COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphr eys, McClanahan and Alston Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

CATHERINE L. DUNFEE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0870-10-4 J UDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS DECEMBER 28, 2010 DAVID A. DUNFEE

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Charles J. Maxfield, Judge Cynthia M. Radomsky (De nnis M. Hottell; Christopher Malinoswski; Donna M. Dougherty; Alyssa D. Emery; Hottell Malinowski Group, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. Paula W. Rank (Paula W. Rank Family Law & Mediation, PLC, on brief), for appellee.

Catherine Dunfee (“wife”) appeals the fina l decree of divorce entered by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County on March 26, 2010, dissolving her eight-year marriage to David Dunfee (“husband”). Wife specifically cl aims the circuit court abused its discretion (1) in valuing the townhouse on Sassafras Woods Court in Fairfax C ounty (“Sassafras”) she purchased prior to the marriage, in which the parties resided together during the marriage, (2) in allocating all of the debt associated with the parties’ boat to wife rather than “orderi ng the sale of the asset with the debt shared equally by the parties,” (3) in refusi ng to assign value to husb and’s professional tools and consider their value in di viding the marital estate, (4) in failing to consider wife’s post-separation pay down of the mortgage on he r townhouse, and by failing to recognize her separate interest in di viding the equity that was preserved in a cash account after a refinance on

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - the property, (5) in classifying a property hus band purchased on Plymouth Court in Woodbridge, Virginia (“Plymouth”) prior to the marriage as wife’s separate propert y and in allocating its associated debt to wife, (6) in refusing to c onsider wife’s pay down of the marital credit card debt in dividing the debt and or dering its monetary award, (7) in failing to properly consider evidence of all of the factors under Code § 20- 107.1 in awarding spousal support to husband, and (8) in failing to consider the factors under Code § 20-107.3 in re ndering its equitable division of the property. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Analysis A. The Valuation of the Sassafras Property Wife first maintains the circuit court erred in valuing Sassafras. Essentially, wife contends the circuit court should have accepte d her valuation of the property over husband’s valuation. We disagree. Upon familiar principles, “we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailin g in the trial court. Where the trial court’s decision is base d upon an ore tenus hearing, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence in the record to support it.” Gamble v. Gamble , 14 Va. App. 558, 563, 421 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1992) (quoting Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter , 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1989)). “‘Unless it appears from the record that the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal.’” Holden v. Holden , 31 Va. App. 24, 27, 520 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1999) (quoting Ellington v. Ellington , 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1989)). “Code § 20-107.3 requires a trial court to value th e parties’ separate and marital property before making a monetary award. The trial court’s valuation cannot be based on mere guesswork.” Stratton v. Stratton , 16 Va. App. 878, 883, 433 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1993) (citation omitted). “However, ‘the burden is on the parties to provide the trial court sufficient evidence- 3 - from which it can value their property.’” Id. (quoting Bosserman v. Bosserman , 9 Va. App. 1, 5, 384 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1989)). “While expert testimony is the most expedient, and, in fact, the preferable method for valuing marital property,” id. at 883, 433 S.E.2d at 923 (alteration deleted) (citation omitted), “[i]t is wide ly recognized that a lay witness may express an opinion as to value,” Stainback v. Stainback , 11 Va. App. 13, 23, 396 S.E.2d 686, 692 (1990). Such a witness “need only have had an opportunity to become fa miliar with the property and to form an opinion as to its true value.” Id. On the other hand, “the opinion testimony of the owner of personal property is competent and admissibl e on the question of the value of such property, regardless of the owner’s knowledge of property values.” DiMaio v. Commonwealth , 46 Va. App. 755, 764, 621 S.E.2d 696, 701 (2005) (citation omitted). Ultimat ely, “‘[t]he credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matte rs solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.’” McKee v. McKee , 52 Va. App. 482, 492, 664 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2008) (quoting Sandoval v. Commonwealth , 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995)). In this case, wife purchased Sassafras prior to the marriage. However, husband lived in the Sassafras home with wife for the duration of the marriage. During that time, husband contributed to the mortgage and personally part icipated in upgrading the kitchen. In support of his valuation, husband submitted a handwritten note from wife, which she had prepared in February of 2009, on which she had written $335,000 next to the Sassafras property. Husband also testified that when wife fi rst began talking about “dividing up the property and so forth” in February of 2009, he began to follow comparable sales of other proper ties in the neighborhood. Husband testified that the lowe st end of the comparable sale s involved a foreclosure in the amount of $295,000. He had seen similar hous es in the same neighborhood sell for $318,000,- 4 - $319,000, and $321,000 within six months of the hearing. 1 On these facts, husband opined that the Sassafras property was worth between $310,000 and $335,000. Wife asserts on appeal that since she is the so le owner, she is uniquely qualified to render an opinion as to the property’s value. Wife submitted her most recent tax assessment from 2009 reflecting a value of $266,310, and opined that her property is worth about $279,000. Wife based her opinion on extensive market research she performed in May of 2009, ten months prior to the equitable distribution hearing. She also checked the most recent market activity the evening before her testimony. Wife c onceded to recent sales nearby for $294,500, $315,000, $325,000, and $340,000, and she admitted that one house was currently listed for $339,900. However, wife believed the higher-priced propertie s were very different from her home. They were “different models.” Wife also testif ied that she never believed Sassafras was worth $335,000.
