. CHABOT. I think all three witnesses have nodded in the affirmative. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have said in my statement that I have always been very critical of our U.S. foreign policy toward the AsiaPacific region, which has been no policy, in my opinion. I take this 

position because I feel that the mentality and the focus of our entire foreign policy is toward the Middle East and Europe, but when 

it comes to Asia-Pacific we get mixed signals. Every administration, every Congress, if you will, and even the people and the leaders in the Asia-Pacific region that I have met, they say, hey, what 

is going on? What is your position? Give me these basic principles 

that we are discussing. 

So that is my concern, Mr. Chairman. 

And would you like to comment on that? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would love to comment on that and bring it 

back to a point that Mr. Rohrabacher raised in his opening remarks about, you were, I think, referencing a piece that was in 

Foreign Policy about whether the Obama administration has any 

senior people on China. I mean, look, the administration is filled 

with lots of people who have lots of China experience. Some of 

them are ferocious defenders of human rights, and we appreciate 

them. 

I think the problem is that there is no policy, and there hasn’t 

been for quite some time. And arguably one of our real points of 

frustration has been to be presented with significant numbers of 

people with fairly deep China experience who have yet to craft a 

policy that is coordinated and executed from senior levels on down. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I will start with Dr. Richardson and Ms. 

Currie. Recently Secretary Earnest made the statement the United 

States supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong in accordance 

with Basic Law, and we support the aspirations of the Hong Kong 

people, while at the same time—I think you already alluded to this. 

I just feel like it is important to have it on the record—the U.S. 

Consulate in Hong Kong said, we do not take sides in the discussion of Hong Kong’s political development. 

With that, is the administration sending mixed signals in Hong 

Kong or to Hong Kong to the protestors? Same thing, are they 

sending mixed signals to Beijing? And is there a clear policy at all 

from the administration in this regard? 

46

Ms. CURRIE. Yes, they are sending mixed signals, both to the 

protestors and to Beijing. And, no, there is not a clear policy. I 

think that what you saw was the consulate issue a terrible statement that they were called on the carpet for, rightly so, by various 

quarters, and then Josh Earnest, trying to walk it back into something that is a little more appropriate, in line with the historic posture of the United States on Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Policy 

Act. 

But, again, it fits a pattern that Sophie just described of incoherence, of reactiveness. You have the so-called pivot or the rebalance 

that is unbalanced and not strategic in any real way and not rooted 

in American principles in any real way, and it causes them to constantly be spinning around saying one thing one day and something else the next. It is a problem across the board. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. I just wanted to get your input because I see 

this as a continued failure of foreign policy of which there are 

many strikes at this point. But moving on, other than the rhetoric 

that Mr. Sherman talked about earlier that we can engage in, I 

want to see us take more concrete action, or some concrete action. 

And let me just ask you this. Regarding what the Congress 

should do, United States Congress should do, would passing legislation to make Hong Kong eligible for the U.S. visa waiver program 

be a viable alternative that might make some form of a difference. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. It strikes me as a perfectly sensible strategy to 

pursue. I think one of the difficulties in developing legislative responses to the crisis in Hong Kong is ensuring that the people of 

Hong Kong aren’t being punished for essentially the mistakes or 

the problems caused by the central government or the failures of 

the Hong Kong authorities. It is difficult sometimes to separate 

those out. 

I do want to go back very briefly to the question you asked a moment ago which is simply to say that I think when this administration has been good on China and human rights issues, it has been 

very good. I will point, for example, to its reactions to the life sentence given to Ilham Tohti, a very prominent Uighur economist. 

There were statements from the White House, from the State Department, from the Secretary. The President mentioned Ilham 

Tohti at a speech in New York. But the unwillingness to deal with 

these issues or raise them publicly while in Beijing or, indeed, give 

remarks to the Chinese press in an interview to Xinhua, I think 

really undermines the comments about Ilham Tohti. 

The President made reference to ETIM, the East Turkestan independence movement. Experts have debated for years about whether 

it even exists, without providing information to substantiate that 

claim and in effect hang a bulls eye on any Uighur identified by 

the Chinese Government as being associated with ETIM is hugely 

problematic. And so it is this very, very inconsistent response. And 

one would like to think that this far in you could get a more consistent reaction, but that seems to be extremely difficult. 

