SECOND DIVI SI ON DECEMBER 21, 2010 1-09-0823 PROTEI N PARTNERS, L L P, a Colorado L imited ) Appea l from the Partnership, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County

. Plaintiff-Appellee , ) v. ) No. 08 M1 602017 ) L I NCOL N PROVI SI ON, I

NC., d/b/a Chicag o Gourmet ) Steaks, ) Honora ble ) Patrick J. S herloc k, Def endant- Appellant. ) J udg e Presiding

.

PRES I DI NG J USTI CE CUN

NI NGHAM delivere d the modified opinion of the court upon denial of pe tition for rehe aring : The plaintiff, Protein Partners, broug ht a n action ag ainst the def

endant, L incoln Provision, in Ohio to rec over commissions alleg edly owed to Protein Partners for service s it rende red in Ohio. L incoln Provision was serve d with the complaint acc ording to the rules of Ohio civil proce dure. L incoln Provision did not file an appea ranc e, and a defa

ult judgme nt was enter ed ag ainst it in Ohio. Protein Partners subsequently reg istered the Ohio judgme nt in the circ uit court of Cook County on Dec ember 23, 2008. Thirty -seve n day s afte r the reg istration of the Ohio judgme nt in Cook County , L incoln Provision filed a motion in t h e circ uit court of Cook County to quash Protein Partners’ reg istration of t he Ohio judgme nt. L incoln Provision’s moti on to quash was denied by the circuit court of Cook County

. L incoln Provision filed a timely appea l to th i s co u rt an d raised the following issues: (1) whether an I llinois court should quash t he reg istration of a fore ign judgmen t b ec ause the pl aintiff in the fore ign state was not reg istered to do business in that state as require d for standing under the fore ign state’s l aw, (2) wh et h er the I llinois Uniform Enforce ment of Foreig n J udg ments Act (7351-09-0823

I L CS 5/12-650 et s eq . (W est 2008)) limit s a party to reg istering a fore ign judgme nt without any modification of the names of the parties as shown in the fore ign judgme nt, and (3) whether an Ohio statute violates the due proce ss clause of t h e Un i t ed States Constit ution beca use of the m anner of service of proc ess on cor

porations allowed by

the Ohio statute. Upon initial revie w of the opening briefs of the parties, this court on its own motion direc ted the parties to addre ss specific jurisdictional issues by way of supplemental briefs on the following issues: (1) whe ther the c ircuit court of Cook County had jurisdi ction to hear L incoln Provision’s motion to quash the reg istration of the Ohio judgme nt filed 37 day s afte r entry of the circ uit court’s order , and if not, (2) whether the circ uit court was r eveste d with jurisdiction to rule on the motion to quash, (3) whether the motion to quash can be construed as a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)), and (4) whether thi s co u rt has jurisdiction to hear this appea l. Following this court’s issuance of its opinion on October 19, 2010, L incoln Provision filed a petition for rehe aring which was denied and this modified opinion was issued. For the rea sons that follow, we aff irm the judgme nt of the circu i t court of Cook County which rec og nized the Ohio judgme nt upon reg istration of that judgme nt in the circ uit court of Cook County by the plaintiff, Protein Partner s. BA CKGROUND The rec ord establishes the following fac ts. The plaintiff-a ppellee, Protein Partners, L L P, a food broker , filed a lawsuit in Summi t Coun t y , Oh i o , i n Dec ember 2007 ag ainst the defe ndantappellant, L incoln Provision, Inc., d/b/a Chicag o Gourmet Steaks, to rec over commissions alleg edly 21-09-0823

owed to Protein Partners for service s rende red in Ohio reg arding the sale of meats. The complaint

was captioned, “Protein Partners v. L incoln Provision, Inc. d/b/a Chicag o Gourmet Steaks.” Protein Partners’ complaint rec ited that it was a Colorado limit ed liability partne rship doing business in the County of Summi t, State of Ohio. The complaint further stated that L incoln Provision was, and is,

an I llinois corpor ation that had reg i s t ered an alias name of “Chicag o Gourmet Steaks” with the I llinois Secre tary

