NUREG/CP-0194

Volume 2 of 3

EPRI 1020621

Final Report

Methods for _pplying Risk

Analysis to Fire Scenarios

(MARIA FIRES) -2008

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop

Volume 2

Module 2: Electrical Analysis

Based on the Joint

NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops

Conducted in 2008

September 28 - October 2, 2008, and

November 17-20, 2008, Bethesda, MD

David Stroup

Felix Gonzalez

Hugh Woods

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Electric Power Research Institute

3420 Hillview Avenue

Palo Alto, CA 94303

NUREG/CP-0194 

Volume 2 of 3 

EPRI 1020621 

Final Report 

Methods for Applying Risk 

~nalysis to Fire §.cenarios 

(MA RIA FIRES)-200B 

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop 

Volume 2 

Module 2: Electrical Analysis 

Based on the Joint 

NRC-RES/EPRI Training Workshops 

Conducted in 2008 

September 28 - October 2, 2008, and 

November 17-20, 2008, Bethesda, MD 

David Stroup 

Felix Gonzalez 

Hugh Woods 

U.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Electric Power Research Institute 

3420 Hillview Avenue 

Palo Alto, CA 94303 
AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS

IN NRC PUBLICATIONS

NRC Reference Material

As of November 1999, you may electronically access

NUREG-series publications and other NRC records at

NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at

http://www.nrc..ov/readinQ-rm.html. Publicly released

records include, to name a few, NUREG-series

publications; Federal Register notices; applicant,

licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence;

NRC correspondence and internal memoranda;

bulletins and information notices; inspection and

investigative reports; licensee event reports; and

Commission papers and their attachments.

NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRC

regulations, and Title 10, Energy, in the Code of

Federal Regulations may also be purchased from one

of these two sources.

1. The Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Mail Stop SSOP

Washington, DC 20402-0001

Intemet: bookstore.gpo.gov

Telephone: 202-512-1800

Fax: 202-512-2250

2. The National Technical Information Service

Springfield, VA 22161-0002

www.ntis.gov

1-800-553-6847 or, locally, 703-605-6000

A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is

available free, to the extent of supply, upon written

request as follows:

Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Administration

Mail, Distribution and Messenger Team

Washington, DC 20555-0001

E-mail: DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov

Facsimile: 301-415-2289

Some publications in the NUREG series that are

posted at NRC's Web site address

http://www.nrc.Qov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs

are updated periodically and may differ from the last

printed version. Although references to material found

on a Web site bear the date the material was accessed,

the material available on the date cited may

subsequently be removed from the site.

Non-NRC Reference Material

Documents available from public and special technical

libraries include all open literature items, such as

books, journal articles, and transactions, Federal

Register notices, Federal and State legislation, and

congressional reports. Such documents as theses,

dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and

non-NRC conference proceedings may be purchased

from their sponsoring organization.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a

substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are

maintained atThe NRC Technical Library

Two White Flint North

11545 Rockville Pike

Rockville, MD 20852-2738

These standards are available in the library for

reference use by the public. Codes and standards are

usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the

originating organization or, if they are American

National Standards, fromAmerican National Standards Institute

11 West 4 2nd Street

New York, NY 10036-8002

www.ansi.org

212-642-4900

Legally binding regulatory requirements are stated

only in laws; NRC regulations; licenses, including

technical specifications; or orders, not in

NUREG-series publications. The views expressed

in contractor-prepared publications in this series are

not necessarily those of the NRC.

The NUREG series comprises (1) technical and

administrative reports and books prepared by the

staff (NUREG-XXXX) or agency contractors

(NUREG/CR-XXXX), (2) proceedings of

conferences (NUREG/CP-XXXX), (3) reports

resulting from international agreements

(NUREG/IA-XXXX), (4) brochures

(NUREG/BR-XXXX), and (5) compilations of legal

decisions and orders of the Commission and Atomic

and Safety Licensing Boards and of Directors'

decisions under Section 2.206 of NRC's regulations

(NUREG-0750).

DISCLAIMER: Where the papers in these proceedings have been authored by contractors of the U. S. Government, neither the

U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any U.S. employee makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any

legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product, or

process disclosed in these proceedings, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

The views expressed in these proceedings are not necessarily those of the U. S. Regulatory Commission.

AVAILABILlTY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS 

IN NRC PUBLICATIONS 

NRC Reference Material 

As of November 1999, you may electronically access 

NUREG-series publications and other NRC records at 

NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. Publicly released 

records include, to name a few, NUREG-series 

publications; Federal Register notices; applicant, 

licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence; 

NRC correspondence and internal memoranda; 

bulletins and information notices; inspection and 

investigative reports; licensee event reports; and 

Commission papers and their attachments. 

NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRC 

regulations, and Title 10, Eriergy, in the Code of 

Federal Regulations may also be purchased from one 

of these two sources. 

1. The Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Mail Stop SSOP 

Washington, DC 20402-0001 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov 

Telephone: 202-512-1800 

Fax: 202-512-2250 

2. The National Technical Information Service 

Springfield, VA 22161-0002 

www.ntis.gov 

1-800-553-6847 or, locally, 703-605-6000 

A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is 

available free, to the extent of supply, upon written 

request as follows: 

Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Administration 

Mail, Distribution and Messenger Team 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

E-mail: DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov 

Facsimile: 301-415-2289 

Some publications in the NUREG series that are 

posted at NRC's Web site address 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs 

are updated periodically and may differ from the last 

printed version. Although references to material found 

on a Web site bear the date the material was accessed, 

the material available on the date cited may 

subsequently be removed from the site. 

Non-NRC Reference Material 

Documents available from public and special technical 

libraries include all open literature items, such as 

books, journal articles, and transactions, Federal 

Register notices, Federal and State legislation, and 

congressional reports. Such documents as theses, 

dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and 

non-NRC conference proceedings may be purchased 

from their sponsoring organization. 

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a 

substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are 

maintained atThe NRC Technic,al Library 

Two White Flint North 

11545 Rockville Pike 

Rockville, MD 20852-2738 

These standards are available in the library for 

reference use by the public. Codes and standards are 

usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the 

originating organization or, if they are American 

National Standards, fromAmerican National Standards Institute 

11 West 42nd Street 

New York, NY 10036-8002 

www.ansi.org 

212-642-4900 

Legally binding regulatory requirements are stated 

only in laws; NRC regulations; licenses, including 

technical specifications; or orders, not in 

NUREG-series publications. The views expressed 

in contractor-prepared publications in this series are 

not necessarily those of the NRC. 

The NUREG series comprises (1) technical and 

administrative reports and books prepared by the 

staff (NUREG-XXXX) or agency contractors 

(NUREG/CR-XXXX), (2) proceedings of 

conferences (NUREG/CP-XXXX), (3) reports 

resulting from international agreements 

(NUREG/IA-XXXX), (4) brochures 

(NUREG/BR-XXXX), and (5) compilations of legal 

decisions and orders of the Commission and Atomic 

and Safety licenSing Boards and of Directors' 

decisions under Section 2.206 of NRC's regulations 

(NUREG-0750). 

DISCLAIMER: Where the papers in these proceedings have been authored by contractors of the U. S. Government, neither the 

U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any U.S. employee makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any 

legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product, or 

process disclosed in these proceedings, or represenis that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. 

The views expressed in these proceedings are not necessarily those of the U. S. Regulatory Commission. 
Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to

Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)-2008

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop

Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis

NUREG/CP-0194 EPRI 1020621

Final Report

July 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

U.S. NRC-RES Project Manager

M. H. Salley

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

3420 Hillview Avenue

Palo Alto, CA 94303

EPRI Project Manager

R. P. Kassawara

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to 

Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)-2008 

NRC~RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop 

Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis 

NUREG/CP-0194 

Final Report 

July 2010 

u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

u.s. NRC-RES Project Manager 

M. H. Salley 

EPRI 1020621 

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

3420 Hillview Avenue 

Palo Alto, CA 94303 

EPRI Project Manager 

R. P. Kassawara 
COURSE TRAINING INSTRUCTORS AND PROJECT MANAGERS

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)

1515 Eubank SE

Albuquerque, NM 87185

Steven Nowlen

Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC)

1671 Dell Ave, Suite 100

Campbell, CA 95008

Bijan Najafi

Francisco Joglar-Biloch

Dan Funk (EDAN Engineering)

Richard Anoba (Anoba Consulting Services)

Mardy Kazarians (Kazarians & Associates)

Frank Wyant

Jeff LaChance

J.S. Hyslop/ Kendra Hill

U.S. NRC-RES Project Managers

CITATIONS

This report was prepared by:

R.P. Kassawara

EPRI Project Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

3420 Hillview Avenue

Palo Alto, CA 94303

Principal Investigators:

D. Stroup

F. Gonzales

Principal Investigator:

R. Kassawara

This report describes research sponsored jointly by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

RES, and EPRI.

The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES), NRC-RES/EPRI Fire

PRA Workshop, Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and Electric

Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, NUREG/CP-0194 and EPRI 1020621.

NUREG/CP-0194 and EPRI 1020621, Volume 2,

has been reproduced from the best available copy

ii

COURSE TRAINING INSTRUCTORS AND PROJECT MANAGERS 

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 

1515 Eubank SE 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 

Steven Nowlen 

Mardy Kazarians (Kazarians & Associates) 

Frank Wyant 

Jeff LaChance 

J.S. Hyslop/ Kendra Hill 

U.S. NRC-RES Project Managers 

CITATIONS 

This report was prepared by: 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Principal Investigators: 

D. Stroup 

F. Gonzales 

Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) 

1671 Dell Ave, Suite 100 

Campbell, CA 95008 

Bijan Najafi 

Francisco Joglar-Biloch 

Dan Funk (EDAN Engineering) 

Richard Anoba (Anoba Consulting Services) 

R.P. Kassawara 

EPRI Project Manager 

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

3420 Hillview A venue 

Palo Alto, CA 94303 

Principal Investigator: 

R. Kassawara 

This report describes research sponsored jointly by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

RES, and EPRI. 

The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner: 

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFlRES), NRC-RESIEPRI Fire 

PRA Workshop, Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and Electric 

Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, NUREG/CP-0194 and EPRI 1020621. 

NUREG/CP-0194 and EPR11020621, Volume 2, 

has been reproduced from the best available copy 

ii 
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN

ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH

INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI NOR ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE

ORGANIZATION(S) BELOW, OR ANY PERSON ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THEM:

(A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,

(I) WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR

SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS DOCUMENT, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS

FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (11) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR

INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTY'S INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY, OR (111) THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USER'S

CIRCUMSTANCE; OR

(B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER

(INCLUDING ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE

HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROM YOUR

SELECTION OR USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD,

PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS DOCUMENT.

ORGANIZATION THAT PREPARED THIS DOCUMENT:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

NOTE

For further information about EPRI, call the EPRI Customer Assistance Center at

800.313.3774 or

e-mail askepric.epri.com.

Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, and TOGETHER ... SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY

are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES 

THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN 

ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH 

INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI NOR ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE· 

ORGANIZATION(S) BELOW, OR ANY PERSON ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THEM: 

(A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 

(I) WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR 

SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS DOCUMENT, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 

FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (II) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR 

INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTY'S INTELLECTUAL 

PROPERTY, OR (III) THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USER'S 

CIRCUMSTANCE; OR . 

(B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER 

(INCLUDING ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE 

HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROM YOUR 

SELECTION OR USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, 

PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS DOCUMENT. 

ORGANIZATION THAT PREPARED THIS DOCUMENT: 

u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research 

NOTE 

For further information about EPRI, call the EPRI Customer Assistance Center at 

800.313.3774 or 

e-mail askepri@epri.com. 

Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, and TOGETHER· ··SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY 

are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. 

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and

performance-based alternative regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July 2004, which allows licensees

the option of using fire protection requirements contained in the National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) Standard 805, "Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for LightWater Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," with certain exceptions. To support

licensees's use of that option, NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly

issued NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) "Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power

Facilities" in September 2005. That report documents the state-of-the art methods, tools, and

data for conducting a fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in a commercial nuclear power

plant (NPP) application. The report is intended to serve the needs of a fire risk analysis team by

providing a general framework for conduct of the overall analysis as well as specific

recommended practices to address each key aspect of the analysis. Participants from the U.S.

nuclear power industry supported demonstration analyses and provided peer review of the

program. Methodological issues raised in past fire risk analyses, including the Individual Plant

Examination of External Events fire analyses, are addressed to the extent allowed by the current

state-of-the-art and the overall project scope. Although the primary objective of the report is to

consolidate existing state-of-the-art methods, in many areas, the newly documented methods

represent a significant advance over previous methods.

NUREG/CR-6850 does not constitute regulatory requirements, and NRC participation in

this study neither constitutes nor implies regulatory approval of applications based on the

analysis contained in this document. The analyses/methods documented in this report represent

the combined efforts of individuals from RES and EPRI. Both organizations provided specialists

in the use of fire PRA to support this work. The results from this combined effort do not

constitute either a regulatory position or regulatory guidance.

In addition, NUREG/CR-6850 can be used for risk-informed, performance-based

approaches and insights to support fire protection regulatory decision-making in general.

On 14-16 June 2005, NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and EPRI

conducted a joint public workshop for about 80 attendees at the EPRI NDE Center in Charlotte,

NC. A second workshop was held the following year, on 24-26 May 2006, in NRC's Two White

Flint North Auditorium in Rockville, MD. About 130 people attended the second workshop.

Based on the positive public response to these two workshops, a more detailed training class was

developed by the authors of NUREG/CR-6850. Two detailed training workshops were

conducted in 2007: on 23-27 July, and again on 27-30 August, both at EPRI in Palo Alto, CA.

About 100 people dttended each of these workshops. In 2008, two more workshops were held

from 29 September through 2 October, and again from 17-20 November, in Bethesda, MD near

NRC Headquarters. The two workshops attracted about 170 participants including domestic

representatives from NRC Headquarters and all four regional offices, U.S. Department. of

Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, EPRI, NPP licensees/utilities, Nuclear

Steam Supply System vendors, consulting engineering firms, and universities. Also in

iii

ABSTRACT 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and 

performance-based alternative regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July 2004, which allows licensees 

the option of using fire protection requirements contained in the National Fire Protection 

Association (NFP A) Standard 805, "Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for LightWater Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," with certain exceptions. To support 

licensees's use ofthat option, NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly 

issued NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) "Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power 

Facilities" in September 2005. That report documents the state-of-the art methods, tools, and 

data for conducting a fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in a commercial nuclear power 

plant (NPP) application. The report is intended to serve the needs of a fire risk analysis team by 

providing a general framework for conduct of the overall analysis as well as specific 

recommended practices to address each key aspect ofthe analysis. Participants from the U.S. 

nuclear power industry supported demonstration analyses and provided peer review of the 

program. Methodological issues raised in past fire risk analyses, including the Individual Plant 

Examination of External Events fire analyses, are addressed to the extent allowed by the current 

state-of-the-art and the overall project scope. Although the primary objective of the report is to 

consolidate existing state-of-the-art methods, in many areas, the newly documented methods 

represent a significant advance over previous methods. 

NUREG/CR-6850 does not constitute regulatory requirements, and NRC participation in 

this study neither constitutes nor implies regulatory approval of applications based on the 

analysis contained in this document. The analyses/methods documented in this report represent 

the combined efforts of individuals from RES and EPR!. Both organizations provided specialists 

in the use of fire PRA to support this work. The results from this combined effort do not 

constitute either a regulatory position or regulatory guidance. 

In addition, NUREG/CR-6850 can be used for risk-informed, performance-based 

approaches and insights to support fire protection regulatory decision-making in general. 

On 14-16 June 2005, NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and EPRI 

conducted a joint public workshop for about 80 attendees at the EPRI NDE Center in Charlotte, 

NC. A second workshop was held the following year, on 24-26 May 2006, in NRC's Two White 

Flint North Auditorium in Rockville, MD. About 130 people attended the second workshop. 

Based on the positive public response to these two workshops, a more detailed training class was 

developed by the authors ofNUREG/CR-6850. Two detailed training workshops were 

conducted in 2007: on 23-27 July, and again on 27-30 August, both at EPRI in Palo Alto, CA. 

About 100 people attended each of these workshops. In 2008, two more workshops were held 

from 29 September through 2 October, and again from 17-20 November, in Bethesda, MD near 

NRC Headquarters. The two workshops attracted about 170 participants including domestic 

representatives from NRC Headquarters and all four regional offices, U.S. Departmentof 

Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, EPRI, NPP licensees/utilities, Nuclear 

Steam Supply System vendors, consulting engineering firms, and universities. Also in 

iii 
attendance were international representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, South

Korea, Spain, and Sweden.

The material in this NUREG/CP was recorded at the workshops in 2008, and adapted by

RES Fire Research Branch members for use as an alternative training method for those who were

unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report can also serve as a refresher for

those who attended one or more training sessions and would be useful preparatory material for

those planning to attend a session.

NRC Disclaimer: This document's text and video content are intended solely for use as training

tools. No portions of their content are intended to represent NRC conclusions or Regulatory

Positions, and they should not be interpreted as such.

iv

attendance were international representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, South 

Korea, Spain, and Sweden. 

The material in this NUREG/CP was recorded at the workshops in 2008, and adapted by 

RES Fire Research Branch members for use as an alternative training method for those who were 

unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report can also serve as a refresher for 

those who attended one or more training sessions and would be useful preparatory material for 

those planning to attend a session. 

NRC Disclaimer: This document's text and video content are intended solely for use as training 

tools. No portions of their content are intended to represent NRC conclusions or Regulatory 

Positions, and they should not be interpreted as such. 

IV 
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 2

A B S T R A C T ........................................................................................................ iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... vii

LIST OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................................... ix

1 INTRODUCTION - ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW ............................................. 1-1

1.1 E P R I P erspective .................................................................................................. . . 1-1

2 ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS SLIDES .......................................................................... 2-1

SESSION 1: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview .......................................................... 2-1

SESSION 2: Task 3, Fire PRA Cable Selection ................................................................. 2-10

SESSION 3: Task 9, Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis ....................................................... 2-22

SESSION 4: Task 10, Circuit Failure Likelihood Analysis .................................................. 2-30

SESSION 5: Support Task B, Fire PRA Database ............................................................ 2-44

SESSION 6: Electrical Exercises Overview ....................................................................... 2-54

3 EXAMPLE EXERCISES .................................................................................... 3-1

APPENDICES ....................................................................................................... A-1

Appendix A: Questions Asked in Module 2 Sessions ...................................................... A-1

Appendix B: Exercise Problems and Solutions ............................................................... B-1

Exercises with Reference Figures ............................................................................. B-2

Instructors Exercise Solutions ................................................................................. B-54

Drawings Needed with the Exercises ................................................................. B-107

Drawing Pack 1 - Electrical Schematic Diagrams ...................................... B-108

Drawing Pack 2 - AOV and MOV Block Diagrams .................................... B-121

Drawing Pack 3 - More Detailed Electrical Schematics ............................ B-130

V

CONTENTS OF VOLUME 2 

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ iii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... vii 

LIST OF ACRONyMS ............................................................................................ ix 

1 INTRODUCTION - ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW .................................................. 1-1 

1.1 EPRI Perspective ......................................................................................................... 1-1 

2 ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS SLIDES .......................................................................... 2-1 

SESSION 1: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview ................................................................ 2-1 

SESSION 2: Task 3, Fire PRA Cable Selection ................................................................. 2-10 

SESSION 3: Task 9, Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis ....................................................... 2-22 

SESSION 4: Task 10, Circuit Failure Likelihood Analysis .................................................. 2-30 

SESSION 5: Support Task B, Fire PRA Database ............................................................ 2-44 

SESSION 6: Electrical Exercises Overview ....................................................................... 2-54 

3 EXAMPLE EXERCiSES ........................................................................................ 3-1 

APPENDICES .. ............................................... , ......................................................... A-1 

Appendix A: Questions Asked in Module 2 Sessions .......................................................... A-1 

Appendix B: Exercise Problems and Solutions ................................................................... B-1 

Exercises with Reference Figures ............................................................................. B-2 

Instructors Exercise Solutions ................................................................................. B-54 

Drawings Needed with the Exercises .................................................................... B-107 

Drawing Pack 1 - Electrical Schematic Diagrams ......................................... B-108 

Drawing Pack 2 - AOV and MOV Block Diagrams ........................................ B-121 

Drawing Pack 3 - More Detailed Electrical Schematics ................................ B-130 

v 

Acknowledgements

The authors of this report greatly appreciate the efforts and contributions made by Carli Follett,

David Yates, and Thomas DeBold, summer interns from the University of Maryland's Fire

Protection Engineering Department, during development of this NUREG/Conference

Proceedings report. As part of their summer internship, they were tasked to analyze, evaluate,

organize, and edit information in the videos of this report and to develop its first draft under

direct supervision of the authors. They compiled all the video files and presentation materials

used during the training sessions and used their knowledge to create, organize, edit, and deliver a

user-friendly report of the highest quality possible.

We also acknowledge the other Fire Research Branch members Kendra Hill, Aixa Belen-Ojeda,

Jason Dreisbach, Jessica Kratchman, Gabriel Taylor, J. S. Hyslop, and Mark Henry Salley for

their support and contributions during its development. Their input and encouragement

facilitated its timely completion and greatly benefited the final product.

In addition, we want to extend our gratitude to Nathan White and Thomas Kardaras of the

Information Technology and Infrastructure Branch for their quick responses addressing all our

computer needs and issues during development of the report. We greatly appreciate the support

of Linda Stevenson (the agency publication specialist) and Guy Beltz (the agency printing

specialist) whose invaluable support and expertise were critical to ensuring the published report's

quality.

Also, several other 2009 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research summer interns, specifically

Minh Dang, Daniel Breedlove, Ashley Carnes, and Anders Gilbertson, made valuable

contributions to this project, both technical and editorial, that contributed to its overall quality.

vii

Acknowledgements 

The authors of this report greatly appreciate the efforts and contributions made by Carli Follett, 

David Yates, and Thomas DeBold, summer interns from the University of Maryland's Fire 

Protection Engineering Department, during development of this NUREG/Conference 

Proceedings report. As part of their summer internship, they were tasked to analyze, evaluate, 

organize, and edit information in the videos of this report and to develop its first draft under 

direct supervision of the authors. They compiled all the video files and presentation materials 

used during the training sessions and used their knowledge to create, organize, edit, and deliver a 

user-friendly report ofthe highest quality possible. 

We also acknowledge the other Fire Research Branch members Kendra Hill, Aixa Belen-Ojeda, 

Jason Dreisbach, Jessica Kratchman, Gabriel Taylor, J. S. Hyslop, and Mark Henry Salley for 

their support and contributions during its development. Their input and encouragement 

facilitated its timely completion and greatly benefited the final product. 

In addition, we want to extend our gratitude to Nathan White and Thomas Kardaras of the 

Information Technology and Infrastructure Branch for their quick responses addressing all our 

computer needs and issues during development of the report. We greatly appreciate the support 

of Linda Stevenson (the agency publication specialist) and Guy Beltz (the agency printing 

specialist) whose invaluable support and expertise were critical to ensuring the published report's 

quality. 

Also, several other 2009 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research summer interns, specifically 

Minh Dang; Daniel Breedlove, Ashley Carnes, and Anders Gilbertson, made valuable 

contributions to this project, both technical and editorial, that contributed to its overall quality. 

vii 

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACB

ACRS

AEP

AFW

AGS

AOP

AOV

ATHEANA

ATS

ATWS

BAT

BNL

BWR

CBDT

CCDP

CF

CCPS

CCW

CDF

CFD

CFR

CLERP

CM

CR

CRS

CST

CVCS

CWP

DC

EDG

EDS

EF

El

EOP

EPR

EPRI

Air-cooled Circuit Breaker

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Abnormal Event Procedure

Auxiliary Feedwater

Assistance General Supervisor

Abnormal Operating Procedure

Air Operated Valve

A Technique for Human Event Analysis

Automatic Transfer Switch

Anticipated Transient Without Scram

Boric Acid Tank

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Boiling-Water Reactor

Causal Based Decision Tree

Conditional Core Damage Probability

Cable (Configuration) Factors

Center for Chemical Process Safety

Component Cooling Water

Core Damage Frequency

Computational Fluid Dynamics

Code of Federal Regulations

Conditional Large Early Release Probability

Corrective Maintenance

Control Room

Cable and Raceway (Database) System

Condensate Storage Tank

Chemical and Volume Control System

Circulating Water Pump

Direct Current

Emergency Diesel Generator

Electrical Distribution System

Error Factor

Erroneous Status Indicator

Emergency Operating Procedure

Ethylene-Propylene Rubber

Electric Power Research Institute

ix

LIST OF ACRONYMS 

ACB 

ACRS 

AEP 

AFW 

AGS 

AOP 

AOV 

ATHEANA 

ATS 

ATWS 

BAT 

BNL 

BWR 

CBDT 

CCDP 

CF 

CCPS 

CCW 

CDF 

CFD 

CFR 

CLERP 

CM 

CR 

CRS 

CST 

CVCS 

CWP 

DC 

EDG 

EDS 

EF 

EI 

EOP 

EPR 

EPRI 

Air-cooled Circuit Breaker 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

Abnormal Event Procedure 

Auxiliary Feedwater 

Assistance General Supervisor 

Abnormal Operating Procedure 

Air Operated Valve 

A Technique for Human Event Analysis 

Automatic Transfer Switch 

Anticipated Transient Without Scram 

Boric Acid Tank 

Brookhaven National Laboratory 

Boiling-Water Reactor 

Causal Based Decision Tree 

Conditional Core Damage Probability 

Cable (Configuration) Factors 

Center for Chemical Process Safety 

Component Cooling Water 

Core Damage Frequency 

Computational Fluid Dynamics 

Code of Federal Regulations 

Conditional Large Early Release Probability 

Corrective Maintenance 

Control Room 

Cable and Raceway (Database) System 

Condensate Storage Tank 

Chemical and Volume Control System 

Circulating Water Pump 

Direct Current 

Emergency Diesel Generator 

Electrical Distribution System 

Error Factor 

Erroneous Status Indicator 

Emergency Operating Procedure 

Ethylene-Propylene Rubber 

Electric Power Research Institute 

ix 
FEDB Fire Events Database

FEP Fire Emergency Procedure

FHA Fire Hazards Analysis

FIVE Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (EPRI TR 100370)

FMRC Factory Mutual Research Corporation

FPRAIG Fire PRA ImplementationGuide (EPRI TR 105928)

FRSS Fire Risk Scoping Study (NUREG/CR-5088)

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

HEAF High Energy Arcing Fault

HEP Human Error Probability

HFE Human Failure Event

HPI High-Pressure Injection

HPCI High-Pressure Coolant Injection

HRA Human Reliability Analysis

HRR Heat Release Rate

HTGR High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

ICDP Incremental Core Damage Probability

ILERP Incremental Large Early Release Probability

INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operations

IPE Individual Plant Examination

IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events

IS Ignition Source

ISLOCA Interfacing Systems Loss of Coolant Accident

KS Key Switch

LCO Limiting Condition of Operation

LERF Large Early Release Frequency

LFL Lower Flammability Limit

LOC Loss of Control

LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LWGR Light-Water-cooled Graphite Reactors (Russian design)

MCB Main Control Board

MCC Motor Control Center

MCR Main Control Room

MG Motor-Generator

MFW Main Feedwater

MOV Motor-Operated Valve

MQH McCaffrey, Quintiere and Harkleroad's Method

MS Main Steam

MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve

NC No Consequence

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NEIL Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

x

FEDB 

FEP 

FHA 

FIVE 

FMRC 

FPRAIG 

FRSS 

FSAR 

HEAF 

HEP 

/ HFE 

HPI 

HPCI 

HRA 

HRR 

HTGR 

HVAC 

ICDP 

ILERP 

INPO 

IPE 

IPEEE 

IS 

ISLOCA 

KS 

LCO 

LERF 

LFL 

LOC 

LOCA 

LPG 

LWGR 

MCB 

MCC 

MCR 

MG 

MFW 

MOV 

MQH 

MS 

MSIV 

NC 

NEI 

NEIL 

NFPA 

NPP 

Fire Events Database 

Fire Emergency Procedure 

Fire Hazards Analysis 

Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (EPRI TR 100370) 

Factory Mutual Research Corporation 

Fire PRA Implementation Guide (EPRI TR 105928) 

Fire Risk Scoping Study (NUREG/CR-5088) 

Final Safety Analysis Report 

High Energy Arcing Fault 

Human Error Probability 

Human Failure Event 

High-Pressure Injection 

High-Pressure Coolant Injection 

Human Reliability Analysis 

Heat Release Rate 

High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor 

Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning 

Incremental Core Damage Probability 

Incremental Large Early Release Probability 

Institute for Nuclear Power Operations 

Individual Plant Examination 

Individual Plant Examination of External Events 

Ignition Source 

Interfacing Systems Loss of Coolant Accident 

Key Switch 

Limiting Condition of Operation 

Large Early Release Frequency 

Lower Flammability Limit 

Loss of Control 

Loss-of-Coolant Accident 

Liquefied Petroleum Gas 

Light-Water-cooled Graphite Reactors (Russian design) 

Main Control Board 

Motor Control Center 

Main Control Room 

Motor-Generator 

Main Feedwater 

Motor-Operated Valve 

McCaffrey, Quintiere and Harkleroad's Method 

Main Steam 

Main Steam Isolation Valve 

No Consequence 

Nuclear Energy Institute 

Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited 

National Fire Protection Association 

Nuclear Power Plant 

x 
NPSH Net Positive Suction Head

NQ cable Non-Qualified (IEEE-383) cable

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

PE Polyethylene

PM Preventive Maintenance

PMMA Polymethyl Methacrylate

PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PSF Performance Shaping Factor

PTS Pressurized Thermal Shock

PVC Polyvinyl Chloride

PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor

Q cable Qualified (IEEE-383) cable

RBMK Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kanalny (high-power channel reactor)

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RCP Reactor Coolant Pump

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RDAT Computer program for Bayesian analysis

RES Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (at NRC)

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RI/PB Risk-Informed / Performance-Based

RPS Reactor Protection System

RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SDP Significance Determination Process

SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture

SI Safety Injection

SMA Seismic Margin Assessment

SNPP Simplified Nuclear Power Plant

SO Spurious Operation

SOV Solenoid Operated Valve

SRV Safety Relief Valve

SSD Safe Shutdown

SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List

SST Station Service Transformer

SUT Start-up Transformer

SW Service Water

SWGR Switchgear

T/G Turbine/Generator

THERP Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction

TGB Turbine-Generator Building

TSP Transfer Switch Panel

UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer

VCT Volume Control Tank

VTT Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Technical Research Centre of Finland)

xi

NPSH 

NQ cable 

NRC 

P&ID 

PE 

PM 

PMMA 

PORV 

PRA 

PSF 

PTS 

PVC 

PWR 

Q cable 

RBMK 

RCIC 

RCP 

RCS 

RDAT 

RES 

RHR 

RVPB 

RPS 

RWST 

SCBA 

SDP 

SGTR 

SI 

SMA 

SNPP 

SO 

SOV 

SRV 

SSD 

SSEL 

SST 

SUT 

SW 

SWGR 

T/G 

THERP 

TGB 

TSP 

UAT 

VCT 

VTT 

Net Positive Suction Head 

Non-Qualified (IEEE-383) cable 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 

Polyethylene 

Preventive Maintenance 

Polymethyl Methacrylate 

Power-Operated Relief Valve 

Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

Performance Shaping Factor 

Pressurized Thermal Shock 

Polyvinyl Chloride 

Pressurized -Water Reactor 

Qualified (IEEE-383) cable 

Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kanalny (high-power channel reactor) 

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 

Reactor Coolant Pump 

Reactor Coolant System 

Computer program for Bayesian analysis 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (at NRC) 

Residual Heat Removal 

Risk-Informed / Performance-Based 

Reactor Protection System 

Refueling Water Storage Tank 

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

Significance Determination Process 

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 

Safety Injection 

Seismic Margin Assessment 

Simplified Nuclear Power Plant 

Spurious Operation 

Solenoid Operated Valve 

Safety Relief Valve 

Safe Shutdown 

Safe Shutdown Equipment List 

Station Service Transformer 

Start-up Transformer 

Service Water 

Switchgear 

Turbine/Generator 

Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 

Turbine-Generator Building 

Transfer Switch Panel 

Unit Auxiliary Transformer 

Volume Control Tank 

Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Technical Research Centre of Finland) 

Xl 
VVER The Soviet (and now, Russian Federation) designation for light-water

pressurized reactor

XLPE Cross-Linked Polyethylene

ZOI Zone of Influence

xii

VVER 

XLPE 

ZOI 

The Soviet (and now, Russian Federation) designation for light-water 

pressurized reactor 

Cross-Linked Polyethylene 

Zone of Influence 

xu 
1 INTRODUCTION - ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW

The components that constitute the fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model eachhave

cables associated with them. These cables must be identified, traced, and analyzed. An

electrical analysis is performed to determine the positions that a component could take given

fire-induced cable failures. Because positions of components are critical to fire PRA to credit a

train to mitigate core damage, the electrical analysis is critical to the PRA evaluation. These

elements of the fire PRA are the topic of the Electrical Analysis module.

The first task of the Electrical Analysis module is to identify all cables associated with the

components selected in fire PRA task 2. A PRA analyst can always assume the worst-case

failure mode but must also consider the Appendix R failure mode for those components

addressed by Appendix R. The worst-case failure mode may be dependent on the risk sequence

entered, and care must be taken to ensure that the component failure modes are treated

accordingly. Should a more realistic analysis be beneficial to the PRA sequence in question,

then more detailed failure analysis can be done.

The Electrical Analysis module is divided into five sessions. Session 1 presents an overview of

circuits relevant to nuclear power plants (NPPs) and a discussion of the importance of the

electrical analysis within a fire PRA. Relevant technical specifications and requirements are

discussed as well as an overall strategy for implementation of the electrical analysis within the

fire PRA. Session 2 covers task 3 that addresses cable selection. This provides a method for

choosing electrical cables and a guide for using the location of cables determined in plant

walkdowns to generate reasonable outcomes of postulated fire scenarios. This deterministic

process produces a list of basic events or electrical components and their associated functions

and failure modes within a fire scenario.

Sessions 3 and 4 concern the failure modes of the electrical components as developed in Task 3.

The first part of the failure mode analysis is a deterministic screening process to identify those

cables with no critical effect on system elements. Only those cables that directly affect the

ability of the system elements selected for PRA are further considered in the fourth session,

which quantitatively establishes the likelihood of certain failure modes, including spurious

actuations.

Session 5 of the Electrical Analysis module is actually not unique to the electrical segment of

this course. The generation of a fire PRA database is a complex task that involves the

compilation of all of the data and results collected in a fire PRA. Distinct from the rest of the

electrical tasks, this is actually a database management task that occurs as a supporting function

throughout the process of the assessment. Although elements from all three training modules are

included, the fire PRA database tool is not repeated in either the Fire Analysis or the Systems

Analysis modules, and so trainees in those modules may benefit from this section of the

Electrical Analysis module.

1.1 EPRI Perspective

"Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)" is a collection of the

materials that are presented at the Fire PRA course provided by EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear

1-1

1 INTRODUCTION - ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 

The components that constitute the fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model each have 

cables associated with them. These cables must be identified, traced, and analyzed. An 

electrical analysis is performed to determine the positions that a component could take given 

fire-induced cable failures. Because positions of components are critical to fire PM to credit a 

train to mitigate core damage, the electrical analysis is critical to the PRA evaluation. These 

elements ofthe fire PRA are the topic of the Electrical Analysis module. 

The first task of the Electrical Analysis module is to identify all cables associated with the 

components selected in fire PRA task 2. A PRA analyst can always assume the worst-case 

failure mode but must also consider the Appendix R failure mode for those components 

addressed by Appendix R. The worst-case failure mode may be dependent on the risk sequence 

entered, and care must be taken to ensure that the component failure modes are treated 

accordingly. Should a more realistic analysis be beneficial to the PRA sequence in question, 

then more detailed failure analysis can be done. 

The Electrical Analysis module is divided into five sessions. Session 1 presents an overview of 

circuits relevant to nuclear power plants (NPPs) and a discussion of the importance of the 

electrical analysis within a fire PRA. Relevant technical specifications and requirements are 

discussed as well as an overall strategy for implementation of the electrical analysis within the 

fire PRA. Session 2 covers task 3 that addresses cable selection. This provides a method for 

choosing electrical cables and a guide for using the location of cables determined in plant 

walkdowns to generate reasonable outcomes of postulated fire scenarios. This deterministic 

process produces a list of basic events or electrical components and their associated functions 

and failure modes within a fire scenario. 

Sessions 3 and 4 concern the failure modes of the electrical components as developed in Task 3. 

The first part of the failure mode analysis is a deterministic screening process to identify those 

cables with no critical effect on system elements. Only those cables that directly affect the 

ability of the system elements selected for PRA are further considered in the fourth session, 

which quantitatively establishes the likelihood of certain failure modes, including spurious 

actuations. 

Session 5 of the Electrical Analysis module is actually not unique to the electrical segment of 

this course. The generation of a fire PRA database is a complex task that involves the 

compilation of all of the data and results collected in a fire PRA. Distinct from the rest of the 

electrical tasks, this is actually a database management task that occurs as a supporting function 

throughout the process of the assessment. Although elements from all three training modules are 

included, the fire PRA database tool is not repeated in either the Fire Analysis or the Systems 

, Analysis modules, and so trainees in those modules may benefit from this section of the 

Electrical Analysis module. 

1.1 EPRI Perspective 

"Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES)" is a collection ofthe 

materials that are presented at the Fire PRA course provided by EPRI and the u.S. Nuclear 

1-1 
Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). The training

and resulting presentation material is detailed and represents in excess of 60 hours of classroom

instruction. The training focuses on the Fire PRA methods documented in the joint Electric

Power Research Institute (EPRI)/RES publication 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850 along with

clarifications, enhancements, and additions provided via the Frequently Asked Question (FAQ)

process for NFPA 805.

The intent of the publication is to provide to the public the training material used at the Fire PRA

training. This material is not intended to be a substitute for direct interaction that is provided in

the periodically offered fire PRA courses; rather, it is meant to augment that training and serve as

a reference. Enthusiastic future students can use the material to become familiar with the general

principles of fire PRA prior to arrival at the course. Students who have already taken the course

can use the material for reference. The material consists of a series of reports that document the

presentations including some speakers' notes and text. In addition, an edited version of a

recorded training session is also available via a separate product number. This video version can

be used in a similar manner to the documentation (e.g., for reference or in preparation for the

course) and includes the actual recorded and edited course.

In providing this material, it is hoped that those who plan to attend the course can arrive more

informed, those who have already attended can have a reference, and those who have been

unable to attend have a resource to gain a more complete understanding of the intent and goals of

EPRI 1011989 and NUREG/CR-6850.

1-2

Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). The training 

and resulting presentation material is detailed and represents in excess of 60 hours of classroom 

instruction. The training focuses on the Fire PRA methods documented in the joint Electric 

Power Research Institute (EPRI)/RES publication 1011989 and NUREGICR-6850 along with 

clarifications, enhancements, and additions provided via the Frequently Asked Question (F AQ) 

process for NFPA 805. 

The intent of the publication is to provide to the public the training material used at the Fire PRA 

training. This material is not intended to be a substitute for direct interaction that is provided in 

the periodically offered fire PRA courses; rather, it is meant to augment that training and serve as 

a reference. Enthusiastic future students can use the material to become familiar with the general 

principles of fire PRA prior to arrival at the course. Students who have already taken the course 

can use the material for reference. The material consists of a series of reports that document the 

presentations including some speakers' notes and text. In addition, an edited version of a 

recorded training session is also available via a separate product number. This video version can 

be used in a similar manner to the documentation (e.g., for reference or in preparation for the 

course) and includes the actual recorded and edited course. 

In providing this material, it is hoped that those who plan to attend the course can arrive more 

informed, those who have already attended can have a reference, and those who have been 

unable to attend have a resource to gain a more complete understanding of the intent and goals of 

EPRI 1011989 and NUREGICR-6850. 

1-2 
2 ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS SLIDES

,SESSION 1: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview

2-1

2 ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS SLIDES 

ISESSION 1: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview 

2-1 
Slide 1 Notes:

EPRIINRC-RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY

Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis

Overview

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp.

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course

September and November 2008

Bethesda, MD

A Co0laboration of U.S. NRC Offmco of NuclMearRegullory Rems..h (RES) & Elot,1o Porer Ro.roh InsbtNe (FPRO

Slide 2 Notes:

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS Presentation Road Map

* Circuit Analysis "Big Picture" Overview

" Circuit Analysis Strategy & Implementation

* Introduction to Key Considerations & Factors

* Review and Discussion of Tasks

* Relationship to Appendix R & NFPA 805

* Discussion of Relevant FAQs

" Examples

duoonl FM P RA Co- St ft, 2ov00E A O e a OrO" Ro0,uoho inRýhioa

Module. 2: Fire PRA Circui AO.ysl OvmM

1 .