Mr. PERRY. Because my time is going to expire and I want to 

spend some time with Mr. Cheng, I think I will stick around for 

round two. But just keeping with your current line of thinking and 

responding, do you think that what you just described as putting 

a bulls eye, so to speak, on those folks that would be interested in 

47

that movement, is that borne out of ignorance? Is there some method to it from this administration or are they just clueless about it? 

I mean, how does that come about? They have not consulted with 

the right people that know something about the situation? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Perry, I would be delighted to have a good 

answer to that question. I don’t. 

Let me be very clear. There have been horrific attacks against 

civilians in Xinjiang. That is absolutely clear, and we have condemned them. But I think the administration has fallen peculiarly 

prey to a Chinese Government line. We are going to hear that line 

again and again and again from Beijing in every discussion about 

Xinjiang and terrorism for years to come. How that sentence wound 

up in that interview, I do not know. And believe me, it is not for 

want of asking. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to pick up where the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania left off. I can’t agree with the idea of a visa waiver 

for either Hong Kong or China, simply because we can’t create a 

circumstance where anybody who can get a Hong Kong passport 

gets right into the United States. Over half the illegal immigrants 

or roughly half the illegal immigrants in the United States today 

came here on an airplane and their entry into the United States 

was legal. And given the incredible poverty of some in China, and 

even some in Hong Kong, I don’t know if we can go visa waiver. 

I do see the reciprocity approach of how long a visa, once issued, 

is good for and how many different trips you can make, but those 

are only to people that we have decided will not be economic immigrants to the United States. 

But I do want to pick up on the gentleman from Pennsylvania’s 

question, and that is, other than rhetoric is there anything we can 

do to express our dissatisfaction with this violation of the commitments of Beijing to the people of Hong Kong? 

Mr. CHENG. Well, to begin with, sir, on the issue of visas, for example, one of the things that clearly is important here is the opportunity to bring more information from Hong Kong out to the broader world and more information from the outside world to Hong 

Kong. Part of the issue here is the fact that the Chinese refuse to 

issue visas to journalists, and in fact at the joint press conference 

between President Obama and President Xi, he in turn lectured the 

New York Times about how if you don’t get visas, it is your own 

fault. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. And that applies even to journalists going 

to Hong Kong, let alone those going to the rest of China. 

Mr. CHENG. Certainly there are controls, observations and the 

rest. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think we have gotten an awful lot of information 

from Hong Kong during the present unrest. It is not like there is 

a shortage of Americans visiting Hong Kong. I think we are getting 

a fair amount of information. 

Mr. CHENG. We are, but that information comes out. That information doesn’t necessarily go back in, and the Chinese are very, 

very tightly controlling their media. At a minimum, demanding recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:18 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120214\91662 SHIRL
48

iprocity, given the number of official Chinese journalists in the 

United States, and creating that kind of reciprocity on the press 

visa aspect, would be——

Mr. SHERMAN. I certainly don’t want to reduce the number of 

Chinese journalists here. 

Ms. Currie, I think you had a important point also about visas, 

which is that being arrested by the Chinese Government for a political crime should not count against somebody in getting a visa 

to the United States. Does the State Department have the procedures now to make sure that we can tell the difference between a 

pickpocket and a political activist. 

Ms. CURRIE. Frankly, we don’t really, especially in a high-volume 

visa office like the consular office in Hong Kong. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do we even have something on the form where 

you can say, I have been arrested but it was political? 

Ms. CURRIE. There is a place on the form where you say that you 

were arrested, and then you can explain the circumstances. But the 

average consular officer, you have to remember, is a brand new foreign service officer usually serving their first tour overseas, and 

their inclination is generally to say no. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We have got to somehow bring in the State Department, and I don’t care how junior these people are, they can’t 

be discriminating against people because they have been arrested 

for political rights and expressing themselves politically. 

I just want to say that this all comes from our insane trade policy toward China since we granted MFN. We have this enormous 

trade deficit which creates this huge debt which causes Americans 

to shrink from criticizing China, because oh, my God, they loan us 

so much money, money we wouldn’t have to borrow if we were allowed to sell our goods to China. And it also creates these enormous profits that create some of the biggest names in our country, 

biggest corporations in our country, becoming lobbyists against 

doing anything to undermine the insane trade policy that started 

it all. 