of State. L incoln Provision was serve d with the Ohio complaint vi a ce rt ified mail at its company ’s Chicag o addre ss. The addre ss on the envelope in which the complaint was mailed was not addre ssed to a specific individual and contained only the company name as the addre ssee, which is allowable under applicable Ohio law. The return signature car d from the post office showed that someone at L incoln Provision’s office rec eived the certified mail containing the Ohio complaint. L incoln Provision did not appea

r nor respond to the Ohio lawsuit. On J une 18, 2008, a defa ult judgme nt for $16,603 plus interest and c osts was enter ed ag ainst L incoln Provision in t he Ohio cour t where the lawsuit h ad b een filed. The caption of the Ohio judgme nt order contained the names “Protein Partners” as the plaintiff and “Chicag o Gourmet Steaks” as the defe ndant. The Ohio court ruled in favor of Protein Partners, and the body of the judgme nt order states that a judgme nt had been enter ed “for the Plaintiff and ag ainst the Def endant.” L incoln Provision did notpay the judg ment. On Dec ember 23, 2008, Protein Partners filed an action in the circ uit court of Cook County captioned “Protein Partners, L L P” versus “L incoln Provision, Inc. d/b/a Chicag o Gourmet Steaks,” in which it reg istered the Ohio judgme nt in Cook County

. Notice of the filing and reg istration of the Ohi o j u d gm ent was sent via cer tified mail specific ally addre ssed to the president of L incoln

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Provision (who was also the company ’s reg istered age n t ), at the company ’s Chicag o addre ss, in

acc ordanc e with the I llinois Uniform Enfor ceme nt of For eig n J udg ments Act (Fore ign Judgme nts Act) ( 735 I L CS 5/12-650 et seq. (West 2008)). On J anuar y 5, 2009, Protein Partners initiated two citations to discover a ssets of L incoln Provision. On J anuar

y 29, 2009, which wa s 3 7 day s afte r the Ohio judgme nt had been reg istered in I llinois , L incoln Provision filed a “Motion to Quash and fo r S an ct i o ns.” In its motion, L incoln Provision all eg ed that: (1) it was not serve d proper ly in the orig inal Ohio case , and (2) the Ohio judgme nt was ag ainst “Chicag o Gourmet Steaks,” an alias of L incoln Provision’s, and there fore the judgme nt was not valid. L incoln Provision reque sted that Protein Partners’ action to regis t er the Ohio judgme nt in I llinois be quashed. Protein Partners responde d to L incoln Provision’s motion by alleg ing that: (1) L incoln Provision was leg ally and admittedly serve d in the Ohio case ; and (2) the Ohio judgme nt properly

identified L incoln Provision in t he lawsuit. In its subsequent “Reply in Support of Motion to Quash,” L incoln Provision alleg ed sever al issues which are summarized as follows: (1) Protein Partners was attempting to use fra ud since the Ohio judgme nt was void ab initio beca use Protein Partners was not reg istered to do business in Ohio and Ohio law prohibits a fore ign partne rsh ip which is not reg istered in Ohio from maintaining a lawsuit in Ohio courts; (2) the plaintiff “Protein Partners” does not exis t and that fac t was implicitl y acknow ledg ed by Protein Partners when it chang ed its name to “Protein Partners, L L P” in reg istering the Ohio judgme nt in I llinois ; (3) the defe ndant named in the Ohio judgme nt does not exis t; (4) it

was impermissible for Protein Partners to attempt to modify the Ohio j u dg ment by chang ing the

names of the parties afte r the entry of the ju d gm en t by the Ohio court and befor e reg istering the 41-09-0823

judgme nt in I llinois ; and (5) althoug h service to L incoln Provision by cer tified mail was valid under Ohio law, this ty

pe of service offe nds I llinois law and public policy including due proce ss and should there fore be held to be void. L incoln Provisio n ’s m o t i o n t o quash was denied by the circ uit court of Cook County on Fe bruar y 27, 2009, without e x planation. The rec ord on appea l does not contain a transcr ipt of the hear ing a nd there is no ag ree d stipulation of facts or a by stander’ s repor

