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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 

IN TRANSITIONAL STATES:

THE CASES OF LEBANON, ISRAEL-PALESTINE

Dr. Anastasia Filippidou

Editor

November 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-648-4
v

CONTENTS

Foreword ..................................................................vii

1. Introduction .................................................1

Anastasia Filippidou

Part I: Conceptualizing Asymmetric 

Leadership in Transitional Processes ....................15

2. Typologies of Leadership: Levels of 

 Leadership and Approaches to Transition ..... 17 

Anastasia Filippidou 

3. Characteristics of Asymmetric 

 Leadership ............................................................43

Anastasia Filippidou 

4. Asymmetric Leadership and 

 Transitional Processes .......................................71 

Anastasia Filippidou

Part II: Leadership in Volatile and 

Transitional Situations Case Studies .................. 83

5. The Case of Lebanon .........................................85

Elias Hanna

6. The Case of the Israelis

 and Palestinians .................................................141 

Eyal Pascovich

Part III: Conclusions and Recommendations.....169
7. Conclusion and Recommendations .................171 

Anastasia Filippidou

About the Contributors ......................................197

vi
vii

FOREWORD

The United States plays a significant role in the 

Middle East. When dealing with the region, often the 

dilemma is: should there be a strong or weak regional 

leadership in order to facilitate a transitional phase? 

However, this decision is contextual, and a state must 

know what is its own foreign policy. To promote its 

national interests in the long term, the United States 

might have to prioritize the local interests and almost 

altruistically help the regions overcome their internal 

divisions and problems. 

In this book, Dr. Anastasia Filippidou reviews the 

main leadership theories in order to set the foundations for analysis of asymmetric leadership in transitional processes. The report also examines the different leadership types and highlights that, with the 

exception possibly of toxic leadership, it is difficult, 

if not impossible, to determine that a specific type is 

better than another in every situation. According to 

Dr. Filippidou, some leadership styles are likely to 

be more effective in certain situations, and that a really effective leader is one who is able to determine 

the context of the situation and use the most effective 

leadership behavior required at the time. 

The concept of asymmetric leadership is based on 

the notion that, when political leaders find themselves 

in a position which compromises their intents, which 

is often the case during transition, they adapt and adjust to the new realities not necessarily because they 

accept the causes for change, but because they need 

and want to survive. Leaders in transitional processes 

can find themselves in situations that compromise 

their intentions, which is often dictated by broader 

political circumstances and changes in the political 
viii

environment. This idea of a constantly changing environment and its consequences validate the concept 

of asymmetric leadership. Dr. Filippidou conducts a 

review of leadership theory in Chapter 2 in order to 

establish a foundation for this study. Chapter 3 examines the phenomenon and key elements of asymmetric leadership and Chapter 4 examines the role of this 

leadership in transition processes. Part II of this work 

provides the case studies of Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, testing the theories discussed in Part I. In light 

of the unpredictable and always changing nature of 

asymmetric and survivalist leadership, understandably multiple challenges arise for those who have to 

face and deal with such leadership. Consequently, 

the Conclusion refers to specific recommendations for 

U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers in the Middle East.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Anastasia Filippidou

BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH SYNOPSIS

The field of leadership studies is multidisciplinary, 

and inevitably there is a plethora of leadership definitions.1

 As a subject, leadership is very complex because it involves many different factors: the leader, 

followers, society, and even the pace of change. Admittedly, none of these facets will be the same in any 

given scenario, thus leadership is a dynamic process, 

which is complicated to confine within one specific 

and succinct definition. As this book demonstrates, 

even though situations and personalities can be too 

complex to have one size fits all, still human nature 

and leadership have certain transcending common elements allowing to draw lessons that can be transferable and applicable to various situations. As J. Blondel 

argues: 

If one reduces politics to its bare bones, to what is most 

visible to most citizens, it is the national political leaders, both at home and abroad, that remain once everything else has been erased; they are the most universal, 

the most recognized, the most talked about elements 

of political life.2

According to Marcha Geaney, there are so many 

definitions that the word is becoming meaningless,3

while Peter Northouse compares defining leadership 

with the challenge of defining peace, love and democracy.4

 R. M. Stogdill argues that “there are almost as 
2

many different definitions of leadership as there are 

persons who have attempted to define the concept,” 

while James MacGregor Burns poignantly states that 

“leadership is one of the most observed and least 

understood phenomena on earth.”5

Northouse identifies four components as central 

to defining leadership: a process, influence, a group 

context, and entails goal attainment.6 Leadership, 

Northouse argues, is a process whereby an individual 

influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal. G. Yukl, after reviewing various theories 

reaches the conclusion that any definition of “leadership is arbitrary and subjective, and it depends, to 

a great extent, on the purpose of the researcher.”7 R. 

Bolden identifies two fundamental difficulties in defining leadership: firstly, leadership is an open concept based on subjective interpretation and secondly, 

it is based on the author’s theoretical stance.8 The latter consists of the trait and process approaches. The 

trait approach suggests that there are specific inborn 

or innate qualities or characteristics that make leaders, 

while the process approach suggests that leadership 

is behavior that can be learned by everyone.9 Scholars 

who believe in natural leadership often attribute the 

required capabilities to traits. 

T. Peters and R. H. Waterman in In Search of Excellence suggest that leadership traits also include 

the ability to develop a shared mission and sense of 

common values.10 However, as the research will show 

more often than not, owing to the constantly changing 

environment and the complexity and variety of elements involved in a transitional situation leadership is 

based on both traits and process, and leaders are both, 

born and made. 
3

Studies have shown that intelligence, dominance, 

self-confidence, energy or action orientation and taskrelevant knowledge coincide with effective leadership.11 However, these studies demonstrate a generally weak relationship of these traits to leadership. What 

is more, traits’ centered research focuses on positive 

traits with less emphasis on negative traits that also 

can contribute to the rise of individuals to leadership 

positions. In sum, traits are not all-encompassing and 

fail to tell the whole story. Organizational structures 

and circumstances can determine the capabilities 

and traits that are considered most valued and most 

desirable. 

Scholars of leadership often focus on hierarchy and 

power defining leadership as a “relationship between 

people in which influence and power are unevenly 

distributed on a legitimate basis.”12 Burns, a political 

scientist, considers leadership as awakening convictions within a collective and giving common direction 

to the desires and aspirations of individual members, 

while an organization is a polity that is a body whose 

members share resources, needs, and communal feelings. The job of the leader is to promote unity, cohesion, order, and performance of the group as a whole. 

Leadership, Burns contends, is exercised when “persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, 

in competition or conflict with others, institutional, 

political, psychological, and other resources so as to 

arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”13

This conception of leadership downplays command 

structure and instead emphasizes a sharing of common cause between leaders and followers. This definition suits very well the main focus of the research on 

asymmetric leadership in transitional processes.

Often leadership definitions are linked to power, 

referring to Max Weber’s results’ approach according 
4

to which power, and with that leadership, is the ability to get someone to do something they would not 

otherwise have done.14 As it can be observed from the 

above succinct overview of definitions, leadership is 

often examined from the individual perspective, and, 

as such, it gives the impression of being monodimensional. On the whole however, leaders have to be 

aware of the complexity and diversity of their environments, as leadership challenges “are shaped by 

the unique dynamics of specific operations.”15 Despite 

the definition difficulties and although leadership is 

never going to be an exact science, the social identity 

approach fits best with the definitional requirements 

of this book.16 In general, a leader would be the most 

representative of a group’s identity, and would symbolize the sharing characteristics within the group 

and at the same time the differences with the opposing groups. Within this context, A. Haslam posits that 

“leaders embody a social identity that is shared with 

other group members [and] leaders exercise influence 

on this basis.”17

FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH

Leadership is not static; it is a continuous process 

and ever-changing relationship between a number of 

different factors. Leadership style can be defined as 

“the patterns of behavior—words and actions—of the 

leader as perceived by others.18 In this sense, it is very 

important how followers feel when leaders attempt to 

influence them. The research focuses on political leadership in transitional and volatile situations and the 

efforts and the role of leadership in the transformation 

process from weak and fragmented states or communities to peaceful and viable states. The research is not 

based on a specific model of leadership and definition, 
5

but a combination of models, because the thesis of the 

research is that leadership, and especially asymmetric leadership, is too complex to be based on just one 

model. To paraphrase Laurence Peter, “some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about 

them.”19 As described already in this book, many of 

the types of leadership just overlap. After all, “out of 

the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was 

ever made.”20

The current research reviews the characteristics and elements expected of effective leadership of 

radical political movements (asymmetric leadership) 

within an ever-changing and complex environment. 

The emphasis of this work is not so much on psychological attributes, but on the incentive structure and 

institutional and contextual constraints for leaders, because good governance matters for good leaders and 

not only vice versa. It is nearly impossible to develop 

a universal checklist for leadership. The focus of this 

research is on asymmetric leadership in transitional 

environments. However, the research aims to demonstrate the necessity for a constant balancing of different characteristics of leadership and adjustment of 

leadership styles to continuously changing situations. 

By focusing on leadership, this book isolates, and at 

the same time highlights, one of the key determining 

elements which affect and influence a political transition from conflict to peace and normalization. The 

objectives of the research are to provide answers to 

questions such as: What are the main leadership challenges in transitional environments, and how do leaders cope with them? What is the role of asymmetric 

leadership in transitional processes? Which skills and 

characteristics are necessary for successful leadership 

in transitional processes? 
6

RESEARCH DEFINITIONS

Scholarly debate focuses on whether the difference 

between successful and great leadership depends 

entirely on the situation.21 Partly, this holds true as, 

for instance, it is fairly certain that Winston Churchill 

would not have been considered great without World 

War II. As the current analysis focuses on leadership 

in transitional states and processes, it is worth clarifying, then, at this stage that the research predominantly 

refers to effective or successful leadership, and not to 

great leadership. Asymmetric leadership of radical political movements operates within an environment of 

uncertainty and risk as part of daily operations from a 

position of weakness compared to conventional leadership. As it will be examined in the following chapters, especially in Chapter 3, the survivability of this 

type of leadership relies on flexibility and adaptability to the situation and the environment. Transitional 

states or transitional processes refer to the transformation process from weak and fragmented states or communities toward a peace process leading to peaceful 

and viable states. When referring to transition in this 

research, it can be twofold: the transition of the country and/or the transition of leadership.

WHY ASYMMETRIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 

IN TRANSITIONAL STATES

Political leadership denotes the ability “to make 

others do a number of things (positively or negatively) 

that they would not or at least might not have done.”22

Leadership has a very significant role in transitional 

processes, given the ability of the leader to shape and 
7

define the future of a country and its structures. S. A. 

Renshon identifies three characteristics highlighting 

the importance of political leadership: decision centrality, the extension of public sphere responsibilities, 

and the structural amplification of effects.23 Decision 

centrality suggests that it is simply impossible to hold 

a public vote on every political issue; even in a democracy, more often than not leaders take decisions without any direct input from the electorate. The second 

characteristic—the extension of responsibilities—is 

directly relational to the leaders’ decisionmaking role. 

The structural amplification of the effect of leaders’ 

decisions is evident in the proliferation of government agencies and organizations charged with the 

implementation of a leader’s decisions. The ability of 

leaders to shape the emerging structures is enhanced 

by the changing character of the period, which makes 

it important to understand how the different actors 

operate under such conditions. 

The top-driven nature of political transitional processes, combined with the associated uncertainty, signifies that leaders are crucial in shaping the process. 

Thus it is essential to focus on political leaders—radical or not—during transitional periods, examining 

successes and failures in moving the regime toward 

a peace process. As discussed with reference to the 

survivability of leaders, a transitional leader has to 

engage in creative destruction and reforming and rebuilding institutions and practices at the same time.24

Despite the definitional difficulties outlined earlier, the phenomenon of leadership has been studied 

universally since ancient times. Sun Tzu reflected 

upon the responsibilities of political and military 

leaders as custodians of the states well-being, and he 

cautioned on the activities of leaders that were benefi-
cial or detrimental to the state. Confucius, Plato, and 

Aristotle are among the philosophers who have written on leadership. Plato classified political leadership 

into timocratic leadership, which is ruling by pride and 

honor (timi means honor); Plutocratic leadership, signifying ruling by wealth and prosperity (plutos means 

wealth); Democratic leadership (ruling by popular 

consent); and tyrannical leadership, which is ruling 

by authoritarianism and oppression.25 In the 1800s, 

Thomas Carlyle advocated: 

universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom, the history of the 

Great Men, these great ones; the modelers, patterns, 

and in a wide sense creators of whatsoever the general 

mass of men contrived to do or to attain.26

Ever since, the belief that leaders were born with 

the gift of leadership prevailed. Emergence theories 

sought to explain leadership in terms of traits (Traits 

Theories), and people who believed in traits tend to 

explain the fortunes of humankind on the basis of individual contributions and acts. In this sense, history 

developed as it did because of the actions of “great 

men.” Following this, the concept of leadership was 

examined from the functional and situational perspectives.27 Adair’s functional approach seeks to bring the 

qualitative and situational approaches to leadership 

within the realm of the interaction of task, team, and 

individuals’ consideration. Therefore, leadership by 

creating the aim, planning for and encouraging the 

group, is able to accomplish the aim.28 The above were 

followed by theories that focused on the interaction 

between leaders and followers (servant leadership 

and charismatic leadership theories), while other 

theories focused on leaders and their interaction with 

8
9

the environment (contingency and transformational 

theories).29 Leadership is a borrowed and dependent identity; a leader needs followers in order to be 

a leader. 

Certain scholars of organizations have been dismissive of leadership, as they argue that factors such 

as structure and culture determine much, if not most, 

individual action. Thus rules, regulations, and structure restrict those in leadership position as much as 

they govern the lowest subordinate. This dismissal of 

leadership represents a reaction to the overemphasis 

on the “great man” theories in the past, as scholars 

often attributed mankind’s great achievements to 

great individuals. Even though organizations may 

deal with routine matters most of the time, but crises 

demand leadership. Furthermore, something very 

fundamental in human nature makes people desire to 

be leaders. Leadership is also important for organizations because of the conflicts and issues it may raise. 

Thus leadership will always remain an important issue. Revolutions, coups, and takeovers are, more often than not, contests and conflicts over leadership. 

A transitional process is one of instability and 

uncertainty, as key actors seek to determine their 

positions within the new structures and rules. Most 

transitions in the end take place or are finalized at the 

top, with a relatively small number of people making 

final decisions. Furthermore, the initialization, at least 

of the implementation phase, also takes place at the 

top. There can be, of course, and there are, bottom-up 

mass movements initiating change, and there can be 

contacts at grassroot level initiating or pressuring for 

peace processes, but still at some point there is topdown decisionmaking at strategic leadership level to 

legitimize the transitional process. In this sense, either 
10

in a bottom-up or a top-down led process, the onus 

lies with the political leadership to formalize a transitional agreement. 

Leadership, as well as conflict transformation and 

resolution, share common traits, such as relationship 

building and inclusiveness. Leadership is only one of 

the elements for conflict transformation and transition, but it impinges directly onto the other various 

transformations, such as structural transformations. 

However, leadership can also be part of the problem 

either on a personal or on a group level. On a personal 

level, because the predominant role of a leader might 

be his own survival and not the resolution of a conflict and a transition to peace; and on a group level, 

because the conditions, real or perceived, may not be 

seen as ripe for a favorable resolution and transition. 

RESEARCH STRUCTURE 

This book examines the role of asymmetric leadership in transitional states. Part I provides a brief review 

of leadership theory. Chapter 2 establishes a foundation for this analysis. When assessing the ability of 

asymmetric political leadership to shape an emerging 

system, it is essential to consider personal attributes, 

the environment, and the character of the regime.30

These combined elements determine the extent to 

which leaders are able to influence and shape events. 

Personal characteristics of political leaders refer to the 

ability to inspire followers. For instance, for a leader 

possessing charisma, faults and errors may be ignored 

or trivialized by followers, which reduces barriers to 

the exercise of power.31 According to G. Pasquino, 

during transition, political leaders have to transfer 

their authority to organizational structures and com-
11

pete under the new rules to remain effective32 and to 

remain in power. Therefore, Chapter 2 focuses on typologies of leadership. Chapter 3 examines the phenomenon and key elements of asymmetric leadership, 

and Chapter 4 examines the role of this leadership in 

transition processes. Part II of this book provides the 

case studies—Lebanon and Israel-Palestine—that test 

the theories discussed in Part I.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. See, for instance, John Adair’s Action-Centered Leadership 

Model, Victoria, UK: Gower Publishing, 1979; and John P. Kotter, 

Leading Change, Watertown, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 

2012; Peter Northouse, Theory and Practice, Thousand Oaks, CA: 

Sage Publications, 2010.

2. J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis, 

London, UK: Sage Publications, 1987, p. 1.

3. Marcha Geaney, “Appreciative Inquiry and Relational 

Leadership,” presented at the New Jersey Organization Development Conference, May 2005.

4. Peter Northouse, Leadership—Theory and Practice, Thousand 

Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010.

5. R. M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of the Literature, New York, Free Press, 1974, p. 259; and James MacGregor 

Burns, Leadership, New York: Harper and Row, 1978, p. 18. See 

also M. Rejai and Phillips Kay, Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 

1997, p. 1.

6. Northouse, Leadership, pp. 3-4.

7. G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, Upper Saddle River, 

NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 8.
12

8. R. Bolden, “What Is Leadership Development: Purpose and 

Practice?” Leadership South West Research Report, Binghamton, 

UK: Centre for Leadership Studies, 2005, available from businessschool.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/cls/research/publications/

abstract/index.php?id=66.

9. Northouse, Leadership—Theory and Practice.

10. T. Peters and R. H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence, New 

York: Random House, 1982.

11. Stogdill.

12. J. L. Bowditch and A. F. Buono, A Primer on Organizational 

Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994.

13. Burns, p. 18.

14. W. J. Mommsen, The Political and Social Theory of Max 

Weber: Collected Essays, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 

Press, 1992.

15. L. Forster, “Coalition Leadership Imperatives,” Military 

Review, November-December 2000, pp. 55-60, especially p. 56.

16. H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” W. G. Austin and S. Worchel, eds., The Social 

Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 

1979, pp. 33-47.

17. A. Haslam, ed., The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, 

Influence and Power, New York: Psychology Press, 2011. 

18. P. Hersey, The Situational Leader, Escondido, CA: Center 

for Leadership Studies, 2004, p. 25.

19. Laurence Peter, The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go 

Wrong, New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2009.

20. I. Kant, “Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political 

Plan,” The London Magazine, pp. 385-393.
13

21. J. Antonakis, A. Gianciolo, and R. Sterberg, The Nature of 

Leadership, London, UK: Sage Publications, 2004, Chaps. 7 and 12.

22. Blondel, pp. 2-3.

23. S. A. Renshon, “Political Leadership as Social Capital: 

Governing in a Divided National Culture,” Political Psychology, 

Vol. 21, No. 1, 2000, p. 202.