R-hOon (-)1000 & Fe- 00 00.000.000 (fEM

2-2

Slide 1 

~~~I I £L'CT~IC pown ~,-,~ R£SEA t Cfl INSTlTVlf 

EPRIINRC-RES FIRE PRA 

METHODOLOGY 

Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis 

Overview 

D. Funk · Edan Engineering Corp. 

F. Wyant . Sandia National Laboratories 

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course 

September and November 2008 

Bethesda, MD 

Slide 2 

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Presentation Road Map 

• Circuit Analysis "Big Picture" Overview 

• Circuit Analysis Strategy & Implementation 

• Introduction to Key Considerations & Factors 

• Review and Discussion of Tasks 

• Relationship to Appendix R & NFPA 805 

• Discussion of Relevant FAQs 

• Examples 

Joint File PRA eou,.. Sept &. Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Fire PRA CIrcuit ANlp ls OVeN',", 

ACoI'~dU S.NRComc.dNuclHr~1Or)' 

R~ (RES) ' EI«:ttIc Power Retearch NfMIJt. (EPRIJ 

2-2 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 3 Notes:

I CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Circuit Analysis Tasks

* Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection

* Task 9 - Detailed Circuit Analysis

* Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis

* Support Task B - Fire PRA Database

JoWnt re PRA Courne, Sept & NOV, 2008 I--- 3 ACoýe oIoo U t NRCOfieoM O•N-tR o'v

Modue 2: Fi.r P"A CStult Anatob o•.rlew j -~~it (RES) & voctv -Ow- Retath 0•0t (EPRO

Slide 4 Notes:

! CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Circuit Analysis Overview

* Substantial Technical and Process-Related Advances

- Implication of these Advances: Circuit analysis is more complex and

difficult than analyses performed under Appendix R

* Collective Awareness of Circuit Failure Implications Greatly Improved

* Knowledge Base Improvements

- Fire Tests: EPRI, CAROLFIRE, Duke: Better but not perfect

understanding of fire-Induced circuit failures

- Practical experience from NFPA 805 transition projects

* Important "Lessons Learned" from pilot plants

* Significant insights from "in-progress" transition projects

- Active FAQ Process

* Interpretation of guidance

* New guidance

Joint Fir PRO CouG-, Sept & Nov. 2008 L j A CoU.abOti oftUS. U& C Ofty &okN Regulatoy

Modu 2: Fl. PRA Cl..ufl•rtal o R.-enh fh (-ES)&EkvuvPoer - - - R o t-t- (E-R0

2-3

Slide 3 

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Circuit Analysis Tasks 

• Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection 

• Task 9 - Detailed Circuit Analysis 

• Task 10- Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis 

• Support Task B - Fire PRA Database 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. oS Nov. 2008 

Mocluae 2: Fir. PRA Circuit Analysis Owrvlew 

A Collaboration 01 U.S. NRC Offlce 01 NIICI$IH RegulatOf)' 

Research (RES) & Electric PowerRftSflarch Im/lfute (EPRO 

Slide 4 

I CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Circuit Analysis Overview 

Substantial Technical and Process-Related Advances 

- Implication of these Advances: Circuit analysis is more complex and 

difficult than analyses performed under Appendix R 

Collective Awareness of Circuit Failure Implications Greatly Improved 

Knowledge Base Improvements 

- Fire Tests: EPRI, CAROLFIRE, Duke: Better but not perfect 

understanding of fire-Induced circuit failures 

- Practical experience from NFPA 805 transition projects 

• Important "Lessons Learned" from pilot plants 

• Significant insights from "in-progress" transition projects 

- Active FAQ Process 

Interpretation of guidance 

• New guidance 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. oS Nov. 2008 

Modukl 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC OffICe 01 Nuclesr Regulatory 

Rssean:h (RES) & Eloctnc Power Research lfIstilute (EPRI) 

2-3 

Notes: 

Notes: . 
Slide 5 Notes:

! CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Circuit Analysis Overview

- Circuit Analysis is Now an Integral and Formal Part of the

Fire PRA Process

- Rigorous and formal process for correlating cables-to-equipmentto-affected locations

- Definitive data and criteria has replaced estimations and judgment

- Essential that Fire PRA and NFPA-805 data be fully integrated

Note: The subtleties of aligning Fire PRA and traditional Appendix

RINFPA-805 data is more complex than originally anticipated. This

primarily shows up in Component Selection (Task 2), but has major

ramifications to the circuit analysis

- Further Refinements to "State-of-the-Art" Techniques Realistic

- Practical aspects of dealing with an integrated data set

- Practical approach for dealing with MSOs

Joint F n PRA Co.-. Sept & No, 2008 "AC810bo00iRof NRC Off O R&gu00to2 Module 2: FiT PRA Cilru A Ovewlew vorty R-rv h (RES) & E• -• M.• (EPR0

2-4

Slide 5 

I CIRCUIT ANALYSIS . Circuit Analysis Overview 

• Circuit Analysis is Now an Integral and Formal Part of the 

Fire PRA Process 

- Rigorous and formal process for correlating cables-to-equipmentto-affected locations 

- Definitive data and criteria has replaced estimations and judgment 

- Essential that Fire PRA and NFPA-805 data be fully integrated 

Note: The subtleties of aligning Fire PRA and traditional Appendix 

RlNFPA-805 data is more complex than originally anticipated. This 

primarily shows up in Component Selection (Task 2), but has major 

ramifications to the circuit analysis 

- Further Refinements to "State-of-the-Art" Techniques Realistic 

- Practical aspects of dealing with an integrated data set 

- Practical approach for dealing with MSOs 

joint Flro PRA Courstt, Sept.&. Nov. 2008 

ModuM 2: Fire PRA CIn;:uH Anaty ... Overview 

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC otrir.;& d Nucltlar ~tcxy 

Research (RES) & Eledrir; Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

2-4 

Notes: 
Slide 6

Notes:

2-5

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

PRA Task Flow Chart 

Slide 6 

r - - - ;::-:=-=:..::.-=-=-==-.-

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

l

",S.UPPIlLillOR:aTI.IT.i/Ij"IrjSKaA_: __ ... HII .. Pteqt WIt pgrns .. 

~ 

I 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview 

Notes: 

[

_ .. _-_._--, 

..... ~~~!: .. ~ ...... --

2-5 

Fire Specific 

Tasks 

PRAlHRA Tasks 

Electrical 

Analysis 

Tasks 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 7

I CIRCUIT PRA Task Flow ANALYSIS Chart (continued)

: Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis

Fire Risk Quantification Potf R:Deaed&roey

uncerainty & Sensitiviy Anatyses Fire Specific ~Tasks

T Tasks IPRHRA 

Fir IRA Documnentation Electrical Analysis

L -T asks-------

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. &. Nov. 2008 .... -....... i Ci ollaboration of U.S.. NRC Offie of Nuclear Regultory Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview .......................I Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-6

Slide 7 

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

PRA Task Flow Chart (continued) 

........................................................ .±. ................................................... 

Oetai/ed Fire Scenario Analysis 

TASK 11: 

Detailed Fire ModttHng 

A. Single Compelfment 

B. Mu,,i-Compartment 

C. Main Control Room 

TASK 13: TASK 128: 

Seismic-FA Interactions Post fire HRA: Detailed & recovery 

L __________ _ 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview 

Notes: 

2-6 

• Fire Specific 

Tasks 

PRAlHRA Tasks 

Electrical Analysis _ .ra~s ___ _ 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 8 Notes:

! CIRCUIT ANALYSIS Overall Strategy & Implementation

* Each Electrical Analysis Task Represents a Refined Level of

Detail, i.e., Graded Approach

* Level-of-Effort for the Electrical Work is a Key Driver for

Project Scope, Schedule, and Resources

- High Programmatic Risk if Not Carefully Controlled

- Analysis and Routing of all Cables can be a Large Resource Sink with

Minimal Overall Benefit

- Concerns Validated by Numerous Projects

* Detailed Analysis Driven by Quantitative Screening Results

- Intelligence-Based Circuit Analysis

- Iterative Process

- Important to screen out obvious "Not Required" cables during the

initial cable selection process, with refinement driven by quantitative

screening

Joint FR. PRA Cod-, Sept. I Nov. 2008 s A CWo4ýbo dono U.S. NRC Offe d NMolew Rn-tl p 

... ule : Fi'. PRA Ciruit tM.lply Owoolew 0..0- (R-S) I Et,* FooD - R-sear - nSoitue EPR0

Slide 9 Notes:

! CIRCUIT Overall Strategy ANALYSIS & Implementation, cont...

* Recommended Methods are Consistent with Industry Best Practices

* Use Risk Perspectives to Streamline and Focus Analysis

* Remains a Technically and Logistically Challenging Area

* Limitations to the State-of-the-Art:

- Number of Multiple Hot Shorts/Spurious Actuations

- Spurious Actuation Probabilities

- Timing Considerations (being addressed by FAQ process)

* Existing Appendix R Circuit Analysis is NOT as Useful as Originally

Envisioned

Joint Fire PRP Cou., Sept & Nov 2008 0 A CaSoti0 00U, NRC 06 RNO ROiO

Module 2: Fi. PiA Circuit M.fly0 Ourolw ReOP (RES) & PfEPROORe I-.0,0 00tufe (EFR0

2-7

Slide 8 

I CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Overall Strategy & Implementation 

• Each Electrical Analysis Task Represents a Refined Level of 

Detail, i.e., Graded Approach 

• Level-of-Effort for the Electrical Work is a Key Driver for 

Project Scope, Schedule, and Resources 

- High Programmatic Risk if Not Carefully Controlled 

- Analysis and Routing of all Cables can be a Large Resource Sink with 

Minimal Overall Benefit 

- Concerns Validated by Numerous Projects 

• Detailed Analysis Driven by Quantitative Screening Results 

- Intelligence-Based Circuit Analysis 

- Iterative Process 

- Important to screen out obvious "Not Required" cables during the 

initial cable selection process, with refinement driven by quantitative 

screening 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Modu" 2: Fit. PRA Circuit Analysts OVWVlew 

A Coilaboration 01 U.S. NRC Office 01 Nuc;learRllgulatay 

RastNlrch (RES) & E/&CIti<; Power Research Insti/ut& (EPRI) 

Slide 9 

_ CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Overall Strategy & Implementation, cont... 

• Recommended Methods are Consistent with Industry Best Practices 

• Use Risk Perspectives to Streamline and Focus Analysis 

• Remains a Technically and Logistically Challenging Area 

• Limitations to the State-of-the-Art: 

- Number of Multiple Hot Shorts/Spurious Actuations 

- Spurious Actuation Probabilities 

- Timing Considerations (being addressed by FAQ process) 

• Existing Appendix R Circuit Analysis is NOT as Useful as Originally 

Envisioned 

Joint Fire PRA COUfW, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Fire PRA ClrcuH Analysts Overvfew 

A Ca//abomtiOll of U S. NRC OffICe 01 NIJI)/fn!r R~/a'CYy 

Res98rch (RES) & E/9Ctnc PowerR9S&srch In.slitule (EPRI) 

2-7 

Notes: 

Notes: 
CIRCUIT ANAL

Overall Strategy -

- FAQ 08-0051 Hot Sh

- Issue:

* The guidance does I

of a hot short once

* This could be a sign

that will return to a "

- General approach to

- Analyze the existing

determine if an adec

distributions

- Status:

* Initial data analysis h

review

* NRC staff and indus

Jont Fme PRA Co- ', Sept. & Nov. 2W08

Modole 2: Fit PRA Citi Aoaelys O i.w

Slide 10 Notes:

YSIS

- Related FAQ

tort Duration (Status: Open)

not provide a method for estimating the duration

ormed

ificant factor for certain types of plant equipment

fail safe" position if the hot short is removed

resolution:

cable failure modes and effects test data to

quate basis exists to establish hot short duration

has been completed and results are under team

try review pending

A Coldoho &f U.S &NC O1. df Nuýa RýýWaot

lide 1s Notes:

Slide 11 Notes:

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Overall Strategy & Implementation, cont...

* Circuit Analysis (including cable tracing) Can Consume

40%-70% of Overall Budget

* Circuit Analysis Scope MUST be a Primary Consideration

During Project Scopinq

* Qualified and Experienced Electrical Analysts Must be

Integral Member of PRA Team

* Coordination and Integration with Appendix R Must Occur

Early and Must be Rigorous

* Coordination with Task 2 (Component Section) is

Essential - MUST Understand the EXACT Functionality

Credited for Each Component

Joint Fie P05 Coup, Sept. & Nov. 20W8 a coo a us. S. C . - -gP rýe y

Module 2: Fire PRA Cr cuit Anaty.A OwrotýeW RO h (RES) & Ek-d -POer RoetrflntJ.e (EPRO

2-8

Slide 10 

_ CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Overall Strategy - Related FAQ fb. 

• FAQ 08-0051 Hot Short Duration (Status: Open) 

- Issue: 

The guidance does not provide a method for estimating the duration 

of a hot short once formed 

This could be a significant factor for certain types of plant equipment 

that will return to a "fail safe" position if the hot short is removed 

- General approach to resolution: 

• Analyze the existing cable failure modes and effects test data to 

determine if an adequate basis exists to establish hot short duration 

distributions 

- Status: 

Initial data analysis has been completed and results are under team 

review 

NRC staff and industry review pending 

Join! Fire PRA Coun;e, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Fire PM CIn::uIt Analysts OveMew 

A CoI/a"bonJtJon of U.S. NRC OffICe d NucIMT R8fIUIatory 

Re".,.,rch (RES,,, B8drlc PowtH Re$Nr'Ch In$IitIM (cpR" 

Slide 11 

_ CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Overall. Strategy & Implementation, cont... 

• Circuit Analysis (including cable tracing) Can Consume 

40%-70% of Overall Budget 

• Circuit Analysis Scope MUST be a Primary Consideration 

During Project Scoping 

• Qualified and Experienced Electrical Analysts Must be 

Integral Member of PRA Team 

• Coordination and Integration with Appendix R Must Occur 

Early and Must be Rigorous 

• Coordination with Task 2 (Component Section) is 

Essential- MUST Understand the EXACT Functionality 

Credited for Each Component 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Modu" 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Overview 

A CoIIabonltJon 01 U S. NRC omc, of N!X:Iear R~tory 

RU8Bf'Ch (RES) "Electric PoNer R,snrch /nstJIute (EPRf} 

2-8 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 12 Notes:

! CIRCUIT Key Considerations ANALYSIS

* Relationship with Appendix R/NFPA 805 Analysis

* Long-Term Strategy for Data Configuration Control - Especially if Shared

Data with Appendix R/NFPA-805

* Availability, Quality, and Format of Cable Data

* Usability of Appendix R Circuit Analysis Data - Not as useful as originally envisioned

- Automated tools are essential

- Functional state analysis is critical - overly conservative cable selection will not work for

Fire PRA

- Many plants are finding that circuit analysis re-baseline is necessary to support

upgraded Fire PRA and NFPA-805 projects

* User-Friendliness of Electrical Drawings

* Availability of Electrical Engineering Support

- Circuit analysis is a developed expertise

- Do not expect to be a proficient analyst based on a simple introductory course

Joint Fft PRA Couwe, Septe a & No. O0* f, ACborWonhelS, NAC ec oft9-oWle.nWaRov MIdule 2: Fl.e PRA CcuC uta•l•Iy a.rvW R0-M.R% (RES) & E5lectr PoýwResh nst#uWe (EPRv)

Slide 13 Notes:

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Summary

* Do Not Underestimate Scope

* Ensure Proper Resources are Committed to Project

* Doable but MUST Work Smart

* Do Not "Broad Brush" Interface with Appendix R - Have a

Detailed Plan Before Starting

* Constant Interaction with Systems Analysts is Critical

* Develop Project Procedures - But Don't Get Carried Away

* Compilation and Management of Large Volume of Data

- Automated Tools Imperative for Efficient Process

- Be Mindful of Long-Term Configuration Management

Joint Fir PRA COa,- Sept & No. 208 [S A oCoreroaý of US -0NC O )•.4 -f-Nujea .ewuloy

Module 2: Floe PRA Ciruat AýelyW Overlew -es h (CRES) & -00tn P-e - -r tue (EPRI)

2-9

Slide 12 

I CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Key Considerations 

• Relationship with Appendix RlNFPA 805 Analysis 

• Long-Term Strategy for Data Configuration Control- Especially if Shared 

Data with Appendix RlNFPA-805 

• Availability, Quality, and Format of Cable Data 

• Usability of Appendix R Circuit Analysis Data 

- Not as useful as originally envision'ed 

- Automated tools are essential 

- Functional state analysis is critical- overly conservative cable selection will not work for 

Fire PRA 

- Many plants are finding that circuit analysis re-baseline is necessary to support 

upgraded Fire PRA and NFPA-805 projects 

• User-Frieridliness of Electrical Drawings 

• Availability of Electrical Engineering Support 

- Circuit analysis is a developed expertise 

- Do not expect to be a proficient analyst based on a simple introductory course 

Joint Fire PRA CDUrse, Sept. «. Nov. 2008 

Modu" 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analyl;hI Owrv"w 

A CollaboratIon of U. S. NRC Olfk:. 01 Nuc/flat R&gulatory 

RaSHrch (RES)" Electric PowerRHfHJreh Irrstltute (EPRI) 

Slide 13 

_ CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 

Summary 

• Do Not Underestimate Scope 

• Ensure Proper Resources are Committed to Project 

• Doable but MUST Work Smart 

• Do Not "Broad Brush" Interface with Appendix R - Have a 

Detailed Plan Before Starting 

• Constant Interaction with Systems Analysts is Critical 

• Develop Project Procedures -But Don't Get Carried Away 

• Compilation and Management of Large Volume of Data 

- Automated Tools Imperative for Efficient Process 

- Be Mindful of Long-Term Configuration Management 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Fire PRA Circuit Analylls Overview 

A Collaboration of U.S NRC OfrlCa ci NvcJear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Eleclnc. Power Re$&I!Jrch Institute (EPRI) 

2-9 

Notes: 

Notes: 
SESSION 2: Task 3, Fire PRA Cable Selection

2-10

SESSION 2: Task 3, Fire PRA Cable Selection 

2-10 
Slide 1 Notes:

C(5U.S.N RC EM~2I Ri OE

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY

Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable

Selection

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course

September and November 2008

Bethesda, MD

I A CoIIboN. .o1o U.S. -RC 0-to otoeoo R--- aor Roe..re (RES) & Electric Porce Roeoseam Institutte (EPRI)

Slide 2 Notes:

! Purpose FIRE PRA & Scope CABLE SELECTION

* Identify Circuits/Cables Associated with Fire PRA

Components

* Determine Routing/Location of the Identified Cables

* Use Component-to-Cable-to-Location Relationships to

Determine What Components Could be Affected for

Postulated Fire Scenarios

Note: Scenario can be Fire Area, Room, Raceway, or Other

Specific Location

* Identify Fire PRA Power Supplies

Joint Fine PRA Course, Sept. & NOV 2008 [ Side? ACtooOboation 0f SNRCM Of ieo N f SRe loe/

M0ule 2: Tak 3 -R. PIA Cabte Selsoffon rh (RES) IleOtric - e -o tt (EPRS)

2-11

Slide 1 

m(JIIC lOW!!' 

RElUICH !NSnlUlI 

EPRIINRC-RES FIRE PRA 

METHODOLOGY 

Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable 

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp 

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories 

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course 

September and November 2008 

Bethesda, MD 

Slide 2 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Purpose & Scope 

• Identify Circuits/Cables AssoCiated with Fire PRA 

Components 

• Determine Routing/Location of the Identified Cables 

• Use Component-to-Cable-to-Location Relationships to 

Determine What Components Could be Affected for 

Postulated Fire Scenarios 

Note: Scenario can be Fire Area, Room, Raceway, or Other 

Specific Location 

• Identify Fire PRA Power Supplies 

Join' Fire PRA CoulSe, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· Rra PRA Cable Selection [Slid.> I A Cdlaooratiol! of u.s. NRC Office f1I NliClear Regula/ory 

Research (RES) & £lee/ric Pow&rReSElfJrch Institute (EPRI) 

2-11 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 3 Notes:

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION Introduction

* Conducted for all Fire PRA Components

Note: Exceptions do exist

* Deterministic Process

* Cables Associated to Components Based on Specified

Functionality

- Basic circuit analysis (Task 9) incorporated into Task 3 work to

prevent overwhelming the PRA model with inconsequential cable

failures

- Final product is a listing of defined Basic Events (component and

credited function) that could be impacted by a fire for a given

location (Fire Area, Fire Compartment, Fire Scenario)

* Procedure subdivided into six (6) distinct steps

Joint Fine PRA Co-s. Sept. & No 2008 . f A COolot U NRC Sfns R l oN'10oktoy

Mod-M 2. TUskS- Rs .,n. PP XttPCoo. Senon Rr. (PEN) &- S'o .t e 

2-12

Slide 3 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION II Introduction 

• Conducted for all Fire PRA Components 

Note: Exceptions do exist 

• Deterministic Process 

• Cables Associated to Components Based on Specified 

Functionality 

- Basic circuit analysis (Task 9) incorporated into Task 3 work to 

prevent overwhelming the PRA model with inconsequential cable 

failures 

- Final product is a listing of defined Basic Events (component and 

credited function) that could be impacted by a fire for a given 

location (Fire Area, Fire Compartment, Fire Scenario) 

• Procedure subdivided into six (6) distinct steps 

Joint Rre PRA CoUI'Sft. Sept. & No .... 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· R,. PM Cable Selection 

A Col~bo(9tIOtl of U S, NRC 0ff1c6 ~ Nuclear Regulaloly 

R&SHrcII (RES) & B&etric PflwerResearch /nstiMe (EPRIJ 

2-12 

Notes: 
Slide 4

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION

Flowchart

Task 3 Interfaces Step 1: Compile and Evaluate

- Inputs from other tasks (1,2 & s Prerequisite Information

taskS) and Data Additional plant Informtn need - Plant Partitioning Boundary Designations

cable selection - Confirm Fire PRA Equipment Ust

Informatlon from plant walkdownis - Cable and Raceway System (CRS)

( los, 3.4.1,3.4.2343 l~ o3.5.)

Step 2: Select Fire PRA CircuitslCableI - Develop strategy for cable selection

-Plant-specific rules for cable selection

-Select Fire PRA cables I ~~(Se-tt. S3 •2)I

Step 3: Identify and Select Fire PRA

Power Supplies Select Fire PRA power supplies

Add power supplies to equipment list

(Section 3.5.3 )

Step 4: Perform Associated Circuits

Review - Confirm satisfactory electrical coordination for

Fire PRA power supplies

Confirm satisfactory electrical overcurrent

protection for common enclosures

Add Associated Circuits to Fire PRA cable ~(5,553w 3.5.4) list

S.................. . ........ ............ A C la o tin fUSN C O ic ofN le rR g aoy

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 I Slide 4 A Collaboration of US. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection ......... . Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-13

Slide 4 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Flowchart 

Notes: 

jTuk""__ ,I - Inputs from other tasks (1 . 2 & support 

task B) 

- Additional plant information needed for 

cable selection 

- Information from plant walkdowns 

(Sections 3.4. 1, 3.4.2 3.4.3 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection 

2-13 

Step 1: Compile and Evaluate 

Prerequisite Information 

and Dat a 

- Plant Partitioning Boundary Designations 

- Confirm Fire PM Equipment List 

- Cable and Raceway System (CRS) 

(Sect ion 3.5.1) 

+-

Step 2: Select Fire PRA Circuits/Cables 

- Develop strategy for cable selection 

- Plant-specific rules for cable selection 

- Select Fire PRA cables 

(SedloD ) ,S.2) 

+ 

Step 3: Identify and Select Fire PRA 

Power Supplies 

- Select Fire PRA power supplies 

- Add po'N9r supplies to equipment list 

(Scclion3.5.J) 

-t 

Step 4: Perform Associated Circuits 

Review 

- Confirm satisfactory electrical coordination for 

Fire PRA pov.er supplies 

- Confirm satisfactory electrical overcurrent 

protection for convnon enclosures 

- Add Associated Circuits to Fire PRA cable list 

Section3.S.4 

t 

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 5

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION

Flowchart

Step 5: Determine Cable Routing and

Plant Locations

Determine cable routing and end points

Determine racevoy and end point locations

Determine raceway fire protection features

(Sention 3.5.5)

SStep 6: Firs PRA Cable List and Targetl

Equipment Location Reports Assemble Fire PRA cable list

Generate target equipment location reports ~(Setdioa 3ý.5.6)I

Task 3 Outputs IUncertainty

-Fire PRA Database II-Plant partitioning and cable location

-C~omponent vmrk packages IL-Plant-specific cable selection guidelines

(Input to Task 9) . r-Cable selection process

(Stetion3.4. Cable location and routing accuracy

"• - Electrical coordination and protection

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 Slide 5 i A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Module 2: Task 3 - Fire PRA Cable Selection ........... Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPR/)

Notes:

2-14

Slide 5 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Flowchart 

Notes: 

Task 3 Outputs 

- Fire PRA Database 

- Component v.ork packages 

(Input to Task 9) 

(Section 3.4.4) 

~ 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3 . Fire PRA Cable Selection 

2-14 

t 

Step 5: Determine Cable Routing and 

Plant Locations 

- Determine cable routing and end points 

- Determine raceway and end point locations 

- Determine raceway fire protection features 

(Section 3.5.5) 

-f 

Step 6: Fire PRA Cable List and Target 

Equipment Location Reports 

- Assemble Fire PRA cable list 

- Generate target equipment location reports 

(Section 3.5.6) 

~ Uncertainty 

- Plant partitioning and cable location 

- Plant-specific cable selection guidelines 

- Cable selection process 

- Cable location and routing accuracy 

- Electrical coordination and protection 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 6 Notes:

FIRE Task Interfaces PRA CABLE - InputSELECTION

* Plant Boundary Partitions (Task 1)

* Fire PRA Component List (Task 2)

* Fire PRA Database (Support Task B)

* Appendix R Circuit Analysis

* Plant Cable & Raceway Database

* Plant Drawings

Joint Fin PRA Cwonte, Sept. & NOv. 2008 F a c ato l U.• NRC tt-.W~lN Regukoe

Modul 2: Task S 3. -tomaých RPA Sabeton (RE$) &"Etctt'onN ==t=R= Rn~ch tZPRO

Slide 7 Notes:

! FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION

Task Interfaces - Output

* Fire PRA Cable List

* Fire PRA Power Supply List

* Associated Circuits review

* Component Analysis Packages

* Target Equipment Loss Reports (Potential Equipment

Functional Losses Broken Down by Location or Scenario)

Joint FtN PRA COUM, Set, & tin. 2008 d A CaboO1, otUS NRC OINCe oNueteRe toy

Modul 2: Task 3 . R. PRA Cabl. Setecton R5e*tCP IRES) S EIn PsV Rse.st etutt (eppo

2-15

Slide 6 

_ FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Task Interfaces - Input 

• Plant Boundary Partitions (Task 1) 

• Fire PRA Component List (Task 2) 

• Fire PRA Database (Support Task B) 

• Appendix R Circuit Analysis 

• Plant Cable & Raceway Database 

• Plant Drawings 

Joint ~ PRA Course, Sept. &. Nov. 2008 

Module 2: TaM J. R,. PRA C4bI. Selec:tlon 

A CoIlabontliorl 01 U.s. NRC OIr.oc. at NucIHr RegulBta-y 

R,_rdr (RES) &. EI«trit: Pow.,. R8$H1'Cl1 /nstittb (EPRIJ 

Slide 7 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION II Task Interfaces - Output 

• Fire PRA Cable List 

• Fire PRA Power Supply List 

• Associated Circuits review 

• Component Analysis Packages 

• Target Equipment Loss Reports (Potential Equipment 

Functional Losses Broken Down by Location or Scenario) 

Joint Fire PRA COUf38, Sepf. &. Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· Rre PRA Cabl. Selecflon 

A CcIIabora/lotl 01 U.S NRCOfflt:eolNucIe¥Regubltoty 

ResfHlfCh (RES) & EIKtrk PrNnN ResMn;/) In.sIlfute (EPRQ 

2-15 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 8 Notes:

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION

Step 1 - Prerequisite Information

* Confirm Plant Partitioning is Compatible

- Do partitions align with cable location data?

- What data is available and what is missing?

* Confirm PRA Equipment List is Final

- Input into a formal and controlled database

- For NFPA-805 transition projects a joint "consistency" review of NSP task

and PRA component selection task is highly recommended

- Critical that electrical analysts understand what the Basic Events really mean

* Evaluate Database Requirements

- What currently exists?

- What is needed to support work?

- How is data to be managed and controlled?

- This is a "Biggy"

J4 l Fee PRA Coure, Saul. & wNo, [s0o2 A COtio,0bo U.S NRC O2Waf N00 e0 Ro460or

Module 2: Task 3 -R.n PRA Cab.i Sleectlon Res-rh (RES) & El0)60 Po Rtiý •.- 00006 tPRO

Slide 9 Notes:

FIRE Step 2 PRA - Select CABLE Fire SELECTION PRA Cables

-Analysis Cases

- Appendix R Component with Same Functional Requirements

* Must consider which (if any) automatic features are included in the

existing analysis

* Aligning existing analyses to Fire PRA Basic Events is not straightforward

- Appendix R Component with Different Functional Requirements

- Non-Appendix R Component with Cable Location Data

- Non-Appendix R Component without Cable Location Data

-Analysis Sub-Steps

- Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy

- Step 2.2 - Plant Specific Rules

- Step 2.3 - Select Cables

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2W08 S A CR000000 000U.S NRC OfiNce W oReOU00oV

M odu2eZ: Task 3 -Rre PRA Cable Oei.O~on ,-,00 (-E0)0&00000 Po. E- - - e0r0 00e (f0R0

2-16

I 

SlideS 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 1 - Prerequisite Information 

• Confirm Plant Partitioning is Compatible 

- Do partitions align with cable location data? 

- What data is available and what is missing? 

• Confirm PRA Equipment List is Final 

- Input into a formal and controlled database 

- For NFPA-805 transition projects a jOint "consistency" review of NSP task 

and PRA component selection task is highly recommended . 

- Critical that electrical analysts understand what the Basic Events really 

mean 

• Evaluate Database Requirements 

- What currently exists? 

- What is needed to support work? 

- How is data to be managed and controlled? 

- This is a "Biggy" 

Joint Fire PRA COUfH, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task"· R,. PRA Cable Selection 

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office d Nuclear Rsgulafory 

R,S&arch (RES) & EIItCtric Power Resesrch /n$/itute (EPRQ 

Slide 9 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2 - Select Fire PRA Cables 

• Analysis Cases 

- Appendix R Component with Same Functional Requirements 

Must consider which (if any) automatic features are included in the 

existing analysis 

Aligning existing analyses to Fire PRA Basic Events is not 

straightforward 

- Appendix R Component with Different Functional Requirements 

- Non-Appendix R Component with Cable Location Data 

- Non-Appendix R Component without Cable Location Data 

• Analysis Sub-Steps 

- Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy 

- Step 2.2 - Plant Specific Rules 

- Step 2.3 - Select Cables 

A Collaboration of U.S, NRC OffIce d Nuc/efJ( Regulatoty 

Research (RES) & Electnc PowerRe:snrch IMtilute (EPR/) 

2-16 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 10 Notes:

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION

Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy

Coordinate with Systems Analysts to Establish Functional

Requirements and General Rules

- Equipment functional states, basic events, initiators

- Initial conditions and equipment lines (i.e., normal state)

- Consistent conventions for equipment functions/state/position

- Equipment-level dependencies and primary components

- Multiple function components

- Super components

Evaluate Appendix R Component & Circuit Data

- Ensure equipment list comparison conducted during Task 2

- Review in detail the comparison list - ask questionslll

- Essential that comparison includes detailed review/comparison of

"desired functional state(s)"

Joak R. PRA Cous, S.M. & Nov 2008 a s CcaooOokn wUS. NRC ow. d eak eo.

Modulo 2: Task 3 -Rn PRA Cobhe Selection R0,0 (RES) & 0e.00 -u,0r Roo•0rc, -,o04 (EPRO

Slide 11 Notes:

! FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy (continued)

* Goal - Efficient and Accurate Process to Obtain Required

Information

* Revisit Past Assumptions, Conventions, Approach

* Potential Trouble Areas

- How is off-site power going to be handled?

- Instrument circuits - understand exactly what is credited

- ESAFA, Load-Shed, EDG Sequencer, other automatic functions

- Medium-voltage switchgear control power

* Extent of Detailed Analysis to be Conducted Concurrently

* Determine How Analysis Will be Documented

Joinl FCr PRA Cou-, Set 4 Nov. 2008 o A Co0aO0, 0/CO. V NRC OfiA s / Nu R- 1- oR. y

Modulo 2: Task 3 -Ro P"A Cab0e Sel.oon Rol-dh (RASO C t o wer R00.50.0.0*00 u04. OCPR0

2-17

Slide 10 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy 

• Coordinate with Systems Analysts to Establish Functional 

Requirements. and General Rules 

- Equipment functional states, basic events, initiators 

- Initial conditions and equipment lines (i.e., normal state) 

- Consistent conventions for equipment functions/state/position 

- Equipment-level dependencies and primary components 

- Multiple function components 

- Super components 

• Evaluate Appendix R Component & Circuit Data 

- Ensure equipment list comparison conducted during Task 2 

- Review in detail the comparison list - ask questions!!! 

- Essential that comparison includes detailed review/comparison of 

"desired functional state(s)" 

Joint Rre PRA CoumJ, Sept'" Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· R,. PAA cable SelectJon 

A CdllJbonr/Jon 01 U S. NRC omellll 01 NIDfnIr RIIgIIIaIDf)' 

~rch {RES} '" E/&Ctric PrYwerR~lnstilufe (EPRIJ 

Slide 11 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2.1 - Analysis Strategy (continued) 

• Goal - Efficient and Accurate Process to Obtain Required 

Information 

• Revisit Past Assumptions, Conventions, Approach 

• Potential Trouble Areas 

- How is off-site power going to be handled? 

- Instrument circuits - understand exactly what is credited 

- ESAFA, Load-Shed, EDG Sequencer, other automatic functions 

- Medium-voltage switchgear control power 

• Extent of Detailed Analysis to be Conducted Concurrently 

• Determine How Analysis Will be Documented 

Joint F,re PRA Course, Sept. '" Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· Rre PRA Cable Selection 

A Cotlllbora/Jon 01 U S. NRC OffICe at Nucleat Rsgu/Blory 

Re_rch (RES).& Sectnc PowerResearch In.s/l/ule (EPRlJ 

2-17 

Notes: 

Notes: 
FIRE PRA CABLE Step 2.2 - Plant Spec

* Objective is Consisten

* Approach for Groups

* Approach for Spurious

* Auxiliary Contacts - C

" System-Wide Actuatio

* Bus or Breaker?

" Subcomponents & Pri

" Identification of Perma

* Procedure - Develop

JOWt RM PRA Co-,., Sept. & No,- 2008

M.duI 2V Tnk 3 - Rm PPA CaM Shftcfon

Slide 12 Notes:

SELECTION

ific Cable Selection Rules

Icy

of Components

Actuation Equipment

ritical Area for Completeness

n Signals

mary Components

anent Damage Scenarios

Circuit Analysis Procedure/Guidelines

A C~b-- I - S. -R -~ - --C R"-'

ft -ch (RES) & DecPOWm R.ch r , (EPR0 )

Slide 13 Notes:

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION Step 2.2 - Ready to Start?

Develop Written Project Procedure/Guidelines

- Consistency, Consistency, Consistency

- Checking Process?

- Data Entry

- Problem Resolution

Training for Analysts

- Prior circuit analysis experience is a prerequisite for key team

members

- Familiarity with plant drawings and circuits is highly beneficial

- A junior engineer with no prior circuit analysis experience will not

be able to work independently

JO?) Fim PRA CO-S, Sop?. & NOf 2008 58. 13 A - ? US NRC WSO &0N0eR VY n(8 

Modue 2, Task 3- tRM PRA 0b/0 Sle 8.on Re60t R - (RES) & E-.ctc•ce8 R h - 08- (EPRI)

2-18

Slide 12 

_ FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2.2 - Plant Specific Cable Selection Rules 

• Objective is Consistency 

• Approach for Groups of Components 

• Approach for Spurious Actuation Equipment 

• Auxiliary Contacts - Critical Area for Completeness 

• System-Wide Actuation Signals 

• Bus or Breaker? 

• Subcomponents & Primary Components 

• Identification of Permanent Damage Scenarios 

• Procedure - Develop Circuit Analysis Procedure/Guidelines 

Joint Rre PRA COUnllt, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2~ Task 3- Rre PRA Cable SelKtion 

A CoIkrbonition of U.S. NRC ameli ~ NudrJar Regulatory R&_rdI (RES)" Bectric Powor RNaarch InstiMe (EPRI) 

Slide 13 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2.2 - Ready to Start? 

• Develop Written Project Procedure/Guidelines 

- Consistency, Consistency, Consistency 

- Checking Process? 

- Data Entry 

- Problem Resolution 

• Training for Analysts 

- Prior circuit analysis experience is a prerequisite for key team 

members 

- Familiarity with plant drawings and circuits is highly beneficial 

- A junior engineer with no prior circuit analysis experience will not 

be able to work independently 

Joint Fire PRA Courne, Sept. &. Nov. 2008 

ModuM 2; Task 3 _ Rre PRA ClIbl. Selection 

A CoIIebonJ/ioIl of U.S NRC OI1lce 01 Nuclear Regulatory 

R,search (RES)" EI9Ctrlc PoNer ResfHlrch Institute (EPRI) 

2-18 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 14 Notes:

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION Step 2.3 - Select Cables

Case 1: Incorporate Existing Appendix R Analysis

- Confirm adequacy of existing analyses lAW plan

- Careful consideration of automatic functions

- Exact alignment for credited functionality

Cases 2 & 3: New Functional State/Component: w/ Cable

Routing Data

- Collect drawings and/or past analysis information

- Identify/select cables lAW plant specific procedure/guidelines

- Conduct detailed analysis to the extent decided upon

- Formally document cable selection lAW established

procedures/guidelines

JoieN MPRA Cow, SWt. & Nf. 2R ft- - ECIUSNRCOuwobNPepMtov

Mold.e 2: Tlak 32 Fire PRA Cable Solec-on ReorC (NES) & Sact eow ReRR kNO (EPRO

Slide 15 Notes:

! FIRE Step 2.3 PRA - Select CABLE Cables SELECTION (continued)

- Case 3: New Component: w/o Cable Routing Data

Available

- Same as Case 2 & 3, plus...

- Determine cable routing and associate with plant locations,

including cable end points

* Analysis Work Packages

- Retrieve from Past Appendix R Analysis

- Highly Recommended for New Components

- Major time saver for future work

Join thR PRA Coure, Sept & No- 2008 F A COlsao, - - tJU.S Iue-e- NRC 0*0. RSNOUIOy

MedU- 2: T-a S -The PtA Ca07e - Ssl - on ReS (RES) & 8S. PSeR Ree 004 (EPRO

2-19

Slide 14 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2.3 - Select Cables 

• Case 1: Incorporate Existing Appendix R Analysis 

- Confirm adequacy of existing analyses lAW plan 

- Careful consideration of automatic functions 

- Exact alignment for credited functionality 

• Cases 2 & 3: New Functional State/Component: w/ Cable 

Routing Data 

- Collect drawings and/or past analysis information 

- Identify/select cables lAW plant specific procedure/guidelines 

- Conduct detailed analysis to the extent decided upon 

- Formally document cable selection lAW established 

procedures/guidelines 

Joint Fire PRA Course, sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· Rre PM cable SeI«tJon 

A Cd/fJboralJot't 01 U.5. NRC OffIce at NucIeM RegulIItory 

RS5&8rdi (RES) & EJedrIc Pow&f" Rtseerch /mtJMI (EPRO 

Slide 15 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 2.3 - Select Cables (continued) 

• Case 3: New Component: w/o Cable Routing Data 

Available 

- Same as Case 2 & 3, plus ... 

- Determine cable routing and associate with plant locations, 

including cable end points 

• Analysis Work Packages 

- Retrieve from Past Appendix R Analysis 

- Highly Recommended for New Components 

- Major time saver for future work 

Joint Aru PM Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· R,. PRA C.bIe SelKtion 

A CoIIabonWon 01 U.S NRC omce at ~ Regulatory 

ReSMn:Il (RES) &. BKtnc PowerRe$Hll;h /m1l1lAe (CPR/} 

2-19 

Notes: 

Notes: 
! FIRE PRA CABLE Step 3 - Select Fire P

* Identify Power Supplies

- Make sure to differentiat

supplies

- Switchgear and Instrum

- Useful to identify the aPl

* Add Power Supplies to F

* Make sure Fire PRA mod

are consistent

* Does Fire PRA model co

- Must understand how th

Joint Fr PRA Cowu, Sept. & Nov. 2008

Modue R. nsk 3 -R. PRA Cbl ,S~t10,o

Slide 16 Notes:

SELECTION

'RA Power Supplies

as Integral Part of Cable Selection

te between "Required" and "Not Required" power

ent power supplies can be tricky

plicable breaker/fuse

ire PRA Component List

del, equipment list, and electrical analysis

nsider spurious circuit breaker operations?

is is modeled to correctly select cables

A*,1 C0*00,4a00US. NRC Off0a0.0w0001001

f0m* (RES) A E • R fo•- - (EPRO

Slide 17 Notes:

! FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION Step 4 - Associated Circuits Review

* Objective is to Confirm Existing Studies Adequate

* View the Process as a "Gap Analysis"

* Common Power Supply Circuits - Assess Plant

Coordination Studies

* Common Enclosure Circuits - Assess Plant Electrical

Protection

* Roll Up Results to Circuit Analysis or Model as

Appropriate

Note: Ensure Switchgear Internal Fusing Supports Analysis

Assumptions

Jo-n Fire PRA Cou-, Sep. & Nov, 2008 S 7 A CO -- flo0oUS. NOffice o oy

Module 2: Task 3 -Fi. PRA Cable Seleotion R_-,4h (RES) & 860Ct ftower Re..d Ins0t0 (E-00

2-20

Slide 16 

_ FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION . Step 3 - Select Fire PRA Power Supplies 

I 

Identify Power Supplies as Integral Part of Cable Selection 

- Make sure to differentiate between "Required" and "Not Required" power 

supplies 

- Switchgear and Instrument power supplies can be tricky 

- Useful to identify the applicable breakerlfuse 

• Add Power Supplies to Fire PRA Component List 

• Make sure Fire PRA model, equipment list, and electrical analysis 

are consistent 

• Does Fire PRA model consider spurious circuit breaker operations? 

- Must underStand how this is modeled to correctly select cables 

Joinl Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov, 2008 

lrIodvlo I: TIsII' .J. Rre PRA Cable SelKtlon 

A CoIllIbonItIortolU.S. NRC Off/ceol Nuc/turRegulafory 

RaSHid! (RES) & E/edrlc Power Rtf.arch Imlituts (EPRf) 

Slide 17 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 4 - Associated Circuits Review 

• Objective is to Confirm Existing Studies Adequate 

• View the Process as a "Gap Analysis" 

• Common Power Supply Circuits - Assess Plant 

Coordination Studies 

• Common Enclosure Circuits - Assess Plant Electrical 

Protection 

• Roll Up Results to Circuit Analysis or Model as 

Appropriate 

Note: Ensure Switchgear Internal Fusing Supports Analysis 

Assumptions 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. &. Nov. 2008 

Module 2: rask"· R,. PRA Cable Selection [Slid.,l I A Collaboration of U.S. NRC OffIce d Nuclear Regulatory 

ReS&fJroh (RES) & B6Clric Power Research /ns/Jtute rEPRQ 

2-20 

Notes: 

Notes: 
FIRE PRA CABLE

Step 5 - Determine C

* Correlate Cables-to-

. Conceptually Straigh

* Logistically Challeng

- Labor intensive

- Manual review of layo

- Plant walkdowns ofte

* Determine Cable Pri

- Fire wraps

- Embedded conduit

JoLt Rem PRA Coune, SWpt, & Nov. 2008

MWodu 2; T.-k 3 - R. PRA C.bN. Selio

Slide 18 Notes:

SELECTION

able Routing and Locations

Raceways-to-Locations

htforward

ping

ut drawings

n required

tective Features

As Colbrtin of 10 S NRC Offd e ou N .eaRegu fby

Sld 19No REtSe PNR 00004.5500 : 

Slide 19 Notes:

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION Step 6 - Target Equipment Loss Reports

* Data Entered into Fire PRA Database

* Sorts and Queries to Generate Target Equipment Loss

Reports

Perspective.... Cable selection process should be viewed as providing

"Design Input" to the Fire PRA. It does not, however, provide any

risk-based results. In its simplest form it provides a list of equipment

that could be affected by a fire at a specified location or for a specific

scenario.

Joint Fire PRA Coue, Set & Nof 208 0 ACdbaWo0 tonot US• NRC OfR~c.0Ncte, Reoulto~y

Modut 2:, Ta 3. Fire PRA Cabl. Selection RerEh (RES) & £e0 - Rower R o Utute (ERR5

2-21

Slide 18 

I FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 5 - Determine Cable Routing and Locations 

• Correlate Cables-to-Raceways-to-Locations 

• Conceptually Straightforward 

• Logistically Challenging 

- Labor intensive 

- Manual review of layout drawings 

- Plant walkdowns often required 

• Determine Cable Protective Features 

- Fire wraps 

- Embedded conduit 

Joint Fire PRA Cou~e, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· FI,. PM Cabl. Selecrlon 

A Coi/aborlJtion of U.S. NRC Offke 01 NuclearRegulafoty 

~rdI (RES) &. EJedncPowor~ /ns1J/uhl (EPRI) 

Slide 19 

FIRE PRA CABLE SELECTION 

Step 6 - Target EquipmentLoss Reports 

• Data Entered into Fire PRA Database 

• Sorts and Queries to Generate Target Equipment Loss 

Reports 

Perspective .... Cable selection process should be viewed as providing 

"Design Input" to the Fire PRA. It does not, however, provide any 

risk-based results. In its simplest form it provides a list of equipment 

that could be affected by a fire at a specified location or for a specific 

scenario. 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 3· Fire PRA Cable Selection 

A Collaboration 01 U.S. NRC Office of NucJ.tw R6fJUlatary 

ReSfllJrr:h (RES) & BfJdric Power Researollinstitut& (EPRIJ 

2-21 

Notes: 

Notes: 
SESSION 3: Task 9, Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis

2-22

SESSION 3: Task 9, Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis 

2-22 
Slide 1 Notes:

~US. RC E-PeI2IStC N111.

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY

Module 2: Task 9 - Detailed Circuit Failure

Analysis

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp.

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course

September and November 2008 Bethesda, MD

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI#

Slide 2 Notes:

Purpose D ETAILED & CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS Scope

The Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Task is intended to:

* Identify the potential response of circuits and components

to specific cable failure modes associated with fireinduced cable damage

* Screen out cables that do not impact the ability of a

component to complete its credited function

Jo.nt Fme PRA C e Septu. & 200 A Coh~o,0eo, oNS NN- oaJeeN R2eWt8o

Module 2: task 9 - Detafed Circult Failure Analyst. Root sesi 0 BR PR05a R.•IJe 0- (R0*

2-23

Slide 1 

~~1 malic IOWlI -I-:I~ IElIAICH INmron 

EPRIINRC·RES FIRE PRA 

METHODOLOGY 

Module 2: Task 9 • Detailed Circuit Failure 

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories 

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp. 

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course 

September and November 2008 

Bethesda, MD 

Slide 2 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Purpose & Scope 

The Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Task is intended to: 

• Identify the potential response of circuits and components 

to specific cable failure modes associated with fireinduced cable damage 

• Screen out cables that do not impact the ability of a 

component to complete its credited function 

A CoIaborotJon d u.s. NRC omc. tJI Nuc/esr Reglhtoty 

Rsseerch (RES,,, E1ectric Power R8$fHJrch Institute (EPRI) 

2-23 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 3 Notes:

! Introduction DETAILED CIRCUIT (1) FAILURE ANALYSIS

* Fundamentally a deterministic analysis

* Perform coincident with cable selection (Task 3) to the extent

feasible and cost effective

* Difficult cases generally reserved for situations in which

Quantitative Screening indicates a clear need and

advantage for further analysis

* Detailed Failure Modes Analysis - Requires knowledge about desired functionality and component

failure modes

- Conductor-by-conductor evaluation (Hot Probe method

recommended)

* Objective is to screen out all cables that CANNOT impact the

ability of a component to fulfill the specific function of interest

Joint Fim PRA Counw, So. & N-v, 2008 W A Coft - -O S ROe 080•8 - R"sý0or

Moduft 2: T7s 9 - D.l6 d CIuMlt FtuMAn1lysI. ARneo_ (RES) & a.. -oke Re.t'o krs0u (E0i)

Slide 4 Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Introduction (2)

Failure Modes Considered

- Single Shorts-to-Ground (Reference Ground)

* Grounded System

Ungrounded System

* Resistance Grounded System

- Single Hot Shorts

- Compatible Polarity Multiple Hot Shorts for Ungrounded AC and

DC Circuits

- Coincident Independent Hot Shorts On Separate Cables

- Multiple Intra-cable Hot Shorts

- Cables Associated Through Common Power Supply

J"Int Am PRO Cour' S 0 t & ft, 2008 S 4 Cab,**, siUS" NRC O5 50 8.r 45I0WV

Modulek 2: Task 9. 508.a8.d Sl~otS Fa80u Anaslyst. 85.508• IRESI & E15~0~~l080.0 Insttut * 078EPR

2-24

Slide 3 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Introduction (1) 

• Fundamentally a deterministic analysis 

• Perform coincident with cable selection (Task 3) to the extent 

feasible and cost effective. 

• Difficult cases generally reserved for situations in which 

Quantitative Screening indicates a clear need and 

advantage for further analysis . 

• Detailed Failure Modes Analysis 

- Requires knowledge about desired functionality and component 

failure modes . 

- Conductor-by-conductor evaluation (Hot Probe method 

recommended) 

• Objective is to screen out all cables that CANNOT impact the 

ability of a component to fulfill the specific function of interest 

A Cc*bontUon 01 u.s. NRC Office ~ NucIHr ~toty 

R~HrCh (RES) & Sedrle PoNfK Rf.HIHCh Inslilute (EPRIJ 

SIide4 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Introduction (2) 

• Failure Modes Considered 

- Single Shorts-to-Ground (Reference Ground) 

Grounded System 

• Ungrounded System 

• Resistance Grounded System 

- Single Hot Shorts 

- Compatible Polarity Multiple Hot Shorts for Ungrounded AC and 

DC Circuits 

- Coincident Independent Hot Shorts On Separate Cables 

- Multiple Intra-cable Hot Shorts 

- Cables Associated Through Common Power Supply 

A Collaboration at u.s. NRC Dmce 01 NuclNr RegtJaIory 

ResNt"Ch (RES) &. Bedric ~ ResNrch In$tlhh (£PRJ) 

2-24 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 5 Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Introduction (3)

- Failure Modes NOT Considered

- 3-phase proper sequence hot shorts (except high consequence

equipment with thermoplastic insulated conductor or ungrounded

configuration)

- Inter-cable hot shorts for armored cable and cable in dedicated

conduit

- Open circuit conductor failures

- Multiple high-impedance faults

Note: if conducting a combined NFPA-805 and Fire PRA circuit

analysis, NEI 00-01 suggests that open circuits be considered

JoWnt FR. PRA Co s S t. & N ov. 2WO ft' 2Nho A 50 a0r0 fl U.S. NRC roRepdals

Modul. 2: Task 9. Detiled C1r Fuitlu A.a.ys10 100e0r0 (RES) & 6lo-H, Power R -h /-st0u0e (EPRI)

Slide 6 Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Assumptions

The Following Assumptions Form the Basis for Task 9:

* An Appendix R analysis for the plant has been completed

and is available for identifying equipment failure

responses to specific cable failure modes

* Component Work Packages have been assembled as

part of the Task 3 activities or previous Appendix R

analyses

* Equipment is assumed to be in its normal position or

operating condition at the onset of the fire - the

equipment state might be variable

* Users of this procedure are knowledgeable on and have

experience with circuit design and analysis methods

Joint Fire PRA Cu-. Sept. & f 2008 A Cooa U S, NnROC COC, o N•a Re ty

ModalM 2Task 9 - Detaie CMlt FFai Analysis R0 h (RES) & 8- Powe , R ah 1n--o (EPR1 )

2-25

Slide 5 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Introduction (3) 

• Failure Modes NOT Considered 

- 3-phase proper sequence hot shorts (except high consequence 

equipment with thermoplastic insulated conductor or ungrounded 

configuration) 

- Inter-cable hot shorts for armored cable and cable in dedicated 

conduit 

- Open circuit conductor failures 

- Multiple high-impedance faults 

Note: if conducting a combined NFPA-805 and Fire PRA circuit 

analysis, NEI 00-01 suggests that open circuits be considered 

A CaIIaboration d U.S. NRC 0fflC9 of NuclNf Regulatory 

Reuarch (RES) & Electric PoNe, Res98rch Institute (EPRI) 

Slide 6 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Assumptions 

The Following Assumptions Form the Basis for Task 9:, 

• An Appendix R analysis for the plant has been completed 

and is available for identifying equipment failure 

responses to specific cable failure modes 

• Component Work Packages have been assembled as 

part of the Task 3 activities or previous Appendix R 

analyses 

• Equipment is assumed to be in its normal position or 

operating condition at the onset of the fire - the 

equipment state might be variable 

• Users of this procedure are knowledgeable on and have 

experience with circuit design and analysis methods 

A Ca/Jaborstiof! of u.s. NRC OfflCa 01 Nuclear R~a/ory 

Research (RES) & Boone Power Research InsU/ute (EPRI) 

2-25 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 7

Notes:

2-26

Slide 7 

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Flowchart 

/M'~ -I

support 

nputs fr

__ om 

task 

other 

B) 

' tasks (2. 7. 11 & / - Additional plant Information needed 

for circuit analysis 

- Information from plant walkdO'M'ls 

(SCCllonJ 9.4. 1. 9.4.2, 9.4.3) 

Anatysls Work Packages 

- Input from Task 3 

(Input /0 Task 10) 

(Sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.4) 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 9 • Detailed CIrcuIt Failure Analysis 

Notes: 

2-26 

Step 1: Compile and Evaluate 

Prerequisite Information 

and Data 

- Confirm Fire PRA Cable List is 

available In the Fire PRA Database 

• Confirm unscreened plant 

cOfTll8rtments and scenarios are 

identified (Section 9.5. 1) 

oJ, 

Step 2: Perform Detailed Circuit/Cable 

Failure Analysis 

- DelJeb p strategy for circuit analysis 

- Develop plant-specific rules for 

perfoming circ uit anatysis 

- Perform detailed circuit failure analysis 

- Document analysis resurts 

(Section 9.5.2) 

+ 

Step 3: Generate Equipment Failure 

Response Reports 

- Enter results into Fire PRA Oatabase 

- Generate equipment failure response 

reports 

(Section 9.5.3) 

+ 

Uncertainty 

- Plant-specific circuit analysis 

guidelines 

- Circuit analysis process 

A Collabora/ion of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 8 Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Task Interfaces - Inputs

* Fire PRA Components List (Task 2)

* Fire PRA Cable List (Task 3)

* Fire PRA Database (Support Task B)

* Results of Quantitative Screenings (Task 7)

* Results of Detailed Fire Modeling (Task 11)

* Appendix R Circuit Analysis

* Plant Drawings

* CRS Database

JoWnt Fkt 0V08 Courn, Sept. & Nv• 2008 F O8 A Colon aO U,& 005N O•eoiNc• a •tor y

Module ki Task 9. D.oW8d 0muotp.Oor.Aon1, 8.001RE$) a 08.00., 8r . 0 bum-( a8

Slide 9 Notes:

! DETAILED Task Interfaces CIRCUIT - OutputsFAILURE ANALYSIS

* Equipment Failure Response Reports

* Component Analysis Packages (Updated)

* Revised Cable List

* Fire PRA Database & Model Updates

Joint FiR PRA Coo- S L & Nov.2000 2W0 A ,ndO.S. fflOl Nuc4W000,a8r0

Module 2: Tas 90. Deried 00000 Fa00,0 Aoatys Felt- ReOt&CO (0ES) & 0e 00,.0.Power FF00,

2-27

Slide 8 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Task Interfaces - Inputs 

• Fire PRA Components List (Task 2) 

• Fire PRA Cable List (Task 3) 

• Fire PRA Database (Support Task 8) 

• Results of Quantitative Screenings (Task 7) 

• Results of Detailed Fire Modeling (Task 11) 

• Appendix R Circuit Analysis 

• Plant Drawings 

• CRS Database 

A eo.oor.Uon of U,S, NRC Olflee Q/ Nut:J..,. ~tDty 

R-.s1NICh (RES) &. Electric Powtr Ruean:h In$IltIn (EPRf1 

Slide 9 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Task Interfaces - Outputs 

• Equipment Failure Response Reports 

• Component Analysis Packages (Updated) 

• Revised Cable List 

• Fire PRA Database & Model Updates 

A CoIabonJIion d U.S. NRC Offie& 01 NuclfNU R&guIatory 

Research (RES) &. EJectric PowtK R$_~ Institute (EPRQ 

2-27 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 10 Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Step 1 - Compile Prerequisite Information

* Ensure that prerequisite information and data is available

and usable before beginning the analyses (ideally the

necessary drawings are already in the Work Packages).

* Step 1.1: Confirm Fire PRA Cable List is Available in the

Fire PRA Database

- Component = Cable = Raceway = Compartment

* Step 1.2: Confirm Unscreened Plant Compartments and

Scenarios are Identified

- Target Equipment Loss Reports

- Equipment ID, Normal Status, Functional Requirements, etc.

Joint Fae PRA Course, SePt & 000 2& 6 Slid" A 0 a0 US, NRCOF ColrýSol t tR k-ty

Modale 2: Thsk 9 - D.Ut d Ci.•Iut Fa lur Analyis R -h (RES) A E-it P-er R -h 1,sti NRI)

Slide 11 Notes:

! DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS Step 2- Perform Circuit Failure Analysis

* Perform a Deterministic-Based detailed circuit analysis for

the Fire PRA cables of interest that are located in the

unscreened plant locations.

* Step 2.1: Develop Strategy/Plan for Circuit Analysis

* Step 2.2: Develop Plant-Specific Rules for Performing the

Detailed Circuit Analysis

* Step 2.3: Perform Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis

* Document Analysis Results = Component Work Packages

Joint r PRA Co , Sept. &i No, 2008 Fall:] - A C o fUs.S. E Cr0 •Rs&it uteso ER I)so

Modal, 2: Uask 9. O &dlaedlrullt on1mAoatysla - - (-) 1 I -01 -~tooORSst -0 t (E-RI)

2-28

Slide 10 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Step 1 - Compile Prerequisite Information 

• Ensure that prerequisite information and data is available 

and usable before beginning the analyses (ideally the 

necessary drawings are already in the Work Packages). 

• Step "1.1: Confirm Fire PRA Cable List is Available in the 

Fire PRA Database 

- Component => Cable => Raceway => Compartment 

• Step 1.2: Confirm Unscreened Plant Compartments and 

Scenarios are Identified 

- Target Equipment Loss Reports 

- Equipment ID, Normal Status, Functional Requirements, etc. 

A Collaboration of U,S, NRC Offsae of NI,JC/ear Regulatory 

RfJS&lJreh (RES)" E/edric PcwtJrR9S68t"Ch Institute (EPRI) 

Slide 11 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Step 2 - Perform Circuit Failure Analysis 

• Perform a Deterministic-Based detailed circuff"analysis for 

the Fire PRA cables of interest that are located in the 

unscreened plant locations. 

• Step 2.1: Develop Strategy/Plan for Circuit Analysis 

• Step 2.2: Develop Plant-Specific Rules for Performing the 

Detailed Circuit Analysis 

• Step 2.3: Perform Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis 

• Document Analysis Results :::;. Component Work Packages 

A CQJJaboratlOfl of U.S. NRC OffICe 01 NIJC/ear Regulatory 

Rssesrch (RES) & Elfie/rIC PoN&r ResfHJrch Institute (EPRI) 

2-28 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 12 Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Step 3 - Generate Equipment Failure Response Reports

* Enter Results into Fire PRA Database

* Generate Equipment Failure Response Reports

- A Listing by location (room, zone, area) of equipment and

associated cables affected by fire

- Provides specific equipment responses (cable failure

consequences) that affect the credited function being analyzed

- Equipment losses should be correlated to each Basic Event

JWWntFa PRA C ourO.. S &0,0 .Nov 2008 , S C o80 o000 o( U,0 NRC O8 W 0 A8,0e 0 •,2 0y

Module. L: Th.0 - Dofed Cl0Ft Wt.. een..08 &F0SJ & 08d00 P R r 0 8 rPRO

Slide 13. Notes:

DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS

Caveats & Recommendations

* This Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Methodology is a Static

Analysis (No Timing Issues are Considered)

* Be Aware of Possible Cable Logic Relationships

- Work Packages (Highly Recommended!)

" Hot Probe" (Conductor-to-Conductor) Analysis Must be

Rolled-Up to Cable/Component Level

* Outputs Need to Be Compatible with Fire PRA Database

Format and Field Structure

* Coordinate with the Fire PRA Modelers/Analysts Early-On to

Define the Fire PRA Component Failure Modes of Concern

Joint Fim PRA Co-, Se. &2. No& . 2008 S 1 coeabo o9 U.S. NR tN ar R0uato'y

Modulo 2: TaskS- Ostailsd CIMult F111uM Analysts R5 h (RES) 00El002 Power Ra h Instiu rEPRO$

2-29

Slide 12 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Step 3 - Generate Equipment Failure Response Reports 

• Enter Results into Fire PRA Database 

• Generate Equipment Failure Response Reports 

- A Listing by location (room, zone, area) of equipment and 

associated cables affected by fire 

- Provides specific equipment responses (cable failure 

consequences) that affect the credited function being analyzed 

- Equipment losses should be correlated to each Basic Event 

A CoIeIlontIIon of us. NRC Otrlce ofMdHf Regulatory 

R-.sNrch (RES) '" Sedrlt: Power RUMt'Ch /mlIfute (EPRIJ 

Slide 13 

I DETAILED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS 

Caveats & Recommendations 

• This Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis Methodology is a Static 

Analysis (No Timing Issues are Considered) 

• Be Aware of Possible Cable Logic Relationships 

• Work Packages (Highly Recommended!) 

• "Hot Probe" (Conductor-to-Conductor) Analysis Must be 

Rolled-Up to Cable/Component Level 

• Outputs Need to Be Compatible with Fire PRA Database 

Format and Field Structure 

• Coordinate with the Fire PRA Modelers/Analysts Early-On to 

Define the Fire PRA Component Failure Modes of Concern 

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC OffICe of Mx:l8l!lr Regulatory 

Res98/'Ch (RES) & EI9Cfric Power Research Institute (EPRIJ 

2-29 

Notes: 

Notes: 
SESSION 4: Task 10, Circuit Failure Likelihood Analysis

2-30

SESSION 4: Task 10, Circuit Failure Likelihood Analysis 

2-30 
Slide 1 Notes:

<CftS.NRC

WE

ELECIRIC POWER EI el fIESEARCHINTUE

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure

Mode Likelihood Analysis

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp.

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course

September and November 2008

Bethesda, MD

I A Cojbooioo U.S. 1NRC -fik. ol9ooloa lgsy -eo-rý (RES) & EIeotWi P-.e Researnh IsltituN (EPRI)

Slide 2 Notes:

CIRCUIT Purpose & FAILURE Scope MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

The Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis Task is Intended

to:

* Establish First-Order Probability Estimates for the Circuit

Failure Modes of Interest

AND

* Correlate Those Failure Mode Probabilities to Specific

Components

Jont Re PRO Coue Sept & No,. 20 Module 2: Trsk 10 -E•ntl Failure Mod. Likellhood [Slide 2 Cete 0 o .Slý e Oec iu Neso. ,Ard&de (o "

A.ayipes •th fRSj a S ; R (E ')

2-31

Slide 1 

~~1 ElEeIliC POWII -I-I~ l!l!AICHlNIIllUII 

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA 

METHODOLOGY 

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure 

Mode Likelihood Analysis 

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories 

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp. 

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course 

September and November 2008 

Bethesda, MD 

Slide 2 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Purpose & Scope 

The Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis Task is Intended 

to: 

• Establish First-Order Probability Estimates for the Circuit 

Failure Modes of Interest 

AND 

• Correlate Those Failure Mode Probabilities to Specific 

Components 

A CoIIabonIfIon d u.s. NRC omc. 01 NIKJ_ Regdalory 

RNMrcII (RES)" S«b1e Poww Re_rch InstinQ (EPR/) 

2-31 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 3 Notes:

CIRCUIT Introduction FAILURE (1) MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

* Probabilistic Based Analysis

* Two Methods Presented

- Expert Panel Results (Look-Up Tables)

- Computation-Based Analysis (Formulas)

* Requires Knowledge About Circuit Design, Cable Type and

Construction, Installed Configuration, and Component

Attributes

* Generally Reserved for Only Those Cases that Cannot be

Resolved Through Other Means

Ahl FR PRA Gor•'-. Sel. & Nft. 2NO8

Moa• 2: ns*10k . oNFigHreMO•h L1N50R0d

Slide 4 Notes:

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Introduction (2)

Caveats:

- Our Knowledge is Greatly Improved but Uncertainties are Still High

. Very limited data for many issues

- For This Reason, Implementing Guidance is Conservative

- Practical Implementation is Challenging

- Further Analysis of Existing Test Data and Follow-On Tests Would be

Beneficial:

* Reduce Uncertainties, including conservatisms as appropriate

* Solidify Key Influence Factors

* Incorporate Time as a Factor (FAQ 007-051)

* Incorporate "End-Device" Functional Attributes and States (e.g., latching

circuits vs. drop-out design)

- Computation-based method (formula) is an extrapolation of existing

data; validation remains to be done. Conservatism has not been

established.

* Probabilities of sufficient quality to move ahead JiO ntFire PR. Co-. Sept & Nov. 2008

M o d UM 2 : T a s C10 .- C l ulft Fs M o d k o 1A. -u c a o n of U s N R C O4o f N uc.. R e gfl tov

An..lW.s R0.0h - (RESt (-) I & E - P - , R.- -50 (EPRi)

2-32

Slide 3 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Introduction (1) 

• Probabilistic Based Analysis 

• Two Methods Presented 

- Expert Panel Results (Look-Up Tables) 

- Computation-Based Analysis (Formulas) 

• Requires Knowledge About Circuit Design, Cable Type and 

Construction, Installed Configuration, and Component 

Attributes 

• Generally Reserved for Only Those Cases that Cannot be 

Resolved Through Other Means 

A CoIabonltbnolU,S. NRCotrIeeolNucJeerRJvulatay 

R8SMrCh (RES) '" El9dric Pc1wer RII~ ~1t~1I (EPRlJ 

Slide 4 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Introduction (2) 

Caveats: 

- Our Knowledge is Greatly Improved but Uncertainties are Still High 

• Very limited data for many issues 

- For This Reason, Implementing Guidance is Conservative 

- Practical Implementation is Challenging 

- Further Analysis of Existing Test Data and Follow-On Tests Would be 

Beneficial: 

Reduce Uncertainties, including conservatisms as appropriate 

Solidify Key Influence Factors 

• Incorporate Time as a Factor (FAQ 007-051) 

• Incorporate "End-Device" Functional Attributes and States (e.g., latching 

circuits vs. drop-out design) 

- Computation-based method (fonmula) is an extrapolation of existing 

data; validation remains to be done. Conservatism has not been 

established. 

Probabilities of sufficient quality to move ahead 

A CoIlaborotJon d u.s. NRC Offlc& of Nudesr ReglJalory 

R9S8BM (RES) & EJectric Paw. ReSt1lJM /lI$ldule (EPRf) 