I don’t think we are going to have a balanced policy toward Hong 

Kong until we have balanced trade. I might also point out that if 

we had balanced trade with China we would have a labor shortage 

and significantly increased wages in this country. That could happen if we adopted Warren Buffett’s idea of legally required balanced trade. I don’t think that is likely to be adopted any time 

soon. I don’t know whether Mr. Cheng had a comment on that. 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, I think that part of the fundamental concept of 

trade is, of course, competitive advantage. Whatever else the Chinese are guilty of, and they are guilty of quite a few things, the 

reality is that we are not going to create or recreate the textile industry in this country regardless of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Sir, reclaiming my time. Germany exports to 

China. We don’t. Those are political decisions. The American workers are the best in the world. The American products are best in 

the world. And the huge trade deficit is not because we don’t provide value. It is because of the slanted trade policies and IP policies 

of China. And blaming the American worker, blaming the American product for the decisions made in Beijing is not the way I 

want to go. 

49

I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would remind Mr. Sherman that I have a piece of legislation 

that suggests that we should not be permitting more Chinese journalists to come to the United States than they permit us to have 

our journalists come and operate in China. So reciprocity would be, 

I think, one tool, especially considering that the vast majority of 

their so-called journalists are actually spies and people who have 

come here to do us harm and propagandize for their dictatorship 

rather than trying to find honest information to provide for the 

Chinese people. So I would think that would be a good way to deal 

with that. 

We don’t seem to have any reciprocity with the Chinese. I mean, 

didn’t we give most favored nation status to China after they 

slaughtered the democracy movement in Tiananmen Square? What 

was our reciprocity there? In fact, it was just the opposite. We gave 

them a reward even though they had just committed an evil action. 

WTO was, of course, permanent most favored nation status, was 

granted by the Clinton administration. Let me just note again this 

is bipartisan in the sense that Herbert Walker Bush was the one 

who originally came out kissing the feet of these gangsters in Beijing and followed by Bill Clinton, all anxious to do favors for these 

omnipotent rulers of Beijing who rule with an iron fist. 

China is, because of its size and other factors, should be considered the world’s worst human rights abuser. We were told there 

would be some impact on that if we just simply did business with 

them. And I think, Mr. Sherman, before you leave, I would like to 

make sure I back up your point—I don’t think he hears me—back 

up his point. The Chinese are not, as you say, outdoing us economically because of the American worker. We have given enormous 

economic benefits to them in terms of an open market, in terms of 

capital investment, in terms of turning our face away and letting 

them get away with the massive threat of American technology 

which has basically permitted them to introduce products to the 

market that were based on our R&D. So they don’t have any R&D 

costs. We are picking it all up for them. No wonder they can charge 

less. 

I think that the people of Hong Kong are our greatest ally in the 

fight for freedom and peace in this world because they are confronting the world’s worst human rights abuser. Just as when we 

ignored and betrayed the people in the Tiananmen Square democracy movement, we now have a world that is less peaceful, we now 

have a world that is more at risk because of this vicious dictatorship that stays in power. The young people, the young activists in 

Hong Kong today, if they are successful, will create a better world, 

a more peaceful world, a world in which the Chinese and American 

people will deal with each other as equals and not having a President being afraid to bring up whatever issue with the leader, with 

his counterpart in Beijing. 

I think that it is quite obvious where we could actually be doing 

things that would counteract or at least put ourselves to be taken 

50

seriously by the Chinese. There are things we could be doing, and 

especially when it comes in the economic area. 

But also, look, when the Chinese Government decides that they 

are going to commit armed force against people who have a territorial dispute, whether it is against India, whether it is against 

Japan, whether it is against the Philippines, whether it is against 

Vietnam——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Or Crimea. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, that is what I am saying. In Crimea, 

Putin sends a couple troops across the border into areas that want 

to be part of Russia and we go bananas. But China commits all of 

this force across the way in disputed territories, there is no price 

to pay. Well, we need to have a little bit more of a consistent profreedom policy, and if we do, like the people in Hong Kong, like the 

activists in Hong Kong, the people of this world will help build a 

better world, and we will be on their side. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend, and I couldn’t resist helping 

my friend from California because I wanted him to have an all-inclusive list. 