24. G. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2002.

25. Plato, Πολιτεία (Republic).

26. Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in 

History, London, UK: Echo Library 2007, p. 1.

27. Adair, Action-Centered Leadership Model.

28. John Adair, Training for Leadership, London, UK: Macdonald and Co, 1970, pp. 15-22.

29. Burns, pp. 19-20; and B. M. Bass, A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry into Transformational Leadership, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Army Institute of the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996.

30. Blondel, p. 28. 

31. B. Kellerman, “Leadership as a Political Act,” Kellerman, 

ed., Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Upper Saddle River, 

NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 63- 89, especially p. 83.

32. G. Pasquino, “Political Leadership in Southern Europe: 

Research Problems,” West European Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1990, 

pp. 118-130. 

15

PART I:

CONCEPTUALIZING ASYMMETRIC 

LEADERSHIP IN TRANSITIONAL PROCESSES

17

CHAPTER 2

TYPOLOGIES OF LEADERSHIP: 

LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP AND 

APPROACHES TO TRANSITION

Anastasia Filippidou

The study of leadership has received increased attention with theories ranging from the more classical 

leadership theories associated with traits and hereditary qualities, to the more recent examination of social 

identity approaches. Leadership is a broad theme with 

numerous associated theories branching out from the 

main original theories, and there remains considerable 

debate vis-à-vis which ones remain relevant today. 

This chapter provides an overview of different types 

and frameworks of leadership, and it emphasizes the 

diversity of qualities and traits that enable a person to 

become a leader. The examination of the phenomenon 

of leadership can be dated back thousands of years, 

with views on what makes good leaders being used 

to inform the selection of leaders and predict their behavior. In the ancient Greek world, Socrates identified 

a list of leadership skills, emphasized the importance 

of knowledge and examined the idea of leadership being situational. Also, Xenophon, a contemporary and 

admirer of Socrates, focused on strategic leadership 

and risk and emphasized the importance of leading 

by example. 

Leadership can be divided into three levels: top 

leadership with very high visibility, middle-level leadership including leaders from different sectors, and 

grassroots leadership consisting of local community 

leaders and local organizations. In a conflict resolution 
18

process for instance, top leadership focuses on high 

level politics and high profile negotiations; middle 

level leadership focuses on training in conflict resolution, peace commissions and problem-solving workshops; while grassroots leadership puts its emphasis on local peace committees, work in post-conflict 

trauma and prejudice reduction.1 In the 16th century, 

according to Niccolo Machiavelli, a leader needed a 

mix of ruthlessness, cynicism, and amorality to gain 

and then to hold onto power.2 In the 19th century, 

Carl von Clausewitz stressed the importance of moral 

forces in the commander to overcome friction: will 

power, resolution, and intelligence.3 According to 

Clausewitz, leaders must be able to exercise sound 

judgment, despite the lack of certainty, if objectives 

are to be achieved. 

TYPES OF LEADERSHIP 

Leaders select their methods based on both personal and organizational needs and aims. Circumstances, 

organizational structure, and history are among the 

elements that determine the degree and type of leadership needed. K. Grint presents a four-fold typology 

of leadership definition: position (where leaders operate that makes them leaders), person (who leaders 

are that makes them leaders), result (what leaders 

achieve that makes them leaders), and process (how 

leaders get things done that makes them leaders).4 O. 

Kroeger identifies four key elements of leadership that 

are common to many definitions and theories: First, 

leadership is about using power, and effective leaders are able to access their individual power at the 

right time to get the desired result; second, the means 

by which leaders decide to use their power involves 
19

judgment; third, leadership involves using power intentionally against a specified aim; and fourth, leadership involves interactions between people.5

In view of the fact that leadership is a peoplecentered activity, it follows that the personalities of 

the people affect how they access their power, make 

judgments, and carry out leadership. However, when 

dealing with human nature and especially people in 

crises and transitions, typologies can be too clinical 

and often become redundant, as the boundaries of the 

various types and approaches are transcended. For 

instance, the emphasis on a specific type may depend 

on the duration of a conflict. Therefore, a result-based 

approach may be more important in a short-term conflict and transition process, while, during a protracted 

conflict, the focus may be on the process. According to 

F. Fielder, leaders are either task- or relationship-oriented, but the effectiveness of orientation depends on 

the situation.6 For Fielder, in an unfavorable situation, 

the group is expected to be told what to do without 

consultation, and task-oriented leadership works best. 

In moderate situations, however, where leaders have 

moderate power and support in combination with a 

complex task, consultation is necessary to achieve followers’ buy-in, and, in this case, relationship leadership is most suitable. 

Leadership occurs in many forms, but ultimately 

culminates in two competences: selecting the best 

option among alternative courses of action, as well 

as bringing and keeping followers on board. What 

is more, typology matters more for those who, for 

whatever reason, need and want to examine the different types of leadership rather than for the followers. More often than not, the emphasis is on rational 

aspects of leadership and on whether leaders achieve 
20

their promises, while not enough emphasis is laid on 

the emotional aspects of leading. In this sense, even 

though it might seem irrational for some to follow a 

specific leader, others interpret and receive words and 

nonverbal communication differently and become 

followers. 

LEADERSHIP THEORY OVERVIEW

A prevailing theory in the 19th century is the 

“great man theory” (GMT), according to which leadership is inherent. In other words, according to GMT, 

leaders are born and not made. This theory seems to 

have certain references to contingency theory (CT), as 

the belief was that great leaders would come to the 

fore when faced with the fitting situation. Originally, 

this was predominantly linked to upper class and educated men. While today this theory is no longer just 

limited to men or to class, the “born or made” debate 

remains the focus of research and writing.7

Although trait theory (TT) could be traced back 

to 380 BC, the theory resurfaced in the 1930s through 

psychologists like Gordon Allport who argued that 

people are either born with or develop qualities that 

enable them to shine as leaders. TT focused on analyzing mental, physical, and social characteristics in order 

to form a better understanding of the combination of 

qualities required for effective leadership. However, 

these studies were inconclusive, with little consensus 

on the essential elements required of leaders. Allport, 

for instance, identified almost 18,000 English personality-related terms.8

 Still, even though TT fell off 

grace, discussion came back to specific qualities and 

traits demonstrated by successful leaders. TT seems 

to be making a comeback reinforced by advances 

in genetics.9
21

According to the Five Factor Leadership Trait 

theory, “significant relationships exist between leadership and individual traits such as: intelligence, adjustment, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness 

to experience general self-efficacy.”10 Trait approaches 

dominated decades of scientific leadership research. 

However, more recently these approaches were criticized for what was seen as an inability to offer a clear 

distinction between leaders and nonleaders and “for 

their failure to account for situational variance in leadership behaviour.”11 S. J. Zaccaro argues that combinations of traits and attributes integrated in conceptually 

meaningful ways are more likely to predict leadership than additive and independent contributions of 

several single traits.12 The trait approach fails to take 

into consideration patterns or integrations of multiple attributes. Furthermore, this approach does not 

distinguish between those leader attributes that are 

generally not malleable over time and those that are 

shaped by, and bound to, situational influences. Additionally, the trait approach fails to consider how stable 

leader attributes account for the behavioral diversity 

necessary for effective leadership.13 Consequently, in 

contrast to the traditional approach, the leadership attribute pattern approach is based on theorists’ arguments that the influence of individual characteristics 

on outcomes is best understood by considering the 

person as an integrated totality rather than a summation of individual variables.14 The inclusive nature of 

the attribute approach does not discount any aspects 

that may have influenced the creation of personality 

traits and the person.

In the early-1940s, TT led on to the development 

of Behavioral Theories (BT), which obviously laid 

emphasis on the behavior of effective and ineffective 
22

leaders rather than their characteristics. BT divided 

leaders into task-focused and people-focused and 

concluded that leaders are made and not born. Using 

authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership 

styles as a basis for this work, it was concluded that 

some leaders were more people-oriented, while others were more task-oriented. It soon became clear that 

leader effectiveness is contingent on interplay of factors relating to both the leader and the situation.15 In 

the 1960s, CT argued that the specific leadership styles 

were only suited to particular situations, and that a 

leader’s effectiveness depended on how well the 

leader’s style fit the context.16 As such, leaders could 

perform very well in certain circumstances but very 

poorly in others. According to John Adair, the performance of a leader depends on the situation, and he 

attempted to provide a framework to match leaders 

to situations. Adair’s action-centered approach is an 

example of CT. Adair argues that the team, the task, 

and the individual needs must all be taken into account, and therefore leadership is a result of what you 

do and not what you are.17 Still, what you do is also 

behavioral, and therefore it is affected in some way by 

what you are. One of Adair’s shortcomings is that he 

assumes that one size fits all. 

As mentioned earlier, no single leadership style 

can be right for every leader under all circumstances 

and in all situations. Consequently, situational theories (ST) were developed to highlight that leadership 

depends upon organization, task, leader-follower 

relationship, and other environmental factors. ST developed alongside CT. Situational leadership places 

primary importance on the tasks and challenges facing the organization itself rather than the personal 

traits of the leader, and it proposes that leaders must 
23

be able to adapt their leadership style as the situation changes.18 Linking this to R. Tannenbaum and 

W. Schmidt’s “Continuum of Leadership” made this 

theory very popular.19 Transitional processes with 

constantly changing circumstances call for constant 

adaptability and adjustability of leaders, which, as 

discussed in Chapter 3, is not always possible. In this 

sense, leaders’ capabilities have to match the organization’s immediate needs, that is, its constantly changing situation. As the situation changes, leaders have to 

adjust and adapt constantly if they want to maintain 

power. According to P. Hersey and K. Blanchard, situational leadership theory recognizes the existence of 

multiple variables in leadership, and, as such, leaders 

could not possibly hope to cope with this high level of 

complexity. Consequently, leaders have to prioritize 

and focus on the relationship between leader and followers, because, as mentioned before, without followers, all other variables will be irrelevant. Thus leaders 

must adjust their styles according to the situation presented. Hersey and Blanchard identify four different 

leadership styles associated with task and relationship 

behavior: selling, telling, delegating, and participating.20 The different styles depend on the situation, the 

relationship behavior (amount of support needed), 

and task behavior (amount of guidance needed). See 

Figure 2-1. 
24

Leadership

Autocratic Protective Participative Delegating Anarchic 

Follower

Figure 2-1. Leadership-Followers 

Relationship and Related Leadership Styles.

Following Hersey’s and Blanchard’s logic, a leader’s behavior has to be adjusted to that of the followers.21 Robert House argues that the leader’s task is to 

make smooth the followers’ path to the shared goal by 

removing barriers and by facilitating motivation, and 

that the leader’s behavior should match the requirements of the followers and the situational characteristics.22 As such, the leader has to select the appropriate 

style to smooth the followers’ path to the goals. Therefore, according to House, ambiguous tasks require directive leadership in order to reduce uncertainty and 

to increase the probability of the outcome; dangerous 

situations require supportive leadership in order to 

increase self-confidence and encourage followers; participative leadership is required when transition has 

advanced and when followers are ready for empowerment; and, result-oriented leadership is suitable when 

followers have high result-orientations.23

One of the strengths of situational leadership is 

that it can provide leaders with a set of different styles 
25

they can use, depending on the situation. Given the 

complexity of transitional processes and the variation 

of reasons to follow a leader at times, and for some of 

the followers the leader will need to implement different leadership styles depending on the circumstances 

and the followers. See Figure 2-2. 

Figure 2-2. Diagram adapted from Hersey, 2004.

24

Leadership styles, as well as readiness levels, are 

situational, and the leadership style should correspond to the readiness level of the follower. Based on 

Figure 2-2, the leadership style (S1-S4) has to correspond to the readiness level (R1-R4). In order for the 

leader-follower relationship to be effective, the leaders have to be aware of the followers’ readiness, and 

the latter should be aware of the leaders’ wants and 

needs. Leaders, for instance, based on the readiness 

Task Behavior Directive

Follower Readiness

Able, willing, confident

R4

Able but unwilling or 

insecure R3

Unable but willing or 

confident R2

Unable, unwilling or 

insecure R1

High

High

High Low

LowSupportive Relationship Behaviour

Participating-S3

Leader-follower

decision making

Delegating-S4

Decision-making

responsibility

assigned to 

follower

Telling-S1

Leader-made

decision and close

supervision

Participating-S2

Leader-made

decision with dialogue 

and/or clarification
26

and behavior of the followers might have to adjust 

their leadership style to influence the followers’ behavior, while followers, based on the leader’s needs, 

might have to adapt their behavior to implement leaders’ requests and demands. 

As mentioned in the introduction one of the roles 

of leadership is, through a rational and emotional appeal depending on the issue and the followership, to 

unite “our side” and differentiate us from the others. 

Benedict Anderson refers to this as the “imagined 

communities.”25 According to Anderson, as we could 

never really meet everybody from “our side” and as 

such we could not really know whether other people 

are really like us, we simply could imagine that this 

was the case or not. 

Transactional and Transformational.

Leadership models can help explain what makes 

leaders act in a specific way. Within this context, E. 

P. Hollander developed the concept of transactional 

leadership,26 while Burns in the late-1970s introduced 

transformational leadership theories.27 Transactional 

leaders take people as they are, motivating through 

their existing needs and goals. With transactional 

leadership, followers are motivated by exchange or 

transaction of something of value leaders possess or 

something that is within their authority to grant to 

followers. Thus, transactional leaders and followers exchange something of value the leader possesses or controls that the followers want in return for 

their services. 

The type of power transactional leaders adopt depends not only on the followers and their needs, but 

also on the personality of the leader and the kind of 
27

power they are able to use. Transactional leaders are 

characterized by the leaders’ relative separation from 

their followers. Transactional leadership can involve 

mutual influence, but, given the unequal dynamic of 

the relationship between leaders and followers, the 

leader retains more power than the followers and 

tends to base that power more on reward and coercion 

and less on interpersonal and influencing skills.

Consequently, the aims by these leaders may simply reflect their personal views of the organization’s 

needs or transactional leaders may simply pursue their 

own objectives utilizing the organization as a means. 

As mentioned earlier, these types of leaders motivate 

followers to implement their decisions through reward, coercion, threat, intimidation, and the application of imperative force. Hence, transactional leaders 

prefer to create order, search for cause and effect relationship and predictability, and they value control.28

In radical political organizations, transactional leaders 

face limits to the degree and efficacy of their actions. 

Coercive power is based on raw power but in radical political movements, membership more often than 

not is voluntary, thus it is difficult to sustain commitment through the leader’s constant use of raw power 

over the followers. 

On the whole, Transactional Theory, also known 

as Exchange Theory (ET), focused on the human desire to maximize benefits and minimize costs to the individual, and argues that a leader must reward, or not 

punish success, to get the best out of the followers. As 

such, leaders have to try and synchronize individual 

and organizational goals. Transactional leadership as 

a long-term approach seems impossible in the leadership environment this research focuses on because if 

morale, discipline, ideology, commitment, and comradeship are based on a simple value, transaction can 
28

endanger success. Nevertheless, transactional leadership may be necessary in protracted critical situations 

when followers might lose their motivation and when 

command and obedience become even more vital. 

The risk of transformational leadership is that leaders 

could misuse the motivation and confidence for their 

own goals and for self-preservation. Transformational 

leaders may seek to transform, but what happens if 

the organization does not need transforming or if the 

organization does not need the transformation the 

leaders wants. 

At times, leaders may decline leading by avoiding responsibility for key decisions, such as choosing 

the future direction of the organization or resolving 

a crisis. This avoidance of responsibility may be due 

to a leader’s will for self-preservation or incapability. 

The subject of leader survivability is analyzed more in 

depth in the following sections.

As a normative approach to leadership, transformational leadership looks beyond the existing system, 

and aims to offer goals and objectives to followers. 

Transformational leadership takes the process beyond holding and using power. According to Burns, 

“leaders induce followers to act for certain goals that 

represent the values and the motivations—the wants 

and needs, the aspirations and expectations—of both 

leaders and followers.”29 Under this type of leadership, the emphasis is not on the leader but instead on 

the perception of those being led. Organizations in 

transitional processes have to be prepared to perform 

different tasks influenced by factors over which they 

have no control. Under these circumstances, individuals are expected to adapt continuously in order to 

function in new environments. It is the responsibility 

of the leaders to have the organization prepared to be 

able to adjust according to the task. This calls for trans-
29

formational leadership which must have the ability to 

realign the organization with unforeseen and unexpected situational changes so that they can achieve the 

task. A radical political organization is an amalgamation of a number of groups in need of constant realignment and adjustment. Transformational leadership 

requires a different attitude from that associated with 

task accomplishment. One of the core components of 

transformational leadership is seen to be charisma, as 

the leader inspires trust and respect, which are used to 

encourage desired behaviors. Transformational leaders seek to raise the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both the leader and those he leads, 

and thus it has a transforming effect on both, trying to 

connect leaders and followers with a common sense, 

understanding and vision.30

As such, transformational leaders empower their 

followers, increase their levels of morality and motivation, and encourage mutual support. Transformational leaders inspire followers through charismatic 

leadership, trust, a sense of belonging, and shared 

ownership of the goals. Within this context, B. M. Bass 

asserted that transformational leadership is of a higher 

order than transactional leadership, and that it “originates in the personal values and beliefs of the leader, 

not in the mutually dependent exchange of leader and 

followers.”31 Transformational leaders are inspired 

by the perceived needs and wants of the people they 

lead. In turn, followers are inspired by these leaders. 

A leader would take carefully calculated risks and try 

things. After all, “it is easier to get forgiveness than 

permission.” Transformational leaders provide or facilitate the creation of a new vision for the followers 

and create a sense of shared purpose and obligations. 

As such, transformational leadership brings leaders 

and followers closer and reaches further into the fol-
30

lower’s international motivation. The division of leadership styles into transactional and transformational 

considers leadership either as a means of exchange or 

to “shape and alter and elevate the motives and values and goals of followers.”32 However, both types of 

leadership have their role in volatile transitional processes. Given the variety of membership in political 

organizations and the constantly changing circumstances, a leader at times will use transactional and at 

other times transformational leadership. 

Over the past 20 years, there has been significant 

research on toxic leadership. While opinions diverge 

on the specific traits and skills associated with toxic 

leaders, there seems to be a wide consensus that these 

leaders work toward self-promotion at the expense of 

the group. Toxic leaders can be successful in the shortterm, but in the end, they leave the organization in a 

worse state than they found it, often with long-lasting 

damage to the culture of the organization and the psychology of the individuals within the group. During 

transitional processes with increased polarization and 

constant change, the conditions may be fertile for toxic 

leaders to come to the fore. However, their rise is often 

circumstantial, and their success is usually short-lived, 

and it does not translate into the equivalent success 

during the normalization phase. After all, it is the very 

short-term success that often protects a toxic leader. 

Visionary and Inspirational: A Trait and a Style(?)

G. C. Avery examines transformational leadership 

within a paradigm of “emotion in leadership” which 

allows her to categorize it under visionary leadership. 

