U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

88–723 PDF 2014

HEARING ON THE ‘‘FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 2014’’ 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

REGULATORY REFORM, 

COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 15, 2014 

Serial No. 113–112 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

DANIEL FLORES, Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 15, 2014 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ........................................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Henry C. ‘‘Hank’’ Johnson, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Georgia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 4 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 5 

WITNESSES 

Donald S. Bernstein, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Thomas H. Jackson, Professor, William E. Simon School of Business, University of Rochester 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 36 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39 

Stephen E. Hessler, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 58 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 60 

Steven J. Lubben, Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 81 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 83 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Discussion Draft of the ‘‘Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014’’ ............ 100 

Questions for the Record submitted to Donald S. Bernstein, Partner, Davis 

Polk & Wardwell LLP .......................................................................................... 129 

Response to Questions for the Record from Thomas H. Jackson, Professor, 

William E. Simon School of Business, University of Rochester ....................... 131 

Response to Questions for the Record from Stephen E. Hessler, Partner, 

Kirkland & Ellis LLP ........................................................................................... 135 

Response to Questions for the Record from Steven J. Lubben, Professor, 

Seton Hall University School of Law .................................................................. 138 

(1) 

HEARING ON THE ‘‘FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 2014’’ 

TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, 

COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:57 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Spencer Bachus (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bachus, Goodlatte, Marino, Holding, 

Johnson, and Conyers. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Anthony Grossi, Counsel; Ashley Lewis, 

Clerk; and (Minority) Susan Jensen, Counsel. 

Mr. BACHUS. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Regulatory 

Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law hearing will come to order. 

And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the Committee at any time. 

And we have had kind of a helter-skelter day. And that may be 

a little severe, that word. But we expect to have votes probably in 

a little over 30 or 40 minutes. So we are going to still have opening 

statements, and then we will hear your statements, and we will 

have time for both of those, if that is okay. And I will start with 

my opening statement. 

Having lived through it legislatively, first during the financial 

crisis of the fall of 2008 and then the deliberations that resulted 

in Dodd-Frank, I know that a question people often ask is why distressed financial firms were not resolved through the bankruptcy 

process instead of drawing on emergency government support, or 

what many people characterize as bailouts, government bailouts. 

Over the last few years, industry legal and financial regulatory 

experts have examined this question in detail. This Committee, 

through its ongoing oversight of the Bankruptcy Code, has closely 

reviewed the question in addition to consulting experts in the field, 

and we have actually heard from several of you before. We have 

held a number of hearings on the issue, including two hearings in 

the past year on this precise matter. 

Two points of general agreement appear to have emerged. The 

first is that the single-point-of-entry approach seems to be the most 

feasible and efficient method to resolve a financial institution that 
2 

is organized with a holding company atop its corporate structure. 

The second point of agreement is that the Bankruptcy Code as currently drafted containsimpediments to using the single-point-ofentry approach. 

The bankruptcy process has long been favored as the primary 

mechanism for dealing with distressed and failing companies because of its impartiality, adherence to established precedent, judicial oversight, and grounding in the principles of due process and 

rule of law. 

We are here today as part of an effort to structure a bankruptcy 

process that is better equipped to deal with the specific issues 

raised by failing financial firms. By doing so, we can also address 

what some have described as bailout fatigue on the part of the 

American taxpayer. 

The subject of today’s hearing, draft legislation titled the ‘‘Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act,’’ includes several provisions that 

could improve the ability of financial institutions to be resolved 

through the bankruptcy process. 

It allows for a speedy transfer of a financial firm’s assets to a 

newly formed company. It would continue the firm’s operations for 

the benefit of its customers, employees, creditors, and the financial 

stability of the marketplace. This quick transfer is overseen by and 

subject to approval of an experienced bankruptcy judge and includes due-process protection for parties in interest. 

Second, the draft bill provides the financial institutions’ regulators with standing to be heard on issues impacting the general 

financial marketplace. Under a narrow set of circumstances, the 

Federal Reserve would be allowed to initiate a bankruptcy case 

over the objection of a financial institution. Specifically, the Federal Reserve must demonstrate to a judge by a preponderance of 

evidence that the financial institution is at or near insolvency and 

commencing a case is necessary to prevent substantial harm to financial stability. 

In addition, there are provisions that facilitate the transfer of derivative and similarly structured contracts to the newly formed 

company which will improve the ability of the company to continue 

the financial institution’s operations. 

Finally, the legislation recognizes the factually and legally complicated questions presented by the resolution of a financial institution. To that end, the bill provides that specialized bankruptcy and 

appellate judges will be designated in advance to preside over these 

cases. 

We have an esteemed panel of witnesses with expertise on bankruptcy and financial implications of the draft legislation. I will look 

forward to their testimony and the ensuing discussion as the Committee continues its consideration of this important issue. 

And let me say before I turn to the Ranking Member, under 

Dodd-Frank, a study was commissioned, which actually the Federal 

Reserve and the Bank of England both said that bankruptcy, a single point of entry—they endorsed that approach. 

And we have worked very closely with Members of the Democratic minority on this, and I think this is one of those issues 

where there is some bipartisan agreement that we can work to-
3 

gether. And I think we have; our staffs have worked closely together on this. 

And so, with that, I would recognize my Ranking Member, Mr. 

Johnson, for his opening statement. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I, too, am heartened by the manner in which our staffs have 

been able to coordinate and cooperate and get to this point with a 

product that can be said to be bipartisan. 

And I also want to acknowledge the brilliance of the people on 

this panel today. It doesn’t get much better, from an intellectual 

point of view, than the gentlemen that we have seated before us 

today. 

Thank you for your work, all of you. 

And today’s hearing concerns legislation that would attempt to 

accommodate the efficient winding down of a systemically important financial institution while promoting stability in the financial 

marketplace, rather than forcing a resolution under Title 2 of the 

Dodd-Frank Act. In other words, this legislation concerns how the 

Bankruptcy Code should treat the failure of the next Lehman 

Brothers, whose collapse caused untold insecurity in our Nation’s 

financial system and wreaked havoc across the globe. 

Four years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in response to the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression. 

I support this landmark legislation because it was a crucial step in 

reining in financial institutions that caused immeasurable hardship to so many American families. Built on the back of predatory 

lending of subprime mortgages to the most vulnerable members of 

society, including low-income, minorities, and the elderly, the great 

recession was indeed a study in corporate greed. 

But despite stemming the hemorrhaging of our Nation’s financial 

system, it is clear that Dodd-Frank left too many issues 

unaddressed. Banks are still too big for regulation, too big for trial, 

too big to fail, and too big to jail. I would also note that under the 

Roberts Court’s interpretation of corporate speech, banks are also 

too big to respect the reproductive rights of women and too big to 

be bound by campaign finance law. 

Later this week, this Subcommittee will conduct an oversight 

hearing on the Department of Justice’s attempt to rein in fraud 

against the elderly and consumers. Imagine that. Banks are also 

too big to investigate for fraud and money laundering and too big 

to be held accountable for defrauding Americans. 

With these observations in mind, it is my strong belief that any 

legislation to accommodate the winding down of a systemically important fiscal institution must promote the public interest through 

a transparent process. 

Although I commend the Chair for the staff-level process for the 

discussion draft we are considering today, we have not heard from 

the bank regulators and many other important stakeholders on the 

draft bill. The purpose of this legislation should be the protection 

of the public interest. The input from bank regulators and other interested parties, specifically on the question of whether this legislation truly protects consumers, is vital to my support for the underlying bill. 
4 

We are all in the same boat when it comes to our Nation’s financial system. I therefore urge the Chair to allow ample time to hear 

from all parties and stakeholders for their comment on this legislation and to not impose an arbitrary deadline on legislation that affects one of the most important aspects of the financial system. 

Lastly, as I mentioned in this Subcommittee’s hearing on Title 

2 of Dodd-Frank in March, it is imperative that this Subcommittee 

consider the strengths and weaknesses of the Bankruptcy Code in 

not just business bankruptcy but in consumer bankruptcy, as well. 

Few other areas are as important to most Americans as the crippling effects of student-loan debt, which has reportedly ballooned 

into the largest source of debt for American consumers. This debt 

is practically nondischargeable, growing exponentially, and has farreaching consequences. I have little doubt that, if we put our minds 

to it, we could reach a bipartisan solution to alleviate the suffering 

of many of those consumers who are affected and afflicted by crushing student-loan debt. 

Furthermore, I would remind the Chair that it is very difficult 

for the minority to routinely support the majority’s priority legislation without reciprocity in consideration of issues. There are a 

number of outstanding bipartisan issues, like consumer bankruptcy, that merit discussion. I urge the Chair to consider these requests. 