Thank you, panel, for being here. And I want to get in two sets 

of questions if I can. I pray I can get it in. 

One is, I would be very interested, and I am going to start with 

you, Dr. Richardson, because you said the problem is not that the 

Obama administration hasn’t done good things in human rights 

and other areas, it has, but the problem is no policy. I would like 

to explore that. What ought to be our policy in Hong Kong, and 

what is our leverage? Let’s have a realistic, not a quixotic policy. 

And then secondly, the second question I want to get at with the 

three of you is, what is the impact on Taiwan? Taiwan is watching 

all of this. If there was any appetite in Taiwan, and there was, for 

maybe a similar model some day in the future, what is the impact 

on Chinese behavior vis—vis Hong Kong, do you think, on those aspirations or those political dynamics in Taiwan? 

So the first question, what ought to be our policy? And what leverage do we have to try to fashion it? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Let me try to answer the first one very quickly 

about policy. I think one of the big problems is that 15 years ago 

when we were having the PNTR debate, human rights issues occupied a much larger piece of the policy pie. And as the relationship 

has deepened and expanded and there are dozens and hundreds of 

competing interests, the amount of time and attention that is given 

to human rights issues has shrunk. 

What we have wanted to see is a much more thoughtful policy 

approach that recognizes human rights issues and human rights 

protections as fundamental to a host of different issues in the relationship. Quite like Mr. Rohrabacher’s point about pro-democracy 

protestors in Hong Kong as allies, these are the people who are arguing for protections that are just as important for their electoral 

processes as they are for U.S. businesses to do what they do and 

51

succeed in that part of the world. It is about a free press and an 

independent judiciary and a free flow of information. 

I think the fact that no more thoughtful policy has been developed such that human rights-related requests or demands can be 

leveled by many different actors in the U.S. relationship, that it remains almost exclusively the purview or the burden of the State 

Department as they sometimes view it, has made it very easy for 

the Chinese Government to essentially minimize and not react to 

the kinds of demands that are made. 

There are certain practical tactics that really aren’t used very 

well any more, the demands of releases. Even the clarification after 

the President’s visit of the human rights-related requests that were 

made in advance of the visit that weren’t fulfilled. Right? I mean, 

there are levers that aren’t being pulled, but there is also the very 

obvious value of public rhetoric and challenging Chinese officials 

publicly, which is something they deeply dislike and usually will 

move to try to avoid. And I think making that a regular part of an 

interaction, whether it is Secretary Johnson or whoever runs the 

Pentagon or Secretary Kerry, is critical. I am going to leave the 

Taiwan question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I 

think human rights always must be a hallmark of U.S. diplomacy, 

and we retreat from who we are when we don’t make it one. Having said that, it must also be done carefully and subtly, that question of leverage again. 

Well, if I announce that I am forming Democrats for Chabot for 

Speaker, I guarantee you that is not helpful to Steve Chabot and 

in some quarters might even make him suspect, that he is so 

friendly with people like me. So in a more serious vein, we need 

to be careful that with the best of intentions we don’t put a target 

on somebody by virtue of our blessing and imprimatur. So it has 

to be done with skill, is my only point. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I am all for skill, and I am all for nuance, but 

I also think we are not yet at a point in time—and we should be—

where a host of interests across the U.S. Government recognize the 

Ilham Tohtis, the Puder Changs, the Gao Yus, all of these people 

who have gone to prison in China as allies for their interests as 

well and go to bat for them. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. This is not an enormous analytical leap. And 

this problem is getting significantly worse in the mainland, and it 

requires a much more robust response. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good point. 

Mr. Cheng, on Taiwan. 

Mr. CHENG. Very quickly, sir, 2016 will be a crucial year, and I 

would predict that we are going to be looking at much worse crossstraits relations. The recent elections in Taiwan have already seen 

a significant growth in DPP popularity and power. This was not 

necessarily key to what has been going on in Hong Kong specifically, but there is no question that the people in Taiwan who are 

skeptical of reunification look at what has happened in Hong Kong 

as a very important warning. 