Much like inspirational leadership, the main idea is 

that the leader’s ability to make emotional connections and create visions to inspire followers to greater 
31

achievements. Interestingly, Avery observes that the 

transformational or visionary leaders depend more 

on followers, rather than themselves, to implement 

the vision.33 What is more, most leaders in hierarchical organizations that utilize transformational leadership will, at any one time, be both leader and follower and therefore require skills to carry out both 

roles. Consequently, effective leaders must ensure 

that they understand not only themselves, but also 

their followers below them as well as their superiors 

above them. Paraphrasing Bill George, inspirational 

leaders would have to have a very good understanding of the purpose, history and vision (knowledge), 

have strong values (behavior), establish trusting relationships (connectedness), act on their values and 

demonstrate self-discipline (consistency), and believe 

strongly in the mission and transition process (passion).34 A strength of inspirational leadership style is 

that it helps leaders to understand their own strengths 

and weaknesses, to create a trusting relationship with 

their followers, while it also seems to include some of 

the best qualities of transformational leadership. 

According to A. Haslam, the theories discussed 

earlier are too individualistic, and he categorizes them 

as the “old psychology of leadership.” He describes 

them as a perspective, portraying leaders as inflexible, 

nonpredictive, and qualitatively lacking.35 Haslam argues that it is not about leaders, but about followers; it 

is not about me, but about us, and it is not about power over, but rather power through. Consequently, he 

proposes Social Identity Theory (SIT) based originally 

on Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s work in the 1970s 

and 1980s as a better prism of examining leadership. 

SIT focuses on explaining intergroup behavior and relationships in order to investigate the phenomenon of 

leadership. For Haslam, there are four key elements 
32

to leadership: being one of us; doing it for us; craft a 

sense of us; and make us matter. At the core of his thesis is that leaders exert influence based on the shared 

social identity of the organization.36

Example, Persuasion, and Compulsion. 

As mentioned earlier, there is a plethora of leadership models. However, Figure 2-3 illustrates the most 

and least effective elements for short- and long-term 

successful political leadership. 

Figure 2-3. Leadership Models.

Starting from the left of the figure, leading by example in both the short and long term can be ideal 

but not always realistic, given for instance the need for 

continuity and hence the protection of the leader. From 

the follower’s perspective, leading by example signifies agreement with the leader and his actions. When 

leadership employs persuasion, that still constitutes 

effective leadership as in the end it achieves consensus 

to a common cause. Owing to the unequal dynamic of 

the relationship between leaders and followers, leaders may demand and obtain compliance from their 

subordinates and followers, but this compliance can 

never be guaranteed unless followers are persuaded 

and buy into a process. As Robert Greenleaf posits, 

leadership by persuasion has the virtue of change by 

convincement rather than coercion, with obvious advantages.37 With persuasion, leaders appeal both to 

Example

Most effective Least effective

Persuasion Compulsion
33

the interests and the emotions of followers. Although 

Carlyle’s leaders are meant to solve the problems of 

their subordinates, through persuasion leadership is 

related to making followers face up to their own responsibilities and become stakeholders in the transition process. The complexity of transition processes 

often demands leaders to be able to ask the right kind 

of questions, which also entails the involvement of the 

followers in order to find a commonly accepted solution. In this way, the authority and decisionmaking 

responsibility is shared between the leadership and 

followers, because often in complex situations only a 

collective engagement can address the challenges and 

fully exploit the opportunities of the transition process. The leader is somebody who does not feel the 

burden of what Z. Bauman calls the “unbearable silence of responsibility.”38

A need for compulsion signifies lack of cohesion 

within an organization and, although imposing one’s 

will on followers can be effective initially, it will be 

ineffective and ineffectual in the long term, prohibiting any successful transition to a peaceful and stable 

state. In sum, leading by example would represent the 

purest and most effective form of leadership; appealing to emotions and persuading followers can yield 

positive results; while compulsion, if at all effective 

in the leadership type examined in this work, could 

only be in the short term. The optimum would be for 

a leader to be egalitarian enough to generate contentment among followers, but at the same time to be 

authoritarian enough to generate efficiency among 

followers. Certain distancing between leaders and followers appears to be common-place, irrespective of 

the country and the cultural background. Empirical 

observations show that proximate leaders are more 

efficient and more successful than distant leaders. In 
34

contrast, Niccolo Machiavelli supports that distance is 

a useful device to prevent followers from noticing the 

weaknesses of leaders.39 Leaders have to maintain a 

specific persona within the organization and with the 

opponents if they are to establish a god-like presence. 

Consequently, getting the distance right is critical in 

order to maintain the mystique of leadership. Nowadays, maintaining this social distance and air of leadership mystery, even for clandestine organizations, 

is much more difficult with the continuous media reporting. This leadership style is discussed further in 

later sections.

A. Etzioni distinguishes three types of compliance: coercive, calculative, and normative.40 Crises 

and complicated and protracted problems are associated with normative compliance. Understandably in 

a transitional process, which is a complex and complicated problem, a leadership cannot force people 

to follow them. It is the very nature of the problem 

with its consequences that requires followers to want 

to participate in transitional processes. Followers have 

to want to give their time and, on occasion, even their 

lives to achieve a political party’s or a movement’s 

goals. Pragmatically, given the complexity of a transitional process and the variation within a followership at different times, in different situations, and on 

different followers, all three types of Etzioni’s compliance would be used. Still, the optimum would be for a 

leadership to achieve collaborative compliance. 

Culture and Leadership. 

The chapter has already highlighted the importance of context vis-à-vis leadership, and at the epicentre of context is culture and cultural differences.41

According to Mary Douglas, culture can be captured 
35

based on two criteria: grid and group.42 Grid refers to 

the significance of roles and rules in a culture, which 

can be either rigid or loose. Group refers to the importance of the group in culture. Some cultures are highly 

group oriented, while others are more individual oriented. For Douglas, when a culture represents both 

high grid and high group, there tends to be rigid hierarchies, such as in clandestine organizations in which 

the “cause” and the group are more important than 

the individual. “When a leader establishes a goal with 

the troops,” advocates Sun Tzu, “he is like one who 

climbs to a high place and then tosses away the ladder” because if followers feel threatened but can see 

an escape route (the ladder), they may take it.43

However, if there is no escape, then the followers 

will have to commit themselves to a fight for survival 

and, as Sun Tzu suggests, “put them in a spot where 

they have no place to go, and they will die before 

fleeing.”44 This is when followers’ survival and goals 

become one, and followers fully commit to the cause. 

One of leadership’s trait is empathy, with the ability 

to step into another’s shoes. Empathy is a requirement 

to address protracted and complex problems because, 

if a leader cannot understand how the followers see 

the problem, how could a leader mobilize followers? 

When culture remains high group but low grid and 

lacks the concern for rules and roles, there is egalitarianism where consensus in decisionmaking is vital. If 

there is both low group and low grid, there are individualist cultures for whom the collective or rules is 

perceived as unnecessary. Last, if there is low group 

and high grid, the isolated individuals can see themselves undermined by the power of rules and roles. 

In sum, hierarchists consider rules and power critical; 

egalitarians prioritize greater solidarity; individual-
36

ists lay emphasis on greater freedom; while fatalists 

just give up. 

With the exception of the last option which is quite 

fatalistic, throughout a transitional process, all three 

options of hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualist will be employed. Here again, a leadership would 

have to achieve a balance and avoid the paradox 

where a political leader in a crisis needs the consensus 

of the followership, but also owing to the complexity 

of the problem, there cannot be an open and inclusive 

decisionmaking process. Grint stresses the interconnectedness between egalitarians, hierarchists, and 

individualists, and that egalitarians are limited by an 

endless search for consensus for a solution. However, 

Grint argues that, because of this paralysis of decisionmaking, there is a need for hierarchists in order 

to be able to reach decisions and also individualists 

in order to protect individuals.45 As such, political 

leadership in transitional processes needs to strike a 

balance between high grid and high group without 

undermining the leadership itself. The rhetoric of a 

political leadership, in order to make a cause attractive, can be egalitarian but in reality, the leadership 

remains highly hierarchical. After all, as mentioned 

earlier, even though collaborative compliance should 

yield the best results in transitional states, even egalitarian leadership would still require somebody to take 

the lead; otherwise, the leaders will be considered as 

irresponsible and incompetent. 

As situations change, leaders with different leadership styles are needed. At times, leaders can be 

proscriptive and have a style that emphasizes giving explicit instruction and setting specific aims. 

Other leaders can be collaborative and delegate decisionmaking to subordinates, presenting them with 
37

aims and allowing them to select their own means of 

achieving these aims. However, in radical political 

organizations the stakes can be very high in combination with the clandestine opus operandi of these organizations. Even though the leadership might appear 

to be collaborative on the surface and that they listen 

to the followers and subordinates, in reality, they are 

very proscriptive organizations claiming to act in the 

name of the community or group of people they claim 

to represent. This is another aspect where asymmetric 

leadership in transitional situations has to strive for a 

balance between proscriptive and collaborative styles. 

By being proscriptive, the leadership ensures that the 

subordinates and followers remain on board, while by 

being collaborative, leaders aim to achieve and maintain legitimacy. On the one hand, in radical political 

movements, the leadership has to be proscriptive because it cannot risk independent thinking and acting 

within its ranks. But on the other, the leadership has to 

be collaborative because its membership is based, by 

and large, on voluntary compliance, as the members 

do not really have to be, they chose to be part of a 

radical political organization. So under these circumstances, a leadership would not want uncommitted or 

disgruntled followership. After all, despite the different types of leadership, by nature, leadership entails 

inequality. As N. Harter argues, this in-egalitarianism 

is both legitimate and necessary, but this inequality is 

mutually beneficial to leaders and followers with the 

proviso that certain safeguards are being maintained.46

Even though this chapter makes clear that there 

appears to be a total lack of consensus on what constitutes an effective leader, there seems to be a growing 

acceptance that each theory has something to offer in 

terms of developing understanding of what elements 
38

could be inherent or developed in good leaders. Chapter 3 brings together the theories discussed in this 

chapter, in combination with the specific characteristics of asymmetric leadership. Figure 2-4 depicts the 

evolution of leadership theory.

Source: B. S. C. Watters, Leadership in Defence, Shrivenham, UK: 

The Defence Leadership Centre. Ministry of Defense, 2004.

Figure 2-4. Leadership Theory: A Chronology.

The Evolution of Leadership Theory

*This is not surpring, as Myrdal has pointed out, that a concern for leadership is a distinctly American 

phenomenon, R.M. Stogdill, Individual Behaviour and Group Achievement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 3.

The Ancients

The Contextual/

Behavior Factor

Participative Leadership 

& Decisionmaking 

Theory

The Philosophers

Homer

Asoks

Confucius

Plato

Aristotle

Machiovelli

Hersey & Blanchard 1935

G. Yuki 1970/80s

Mayo's Hawthorn Studies 1933

George Hormans 1950

Maslow's hierarchy of Needs 1954

McGregor's X & Y Theory 1960

Fredrick Herzberg 1959/66

Chris Argyris 1970

Stogdill

R. Tannenbaum & WH Schmidt 1953/73

VH Vroom & PW Yettom 1973

Hersey & Blanchard 60's-93

RJ House 1976/77

Ohio States Research 1950's

Michigan State University-R Likert 1961/67

Blake & Moulton 'Managerial Grid' 1954

Robert Greenleaf

Alimo Metcaile/Argyrics/

Avolio/Goleman/Kotter

Collins/Grint/Heifetz/Yuki

Thomas Carlyle 1850s

Sir Francis Galton 1869

John Adair

F. Fiedler 1970s

Jenkins 1947

Stogdill 1943

Goldbach 1935

JRP French & BH Raven 1959

BM Bass 1960

A Edzoni 1961

JP Kotter 1932

JM Burns 1978

BM Bass 80s-90s

The Great Man

Theory

The Functional

Approach

Contingency 

Theory

Motivational

Theory

The Situational 

Approach

Charismatic 

Leadership Theory

Trait

Theory

Power & 

Influence Theory

Transformational

Theory

Universal

Theories

Servant

Leadership Theory

Contemporary

Thinking
39

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. J. P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of 

Building Peace, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005. 

2. N. Machiavelli, The Prince (Penguin Classics), New York: 

Penguin Books, 1961. 

3. Carl von Clausewitz, M. Howard, ed. and trans., On War, 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. 

4. K. Grint, Leadership: Limits and Possibilities, London, UK: 

Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005.

5. O. Kroeger, J. M. Thuesen, and H. Rutledge, Type Talk at 

Work, New York: Dell Publishing, 2002, p. 66.

6. F. Fielder, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness, New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1967.

7. John Adair, Great Leaders, Guildford, United Kingdom 

(UK): The Talbot Adair Press, 1989, pp. 37-38.

8. G. W. Allpot, The Nature of Prejudice, New York: Perseus 

Books Publishing, 1979. Also see G. Matthews, I. J. Deary, and M. 

C. Whiteman, Personality Traits, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 3.

9. D. Day and J. Antonakis, The Nature of Leadership, Thousand 

Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2012, pp. 7-8, and Chap. 16.

10. J.A. Smith and R. J. Foti, “A Pattern Approach to the Study 

of leader Emergence,” The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 9, pp. 147-160.

11. S. J. Zaccaro, “Trait-Based Perspectives of Leadership,” 

American Psychologist, Vol. 62, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 6-16.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.
40

14. Ibid.

15. V. L. Reardin, “Predicting Leadership Behaviours from 

Personality as Measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,” 

Dissertation, Raleigh, NC: North Carolina State University, 

1996, p. 50.

16. R. G. Funnel, Leadership—Theory and Practice, Seares House 

Papers, 1981, p. 137.

17. John Adair, Leadership Skills, London, UK: IPD, 1997, p. 11.

18. F. E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness, New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1967.

19. R. Tannenbaum, W. H. Schmidt, “How to Choose a Leadership Pattern,” Harvard Business Review, May-June 1973, pp. 162-

175, reprint of the original HBR article of March–April 1958.

20. P. Hersey and K. H Blanchard, The Management of Organizational Behavior, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977.

21. Ibid.

22. Robert J. House, “A Path-Goal Theory of Leader Effectiveness,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1971, pp. 321-338.

23. Ibid.

24. P. Hersey, The Situational Leader, Escondido, CA: Centre 

for Leadership Studies, 2004.

25. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, New York: Verso, 1991.

26. E. P. Hollander, “The Essential Interdependence of Leadership and Followership,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1992, pp. 71-75.

27. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, New York: Harper 

and Row, 1978.
41

28. A. C. Gayle, Understanding Leadership, London, UK: Sage 

Publications, 2004, p. 144.

29. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, New York: Harper 

and Row, 1978, pp. 19-20.

30. Ibid., p. 20.

31. B. M. Bass, A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry into 

Transformational Leadership, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Institute 

of the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996, p. 5.

32. Burns, p. 425.

33. G. C. Avery, Understanding Leadership, London, UK: Sage 

Publications, 2004.

34. P. Northouse, Leadership—Theory and Practice, Thousand 

Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010, pp. 208-211.

35. A. Haslam, ed., The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, 

Influence and Power, New York: Psychology Press, 2011.

36. Ibid.

37. R. Greenleaf, Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature 

of Legitimate Power and Greatness, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2002.

38. Z. Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993.

39. Machiavelli.

40. A. Etzioni, Modern Organizations, London, UK: Prentice 

Hall, 1964.

41. See, for instance, C. C. Chen and Y. T. Lee, Leadership and 

Management in China, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 

Press, 2008; and A. S. Tsui, S. S. Nifadkar, and A. Ou, “Cross-National Cross-Cultural Organizational Behavior Research,” Journal 

of Management, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2007, pp. 462-468.
42

42. Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, London, UK: Routledge, 2003; and Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger, London, UK: 

Routledge, 2008.

43. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Nine Grounds), Oxford, UK: 

Capstone Publishing, 2010.

44. Ibid.

45. Grint.

46. N. Harter, F. J. Ziolkowski, and S. Wyatt, “Leadership and 

Inequality,” Leadership, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2006, pp. 75-94.
43

CHAPTER 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF ASYMMETRIC 

LEADERSHIP

Anastasia Filippidou

Hyper-turbulent, hyper-accelerating conditions 

increasingly typify the organization world of the 21st 

century, according to Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. 

Quinn.1 They label it “adhocracy culture” and one that 

is dynamic and creative. This type of culture closely 

aligns to that of a radical political organization in a 

transitional process, which is constantly facing new 

circumstances. It also requires changes in rigid structures and involves innovative and adaptable thinking in leadership. In addition, Cameron and Quinn 

contend that this adhocracy leadership style requires 

vision, innovation, and an ability to take risk. This 

supports the thesis of this book that a changing situation—the transitional process—requires a combination of leadership styles and, as such, requires adaptable leadership. Thus the optimum leader would be 

somebody with an ability to understand context and 

lead change through necessary communications’ 

methodologies. 

Context, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is important 

as it defines the broader social and political sphere in 

which the leader has to operate. Contextual constraints 

range from custom and previous practice through to 

institutions, which can introduce restrictions as well 

as opportunities.2 One of the main arguments of this 

book is that the most important factors that distinguish effective leaders often lie outside the control of 

an individual leader. Although leaders must have the 
44

ability to exploit the opportunities offered by external 

factors, irrespective of how good they may be, leaders 

cannot really guarantee effectiveness by their own actions. However, there are external factors that allow a 

leader to be recognized as successful, in addition to individual attributes required of the individual to make 

the most of the opportunity presented. See Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. External Factors for a Leader to 

Be Recognized as Successful; Individual Attributes 

Required to Make the Most of a

 Presented Opportunity.

As argued already, asymmetric leadership is complicated and complex, and it is critical at all levels 

and within organizations that need to make decisions 

that “address longer time spans of responsibility, 

that are faced with more complex situations, and are 

faced with dealing with environment relationships.”3

This argument is supported since violent political organizations are both complex in their organization 

and the manner in which they deliver output. In this 

sense, political leadership is viewed as “a process of 

External

• Success in an 

unusually challenging situation

• Longevity of leadership legacy

Individual Attributes 

(not exhaustive)

• Strategic vision

• Intellect

• Courage

• Resilience

• Presence

• Commitment
45

influencing people to accomplish the mission, inspiring their commitment, and improving the organization.”4

 To paraphrase Stephen Rosen, violent political 

organizations are unique organizations that, owing 

to their very nature, promote and reward from within.5

 The advancement of followers and subordinates 

could therefore be subjective if the weighting given 

by the assessing leader to loyalty and adherence to 

orders is deemed more important to the organization 

than the application of acquired knowledge to yield 

better results. 

For a leader to remain at the top over a period of 

time during conflict and through transition to normalization requires constant adaptability and self-awareness, as advocated by the Situational Leadership 

Theories. As already discussed, asymmetric leadership in transitional and volatile situations in order to 

survive is adaptable and moves between the different 

leadership styles, such as from transactional to transformational, depending on the specific circumstances. 

