1

Filed 11/2/20s

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Manson Construction Company (Manson), a marine construction and 

dredging company, challenges the trial court’s determination that Manson’s 

marine vessels, which carried sludge and other dredged material from 

harbors to disposal sites, were not “engaged in the transportation of freight” 

within the meaning of a property tax exemption known as the Vessel Use 

Exemption (Cal. Const. art. XIII, § 3, subd. (l)), and therefore did not qualify 

for the exemption. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Manson owns a “fleet of heavy marine construction and dredging 

equipment” that “includes 60 specialized vessels and over 50 barges.” After 

MANSON CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA 

COSTA, 

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 A159144

 (Contra Costa County 

 Sup. Ct. No. MSC1700713)
2

the Contra Costa County Assessor’s Office assessed property taxes on the 

value of Manson’s vessels for tax years 2013 and 2014, Manson filed two

administrative appeals for those tax years with the Contra Costa County 

Assessment Appeals Board (the Board), claiming some of its vessels were 

exempt from taxation under the Vessel Use Exemption, which provides that 

“[v]essels of more than 50 tons burden in this State and engaged in the 

transportation of freight or passengers” “are exempt from property taxation.” 

(Cal. Const. art. XIII, § 3, subd. (l).) 

A. 2013 Tax Appeal

At a hearing on Manson’s 2013 appeal with the Board, Manson claimed 

the Vessel Use Exemption applied to ten of its vessels in tax year 2013. First, 

Manson claimed the exemption applied to four dump scows. Manson 

explained that its dredge cranes would reach down into the water, pull out 

sludge and other material (dredged material) from the bottom of the harbor, 

and load the dredged material into dump scows. Manson would then carry 

the dredged material inside the dump scows to disposal sites where the 

middle of the dump scows would open up and the dredged material would fall 

out. Second, Manson claimed the exemption applied to four barges that 

carried construction materials to piers and other locations where Manson was 

conducting marine construction. Third, Manson claimed the exemption 

applied to two tugboats, which were used to move the dump scows and barges 

from one place to another because dump scows and barges do not have motors 

and cannot move on their own. A Manson representative stated it is a 

continuous process whereby a dump scow is filled with dredged material 

while another dump scow that has already been filled goes to a disposal site 

to dump the dredged material, then returns to the harbor to be refilled. 
3

Manson presented evidence that, during tax year 2013, the Army Corps 

of Engineers (Army Corps) hired Manson to dredge the Oakland harbor to 

make the waterway deeper for large ships.1 Manson submitted a 

September 19, 2013 contract it entered into with Army Corps entitled 

“Oakland Inner & Outer Harbor Channel Maintenance Dredging Project.” 

The “Job Description” section of the contract stated in pertinent part: “The 

work consists of maintenance dredging of Oakland Inner & Outer Harbor 

Channel of approximately 421,000 cubic yards of materials, to provide a 

[certain] authorized depth . . . for the Inner Harbor and Outer Harbor 

Channels. Dredged material excavated from the Oakland Inner and Outer 

Harbor Channels shall be transported and off loaded at [two specified 

disposal sites] and at any permitted upland site of the Contractor’s choosing.” 

Manson dredged the harbor pursuant to the contract and disposed of 

the dredged material in two locations. According to Manson, it took about 8 

to 12 hours to transport the dredged material to one of the disposal sites; 

Manson did not know how long it took to transport the dredged material to 

the other disposal site. A Manson representative estimated that it usually 

takes about 18 hours to fill a dump scow with dredged material. The chair of 

the Board asked, “Do you consider sludge that’s dug up on the bay to be 

freight?” A Manson representative responded that he did, because “[s]o long 

as somebody is hiring you to move it, it’s considered freight. . . .” A Board 

1 Manson gave additional examples of dredging and other work it has 

performed over the years, but it appears that most, if not all, of the other 

work was performed outside of the 2013 tax year, and was therefore not 

relevant in determining whether the vessels were exempt from property 

taxation that tax year. 
4

member commented, “my impression is that your particular job is to dredge, 

and secondary function is to get rid of the dredge” “or the sludge.” 