And I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony on the discussion 

draft of the Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2014. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

I would now like to recognize the full Committee Chair, Mr. Bob 

Goodlatte of Virginia, who later tonight will be playing tennis for 

charity against an opponent from the Administration. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. On the other hand, I might be here working on 

immigration reform. 

Mr. BACHUS. The great tennis match might be postponed, huh? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the Chairman and welcome our panelists today. 

This is an important hearing. Our Nation’s financial system provides the lifeblood for industry to develop, grow, and prosper. Ensuring that this system functions efficiently in both good times and 

bad is critical to the ongoing vitality of our economy. 

The recent financial crisis illustrated that the financial system 

and existing laws were not adequately prepared for the insolvency 

of certain institutions which threaten the very stability of the global economy and our financial industry. There has been considerable 

debate over whether Congress’ main response the financial crisis, 

the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 

is adequate to respond to a future crisis. 

Today’s hearing, however, is not focused on that debate. Instead, 

we turn our attention to the private and public efforts to strengthen the Bankruptcy Code so that it may better facilitate the resolution of an insolvent financial firm while preserving the stability of 

the financial markets. 

The subject of today’s hearing, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, is a reflection of these efforts. The bill is calibrated carefully to provide transparency, predictability, and judicial 
5 

oversight to a process that must be executed quickly and in a manner that is responsive to potential systemic risks. 

Additionally, it incorporates the single-point-of-entry approach, 

which a growing consensus of experts in public and private industry believe is the most effective and feasible method to resolve a 

financial institution that has a bank holding company. 

The Judiciary Committee has a long history of improving the 

Bankruptcy Code to ensure that it is equipped properly to administer all failing companies. The Financial Institution Bankruptcy 

Act adds to this history by enhancing the ability of financial firms 

to be resolved through the bankruptcy process. 

The development of the discussion draft before us today has been 

a collaborative effort that included the financial and legal community as well as the Democratic staff. This collaboration has continued through a broader circulation of the bill, including to, among 

others, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the courts, and Treasury. 

We look forward to feedback from all parties regarding the proposed text of the bill. 

Over the course of the past year, during two separate hearings, 

this Committee has heard testimony that the Bankruptcy Code 

could be improved and that a measure that creates a new Subchapter V within Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code should be enacted. 

Today, we will hear from a panel of experts whether the draft 

before us meets these goals and whether the text could be further 

refined. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on this 

important measure. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I yield 

back to you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte. 

I would now like to recognize the full Committee Ranking Member, Mr. John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan, for his opening statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Bachus. 

Welcome, witnesses. 

I am the last presenter on this side of the table. And we are trying to ensure that the resolution of complex bank holding companies on the verge of insolvency can be better facilitated under the 

Bankruptcy Code, and I would appreciate your views on that. 

Any legislative fix should be premised on the critical lessons 

learned from the near collapse of our Nation’s economy just 5 years 

ago. Without doubt, the great recession was a direct result of the 

regulatory equivalent of the wild west. And in the absence of any 

meaningful regulation of the mortgage industry, lenders developed 

high-risk subprime mortgages and, frankly, used predatory marketing tactics, targeting the most vulnerable. 

These doomed-to-fail mortgages were then securitized and sold to 

unsuspecting investors, including pension funds and school districts. Once the housing bubble burst, the ensuing 2008 crash 

stopped the flow of credit and trapped millions of Americans in 

mortgages they could no longer afford, causing waves of foreclosures across the United States, massive unemployment, and 

international economic upheaval. 

And to this day, we are still dealing with the lingering effects of 

the great recession of 2008. Neighborhoods across the Nation are 
6 

still blighted by vast swaths of abandoned homes. Many municipalities, big and small, continue to struggle with the attendant 

costs resulting from mortgage-foreclosure-induced blight as well as 

reduced revenues. 

Thus, lesson number one is the legislation should make it easier, 

not harder, for regulators to respond to an imminent threat to the 

Nation’s financial marketplace. 

Then, as demonstrated by the failure of Lehman Brothers and 

the resultant near collapse of Wall Street, it is critical that liquidity and trust in the financial marketplace be restored as soon as 

possible after the collapse of a major financial institution. Fortunately, Dodd-Frank goes a long way toward reinvigorating a regulatory system that makes the financial marketplace more accountable and, hopefully, more resilient. 

The act also institutes long-needed consumer protections. While 

Dodd-Frank establishes a mandatory resolution mechanism to wind 

down a systemically significant financial institution, the act implicitly prioritizes using a bankruptcy solution before invoking DoddFrank’s orderly liquidation process. This is because the Bankruptcy 

Code has, for more than 100 years, enabled some of the Nation’s 

largest companies to regain their financial footing, including, more 

recently, General Motors and Chrysler. 

But for bankruptcy to be truly viable as an alternative to a Title 

2 resolution process, the bank holding company must have access 

to lenders of last resort, even if it is the Federal Government. Unfortunately, the draft bill is utterly silent on that critical component. In fact, the Senate counterpart to this measure strictly forbids government assistance. So I need you to think with me of 

whether we are engaged, at least to some degree, in a futile effort. 

And, in concluding, this legislation must be carefully analyzed to 

ensure that the constitutional due-process and property rights are 

not violated. Although there appears to be a consensus that the 

bankruptcy law must be amended to better accommodate the resolution of large bank holding companies, we must ensure that fundamental rights and protections are not adversely affected, even 

unintentionally. 

In the rush to expedite the transfer of a troubled company’s assets, does the bill ensure that the interests of all affected parties 

are adequately protected? And I hope you will respond to that. 

Does the legislation strike the right balance between stemming 

panic contagion and transparency? Are the legislation’s time limits 

for judicial determinations and appeals workable? 

And so here we are today trying to struggle through these and 

other considerations, and we have to continue to realize that the 

regulators and the Federal courts play a critical role in these determinations. And so I invite you to join us in what is a very, very 

important hearing. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Ranking Member Conyers. 

Without objection, all Members’ written statements will be made 

a part of the record. 

As Ranking Member Johnson said, we have a very distinguished 

panel before us, and I will first start by introducing our witnesses. 
7 

Mr. Don Bernstein is partner of Davis Polk, where he heads the 

firm’s insolvency and restructuring practice. During his distinguished 35-year career, he has represented nearly every major financial institution in numerous restructurings, as well as leading 

a number of operating firms through bankruptcy, including Ford, 

LTV, and Johns Manville. 

Mr. Bernstein has spent the last several years working on resolution plans, commonly referred to as living wills, for large financial 

firms, as well as representing financial institutions on resolutionrelated issues. 

Mr. Bernstein has earned multiple honors for his practice, including being elected by his peers as chairman of the National 

Bankruptcy Conference, the most prestigious professional organization in the field. Mr. Bernstein received his A.B. Cum laude from 

Princeton University and his J.D. From the University of Chicago 

Law School. 

We welcome you. 

Professor Tom Jackson holds faculty positions in the William E. 

Simon School of Business Administration and the Department of 

Political Science at the University of Rochester, where he also 

served as president from 1994 to 2005. 

Before he became Rochester’s ninth president, Mr. Jackson was 

vice president and provost for the University of Virginia, where he 

first joined as the dean of Virginia’s School of Law. Previously, he 

was professor of law at Harvard and served on the faculty at Stanford University. 

He clerked for U.S. District Court Judge Marvin Frankel in New 

York from 1975 through 1976 and then for Supreme Court Justice 

and later Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist from 1976 to 1977. 

Professor Jackson is the author of bankruptcy and commercial 

law texts used in law schools across the country. Recently, he has 

spent considerable time on the issue of improving the Bankruptcy 

Code to facilitate the resolution of financial institutions, including 

working with the Hoover Institute, the Bipartisan Policy Center, 

and the FDIC on this issue. 

And he received his B.A. From Williams College and his J.D. 

From Yale Law School. 

So, welcome. 

Mr. Stephen Hessler is a partner of the restructuring group of 

Kirkland & Ellis. His practice involves representing debtors, creditors, and investors in complex corporate Chapter 11 cases, out-ofcourt restructurings, acquisitions, and related trial and appellate 

litigation. 

He has counseled clients across a broad range of industries, including energy, gaming, hospitality, and real estate, telecommunications, financial institutions, and manufacturing. 

Prior to joining Kirkland & Ellis, Mr. Hessler was a law clerk for 

Judge Ambro at the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit, as well as Justice Hepburn at the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Kentucky. He also served on the 

staff of Senator Spencer Abraham. 

In addition to practicing law, Mr. Hessler is a frequent lecturer 

and author on a variety of restructuring-related topics. He currently serves as the chairman of one of the advisory boards to the 
8 

American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform 

of Chapter 11. He also teaches a restructuring class each fall at the 

University of Pennsylvania to both law school and Wharton students. 