t. On Marc h 27, 2009, L i n co l n Provision appea led the circ uit court’s denial of its motion to quash reg istration a

nd entry of the Ohio judgme nt. In its initial brief on appea l, L incoln Provision claimed that the appellate court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rules 303 (appe als from final judgme nts) and 304(b)( 3) (appe al from a judgme nt or order denying relief reque sted under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedur e). 210 I ll. 2d Rs. 303; 304(b)( 3). On appea l, L incoln Provision raised the followi n g is s u e s : (1) whether an I llinois court should q uash the reg istration of a fore ign judgme nt beca use the plaintiff in the fore ign state was n o t reg istered to do business in that state as requ i red for standing under the fore ign state’s law; (2) whether the For eig n J udg ments Act limit s a party t o re gistering a fore ign judgme nt without any modification of the names of the parties as shown in the fore ign judgme nt; and (3) whether the Ohio statute violates the due proc ess clause of the United States Constitution because it per mits service of proce ss on corpor ations by ce rtified United States mail with an envelope addre ssed to the corpor ation in ge nera l, with no specific pe rson named. After revie wingthe par

ties’ brief s and the rec ord, this c ourt order ed supplementa l briefing by the parties on the following issues: (1) whether t h e t rial court had jurisdiction to hear L incoln 51-09-0823

Provision’s motion to quash the reg istration and entry of the Ohio judgme nt filed 37 day s afte r entry of t he court’s order allowing reg istration, and i f n o t ; (2 ) whether the t rial court was revested with jurisdiction to rule on the m otion to quash; (3) whether the motion to quash can be construed as a section 2-1401 pe tition; and (4) whether this court has jurisdiction to hear this appe al. ANALYSI S We note t hat t he purpose of the F oreign J udg ements Ac t is to implement the full faith and

cre dit clause of the fede ral Constit ution and t o fa ci l i t at e interstate enfor ceme nt of judgme nts in a jurisdiction wer e the judgme nt debtor is found. Ace Metal Fa bricating Co. v. Arvid C. Walberg & Co., 135 I ll. App. 3d 452, 455, 481 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (1985). The standard of revie w that applies to issues of law involving the reg istration of fore ign judgme nts is de novo. Robill ard v. Be rends, 371 I ll. App. 3d 10, 14, 861 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (2007). This c ourt reque sted that the parties addre ss whether the circ uit c ourt of Cook County had j u risdiction to hear L incoln Provision’s motion to quash the reg istration and entry of the Ohi o judgme nt. The rec ord reve als that Protein Partners filed an action reg istering the Ohio judgme nt in I llinois on Dec ember 23, 2008. Subsequently Protein Partners issued two citations to disc over assets,

one to L incoln Provisio n , an d t h e other to a third-par ty bank. Both citations had a return date of J anuar y 29, 2009. The ba

nk acknow ledg ed that it held funds belong ing to L incoln Provision, and Protein Partners’ motion for an order compelling the bank to turn over the funds was to be prese nted to the circ uit court of Cook County on J anuar

y 29, 2009. That same da

y , which wa s 37 day s after the Oh i o judgme nt had been filed in the circ uit court of Cook County , L incoln Provision filed its

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appea ranc e and motion to quash reg istration of the Ohio judgme nt. Protein Partners did not object 1 to L incoln Provision’s moti on on the ground that it was untimely

. A fore ign judgme nt filed in the circ uit court of Cook County under the For eig n J udg ment Act is treated a s any

other I llinois judgme nt and is subject t o the same pr ocedur es and de fense s as any judgme nt enter ed in the circ u i t court of Cook County

. 735 I L CS 5/12-652(a) (West 2008). A posttrial motion, such as a motion to quash a judgme nt, must be filed within 30 day s of the date that the judgme nt is enter ed. 735 I L CS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2008). In this case , L incoln Provision did not file its motion to quash until 37 day s afte r the Ohio judgme nt was reg istered and enter ed by the circ uit court of Cook County