2-32 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 5 Notes:

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

Introduction (3)

Public and Peer Review Comments

- Several Questions Involving Interpretation of the EPRI Test Data

Lead to Extensive Discussions Regarding the Most Appropriate

Way to Tally Spurious Actuation Probabilities (Many Subtleties for

Implementation)

- Team's Consensus is that Expert Panel Values are, in General,

somewhat Conservative

- Additional Independent Review of the Computational Method was

Solicited as a Result of Peer and Public Comments

Review was Favorable, However the Team Acknowledges the Inevitable

Limitations of the Methodology

JoWtF m0PRA Co-rs, Sept. &0N, 2008

ModeM 2: Tlak 10 - Ciruit ftleu Mode LUkeldhood 0 A Coflor U S NRC 0fic dNeile ReeuhtoV

A-1yvo1 R.e$re CRES) & 5.e00 Powe res hSISXO (5080

Slide 6 Notes:

! Assumptions CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

The Following Assumptions Form the Basis for Task 10:

* Specific Cable/Circuit Configuration Attributes are Available or Can Be

Determined

* The Equipment is in Its Normal Position or Operating Condition at the

Onset of the Fire

* Users of This Procedure are Knowledgeable and Have Experience with

Circuit Design and Analysis Methods and Probability Estimating

Techniques

* This Analysis Method is Applied to Cables with No More than 15

Conductors

Joit FiR PRA Core, Sept & Nv. 2008

Module 2: oask 10. Circi Failure Mode Liklihood ŽSod 6 esoero f NRC Oi0 or Nu00 regiatEtu

AnalsIs - (RES) I El- ow R.- In u (EPRI)

2-33

Slide 5 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Introduction (3) 

• Public and Peer Review Comments 

- Several Questions Involving Interpretation of the EPRI Test Data 

Lead to Extensive Discussions Regarding the Most Appropriate 

Way to Tally Spurious Actuation Probabilities (Many Subtleties for 

Implementation) 

- Team's Consensus is that Expert Panel Values are, in General, 

somewhat Conservative 

- Additional Independent Review of the Computational Method was 

Solicited as a Result of Peer and Public Comments 

Review was Favorable, However the Team Acknowledges the Inevitable 

Limitations of the Methodology 

Slide 6 

A CoIlaboralion d u.s. NRC Offke of Nudoor RflglJla/oiy 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Ins/aule (EPRIJ 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Assumptions 

The Following Assumptions Form the Basis for Task 10: 

Specific Cable/Circuit Configuration Attributes are Available or Can Be 

Determined 

The Equipment is in Its Normal Position or Operating Condition at the 

Onset of the Fire 

Users of This Procedure are Knowledgeable and Have Experience with 

Circuit Design and Analysis Methods and Probability Estimating 

Techniques 

This Analysis Method is Applied to Cables with No More than 15 

Conductors 

A OJIlliboration of u.s. NRC Office of Nudoor Rfl(JUla/ory 

Research (RES) & Electric Pc1Ifflr Research Ins/l/lIIe (EPRJ) 

2-33 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 7

Notes:

2-34

7 

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Flowchart 

~"'- / - Input from support lask B 

- Additional plant information needed 

for likelihood analysis 

- Information from plant walkdawns 

(SCCUont 10.4.1 . 10.4.2. 10.4.3) 

~ 

Analysis Work Pack_s 

- Input from Tasks 3 & 9 

(Output to rasks 11, 12, 

& 14) 

(Sectiont 10.4.1 *!!!!!.4.4) 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood 

Analysis 

Notes: 

I---

Step 1: Compile and Evaluate 

Prerequlstte Information 

and Data - Confirm co~tIon of detailed cirC\J1t analysis 

for cot1llOnents of interest 

- Collect Important cable and configuration 

attributes 

(Sec:lioIl IO.S.I) 

~ 

Step 2: Select Analysis Approach - Failure mode probabiity estimate tabkl 

- Cof1'1>UtatlonaJ probability estimates 

(Sao:tlaalO,S.2) 

'" Step 3: Perform cu~ Failure Mode 

Probabll"y Analyses - Failure mocIe probabllty estlmate table 

- Corf1)utatJonal probability estimates 

(Stc:tioa 10053) 

~ Step 4: Generate Circuit FailUre Mode 

Probabll"y Reports 

- Assembfe circuit falkJre mode probability list 

- Generate circuit falture mode probabity 

reports 

(Sodicoa IO." .f) 

'" Uncertainty 

- Plant-specific probabiity analysis 

guidelines • Circuit falure mode analysis process 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

2-34 
Slide 8 Notes:

C IRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Task Interfaces - Inputs

* Fire PRA Cable List (Task 3)

* Fire PRA Database (Support Task B)

* Results of Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (Task 9)

* Specific Scenarios Identifying Affected Cables (Tasks 11

& 14)

* Cable & Circuit Configuration Attributes

* Plant Drawings

t C-o, o No, 2008 _ A Cokh,,s dU& of NRC OPRA gSAa&oq2

MNdaM 2: Task 10 - C ul Talun Mod. lfkehood SiNA b )RES) &UE RPfl . W~hldN~f (SP.O

Aralys,

Slide 9 Notes:

! CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Task Interfaces - Outputs

* Quantification of Fire Risk (Task 14)

* Post-Fire HRA (Task 12)

* Detailed Fire Scenario Quantification (Task 11)

* Circuit Failure Mode Probability Reports

* Component Work Packages (Finalized)

* Fire PRA Database & Model

Joint FRe PRd Coup, Sept & No, 2008

Mod ue 2. Task 10. 0-lC fut F.0-, Mod Ue L US ta ood A CWOoO tion o U S , C o NUde Repw atoý y

A-1ylyssRaaT .LnTOtaaRO~OM(R~ os 

2-35

Slide 8 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Task Interfaces - Inputs '------=======_ ... • Fire PRA Cable List (Task 3) 

• Fire PRA Database (Support Task B) 

• Results of Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (Task 9) 

• Specific Scenarios Identifying Affected Cables (Tasks 11 

& 14) 

• Cable & Circuit Configuration Attributes 

• Plant Drawings 

A Co/litbonItion d u.s. NRC om.:. d MJt:IfIN RetPatotr Re$eereh (RES} & E/6cITk Pf1/NtK Re$fHJrch Insfiluttt (EPR/) 

Slide 9 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Task Interfaces - Outputs 

• Quantification of Fire Risk (Task 14) 

• Post-Fire HRA (Task 12) 

• Detailed Fire Scenario Quantification (Task 11) 

• Circuit Failure Mode Probability Reports 

• Component Work Packages (Finalized) 

• Fire PRA Database & Model 

A CoIlIJborriIJolldUS. NRC OfficedMJd_Regulatoty 

R_n:h (RES) oS Bectric PfNf&r RMeerch Imlltut. (EPRIJ 

2-35 

Notes: 

Notes: 
! CIRCUIT FAILURE Step I - Compile Prer

Ensure that Prerequisit

and Usable before BE

* Confirm Completion (

Components of Intere

* Collect Important Cat

- Insulation

- Number of Conductors

- Raceway Types

- Power Source(s)

- Number of Source & Ta

JoW Rm PRA CouQ, Wept. & Nov 2000

MOdMS 2, Task 10. CircutFwmiu Mode Ukfleo

A.WyW.

Slide 10 Notes:

MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

requisite Information

e Information and Data is Available

eginning the Analyses.

f Detailed Circuit Analysis for

tst

ble and Configuration Attributes

rget Conductors (for Option #2 Only)

Slide 11 Notes:

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Step 2 - Select Analysis Approach

Decide Which Analysis Option is Best Suited for Conducting the

Evaluation.

1. Failure Mode Probability Estimate Tables

* Grounded Circuit Design

Non-Complex Control Circuit

. Single Component Service

, Cable Configuration Matches Table Categories

Principal Failure Mode of Concern is Spurious Actuation

2. Computational Probability Estimate Formulas

Ungrounded or Resistance-Grounded Circuit Design

* Complex Circuit or Component

Failure Potentially Affects Multiple Components

* Cable Configuration Not Easily Categorized in Tables

doint Rm PRA Co-re Swl & N-0, 2008

Mo~du. 2: Task 10 - 000uit FPiu Mode Likeliood Sd A CdoHooonoU.S. NRC 011(0. o(ON Ror,

Amlyes

1

a. -, (RES) & 0.0,0 PR-$0h 0811tu,4 (EPRI)

2-36

Slide 10 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Step 1 - Compile Prerequisite Information 

Ensure that Prerequisite Information and Data is Available 

and Usable before Beginning the Analyses . 

• Confirm Completion of Detailed Circuit Analysis for 

Components of Interest 

• Collect Important Cable and Configuration Attributes 

- Insulation 

- Number of Conductors 

- Raceway Types 

- Power Source(s) 

- Number of Source & Target Conductors (for Option #2 Only) 

A COIl8botalJon« u.s. NRC omee of fWcJNI' Regi6mort 

RNHreh (RES) & EI.wIc POlIN R8$Nrch Institutfl (EPR/) 

Slide 11 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Step 2 - Select Analysis Approach 

Decide Which Analysis Option is Best Suited for Conducting the 

Evaluation. 

1. Failure Mode Probability Estimate Tables 

Grounded Circuit Design 

Non-Complex Control Circuit 

Single Component Service 

Cable Configuration Matches Table Categories 

Principal Failure Mode of Concem is Spurious Actuation 

2. Computational Probability Estimate Formulas 

Ungrounded or Resistance-Grounded Circuit Design 

Complex Circuit or Component 

Failure Potentially Affects Multiple Components 

Cable Configuration Not Easily Categorized in Tables 

A Collaboration of U.s. NRC 0trI0tJ of NucI_ R8f1UIatory 

Rfluareh (RES) & SI1Ctnc Power ReS98rcllln$/ltute (EPRIJ 

2-36 

Notes: 

Notes: 
! CIRCUIT FAILURE Step 3 - Estimate Circ

Estimate Circuit Failure

Selected Method

Option #1: Failure Mod

-Table 10-1,

-Table 10-2,

-Table 10-3,

-Table 10-4,

-Table 10-5,

Option #2: Computation

Pcc =(cT

CF=

Joint Rm PRA Co , SePt & Nov. 20M0

Modul 2: Task 10 - C0-11t Fa.uo Mod. UkaIhC

Amt

Slide 12 Notes:

MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

uit Failure Mode Probabilities

Mode Probabilities Employing the

e Probability Estimate Tables

rhermoset Cables with CPTs

rhermoset Cables without CPTs

rhermoplastic Cables with CPTs

Thermoplastic Cables without CPTs

Armored or Shielded Cables

nal Probability Estimate Formulas

t - CG) / [(CTt -- CG) + (2 x CG) + n]

{CT x [Cs + (0.5 / Co)]) / C0,

PFM = CF x Pcc

tod 54. 12 C °tnabn °USA NRC OtttofM ý I e e Rat.Oy

Slide 13 Notes:

SCIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Step 3 - Related FAQ

- FAQ 08-0047 Cable Dependency (Status: Open)

- Issue:

Guidance (Vol. 2, Page 10-7, Bullet 3) states that when more than one

cable can cause the same spurious actuation you combine probabilities

using "exclusive or"

* This assumes faults/effects are independent

- General approach to resolution:

* Consensus reached that "exclusive or" is not appropriate if faults are

dependent (e.g., a common power supply for both cables)

Clarify treatment to determine and address dependency

- Status:

* Team draft has been completed

* Staff and final industry review pending

Joilt Am PA Court 505 04 NO&. 2N58 Modola 2: T sk 10O- C ult F. a ou Mod. Likefihood kAfCiOt* IoO ,s'U.S NRC O a l ýo e' OWN-dR ty

AnýY.!. (-ES) . -tad*P •tos ostoda (F-PRo

2-37

Slide 12 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Step 3 - Estimate Circuit Failure Mode Probabilities 

Estimate Circuit Failure Mode Probabilities Employing the 

Selected Method 

Option #1: Failure Mode Probability Estimate Tables 

-Table 10-1, Thermoset Cables with CPTs 

-Table 10-2, Thermoset Cables without CPTs 

-Table 10-3, Thermoplastic Cables with CPTs 

-Table 10-4, Thermoplastic Cables without CPTs 

-Table 10-5, Armored or Shielded Cables 

Option #2: Computational Probability Estimate Formulas 

Pee = (~ot - cG) I [(CTot - cG) + (2 x cG) + nJ 

CF = {CT x ICs + (0.5 I CTot)]} I cTot 

PFM=CFxPcc 

A Co//abonItion ~ u.s. NRC 0I'I'ice Q/ Nvtiear Regciatory 

R_reh (RES) & EJedric PoNrK RM.arch /flSlilul. (EPRI) 

Slide 13 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Step 3 - Related FAQ 

- FAQ 08-0047 Cable Dependency (Status: Open) 

- Issue: 

Guidance (Vol. 2, Page 10-7, Bullet 3) states that when more than one 

cable can cause the same spurious actuation you combine probabilities 

using "exclusive or" 

This assumes faults/effects are independent 

- General approach to resolution: 

Consensus reached that "exclusive or" is not appropriate if faults are 

dependent (e.g., a common power supply for both cables) 

Clarify treatment to determine and address dependency 

- Status: 

Team draft has been completed 

• Staff' and final industry review pending 

A Cc/Iaboration d u.s. NRC omc. 0( HeId_ R.aJ.ory 

RHMreh (RES) & EJfCfric PoN&r Rfl:.areh InstiM. (EPRIJ 

2-37 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 14 Notes:

! CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Step 4 - Generate Failure Mode Probability Reports

* Enter Results into Fire PRA Database

* Generate Circuit Failure Mode Probability Reports

- Listing the Probability Estimates for the Circuit Failure Modes of

Concern for Each Component of Interest by Plant Area

(Compartment, Fire Area, Fire Zone, etc.)

Jo"t R.w PRA Cou. Sept. & Nov. 2008

Module 2, ThoR 10 - Okuv P.uie Mod. LfktghOOd 4 A Co ston;on of U. NRC Oftce oSNnRgndatOAt1•.ftr*I. R,,h (RES) S EketSO pO ReO5~h /002, (SPR

2-38

Slide 14 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Step 4 - Generate Failure Mode Probability Reports 

• Enter Results into Fire PRA Database 

• Generate Circuit Failure Mode Probability Reports 

- Listing the Probability Estimates for the Circuit Failure Modes of 

Concern for Each Component of Interest by Plant Area 

(Compartment, Fire Area, Fire Zone, etc.) 

A CoIJaboralion d us. NRC Offlce of NudearRegulatrxy 

Research (RES) & E/9dric Power ReulJrch Inslllute (EPRI) 

2-38 

Notes: 
Slide 15

ICIRCUIT

Example -

FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

SOV Control Circuit

-P00

SP

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

QUESTION: What is the probability that damage to Cable B will

result in spurious opening of the SOV?

See next slide -4

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008

Module 2: Task 10- Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood l 5-

A nalysis I...................................

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-39

Slide 15 

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Example - SOV Control Circuit 

Fuse 

POO 

XKSV2 

PB 

(CLOSE) 

SVO 

ENERGIZE 

TO OPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

33UROO 

QUESTION: What is the probability that damage to Cable B will 

result in spurious opening of the SOV? 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 10 • Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood 

Analysis 

Notes: 

2-39 

See next slide ~ 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 16 Notes:

! CIRCUIT Example - FAILURE Step 1: Prerequisite MODE LIKELIHOOD Information ANALYSIS

- Detailed circuit analysis completed & documented? Yes

Cabl +125 VDC Hot Probe .125 VDC Hot Probe

A LOG LOG

B LOG, El, SO -Open LOG

C NC LOG

* Collect important cable and configuration data:

- Cable insulation? Thermoset

- Number of conductors? Seven

- Raceway type? Tray

- Power source? Ungrounded DC bus (no CPT)

- Number of source & target conductors? 3 sources, 1 target

See next shde4-

Jo"t Fe PRA 0o- Sept 8ait B . 20M

Moe M 2: P2 k 10 - crEB uo -lHm. ModE UCkO hooB 6 A Co( eofe-4 U S .C Or oO•ode ba r

A-obt~l s-002 CRES) 0 8.d~~o~oec~t (E-1c)

Slide 17 Notes:

SCIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Example - Step 2: Select Analysis Approach

Option #1: Failure Mode Probability Tables - Grounded circuit design? No

- Control circuit cable? Yes

- Single component circuit? Yes

- Known cable configuration? Yes

- Spurious operation concern? Yes

* Option #2: Computational Probability Estimate

- Ungrounded circuit? Yes

- Complex circuit/component? No

- Multiple component circuit? No

- Cable configuration not categorized? No

For this example, we'll show both methods See nestslide

Joant RM P0RA Caue Set & No- 2008

Moad ue 2: Took 10. - 0 olt Fu . Mode Likelhood 7 A Cobo yto f UE NRC Office of Ndee R.Va tu

Analysis R.5 h CRES) &o.ect P0o R .Sr Sih .010ut rEpRO

2-40

Slide 16 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Example - Step 1: Prerequisite Information 

• Detailed circuit analysis completed & documented? Yes 

Cable +125 VDe Hot Probe ·125 VDe Hot Probe 

Aloe Loe 

lOC, EI, SO - Open LOG 

NC LOC 

• Collect important cable and configuration data: 

- Cable insulation? Thermoset 

- Number of conductors? Seven 

- Raceway type? Tray 

- Power source? Ungrounded DC bus (no CPT) 

- Number of source & target conductors? 3 sources, 1 target 

See next slide-7 

A Co/Iaborefion d u.s. NRC otfIr» of Nud_ Regd/llor)' 

R&search (RES) & B.anc ~ RNNrch In$tlll.ll. (EPRI) 

Slide 17 

_ CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Example - Step 2: Select Analysis Approach 

• Option #1: Failure Mode Probability Tables 

- Grounded circuit design? No 

- Control circuit cable? Yes 

- Single component circuit? Yes 

- Known cable configuration? Yes 

- Spurious operation concern? Yes 

• Option #2: Computational Probability Estimate 

- Ungrounded circuit? Yes 

- Complex circuit/component? No 

- Multiple component circuit? No 

- Cable configuration not categorized? No 

For this example, we'll show both methods See next slide ~ 

A CoI/aborefion d U.s. NRC omoe 01 Nud __ Regthtory 

Research (RES) & Bectric PaNer R~ Ifdllfute (EPRI) 

2-40 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 18 ! CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

Example - Step 3: Perform Analysis (1)

Option #1:

- Which Table to Use? Table 10-2, Thermoset Cable without CPT

Raceway High Confidence

Type Description of Hot Short Best EstimateRange

Tray M/C Intra-cable 0.60 0.20 - 1.0

1/C Inter-cable 0.40 0.1 - 0.60

M/C -- 1/C Inter-cable 0.20 0.1 - 0.40

M/C -* M/C Inter-cable 0.02 - 0.1

Conduit M/C Intra-cable 0.15 0.05-0.25

1/C Inter-cable 0.1 0.025-0.15

M/C-- 1/C Inter-cable 0.05 0.025-0.1

M/C M/C Inter-cable 0.01 -0.02

- SOopen Probability Estimate, P = 0.62 (0.60 + 0.06 - 0.60*0.06)

See next slide 4

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood

Analysis " 18 -Slide I] A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory ................. Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-41

Slide 18 

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Example - Step 3: Perform Analysis (1) 

• Option #1: 

- Which Table to Use? Table 10-2, Thermoset Cable without CPT 

Raceway Description of Hot Short Best Estimate High Confidence 

Type Range 

Tray M/C Intra-cable 0.60 0.20 -1.0 

1/C Inter-cable 0.40 0.1 - 0.60 

M/C ---> 1/C Inter-cable 0.20 0.1 - 0.40 

M/C ---> M/C Inter-cable 0.02 - 0.1 

Conduit M/C Intra-cable 0.15 0.05 - 0.25 

1/C Inter-cable 0.1 0.025 - 0.15 

M/C ---> 1/C Inter-cable 0.05 0.025 - 0.1 

M/C ---> M/C Inter-cable 0.01 - 0.02 

- SOopen Probability Estimate, P = 0.62 (0.60 + 0.06 - 0.60*0.06) 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood 

Analysis 

Notes: 

2-41 

See next slide ~ 

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institufe (EPRI) 
Slide 19

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

Example - Step 3: Perform Analysis (2)

Option #2:

- Calculate probability of a conductor-to-conductor short:

Pcc = (CTot - CG) / [(CTot - CG) + (2 * CG)]

Pcc = (7 - 1) [(7 - 1) + (2 * 1)]

Pcc = 6 /[6 + 2]

Pcc = 0.75

- Determine cable configuration factor:

CFso = {CT * [Cs + (0.5 / CTo)]} / CTot

CFso = (1 * [3 + (0.5 / 7)]} / 7

CFso = 3.071 / 7

CFso = 0.44

- Probability of spurious operation, PSO(Open) = 0.75 * 0.44 = 0.33

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 . . ........... .

Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Slide 19 1 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Analysis ............................. Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-42

Slide 19 

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Example - Step 3: Perform Analysis (2) 

• Option #2: 

- Calculate probability of a conductor-to-conductor short: 

Pee = (CTo! - CG) / [(CTo! - CG) + (2 * CG)] 

Pee = (7 - 1) / [(7 - 1) + (2 * 1)] 

Pee = 6 1[6 + 2] 

Pee = 075 

Determine cable configuration factor: 

CFso = {CT * [Cs + (0.5/ CTo!)]} / CTo! 

CFso = {1 * [3 + (0.5/ 7)]} /7 

CFso = 3.071 /7 

CFso = 0.44 

Probability of spurious operation, pso(open) = 0.75 * 0.44 = 0.33 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Module 2: Task 10 - Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood 

Analysis ' 

Notes: 

2-42 
Slide 20 Notes:

CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

Example - Step 4: Failure Mode Probability Report

Estimated Probability Estimated Probability Failure Code (Calculated) (From Table 10-2)

SO (Open) 0.33 0.62

"t R. PRA Cos, Sept No& . 2f0a

Modut 2: Task 10. C- lt F.a9 Mod. L k eihoý d[- ; 7 A C -tb o i ftk S. NRC S OU is e f Nu d bg Astpsts 8.s~ah tOES) & Eetrc a PowRe•s.rc tstldutentRI

2-43

Slide 20 

I CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 

Example - Step 4: Failure Mode Probability Report 

Failure Code 

so (Open) 

Estimated Probability 

(Calculated) 

0.33 

Estimated Probability 

(From Table 10-2) 

0.62 

ACd1aborutkmdU.S.NRCOtricoalNudelJrR~ 

RNfHJn:h (RES)" BftCtrIc Pow",. RNHtch Institute (EPRI) 

2-43 

Notes: 
SESSION 5: Support Task B, Fire PRA Database

2-44

SESSION 5: Support Task B, Fire PRA Database 

2-44 
Slide 1 Notes:

qllS. I :MU2CH INSEUTUT,

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY

Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA

Database

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp.

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course

July and August 2007

Palo Alto, CA

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear RegulatorV Research (RES) & Electric Powe Research Institute (EPRO

Slide 2 Notes:

FIRE PRA DATABASE Purpose & Scope

* Identify Required Database Functionality

* Assess Capability of Existing Systems

* Implement Structured Process to Obtain the Required

Database Capability

* New Software and Data Management Tools are Finding

Their Way Into the Market

Joint Fit PIZA Cue, Sept. & Nov. 2008 S A Coabo• °e dOS. NRC Offit°otNoleReouet~y

Module 2: Spport Teak B Fire .- PO4 D01as0 4 h (RES) &1.404 eer R .... 0144. (EPR1)

2-45

Slide 1 

~~1 ElECliIOOWfl -I-Ie:; R!SEAlCHlNSIiIUT! 

EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA 

METHODOLOGY 

Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA 

Database 

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp. 

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories 

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course 

July and August 2007 

Palo Alto, CA 

Slide 2 

_ FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Purpose & Scope 

• Identify Required Database Functionality 

• Assess Capability of Existing Systems 

• Implement Structured Process to Obtain the Required 

Database Capability 

• New Software and Data Management Tools are Finding 

Their Way Into the Market 

Joint Fin! PRA Course, Sept. &. Nov. 2008 

Nodufe 2: Support Tulf S - Fire PRA Database 

A CoIIaboffltion d u.s. NRC 0JTice 01 Nuclear R"gullltrxy 

Research (RES) & EIfJdJic: PcNver RUHrch Imli1u1f1 (EPRI) 

2-45 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 3 Notes:

FIRE PRA DATABASE

Introduction

* Task is Distinctly Different from Other Tasks

* Essential Element of PRA

- Proposed Methods Require Manipulation and Correlation of Large

Amounts of Data

- Must be Efficient and User Friendly for Effective Implementation

- Manual Analysis Not Practical

JdFk. PRA C -, Sept & Not, 2008 FTide A CNoMIoo WU Na - t Ofi °O d..,R.OhtUy

Modute 2: Suppot Tsk - Rm PRA 0.60.. R006th (PUS) £ 804rw PO.,., RoofoP PotOt (FPR)

2-46

I 

Slide 3 

FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Introduction 

• Task is Distinctly Different from Other Tasks 

• Essential Element of PRA 

- Proposed Methods Require Manipulation and Correlation of Large 

Amounts of Data 

- Must be Efficient and User Friendly for Effective Implementation 

- Manual Analysis Not Practical 

Joint FIra PRA Couroo, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Suppott rask 8· R,.. PRA Dam"'" 

A~dU,S.NRCOtr/f;eolNudearR&gI611trxy 

RNMn:h (RES)" e8dric PomK ResHreh /fI$/itufe (EPR/J 

2-46 

Notes: 
Slide 4

Notes:

2-47

4 

FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Flowchart 

/ "pport • Inputs froT m .. other k • tasks ''''....... (1 , 2 & 3) I - Plant cable and raceway data 

- Additional plant information needed for 

cable selection 

(Sections 184.1 , 18 4 2) 

Support Task B Outputs 

- Fire PRA Database 

- Input to tasks 2, 3 & 9 

(Section 18.4.4) 

'" ~ 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Support Task B • Fire PRA Database 

Notes: 

2-47 

Step 1: Database Structure and 

Functional Requirements 

- Database Functional Requirements 

- Database Structure and Data Fields 

(Section 18.5.1) 

'" Step 2: Database Platform 

- Reviewel<isting capabilities 

- Perform cost-benefit analysis 

(Sei;tion 18.5.2) 

t 

Step 3: Database Augmentation Plan 

- Develop Database Augmentation Plan 

- Identify barriers & limitations 

- Revise functional requirements as necessary 

(Section 18.5.3) 

'" Step 4: Implement Database Upgrades 

- Implement Database Augmentation Plan 

- Conduct "test cases" 

(Section 18.5A) 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC OfrlCe of Nuclear RegulatOlY 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 5 Notes:

Step FIRE 1.1 PRA - Database DATABASE Functional Criteria

Data Input Criteria

- In what shape and format is existing data?

- How and who will entered and control data?

- Will data be shared by separate groups? If so, who can change

data?

* Data Output Criteria

- Define Required Output Reports

- Define Sort and Query Options

Joýt Fte PRA Coum. Sept. Nov. -iPS _ _ A COrAV WAS, NRC Om2aM8dee Ret

fodu. 2' Support luk 8 . RC PRA .•bal Reee (RES4 SA Poee ,e.. et (ERRA

2-48

Slide 5 

I FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 1.1 - Database Functional Criteria 

• Data Input Criteria 

- In what shape and format is existing data? 

- How and who will entered and control data? 

- Will data be shared by separate groups? If so, who can change 

data? 

• Data Output Criteria 

- Define Required Output Reports 

- Define Sort and Query Options 

Joint FIrv PRA Cou~. Sept. & Nov. 2008 

ModIlM': Suppon Task 8· FI'" PM o.,.~ .. A CoIt.boI'at/on 01 u.s, NRC omce 01 NiJcIrHM RlJgUIIIDty 

RMYICII (RES, & EIKIrlc PattN ResNlrcJt 'MtIlIA, (EPRf) 

2-48 

Notes: 
Slide 6

I I

Notes:

2-49

Slide 6 

FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 1.2 - Database Structure (Example A) 

Analysis Tables 

CrftlC!!l Equipment u.t EquI~ lO 

Equlpm.nt O .. erlpUan 

PM Bule Ennt I) 

PItA a"'e: Ewnt DflIerlption 

SystemOefoignlllkln 

EquiprMntT~ 

ComJMrtmMllD 

Norn\III PDlition.stiJM I---- DeSiredPosition-Status I-- F~~Posilon..status I-- Failed Alr Pos/tIoI'I-Stsolus ~ 

Indication and Alarm 

corrment. and Information 

Equipment 

qulprnentlO 

Dtptnd. neltt r 

"".,,,,,,," 

~P""",u:::::::... 

R'''f''IInC.Ot!!W!nqt 

~ 

Equipment 10 

P&/o DraWIng 

Sehematk;Dtagram 

WIMo."...., 

l cx:ationOftlWlng 

Source Oata Tables 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Support Task B • Fire PRA Database 

Notes: 

CrltlcalCabIe'U.' 

Equipment 10 

Cab/, 'D C_"""""" 

Endpoint From 

_To 

E~FIliknCode 

HCrftkaJP_S\,/pp,wU,t 

EqlllpmetrtlD 

Po_SupplylD 

Breaker / Fuse 

t--

r----------- --------- I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

P_SI.Ipply Pick Uift 

P_SupplyiD 

Pow" Supply Dnc:a1ptlon 

Piaoi Comp.nmeol.l 

1 COmJHIrtmenilO 

Comp-'rtmem OneripUcm 

FIBAr .. to 

2-49 

C,bl. Oata t- C.ble'D 

Cable Code 

CabieSIz. 

Cable Description 

Cable Classification 

Cable Function Pick Ust I +-+1c...Function I I CabktFunctionCode 

A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 7

I Step FIRE 1.2 PRA - Database DATABASE Structure (Example A)

Analysis Tables

Adlacant Cemeantmiean

Corpartiment tD

Adjacent Compartnents

Fire Ipnition Frequeniesn

Conpartmeont tD

5% Frequency

Moan Frquency

95% Frequency

Detection & Suppression

Compa.'r"nt ID Sonoke

Smoke Detection Into

Heat

Heat Detection Into

Flane

Flame Detection Into

C02

CO2 Acuation

C02 System Into

He

Ha2on Actuation

Haton System Into

Water Curtein

Water Curtain Actuation

Water Curtain Into

Sprinkler

Sprinkler Actuafon

Sprinkler System Info

Hose

Hose Station Into

Portable Extinguisher

Portable Excnguisher Into

Pteat Cmrart ernt Fine Modlelng Cunnpanrtneat ID

(other plant-specific modeling

parameter}

Source Data Tables

Plant Coernarterenf

Compartment ID

Conpanrmant Description

Fire Area ID

Fire Area Oe..ription

(plant-specific options based on fine

oreMdeling Parattra)

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008

Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA Database

Slide 7 A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory ... ............... Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-50

Slide 7 

FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 1.2 - Database Structure (Example A) 

Analysis Tables 

Adlacent Compartments Detection & Suppression 

Comparb'nent 10 

Adjacent Companments 

1-...... ----- Compartment to Smoke 

Fire Ignition FrequencJes 

Compartment 10 t-- 5% Frequency 

Mean Frequency 

95% Frequency 

---------------I 

I 

Source Data Tables I 

I 

I 

I 

Smoke Detection Info 

Heat 

Heat Detection Info 

F~me 

Flame Detection Info 

C02 

C02 Acuation 

C02 System Info 

Halon 

Halon Actuation 

Halon System Info 

Water Curtain 

Water Curtain Actuation 

Water Curtain Info 

Sprinkler 

Sprinkler Actuation 

Sprinkler System Info 

Hose 

Hose Station Info 

Portable Extinguisher 

Portable Extinguisher Info 

Plant Compartment Fire Modeling 

r-- Compertmenl lO 

{other plant·specific modeling 

parameter} 

~------------- --------------

Plant Compartments 

g:==~:~SCri Fire Ar •• lo tion J-y ~------

Fire Fire Are.. AnI. 10 l F_i~_A_ _D Crl_._ti on ___ 

Joint Fire PRA Course. Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA Database 

Notes: 

2-50 

F .... ModeUnA Pldt Liat 

(ptant..-specific options based on fire 

model«lg parameters) 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 8

Notes:

2-51

8 

FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 1.2 - Database Structure (Example B) 

Ana'y,'s Tabl •• 

Crftlctl E91!Ipm'lIll!t! 

E .. "Ip ..... '11O 

E .. "lp .... nID •• cnpllon 

Spblm O •• lgMtian 

E_mnITyp, 

c .... p.ttm..,tl) 

Na<m"'P.,.il.H.·S' ...... 

! E9YIPm.nlb"pI9I! LI.1 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Support Task B - Fire PRA Database 

Notes: 

f ltt P 8.t. C,bl" Ie' 

E41,",,'I\IID 

F\lncllo",ISt.l. 

C.bllolD 

C.bllol'"nctlon 

F.ultCon •• qu.rIC. 

Comm'!'Iti 

2-51 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 9 Notes:

! FIRE PRA DATABASE Step 2 - Database Platform

Decide on Platform for Database

- Existing System

- New Stand Alone System

- Upgrade Existing System

- Combination of Existing and New

Vendors are Responding to the Call for New and Improved

Software Functionality

- Highly Integrated Solutions are Emerging as the Standard for NFPA

805 Plants

- Seamless Link to Fire PRA Software is in the Works But Not Yet

Available as Production Software

Jo=t F re PRA Cou-.. Sept. & Nov. 2008 _ A CP Qs__ JpaUa PUS. N CO NMP Reg.atO..

Modu.e 2: Suppor Task B - R PPA P atabaae RaseaaRO (RES) a . P*owaRýSah atAue (EPR,

Slide 10 Notes:

FIRE Step 3 PRA - Database DATABASE Augmentation Plan

-Augmentation Plan is Based on the Results of Step 2

* Formalize Process for Upgrades/Changes

* Determine Necessary Resources

- This Effort Can Innocently Affect Many Plant Organizations

- The Cost, Resources, Schedule, Training, Procedural Changes

and Overall Impact of Major Software Changes ALWAYS Seems

to be Underestimated

* Involve IS/IT Department from the Beginning

Johpf Fim PRA C-or, Sept & No.- 2008 P A C°O R O d U S. NRC O RMCPN Ms d dNU als sy

Modua 2: Support Tksk B . Ftr PRA Dafabaa Raa,• (RESt C) I aes- m-po.rh .st-a (EPO)

2-52

I 

Slide 9 

FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 2 - Database Platform 

• Decide on Platform for Database 

- Existing System 

- New Stand Alone System 

- Upgrade Existing System 

- Combination of Existing and New 

• Vendors are Responding to the Call for New and Improved 

Software Functionality 

- Highly Integrated Solutions are Emerging as the Standard for NFPA 

805 Plants 

- Seamless Link to Fire PRA Software is in the Works But Not Yet 

Available as Production Software 

Joint FInJ PRA Couml, $apt, & Nov. 2008 

Nodule 2: Suppon Told: B • Fire PRA D.Jtabase 

A CoI/aboratJon aI U.S. NRC OffICe 01 NIJdMr Roguill/Of)' 

Re.seatdl (RES, & Beetrk ~ Res8lllr:h Ins/lilli' (£PRI) 

Slide 10 

I FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 3 - Database Augmentation Plan 

• Augmentation Plan is Based on the Results of Step 2 

• Formalize Process for Upgrades/Changes 

• Determine Necessary Resources 

- This Effort Can Innocently Affect Many Plant Organizations 

- The Cost, Resources, Schedule, Training, Procedural Changes 

and Overall Impact of Major Software Changes ALWAYS Seems 

to be Underestimated 

• Involve IS/IT Department from the Beginning 

Joint Fire PRA CoutW, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Support Tnll: B • Fire PRA Database 

A CdJabonIlion d U.S. NRC OffIce 01 Nudeer Regtiatory 

RNNrr:h (RES) & EJectric Paww Research Instl/ute (EPRI) 

2-52 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 11 Notes:

I FIRE PRA DATABASE

Step 4 - Implement Database Upgrades

* Have a Clear Plan BEFORE Beginning any Significant

Work

* Consider Long-Term Maintainability

* Plan for De-bugging and Test Runs

* Do Not Overlook Data Integrity and Configuration Control

Features

* Determine All Affected Users and Involve Then Early

* The Days of "Rogue" PRA Databases are Gone!

M dPRA Con Spt &lk ft wS p.FflPAACOmbatoio' MOO WO hRe o.

2.d 1: . Suw~f The . FI PA . bh hsc,(R_ adt__pSdlSbl E

2-53

Slide 11 

I FIRE PRA DATABASE 

Step 4 - Implement Database Upgrades 

• Have a Clear Plan BEFORE Beginning any Significant 

Work 

• Consider Long-Term Maintainability 

• Plan for De-bugging and Test Runs 

• Do Not Overlook Data Integrity and Configuration Control 

Features 

• Determine All Affected Users and Involve Then Early 

• The Days of "Rogue" PRA Databases are Gone! 

Joint Are PRA eow.. Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Al'od&rJI J: SUppott hair 8. FIN PRA Datat.s. 

ACdtalJot'atiortdU-S.NR:COII'iI:$~Nuc;#NlRegul:rlrrt 

Re_rdI {RES}" ElrJctric PawerRlHHtd! Imtilute rEPRO 

2-53 

Notes: 
SESSION 6: Electrical Exercises Overview

2-54

SESSION 6: Electrical Exercises Overview 

2-54 
Slide 1 Notes:

cUS.NRC ECTRIC 1`01112 EP21 JRMAKH INSTIM

M===-

EPRIINRC-RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY

Module 2: Electrical Examples

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp.

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course

*September and November 2008

Bethesda, MD

A Collbortion of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) & Electric Poter Research Institute (EPRI)

Slide 2 Notes:

! OVERVIEW OF EXAMPLES

* Provide Hands-On Practical Experience

* Cover Many (But Not All) Typical Cases

* Exposure to Typical Problems and Decisions

* Appreciation for Challenges and Trade-Offs

* A Worn Out Expression, Yes... But for Circuit Analysis the

"Devil is in the Details"

Joint Frir PRA Cour-. Sept. & NoC, 2000 A C Eo 0 N) f00, of NP.00 r Re uPty

Modeul 2: EleFlcelEnMPhs (EM)

2-55

Slide 1 

~121 HEmiC POWIi -,- I!5lAI:CHINSTlllI)f 

EPRIINRC-RES FIRE ,PRA 

METHODOLOGY 

Module 2: Electri.cal Examples 

D. Funk - Edan Engineering Corp. 

F. Wyant - Sandia National Laboratories 

Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Course 

September and November 2008 

Bethesda, MD 

Slide 2 

I OVERVIEW OF EXAMPLES 

• Provide Hands-On Practical Experience 

• Cover Many (But Not All) Typical Cases 

• Exposure to Typical Problems and Decisions 

• Appreciation for Challenges and Trade-Offs 

• A Worn Out Expression, Yes ... But for Circuit Analysis the 

"Devil i§. in the Details" 

Joint FlflJ PRA COUr06, Sept. & Nov, 2008 

Module 2: Electrical Examples 

A CoIJabornlioll of u.s NRC Office of Nuc/9t:I( Regulatorr 

Research (RES) & EJecttic Power R8search Insldute (EPRI) 

2-55 

Notes: 

Notes: 
Slide 3

Notes:

2-56

Slide 3 

SNPP ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Notes: 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Electrical Examples 

2-56 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
Slide 4

I EXAMPLE PROBLEMS

Example Component Description of Analysis NUREGtCR-6850 Comments

No.

1 AOV-1 (SOV-1) Std AC Solenoid Control Circuit No Multi-function component - analyzed for open and close

2 AOV-3 (SOV-3) Std DC Solenoid Control Circuit Yes - Figure 1-2 Spuarous only analysis

3 MOV-9 Typical MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure 1-4 Functional analysis - change of position required

4 MOV-1h Double Pole DC Motor Control Yes - Figare 1-6 Functional analysis - chonge of position required Ci rcoit 4 OV15Circuit Yes - Figure 1-8 Functional analysis - change of position required 5 MOV-l 3 Ungnd AC. Inverted MDV Control Yes - Figare I-8 Functional analysis - change of position required

Circoit

6 MOV-10 Ungnd AC MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure I-10 Functional analysis - change of position required

MOV Control Circuit / Dual Yes - Figure 1-12 Spurious only, classified as high consequence

7 MOV-8 Controls component

8 MOV-1 1 Typical DC MOV Control Circuit No Functional analysis - change of position required

9 MOV-16 Typical MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure 1-4 Spurious Only

10 Pt-1 Instrument Circuit No Indication only

11 ANN-1 Annunciator Circuit No No false indication

12 HPI-B 4.16 WV Motor No Functional analysis

13 COMP-1 480 V Motor No Functional analysis

14 SWGR-B 4.16 WV Bus No Multiple source options

15 LC-B 480V LC No Functional analysis

16 MCC-1 B 480V MCC No Functional analysis

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008

Module 2: Electrical Examples .Slid' . A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory .............. ....I................ Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-57

Slide 4 

EXAMPLE PROBLEMS 

-

Example Component Description of Analysis NUREGICR-6850 Comments No. 

1 AOV-1 (SOV-1) Sid AC Solenoid Control Circuit No Multj·function component - analyzed for open and close 

2 AOV-3 (SOV-3) Sid DC Solenoid Control Circuil Yes - Figure 1-2 Spurious only analysis 

3 MOV-9 Typical MOV Control Circuil Yes - Figure 1-4 Functional analysis - change of position required 

4 MOV-15 Double Pole DC Motor Conlrol Yes - Figure 1-6 Functional analysis - change of position required Circuit 

5 MOV-13 Ungnd AC. Inverted MOV Control Yes - Figure 1-8 Functional analysis - change of position required Circuit 

6 MOV-10 Ungnd AC MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure 1-10 Functional analysis - change of position required 

7 MOV-8 MOV Control Circuit wI Dual Yes - Figure 1-12 Spurious only, classified as high consequence 

Controls component 

8 MOV-11 Typical DC MOV Control Circuit No Functional analysis - change of position required 

9 MOV-16 Typical MOV Control Circuit Yes - Figure 1-4 Spu~ous Only 

10 PI-1 Instrument Circuit No Indication only 

11 ANN-1 Annunciator Circuit No No false indication 

12 HPI-S 4.16 kV Motor No Functional analysis 

13 COMP-1 480 V Motor No Functional analysis 

14 SWGR-S 4.16 kV Bus No Multiple source options 

15 LC-S 480V LC No Functional analysis 

16 MCC-1S 480V MCC No Functional analysis 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 I Slide 4 I A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Module 2: ElectrIcal Examples Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

Notes: 

2-57 
Slide 5

I HANDS ON WORK

JR(QUIT AXY11M WOR),9fl1fT

2M Caw _______

RQAW P000 _________

F -oco 0000 _______________

F0kA "oo _____________

.0ec00p00,0c0 ~ 0 U . 1S 

P-~ ___________________

C..0 .. ~ ao0 FU0Oofl.jorO~

0

0

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008

Module 2: Electrical Examples

F .. . A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Slide .. 5 Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Notes:

2-58

HANDS ON WORK 

Notes: 

C"-",tIt,,,", ___ _ 

""-"""""". 

,.,.",.. ....... falild QIuruI Pos=n 

,~~pgu:gn 

CO"1>, ..... ,ypt' ______ _ 

KgftCCln$tqJO'Xec~ Ve.s IJ Nt! lJ 

Joint Fire PRA Course, Sept. & Nov. 2008 

Module 2: Electrical Examples 

Slide 5 

2-58 

Fuse 

POD 

SV2 

SVO 

ENERGIZE 

TO OPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

A Collaboration of U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
3 EXAMPLE EXERCISES

3-1

EXAMPLE EXERCISES 

3-1 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 1 (first part)

Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV

Component Description: Power-Operated Relief Valve

BE Code: AOV-1_TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: CLOSED

Failed Air Position: CLOSED

High Consequence Component Yes E] No N

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-2

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 1 (first part) 

Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: Power-Operated Relief Valve 

BE Code: AOV-1_ TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

Power Supplies: ______ _ 

Cable Analysis 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

Yes 0 No 

Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-2 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 1 (second part)

Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type:

Component Description: Power-Operated Relief Valve

AOV

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

AOV-I_FTO (PORV AOV-1 FAILS TO OPEN)

OPEN

CLOSED

CLOSED

CLOSED

Yes 1:1 No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function I Fault Consequences Comments

4 +

4 +

4 +

Comments:

3-3

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 1 (second part) 

Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: Power-Operated Relief Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

AOV-1_FTO (PORV AOV-1 FAILS TO OPEN) 

OPEN 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

Power Supplies: ______ _ 

Cable Analysis 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

Yes 0 No 

Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-3 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 2

Component ID: AOV-3 (SOV-3) Component Type:

Component Description: Charging Pump Injection Valve

AOV

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE)

CLOSED

OPEN

CLOSED

CLOSED

Yes [] No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-4

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 2 

Component 10: AOV-3 (SOV-3) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: Charging Pump Injection Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE) 

CLOSED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: OPEN 

Failed Electrical Position: CLOSED 

Failed Air Position: CLOSED 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

Comments: 

3-4 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 3

Component ID: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: High- Pressure Injection Valve

BE Code: MOV-9_FTO (MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes El No 1z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-5

'-

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 3 

Component ID: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: High- Pressure Injection Valve 

BE Code: MOV-9_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequen~e Component 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-5 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 4

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve

BE Code: MOV-15_FTO (MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: THROTTLED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No [E

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-6

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 4 

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

MOV-15_FTO 

THROTTLED 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

Yes 0 No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-6 

(MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 5

Component ID: MOV-13 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: PORV Block Valve

BE Code: MOV-13_FTC (MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE)

Required Position: OPEN / CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: OPEN

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes El No E

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-7

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 5 

Component ID: MOV-13 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: PORV Block Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

MOV-13_FTC 

OPEN/CLOSED 

OPEN 

AS-IS 

N/A 

Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-7 

(MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE) 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 6

Component ID: MOV-10 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-10_FTO (MOV-10 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

F t 1

F F I -F

F F 4 +

F F I +

Comments:

3-8

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 6 

Component ID: MOV-10 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

MOV-10_FTO 

OPEN 

CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power SuppJies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-8 

(MOV-10 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 7

Component ID: MOV-8 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: RHR Outboard Suction Valve

BE Code: MOV-8_TO (MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes [ No LI

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

4 +

*1 I.

Comments:

3-9

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 7 

Component ID: MOV-8 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: RHR Outboard Suction Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

MOV-8_TO 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

AS-IS· 

N/A 

Yes IZI No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-9 

(MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

D 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 8

Component ID: MOV-11 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-11_FTO (MOV-11 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-10

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 8 

Component 10: MOV-11 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-11_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-11 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

Yes 0 No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-10 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 9

Component ID: MOV-16 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-16_TO (MOV-16 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-11

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 9 

Component ID: MOV-16 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-16_TO 

CLOSED 

(MOV-16 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-11 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 10

Component ID: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument

Component Description: RCS Pressure

BE Code: PI-I_FL (RCS Pressure Indication Fails High)

Required Position: AVAILABLE

Functional State

Normal Position: AVAILABLE

Failed Electrical Position: LOW

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes El No [

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-12

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 10 

Component 10: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument 

Component Description: RCS Pressure 

BE Code: PI-1_FL 

AVAILABLE 

(RCS Pressure Indication Fails High) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: AVAILABLE 

Failed Electrical Position: LOW 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

Comments: 

3-12 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 11

Component ID: ANN-1 Component Type: Annunciator

Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature

BE Code: ANN-I_FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann)

Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS

Functional State

Normal Position: AVAILABLE

Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes L1 No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-13

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 11 

Component ID: ANN-1 Component Type: Annunciator 

Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature 

BE Code: ANN-1_FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann) 

Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS 

Functional State 

Normal Position: AVAILABLE 

Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

Comments: 

3-13 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 12

Component ID: HPI-B Component Type: Pump

Component Description: High-Pressure Injection Pump B

BE Code: HPIAFTS (HPI-A Fails to Start) HPIAFTR (HPI-A Fails to Run)

Required Position: ON

Functional State

Normal Position: STANDBY / ON

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes LI No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-14

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 12 

Component 10: HPI-B Component Type: Pump 

Component Description: High-Pressure Injection Pump B 

BE Code: HPIA_FTS (HPI-A Fails to Start) HPIA_FTR (HPI-A Fails to Run) 

Required Position: ON 

Functional State 

Normal Position: STANDBY/ON 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

Comments: 

3-14 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 13

Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: Compressor

Component Description: Instrument Air Compressor

BE Code: COMP-1_FTR (COMP-1 Fails to Run)

Required Position: CYCLE

Functional State

Normal Position: CYCLE

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-15

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 13 

Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: Compressor 

Component Description: Instrument Air Compressor 

BE Code: COMP-1_FTR 

CYCLE 

(COMP-1 Fails to Run) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CYCLE 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

Comments: 

3-15 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Not a numbered exercise - Exercise 14 is similar, but its BE Code is PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2

(not BF-1) and its Required Position: Functional State is Energized from EDG-B (not SUT-1)

Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type:

Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear

Switchgear

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-1

ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1

ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1

Off

N/A

Yes El No 0

(4KV BUS B FAULT)

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

1 -II -I4 4 +

4 4 -IComments:

3-16

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Not a numbered exercise - Exercise 14 is similar, but its BE Code is PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2 

(not BF-1) and its Required Position: Functional State is Energized from EDG-B (not SUT-1) 

Component 10: SWGR-B Component Type: Switchgear 

Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear 

BE Code: PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-1 (4KV BUS B FAULT) 

Required Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1 

Functional State 

Normal Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

Comments: 

3-16 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 14

Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type:

Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear

Switchgear

BE Code: PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2

Required Position: ENERGIZED FROM EDG-B

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes [] No

(4KV BUS B FAULT)

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-17

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 14 

Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type: Switchgear 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

Train B 4160V Switchgear 

PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2 

ENERGIZED FROM EDG-B 

ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1 

Off 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-17 

(4KV BUS B FAULT) 

Comments 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 15

Component ID: LC-B Component Type: Load Center

Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center

BE Code: EPS-480VLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT)

Required Position: ENERGIZED

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes El No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-18

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 15 

Component ID: LC-B Component Type: Load Center 

Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center 

BE Code: EPS-480VLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT) 

Required Position: ENERGIZED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: ENERGIZED 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments 

, 

Comments: 

3-18 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 16

Component ID: MCC-IB

Component Description:

Component Type: MCC

Train B 480 V Motor Control Center /

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

EPS-480MCCBIF

ENERGIZED

(480V MCC B1 FAULT)

ENERGIZED

Off

N/A

Yes El No 0

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences Comments

Comments:

3-19

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 16 

Component ID: MCC-1B Component Type: MCC 

Component Description: Train B 480 V Motor Control Center 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component 

EPS-480MCCB1 F 

ENERGIZED 

ENERGIZED 

Off 

N/A 

Yes D No 

Power Supplies: ______ _ Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequences 

Comments: 

3-19 

(480V MCC B1 FAULT) 

Comments 

I 
Circuit Analysis Example Summary

Example

No.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Component

AOV-1 (SOV-1)

AOV-3 (SOV-3)

MOV-9

MOV-15

MOV-13

MOV-10

MOV-8

MOV-11

MOV-16

PI-1

ANN-1

HPI-B

COMP-1

SWGR-B

LC-B

MCC-1B

Description of

Analysis

Std AC Solenoid Control

Circuit

Std DC Solenoid Control

Circuit

Typical MOV Control

Circuit

Double Pole DC Motor

Control Circuit

Ungnd AC, Inverted MOV

Control Circuit

Ungnd AC MOV Control

Circuit

MOV Control Circuit w/

Dual Controls

Typical DC MOV Control

Circuit

Typical MOV Control

Circuit

Instrument Circuit

Annunciator Circuit

4.16 kV Motor

480 V Motor

4.16 kV Bus

480V LC

480V MCC

NUREG/CR6850

No

Yes - Figure 1-2

Yes - Figure 1-4

Yes - Figure 1-6

Yes - Figure 1-8

Yes - Figure 1-10

Yes - Figure 1-12

No

Yes - Figure 1-4

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Comments

Multi-function component - analyzed for open

and close

Spurious only analysis

Functional analysis - change of position

required

Functional analysis - change of position

required

Functional analysis - change of position

required

Functional analysis - change of position

required

Spurious only, classified as highconsequence component

Functional analysis - change of position

required

Spurious only

Indication only

No false indication

Functional analysis

Functional analysis

Multiple source options

Functional analysis

Functional analysis

3-20

Circuit Analysis Example Summary 

Example Component Description of NUREG/CR- Comments No. Analysis 6850 

AOV-1 (SOV-1) Std AC Solenoid Control No Multi-function component - analyzed for open 

Circuit and close 

2 AOV-3 (SOV-3) Std DC Solenoid Control Yes - Figure 1-2 Spurious only analysis Circuit 

3 MOV-9 Typical MOV Control Yes - Figure 1-4 Functional analysis - change of position 

Circuit required 

4 MOV-15 Double Pole DC Motor Yes - Figure 1-6 Functional analysis - change of position 

Control Circuit required 

5 MOV-13 Ungnd AC, Inverted MOV Yes - Figure 1-8 Functional analysis - change of position 

Control Circuit required 

6 MOV-10 Ungnd AC MOV Control Yes - Figure 1-10 Functional analysis - change of position 

Circuit required 

7 MOV-8 MOV Control Circuit wI Yes - Figure 1-12 Spurious only, classified as highDual Controls consequence component 

8 MOV-11 Typical DC MOV Control No Functional analysis - change of position 

Circuit required 

9 MOV-16 Typical MOV Control Yes - Figure 1-4 Spurious only Circuit 

10 PI-1 Instrument Circuit No Indication only 

11 ANN-1 Annunciator Circuit No No false indication 

12 HPI-B 4.16 kV Motor No Functional analysis 

13 COMP-1 480 V Motor No Functional analysis 

14 SWGR-B 4.16 kV Bus No Multiple source options 

15 LC-B 480V LC No Functional analysis 

16 MCC-1B 480V MCC No Functional analysis 

3-20 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID:

Component Description:

Component Type:

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component Yes El No E]

Power Supplies: quire? _Fuction FaulConsquen Breaker:

_____________________Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Commments

Comments:

3-21

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: _______ _ Component Type: ___________ _ 

Component Description: ______________ _ 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Consequence Component Yes D No D 

Power Supplies: Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Commments 

Comments: 

3-21 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: Continuation Sheet (_ of

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

4 4 +

4 4 +

3-22

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: _______ _ Continuation Sheet (_ of_) 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

, 

3-22 
Appendices

Appendix A: Questions Asked in Module 2 Sessions

NRC Disclaimer: Appendix A is intended solely for use as part of a training tool. No portion

represents NRC Conclusions or Regulatory Positions, and should not be interpreted as such.

Session 1:

QUESTION

How do the probability values assigned to certain events differ between Appendix R standpoints

and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)?

RESPONSE

If I had a motor-operated valve and Appendix R did an analysis in which it picked up a certain

set of cables that were related to the desired function of that valve, which would generate a

cable list. Historically, the guidelines there have been as such: if a valve was closed and an

operator could open it and he could walk over and put the valve in the desired position, that was

how we went for it. That's how the analysis was made. Of course, if there were contacts or

portions of the circuit that could prevent you from doing that, by the rules of Appendix R, those

were identified. The difference in PRA is that if a valve is normally closed and you wanted it

open, there may be three or four ways that that valve could be opened. For example, an

operator could go to a control switch or a safeguard signal could actuate, and each of these

might have a contact within the circuit that could cause the valve to open. In addition, even

regular interlocks could cause that valve to open. A PRA analysis would go in and determine

that any type of operation that could open those valves, even by way of contacts, also affects

the operation of this circuit. The failure of any of these mechanisms would not prevent the

operator from opening the valve. Now, however, all of these other circuits must be evaluated to

determine their effects on this component. The integrated nature of these circuits makes this

evaluation quite a challenge.

QUESTION

The Appendix R analysis didn't account for necessary operator action; we were concerned

mostly with the successful operation of warning signs. Is this similar for the PRA?

RESPONSE

From a PRA point of view, though, if the SI came on and they wanted that valve to reposition,

they count on the SI actually repositioning that valve. They don't rely on'the operator. Every

time you have to rely on an operator, they have to credit the operator with diagnosing the

problem, in the midst of all the commotion, and then going over and taking that action. A

probability number, discussed in the Human Factors Analysis portion of this presentation, must

be applied. Even though no circuit capacity has been lost, and the valve can still be opened, in

the PRA world, it's very different. On-demand, that valve needs to be opened when given the

signal by SI. So the key to this analysis is that if a valid SI signal is realized, then the valve

must be opened on demand.

A-1

Appendices 

Appendix A: Questions Asked in Module 2 Sessions 

NRC Disclaimer: Appendix A is intended solely for use as part of a training tool. No portion 

represents NRC Conclusions or Regulatory Positions, and should not be interpreted as such. 

Session 1: 

QUESTION 

How do the probability values assigned to certain events differ between Appendix R standpoints 

and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)? 

RESPONSE 

If I had a motor-operated valve and Appendix R did an analysis in which it picked up a certain 

set of cables that were related to the desired function of that valve, which would generate a 

cable list. Historically, the guidelines there have been as such: if ,a valve was closed and an 

operator could open it and he could walk over and put the valve in the desired position, that was 

how we went for it. That's how the analysis was made. Of course, if there were contacts or 

portions of the circuit that could prevent you from doing that, by the rules of Appendix R, those 

were identified. The difference in PRA is that if a valve is normally closed and you wanted it 

open, there may be three or four ways that that valve could be opened. For example, an 

operator could go to a control switch or a safeguard signal could actuate, and each of these 

might have a contact within the circuit that could cause the valve to open. In addition, even 

regular interlocks could cause that valve to open. A PRA analysis would go in and determine 

that any type of operation that could open those valves, even by way of contacts, also affects 

the operation of this circuit. The failure of any of these mechanisms would not prevent the 

operator from opening the valve. Now, however, all of these other circuits must be evaluated to 

determine their effects on this component. The integrated nature of these circuits makes this 

evaluation quite a challenge. 

QUESTION 

The Appendix R analysis didn't account for necessary operator action; we were concerned 

mostly with the successful operation of warning signs. Is this similar for the PRA? 

RESPONSE 

From a PRA point of view, though, if the SI came on and they wanted that valve to reposition, 

they count on the SI actually repositioning that valve. They don't rely on the operator. Every 

time you have to rely on an operator, they have to credit the operator with diagnosing the 

problem, in the midst of all the commotion, and then going over and taking that action. A 

probability number, discussed in the Human Factors Analysis portion of this presentation, must 

be applied. Even though no circuit capacity has been lost, and the valve can still be opened, in 

the PRA world, it's very different. On-demand, that valve needs to be opened when given the 

signal by SI. So the key to this analysis is that if a valid SI signal is realized, then the valve 

must be opened on demand. 

A-I 
QUESTION

Are the analysts for task 3 and task 9 the same people?

RESPONSE

The people who do task 3 and task 9 are the same people.

QUESTION

Could we screen out certain aspects based on our knowledge of their importance in PRA ?

RESPONSE

No. The ways tasks 3 and 9 are set up are meant to be deterministic. No screening is allowed

based on importance at that stage. When we get into how important a cable is to the PRA

model, a different group does that. What we did not want was for the electrical analysts to make

a decision on what is important in the PRA model. No screening other than what can be

screened deterministically by the actual circuit design.

Session 2:

QUESTION

Slide 3: Does fire PRA use alternate power supplies to switch power sources when analyzing

events?

RESPONSE

Yes, they do. In fact, even more so than in Appendix R. If you take your appendix R analysis

and multiply it by 5, you'll get the number of cross-ties in PRA. PRA solves the problem by

having lots of different ways to accomplish the same thing. Where they have diverse options

(like a bus that has multiple power supplies), that's a big win for them, whereas in Appendix R it

may mean nothing. Diversity really works in their favor for reducing the core damage frequency

numbers or conditional core damage probabilities. That same windfall doesn't exist in Appendix

R.

QUESTION

Slide 5: But what if you take too many cables for a given component? How does this affect the

conservatism of your answer?

RESPONSE

There would be no uncertainty with that. The cables you picked don't provide an uncertainty; in

this case, the analysis would simply be too conservative for what you needed.

This is also a good question from a different angle. If I do a very conservative analysis from an

electrical perspective and I pick all these cables and I do that for every component out there, I

A-2

QUESTION 

Are the analysts for task 3 and task 9 the same people? 

RESPONSE 

The people who do task 3 and task 9 are the same people. 

QUESTION 

Could we screen out certain aspects based on our knowledge of their importance in PRA? 

RESPONSE 

No. The ways tasks 3 and 9 are set up are meant to be deterministic. No screening is allowed 

based on importance at that stage. When we get into how important a cable is to the PRA 

model, a different group does that. What we did not want was for the electrical analysts to make 

a decision on what is important in the PRA model. No screening other than what can be 

screened deterministically by the actual circuit design. 

Session 2: 

QUESTION 

Slide 3: Does fire PRA use alternate power supplies to switch power sources when analyzing 

events? 

RESPONSE 

Yes, they do. In fact, even more so than in Appendix R. If you take your appendix R analysis 

and multiply it by 5, you'll get the number of cross-ties in PRA. PRA solves the problem by 

having lots of different ways to accomplish the same thing. Where they have diverse options 

(like a bus that has multiple power supplies), that's a big win for them, whereas in Appendix R it 

may mean nothing. Diversity really works in their favor for reducing the core damage frequency 

numbers or conditional core damage probabilities. That same windfall doesn't exist in Appendix 

R. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: But what if you take too many cables for a given component? How does this affect the 

conservatism of your answer? 

RESPONSE 

There would be no uncertainty with that. The cables you picked don't provide an uncertainty; in 

this case, the analysis would simply be too conservative for what you needed. 

This is also a good question from a different angle. If I do a very conservative analysis from an 

electrical perspective and I pick all these cables and I do that for every component out there, I 

