COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

GREGORY LELAND RAYMER, S/K/A 

 GREGORY L. RAYMEUR 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0586-99-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 APRIL 11, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

William R. Shelton, Judge 

 Linwood T. Wells, III, for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 The trial judge convicted Gregory L. Raymeur of two counts of 

fraudulently obtaining money upon a promise to perform 

construction. See Code § 18.2-200.1. Raymeur contends the 

evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. We disagree 

and affirm the convictions. 

I. 

 The evidence proved that on August 28, 1996, Raymeur 

contracted with Charles Hall to replace the vinyl siding on Hall's 

house. Hall, who had hired Raymeur in the past to perform work, 

gave Raymeur a check for $1,000 as "a down payment" on the 
contract price of $1,600. The contract stipulated that Raymeur 

would begin the project September 23, 1996, and complete it in 

September. Both parties testified that meant September 1996. 

Raymeur never returned to replace the siding on the house. 

 Hall made telephone calls to Raymeur and went to Raymeur's 

residence. He received no responses. On December 3, 1997, Hall 

sent to Raymeur at the address listed on the contract, a letter by 

certified mail demanding his money. Raymeur did not respond. 

 The evidence also proved that in August 1996 Raymeur agreed 

to replace a piece of siding on Fran Mena's house. Mena gave him 

a check for $375, the agreed costs, to purchase new siding and for 

his labor. Raymeur nailed the existing piece of siding onto the 

house and never returned to install new siding. After Mena left 

messages on Raymeur's answering service, Raymeur returned her call 

and said that he had problems with his employees. He promised to 

complete the job. He never did. In February 1998, Mena sent a 

certified letter to Raymeur. The post office returned the 

unclaimed letter to Mena. 

 Raymeur cashed both checks. He testified that he purchased 

materials for both projects but had problems with his employees 

and his truck. He denied receiving the letters from Hall and 

Mena. Raymeur also testified that he has been incarcerated since 

July 10, 1997, for crimes arising out of similar construction 

agreements. Explaining this failure to complete the two projects 

in the year that lapsed before he was incarcerated, Raymeur said 

- 2 -
he "was running behind on other jobs." Raymeur further testified 

that he was behind on several jobs because of his incarceration, 

difficulties with his workers, and problems with his truck. While 

in jail, Raymeur obtained work release status to complete other 

projects that he had failed to perform. 

 The trial judge convicted Raymeur on both counts. 

II. 

 Code § 18.2-200.1 provides as follows: 

 If any person obtain from another an 

advance of money, merchandise or other 

thing, of value, with fraudulent intent, 

upon a promise to perform construction, 

removal, repair or improvement of any 

building or structure permanently annexed to 

real property, or any other improvements to 

such real property, including horticulture, 

nursery or forest products, and fail or 

refuse to perform such promise, and also 

fail to substantially make good such 

advance, he shall be deemed guilty of the 

larceny of such money, merchandise or other 

thing if he fails to return such advance 

within fifteen days of a request to do so 

sent by certified mail, return receipt 

requested, to his last known address or to 

the address listed in the contract. 

As we ruled in Klink v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 815, 407 

S.E.2d 5 (1991), this statute consists of the following five 

elements: 

(1) obtaining an advance of money from 

another person, (2) a fraudulent intent at 

the time the advance is obtained, (3) a 

promise to perform construction or 

improvement involving real property, (4) a 

failure to perform the promise, and (5) a 

failure to return the advance "within 

fifteen days of a request to do so by 

- 3 -
certified mail" to the defendant's last 

known address or his address listed in the 

contract. 

Id. at 818, 407 S.E.2d at 7. Raymeur contends the Commonwealth 

failed to prove he had fraudulent intent when he obtained the 

advances and also failed to prove he did not return the money 

advance within 15 days of a request to do so by certified mail. 

 In determining "whether fraudulent intent exists, the Court 

must 'look to the conduct and representations of the 

defendant.'" Rader v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 325, 329, 423 

S.E.2d 207, 210 (1992) (citation omitted). The evidence proved 

that when Raymeur received money from Hall, he promised to begin 

and complete the installation of siding during the next month. 

He also received payment from Mena and promised to replace her 

siding. Although a substantial time had lapsed without any 

work, Raymeur failed to respond to contact from both homeowners. 

Indeed, Raymeur never returned to do any of the work he promised 

to complete. "The use of false statements to induce someone to 

enter into a contract can be persuasive evidence of fraudulent 

intent." Id. at 330, 423 S.E.2d at 210. Moreover, the trial 

judge could infer intent to defraud from Raymeur's failure to do 

anything in furtherance of his promise to perform after he 

received payment. See Norman v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 518, 

521, 346 S.E.2d 44, 46 (1986). The trial judge also could 

consider as evidence tending to prove intent to defraud 

Raymeur's pattern of conduct regarding Hall and Mena, who were 

- 4 -
neighbors, and others. See Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 61, 

67, 109 S.E.2d 100, 105 (1959). These facts were sufficient to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt Raymeur's fraudulent intent. 

 In addition, the evidence proved that Hall and Mena sent 

certified letters, with return receipts requested, to Raymeur. 

Both Mena and Hall used the address that appeared on Raymeur's 

contract with Hall. No evidence tended to prove that the 

address was not Raymeur's last known address. Accordingly, the 

trial judge had sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that both Hall and Mena requested return of their payments 

"by certified mail, return receipt requested, [sent] to 

[Raymeur's] last known address or to the address listed in the 

contract." Code § 18.2-200.1. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

- 5 -