The circuit court found that wife’s valuati on was based on outdated comparables. The circuit court ruled, “I’ve got he r stating its $325,000 [sic], him stating that it’s between $310,000 and $335,000 . . . the best evidence in this case is that the value of the house is $325,000.” In rendering its decision, the circuit court weighed the credibility of the witnesses, the basis for their respective opinions, each part y’s respective relationships with the property, and wife’s own apparent assertion on the February 18, 2009 note that the property was worth $335,000. 2 The

1 The circuit court commen ced the equitable distribution hearing on March 2, 2010.

2 Wife suggests the circuit court erred in c onsidering her handwritten note on the value of Sassafras. We disagree. “Gener ally, on public policy grounds, an o ffer to settle or compromise a disputed claim is inadmissible in evidence. However, an admission during settlement negotiations of an independent fact pertinent to a questi on in issue is admissible.” Lyle, Siegel, Croshaw & Beale, P.C. v. Tidewater Capital Corp. , 249 Va. 426, 438, 457 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1995) (citing Brickell v. Shawn , 175 Va. 373, 381, 9 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1940)). Wife invited husband over on February 18, 2009, to “discuss the divorce. ” At that time, wife gave husband a list of their property. Next to the Sassafras house, wife listed $335,000 as its value. The court did not- 5 - record indicates that recent sales in the neighborhood ranged from $295,500 to $340,000 and that wife herself believed, at l east as of February 18, 2009, th at the house was worth $335,000. Husband testified he had performed recent rese arch on comparable sales and opined that the house was worth $310,000 to $335,000. On these facts, we cannot conclude that the ci rcuit court, as the fact finder, was plainly wrong in ruling the Sassafras property was worth $325,000 or that the record contains insufficient evidence supporting th e court’s valuation. We, thus , affirm the court’s finding on this issue. B. The Valuation of the Boat and Allocation of the Debt Wife next argues the circuit court erred in valuing the parties’ boat at $83,205 and in allocating all of the joint debt associated with th e boat to wife rather than ordering the boat sold with the debt divided equally. Again, we disagree. In valuing marital property, the circuit court “may not refuse or fail to give parties a reasonable opportunity to develop and present evidence of value.” Bowers v. Bowers , 4 Va. App. 610, 618, 359 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1987). “Nor can the court arbitraril y reject credible evidence of value merely because other evidence might be more accurate, convincing, desirable or persuasive.” Id. “It may, however, choose among conflic ting assessments of value as long as its finding is supported by the evidence.” McDavid v. McDavid , 19 Va. App. 406, 413, 451 S.E.2d 713, 718 (1994). The circuit court’s valuati on of marital property “will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Howell v. Howell , 31 Va. App. 332, 341, 523 S.E.2d 514, 519 (2000).

err in considering this statement, made during a discussion between the parties pertaining to the distribution of their property, as evidence of the home’s value.- 6 - In this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in va luing the parties’ boat. By wife’s own evidence, the boat was worth $83,000. Indeed, wife submitted as an exhibit the NADA Vehicle Pricing guid e, which suggests the average retail value on the boat is $83,205.