A-2 
have this highly conservative electrical analysis. You may think, "Well, that'll make your overall

answer conservative, right?" Wrong. This is because if by the nature that you picked cables too

conservatively and for expediency associated particular cables with equipment rather than

dispositioning them and therefore need them, it's a "required" cable. If I do that for all my

components, as I mentioned, you'll have a very conservative analysis. Keep in mind that this

circuit analysis feeds into the model. The problem is that if you're too conservative in a

systematic point of view, you could skew the results of the PRA to suggest that one particular

area is highly risk-significant in comparison to another. Being too conservative in the circuit

analysis could mislead the results of the PRA.

QUESTION

Slide 6: Is there a systematic framework for establishing the task I boundaries?

RESPONSE

The first task in the PRA, Task 3, is already available and done. When you do Task 1, setting

up the boundaries for the fire PRA, ensure that what you're doing aligns with the preexisting

data in the PRA database. If the electrical analysts establish partitions that do not align with the

data in the database, it is too expensive to try to retroactively develop the database to align with

the electrical analysts.

QUESTION

Slide 8: How do you deal with PRA analysts and electrical analysts viewing the same

components different ways?

RESPONSE

This is a typical case for plants that are trying to establish a correlation up-front. Plants that fail

to do this will find out on the back end of Task 9 that they'll have to pay for their indolence. One

thing that we've started doing, which has proven to be extremely effective, is to arrange a

meeting between the PRA analysts, the fire modelers, and the electrical analysts after the PRA

equipment list is done. They must sit together and process every system component and every

functional state. It sounds horribly detailed, but you would be amazed at how much comes out

in those meetings. When you try to reconcile Appendix R and PRA and you see the same valve

and both groups are trying to demonstrate that the plant runs safely and one group wants the

valve open and the other wants it closed, it begs the question: "How can you both be right

here?" The answer is that sometimes they are both right and you figure out what the reason for

that was. In most cases, however, one group will admit that they had it wrong. One

recommendation is that when completing task 2, build into your schedule time to have face-toface interactions where you process every component and every functional state in great detail.

QUESTION

Slide 9: How should auxiliary components be included?

RESPONSE

Deterministically decide if the components can affect the desired functional state of the

component in question.

A-3

have this highly conservative electrical analysis. You may think, "Well, that'll make your overall 

answer conservative, right?" Wrong. This is because if by the nature that you picked cables too 

conservatively and for expediency associated particular cables with equipment rather than 

dispositioning them and therefore need them, it's a "required" cable. If I do that for all my 

components, as I mentioned, you'll have a very conservative analysis. Keep in mind that this 

circuit analysis feeds into the model. The problem is that if you're too conservative in a 

systematic point of view, you could skew the results of the PRA to suggest that one particular 

area is highly risk-significant in comparison to another. Being too conservative in the circuit 

analysis could mislead the results of the PRA. 

QUESTION 

Slide 6: Is there a systematic framework for establishing the task 1 boundaries? 

RESPONSE 

The first task in the PRA, Task 3, is already available and done. When you do Task 1, setting 

up the boundaries for the fire PRA, ensure that what you're doing aligns with the preexisting 

data in the PRA database. If the electrical analysts establish partitions that do not align with the 

data in the database, it is too expensive to try to retroactively develop the database to align with 

the electrical analysts. 

QUESTION 

Slide 8: How do you deal with PRA analysts and electrical analysts viewing the same 

components different ways? 

RESPONSE 

This is a typical case for plants that are trying to establish a correlation up-front. Plantsthat fail 

to do this will find out on the back end of Task 9 that they'll have to pay for their indolence. One 

thing that we've started doing, which has proven to be extremely effective, is to arrange a 

meeting between the PRA analysts, the fire modelers, and the electrical analysts after the PRA 

equipment list is done. They must sit together and process every system component and every 

functional state. ILsounds horribly detailed, but you would be amazed at how much comes out 

in those meetings. When you try to reconcile Appendix Rand PRA and you see the same valve 

and both groups are trying to demonstrate that the plant runs safely and one group wants the 

valve open and the other wants it closed, it begs the question: "How can you both be right 

here?" The answer is that sometimes they are both right and you figure out what the reason for 

that was. In most cases, however, one group will admit that they had it wrong. One 

recommendation is that when completing task 2, build into your schedule time to have face-toface interactions where you process every component and every functional state in great detail. 

QUESTION 

Slide 9: How should auxiliary components be included? 

RESPONSE 

Deterministically decide if the components can affect the desired functional state of the 

component in question. 

A-3 
QUESTION

Slide 10: What is a supercomponent and how is it employed in this context?

RESPONSE

Some components aren't actually components. Instead, they're systems of subcomponents that

are better defined as a component. A perfect example is the load sequencer. One does not

simply walk and touch the load sequencer. Instead, the sequencer is made of sundry

subcomponents. Even though it's not a component proper, everyone thinks of it as a

component.

Session 3:

QUESTION

Slide 5: what's the difference between thermoset and thermoplastic cables?

RESPONSE

The difference is largely in the insulation that protects the conductor, not necessarily the cable

jacket.

QUESTION

Slide 5: When specifying a fire-resistant cable, does this imply a certain configuration?

RESPONSE

In a sense, it does imply the thermoset-only because those are the types-of cable that are

survivable under those conditions. However, it does not a priori define them as one particular

type or another. Another very rugged material is a silicon rubber insulation. We tried several

times to fail those during the CAROLFIRE tests and were not successful until we hit it with

water.

QUESTION

Slide 5: When you talked about the cable, you spoke little about the jacket. Is that because the

jackets on most of these cables are the same materials?

RESPONSE

The jacket's intent is not an electrical insulation. Instead, its purpose is to provide physical

protection for the electrical insulators that surround the individual conductors. When you're

pulling it through a conduit, sometimes that conduit has burrs or sticky things that will score the

jacket and hopefully protect the insulation. It's a sacrificial material. It also binds the conductors

together, making it easier to deal with a multi-conductor cable. Usually a binding tape will be

A-4

QUESTION 

Slide 10: What is a supercomponent and how is it employed in this context? 

RESPONSE 

Some components aren't actually components. Instead, they're systems of sUbcomponents that 

are better defined as a component. A perfect example is the load sequencer. One does not 

simply walk and touch the load sequencer. Instead, the sequencer is made of sundry 

subcomponents. Even though it's not a component proper, everyone thinks of it as a 

component. 

Session 3: 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: what's the difference between thermoset and thermoplastic cables? 

RESPONSE 

The difference is largely in the insulation that protects the conductor, not necessarily the cable 

jacket. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: When specifying a fire-resistant cable, does this imply a certain configuration? 

RESPONSE 

In a sense, it does imply the thermoset-only because those are the types· of cable that are 

survivable under those conditions. However, it does not a priori define them as one particular 

type or another. Another very rugged material is a silicon rubber insulation. We tried several 

times to fail those during the CAROLFIRE tests and were not successful until we hit it with 

water. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: When you talked about the cable, you spoke little about the jacket. Is that because the 

jackets on most of these cables are the same materials? 

RESPONSE 

The jacket's intent is not an ~Iectrical insulation. Instead, its purpose is to provide physical 

protection for the electrical insulators that surround the individual conductors. When you're 

pulling it through a conduit, sometimes that conduit has burrs or sticky things that will score the 

jacket and hopefully protect the insulation. It's a sacrificial material. It also binds the conductors 

together, making it easier to deal with a multi-conductor cable. Usually a binding tape will be 

A-4 
inside the jacket, just a plastic wrap to bind the strands together. Filler is also used to help

maintain the roundness of the cable.

QUESTION

Slide 5: Is the shielding considered part of the jacket?

RESPONSE

This can be both ways. There are a few insulators where people will have a shield around the

inside of the jacket, surrounding the thing. This is rare. Most cables, especially for

instrumentation wire, shield twisted wire pairs with an aluminized mylar. This has minimal

structural strength and is actually intended to provide protection against radio frequencies and

other electromagnetic interference.

Just as an aside, if your cables are stacked in a tray, the uppermost cables will generally be the

power cables, the next lower group would be control cables, and finally near the bottom are your

instrumentation cables. The whole idea there is that the power cables tend to give off much

more heat, and would likely be more prone to spontaneous combustion if a fault occurs.

QUESTION

Slide 5: Are cables generally given any sort of systematic designation on cables to specify their

function?

RESPONSE

When doing a plant walkdown, generally your cable tray identifiers will have a letter or number

within the identifier that indicates its service function, whether it's power, control, or

instrumentation. Sometimes they use a variety of letters, not necessarily P, but maybe AB or M

for power. C generally is used to designate control. Instrumentation is designated X or I or

some other designator.

QUESTION

Slide 5: I'm told there are few spurious actuations in power cables.

RESPONSE

This is true. We will elaborate more as we cover the three-phase proper sequence hot short.

The only other possibility would be for DC-powered circuits; since they're ungrounded, the

possibility exists for a polarity conflict that would result in a short.

QUESTION

Slide 5: When do you have to consider inter-cable shorts?

RESPONSE

It doesn't matter what insulation type is in either cable, we don't consider it credible that an

external short will be observed through the robust armor to interact with another protected

A-5

inside the jacket, just a plastic wrap to bind the strands together. Filler is also used to help 

maintain the roundness of the cable. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: Is the shielding considered part of the jacket? 

RESPONSE 

This can be both ways. There are a few insulators where people will have a shield around the 

inside of the jacket, surrounding the thing. This is rare. Most cables, especially for 

instrumentation wire, shield twisted wire pairs with an aluminized mylar. This has minimal 

structural strength and is actually intended to provide protection against radio frequencies and 

other electromagnetic interference. 

Just as an aside, if your cables are stacked in a tray, the uppermost cables will generally be the 

power cables, the next lower group would be control cables, and finally near the bottom are your 

instrumentation cables. The whole idea there is that the power cables tend to give off much 

more heat, and would likely be more prone to spontaneous combustion if a fault occurs. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: Are cables generally given any sort of systematic designation on cables to specify their 

function? 

RESPONSE 

When doing a plant walkdown, generally your cable tray identifiers will have a letter or number 

within the identifier that indicates its service function, whether it's power, control, or 

instrumentation. Sometimes they use a variety of letters, not necessarily P, but maybe AS or M 

for power. C generally is used to designate control. Instrumentation is designated X or I or 

some other designator. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: I'm told there are few spurious actuations in power cables. 

RESPONSE 

This is true. We will elaborate more as we cover the three-phase proper sequence hot short. 

The only other possibility would be for DC-powered circuits; since they're ungrounded, the 

possibility exists for a polarity conflict that would result in a short. 

QUESTION 

Slide 5: When do you have to consider inter-cable shorts? 

RESPONSE 

It doesn't matter what insulation type is in either cable, we don't consider it credible that an 

external short will be observed through the robust armor to interact with another protected 

A-5 
cable. The same is true for a cable in dedicated conduit sitting by itself. An interaction through

the conduit by an outside source is, again, not credible. However, for both cases, you must still

consider the intra-cable events.

QUESTION

But is inter-cable shorting still possible with thermoset cables?

RESPONSE

This is still credible. We did find one or two cases during CAROLFIRE where this happened.

QUESTION

But you said that thermoset cables only have issues with conductors and not with the jacket.

RESPONSE

The issue is with a cable-to-cable interaction between two thermoset cables.

QUESTION

And does it matter whether it's thermoplastic or thermoset?

RESPONSE

The existing guidelines indicate no difference between the two. However, we hope that with

additional research we will show that the probability for interaction between the two cables is

much less for thermoset than it is for thermoplastic.

QUESTION

What causes high-impedance faults?

RESPONSE

Fire damage. Again, it's somewhat of an artificial assumption that the cable will sit and short

with long arcs. The arcing tends to suppress the current. It is actually a resistance to flow

pathway.

QUESTION

Do we normally ground power cables?

RESPONSE

Yes. Through the equipment, it does see a ground. But these aren't normally grounded;

instead, they run with the ground. This is a grounded electrical system because the alternative

(ungrounded) cases are about the same.

A-6

cable. The same is true for a cable in dedicated conduit sitting by itself. An interaCtion through 

the conduit by an outside source is, again, not credible. However, for both cases, you must still 

consider the intra-cable events. 

QUESTION 

But is inter-cable shorting still possible with thermoset cables? 

RESPONSE 

This is still credible. We did find one or two cases during CAROLFIRE where this happened. 

QUESTION 

But you said that thermoset cables only have issues with conductors and not with the jacket. 

RESPONSE 

The issue is with a cable-to-cable interaction between two thermoset cables. 

QUESTION 

And does it matter whether it's thermoplastic or thermoset? 

RESPONSE 

The existing guidelines indicate no difference between the two. However, we hope that with 

additional research we will show that the probability for interaction between the two cables is 

much less for thermoset than it is for thermoplastic. 

QUESTION 

What causes high-impedance faults? 

RESPONSE 

Fire damage. Again, it's somewhat of an artificial assumption that the cable will sit and short 

with long arcs. The arcing tends to suppress the current. It is actually a resistance to flow 

pathway. 

QUESTION 

Do we normally ground power cables? 

RESPONSE 

Yes. Through the equipment, it does see a ground. But these aren't normally grounded; 

instead, they run with the ground. This is a grounded electrical system because the alternative 

(ungrounded) cases are about the same. 

A-6 
Yes. I have a compressor motor here, and it needs to have the proper sequence (A-A, B-B, CC) in order to operate. If it's an MOV, then in order to reverse direction, you have to reverse two

of the phases,

QUESTION

Slide 9: Earlier you talked about using tasks 3 and 9 together, thus removing a lot of cables from

the appendix R safe shutdown list. On your first pass, about how much of the cables are you

able to get rid of by looking at functional states?

RESPONSE

It depends on the failure mode of interest to the fire modelers who generated the component

list, or what functional state is important, and then the circuit design plays a major role in which

cables can be thrown out.

QUESTION

Slide 10: What does a screened compartment look like?

RESPONSE

That's where your interaction with the fire modelers comes from. They will break down the plant

into a variety of compartments and affirm that certain ones are devoid of combustible materials

or ignition sources where others are not. A screened compartment is one where the fire

modelers have decided that there is no way a fire can occur in that compartment.

QUESTION

Slide 10: How do you define the "normal" state of the plant?

RESPONSE

One of the underlying assumptions of the whole PRA is that all events take place at-power.

QUESTION

Slide 11: We know that the analysis has to be done on a conductor basis. You've only identified

the cable as far as the documentation goes, though.

RESPONSE

It will take different conductor actions to cause each of these possible events within the cables.

However, for a particular cable, multiple events are listed as possible outcomes.

QUESTION

Slide 11: When looking at a particular consequence, can you work backwards to determine the

possible initiating events?

RESPONSE

A-7

Yes. I have a compressor motor here, and it needs to have the proper sequence (A-A, 8-8, CC) in order to operate. If it's an MOV, then in order to reverse direction, you have to reverse two 

of the phases. 

QUESTION 

Slide 9: Earlier you talked about using tasks 3 and 9 together, thus removing a lot of cables from 

the appendix R safe shutdown list. On your first pass, about how much of the cables are you 

able to get rid of by looking at functional states? 

It depends on the failure mode of interest to the fire modelers who generated the component 

list, or what functional state is important, and then the circuit design plays a major role in which 

cables can be thrown out. 

QUESTION 

Slide 10: What does a screened compartment look like? 

RESPONSE 

That's where your interaction with the fire modelers comes from. They will break down the plant 

into a variety of compartments and affirm that certain ones are devoid of combustible materials 

or ignition sources where others are not. A screened compartment is one where the fire 

modelers have decided that there is no way a fire can occur in that compartment. 

QUESTION 

Slide 10: How do you define the "normal" state of the plant? 

RESPONSE 

One of the underlying assumptions of the whole PRA is that all events take place at-power. 

QUESTION 

Slide 11: We know that the analysis has to be done on a conductor basis. You've only identified 

the cable as far as the documentation goes, though. 

RESPONSE 

It will take different conductor actions to cause each of these possible events within the cables. 

However, for a particular cable, multiple events are listed as possible outcomes. 

QUESTION 

Slide 11: When looking at a particular consequence, can you work backwards to determine the 

possible initiating events? 

RESPONSE 

A-7 
Fire damage to the cable can cause some event. For a particular cable, we want to diagnose it

by looking at the overall list of events and discerning what the cable can cause a component to

do. If it gives an erroneous indication by misleading the operator, is that important from a

human factors standpoint? Perhaps. Therefore, it must be identified as a possible failure mode

of this cable. If not, and if the operators plan to use procedures to verify the operating status of

a particular component, then you'll probably only be looking for the spurious operation case, if

that's a possibility. This will be determined by inspecting individual cables.

QUESTION

11: If you're done with the fire analysis on a cable and know which ones cause spurious

operation, how do you make the final determination of what is risk-significant?

RESPONSE

It's not the decision of the electrical analysts, it's the systems analysts who make the

determination about what should finally be included in the PRA and decide how risky a fire can

be to their plant. They will have made a set of component selections that they believe are key

to successfully operating their plant. All the electrical engineers do is identify those cables

which could be affected by the fire in such a way as to result in unsuccessful operation of the

plant.

QUESTION

So do the PRA analysts simply disregard the Appendix R analysis and form their component

lists independently?

RESPONSE

When they form their component lists, they too go through the Appendix R components. If they

fail to include an Appendix R component, they justify why. They, too, depend on previous

analyses. However, they have a completely different rationale for their component selection.

QUESTION

How are inter-cable shorts affected by using the raceway system as the ground path?

RESPONSE

Based on experience, there may be intra-cable shorting long before one element shorts to

ground, but by the time you have cables shorting across one another, we have generally seen a

short to ground occur prior to that. So even if there isn't a ground conductor within the cable

itself, and you're using your raceway as the ground path, it still applies.

Session 4:

QUESTION

A-8

Fire damage to the cable can cause some event. For a particular cable, we want to diagnose it 

by looking at the overall list of events and discerning what the cable can cause a component to 

do. If it gives an erroneous indication by misleading the operator, is that important from a 

human factors standpoint? Perhaps. Therefore, it must be identified as a possible failure mode 

of this cable. If not, and if the operators plan to use procedures to verify the operating status of 

a particular component, then you'll probably only be looking for the spurious operation case, if 

that's a possibility. This will be determined by inspecting individual cables. 

QUESTION 

, 

11: If you're done with the fire analysis on a cable and know which ones cause spurious 

operation, how do you make the final determination of what is risk-significant? 

RESPONSE 

It's not the decision of the electrical analysts, it's the systems analysts who make the 

determination about what should finally be included in the PRA and decide how risky a fire can 

be to their plant. They will have made a set of component selections that they believe are key 

to successfully operating their plant. All the electrical engineers do is identify those cables 

which could be affected by the fire in such a way as to result in unsuccessful operation of the 

plant. 

QUESTION 

So do the PRA analysts simply disregard the Appendix R analysis and form their component 

lists independently? 

RESPONSE 

When they form their component lists, they too go through the Appendix R components. If they 

fail to include an Appendix R component, they justify why. They, too, depend on previous 

analyses. However, they have a completely different rationale for their component selection. 

QUESTION 

How are inter-cable shorts affected by using the raceway system as the ground path? 

RESPONSE 

Based on experience, there may be intra-cable shorting long before one element shorts to 

ground, but by the time you have cables shorting across one another, we have generally seen a 

short to ground occur prior to that. So even if there isn't a ground conductor within the cable 

itself, and you're using your raceway as the ground path, it still applies. 

Session 4: 

QUESTION 

A-8 
What do you mean by a 50-percent margin of safety for the CPT?

RESPONSE

If this CPT is rated for no more than 150 percent of the normal power requirements for the

circuit, including surge current, and the CPT is not overly sized, then you can credit the

reduction in the probability of a spurious actuation. You'll see that reduction when we get to the

tables. However, if you start getting a number of leakage current paths because the fire

damages the cable, you'll start drawing down on the CPT to the point where it won't support a

spurious actuation.

QUESTION

What happens when the CPT margin is greater than 150 percent? Do we analyze it without

further consideration?

RESPONSE

Yeah, we don't formalize that as part of our process, but that's really the right way to do it. For

example, if your normal power requirement is on the order of 100 V-A, and you've got a 300 V-A

CPT out there, that violates the 150-percent rule. You really shouldn't take credit for the CPT.

However, we don't deal with that in the decisionmaking process.

QUESTION

When are you able to allow the internal event risk contribution to be zero?

RESPONSE

If you can justify it by saying that there is no possibility of an internal shorting event and there is

no way to get an intra-cable portion of that event, note it and use your external event (one only).

But it is incumbent upon you to justify why you didn't use the primary shorting event.

QUESTION

What source do you use for the fire scenario when you have multiple neighboring

compartments?

RESPONSE

If, in your plant, you have four neighboring compartments and only have fire concerns in two

compartments; if you have a cable in a tray running through one fire hazard compartment into

the other, but only the conduit exists in the second; then you would have had to do the Task 9

circuit analysis for that particular cable no matter where it ran, now the neighboring

compartment issue does become important. Now, in the tray compartment, you would use the

tray case. If, on the other hand, they wanted you to analyze the fire impact from the conduit

compartment on spurious operation, then you go to the conduit.

QUESTION

A-9

What do you mean by a 50-percent margin of safety for the CPT? 

RESPONSE 

If this CPT is rated for no more than 150 percent of the normal power requirements for the 

circuit, including surge current, and the CPT is not overly sized, then you can credit the 

reduction in the probability of a spurious actuation. You'll see that reduction when we get to the 

tables. However, if you start getting a number of leakage current paths because the fire 

damages the cable, you'll start drawing down on the CPT to the point where it won't support a 

spurious actuation. 

QUESTION 

What happens when the CPT margin is greater than 150 percent? Do we analyze it without 

further consideration? 

RESPONSE 

Yeah, we don't formalize that as part of our process, but that's really the right way to do it. For 

example, if your normal power requirement is on the order of 100 V-A, and you've got a 300 V-A 

CPT out there, that violates the 150-percent rule. You really shouldn't take credit for the CPT. 

However, we don't deal with that in the decision making process. 

QUESTION 

When are you able to allow the internal event risk contribution to be zero? 

RESPONSE 

If you can justify it by saying that there is no possibility of an internal shorting event and there is 

no way to get an intra-cable portion of that event, note it and use your external event (one only). 

But it is incumbent upon you to justify why you didn't use the primary shorting event. 

QUESTION 

What source do you use for the fire scenario when you have multiple neighboring 

compartments? 

RESPONSE 

If, in your plant, you have four neighboring compartments and only have fire concerns in two 

compartments; if you have a cable in a tray running through one fire hazard compartment into 

the other, but only the conduit exists in the second; then you would have had to do the Task 9 

circuit analysis for that particular cable no matter where it ran, now the neighboring . 

compartment issue does become important. Now, in the tray compartment, you would use the 

tray case. If, on the other hand, they wanted you to analyze the fire impact from the conduit 

compartment on spurious operation, then you go to the conduit. 

QUESTION 

A-9 
What if you have a cable in a tray that extends partway into the room and the rest of the cable

remains in conduit?

RESPONSE

,You must then ask the modelers about their postulated fire scenario. Is the fire scenario more

likely to affect the conduit, or is it more likely to affect the cable tray portion of it? If they say

"both," then my suggestion would be to only investigate the one with the higher probability

value.

QUESTION

Why would you use the table method at all to get probability values if it is so inaccurate?

RESPONSE

It changes the approach so that when you use the table method, you just go with the numbers

that you have. Again, the differences in number of targets and sources and grounds play a role

in the formula there. The table method has one nice aspect in that it is quick and dirty. We

think it is overly conservative. However, it gives you a number, and you don't spend days

working it out. You instead just go to the cable, write it down, and go to the next cable.

QUESTION

Where do you get the inputs for the PRA model (probability of ignition, severity, duration)?

RESPONSE

The basic probability number is used in the PRA model as whether or not a certain component

will experience an operation and what impact that will have on the plant. There is no means

right now of determining the duration, other than what the fire modelers predict for how long it

will take to damage the cable. This turns around, then, and becomes an HRA issue, which is

something rather alien to me.

QUESTION

What type of cable should we assume for PRA applications if we can't get in to look at them?

RESPONSE

For Appendix R and safety-related applications, my best guess would be that the great majority

of cables are thermoset. But, because this fire PRA will also bring in balance-of-plant-type

components and systems, the ratio for the fire PRA may bring the number of thermoplastic

cables a little closer to the number of thermoset. Again, you need to consider whether or not

you're talking about an older plant, where a lot of thermoplastic cables were used (i.e., pre

Browns Ferry), or are you talking about a later version, like a Watts-Barr-something that uses

almost exclusively thermoset. In any case, it's still a plant-specific issue.

A-10

What if you have a cable in a tray that extends partway into the room and the rest of the cable 

remains in conduit? 

RESPONSE 

,You must then ask the modelers about their postulated fire scenario. Is the fire scenario more 

likely to affect the conduit, or is it more likely to affect the cable tray portion of it? If they say 

"both," then my suggestion would be to only investigate the one with the higher probability 

value. 

QUESTION 

Why would you use the table method at all to get probability values if it is so inaccurate? 

RESPONSE 

It changes the approach so that when you use the table method, you just go with the numbers 

that you have. Again, the differences in number of targets and sources and grounds playa role 

in the formula there. The table method has one nice aspect in that it is quick and dirty. We 

think it is overly conservative. However, it gives you a number, and you don't spend days 

working it out. You instead just go to the cable, write it down, and go to the nextcable. 

QUESTION 

Where do you get the inputs for the PRA model (probability of ignition, severity, duration)? 

RESPONSE 

The basic probability number is used in the PRA model as whether or not a certain component 

will experience an operation and what impact that will have on the plant. There is no means 

right now of determining the duration, other than what the fire modelers predict for how long it 

will take to damage the cable. This turns around, then, and becomes an HRA issue, which is 

something rather alien to me. 

QUESTION 

What type of cable should we assume for PRA applications if we can't get in to look at them? 

RESPONSE 

For Appendix R and safety-related applications, my best guess would be that the great majority 

of cables are thermoset. But, because this fire PRA will also bring in balance-of-plant-type 

components and systems, the ratio for the fire PRA may bring the number of thermoplastic 

cables a little closer to the number of thermoset. Again, you need to consider whether or not 

you're talking about an older plant, where a lot of thermoplastic cables were used (Le., pre 

Browns Ferry), or are you talking about a later version, like a Watts-Barr-something that uses 

almost exclusively thermoset. In any case, it's still a plant-specific issue. 

A-lO 
Session 5:

QUESTION

Are the functional states of the cables in question described in the PRA database?

RESPONSE

We'd say that the answer to that is "yes" in the sense that it is clearly the intent of the database

where the functional requirements of the database are defined to include the functional

requirements of the critical cable elements that are required. It is the intent of the database to

house the information developed through the circuit analysis project. The cable raceway

information does not typically have that.

My experience to date is that some of the traditional stuff would always be in there-you know,

the worksheet stuff. If you noticed, the worksheet didn't really cover that. I think what you'll see

is that when Frank gets into the Task 10, as far as inter-cable, intra-cable, and all the subtleties

and mechanistic things that go into Task 10, those tend to be more of a "here's a comment field,

write down what you did" rather than one or the other. I think that part could be matured a little

bit, certainly, but to this point, my experience or exposure hasn't been in instances where it was

as rigorous as the task-end type of data that you're discussing, that I've seen for the other circuit

analysis data. But, your point's still very valid that when all is said and done, you want to have

some way to capture that in a fairly automated sense. We're trying to avoid going back and

having volumes and volumes of paperwork that don't work with the database.

QUESTION

Rather than using the default position of all valves as "open, full power" because this results in

inadequate results, could you use three conditions in your PRA: open, closed, and operating?

RESPONSE

You could. You could define your operating conditions to cover all cases. That's where, when

you sit down to develop your strategy, you'll sit down with these guys and know how their basic

events are done. It can become amazingly complicated, based upon how basic events are

captured. At the onset, the way basic events were first presented in the model just seemed

silly. I didn't get it. After a while, though, when I got really familiar with what the PRA is trying to

do, it makes more sense. Let me give you an example. If the initial state of a motor-operated

valve is closed and the desired position is open, there may be two basic events for this event. I

can't change their model every time I don't like the way it works for me electrically. If they have

a basic event, called BE-i, where the valve fails to close, and BE-2, where the valve transfers

open, then they split into two events the functioning of the valve. This becomes an embedded

spurious actuation concern of a functional state. You may have to do two separate analyses for

this valve every time you see that. If BE-2 is mapped under a different gate in the model, you

may want to, because it will encompass a smaller subset of cables than BE-I. But when you

consider 400 or 500 valves, it would cost a great deal of money to do this. Is that money well

spent? It depends. If both events are mapped under the same gate in the electrical model, the

dominant basic event will dominate and the other one will become meaningless. If you didn't

A-11

Session 5: 

QUESTION 

Are the functional states of the cables in question described in the PRA database? 

RESPONSE 

We'd say that the answer to that is "yes" in the sense that it is clearly the intent of the database 

where the functional requirements of the database are defined to include the functional 

requirements of the critical cable elements that are required. It is the intent of the database to 

house the information developed through the circuit analysis project. The cable raceway 

information does not typically have that. 

My experience to date is that some of the traditional stuff would always be in there-you know, 

the worksheet stuff. If you noticed, the worksheet didn't really cover that. I think what you'll see 

is that when Frank gets into the Task 10, as far as inter-cable, intra-cable, and all the subtleties 

and mechanistic things that go into Task 10, those tend to be more of a "here's a comment field, 

write down what you did" rather than one or the other. I think that part could be matured a little 

bit, certainly, but to this point, my experience or exposure hasn't been in instances where it was 

as rigorous as the task-end type of data that you're discussing, that I've seen for the other circuit 

analysis data. But, your point's still very valid that when all is said and done, you want to have 

some way to capture that in a fairly automated sense. We're trying to avoid going back and 

having volumes and volumes of paperwork that don't work with the database. 

QUESTION 

Rather than using the default position of all valves as "open, full power" because this results in 

inadequate results, could you use three conditions in your PRA: open, closed, and operating? 

RESPONSE 

You could. You could define your operating conditions to cover all cases. That's where, when 

you sit down to develop your strategy, you'll sit down with these guys and know how their basic 

events are done. It can become amazingly complicated, based upon how basic events are 

captured. At the onset, the way basic events were first presented in the model just seemed 

silly. I didn't get it. After a while, though, when I got really familiar with what the PRA is trying to 

do, it makes more sense. Let me give you an example. If the initial state of a motor-operated 

valve is closed and the desired position is open, there may be two basic events for this event. I 

can't change their model every time I don't like the way it works for me electrically. If they have 

a basic event, called BE-1, where the valve fails to close, and BE-2, where the valve transfers 

open, then they split into two events the functioning of the valve. This becomes an embedded 

spurious actuation concern of a functional state. You may have to do two separate analyses for 

this valve every time you see that. If BE-2 is mapped under a different gate in the model, you 

may want to, because it will encompass a smaller subset of cables than BE-1. But when you 

consider 400 or 500 valves, it would cost a great deal of money to do this. Is that money well 

spent? It depends. If both events are mapped under the same gate in the electrical model, the 

dominant basic event will dominate and the other one will become meaningless. If you didn't 

A-ll 
understand that you could do circuit analysis for 300-400 valves, it would be a lot of money and

time for absolutely zero value. You really need to understand how the basic events line up. It's

okay to map BE-2 to the circuit analysis for BE-1 for one functional state because the functional

state encompasses the second one. You have case after case where it's just necessary to

drive it down to a detailed level when doing the circuit analysis and making sure it gets mapped

into the PRA and basic events. What seems to be simple is not. If you do your database

correctly, it should be able to accommodate all the different iterations of the functional state. If

you can't come to terms in an 805 project on the issue of what a functional state means, you

just create another one, which checks 805, not PRA.

A-12

understand that you could do circuit analysis for 300-400 valves, it would be a lot of money and 

time for absolutely zero value. You really need to understand how the basic events line up. It's 

okay to map BE-2 to the circuit analysis for BE-1 for one functional state because the functional 

state encompasses the second one. You have case after case where it's just necessary to 

drive it down to a detailed level when doing the circuit analysis and making sure it gets mapped 

into the PRA and basic events. What seems to be simple is not. If you do your database 

correctly, it should be able to accommodate all the different iterations of the functional state. If 

you can't come to terms in an 805 project on the issue of what a functional state means, you 

just create another one, which checks 805, not PRA. 

A-12 
Appendix B: Exercise Problems and Solutions

B-1

Appendix B: Exercise Problems and Solutions 

8-1 
Exercises with Reference Figures

B-2

Exercises with Reference Figures 

8-2 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: I AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type:

Component Description: Power Operated Relief Valve

AOV

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

AOV-1_TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN)

CLOSED

CLOSED

CLOSED

CLOSED

Yes [] No

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? I Function Fault Consequence Comments

F 4

F 4

F I

F i

I 4 4 4

Comments:

B-3

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component 10: . AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: Power Operated Relief Valve 

BE Code: AOV-1_ TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [gJ 

Power Supplies: .!:::!B~re~a~k~e.!...:.r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-3 
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

SCHEME VA3 SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

PRESSURE OPERATED

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE

SOV-1

Drawing No.:

E-03

Date:

05/04/2007

Revision No.:

1

B-4

Fuse 

XOO 

KPHUOO 

h PB 

(OPEN) 

'-L"'"- SVO 

ENERGIZE 

TO OPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

SCHEME VA3 

B-4 

33LGOO 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

PRESSURE OPERATED 

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 

SOV-1 

Drawing No.: 

E-03 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 
VJTAL-A

w

0 XOO, U00 U U

II R00,®V

IX00, U00, U U

GOO, SVO

x0o, svo

©

I T-1

SOY-l, SCHEME VA3

B-5

SNPP 

TITLE: DATE: 

AOV-1 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27/07 

VITAL-A 

0 

XOO, UOO 

CB-2 ® ~ xoo, UOO, ROO, 

GOO,SVO 

XOO,SVO 

© 

PT-:l 

SOV-1, SCHEME VA3 

B-5 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: AOV-3 (SOV-3) Component Type:

Component Description: Charging Pump Injection Valve

AOV

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE)

CLOSED

OPEN

CLOSED

CLOSED

Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-6

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: AOV-3 (SOV-3) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: Charging Pump Injection Valve 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE) 

CLOSED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

OPEN 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

High Consequence Component Yes D No IZI 

Power Supplies: =B.:...,:re=a::..:..;k""'e.:....:.r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-6 
PO0

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID

SOV-2 LETDOWN ISOLATION P82 AOV-2

SOV-3 CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM --

PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM

SOLENOID VALVES

SOV-2 & SOV-3

Drawing No.:

E-02

Date:

07/25/2008

Revision No.: B-7

1

Fuse 

VALVE 

SOV-2 

SOV-3 

POD 

SV1 

33UNOD 

XK-

~~ SV2 

PB 

(CLOSE) 

L PB I (OPEN) 

""-"---- svo 

ENERGIZE 

TO OPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

LETDOWN ISOLA TION PB2 AOV-2 

CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3 

B-7 

33UGOO ROO 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM--

PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM 

SOLENOID VALVES 

SOV-2 & SOV-3 

Drawing No.: 

E-02 

Date: 

07/25/2008 

Revision No.: 
U q

.PNL-B

U- -

0

P00, NOO

I

POO, N00, ROO,

GOO, SVO, SVl,

SP

U q

P00, SV2©

PNLX

SOV-3, SCHEME PB3

B-8

SNPP TITLE: DATE: 

AOV-3 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27/07 

PNL-B 

0) 

POO,NOO \ 

CB-5 ® ~ POO, NOO, ROO, 

GOO, SVO, SV1, 

POO,SV2 SP , 

© 

PNLX 

SOV-3, SCHEME PB3 

B-8 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: High Pressure Injection Valve

BE Code: MOV-9_FTO (MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes D No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-9

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component 10: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: High Pressure Injection Valve 

BE Code: MOV-9_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No 1:8] 

Power Supplies: !:B:!...!re~a::.!:k~e~r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-9 
A

AB____ 480 V

B 30, 60 Hz

C.1.I

42_

0-

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH Ib

MOV-1 HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-1

MOV-9 HIGH PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - HIGH

PRESSURE INJECTION

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES

MOV-1 & MOV-9

Drawing No.:

E-04

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

B-10

A 

B 

C 

CCC 

42 

0 

VALVE 

MOV-l 

MOV-9 

} 480V 

3¢, 60 Hz 

FU 

4801120 V 

-

42 

C 

ALL 

49-

49 

YOO 

11 

49X420-

MECH_ 

INTLK 

42 

0-

49X42CVALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-l 

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9 

B-IO 

7 

-GOO -ROC 

Drawing No.: SNPP E-04 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - HIGH 1--::0:-: ale:----1 

PRESSURE INJECTION 05/01/2007 

MOTOR OP E RATE D VALVES 1-::--:-:---:-:-----1 

MOV-1 & MOV-9 Revision No.: 

o 
K

YOO, SO1, ROO,

G00, SC1, SCO,

SOO, 2SP

vLX00, S01, R00,

G00, SC1, 2SP

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME

MOV-1 MCC-Al 2 CB-5 MA12

MOV-3 MCC-Al 3 CB-5 MA13

MOV-4 MCC-BI 2 CB-5 MB12

MOV-5 MCC-Al 4 CB-5 MA14

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13

MOV-7 MCC-Al 5 CB-5 MA15

MOV-9 MCC-Bl 5 CB-5 MB15

MOV-16 MCC-Al 8 CB-3 MA18

MOV-17 MCC-Bl1 6 CB-3 MB16

B-1I

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 1 5/4/07 

® 

T1, T2, T3 

0 ® MB MCC M YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, 

GOO, SC1, SCO, GOO, SC1 , 2SP 

SOO,2SP 

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME 

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12 

MOV-3 MCC-A1 3 CB-5 MA13 

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12 

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 CB-5 MA14 

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13 

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 CB-5 MA15 

MOV-9 MCC-B1 5 CB-5 MB15 

MOV-16 MCC-A1 8 CB-3 MA18 

MOV-17 MCC-B1 6 CB-3 MB16 

"-

B-ll 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve

BE Code: MOV-15_FTO (MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: THROTTLED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes El No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

+ + 4 +

-4- + 4 +

+ + 4 i

+ + + i

Comments:

B-1 2

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve 

BE Code: MOV-15_FTO 

THROTTLED 

(MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No [gI 

Power Supplies: .=B::..:re::.::a:::;.;k~e::..:r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-12 
V

REMOTE--

RAISE_

~43 LOA

JRAISE

0

+1

(REM)-

REMOT7

I RAISE

(LOC)

S43 -LOCAL

rNo1

.6ý T

Motor Shown in Remote Operating Mode

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW- B STEAM THROTTLE

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

MOV-15

Drawing No.:

E-09

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 B-13

P01 

REMO~ 43 LOCAL 

RAISE RAISE 

(REM) (LOC) 

1- LOCAL 

r-F03 

L_

l 

() 1 

~ LOWER LOWER 

co (REM) ~ (LOC) 

""" +1 

1 

-~ 

F02 REMO~ 

LOCAL 

N01 

Motor Shown in Remote Operating Mode 

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 B-13 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW- B STEAM THROTTLE 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-15 

Drawing No.: 

E-09 

Date: 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
SN PP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM- 2 5/1/07

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4

B-14

SNPP MOV BLOck DIAGRAM - 2 5/1/07 

I . C8-3 1 P01, N01, F02, °1 

-----_ ..... F03, SP 

ISE. I P01, N01, FOCfJ I MOV-1S I 

F03,SP 

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 

B-14 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-13 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: PORV Block Valve

BE Code: MOV-13_FTC (MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE)

Required Position: OPEN / CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: OPEN

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-1 5

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: MOV-13 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: PORV Block Valve 

BE Code: (MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE) 

Required Position: OPEN I CLOSED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: OPEN 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No IZI 

Power Supplies: ~B~re~a~k~el..:.r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-15 
A

B

C

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - PORV

BLOCK MOTOR OPERATED

VALVE

MOV-13

Drawing No.:

E-10

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

B-16

0

B A--~--~-------} 480 V 

3¢, 60 Hz 

C ---+-+---41,....------

42 

o 

ccc 

000 49-

4801120 V 

42 

C 

F 

IS£!. 

43-

FU 

49 

YOO 

ALL 

49-

XOO 

IS£!. "+ 43- J ~Y04 

LPB 

B..SP. [(OPEN 

IS£!. 

43-

IS£!. 

43-

VAlVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION 

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 

B-16 

.33 

7 

.33 

3 

-R01 -G01 

Drawing No.: SNPP E-10 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - PORV Date: 

BLOCK MOTOR OPERATED 

VALVE 

MOV-13 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
XOO, GO1, R01

YC2, Y05, ROO,

GOO, Y06, YC1,

YO1, 2SP

YOQ, X01, X02,

YC5, Y07, 4SP

T1,T2, T3

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17

B-17

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 3 5/1/07 

® 

XOO, G01, R01 

© ® @ ....... ----~ MCC-A1 XOO, SCO, SOD, MOV-13 YC2, Y05, ROO, YOO, X01, X02, 10-__ ..... GOO, Y06, YC1, 1.....-_,....-..... YC5, YO?, 4SP 4SP 

Y01,2SP 

YC4, Y02, 

R02, G02, 

Y04, YC3, 

Y03,2SP 

@ 

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 

B-17 

® 

T1, T2, T3 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-10 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-10_FTO (MOV-10 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-18

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: MOV-10 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-10_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-10 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No ~ 

Power Supplies: !:B:.:.:re:::!:a::.:;k~e:!..:r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-18 
VALVE SHOWN IN FULL CLOSED POSITION

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR

OPERATED VALVE

MOV-10

Drawing No.:

E-11

Date:

05/04/2007

Revision No.:

0

B-19

A-...... -------.,.;} 480 V 

B 3¢,60Hz 

c--+--+--..---

42 

o 

ccc 

49-

4801120 V 

42 

C 

FU FU 

42CVALVE SHOWN IN FULL CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 

B-19 

3-

SC3 

43 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR 

OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-10 

Drawing No.: 

E-11 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
SN PP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM -4 5/4/07

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16

B-20

SNPP 

CB-3 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 4 

SOO,SCO, SC3 SOO,S01, SCO, 

L....-........ ---,~ SC1, SC3 

© 

5/4/07 

RSP 

@ X01, 

S02, 

SC2, 

SC3 S01, S02, SC1, SC2, SP , 

SP ® 

I-~-o-o-, s-o-o-,s-c-o_@.;;;.B ..... MCC-A1I-T

- 1-,-T-2,-T-3--@.;;;.P ...... MOV-10 

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 

B-20 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-8 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: RHR Outboard Suction Valve

BE Code: MOV-8_TO (MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes Z No [D

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

.4 4. I. I.

Comments:

B-21

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: MOV-8 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: RHR Outboard Suction Valve 

BE Code: MOV-8_TO 

CLOSED 

(MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes IZI No D 

Power Supplies: .=B.:....:re""'a::.:.;k~e.:.!r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-21 
A

B _480 V

} 30, 60 Hz

C.E.C

42

0

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

MOV-8

Drawing No.:

E-12

Date:

05/04/2007

Revision No.:

0

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 B-22

A 

B 

C 3¢,60Hz 

(( (1 

} 480V 

42 

o 

4801120 v 

4801120 V 

.-+-+---Cl--.. 

42 

C 

-XOO 

FU 

X02 

ALL 

49-

YOO 

PB 

(OPEN) 

KS 

-SOl 

42 

c-

_MECH 

INTLK 

-SCl 

42 

0-

49XVALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 

MOV Permissive 

Control Circuit 

Main MOV 

./control 

~ Circuit 

3 

-GOO 

G R 

B-22 

7 

-ROC 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-8 

Drawing No.: 

E-12 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
YOO, S01, ROO,

GOO, SC1, SCO,

S00, 2SP

XOO, S01, ROO,

GOO, SC1, X01, SP

X02, YO1, LOO, WOO, SP

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14

B-23

TITLE: DATE: 

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 5 5/4/07 

® 

T1, T2, T3 

@ ® ~----------~MCC-B1~----------~ YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, CB-5 MOV-8 

-----.--- GOO, SC1 , SCO, -----.--- GOO, SC1, X01, SP 1....-____ ...... 

SOO,2SP 

© 

X02, Y01,LOO,VVOO,SP 

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 

B-23 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-11 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-11_FTO (MOV-11 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-24

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: MOV-11 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-11_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-11 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No IZI 

Power Supplies: .=:B.!..!re~a:.!.:k~e!...:.r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-24 
+

P1

G1 RI

72C: I. HS- L_ HSCLOSE OPEN

Fl

0

04

Yc1

SHUNT

SI

720

C

YO0

72C

0

Y02

Xl 33_

YC2

TSNI

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3

B-25

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR

OPERATED VALVE

MOV-11

Drawing No.:

E-1 3

Date:

05/09/2007

Revision No.:

0

--~---- ~--~~-.-------- P1 ----------------------.-------~~----------------._------_. 

o 

o 

> 

LO 

N 

..... 

SHUNT 

SERIES 

YC1 

S1 

YC2 

TSHSCLOSE 

Y01 

Y02 

HSOPEN 

33-

33-

G1 R1 

~L---__ ~--~Jr~-------N1 ----------------------~------~~----------------~------~ 

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 

B-25 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR 

OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-11 

Drawing No.: 

E-13 

Date: 

05/09/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
NI, Fl, Si, Al, A2

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3

B-26

SNPP 

TITLE: DATE: 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 6 5/9/07 

(A) CB-3 

P1, N1, YC1, Y01, G1, R1, SP 

(s) 

DC BUS-B N1, YC2, Y02 MOV-11 (c) 

P1, G1, R1 

I (P) I 

N1, F1, S1, A1, A2 

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 

B-26 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-16 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-16_TO (MOV-16 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

+ F t t

+ + *

4- i i i

4 i i

.4 + +

.4 + +

.4 i i

Comments:

B-27

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component 10: MOV-16 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-16_TO 

CLOSED 

(MOV-16 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No ~ 

Power Supplies: =B.:...,:re=a::..:.;k=e.:...!r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-27 
A

B

c-Ti

(.C..

480 V

30, 60 Hz

FU

480/120 V

0-

DS ~3TSC 3

T_t ,,1_ 133

t 3 T7

4

>-So1 I --Sc1 c --GOO C >-ROC ALL

4 49-

I

4

I

42_

0 iii (OPEN)a

;#49X42

C k PB

=420-1

#49XI F4

000 C

4

,_4-42C- -OIf(0 ()

O 4 9-

TI' TT3

M

,P 42

C42

'-0-

jyhINTLK y

4

I U

(-yoo I

p

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - AFW

TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR

OPERATED VALVES

MOV-16 & MOV-17

Drawing No.:

E-08

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID

MOV-16 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MA18 MOV-16

MOV-17 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MB16 MOV-17

B-28

A 

B 

C 

CCC 

42 

0 

VALVE 

MOV-16 

MOV-17 

} 480V 

3¢, 60 Hz 

FU 

4801120 V 

ALL 

49-

-

42 PB 

C (OPEN) 

49 

YOO 

~ 

11 

49X420-

MECH 

INTLK 

42 

0-

49X42CVALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MA18 MOV-16 

AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MB16 MOV-.17 

B-28 

3 7 

-GOO -ROC 

Drawing No.: SNPP E-08 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - AFW Date: 

TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR 05/01/2007 

OPERATED VALVES 

MOV-16 & MOV-17 Revision No.: 

o 
SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM -1 5/4/07

TI, T2, T3

,,,, K ',O,' A I

YOO, SO1, ROO,

G00, SC1, SCO,

S0O, 2SP

X00, S01, R2S, IGOO, SC1, 2SP

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME

MOV-1 MCC-Al 2 CB-5 MA12

MOV-3 MCC-Al 3 CB-5 MA13

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12

MOV-5 MCC-Al 4 CB-5 MA14

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13

MOV-7 MCC-Al 5 CB-5 MA15

MOV-9 MCC-Bl 5 CB-5 MB15

MOV-16 MCC-Al 8 CB-3 MA18

MOV-17 MCC-Bl1 6 CB-3 MB16

B-29

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 1 5/4/07 

® 

T1, T2, T3 

0 ® MB MCC M YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, 

GOO, SC1, SCO, GOO, SC1, 2SP 

SOO,2SP 

.M. MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME 

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12 

MOV-3 MCC-A1 3 CB-5 MA13 

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12 

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 CB-5 MA14 

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13 

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 CB-5 MA15 

MOV-9 MCC-B1 5 CB-5 MB15 

MOV-16 MCC-A1 8 CB-3 MA18 

MOV-17 MCC-B1 6 CB-3 MB16 

B-29 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument

Component Description: RCS Pressure

BE Code: P1-I_FL (RCS Pressure Indication Fails High)

Required Position: AVAILABLE

Functional State

Normal Position: AVAILABLE

Failed Electrical Position: LOW

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-30

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument 

Component Description: RCS Pressure 

BE Code: PI-1 FL (ReS Pressure Indication Fails High) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

AVAILABLE 

AVAILABLE 

Low 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No [8J 

Power Supplies: .=Bc:...:re:<,::a::.!.k"",e"-'r:'--_______ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-30 
7 3 (:D

SH E-02

VBIF

VBIE

PSi

SOV-1

SH E-03

PT-1

120 VAC SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RCS

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

TRANSMITTER I

Date:

05/22/2007

Revision No.:

1

PT-1 B-31

00 

TB 

3 .' 4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

G 

VB1A VB1F 

PS1 

PT-1 

PRESSURIZER 

120 VAC 

B-31 

CB-2 

VB1G 

PI-1 

SIRR PB2C 

SOV-2 

SH E-02 

SOV-3 

SH E-02 

PB3C 

VB1E 

RPH VA3C 

SOV-1 

SH E-03 

KPHSNPP E-14 

Orawing No.: 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RCS I--::O:-at-e:-----l 

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 

TRANSMITTER 

PT-1 

OS/22/2007 

Revision No.: 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: ANN-A Component Type: Annunciator

Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature

BE Code: ANN-I_FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann)

Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS

Functional State

Normal Position: AVAILABLE

Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

+ t t

± + t t

+ + + t

Comments:

B-32

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: ANN-1 Component Type: Annunciator 

Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature 

BE Code: ANN-1 FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann) 

Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS 

Functional State 

Normal Position: AVAILABLE 

Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No ~ 

Power Supplies: .=B"""re::..::a""'ko.:::e.!..!r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-32 
P-8A FAILED. TO -P -ac ° PI\A/A - j-v '-A 6mE T I-a

F HIGH TEMP

ANN-1

I AUTO STAP.T

P8A

I IW IPPED

P8C

C11L

35)-5

AFW-A

E'•43G..

PSA

k. ZtL9,

'L,

(3-4) (3ý.5) (5-ro)

-X1, 45P(445)®(

Z4 (449)

-I1 t2I, 13,5,15, IG[•, 1-7,0

186 19(449) -2•,2,23,25z4.5,2e_,Z2• 0'1

10, 129 (49')•

-- lIAZ, 15,I14,15 I I7,$ , '

Vb,19 (449)

a- 2k 2, ZB?, B4, B5, Zr, Z7,

10, 29,(449) ©

BLOCK DiAGRAM

SCHEME K16

SNPP

ANNUNCIATOR

SCHEME K16

Drawing No.:

ANN-1

Date:

05/20/2007

Revision No.:

#8

B-33

AFW-A ID~8A FAILED, TO 

HIGH TEMP "'t AUTO 5TA2.T -tIC! 

·P-BC 

TKIPPED 

ANN-1 

C11L :100o:t .. 

TE-AF~1 

TE-AFWA J i~~~~ _. ~J 5\-\, 3 J. 

Jl005 4 

P8A 

P8C 

~ 21 3x-<e 

8f·"j~~0'. 51--\. 10) 

JIOOO 

30 

ell ell \.: 

~---....., 

(3- 4) (.3-G) 

C.1870 

"I. II, 'Z,l3,l4~ frV1\ 18,'21,22,23.24 ~ (UNSCHECULE.D 

b-~ Xl, 4'5P(4,45) ® 

11,\2. ;3.lLl,le,21,22,23; 0 

24 (449) \:::.J 

G::IB7B 

""---1--1 Ir'2 ,13, lA ,15,16,17.(]) 

18,19 (449) ,: " 

@ 33, 34 _---, Sl5 \J\ilRE.'5 J 

I TE-AFW-A 1 1 ® )(.1., 4 SP(445) 

~~--~ ~~~~ 

JI005 

BLOCK D1AGRAJv1 mII'~ 

SCHEME K16 

B-33 

2\r2c,2.3,L~:25,26.Z7, (D fD t29 (449) 

SNPP 

ANNUNCIATOR 

SCHEME K16 

Drawing No.: 

ANN-1 

Dale: 

05/20/2007 

Revision No,: 

#8 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: HPI-B Component Type: Pump

Component Description: High Pressure Injection Pump B

BE Code: HPIAFTS (HPI-A Fails to Start)

HPIAFTR (HPI-A Fails to Run)

Required Position: ON

Functional State

Normal Position: STANDBY / ON

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

_ Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? I Function Fault Consequence Comments

Comments:

B-34

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component 10: HPI-B 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

Component Type: 

High Pressure Injection Pump B 

HPIA_FTS 

HPIA_FTR 

ON 

(HPI-A Fails to Start) 

(HPI-A Fails to Run) 

STANDBY/ON 

Off 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No [8J 

Pump 

Power Supplies: .!::::B:!..:re~a:!.!:k~e~r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-34 
1 I 2 2 I 4 I 6 I 7 B I 9 I 12 I 11 12 12 I f f -

SWGR-B 4.16KV

LECAKOE I SEECEIRAIOM LEEJAW. I

1(350 MVA)

A

B

D

.... ... - - - - I --- ',- .... ,-- ,- ,,-,--. -- ---

2S .Ob 4 --.SE .. .. . .4 ... . . 4, S .J00S E ... . 4, . . . '.,• • . , . .

------ ------ , L •• -• - --': i , -• \ • ' --L ::• -. . .

• -•m, ,••• L- 4------ - ------ ... -•

B, [

.•A - •

A C 5 A

SWGR-B 4.16K V (350 MVA)

Arp

-'' ---- . EfET

400. 5 400 A [99AEKA toAI,

SST-B 1' 7~

7: .

--------0

- - -

lEA!'. A-T

El,

W ITA T -RU ~ SES 

It ST.US wESR SA

Tc T ER EASS

fl~L COKEA~!AE SAE TSR '

&44 aKSCAtlEL

~r. AS CSUO AXR .E I

paaC"S CU6

I IAAO

EEESI

ToPAU PAA.~ AAt

EGS E 00.00

TOS IJW YSR

AlfU 

C A

0-35 ALSAO

ES3SACAA.

:3 213A

A~f.EAAA*EPICUR .IsCAL

01

A

c

D

EE~UAA

F

-, I

Li

6

H

REENEDRAWINGS.

A.AP-= KE'ATA ! CO.L C AU .,CO -1AA . I

SNP P Drawing No.: SWGR-B-01

Date:

4.16 KV SWGR-B 05/20/2007

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM R vsIAonN.:

B-35

A 

B 

c 

D 

G 

H 

4.ISKV 

4 

SWGR-B 

5 

1(350 MV/\) 

_____ ;~~----J 

~ 

~ 

-. ------- --. -- -_.- -- --- --- ---- ----------- ------ ---------- ------- ---- -- ---!---

B-35 

10 

CC""'~.;;D 

hLOW L.6C:T 

('U, 

i1 13 

I'JC,IW ""~I''''I:II.C! roCt .. L' 

I Dc40& 'TO o('0'1.DCo09 TOIXiIt. 

a .,-To\. K!\v '":'IIIA~ II. CiC'jr.-:;.,,"o 

~ ::= =:: .. ::~"~.,p ,.la./LAUolo ;r.04 OVER CU'UIENT AEl.a..v , 

~ ~: g:~i~TW~I!L~~P '''re/U(Mo. 

~ CHA~N(i/..j .. S! ~"'i=' Ie "/r~a ~OCit [JV[:Q ClliRtNT 1lE"!.f.Y I ~ c. ..... ~'~/o1 .. $~ ~u ... ~ 1& ~"'1OQoO 

0:'07 oyeR CURIt&.N"r' R.t."'" I ...&1<1.- 'Il!Av ' ...... RM ".101" (AO;.JNC r.N;.'5,4A .... " .. Uc.A&:.. .. 'TO ""'I.'" "'t .. Q.I:\.. ... .., 1)6C'I ~ 001" 

15G"09 '~t R",q/L.I.~1:. OVIIt CL'RRaNT PUaoIP R .. 

IA 

I. .. V etI~&1 ..M!l!!.. AUV "'!tao 'IV",TII.,.. PUMP' It. ~~ 

oa 10 oveR CUI'\tteNT R.:.. .... V 

G!fT- ~~; ~::::~':~ ... Vlt. ~ 

$TA.:)4l1itV "TR ...... '" 

ov~ ... CURReNT I'tI!Urrr.V 

"'60V SWITC~Q,''''R l.:r C'VaR CURRENT RU .... V 

~.! 10 l~;:)J.IoiD":I!.~ ...... , .. (,O",T/:tIK. I!Ic4R!I .100 .......... ~ ... .,.Iloo.. 

t. Dlliltal. Q.!;NIl ...... ,.QR ~R ~.Qu.l'\Iey ..,:tOTGeTlO"" "UNC!'I~ 0NI.'f WHaN oc;.~a.1.. tIS IS OPCRAl"l1'oICo 'M l:!.C 

,. ..-I 

A 

B 

c 

D 

F 

5 ~e Il,.V ""l~.ID:.>C.'''r. C" &U. 1Z,:»OSl1oe1! OUQ'(.-"'1h'\, G Go l'Oa ... " ,,,'1.1LU:C,IIU.*" C' '£>.-." Sl·tJ(I01CUJE CMlCio."-"',l.O '1. \."'~-Cl-.c".!.,-oc..l.. c.o"'''QCI~ '"U«. .... 

6.~~OfIlQ'Tt'" .",eRG. ~!:l ~Q.O IN """'11'0 (;o"TQ~ 

j~~ ,. I.Q. - ~NO"'1I:& 1..Oc. .. \.. ~, .. ~.'- ....... 1-

... t ~ ~.~ I.1'IT 1:1 M~'N C 'ITIj:. Qlot 

REFEREN·:C DPAVINGS, 

Il-f17o:1: SI!Or..u: LINt ttee r.uw. 5"ST[W UJ.tt:1lG ~·tt) • 'J} 

SNPP 

4.16 KV SWGR-B 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Draw ing No.: 

SWGR-8-01 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

R:lvisionNo.: 
I I I 3 I 4 1 6 7 I I 9 1 10 I 11 I 12 1 13

no -__ I 84 l.XLSIP~OUt MEET ON1O8CNl&~ CIS4INEXME~

A

13

c

4i =Jo ALI

i-- A

YU