. L incoln Provision argues that a judgme nt enter ed by an I llinois court can be attacke d for lack of service at any time and cites State Ba nk of L ake Z urich v. Thill, 113 I ll. 2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986), for support. In that case , our supreme court held that service on the defe ndant was defe ctive and noted that a party attacking a judgme nt for lack of persona l jurisdiction due to defe ctive service

can do so at any time, in any court, either direc tly o r co llatera lly

. Thill, 113 I ll. 2d at 309, 497 N.E.2d at 1162. There fore , L incoln Provision argues, the fac t that its motion to quas h wa s fi l ed beyond 30 day s is of no conseque nce under these fac ts. L incoln Provision m i s ap p rehends the application of Thill to the fa cts of this case

. L incoln Provision admits that service in the Ohio lawsuit was valid under Oh i o l aw, but

There is no recor d of the filingof L incoln Provision’s appear ance in the rec ord on 1 appea l, but L incoln Provision’s moti on to quash states that “the defe ndant havingfiled an Appea ranc e and a

Motion to Quash.” 71-09-0823

ar gu es t h at this ty

pe of service offe nds I llinois law and public policy as well as due proce ss. Howeve r, we note that L incoln Provision’s argument, which relies on Thill, is not based upon defe ctive service in the orig inal Ohio lawsuit, since service was proper under Ohio law, the orig inal venue of the lawsuit and judg ment. Thus the Thill case is not applica ble to these fa cts. Another issue that we asked the parties to addre ss was whether L incoln Provision’s motion to quash ca

n be construe d as a section 2-1401 petition. 735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 2008) . L incoln Provision notes that courts have consistently held that the controlling issue i s t h e s ub stance of a motion and the caption does not matter. I t cites Schuman v. Depa rtment of Revenue , 38 I ll. 2d 571, 573, 232 N.E.2d 732, 733 (1967), and Norther n I llinois Gas Co. v. Midwest Mole, Inc., 199 I ll App. 3d 109, 115, 556 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (1990), in support of its argument. In g ener al, the applicable require ments reg arding the filing of a section 2-1401 petition is that a party may file a petition afte r 30 day s have passed since the judgme nt was enter ed, and within 2 y ear s of the filing of the judgme nt, wh er e the moving party can show: (1) a meritorious defe nse; (2) due diligenc e in prese nting t h e defe nse in the orig inal action; and (3) due diligenc e in filing the section 2-1401 petition. Our courts have repe atedly held that an untimely postjudgment motion m u s t b e v i ew ed as a section 2-1401 motion by the appellate court beca use it is the only vehicle that a party may use once the 30 day s has expired. See Schuman v. Depa rtment of Revenue , 38 I ll. 2d 571, 573, 232 N.E.2d 732, 733 (1967). Protein Partners admits in its brief that L incoln Pro v i s i o n ’s motion to quash could be char acte rized as a section 2-1401 petition. Howeve r, Protein Partners argues that the only issue that 2 Section 2-1401 provides e x plicit methods of service to the nonmoving pa rty . Howeve r, 2 Protein Partners a dmits t hat it forfe ited any objection to improper se rvice by L incoln Provision 81-09-0823

the circ uit court of Cook County obtained jurisdiction over w as the issue of whether the Ohio j u d gm en t was void beca use the defe ndant claimed that the Ohio court did not have persona l jurisdiction over the de fenda nt. We examine the case of Sarkissian v. Chicago Bo ar d of Educa tion, 201 I ll. 2d 95, 776 N.E.2d 195 (2002), which both parties rely on in their briefs. In Sarkissian, o ur supreme court