For leaders of political organizations, the ideology 

underpinning the organizations provides a solid basis 

from which to exercise transformational leadership 

that can be achieved through numerous interactions. 

At the same time, the grip on the organization can be 

accentuated and reinforced through a more transactional style, based on an uncompromising approach to 

discipline and procedure. This is not because leaders 

do not know what they want, but because they know 

they have to adapt the means to achieve their ends. 

This is a logical and pragmatic approach, given the 

security risks of direct contact with other members of 

the political organization; but without direct contact, 

it is difficult for leaders to provide transformational 

leadership. 
46

More often than not, a combination of leadership 

styles is needed in asymmetric leadership in order 

to steer the organization from the different phases 

of conflict toward peace processes. Throughout this 

transition, effective leaders have to be able at times to 

lower the expectations of the very organizations they 

are leading so as to reach a deal with the other side. At 

times, they have to fulfill the demands and needs of 

their followers in order to secure the continued buying in of the followers in the transitional process. Furthermore, the dealings of leaders with those external 

to the organization they are leading are initially predominantly transactional as they seek to maximize the 

benefits and minimize the costs of transition to their 

organizations. 

It is only when there is a realization that a transitional process and the way out from a protracted 

conflict has to be inclusive involving a compromise 

of all the conflicting sides, that leadership shifts from 

transactional to transformational. In this sense, leaders acknowledge that they need their own side, as 

well as the opposing side, to agree to come to the table 

and reach a commonly accepted agreement. Within 

this context, leaders need to inspire transformation of 

their own people, as well as that of the opponents, and 

help build Sun Tzu’s golden bridge. Few, if any, leaders will conform to only one leadership model. Still, as 

mentioned earlier, this does not make theories redundant. Indeed, the applicability of a number of theories 

to individual leaders facilitates a deeper understanding of the individual and therefore the conceptual 

understanding of leadership. 

The main elements of asymmetric leadership are 

flexibility and adaptability. Inevitably, during transitional processes, asymmetric leadership is constantly 
47

changing, both internally (within the organization itself) and externally (within the state). The elements of 

flexibility and adaptability are not meant in the sense 

of leaders not knowing the pathway and course of the 

organization. Instead, flexibility and adaptability is 

meant as a necessary means to achieve ends. As such, 

asymmetric leadership has to be rigid enough so as to 

set its direction and destination, and flexible enough to 

be able to reach that destination. Asymmetric leadership has to accept that it competes in an environment 

of uncertainty and risk as part of ordinary daily operations. Thus flexibility is key in asymmetric leadership. 

Owing to this flexibility and adaptability, asymmetric 

leadership is able to change course as new opportunities emerge quicker than more conventional types of 

leadership. 

Leaders help to create organizational cultures 

and then try to reinforce them through their communication with followers and their actions. Therefore, 

asymmetric leadership can be symbolic but also more 

directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the 

organization, where the leader is seen as an active decisionmaker instead of just a distant or formal authority figure. Within this context and under transitional 

circumstances, leaders encourage reasoned risk-taking 

down the hierarchy. Risk-taking in transitional processes is defined as taking calculated risks to resolve 

pressing operational problems as quickly as possible. 

The duty of followers is to try and understand and accept what the organization wants done, and then do it. 

This responsibility is reinforced by repeated encouragements and admonitions by the leader to focus on 

the end, notwithstanding the daily challenges. In this 

sense, members of radical political movements buy in 

to the needs and wants of the leadership and consequently it becomes a collective obligation to succeed. 
48

With asymmetric leadership in political transitional processes, the focus is on creative problem-solving 

and reasoned risk-taking. As a result, the leadership 

anticipates and responds to environmental changes 

rapidly to capitalize on opportunities and manage 

problems and develops flexible operating policies. 

The risk acceptance in combination with flexibility in 

transitional processes denotes the need to find solutions and apply them quickly. Asymmetric leadership aims to take advantage of unstable environments 

through operational flexibility and acceptance of risk. 

After all, the very nature of a radical political organization is based on asymmetric culture where the norm 

is uncertainty and flexibility and the organization 

exists “on the edge.” 

To sum up, risk and uncertainty lead to a crisis, 

which in turn leads to an often opportunistic decisionmaking. Furthermore, for the members of the organization, if there is a challenge, there is an imperative for 

a response and an action in order to accomplish the 

task. This operational commitment of the members 

leads the above mentioned “buying in,” and it leads 

to a “we and me” culture with high institutional, but 

at the same time high in-group, collectivism. 

The we and me culture encourages commitment 

to and cooperation with both the political organization as a whole and their individual teams. Followers and members of radical political organizations are 

therefore encouraged to cooperate broadly through 

the we culture but also at the same time to take greater individual and team responsibility for outcomes 

through the me culture. Subsequently, followers were 

also encouraged to be both collectively and individually responsible for operational performance. Given 

the nature of asymmetric leadership—within the or-
49

ganization and outside it—in transitional processes, 

decisionmaking has to be quick. It is centralized for 

strategic decisions and at the same time decentralized 

for local operational decisions. 

In view of the fact that membership in radical political organizations is predominantly voluntary, both 

actions and results are of high importance in order to 

retain membership and commitment to the cause. Success in asymmetric leadership becomes a “must succeed,” with its reliance to voluntary membership and 

the belief in a cause instead of the “can succeed” of 

symmetric leadership with its reliance on established 

institutions and structures. In asymmetric leadership 

in transitional processes, there appears to be a stronger sense of urgency and assertiveness in achieving 

the objectives of the organization, while also more 

trust is placed in their fellow members of the organization and their leaders, rather than in systems. 

As argued previously, the main elements of asymmetric leadership is flexibility and adaptability, but 

also unpredictability. The latter is understandably 

augmented during transitional processes. Radical political organizations with asymmetric leadership are 

by definition and intent, imbalanced or disjointed to 

some extent. Consequently, under these circumstances, a leader’s role would be to anticipate and prepare 

members for the unexpected, instead of minimizing 

or systematizing it. Flexibility and dealing with the 

unexpected quickly and effectively represents advantages and opportunities instead of threats to the 

organization and its goals. A transitional process in 

itself entails uncertainty. In transitional processes, attitudes, behaviors, and values change over time, and 

the effectiveness of decisions may be judged by a different leader who may not hold the same values as 

the original decisionmaker. This can be positive and 
50

escalate commitment, or it can be negative and lead to 

goal disorientation for instance.

At the epicentre of asymmetric leadership is inspiration and vision in combination with the ability 

to grasp the nature and complexity of political transition. A vision in itself implies transition, and a move 

toward something more positive in the future. A vision challenges people to transcend the status quo 

and to commit themselves to worthwhile causes connected to the larger community. The implementation 

of a vision, however, would require the “buying in” 

from, and the voluntary compliance of, the followers 

as it will be them, in the end, who are going to implement this vision. Thus, as stated already under asymmetric leadership vision, strategies and goals come 

from the top, but facing local challenges are largely 

decentralized. In addition, asymmetric political leadership involves the capacity to overcome the different 

types of constraints that might be caused by domestic 

or external factors. Thus, as discussed already, asymmetric leadership combines different elements from 

different leadership types; on certain issues it is transformational, envisioning a better future for the followers and helping them get there, and on other issues, it 

is transactional in an effort to try and overcome constraints through the use of trade-offs. 

As stated in the introduction, in asymmetric leadership in radical political movements, the leaderfollower relationship is at the same time fluid and 

rigid. Leaders need to strive constantly to maintain 

favorable relations with their followership, and, consequently, they need to regularly negotiate new bases 

for collaboration. Simultaneously, the relationship has 

to be rigid enough to assure compliance and commitment to the cause of the organization. In transitional 
51

processes, there is a human cost if conflicts are not 

transformed successfully and quickly. Time is of the 

essence, and there is no liberty to spend the time required to build consensus on every detail, and a bias 

for action will be required. Therefore, during crises 

and transitional processes, there is not always time for 

inclusive discussions and therefore the circumstances 

legitimize coercion as necessary for the public good. 

On the other hand, leaders need the followers’ to buy 

into the transitional process. Followers’ compliance 

is secured through fear and threats and punishments 

followers would want to avoid. Coercive power is 

based on raw power, but in radical political movements, membership more often than not is voluntary. 

Consequently, it is difficult to sustain commitment 

through the leader’s constant use of raw power over 

the followers. 

INFORMAL TIES

Leadership is a phenomenon involving the leader, 

the followers, and the situation, and, as such, it is a 

constantly changing process. It is a relationship and 

an experience affecting one another in an interactive 

complex process rather than a linear one. As mentioned already, leadership is situational, and therefore 

it has to be examined within context, while it also impacts on the leader at a personal and aggregate level. 

Early leadership theories discuss specific traits leaders 

should have, such as initiative, intelligence, talkativeness, etc., but the importance of these traits depended 

on the context.6

Even organizations that function under strict rules 

and regulations still rely on informal social ties to 

achieve their tasks. Through these informal ties, net-
52

works are built, which are systems of personal ties 

maintained along-side formal structures and with 

all the benefits networks bring. In general, leaders of 

radical political organizations often emerge in primary groups consisting of people connected by informal 

social ties. These informal links enhance loyalty to the 

organization and the aims, while they also help with 

trust-building among the members of the organization. In consequence of these informal ties and because 

of the strong ideological links within the organizations 

under examination in this chapter, leaders are often 

socio-emotional. Socio-emotional refers to nonmaterial, though personally gratifying, communications and 

activities that are part of nearly every human group: 

personal validation, companionship, recreation and 

expressions of esteem.7 In most radical political movements, individuals rise to the top who are particularly 

skilled and forthcoming in personal and emotional 

matters; individuals who are approached in a crisis 

for sympathy and understanding. These individuals 

are socio-emotional leaders and, in ideologically motivated organizations, these leaders are crucial. Socioemotional rewards such as good feelings and personal 

affirmation promote adherence to role expectations 

and stability of structure. 

One of the most important leadership activities is 

the promotion of stable and productive relationships 

within organizations. This is particularly true in complex organizations pursuing multiple goals and objectives. Radical political organizations are networkbased organizations with complex structure, and the 

diversity of tasks can counteract factors leading to cohesiveness. The variety of responsibilities and objectives can lower members’ visibility and importance to 

each other. In addition, the clandestine nature of such 
53

organizations makes face-to-face relationships almost 

impossible to maintain. These conditions can render 

coordination within the organization difficult, and the 

sense of common purpose upon which these organizations depend can be undermined. This can lead to 

the disintegration of the orgainzation, which is why 

relationship building is a vital role for leaders. 

A generalized feeling that both followers and leaders will benefit eventually from their role in their organization can create a more stable system. In radical 

political organizations with asymmetric leadership, 

followers’ participation in the organization is predominantly voluntary. Leaders and followers believe in a 

shared higher cause and as such the “buying in” from 

the followers’ perspective is already present. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in radical political movements, 

the most effective leaders aim to develop mutual links 

of trust and voluntary collaboration with their followers. Effective asymmetric leadership aims to reduce 

perceived differences between their interests and aims 

and those of their followers. As Follet states, “one person should not give orders to another person, but both 

should agree to take their orders from the situation 

facing the organization.”8

ASYMMETRIC LEADERSHIP, PARADOXES, 

AND MISCONCEPTIONS 

There is the false belief of holding out for a hero. 

This is false because the supply of heroes is scarce and 

unreliable, while at the same time, it seems as if followers are aborting their own responsibilities, expecting a leader to do everything. What is more, during 

transitional periods, the luxury of time to hold out 

for a hero just does not exist. As Jean Lipman-Blumen 

states, most people view leaders through a distorted 
54

lens emphasizing their strengths and minimizing their 

failings.9

From this follows the utopian portrayal of a charismatic leader. Leaders with charisma are believed 

by their followers to have powers and abilities that 

exceed those of everyday individuals. Charisma can 

allow flaws to be overlooked, albeit this is temporary 

until there is failure to move toward a peace process 

and transition to normalization. This type of leadership is primarily defined by who the leaders are, and 

often this approach is based on an emotional relationship between leaders and subordinates. According to 

Émile Durkheim, followers actually want their leaders 

to be god-like in their powers.10 In the original Greek, 

the meaning of hierarchy is “holy sovereignty.” Archi

means ruler or sovereignty, and ieros means divine. 

Hierarchia signifies a sacral ranking, and therefore the 

concept of hierarchy is the sacred organization space 

that facilitates a god-like leadership. 

As mentioned earlier regarding the distance between leaders and followers, leadership has to be treated as sacred to maintain its legitimacy. The shortcomings of the god-like approach are that followers can 

make irrational choices and may render subordinates 

incapable of judging what is wrong and right. More 

precisely, the “Great Man” approach allows followers 

to abort decisionmaking responsibility to leaders, and, 

if the decision is proven wrong, the subordinates can 

blame their leadership. 

For Max Weber, charismatic leadership can be differentiated between power and authority and distinguishes three different kinds of authority.11 According 

to Weber, traditional authority occurred when subordinates followed because they had always done so; in 

rational-legal authority, it is rational for subordinates 
55

to follow; and in charismatic authority, leaders attract 

followers devoted to the leader’s powers that seem to 

provide the possibility for a radical and previously 

unknown solution to some kind of social crisis. The 

last one, charismatic leadership, constitutes the only 

form of noncoercive authority, but because the charisma is embodied within an individual, it usually 

dies out with that individual or becomes routinized 

through an institution.12

Weber argues that charismatic leaders seek fundamental and radical changes in society, necessitating destruction of conventionally accepted practice. 

Like Niccolo Machiavelli, Weber’s account of political leadership referred to those with a strong instinct 

for power.13 Charismatic leaders appear to have supernatural qualities derived from powers outside 

themselves. Thus followers feel the duty to obey these 

leaders because of the higher forces from which their 

powers derive. For James MacGregor Burns, charismatic leaders are power-wielders, that is, leaders who 

safeguard loyalty and dedication from followers that 

satisfy the leaders’ interests instead of the followers’.14

Power-wielders maintain followers’ obedience to an 

organization of ideals and not adherence to an ideal 

organization. Within this context, power-wielders 

tend to achieve high levels of dependency among 

their followers and, in effect, disempowering their 

followers. 

To an extent, followers can share their leader’s 

charisma by being members of the same group and 

organization. Furthermore, often people in desperate 

and volatile situations want to believe in the ability of 

the charismatic leader to help them and protect them 

in times of emergencies. Thus, charismatic leadership 

should still be acknowledged as an important force, 
56

even if it is not often encountered. Radical political 

organizations, because of the very nature of these organizations with their need for voluntary compliance 

and at times their demand for sacrifice on behalf of the 

followers, may be expected to breed charismatic leaders from time to time. In crises situations, charismatic 

leaders may prove vital in decisionmaking. However, 

when time comes to move on and progress to a different phase of transition, charismatic leaders often 

prove reluctant, to say the least, of handing power 

over to the successors. Thus, there appears to be a 

fundamental flaw in the general belief that leaders are 

indispensable. What is more, when charismatic leaders are gone, it is not always clear that their achievements can be sustained or that their very actions as 

charismatic individuals undermine the possibility of 

sustainable actions by the followers. 

Also, what happens when crises do not exist? 

Charismatic leaders may be impelled to maintain crises if resolving would undermine their authority. Leo 

Tolstoy’s criticism of the charismatic leader is very 

poignant when he likens this type of leaders to bow 

waves of moving boats, always in the front and in theory leading, but in reality just being pushed along by 

the boat itself. Interestingly, pragmatic and objective 

examination of the lives of charismatic leaders reveals 

them to be less mysterious than they might initially 

appear. What is more, the rise to charismatic leadership is not spontaneous, but takes planning, organization, and staging. 

According to Burns, there are four types of transformational leaders: intellectual leaders, revolutionary 

leaders, heroes or ideologues, and leaders of reform.15

As discussed in Chapter 2, the aim of transformational 

leadership is for the leader to transform people and 
57

followers into something better. As a result of this 

transformation, followers are prepared to be true to 

their better selves.16

A paradox is that, although people value their freedom, they also realize that collective activity requires 

leadership. Followers acknowledge that leadership 

is necessary for organizing a group of people, but, 

at the same time, followers do not like to surrender 

themselves any more than necessary. This paradox 

has often been a point of friction between leaders and 

followers, and it has led to discontent and distrust. As 

it has been argued throughout this book, leadership 

is dynamic and not static; in the same way, followership has to be proactive and not passive for the leaderfollower relationship to be successful and flourishing. 

In this sense, followers have to be transformed from 

followers to active supporters of the leader and of the 

activities and policies.

ASYMMETRIC LEADERSHIP 

AND FOLLOWERSHIP

Leaders and followers are linked in relationships 

of mutual dependence. As stated already, leadership 

is a borrowed identity, and leaders cannot exist unless they induce others to implement their decisions. 

Since the focus is on the charismatic leader with the 

extraordinary nature, theorists shifted their focus on 

the relationship between leaders and followers which 

is based on deeply held and shared ideological values. Thus, charismatic leaders achieve unique goals 

through followers who are exceptionally loyal to, and 

deeply trusting of, their leaders. Under these circumstances, followers are willing to make personal sacrifices that might appear irrational to outsiders in the 

interest of the shared vision.
58

Crises, which are normal, allow limited time for 

decisionmaking and action-taking, which is often associated with authoritarianism. To his rhetorical question, “Whether it is better to be loved, or feared, or the 

reverse,” Machiavelli clearly sides with fear, arguing 

that “it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both. The Prince must nonetheless make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, at 

least he escapes being hated.”17 Leaders, irrespective 

of how charismatic they might seem, are still human 

and, as such, flawed and imperfect. Often, in crises 

there is a need for decisionmakers who are perceived 

as god-like in their decisiveness and their ability to 

provide answers. However, in transitional situations and state building processes, which have to be 

inclusive and egalitarian processes in order to stand 

a chance of success, a god-like authoritarian leadership might prove counterproductive. What is more, 

god-like leaders more often than not end up fighting 

for their own survival and self-preservation as rulers 

rather than for the successful transition to peace. The 

need for self-preservation is examined in Chapter 4. 

Leaders do not really enter into conflict contemplating failure. Failed leaders can become single minded 

and get involved in tactical decisions and lose objectivity. Hence they surround themselves with followers whose advice and opinion is limited to uncritical 

compliance and destructive consent (UCDC). In these 

cases, even when they know their leader is wrong, 

they feel they have reasons—self-preservation, new 

role within the organization, etc.—not to say anything, 

and therefore they consent to the damage of their own 

leader and possibly of their own organization, too. To 

this end, these leaders start seeking crises, as by maintaining an emergency status, they can maintain authority and their post. Leaders tend to legitimize their 
59

decisions and actions on the basis of a suitably persuasive account of the situation. Consequently, UCDC 

signifies another form of leader-follower dysfunction, 

as consistently uncritical followers allow their leader 

to detach themselves from reality, create their own 

and often self-serving reality, and develop delusions 

of grandeur and, as such, set either impossible or detrimental objectives for the organization. 