~~~Th%4J*~'

ImOlW

~:~r:" I~

S I I *

'I - ---- I '7

.lN?~.N~1

~. 1~

~~~~0

or - _________

*t~E

T I

.ý IT.

*jI~. !~.. IN --

I. Li

,JOILXA IOINS1)

* I

I A I PIES ISLAY P54)184)15 I AX.OftIOIXIC IONS ES. I (SET fl s~ SEC.) I SE'S SOC. r ~ ~. ,~,, 15 V I I. I j 1 .a/cons s. 1 tNt, - I Ift) . 1

100.5 ES NON

]?

an-)

=} . ,

t-,

NOTES

5.11-- T001.0 O PErATED CELL. EAME

5, OISEIN OE 1)1E,D

- •r-nNN.V 0V SWIT).

I.71 VTNOM.lEOVN

,I ,I =.[, L I j @ M

7 'R

N I-AIO EAN XI S

N Xi IWNI LOE IN

0 .57~ i"' 5

NE 0011.0 - 14,11550,11

Ill SlIrE

A p MEt

0401. 1.11 CC

X1INONINII*I

I 5 4

SI OAT. T JO_ " ,,

$1516 REINd 10 -MENA

p Drawmg No.: H

r4(1 W91~

INN..... ~ l ENI-N1 L-, . I'% =• I VIJ==: 1 1

1 60100 ILO1AES IEANONOEELI (XII 150.4001 UjC.V.0ClEIj,. I, • I)1=u I * ~ i~1

z~1

--1-1,• •,•- I '• I'" I • I • I"•°•='' i .... .... • [• .... i ........ i ....... . ~5MO.l 15554556 I I T -z~1 . A HPI-B-01

HPI-B SCHEMAIC1 DIAGRAM 05/20/2007

SHEET 1

4 ReviionXIo.:

_ _ _ _ _ #6

B-36

A 

B 

C 

D 

[ 

G 

H 

...... 

"'i>" 

Y)~ 

®._~ ____ ~,",L.-".._ .. --' 

,..,."'''''' &e TfA" rIO 

CAT .... .uo-u ..... ,,..,,l.nJlalTO ~ 

~~TIU" 

..tga a.M. (I. ....... 

~.,..TJI'.~T..,.. 

...l.j ..... • ~ ........ 

. '11""1. 

, 

1 

,I 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

I 

I 

! 

.1 .... < • '" 

B-36 

,--; 

.. '! • 

. 

•••• "'T'f". 

=::!I~,,:'N 

...,-

. 

. 

'-.. ...... 

NOTES 

I. T~_ TE .. T 1I.WITt:"H· 

L.H-TRU(..K OPvtATEDC.EI..LhlrKM 

5HOWN 'OR. BRItAKe." 

I'" T£"'" Pos,ITICINI, 

•• ~...,.o ..uoMiQ8;UIT "''', ___ 

l)~,DIoIIOO..t1'1684). 

.. DaNUnD ~ DIt.NUIdA. M 0wII Do..."..IJC .... hCll>.l'ItMC.) . 

A 

B 

s.=:~=~~ .. , C Co. TUII (.DIIIIP!.I":'''. OPElUlOIlAoO"If~$ 

UU00l8U$ f!O& 01"04- , CIC.D' "'.Ie. ...::1,00:>0 

, 'I'Ot02.0, .. ..-£TrV.L .... 

7.~~IV~,.'I«IDIiO""'S>tOfJI.OK 

~~ .. 'fl...,OI"UI ..... '....,."... 

.. .-. UoelE rr&QII.OC.oIi _1lI.tI ,.. lOU.,..", 

nm.~1U'(#cA8U.SlwallllCC.~"',.. 

'l. m;=~~:1r.1"'Ir.'. FOR ru$I1 D 

REFEREIa DRAWINGS 

O~17700I-SINGol.It.I..IN~ t.I.~C."'VK 

$Y$T5. ... (rlllRIO· .. ..o. , ..... ) 

D .... "1"OO5- l!t1Ni>t.r. LINE. PRQT"I.CnOff 

~ MeTeRINGo 4160V SWITCH 

GoEAR Q~I" 

O·I''700~- SINGoLI!.I-'J\rE PiItOTl!C.,.,o... 

·fM"TEtcl"'lijo~ JW'~ r OoI!:-.IIlIIUSo' • 

.... -1"7715.- I:La.c.. ~~NI!.JlAL P~T"IL" 

, NOT£~ 

~us. lItliP\.. .. clll.,..'.n foWoIIW.. F<:IJt SAFETY ~LA"aD 

E.I3.UI~T. 

G 

Drawing No.: 

HPI-B SCHEMATlC DIAGRAM 

SHEET 1 

HPI-8-01 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

Revisionl'b.: 

116 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 12 13 CE700TIOCI fll~VE

1 rn-!24 41 * ........ OCI -A .... -11 .

USP Me --O -

• 0--- -w

I2F I -

11. I

llý i 1- I JIl I

CEI~

710 II

fIC

-----..... ~ I- 'fr~If

WV LTC~71CCCV V 100-Dc.

J~IC1 1EI 0n.V C~0VI

772

If

* 0~~~

a a *0 a

05~~~~

(62 I..T sEC T I .....

I -- CIIEUI ........ OS- /VC-IE V....

LCSI2

I&

Cf

Vi.

A

A- ... i= *T:

NOTES

IN T-IST SWITCH0ON,

C.QCMU - VIS...ICV -A E

I. T000 sMSSDECCOI (

DtEIb.pOD--GC).

117101

71

2154 Ic

0-_L -.T

III I

ICC00EEI

EI~ IS

41 REFRERLE ORMANMS

I.CI-IC*CV s2*0 

TTE2IO40ICCC

-T.

1 -CC

•- "T•"'• T• I • . ..

If If I I IIII-Ti 4i

Cml ICTI HE,:-C 

F

13

M,

Ac ý ..

.-- Of

--41 % ajý4 OEC

WIICI " -- 631C 'Ca1IC0 1COECCC!.CCIVCVU 10 CO -ICC ECSICVVX L'VCC II L' C 0 -_- n*CWTO-C0bC .CCLC(CI4CT IIS CRT, FV P1 IC 10EOCI . I 071100R E =! C -ICCOV WHI P V. 1500C. E I E1

1~C

77,000IIC IC TVVIC r0 I

I~I =.tCOC .__I__ -. j= CI ' I zaICII.II Ld- I JT,COVAI jV rVV l Ih4UI I-jCIC 1 3417-0TE a 2.r I l L I u

A

IC 4K

1K

SNPP PB0

PI-B SCHEMA11C DIAGRAM 05/20/2007

SHEET 2 PbVEVIsoww.

B-37

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

]. 

.......... 

~I-l-TII'P 

~.~OC .. U.Otl ... 

..!..jt-L T"'" tf'''''''T!OfOI 

..I.jiJI-o\U"'" -OJ,.. ... 

A 

I ............ c .. Jl11l¥I,1 .,"" 

. 

--r--

~-_~_-_--_-__ -_-_-'+---_-~_·+-_~+-_J~·'--~l 

'!.. "F- if ~ ~~::-1------------~ 

i .. M~------------~ 

.. H 

'"""~. , ... , .... =~:~;;........,.~O 

B-37 

.. ~ . . 

.~ ~"MTY~.& 

1"100 N!. l04AIO'! 

'~""N" .... TVfltN 

.0_ ... 

-

ANN. 

WINbOW 

® 

,. 

'flO 

~ 

ANN. 

W .. """ 

~~ 

.) .. 

~ .. 

.. TIM! Dn.AV pge;.pmolJf( 

CUT II:f Ie SEC.) 

"'UII!'~'IrII'IOI'OU1 

rnA, NT""\" ,.e.) 

NOTES 

I.T~- TK.'IoT SWITCH 

13 

LH - TRUCK OPERATItD ~EI..L. SWITCH 

SHOWN FaA. BItIl.o\KI!.A 

IN Tl.'ioT PO~I'rION • 

•. ~L.Q$~"~~.~,DWGI 

:>-nTW<ll(&G,~ C-n~). 

4. E~~~I) hCUlll<ltIJIGL'" 

~ thl1164,(OIll,o..,,,, p-n~) • 

!I, ~ ~ 10.,."1 ~~OoIed Itt"" OI'GlD·Il~(pta t>--mao) • 

" TH! c:.cw."UTIlR Qf8AI .. I'QA,A"" ..... 

J.:\,IJoIIoe,.., pO& 01"04. t o..~ ... ~ ~IOOO 

L VOIMO, iUSl>acTJl/aL.V. 

REFERENCE ORAWlt:JGS 

D-'"J'7COI-SIN/OoLIL LINIl r;;LCc.AU)( ,,,,,,.''''(1,,,1111''-41.0 ... '.00 .. ) O-t77005- ~INGi.!. !-IN!!. pA:QTILr.nON 

t Me,TltRIM!l1110V ~Wlrc. ... 

Gio6". But. IF 

0-17')00"- 5oINGo1.." LIN« PROTttTION 

;,..ttTERIN6 ~ SWITC.M 

CIoPR aLJf.t& 

"'-1'77Ua- ~L.~c. C."N~RAL. DlLT ...... " 

..-: NOTI!.$ 

(!)~.".ri 

u, .. ... , @'" 

~-" , ." 

n, 

'" " :: 

HPI-B SCHEMlI.llC DIAGRAM 

SHEET2 

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

[)-awilg~.: 

t-P~B-02 

C>3te: 

05/20/2007 

Revisionr-b.: 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: Compressor

Component Description: Instrument Air Compressor

BE Code: COMP-I_FTR (COMP-1 Fails to Run)

Required Position: CYCLE

Functional State

Normal Position: CYCLE

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes LI No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID IRequired? Function Fault Consequence Comments

+ -4- + +

+ -4- + +

Comments:

B-38

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

Instrument Air Compressor 

COMP-1_FTR 

CYCLE 

CYCLE 

Off 

N/A 

(COMP-1 Fails to Run) 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [8] 

Compressor 

Power Supplies: !:::B.!...!re~a::.!:k~e:!..;r:,--_______ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

r 

Comments: 

B-38 
ToABCompreso

"~aq P

~ ~0BB BT

ý Li 00 0

"Y

1 yB~ y22B yB

LEGEND

y 00

y y y Y Y Y V Y Y

1 2 2 IiH~

iB. }202 jOn 1~' 102 I~o ~ ~

~ 14IoIad r r i~

I 2 I

11212 J~To0TTIBo~01PB BB kB [00

~.Tj~2~2lT~BJ*02[0lT I~* I.' T~ ~a

BB-00TB an 92100 0011200900

REFERENCES:

104002 To 204 00.2 •W0U5D ,000

BBOPgTa~ 47*- 0B7I 0 0, I92 0

00 M, KT OBABBOO000

B-39

( 

~--v~v--,...--......--..----",.-.....,....--....-...--...~...--...--..----~ 

480 V load Center LC-1 Feeder 8krLC1-15 

ffl: 

t t l' 

~~~ ~, 

j*j#~ To P-Jr Compressor 

COMP·1 

!<--------o.tII.cw:. $OO'IIIUS 2QrrrtJ(R(II(A. £011' _______ -->1 

B-39 

LECEND 

H ~ 1IIUO( CII'OI.IJO CEll SIO'01 90l'Il .m. lHMfJ: .. nsrF'OSlXll 

ots·~TItI'$IIIT01 

WG..EUlltPllOrtCllONIl 

U[lrw«; WClilOM tIIl:;oc r.:«UlftfPflOtfCl'lOllIl 

ILf!ltlJClOtI¥lt.lDtlll2Q 

SNPP 

Ir£TR...IIJENf AIR 

CXJvf'R:S&ROOtvP-1 

CCM'-1-02 

CBte: 
XI I A

TI I L. II ii

Tcm . I 

_ -__ - - - - - - -

1 -4.- ,4a 

-4

2 --' E2. Lý N' r ~ ~ ~ L E 1 l (

WY L1

IA AT

_ IN __l _S91,9

1- -1 T. - tIO-' -

M IT_ W_.- __ _ Ifp- i _ _ O.l.'p ~TC

K' lACT

[~ LAS

SNPP 2-lh

J~CCM:Ll-0i mb~tso No

B-40

" ")'" --11 ______ ~~~--~-v :jt: 

-11..!...t:-:- 10 - . ....- ~" 2-ti s,. 

. ". 

-lZ~:-!-!O- "'"' 

, ~ '" 

~:: £$100 " "'" 

8-40 

0--------- b

eoM

.

1 

_ ,.,. D ~>(z 

I ____ ..1 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve

BE Code: MOV-15_FTO (MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: THROTTLED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

4 4 4

Comments:

Note: This page was erroneously included in the available set of exercises in the proper location

for Exercise 14, but is instead a duplicate of Exercise 4. A later section of this Volume 2 has

a solution for Exercise 4, but not for Exercise 14.

B-41

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve 

BE Code: MOV-15_FTO 

THROTTLED 

(MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [gI 

Power Supplies: =B.:...,:re=a::..:..k=e.:....:r:'--_______ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

Note: This page was erroneously included in the available set of exercises in the proper location 

for Exercise 14, but is instead a duplicate of Exercise 4. A later section of this Volume 2 has 

a solution for Exercise 4, but not for Exercise 14. 

B-41 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: LC-B Component Type: Load Center

Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center

BE Code: EPS-48OVLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT)

Required Position: ENERGIZED

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes [] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID I Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

*1 I.

Comments:

B-42

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component 10: LC-B Component Type: Load Center 

Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center 

BE Code: EPS-480VLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

ENERGIZED 

ENERGIZED 

Off 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No [gI 

Power Supplies: =B.:....;re=..=a::..:..k:.,:e.:...,:r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-42 
DEVICE. OEECRIPTIOWJ MSR/-TYP REMARKS

5Tk ST.LVICV1E MUM, IF. Ge/pjCobzC NOTE io OVER CURRZE* KLEV,31

46.f ,TIME MLAY RLAI' AdAVA1/

50 OVER CURRU~ CGLAMY ' OE% ilise NOTE 10 NOC FOR FROM4 LOOID I IF

TIME OEDG,4A KEL.aY NOTEIO EISIEPA

SYrA.5EEVILE TRAMSF IDS OI;ERE,.JTIA,. REt.AY OS./rLwSOImsN

*..4. STA. SERVICE TRA.QSF ID 0Or!O LOCRAM, OUT RELAY( 0.IE/NB

5'1 W 5U ID OIVER VOLTAAIF. TCYA EDOl IELAY(e.ROWJ0OFDTECTIOS0)

ZI

-E BDhOISMIMOEZ VOLTAGE RELAY WL&TI(-V-Z.

L07.1, EUO LID UIJO% VOLTAGE IIS/tNOTES

M'bAOE IAFSAE '0I'ER 60ARI IN MAIN CONTARM

C I1TERRKUPTIN(. KA1

TIWC, OP A.(BD ID

00.00 AMO APAFA KII SYMMETRIC.AL I:MiJ)) 5. B OM r rTIRCUIT KATVJ& MOOD

AAMP5S YMMAETRICAL,

4, 5TA.Ti0S SERVICE TRMDFOXMEIR

5. BREAKERS 52-EODZ AND 52-ED12 ARE KEYB INTERLOCKED &0 TWAT ONLY ONE. CAN Be CLOSED

AT ANT TIME (OWr., 6-171 ITO)

4. 5VEACEE AJ 5%-DO EAD5OM (o OOV. A FU-EIA OpEArD a DY A, CO0T1O. 5WITCI4 li THE. mAws COQ3TROI. ROOM.

7. ALL BICKR' EXECPT 52. C002 4 DUEDIS WAVE. 3ouD $TATE rRIP LAJT5 WITIA FOLLOWou61

RAT UIC.-AMPEES 8 REA1CEi11 5t-EVOI, DO-EEo(. AltO moLDIED cA.,E BRED, TO BATTERY eM R(.ER It AXE KEN INTERLOCKED SO

THAT om3y OML SKEAV.FE AsiD (OzIESPIOuIsII

T OLDEO C.&EW bASS CAR BE CLOSED AT AIJY TIMEFOs--~D3

2- UNIT I ElkiAOtE EDO& IS &ECTEICAL17 -MT~geWLECSED

WITH UNIT 2 9AEAISSA EM69 'M YSEOEMT 0ZW15¶SEROAS

CLOSliwCF dF sm.l burkte".

10 I-Or.ATEO IN TERMINA

5., 5L.IK' COMPARsTmEN7 kbOVE A.SSOC.IATIE0 t3SIE:_AE.,

11. Tl'IS BRAVING SUPERSEDES DRASINtE -177M,0 SHYT I OF I. REV. LA, BATED IER5S, T PCN S-9310690,S REV, 0.

RFFFRENrCE DRAWINGS

AI0118TE-EFIECT FICAI. "kElt&L bEapL5 4 ID6 0. 11100 1 - IRA9LE LIIJB ELAC, A4Jx. YsyTE A (4I51&o 04 to

SNPP

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B)

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM

Drawning No.:

LC-B-01

Bate:

05/20/2007

Revision No.:

B-43

FRoM DI~~ CT'S 

F'ROM 4!c.O V Bi.J5 ''" 41GoO V SWGR - B OWG 0·177005 

ffiu TRANS SST-B 

t::. 1000 KVA,411OO-IOO

OV r3O\ 

Z

a 675):.,OA.SS· ~ 

S~,<"OH'E. I' I 

TO <i>OO Y 

LOAD C(.tJTIi.R. 

IA. 

t::. ~t STA SE"",CE. ~ 

~ SO ~ 87 ra;:< _+TRIP S2. OtO'! @ --'=7.l -~ OWG D-17700S 

twO,.e. 10" 1

St 

1 1, 4 I I iI 8 ~ _____ J 

~ t.~ZOf~~~~7l 

.1-, 

~l~ .. k-I" .1\, 

I , 

@, 

I 

I 

I 

I S 

'I ' 

I ~ 

t I # ~ I 

I II 

I 

I 

I I 

~J 

150 

u 

" 

TO UfJIT! /000 V. LO"-O (Tt ~D 

MCC IF 

*~ .. /O 

~ 

2 

IJ 

IJ 

Ji 

[ 

~ 

B-43 

OEV'(.E., o ~, IPTIOt.) M<{ T~PE K~t.\"'1tJ<.5 

--'2.~._ ';T~. ~"~"'<IO TU"'''' 10 G e/p,JC;&2G 

~TE 10 O"E~ (UIU.E"T rt.E.L'Y,'" r.t 

~ TIME ~cl'lV oe~L"'V """"'..,4T/ 

E.-utl'lPA. 

~o 

NOTEIO ~F~~:~L~~~'IF CiB/PJC!'lG 

-"'L- TI"iE OELII.Y !lEe ... V ""A.'O'rI'lTI NOTE-IO e.'OltPA 

~ ~TA..S"VI« T~"'ISF. 10 DIFnItEIJTIA.(. ~E"A.V Oe."'~'D\%~" 

...aL ST .... SE~V"E TR"o,;5F.IO C~()a LOC KIf.!(, OIlT ULII.V' s, .. 6U~ 10 OVEIt I/OI.:tM6. m-r- £90T/<.V-6 UOL'V ("'lOu~O O~T.'TIO!l) 

t, 

EPOI 8tr> ID UllDEr. VOLT"". ItEL.o.V EaT/c.v-... 

t'X·1 BU~ ID uuo~. VOlTI\(oE 

EDOI >'IUT/"!··'" ""XII.I"~Y it.ElI'IV, 

I. ",.1fo-~NO'at. EMa.,,(;, ~""'e:.\\ eOA.~C IN M~IN CQN'T.AM. 

t ~~:~~~U:S~~ ~~1'~~~~m;w (MI>.!~ ~ BU~ ~""~T 'I!tWIT R"TltJ'" It,OOO ~MP~ ~YMM£TRI("'L. 

4. ~T"'TlotJ SEitYICE TR"t.)~"OlbAIiI1. 

• ... ~""RI!L." TYPE. S. BREAKERS S2-EC02 AND S2-EOI2 ARE 1<.e1' INTERLOCKS;C SO T~Al ONLY ON. C"'N Be CLOSED • T ANY TIME (OWl;., &-117 I'U) 

io. ~5~"~)~Ut6'~~~T'fg ~~-'l.I\g~,,<.:,"l.~ '-OOY. 

colJTROL &WIT{H /Il THE MAitJ COtJTII.OL ~OOM. 

7. "LL e.KR·S £XCLPT 52- r:DCl! 4 52-E012 H/>,VE. 

~oUD ~T"Ti TRIP ll>Jin WITH FOLLOWI"'" 

De.51"'''I\TI0''~ (BleAKER .R"'ME/"~Nt;OR R ... TltJ",-A,MPUES) 

8. 8tEIII(I:~.'Ht-EPO,,~t.EEor. "~D MOI-.oe:o ""~~ IlI<.R~. 

TO BATTEI.V (~~1l6tl I{ II.U Kt~ INT.tl.D'K~O ~ 

THI.T O~LV Oije. SII.EAiC.E.l A.>lD (t)UE~I'OIlDIt.)e. ..... " .. 0 GA~ I!IKqe , ..... 6. {"05E.D I'IT "uv TI"iE (D"''''-'-'''I~'!>I. 

" 4"11" BR!Aj(~ mo& 1.5 !t..LC1'UCAl.L)o l:Ho'TE1U.lIC.tc.£l) 

"'Int UNrr Z YEAUA EnOS "TO "'E~T S'tMUL"WU.OUi 

Cl.O~IWC7 OF &ar~ MP'\ItU!I. 

10. l.Ot.4TE.C IN. ,e,qMII""L. &l.oc..K,: COMPA.oa.'TMtNoi 

"t10vl!. A.~Oc:.IATE.O t"oR.E."I(,~.Il" 

tl. TI-"I$ D;QIIY!!\'G SUPEASE:D~S DRAIJING ::-177010. S~T 1 OF' 1. Rev. 14, DATt:D lH5-90, ~CR peN S-?:J-HIG9C, Rev. c. 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

~·\l1~~B-EL£(TtI("L <:'£fJ~l"'l. DET""(.~ ( ~.TE~ 

0·111 001 • ~1~I.E LI>.!e U.!(. ~l(. SV~TEM (41~O uoool) 

SNPP 

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Drawing No.: 

LC-B-<l1 

Date: 

05120/2007 

Revision No.: 

#6 
A

- liMo

6'3

5

*1

FIEFERE:NCE DRAWINGS 0 -11700, .0,1 •144 SLOle•l60.

,601L16V 5¶AUSI.

E

F

"0.0LOTta"T "T "F061"0

N~~~ TO x. xO••T~ ••

I go 4

1, 7 10 .O

ftc1o 4

B-44

ft:"r 

r+-+----::~~ H 

100 

,f---<>-...... l U "--~~i:~ "it 

J!~! 