rec og nized that a motion to vacate a void judgme nt for lack of service that is filed more than 30 day s afte r the judgme nt was enter ed is proper ly desig nated a section 2-1401 p etition. An attack on a judgme nt on the basis of voi dness m ay be construed as a section 2-1401 petit ion, an d satisfac tion of the time constraints or the require ment of a meritorious defe nse or due diligenc e is not nece ssary . Sarkissian, 201 I ll. 2d at 105, 776 N.E.2d at 202. Acc ording ly , we fi n d t h at L i n co ln Provision’s motion to quash reg istration of the Ohio judgme nt was in eff ect a petition under section 2-1401. The denial of L incoln Provision’s motion was there fore a final and a ppeala ble orde r, vesting this c ourt with jurisdiction. Review of a judgme nt on a section 2-1401 petition that is reque sting relief based on the alleg ation that the judg ment is void, shall be de novo. People v. Vincent, 226 I ll. 2d 1, 18, 871 N.E.2d 17, 28 (2007); Rockford Financ ial Sy stems, Inc. v. Bor g etti, ___ I ll. App. 3d ___, ___, 932 N.E.2d 1152, 1158 (2010) (No. 2-08- 1236). Next, we examine eac h of the defe nses L incoln Provision invokes as g rounds for defe ating the Oh i o j u d gm ent. The case of Doctor’ s Associates, Inc. v. Dure e, 319 I ll. App. 3d 1032, 745 N.E.2d 1270 (2001), is instruc tive in our analy sis r eg arding the g rounds on which the judgme nt of by not raisinga ser

vice a rgument in its response to L incoln Provision’s moti on. Padilla v. Vazquez, 223 I ll. App. 3d 1018, 1024, 586 N.E.2d 309, 313 (1992). 91-09-0823

a s ister s tate may be challeng ed by a judgment debtor once the judgme nt has been duly reg istered in I llinois

. Collateral attacks are allowed only on the g rounds th at (1 ) the rende ring court lacke d subject matter or persona l jurisdiction in the case , or (2) the fore ign judgme nt was pro cured by extrinsi c fra

ud, or (3) the judgme nt has been satisfied or otherwise rele ased, or (4) that the defe nding party was denied due proce ss of law, or any other g round that would rende r the judgme nt invalid or unenfor cea

ble. Doctor ’s Associate s, 319 I ll. App. 3d at 1040, 745 N.E.2d at 1278. In the case at hand, the rec ord shows that the Ohio cou rt had jurisdiction over L incoln Provision beca

use it was serve d acc ording to Ohio law. Someone at L incoln Provision’s corpor ate office s signe d for the envelope containing the summons and complaint reg arding the Ohio lawsuit. There is no dispute that the judg ment has not bee n satisfied. Thus, we turn to L incoln Provision’s argument that Protein Partners committed fra ud in procuring the judgme n t

. I t is well settled that wher e ex trinsic fra

ud exis ted i n the procurement of a ju d gm ent, the court acquir ed only colora ble j u ri s d i ct i o n. Doctor’ s Associates, 319 I ll. App. 3d at 1043, 745 N.E.2d at 1280, citing Pinnacle Ara bians, Inc. v. Schmidt, 274 I ll. App. 3d 504, 510, 654 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1995). Ex trinsic fra ud is collater al to the issues of a case and preve nts the unsucce ssful party from having a fair opportunity to participa

te in and defe nd the action. This ty pe of fra ud is distinguished from intrinsic fra ud, which g oes to the ac tual merits of the c ase a nd does not prec lude a party from raising a claim or def ense,

or being awa

re of and attending the proce eding

. Doctor’ s Associates, 319 I ll. App. 3d at 1043, 745 N.E.2d at 1280. We must deter

mine whether L i n coln Provision has successfully pleade d extrinsi c fraud to

serve as a basis for its c ollatera l attack upon the Ohio judgme nt. L incoln Provision argues that the 101-09-0823

underlying judgme nt is void beca use: (1) the Ohio judgme nt was voi d a b i n i t i o since Protein Partners was not reg istered to do business in Ohio, a requirement f or initiating a lawsuit in Ohio, (2 ) “Protein Partners” as an entity did not exis t, (3) the defe ndant named in the Ohio j u d gm en t , “Chicag o Gourmet S teaks,” did not exis t, (4) Protein Partner s was attempting t o modify the Ohio judgme nt befor e reg istering it in I llinois by chang in g t h e names of the parties, and (5) althoug h service upon L incoln Provision by cer tified mail was vali d u n d er Ohio law, this ty pe of service offe nds I llinois law, public policy and due pr ocess. We first addre ss the argument that L incoln Provision advanc es that Protein Partners was not reg istered to do business in Ohio and that Ohio civil proce dure require s a plaintiff corpor ation to be reg istered in Ohio befor e it can maintain a lawsuit in O hio c ourts. L incoln Provision relies on this argument in concluding that we should find the Ohio judgme nt void ab initio. We char acte rize this alleg ation as i ntrinsic fra