The low retail value is listed as $73,5 05. Wife testified herself th at the boat is worth $83,000. She explained that it is “a beauti ful, gorgeous boat. And there’s not a thing wrong with it.” Wife further explained, however, that she had received only one offer for the boat for $70,000. On top of that, there is a 10% commission attached to its sale, so if she took the offer, she would incur additional indebtedness in the amount of $20,000. Wife believes the fact of her single offer suggests the boat is actually only worth $70,000. She, thus, asserts the court abused its discretion in assigning a value of $83,205. Howeve r, because the record contains sufficient evidence upon which the court below could conclude the boat was worth $83,205, we will affirm
the court’s valuation of the boat. With respect to wife’s contention that the ci rcuit court erred in di stributing the boat and in allocating its debt to wife, we note [t]here are three basic steps that a trial judge must follow in making an equitable distribution of property. The court first must classify the property as either [sep arate, marital, or part separate and part marital property]. The court then must assign a value to the property based upon evidence pr esented by both parties. Finally, the court distributes try [s ic] property to the parties, taking into consideration the factors presented in Code § 20-107.3(E). Alphin v. Alphin , 15 Va. App. 395, 403, 424 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1992) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). “‘The division or transfer of marital property and th e amount of any monetary award is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Id. (quoting Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387, 393 n.2, 382 S.E.2d 263, 266 n.2 (1989)). “However, any division or award must be based upon the equities and the rights and interests of each party in the marital- 7 - property.” Id. at 403, 424 S.E.2d at 577 (citing Keyser v. Keyser , 7 Va. App. 405, 410, 374 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1988)). In pertinent part, Code § 20-107.3(C) provides as follows: The court may , based upon the factors listed in subsection E, divide or transfer or order the division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned marital property, or an y part thereof. The court shall also have the authority to appor tion and order the payment of the debts of the parties, or either of them, that are incurred prior to the dissolution of the marriage, base d upon the factors listed in subsection E. As a means of dividing or transf erring the jointly owned marital property, the court may transfer or order the transfer of real or personal property . . . to one of th e parties, permit either party to purchase the interest of the other and direct the allocation of the proceeds, provided the party purchas ing the interest of the other agrees to assume any indebte dness secured by the property, or order its sale by private sale . . . . (Emphasis added). Thus, “[u]nder Code § 20-10 7.3(C), the trial court had the ‘authority to apportion and order the payment of the debts of the parties.’” Alphin , 15 Va. App. at 403, 424 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Code § 20-107.3(C)). At the time of the hearing, husband and wife owed $133,400 on their boat loan. After valuing the boat at $83,205, the cour t found “the marital equity [in the Maxim boat] to be a net liability of $50,195.” The divorce decree provides that “the debt associated with this property is allocated to [wife].” The court, nonetheless, subtracted from husband’s monetary award one-half of the apportioned debt, essentiall y allocating the payment of the debt to both parties. Any additionaldebt associated with the sale of the boat was allocated to wife. Because the apportionment of this debt is in keeping with th e statute, we will not disturb the court’s operation of its discretion in this regard. Moreover, the circuit court was not , as wife suggests, required to order the sale of the boat; the boat was already lis ted for sale, and at any rate “the language of [Code § 20-107.3] subsection (C) is not mandatory.” Id.- 8 - In sum, it appears the circuit court, in its discretion, both awarded the boat and allocated any remaining debt associated with its sale to wife, as permitted by the statute. The court, thus, classified the boat as marital, valued it at $83,205 , and distributed it to wife. On the facts presented, the court’s classification, valuation, and distribution of the boat and its accompanying debt does not amount to an abuse of discre tion. We, thus, affirm on this issue. C. The Failure to Value Husband’s Tools Wife next assigns error to the circuit c ourt’s failure to assign a value to husband’s professional tools, purchased during the marriage, along with its failure to include that value in the equitable dist ribution award. Again, in fashioning its award, the circuit cour t must classify, value, and distribute the property in accordance with th e equities, rights, and interest s of each party in the marital property. Alphin , 15 Va. App. at 403, 424 S.E.2d at 576-77. In this case, wife testified that she and husband purchased a significant number of professional work tools during the marriage. Wife testified they spent about $80,000 on the
tools. Wife testified she believes the tools are worth $40,000, and she clearly asked the court to