T. 

~~~~~:: ... U!1jI ! ! o-..,t-Oo-tl-O~ , 

0· .. 11 .... -00011""'0 ~ X X 

, c~· .. u .. -Oo-it-o 

lWClIS'oI1lC" 

OEUMTl'J'f. 

MODO.,",~", 

.,..,.ItV'uth4-,gc.E1fTUI 

hU.tl)LI)CII.IMT1tl"~l~ 

, , , 

I Cl.~" I .. 

!n!l~! 

· 

, , 

. , 

· ... 

... 

...... 

...... 

,.,. ....... - ! 

~ ~ 

.. r To U 

~~ 

e~~ 

8-44 

~ .... TIII,(K tJ'f,;I!ATtu au. lVlJOC Pt;W ,tR RO<Ull,lrtn S;Tl£Jt 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

D-"'1OO1'=~{-:r~_. 

411l0V t 6000'1) 

,H'f""!6"'I.C/!TJII'ICA.t..~ DIo'ftoII.6 

IoNI;) NOOn •• 

D .,1"'010 .. ....ua. UN" 1NtO"t'1c:"I' ..... *" .. ~ft«W1...,46.t)~ 

",(.........c) 

B 

c 

D 

E 

u-t'non --... \,..l\tl!.flQO,.&A;.1tOM 41«1' F t"IroT&RM;.~!I tAt.p "~TW._ 

I.'E.MI!.~) 

G 

S\W Da.vWg~: 

LC8{l2 

H Qte 

~ 

Effi6/ffis::HM\l1C ~ 

-~: 

Ifj 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 -I 6 I 7 i i in I 1 3 

Cýýt IRwinstr 'e-NDKAIq -1

j D .. . .... .. --- .a.x- II:A m • !'12 .t x 0J ~ ~ ~ ~ 780 ~ T 14 Z~i SEC,, 

!an

B

504041. .....IT 00

-4 ,,, 0 ,k 1 IB) 5 • .? ,O • . ,,. -,

,00L¢oo~.,LkL•o,~:

NO-TES; EASIctS/T 8ar

C

B

UE(TEOO 04TIOM

80)0~ fl- -0Lt

RU~ERENCE DRAWINGS

A.1556O- t~tT0CMC/ GEK/4007 0110/AL-

&NO BmlOs

0411003 L.4k /E S ./O.00

vsn(IT2A fg Al00I-4 O70

0.111010 - SW./a Ith fl0¶tCtTJ BUD

D-/11101- 6,/sA~ LNG WiOTcTI 00&No

T/ItT1/T/ AM 1//S .500 15

FG

H

LC .1ý V1 OPME F TENiT4

10/0-0 1700 IOU/ tEy- EI _A t/.S0BTCU. 

It S~%At Vr BEEL a m ma// A- ~ / Cx 9I'l

WMBBS AIICD R./0 p2 1W 1 U (lj !S / igg W LBS14, 'll, 08/tOES-; TEES oI tf 6~- E2 - /4ET82 C l -2 (1 B- /- EI 8Ea0BSB/S Tb A/S TCI t// P-1.39 ETMETO010(

AORiL-A 

E

BMomS OIA/SOmA

SNPP Lw-3

92-ED-12 2Q7 S3-E5vIU211C

SCHEI0fl/TolN ii B-45

--------

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

AIIIME.nR: 9\MTCH lSI TYI'£ W-t. $ .... 707NI-.r.oI 

JlOI.N)f1l6.lt AAMIft...~ 

LDo\O tUfTER Te IleA OCK U Pl~ 

COMPArnM A a COil J! H J [-II!"! B-2 -J li-U e~1 

-fAr1 &-1 ·ur·1I5-1A -58' II CoI2 

,1 

COPoI:r.,cn 

9 11U,)j0l~ ta.O ODD all .. 

Doott-O O-It...o 1. 

, 

Oo-1!"O Oo-1.-o! x 

o-tt-O o-jl-O ~ X 

;iii~~~~~~~;; COl. ~~~M HIII.T'IIK 

IIIODU. ",t..0t.Ir0I16 

V!I,IaGlUi:'1"lmM roc:atlTU; 

,",J1,.LTOlDClI.nITll,ll'f'il)!lffIOlli. 

~ ! 

, , 

.. . . . 

x 

~~! 

. , 

• . . , 

BLOC ... DtAGRA,M 

B-45 

L ~-TllD [JI[hT(O em WiTCH SKJ\.'t,I nJl IlfEM(R IN iUT TIC~ 

i.II[;[iilT(jI,,"~1'I-'dl'1ditOW'UOIl 

RAHIliN'.'ll TYP[. 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

A·I1,~-e.~i'm\C"\. GttrrK1\.,\, i)llAIL.i!I "'NO NOTE'S 

B 

c 

D 

0."'001 -- '5\"'1.1 LUili ;,,";cTR,,IC..-.L -'14 ~ j ~'ffl,.tM{'EMi~U.-~.a.oc;:JiI'} "-! 

C.I'10\O--5~lw.·LIM'& 9Q,~'CTIOt.I Atr.iO 

MlTU.I\&G GOOY I.,r:, 10 (MR61 

tH1'0\ 1 - ~\tI;~I.'C!. LIW'6 OROTiCTLow, ",,!O 

MCn,A\\lG400'i I..C..\C{MIW) 

C-I"G1rt • 5!NGU, LW! ~TI'';'IOrro{ AWO 

MutRlNCi r.ocH LCW) CI\lT&ilIF 

SNPP D-avvirg r-.b.: 

LCB-03 

Qte: 

52-ED-12 

~llC 

051'2fJf2fJJ7 

FEvisial N:l.: 

Ifj 

I 

F 

G 
GJTA lERLV

TCLAt&S SST-B3 GOOV LOAD. CIT IF

4E A I

480 V Load Center LC-B

NOTES

1. ALL. INTEPLOCYSC ARE KIRK TYPE,

2-CIP-C.Ul SPEAI(E121- 52-E.D05,5Z-EE~&~

CHAI.CzEQ IC.AkE K(EY INTEP-LOCE ' rMHA'r QNL ONE. 612EAKt.EZ ANDI cop-PESONO,

ING BATTE2E'l C-HA2C,)E?- MOLDED~C~

%RE&KE12E C~AN BE r-LOF-0 A7 A'" 'TIME

LEGEND

51.-EDOZ

qLo-01 11 -

Fel

INTERLOCK WITH KEY HELD.

INTERLOCK WITH KEY REMOVED.

v.y', I% HN_.p IN CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-E.DO. INTERLOC

TO F.STkbLI'H r.•.VIC.-- 'THROUGH CIRCUIT BREAKER

I, TRIP CIR..UIT BOEAKIMF.. Z'2-Eb.tP2. TURN KEY Al IN L-O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKER

152-EDO.- TO LOCK -OPEN. KEY Al IS NOW FREE.

3. INSERT KEY Al IN L-O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKE

52--.r.bl AND TURN -TO UNLOCK. KEY Al IS NOW HEI

4. CLOSE CIRCUIT BREA-KER 52- E1-D ...

RL..mr.PSE S•q...,,WC.L 'TO RES70T0R.E SERVICE THROUGH

NOTE.I AS AM~ ECEPTIOK3 FOP-. MsAl 47Ei4ANCE \OJO0 PK k PLANT

FOCE-DUKE, TWO IK'_.5• MNY IE . UE.D TO O'ERKIbE THE.

NOKMALCIRC... 5FER1FIKT RLOCK FEATURE.

L-O - (LOCKED OPEN) INDICATES THAT

THE KEY IS REMOVABLE WHENTHE

CIRCUIT BREAKER IS LOCKED IN THE OPEN POSIt"ION.

IK. E - INDICATES KEY REMOVABLE NLY

WHEN BOLT EXTENDED.

,14 E-INGERL ROTA CTBON

Li~R1¶ -4204I

R I

... AT-TERY CHNJZ~tR REFERENCE DWG.

ICD-177001-SINGLE LINE ELEC. AUX( SYSTEM

r- 177010 -SINGLE LINE PROTECTION4

METERING GOOV LOAD CENTER I1

A-177538-ELEC GEN DETAILS j NO-14ES

)

SNPP Drawing W.:

LC-B Date:

INCOMING BREAKER 05/20/2007

INTERLOCKS Revion, M.

B-46

~"T~ taER.v' 

TQ.A.~~ SST-B 

S1.-EDOZ. 

480 V Load Center LC-B 

- OP£1l."--"ON .~u .. ~<.. - "-"",,,,4-

NOTES 

L A.L..L INTEflLOC.I<'S AI<.E. KIRK TYPE, 

2.C\12.C.UIi BIi!.EAKE.~~ ~2-f!.DO')J5Z.-E.EO~ ~ 

""OL..DeO CA~E e.2eAK.!..Q.':> iO' e.lIo.i1E~'f 

CHA"C.e:2. 1C;A.Ii!..E KE.y INTEe\;..,OC.""EC ';'0 

"TI-'IA1 01-11-'I 6~E. ~li!..eAK.EIi!. A.N\) COE.I2.ESPONO 

ING e,A1"TE2'f C.HA12c:>EI2. MOLOE.O CA";)E 

~RE.A.KEI2. c...AN SE c.L..Oo;,E..O Ai A.N-V TIMe. 

(,::>EE.. D'/.JCi c.- \ -, "'\ I ~!> ) 

I@l-

~ 

f81- l!11 

L-Q -

LEGEND 

INTERLOCK. WITH KE'( HELD. 

INTERLOCK WITH KEY REMOVED. 

(lOCKEDOPENIINDICATES iHl\T 

THE KEY IS REMOVABLE WHEN THE 

CIRCUIT BREI-KEF< IS LOCKED iNiHE 

OPEN POSITION. ~!.'f , ... HE'-D IN CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-IDOa INTE.RLOC.K. }--~ 

TO E'5TA.f}L'~H 'e) __ Q."IC1i!..THROUGH CIRCUIT BREAKER l-..k t.., E 

52-,EOI2. ,I 

I· TRIP C.IR,.CUIT 6R.E.A~E.R c~- E.D02. 'L-O. . II 

2· TURN K!=.Y AI IN, 1.:9 INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BRE.AKER 

e2-EOlX. TO LOCKOPE.N. KEY AI IS NOW FRE.E.~E. NOTt-z.~ 

INDICATES KEY REMOVABLE Qt:IU 

WHEN BOLT EX-TENDED. 

INTERLOCK KEY TARI ~ 

IINTf.RLOCK I KEY NUMBER I 

I td IRE -14204 I 

3· INSE.RT KEY AI IN L:O INT~Rl.OCK ON CIRC,UIT SREAKER' J 

!}2,.E.DI2. AND TURN TO UNLOC,K. KEy AI IS NOWH!;.LD. BATTER,'" CflJII.~GotR REFERENCE D WG. 

4kCL..OSE CIRCUIT eRE.AKER 52- tD Il.. Ie; 

'-•. _.-, .•••. ~. _"4"~'_"""_"~"_"~"" 

B-46 

O-177001-SINGLE LINE. ELE.C AUl( SySTEM 

(41(;,0'/ f c;,001l) . 

<:-1770'10 - SINGLE. LiNE PROTECTION ~ 

totE TERINGo c;,OOV, LOAD C!!NTER 10 

A-177.538 - ELEC "EN. OE TAILS • NOliE. S 

r SNPP 

LC-B 

INCOMING BREAKER 

II\ITERLOCKS 

Drawing I\b.: 

LC-B-04 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

Revision f'.h.: 

116 
1 1 : 5 i 6 7 I 8 1 9 I i ii I 12 I 1 3

.l vivcs I 449110 f I "r.,1IRM I 2 A.2.

iLP

mill 4:

42 I

712.4 ~ @)/4244422 2750 24

272.2 4742A254L4211C 22A11.2 244.43 4,13214 RAy 24 A

brQCC - LC ,

NGTES,

4.'A C 4P" A,C. POXINI*A4. L 414"M

-2 - '-,I :. -211:. .A

C

11W AINCA 71 1 .,17

.w• +,• E:

a.-: 3MI% , 22

I6Y0YAI 2112 28Y14,041124 lýIý 2222,0 1

-4ý E.. I4440 I- I--1822221~:11I~ 2 ~ ~ p2

skI 24:0 TOS Zt:.24~2821141 * ;2 622

t11* 012 1 - 4002 442:.

-ai lgf 2ý- .91 REFERFNCE D)RAWLNQS' -:42-4226. $1ý44.62621A4

44522014(2:5st. YACTRX"1254 14fi8A' 

224: 5126M (644024,2 .40) 42~~ITRM IOO LCM& ClUTZA__________

Fii, '.Ot 4l 2 O

1.4 O~A 4n~5!1E.........rt................................2212 ,-~r 243.0411104 212 44144,

I ~ ~ ~ -1--- 225fOi 2_____________ --- F44,4. W- 

_____ t 22414 4214 511 .42121222000045 244

F,

L.2- "..05 -. . I .... 8- ....... o .44 l-(7 I.-4 -l -6C0 . 11,"',7 7-i -- -;-K-• -iT; - -l • -i % - C

.2:~ .4 4 ~ sf L 424

j4 X 42 2c221244 :

I £22411371 I 15412471.44 12.-I 2224 I ,:-~-t IA:t4:~I22

40 12 - 7 42 I A.Av 2M431E 1 5

I I A I t0A.....hl4I v 2I24 I Z.:: I AI In"4I SNPP IDrawing NW.:

SN PP LC-B-05

Date:

LOAD CENTER 05/20/2007

UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME

B-47 Revision Nb.:

I I 3 I 4 

I I I 

_lllil rT:1 [ .... ~(:u.Cy 

"<JV~!( ~\,lIW:I H~;;~~r.N 

:;SI!!:-.:G [?U5:l8-A3 

QSH!!!G 

::?5?"-... 11H,' 

~'l::'G 

t~J2SQ8-o\J 

OS!i1!'G Qlle'~OJ'1-~ PaES~-Aa 'v 

-

I 

~t~ 

i:AU &E:.I.:n 

::Dt1 ol£te: 

aEt.:: 

I 

.. ~ - t.~ -, 

;a!: f

P

::': , -, 

: ~ 

! '., : ~ , , , , 

, , 

: , l~: , I !£.... 

: tN', : ~_ ~J 

-, ($U . NO'T8.6) "'" 

" I 7 I 

8-47 

8 I 

1ve1t!';.~Qw.! --j="'-

@ 

,t ~~~ ___ +".~ l"'U) 

y~ 

1M G<O<NO o;:t'('To~ 

LQ.I.O ClNl'i'lLC- B 

LD40 GDlTIIIl II! 

9 I I 11 I 12 I 13 

_ ...... I 11~" DC 

I lI!5V X 

t.~Ul.I"" '0+4"""T T=8G OI"""""",,r;o 

3. CA&l..e. FOR D.e. f'OT£NT,A1.. UGHTA • 

... C"'&&'. PCA II,C. Po-Ttf'lTIA1.. 1olC;~T6. 

:s. SE£ :JIl<lVl~ IHUI'l81 H~ FI.;$( ~AH'!(i A,~; 

~;f &t .,FIIP':'S u.::, tt::, 0::, Allo) 

Drawing I't>.: 

!> 

c 

-

-

E 

F 

-

SNPP LC-B-05 

LOAD CENTER 

UNDERVOL TAGE SCHEME 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

Revision f\b.: 

116 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Component ID: MCC-IB Component Type: MCC

Component Description: Train B 480 V Motor Control Center

BE Code: EPS-480MCCB1F (480V MCC B1 FAULT)

Required Position: ENERGIZED

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

I. I.

I. I.

Comments:

B-48

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component 10: MCC-1B Component Type: MCC 

Component Description: Train B 480 V Motor Control Center 

BE Code: EPS-480MCCB1 F (480V MCC B1 FAULT) 

Required Position: ENERGIZED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: ENERGIZED 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [gI 

Power Supplies: =B.:...,:re=a::..:..;k=e.:...,:.r: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-48 
UEVI(..E O-OC.EIPTIOM I ME!JTYPE RI, L.

__50 5TA.5LKVICE TRA03F. so"epQ z NOTE Io OV/ER (URROZT RELkY,39

TIMAE OEA ItJA ACSTA'T/

ETOIOPA

50 VE CURREQT ZELAV3 FRDg PC NOTE 10 IWl FDR FROMLOADCTi F

G? TIME 011D ELAY AS fLAV.T NOTE 10 ElOILFA

**~5TA.srIvHF TRk)SPEMI

8& 5ThA. ERVICE TRAMSFID 0EO01 LOCKCIJC OUJT l.ELAk OI/I

51M l OL5U ID OVER VOLTA.4 ESTICN-O EDOI ZEL*AY(GXOtJID PETECTIOk))

FDIBUSI 10 IJkDER.VOLTXGE ELAy Eh5TjQV~-Z

Z70.1 EIJBSID UIJOER VOLTAG(E WS/OQ EDO lAUXIJOLIAKY RELAY. W.TM.

NOTES

1. *-bENOIES EMP-.r. POWEA e0,ORD IN MAIN QONTafA

0 IJTER.RUPTII.e RATIWCo OF A.B'5 15 SZ.000 AMPS RM S 5VIIVMETKICAI. A i (II

5. BUIS 5NO.T CiRCUIT IATIM4 Zt0,000 A.MPS SYMMETRICAL. 4. 5TTIo0J SERVICE TRAOSFORMER 'A.S.AR. UTYPE. " 

5. BREAKERS 52-EDOZ AND 52-EDI, ARE KEEY INTIERLOCKED SO TWAT ONLY ONE CAN BE CL-O5ED AT ANY TIME (DWr, b-If) 2sN)

A BREAKE 5 S.-EDo0 AIJD bt- EN0 (OW 1.oov. SU, IA) ARE OPERATED BY A 5IhX.LPE COITROL. SWITCH JU ThE MAIM COMTROL ROOM.

7, ALL 5KR'S EXCEPT 152-F002 4 52-EDiD WAViE SOUD STATE TRIP UJUIT5 WITH FOLLOWmIC(

E.ISGk)1ATIOIS (BZE_ArEE FRAME/5ENSOR RATI M.-AMPERES)

S. MEAKERS5t-EPOI, 5E.EEOC. AhD MOLDED CAS~E 6KAZ.

TO BXTTE.Y CIH/AX'E IK AXE KEN II•oLOCCED 50

THAT OIJLY OfJE BI.EAKL. AlD (OZESPOUDIIM& MOLDEO CA.S BARB CAm BE CLO0ED AT ALNY TIME (ODWG-CM-I'5).

. UNIT I B Kg E OGIS EL-LC'IICALYd. IR"MEKLOCKED

WITH t11rr EZAEAS..A ZEENAT 105 "TO SI4kl'tO1E,

CLOSI I OF scI mePwO.

'0' LBL.ATED IN TERMIWA.L BLOCK' COLOPAEGTMENrT

ABOVE ASSOC-IATED BIIIEARRL

E. TOIS RACVI\O SU!ERSOS DRAVIFG S-W770I0, O I OF 1.

REV. I., DATED U-j-O, PER PEN S-93-1-1-GOC, REV. 0.

REFERENCE DRAWINGS

AI111518-ELECTEICAL COEFEXNL DETAIL5 4 IJOTES .111001-SloiLLSE LIBE ELIC, AUX.SY5TEL,(4ISOf&OOr

SN PP Drawing No.:

LC-B-01

Date:

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 05/20/2007

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM Revision No.:

#6

B-49

o-}, 

~r . ~" , I 

I ~ 

~ 

I ~ 

9-

I ~ N .g '!' 

I , , , ~ , ~ ~ I '" N @, .:. w I ~ • t I 

I 150 , r ~ 

I ~ 0: I oJ 

I W Ii 

@,J I I g "' 

:s '" ~ ~ oJ 

r< 

0 ~ u ~ 

TO UIJIT ! r.oo 1/. 1.0"0 (T2. to 

MeCI!!' 

~ 

;L 

'" 

TO 

a.oov LOAD C.E.tJT~R 

I" 

II 

~ /). 

d' 

oJ 

'" ~ 

!!! 

~ III 

~ ,. 

§ , 

'J! 12 ., 

~ f 

0-:1 (""E')~) 6-*,-IP 

25 ~ 

'" ~~ '" 

-,. " 3,1 ~ u 

at" >-

6~ It 

'" ~~ '" 

~ 

g 

lI-

.!. 

e~~ 100 

~ 

.. 

-' 0 II' 

~ g 

() ~<!! Ll ::; Q2 Ll 

.,< S ,,'" 

B-49 

.!. 

0 W 

~ '" !! ~ ~ -l. 

& 125 

~ ':> 

U " ::i 

'Z( Iz u1_ WoO s-_ ~::; !d" "J" ""d !;8~ I-J" >§s 8v~ e 1i 

DEVIC.E. o "RIPTIO'l M< VPE RE"'''ItI'S 

~Q...- ';T .... ~"~V"E TU'l'F. ID a e/PoJc,&,C; NO"! 10 OVE~ (u!lR,E"r REL"'V,>91 rot TI"'E !l£cAV Jl:ELA.V ~T"T/ N"'OTriO E"ltHZPA. ~O 

Nffi'To I~EF~~:~ tt.:i;,A.'d/,{, F GB/PJC$1.G 

~ TIME OG.!..A..Y 'tE.t..A,Y rw"'bTA.TI NaTE 10 E.'OIZ.PA 

~ ~TA.. SHVI{E. TIt"II.}'Sj;, II) CUF;:'E.I{E.IJTIA.l tE!.."V Oe./Wlltl\~'!IA 

~ ST .... SHV"E TR ... >lSF: 10 C~Q!I LOCKI"'- OIJT REl~Y 

,~., SUS 10 OVEIt "OLTN.E. uor ~~T/(N-e :tEl ... " (~ROU"D OETECTIO'l) 

t1 

EOOI eu, 10 U"OE" VOL T~E RE~V EbTI'-v-1.. 

Z1~·1 SU' 10 U"D£~ VOlTo\~E 

EOOI We."T/"I.-" ""xIU ... ~y E.El"V. 

I. _.-De.NO"e.~ EtotE.I:tGo. roo"",!.\\ ~OA.RC IN M.lUN CQI(T.$i:M, 

.t k~:5~~U:J'~~ ~11"~~;,,~~~;W (MIIi) 

3. eu~ '><O .. T ~'~<UIT I<:"TI.,6 n,ooo "''''P~ 'YMMETRICA.L. 

4. ';T"'Tlo'l SERVICE TRA.'l~'OO:"'E~ ·"~k"R!!1-1i TVPE. 

5. BReAKERS 52-E002 AND 52 .. 012 ARE KEY INTERLOCl(;D SO TMA.T ONI..Y ONE. CAN Be CLOSED 

AT ANT TO"'E (OW';', b·n7 '"l~) 

'- ~~~A~)~l:n~~~ft'~ ~~-~"g~~<:L~ "COV. 

~OlJnOL SWITCH IU .-ME MAIIJ ~O"TII.OL ROOM, 

7. ALL ~KR'S EXCI!.PT 52- I:DO'2 4 52-EDl2 WAV,," 

~ouO 5TAT£ TII.IP lllJlT) ''''ITII FOLLOVVI~" 

D£SI(,IJO\TIOIJ5 (BREA<:U. nAME/"I!."\;O~ 

R~TIIJ('-AIvIPERE'" ) 

3. 5tEAXu.-; ~t-EPo",;r-EE"" "~D MOl.l)e:O ",,~e e-.~~, 

TO s...HEItY ()f/,1t6E.t It ~u ~'-~ INT.tUX~tO 50 

THAT OIJLV O~t 8i!.e.Ai<.E.t ">.)0 COUESpOIlOlll" """-\)~O c... ..... e.<~~ 0," 6E LeOSED "'T A~ TIME (DW6-<-IT1I~~), 

" UNIT I BR!AKeR mOE; l.S ~L..l.C'1'''ICAI.U' UinLOC.t(£J) 

M.Th UMrT Z e.REAKe.R. EDOEt iO 'PREV1!llT ~.".. .. ous CLD':tIWC7 OF eoT\4 MP-'lIIeR!o. 

10. I.Qt.4TE.O IN "'fJ:t.MU.I~ ~l.oc,.l(. COUPA.ajMENl 

"'flOv!. A.~'EtOC.IATEO I!tRE.A..IC.e.II." 

I:. TI-1S D~.o,'IIl\G SlPERSEDES DRA ...... 1~ :-In:110. SHT 1 OF' 1. REV. 14, DATal lHS-90, PER PCN S-93-1-8GI)(', REV. O. 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

~·Ill~~II-e.eiCTlJCAl <'EIJER.'IL bETl\lLs ~ lJoTES 0-\1100'- "~L~ L'"! ~Lf{. I>.UI(.SVSTU.I(41~OI~OOI/) 

SNPP 

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Drawing No.: 

LC-B-01 

Date: 

05120/2007 

Revision No.: 

#6 
A

B

AW8V LOADCENlTER

$14 ILc L H1TIWK WPATED Cr± &W11 9b AM

milA wATET 1

C e IAEASK'Eld

I MR-W3 AARMS, A3Q TVO 9 1 WT

MK PRtAVA iIA$MBIA5 0.01013

l*111 tAI j LW ZFEWE BAR TO flW!3 MCC

Aft E..ECOTAMA.. V4TATSC)CjA CE TABLE.

D

E

F

AT-I } 811 CAT At 40As5llt.I.V.MB e0wsFt11$A V1101 NORMAl.

PSTOL "11 PMSD %AM"0

50133A 583301*10 l4Q01.A.A

A-IflS"e--jCTSCAJ. 69ABM.V8ALC LS AND0

RIRTIM (1313fi- 40*V 0 G004)

0.ITIOAO-6Al3L1 "* P3QRC1IOI 4 LA11101

301.00 WO1111, (3 "RslQ

0.l10IVI*111,5 ~ 0L PROMTIG?04 14103186

330*1LOAD CWTGlA 16 (1,.4G

-- A F--

L m

v. AD• 14 I001-et

H

B-50

A 

B 

c 

lIT 

Itt 

111~ ~ 

10"" 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

~--------------------------------~ 

: t'-----------------'i!L 

-r ~t;-~-~J 

AI 

.. 

.. ...1 

rrFttuprrfn 

P.PdOTI \W4~ 

_MeO 'AT MI40'911(I.'(·",,' 

~PRilrI$ P.lTUPH 10 NORhtAl. 

G G 

B-50 

13 

L .... Tll.t1C ftI,U[D ccu. S\lJTOl 9IIVN rIR 

1ItNCE111I' rUT POnTIIIIl 

Z. [[IO[NTS IlUIED. 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

A",,,~e-c.L1CT'RICAL G;NtRM.C£TAlL-\ .... " 

MO"~ 

D.n'tOOl-tlIJrUj\A l,.ta.&. e.l"TR1CAL AU"JLN't 

oS.,."iM C'M"Wi-4t(iC'I .<;,OO~) 

o-nuo-oSIhItZtl.I: \.INi ~CT\C* ~ t.4L'ftRIND lIOCN u:»O <\W"C1.P.. \0 (VA1i\Q.) 

O.I"~4-~11 LIM; PROTeC.TIONCMlTU,tN6 

.oov' lo.t.D '''''TliR. Iii (lMAAG) 

Drawing r.t>.: 

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

SNPP MCC-B1-01 

MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 

MCC-1B 

D3te: 

05/20/2007 

Revision t-.h.: 

116 
Table 1: Target Equipment Loss Report

Equipment ID Equipment Description Equipment Location Desired Position/ Target Loss

Type Status Locations

On 1,2,3, 10

HPI-A High pressure safety injection Pump Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft

pump A On 1,2,3,10

On 1,2,3,11

HPI-B High pressure safety injection Pump Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft

pump B On 1,2,3,11

RHR-B Residual heat removal pump Pump Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft Off 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 11 B

AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A Pump Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 4B, 9, 10

AFW-B Steam driven AFW pump B Pump Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 4B, 9, 11

AFW-C Motor driven AFW pump C Pump Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 12

RCP-1 Reactor coolant pump 1 Pump Containment Off 1,2,3,7,12

RCP-2 Reactor coolant pump 2 Pump Containment Off 1, 2, 3, 7, 12

COMP-1 Instrument air compressor Compressor Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Cycle 12

Closed 1,3,7,9 AOV-1i) Power operated relief valve AOV Containment (SOV-1) Open 1,3,7,9,10

AOV-2 Letdown isolation valve AOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9

(SOV-2)

AOV-3 Charging pump injection AOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9

(SOV-3) valve

MOV-1 HPI discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1,2,3,9,10

MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1,2, 3, 9,11

MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft Open/ Closed2 1,2,3, 4A, 9,10

MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft Open/ 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 11 Closed

MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 12

MOV-6 RWST isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 12

MOV-7 RHR inboard suction valve MOV Containment Closed 4A,7,9,12

MOV-8 RHR outboard suction valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. -20 Ft Closed 4A,9,12

MOV-9 HPI discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1,2,3,,9

MOV-10 AFW pump A discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft Open 1,3,4B,9,12

MOV-11 AFW pump B discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft Open 1,3,4B,9,11,12

MOV-13 PORV block valve MOV Containment Open/ 1,3,7,9 Closed'13,,

MOV-14 AFW pump B turbine steam MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1, 3, 4B, 12 line isolation valve

B-51

Table 1: Target Equipment Loss Report 

Equipment ID Equipment Description Equipment Location Desired Position! Target Loss 

Type Status Locations 

On 1, 2, 3, 10 

HPI-A High pressure safety injection Pump Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft 

pump A 

On 1, 2, 3, 10 

On 1, 2, 3, 11 

HPI-B High pressure safety injection Pump Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft 

pump B 

On 1, 2, 3, 11 

RHR-B Residual heat removal pump Pump Aux Bldg. EI. -20 Ft Off 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 11 B 

AFW-A Motor driven AFW pump A Pump Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 4B, 9, 10 

AFW-B Steam driven AFW pump B Pump Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 4B, 9, 11 

AFW-C Motor driven AFW pump C Pump Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft On 1, 3, 12 

RCP-1 Reactor coolant pump 1 Pump Containment Off 1, 2, 3, 7, 12 

RCP-2 Reactor coolant pump 2 Pump Containment Off 1, 2, 3, 7, 12 

COMP-1 Instrument air compressor Compressor Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Cycle 12 

Closed 1, 3,7, 9 AOV-1 Power operated relief valve AOV Containment (SOV-1) Open 1, 3, 7, 9,10 

AOV-2 Letdown isolation valve AOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9 (SOV-2) 

AOV-3 Charging pump injection AOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Closed 1,2, 3, 9 (SOV-3) valve 

MOV-1 HPI discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 9, 10 

MOV-2 VCT isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Closed 1, 2, 3, 9, 11 

MOV-3 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. -20 Ft Open! 

Closed2 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 10 

MOV-4 Cont. sump recirc valve MOV Aux Bldg . EI. -20 Ft Open! 1, 2, 3, 4A, 9, 11 Closed 

MOV-5 RWST isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 12 

MOV-6 RWST isolation valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 1, 2, 3, 12 

MOV-7 RHR inboard suction valve MOV Containment Closed 4A,7,9,12 

MOV-8 RHR outboard suction valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. -20 Ft Closed 4A,9,12 

MOV-9 HPI discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 1,2,3,,9 

MOV-10 AFW pump A discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft Open 1 ,3,4B,9, 12 

MOV-11 AFW pump B discharge valve MOV Aux Bldg. EL. 0 Ft Open 1 ,3,4B,9, 11 ,12 

MOV-13 PORV block valve MOV Containment Open! 

Closed' 1, 3,7, 9 

MOV-14 AFW pump B turbine steam MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 1, 3, 4B, 12 line isolation valve 

B-51 
Equipment ID Equipment Description Equipment Location Desired Position/ Target Loss Type Status Locations

MOV-15 AFW pump B steam inlet MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Throttled 1, 3, 4B, 12 throttle valve

AFW pump A test line MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 2, 4B, 9 MOV-16 isolation valve

MOV-17 AFW pump B test line MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 2, 4B, 9 isolation valve

MOV-18 AFW pump C discharge MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 1,3, 12 valve _

MOV-19 AFW pump C test line MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Closed 1, 3, 12 isolation valve

V-12 CST isolation valve MOV Turbine Bldg. El. 0 Ft Open 12

LI-1 RWST level Instrument Yard Available 1, 3,12, 13

LI-2 RWST level Instrument Yard Available 1, 3, 12, 13

LI-3 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7, 12

LI-4 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7, 12

TI-1 Letdown heat exchanger Instrument Aux Bldg El. 0 Ft Available 1, 2, 3, 9 outlet temperature

PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7

ANN-1 AFW motor high temperature Annunciator SWG Access Room Non spurious 1, 2, 3, 9, 4B

Energized from 1, 3,10,12,13

SUT-1

SWGR-A Train A 4160 V switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Room A Energized from 1,3A,0,2

EDG-A

Energized from 1, 3,9, 11, 12,13 S UT-i

SWGR-B Train B 4160 V switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Room B

Energized from 1,3, 8B, 9,11, 12

EDG-A

SWGR-1 Non-safety 4160 V Switchgear Turbine Bldg. El. Oft Energized 1,3,12,13 switchgear

SWGR-2 Non-safety 4160 V Switchgear Turbine Bldg. El. Oft Energized 1, 3,12,13 switchgear

SUT-1 Startup transformer Transformer Yard Energized 1, 3,12,13

EDG-A Train A emergency diesel Diesel DG Bldg. On 1, 3, 8A, 10, 12 generator Generator

Train B emergency diesel Diesel EDG-B generator Generator DG Bldg. On 1, 3, 8B, 10,12

LC-1 Non-safety 480 V load center Load Center Turbine Bldg. El. 0 ft Energized 1,3, 12

LC-2 Non-safety 480 V load center Load Center Turbine Bldg. El. 0 ft Energized 1, 3, 12

LC-A Train A 480 V load center Load Center Switchgear Room A Energized 1, 3,10

LC-B Train B 480 V load center Load Center Switchgear Room B Energized 1, 3,11

SST-1 Non-safety station service Transformer Turbine Bldg. El. 0 F Energized 12 transformer

B-52

Equipment 10 Equipment Description Equipment Location Desired Positionl Target Loss 

Type Status Locations 

MOV-15 AFW pump B steam inlet MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. OFt Throttled 1,3,4B,12 throttle valve 

MOV-16 AFW pump A test line MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Closed 2, 4B, 9 isolation valve 

MOV-17 AFW pump B test line MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Closed 2, 4B, 9 isolation valve 

MOV-1S AFW pump C discharge MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 1, 3, 12 valve 

MOV-19 AFW pump C test line MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Closed 1, 3, 12 isolation valve 

V-12 CST isolation valve MOV Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 Ft Open 12 

LI-1 RWST level Instrument Yard Available 1, 3, 12, 13 

LI-2 RWST level Instrument Yard Available 1, 3, 12, 13 

LI-3 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7, 12 

LI-4 Cont. sump level Instrument Containment Available 1, 3, 7, 12 

TI-1 Letdown heat exchanger Instrument Aux Bldg EI. 0 Ft Available 1, 2,3,9 outlet temperature 

PT-1 RCS pressure Instrument Containment Available 1, 3,7 

ANN-1 AFW motor high temperature Annunciator SWG Access Room Non spurious 1, 2,3,9,4B 

Energized from 1,3, 10, 12, 13 SUT-1 

SWGR-A Train A 4160 V switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Room A 

Energized from 1, 3, SA, 10, 12 EDG-A 

Energized from 1,3,9,11,12,13 SUT-1 

SWGR-B Train B 4160 V switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Room B 

Energized from 1,3, SB, 9, 11,12 EDG-A 

SWGR-1 Non-safety 4160 V Switchgear Turbine Bldg. EI. Oft Energized 1,3,12,13 switchgear 

SWGR-2 Non-safety 4160 V Switchgear Turbine Bldg. EI. Oft Energized 1,3,12,13 switchgear 

SUT-1 Startup transformer Transformer Yard Energized 1, 3,12, 13 

EDG-A Train A emergency diesel Diesel DG Bldg. On 1,3, SA, 10, 12 generator Generator 

EDG-B Train B emergency diesel Diesel DG Bldg. On 1,3,SB,10,12 generator Generator 

LC-1 Non-safety 4S0 V load center Load Center Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 ft Energized 1,3,12 

LC-2 Non-safety 4S0 V load center Load Center Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 ft Energized 1, 3, 12 

LC-A Train A 4S0 V load center Load Center Switchgear Room A Energized 1, 3,10 

LC-B Train B 4S0 V load center Load Center Switchgear Room B Energized 1, 3, 11 

SST-1 Non-safety station service Transformer Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 F Energized 12 transformer 

B - S2 
Equipment ID Equipment Description Equipment Location Desired Position/ Target Loss Type Status Locations

SST-2 Non-safety station service Transformer Turbine Bldg. El. 0 F Energized 12 transformer

SST-A Train A station service Transformer Switchgear Room A Energized 10 transformer

SST-B Train B station service Transformer Switchgear Room B Energized 11 transformer

MCCO- control Non-safety 0 center V motor Control Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12 . Center

Non-safety 480 V motor Motor

MCC-2 control center Control Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12

Center

Train A 480 V motor control Motor

MCC-A1 center Control SWG Access Room Energized 9,10 Center

Train B 480 V motor control Motor

MCC-Btra Control SWG Access Room Energized 9, 11 1 center Center

ATS-1 Automatic transfer switch ATS SWG Access Room Energized from 12

BC-I Non-safety swing battery Battery Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12 charger Charger

BC-A Train A battery charger Battery Switchgear Room A Energized 9,10 Charger

BC-B Train B battery charger Battery

Charger Switchgear Room B Energized 9,11

BAT-I Non-safety battery Battery Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Available 12, 15

BAT-A Train A battery Battery Battery Room A Available 5, 10

BAT-B Train B battery Battery Battery Room B Available 6, 11

DC BUS-I Non-safety 250 VDC bus DC Bus Turbine Bldg El. 0 Ft Energized 12

DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC bus DC Bus Switchgear Room A Energized 10

DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC bus DC Bus Switchgear Room B Energized 11

PNL-A Train A 125 VDC panel Panelboard Switchgear Room A Energized 10

PNL-B Train B 125 VDC panel Panelboard Switchgear Room B Energized 11

INV-A Train A inverter Inverter Switchgear Room A Energized 3, 9, 10

INV-B Train B inverter Inverter Switchgear Room B Energized 3, 9,11

VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC vital bus 120VAC Bus SWG Access Room Energized 9,10

VITAL-B Train B 120 VAC vital bus 120VAC Bus SWG Access Room Energized 9,11

B-53

Equipment 10 Equipment Description Equipment l ocation Desired Positionl Target loss 

Type Status locations 

SST-2 Non-safety station service Transformer Turbine Bldg. EI. 0 F Energized 12 transformer 

SST-A Train A station service Transformer Switchgear Room A Energized 10 transformer 

SST-B Train B station service Transformer Switchgear Room B Energized 11 transformer 

Non-safety 480 V motor Motor 

MCC-1 Control Turbine Bldg EI. 0 Ft Energized 12 control center Center 

Non-safety 480 V motor Motor 

MCC-2 Control Turbine Bldg EI. 0 Ft Energized 12 control center Center 

Train A 480 V motor control Motor 

MCC-A1 center Control SWG Access Room Energized 9, 10 

Center 

Train B 480 V motor control Motor 

MCC-B1 center Control SWG Access Room Energized 9, 11 

Center 

ATS-1 Automatic transfer switch ATS SWG Access Room Energized from 12 MCC-1 

BC-1 Non-safety swing battery Battery Turbine Bldg EI. 0 Ft Energized 12 charger Charger 

BC-A Train A battery charger Battery Switchgear Room A Energized 9, 10 Charger 

BC-B Train B battery charger Battery Switchgear Room B Energized 9, 11 Charger 

BAT-1 Non-safety battery Battery Turbine Bldg EI. 0 Ft Available 12. 15 

BAT-A Train A battery Battery Battery Room A Available 5, 10 

BAT-B Train B battery Battery Battery Room B Available 6, 11 

DC BUS-1 Non-safety 250 VDC bus DC Bus Turbine Bldg EI. 0 Ft Energized 12 

DC BUS-A Train A 125 VDC bus DC Bus Switchgear Room A Energized 10 

DC BUS-B Train B 125 VDC bus DC Bus Switchgear Room B Energized 11 

PNl-A Train A 125 VDC panel Panelboard Switchgear Room A Energized 10 

PNL-B Train B 125 VDC panel Panelboard Switchgear Room B Energized 11 

INV-A Train A inverter Inverter Switchgear Room A Energized 3, 9, 10 

INV-B Train B inverter Inverter Switchgear Room B Energized 3,9,11 

VITAL-A Train A 120 VAC vital bus 120VAC Bus SWG Access Room Energized 9, 10 

VITAL-B Train B 120 VAC vital bus 120VAC Bus SWG Access Room Energized 9, 11 

B-53 
Instructors' Exercise Solutions

B-54

Exercise Solutions 

8-54 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 1

Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type:

Component Description: Power Operated Relief Valve

AOV

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

AOV-1_TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN)

CLOSED

CLOSED

CLOSED

CLOSED

Yes E] No E

Power Supplies: Vital-A Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

VA3A No Power LOP

Hot Short between conductors GOO and SVC

VA3B Yes Control SO-Open can cause valve to cycle open-shut

repeatedly

VA3C Yes Control SO-Open

Comments: Table Formula

P(SO, B) = 0.60+ 0.06 - (0.6*0.06) = 0.62 P(SO, B)= 0.57*0.42= 0.24

P(SO, C) = 0.60+ 0.06 - (.6*0.06) = 0.62 P(SO, C)= 0.67*0.63= 0.42

B-55

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 1 

Component ID: AOV-1 (SOV-1) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: Power Operated Relief Valve 

BE Code: AOV-1_ TO (PORV AOV-1 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: CLOSED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: CLOSED 

Failed Air Position: CLOSED 

High Consequence Component Yes D No I:8l 

Power Supplies: Vital-A Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

VA3A No Power LOP 

Hot Short between conductors GOO and SVC 

VA3B Yes Control SO-Open can cause valve to cycle open-shut 

repeatedly 

VA3C Yes Control SO-Open 

Comments: Table Formula 

P(SQ. B) = 0.60+ 0.06 - (0.6*0.06) = 0.62 P(SQ. B)= 0.57*0.42= 0.24 

P(SQ. C) = 0.60+ 0.06 - (,6*0.06) = 0.62 P(SQ. C)= 0.67*0.63= 0.42 

B-55 
A t

e

.%

FJ• 'Act)

~oK

( /L,

,'>¶v~ 2~

~. ~i

) ,

I.

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

SCHEME VA3

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

PRESSURE OPERATED

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE B-56 SOV-1

XOO c,S-L 

Fuse ~ 

KPHh PB 

(OPEN) 

........ --svo 

- -

uoo 

-- /' 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

SCHEME VA3 

B-56 

, t' oJJ, 

, 'J-

"'wI A 

7 

, ."". ", W i 

" .:.s.. '(., ~ £.' "e. .- p 

/ 

'4, ~ 

o 

/ 

/ 

/ 

c.. 

I 

)(l» 

'..100 

j.'JLJ 

cD 

Pco 

(,. 00 

':-'10 

)<00 

<;1./0 

SNPP 

G 

'j 

1'4 r" 

. le -..:> r" 

'-.\C.. '\I'" f.j _ - ...of- .\.. EI ~ i<-t t:; 

£1: ",)tv..Of ,-0 \-

..J{)- ;>i"' ... , LOC. ()f 

/'J C- L-Ofw 

:'0 :> I-f-I) (...04 1)/ 

., 1-

t J 

Drawing No,: 

E-03 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

PRESSURE OPERATED 

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 

SOV-1 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

1 
0

VITAL-AI

00,_UOOJ®

CB-2 jxoo, uoo,

oGOO, SVO

xoo, svol®

S PT- 1

!:'V-/ SCHEME VA3

0

ROO,

B-57

.. . .... , 

SNPP TITLE: DATE: 

AOV-1 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27107 

0 

, 

--

VITAL-A 

® 

XOO, UOO 

C8-2 ® Y.. XOO, UOO, ROO, 

0 GOO, SVO 

XOO,SVO . 

© 

PT-j 

~v-I SCHEMEVA3 

0 

B-57 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 2

Component ID: AOV-3 (SOV-3) Component Type:

Component Description: Charging Pump Injection Valve

AOV

BE Code:

Required Position:

Functional State

Normal Position:

Failed Electrical Position:

Failed Air Position:

High Consequence Component

AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE)

CLOSED

OPEN

CLOSED

CLOSED

Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Panel B Breaker: 3

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

PB3A No Power LOP

PB3B Yes Control SO-Open Energize SVO (Also El, LOP, LOC)

PB3C No Control LOP

Comments: Table Formula

P(SO, B)= 0.60 + 0.06- (0.60*0.06)= 0.62 pcc= (7 - 1) - 6 - 6 = 0.75

(7-1)+(2*1) 6+2 8

CF= {1"[3+(0.5/7)]}/7= 3.07/7= 0.44

P(SO, B)= 0.75* 0.44= 0.33

B-58

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 2 

Component ID: AOV-3 (SOV-3) Component Type: AOV 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

Charging Pump Injection Valve 

AOV-3_FTC (AOV-3 FAILS TO CLOSE) 

CLOSED 

OPEN 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

High Consequence Component Yes D No IZI 

Power Supplies: PanelB Breaker: 3 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

PB3A No Power LOP 

PB3B Yes Control SO-Open Energize SVO (Also EI, LOP, LaC) 

PB3C No Control LOP 

Comments: Table Formula 

!...P..\.!(S~O:::...,...!:B:...L)_= ~0~.6~0..-:+..-:0~.~06~-..J..:(o~.~60~*~0~.0~6J...)=--,0~.~62=--__ ....!P~c<.!"c~= (7 - 1) = _6 _ = ~ = 0.75 __ 

(7 - 1) + (2 * 1) 6 + 2 8 

CF= {1 *[3+(O.5/7)]}/7= 3.07/7= 0.44 

P(SO, B)= 0.75* 0.44= 0.33 

B-58 
I'

A Ap

-A> j

• p

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

VALVE bESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH Ib

SOV-2 LETDOWN ISOLATION P82 AOV-2

SOV-3 CHARGING PUMP INJECTION P83 AOV-3

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM --

PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM

SOLENOID VALVES

cDrawing No.:

E-02

Revision No.:

0

B-59

VALVE 

SOV-2 

SOV-3 

I 

\ 

\ 

RlO 

33UNOO 

Pr-/ 

h PB 

(OPEN) 

""""'--SVO 

ENERGIZE 

rOOPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

LETDOWN ISOLA nON PB2 AOV-2 

CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3 

B-59 

.... . 'A" LD f ~ . . 1 ) 

® /V(J() w f Pte LaP 

.::;r;;o: E..[ Roo = 4)(' .. -' liD: SC>-o S v e '" Lt>'-

V( ", u.f' 

/S) 1...Df' 

GOO "-

'\ 

( .. 5 

/ 

SNPP Drawing No.: 

E-02 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -- Date:s-1'1107 

PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM -G4/271Z0S1-

SOLENOID VALVES 

Revision No.: 

S()u- z i SoU-3 0 
Po0, NOO, ROO,I

PO0, SV2 SP

5•//3 SCHEME PB3

Icv I,

B-60

I • 

,. .. ... .. ., 

--------~~~--------------------------~~------~ TITLE: DATE: 

SNPP AOV-3 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27107 

pNL-B 

® - POD, NOD, ROO, 

L.------'GOO, SVO, SV1,1...-------' 

SP 

'j/)/J -3 SCHEME PB3 

I 

B-60 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 3

Component ID: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: High Pressure Injection Valve

BE Code:' MOV-9_FTO (MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No Z

Power Supplies: MCC-B1 Breaker: 5

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

MB15A Yes Control El, SO-C, SO-0, 9-C, 1 ground, I target, 2 sources LOP, LOC

MB15B Yes Control El, LOP, LOC

MB15P Yes Power LOP

Comments:

P Table 10-1= 0.3+0.03= 0.33 Pcc_ (9 - 1) = 0.727

(9- 1) + (2 * 1) + 1

Pcalc= 0.727*0.228= 0.17 CF= lx[2+ (0.5/9)1/9= 0.228

B-61

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 3 

Component ID: MOV-9 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: 

BE Code:' 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Pressure Injection Valve 

MOV-9_FTO 

OPEN 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

(MOV-9 FAILS TO OPEN) 

High Consequence Component Yes D No r8l 

Power Supplies: MCC-B1 Breaker: 5 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

MB15A Yes Control EI, SO-C, SO-O, 9-C, 1 ground, 1 target, 2 sources LOP., LOC 

MB15B Yes Control EI, LOP, LOC 

MB15P Yes Power LOP 

Comments: 

.:....P--'T....:::a=b=le'-'1~0~-1!....='-'0~.::::..3+--'0::..:...0~3:::....='-'0~.~33:::.....-________ ----!....P cc= __ ~( 9_-_1--'.,) __ = 0.727 

(9-1)+(2*1)+1 

Pcalc= 0.727*0.228= 0.17 CF= 1x[2+ (0.5/9)119= 0.228 

B-61 
A

B

C

C

V

OP 11*PO

,oo -- -A ý

A

V2ý /2

VALVE SHOWN

op OSTO

IN 51.6O1D POSITION SNPP

I

VALVE

MOV-1

MOV-9

DESCRIPTION

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-B

+

SCHEME

MA12

MB15

SWITCH Ib

MOV-1

MOV-9 B-62

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - HIGH

PRESSURE INJECTION

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES

MOV-1 & MOV-9

I

I

A 

B 

C 

((( 

42 

0 

VALVE 

MOV-l 

MOV-9 

} 480V 

3¢, 60 Hz 

FU 

4801120 V 

ALL -SOl 

49-

'=' 

49 

YOO 

-SCl 

49X-

/' 

PB -B ,/ 

ICLOSE_ ~ 420-

-sco 

42 

0-

49X42Cop£N 

VALVE SHOWN IN ~D POSITION 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-l 

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9 B-62 

-

l -/ 

\ 

V 

\ 

\ 

,2- 0 G -ROO 

@ ootnE,.L ~_DP R,.,b - oM> p fl .:;.L.D : SD-C. ~<:.O .... r<.. 

::;tX> ">SO-- o 

®{,.()O;/i;..~ j."~ , t..r' p 

roo .. D f' 

$':' I _ t.t7 I' 

:;,l> I ' ... " '-

mE> -

SNPP Drawing No.: 

o 
.., ., it

SNPP I MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM- 1i 5/4/07

YOO, S01, ROO,

GOO, SC1, SC0,

S00, 2SP

XOO, S01, ROO,

GOO, SC, 2SP

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12

MOV-3 MCC-A1 3 CB-5 MA1 3

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 CB-5 MA14

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 CB-5 MA15

MOV-9 MCC-BI 5 CB-5 MB15

MOV-16 MCC-A1 8 CB-3 MA18

MOV-17 MCC-B1 6 CB-3 MB16

B-63

... . 1\ 

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 1 5/4/07 

® 

T1,T2,T3 

@ ® MB MCC , M YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, 

GOO, SC1, SCO, . GOO, SC1, 2SP 

SOO,2SP 

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME 

0 MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12 

MOV-3 MCC-A1 3 CB-5 MA13 

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12 

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 CB-5 MA14 

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13 

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 CB-5 MA15 

MOV-9 MCC-B1 5 CB-5 MB15 

MOV-16 MCC-A1 8 CB-3 MA18 

MOV-17 MCC-B1 6 CB-3 MB16 

B- 63 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 4

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve

BE Code: MOV-15_FTO (MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: THROTTLED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: DC Bus-B Breaker: 4

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

SO possible only with dual hot

DB4A Yes Control LOP shorts P01-F03 (F02) and N01-F02

(F03)

DB4B Yes Control LOP

Comments:

P(SO) = 0.60+0.06-(0.60*0.06)= 0.62 Pcc__• 5 - 0 = 1

(5 - 0) + 0

CF= (1"*(1+(0.5/5)))/5= .22 CF2= (1*(1+(0.05/3)))/3= 0.39

P(SO)= Pcc*CFi*CF 2= 1*.22*.39= 0.09

B-64

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 4 

Component ID: MOV-15 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

AFW Steam Inlet Throttle Valve 

MOV-15_FTO 

THROTILED 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

(MOV-15 FAILS TO OPEN) 

High Consequence Component Yes D No IZI 

Power Supplies: DC Bus-B Breaker: 4 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

SO possible only with dual hot 

OB4A Yes Control LOP shorts P01-F03 (F02) and N01-F02 

(F03) 

OB4B Yes Control LOP 

Comments: 

P(SO) = 0.60+0.06-(0.60*0.06)= 0.62 Pcc= 5 - 0 _=----:.1 __ _ 

(5-0)+0 

CF1= (1*(1+(0.5/5)))/5= .22 CFl = (1*(1+(0.05/3)))/3= 0.39 

P(SO)= Pcc*CF1*CFl = 1*.22*.39= 0.09 

B-64 
-6-

pol- o

-4

FC1 F\b 

+1

&'Jol .ý-9 J-ý, I ý (':) V

Motor Shown in Remote Operating Mode

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW- B STEAM THROTTLE

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

MOV-15

Drawing No.:

E-09

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 B-65

.1 __________________________ 1 __________

43 1 LOCAL 

RAISE 

(LOC) 

- 1-- LOCAL 

I 

I 

L_--i 

I 

() I 

~ I LOWER 

co f;~ ~ (LOC) , 

+1 1 

1 

I 

r- --~ 

1 

1 

_ -1 __ LOCAL 

RAISE 

(LOC) 

LOCAL 

Motor Shown in Remote Operating Mode 

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 B-65 

POI- Fo3 

~ -4 SD ~ 

fJ01- ro ,-

I\l/) \ - Fo'3 

fJ 01 1...0 r' 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW- B STEAM THROITLE 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-15 

Drawing No.: 

E-09 

Date: 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 

, 
P01, N01, F02, P01,

F03, SP S IBF03,

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4

N01, F02, SP

B-66

.. . ... 

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 2 5/1/07 

C8-3 I P01, N01, F02, @ I 

'-----..... F03, SP 

ISE I P01, N01, FOCf I MOV-1S I 

F03,SP 

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 

B-66 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 5

Component ID: MOV-13 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: PORV Block Valve

BE Code: MOV-13_FTC (MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE)

Required Position: OPEN / CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: OPEN

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes F] No E

Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 7

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

MA17A Yes Control LOP, LOC

MA17B Yes Control SO-C, LOP, LOC

MA17C Yes Control SO-C, El, LOC

MA17D Yes Control El, LOP RSP

MA17P Yes Power LOP

I I

Comments:

Case for both B/C P(SO)= 0.30+0.03-(.3*.03)= 0.32

B: Pcc = (9-1) = 0.8 CF= {1*[1+5/911/9= 0.12 P(SO)= 0.8*0.12= 0.10

(9 - 1) + (2 * 1)

C: Pcc = (9 - 3) = 0.5 CF= {1"*3+5/911/9= 0.34 P(SO)= 0.5*0.34= 0.17

(9 - 3) + (2 * 3)

B-67

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 5 

Component ID: MOV-13 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: PORV Block Valve 

BE Code: (MOV-13 FAILS TO CLOSE) 

Required Position: OPEN I CLOSED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: OPEN 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [gI 

Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 7 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

MA17A Yes Control LOP, LOC 

0 

MA17B Yes Control SO-C, LOP, LOC 

MA17C Yes Control SO-C, EI, LOC 

MA170 Yes Control EI, LOP RSP 

MA17P Yes Power LOP 

Comments: 

Case for both B/C P(SO)= 0.30+0.03-(,3*.03)= 0.32 

B: Pee = (9-1) = 0.8 CF= {1*[1+S/9U/9= 0.12 P(SO)= 0.8*0.12= 0.10 

(9-1)+(2*1) 

C: Pee = (9 - 3) _=-""0=.S'--____ ....!:C:..:...F_= ....... {1!-*.J.!:f3:...;;.+=S/-""9J.L<]}/-""9_= ~0=.3~4...:....P.l..=(S=O~)_=-""0=.S:.....:*0=.3:::....4!-=~0:..:....1!..!.7_ 

(9-3)+(2*3) 

B-67 
A

B

C

4.• c

Ya, -- 41ýc

Vc 5 - 10,

Yc. ~~$I

I

02

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17

B-68

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - PORV

BLOCK MOTOR OPERATED

VALVE

MOV-13

Drawing No.:

E-10

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0 I _____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________

480 V B --f--4--\. 

A-"'-- } 

3¢, 60 Hz 

c -+--+-..... ---

42 

o 

ccc 

4801120 V 

") ") ") 4 9-

Jlr.rr 

F FU 

49 

YOO 

ALL 

49-

ISE. 

43-

-soo 

__ MECH_ 

INTLK 

42CISE. 

43-

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION 

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 

B-68 

.:u 

3 

SNPP 

yeS .... SO - C'... 

yc..2: . 

Drawing No.: 

E-10 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - PORV Dale: 

BLOCK MOTOR OPERATED 

VALVE 

MOV-13 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
SNPP I MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM -3 5/1/07

GO, YO6, YCl,

Y01, 2SP

YC4, Y02,

R02, G02,

Y04, YC3,

Y03, 2SP

YOO, XO1, X02,

YC5, Y07, 4SP

TI, T2, T3

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17

LB-69

o 

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 3 5/1/07 

XOO, G01, R01 '---"" 

@ t-------® ...... MCC-A1 t--~ ______ 0~ MOV-13 

YC2, Y05, ROO, y~o, X01, X02, XOO , SCO, SOD, 

L--_---' GOO, Y06, YC1, L.....-.--r----' YC5, Y07, 4SP 4SP 

Y01,2SP 

YC4, Y02, 

R02, G02, 

Y04, YC3, 

Y03,2SP 

T1 , T2, T3 

@ 

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 

B-69 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 6

Component ID: MOV-10 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-10_FTO (MOV-10 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No Z

Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 6

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

MA16A Yes Control SO-Close

MA16B Yes Control SO-Close 3-C, 0 ground, 1 target, 1 source

MA16C Yes Control SO-Close RSP

MA16D Yes Control SO-Close, LOCOpen

MA16E Yes Control SO-Close, LOCOpen

MA16P Yes Power LOP

Comments: Note- MOV-10 is an ungrounded control circuit

Ptable= 0.3+0.03= 0.33 Pcc (3 - 0) = 1

(3 - 0) + (2 * 0)

Pcalc= 1.0*0.39= 0.39 CF= 1*[1+(.5/3)1/3= 0.39

Note: only cables B and E have energized conductors

B-70

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 6 

Component ID: MOV-10 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-10_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-10 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [8J 

Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 6 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

MA16A Yes Control SO-Close 

MA16B Yes Control SO-Close 3-C, 0 ground, 1 target, 1 source 

MA16C Yes Control SO-Close RSP 

MA16D Yes Control SO-Close, LOCOpen 

MA16E Yes Control SO-Close, LOCOpen 

MA16P Yes Power LOP 

Comments: Note- MOV-10 is an ungrounded control circuit 

~P~ta~b~le~=~0~.~3+~0~.~03~=~0.~3~3 ______________ ~Pc~c~= (3-0) _=~1 ________________ __ 

(3 - 0)+ (2 *0) 

Pcalc= 1.0*0.39= 0.39 CF= 1*[1+(,5/3))/3= 0.39 

Note: only cables Band E have energized conductors 

B-70 
129

A

B

C

480 V

30, 60 Hz

'Ii I

I yt FU • , =5 C- A

~- I -10"~-

480/120 V

IL~~' 00. , Ir

- /) t~

42

0

42

C

)U A• PI

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL P'fDPOSITION SNPP

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR

OPERATED VALVE

MOV-10 B-71

B -04--...e----- 480 V A-~-!: } 

C 3;. 60Hz 

42 

o 

ccc 

4801120 V 

42 

C 

FU FU 

X01 

_ _ MECH _ _ 

INTLK 

42COP£IJ 

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL ~ POSITION 

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 

B-71 

rUJ 0- 'SCo"" -50- ( 

s>'-l - > 80 G, 

~ ..L) ')0 2 ~ LOc..-",.~ 

S<:. I ::- SD -I!. 

$ C<- ~:so-c 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR 

OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-10 

1 

Drawing No.: 

E-11 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
0

p MOV-10, SCHEME MA16

.3

Q

B-72

... 

SNPP 

CB-3 

o 

I 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 4 

SOD,SCD, SC3 SOO,S01, SCO, 

....... -.._ ..... SC1, SC3 

5/4/07 

© RSP 

X01, 

502, @ 

SC2, 

SC3 S01, S02, SC1, SC2, SP , 

SP ® 

I-Xi -

O

-

O

-, s-o-o-,s-c-o_@ .... B ...... MCC-Al Tl, T2, T3 ® MOV-1Q 

i , 

, . 

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 

I 

,j 

B-72 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 7

Component ID: MOV-8 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: RHR Outboard Suction Valve

BE Code: MOV-8_TO (MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes Z No F]

Power Supplies: MCC-B1 Breaker: 4

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

MB14A Yes Control SO-Open Energize SOO (Also El, LOC, LOP)

MB14B No Control El, LOC, LOP

MB14C Yes Control SO-42 Energize LOO (Also El, LOC)

MB14P Yes Power SO-Open 301 "smart short"

Comments:

P(SO, A)l= 0.3+ 0.03= 0.33

Pcc= (9 - 1) = 0.73

(9 - 1) + (2 * 1) + 1

P(SO. A)= 0.73*0.12= 0.09

CF=fI*11 +5/911/9= 0.12

B-73

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 7 

Component ID: MOV-8 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

RHR Outboard Suction Valve 

MOV-8_TO 

CLOSED 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

(MOV-8 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

High Consequence Component Yes [8J No D 

Power Supplies: MCC-B1 Breaker: 4 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

MB14A Yes Control SO-Open Energize sao (Also EI, LOC, LOP) 

MB14B No Control EI, LOC, LOP 

MB14C Yes Control SO-42 Energize LOa (Also EI, LOC) 

MB14P Yes Power SO-Open 3ct> "smart short" 

) 

Comments: 

peso, A)= 0.3+ 0.03= 0.33 

Pcc= (9 - 1)= 0.73 _______ ---=Cc.:....F_={....,1'-J*[L...:,1_+5=1..:.91.u.:}/'-"'9_=....:::0c.:.....1:...:2=--____ _ 

(9 -I) + (2 *1) + I 

peso. A)= 0.73*0.12= 0.09 

B-73 
j-~~ 5t-4/2

~.XC LIII

iL" -ý

!

gee,: 43ý wo -L

:ý0iý

&- tv -

L 0Lý L CL

SV'- '3y2 ýv

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

MOV-8 VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14

A 

B 480 V 

C -+--i=+---J 3;, 60 Hz 

42 

o 

4801120 V 

42 

C 

X02 

voo 

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 

I1)V Pe rmi ssi ve 

Control Circuit 

Ma in M:)V 

.......--Control 

~ Circui t 

G R 

B- 74 

~ 

Lc' .pi!:- -. 

fl \ 

'J#Ir 

l.tb-::: >0-4 2 

/.)(;{) - E::( 

SGl" - I a t 

RtO-; c:L 

• t:..D :::' L Dt.. 

DO - ~c>' C>f'", III 

SNPP 

'1<> 0 : 4If 

501 = WL 

0{.)(;) LP(> 

'<;01 ;:' 1..0 (.. 

$ 0 1 -= Loc.. 

t':::i oD = LOP 

'JOb ::: /-/)( 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-8 

.' 

Drawing No.: 

E-12 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
%

TI,'

YOO, SOl, ROO, 0,

GOO, SCI, SCO, GOO

S00, 2SP

X02, YO1, LOO, WOO, SP

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14

S01, ROO,

SC1, X01, SP

B-75

· . . 5/4/07 

TITLE: DATE: 

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 5 

® 

T1, T2, T3 

@ ® CB-5 MCC-B1 MOV-8 YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, 

GOO, SC1, SCO, GOO, SC1, X01, SP 

SOO,2SP 

© 

X02, Y01, LOO, VVOO, SP 

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 

B- 75 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 8

Component ID: MOV-1 I Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-11_FTO (MOV-11 FAILS TO OPEN)

Required Position: OPEN

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes [ No Z

Power Supplies: DC Bus-B Breaker: 3

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

DB3A Yes Control SO-C, El, LOC, LOP

DB3B Yes Control LOP

DB3C Yes Control El, LOP

DB3P Yes Power LOC, LOP

Comments:

P(SO, A)= 0.60+0.06 - (0.6*0.06)= 0.62

Pcc_= 7 - I = 0.

(7 - 1) + (2 * 1)

P(SO A)= 075*0.30= 0.23

7F5 CF= il*[2+S171117= 030

75 CF= ii *r2+5/711/7= 0 30

B-76

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 8 

Component ID: MOV-11 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Discharge Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-11_FTO 

OPEN 

(MOV-11 FAILS TO OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

CLOSED 

AS-IS 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No [8] 

Power Supplies: DC Bus-B Breaker: 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

DB3A Yes Control SO-C, EI, LOC, LOP 

DB3B Yes Control LOP 

DB3C Yes Control EI, LOP 

DB3P Yes Power LOC, LOP 

Comments: 

peso, A)= 0.60+0.06 - (0.6*0.06)= 0.62 

3 

Pcc= 7 - 1 _=-,,0,-,-,. 7'-"5'----__________ ~C:.!..F_=....L{...!..1 *~[2=_+:...!5::.!../7!..Jlu.!.}/..!_7=____""0.:..::.3:..:::0'___ __ 

(7-1)+(2*1) 

peso, A)= 0.75*0.30= 0.23 

B-76 
(

/

RI

HS-

-- CLOSE OPEN

Ycl Yol

Si

12 1;

j-1;= LO£ L C2

S I &.6c YC2

Ni

Y02

TSYat =SD-t2

yet 40Pw

Yoi :WC

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR

OPERATED VALVE

MOV-11

Drawing No.:

E-1 3

Date:

05/09/2007

Revision No.:

0

B-77

() 

o 

> 

LO 

N 

..... 

------------------- -

'----<:1"'0 n--e------ Pf __________ , 

- -

72C 

S1 

~ . ___ SERIES ~ 

---- , 50 -c. (.D4.~ 

m~~~ ' 

fl~~l AI ~ 

A?.- <;, ..-!o.-6., "'~/l 

~-r~.r ......... ":J 

'::1 ::. £..0'-

A, :: I..DL 

A'L"'- WL 

S I ", ' 0(" 

'S."' ,~ "".1. 

.J 

HS- HSCLOSE OPEN 

YCf YOf 

YC2 Y02 

33-

--~--~ '-~~r-*-----N1 --------~~~~-=~==~~~-------~7----~ 

+ 11.5 

Yc>/ =$()-o 

yc,/ " 1.l>C 

f<1 :. E:1: 

YO?, ::' l..Pf 

fill ::' /..Of 

-11..$" 

p/:I..bP 

61 ~P 

~ 

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 

B- 77 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR 

OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-11 

+IL:; -!~ 

,. 

Drawing No.: 

E-13 

Date: 

05/09/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
d

C NI, Fl, SI, AI, A2

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3

B-78

, .... 

SNPP TITLE: 

. 

DC BUS-8 

I 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 6 

P1, N1, YC1, Y01, G1, R1, SP 

N1, YC2, Y02 

P1, G1, R1 

N1, F1, S1, A 1, A2 

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 

B-78 

DATE: 

5/9/07 

@ CB-3 

® 

(C) MOV-11 

@ I 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 9

Component ID: MOV-16 Component Type: MOV

Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve

BE Code: MOV-16_TO (MOV-16 TRANSFERS OPEN)

Required Position: CLOSED

Functional State

Normal Position: CLOSED

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 8

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

MA18A Yes Control SO-Open Energize S00 (Also El, LOP, LOC)

MA18B No Control El, LOP

MA18P No Power LOP

Comments:

P(SO, A)= 0.30+0.03= 0.33

Pcc= 9 -1 = 0.73 CF= {1"[2+5/91}/9= 0.23

(9 -1) + (2 * 1) + 1

P(SO. A)= 0.73*0.23= 0.17

B-79

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 9 

Component ID: MOV-16 Component Type: MOV 

Component Description: AFW Test Line Isolation Valve 

BE Code: MOV-16_TO 

CLOSED 

(MOV-16 TRANSFERS OPEN) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: CLOSED 

Failed Electrical Position: AS-IS 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [8J 

Power Supplies: MCC-A1 Breaker: 8 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

MA18A Yes Control SO-Open Energize SOO (Also EI, LOP, LOC) 

MA18B No Control EI, LOP 

MA18P No Power LOP 

, 

Comments: 

peso. A)= 0.30+0.03= 0.33 

Ecc= 9-1 _=~0~.7~3 ________________ -=C~F=~{1~*~[2~+~5/~91wV~9_=~0~.2~3 ________ ___ (9-1)+(2*1)+1 

peso. A)= 0.73*0.23= 0.17 

B-79 
, 10

~jLOP

56& 7

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - AFW

TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR

OPERATED VALVES

MOV-16 & MOV-17

Drawing No.:

E-08

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID

MOV-16 AFW TEST LINE I5OLATION MA18 MOV-16

MOV-17 AFW TEST LINE I5OLATION M816 MOV-17 B-80

.1 _____________________________________

A 

B 

C 

42 

o 

~ } 480V 

'-.1 3¢, 60 Hz f 133 

FU 4 1 8 

((( : TS.0[f Ts.clL 

11 ~15 

4801120 V 

ALL 

49-

= 

49X-

(~ B H 

(CLOSEh 

---

420- 42C000 49-

JJn® 49 

YOO 

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME ' SWITCH ID 

MOV-16 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MAlS MOV-l6 

MOV-17 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MB16 MOV-I? B-80 

v 

..... 

\ ) 

SNPP 

120 <:, . 

~ If'. . ~110 £1 ,,,,, . I..t>P 

5<>' ''' I..Df' 

iQDo " <.I)J> 

~ 

(')/)0 un" rcflO := l:'I .el ' , 0' 

'!:,.tllJ - S/)-{) sao = 1.Oc. 

Orawing No.: 

E-08 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -AFW I-=O-=-ate- :---I 

TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR 05/01/2007 

OPERATED VALVES 

MOV-16 & MOV-17 Revision No.: 

o 
S NPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM- 1 5/4/07

C

a fli% I

YOO, SO1, ROO,

GOO, SC1, SCO,

SOO, 2SP

A X00, Sa1, ROO,

GOO, SCI, 2SP

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12

MOV-3 MCC-A1 3 CB-5 MA13

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 CB-5 MA14

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 CB-5 MA15

MoV-9 MCC-B1 5 CB-5 MB15

MOV-16 MCC-A1 8 CB-3 MA18

MOV-17 MCC-B1 6 CB-3 MB16

B-81

I· . .. . . 

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 1 5/4/07 

® 

T1, T2,T3 

@ ® MB MCC M YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, 

GOO, SC1, SCO, . GOO, SC1, 2SP 

SOO,2SP 

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME 

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 CB-5 MA12 

MOV-3 MCC-A1 3 CB-5 MA13 

MOV-4 MCC-B1 2 CB-5 MB12 

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 CB-5 MA14 

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13 

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 CB-5 MA15 

MOV-9 MCC-B1 5 CB-5 MB15 

MOV-16 MCC-A1 8 CB-3 MA18 

MOV-17 MCC-B1 6 CB-3 MB16 

B-81 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 10

Component ID: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument

Component Description: RCS Pressure

BE Code: PI-I_FL (RCS Pressure Indication Fails High)

Required Position: AVAILABLE

Functional State

Normal Position: AVAILABLE

Failed Electrical Position: LOW

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Vital-B Breaker: 8

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

VB1A Yes Indication FH, Error-H

VB1B Yes Indication FH, Error-H

VB1C Yes Indication FL, Error-L

VB1D Yes Indication FL, Error-L

VB1E Yes Indication FL, Error-L

VB1F Yes Indication FL, Error-L

VB1G Yes Indication FL, Error-L

VA3C No Indication None Cannot affect indication

Comments:

1. Shielded Instrument Cable- External hot shorts not considered credible.

B-82

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 10 

Component ID: PI-1 Component Type: Instrument 

Component Description: RCS Pressure 

BE Code: PI-1 FL (ReS Pressure Indication Fails High) 

Required Position: AVAILABLE 

Functional State 

Normal Position: AVAILABLE 

Failed Electrical Position: LOW 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [gJ 

Power Supplies: Vital-B Breaker: 8 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

VB1A Yes Indication FH, Error-H 

VB1B Yes Indication FH, Error-H 

VB1C Yes Indication FL, Error-L 

VB1D Yes Indication FL, Error-L 

VB1E Yes Indication FL, Error-L 

VB1F Yes Indication FL, Error-L 

VB1G Yes Indication FL, Error-L 

VA3C No Indication None Cannot affect indication 

Comments: 

1. Shielded Instrument Cable- External hot shorts not considered credible. 

B-82 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

ComponentiD: rF'.I Continuation Sheet (. of -Lj

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

?82C. JNOlCN-TJOt T 

0

0

B-83

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

o Component ID:_f_I_--'-l ___ _ Continuation Sheet <.l::: of ~ 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

? B2 C f'J r NDI"E CflfJfJ"l f>..fEecr IrvOIGA-Tlo,.J 

f 63 C. N r NOrJ~ CA-IJ"'4i M:PeL-T IJV() l(..m IoN 

o 

, 

o 

B-83 
(D 7 "m

VB IA VBIF

VBIE

Psi

SOV-1

SH E-03

PT-1

120 VAC SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RCS

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

TRANSMITTER

PT-1

Drawing No,:

E-14

Date:

05/2212007

Revision No.:

B-84 I

80 

c ') VB1A C'> VB1F 

PT-1 

--

PRESSURIZER 

VB1G 0 

( )- VB1C 

TB 

) VB1E 

CB-2 

PI-1 

SOV-2 

~..-+l- SH E-02 

H-:..++!-so V-3 

SH E-02 

PS1 RPH 

120 VAC 

B-84 

SOV-1 ~....+-i+- SH E-03 

KPHSNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - Res 

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 

TRANSMITIER 

PT-1 

Drawing No.: 

E-14 

Date: 

05/22/2007 

Revision No.: 

1 

" 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 11

Component ID: ANN-A Component Type: Annunciator

Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature

BE Code: ANN-I_FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann)

Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS

Functional State

Normal Position: AVAILABLE

Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Vital-A Breaker: 4

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

K16A Yes Indication LOI, SP-ALM

K16N Yes Indication LOI, SP-ALM

K16B-K16M No Indication LOI

± ± *1-

+ + ±

* + + ±

Comments:

B-85

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 11 

Component ID: ANN-1 Component Type: Annunciator 

Component Description: AFW Motor High Temperature 

BE Code: ANN-1_FH (AFW Pump Motor Spurious High Ann) 

Required Position: NON-SPURIOUS 

Functional State 

Normal Position: AVAILABLE 

Failed Electrical Position: UNAVAILABLE 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [gJ 

Power Supplies: Vital-A Breaker: 4 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

K16A Yes Indication LOI, SP-ALM 

K16N Yes Indication LOI, SP-ALM 

K16B-K16M No Indication LOI 

Comments: 

B-85 
. .l. I

AFW-A _L

_*__HIGH TEMP

ANN-1

P-8A FAILED TO _ P -8c

AUTO 5TA9T TZIF'E

P8A

P8C

(3- 4) (3-5)

1I, 4'5P C,4A5)

Z4 (449)0

IS(444$)

10, Z29(449')

tI AZ, 15,14,15, G, 7,

t5,19 (449')

7

(449'ýi

zu '?a

BLOCK DIAGRAM

SCHEME K16

SNPP

ANNUNCIATOR

SCHEME K16

Drawing No.:

ANN-1

Date:

05/20/2007

Revision No.:

B-86 #8

, .. , • • *" • • 

AFW-A 

HIGH TEMP 

ANN-1 

TE-AfWA Z 

(3- -4 ) 

,o-8A FA tLEO TO , .. P-BC 

AUTO 5TAS2T 

(3 - 5) 

BLOCK DIAGRAM 

SCHEME K16 

B-86 

P8C 

~ 2T~~~ 8 '. (e:-\~ iO) 

tOOG 3~ 

Cll l 

------ --. 

b--- ){I, 4SP(445) ® 

'112 ,13,lA,15,IG,17·0 

10, t9 (449) .' 

2\,2Z,2.~.24 25,2o '27, CD 

ID t 29 (449) 

SNPP 

ANNUNCIATOR 

SCHEME K16 

Drawing No.: 

ANN-1 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

Revision No. : 

#8 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 12

Component ID: HPI-B Component Type: Pump

Component Description: High Pressure Injection Pump B

BE Code: HPIAFTS (HPI-A Fails to Start)

HPIAFTR (HPI-A Fails to Run)

Required Position: ON

Functional State

Normal Position: STANDBY / ON

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

BDG06-P Yes Power LOP

BDG06-N Yes Control

BDG06-D No Indication None Isolated by I/

BDG06-G No Control None Isolated by SCB/SS

BDG06-E Yes Control

•BDG06-Z Yes Control

BDG06-L Yes DC Control Power

Comments:

B-87

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 12 

Component ID: HPI-B Component Type: Pump 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

High Pressure Injection Pump B 

HPIA_FTS 

HPIA FTR 

ON 

(HPI-A Fails to Start) 

(HPI-A Fails to Run) 

STANDBY ION 

Off 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes [] No rg] 

Power Supplies: .:::B,",-,re::<.:a",-,k"",e~r:...: ________ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

BOG06-P Yes Power LOP 

BOG06-N Yes Control 

BOG06-0 No Indication None Isolated by III 

BOG06-G No Control None Isolated by SCB/SS 

BOG06-E Yes Control 

BOG06-Z Yes Control 

BOG06-L Yes DC Control Power 

Comments: 

B-87 
1 1 1 1 1 1 A I 2 I I I ~~7 i I 2: - I

SWGR-B 4.16KV 1(350 UVA)

A

11:

I,

4- -- ---- -- -I-- - -- - - - - -

4.~ ....... 4. ---l -----

............

H!

I7

!

t/\ 1c. ovnUMT m M I

4ts

* fl 05 -c05 ý nA*Sý AUZ~

... aftaa-1r i , 

OW ""m" 4'-v F-'-

M.*. - n .. . A

cv: S.Au-.VA ..

* m. Maw wi ~ caa a. E--i

M~ arn #~~trMt

-ý tS a W't*..Z -.

SMa 5.4- -- j

4 Ga.4 05S PnW=AW C1

1'.VN I't qc, MSi3ff /

I an%~I aiS ~Sg 4

N

|

buta 0 C016

I -. 0ml

A

0

c

'V,

4 : 450

4.16

P

KV SWGR-B (350 MVA) E

Js.1~ '~'.~Si

~LY .~LSL

I.rnK

-A

B-88

..........

- - -- - - - -

4Z-CSI

P

I .* -VOW, Nf*..t 9*04t ml ?4 

Rtr'eoe.CC DPAVVi.CS

SST-B

SNPP SNPP SWGR-B-01 ""

4.16 KV SWGR-B 05/20/2007

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM

5 

n 

" J 

o 

c ~ ~ 

! 

S 

, 

« 

Ili~ ~ 

~~<4 ii. ! I·~ ".,- i ih~ ¥~" 

~h hi I ~fili hi 

• t 

j I' 

! 

-l ~i :. 

I i .h - a i~· hG h~ SST-B § ! 

ali ·11- ~~; 

;~f &~~ .~i ~ & f ~ 

------- --------_ ... _----_._---_ ... =--- -:=---=----=-- -=: ----:=----=_. ==~~:=:;:j~~~~~ 

B-88 

t.. __ •• ,,~ 

~ 

.r~ .... v,...,.".., 'I 

ClYlIIlW~.""'Y 

CON'" GQVt.."''''' ",,","1.\ OI/'~ 001811 CUUINT Jttu.y 

COW" COn,.,.. .... .-v.;,.,.." .. ~c...e 

~, ... ~.,.,,. qaJ..¥ j ~:~~.;~t : ~:,J' ,-""""" 

---

~_~1II0 "".1. -V"" t6~M.'" O't ::".r-- •• w .. "-"'T "I" .. 

c.a:a,..o 

·.,.... . P'''-r , • ·0:1;° ~ 

" .... /L"~2. " ",W. j" :/I.oC.w.. cwa4: ,,,,,,till,..,. " .... -.y ~ 

OYCIt 

C'YWT C:~ ." ... v....,..,.. ACl,...... I. ~ , . 

P"" MItV ,.. ..... "I 'P-"" 

:: ~::=:':;V .Ic~s» OtooVl c""' •• .". ... ~ .. v 

~( S 

IOr:J.~~C'l ..... , .. ~~ .... ~, , ............ CoO .. ,. .... 

•. IltI"'" ~, .... f,#O;ce .. "'.Q .... "", """"(.TM>i {'- """"'t' ~ ..... 1' _ .... MS-1. ... .,.... __ ... t ... .,. 

'~;;:;;~ .. S ...... 1\I,.~Qtr &.u .&.-:.os ~ ""e,...,·uI"U 

r,. t'l\~~~ ~,.,fQ!t.:~N.f .... ' · ' ,-"1,\0 

.. ~atloOft." ........... ~ ____ 0 ww _ ... C4W., .... 

/1' . ., .. " ... · .. ~h ~ .. '- ~~.~ MerE ~(" -:e~: :: :::;, ~t:rCO~hC[ DPA'tIII,C:S 

t " ::::'1 S:o.t..L t IN LtC "'-'" '''''",. ~c:"r'Y.. .... . .. <'Y.'" 

O:awl1g I'b.: 

n 

c 

E 

SNPP SWGR-B-01 

4.16 KV SWGR-B 

ONE-LIfE DIAGRAM 

Date: 

0512012007 

116 
E ý

KC~'SKS ~ ~5L. A.-. a.4 awn -

A

41

I C~~~aR W, R.S,

H

I VL

m

v-i

h

- ii

* j S ~ -

*1-- I

D

m

'I"

I.

7

~f

!t

1+

4 .

*-Ca

C 4

rpFF$

NOTES

Invr~ O~dS

- ~~ mi5S~da

- 0-iR9WU

* -SS. P- 6),

- ono 00

* caflmr S.A'SAS*

I&S*ISICUT SULKY 7J2 3 C0'~ 00004

ui..~ n.-~- ~ :iSS/tSaVC I Into.

($55 - ~o SEC. ps-..

Ta SCSI Yang *~, *,~

.o4t.t I ~..,=

CE,

*C~5* anne 1*5 vS

I.

I

I

-4j. I

I ¶

i . .

5

~T o11Tw _T~

a

sr.mo KhIM"

-Arl,.

A4L -u

F=a

I000 -L Fý

111111L

L SNIP

HPI-B SCHEMA-ri

SHEET

a-..

j. ., a,- E_ wr indPl5CrmmC -.. :-, , '- I

I I]11111•/1' INli • ]• I [ J i I I

- ~ ~ Sa ~ ~ ~ IiSSI ~ ,~ C Em , 5

1 7;-------- ~

)p 1 W-li. Da{te:

C DIAGRAM 05/20/2007

"1

B-89

D 

....... 

~. 

r 

. _---------- G 

..ajfI. .. lit. \1 ..... 

~ ..... ,.., .. ~~ 

~ ........ ,... "I~ ... 

I 

. I • 

V- I I--j;! I r- I I -:- I 

; I 

I 

I 

B- 89 

1 

. .1'1: 

~-

~-, 

&< 

:2 : 3 

_ .... lItt:,.._tcS 

... 0<_ 

L()(,iUKrCUl' PI!LA'" -, ..... ~MW'DC. 

TlMC teLA'" ~1IaM NFt.A/1.W)f'2.'f'C ~.oc. A ($!T,.." IO~C. . ..... -. T_ ...... ~ 

-- .u./.-..n .. N1'''' , leU 

..../ rZJIO:'AI.,...... 

-~ 

...,TES B 

\, r-$- T It'S>T ,WI'7C!H t." -1'AV(.1C O,..~TU)C£I..L.. .... I"I'CM 

SttOW"t '0..- MU.eE. I,., ra."," Pot.ITa:>", • 

............. ~qc;,n>-• ...,., ,...,.,....(aG .... O~ 

.... ........,~~.., 

OIof&O~( ........ .f1'l6044). 

.. ~~GPIIff.~~ .... ::.- ?~ ~<-- o-mMO). 

,,_ tit. UIIoI"U'I'," ~1OIIl"" •• 'U 

lllUflltKA5"'o.oe. t~""'<oO ~ 

<'vcuOctP ... ___ "",.",'f, 

~",~".~""""OM 

~~"n.:I"CA"""..-.ou .-. • uoec.a~ ......... "~. 

~flC.ltUi'~"'''' 

"), $(" 'OfU,W_ "'-1.,..6' "oa I"'U$C 

~""«it ~ 'tV"'. 

"1OO1- SlIOffk.a. ",f Nt na.e. A..,J6 

~(r .. tK-+4_'''''') 

I> .... T1OO5~ ~INGLI. UN .. ,""OTI.<'T'tOM 

< ",CTlAl"" "'4OV ~""I"Qt 

•• AIII.~I" 0.'''''006- S.1~'"''' ''''Ii. .. .cntt''~ 

f~TC-"I"'.~ ,..ft.M r ....... ,. ""'nnM- .~ ~&""~ OCT ........ 

, NOTLS 

"I"&' - ,:~ "'c~ .. c.""''''l' MANUAl... "ott, SA.F5T't 1l5L4,,-cD 'E~\It~ • 

CXaw flg No.: 

HPI-B-01 

rete: 

HPI-B SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 

SHEET 1 

05/20/2007 

Revision N:J.: 
1 I 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 ! 7 I 8 1 9 1 1 0 1 I 1 2 . .3

OZSCBIATIKSS A.ArYTC JABS*AAS -1

41 0 V aS P -- AtTOT OAKSt•lSASAP

Al

S-!. KJ B A.--,•

TIPL

0 i 06

iv kip

/ 1

,A

I 7 ?

I

'V

000

a

ij

V La'.

TO LX01P'flCUT STL.AY SKA'.7)AAA - AmA? 1A1. CT? .BrIOAj -

COL4

S 015504.04 '.CSLOOCL0C OCALOA4SC OS flS.I

(SOT ATe SOC. '4-1,0*

TIflSTLST mACS .4~ocA ~ ~

5.5,

055 *10505* SAul 'A *AS*'.I..AA AS ABS

i~ 4!:

T~ I~

P~OTES S fl .- V OtT SW ¶55

LA- 700CM OPSMATLA CBLC'.*TCA

MACON PAM BALSAMS

IN rEar PASS00AS.

A. AKQ.~* *.la ~AS SJET BU~Am

A-ITBBQOA 0-40*1,').

4. 000485KM K.fl4.A BATmSASA BIlK,

SAG A 10045(14 AMA (77525)

A. t 1¶K KAIMA* BA

O' A l1KAA'O A.IATSOS).

B

C

-lil

_________________________ I

II I--

RE]EREPCE DRWINGS

II I A. lOACA- SIASLE LINE PA mOTCAF'

T -op+. -.-_s SB B. VAAAAAS414 005

*14 _________ml~+Im

c •z

swypt

*,0SS #005 4.lflS CIS SANAIA (DEaIL

Am ~~=v 

:;T STA .l L X1.? 

,1 3OAISSI

MS-1j~

D,

L-

'----'-'+ ZI 4 "

~~~J ~ M¶;ABAST- R ~t

SOil SMx STx "Ix{ • KI A aw , 5151.1'. S*-S

'

~0~ -

0500 1AM

=zz "AOAII - IS -- A ISS KO.

SlAtS 054270

t AMmn t

FFI~

.0. $l

LSSS 45505. WI~0B4IS50K4S~AflW I

in- V,-Wl--MFWN;MM

SNPP •'" "0

FPI-B SCI-EMA1IC DIAGRAM 05120/2007

S-EET 2 )•W NO:

B-90

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

2 

.. r. ... 

tf 

.~ '=M ./. 

~- - - - - - - - - --

,....""'" 

.lCT"rO>II:VO 

::'T. Na !1O-U-9f~ 

!DII:d~~~ 

3 

" .. 

~f*. • ..!-IJ2..T~" 

~-...oQ.O_ 

A.Q1. y", ...... IC.A'"="'" 

...,.. 

........ ... - "~c.AT ... 

...U;u. VIIl ...... T .... 

__ ~ TO~O 

8-90 

~ " 

f 

'i!: 

-f 

..... 

~ 

.--

i 

I 

I 

I 

~ 

I 

!,h 

:TO l ~ '~'I 

.. ~ . . I 

10 

.. 

~ 

13 

"Etof""KS 

z-yl)C~iI 

L.XKIN::"CUT ~'-".,. 

.~..w.u.."('K,1!,.;CI..I« -<>=<- tU:(~ 

(50fT .(1' Ie "C. ~ .. ,,~c.... 

"H"'"':C!.a"rt!I'DNU"I' ,."./lTaZ,. 'Z.5Wi;)t. 

IIQJU' (VT ..... l.e.~ o.S.·5~:;" 

,~.!:~~" _ ... IIrSII'DC. 

NOTES. 

t. T'_ T~"T 5WJT!:IoC 

z..W_TRUC.1C CP£RAT£OC.EI..L.5'lfm:M 

S~1noIIN FOR BrtE.At.KEJl 

IN TL"'r p~rno". 

S.~~"""~C.CI;;UfT .... ,~ 

,~,~o-o~). 

4,.~~.~81"" 

0urIII i:)_~,DvQO.~). 

s.~()IL0ci:err.~~1I~ o-l).t1~ 1>tTfUO). 

"- -:"e (.I»lI'-IolTU CW"IAATCR.",CO".'U 

,"~"'HIlS ~ OflOO'. 4. ~ .. " 'otloce 

L ,;,tIllOC,Oj ,uUUT:'JU.Y. 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

D-I"I''1OOI-SINGoLIt LIN. [t.Ilc. ... U)l' 

$YSTIi"'(rMl.4-41.., .. '..-0 .. ) p~TTOOS· $1N6Ll. LINE ~AOT'l.C.T'lON 

r "'CTPIH'), .. KOV $WI'I'(;H 

Go6"''' • ..,..,. 

p. 117006- $INo.,-.. LI",,£ PJtOTE&TJO,.. 

,"'CTERIN(.411:001 SW.Tgt 

Goo«AR.MnJ6 

.... -'"J7S3.- ELIE.C. G.CNUlAL DILTAII .. '" 

~ "'OTIltS 

®~"h 

1-F'1-8 SQ-EMc\llC DIA<?RAM 

St-EET2 

f>, 

B 

c 

D 

F 

G 

Ce!e: 

05120/2007 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 13

Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: Compressor

Component Description: Instrument Air Compressor

BE Code: COMP-I_FTR (COMP-1 Fails to Run)

Required Position: CYCLE

Functional State

Normal Position: CYCLE

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes LI No Z

Power Supplies: LC-1 Breaker: LC1-15

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

YEG06-P Yes Power LOP

YEG06-A Yes Control LOPCopesrSi Faults could cause LOP to Air

Loss of Cooling H20, YEQ1 7-A Yes Control LOC

YEQ17-E Yes Control LOC

YEQ17-1 Yes Control LOC

YEQ17-H Yes Control LOC

YEQ17-M Yes Control LOCfail off

YEQ17-M Yes Control LOC, fail off

Comments:

1. Air Compressor Sequence Control Mounted on COMP-1 skid

2. Motor winding heater not required

B-91

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 13 

Component ID: COMP-1 Component Type: 

Component Description: 

BE Code: 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

Instrument Air Compressor 

COMP-1_FTR 

CYCLE 

CYCLE 

Off 

N/A 

(COMP-1 Fails to Run) 

High Consequence Component Yes D No C8] 

Power Supplies: LC-1 Breaker: LC1-15 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

YEG06-P Yes Power LOP 

Compressor 

YEG06-A Yes Control LOP Faults could cause LOP to Air 

Compressor Skid 

YEQ17-A Yes Control Loss of Cooling H2O, 

LOC 

YEQ17-B Yes Control LOC 

YEQ17-E Yes Control LOC 

YEQ17-1 Yes Control LOC 

YEQ17-H Yes Control Fail off 

YEQ17-M Yes Control LOC, fail off 

Comments: 

1. Air Compressor Sequence Control Mounted on COMP-1 skid 

2. Motor winding heater not required 

B-91 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

0 ComponentID: C,,om-__ Continuation Sheet (2- of -L)

Cable Analysis:

0

0

Cable ID Required? 1Function Fault Consequence Comments

aa) I - :Li4D NreAjPN.f-W N

UThý)7- T j -LN- P____________ jo 6NL~

B-92

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

o Component ID: C~ fI f -I Continuation Sheet ~ of J:-.J 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

~f:..Qn - rJ rv II"D rv"rv£ ftf'J tJilN c..) frTlcr7V cSNl..y 

~EQ)7-T N "1-N.D fJoN~ ANNV f'I C-, Prj/oN CJNLY 

o 

o 

B-92 
- ~-

TOWi

i t.

I-2

T•" i i 'v:-' i •. ,,J .. . .• , - , , , 

* -•ti

* 4• .•__

i S 

-

'9

lll !v

1 1 ; I I ? 

I

- A A 4, A 

A

- ~i 

I V 

V

a

Iii I'4

Th -4

/

4'

-V

4 L-N- C. .-

- -4 

-

WV, 

~ ?.. 9 V

)

C-' K

-'

SNPP

ItNEIR CCWAIR CPESJ CWvIP-I

DuAW NX

COMi-r21

B-93

( 

( 

, 

, 

f 

} 

------

1

--:----

- , . J " t ') ; 0 11..(011 

. ~ 

-- ---- -. - - --_. ----

B- 93 

1 

) 

( 

<' 

.( 

, ~:.:, "' t~, ~ . .. ) " 1""'" .... ~~~.,.,:.~?) 

$.'Ii , ... t- !.t'..;"~ .... ' ... 

~ 

..J, 

, J 

/ 

j 

! 

.J 

./ 

SNPP 

10lI0: 

I r:t:i2fY:lJXJ7 I_N>.: 

113 
SI ý ~ -13

-•.15

1~

/ COM. 1

E2 I

El

8B-94 - 94 

COM. 1 

& 

V -:'~r'~ ~ 

-'-- '. :::~::: ~ . -

. , .' 