Leaders have to be able to operate independently 

in an ambiguous, changing, dynamic, and politically 

sensitive environment. Accordingly, effective leaders 

are meant to surround themselves with people who 

complement their skills, and therefore leaders are advised to seek people who demonstrate intelligence, 

judgment, and the capacity to anticipate in support.18

However, in reality political leaders are constrained 

in their ability to take into consideration advice from 

their followers as they are leading hierarchical organizations that are complex in their construct and their 

modus operandi. As mentioned earlier, leadership is a 

relationship, and Karl Popper suggests that it is the 

responsibility of followers to impede leaders’ shortcomings and to remain constructive dissenters.19 In 

this way, followers can help keep the organization on 

track and achieve its goals, thereby prohibiting leaders from undermining these. In effect, followers and 

leaders accept that neither is perfect, and all share 

responsibility. Once again, a balance is necessary 

between dedicated and independent followers to be 

responsible followers, and for a constructive relationship between leaders and subordinates. Leaders do 

not need to be perfect. Instead, they have to be aware 

of the limits of their knowledge, ability, and power, 

and that these limits can lead them to destruction unless they can rely on their followers to compensate for 

their own limits.
60

Although Carl Clausewitz viewed the commander’s knowledge as an essential capability, current research shows that stand alone components and traits 

are not effective unless they are combined and coordinated. Leadership is much more complex than a linear 

relationship, with the leaders limited to just giving 

commands and exercising power and authority over 

the followers. In point of fact, in asymmetric leadership in transitional processes, the leader-follower relationship is very fluid, owing to the nature of the unequal dynamic, but at the same time, it is also a rigid 

relationship, because of the need for trust within the 

organization. Thus, leaders need to maintain favorable relations with their followership, but to achieve 

that, they need to negotiate regularly for new bases for 

collaboration. Usually organizations require leaders 

with traits, skills and characteristics that match their 

immediate needs. However, in radical political organizations, often the leader plays a significant role to 

the very formation of the organization and its needs.

Effective leadership requires consistent partnership between leaders and followers in a way that meets 

the needs and advances the aims of both. Leadership 

is a dependent, if not borrowed, identity in the sense 

that somebody is a leader because somebody else is a 

follower. Irrespective of the type of leadership, leaders 

and followers are linked in a relationship of mutual dependence. The legitimation of leaders depends on the 

relationship between the followers and the leaders. A 

person is a leader because there are followers. In point 

of fact, as Grint advocates, it is the followers who teach 

leadership to leaders, as it is not just experience that 

counts but reflective experience.20 As he argues, learning is not so much an individual and cognitive event, 

but a collective and cultural process. In the words of S. 
61

Kierkegaard, “life can only be understood backwards, 

but it must be lived forwards.”21 As explained in the 

introduction, the focus of the book is on asymmetric 

leadership, and where the association between followers and leaders becomes rigidly asymmetric in either 

direction, the relationship breaks down. This renders 

the success of an organization short-lived because 

feedback and learning is minimized. 

THE ROLE OF POST-TENURE 

PROSPECTS FOR LEADERS:

THE NEED FOR SURVIVABILITY

Maintaining the Status Quo.

Leaders on an individual level are often reluctant 

to admit the need for changes lest it be seen as weakness among both supporters and opponents. As such, 

leaders can fall victims to their own rhetoric and propaganda. During a conflict lasting for years, they can 

demonize the other side, but during the transition 

phase, they have to persuade their own, as well as the 

opposing side, that they can coexist peacefully in the 

future. Again, a leader would have to try to strike a 

balance between overselling and underselling a peace 

agreement. If they oversell an agreement, the leaders 

may cause frustration to the followers if goals and 

promises are not materialized during the implementation phase. But if they undersell the agreement, it 

will be difficult to persuade the followers to buy into 

the agreement, rendering its implementation difficult, 

if not impossible. 

During a transition, political leaders have to deliver their own people and simultaneously reassure 

them that the ultimate goals they had been fighting 
62

for have not been sacrificed for the peace agreement. 

But at the same time, the political leadership has to 

assist the opponents and bring them to the negotiating 

table. By delivering their own people, if the leaders do 

not get it right, they run the risk of losing their own 

followers. But if they do not assist their opponents, 

they risk the collapse of the transition to peace and 

stability. In effect, for a smoother transition and a way 

out from a protracted conflict, the political leadership 

needs to build Sun Tzu’s golden bridge. 

As mentioned before, leadership may be part of the 

problem itself. Hence, change of leadership may be a 

necessary element for a successful transition out of a 

crisis and/or a conflict. But, then, change of leadership may also be facilitated by the transition process, 

which is why leadership and its role is also situational. 

Most leaders like to lead, and if any change risks altering the status quo, they will not be keen to help. 

As such, they can prioritize leadership survivability 

over transition and conflict resolution. Plato feared 

that even leaders who intended to lead in a moral way 

would be corrupted by the system and, since leaders 

were essential to the health of the community, a corrupted leader would inevitably destroy his own community and organization.22 As such, more often than 

not, pragmatically there has to be a coincidence of personal wants and a leader’s duty in order for leaders to 

remain altruistic and try their best for the higher good. 

That is why what a leader wants as a person has to 

coincide with what the followers want and what the 

country in transition needs. 

Burns makes a clear distinction between leadership and the exercise of naked power. However, influence, although it is not a true imperative force, can 

play an important part in the practice of leadership. 
63

Influence elicits voluntary compliance and agreement. As mentioned in the Introduction, leadership 

involves decision. Either alone or in partnership with 

others, leaders select among alternative perspectives 

available. Afterwards leaders use their personal resources and those of the organization to engage and 

motivate others to implement their decisions. Kotter’s 

eight-step change process highlights the importance 

of a narrative and of communication in the change 

process. Through effective communication, potential 

misunderstandings and fear of disadvantages can be 

avoided, and the urgency of the change can only be 

emphasized by strong communication between leaders and followers. As mentioned earlier, narratives do 

not arise spontaneously, but they are strategic because 

“they are deliberately constructed or reinforced out 

of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.”23

Narratives are compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences 

can be drawn. However, as the focus of the research is 

on transitional process, certain questions arise: How 

can old narratives be reconciled with new realities? 

What happens when old narratives cannot explain 

complex new realities in transitional processes?

Necessity for Leadership Survivability. 

Change does not come easy for leaders. Power is 

not something tangible, but it is a relationship which 

is constantly changing. These changes can be beyond 

the control of the leaders, which in turn is why change 

does not come easy for leaders. As mentioned earlier, 

asymmetric leadership in transitional processes are by 

definition transformational. However, the key issue 

is to what extent asymmetric leadership can maintain 
64

its transformative stance, in view of the fact that this 

would be in contrast to the very survival of that leadership. More precisely, as soon as the transitional process is initiated and the new regime and structures are 

formed, further change is needed as the leader now 

would have to move “from guiding the political system in introducing new structures, to working within 

those structures.”24

In reality, however, more often than not, asymmetric leadership turns from revolutionary and prochange to conservative, in the sense of preserving the 

status quo. The continued presence of a leader during 

a transition process may undermine the ability of the 

emerging regime to be formed by restricting opportunities for the normalization of politics. In other words, 

leaders have to be prepared to move from the foreground to the background, which asymmetric leadership might find even more challenging, given the 

unequal dynamic in the relationship between asymmetric leadership and traditional leadership. Thus, the 

success of asymmetric leadership depends on the ability to adapt constantly and to maneuver between competing forces and lead through change, while bargaining and compromising where necessary to maintain 

stability. As G. Breslauer highlights, “rare is the leader 

who is able to succeed in both, system destruction and 

system building.”25 To this end, “a breakthrough may 

be required to undo old structures . . . but numerous 

and repeated follow-up initiatives are required to put 

new structures in place and to build legitimacy for the 

new order.”26

In protracted conflicts, leaders change because 

they either “see the light” of new realities or they “feel 

the heat” in the sense that they feel the pressure either from their own side as well as from the opposing 
65

side. If, for political leaders, gambling for survival is 

more important than what the state wants and needs, 

their decisionmaking will be affected accordingly. As 

mentioned previously, there has to be a combination 

of personal and professional goals for a leader to remain selfless and self-sacrificing, but empirically it is 

known that leaders base decisionmaking not just on 

the probability of being removed, but also the manner 

and consequences of becoming redundant. In point of 

fact, as the ability of leaders to call on their followers 

to support the reform program decreases, the more 

the leaders shift from transformation to a more transactional leadership type. As argued already, a leader 

may shift from transactional to transformational leadership style, depending on the situation. The reasons 

for changes from one style of leadership to another 

may vary, but it may also result from the loss of faith 

from followers in the ability of the leader to lead effectively in the case of the transformative leader.27

For a leader, for instance, the decision to continue 

or terminate a conflict will depend in part on the anticipated consequences for the leader’s personal fate. 

In the early-1930s, the king of Siam, Prajadhipok, took 

out unemployment insurance with French and British 

insurance companies. Having failed to suppress the 

newly formed constitutional government, he accepted 

his ouster and collected on the policies. In his Book 

Eight, Thucydides describes how the overriding concern for personal safety influenced the oligarchy on 

whether to continue the war. The first aim was to preserve the oligarchy and maintain control over the allies, the second aim was to hold on to the fleet and fortifications of Athens and retain independence, and the 

third aim was not to be in a position of being the first 

to be destroyed by a reconstituted democracy. In the 

end, the oligarchy preferred to call in the enemy, give 
66

up the fleet and the fortifications, and make any deal 

for the future of Athens, provided they had their lives 

guaranteed. Political leaders who are afraid of losing 

power through forcible means have less to lose from 

initiating or prolonging a conflict. After all, leaders 

who are fighting for their own survival do not need to 

win, but to just avoid defeat. As Samuel Huntington 

advocates, “do not prosecute, do not punish, do not 

forgive, and, above all, do not forget.”28 Leaders may 

have vested interests in the status quo, and policies 

may be chosen with an eye to their continued stay in 

office. In an effort to avoid personal punishment, the 

leader will try to prolong staying in office, in which 

case the leader’s effort will be to maintain the status 

quo, even if the present and future are left in limbo, in 

order to avoid punishment. 

In 2007, the businessman Mo Ibrahim established 

the homonymous prize for Achievement in African 

leadership. The prize consists of $5 million initial payment over 10 years and thereafter a $200,000 annual 

payment for life to African leaders who improve the 

economy, security, and education, and successfully 

transfer power to their successors. The prize is supposed to be awarded each year to a democratically 

elected leader who governed well, raised living standards, and then voluntarily left office; but there has not 

been a winner for about 2 years. The idea is to promote 

development by changing the incentives that drive 

political leaders in and out of office. Development and 

prosperity direct leaders to good governance which, 

in turn, directs how leaders strike a balance between 

private gains and public benefits to pursue political 

careers. Perpetually sponsoring aid and development 

projects do not alter positively how leaders rule. Foreign support reduces a leader’s incentive to negotiate 

an inclusive distribution of power. At times, there is 
67

suppression of entry to power by control from the top, 

with advancement based on loyalty to the top leader. 

For a successful transition and effective governance, 

the focus must be on how to institutionalize domestic accountability rather than external accountability 

to donors. After all, effective governance can gradually and in a cooperative manner be built, it cannot 

be imposed.

Instability and crises may provide leaders with 

unique opportunities to deal with the actors most 

threatening to the leader’s survival. For instance, in 

Mao Zedong’s China, there were five armies loyal to 

the five heads. Mao Zedong drafted from each of these 

armies to send to the Korean War. These units were 

rotated back to China on regular intervals, but were 

not returned to their original army. At the end of the 

Korean War, the five armies were merged into one. In 

this way, Mao removed the four generals from their 

positions of personal power that could pose a threat 

to his leadership. 

A further challenge of asymmetric leadership is 

how a leadership can foster an emergent structure in 

an organization that would help achieve the ultimate 

goals of the organization, but without the leader creating passive followers following some vision or without creating followers that could challenge their very 

leadership in the future. To an extent, leadership survivability is vital for internal and external purposes. 

If there is frequent leadership change, there is no continuity, and it is very difficult to build relationships 

that would facilitate a smooth transition to peace and 

stability. Internally, within the organization, lack of 

leadership continuity can cause uncertainty and lack 

of commitment and abandonment of what is seen as 

the fight for the cause. Given that one of the roles of 

leadership is to build relationships externally, the fre-
68

quent change of leadership also causes uncertainty 

and lack of commitment to a peaceful transition process. Internally, a leader has a unitary role and should 

help to avoid, among other things, dissension and 

spoiler groups. 

However, there appears to be a couple of paradoxes. To fulfill a unitary role, a leader would need 

to show moderation and openness. But during a protracted conflict and the initial phase of transformation, 

moderate leaders, with possibly a more pragmatic 

outlook, fail and fall victims to their own side. The 

second paradox is that the stronger the leadership, the 

more likely the survival of a transitional process; but 

the stronger the leadership, the less the need for compromise and concession in order to achieve this process. Therefore, it becomes a risk for leaders to try and 

regulate a conflict or a crisis, as it can weaken their 

position within and between conflicting parties. As 

such, the early stages of transition are a balancing act. 

Furthermore, often most relationship building opportunities and peer-learning becomes more limited immediately after the signing of an agreement, because 

each side tries to find its own space under the new 

circumstances. Leadership has to be flexible enough to 

push its constituents in the interests of transition and 

peace but not push too far to lose support and commitment from the followers.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. K. S. Cameron and R. E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing 

Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework, 

Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.

2. J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis, 

London, UK: Sage Publications, 1987, pp. 7-8.
69

3. Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien “Leadership in Complex 

Organizations,” The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 12, 2001, p. 407.

4. Bernd Horn and Allister MacIntyre, eds., In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership, Winnipeg, 

Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006, p. 103.

5. Stephen Rosen, “Thinking about Military Innovation,” 

Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Next Military, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 8. 

6. G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, Westford, MA: Pearson 

Education Ltd, 2013.

7. G. Greenwald, Chap. 9, Leadership and Followership, London, 

UK: Sage Publications, 2007, p. 232.

8. M. P. Follett, “The Giving of Orders,” J. M. Shafritz and J. S. 

Ott, eds., Classics of Organization Theory, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 

Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 156-162.

9. Jean Lipman-Blumen, The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We 

Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians—And How We Can 

Survive Them, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 14.

10. É. Durkheim, De la division du travail social (The Division of 

Labour in Society), French Ed., Charleston, SC: Nabu Press, 2011.

11. Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, Berkeley, CA: 

University of California Press, 1978.

12. Ibid.

13. See Max Weber, “Types of Authority,” Barbara Kellerman, 

ed., Political Leadership: A Source Book, Pittsburgh, PA: University 

of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, pp. 232-244.

14. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, New York: Harper 

and Row, 1978.

15. Ibid.
70

16. Terry L Price, “The Ethics of Authentic Transformational 

Leadership,” Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003, pp. 67-81.

17. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Penguin Classics), New 

York: Penguin Books, 1961.

18. Oren Harari, The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell, New 

York: McGraw-Hill, 2002, pp. 168, 178.

19. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, UK: 

Routledge, 1959.

20. K. Grint, Leadership: Limits and Possibilities, London, UK: 

Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005.

21. S. Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: Selection, London, UK: 

Penguin Books, 1996.

22. Plato, Republic. 

23. L. Freedman, Transformation of Strategic Affairs, London, 

UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2006.

24. Thomas O’Brien, The Role of the Transitional Leader: A 

Comparative Analysis of Adolfo Suarez, Melbourne, Australia: University of Melbourne, 2007; and Boris Yeltsin, Leadership, Vol. 3, 

No. 4, pp. 419-432, especially p. 423.

25. G. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 263.

26. Ibid., p. 270.

27. O’Brien, pp. 419-432, especially p. 420.

28. Samuel Huntington, Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 

Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 

1993, p. 231. 
71

CHAPTER 4

ASYMMETRIC LEADERSHIP AND

 TRANSITIONAL PROCESSES

Anastasia Filippidou

This chapter examines whether the role of asymmetric leadership in transitional processes is to protect 

and safeguard the interests of their own followers or 

whether asymmetric political leadership transcended self-interest and aims to make peace at all costs. 

The chapter argues that asymmetric leadership plays 

multiple roles which often appear incompatible and 

contradictory. 

As examined in Chapter 2, transformational, transactional, and charismatic leadership have been used 

to explain the leadership of successful social reforms 

and leadership of transitions from colonial rule and 

dependence to independence.1 It is known empirically that political leaders can act as triggers to escalate violence during conflicts but also during peace 

processes.2 Similarly, empirically it is also known that 

political transitions and peace processes might be instigated and supported by the people, but they were 

made and established by political elites. In point of 

fact, generally those who lead have mattered more 

than they possibly should. Although asymmetric leadership in transitional processes is by definition transformative, as it involves moving from one regime to 

another through the reforming of social and structural 

relations,3 this book has emphasized that it is difficult 

to determine that any single type of leadership is better than another in every situation. Thus, it is apparent that some leadership styles are likely to be more 
72

effective in certain situations, and that the really effective leader is one who is able to determine the context of the situation and use the most effective leadership behavior required at the time. After all, leaders 

in transitional processes have to be at the same time 

creators and destructors, what J. Schumpeter referred 

to, albeit in relation to capitalist development, as “incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating 

a new one.”4 Therefore, political leadership of radical 

political movements during transition processes is often contradictory in style and substance, owing to its 

asymmetric nature and the circumstances surrounding it. This pragmatically contradictory style depends 

on the situation, and the issue may make leaders both 

dogmatic and concessionary, traditionalist and modernizers, idealists and pragmatists, transactional and 

transformational. This type of leadership is irregular 

and varying, and it has to be able to adjust and adapt 

constantly in order to compensate for the unequal dynamic of asymmetric leadership. 

Transitional processes have no simple solutions 

because they are complex. That is, their solution depends on the wider context and, as such, on a variety 

of interdependent issues and elements. The solution 

of one issue can have an effect on another issue, or it 

can generate a new problem. As a result, this interdependence of issues makes a transitional process 

unique, while uniqueness and complexity can render 

a transitional process unsolvable. The complexity of 

the process makes collective agreement more important than getting the right answer. Complex problems, 

as K. Grint argues, require political collaboration and 

the role of the leadership is to ask the right questions.5

Adding to the complexity is the fact that, during a 

transition process, there is a decrease in the strength 
73

of formal institutional structures, as these would be 

undergoing changes in order to meet the new situation. Moreover, a political vacuum during the transition phase would increase the possibility of conflict, 

with the participating parties in the transition process 

viewing the uncertain future outcome as an opportunity to establish a better position for themselves. 

For a transitional process to stand a chance to be 

successful, there has to be a broadly accepted need for 

change. Understandably, the broader this acceptance 

the better the chances for success become. The acknowledgment of the need for change also requires a 

viable way out from the crisis, as well as valid spokespersons.6

 In light of the fact that participation and 

membership in radical political movements is predominantly voluntary, there also has to be a realistic 

time scale to achieve these changes. If not, the membership’s commitment to the cause of the movement 

may start faltering. A transitional process will need an 

end, even if this is symbolic and, as leadership is a 

relationship between leaders and followers, a transitional process is the responsibility of both leaders and 

followers. 