Mr. Hessler recently was selected by Turnarounds and Workouts 

as one of their 2013 outstanding young restructuring lawyers. He 

received his B.A. And J.D. From the University of Michigan, where 

he served as a managing editor of Michigan’s Law Review. 

Again, quite impressive. 

And particularly for you who teach classes at law schools, or 

Wharton students in your case, you better know your subject if you 

teach at that level. 

Professor Steven Lubben is the holder of the Harvey Washington 

Wiley Chair in corporate governance and business ethics at Seton 

Hall and is a recognized expert in the field of corporate finance and 

governance, corporate restructuring, financial distress, and debt. 

He is the author of a leading corporate finance text and a contributing author to the Bloomberg Law on Bankruptcy treatise. He 

is also a columnist for the New York Times Deal Book page. 

And I read that. I will have to pay more attention to your articles. 

Following graduation from law school, Professor Lubben clerked 

for Justice Broderick in the New Hampshire Supreme Court. He 

then practiced bankruptcy law in the New York and Los Angeles 

offices of Skadden & Arps, where he represented parties in Chapter 

11 cases throughout the country. 

Since joining Seton Hall, Professor Lubben has presented his papers at academic conferences around the world and frequently provides commentary on Chapter 11 and related issues for national 

and international media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, 

the New York Times, the Financial Times, Reuters, the Associated 

Press, Bloomberg, and BBC. 

Professor Lubben received his B.A. From the University of California Irvine and his J.D. From Boston University, his LLM from 

Harvard Law School and his Ph.D. From the University of Groningen—is that right? 

Mr. LUBBEN. Yes, close. 

Mr. BACHUS. He tried to teach me, but I couldn’t get it—in the 

Netherlands. 

Mr. LUBBEN. My wife can’t get it either, so don’t worry about it. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

All right. We will start with Mr. Bernstein. 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD S. BERNSTEIN, PARTNER, 

DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Thank you, Chairman Bachus and Ranking 

Member Johnson, as well as Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and the other Members of the Subcommittee. I want 

to thank you for inviting me to testify before this Subcommittee 

once again about the resolution of systemically important financial 

institutions under the Bankruptcy Code. 

I am especially pleased to be commenting on the draft, which I 

commend the staff on, of the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act 
9 

of 2014 that would add a new Subchapter V to Chapter 11 of the 

Bankruptcy Code dealing with insolvencies of large financial firms. 

In light of time constraints, I am going to focus on a few key 

issues in my testimony; I am not going to focus on everything. But 

I commend the testimony to you. 

The first issue is bankruptcy as the first method of resolution but 

retaining Title 2 of Dodd-Frank, as well. As others have mentioned, 

Title 2 can only be invoked if resolution in bankruptcy can’t be effectively accomplished. And I think this is as it should be. 

Bankruptcy is a transparent process. It is driven by the rule of 

law. But Title 2 should remain as a backup resolution tool. It is 

important to have that available. And we don’t know whether we 

will ever need to use it, and, hopefully, if this bill is passed, it will 

make it far less likely that we will need to use Title 2. 

When I was before the Subcommittee in December, I did recommend that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to add tools to facilitate what I called at the time whole-firm recapitalizations, similar to the single-point-of-entry resolution strategy advocated by the 

FDIC. 

I think it is increasingly recognized, not only in the United 

States but in other parts of the world, that whole-firm recapitalization is the best way of resolving large financial institutions in a 

manner that minimizes losses, minimizes systemic disruption, and 

prevents taxpayer bailouts. 

This is because recapitalization preserves the going-concern 

value of a financial firm by avoiding what I will call a short-stop 

liquidation of the kind that we had in Lehman Brothers. It maintains the continuity of the firm’s operations that may be critical to 

the financial system. Examples are custody, clearance, settlement 

of transactions. All of these things run through our financial institutions, and if they get disrupted or stopped, it could be very systemically damaging. 

And, most importantly, the recapitalization imposes the firm’s 

losses on private-sector creditors rather than on taxpayers. This is 

a highly important point because, by removing an implicit government backstop of financial firms, it incentivizes private-sector 

creditors to appropriately price risks and, most importantly, to engage in more effective monitoring of these firms. 

And I would point out—and Representative Conyers made the 

point about making sure that financial firms are not taking undue 

risks—the creditors should actually be monitoring that. And having 

an incentive for them to do it, by making it clear that they are 

going to absorb the losses, is extremely important. 

Professor Jackson and I describe in our testimony that singlepoint-of-entry recapitalization is facilitated by the bank holding 

company structure that we have in the United States. In other 

countries, they don’t necessarily have holding companies. 

What a holding company does is it creates a class of structurally 

subordinated debt at the holding company which can be used to be 

bailed in, or recapitalized, by being left behind in our system in a 

bankruptcy or a receivership. And the process is described in all of 

the witness statements, so I am not going to belabor it, but it facilitates a recapitalization solution to have this holding-company 

structure. 
10 

The bill we are looking at today embraces the idea of whole-firm 

recapitalization. It includes many of the tools that I discussed in 

December, and I think the bill’s overall approach is the right one. 

And its passage, with some minor modifications, would be a substantial step forward in helping to assure that taxpayer-funded 

bailouts never happen again. 

I want to focus on three particular points in the legislation, and 

you will see why I think they are important. The first one is the 

definition of ‘‘capital structure debt.’’ That is the debt that gets left 

behind when you recapitalize the firm. I noted in my written testimony that the bill’s expansion of the definition of ‘‘capital structure 

debt’’ to include all unsecured debts of the holding company and to 

omit the words ‘‘debts for borrowed money’’ reduces the clarity that 

the market has over how the recapitalization is going to occur. 

The Federal Reserve has announced that they plan to require 

companies to have substantial amounts of capital structure debt, 

and the discussion has been about long-term debt, which is not, for 

example, held by mutual funds or money market funds. And I actually favor the definition that is in the Senate version of the bill because it focuses on long-term debts with maturities of longer than 

a year and debt for borrowed money, and there are two reasons for 

this. First of all, I think it really corresponds to the expectation of 

what the Federal Reserve is likely to put out, and it is going to 

make it clear to creditors which class of debt is going to be the debt 

that ends up being used to recapitalize the firm. 

One of the criticisms that has been leveled against Title II is that 

the statute doesn’t make it sufficiently clear which category of debt 

is going to be the debt that is going to be bailed in and how that 

decision is going to be made. 

Second, as I mentioned, those debts with maturities of less than 

a year are held in various places where they could become systemically significant. And if capital structure debt is defined to include 

those potentially systemically significant debts, it could require 

that a provision be included in the bill to give regulators the discretion to exclude certain capital structure obligations for favored 

treatment so that if there is a systemic risk associated with some 

of the capital structure debt, it would be assumed by the bridge 

company rather than left behind. 

The National Bankruptcy Conference recommended this particular solution in its letter to the Subcommittee of January 29. 

The NBC was concerned that a bright-line test might create activities to avoid the test. But as noted in the written testimony, with 

the Federal Reserve actually promulgating a requirement that this 

debt be in place, I think the risk of avoidance goes away because 

the financial institutions will actually have to maintain the debt on 

their balance sheets. So this debt will be there if it is needed. 

The second topic I want to discuss is the topic of the special 

trustee. The special trustee provision in this bill, in my view, is important and should be retained. Its use is not mandatory, but it 

does have an important purpose. From the point of view of the 

market, and from the point of view of foreign regulators, it is highly important that the new bridge company be returned to a state 

of normalcy as soon as possible. This will enhance the likelihood of 
11 

quickly regaining access to private-sector liquidity and reduce the 

risk of ring fencing by local regulators. 

To accomplish these goals, it may be highly desirable that the recapitalized firm be perceived as healthy enough to longer be subject 

to the bankruptcy process. The provisions of section 1186 of the bill 

permit the court to transfer the bridge company to a special handpicked trustee, and it gives the court the necessary authority to accomplish this if it is in the best interests of the estate and is going 

to preserve the value of the asset. 

The last point I want to mention is the question of how the proceedings get commenced. I think it is very appropriate for the Federal Reserve to be given the right to file an involuntary case 

against a SIFI if a board of directors has not voluntarily done so 

in the appropriate circumstances; however, I think it is a failure 

if the Federal Reserve actually has do that. A dispute over commencement of the case could seriously impair the effectiveness of 

resolution proceedings. 

With this in mind, I think the bill should do what it can to encourage voluntary petitions in Subchapter V cases where the firm 

is in financial distress. And I have suggested that the bill adopt an 

approach similar to the one taken in Title II of Dodd-Frank, where 

the simple act of filing or consenting to a case under Subchapter 

V should not cause liability for the board. Boards will remain accountable for their prebankruptcy actions, but they shouldn’t feel 

at risk for the simple act of invoking Subchapter V. 