" . . , 

........ ~ 

;- :;;:t- ~:.:-~~-

SNPP 
Eoýý~ \,MD 4 ý CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

0 Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type: Switchgear

Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear

BE Code: PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2 (4KV BUS B FAULT)

Required Position: ENERGIZED FROM EDG-B

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: N/A

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: Breaker:

Breaker:

O Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

.4- .4 4

Comments:

0

B-95

o 

o 

o 

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Component ID: SWGR-B Component Type: Switchgear 

Component Description: Train B 4160V Switchgear 

BE Code: PNL-B EPS-4VBUSBF-2 (4KV BUS B FAULT) 

Required Position: 

Functional State 

Normal Position: 

Failed Electrical Position: 

Failed Air Position: 

ENERGIZED FROM EDG-B 

ENERGIZED FROM SUT-1 

Off 

N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No IZI 

Power Supplies: !:B:!...:re~a:=..:.:k~e:.:..:r:~ _______ _ 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

Comments: 

B-95 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 15 (Note: No detailed description, nor solution, of Exercise 14 on prey. pg. is available.)

Component ID: LC-B Component Type: Load Center

Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center

BE Code: EPS-480VLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT)

Required Position: ENERGIZED

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: NIA

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: SST-B Breaker: N/A

PNL-B Breaker: 11

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

AED02-A Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection

AED02-B Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection

AED02-Z Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection

AED12-A No Control None Kirk-Key Interlock

AED12-B No Control None Kirk-Key Interlock

AED12-P No Power None LOP from LC-1F

AED12-Q No Power None LOP from LC-1F

AED12-R No Power None LOP from LC-1F

Comments:

B-96

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 15 (Note: No detailed description, nor solution, of Exercise 14 on prevo pg. is available.) 

Component 10: LC-B Component Type: Load Center 

Component Description: Train B 480 V Load Center 

BE Code: EPS-480VLCBF (480V LOAD CENTER B FAULT) 

Required Position: ENERGIZED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: ENERGIZED 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes D No [8J 

Power Supplies: SST-B Breaker: N/A 

PNL-B Breaker: 11 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

AED02-A Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection 

AED02-B Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection 

AED02-Z Yes Control LOC, Loss-Protection 

AED12-A No Control None Kirk-Key Interlock 

AED12-B No Control None Kirk-Key Interlock 

AED12-P No Power None LOP from LC-1 F 

AED12-Q No Power None LOP from LC-1 F 

AED12-R No Power None LOP from LC-1 F 

Comments: 

B-96 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

I Component ID: L (- . Continuation Sheet C(. of j

Cable Analysis:

02

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

•E•]'Z-V IOJ CvoE Nlk,•- Key, "f--•E:'L-OcC

B-97

" 

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

e:t Component ID:,~/'_G_--==B,-' --- Continuation Sheet ~ of -.f:.J 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable 10 Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

A£D 1~-\JJ rJ C /VoNE ~ I~': - X. r::y l i\rr ~l-C c..K. 

~L.18D"- A Y 'P lo'~ ~~ Ca"()t~ ewe S"'D\ "'" B~.s 

ALI8ab-B Y f 1-.,.55 aT ~t~ ~"" f~ B~kw-.s 

A1)f\Lj-'1 y C f~,\ l~~ 5~ 

REA 01- 'i ~ C f 0.7, \ la-~~ <5~ 

AE.DaJ- f1 y C f~,\ ~~~ s'Nl 

AEbal-jS y V ~\ L~S~, 

., .. 

o 

o 

B-97 
EV• IOF lizIT-Ai Z 

_5kQ STA SIMCI(TtLAU5P 0b IleI#.JIA2

'O0.0 G OVER CUIJEOT tE.L&VY,SP

A 6~ T.mF WlLAY KtLAV IAGNSTAT/

50OV1ER CURRIEW~ U08g &.A'

NOTE 0 -X IC FPWO" 41O~i~iFF S.c0

Ol. TIME 0L&.AV CELAY AGA-bTAL

NOTE 10 Er10".A

5TA SEVCE TRA3.SF ID

Aw OCCIN&our OCLAy /r

I U5 IV OvaIt VOrP(LTA L 

. ti ZLk&YjtUO0 Dr-r4TIOW) ""

815.0 UUM10( VOLTA(.0 ZOUAy [EShTIC.'-

rio, 51110 JW0fe VOLTA64E

CC0-1 AQ10a.,Ak~Y OELAY.

V 480 VLC-B (1600A) NOTES

L!2~~i LL~4'5 S~l OIOPT CJOXCJnT RATING(. MtOOD

-E 5.V,- 

AMPS SYL41.4(TRICAL.

S~o~¶avIJA'1 2 8RAKERS 52-ID0 Of012 6N ARE KET

8.11 IA) ARE OPERATED 5y A 5ig&L.&

p W 7, ALL. SKXS EXCLIAT 52- rO2 4 52-ED42 HAVEO

~' ~ -I O DTILS ($8101.2 'CAU R 1074/EN01050

S 0t-1 0001, 5 t.EOr. XUW MOL010I CAWR 8181S

IC70 1 M09.t1.0 CHALE It8 (ACl KOf* (LIKO Ttoi soI (~)5)- T'NT. OAJLV 0Okr 8REOAkU AIkM MILISPOIOD'"

w w0V W ATIE OCINTCO &11.~o

0 o~

u REFERENCE DRAWIN15S

0 0 .03 ~ 0 A11I556-018(TIIC" fAEIJEAL bETAIll 4 VJOTES

To u)JIT t (.00 V. LOPAD (.Tt 00

SNPP OLC-8-01

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 05/20/2007

B-98 ONE-LINE DIAGRAM Revision No.

I 

I :r 0 

~ '::- ~ I ~ " ~ ;; 

I .g ':' ~ 

, " , , ~ ~ v 

, ~ ;; ;. 

•• 

.' I dJ)~ . I 150 25 

'I ~ I 

I ~ '" .. >~ I >- " .. I I :;: ~~ @.-J 3 UI> 

IrlOJC;f fJO'" '" ~ rJ" ~ g9 ONL') 2 ~ "I- ,,::0 0 

'" ~ ",J 

U rJD 

TO UtJlT l: ,,00 . lj)~O (12. tD 

MCC IF 

'!! I g 

II 

iii g ~ '" § ~ ~ ~ '" 1 .. ~ : r « .. ) 

IIC1£"~) "'/<'P 

!! 

« 

'" 

~ 

< 

~ 

U 

,. 

~ >-

IC 

.. 

a; 

~ 

g 

~ 

<~o." 

.. 00" L.O",O C.~"'T'"R. 

IF 

e~~ 100 

" oJ 

.. 

0 

e " ~~ ... 02 U 

Ol< :> ",,-

0 

I8

- 98 

0 g W 

~ ~ 

~ < 

~ ~ 

" 

~ ~ ~ \I 

125 125 

,... Iz z< Ul_ " .. ~ .. ~ ~-~ 

:!d\) 

:a~., «IUd 

'ZO~ t- J .. 

s8~ 2§S 3 :lI 

tv.'€' 'll TIO» M~ VPi ~u.,~ 

~Q. ~T". ~L~VI(E. TUu\;. 10 Ge/P.Jc."lc. ..:)"£ W) ovelit CUR,I,El,)" ~!.L"VJa, 

~ T,M£ !)£

cAV u .. /\,v ~T"TI 

l"lOftl''' ~o 

NOri"'""IO .?i~D~:·~= ~~"'t 'i./P.lC.~'1G 

~ TI"IE C~c"'V I.E <Ai ~A.~T"TJ 

HOT"10 t'OIUA 

~ ~~A t;!tvl(£ T~""";~ 10 n&/I1-°"ln\-.;.- e,.~'e.(.~tlTlt\t.. ~e."'''y 

~ STA. ~'tVICE Tt">lSF. 10 

G.e/wu .0("''1(, O<IT ElLAY 

~'IJ !U~ \0 OVE.t VO\..T .... 4&. no;- .. ~T/c..v-e UI. .... y(~ ... O Oi."T(,T IO",,) 

t1 

~ M 

.0 ~t VOLTf,l.E I1EIAY £..$i/C."

-l. 

tlt·1 811\ 10 .J»OU VOLTME WI5."Tj"10-<. ToOl -'.UXl\o'O\RY ItEL~". 

I. ,..-be.MO"~~ e.~,-,,~ 1""O,,"'f.1:\. eOA.~O IN~" r;Q~l AM. 

t :~:~~~~I~~ f~1 ~~~M~~~', ~~~ (M I~ . 8U) )"""T C.I~(JIT 11:,0..,1>-1<0 It.OOO "'l.Ip~ WIAIA~TR. ("L. 4. ~T,o..TlOU ~ER.II"£ HAIJ~FO~""I( 

"$K~It.!.L." TYPE.. 

~ ~~AK&"S ~2·~00Z ..... 0 SZ·EOtZ ME I<.sT INTEIILDCKl<O SO TH4T OM.Y ON_ C411 S: CLO~EO 

4T ANT TIME (OW!;.. &·n7IU) 

eU~[t5 ~"Eoo& AUO .1. ... /\,,, (OU "0011. I!!>U~ 1"'-) ARE OP!.t"T~O ev A. 51-';C:tL.!. 

COUno~ ~WIT(H ·Ul'E """11.1 (O>-lT~OL 

~OO .... 

"LC &1<0:' $ e:<CLPT 52· !.OO2 4 52·F.0I2 W""E. :j,~u) TA.Tt. i ltJP ulJlT) tVlTl'\ '0'-1..01\11""" 

DE~16.iJ"TlO>-l~ (elaA"U: Ftll.ME/'~"~OA 

~ATIIJC.-NAPH<'!» 

&. s(EAt.Et~ ~H!)Q'), S!·EEoc. MID MOcoe:O ""~E &11~'. 

,. !IITTU." a<U/.U I( >.U o~ INhtLO<tU;O ~ 

THA~ O/.ILV Oll" 8R.CAl<.U ;WO CDlltE.POt.lOI"(o ~Of.Q c... ..... 6I<'IlI (/\," ee. ( CC)"D >., "'1J'f TlMe (DWb·(.·'l1f!~J • 

, . llN('T I ...... lICea ~ 1.S ' ..... C'f .. IeAu,Jt %M'C-.u)C.VSD 

.n. 1I'tfT l' UCA.UJI. DO.S "110 "'£~T ~I ..... ,....rOU.i 

CI..b\INQto OJ" ICfM ..,,"fU 

0. \"OC. .... Tf!.O ' ''' T!.ct.MIJoa,"- !h.OGI(. COM' .... ,."""" 

.t..to(Ive. A~~oc.l"Te.O &"'£"'1(1.2.. 

I: ;:~ ::"~~:-Sf.1;S~ .,!:a,.~".\:is =;.l7?;;J;.,~-;:~ ~ . 

REfERENCE QRAWINGS 

... ·11's'a·H E(TtJ(AL 4£IJHI\L bETNL) ( ~.T') 

D·111001. ~~' ~IIIE ~Lf(. "'U •. W~TE/.I(4v..ol"'l4 

SNPP 

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Drawing No.: 

LC-B-Ol 

Date: 

OS/2012007 

Revision No.: 

116 
FhýA

a ~

~ A

:4~44 WrN1~r4~~2

REFERENCE ORAAEI'K

*.~i';'.

w Mm., eT

B-99

'O L4.Nah

1 --- - ~ 

D.J 

®.-

--.... 

"'''l4'''''' _ ... -

I 

I 

tI 

; :iN ~ 

0: 

.; 

1I Vi' IS o5-.. iu 

• 2 w 

.. co:.~M a._._ 'J I! 

_ ... --- _ .. -

_,.... -........ ~ 1" 

......... .....,.... .. x 

................. • ' a 

..... 1Ilt\Ift1Oc::amA ,.~ fOUCA .,.,.t'OSfUDIt, 

· · · 

I~ 

! 

• . . · . . · ... "

...... 

..-

B- 99 

I rtU ~~ rnrP'! ~ 

62 ~~'f ~ a.: IJCIC 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

Inool =':-~ ...... <M<''' two,,) 

-"1SN·~"""""~ ..., .-no_. o oftlOt() ......... u_ .. nee' ''''' .aMO ,. .......... .,...I..OIrDQl~ 

.. <... .......,..) 

A 

3 

c 

1)_11101 · ............... ~'...:TtOMItIIO :­ M.,...tr£f"t/;JIIW ,J/IIt"pca ... 

.:::~) 

G 

_N>: 
4 1 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 i :_ I 11 I 13

A

77~IIB

¶AA~flat LPfltt - .ak0.. C - 1 -• A

B

C

D

B

1nhrn.~

SE-mAn IAI44)

6Y .:ii, T"" "T T 'IT r " l 

1.-TW Oý ~ mc .4~

REFERENCE OPAWS

".1n-t¶AA aO4 palm. IAND

LAWa 60= cu

E

(.2!)

F

13

H

WE0 W. .aý. 5, 1- Lii 'A *****~l9~. ~I#j s

L!IJ ~CA. @1 l~fl

-1.-c

Act-A ~.a IFS. WAd

.1.

1*atA 1! :mmiSIIIIXl I i iILilm

0"CMA Ni:

52-ED-12 MM207

SC-EMM'TC

SNPPb W

B-1O0

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

G 

H 

e"''''* .....,,,....-... 

...... _-·l. .•• ~ 

-"lIlfr.1IoO --" 

... ..... ............. 

...... 

~ ...... 

= 

~ ~ W~! < 

!.....Ll :lli 

" . .. . . . • . = t"j . " 

,. 

..... . ..... 

8- 10 0 

13 

" Ei'ER,NCE DRAWINGS ,,~)6_l,t.u,",1oCA.o. GlKa .. ;"WV\ 

"'NO WO'I'a'S 

.\~I-~~~·!::,\-:=C~ 

O. 1110 O_~~~~:'_. 

"-\1":0" - ~:;~~ :!~~~~) 

: .I'\1o.t ~ =:~I:n..~ 

SNPP 

52-ED-12 

SJ-fM\l1C 

B 

c 

G 
441A %Eltv

TILA14 SST-B .J\cGOOV LO

5Z -ErIZ

480 V Load Center LC-B

0~ CstR IF NOTES

1. A.LL. INTE.RLOCKS ARE KIRK TYPE

2,c-%QC.I.WT BBZEAKI.RS 52-L-DO-,SZ-EE t

VAOLDE!D CAcQE 'TOQ r bAkTq vk

C-HARLGF. IC.APE $KLY IN.T CA'.v-wt0 'O

nTtA*,T OW.Li ONE. IPEA-KEZ A-MDOP PE5PON&D

ING~ BTTERY1 C.HAI 3I MOLDEO C.A6bE

EPA.KEP- CANm ag CL.,OFLO Al AN,'y TIME

(SEE.F D*GC- V11 15)

LEGEND

- - INTERLOCK WITH KEY HELD.

INTERLOCK WITH KEY REMOVED. I I II I I

OPCIEA.-NION, SlL.kuv~mCE

K'Y IS HIL%.P IN CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-LDOZ INTERLOC

TO F--TA•LISH 'b•tiCv- THROUGH CIRCUIT BREAKER

S2-.I£DI2

i.TRIP CIRCUIT 1UtEAI•ER 62-EDO2. TURN KEY Al IN L'O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKER

52-EDOL TO LOCK OPEN, KEY Al IS NOW FREE.

3. INSERT KEY At IN L-O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKE

52-E.bI. AND TURN TO UNLOCK. KEY Al IS NOW HEI

4. CLOSE CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-EDIZL.

StVI.IRSS. SWQU.=WCF- 'TO RESTO;.- SERVICE THROUGH

,jr,,UII .RjLE.TR blt_-_Or..

* NOTE. 'A'S A EX.CEPTIOIJ FOP. hA•IIMTEMANCE W#OKK PE. R PLhNqT

rFc.C-VuKFET-QI0 KE_15 MAY SE UbEV ID OVERKIDE THE

NO&MAL CIRCAAi 5KEAKS XJT.rr LOCK FEATURE.

L-0 (LOCKED OPEN) INDICATES THkT THE KEY IS REMOVABLE WHENTHE

52-EDO`'lr CIRCUIT BREAKER IS LOCKED INIHE

OPEN P0SI[ION.

SI. E - INDICATES KEY REMOVABLE NL

-WHEN BOLT EXTE NDED.

I-----.A.NIVIL LOCK I I Y

"tSEE_ NbTEZ I. Al IRR I

D. BrTTLRY CHARCR REFERENCE DWG,

IC D-177001-SINGLE LINE ELEC AUX SYSTEM

glaGo€ t ooov)

C-177010 -SINGLE LINE PROTECTION

METERING GOOV LOAD CENTER I1

A-177538-ELEC GEN OETAILS 4 NOIES

SNPP LC-B-04

LC-B Ei-te

INCOMING BREAKER 05120.2007

INTERLOCKS FRii W:

B-1O1

"0£ ..... "0" U~U""C,, "-"",,,,4- ~f.."'" I~ HE'-P IN CIRCUIT BREAKER !52-ED02 INTERLOCK. }--~ 

,.0 E~TA.I!>~I~H ~1ii..1lt."IC'" THROUGH CIRCUIT BREAKER 1-.k t,1 Sl-.EDI2. 

I. TRIP CIRCUIT BREA~ER 62-EDOZ- L-O I 

2· TURN KEY AI IN L:O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKER I 

e>2-EDOe. TO LOCK OPEN. KEY AI IS NOW FREE. ~E. NOTl'Z.J. 

NOTES 

I. A.Ll.. INTE.pLCX.rs AR.E. KIRK TYPE 

2.CI2CUli SQEAKER'Q 52. -e.OO' 5t-E.EOG:. t\ MO~Deo CA":lE e.2EII..~e.Q.S iii e.~iit.fll"'" CHII..fi,.CaE.Q Ie. A.2.E. t<.E.y INTEewx.\II..ED 'tIC 

'THII..i 0,,",1..'1 OWe.. I!>2.EA..I(.E2 A..MDcoe2.ESPONO 

INCl e,.t..,.TE2'1 C-HAI2c...e2. MOLOEO c,A.~ e.Rl:.A..KEIa <..A.N E)E c..~O~E.O AI A.~" TIME 

("bE.E D'4JCa c.- 1,-1 I ~~ ) 

[!-

~-L-Q -

E 

LEGEND 

INTERLOCK. WITH KEY HELD. 

INTERLOCK WITH KEY REMOVED. 

(LOCKED OPEM) INDICATES lHA.T 

THE KEY IS REMOVABLE WHENTHE 

CIRCUIT BRE~KEF< IS LOCKED INTHE 

OPEN POSIiiON. 

INDICATf.5 K.EY REMOVABlE 2t:Il...'! 

WHEN BOLT EXTE NOEO. 

INHRIOCIt KEY TABLE 

lINTUlOCK I !CEY NUMBER I 

I AI IRE -14204 I 

a . INSERT KEY AI IN L-O INTERl.OCK ON CIRCUIT SRE .... KER I I 

~2-E.[)I2. AND TURN TO UNLOCK. KEY AI IS NOW HEl.O. SATTER y Cf\A.~a.t.R REfERENCE DWG 

4· CL.OSe. CIRCUIT BREAK.ER 52- tD ,z... 

1ltE.1I&''''SE. 'VLQu.ltt..lCE.. 'TO Re:.~"OR.E SERVICE THROUG.H 

~It.CUI1. .DQ.~tt..EIlt. ~t:LQ.02. .. ._. ______ - - - -_ . 

O

>TE. : AS ~..., EXCEPTIO..., FOft- M"I~TE."'ANCE. 'I.ORK ~ A PLMlT~ fF.OC.E.OUREI T\NO ~E.~S MI>.Y & U~£D 10 O\IE.~RrDE THE. 

. NO~M"'L C.I~C.\A\I eR1:.AKE.~ "DJT1:.RLoc.K FEATURE. ~ 

_ " ._. ___ ' ___ ' _ __ ' P· ' _ 'u .• _ _ . _ _ , , '.' . .. . . . ,. _ ",,_ ,,_ •• • _ ... • ... 

B-101 

IC D-177001-SINGl.E L INE. ELe.C AUX SySTEM 

(~I"OV t ,"OOV' 

(.-177010 -SINGLE L.INE PROTECTION ~ 

IofETERINt; c,oov LOAO CENTE~ 10 

A-177.538-ELEC .EN DETAILS. NOlle.S 

I SNPP 

LC-B 

INCOMING BREAKER 

INTERLOCKS 

D'awflg t-b.: 

LC-B-04 

Cltte: 

0512012007 
1 2 i p 1 5 I _2 '.3 3 i p 9 I 2

ft 0*

'I - S I

a'. / -~ , S 14

~ p

141

'N L. 2

('---4 ~

--- *

-~

!ýýt ý -

sickA

3'tOA~ 

- - LC - B

•'IS cam. ft

- J VI 1 50t. mt cftsT .Vl 0mnI.ftIo

4 C.48,. 'ORS C. 11tfti SS.-

-I-Iy

Oq.y*I~ ft~ft.4~ThfttAS .eSs

-.-- -s , Ot ,,t.o

.xtCf S .. k VLJAA ft* ¶0 ,aC14 ,.tt

TA r-_l

- -. -- tact :0v

0 

- - -fl~ :0-r ------- *F-:- CSC.r -- -*n-o

"' ~ ~ ~~~t st*l¶t.. 1~ ~o S*

ftft53 Jul poA...o0"0

Mtllft4 S.Oft6t.400YttO

=,f~t..1"15'3-to

"O 54ft JU 54 tL-1 ~ .,I,.Uc, "Few A-m

SftCft 8. 6tfl .Ot

-- t-- 14 0 c- aq-ý too •" •'__' I• ftcsin.,e. ---- A - - I-n-

-1-L- &+L

A•• .... Af I S T ft"t ~ ~ " -.,. g I-' . . .. z ze __..... ___

ftC-tf '- - I-m- - ",

r:O ftml774Cfm

SNPP IC-"5

LOAD CENTER 0 o07

UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME

B-102

~ ;", 0 

, ... 1 

:i.t=-I 

:: 3 

~ f f 1'" r

H r" l~.OVI1 CN 

~ r-r--r ... Jtl i~ !-~ --j r---- -- ' I ""ri1. , , • . 1 I I e :, . ' 

- ~ ~~~;! I 

~ 

''''la.~ 

~ ..... . ~!~ 

::-e..o".' ;.1 

::-«:..Q1-1 1 t,! 

e 

~~-L I 

e 

~'aHn!II.l C- B 

B-102 

.'\X\.:..-....:! 

" ... "'''tY a' ..... " 1X1:w::..'''U L_-L--=...-:.....:··::: ... .., =· L-___ -L __ -l.:. 

t ,"- .:,oo.uc.r,olG OI .. COfI4 .... C."" .. C'k. .. _ 0. u.J: rut",.,,-.. h . 

.. r.. "~. "Oft " e. I"OT~HT l,. t.1 .... ~ 

-:;~p:· tf:!!. ~f lx .':; ~ 

l. ".' .-1"1"'111..( .... " .... It ... 0; ..... '1.. 

"""tl .. ~ •• 

). "I ClOO- ~_. _M L GtC,<1t .c:Ao.. &J_ 

M ":" ... (\1~~_·"~'lo~. 

H-,,()(), ~"' .. , ", \of l".,,-.. C ....... ( 

~'" .", C ....... u.c f60't ,'o.ocw) 

1-:., ~ .. :. ~t _~l ~!!oC'T o-.. ."'0 Itol! 1'11'11. 0,;6 ~ !.o..!) :.t. ... . " A 

: ... ~a ' I."" U. :TIO'" A.o ,,:;·;,::t:"'l'ir:!O't .%.O ::. u.:~ : 

.. 'Jo ~)J\e. . ,,"-l' fI'-.c::"'.:TOI AN:) 

""'- . ... ...:. ¥ ,.ot.::) tt,hTUl 

" . ' 'r.- ) ~ .. , \JIoit r.ao-c':'fI.c>.o .. ~c 

~\.'I'I~' ~OO-' 1.Oot.:> ~'" te;..."4tt61 

- ~';' ~i ~ "-OfC":'c>.. a"c 

....,~ 600''1 I.OIroO "~ . 

·.( .... 1 

" ·" .-u1- f'\r.M. "~U!.Mttt( ....... AJQ Jlfllll'en ~t'.D 

.~"T. 

SNPP 

LOAD CENTER 

UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME 

[)'owing No.' 

LC-B-05 

c.t:e: 

0512012007 

_ .... No.: 

1/6 
I z 3 1 74 i I # ID1 1 71 1 a I u

I I kractI -fwoc i wol -i-I

A

I;M-M

WAvk

coo pm

I *' I'-waom jom"m I "wa"

NOT~S~ L Sit 5M*4 Afltl SOC PilOt RAil.

D I

*

f

LCOMW MAN PW*WTW TAK

1-~t -4- W t~ I~**G0 

mm Wro am ",w

:Ipwý m" -*#mm

0WM

0- f 1O0"t-4.WMA UM La.k4

e-mmm -aON" k". pmlcw om - ma .VA -A C5M

WA 0l¶ a ca * w&") U

-410 Samumit

4

E~o -

3

WNW GQMMAWt a

It S ULM-f !M t0e.

It

Draw hg N.: SNPP L"":

STATION SERVICE No:

TRANSFORPAER 05/20/2007

DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

SCHEME wls'M W.: B-103

1 ~ I OS .. 5 6 I 7. • , I ., 11 12 I U 

~. 

- ~ 

-- Ct'--i--:'-?1 to _ "':..:.,,, _ I .. 1-... 110 ••••• I_~ .. -I.....,o<; ..... • 

-4~ A I \ .... """"/' .. 1 1 ~~ 

. t , 8" ~ u£ - U ~ 

Ie t~ 1 

Efi ~ ,.-A-,. ,~ .. -~ 

th ~~ -....,.,... 

h !.r J J '--I I • tit gl! 1 t ,?-------+-----1 .. .. ... ~ .. ~ ... t= 1fT I i i I If' 10 

- ~A '" C~~~~ 

OT'lOI~ !l ~ I .. ~ .. PlAW\N<io, ~t't., FOA ,"U~E 

~ I ItA"'I-' ~ "Type • ...-

~l I "& . c -.~ i 

-~ I · ! '" , 

- i )------~t------1 .. • I M.J.~ ~ I D 

, ~ -¥- --- .....",.,..~ ...... 

I t 

~ 

~ RE F£REHCE QP.!,W!NGS .. • , A-I"*,_-tt..KTaIC,U.GI"II.1Uo.1.. ~ ....- "- 0-\ '100' -~ l.M'~ A6a 

<M""~"4IIIIOW'~ 

- ~tII&.Nt~f'" c·t'1OO1-..... U. ~AND 

"'11AIWG~~ 

II pro"" -~ 1-'" & .....".,.. 1-"'" ! p-,",,- .... ......",.,.. 

O·r'TlOO9-~ .... ~ .... 

~ ,....."""'t'l.~ ~ ...!.f.S. ---- ~ -4-S- ..... _".,...,.. 10m'" • "~tJ>1'I""""') _ ...... - , 1..1.fS. ......... 1-- ~ ......... r.-- -4!! .ua. )-.... \ .. , rnoo.-~ .... ~.., I 

~ -4"" -1flf- - I- e;, ""'''r'P6IOUIoOV<!Wt~ - - - - ..." .. ( ....... ) 

l-¥i - ~ .-, I-¥E p.."'" 

0'? -~ c·,"oo-..... -... """*,,,,,* .. ayx .... 0WIAU0I ..... ,....."00IIf~~ 

- -¥ I~:~- ~ ~ I=--.... ~ "" ... -¥S - 1- tO~"1 

~ 

- ~ 

- -- I~ 

- 1- (.'.,,0'1-........ ue.- ""O'fU'f'OIt..., - MIl""" ~ u»6 CunM II_I 

c,..'T1.'.-..... \NI~NID ( :; ..... " ..... ~ LOfrO"~ 

~ 

1\ 

.. _""" .. ~~.~ • .,.,.~1.A,"r&~ 

- ~Jooo-I:' =~ 'CiL"'~ 

--'" rt ....,. """" ocoo I , (Il"-"&,:'"-. 

r~SIW . ... eooo. OGOO ....,. • w.... 11 SNPP Orow;,g No.: II .. ~ .,..,. "'" 5 ')r 1& ... 

"t;r lC-B-06 ~ 

STATION SERVICE Date: 

TRANSFORM:R 0512012007 

B- I03 DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION 

SCHEME Revision f\t).; 

~ 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Exercise 16

Component ID: MCC-IB Component Type: MCC

Component Description: Train B 480 V Motor Control Center

BE Code: EPS-480MCCBIF (480V MCC B1 FAULT)

Required Position: ENERGIZED

Functional State

Normal Position: ENERGIZED

Failed Electrical Position: Off

Failed Air Position: NIA

High Consequence Component Yes E] No Z

Power Supplies: LC-B Breaker: ED-10

Breaker:

Cable Analysis:

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments

BEE10-P Yes Power LOP

BEE10-A Yes Control LOC, SO

BEE10-B Yes Control LOC, SO

BEE10-Z Yes Control LOC, SO

*1 i

.1 4

Comments:

1. Breaker control power included in analysis for LC-B.

2. MCC-1 B has no main breaker. Power cables connected directly to bus.

3. Annunciation circuits not required for functionality.

B-104

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 

Exercise 16 

Component ID: MCC-1B Component Type: MCC 

Component Description: Train B 480 V Motor Control Center 

BE Code: EPS-480MCCB1 F (480V MCC B1 FAULT) 

Required Position: ENERGIZED 

Functional State 

Normal Position: ENERGIZED 

Failed Electrical Position: Off 

Failed Air Position: N/A 

High Consequence Component Yes 0 No IZI 

Power Supplies: LC-B Breaker: ED-10 

Breaker: 

Cable Analysis: 

Cable ID Required? Function Fault Consequence Comments 

BEE10-P Yes Power LOP 

BEE10-A Yes Control LOC, SO 

BEE10-B Yes Control LOC, SO 

BEE10-Z Yes Control LOC, SO 

Comments: 

1. Breaker control power included in analysis for LC-B. 

2. MCC-1 B has no main breaker. Power cables connected directly to bus. 

3. Annunciation circuits not required for functionality. 

B-104 
r ?7* T 

r

FROM DOFF CT'S 4-40 v ftw IF

CW4 0 , 77005 i

0-1I77005

1

S S-IT"iaVw KLTWSF. .0G p"1,9

I0!0 OVSR CURALE-T EA(,0

TIL49 X.AY IELAY "AVT

IA,1.AlTArI TIME 06LOk QI.Ay I£@F

14SPEVI. Tt-.S- I1I

oc%,I, ok Dl~ Oj.&.44

5ý5.0 0011t VOLrAAA 

L

0 .~-4 ;lmJ).II&E2J..0U DETECTIONJ)

tow UW 0 LAME V0.TA&I Rfj.y RWtL~IEIITA41;

NOTES

~ EEJ E 0* Q$ ChTIIJ. III.CB1

?00AIt'0 ClicS, KAM U.000 (M~ &%4P5 SYL4IAtTgC(A'..

YIT '-ED E 1.4 L1-115 5TAT0~ou SLRvct TRAWS00kER

ID I 

. '~AUAEI TYPE.

7ý~ 5 5EAESNS &2-!DO AND 3Z-EOI.0 ARE Agy

ftv 5 3 T..T ONLY0.1' Can I~ .1%& bI.V

AT A,%* TINAE .C. Dw nfl lS)

MAACIts ST-ED00 "D3 St-kl)Z5o.; 6001.

512S 'A) ARE OPLERAED SYJl Atx. Il~

p C0.kTE0I $vATcm k T6LAIAoj i too2Tt.0t

1 A" 5CR 5 EXCILPT 52- LED0 4 5Z-EDIC 0AVE.

IT6AT10 T(II. AfTK FvA.C/QviOR

EAlTIW-ALMPE~t5) 6 MAMA$ tS tID0i, W,-EEMc AMDO Md0,=1 CASE bm.5 1-0 SATTLEV (NAEE it AXE tIN imittayo Sr,

TPK7 0xia "-.- stEAALt os'.D 0tccsvc,,O 06

M0..Dt2 CASM MORS "u SE (0.C5ED A7 4A'?

T.VLh V00--~S)

C-1 1 .V o' AA. -1-01 .~5s&,ZII.CL

-o.0(&TE0 o TE...... I CO'ACT.EN .VEASO 70 R~*

u ali R1FERENCE DRAWiNGS

MOAl~~-CtC 'A(iJEEL DIETA.,L5 (4 10Tf.

A 0 ýT"10 -!Pk;&L LIWL FLLC AIJV. SY$TEJA(4W4W0C

SNPP C30

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 05/2W"2O7 B-105 ONE-LINE DIAGRAM ReOvkmo No.

~, 

~ ..2I

4

I.,

I,II0U

4

5:1

OF

02

:s 

~ 

S N 

~ ~ '? 

~ ~ ~ '" :. 

150 ~ 

~ tit 

w 

~ :i! .. 3 .. 

" ~ .. 

J 

0 

'" v ~ 

TO W IT l <.00 .... I.OAO Cit tD 

... .. 

~ 

>! 

" ~ 

TO ,,"00" LOAO ~£. ... l ~5\ 

.. 

" 

~ i' 

.. 

rt 

~ 

Ii! I ... 

C> " ~ " l1 ~ .. 

I< " I 

~ : I 

~f~ 

) 

"':T'~l~) - H'·'II' 

25 ~ 

a: 

~~ ... 

~ 

§~ < :r 

v 

lJ" > 

rt ... \1 

~3 '" ~ 

",/l ~ 

"" ,. 

v 

~ 

g 

~ 

.! 

.~o.., 

~OO" 

LO .... O C,t:NTt.R 

IF 

~ 

" 

@~~~ 100 

Ii 

!:l 

0 '" 2 

:s:~ .., 

.., 02 

6l'" 5 " ... 

~ 

0 .g .. ~ ~ 

< 

~ ~ " 

& ~ ... tz( z 

.... ~ 

UJ_ 1-_ :l",_ 

~,~ !cf\) .., ",,,~ 

" >-8" >-J" , SJ; 2§~ 

8 " 

B-105 

•• e.G. 

...2L. 

"oO"'! ~ 

~ 

( "TIO~ ~~,.. 

~T" ~HV"E TU"~F . • O .. e/.~c..i" 

0'15': (uU,£,.". ~EI.:"VI.&' 

TIME *':.. ... V lE.t..A.V ~TA.TI l"1lDrtP'" 

~E '" ~-f~~~~ _~~~'!, • 

;;klO nMe O;':.A,Y (!.I..\'l 

~ 

&-smr- ~'0.1 

t1 

toOl 

')-A 'flvl" TI..IJ\£, It' OtF;:'(£..,TIA.l t£\.~y 

STl ~~".t: E T~""~ 10 ",OCJC,l,b CHJ"r ItLA.'f 

~~;l) ""f.( 'OI.T""~ QV.y (&I..Ou\iO Dt"£'ilO~) 

I, .... -tb.O !.~ I!. ~L"&. ~O""t.Q oo.a.~o 1*'1 !IM." ::.c"T. A~ 

t ,>l T~t.~JOT"' 6 ~"T ~'" ot "c5 ~ ~ :'-: . .ooe AM') ~vt, ~"MMe I «'!C .. 1\'- '.'I.l~ 

~ eu:) !I~~ C.'~{J i It-'.T11'\J6 tt.OOO :"'\.iP~ ~'(l.A~'!.TR. C~ . 

4 !> ~T O\l ~~Jt \l' (e. T~"'tJ~C:OIt""£~ 

"~(.A~!.t.." iV"E.. 

!> &A:eAj(=~S !2·!:lot AA.'C .52·eDtt ARE "<.5Y IH'T£ftt...DCK£O 10 T ..... T ONt... T ON. '''}lit e= Cl..U~EO 

A T ,,~ ... TatE ~". 6.n1 ''"(~) 

'" ~5~~ tlR~·J-p~~~-t£V; :~'~";~.:<:L.'i flool/ 

COIlHOl ~wtT( H 0 T.e. Ioo1A ~ (0;)1l01. tOOM. 

7 ":.I. 

&KR S c_r;LPT 52· r.ooz 4 5Z-E.Otl ~""E. 

:NI..'" IT;\jE. T~ P 0\U T~ NIT"; F'O'-LONIW 

~~f~~~~~~m~'r't.;1t .U·At/S~~"O~ 

o 5t€."U.~ St·EP"" ~l·££~ MID -.1)£0 "'~! ~~ .. jQ !ATTU.( (H;.J.~t Ie. .,U ":,, '''lttL1XU.O !IO 

TH~7 O,-'l.V o\.t 8ttfo.U..t ",,0 (OUE~l'O~D "<> 

"'~Cl.O (A'S'!! e..c.~~ ( .. ~ Be ,'-c~£, ,..- .... ¥{ 

TlMf. IOWb·, .. J"I~") . 

, . "",T , eIiIU."!'l fOo&l'S tt..f.. c-Ic.~ Dt'TE~Kl~ 

1t11l$ IUk T r ¥EAIIItJIl f!I»6 "0 t'Q\lDlT .t. ..... "tIIHIOtJ.i 

CUl~ .... c.. Of eon' t'lf'''' .... !. 

1(), ... ~C. .. TI.O ' l00I0 T!.=tVt ... ~... !h.O:='14" cO¥""'o:T"""t.~, 

"to,,! A.~~oc. "''T!O i\s:t ..... «.'!'. 

I "ao:S :~ ~ .. N SJ2tu:::::s ~ . ... I"': .: .~ ,::~ -~ :: . .. :" r- : : . : '! Ii: .... .: ~ A i 1:; . ;'-;-:. ... ... : 

R"FERENCE DRAWINGS 

ll'~! O - "TtI(~t. (oEUf:tAL *T~'I.' 4 \lOTi' 0· ' ''00' - ~~I.." LIU' f.Lf( '-U~ ~V~TEM(HoO' 

_.l) 

SNPP 

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Or.owing No.: 

LC-B-01 

Date: 

05l2OllfJ07 

Revisioo No.: 
ýý ýý r-7mý -, - -- I -- : '', I

B

C

NOTES

Kl nx P min CL 511

4-T-ZPSO 4A y

S M US AWM Sit btl 0 Y M

w ISA to a Mm ý I*UA Ic,,

Am &ACLIrcA.I ~vaSkIc 0" vB

REFERE~cE DRAVOMG

A51-UUTBALGS~.St~MDA

S I-SswLI t Et&TmAA AAAEw

tlIh tsa M-459e, fGymom

Q,~-so-~ Wi cUSYm a f'~wmm

Mir ~TC C& UJ- -

**A

WAM" I4 

"

%low N ~ ~ ~ I-K

MONK

H la E *;If..

B-106

A :1W 

B \T1-~5t J:L 

c 

o 

E 

G 

H 

.. 

s: 

tLfttf!ITFl 

fWoOtl~M 

e,Iio4CO (At Itt. 40",'lttl.'f"'4Q 

~N1\I"""~ 

G & 

B- 106 

~ .. 1ICiJ' 

, ~'IA," u.a... TO 

l .... 1U. III'tMtn au: IV'lJOt wo.w r:Jt 

.... UlItUflllSl'lCIl 

I CDntKrt m(ttD 

't.O~~ "~J 6ft' CN.."f KC', II '10 MIa fU A:M hIO ~ CJ;Nr~ 

ClC.H.1Ofltll&'CMf1dlU..~~. 

~, l,""l~~lO~-ce!t 

AIIIl~y~t'IA!."...t 

~~-: .. ~ 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

A .. I11~e -,t..I.!~ OCNUt.w.CIi.,. ...... ~ ANO """'1 O~'''IOO1 -~ tJII, 1\,.':TfUCAL AUWJ,..M"f 

".,.11M (l""M-~' fOOOv) 

O·ll'lll:l!.O - ......,...l.Wl flClarUNW C II&L~ 

OOC'I \010 C'llrlfllll. ID t\a.II"'G) 

O·I"Oti ~ LIN; ....oTKT.,.,.."".TU_ 

~LQIIO~lI'4(IMl'" 

SNPP 

MOTOR CONTROl CENTER 

MCC-1B 

A 

B 

c 

D 

r 

G 
Drawings Needed in the Exercises

B-107

Drawings Needed in the Exercises 

8-107 
Drawing Pack I - Electrical Schematic Diagrams

B-108

Drawing Pack 1 • Electrical Schematic Diagrams 

8-108 
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM - SIMPLIFIED ONE-LINE DIAGRAM

SWYD OFF-SRTEPOWER Page B-109

UAT-1 SLUT-1

oo0 0 0

0

0-

I [W-g

Non-Vital DC

Loads

VITAL-A

0 0

(,9 C9

LI-1 LI-3 SOV-1 TI-1 ANN-1 PI-1 LI-2 LI-4

B-109

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM - SIMPLIFIED ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

SWYD OFF-SfTEPOWER Page B-I09 

1 SlJT-1 

------------------------- -----1 

_J 

COMP-1 

,---- ----------------------------------1 I MCC-1 1 

L________________________________ _ ___ j 

ATS-1 

-=- BAT-A 

DC BUS-A 

-=- BAT-1 

DC BUS-1 

"-

V 

/ 

Non-Vital DC 

Loads 

L~1 L~3 SOV-1 n1 ANN-1 PI-1 LI-2 L~4 

B-I09 
VALVE SHOWN CLOSED

SCHEME VA3

B-110

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

PRESSURE OPERATED

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE

SOV-1

Drawing No.:

E-03

Date:

05/04/2007

Revision No.:

1

Fuse 

XOO 

KPHUOO 

h PB 

(OPEN) 

~-svo 

ENERGIZE 

TO OPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

SCHEME VA3 

B-UO 

33LGOO 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

PRESSURE OPERATED 

RELIEF SOLENOID VALVE 

SOV-1 

Drawing No.: 

E-03 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 
PO0

33UVALVE SHOWN CLOSED

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID

SOV-2 LETDOWN ISOLATION PB2 AOV-2

SOV-3 CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM --

PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM

SOLENOID VALVES

SOV-2 & SOV-3

Drawing No.:

E-02

Date:

07/25/2008

Revision No.:

1

B-Ill

Fuse 

VALVE 

SOV-2 

SOV-3 

POD 

33UNOD 

XK-

.~- S\(2 

PB 

(CLOSE) 

L PB 

i(OPEN) 

~~. SVO 

ENERGIZE 

TO OPEN 

VALVE SHOWN CLOSED 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

LETDOWN ISOLA TION PB2 AOV-2 

CHARGING PUMP INJECTION PB3 AOV-3 

B-lll 

33UROO 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM--

PRIMARY MAKEUP SYSTEM 

SOLENOID VALVES 

SOV-2 & SOV-3 

Drawing No.: 

E-02 

Date: 

07/25/2008 

Revision No.: 
A

B

C

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - HIGH

PRESSURE INJECTION

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES

MOV-1 & MOV-9

Drawing No.:

E-04

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID

MOV-1 HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-1

MOV-9 HIGH PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9 B-112 0

A 

B 

C 

CCC 

42 

0 

VALVE 

MOV-l 

MOV-9 

} 480V 

3rjJ, 60 Hz 

FU 

4801120 V 

ALL 

49-

-

42 

C 

49 

YOO 

1J.1 

Ts-h 11 

49X420-

MECH ~-

INTLK 

42 

0-

15 

49X42CVALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-A MA12 MOV-l 

HIGH PRESS INJECTION-B MB15 MOV-9 B-112 

3 7 

-GOO -ROC 

Drawing No.: SNPP E-04 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - HIGH I-::Date:------; 

PRESSURE INJECTION 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES 

MOV-1 & MOV-9 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
A

B-- 480 V

c .cl-- J 30, 60 Hz

c-c-c

42

0

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - AFW

TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR

OPERATED VALVES

MOV-16 & MOV-17

Drawing No.:

E-08

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

VALVE DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH Ib

MOV-16 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MA18 MOV-16

MOV-17 AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MB16 MOV-17 B-113

A 

B 

C 

CCC 

42 

0 

f)f)f) 49-

VALVE 

MOV-16 

MOV-17 

} 4BOV 

3rjJ, 60 Hz 

FU 

4801120 V 

ALL 

49-

-

42 

C 

49 

YOO 

11 

49X420-

MECH 

---

INTLK 

42 

0-

49X42CVALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

DESCRIPTION SCHEME SWITCH ID 

AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MA18 MOV-16 

AFW TEST LINE ISOLATION MB16 MOV-17 

B-113 

3 7 

-GOO -ROC 

Orawing No.: SNPP E-08 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - AFW r:o-at-e:------I 

TEST LINE ISOLATION MOTOR 05/01/2007 

OPERATED VALVES 

MOV-16 & MOV-17 Revision No.: 

o 
P01

00

+1

Motor Shown in Remote Operating Mode

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4

B-114

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW- B STEAM THROTTLE

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

MOV-15

Drawing No.:

E-09

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

0 

~ ~ 

'<:t +1 

P01 

LOWER 

(REM) 

F02 

N01 

REM07"! 43 LOCAL 

RAISE RAISE 

(REM) (LOC) 

1- LOCAL 

,-F03 

~-l 

I 

~ 

I 

-~ 

~~~- LOCAL 

RAISE 

(LOC) 

LOCAL 

LOWER 

(LOC) 

Motor Show n in Remote Operating Mode 

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4 

B-114 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMAFW- B STEAM THROTTLE 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-15 

Drawing No.: 

E-09 

Date: 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
A

B

C

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION

Drawing No.:

E-1 0

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17

B-115

'HEMATIC DIAGRAM - PORV

3LOCK MOTOR OPERATED

VALVE

MOV-13

Date:

05/01/2007

Revision No.:

0

A 

B } 480V 

C 

3¢,60Hz 

CCC 

F 

4801120 V 

42 42 

0 C 

I.Se. 

43-

FU 

ALL 

49-

49 

YOO 

XOO 

I.Se. 

43-

9X2CMB 

.33. 

15 

20-

-YC5 

I.Se. 

-YC2. 43- f -YC4 

~:gSE~ ~ 

I.Se. 

43-

.33. 

3 

-G01 

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL OPEN POSITION S NP P 

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 S HEMATIC DIAGRAM - PORV 

LOCK MOTOR OPERATED 

B-115 VALVE 

MOV-13 

Drawing No.: 

E-10 

Date: 

05/01/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
42

0

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL CLOSED POSITION

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16

B-116

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR

OPERATED VALVE

MOV-10

Drawing No.:

E-11

Date:

05/04/2007

Revision No.:

0

B A- 480 V ..... -----} 

3tjJ, 60 Hz 

C--+--+ ..... ---

42 

o 

ccc 

4801120 V 

42 

C 

FU FU 

42C11 

MECH 

--

INTLK 

VALVE SHOWN IN FULL CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 

B-116 

3-

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMAFW-A DISCHARGE MOTOR 

OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-10 

Drawing No.: 

E-11 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
ABC.

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

MOV-8

Drawing No.:

E-12

Date:

05/04/2007

Revision No.:

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 0

A 

B 

C 

42 

o 

} 480V 

- 31jJ,60Hz 

(( (1 

4801120 V 

4801120 V .... +-+-_.0..._ 

42 

C 

-xoo 

FU 

X02 

ALL 

49-

YOO 

PB 

(OPEN) 

KS 

-S01 

49X-

-woo 

-SC1 

~ 

42 

0-

15 

49XVALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 

MOV Permissive 

Control Circuit 

Main MOV 

~Control 

/' Circuit 

3 

-GOo 

G R 

B-117 

7 

-ROC 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

RHR OUTBOARD SUCTION 

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-8 

Drawing No.: 

E-12 

Date: 

05/04/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
7:

0

LO

04

P1

33-

G1 RI

_ HS-

-- CLOSE

Yc1

Fl

SHUNT

_J_ HSOPEN

Y01

72C

0

Y02

SI

720

YC2

TSN1

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3

B-118

SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR

OPERATED VALVE

MOV-11

Drawing No.:

E-1 3

Date:

05/09/2007

Revision No.:

0

--r-----'---~~~-------P1 --------------------~._------_.~----------------._------_. 

o 

o 

> 

l{') 

N 

..-

SHUNT 

72C 

SERIES 

72C

T i 

YC1 

51 

YC2 

TSHSCLOSE 

Y01 

Y02 

HSOPEN 

33-

33-

G1 R1 

--~----'---~~~-------N1 ----------------------~------~~----------------~------~ 

VALVE SHOWN IN CLOSED POSITION 

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 

B-118 

SNPP 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -

AFW-B DISCHARGE MOTOR 

OPERATED VALVE 

MOV-11 

Drawing No.: 

E-13 

Date: 

05/09/2007 

Revision No.: 

o 
7D (:D

VBIF

VBIE

PSi

SOV-1

SH E-03

PT-1

120 VAC SNPP

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RCS

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

TRANSMITTER

Date:

05/22/2007

Revision No.:

1

PT-1 B-119

TB 

3 (, 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

G 

VB1A VB1F 

PS1 

PT-1 

PRESSURIZER 

120 VAC 

B-119 

CB-2 

VB1G 

PI-1 

PB2C 

SOV-2 

SH E-02 

SOV-3 

SH E-02 

PB3C 

VB1E 

RPH VA3C 

SOV-1 

SH E-03 

KPHSNPP E-14 

Drawing No.: 

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RCS 

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 

TRANSMITTER 

Date: 

OS/22/2007 

PT-1 Revision No.: 
A F\ALA DP.8A FrAILED. TO P -8c --I- -"- - -'4. 6m -- Inc

HIGH TEMP

ANN-A

I - AUTO STA'T

P8A

I TO IPPED

P8C

C11L

5X-5

ArfW-A

SIP.5"),

PBA

(3- 4) (3-.) ( 3-6 )

X11, 4SP(4A45)®0

Z4 (449)

1 19 (.4 49)

Z 5~Z-3,2,?-5, Z~, ?JT Z7, ~I, 3~32,~-

4,~35~ 3~3~5P~

(~49',

3s, 40 3SF'

(44a)

i~S~73~~I ___S

BLOCK DIAGRAM

SCHEME K16

SNPP

ANNUNCIATOR

SCHEME K16

Drawing No.:

ANN-1

Date:

05/20/2007

Revision No.:

#8

B-120

AFW-A P-8A FAILED· TO 1~ ·P-BC 

HIGH TEMP AUTO STA2.T TKIPPED 

ANN-1 

~ 3X-5 

t 

AFW-A 

TE-AFWA 8 . (E.T~ '96.. ~. 

5\-\.5). 

J100 4 

ell 

(3- 4) 

P8A 

~X-\ 7T PBA .- (E.-l9~. 

JlC05 Si-J,: Z ';. 

IC1870 I j 8.:167C 

)(,1. \\~ I 2,13, l4~ @ \8;2.1,22,2.3.24 

(UNSCHEDULE.D 

I 

56 \N1RE'5c ') G:1B7B I 

1 

@33,34-

P8C 

~1O~i .. 

3X-G8 1'..{E-\9~., .. J5!.-\, 10 ) 

1:'8(' 

JIOC6 30 

ell\.': e----~ ..... 

I 

1 

, 

\112,13, '4,15,16,17·0 

8,19 (449) .:' 1 TE-AFW-A 1--1 -

I 

® KI., 4 5P(4~5)-q .)---2\r2~J 23,2.4 ,Z5,26,27,0 

, 

I JIOOSI I C\87A I 

D t29(449') 

~1, 31.:32, ~3 A 34,35; 3e;3Q 

(449) . 

,SP X. \, .4 ~4Lj5)-< 1I .. iZ, 13, 14115,1~,n, ® 

\8,19 (449) 

2.1, Z 2, '2.3, 2~ . 25,2C:>, 27, 

1_ JQ,29,(449) ® ,CIIL _. 1 

t:::: ' .. ,.----.: .,;,v" -------.... \. .' 

f----<~·f I'~ IS'P ". X dO Se·...;: --... . -t"t L,_,® ._\ ~ 

I J lOOO IJJ~()<S.w_3~_.< I ~~<Cr1:3]J.:-. __ 

.... " J 

!-J-,,-J,----'-:::::::::::r'~ .-------------~------~ 

BLOCK DIAGRJ~ S N P P Drawing No.: 

SCHEME K16 ANN-1 

B-120 

ANNUNCIATOR 

SCHEME K16 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

Revision No.: 

#8 
Drawing Pack 2 - AOV and MOV Block Diagrams

B-121

Drawing Pack 2 - AOV and MOV Block Diagrams 

8-121 
I

VJTAL-A

- V -

0

x0o, UO0 p U I

I CR-9 I ROOv

RO0, X00, U00, U p GOO, SV0

XOO0 svo

PT- IT 1~

SOV-1, SCHEME VA3

B-122

SNPP 

TITLE: DATE: 

AOV-1 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27/07 

VI TAL-A 

0) 

XOO, UOO 

CB-2 ® 'JL XOO, UOO, ROO, 

GOO, SVO 

XOO,SVO 

© 

PT-:1 

SOV-1, SCHEME VA3 

B-122 
PNL-B

0

P00, NO0 Ii

POO, N00, ROO,

GOO, SVO, SV1,

SP

K -

P00, SV2

.

©

PNLX

SOV-3, SCHEME PB3

B-123

SNPP 

TITLE: DATE: 

AOV-3 BLOCK DIAGRAM 4/27/07 

Pt::JL-B 

0 

POO,NOO 

CB-5 ® 'jL poo, NOO, ROO, 

GOO, SVO, SV1, 

POO,SV2 SP 

© 

PNLX 

SOV-3, SCHEME PB3 

B-123 
SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM- 1 5/4/07

0.

I MR I

®G I

TI, T2, T3

0 

1

fo 

I YOO, SO1, ROO,

G00, SC1, SCO,

S00, 2SP

XOO, S01, ROO,

GOO, SC1, 2SP

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME

MOV-1 MCC-Al 2 CB-5 MA12

MOV-3 MCC-Al 3 CB-5 MA13

MOV-4 MCC-BI 2 CB-5 MB12

MOV-5 MCC-Al 4 CB-5 MA14

MOV-6 MCC-B1 3 CB-5 MB13

MOV-7 MCC-Al 5 CB-5 MA15

MOV-9 MCC-Bl 5 CB-5 MB15

MOV-16 MCC-Al 8 CB-3 MA18

MOV-17 MCC-Bl1 6 CB-3 MB16 I

B-124

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 1 5/4/07 

. ® 

T1, T2, T3 

0 ® MB MCC M YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, 

GOO, SC1, SCO, GOO, SC1, 2SP 

SOO,2SP 

, 

M MCC CUBICLE MB SCHEME 

MOV-1 MCC-A1 2 C8-5 MA12 

MOV-3 MCG-A1 3 C8-5 MA13 

MOV-4 MCC-81 ,2 C8-5 M812 

MOV-5 MCC-A1 4 C8-5 MA14 

MOV-6 MCC-81 3 C8-5 M813 

MOV-7 MCC-A1 5 C8-5 MA15 

MOV-9 MCC-81 5 C8-5 M815 

MOV-16 MCC-A1 ·8 C8-3 MA18 

MOV-17 MCC-81 6 C8-3 M816 

8-124 
SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 2 5/1/07

MOV-15, SCHEME DB4

B-125

SNPP MOV 8LOCK DIAGRAM - 2 5/1/07 

I . CB-3 1 P01, N01, F02, °1 1.....-__ ..... F03, SP 

:r.s.e I P01, N01, FOCfJ I MOV-1S I 

F03,SP 

MOV-15, SCHEME 084 

8-125 
XOO, GO1, R01

GOO, Y06, YC1,

YO1, 2SP

YOO, X01, X02,

YC5, Y07, 4SP

YC4, Y02,

R02, G02,

Y04, YC3,

Y03, 2SP

TiT2, T3

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17

B-126

SNPP MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 3 5/1/07 

® 

XOO, G01, R01 

© ® @ I------~ MCC-A1 XOO, SCO, SOD, MOV-13 YC2, Y05, ROO, YOO, X01, X02, L...-__ ...I GOO, Y06, YC1, 1....-_,....-..... YC5, YO?, 4SP 4SP 

Y01,2SP 

YC4, Y02, 

R02, G02, 

Y04, YC3, 

Y03,2SP 

@ 

MOV-13, SCHEME MA17 

B-126 

® 

T1, T2, T3 
MOV-10, SCHEME MA16

B-127

SNPP 

CB-3 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 4 

SOD ,SCO, SC3 SOO,S01, SCO, 

L..... ...... -!~ SC1, SC3 

5/4/07 

© RSP 

X01, 

S02, ~ SC2, 

SC3 S01, S02, SC1, SC2, SP , 

SP ® 

I-Xl -

O

-

O

-, S-O-O-,S-C-O-@...;;;;S ...... MCC-A1 T1, T2, T3 ® MaL-jO 

MOV-10, SCHEME MA16 

B-127 
YOO, SO1, ROO,

GOO, SC1, SCO,

SOO, 2SP

XOO, SO1, ROO,

GOO, SC1, X01, SP

X02, YO1, LOO, WOO, SP

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14

B-128

SNPP TITLE: 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 5 

DATE: 

5/4/07 

® 

T1, T2, T3 

@ ® ~----------~MCC-B1~----------~ YOO, S01, ROO, XOO, S01, ROO, CB-5 MOV-8 

1....-....... - ..... GOO, SC1, SCO, 1....-....... --GOO, SC1, X01, SP --------' 

SOO,2SP 

© 

X02, Y01, LOO, VVOO, SP 

MOV-8, SCHEME MB14 

B-128 
NI, Fl, SI, Al, A2

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3

B-129

SNPP 

TITLE: DATE: 

MOV BLOCK DIAGRAM - 6 5/9/07 

(A) CB-3 

P1, N1, YC1, Y01, G1, R1, SP 

(s) 

DC BUS-B N1, YC2, Y02 

MOV-11 (C) 

P1, G1, R1 

I (P) I 

N1, F1, S1, A 1, A2 

MOV-11, SCHEME DB3 

B-129 
Drawing Pack 3 - More Detailed Electrical Schematics

B-130

Drawing Pack 3 - More Detailed Electrical Schematics 

8-130 
2 I4

SWGR-B 4.16KV

i 5 I 7 I I I 11 I 12 I 13 1 1 13 I,- - 1- -, F I AW-FF a I ..... I

1(350 MVA)

A

D

S, ,j T ,O-V OL,

4.CO AO . NNA ,,C~4 ttO0,

- -- - - - - -- - - -- - -

40

---- -----

- .. ! 7 - .. < ...

o) ,

00

e toX;r. ILI'v

1o i

- -• •- --7 7 -- --

AIL -TR -I EI-S I.

W~OIRURRAN L-Y

G0Ls- 6 CON-IGTER PRE Is

OVE I.uR SG~- ... OIlY IN

U.N LV C ME00IIAR EUR IN

IUE UE'I RES VI.lCOUE

OIe IsR~IOLI

I01 OVER cu-R-N ROA.

Do's OVR -IR-eU RNA

00,32 jCREPARK CURRSEt REN-A

-0 RUR VTRERTSN M"50C

zzzzzrzr,~- N O-iNA OLO

I - T CURN5RNA 1V -

AR/Z0A5

1

.......

CSNAR1I

05.0. SUOGIC

IA~AAC0SR

UNICIONIIR EEEAA10 JO CANS

10000 To 0401.0003

OJVSARRE

l5~CAP.UUSj

CE~0OOUS

4tCSAOAE~

~ CELLS

IqCSAUAR

IRIA01UAO

IOO<CAC0O

00/040

;O.fl CCI., COROT.

NSTOIPELN I - PUN-

~F2? N-N

4NSS INS I

N' LI, SI SIEOAN OENERCSOA

*E/C0CSR~

SR~0A.NI -

AILSUE.. I0EELICAELE To ARLUS 00014 0010

ICOErOASO TOO,.

00 CE RIUOTNAIOC

4'?'

* lYS?' ROES

1!1,5

4.16KV SWGR-B (350 MVA)

IFI

4 0,0

all

SST-B

U br2

V4

3

.. ... ------..

_[I_ 

SOP P04 0-ISPOCO

NmTSI

I.0 OENOTES MAIN AOU100A AOUE3 IA MAIN CORYSO,,

A 0 EARN- UNEEAOR ..AI00R PRE0UEICT PROTON-tON A EARN? 053 OA.1 ROES CONAN- Is 0 OPEOOP00 3

7. N-N- E - CECOVES LOCAL. COCTOVA M1AL

RAE- NEIUOTES £5154. POAO.S ROSOOIAS 50515 CONtROL

AR>'- LOP-ANRATRE LAN-SN- SIEIAL *CA11 -

rill, ý_l

liD . .. J --

REFERE7NE DRAWINGS,

-C 4 ___________ I.

Drawing NW.:

SN P Date

05/20/2007

4.16 KV SWGR-B

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM

.............. ........ ...... .............. .............. .....-- --. .... .......-- ---- - J ........

B-131

A 

B 

c 

D 

G 

H 

~> 

~j s i, 

u' 

. 

~ 1l. ... f5 < 

~!! ::,Il-~ . ~:!~ ~ 

i~ ~ ~~ ~~. ~ ~ 2 ~i I 

~~ 

'" ~'G 

~Ii ~~2 

4 

4.16KV· SWGR-B 

ili 

iii~" ~i. ~~~ ... -

~~~ h~ 

~ SST-B ~~~ ~.' 