Leadership often has a negative connotation in 

transitional processes. Violent conflict is often the result of ruthless leaders who, out of greed for power 

and resources, exploit their people. Furthermore, despite the different types of leadership discussed in this 

book, the concept of leadership as such is an hierarchical and authoritarian one relying upon coercion, while 

leaders can have personal vested interests in the status 

quo. However, if the situation is untenable, leaders 

may choose to change or change their aims in order to 

maintain the status quo. 
74

CHANGE CHALLENGES

It is noteworthy that the outcome of a transitional 

process is not guaranteed, and it is possible for this 

process to stall, go backwards, or consolidate in a 

nondemocratic form.7 Leading and managing organizations in dynamic and changing situations require 

leaders that embrace change. In an increasingly interdependent world, even in peaceful environments, 

leaders and followers are confronted constantly with 

the challenge of change. Understandably, in transitional situations this challenge is felt even more intensely. 

The transitional phase is, by nature, a time of intense 

fluidity as the rules and structures of the preceding regime are eradicated and new ones are developed and 

implemented in their stead. This transition denotes 

that there is a reduction in the strength of formal institutional structures, as these are changed and reformed 

to meet the new situation. Structures and institutions 

of the previous regime are abolished and replaced by 

new institutions, and also can provide an opportunity for leaders, but it can simultaneously jeopardize 

leaders. However, the longer this limbo and vacuum 

remains, the higher the risk for conflict, with participants seeing the uncertain future as an opportunity to 

establish a better position for themselves. 

J. Kotter’s eight-step change process includes establishment of a sense of urgency; creation of a guiding coalition (persuade followers and lead change); 

development of a strategy and vision (foundation for 

change); communication of the vision (inclusive interaction); empowering followers (removal of possible 

obstacles); creation of short-term benefits (motivation 

and sense of victory); consolidation and development 

of change (long-term change); and anchoring changes 

in the culture (values and vision).8
75

As mentioned already, a major challenge for transitional leaders is the role they have in demolishing 

and building at the same time in a constantly changing 

environment internally and externally. After a transition, structures and institutions are removed and are 

replaced by new equivalents. The effectiveness of 

leaders is based on the ability to introduce successfully and establish these new rules and structures, while 

ensuring their stability and longevity. These changes 

can jeopardize the very role of the leader, hence quite 

understandably, transitional leaders may try to safeguard their own political survival. As such, political 

leadership in transitional processes is not always a 

wholly positive phenomenon. Moreover, often divided communities chose to give their support to more 

radical and polarizing leaders, whose motivations are 

not always altruistic either in conflict or in subsequent 

peace processes. Communities do this because these 

kind of leaders, with their strong ideas, can make followers feel more secure in an already uncertain and 

volatile environment. 

Regarding leadership survivability and transitions 

to peace processes, Bernard Bass subdivides transformationalism into two distinct types: true transformational and pseudo-transformational leadership.9

 Truly 

transformational leaders, according to Bass, either 

align public interest with their own interests or else sacrifice their own interests for the common good. These 

leaders envisage an attainable future for their followers and their community, which is why narrative and 

vision are important elements for asymmetric leadership in transitional processes. On the contrary, pseudo-transformational leaders adopt the rhetoric of public interest, but in reality their own self-interest takes 

precedence. 
76

As discussed earlier, one of the main elements 

of asymmetric leadership is its adaptability to the 

circumstances. To paraphrase Gabriel Sheffer, this 

adaptability is the result of: 

a fresh scrutinizing of the real world; dissatisfaction 

with the reality that is observed; clear notions about 

desired changes in existing systems, goals and strategies for change; and dedication to implementing these 

changes.10

All this makes asymmetric leadership a very proactive form of leadership, but at the same time it puts 

leadership in a position of constantly trying to strike a 

balance from one element and issue to another. 

The need to influence might necessitate political 

leaders to act in different and at times in contradictory 

ways at different phases of a peace process. Leading 

change remains one of the most important, and at the 

same time most difficult, leadership responsibilities. 

G. Yukl argues that efforts to implement change are 

more likely to be successful if a leader “understands 

the reasons for resistance to change, sequential phases 

in the change process, different types of change, and 

the importance of using appropriate models for understanding organizational problems.”11 As Barry Posen argues, it takes time and effort for organizations 

to unlearn and then relearn.12 This is supported by the 

fact that it is the need to keep the organization aligned 

with changes within the environment that redefines 

the purpose for which the people, its internal constituents, must facilitate the revised way of doing things. 

Change is often associated with uncertainty, and 

uncertainty is very pervasive within the strategic environment relative to time, place, and space. Radical 

political organizations prefer to reduce uncertainty 
77

in order to maintain commitment from the followers, and it is for this reason they codify solutions as 

constitutions and manifestos. Still, radical political 

organizations often find it difficult to conceptualize 

and implement changes within the organization, and 

they become content with structures and principles 

that served them in the past. From the followers’ and 

members’ perspective, conformity to current practices 

and the accepted norms are requirements for upward 

mobility, and those who are part of the system become 

fully aware that the logics of consequentialism and 

appropriateness requires their unwavering loyalty to 

the organization and to their leaders.13 Consequently, 

leaders have to think broadly in terms of systems, 

nonlinear effects, and network forces, and hence feed 

the natural, bottom-up dynamics of emergence, innovation, and fitness.14

RIPENESS AND THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 

The Chinese symbol for crisis is a combination of 

danger and opportunity. As mentioned already, crises 

are natural occurrences, and for their effective solution, there is a need to make the best of it. Political 

leadership is directly related to problem-solving. After all, political leadership means the diagnosis of a 

problem, the prescription of solutions, and the mobilization of support for needed action.15 Understandably, the problem-solving quality of leadership is very 

important in the context of violent conflicts and transitions to peace processes. 

Given the uncertainties involved in any transitional 

process, political leaders at times perceive a process as 

positive, and another as negative or more risky. This 

would explain any apparent inconsistencies in their 
78

attitudes and behaviors toward a peace process which 

they might be a part. During transitional processes, 

there is often a contradiction between the expectation placed on leaders to do the right thing in often a 

self-sacrificing manner and to secure the best outcome 

possible for their own organization on the one hand, 

and what is actually best for the country in general, on 

the other. Often the personal needs and interests of a 

leader or the interests of the specific organization are 

in direct contrast with the interests of the wider community. What is more, often in transitional processes, 

the leaders with the most influence are the more radical ones, which renders a transitional process even 

more challenging. Furthermore, during a transitional 

process leaders have to be prepared to become more 

inclusive, and instead of focusing on a very limited 

group of leaders, they have to broaden the number of 

political players who could help shape a peace process and drive it forward. Finally, during transitional 

processes, there is often a clear contradiction between 

the need to build relationships between the different 

political leaders within the context, however, of the 

adversarial nature of peace processes. In other words, 

transitional leaders have to build workable relationships with their adversaries, while at the same time, 

they need to fight for their interests and that of their 

organization. 

According to I.W. Zartman, a conflict must reach 

a ripe point in order for efforts to resolve that conflict 

to be fruitful and to lead to a successful transition to 

peace.16 Now for a conflict to reach ripeness, Zartman 

argues that the conflicting parties have to commonly 

accept that there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a 

viable way out, and a valid and commonly accepted spokesperson. For a mutually hurting stalemate 
79

(MHS) the leadership of the conflicting parties will 

have to realize and be prepared to accept that they 

cannot defeat the other side, but also at the same time, 

they do not want to admit defeat. However, an MHS 

is only an element of a transition process. There also 

has to be the option of a viable way out. If not, the recognition of an MHS can create a vacuum which then 

may be filled by elements that can escalate the conflict. 

Like the MHS, this viable way out also has to be commonly accepted by the conflicting parties. The valid 

spokesperson is either a leader or somebody who will 

be playing a leading role. In this context, the leadership is cultivating relationships between key players. 

In an increasingly interdependent world, transition 

can be achieved and stability can be built through networks and, as mentioned before, leadership signifies a 

relationship and a relationship flourishes based on coexistence. A political strength of a stable government 

is in the leaders who have stakes in the government 

and in the network of supporters. Distributing power 

and giving local and grassroot leaders a stake in the 

regime, strengthens the regime, and reduces the need 

for foreign support.

NEGATIVE AGREEMENT VS. POSITIVE 

DISAGREEMENT 

Since no leader has the knowledge and power to 

lead effectively on his own, leadership is a collective 

affair. Thus, for effective and successful leadership, it 

is imperative to achieve agreement and constructive 

dissent, if necessary, instead of disagreement and destructive consent. Destructive consent as Grint argues 

is “the bedfellow of irresponsible followership” and 

an inadequate frame for addressing protracted and 
80

complex problems.17 Groupthink, which is the tendency for groups and communities to suppress internal dissent, is dominant among groups under duress 

and pressure. Furthermore, nondominant individuals and groups find it difficult, if not impossible, to 

break out of the groupthink and to express their dissent—constructive or not—and to break into leadership positions within established organizations and 

groups. On the other hand, constructive dissenters are 

willing to stand up to their leaders and express their 

disagreement to a wrong decision. The argument for 

constructive dissent is not for followers to disagree 

constantly with their leaders but to dissent if the leaders are deemed to be acting against the interests of the 

organization and the community as such. 

As stated in the introduction thesis of the research, 

there is a need for a constant balancing of different 

characteristics of leadership and for an adjustment of 

leadership styles to continuously changing situations. 

When followers, for instance, lose their motivation 

and do not want to support the transitional process, 

political leaders have to alter their leadership style to 

a transactional one instead of transformational leadership. This supports the thesis of the research that 

leaders need a variety of leadership styles and models. D. Goleman poignantly argues that leaders “must 

play their leadership style like a pro—using the right 

one at just the right time and in the right measure.”18

This is what Ronald Heifetz categorizes as adaptive 

leadership.19
81

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. See, for instance, Betty Glad, “Passing the Baton: Transformational Political Leadership from Gorbachev to Yeltshin; from 

de Klerk to Mandela,” Political Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1996, 

pp. 1-28; and Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, 

eds., Leadership and Social Movements, Manchester, United Kingdom (UK): Manchester University Press, 2001.

2. M. E. Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and 

Implications,” Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 

Conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 220.

3. Thomas O’Brien, “The Role of the Transitional Leader: A 

Comparative Analysis of Adolfo Suarez and Boris Yeltsin,” Leadership, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 419-432, especially p. 422.

4. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, 

UK: Routledge, 1976, p. 83.

5. K. Grint, interview, available from www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/

som/dinamic-content/media/knowledgeinterchange/booksummaries/

Arts%20of%20Leadership%20-%20Part%202/Transcript.pdf.

6. See I. W. Zartman, Peacemaking in International Conflict: 

Methods and Techniques, Washington, DC: United States Institute 

of Peace, 2007; and J. Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and 

Conflict, Development and Civilization, Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 1996.

7. M. McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-Competitive Transitions in the Post-Communist 

World,” World Politics, 2002, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 212-244.

8. J. Kotter, Leading Change, Boston, MA: Harvard Business 

School Press, 1996.

9. Bernard Bass and P. Steidlmeier, “Ethics, Character and 

Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior,” Leadership 

Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999, pp. 181-217.
82

10. Gabriel Sheffer, “Moshe Sharett: The Legacy of an Innovative Moderate Leader,” Gabriel Sheffer, ed., Innovative Leaders in 

International Politics, Albany, NY: State University of New York 

Press, 1993, p. 85.

11. G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, Upper Saddle River, 

NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 285.

12. Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and 

Germany between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 1984, pp. 34-80.

13. Terry Terriff, “Innovate or Die: Organizational Culture 

and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2006, 

pp. 478-479.

14. Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, “Leadership in Complex 

Organizations,” The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 12, 2001, p. 403.

15. R. C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership, Columbia, MO: 

University of Missouri Press, 1981.

16. Zartman.

17. K. Grint, Leadership: Limits and Possibilities, London, UK: 

Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005.

18. D. Goleman, “Leadership that Gets Results,” Harvard Business Review, March-April 2000, pp. 78-90, especially p. 90.

19. R. Heifetz, ed., Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and 

Tactics for Changing Your Organisation and the World, Boston, MA: 

Cambridge Leadership Associates, 2009.
83

PART II:

LEADERSHIP IN VOLATILE AND 

TRANSITIONAL SITUATIONS

CASE STUDIES

85

CHAPTER 5

THE CASE OF LEBANON

Elias Hanna

INTRODUCTION

Leadership in Lebanon is directly related to the 

volatile nature of its political structure. Throughout 

history, the degrees of volatility have determined 

the kind of leaders the Lebanese society has produced. During times of turmoil, leaders have found 

legitimacy in their religious, sectarian, or even feudal 

backgrounds. Also, the political influence of various 

foreign powers has produced a certain class of leaders. Furthermore, the leaders that the recurrent civil 

wars have produced are by militias that derived their 

legitimacy through arms.

While teaching students the history of Lebanon 

and the Middle East from the Ottoman Empire era until modern times, including the independence period 

and the creation of Greater Lebanon, the common and 

recurrent questions from my students are: When will 

Lebanon be a normal country? When will we have the 

luxury of planning for the future? When will the brain 

drain stop? When will we stop being a buffer state and 

a battle ground for the region? When will we be able to 

break the cycle of civil wars? My answer is that this is 

the normal status of Lebanon. Unfortunately, the idea 

about Lebanon being the Switzerland of the Middle 

East is a myth. Could it be the tyranny of geography? 

Does the geographic location of Lebanon make it volatile or unstable? Or is it the constituencies that form 

Lebanon, or the political culture? Is it the lack of expe-
86

rience with the imposed political entity? Is Lebanon a 

nation-state? Is it the regional environment? History 

has taught us that political upheavals in Lebanon follow a certain framework and a pattern cycle. If we 

need to understand the history of Lebanon that oscillates between anarchy, chaos, and quasi-stability, it is 

a must to comprehend in depth the framework as well 

as the pattern mentioned earlier.

I would like to discuss two theories that explain 

and help analyze the aforementioned patterns. The 

first is called the theory of the circle and the arrow, 

which means: history repeats itself in Lebanon, a politically volatile country, where civil wars are a part 

of the Lebanese life and culture. The variables are the 

context: political, economic, and social. Thus the recurrent civil wars that arise from different dynamics, 

according to the variables and the context, show that 

the elites and leadership are the consequence of the 

quasi-stability and the volatility. (See Figure 5-1.)

Figure 5-1. Context.

The context:

1-Political

2-Social

3-Economic
87

In this chapter, we will discuss the geopolitics of 

Lebanon and determine its geopolitical imperatives. 

The application of the theory or the framework of the 

previously mentioned cycle on key periods of the history of Lebanon such as civil wars, invasions, occupations, and quasi-stable times is also discussed. Accordingly, we will shed light on the role and creation 

of leadership during these periods, and discuss how 

they acquired their legitimacy and how they behaved 

during a quasi-permanent state of crisis.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF LEBANON

Geopolitics is a study of the influence of such 

factors as geography, economics, and demography, 

on the politics and especially the foreign policy of a 

state.1 The geopolitics of Lebanon depends totally on 

its location. Lebanon is the linchpin between east and 

west,2 rather it is the main passage between those two 

worlds, even though we are witnessing the third historical revolution, the technological one,3

 where geography is starting to become irrelevant.

A look from above God’s eye, as we say in geopolitics, locates Lebanon on the main historical axis 

of instability, volatility, and chaos. The Fertile Crescent (see Map 5-14

) is the starting and vital point, the 

bridgehead to enter this crescent, for an empire coming from the west, as well as the ultimate goal for any 

empire that is moving from the east and willing to 

project power toward the west.
88

Map 5-1. The Fertile Crescent.

This Fertile Crescent was historically and still is a 

buffer area among the major regional empires. It used 

to be, and still is, the battleground where accounts are 

settled—compare it to present times. In the modern 

era, we may add Israel as a major regional player (see 

Map 5-2).

Map 5-2. Buffer Zone.
89

In this realm, it is necessary to discuss the second 

theory, the Theory of the Three Ring Model, followed 

by the pattern of the history of Lebanon as a major 

consequence of this theory.

The Three Ring Model.5

This theory or framework is a guideline and a road 

map that leads us into the analysis of the history of 

Lebanon. It is a way to explain Lebanon’s phenomena. 

The past history of Lebanon is best understood by using the so-called theory of the Three Ring Model. The 

Three Ring Model, see Figure 5-2, if well used and fed 

by historical factors, may lead to discern a certain pattern of civil wars in Lebanon, how they occur, how 

they are resolved, and, last but not least, how the political solution is usually imposed on Lebanon. It also 

depicts how, by default, leadership is created.

Figure 5-2. Three Ring Model.

International

Regional

Local
90

The first ring is the outer ring and is used to determine the international players that affect the situation in Lebanon, how the world order is set and interacts, how it relates to internal dynamics, and how it 

influences Lebanon.

The second ring is the regional one where the 

regional players interact within the realm of a multipolar, bipolar, or, as at the time of this writing, perhaps nonpolar world order.6

 This ring will display 

the regional order, alliances, and enmity; the stakes; 

the rules of the game; and last, but not least, where 

Lebanon fits, which leads us to the last inner ring of 

the theory.

The third ring is the local Lebanese inner ring 

where the effects of the dynamics of conflict or cooperation at the world order level and the regional one 

are really felt. Thus as a consequence, we can understand what is happening in the world or the region 

by following and monitoring the micro-political level 

in Lebanon, and vice versa. In this ring, the civil wars 

by proxy are waged. By looking deep into this ring, 

we can discern and analyze the rise of leadership and 

elites in Lebanon.

Thus, what goes within the international system 

is directly reflected in the Middle Eastern regional 

system, and then felt on the Lebanese theater. It has 

been like this historically, and it will go on until the 

Lebanese political elites can create a magic solution 

to shield Lebanon from external influences. Unfortunately, this does not appear likely in the near future. 

The clearest example in how these circles interact and 

how they affect the inner circle is the project of the 

“New Middle East” promoted by former U.S. President George W. Bush, which led to the July 2006 war.7
91

The Pattern in Lebanon’s History.

What happens within the dynamics of the Three 

Ring Model theory will create the following consequences in Lebanon:

• Internal strife under multiple aspects, including secular nationalism, religious or sectarian.

• Possible return of civil war.

• Last, but not least, since Lebanon’s political 

elites historically could not create their own 

political solutions, a political solution is always 

imposed on Lebanon.

Going through the first step of the pattern does not 

really lead to civil war. Civil war could be skipped to 

go directly to the imposed political solution. In between, a mini-civil war could occur.8

Geo-Codes of the Lebanese Imperatives.

After situating Lebanon in the region and discussing the fate of the land of the Cedars, it is a must now 

to define some geopolitical imperatives and codes. 