The Contra Costa County Assessor’s Office (the County) conceded all of 

the vessels at issue were “more than 50 tons burden” but argued they did not 

qualify for the Vessel Use Exemption because Manson was required to—but 

did not—“properly and timely claim the exemption” by filing a “vessel

property statement” known as Form 576-D. The County asserted that “even 

if [Manson] had filed [Form 576-D], . . . [it] still would not qualify for the . . . 

exemption because they’re not engaged in the transportation of freight as 

defined under the law.” 

Manson responded that the County never suggested or instructed 

Manson to submit the form and instead provided Manson with a different 

form, Form 571, which Manson did complete and submit. Manson also 

argued its vessels qualified for the exemption because the vessels were hired 

to transport dredged material and the dredged material constituted “freight.” 

After the hearing, the parties submitted briefing on the issues and the 

Board issued a written order denying Manson’s request for an exemption on 

the basis that Manson failed to file Form 576-D by April 1 as mandated by 

Revenue and Taxation Code section 251 subdivision (a) and Board 

procedures. As to the substantive issue of whether the vessels transported 

freight, the Board stated only that the vessels “are of more than 50 tons 

burden and do not carry passengers. They are used to carry the spoils of 

[Manson’s] dredging operations out to sea where they are dumped.” 

B. 2014 Tax Appeal

At a hearing on Manson’s 2014 appeal with the Board, Manson claimed 

the Vessel Use Exemption applied to six vessels—four dump scows and two 

tugboats. Manson acknowledged it did not file Form 576-D and explained 
5

that by the time it hired a new accountant who informed Manson that its 

vessels might qualify for the exemption, the time to file Form 576-D for both 

tax years 2013 and 2014 had passed. After extensive discussion regarding

whether Manson’s claim should be denied based on its failure to file Form 

576-D, the Board stated it was “withholding judgment on that . . . issue” and 

was going to proceed on the other issue of whether the Vessel Use Exemption 

applied to the six vessels. 

As before, Manson explained that it dredged material with dredge 

cranes, placed the dredged material onto dump scows, and used tugboats to 

take the dump scows to disposal sites. The County again argued Manson was 

not entitled to the exemption because it failed to file Form 576-D. The 

County also argued that to qualify for the exemption, the vessels must be 

transporting “freight,” which “has a very specific meaning that’s defined in 

case law. And it’s basically transporting goods from a consignor to a 

consignee. It’s not dredging materials and transporting it and dumping it.” 

The County argued the dredged material has no consignor or consignee and is 

“not delivered or sold to a third party.” The County noted that customers 

paid Manson to dredge materials, and that the transportation and disposal of 

the dredged material was simply “part of the [dredging] service.” The County 

argued Manson had also failed to submit sufficient documentation to show its 

vessels were engaged in the transportation of freight because it presented no 

evidence regarding the number of days the vessels were used for 

transportation of freight in tax year 2014, versus the number of days they 

were idle or performed other work. 

The Board issued a Findings and Decision stating Manson “did not 

meet its burden of establishing that any of its vessels are engaged in the 

transportation of freight or passengers. Instead, the evidence shows that 
6

[Manson] is hired primarily to perform dredging services, and its vessels are 

primarily used to move dredged waste, such as sand, silt, and mud, as a 

byproduct of the dredging services it provides.” The Board found that 

Manson’s customers “do not own the dredged waste, because it is dredged 

from the bottom of the bay, port, or ocean. The byproduct is not a ‘good’ . . . 

[Citation.] In sum, the evidence establishes that [Manson’s] vessels are not 

engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers, and that there is no 

consignor-consignee relationship between [Manson] and its customers.” The 

Board found Manson’s claim also failed because Manson did not file Form 

576-D: “[Manson] did not follow the proper procedural steps [established by 

the Board of Equalization] to qualify any of its vessels for [the Vessel Use 

Exemption].” 

C. Superior Court Action

On April 24, 2017, Manson filed a complaint in Contra Costa County 

Superior Court against the County alleging causes of action for declaratory 

and injunctive relief, constructive trust, accounting, money had and received, 

mandamus, violation of state and federal constitution, and conversion. In its 

second amended complaint—which is the operative complaint—Manson 

asserted a single cause of action for “Refund of Property Taxes” and alleged 

the County “erroneously collected property tax bills” in tax years 2013 and 

2014. 