ud in the procurement of

the Ohio judg ment. As such it is a defense that L incoln Provision can adva nce in a n Ohio court of competent jurisdiction to defe at the judgme nt. I t has been long held in our state that “a judgme nt debtor may defe nd ag ainst a fore ign jud g ment soug ht to be enfor ced in an I llinois court, but not on g rounds which could have been prese nted in the action in which the judgme nt w as rende red.” Thompson v. Safewa y Enterpr ises, Inc., 67 I ll. App. 3d 914, 916, 385 N.E.2d 702, 705 (1978)

. L i n co ln Provision claims that it did not have any knowledg e of the Ohio lawsuit and thus could not put forth this defe nse in Ohio. This argument fails when a naly zed in light of established c ase la w. Protein Partners cites Fa lcon v. Fa ulkner, 209 I ll. App. 3d 1, 567 N.E.2d 686 (1991), a case in which a judgme nt debtor unsucce ssfully attempted to defe nd ag ainst a fore ign judgme nt by raising 111-09-0823

intrinsic fra

ud. In that case , the plaintiffs reg istered a Montana judgme nt in I llinois

. The defe ndant attacked t h e j u d g ment by arguing that the plaintiffs committed fra ud on the Montana court and there fore , the Montana court had only colora ble jurisdiction. Our appellate court held that the ty pes of fraud t hat t he defenda

nt alleg ed were not extrinsi c and that the def endant c ould have presente d evidenc e in the Montana trial. Fa lcon, 209 I ll. App. 3d at 14-15, 567 N.E.2d at 695-96. Similarly in this case , L incoln Provision could have prese nted and still can prese nt its claim in an Ohio court that Protein Partners did not have stand i n g i n the original Ohio action in which the judgme nt was enter ed. L incoln Provision also argues that the differ ence s among the names of the parties as shown in the caption of the orig inal Ohio complaint, in the caption of the Ohio judgme nt order , in the body of the judgme nt order and in the lawsuit initiated in the circ uit court of Cook County to reg ister the Oh io judgme nt, show that Protein Partners committed fra ud by attempting to modify the Oh i o judgme nt befor e reg istering it in Cook County

. Protein Partners added the desig nation “L L P” to its

name in the lawsuit that it filed in the circ u i t co u rt o f Cook County when reg istering the Ohio judgme nt. The Ohio judgme nt showed “Prot ei n P artne rs” as the plaintiff without the “L L P” d esi g nation. Also, in the Ohio lawsuit the named defe ndant was “L incoln Provision, Inc. d/b/a Chicag o Gourmet Steaks.” The order that was enter ed by the Ohio court fo l l o wi n g t h e defa ult judgme nt shows the defe ndant as “Chicag o Gourmet Steaks.” L incoln Provision argues that the

manner in which Protein Partners named the parties wh en i t re g istered the Ohio judgme nt in the circ uit court of Cook County was a n outrag eous attempt to modify the Ohio judg ment. Protein Partners rebuf

fs L incoln Provision’s a

rgument and contra sts the fac ts at ha nd with 121-09-0823

a case relie d upon by L incoln Provision, Ay ers Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Allen Rose Cement & Construction Co., 109 I ll. App. 3d 520, 40 N.E.2d 907 (1982). The court in Ayers r ecognized that the judgme nt of a sister state is not subject to collater al attack in I llinois court s “e x cept for the defe nse of fra

ud in the procur ement of the judgme nt or lack of jurisdiction in the rende ring court.” Ay ers, 109 I ll. App. 3d at 523, 440 N.E.2d at 909. In Ayers, the plaintiff filed a petition in I llinois to reg ister an Ohio judgme nt wher ein the defe ndant in the Oh i o lawsuit was named “Rose Constru ct i o n Company .” Plaintiff chang ed the defe ndant’s name in the I llinois action to “Allen Rose Ce m ent and Construction, d/b/a Rose Construction Company ” supposedly afte r di scover ing that the corpor ation was operating under that assumed name. The defe ndant denied that it was doing business under the name of “Rose Construction Company ,” denied that the person who acc epted an alias summons was authorized to accep t t h e summons and asser ted that the party with whom the plaintiff had contra cted was a sole proprietor who was never serve d with proce ss in the orig inal Ohio