The cross-straits relationship has been calm for the last 6 years, 

in no small part because President Ma Ying-jeou chose not to emVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:18 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120214\91662 SHIRL
52

phasize independence. But the prospect of a pro-independence government arising in Taipei is especially difficult to calculate because 

Xi Jinping himself was not within the inner circle of power when 

there was a previous DPP President. 

So essentially you could wind up in 2016 with three sets of leaders, all of whom have very different interests, a potential DPP 

President possibly, but certainly more pro-independence sentiment 

on the island; Xi Jinping, who would be confronted with a pro-independence attitude on the island; and of course we ourselves are 

going to be very, very focused on our own electoral politics, and 

perhaps, as the ranking member noted, not necessarily paying the 

right amount of attention to that region as the pot begins to boil. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And Mr. Cheng is a constituent of 

mine, and his brilliance is obvious. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We will go on a second round, but we are going to have votes 

here very shortly, so if we can keep it. I will just ask one question. 

And my colleague and friend from Virginia has already brought it 

up. I was going to talk about Taiwan, so I will just bring it up very 

briefly because you already addressed it, Mr. Cheng, very well. 

And that is, relative to Taiwan, obviously they can’t have helped 

but observe China’s thuggish behavior in Hong Kong, and I think 

it probably did send a message in the recent election to some degree because KMT was soundly defeated in the local elections 

around the country. 

Now, President Ma, to his credit, had spoken out in favor of the 

Hong Kong protestors. And so you addressed the question really. 

I just really wanted to get back, as one of the cofounders of the 

Congressional Taiwan Caucus, what impact will this have, if any, 

on the public’s attitude toward China and reconciliation versus 

independence versus maintaining the status quo, et cetera? 

Mr. CHENG. As we saw this summer with the Sunflower Movement which took over the Taiwan legislature, there is a growing 

unease, frankly unhappiness in Taiwan toward the current status 

quo. There is a perception that the island is falling ever more 

under the sway of Beijing. And if Beijing were living up to its commitments, was truly valuing things like ‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’, that might produce one dynamic. But as we have seen in 

Hong Kong, what this really is saying is, from the people of Taiwan 

it seems, we don’t trust you as a partner. 

Now, the problem is that, and we saw some of this in Hong 

Kong, is Beijing doesn’t take to that sort of skepticism very well. 

And the sad reality is that Taiwan’s security is eroding. There have 

been reports from our own military about how Taiwan’s ability to 

control the air space and sea space around the island is deteriorating. There has not been a major arms sale to Taiwan in years. 

The recent sales have mostly been fulfilling previous commitments 

dating back over a decade. Taiwan has been asking for the U.S. to 

allow teams to go and study the problem in Taiwan, and those requests apparently are sitting on some State Department desk for 

years. 

By the way, this is bipartisan. It is not simply this administration. They has been sitting on those desks dating back to the previous administration. This sends a signal, unfortunately, to Taiwan 

53

that maybe you should try and cut a deal, unfortunately, with an 

unreliable partner. 

Mr. CHABOT. And if I were a resident in Taiwan, I would be particularly concerned when they hear stories about the administration’s goal to reduce our military back to pre-World War II levels 

at a time when the PRC has increased their military expenditures 

by double digits every year for the last 25 years. 

That being said, I think that the U.S. should continue to maintain a very strong relationship with Taiwan, and we should be 

there for them. They are a role model for other countries around 

the world, and we shouldn’t let them be bullied by the PRC. 

That being said, I will yield back the balance of my time and 

turn to the gentleman from American Samoa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions 

other than to again thank our distinguished panelists for their 

statements and their positions. And I certainly want to thank you 

for your leadership and your service to our committee and to our 

country. Yes, this will be my last subcommittee hearing, and it has 

been my distinct honor and privilege of having served with you and 

the other members of the committee, hopefully being helpful in developing a better world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will turn to Mr. Cheng. We spoke briefly prior to this about 

China and the fact that they aren’t a very good neighbor. They are 

happy to—well, we in this country are oftentimes accused from 

within and without of being imperialist. They on the other hand go 

ahead and take the minerals and the raw materials—with a deal, 

they make a deal with somebody, some nation, to take the raw materials. And as you aptly put it, they don’t lecture. Of course, they 

are not in any position to lecture, but they don’t lecture. They are 

happy to do that. But as a world actor on the world stage, they are 

not a very good neighbor in the way that we would see one. 