Colin Flint defines vision and codes as follows:

A vision is the understanding of a state’s national 

history, character, or even destiny that is stable and is 

rooted in popular sentiment. The vision is the foundation that is mobilized to ‘make sense’ of the code.

A code is more dynamic—it changes with changing circumstances—and is the product of state 

elites. It is the foreign policy calculations that are 

reassessed daily.9
92

In the case of Lebanon, unfortunately, there is neither vision nor defined and clear geo-codes due to the 

lack of national unity in defining the vital interests, 

such as defining the friends and foes of the nation. The 

threats of which can be inflicted on Lebanon by both 

enemies and friends/allies alike. We neither have a 

grand strategy in Lebanon, nor a document issued 

at the official level dealing with the national security 

strategy. Regretfully, all we have in the official statement are a few sentences that address national security that were written by newly formed governments 

to gain the confidence of the legislature.10

As mentioned by Flint, the relationships between 

vision and geo-codes and (as discussed earlier) the 

Three Ring framework, it is useful and possible to discern now some geo-codes and imperatives for Lebanon, having in mind those geo-codes are not like a silver bullet that will solve all Lebanon’s ills. However, 

we can consider them like a road map since they are 

dynamics and change according to the context in the 

circle and arrow theory discussed earlier.

• The unity of the land.

• A political consensus on how to distribute 

wealth and power.

• Stop being a buffer state for the global and 

regional dynamics, thus stopping the cycle of 

civil wars and the pattern of imposing political 

solutions on the area as well.

• Lebanon is not a capital maker and provider, 

rather it is a capital manager and consumer 

of services. We need the foreign direct investments to keep the country rolling on the way of 

prosperity. In addition, we need to also keep the 

hard currency coming into Lebanon through 
93

remittances11 from the Lebanese diaspora in the 

Arab World as well as in other regions. Thus, 

we must be, and stay, liberally oriented and 

have no conflict and enmity with any country 

in the Arab World. As Michel Chiha has said 

about Lebanon being a mountain and a sea 

state, the sea is to keep doing business with the 

outside world, and the mountain protects the 

minorities.12

SOME PERMANENT FACTS ABOUT 

THE LEBANESE CASE

Lebanon is considered a fragmented, unstable 

democracy according to Arend Lijphart.13 Moreover, 

the distribution of political power in Lebanon is consociational. It is a consociational democracy based on 

religious and sectarian dimensions. In addition, stability in such a system necessitates a positive role of 

the elites. In the Lebanese case, the elites of the subcultures that form the Lebanese fabrics are usually 

in a competitive mode even within the same culture, 

religion, or sect.

Lebanon is a main part of the region, especially the 

Arab World. It is linked to the regional environment, 

as the brain is a part of the human body. When events 

occur in Palestine, we feel it all over the Arab world. 

What makes Lebanon different is the political system, 

i.e., a democratic country surrounded by authoritarian regimes. Thus, the concept of neutrality for Lebanon is out of the question; hence the relevancy of our 

Three Ring Model. 

The recurrence of the civil wars in Lebanon is 

due to how the previous war has ended, i.e., the war 

termination process, or what the scholar Edward Lu-
94

ttwak described as “give war a chance.”14 Negotiated 

settlements to end the civil war will keep two or more 

sovereignties among protagonists, and the security dilemma will be enhanced. Thus, the settlement will be 

temporary and tactical, to survive and prepare to fight 

another time.

In Lebanon, the slogan to follow after ending a 

civil war, and the imposition of the political solution, 

is: “No victor, no vanquished.” It is considered as the 

main platform for reconciliation, though this reconciliation is fake and shallow. Hence, civil wars occurred 

in 1845, 1860, 1958, and 1975, with numerous mini 

wars in between.

Last, but not least, the same negative dynamics 

on Lebanon of the Three Ring Model discussed previously that lead Lebanon to civil war; are the same 

dynamics that are also positive on Lebanon and will 

lead Lebanon to terminate the war. Said differently, 

Lebanon is caught between two dynamics within our 

theory. One is negative and leads to internal strife 

and to civil war by consequence. The other is positive 

and takes Lebanon to the imposed political solution, 

and to an enforced stability not too far from volatility. Thus, Lebanon is in a lose-lose situation in both 

dynamics. It is all about the degree of volatility and 

the amount to be paid in human and material losses. 

Civil Wars Seen from the Three Ring Model 

and Role of Elites.

In 1840-85, Lebanon witnessed a civil war due to 

the competition in the international system—European powers (United Kingdom [UK], France, Austria), Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. Those powers, 

if used within our theory of the Three Ring Model, 
95

would depict the European Union (EU) powers in 

the first ring; the Ottoman Empire in the first and 

second—the regional; and as far as the local ring is 

concerned—1st ring—at that time, Mount Lebanon 

was the political entity, where Druses and Maronites 

coexisted in a self-ruled status. Due to the competition 

in the international system, a sectarian civil war broke 

out in Mount Lebanon. 

When the world powers interfered, a political resolution was imposed on Mount Lebanon, Al-Qaimaqamiah.15 This political system created what we now call 

the confessional system. The imposed political solution created a new kind of leadership and elites at the 

inner ring. The qaimaqam governs his district, and 

there were two districts—Druse and Maronite—aided by a council formed on sectarian basis. The elites 

of that time could not really protect Mount Lebanon 

from the recurrent civil war. Civil war reoccurred 

in 1860.

The 1860 civil war was also sectarian and occurred 

between the same factions, Druses and Maronites, 

within the same geographic theater, Mount Lebanon, 

and spread to Damascus. The same powers interfered, 

but the Ottoman Empire was the “sick man” at that 

time, and another political solution was imposed under a new political system, the Al-Moutasarsifiah (see 

Map 5-3).16 The elites or the political leaders at the 

time were chosen by the Ottoman Empire, especially 

the Al-Moutasarref or the governor, and imposed on 

Mount Lebanon. The Lebanese Druse and Maronites 

had no say in choosing their leaders. The Moutasarref 

had to be a Christian but a non-Maronite proposed by 

the Ottoman authority, and approved by the greater 
96

European powers. The Governor was aided by a 

council of 12 members chosen on a sectarian basis.17

In addition, Mount Lebanon was divided into seven 

geographic districts.

The end of World War I and the collapse of the 

Ottoman Empire led to the creation of Greater LebMap 5-3. Map of Al-Moutasarsifiah.
97

anon in 1920 by the French, represented by General 

Henri Gouraud. The creation of Greater Lebanon 

led to an identity crisis for the constituencies of 

Lebanon. Are we Arabs? Are we Phoenicians? Do 

we belong to the Arab world, greater Syria? Are we 

a different civilization? Oriented toward the Western world? Vital identity issues simmered and were 

the main reasons for fomenting the internal strife 

within the above mentioned pattern. According to 

prominent Lebanese historian Albert Hourani, the 

creation of Greater Lebanon mixed two incompatible ideologies; the ideology of the mountain—of 

the Christians Maronites—and the ideology of the 

city—of the coast where the Muslim Sunnis reside.18

For Hourani, the mountain ideology is insular, superstitious, religious, and populist; hence the distrust 

of the city, where the ideology is pluralistic which 

creates internal strife.19

Hourani implies several issues. On the one hand, 

the status of Mount Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire where Christian Maronites coexisted along with 

the Druse Community for centuries created a certain 

special modus vivendi and operandi ideology of the 

mountain regardless of the two civil wars that had occurred, since we consider them as the by-product of 

this unique experience between the two sects. Moreover, under Al-Qaimaqamiah and Al-Moutasarsifiah, 

Mount Lebanon went through a unique political experience of quasi-self-governing, which prepared the 

people of the mountain, especially the Maronites, to 

take the helm of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and consider 

it a nation-state. Last, but not least, Maronites perceive 

themselves as a separate entity from the region especially from Greater Syria.
98

On the other hand, the people of the city never 

went through the same experiences as the people of 

the mountain. They were mainly governed directly 

by the Ottoman Empire through the Wali. Moreover, 

they were mainly Sunni Muslims. Religiously, they 

looked to the Khalifa in the Astana Ottoman Empire 

for guidance. They have never experienced any common modus vivendi and operandi with the Maronites. 

Last, but not least, they perceive themselves as a part 

of a wider Arab World and a Muslim world that really 

goes beyond the border of Lebanon.

When in 1920 Greater Lebanon was created, these 

two ideologies were put together to the test—imposed political solution—with no previous common 

experience on how to distribute power and wealth. 

Also, they were put to the test on how to deal with 

their geo-strategic environment, whether in war or 

in peace, since the ideologies are incompatible, hence 

the permanent internal strife when there is any shift 

in the regional geopolitical environment (the second 

ring of the framework). In this period, the main elites 

that were behind the creation of Greater Lebanon the 

religious Christian Maronites20 on the one hand; and 

on the other, the elites opposing this creation were 

mainly Sunni under the Arab Nationalism umbrella.

A Turning Point for Lebanon.

After numerous major geopolitical shifts in the 

regional ring, especially the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Arab Nation-State, Lebanon became a de facto country. All parties began to 

realize that there was no way back, and they had to 

follow and abide by the new geopolitical game and 

its consequences of different dynamics in the Three 

Ring Model. 
99

Therefore, the political elites started to reassess 

the situation to see how to create a modus vivendi

among the constituencies of the new nation-state, 

mainly Christian Maronites and Muslim Sunnis, in 

order to have a stable and prosperous country. In 

1943, an agreement was reached which was called the 

National Pact.

The main purpose of this pact was really to isolate the inner ring—the local—as much as possible 

from the regional and outer rings. According to the 

agreement, the Christians would not ask for help from 

France, and the Muslims will never ask to be reintegrated in Greater Syria. In addition, the distribution 

of power will follow the ratio 6:5 in favor of the Christians, based on the 1932 census.21

Along with the Constitution, written in 1926, the 

National Pact of 1943 was morally binding for the political elites from both religions to work and cooperate 

for the stability and prosperity of Lebanon. This continued until 1948 when the Arab world was struck by 

a major “Black Swan”22 event that shook its foundations—the creation of the state of Israel.

The Creation of Israel Analyzed through 

the Three Ring Model.

The creation of Israel is analyzed through the following rings:

• The international ring:

— The world order was going through 

a major geopolitical shift, the decline 

of Great Britain, and the redistribution of power globally; hence the decision of Great Britain to withdraw from 

Palestine.
100

— The new world order became bipolar—the 

United States vs. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

— The cold war ensued.

• The regional ring:

— The withdrawal of Great Britain from the 

region created a vacuum and hence a time 

of uncertainty.

— The major defeat of the Arab countries 

during the 194823 war with Israel led to a 

de facto power in the region called the alNakba, a major blow to the Arab countries. 

The refugee catastrophe ensued from this 

war,24 created a burden on host countries. 

Many wars followed 1956, 1967, 1973, and 

1982, and more recently the July 2006 war. 

After al-Nakba, Arab countries were never 

politically stable. Coup d’état and countercoups occurred for many years. The military 

dominated politics in many Arab countries. 

Finally, the Gamal Abdel Nasser reign in 

Egypt in1952, under the Pan Arabism umbrella, added salt on Lebanese wounds.

• The Local Ring:

— At the national level, the National Pact was 

put to the test on how to really isolate Lebanon from the regional upheaval. The refugee crisis provoked deep communal divisions, critical internal political debate, even 

ideological controversies, and deep debate 

on the identity of Lebanon.
101

The creation of Israel in 1948 led to new dynamics 

for the Three Ring Model. There was more activity on 

the regional dimension than on the international one, 

and, by consequence, political volatility increased 

in Lebanon.

The rise of Gamal Nasser after the Suez Canal crisis 

in 1956 and his project to unite the Arab world starting 

with Syria in 1958 under the banner of the United Arab 

Republic (UAR), created an internal tension in Lebanon. President Camille Chamoun invoked the Dwight 

Eisenhower Doctrine25 and asked for U.S. help. Five 

thousand U.S. Marines landed on the shores of Lebanon to end a 3-month rebellion. The interference of 

U.S. Marines in Lebanon was meant to “hit two birds 

with one stone.” On the regional front, it was meant to 

send a message to Nasser after a coup d’état occurred 

in Iraq, toppling the pro-American monarchy. On 

the local front, the landing of the Marines created the 

needed atmosphere to stop the rebellion and deny any 

interference from the UAR, where Nasser was the de 

facto president.26 The imposed political solution after 

this period of instability was the election of General of 

the Lebanese Army Fouad Chehab, after a tacit agreement was reached between the United States and 

Egypt on the new president.27 Again, Lebanon oscillated between democracy, liberty, volatility, and stability. Once again, stability was imposed.

With Chehab as president, an agreement was 

reached between Nasser and Chehab to work on the 

stability of Lebanon, on the condition that Chehab 

will follow a pro-Nasser foreign policy.28 The cordial 

agreement between the two presidents insulated Lebanon from any Arab interference in its internal affairs, 

especially from the giant neighbor, Syria, but this was 

temporary. Moreover, this relationship buffered Leba-
102

non from any negative consequences that might occur 

from the dynamics of the Three Ring Model. Nasser 

guaranteed the loyalty of the Muslim nationalists in 

Lebanon to the state. It was a managed stability—

a fake and contextual one. When the rules of the game 

changed, the equation of stability fell, and Nasser’s 

death in 1970 caused the return of the volatile state 

once again. Thus, the leadership of Lebanon was selected by the international ring and agreed upon by 

the regional one. 

After Chehab, President Charles Helou was chosen, as usual, outside the legal process or the democratic institutions; the Parliamentary election was 

just a charade. It is said that the election of Helou 

came after a simple telephone call between previous 

President Chehab and President Nasser, with some 

help from the Egyptian ambassador in Beirut, Abdel 

Hamid Ghaleb.29

The Six-Day War of 1967 was another blow to Arab 

pride, and to the stability of Lebanon. If the first war 

of 1948 was tagged as Al-Nakba, this war earned the 

name of Al-Naksa. After the 1967 war, no major Arab 

state was able to wage a conventional war against 

Israel. Consequently, at the Khartoum Arab League 

Summit, the mission to fight Israel was diverted to a 

nonstate actor, The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). At the summit, 13 Arab countries issued 

the three No’s: No peace, No negotiation, and No 

recognition. They pledged for the continuation of the 

struggle against Israel until the return of Palestine.30

Since peace was ruled out as a solution at the 

Khartoum Summit, war became the only way to recover the lost and occupied lands. However, the 

questions remained: How? Where, and by whom? 

Once again, Lebanon suffered the consequences of 

the Arab defeat, and the dynamics of the regional 
103

ring laid its heavy weights on the fragile country as 

the weakest node in the Arab world. Lebanon is the 

only Arab country with an ideal location to wage an 

unconventional war on Israel. Hence the 1969 Cairo 

agreement31 imposed on Lebanon during the reign 

of Helou.

The Cairo agreement provided the PLO a platform 

to attack Israel from Lebanese territories, creating a 

state within a state.32 Between the PLO’s attacks on 

Israel and the Israeli retaliation, Lebanon lost its sovereignty, and went to civil war in 1975, followed by an 

unprecedented and destructive war during the Israeli 

invasion of 1982. No Lebanese leadership during this 

critical period was really able to manage the situation 

positively. Rather, the chairman of the PLO, Yasser 

Arafat, was a de facto ruler of most of Lebanon, including Beirut and the South. On the other hand, Syria 

and Israel were using Lebanon as a battleground and 

a buffer state. The legitimate sate of Lebanon was limited to a small, mostly Christian area.

The civil war of 1975 lasted the longest and was the 

major factor to redistribute the political power in Lebanon afterwards. The war can be explained according 

to our framework of the Three Ring Model:

1. The international ring—world order—was at 

that time bipolar between the USSR and the United 

States. At this time, the United States was caught 

in the Vietnam War with no possibility in sight to 

withdraw.

2. In the regional ring, the October war erupted in 

1973, surprising Israel as well as the United States. Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria in the Sinai and 

the Golan heights. It was a semi-victory for the Arabs 

and a semi-defeat for Israel. But the realities after the 

war proved that Israel was not really invincible and 

that the Arabs could wage conventional war against 
104

Israel as well, though the qualitative edge was in Israel’s favor. The major consequence of the October war 

was the oil embargoes by the Gulf Arab oil countries. 

This embargo hit the Western world hard, especially 

the United States. 

According to Lebanese writer Roger J. Azzam, the 

civil war of 1975 was planned and initiated by former 

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and called the Kissinger’s plan.33 In addition to this, American political 

activist Lyndon Larouche mentioned the same plan by 

Kissinger to plunge Lebanon into civil war.34

Briefly, the plan is as follows:

• Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal was behind the 

oil embargo. He was assassinated by his half 

brother’s son, Faisal bin Musaid, on March 25, 

1975.

• The casus belli for the October war were the Palestinians. The PLO resided in Lebanon and had 

taken control over it. On April 13, 1975, the Ain 

El Rummaneh35 bus incident occurred, which 

sparked the fourth civil war.36 The PLO was 

destroyed in Lebanon during the 1982 Israeli 

invasion

• Lebanon was divided between Israel and Syria; 

a small area was left for the Christians, approximately the old area of Al-Moutasarsifiah 

as discussed earlier.

• Secret and tacit rules for the game between 

Israel and Syria were in place, for example, 

Israel will have the air dominance over Lebanon, while Syria will never militarily cross the 

Al-Awali River near the city of Sidon, which is 

the main entrance between the Mount Lebanon 

district and Southern Lebanon.37
105

• Thus, instead of fighting each other directly, 

the war between Israel and Syria was fought 

by proxy on Lebanese land. During this time, 

Lebanon was in a lose-lose situation.

The human toll of this war was huge, with more 

than 100,000 people killed. Lebanon was totally destroyed, and geographically partitioned into many 

sectarian cantons (see Map 5-4).38 In this plan, the international ring used the Lebanese civil war to solve its 

geopolitical conundrum and to create a new regional 

environment where the Palestinian question is weaker 

after losing its military teeth through the destruction 

of the PLO.

Map 5-4. Division of Lebanon after

 the Civil War of 1975.
106

The civil war of 1975 went through many phases; 

all of which took Lebanon from bad to worse. Moreover, a hidden war went along with the civil war between Arafat and President Hafez Al Assad, on the 

political control of the Palestinian card. Whoever controlled Palestine would have the upper hand in any 

peace process, and would be the sole representative 

of the most crucial Arab issue. Lebanon was used as a 

battleground for the indirect war between Assad and 

Arafat, as well as between Assad and the leaders of 

the whole Arab world, since the PLO was physically 

and politically in Lebanon, and Syria has the longest 

borders with Lebanon. 

In 1967, Assad delivered a speech announcing the 

overt military interference in Lebanon to stop the war 

and protect the Christians from being massacred by 

the forces of Al Haraka Al Watanieh—National Movement—which was being aided by the PLO.39 Moreover, the main point in the speech was to deny Israel 

any part in the partitioning of Lebanon.40 The entry 

of Syrian forces into Lebanon had many geopolitical 

implications and objectives. First was to buffer Syria 

from the sectarian war that was raging in Lebanon; 

second was to try to control the PLO and deny Arafat 

total control over Lebanon; and third, Lebanon would 

give Syria the strategic depth needed in its struggle 

with Israel and the possibility of waging a proxy war 

against Israel without being accountable. In other 

words, Syria would have plausible deniability.