On February 9, 2018, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings, 

asserting Manson’s vessels did not transport freight as a matter of law and 

therefore did not qualify for the Vessel Use Exemption. The trial court 

denied the motion on the basis that Manson had alleged the federal 

government hired it to transport freight. The court emphasized that “[t]he 

parties are at the pleading stage” and stated, “For all the court knows, 
7

[Manson may have] a ‘Transportation Agreement’ or some other contract 

with the Federal Government. . . .” 

After the matter was set for trial, Manson filed a bifurcation motion 

seeking to have the trial court first decide whether Manson should be allowed 

to introduce evidence beyond the administrative record, before proceeding to 

trial on the substantive issue of whether Manson’s vessels qualified for the 

Vessel Use Exemption. The court denied the motion, stating, “There is no 

reason to grant a bifurcation. The standard of review on a tax refund 

case . . . confines the court to the administrative record, whether the issues 

are factual or legal in nature.” 

Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings and the matter was 

submitted on the parties’ trial briefs and supporting papers, the 

administrative record of Manson’s 2013 and 2014 appeals before the Board, 

and arguments of counsel. On October 23, 2019, the trial court issued a 

judgment denying Manson’s claim for refund of property taxes, stating:

“Under any standard of review, Manson is not entitled to its claimed property 

tax exemption because it was not transporting freight and it failed to timely 

claim the exemption in the manner required.” The court determined there 

was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings that Manson’s vessels 

were “ ‘used to carry the spoils of [Manson’s] dredging operations out to sea 

where they are dumped,’ ” that Manson was “hired primarily to perform 

dredging services not transportation services,” and that “its customers ‘do not 

own the dredged material because it is dredged from the bottom of the bay, 

port, or ocean.’ ” The court then stated: “If a pure legal issue remains for 

decision by the court, it is whether the carrying of dredged material not 

owned by customers out to sea where it is dumped qualifies as the 

transportation of freight. The court concludes it does not.” Noting that the 
8

word “freight” is defined as property delivered by a consignor to a consignee, 

the court determined that the “underwater dirt” that Manson dredged and 

transported for the purpose of “dump[ing] . . . at sea” was not freight. “No

one delivered the material to Manson and Manson delivered it to no one.” 

The court also found Manson failed to file the proper form, Form 576-D, to 

claim the exemption. Manson appeals. 

DISCUSSION

We conclude Manson’s vessels did not qualify for the Vessel Use 

Exemption for tax years 2013 and 2014 because the vessels, which carried 

sludge and other materials dredged from the bottom of the harbor to disposal 

sites, were not “engaged in the transportation of freight” within the meaning 

of the exemption.

A. General Principles

Under the existing constitutional scheme, “[a]ll property is taxable” 

“unless otherwise provided.” (Cal.Const., art. XIII, § 1, subd. (a).) 

Constitutional provisions granting exemptions from taxation, such as the 

Vessel Use Exemption that is at issue in this case, “ ‘are strictly construed to 

the end that such concession will be neither enlarged nor extended beyond 

the plain meaning of the language employed.’ ” (Smith-Rice Heavy Lifts, Inc. 

v. Los Angeles County (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 190, 194 (Smith-Rice Heavy 

Lifts).) “The rule has long been established in California that a presumption 

exists in favor of the [v]alidity of a tax assessment” and that it is the 

taxpayer’s burden “to prove . . . the assessment was unauthorized by law.” 

(Id. at p. 195.) In interpreting an enactment, we give words “ ‘their ordinary 

and popular signification’ ” if they are “ ‘reasonably free from ambiguity and 

uncertainty.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Craig (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 58, 61.) 

If the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, it is 
9

appropriate to turn to extrinsic aids, including the legislative history of the 

enactment, to ascertain its meaning. (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. 

v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 29-30.) In the 

context of a tax exemption, any doubts concerning the applicability of the 

exemption are to be resolved against the taxpayer. (Amdahl Corp. v. County 

of Santa Clara (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 604, 614.)