In my written testimony I have made a number of other technical comments both about the safe harbor provisions as well as 

the provisions relating to avoidance actions. I generally support 

these provisions. I think they are critical to accomplishing the goal 

of Subchapter V. However, I think some of the technical tweaks I 

suggest are merely cross-reference errors in some cases, but they 

should be fixed so that the provisions work as intended. I welcome 

the opportunity to discuss these technical points directly with the 

staff, and would also like the opportunity to study the bill further 

and provide additional technical comments if I have any. 

Once again, I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to 

present my views. I believe this bill is a very important step forward, and I thank the Committee for considering this legislation. 

I would, of course, be pleased to answer any questions about my 

written statement or my oral testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bernstein follows:] 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

What we are going to do at this point, we have 2 minutes, 50 seconds plus whatever time they give us to get to the floor. The opening statements, you know, instead of 5-minute opening statements 

on this, I would prefer to have, if you need 10 or 12 minutes, you 

have it, and that way we will—because we very much want your 

comments, and we are not just simply going through the motions. 

So we will recess until the votes are through on the floor. The 

Committee staff can keep you appraised of that and give you a 

pretty good idea about when we will be returning. How many votes 

on the floor? Just two votes. So we should be back probably in 15, 

20 minutes. We will resume. And then I think taking your testimony as opposed to asking questions is probably going to be the 

best way to do this. 

We are in recess at this time. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FARENTHOLD [presiding]. The Committee will come to order. 

Chairman Bachus asked me to get started in his absence. He is on 

the floor with an amendment to the appropriations bill. He will return shortly, and I will return the gavel to him. But in the interests of getting everybody home in time to see their families tonight, 

we will recognize Mr. Jackson for the customary 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS H. JACKSON, PROFESSOR, WILLIAM 

E. SIMON SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you. 

Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Johnson, Representative 

Farenthold, also Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, this is my second time testifying before you this year on a 

subject near and dear to my heart, which is bankruptcy law, specifically the role bankruptcy law can and should play in the best 

possible resolution of a troubled financial institution, and how the 

bill under consideration, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act 

of 2014, is a solid starting point permitting that to happen, thus 

fulfilling the vision of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDIC that bankruptcy should be the primary resolution mechanism, which it cannot be, I believe, in its current form. 

It is clear from this bill that much has occurred since my March 

testimony, and I am grateful particularly to the staff for that. 

First, what do I mean by the best possible resolution of a troubled financial institution? I mean a resolution process that meets 

three important tests: First, one that both minimizes losses and 

places them on appropriate pre-identified parties; second, one that 

minimizes systemic consequences; third, one that does not result in 

a government bailout. And I might add, for me, a fourth: One that 

is predictable in the sense of conforming to the rule of law in its 

myriad decisions. 

At the time of the 2008 financial crisis, everyone seemed to acknowledge that bankruptcy law should play a major role, but there 

were also a general lack of confidence that it was up to the task. 

The resulting Dodd-Frank Act, while placing bankruptcy at the 

core of a resolution regime, also found it necessary to create an administrative backstop to it. And let me spend a minute on that, because it demonstrates, I think, the clear need for amendments to 
37 

the Bankruptcy Code along the lines of the Financial Institution 

Bankruptcy Act of 2014. 

The primary role bankruptcy law is expected to play, even under 

the Dodd-Frank Act, is reflected first in the requirement of resolution plans, the so-called living wills, under Title I of that act. These 

plans are specifically to be focused on and tested against bankruptcy. Thus, a resolution plan must be resubmitted if it, quote, ‘‘is 

not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the company under the Bankruptcy Code.’’ And the firm must ultimately 

be reshaped so that its resolution plan will, quote, ‘‘facilitate an orderly resolution of such company under the Bankruptcy Code.’’ 

It is also reflected in the statutory requirements for implementing an administrative resolution proceeding, the orderly liquidation authority under Title II. Such a resolution proceeding cannot be commenced without a determination that the use of bankruptcy law would have a serious adverse effect on U.S. financial 

stability. It is widely acknowledged, I think, that bankruptcy law 

is or should be the preferred resolution mechanism. To quote from 

the FDIC when it released its single point of entry strategy paper 

in December, quote, ‘‘The statute makes clear that bankruptcy is 

the preferred resolution framework in the event of the failure of a 

SIFI.’’ 

But there is a disconnect between those premises and today’s 

Bankruptcy Code. There is an emerging consensus that the best 

resolution system, one that meets the standards I indicated above, 

involves, A, loss-bearing capacity known in advance that, B, can be 

jettisoned in a rapid recapitalization of a financial institution. In 

the U.S., this system is represented by the FDIC’s single point of 

entry proposal for the recapitalization via a bridge company of a 

SIFI holding company under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. Compared to this administrative resolution proposal, the current Bankruptcy Code is clearly found wanting. 

The essence of this kind of recapitalization is, first, leaving behind equity and the loss-bearing debt—presumably long-term unsecured debt that has been required by the regulators, the Federal 

Reserve Board, to bear the loss; and, second, transferring everything else—assets, liabilities, rights and subsidiaries—to a bridge 

company that, because of the stripping off of the loss-bearing debt, 

is presumably both solvent and in a position to deal with the needs 

of its subsidiaries. And this must be done with great speed so as 

to restore market confidence without a contagion-producing run. 

Yet because of the exemption of qualified financial contracts from 

most of bankruptcy’s provisions, including the automatic stay, and 

because of the lack of clear statutory language permitting the assignment of liabilities or the override of cross-default or change-ofcontrol provisions, the current Bankruptcy Code cannot provide the 

necessary assurance of a rapid recapitalization. This will lead, in 

my view, either to ineffective resolution plans and/or the reality 

that the orderly liquidation authority under Title II will, contrary 

to the starting premises, become the default resolution mechanism. 

The bill you are considering, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, by adding a new Subchapter V to Chapter 11 

of the Bankruptcy Code, and by paying attention to these concepts, 

neatly provides the necessary amendments to permit a rapid re-
38 

capitalization that will, first, leave losses on previously identified 

parties, equity and long-term debt holders; and second, rapidly recapitalize the parent institution in a way that will make clear that 

it is solvent, its business has been kept together, and it is able to 

deal with the subsidiaries so as to restore market confidence and 

reduce contagion. 

What is required? In addition to the specific loss-absorbency capacity known in advance that, as Don Bernstein indicated, the Federal Reserve Board is working on and is really a necessary ingredient in all of this, it requires explicit statutory authorization for 

a rapid transfer of the holding company’s assets, liabilities, rights, 

and subsidiaries, minus the loss-absorbing debt and equity to a 

bridge institution, and that it would have stays and overrides of 

certain provisions to enable that to happen. 

The bill you are considering does all of this and as well provides 

an important role in the process for the Federal Reserve Board and 

the FDIC in a proceeding run before preidentified bankruptcy 

judges, with appeals going to a predesignated appellate panel consisting of court of appeals judges. 

While the details are many—and I am happy to get into them 

with staff in further discussions, and my written statement to some 

extent does this—and, yes, I think the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014 is, as a result, necessarily somewhat complex at 

points, the concept is simple. Through what ends up being modest 

amendments to the Bankruptcy Code which would be effectuated 

by this bill, it indeed can be considered the primary resolution vehicle for SIFIs as envisioned by the Dodd-Frank Act. And because 

it is a judicial proceeding, it places primacy on the rule of law, on 

market-based solutions rather than agency control, and on a process that is fair and known in advance, indeed planned for via the 

living wills, the resolution plans that now can legitimately focus on 

a viable bankruptcy solution. 

In your deliberations on the Financial Institution Bankruptcy 

Act of 2014, I believe some technical changes need to be made, and 

there is some other relatively small issues that I think warrant further consideration. Don Bernstein’s written and oral statements, 

and I have had time to read his written statement, contains several, and I concur with them. 

I have glanced at the suggestions of the other two witnesses that 

you will be hearing from today, and I believe a number of them 

probably warrant consideration as well. But importantly, none of 

them undermine the basic structure and importance of the bill before you. 

So with that modest caveat that there are things I think need 

consideration and work, I want to emphasize what I think is an incredibly important step by your consideration of the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014. 

Again, I want to thank the Subcommittee for allowing me this 

opportunity to present my views, and even moreso for its wisdom 

and its consideration of the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act 

of 2014. I would, of course, be delighted to answer any questions 

you may have about my testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:] 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Professor Jackson. 