consider the value of those tools in the division of the property. Husband testified that he would sell the tools for $12,000. Thus, both parties put on ev idence as to the value of the tools and the record indicates they expected the court to classify, value, and divide them. And yet, the circuit court found that, although “the re was some evidence as to a large tool collection,” the tools were “in the personal property schedule s, and it is resolved.” It is true that wife included a number of unvalued tools on her pr operty schedules. It is also true that the parties admitted in open court that the matter of personal property was resolved. However, that admission followed a conversation between the parties specifically pertaining to an entertainment center and some dining room furniture . Husband conceded at oral argument that- 9 - the parties’ discussion as to pe rsonal property did not include th e tools. It follows that the admission as to their resolution of persona l property did not include the tools. Moreover, the court classifie d, valued, and distributed wife’s Prius and husband’s two vehicles, which are also items of personal property. The court incl uded those values in its award. The court should also have included the value of the tools, which were clearly marital property in which wife had an interest. We reject husband’s a ssertion that the court wa s not required to give wife a credit for the tools because there is no presumption of an equal division of property in Virginia. See Robbins v. Robbins , 48 Va. App. 466, 480, 632 S.E.2d 615, 622 (2006). The court in this case expressly ruled that it was rendering an equal division of this asset. It should have valued the tools and included that value in the award. We, thus, reve rse the circuit court as to this assignment of error. D. The Value of Wife’s Interest in the Sassafras Property Wife also contends the circuit court erred in calculating wife’s separate interest in Sassafras. Specifically, wife asserts the c ourt erred in awarding husband one-half of the $117,000 equity from the September 2009 refinan ce on the property, effectively excluding her separate interest in th e property. We agree. Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) provides, When marital property and separa te property are commingled by contributing one category of propert y to another, resulting in the loss of identity of th e contributed property, th e classification of the contributed property shall be tr ansmuted to the category of property receiving the contribution. However, to the extent the contributed property is retraceab le by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, such contributed propert y shall retain its original classification. (Emphasis added). “When a spouse commingles se parate and marital funds in a single account created during the marriage, the spouse claiming a separate share must shoulder the burden of- 10 - tracing . . . [i]f he cannot do so, the account remains wholly marital.” Robbins , 48 Va. App. at 478, 632 S.E.2d at 621. Contrary to husband’s argument on brief, this assignment of error does not implicate the method or formula used to trace wife’s separate in terest in Sassafras. Wife does not contend the court erred in concluding there was a 34.70% marital interest in the asset. Wife merely contends she was not given full credit for her 65.32% separate interest in the asset, because the court divided the $117,000 in remaining equity she had in a separate money mark et account in half, giving husband more than his fair share in the unspent equity. Wife is correct. Although the court stated it was “dividing the cash that sits in the account as equity ” in the property, it treated the equ ity as fully marital. The court took the position that “ every time money came out of Sassafras, it was marital” proper ty. Such treatment of the funds was contrary to its earlier finding th at wife had a 65.32% separate interest in the property. Moreover, wife took the money and placed it into a separate money market account, technically rendering the equity fully separate absent husband’s ability to retrace. At the time of the hearing, $117,000 remained in wife’s separate account and husband retraced that equity to the Sassafras property, in which there was a 34.70% marital interest. It is, therefore, apparent that the funds from the 2009 refinance retained their clas sification as part separate, pa rt marital property, and husband adequately retraced his interest in 34.70% of the marital portion of that property. Nevertheless, instead of awarding husband one -half of his 34.70% interest in the marital portion of the property, the circu it court awarded husband one-half in terest in the entire amount. In so doing, the court awarded husba nd a greater interest in the property than that to which he was entitled. For that reason, the court abused its discretion in awardi ng husband a full one-half interest in the $117,000 funds remaining in wife’s separate money market account. We must, therefore, reverse the circuit court as to this assignment of error.