3~~ 

s. 

~ 

~~ ~!.~ 'I' 

~~~; a:: 

I 

~§~il 

'-'-'-~---

" 

~~ 5 

>!r ~ ~ ~ i!J ;!. il' ~ e g --_ ... _ .......... - _ .. -- - -..... --_ ... - - -...... - . -- - - - - - .- -- - - - - - -- - - ...... - .. -- - - .. -- -_ ...... -...... - - .. - ~. - -- -

~ " 

i= 

uU ~~~ 

B-131 

13 

A 

B 

c 

Il 

F 

l:{QTES:.! \. ~:io;:'J.NO":~~ "'.1 ... (.o ... .or1:lOL. &oAR.O \).; .......... eo ... .,.1lo\.. 

t. DIEaf!\. Q.!!Na"",..OR \.J'Io!o.Jt "",aQu.,.,.ey PlltOTGeTW)fI; ;:.. FUNCTION$ 0NI..'f '#OHIlN C5'lBI.. 18 t$ ()pCPt .... T~ IN 

I"~.~;.::~~. S ~Q >(,..~ \"'f'tIl\.IX.,(I"Q, ¢~ ~ .... z...::lG05t~~ CJ,UG'('·''''11''I1 G (;, 1"011 11," Il.jtl~1tG c" eKe. 51.-tXt01(U1! orKo.C.-I"I',t.O 7. \..c:. '" - OI.!I.OTe.~ 1..C:C.A.1... c.o,..TACl\. "''''IC,\... 

a.~~c.ft.lO'T&'" E.toi!AG.~ 'I!!IO*o~OIl""-'I"'COt.ITQOI. 

I~~ ~ 1.':)~-'QeNO~& -"'Oc.. .. 1- ~, ... 1!1. ...... ru .. 

: -I'O,E "iE~:~AL !.iN1T m ~'N C"~'I'q , 

REFERENCE DPAIJINGS, SI"GLt: L1~1: tu:c AUX. SYS 1[101 ~"'l:~ 

,:.'t,Ov l. (."m'1l 

SNPP 

4.16 KV SWGR-B 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

O'awing r-.b.: 

SWGR-8-01 

Date: 

05/20/2007 
I I . I! 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 6 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12 I 13 r I ~ r -,-rt.-- r '---I k "-- 4 I IOft02-.4WOi~Vq0oCIP20 OS I SOC P.IPE~OUT MINT jCOl$0IJGPZj COIL fOLIOS

7

(So~tSCO

I - I I I

VI

I I

I I

I -

I I I I

I I

I I

, ¶tP ,t i" •M •

,"• .?. •".

-. L •

I- 1-I - m . *CC/ESflaA

A__. "LI - .~

P.1

~A 4 4.'

'.T'.4 ~ T

nttsSt ~

NOTES

I.TS-- TEST SWITCH"

tO H-- TyCE OPEATOPS'rocLL.SSOlE

IHON rET OsrCBrA.e

S. .. aS La t.02L 002.-0 '.Y

020 2

R-0FaRENa OCJTAWIN.

S .. € NMOTS~a50101

13

3

c

.'•..t.=' I I"-.:"I 2*

i±i~ I-.I 11•• - • ... • " • .20 0,-0 . •

St~lOt

,-T-T - " --TT I I; T -•

1111111--'TIT"T.ST5,T'°T I -- Iol I] •• "I' -- 4"1- od Io 

SI S I PSSUOE£ 50 NE mO 

OCN50

T.0 Ra''0OSN

S COO

855 T5. *00551, CI .1,05

O .505

~tSL2

I a C H. C1, PC, I "04,5.02

CUS Z11,PH

SGO~ 42 5 M

SLOLCA OSAFSAM

F

SF0525 ETCISC -To 5051Mb

ý-L42,~

Al.04 .2

1

[SII£LJIU.I52C

I ... . . . "1... . I I

IV-. Jý SN'•'. 0*PUONI.GCOI

55019550? IICCI 500C02 L~I3~J a~~S 21IS.2C-55,I MG. I OP IlL~ 0

402 05002120/bEe IC IV 50526 0504 Ha UI ...... I•.' I I =I.... I'..... I I

SNPP

HPI-B SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

SHEET 1

Drawing No.,

HPI-B-01

05/20/2007

I Z I I l l I I I r l I • ; I . . . . . .

B-132

A 

B 

c 

D 

[ 

F 

G 

H 

QY_ •. ____ 4-______________ ~~~~~~----J 

..... ".n<. ac "f"PP£1P1O 

,., 

.-. CIIIT. "-&10-1.&"'''' IPM. tUT\lIlDlTCI MDIt¥AL... 

........ !L'T ..... 

~aoI:lIU.lI_ 

~j.l.TJI.'.IWlMCAT­

...l.l1'-- .... oUlIII ·-11" AIL 

(~~e ... ) -; 1'-- n~ .f[', I 

, 

, 

, _~ I .... , ~I 1;: : 

I 

I 

I. 

I 

, 

, 

I 

'j<. 

" 

ott. C • '" 

. ~.-

~ 

..... ~", -1 . 5-"',6 

B-132 

.. '! • 

. 

.... loa .. T"pa 

=='.:"~H '10_ 

1 

. 

H:'~ 

~ 

~ ,,-

f.-; 

C 8~tI{t~!ItJ~ 

~! ... 

13 

AIE ..... Aj( 

ow "' .... ux.IlIt.IHt'l-9uT P:ftA,y c,olL nsVQ(. 

NOTES 

I. T&_ T£-.T 'LWITt.:H· 

I..tI-YAuC.k OP!A.ATWc.EI.L6Wm .. 

SHOWN 'OR 8RIt"K~. 

.,.. T~"T' POSITIO,.., 

.. ~ L..CIIP --=--Cl~ ."./WIC. 

O-n~,DIoJG D~""'). 

... .......m~KNUlCMM 

".,... r1~("' .. PwG O-,.,16o+l.) . 

5.LOMICJ'I>oR:a.'f.IIOIIW.~~ o-a O·In...-.(~ ponlMO) . 

'-. THB U)JIIPY"l'51l OPW, ...... 'IOII.AOO .... .,S 

I.IUIlilBr. .... S ..... Of0060 "~""e. '001000 

, ..",e20, ¥ ..... c:TtV.L .... 

'1 CACU!~ Iv.e.oeor..r J I'IIIDWIoft S>IOUUI Br. 

I'OUT"'O ~>&IIiCIlln.ot.C.A ... U"...,.,. ,_. 

IL CIIel.e N&D80w:0 _1lU» ilia CO"'f'lP 

'DJDa~oJ1I...,tllcA&.lSt~.CIf-

'). St:F. nRA.WiW4 ",,181"'161 ,"OR. )"USIlil 

q,t.-ntt;:;, (. T(Pe:. . 

REFEREIa DRAWINGS 

D-I"77001- 51N6L£ ,-'HoE. £LEt;. AU'" 

sWY"It .. (rllllll'-·4-tWl'l' ....... ' 

0-177005- ~1NC5>t.!. LIN! ~orE.'TlON 

C "'CTC-RINGo 4'I.OY 5WTrCH 

GEAR au..tF' 

D_I"1'7oo._ $INQ,LI!.L'fIIE PltOTttTION 

.'''LTEfCl .... ~4~ ,.w.~ 

c;.tt .... " 1IIr.K1& 

~-n7CS.- ItL"C. ," .. NVlAL. D!;.TAIL." 

, NOTE.S 

A-IS"'.' - I=LI~I A;;-P\.AC .. ,....IIIT I'CA.NIW. F<QA. SAFIOT'I' AIi\..A'fIllD 

~""UIPt'\"T. 

B 

c 

D 

F 

G 

Draw ing No.: 

SNPP 

HPI-B SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 

SHEET 1 

HPI-B-01 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

116 
1 1 2 1 3 I 4 1 5 I 6 1 7 i 8 I 9 I 10 I II I 12 i 13

I 01CC ni-ion N.N TXKSO-S*COO

I" - I - I - I-- --- q I BA f tKlýOni S.T oAI-y ~ *4o.

-~ 1'

ME CAo~usp_

J7 'r •11....

1.

Tl-il

IF

.4

T" i W-iS A

S-I

*4 1 L5 ®: ® A.. t

%apNI:

B

NOTES

i4 , -CT POSiON.

Ii..rrrl&, u Pfl€. o-iY ).

4.t •~ . W AS~¢41 ;Ni S,- r 4 NW, L

I ¢.1 C

1N 1 2 J

CO~-iI II

REFEREWX~ ORAWNGS

0, 41 C 1nn~~ci . -

ISC~iNN~NAt iN T4OtnbO

iti~n~hCV Cin

fiiiO. m iS~ T io PO~nit

L i N i~4tniA4A~in

0 . t~i t fi-roi nAR us

-. ~ ~ ~ ~ CT.rTniC v m-~f c%~ QEMA ac~n

~ ~ I 5

0

E

------ ýT

2s (

Fi

T:.*1 1

-L4

.14,4nn

l~III~I

~7FF

iTs iTS re-N it TO- fl-C fl-I it

[OAtAtTAA1L*tXCIVCAA1

G

1. =1t ti-s 1.0.1 inS-e

COACZ~T OOS~c~e tt on,. ASCt t00~ CQAtnt ti COi ltiS~~ic C -ACio neii

co P n1ciicki. AS= •L[ JI m

I 1/

I... . .. .. . [,I. ."

SNPP FP B-02

I-1 -PB SCI-EMAl-C DIAGRAM 05/20/2007

SI-EET2 ~tNPV

• tI4 -1

B-133

A 

B 

c 

D 

@' 'I" UJ I E @ ,1,1_ 

tt-~l 

J. 

tf '" ~ 

, n"" r Ic.t 1M 

r . .. F 

~ , 

Ifii.s" " 

'" -----------

G 

......... 

.!.I~TRIP 

EEl ~,I,.OCII"'O' .... 

..!.tJl. "'ft,p ,1j0l,'T1001 

-1.C~ AUIIoN -'1"'- Turl.,RH 

AC1'y;oeZlO 

H CAT. Ma 110-1&.-9" 

a~ ~tfUIIII'O,.OItW\L 

T TO 

"J ........ ) 

.. 

"e: ~"HTY~'" 

=~:~~:-'N 

~TI-" 

. . 

. 

. 

os-

,. 

t ~EC.) 

."'".",TV_ ._ ... ...... ,. ... "" 

""',.'" ""-"'" 

~'-'.r-~~"'-

13 

l'(VOCl;lffit 

c:.oU • • '2':f'Vg(.. 

qalfTGO,L 

TIMe' on.AV KIIoPCl.JIft Ko/tJrDb(Ut!. IU' V Dc.. A (£on Kf 10 SEC. "';"!'!I5fc., 

"T'IIII!"lla..''I'DllDNIIT 

ID.A, (VIla IKC.) 

NOTES 

I.T~_ TII."'T 'SW,TC!H 

LI-I - TRVc'1c: OPERATE.O CEl.l. SWI'KH 

SHOWN FOR BR£4)(ItR 

IN TE.<;'T PO~ITIO"' • 

••• ~I"Qlg~ ... .:;ItCUIT.IP,PWGI 

!lo~"(&G,t:MoIIo o-n"l6&t). 

... ~~oi.~tl.R81'" 

~ t..ITTft4s(el4l.~GlD-I'~), 

IS. L.c.s CI'L ~1T.1IrOfCIIt.~G&Cd alp, 

OIOIIO-Il~<-- tHTJUOJ. 

(". ,"e c.ow:~UT&R Qf'EAATOA. ... ""I: •• s ":UNa!!...., Foe OI"OCo ~ ~Ace. ""'000 

It. 'iO/MD, lU~O'KT'tV'~Y' 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

0-'''700,- SiHC.1..11. \.IN!!: ELC:(; .... U)t' 

.' 'Vl.rIiii:M~r!'l[ItG.-411tO. ,,"00"') 

04'17005- ~ING'-l. L-IN~ PlitOTE,c.nON 

r "UtT~RIIOIII) '4lfoOV :;WITCH 

co.E"R 1iIU'SIF 

D-li'700&- $IN~I..e.I..I"IE P~£C.T'ON 

f""ETEIlINfo...-..oY 'WfT'CoM 

GoEAR 81JS.,60 

IL"'~C. ~ItNli:AAL.. 011.'1"',1..,. 

t: .... OT~S 

HPI-B SCHEMA.llC DIArnAM 

SHEET 2 

B 

c 

D 

E 

G 

05/20/2007 
r I

it4 144=p

ToMcawpos

tL1

LEGEND

A Aý

\1,Y 1 A -1 YA k .

\Y Y Y -0000 YY 

HIH~ GO IT jffG 1~ ~.f ~ 700~O~f } Go -00 an ff0 a 00205 0

TI

REFERENCES:

7f0 A4fC~ -M 020

=00E0aT a 0,00Sa

010000f0

020o o0050

T.11f wLsE T'-" -6 20 0f

W0K0602002020 00 000004-

.--./"" ........ /"',/"~.....-........-........-...-....-.........-.....--...~...--........-...--.. .......... ,.-....,--.. 480 V load Center LG-1 Feeder BkrLC1-15 

To AirComPIlISSOI" 

COMP-1 

)o--------IU\oI.!J.AoC- IOOI/M 2Q1'ITDEII8I1t £011 _______ -.j 

LOU ~\I'CSW!TCI-/ 

I:~IP 1 I TACT 

a.OSf: A 

II Bit 

AI -61 

;w,.r~1EII/l A - ~9tC701HQ2 

IW()\.< 

~IOC02tlI-()2 

SioIlT(H-

""""'lG()1 

-

CU<S 

" I , o 0 , ii , 

. ~ I ~ 

LEGEND 

H _ 1IU:IC 0PDtJ,tt~ tru sr.IOI 5IOnI M!Il 

1III'ND"TrSl'1WDI 

0l'S-CMJIQIIRDIT1'R'I'~ 

REFERENCES: 

PQ.1 \.III[ IIII)'ltClDl" ~!OOIlQlQCIllze 

~KrJf~m"20 

SNPP 

II'STR.JvENr AIR 

~CXlvP-1 

1-------------------------------------------------------------~B~-~1~3~4----------------------------------------------\ 

Dte: 
"T I ITrI S .0337 Fl T&-73 I &E- S-I.S 1 7777737307.337.7.17E3 

I. 

-I- 00 070,2. S1.. 70700-3Ž770 33 ~ J~~3-.3~- 773 ~ 737737 77 0337777773C097Ty Ic 1 27 37973.33

73~ 

0.3.7 7132737.07AL

c 

T3773 00.3 

LT1 - --I -----

I1 r r,, I - I S I- I E73 

307077.07 3

11 I SEE ____ 2 -a 7773 73 3,73

ý -3 3 7 .. 0 L- 7

T 7 A ~ 4 7 -. 7 ~ 7

ED2. 7~7s. 3.3 -TE 77

(D__________ ___________I ____

__ _ _ _ _ __-_ _ _ _ _ _ 71% -o

1%7RLvB'JTAJR &027

B-135 CCM:TESSC CCIVPL1

.J 

--111- 0 21 

--I tL--~o. Ll. ---i fl---'-I5 

--I ~ --i P-",?O 1Q.. 

~ ~ --i t-L- SP 

-+~CJ>_Lf. 

---+>"-

-W-

:-t~"f~, .. f~" 

-1I~t.~~OP2-ti ~: 

B-135 

:~fr~!} 

L( 6.00'/ S",nCI-lGEAA 

Ie I(RMI_l/~ C"'Plf4:r 

I1CB HAIH CONTI''lJL !CA!;'IJ 

AC AIR C;tMPl.::l;Sstl~ 

1-11;'1.2 

11.2 Cl)NI",CL lIi'AN'S'O"~" 

[I Eu:"nmlll .. ON R[GlJl.A1Qq 

1:21 ~rw'[l<t (~PANS;I:N i'<[JDULE 

S2<>.b.c (MERC<:),I(y SToP I'\J:;H !lU'jT~ 

HC8 HAND $~'!TCH 

HIGH PIS(HARC£ ..... Al(~ T[HP S"", 

lut (,(h 1lt1'41 L >d1'i:$ 

(\(" ~ .... ·stOl"(lo:t (U'lU'II.U. 

~IGlX trY rrt::t,.:ctl' ...-Tn"'" !.lIN. tJl,O,~ U'I. l~ 

.. :~ COOJ'C!fSSCR t\olf.,...:1ttJ< JO>. 

f"'~\llll&.j'.l 

SU~I VI' NO • ...li.. 

SNPP 

12 
DEVICE DESCMIPTIokU MýX/TYPE REk4MAJ.

50 5TA,-5LXVICETRAkJ5A 19 te/pc-bzo

NIOTE '0 OVER CURB.E01 E.ELA.y,,30

gmTIME DELAY RELAY~ ~ ArTAT/

MIZFPA

50, 0VFEBcURREI3T l!ELA.V5Fo~pJ5 NO~TEo IsC FOR FROM LOAD iiR I F

<,7 TIME DELAY RELAY GbAT NOTE10 E1OIEFA - ST.SEEICET9010F, ID -Lij eAN DIFFEKLL)TiA RELAYX aF~1I~

_84 STAL SEZVICE TRAMSE.ID OIPOb LO(IP OIJTRELAY G.C/HIA~

SINj BUS ID OVER VOLTAAE lrb/Cv-e WDD F_ ELAY(GROIJIID IDEECTIok)) v6

ED USMD U&IJOEZOLTAGE RELAY~ Eh-TJY-Z

L70.I IUI ID UIJOER VOLTAGE WS/or £001 AI~EILIAR L KY.EM JS/I

NOTES

1. A0ObeAS EMIEG. M 01E0 WE ORD IN MKAIN C41NZAIA . tjoORUP'M RATIP(3 OF P&BbIS ~(

AMPS SYMME4TRICAL. 4. SITATIOM) SERVICE TRAU35FORtMER "A.5RAB.EL TYPE.

5. BREAKERS 52-E002 AND 52-EDI2 ARE KY.E INTEIRLOCICIE SO T14AT ONLY ONE CAN BE CLOSED AT ANY TIME (OWC.. 5477 12IO)

S B AKEES 52-EDOS UD 5--E0.01S(OMJ 4OOV. BUIS IA,) ARE OPIERATED BY A, 5Ih6LE COL(TROL SWITCH Ju THE MAIM COUTROI. ROOM.

7. ALL 5KR'S EXCLIPT 52-R002 4 52-ED42 N4AVE. SOLID STATE TRIP (WIT3 WITH FOLLOWIIJ~l

LIES f.xIATIOIJ (8RE.ACER FRAmE/-3REm-OR

RATIUQe-AJAPERES)

8, MRAW~St 5ZEBDj, S-EEOC. AIIID MOL.eDO CASe eKRS.

To BATTERYI CHALGER C KARE KEN IBE1IRLOCIIED 50

TBHAT 0Q3W ONIL BREMLke AmD (CERESPOLUDINO, MOLDED CARIE 5ANS CAM BE CLOSED NAT Awl TIME (Dws-C-Mf5?5I.

3. UNIT I MRAK0t ED0615 PI.ECI6ICALL.Y XTEWLOCIOED

WITH 110110 zOAE weIqtu 10d eFoEVIERT OWALLANFOA

Ems.NO OF tam1 fl0Om.

to, LgC.AT ED IN TERMIINAL. 5LO.dI COMPAJITMEFT

AEIoVEASOIR B.REOOFA.

11. SkIS DR0VIPO SUPERSEDES DRAVI4G C-1770ID, SHlT IOF 1.

REV. 14, MATED IlISS PER PEN S-93-1-1310,1 REV. 0.

REFERENCE DRAWINGS

AI111558-ELECTriCAL 6UBEXAýL DIETAII. 4 IJOTES D.111001- 5IIJLE LIAJE ELEC. A j.SY5TEI.(4i(O(00 1.00

SNPP

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B)

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM

DrawiI`g No.:

LIC-B-01

Date:

05/20/2007

B-136

#6

·-}, 

r!~, .N. 

I , 

@, 

~ .. 

, 

~ 

150 

~ 

I-

'" '" " ::> 

1 

a 

'" oJ 

~ 

~ " 

a 

.g ':' , 

u ~ ;;; ~ 

~ 

'" ... 

~ 

5 

I: 

oil 

TO UIJIT! 

t.OO V. LO"D '1'2. tD 

MCC I~ 

~ 

~ fI 

TO 

a.ooV LOAD C.E.tJTii.R. 

I .. 

W 

~ al 

« 

I ~ S 

" ., ~ 

g ,. 0 

I 8 ~ " ~ 

" I f!. ,:. 

~ 

dr~ 25 

~ : t (OIl1E&I~) 8-1/<'1/0 

>! 

It 

'C~ 

'-:lI 

~~ 

w 

~ < :r 

u 

«" 

~S1 " .... 

~~ 

>-

It 

oJ 

I-

~ 

~ u 

::;; 

'" g 0 

0 0 W 

;? .. ~ II! 

.!. f!. l! ~ ~ .l. 

8~P 100 

~ 125 lv 125 

III t- III !z~ z .. w .. 0 If' '" oJ_ 

~-- 3 ::0",_ 

~w~ !d~ 

::oo!! u <w" " 4J" o-J" oJ oJ 02 ';8" %§s IIoC< S " ... :i 8u~ e .1\ 

8-136 

DEV'(E. 0 ~'I!:IPTIOI.I M< "PE 

...2.'<- ';T". ~U"I(E. TU"'F. ID G e/P~c.nG 

NO"! 10 OVE~ (UIlR,.E.t.)T ItE.L'VI3, 

No'k 10 TIIVIE DEC,"," II!E~"V ~~~T/ 

N"o':EIO ~F~~=l~"'d-~'IF "S/PJC~~G 

~E.IO TIME DE ..... V r.E~"V 

~ 

...aL 

o~oa 

~~hJ roor 

~T",~Ei':VI'E TR""')C;~, II) OIFJ:E.ltE.tJTJAJ. tEI.."Y 

STA. ';E~V"E T~""'SF.ID 

LOCKI>J& OUT I!l!l~Y 

!lU~ 10 OVEr. VOC'''''E. ~l~V((,,_IID O.T£(TIO") <.!>T/c.v-a 

E~~' 15Ih 10 UllOEI!: VOCTA,(,E ~LAV UT /,-v-1. 

t1~·1 BUS 10 U~OE~ VOLT"',. 

£001 ""KI~I~~Y r.El"Y. 

I. ,...w-tleMCne" EJo'IE.'tc;,. 1"'¢'4!,Q. 60A.RD IN MA.I/'( CQ/r{T.)1M, 

t IUTERRUPTI..,G. R.&.Tll-lb O~ A.Cln 15 . tt.OOO "MPS b'~ ";YIvtIVlET~IC"'. (MIll) 

~. aU) 'HO~T ClI!:<UIT RA.TIhlG. a,ooo ~MP$ SYMME.TRIC"L. 

4. ";T"TIOI.I SE~VICE TIt"I.I~FO"'''ER .A.~t:"R.e.,-" TYPE. 

S. BREAKERS 52-0002 "NO S2-5012 ARE KEY INTS:RLDC!(;D SO TMA.'T ONL.Y DN&. CA.N Be CLD~E.D 

AT ANY TIME (OW~, &-n/ In) 

" ~5~Aft)~Ut~~~~.;tg ~~-~~,,<:~ '-ooV. cOlJno~ ~WIT(H JU TNE ......... I!! (OJVTROl ROOM, 

1. A~l &KR'S E:XCLPT 62- !:D02 ~ 52-E-0<2 HIWE. 

~OUD ~T""TE TRIP Ul.JJn WITH FOCLOWI~'" 

~~f:~~~~~umA<:ER .l .... ...,E/ "LNfoO~ 

8. SEElIKtll:> ~t·EPO,,~l-EEoc. "~D t.IOl.l)I<D c.o."e: eKR~, 

TO B!.TTEfl.Y c.H1IfI.("E.l It ~(E n~ IIJl.tCOtIU:D so 

TH~i O!.lW O~e. BltEAl<.E.l "»0 conE~pouDI"" 

"""OI!.O CA .... ~Rl!> CI,,, 6E (lO~ED ", AIJY TIMe (DWb·<-m~~I, 

,. UNIT I 8R!AKeIt ~os 1.S ~LE.C1IUCALLY XN."TE~t<El) 

"1'Tli U .. " Z 1!#.EA~ EDOJi"lO ~E~T ~1ANEOUi 

Cl.l)~IWC7 OF eafH 5l1!'~I(!R!o. 

10. L.Qt.A.lED IN TERMU"~L. ~l.oc.l<. COt.APA.R.jMENT 

....!Xlv!. A.4b':tOC.IATEO e.RE. ... I(.!!R." 

11. THIS C::fA\IlMi SU?ERSEDES DRAIJl'113 C-ln!uo. SHT 1 OF' l- RCV. 14, IIATDl 11-15-90, PER' PCN S-IJ:J-l-BG9!l. REV. O. 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

~·I"~~II-E.LE(TtJt"l "EUH,"~ ~ETI\I~) < ij.rE) 0·111001- ~'tJIolE Llue Ele(, fo.u".SVSTEIo\(41~OI~OOv) 

SNPP 

LOAD CENTER B (LC-B) 

ONE-LINE DIAGRAM 

Drawing No.: 

LC-B.{)1 

Date: 

05/20/2007 

116 
- - p - I - - I - I - I I -- . I

i, oc•_ • Lmo r.eJ•mJe,

Th& MMojtOCA flýviO 1.*S 1- . Ml-"

NtTE 1 TSTPCi t

REFERENCE DRAWINGS

a-o-7Osl, ssuNe .. % tutC•..e•'O•..

0 . uOl y 1 3T' 0 ( I0S,.

13

C

D

m a I I O

E

yZOT'5hl4

TcafSbV~TOzY Z~ F

La.....Jill..I.III X x X; I

0-- sang

01104 ~~ýý f0rtfEif 0.5

CPO

M~'

R24 lb A

010. T

35L l.

............ ! __e __ .

I..iiiI~A~hU..0 0 0 leoso ~ I *

S % \F P D G EW 2_N

52L6x 02D

EFEAKESCH3MMfl

H

1v ý --- - , -. J} 1051-0. ItlS -

.. . . . I n ........ i-•--- ........ . )

0*2000005

01*050,1005 lotosiS

P.0. 15.0Cr - nip 1150101

B-137

~ t 

R 

l! 

> 

!! 

I' 

Itl~O;:~"~~ na ...... III I~! ~~! G--1HO-U-O ~ X 

-i1--Clo-1t-o l JI. 

IW4D$'IIITC· "' .... "... ............. D-if-OO-O"-o 

.,... II(T\lthI 1Q CbITP 

P'Vu. m ~OU 1M Tal, f'OtmoM 

, 

X X 

, 

, 

, , , , 

, ... 

... 

....... 

....... 

B-137 

" 

~ ~ 

~~ 

" " "" 

.. .. .. 

L' • 

. , ""'" 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

0-117001-5'~ \JIIIl/"1J!'~~ 

A\J'IC,I ... "'ctv ..-sr&M{_ ... a-.- 411WY t '-OOY) 

"-m5~-.~~..,...,. .... 41113 wo,..,e.. 

a .11'JQfO alNaI... .. uQ~ ... -*O 

Ma~ 6DO'I I...DlO CJUiftIl 

n:.(~) 

B 

c 

D 

E 

0-111011· ......... 1..1We.PIlO,. .. ''I''IO .. ~ F "'I!O.""~ c.Dol/ IA4p ca~Tak ,.(~) 

G 
1 I 1 2 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 1 10 I 11 I 12 I 13

A - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 1- - - - - - - - - -

4 QmR

B

r~~

"T'' •TT• N"FT " "T mTIo

REFERENCE DRAWINGS

O.'lEFE 1.9E aLSiCYLEJ AWE

D.111010-EOE sLE. `1%Pwl" ANDSW

D.C11ELC 400CL.S .110 VQC`TqdTO A.0

ESSCASWO"04 'CEI5EEQRG)

C.C111CA S.ALLE LAY PEOTSC.COL "0J SLEPYCISE I100I LWS Q.TtER IF

C

B

-TS0 AG.E EEEE' l

:-I

F

G

H

LOAE ESAtS

isWE.E rEl- NMIRE- EOCO-B S S0

ItiP~ EEGOY~ A5 111 I~~Li AEOE* M

EA.L T L F

El 45 A

2!1-0 -A5.1 IA-I AIRY 

G ~x• x,-

SNPP DawF• N.:

SNPPLC-B-03

52-ED-12 052W"7 SCHIv-EM'nC

S~-1 f61

BLOCK5 EDIEAAM

B-138

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

LOADeUfTER 

COMl"IIftTM 

001 

6 I 

.. " 

;:;;~~lIDrn:C:t:DJ\L"IUI """'. 

B-138 

SNPP 

52-ED-12 

OCI-EM\llC 

B 

c 

D 
SIX 3ERtv

TCLAtW SST-B oV LOAD T. R IF d

A I

L- 0

NOTES

1. ALL It4TERLOCeS ARE KIRK TYPE

2.CkQC.U1'T SPEAKEBS.5 5n2-e.DO'),5Z-EEO~

MOLDED CAzE~bpEAK!-M.I. 'To bkA.TTE '

CHAP..CEQ- ICA.E- KE.Y -NT PL.OGWC.L. 4bO

1NA'T COI.L'1 ONE. bFA.KES hAND C0FE2E5POND,

INGa BATTEP-1 CH.2c,)E? MOLDE.D O-AbE

j~ehAKEEI2 CAk BE C.LO5E-D AJ ATAY TkM!-

LEGEND

S.-EDO 0Z. 52 -EbIZ

E

480 V Load Center LC-B

FE -lD-1 IL-01

At

INTERLOCK WITH KEY HELO.

INTERLOCK WITH KEY REMOVED.

rI I

TO ET.L~

OPEF.A toN IALUr.NCL

IN CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-EDO- INTERLOC

=br.MICV- THROUGH CIRCUIT BREAKER

i. TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKI.E.R Z2-Eflo>&

2. TURN KEY Al IN L• INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKER

52-EDOM TO LOCK OPEN. KEY Al IS NOW FREE.

3. IN-SERT KEY Al IN L-O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BREAKEI

52- E.D12 AND TURN TO UNLOCK. :KEY Al IS, NOW ýMEt

4. CLOSE CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-EDIL.

IRLE.VSE. S-QUI•W.C.f.. 1'0 RtF_70..E SERVICE THROUGH

./NOTE AS A EC..TI',O FOlk. MAIMTEAIANCE. WOK PL P% PLANT'

CE:....EDUK.TVO 1,E'A5 MAY E USE TO Ox.IEKKIDE THE

M C NO-MLtCRCAA3 BA TERLOCK VEATURE, OTE' I Aý FETURE

L-O - (LOCKEDOPEN) INDICATES THAT

THE KEYIS REMOVABLE WHENTHE

5Z-E~ CIRCUIT BREAKER IS LOCKED IN'THE 5 OPEN POSITION.

-. E. E - INDICATES KEY. REMOVABLE ONLY

0 - -,. 1WHEN BOLT EXTENDED.

I L-0 'IINTERLOC EY TA B-E

INT.R.LOCK IKEY NJMRBER

XE. NOTF 74 PEAIl I RE -14204-

R I j

LD XTTELRY CHAPCmtR REFERENCE DWG.

1 D 0-177001-SINGLE LINE ELEC. AUX SYSTEM

e4IGOV ý GOOV)

C-177010 -SINGLE LINE PROTECTION

METERING 6OOV LOAD CENTER I1

A-177538-ELEC, rEN DETAILS ; NOVtES

r SNPP -Dow~n0 o

LC-B Date:

INCOMING BREAKER 05/20/2007

INTERLOCKS

B-139

~"T" 'flEet" TIl/l."~ SST-8 

Sl.-ED02. 

GoOOI/ 1:.0"0 C HI. I F 

1 5l-£'I)I~ tE 

-+ _____ ...... _____ ~w,_ _ A I E 

1=0 

480 V Load Center LC-B 

OPE ... .-"!.O. .~u" we' SZ-£l)O'!> J- ~'-'{ 1'0 HE\,.£) IN C.IRCUIT BREAKER !52-E,pOa. INTERLOCK. }-~'.' TO E'ST""'LI~1i 'e)1ii.1l'lIC1!..THROUGH CIRCUIT BREAKER l~ t'l 

52-_£012-

I. TRIP CIRC.UIT eREA~ER c2- ED02. L-O . I 

2· TURN KEY AI IN L:O INTERLOCK ON CIRCUIT BRE.AJo<.ER . I ~2-ECoz. TO LOCI< OPEN. KE.Y AI IS NOW FRE.E. '':)EE. NOTl-z.~ , J 

NOTES 

I .. A,LL INTERLOC.~S ARE klRI( TYPE 

2.CI2C.Uli 8I2.EAKE.~'5 !5'2.-!!.005J Sl.-E.EOG. ~ 

MOLDeD CA";)E e;2eA.~~\C.~. io e,"'TiE~'i 

CHAQ..c.e.2 Ie. A.I2.E KE.Y ·III.ITEeL.()C..""-ED ';'0 

iKAi O~L'1 ONE. eIiEA.~E.2 A.N\) C02.I?ESPOND 

INCl &A.TTE2"f C-HAI2c..EI? MOLDE.O c,,c..c;:,e 

e.RE:A.KEI2. c...A.~ SE C,LOSE.D A\ A~'" T\~e. 

("::>EE. D'/.JCi C- \ i ,I ~!> ) 

~-

r@l-

~ 

E 

LEGEND 

INTERLOCK WITH KEY HELD. 

INTERLOCK WITH KEY REMOVED. 

(lOCKEDOPENIINDICATES THAT 

THE KEY IS REMOVABLE WHEN THE 

CIRCUIT BRE"KER IS LOCKED iN THE 

OP[N PO:'1110N. 

INDICATE5KEY REMOVABLE ~ 

WHEN BOLT EXTENDED. 

INTERLOCK KtV TARI ~ 

'INTERLOCK I KEY M)MBERl 

I .ill I RE-14204 I 

3·INSE.RT I<EY. AI IN 1=0. INTI!.RL-OCK ON CIRC.IJIT SREAI<ER 

S2 - E.DI2. AND TURN TO UNLOCK .KE'y.AI IS- NOW 'HEeL-D. BATTER,"'" C:f\JI..~e:.t.R REFERENCE D WG, 

Ie: 

. -.. _.' ," ,".-. ~ .. -.. ~ ,-~. ~';' ..... -......... ~.' . 

8-139 

D-177001.-SINGLE LINE ELEC AUl( SySTE.M 

C41<POII f ,,"(011) 

<:-177010 - SINGLE LINE PROTE.CTION ~ 

ME.TERIN~ ,"OOV 1..0AO CENTER 10 

"-177.538 - ELEC. ,.,eN. OE TAILS. NOllES 

r SNPP 

LC-8 

INCOMING BREAKER 

I f\fTERLOCKS 

Drawing r-.h.: 

LC-8-04 

C6te: 

05/20/2007 

116 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12 I

IOmm's I OSsAcS.0L I 1"t I .. AIL.SOA BALAT hoAr SvK;MO '557 oc

0 COOiO.,0 b

I°'' 'JC I 

Oa]t). __]'' •z

ps:

ELeI SO

JJ

-E I--LC. -- --, I] -... 0$-

.01

56.R _Div_

I75 -- I ~ i~ I - IT :.v A

3. CABLE POR O.K. RO-Ts,*LIGCS

4 COOL Pon A.C. POT5CIBU LIGOM6

C

C~OR-ee-e. -ILh *,rB

n! 24 =_ 2tk 1 1 ý 1 1

= *,l, 144k=r5l 1 1 1 1ý , _ l , . ,

1. .,OT I- -- .0 

11C1a MIDO .- ___ M EFERENCE DR~AWINGS,

.. ... .. .. ... I• ce. 1 5 ... I 4. , SO- 511 * .7O05OcAtlSOATEA B UN041OSOLAS OAUXILIARY 00.0510 LIA bO USIA OSTKL SOaOIA ~T 1~OIOISA.IUI -C' a.A G4 LOCCAI Aax

li '.L,,on ,' .,I,.CTIRM•".S O rI Il"BZ " S " I 92 c ... . 'C'S + Ic , ,,TOP -'. O lS o. ORC,, . I" .... 5*,000"0"0,00 R 0-A5 1- ICoo l.6o G, LO toLO C i•

-- jr m- O--. t'l- &co- op' , ---- C'-•. 'D- t. c --+,,.+.- ', r--a

_____-__1 -- I--__---_- I -- I I --R i - *001505 ,r m %O.4-0 o0

soIJll• Im aOA l, -T`"a

**~~~~C COO ACO C55OL947 CT0 Ir0 I

~~SI -u ____ A 01 5.40 Sr uOT 

OR.... 5++ .f ......... .... .. .. .... . -j+ I I I ...... COOL I +.1-'.-+ I~ 2 SK.. I ++ I ... . :I;.... I O-I,,A,-- ......... . ... ..

SalK ~ - - 1 0 1 6 - K 1 750 I - a-- - - I _ S OAr S IS r_ 1O

J 4 7 0IýY,-~ 07-. >171 -SImC L..- 007510I O EA,: _ePIA IS6 AUIICOBOSLG UO

F

C

14 O.T4.l!A ATS

LK AýELACTS VI - OA.

I . .... .. ... .. . "I I... ... Iv Y-I I I .

.'4.-055 S-E=. , 

Drawing Nb.:

SNPP•.,.LC-B-05 SNPPDae

05/20/2007

LOAD CENTER

UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME

B-140

-

-

-

-

-

I " 

Kj r-;;oo,'" 'I""'~T 'POI~OT"'I" A.li-e.n 

.... 1;-&1\ 

.,-

. - . \O\.TMl!(R. 

~ltC.'" At-

®'T,,",'IN.>l .... 0\1\"!O1'-", RQ.W..ID p.1'«,CO 1oIAMCi.; 

M ... ttJ.l"'\~D Cow.T.t.CT~ 

'8if L:B('t TR:;? n."i:jrrt; ::ot:>7 

..J;rL PR(S~1::t'h"';' ::;<:1:,,"1" 

...l!rL '0:' $j4~~ .. ~ 

ccvl't!~iS~ I~ 

--'It'--

I (X """"'*'- (~11?:;; 

'-';;JL S:>N;~ 

-";;JL 

>-:m~ 

Sit .. 

:-112'" St-;4 

I 3 I 4 I 

f- f- trrm IT:"l 

I'"~~~~~~:I l:'2!';~~l~ ~ :Sl(.:~ ~t'J,-. (:>J2~-.u 'v Z>e!~ Q1I-re,..cn-, 'v [:n P!<'S:8-4J 

=S>1:!'" a:..o.e51tJ1-l 'v "" ~JZS;a-q 

~ :1-'i:!'U ;::>r6:8~ 

I 

~'>J.' 

::2 

6 I 7 I 

B-140 

8 I 

l&ia!;~QW.! oo.~~""""~ 

!~l 

J 

e 

I 

l~ lu;os ,0'-"""'» 

j~ ..... G'lQoNO 

0l1't.c.T::):t 

9 I lD I 11 I 12 I 13 

ILZ"_'_Z..JI_:.::.ll:,u="::'~:::vn,-' :.....=...,::...-. _-'-I ___ --'IL-_",_V_X---.j f> 

j. coe~WOT.un>LV m UIOI. 

t. SUI..'" C0t4T"'T TQ'" OI~~ftO 

3. CA&LI! r:OR C.C. POTENTIAl... UGHTS. 

'f.C"&L. FOR A.C. POT .... TIAI... I.U;"Ta. 

~ SEI: lJI1IV1\'t> II-lBl981 H~ nm: ~An~(i .'t~ 

~fit.Oc:.'Pj'Stlot:.[:::I.o:.l •• " 

~EFER;:-NCE DRA\JINGSI 

... n,l1I1&-I.I.IC.T1ll'-AI. .'I4.R:,"- Oi"t"t\,.. .... 0 MOTM 

-

-

c 

E 

.H"OOG-'9IGLii ltJoli. e:L'iC.~"'1.. .t..U'Il ~aM{lIlORM.I,. .. 411bO'1t.QoOO¥.' f-- O·111OOt-'lN30l1 U\l& il,.;,C~"At. 6,U)C 

~'t"lilM (~""'RQ ·41~V" CiIOOf) 

!:-!77Ctl7 -"'!IIIIr,;l; Lltd. ~'l'.o" ""'0 

IoI.L1;'A'~~" \,(W) "'!.ITt.A. ... C.·"'OO8--S\N.G:'~ "'tN; PPOTiCTION AUO t.t;'1';:U1.O:;' (0,00'1 :"OAO:I C.,s.:ttR 

C.(-:~-fJl~l~ '" I.n.lli P~'tIICTIQU /III4D toIi;TiFl)l4G ~ \"OAI) Cv.rnR 

:-1770:3 - '" ~t.IG\.1. Uw., ~TtQI.i "'WOO 

SNPP 

~'1'p.\!o.l4 aocw I.OAO C~nq 

10 ~&M;'''6) 

Drawing N:>.: 

LC-8-05 

D3te: 

F 

05/20/2007 

LOAD CENTER 

UNDERVOLTAGE SCHEME 116 
A

B

AN~ V LOD CIEMIEP,

EDO ToLC I T4a, CIPOIMIlT VS IC= , ý

Z, 10C~MVED. I6 IIC4TWC

C

MR UX1 " A IDS AMl Ell r0D 1 CVOIY -

EWýl TO PABVI10 Ji0VT0AIOI *ý

A"M gL.eCO~iAC~l. IRCI5liCoo (WE1 TABLE

D

F

hOI~ACO CAT At 40OA6tttl .1M0 SPRWQ POSTURN W0401440

500014 411UF4 74 WO 0MAN.

V CA"

E Oc f

4 tc

C~ *cI,pi

%C E4,VA C- U .4 r~§~1 Vwe PON M IC A

REFERENCE DRAWINGS

hIRTIM COTE M14.-CO (009)

&CM4 1.Cl C9MM Or (9"4GO)

(3

H

B-141

A 

B 

c 

o 

E 

F 

G 

H 

I VXAL 

: t----------------';iL 

r: :11~-Z~ 

., 

r~~ r; .. ti ~ 

G 

B-141 

Lit-lUll (ftbTD au MfCH SNNN rat 

II£AI((I1M n:nRlSIlIDIt 

l. tonENTS IEl.(TED. 

13 

REFERENCE DRAWINGS 

."'''"O-c.'-'GTRIC .... o;NUUl.CiTAlI.~ '-NO ...".. 

tN'1OOI-~\MG1.A UII& I.Li.CTitICA.L AU'lULWn' 

oS'ftT&M """"'-4J(.Q't IfGOOV) 

o·mOlo-~\.U~T\O\I.IMC,~ 

QOCN lQIID aNTI"- 10 (WIRG) 

o·I11O!I-~ UNG PROftC.T/ON't4TUIN6 ~ LOIlD ,tNT'" Iii (IMlAG) 

Drawing ~.: 

A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

SNPP MCC-B1-01 

MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 

MCC-1B 

Oate: . 

05/20/2007 

116 
I z i 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 74 I a 1 9 I 1o 1 II 1 12 1 13

I I I 4 I I I I I 1wI I 3

A

c

sm Sm0 TOM$

I O Lr•OoFcOTm% ]MvO-GS I nsvo

NOTE$:

LOSDRIFI IFSI O PS

I

*

W; PJCOmO on t WCWX MM F04CO P 41KTOS!!ýU :IP- AtOFA mgma NODLSN

0055 - I --

M4'tI

REFERENCE DRAWOFIG

A-01"OS-L1CThRIA6 "MWEOL O&TMA

ow.11100. -SPSOAý Ut!ws 1CCI0

WMIU155 4*000 SW1013W

S-mosoS-east Las PROIITacF.

*.a~fAms AWN0 eameldIA

bus w (SWARM0

soP *1 (%"m0R)

c*IT,01- SOWt Laot PROTOCTOeM as

14o (WAdMI) C.1m101-SnAL LIMB PP0010010 AN0 .9ya5Rma 400 1.00414010

C-6T14 -01501 1155 PROMSTOM AND

511104 1 .41SAR

II Z "o

*10100 - U 5PACIS5 *011

4

r00441 I 5554 0548 ..

411010014 ULM(41 I s IV 10450 mob 5

~J I ~ caO'O 010

400 bll * 001 o 0.0 I s 410FO .V Dt4Wi4g No.

SNPP

SNPP LC-B-06

STATION SERVICE Date:

TRANSFORMER 05/20/2007

DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

B-142 SCHEME

-

I 

-

c 

-

D 

-

E 

.. 

- \..OO"lOUT IlSI.Nt PUNCTION 't.teI.~ 

.& """""'" i-"" I~ 

_'!lOW 

~ TRIP I!W'. "·01=0," ",... ...!..p- TRlPBI'.R O1..oOISO& 

F .-"fl". I>J.»M "" ... ~ ........ M 

..!tl' ...... -4JS 

_ ... -- i-¥- ...... , - -¥ ...... --¥ .~~c. c.-mM ~ =~'l~~ ~ ....... - ~ 

- OIfPr.A!NtIAI.. MLArI't ID IV AOfoti ~ lOOt , 

~~~~RV .. 1'4 enact DGO' QQI , 

n N 'ltO~~ _lOA 5> 

~." ~ 

. .",.. ...J..t.5. 

... -..1f"" 

- ...I.f1S. 

-- .-¥!' -rnWO ~ 

-- -"t=' 

Ii 

4 5 

'UN(."nON .... II. 

TRP I!IiIA !Il.w..oa. 

.... ""'" ....""" ~ ..... 

I~~.~ 

_ "''''"''' ... 

1 1 

• \ .• ,. .NO,e. • 7'" 

E 

B-142 

9 

1 1 

10 ., 

""'" o 

.. , • 

• .'"'' 

10 

~4; ..... 

0.." 

---

~IPROT,.AI" 

11 I 12 I 13 

1o<v<c5 IlOI(1UPTIClN -n-...- I eGo 1_......... I""-~ •• lotO'DC 

7£> , 

A.,m~;~~:!.~~~o.,," ~ 

Do-l ,1001 -'5IN611l --LJN& ral.&CT1\OIr. A,IIII 

M'ttM ,&MI&Jt6.4IAOV C*OCW) 

Q.I'1CO't-9d..I UMI PAOtaCTICAI& AND -

Ml'TIRING ,~ 'tWtTCMMAR. 

.. O·rTtOO~-.11GI.I.1.Id ~...., 

Ml.ttALNCl 4IGOY ~~tl au" I~ C,MtAe) 

D.fT1OOfJ- '!INIilI. L.NI PAO'tKTlON ANO I M'~4WiO'1 ~TtI4UR 

~IGUUARG) 

C·I"OIO- '!o1\lG1.t \JM't fIROTIC.noN *0 

~~~u.:~OCN ~ ~ft _ 

(_I"Ott_"5tWOI..I UWI PAOTU:'notrf. AIIO 

MI~ 4COf 1..0l0 CiW'RA _..-, 

Drawing t-h.: SNPP Le·S·06 

STA1l0N SERVICE 031.: 

TRANSFORMER 05/20/2007 

DIFFEREN1lAL PROTEC1l0N 

SCHEME 

#6 
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER

(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,

NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instructions on the reverse) NUREG/CP-0194 Volume 2

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

MONTH YEAR

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2008,

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Conference Proceedings

Compiled and edited by D. Stroup, F. Gonzalez, and H. Woods (NRC) ConferenceProceedings

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor,

provide name and mailing address.)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type "Same as above"; if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

and mailing address.)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshops conducted Sept. 28 - Oct. 2, 2008 and Nov. 17-20, 2008 in Bethesda, MD

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and performance-based alternative

regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July 2004, which allows licensees the option of using fire protection requirements

contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805; "Performance Based Standard for Fire

protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," with certain exceptions. To support

licensees' use of that option, the NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly issued NUREG/CR-6850

(EPRI 1011989) "Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," in September 2005. That report documents the

state-of-the-art methods, tools, and data for conducting a fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in a commercial

nuclear power plant (NPP) application. Since the release of NUREG/CR-6850 in 2005, the NRC-RES and EPRI have

conducted a number of joint public workshops to provide training in the use of the methodologies and tools contained in

the document. The workshops have attracted both domestic and international. The material in this NUREG/CP was

recorded during two workshops conducted in 2008. It was adapted by NRC-RES Fire Research Branch (FRB) members

for use as an alternative training method for those who were unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report

can also serve as a refresher for those who attended one or more training sessions, and would be useful preparatory

material for those planning to attend a session.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words orphrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

unlimited

fire, performance-based, risk-Informed regulation, fire hazard analysis (FHA), fire safety, 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

fire protection, nuclear power plant, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fire modeling, circuit (This Page)

analysis unclassified

(This Report)

unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

NRC FORM 335 

(9-2004) 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER 

(Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev., 

and Addendum Numbers, if any.) NRCMD 3.7 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET 

(See instructions on the reverse) 

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 

Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) - 2008, 

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop, Volume 2 - Module 2: Electrical Analysis 

5. AUTHOR(S) 

Compiled and edited by D. Stroup, F. Gonzalez, and H. Woods (NRC) 

NUREG/CP-0194 Volume 2 

3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED 

July 

MONTH 

I 

YEAR 

2010 

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER 

6. TYPE OF REPORT 

Conference Proceedings 

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates) 

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor, 

provide name and mailing address.) 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303 

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type "Same as above"; if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

and mailing address.) 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94303 

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

NRC-RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshops conducted Sept. 28 - Oct. 2, 2008 and Nov. 17-20,2008 in Bethesda, MD 

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less) 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the risk-informed and performance-based alternative 

regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c) in July 2004, which allows licensees the option of using fire protection requirements 

contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805; "Performance Based Standard for Fire 

protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," with certain exceptions. To support 

licensees' use of that option, the NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) jointly issued NUREG/CR-6850 

(EPRI 1011989) "Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," in September 2005. That report documents the 

state-of-the-art methods, tools, and data for conducting a fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in a commercial 

nuclear power plant (NPP) application. Since the release of NUREG/CR-6850 in 2005, the NRC-RES and EPRI have 

conducted a number of joint public workshops to provide training in the use of the methodologies and tools contained in 

the .document. The workshops have attracted both domestic and international. The material in this NUREG/CP was 

recorded during two workshops conducted in 2008. It was adapted by NRC-RES Fire Research Branch (FRB) members 

for use as an alternative training method for those who were unable to physically attend the training sessions. This report 

can also serve as a refresher for those who attended one or more training sessions, and would be useful preparatory 

material for those planning to attend a session. 

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.) 

fire, performance-based, risk-Informed regulation, fire hazard analysis (FHA), fire safety, 

fire protection, nuclear power plant, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fire modeling, circuit 

analysis 

NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) 

13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

unlimited 

14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

(This Page) 

unclassified 

(This Report) 

unclassified 

15. NUMBER OF PAGES 

16. PRICE 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER 
F.deral Federal Recycling Recycling Program Program
Export Control Restrictions

Access to and use of this report is granted with the specific

understanding and requirement that responsibility for ensuring

full compliance with all applicable U.S. and foreign export

laws and regulations is being undertaken by you and your

company. This includes an obligation to ensure that any

individual receiving access hereunder who is not a U.S.

citizen or permanent U.S. resident is permitted access under

applicable U.S. and foreign export laws and regulations. In

the event you are uncertain whether you or your company

may lawfully obtain access to this report, you acknowledge

that it is your obligation to consult with your company's legal

counsel to determine whether this access is lawful. Although

EPRI may make available on a case-by-case basis an informal

assessment of the applicable U.S. export classification for

specific report, you and your company acknowledge that this

assessment is solely for informational purposes and not for

reliance purposes. You and your company acknowledge that

it is still the obligation of you and your company to make your

own assessment of the applicable U.S. export classification

and ensure compliance accordingly. You and your company

understand and acknowledge your obligations to make a

prompt report to EPRI and the appropriate authorities

regarding any access to or use of this report hereunder that

may be in violation of applicable U.S. or foreign export laws

or regulations.

Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of

the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.

@Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America

EPRI 1020621

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), with major locations in

Palo Alto, California, and Charlotte, North Carolina, was established

in 1973 as an independent, nonprofit center for public interest

energy and environmental research. EPRI b'rings together members,

participants, the Institute's scientists and engineers, and other leading

experts to work collaboratively on solutions to the challenges of electric

power. These solutions span nearly every area of electricity generation,

delivery, and use, including health, safety, and environment. EPRI's

members represent over 90% of the electricity generated in the

United States. International participation represents nearly 15% of

EPRI's total research, development, and demonstration program.

Together...Shaping the Future of Electricity

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

NUREG/CP- 0194

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304-1395 e PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303-0813 USA

800.313.3774 9 650.855.2121 e askepri@epri.com 0 www.epri.com

Export Control Restrictions 

Access to and use of this report is granted with the speciFic 

understanding and requirement that responsibility For ensuring 

full compliance with all applicable U.S. and foreign export 

laws and regulations is being undertaken by you and your 

company. This includes an obligation to ensure that any 

individual receiving access hereunder who is not a U.S. 

citizen or permanent U.S. resident is permitted access under 

applicable U.S. and Foreign export laws and regulations. In 

the event you are uncertain whether you or your company 

may lawfully obtain access to this report, you acknowledge 

that it is your obligation to consult with your company's legal 

counsel to determine whether this access is lawful. Although 

EPRI may make available on a case-by-case basis an inFormal 

assessment of the applicable U.S. export classiFication For 

specific report, you and your company acknowledge that this 

assessment is solely For inFormational purposes and not for 

reliance purposes. You and your company acknowledge that 

it is still the obligation of you and your company to make your 

own assessment of the applicable U.S. export classification 

and ensure compliance accordingly. You and your company 

understand and acknowledge your obligations to make a 

prompt report to EPRI and the appropriate authorities 

regarding any access to or use of this report hereunder that 

may be in violation of applicable U.S. or Foreign export laws 

or regulations. 

Electric Power Reseorch Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of 

the Electric Power Reseorch Institute, Inc. 

@) Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America 

EPRII020621 

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), with major locations in 

Palo Alto, California, and Charlotte, North Corolina, was established 

in 1973 as an independent, nonproFit center for public interest 

energy and environmental research. EPRI b~ingstogether members, 

participants, the Institute's scientists and engineers, and other leoding 

experts to work collaboratively on solutions to the challenges of electric 

power. These solutions span nearly every area of electricity generation, 

delivery, and use, including health, saFety, and environment. EPRI's 

members represent over 90% of the electricity generated in the 

United States. International participation represents nearly 15% of 

EPRl's total research, development, and demonstration program. 

Together ... Shaping the Future of Electricity 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 

NUREG/CP - 0194 

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

3420 Hillview Avenue, Polo Alto, California 94304·1395 • PO Box 10412, Polo Alto, California 94303·0B 13 USA 

800.313.3774 • 650.855.2121 • askepri@epri.com • www.epri.com 
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 

OFFICIAL BUSINESS