Mr. Hessler, you are up. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN E. HESSLER, PARTNER, 

KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 

Mr. HESSLER. Good afternoon, Chairman Bachus, Chairman 

Goodlatte, Ranking Member Johnson, Ranking Member Conyers, 

and Representative Farenthold. Thank you for inviting me to testify at today’s hearing. My name is Steve Hessler, and I am a partner in the Restructuring Group of Kirkland and Ellis LLP. My 

practice primarily involves representing debtors, and my recent engagements include some of the largest and most complex corporate 

reorganizations in history. 

I have also written at length about Title II of the Dodd-Frank 

Act, and I have specifically advocated that adopting relatively discrete amendments to Chapter 11 would better facilitate the orderly 

reorganization of systemically important financial institutions. To 

that end, I am pleased that Subchapter V incorporates many of the 

prescriptive alternatives that I have long favored. 

The written materials that I have submitted include a lengthy 

comparative analysis of the various insolvency resolution frameworks at issue, but in my testimony this afternoon, I will focus on 

the most significant reasons that I believe, as a debtor practitioner, 

Subchapter V is the best-designed option so far, both structurally 

and philosophically, to maximize estate value for the benefit of 

stakeholders, while also protecting against the broader economic 

contagion that could result from the unmitigated failure of a financial corporation. 

First, perhaps the signal benefit of Subchapter V is that a financial corporation case will be administered by a predetermined panel 

of experienced bankruptcy court judges within the established practice and precedent of the Bankruptcy Code instead of politically 

sensitive regulators within an untested nonjudicial process. 

Second, Subchapter V amends the Bankruptcy Code to allow the 

Federal Government to file an involuntary petition and to commence a Chapter 11 case without the debtor financial corporation’s 

consent. To echo the remarks of Mr. Bernstein, given that regulators already have various methods of essentially forcing a financial company to commence a voluntary case under the Code, making this ability explicit and subject to bankruptcy court approval 

hopefully will help further incentivize financial corporations to confront their problems early on and to diligently pursue responsible 

restructuring options. 

Third, the Bankruptcy Code does presently provide that 

counterparties to qualified financial contracts are not subject to 

section 362’s automatic stay against termination. This means a 

Chapter 11 filing by a financial corporation could be marked by 

chaos at the outset as counterparties proceed to terminate and enforce their rights in the debtor’s assets. Subchapter V addresses 

this issue by subjecting qualified financial contracts to the automatic stay, but only for 48 hours. Although I have concerns that 

this time period may be too short to be viable, Subchapter V, unlike Title II, at least provides for debtor involvement and bankruptcy court approval of the contract assumption determinations. 
59 

Fourth, beyond Subchapter V’s key amendments, I also want to 

focus on what I think is quite notable, which is the core provisions 

of Chapter 11 that Subchapter V does not modify, and I want to 

cite three key examples. The first is that the Bankruptcy Code requires debtors to adhere to the so-called absolute priority rule, 

which generally provides that creditors with similar legal rights 

must receive the same treatment, and that junior creditors may not 

receive any recovery until senior creditors are paid in full. Unlike 

Title II, which provides that similarly situated creditors may receive dissimilar treatment, Subchapter V does not disturb the primacy of the absolute priority rule, which is one of the most fundamental principles of Chapter 11, and is critical to ensuring the fair 

and equitable treatment of creditors of financial corporations. 

Next, Subchapter V also does not amend a debtor’s exclusive 

right to file a reorganization plan under section 1121. This means 

that the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, like all other parties in interest, would have standing to file a motion to terminate exclusivity for cause, but the government appropriately must first obtain 

bankruptcy court permission before abrogating a debtor’s prerogatives on these fundamental restructuring decisions. 

Thirdly, regarding directors and officers, in my experience their 

knowledge, expertise, and commitment is indispensable to effectuating a debtor’s soft landing into and orderly passage through 

Chapter 11. In this regard, Subchapter V exercises, I believe, admirable restraint in not vilifying, much less disqualifying, a financial 

corporation’s existing leadership from continuing to serve the debtor in possession postpetition, subject, of course, to already applicable Bankruptcy Code grounds for removal as justified. 

Lastly, while I am very supportive of Subchapter V, I do want 

to note for the record there are certain provisions about which I 

have reservations, most significantly regarding the single point of 

entry approach that is central to Subchapter V. While the immediate separation and transfer of good bank assets in certain respects does mirror the so-called melting ice cube very fast section 

363 asset sales that already are occurring under Chapter 11, Subchapter V codifies and accelerates these practices. That said, Subchapter V does also employ a number of safeguards on this front, 

including, critically, bankruptcy court approval under existing section 363 of the debtor’s proposed transfer and plan distribution of 

trust assets. 

I also believe there are certain issues around the procedures for 

commencing a Subchapter V case, especially in the highly compressed initial ruling deadlines, the record-sealing requirements, 

and limited judicial review. These provisions depart from standard 

bankruptcy principles of due process and transparency. So my preliminary reaction is to favor greater flexibility and openness. Here 

as well, however, I am very aware that the drafters of Subchapter 

V are striving very hard to balance those imperatives against the 

widely held views that the good assets of a financial corporation 

cannot withstand the prolonged public scrutiny of a typical Chapter 

11 filing. To that end, I look forward to further careful consideration and further discussions with the Subcommittee staff on these 

key issues. 
60 

I thank the Subcommittee for allowing me to share my views on 

this important legislation, and I welcome the opportunity to answer 

any questions about my testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hessler follows:] 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

We will now go to Professor Lubben. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, PROFESSOR, 

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. LUBBEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Could you make sure your microphone is on 

and close to your mouth, please, sir? 

Mr. LUBBEN. Thank you very much, Chair Bachus, distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Steven J. Lubben. I 

hold the Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance 

and Business Ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law in 

Newark, New Jersey. 

When considering financial institution failure, to my mind context is key. The context in which the failure happens is key. You 

need a range of options to address the failure of a financial institution, ranging from current Chapter 11 practices to the orderly liquidation authority. And I commend the proposed Subchapter V as 

a new addition to the regulatory toolbox. And accordingly, it applies the approach that was successfully used in the automotive 

bankruptcy cases to the case of financial institutions, and thus 

gives the regulators and financial institutions another approach to 

deal with possible failure. 

I also commend the bill for utilizing the experienced bankruptcy 

judges to conduct the proceedings. One of the key benefits of the 

American approach to corporate reorganization is the use of specialized knowledgeable bankruptcy judges, and I do, again, commend the bill for utilizing those judges for resolving financial institutions. 

I do believe that the bill could be improved in a few ways, however, and I will focus on three of those in my comments today. First 

of all, unlike some prior witnesses, I have some doubts about the 

utility of the special trustee concept. At heart, I think the special 

trustee concept confuses the debtor’s ownership of the shares of the 

bridge company with the ongoing operations of the bridge company. 

It is an issue that could be addressed more straightforwardly and 

less confusingly. In particular, I think that the special trustee provisions add unneeded complexity and uncertainty to Subchapter V, 

and I would urge a rethink of those. 

Next, I would urge the Subcommittee to give further thought to 

the fate of the debtor after the sale of the assets to the bridge company. Understandably, the bill focuses primarily on the successful 

movement of the debtor’s assets, which is primarily going to be the 

equity and the operating subs, to the bridge company, but it doesn’t 

really address the question of what happens next. This may seem 

a bit overly technical, but the debtor’s creditors may rightly argue 

that leaving them to recover claims in an unfunded liquidation proceeding of the remaining debtor amounts to appropriation of their 

claims. Presumably that makes the investment decision to invest 

in bank holding company debt somewhat difficult, which we probably don’t want to do. 

At the very least, I think we need a mechanism to convert the 

case from Subchapter V to a liquidation under Chapter 7, but, as 

my comments suggest, the Subcommittee may want to consider, if 
82 

conversion is not the likely outcome in many cases, if there is no 

mechanism for reorganizing the debtor or even coming to a liquidation plan. 

Specifically, we need to think about ways to fund the case after 

the transfer of the asset has happened, and precisely what is going 

to happen, and what role regulators will play in that new case. 

Third, I suggest the Subcommittee should consider what will 

happen if a Subchapter V proceeding fails. In other words, if you 

do transfer the assets to the new bridge institution, and the institution continues to experience a run, what is going to happen at 

that point? Can the bridge company itself be put into a Dodd-Frank 

orderly liquidation authority proceeding? At the very least, you 

may want to make it explicit that the bridge company succeeds to 

whatever eligibility its former self had. 

In addition, does the bankruptcy court have an ability to convert 

a Subchapter V proceeding to some other sort of insolvency proceeding? And does the court have an ability to coordinate with regulators? 

Likewise, does the bankruptcy court have an ability to block regulatory actions that might undermine a Subchapter V proceeding. 