- 11 - We reject wife’s contention th at the court further erred in fa iling to award her a credit for her post-separation payments on the Sassafras mo rtgage. Wife had exclusive use and possession of the home during the separation, and husband had no access to marital funds or credit cards. “Although the separate contribution of one party to the acquisition, care, and maintenance of marital property is a factor that the trial court must consider when maki ng its award of equitable distribution, Code § 20-107.3 does not mandate th at the trial court award a corresponding dollar-for-dollar credit for such contributions.” von Raab v. von Raab , 26 Va. App. 239, 249-50, 494 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1997). The court in this case expressly considered each of the factors listed in Code § 20-107.3, including the “contri butions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party in the acquisition and care and maintenance of such marita l property of the parties,” and decided not to award wife a credit for her post- separation payments on Sassafras. We will not disturb that decision on appeal. E. The Plymouth Property Wife next contends the court erred in awardi ng Plymouth and its associated debt to wife. We disagree. Code § 20-107.3(A)(1) provides in re levant part that “[s]eparate property is . . . that part of any property classified as separate pursu ant to subdivision A 3.” Code § 20-107.3(A)(3) provides [t]he court shall classify property as part marital property and part separate property as follows: * * * * * * * d. When marital property and separate property are commingled by contributing one category of propert y to another, resulting in the loss of identity of th e contributed property, th e classification of the contributed property shall be tr ansmuted to the category of property receiving the contribution.- 12 - Moreover, as already stated, the court may, in its discretion, “apportion an d order the payment of the debts of the parties. ” Code § 20-107.3(C). In this case, husband owned the Plymouth pr operty prior to the ma rriage, but over the course of the marriage, wife reti tled and refinanced the property solely in her name. The court found that wife arranged for th e transfer of the property to wife while husband was in the hospital for delirium tremens, and she then refinanced the property, without consulting the husband, in order to use the equity to bail her son out of credit card debt. Wife also used some of the equity to purchase windows for Sassafras. By her actions, wife essent ially contributed what

was marital property to th e acquisition of what is now separate property, resulting in the loss of identity of the marital property. The marital property became wife’s separate property. Ultimately, the court classified the Plymouth prope rty as wife’s separate property and allocated the debt on the property to wife. The court f ound at the bottom line that “she owns Plymouth, and she owns the debt.” That finding is not pl ainly wrong, or without evid ence to support it and, we, thus, affirm the circuit court. Nevertheless, we agree with wife that the court erred in awarding one-half of the funds that remained in a CD at the time of the heari ng. Indeed, when wife refinanced the property she placed $23,000 of the equity in a CD. She then used one-half of those funds to purchase windows for Sassafras. The remaining $10,447 remained in the CD at the time of the hearing. Since the court classified the property as wife’s se parate property and distri buted it to wife in its entirety, the funds from the refinance were also wi fe’s separate property. The circuit court, thus, erred in awarding one-half of the remaining $10,447 to husband.- 13 - F. Post-separation Credit Card Payments Wife further alleges the circuit court erre d in failing to award her a credit for the post-separation payments she made on her cr edit cards and, instead, offsetting husband’s monetary award by the difference be tween his credit card balance and wife’s credit card balance. Again, the court is not requi red to offset post-separation payments on marital debt. von Raab , 26 Va. App. at 250, 494 S.E.2d at 161. As long as the circuit court considers the necessary factors, this Court will not disturb its judgment on such matters. Here, wife asked husband to leave his creditcard and she insisted that he vacate the premises. When he refused, wife obtained a pr otective order against husband and changed the locks. Wife knew husband had nowhere to stay and that he had recently suffered a severe emotional and professional setback brought on by the loss of his long-st anding employment and the death of his father. Wife, who made a signi ficantly greater income, prohibited husband from any access to marital funds or marital property for the duration of the separation. Husband lived on a modest paycheck, savings bonds, and family charity. Although wife was able to pay the balances down on her credit cards during this time, husband understandably could not. After considering the respective circumstances of the pa rties and the necessary statutory factors, the circuit court ordered husband to pa y his credit card debt and it or dered wife to pay hers. The court then gave husband a $2,000 credit on the $ 4,000 difference between the two. That award was not inequitable or unjust in light of the facts presented and we, thus, affirm on this issue. G. Spousal Support “Whether a spouse is entitled to support, and if so how mu ch, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be dist urbed on appeal unless it is clear that some injustice has been done.” Steinberg v. Steinberg , 11 Va. App. 323, 329, 398 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1990) (citation