That having been said, why do you suppose there is this reluctance from this administration to take quantifiable action regarding Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong—cyber crime, the physical incursions in the China Sea, et cetera. Why do you suppose there is 

this reluctance? And I said to you, and I just want you to recount 

your statement, I said to you, is it because we borrow so much 

money from them and we are concerned that that would jeopardize 

that? If you could just elaborate. 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, I do not believe that the administration is reticent because of the concern over issues of debt, because, frankly, 

China purchases American debt more because of the situation with 

its own currency which is under very tight control, which is not 

free floating. China is not really in a position to replace the U.S. 

as a global reserve currency. It is buying American debt because 

it is probably the best and safest place to put China’s surpluses 

short of building the world’s largest mattress and stuffing all of 

that money underneath. 

I do believe, however, that the administration has chosen to 

value other things more highly than in some cases our principles 

54

and in other cases our traditional strategic interests. The administration, for example, trumpeted the climate change agreement as 

a huge advance despite lacking in details. This dates back to 2009 

when the administration made very clear that what it wanted from 

China more than anything else was an agreement at the Copenhagen climate talks. 

So I believe that the administration is pursuing what for it is a 

rational choice of saying what they value, which seems to be on 

issues of things like climate, and on more nebulous, less concrete 

things from their perspective, such as human rights or American 

security commitments to the region, it is willing to offer those up. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. 

Moving on, I would just like to make one clarification while I 

have got the mike. A good friend from the other side of the aisle 

commented that my interest in potentially modifying the visa waiver program would be untenable because he included all of China 

in the discussion where I did not ever advocate for all of China, 

just Hong Kong specifically. I also find it very telling and interesting that he would continue with restrictions for political dissidents, meanwhile advocating for an open southern border, which 

he currently is, as far as I know. 

That having been said, again to you, Mr. Cheng, if you can just 

codify very simply, what are our interests in Hong Kong, and why 

should Americans care? Why should Americans care? Why should 

we invest? What are our interests? If you can codify that pretty 

simply, I know that is hard to do. I have got about 11⁄2 minutes 

left, which is yours. 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, some of the issues at stake here, at the most 

materialistic end, this is a global financial hub. You create massive 

disruption if you have instability in one of the world’s truly global 

financial centers. You raise questions about the American commitment to its principles when we walk away from people who want 

to be free. 

My colleagues here have stated quite eloquently the issue of values and where they stand and how we are perceived with regards 

to those values and especially if we walk away from them. And, 

frankly, we also send the wrong message to Beijing about what is 

in its interests if we mislead them into thinking that they can violate agreements without consequences. At some point, if somebody 

keeps getting away with things, they are going to keep on doing 

that. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, panelists. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

First of all, Mr. Cheng, I agree with your last statement. I believe Beijing in a sense respects one thing: Power. And it is a mistake for the United States not to sell weapons to Taiwan. It is a 

mistake for the United States not to show, in fact, a fortified relationship with Taiwan, especially in light of the developments in 

Hong Kong. It is a mistake for the United States not to make it 

very clear, at least in diplomatic sessions with the Chinese, we care 

55

a lot about that, and it will impinge the relationship, as Dr. Richardson, I think, was suggesting in a previous answer to my question. 

I do want to be fair though. I know you are from Heritage Foundation. But with respect to Mr. Perry, it is hardly limited to this 

administration that we pull our punches with China. I wish that 

were true. Since Richard Nixon went to Beijing and visited with 

Zhou Enlai and saw the Forbidden City and the Great Wall, every 

succeeding administration has made compromises that make one 

sad about U.S. principles and virtues and values because they are 

weighing various and sundry factors, and there seems to be this 

ethos we can’t afford to make the Chinese angry. And it seems to 

me that that is the wrong calculus, even if it is noble in intent. 

And I wonder if you might all want to comment on that because 

I am cochair of the Taiwan Caucus, and I feel that it is really important we not equivocate about the Taiwan Relations Act commitments to Taiwan and that Beijing is always calculating those 

misses. And we have now virtually given Beijing veto power over 

weapon system sales, as Mr. Chabot indicated, to Taiwan, and I 

think that is a terrible mistake. But at any rate, your views. Question of what does Beijing respect and how does that fashion or 

should fashion or influence U.S. policy. 