For example, what if a State insurance regulator or a State banking regulator decides to take action against an operating subsidiary 

that undermines the viability of the Subchapter V process? Does 

the bankruptcy court have an actual ability to stay them? 

Presumably, if they have such a power, it is not going to extend 

to foreign regulators, which I think then highlights the reality that 

solving the ‘‘too big to fail’’ problem is as much about the structure 

of financial institutions as it is about the specifics of any insolvency 

process. Insolvency, in other words, is a very small piece of a much 

larger regulatory structure. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lubben follows:] 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate all of your testimonies. And we will begin with some 

questions. 

I will be the first to admit that I am not the expert in bankruptcy. I practiced law for a while, took one bankruptcy class. So 

just really getting up to speed on this Committee, and I appreciate 

you-all’s help with that. 

With that in mind, I want to step back and start with a 30,000- 

foot view for those who will be reading this record who are not as 

expert as you guys are. I just want to get everybody’s 30,000-foot 

opinion. Do you agree that the Bankruptcy Code could be improved 

to facilitate the resolution of financial institutions? I think that I 

got a yes from everybody’s testimony. Does anybody disagree with 

that statement? 

All right. I think we are good. All our panelists seem to be nodding their head in the affirmative. 

Can you all also generally agree, subject to some of the revisions 

that is in your written testimony, that you could support the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act? Anybody have any reservations beyond what is in their testimony? 

I think we got all affirmative nods there, too. I like it when we 

can get everybody to agree here. 

All right. Professor Jackson, let me ask you, do you believe the 

enactment of Subchapter V would reduce the necessity for regulators to initiate Title II resolution proceedings? 

Mr. JACKSON. I do. I believe, as Don Bernstein indicated, Title 

II should be there as a backstop. The world is an uncertain place. 

But I believe that enactment of a bill along these lines, with some 

of the amendments people have talked about, will significantly reduce the need for invocation of Title II of Dodd-Frank, because, 

again, in order to invoke it, you have to find a bankruptcy is wanting. I think this largely fixes the problems that currently exist that 

would make bankruptcy wanting. So the short answer to your 

question is yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Anybody else want to weigh in on that? Mr. 

Hessler, or Professor Lubben, Mr. Bernstein? 

All right. Mr. Hessler, I will ask you, why do you believe the Federal Reserve should be provided with the authority to commence involuntary Subchapter V proceedings? 

Mr. HESSLER. There is two reasons. One is practical; one is a little more theoretical. First, the practical reason is there are various 

regulatory maneuvers that regulators, including the Fed, could 

take that would otherwise effectively make it inevitable that a financial corporation had to file for bankruptcy in any event. 

But from a more important, I think, theoretical perspective, and 

it was echoing some remarks of Mr. Bernstein as well, the fact that 

there is the explicit ability for an involuntary to be commenced 

against a financial corporation hopefully will incentivize them to, 

as early as possible, as they approach the zone of insolvency, to 

begin to responsibly explore what would be alternative or viable restructuring alternatives instead of otherwise turning a blind eye to 

the problem for as long as possible, safe in the awareness that nobody can force them into bankruptcy until things are truly dire. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Bernstein? 
89 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I think there is one additional reason, which is 

if the Fed believes that the company, if the firm needs to be in a 

resolution procedure, if we didn’t have this provision, its only recourse would be to consult with the FDIC and Treasury and do a 

Title II procedure. So this gives them another option. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Mr. Hessler, let’s talk a little bit 

about the importance of retaining existing management for like 

newly formed bridge companies or holding companies. The concern 

is that if the financial institution got in trouble to begin with, and 

we are hanging onto some of the same management, you know, 

there is a potential problem. Does the Bankruptcy Code provide 

sufficient methods to remove these bad managers? 

Mr. HESSLER. It does. It does. First of all, just some background 

context from that. As I said, in my experience the overwhelming 

majority of cases, the overwhelming number of Chapter 11 cases, 

were not caused by bad actions by management. They tend to be 

balance sheet restructurings either having to do with macroeconomic effects that were unanticipated, or potentially entirely 

justifiable business decisions that turned out to be wrong, but not 

the type of malfeasance or other type of actions that would otherwise warrant, as Title II would upon the invocation of proceedings, 

simply cleaning the slate and removing all of the top directors and 

officers. 

So like I said, in my experience that would actually be disastrous 

if you did that, because you would have a rudderless ship going 

into bankruptcy. And what Title II anticipated was not just regulatory help, but the employment of various consultants and third 

parties to otherwise assist in what is going to be a very rapid 

transfer of assets and then liquidation. It is extremely impractical, 

in my opinion, that that could be effected that quickly in a way 

that doesn’t otherwise cause massive chaos and confusion. 

And the last thing I would add to your direct question is the 

Bankruptcy Code already provides that creditors or other parties in 

interest can seek the appointment of a trustee. And the trustee has 

the powers to otherwise relieve the debtors of directors and officers 

if, in fact, that is warranted by the circumstances. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I see, Professor Jackson, you have got your 

hand up. You want to weigh in here? 

Mr. JACKSON. One other concurring comment with respect to 

that. The system assumes that there may be utility to continuing 

the management. The management may or may not have been responsible. In the case of the 2008, it was sort of a systemic-wide 

use of the mortgages that everybody did. But the Bankruptcy Code, 

whether through the trust or through the ownership—remember, 

the ownership of the—the beneficial owners of this new entity, this 

bridge company, are the people left behind, the old long-term debt 

and equity interests that are left behind, and the debtor, and like 

any corporation that is functioning, they ultimately have the control and ability to replace both the board and management, and I 

think that is as it should be. They may decide to, and they may 

decide not to, but they are the right people to be making that decision. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. I see my time is up. 
90 

We will now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Well, let’s suppose that a Federal Government backstop as a 

creditor of last resort is a mechanism in place should this legislation be signed into law, passed and signed into law. And let’s assume that the Federal Government then uses taxpayer money to 

assist or bridge the chasm between when the bankruptcy is filed 

to a more stable period, thus avoiding a catastrophic meltdown. 

Let’s say that that is in place. 

Does this legislation insulate the bad actors, namely those who 

control a large unaccountable business, that brought the business 

to that point? Does this legislation insulate that kind of malfeasance, which could border upon willful behavior that could even implicate some criminal law violations? But does this legislation insulate those types of bad actors and shield them from accountability? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Representative Johnson, I don’t think it shields 

anyone from liability. And, in fact, remember that if this bank is 

going to be continuing in business, it still is a regulated entity. So 

whatever actions need to be taken with respect to any sort of malfeasance of the kind that you are talking about are still available. 

Mr. HESSLER. Just to add to that, to echo Mr. Bernstein, the legislation in no way places any limitations on the ability to otherwise 

address those issues. 

The other thing I would just note, the Federal Government, both 

the legislators as well as regulators, are entirely understandably 

and entirely justifiably focused on remedial actions for fraud, mismanagement, and things like that that would occur. 

The one thing I would just, you know, highlight or reiterate is 

nobody is more motivated to address those issues than creditors, 

because they are the ones who are even more directly impacted. So 

there is already an enormous amount of incentivization and investigatory powers that creditors have to make sure that, to the extent 

those circumstances exist, that they are remedied. And creditors do 

not hesitate to go and seek the appointment of a trustee and the 

removal of management and directors and officers if, in fact, there 

is any credible evidence of the type of malfeasance or even criminal 

actions that you just mentioned. 

Mr. LUBBEN. If I could add, Representative Johnson, I did want 

to say—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Get a little closer to the microphone. 

Mr. LUBBEN. Okay. I did want to say that I do think that if the 

circumstances arise that you indicate, where the Federal Government is providing funding to a failed financial institution, the Federal Government should have the rights of any other—that any 

other DIP lender would have in that circumstance. And therefore, 

I do have some concerns with the special trustee provisions in this 

bill, that they complicate the ability for the Federal Government, 

for example, to demand an equity stake in the bridge entity. If taxpayer money is at risk in the reorganization of a financial institution, the taxpayers, to my mind, should have some stake in the upside of that financial institution, too. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Professor Jackson? 
91 

Mr. JACKSON. I basically concur with the statements that have 

already been made. The only place there would be any insulation 

at all, as Don Bernstein suggested, you might insulate the trustee, 

the directors of the company for the filing of the bankruptcy case 

itself, which I think is a wise thing. But other than that, they are 

subject to regulatory authority, they are subject to rule of law, they 

are subject to criminal prosecution. And I think importantly to 

note, they are subject to the debtor, which is going to have the 

long-term debt holders, and they would have an incentive not only 

to remove the management that they think may have done something, but actually seek funds from them, because that may be 

some of the funding that they could get in terms of their own reorganization of the debtor or whatever, liquidation of the debtor. So 

I think there is lots of incentives here not to let bad actors get 

away with it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. To date are any of you aware of anyone who has 

been prosecuted for their role in causing the great recession? It 

looks like there is no—none of our witnesses can speak on that, so 

I assume that that means nobody knows of anyone who has been 

prosecuted. I will refrain from asking whether or not you think 

that there is anyone who should be prosecuted, but I will ask this 

question: Will this legislation work without a Federal Government—— 

Mr. BACHUS [presiding]. Would they be under immunity if they 

did offer that somebody ought to be prosecuted? 