omitted). “The challenge to the amount of support raises the issue of the- 14 - sufficiency of the evidence to suppo rt the judgment. The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and we may not disturb its ruling if there is credible evidence to support it.” Id. (citing Code § 8.01-680). In awarding spousal support, th e chancellor must consider the relative needs and abilities of the pa rties. He is guided by the . . . factors that are set forth in Code [§] 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given due consideration to these factors, his determination will not be disturbed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion. Joynes v. Payne , 36 Va. App. 401, 419-20, 551 S.E.2d 10, 19 (2001) (quotation omitted). “‘The trial court is not required to qua ntify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to each of the statutory factors’ . . . [h ]owever, its findings must ‘have some foundation based on the evidence presented.’” Id. (quoting Woolley v. Woolley , 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986)). Here, the circuit court expressly and pa instakingly addressed each of the factors contained in Code § 20-107.1 in awarding husba nd spousal support. Husband submitted an income and expense statement indicating a modest monthly need of $5,202. Husband pays child support in the amount of $980 per month for a ch ild born of a former relationship, and he indicated he needs only about $800 per month for housing because he can get a roommate. At the time of the hearing, husband was working a ne w job at Brown’s Nissan and he testified he earned $2,000 in the six weeks preceding the hear ing. Amortized, this amount is only slightly lower than the income husband earned during th e marriage. Wife, who earns $139,000 per year, is not only capable of paying husband’s support, sh e contributed to the circumstances leading to his need for support. Wife changed the locks on the marital house and told husband to leave. She took his credit card and did not pay husband any support duri ng the separation or otherwise allow husband access to marital prop erty or funds during that time. Wife took out a protective order against husband resulting in his ultimate incar ceration. Husband than spent a considerable- 15 - amount of time in rehabilitation to remedy his drinking problem. Finally, at the time of the hearing, husband had only recen tly secured new employment. It is unreasonable to expect in light of these circumstances that husband should already have found housing by the time of the hearing, and it would be highly inequ itable to require, as wife contends, that he continue living with his family and surviving on family charity. Rather, as the circuit court found, “what’s fair in this case is to give the husba nd . . . a little bit of a boost at this time.” In other words, because the circu it court considered all of the required statutory factors in rendering its decision, and because its decision is supported by evidence on the record, we affirm the court’s award of spousal support to husband. H. The Equitable Distribution Award Lastly, wife contends the court abused its discretion by failing to consider all of the factors listed in Code § 20-107.3 in fashioning its equitable dist ribution award. We disagree. On appeal, the trial court’s award of equitable distribution will not be reversed “unless it appears from the record that the chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not considered or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that the evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying his resolution of the conflict in the equities.” von Raab , 26 Va. App. at 246, 494 S.E.2d at 159 (quoting Robinette v. Robinette , 10 Va. App. 480, 486, 393 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1990)). Here, the court expressly considered each and every one of the factors contained in Code § 20-107.3 in fashioning its equita ble distribution award. The court found that wife contributed significantly more income to the marriage, but concluded wife was aware of husband’s income and education level before she married him. The court opined that this was largely a marriage of companionship. The court also considered th e dubious manner in which wife obtained the Plymouth property and refinanced it to help her son out of de bt. The court found that both parties contributed both monetari ly and nonmonetarily to the marri age and that both parties were- 16 - at fault in the marriage’s ultimate demise. Wher eas the court apportioned much of the debt to wife, it divided the assets equally between the parties. The court’s findings and award are based on th e requisite statutory factors and supported by evidence contained in the record. We, therefore, affirm on this issue.
II. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court abused its di scretion in awarding husband one-half of the funds from the refinance on Sassafras held in wife’s separate money market account, in failing to include the value of husband’s professional tools in fashioning its equitable distribution award, and in awarding husband one-half inte rest in the CD. We, thus, reverse and remand the matter to the circuit court fo r revisions to the award in keeping with this decision. We affirm the court below on all other assignments of error. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.