Ms. CURRIE. I agree with you that this is a bipartisan problem 

and it largely tends to be focused in the executive branch, but not 

exclusively. When I worked at the State Department it was very 

frustrating at times to see the way in which the Department and 

the government as a whole, the executive branch as a whole, would 

curl into a self-protective ball when it came to dealing with China 

and choose the issues that they would raise and the way in which 

those issues would be raised based on the likelihood that they 

would provoke a negative reaction. The things that provoked the 

negative reaction go off the list, and the things that can be talked 

about safely without upsetting the Chinese stay on the list. 

And our officials become conditioned over time, because the Chinese react to anything in a very hyperventilated way when they 

don’t like what they are hearing from our officials. Whereas we are 

conditioned to sit and take everything that they say, no matter how 

offensive it is to our values, no matter how offensive it is to our 

interests. Our diplomats sit there and take it from the Chinese. 

And then when we say anything that is even mildly critical, they 

fly off the handle. And it is a strategic negotiating tactic that they 

use in the way that they deal with us. 

So i think part of the problem is it goes back to the way our diplomatic corps is organized, how they are trained, what they are 

prepared to deal with when they go into meetings with the Chinese. They simply are not, even when they are China hands, and 

in some cases the China hands are the worst because they have invested all these years in learning Chinese and in making relationships with people in the Chinese Government. The last thing they 

want to do is screw up their career by alienating their interlocutors. 

So one of the big problems is trying to get people out of this mind 

frame that the relationship is the most important thing about our 

relationship. It is not. The relationship is a means to an end. And 

56

our interests and our values are the same thing when it comes to 

China. These two fundamental issues lie at the heart of the problem with our lack of policy and our lack of strategic thinking about 

how to deal with China. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much. 

If the chairman will indulge, I would just like to give the other 

two panelists an opportunity to answer the same question. I thank 

the chair. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I will try to be very quick and just point out 

that in 1997 the great hope was not only that rights in political 

space in Hong Kong would be protected and possibly expand, but 

also that it might have a positive influence on the mainland. And 

we are here today because we are seeing the opposite. And I think 

if the U.S. really does believe that democracies and rights-respecting governments make better trade partners, make better strategic 

allies, make more reliable partners across a host of issues, there is 

a lot more work to be done with respect to China. 

I think it is also deeply problematic. It is not just a question of 

people I think scaling back their expectations of diplomatic initiatives or what the Chinese Government may or may do, I think 

there is almost a complete absence from these discussions about 

what people more broadly in China want and supporting that and 

expressing some solidarity with people who are trying to make precisely the kind of change that I think is fundamental to the U.S. 

achieving its long-term policy goals. Again, it goes back to the point 

about seeing various activists in the mainland as key allies for lots 

of different interests in the U.S., not as sort of the human rights 

box to be checked. 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, the key and fundamental difference here is that 

China knows what it wants. It pushes for those goals, and it 

pushes them with every lever at its disposal, which given a centralized authority means economic, industry, official spokespeople, 

media, et cetera. 

We need to be consistent in our policy objectives and persistent 

in enunciating them. We need to apply not only the State Department and the Commerce Department and the levers of government 

in the executive branch and also here in the legislative branch, but 

also to encourage business, to encourage NGOs, to encourage media 

and other places to be as forthright in standing up for those American principles, not American Government principles, but American 

principles, as the Chinese are in standing up for theirs. 

I don’t fault the Chinese for standing up for what they believe 

in. That is their business. I do fault us for not applying all of those 

levers in a consistent manner persistently. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. All 

time has expired. And we want to thank the panel for its testimony 

here this afternoon. We are being called to the floor for votes now. 

All members will have 5 days to supplement their remarks or submit questions. 

And I want to once again thank Mr. Faleomavaega for his service 

to this committee, to American Samoa, and to our country. We really did mean all those nice things that we said about him. 

And if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. Thank you. 

57

[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(59)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

60

f


91662n.eps
61

f


91662m.eps
62


91662d-1.eps
63

Æ


91662d-2.eps