Mr. JOHNSON. They probably have some legislative immunity 

since they are testifying, but we won’t put them in that spot. 

But would this legislation work without a Federal Government 

backstop as a creditor of last resort? 

Mr. LUBBEN. The legislation will work. It would obviously work, 

I think, much better with the Federal Government providing liquidity, because in the context of a financial crisis, you probably 

cannot depend on the free market, the private market providing 

the degree of liquidity a large financial institution is going to require. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Hessler, would you disagree with that? 

Mr. HESSLER. I would not disagree with that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Professor Jackson? 

Mr. JACKSON. No. And I actually have a pragmatic concern that 

since the orderly liquidation fund is available under Title II of 

Dodd-Frank, if something comparable to that is not available to the 

bridge company in a bankruptcy proceeding, there may still be 

powerful reasons to use Title II of Dodd-Frank to access the orderly 

liquidation fund, where I would rather have the bankruptcy proceeding take precedence. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I agree with everything the others have said. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. With that, I will yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Let me start off saying lender of last resort, or whether that is 

the government or someone else, we think that is maybe something 

for the Financial Services Committee to address, and we have tried 

to structure this text to avoid going there. But it is something that 

is worthy of consideration. I do understand that. 
92 

And I will start with Mr. Bernstein. The Financial Institution 

Bankruptcy Act deploys a very quick process where assets are 

transferred in a time frame that can be as short as 24 hours. Do 

you believe this expediency is necessary, or can a financial institution endure a longer bankruptcy process? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I do believe it is necessary. I will 

make a reference to the movie ‘‘It’s a Wonderful Life’’ with Jimmy 

Stewart. You remember what happened at the building and loan 

when there was a run on the bank, and he was able to get everybody in the room and say, you are a depositor, but don’t take your 

money out because your money is in your neighbor’s house. 

Well, that is what banks do. They are in the business of maturity 

transformation, and they can’t liquify their assets in the face of a 

run. And if you end up having a prolonged bankruptcy proceeding, 

and they aren’t fixed very quickly, which this bill permits you to 

do because of the recapitalization it allows, you end up having a 

run that becomes unmanageable; whereas if you fix it, and you are 

able to go back into the market and get credit, the bank will stabilize. And that is really the objective here, and you can only do 

that if it is fast. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

And, Professor Jackson, I might ask you the same question. Do 

you have any input on that response? 

Mr. JACKSON. No. I agree with the response. The comment I 

would make is that you need the rapidity for two reasons. One, you 

need to restore market credibility, otherwise I think it will spread 

to other institutions. 

The second reason is you are staying a lot of players in order to 

have this happen. You are staying all the qualified financial contracts. You are staying a lot of things because you want to keep everything in place for the transfer. And it seems to me that that 

itself is a powerful reason to call for rapid, essentially 48-hour, resolution of this. It would be nice if it could be longer, but I just don’t 

think it is practical. 

Mr. BACHUS. Yeah. I think the text we are using is 48 hours, or 

2 days. If the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act were enacted 

today, or in law today, and you had a Lehman-style insolvency a 

year from now, say, would the bill improve the resolution process 

for that firm, and would the result be better than the result we had 

in the Lehman bankruptcy? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I think the bill, plus some of the 

other things that have been going on, would make it a lot better. 

First of all, financial firms are a lot better capitalized today than 

they were when Lehman Brothers failed. In addition, the Federal 

Reserve is going to impose a long-term debt requirement, which is 

going to create loss-absorbing debt at the holding company level. 

And once you have got those two things, you then have a situation 

where this legislation could really make a difference and permit a 

company to actually be resolved very efficiently. 

Mr. BACHUS. Professor Jackson? 

Mr. JACKSON. One other thing to add to that. And I actually 

think Lehman Brothers was—Harvey Miller’s work for them was 

magical under the circumstances. Remember, they had done no 

prebankruptcy planning whatsoever. The board had not even con-
93 

sidered it. One of the great features of Title I of Dodd-Frank is the 

resolution plan living wills that are focused on bankruptcy so that 

you are not going to have a situation again in which a company 

like Lehman Brothers needs to enter bankruptcy, not having a clue 

what it is going to do once it is in bankruptcy. So I think the living 

wills are also an important part of the background here. 

Mr. BACHUS. Right. And at this time I am going to interrupt my 

questioning and let the former Chairman of the full Committee Mr. 

Conyers start his questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you for your generosity, Chairman Bachus. 

I merely wanted to raise this aspect in the granting of Subchapter V relief in terms of the very short windows of time for 

these decisions to be made. On page 6 it is 12 hours; on page 7 it 

is 14 hours; page 8 it is 14 hours. And I am just wondering can 

we be assured that the judicial role is meaningful when you have 

to be looking at your watch at the same time that you are making 

humongous kinds of decisionmaking? Could you talk with me about 

that for a little while, gentlemen? 

Mr. JACKSON. I will take a stab at it. It is a difficult question. 

Obviously, all of us would like a judicial process to have more time, 

but it is offset by some need for speed. 

A couple of just sort of background comments. Yes, I don’t think 

there is time for a whole lot of consideration, but it does bring in 

the important regulators, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC, 

whose perspective—if their perspective is contrary to that of the 

debtor, for example, who files, I think that will be a very interesting hearing before the bankruptcy judge. The bankruptcy judge 

does not have to approve the transfer. 

But the second point I would make is once you have filed, it is 

almost a self-fulfilling prophecy that you need to resolve this firm. 

This firm is not going to easily get out of bankruptcy on its own 

because of the market signal it sent by being in bankruptcy. So 

once the case is commenced, I am not sure there is a whole lot of 

people who are harmed by the speed in which this happens as long 

as you have well-established, preidentified parties who get left behind. Everybody else goes with the company and presumably will 

not be harmed. And the equity and the whatever the debt, the 

long-term debt, whatever, the capital structure debt, are people 

who know ahead of time that they are going to be left behind, they 

know their priority, and it seems to me under those circumstances 

their ex-post remedies are probably the best we can do under these 

circumstances. 

Mr. CONYERS. Any other comments on this? 

Mr. HESSLER. I would tend to agree with that. And I addressed 

in both my written testimony, as well as I spoke of today, that it 

is highly unusual. And as a debtor practitioner, I can imagine how 

chaotic that would be to be dealing with those time periods. 

I would note as a practical matter that I think there is a high 

likelihood that if a debtor is on the brink of being told that an involuntary is going to be commenced against it, that there is a high 

likelihood—it would probably go ahead and commence its own voluntary proceeding so as to continue to maintain control of its case. 

And if a debtor itself opted to commence that voluntary proceeding, 

these very compressed time periods for the appeal, they are irrele-
94 

vant at that point in time because no one is going to be challenging 

the debtor’s determination that, given its insolvency, a bankruptcy 

proceeding is appropriate under the law. 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I agree with what has been said. I also want to 

make one other point. We have to look at what the outcome of the 

proceeding is. Unlike other cases where you are doing a section 363 

transfer very quickly, this asset is not being transferred away to 

a third party, so there is no question of whether there is an adequate price or not. It makes the decision much easier for the court 

because the asset is being preserved for the benefit of the estate. 

So not only with respect to the time periods for an involuntary 

filing, and I agree with everything that has been said about how 

likely it is, once there is an involuntary filing, people are not going 

to be prejudiced because you really need to be in the proceeding. 

But more importantly, the consequence of that is going to be the 

asset is going to be protected through the process of moving it to 

a place where it is safe and can continue to maintain its value 

rather than being transferred away. 

Mr. CONYERS. My second question was dealing with the requirement that the pleadings be filed under seal. And I take it that this 

would also prevent runs and panic and so forth from happening. 

So I am going to go to my last question, which is by allowing a 

failed bank holding company to spin off its subsidiaries so they can 

continue to function, does this present a possible issue of moral 

hazard? Because they are going on unimpeded, and they are really 

in big trouble, but maybe nobody knows it. 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. May I answer that, Representative Conyers? It 

is Don Bernstein. 