case . The c ourt in Ay ers noted that “[a] j udg ment in personam rende red a g ainst one who wa s not desig nated a party , or who was not made a party by service of proce ss, is not entitled to full faith and

cre dit.” Ay ers, 109 I ll. App. 3d at 523, 440 N.E.2d at 909. The plainti ff in the Ayers c ase, r elying upon the principle of misnom er of a party , claimed that the rea l party had been serve d and that to am en d the Ohio judgme nt to show the exact name would be mere ly to corr ect a misnomer. The revie wing court, ho we ver, did not ag ree with this argument an d ruled that the plaintiff’s attempt to establish the rea l party in interest in the I llinois action, raised issues that exceede d the scope of proper judicial inquiry by an I llinois court under the For eig n J udg ments Act. Ay ers, 109 I ll. App. 3 d at 524, 440 N.E.2d at 910. Unlike t he facts and 131-09-0823

the parties in Ay ers, our rea ding of the pleading s and rec ord in this case leads us to conclude that the

rea l parties in interest wer e identified and serve d in the orig inal Ohio case in acc ordanc e with Ohio law. Notwithstanding L incoln Provision’s hairsplitting analy sis, there is no dispute that it has used the name “ Chicag o Gourmet Steaks” in its busi ness dea lings. L incoln Provision contends that Protein Partners failed to use its own leg al name in filing its Ohio lawsuit. L incoln Provision argues that beca use Protein Partners did not include the desig nation “L L P” afte r the words “Protein Partners,” in the orig inal Ohio lawsuit, P rot ein Partners was not entitled to initi ate the O hio action or to reg ister t he judgment and collect on it in I llinois . L incoln Provision cites Capital One Ba nk, N.A. v. Cz ekala , 379 I ll. App. 3d 737, 884 N.E.2d 1205 (2008), in support of this argument. In that case , the def en d an t , J o es eph Cz ekala , attacke d a judgme nt enter ed ag ainst “Joseph Cz ekala d/b/a Sealand Foods.” The defe ndant claimed he had no knowledg e of the judgme nt until his ear nings wer e g arnished five y ear s afte r entry of the judgme nt. At the time of the defa

ult judgme nt, the defe ndant was th e p re s ident of Sealand Foods, Inc., a corpor ation reg istered to do business in I llinois

. The court char acte rized the def endant’ s petition to vacate the five-year -old defa

ult judgme nt as a section 2-1401 petition and held that it was timely

. Fur ther, the court found that the plaintiff had car elessly linked Cz ekala to a misnamed, noncorpor ate business. The c ourt stated:

“The eff ect of misnomer is that the party called by the wrong name is still subje ct to the court’s jurisdiction a fter rec eiving notice of the lawsuit. *** On the other hand, the eff ect of a mistaken identity is that the 141-09-0823

court does not acquir e persona l jurisdiction over the person named by mistake but serve d. *** This is especially true when the m istaken identity involves a nonexis tent business.” Cz ekala , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 742-43, 884 N.E.2d a

t 1211. The c ourt held that the judg ment was void ab initio beca use Czekala could not do business with a company that did not ex ist. Cz ekala , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 743, 884 N.E.2d at 1212. The court in Czekala went on to disc uss misnomers and mistaken identity in c omplaints a s articulated in Ba

rbour v. Fr ed Be rg lund & Sons, Inc., 208 I ll. App. 3d 644, 567 N.E.2d 509 (1990): “ ‘The misnomer statute applies only to corre ctly joined and

s er v ed , but misnamed, parties. Mistaken identity occur s when the wrongperson wa s joined and ser ved. The intent of the plaintiff is a pivotal inquiry i n the deter mination of whether a particula r case involves misnomer or mistaken identity .’ ” Cz ekala , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 743, 884 N.E.2d at 1212, quoting, Ba rbour, 208 I ll. App. 3d at 648, 567 N.E.2d at 512. In Cz ekala , the cour

t determined tha

t the plaintiff’s intent was to sue the corporation, notCz ekala individually

. Thus, the cour t held that the trial cour

t did not have jurisdiction to enter the or igina l defa ult judgme nt ag ainst Cz ekala alone. Cz ekala , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 745, 8 8 4 N. E