A county assessment appeals board “ ‘is a constitutional agency 

exercising quasi-judicial powers delegated to the agency by the Constitution’

[citation] . . . .” (Farr v. County of Nevada (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 669, 679.) 

“In light of the semijudicial status of local boards, ‘[the Board’s] factual 

determinations are entitled on appeal to the same deference due a judicial 

decision, i.e., review under the substantial evidence standard.’ [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.) When the assessment appeals board decides a question of law, such as 

the interpretation of a statute, courts are authorized to conduct an 

independent reassessment. (Ibid.) In reviewing a property tax assessment, 

however, the court presumes the assessor’s office properly performed its duty 

and that the assessment was both regularly and correctly made. (California 

Minerals, L.P. v. County of Kern (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1022; see 

Auerbach v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2008)

167 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1442 [gave deference to the Board’s interpretation of 

an exemption given the Board’s expertise in property tax matters]; Yamaha

Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12 [courts 

are more likely to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation where 

“ ‘the legal text to be interpreted is technical, obscure, complex, open-ended, 

or entwined with issues of fact, policy, and discretion’ ”].)
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B. Vessel Use Exemption

The Vessel Use Exemption was enacted in 1914 “to assist the shipping 

industry in this state.” (County of Los Angeles v. Craig, supra, 38 Cal.App.2d 

at p. 61.) “[T]he history of the constitutional amendment . . . particularly the 

arguments to the voters at the time of its initial adoption in 1914, and 

readoption in 1932, makes clear that the principal purpose behind the 

creation of this tax exemption was to insure that California obtained, and 

thereafter retained, its fair share of the increased maritime industry 

resulting from the opening of the Panama Canal and the national effort to 

increase the size of America’s merchant fleet in the face of the then 

impending first World War. The obvious intent of its proponents was to 

encourage persons and corporations owning vessels engaged in interstate and 

international operations to establish their headquarters and home ports in 

California rather than in other coastal states which had theretofore extended 

tax benefits to such maritime operations. [Citations.]” (Smith-Rice Heavy 

Lifts, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 197.)2

The Vessel Use Exemption has been expanded beyond the authors’ 

original limited intent of supporting merchant fleet and interstate and 

international commerce. For example, in Alalunga Sport Fishes, Inc. v. 

2 Manson has asked us to take judicial notice of additional legislative 

materials, including documents that show the exemption was proposed 

because other states such as New York and Washington already exempted 

vessels from property taxation, while California did not. Manson also argues 

the materials show the Legislature intended to give the word “freight” a 

broad meaning because “the language of [the] . . . amendment eliminated any 

reference to the exemption as applying to ‘ocean commerce,’ ” in contrast to 

New York and Washington’s laws, which explicitly limit their exemptions to 

“ocean commerce” or “trade.” We grant Manson’s unopposed request for 

judicial notice and consider the materials to the extent they are relevant to 

our determination of the appeal. 
11

County of San Diego (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 663, 665, 668 (Alalunga), the 

exemption was extended to include sportfishing vessels that were hired to 

transport passengers out to sea to fish or sightsee. In Star & Crescent Boat 

Co. v. County of San Diego (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 534, 535, 539 (Star & 

Crescent Boat), the exemption was extended to barges and tugs that were 

hired by oil companies to transport the oil companies’ petroleum products 

intrastate, from Los Angeles to San Diego. (See Smith-Rice Heavy Lifts, 

supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 198 [observing that the exemption is no longer 

“restricted to ‘seagoing vessels’ engaged ‘only in trade with foreign 

countries’ ” and has been extended to include vessels “ ‘employed in the

coasting trade or fisheries’ ”].) 

Despite these expansions, however, the exemption is still limited to 

vessels that are actually “ ‘ “engaged in the transportation of freight or 

passengers.” ’ ” “ ‘This phrase must be given some meaning’ ” and should not 

be interpreted to mean any vessel that carries any property or persons. 

(Smith-Rice Heavy Lifts, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 196, quoting Dragich v. 

Los Angeles County (1939) 30 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 (Dragich).) “[T]o give this 

phrase such meaning would be to render it meaningless” as all vessels are 

used to carry some sort of “property or persons or both.” (Dragich, supra, at 

p. 399.) 