There are two things that are going on here. One is, yes, the 

company is continuing in business, but there is a group of creditors 

and shareholders who are going to be left behind and are going to 

be suffering the losses. And the question of moral hazard is going 

to surround making sure that they understand that prior to any 

failures so that they do proper monitoring and risk management, 

and they know that they are going to suffer the losses if this happens. So I think there is, you know, actually some positive impact 

of this in terms of the ability of the market to regulate these companies. 

Mr. CONYERS. Professor? 

Mr. LUBBEN. I might be somewhat more skeptical about the 

moral-hazard issue. I think the moral-hazard issue might still well 

prevail. But I think that goes back to my comment in my opening 

remarks, that the insolvency process has to be a small piece of a 

much larger regulatory approach. And probably moral hazard is 

not best addressed through the insolvency process; it is best addressed through the financial institution regulators more directly. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions, and 

I thank you for your generosity. 

And I thank the witnesses. This has been a very, very special 

panel, as far as I am concerned. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. As you know, I have the 

greatest respect for you over the last 22 years, and you served as 

my Chairman when I first arrived here on the Hill. So thank you. 
95 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. I am going to ask some questions. 

We were talking about Lehman Brothers, and, of course, Lehman 

Brothers, because of Bear Stearns, I think most people expected 

Lehman to receive a government assistance. And I think there was 

a reliance by Lehman, to a certain extent, that that was coming, 

and it never came. 

But it did serve a benefit, in that I think it highlighted some 

needed changes in the Bankruptcy Code if you were going to choose 

that as opposed to a government-assisted resolution. So I think we 

may have benefited from that. Certainly, the Lehman shareholders 

did. 

I am going to ask Professor Jackson, can Subchapter V be used 

to resolve financial institutions that have international operations 

and subsidiaries? And I think Mr. Conyers sort of mentioned that. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, it can, but, obviously, a limitation of any U.S. 

Law, whether it be bankruptcy law or whether it be Title 2 of 

Dodd-Frank, is that it cannot directly impact foreign operations 

that are incorporated in other countries. It can set out a template, 

and it can give confidence to the foreign regulators that the rule 

of law will be followed, but I think that what you need in addition—and I think it is taking place—is international conversations 

and coordinations around this issue. 

I think it is hugely helpful that the European Union and the 

FDIC have agreed that single-point-of-entry-like proceedings are 

the appropriate way to go. I have a lot of confidence that they will 

work on these issues of cross-country collaborations, which I don’t 

think we can solve on our own. 

I would just make the point that whatever the problems exist for 

bankruptcy law, they are going to exist for Title 2 of Dodd-Frank, 

as well. The one difference is maybe foreign regulators would prefer seeing a regulator do this than a bankruptcy judge do this, but 

I think a lot of that depends on the FDIC’s confidence in the bankruptcy process. And if they give their imprimatur to the process, 

then I think there will be very little distinction between whether 

it is Title 2 of Dodd-Frank or section 5 of Chapter 11 under this 

proposed bill. 

Mr. BACHUS. Right. 

And I guess the fact that it is only the top holding company that 

files the bankruptcy, it does maybe lessen some of those complications. 

Mr. JACKSON. Somewhat. 

Mr. BACHUS. But not—— 

Mr. JACKSON. The problem is—and the bill effectively addresses 

this, but of course it cannot address it effectively 

extraterritorially—is a lot of the contracts that you want to keep 

in place at the operating subsidiary levels, like the qualified financial contracts and others, may have cross-default provisions, may 

have change-of-control provisions that you don’t want them to be 

able to enforce, and so we are still going to need help from the foreign regulators in keeping those things in place. 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. 

Mr. Bernstein, do you—— 
96 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. No, I don’t have really anything to add. There 

is also work under way to develop contractual solutions so that if 

you do go through an appropriate proceeding and, for example, a 

bridge company were created that assumed the guarantee and 

what have you, that the contracts would remain in place even in 

foreign countries. 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. 

And any suggestions you all have on whether there ought to be 

any statutory language in this bill or in a financial services bill or 

companion bill, perhaps? 

Professor Jackson, do you believe that enactment of Subchapter 

V into law would reduce the necessity for regulators to initiate a 

Title 2 resolution proceeding? 

Mr. JACKSON. Quite clearly, yes. 

Mr. BACHUS. And, Mr. Hessler, do you agree? 

Mr. HESSLER. I do agree, as well. 

Mr. BACHUS. Okay. 

I have been told that Mr. Farenthold asked you questions concerning the Federal Reserve and some other questions, so I am not 

going to repeat those. 

My final question, for Professor Lubben: In your written testimony, you indicated that it may be better to keep the equity of the 

newly formed bridge company in the possession of the debtor. Are 

there any risks associated with this proposed approach, particularly with the perception of the bridge company existing in, rather 

than out of, the bankruptcy process? 

Mr. LUBBEN. This goes to the question of separating the management of the bridge company from the ownership of the equity of the 

bridge company. 

I think there would be ways to make it clear that management 

is distinct from share ownership and that it would still allow the 

debtor, the old debtor, to access the value of those shares if they 

needed to fund their bankruptcy case. And I think, as I suggested 

in my written testimony, these may be a little bit more clear-cut. 

So the risk is just not making that distinction clear, but I think 

it could be made clear. So I think it is a solvable problem. 

Mr. BACHUS. Well, I think there was some mention earlier by 

Mr. Bernstein or Professor Jackson, I think, that if you allowed, 

you know—that particularly the filing of a bankruptcy would not 

lead to any liability on the part of the board of directors. 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Yeah, we both mentioned that. We think that is 

an important feature so that you encourage voluntary, as opposed 

to the involuntary, proceedings. 

And if I might just comment on the question that Professor 

Lubben just discussed, one of the difficulties, which was mentioned 

by Professor Jackson, is the lack of understanding by foreign regulators of the bankruptcy process and moving the bridge company 

back into private ownership, albeit a trustee, but not ownership by 

the bankrupt holding company, and having it back in an environment where it is dealing directly with its primary regulators and 

the primary regulators are in control, and those are the people who 

are talking to the foreign regulators, may go a long way to stabilizing the new company’s relationship with the regulators so they 

don’t take precipitous action. 
97 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. 

Mr. HESSLER. If I could just add one quick thought on that, what 

happens at present under just a conventional Section 363 sale, 

even one that happens quickly where most of the debtor’s assets 

are sold, you know, to somebody entirely outside of bankruptcy, in 

those circumstances what typically happens is nearly all of the 

management and certainly all of the management that is tied to 

the operations of the assets that are being transferred go with the 

assets. And I expect that that would happen here once the transfer 

happens under the single-point-of-entry approach. 

To Professor Lubben’s point, also, about potential disjunction between, you know, sort of, creditor access to the assets, you know, 

where the management otherwise lines up, my instinct is that 

creditors would be very supportive of management going over into 

the bridge company along with the assets, given that it is their economic interest in the equity being held in the trust that is ultimately going to come to them through the plan distribution. So, 

you know, my instinct is that creditors actually would be heartened 

that this approach contemplates that. 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. Thank you. 

I might ask this. You know, the Senate bill has been mentioned. 

They actually have Chapter 14 as opposed to a Subchapter 11, but 

is there any—is that a matter of substance, or is that just—— 

Mr. JACKSON. Not really a matter of substance. I actually think 

Subchapter V of Chapter—my Hoover counterparts may not like 

me to say this, but I think Subchapter V of Chapter 11 is the cleaner way to go. 

Mr. BACHUS. Uh-huh. Thank you. 

Mr. LUBBEN. And I would actually concur on that. And I think 

there actually may be a subtle substantive reason to do it this 

way—namely, it makes clear that the other parts of Chapter 11 

still apply to—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Yeah. And I think that was our reasoning, that it 

is a part of—it is not a separate—— 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I agree with that. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. HESSLER. As do I. 

Mr. BACHUS. I was afraid to ask that, but I am glad I did. But, 

you know, it obviously is something you want to know. And I don’t 

think they have any objection to that either. 

This concludes today’s hearing, and thanks to all our witnesses 

for attending. It is always good for you to hear compliments about 

your abilities. Witnesses don’t always get that from the panel, but 

there was unanimous recognition of all of your qualifications, experience, and abilities. And we appreciate you giving your valuable 

time to us. I am glad you are not billing at your normal hourly 

rate, for the attorneys. 

But, without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days 

to submit additional written questions for witnesses or additional 

materials for the record. 

This hearing is adjourned. And I thank you for your patience. 

[Whereupon, at 6:06 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(99) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 

f 
129 

———— 

Note: The Subcommittee did not receive a response to these questions at the time of the printing of this hearing record. 
130 

f 
131 
132 
133 
134 

f 
135 
136 
137 

f 
138 
139 

Æ