NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL LLC, A USVI 

Limited Liability Corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

FACEBOOK, INC., A Delaware 

Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-56304 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-06727-FMOMRW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2019**

Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

Havensight Capital LLC (“Havensight”) appeals from the district court’s 

judgment dismissing its action alleging federal and state law claims arising from 

charges for online advertisements. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 26 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-56304 

We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of claim preclusion. Manufactured 

Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). We 

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Havensight’s action as barred by the 

doctrine of claim preclusion because Havensight raised, or could have raised, its 

claims in its prior California state court action that involved the same primary 

rights and parties, and resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Adam Bros. 

Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(setting forth elements of claim preclusion under California law and explaining that 

California’s doctrine of claim preclusion is based on a primary rights theory); 

Palomar Mobilehome Park Assoc. v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (“In California, a judgment entered after the sustaining of a general 

demurrer is a judgment on the merits, and, to the extent that it adjudicates that the 

facts alleged do not establish a cause of action, it will bar a second action on the 

same facts.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Havensight’s 

request to recuse Judge Olguin because Havensight failed to establish any ground 

for recusal. See United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(standard of review and circumstances requiring recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Havensight’s 
3 18-56304 

request for entry of default because Havensight’s request was frivolous. See 

Speiser, Krause & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2001)

(standard of review).

Havensight’s contentions that the district court erred in admitting into 

evidence emails between Havensight’s counsel and defendant’s counsel, that 

Facebook’s counsel has alleged conflicts of interest, and that the district court 

failed to act properly, are unpersuasive. 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Appellee’s opposed motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 16) is 

denied as unnecessary. 

All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.