In Dragich, the plaintiffs, as part of their own fishing operation, sent 

their fishing boats out to sea to catch fish and return to their port or go to 

other ports to sell the caught fish. (30 Cal.App.2d at p. 398.) They argued 

the exemption applied because their boats were “ ‘engaged in the 

transportation of freight or passengers’ ” from port to port. (Id. at p. 400.) 

The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating: “The word ‘freight’ has more than 

one meaning but generally denotes property transported by a carrier from a 
12

consignor to a consignee. (Civ. Code, § 2110.) In one accepted sense, it 

means ‘the hire or compensation paid by anyone for the transport of goods’ 

[citation], and when used to denote the property transported, it carries the 

definite implication that the transportation is for hire. A similar implication 

is found in the use of the word ‘passengers.’ A ‘passenger’ is defined as ‘[a]

traveler by some established public conveyance, as a coach, omnibus, 

steamboat, railroad train, etc.’ [Citation.] Said definition implies carriage for 

hire and it further appears that the word ‘passenger’ is quite generally used 

in contradistinction to the word ‘guest.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 399.) “With 

these definitions in mind and reading the phrase as a whole,” the court 

concluded “that the phrase ‘engaged in the transportation of freight or 

passengers’ . . . means ‘engaged in the transportation of property or persons 

for hire.’ ” (Id. at pp. 399-400, italics added.) Because the plaintiffs were 

using their fishing boats to go out to sea to catch fish for wholesale, the 

vessels were not engaged in the transportation of “passengers,” i.e., “persons 

for hire,” and were therefore not exempt from property taxation. (Ibid.) 

Other courts have followed Dragich in concluding that vessels must be 

hired to “transport[]” “freight or passengers” in order to qualify for the 

exemption. In Crivello v. San Diego County (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 713, 715, 

fishing boats that left their port, “manned by a fishing crew, and carrying 

only fishing equipment and sufficient food to supply the crew until the return 

to port with the catch of fish,” did not qualify for the exemption for the same 

reasons set forth in Dragich. In Alalunga, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p. 668, 

the Court of Appeal cited with approval the holding in Dragich that the 

property or persons on the vessels must be transported “for hire.” In 

concluding that sportfishing vessels that took people out to sea to fish or 

sightsee qualified for the exemption, the court emphasized that the people
13

the vessels transported were “not guests, since they pay for being conveyed, 

but are passengers” who purchased tickets to be transported. (Alalunga, 

supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p. 668.) In Crowley Launch & Tugboat Co. v. 

County of Los Angeles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 437, 438, 441 (Crowley Launch & 

Tugboat), the Court of Appeal held a tugboat was not exempt where it was 

used as a “harbor tug” that would attach to a cargo or passenger vessel and 

assist that vessel in navigating the waters and channels of the harbor. In 

reaching this conclusion, the court noted “[t]here were no dealings between 

consignors or consignees of [the] cargo or passengers,” i.e., the tugboat had 

not been hired to transport the cargo or passengers that were on the vessels 

that it towed, but to assist those vessels in navigating the harbor. (Id. at 

p. 438.) 

We note, as the court in Dragich did, that “freight” is defined in Civil 

Code section 2110 in the context of a consignor-consignee relationship, i.e., as 

property that is delivered from a consignor to a consignee. This Civil Code 

section was enacted in 1872 (Civil Code, § 2) and we presume the Legislature 

was aware of the definition of “freight” at the time it enacted the Vessel Use 

Exemption. In addition, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines freight as 

“the compensation paid for the transportation of goods.” (MerriamWebster.com <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/freights> [as of 

Oct. 15, 2020].) The Legislature’s use of the word “freight” therefore suggests 

the exemption was intended to apply to vessels that are hired to carry goods 

from a consignor to a consignee. Further, although courts have expanded the 

scope of the exemption over the years to include fishing boats and intrastate 

(as opposed to interstate and international) commerce, the Legislature has 

never amended the exemption to extend it to vessels that carry any tangible 

item or person for hire. There is also nothing to indicate that the purpose of 
14

the exemption has changed from its original purpose of protecting the 

shipping industry by encouraging commercial shipping and insuring 

California retains its fair share of the merchant shipping industry over other 

states that may provide similar exemptions. The above definitions, the 

context in which the exemption was enacted, and the way in which courts 

have since interpreted the exemption, show that Manson’s vessels were not

“engaged in the transportation of freight” for hire when they moved dredged 

material from the harbor to disposal sites as part of the dredging work they 

performed. 