. 2 d at 1213. Her e, it is evident from the rec ord and the argument of the parties that the plaintiff intended to sue L incoln Provision, d/b/a Chicag o Gourmet Steaks, the party that was serve d in the Ohio and I llinois actions. We, find the court’s rea soning in Cz ek al a p er suasive; and acc ording ly , we hold that the 151-09-0823

technica l defe cts in both the plaintiff’s and defe ndant’s names during the course of the litigation are not fata l to the reg istration and entry of the Ohio judgme nt, nor can it be said that the rea l parties in interest are not at the table. L incoln Provi s i o n ’s arg ument that Protein Partners committed fra ud there fore fails. L i n coln Provision further urg es us to decla re the Ohio judgme nt void beca use alt h o u gh service upon L incoln Provision by cer tified mail was vali d u n d er Ohio law, this ty pe of service offe nds I l l i n o i s l aw , public policy , and due proce ss. L incoln Provision admits that the m anner of service reg arding Ohio lawsuits, which is the basis for its objection and argument, has been decla red constitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court. In Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honey well, Inc., 66 Ohio St. 2d 290, 421 N.E.2d 522 (1981), the Ohio supreme court held that the ty pe of service complained of by L incoln Provision wa s proper and that the defe ndant cor poration wa s not denied due pr ocess e ven though the summons and complaint appar ently never rea ched the proper depar tment or office r of the corpor ate entity

. The court stated, “[t] he problem was not with the addre ss used by the cler k of the

co u rt, but with [t he defenda nt’s] own handling of its incoming mail.” Samson Sales, 66 Ohi o S t

. 2d at 294, 421 N.E.2d at 524. The reasoningin Samson S ales ha s applicability to the instant case

as it is undisputed that someo n e at L incoln Provision’s corpor ate office s signe d for the envelope containingthe summons and complaint in the orig inal Ohio lawsuit. L incoln Provision ac knowledg es that the Ohio Supreme Court would aff irm the validity of the service statute at issue in this case , but argues that “[u] nder the Supremac y Clause of the United Stat es C o n s t i t u t i on, the fede ral courts are char g ed with and have the ultimate word on the rig hts provided by the United States Constit ution.” In sum, mo s t o f L in coln Provision’s arguments direc ted 161-09-0823

to the entry of the orig inal Ohio judgme nt are or we re more appropr iately raised in a n Ohio court. Thus, we decline L incoln Provision’s invitation to decla re the subject Ohio statute unconstitutional. Acc ording ly , we hold that the circ uit court of Cook County did have jurisdictio n t o h ear L incoln Provision’s motion to quash the Ohio judgme nt. There fore , the circ uit court’s ruling on L incoln Provision’s section 2-1401 petition is deeme d a final order and thus is ap p ea l ab l e under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)( 3) (210 I ll. 2d R. 304(b)( 3)); S ar k i s s ian, 201 I ll. 2d 95 at 102, 776 N.E.2d at 200), there by vesting this court with jurisdiction. We further hold that L incoln Provision has advanc ed no leg ally sufficie nt basis upon whi ch t o o v er t u rn the ruling of the circ uit court of Cook C o u nty , which allowed Protein Partners to reg ister the Ohio judgme nt in I llinois

. For the

rea sons stated, we a ffirm the judg ment of the c ircuit court of Cook County

. Affir med. KARNEZ I S and CONNORS , J J ., concur . 3

Then PresidingJ ustice Theis pa rticipated in the r esolution of this case. Justi ce Connors 3 has substituted for Jus tice The is upon the petition for rehe aringand has r eviewe d the re cord, the briefs a nd all aspec ts of the fa cts nec essar y to participate in this petit ion for re hear ing. 17