Manson did not present any relevant authority to show that anyone 

owned or controlled the sludge it dredged, or that the dredged material could 

be considered goods, delivered from a consignor to a consignee. Instead, the 

evidence showed the dump scows and barges were moved from the harbor to 

disposal sites for the purpose of being emptied out so that they could return 

to the harbor and continue to perform the work for which they were hired, 

i.e., to be filled up with more dredged material for disposal. In other words, 

the carrying of the dredged material from the harbor to the disposal sites was 

merely a necessary byproduct of, and incidental to, the dredging work the 

vessels were hired to perform. As noted, in Crowley Launch & Tugboat, 

supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 437, a tugboat that towed vessels that carried cargo or 

passengers was not “engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers” 

because it were hired to assist those vessels in navigating the harbor, not to 

transport the cargo or passenger the vessels carried. Similarly, here,

Manson’s vessels were engaged in a dredging project, not in the 

transportation of goods for hire.

Manson argues that the case of Star & Crescent Boat, supra, 

163 Cal.App.2d 534 supports a broad construction of the word “freight.”
15

According to Manson, the court there held that “freight” includes “raw 

materials” and that “transportation of freight or property means picking up 

the material in one location and dropping it off at another.” The holding in 

Star & Crescent Boat, however, was not as broad as Manson presents it to be. 

There, the court held the exemption applied to barges and tugs where: 

(1) the owners of the barges and tugs were hired by oil companies pursuant to 

contracts entitled “Transportation Agreement” to transport petroleum 

products from Los Angeles to San Diego; (2) the oil companies owned the 

petroleum products that were transported; (3) the contract referred to the 

barges and tugs as “carriers”; and (4) the owners of the vessels paid 

significant transportation taxes to the federal government for transporting 

the oil companies’ products. (163 Cal.App.2d at pp. 535, 538.) Thus, the 

court did not hold that “transportation” simply means picking up material 

and moving it. In contrast to the situation in Star & Crescent Boat, here, the 

evidence shows the contract between Manson and Army Corps was for the 

dredging of the Oakland harbor to make the waterway deeper for large ships. 

The dredged waste was not “goods” like the petroleum products that were 

owned by the oil companies and delivered into the stream of commerce, and 

there was nothing in the record indicating the incidental moving of the 

dredged material to disposal sites triggered federal transportation taxes. 

Manson also points out that the word “freight” has been given broader 

meanings in other contexts. The cases to which Manson cites, however, are 

not from California and do not concern the definition of the word “freight” in 

the context the Vessel Use Exemption. Thus, they do not support Manson’s 

argument that the word “freight” should be interpreted more broadly for 

purposes of the exemption. (See Smith-Rice Heavy Lifts, supra, 256 

Cal.App.2d at p. 199 [tax exemptions are strictly construed].) We conclude 
16

the Vessel Use Exemption did not apply to Manson’s vessels, which were not 

“engaged in the transportation of freight” within the meaning of the 

exemption.3

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The County shall recover its costs on appeal. 

3 The County argues that Manson’s claim for an exemption fails for two 

additional reasons: (1) Manson did not timely file Form 576-D as required by 

statute and Board procedures; and (2) Manson presented insufficient 

evidence to show its vessels were “primarily” engaged in the transportation of 

freight, as required by case law. In light of our conclusion that Manson’s 

vessels did not qualify for the Vessel Use Exemption as they were not 

“engaged in the transportation of freight,” we need not, and do not, address 

these additional arguments.
17

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Siggins, P.J.

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

A159144/Manson Construction Company v. County of Contra Costa
18

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Steve K. Austin

Counsel: Law Offices of Stephen M. Harris, Stephen M. Harris; 

Gangloff and Gangloff, Ronald Gangloff and David 

Gangloff, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sharon L. Anderson, County Counsel, Rebecca J. Hooley 

and Kathleen S. Kizer, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Defendant and Respondent.