To stop the bloody civil war in Lebanon, in 1976 

the Arabs decided, in the Al Riyadh Arab League 

conference, to send a deterrent Arab force41 to end 

the war, rebuild the Lebanese Army, control the PLO, 

and restore order between belligerents. This deterrent 
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force, in fact, added salt on Lebanese wounds. Nearly 

90 percent of the forces were comprised of the Syrian 

army. Most of them were already fighting in Lebanon. 

When war broke out again, the non-Syrian Arab forces left, leaving the bulk of the Arab Deterrent Force 

(ADF), mostly Syrians, fighting the Lebanese militias, 

mainly the Christians.

Along with the initiative of the ADF, a new Lebanese President was elected in 1976, Elias Sarkis. As 

usual, the presidential election in the parliament was 

prearranged; this phenomenon was to turn into a Lebanese pattern. It is said that the agreement was made 

between American envoy Dean Brown and Syrian 

President Assad. Therefore, the situation in Lebanon 

depended on local and global interference, and their 

synchronization, whether to stop the civil war or to 

choose political elites by the same dynamics that had 

previously been imposed on Lebanon.

The 1978 Camp David Accord between Israel and 

Egypt under American sponsorship was a “Black 

Swan” event for the Arab World. It meant a major 

and unprecedented geopolitical shift in the regional 

balance between the Arabs and Israel, even between 

the USSR and the United States. The Arabs lost the 

country that fought Israel; the burden was now on 

Syria. Being in Lebanon, or de facto controlling Lebanon, and to spoil this accord, Syria used whatever it 

had on hand to rectify the balance of power. Hence 

Kissinger’s famous dictum: “No war without Egypt, 

no peace without Syria.”42

During this new equation, the civil war returned 

to Lebanon until the Israeli invasion of 1982 thus 

starting another kind of conflict and war, with new 

regional dynamics especially after the Iranian Islamic 

revolution of 1979. The most important tectonic shift 
108

was the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution with Imam al 

Khomeini. This revolution shook the foundations of 

the Arab and Islamic world. It was an exclusive revolution per se, only for the Shia Twelver who follow 

the wilayat al- faqih doctrine—the guardianship of the 

jurist.43 Whoever wanted to join were required to first 

be Shia, then twelver, and finally, believe in the guardianship of the jurist.

The seismic waves of this revolution rippled the 

whole region. It defied the Sunni Arab world; moreover, it revived a neo-imperialist tendency under the 

guise of Islam. The grand scheme of Islamic Iran in 

the region revived in Turkey the old enmity of the 

Ottomans and the Persians. Both old empires fought 

each other fiercely when the Pax Mogolica had ended 

after the withdrawal of the Mongols from the region. 

However, when the Pax Americana ended after the 

withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, both 

regional powers went back to trying to control the Fertile Crescent; as discussed earlier, Lebanon became a 

part of the Crescent.44

Therefore, 1979 and 1982 are two highly critical 

years for the modern history of Lebanon: 1979 led to 

the revival and rise of the Shia under the leadership of 

Iran, including the Lebanese ones; and the 1982 Israeli 

invasion led to the creation of the strategic relationship 

between Syria of Al Assad, and Iran of Al Khomeini. 

This invasion also led to the creation of the Lebanese 

Hezbollah party whose goal was to fight the Israeli 

occupation in Lebanon, and to remove the United 

States from the region. So the Shia of Lebanon were 

mobilized and drafted to be a part of the strategic axis 

of Iran and Syria; though the relationship between 

the Shia of Lebanon and those of Iran date back 500 

years.45 In addition, the Assad family owed the Shia of 
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Lebanon, especially the Imam Moussa Sadr, when the 

latter issued a fatwa in 1973 considering the Alawis of 

Syria as Shia Muslims, to facilitate the rule of Hafez 

Al Assad vis-à-vis the Sunni, especially the Muslim 

Brotherhood,46 when drafting the Syrian constitution.

The 1982 invasion by the Israelis forces, in concordance with the Christian Lebanese militias, led to the 

destruction of the PLO as well as of the Lebanese infrastructure. This invasion ended for good the armed 

dimension of the Palestinians’ resistance.

Lebanon in this turmoil did not change the historical course of choosing its political elites. The political 

solution was imposed again on Lebanon by the Israelis when they elected and lobbied in favor of the 

Christian militia leader, Bashir Gemayel.47 Gemayel 

was assassinated by his brother, Amin, who followed 

as president of Lebanon. The Israelis withdrew to the 

security zone in southern Lebanon and the Syrians returned to Lebanon. Again, Lebanon will go through 

a lengthy period of instability where the leaderships 

have no influence at all on the main course of events.

In 1988, when the term of President Amine Gemayel ended with no possibility in sight to elect a new 

President or to renew or extend his term, he nominated an interim cabinet under the helm of General of 

the Lebanese Army, Michel Aoun. Aoun waged two 

destructive wars; the first against the Syrians under 

the slogan of the war of Liberation, the second against 

the leader of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea. Both 

wars were the straw that broke the camel’s back of 

the Christian community in Lebanon, and changed 

the balance of power, tilting it toward the Muslims in 

all aspects. The war between Aoun and Geagea was a 

new phenomenon in the Lebanese equation of volatility and instability and a new dimension—that war 

could happen between people from the same sects.48
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The civil war in Lebanon became futile and costly, 

and it was time to put an end to it, but how? To explain the process of ending the war, we go back to the 

Three Ring Model and the pattern. The United States 

gave the green light to end the war. Saudi Arabia as 

regional power, with the help of Morocco, Algeria, 

and Syria, created the political solution that was imposed by force via Syria on Lebanon—the Taef Agreement. From 1842 until 1990, nothing really changed 

in the bloody cycle of civil wars in Lebanon; history 

repeated itself but in different contexts, the circle and 

the arrow concept. Syria entered Lebanon by military 

force and ended the rule of Aoun and then took over 

Lebanon until 2005, when it was forced to withdraw 

from Lebanon under U.S. pressure after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

The Lengthy Syrian Presence in Lebanon.

The Syrian hegemony over Lebanon was facilitated by an American green light, when the United States 

was preparing the campaign to liberate Kuwait from 

Saddam Hussein. It needed an Arab and Islamic cover for more legitimacy. The shrewd Assad exploited 

the opportunity, and sent Syrian forces to participate 

symbolically in the liberation of Kuwait; Lebanon was 

the big prize. Thus he achieved his geopolitical goal 

by only following the new rules of the game. 

Lebanese Governance during the 

Syrian Regional Hegemony.49

The imposition of the Taef Agreement on Lebanon by the Syrian military force, in fact, validated 

our theory concerning the pattern in Lebanon—an 
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imposed political solution. Moreover, it was a historical opportunity for President Hafez Al Assad to 

achieve his strategic goals, while the international 

and regional context favored taking over Lebanon for 

good. The Taef Agreement changed the internal balance of power among the sects. Instead of distributing 

political power along the ratio 6 to 1 as is done today, 

the distribution will be 50/50 percent. Moreover, the 

Maronite President lost most of his powers. According to former Defense Minister Albert Mansour,50 the 

President of the Republic lost, with the Taef, almost all 

his powers; political, military, financial, and administrative. The president became powerless and instead 

of solving the Lebanese dilemma, the Taef agreement 

created more problems than solutions. The Taef agreement created a vital dilemma for the Christians. If they 

go along with the implementation, they lose; if they 

boycott it, they lose as well. The Christians oscillated 

between both courses of action.

Entering Lebanon by force and under a regional 

and international legitimacy was the most opportune 

time for Assad to complete his geopolitical design for 

Syria and his role in the region. After deciphering his 

plans in retrospect vis-à-vis Lebanon, Assad's calculations were based on the most important geopolitical 

equation, which is: 

• Lebanon is indispensible for Syria, it is the vital 

strategic depth for Syria.

• Lebanon is also the soft belly of Syria, the ills of 

Syria could come from Lebanon.

• Lebanon, under the Syrian thumb, gives Syria a 

major global and regional status; without Lebanon, Syria is just an ordinary regional country 

in the Fertile Crescent.
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• If Syria loses Lebanon, the struggle will be on 

her soul,51 on how to control Syria; it will be 

the main stake in the region, on one hand; on 

the other, if Syria has Lebanon, it will lead the 

struggle in the region beyond its borders, and 

will be the linchpin of the Fertile Crescent.

• Lebanon can add to Syria the most important 

tools needed for a grand design in the region, 

among many, the political, and financial, as 

well as the media one.

The Taef agreement was presented to Assad on a 

golden plate. It was the historical opportunity to complete his design without being interrupted, neither 

by the Arabs nor the United States, and not by Israel. 

He became a necessity for them after he repositioned 

himself and followed the tides of change after the fall 

of his main sponsor, the USSR. This was the macro 

level of Assad’s design for Lebanon. It denotes how 

shrewd he was, and how he had in depth knowledge 

and a sense of history; and how he was able to relate 

the macro to the micro practically. It also denotes how 

patient he was by following the famous dictum of 

Muawiyah:

I never apply the sword when the lash suffices, nor the 

lash when my tongue is enough. If there is even one 

thread binding me to my fellow man, I do not let it 

break. If he pulls, I loosen. If he loosens, I pull.52

Assad, the Muawiyah of the 20th century, governed 

Lebanon at the micro level by suppressing the Sunni, 

especially Hariri, knowing in advance that Hariri was 

the man of Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, pro-American, 

and a close friend to French President Jacques Chirac. 

All the above hindered his design for Lebanon. 
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To get rid of his main historical opponents in 

Lebanon, the Christian Maronites, he exiled some, 

imprisoned others, and got the services of the rest by 

intimidation.53 In fact, the Maronites were the main 

hurdle for Assad, since they considered themselves as 

the creators of Greater Lebanon. Aoun was exiled to 

France, as was former President Gemayel. The leader 

of the Lebanese Forces, a staunch supporter of the Taef 

Agreement, was jailed for almost 11 years. The Christians of Lebanon were leaderless for almost 14 years, 

while Taef deprived them of their main historical 

role in the governance; a new kind of leadership ensued under the control of the Syrian influence—in the 

Christian realm, the leaders were called the puppets 

of the Syrians. Last, but not least, the Syrian regime 

opened up the whole state of Lebanon for the Shia 

Amal movement, the most important party of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is considered the offspring of the strategic relationship between Assad and Khomeini; it is 

the military arm to project power in multidimensions. 

When the militias of Lebanon were disarmed after 

the Taef agreement, Hezbollah kept its arsenal under 

the slogan of Islamic resistance to liberate the occupied land by Israel after the 1982 invasion. The resistance was exclusive for the party of God; the other 

secular parties were denied by force the sacred role 

of fighting the occupier, keeping in mind that the first 

resistant shot fired on the Israeli in Lebanon was pure 

secular. It is worth noting that Hezbollah, with President Assad, the father, was a controlled tool for his regional design. He never personally met the Secretary 

of the party of God, and the relationship between Iran 

and Hezbollah had to go through Syria first for the 

final decision—this changed dramatically with Assad, 

the son.
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For instance, the Iranian government was against 

the Taef Agreement, as it marginalized the Shia of 

Lebanon. To spoil the situation, the Iranian ambassador to Syria crossed the border to Lebanon to meet 

the leaders of Hezbollah, asking them to oppose the 

implementation of Taef. President Assad was aware 

of the Iranian design, stood firm, and ignored the Iranians wishes.54 From the macro to the micro level, the 

Syrians, through their Lebanese puppets, tightly controlled Lebanon.55 The security apparatus were under 

the total Syrian control—Army, Iraqi Security Force, 

and so on—as well as the political institutions, elections, assignments, etc. The foreign policy of Lebanon 

had to be geared by the Syrians to serve their grand 

strategy design.

In this period, we could say that the absence of 

volatility and instability was at the expense of the liberty and sovereignty of Lebanon. Even, the leadership 

was assigned from top to bottom—it was a stiff and 

tough micromanagement. For instance, Sunni Leader 

Hariri, the architect of the Taef, was a billionaire and 

considered the man of Saudi Arabia in Lebanon. The 

Maronites had no sponsor at that period in time, since 

their role became irrelevant in linking between East 

and the West; but they were a major factor of the problem, or rather the main problem, but not necessarily 

a part of the solution. As far as the Shia factions were 

concerned, they were the main proxies of Syria and 

Iran. Hence, the stability of Lebanon in that critical 

period of time was not the by-product of the Lebanese 

leaderships, rather it still depended on the dynamics of the geopolitical games in the region and on the 

whims of the regional powers. 
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To be more precise, there was a tight Syrian system 

of control on all levels, as mentioned earlier. This was 

institutionalized, and it had a structure and a modus 

operandi. For instance, the main intelligence bureau 

was located in the Bekaa Valley in the town of Anjar. 

The regional intelligence bureau was located there and 

in each administrative district—hub and periphery. 

The main bureau was responsible for all day-to-day 

affairs in Lebanon from security issues to elections at 

all levels, even to economy. The passage to Damascus 

had to go through the main gate, which was Anjar, except for privileged people and high-ranking officials. 

Even at the highest level of leadership, it is extremely 

embarrassing to discuss how, for instance, the president of Lebanon was chosen, elected, and how his 

term extended.56 As defunct Lebanese president Elias 

Hraoui stated:

In 1995 on the 15th of April, I met with President Assad 

for more than 5 hours. He said to me that the region is 

going through a critical time, and change at the leadership level is not a good option. And since we are in an 

excellent relationship, I suggest that you extend your 

term for 3 more years.57

Hraoui continues:

. . . The Speaker of the House, Nabih Birri, was assigned 

by Damascus to prepare the Parliament to amend the 

constitution. . . .58

The trigger for the whole process above, to start, was 

not made in Lebanon. The President continues:

On the 11th of October 1995, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram published an interview with President 
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Assad, saying, that the Lebanese have agreed to extend the term of the President.59

While being President for more than 9 years, and 

knowing tacitly that Assad preferred General of the 

Lebanese Army Emile Lahoud to be the next President 

of Lebanon, Hraoui, while on the road from Damascus 

to Beirut, called Lahoud and congratulated him for being chosen as next President of Lebanon. Afterward, 

the charade continued within the legal institutions.60

Points in analyzing the Lebanese status during this 

period, according to the Three Ring Model, are:

• At the international level, the United States was 

in Iraq, with two no-fly zones. The Lebanese 

question was geopolitically irrelevant. Russia, 

after the fall of the USSR, was immersed internally by a high degree of instability.

• At the regional level, the sponsors of the Taef 

Agreement gave up on their role for Lebanon, 

especially the Gulf States, for fear of the situation from the encircled Iraq, and the looming 

danger of the Iranian revolution.

• Locally, Lebanon is left to the Syrian unchallenged hegemony.61 Thus, Lebanon became the 

means for Assad to achieve his regional goals.

In June 2000, Assad died from a heart attack. His 

son, Bashar, was elected after being prepared for this 

contingency for more than 5 years. Changes in Syria 

are directly reflected in Lebanon. Whether by intimidation or choice, accordingly, the system of control in 

Lebanon was changed, upgraded to suit the new realities. The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon 

on May 24, 2000, after 18 years of occupation and insurgency by Hezbollah—backed by Iran and Syria—
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created new rules for new kinds of games. Simply said 

internal strife resurfaced. The issue of Hezbollah’s 

arms was brought up. The Syrian presence in Lebanon 

was put to the question. The relevance of the strategic 

axis of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah was contented post 

liberation.

The most important declaration dealing with these 

major issues came from the Maronite Bishops.62 This 

declaration defied the Syrian presence, asking for 

their withdrawal and even blaming them for most of 

the Lebanese ills. This led back to internal strife. To legitimize the arms of Hezbollah after the Liberation of 

the South, a casus belli was designed in Shebaa Farms, 

as an occupied territory by Israel that needed to 

be liberated. 

The greatest “Black Swan” event of the 21st century occurred on September 11, 2001. The global war 

on terror of the American President George W. Bush 

was focused on the Middle East as the main theater, 

especially the Arab world, since 15 of the 19 culprits 

were Saudis, one was Lebanese, one was Egyptian, 

and two were from the United Arab Emirates. After 

the war on Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq was occupied in 

2003 and Saddam Hussein was toppled.

Using the Three Ring Model, the geopolitical shift 

in the world and the region was unprecedented. How? 

The global ring was dominated by the United States; it 

was its Unipolar Moment,63 never been experienced in 

the history of great powers.64 The Russians reassured 

the Americans that they were in the same fight against 

terrorism, and Le Monde, the famous French Newspaper, wrote in its opening, “Nous sommes tous Americains” (“We are all Americans”).65

In 2003, the major shift was the occupation of Iraq 

and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Thus, the inter-
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national ring coalesced tightly with the regional ring. 

Because of the disparity of power between both rings, 

the ripples were felt all over the region. The analogy 

of the United States resembling a 5,000-pound gorilla 

entering a gift shop; however it moved, the consequences were very high. Iraq was the center of gravity 

of the region; from this center, the United States could 

project power and influence in the whole region. But 

the American designs were of an utopist nature in a 

region where history weighed heavily. The Iraqi adventure was supposed to be a short and quick battle in 

a long war; it turned out to be the main U.S. battle. The 

Syrians, as well as the Iranians, refused to cooperate to 

help stabilize Iraq post Saddam. How could they help, 

knowing that their turn could be next? It was also a 

historical occasion to bleed the United States, remove 

it, and dominate the region. On the local ring, Syria 

held Lebanon tight for many geopolitical imperatives 

discussed earlier, and Hezbollah later dominated the 

Lebanese scene.

In 2004, the United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC) issued Resolution 1559, asking for the Syrian 

withdrawal from Lebanon and the election of a new 

president when Lahoud’s term ended.66 Resolution 

1559 was the offspring of cooperation between Bush 

and Chirac. Since Hariri was a close friend of Chirac, 

he was accused indirectly as being the father of this 

resolution. On February 14, 2005, Hariri was assassinated by a huge car bomb in the middle of Beirut. 

According to many analysts, Hariri was killed for the 

future roles he might have played, not on what he had 

done. He was caught in a very big regional and global 

game where the stakes were very high, and he paid 

the price. He was assassinated, not because he was 

a Sunni, rather because he was the man of the King-
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dom of Saudi Arabia in Lebanon in a time when the 

regional rivalry among regional great powers was at 

its peak.

This assassination was the main reason for Syria 

to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon, though 

not its intelligence, influence, and apparatus. When 

pressure was put on Assad, he acquiesced, however 

he promised to destroy Lebanon. In fact, Lebanon 

sunk into the abyss of violence and political assassinations. Then Lebanon was divided into two camps: 

14th March and 8th March. Though both groups were 

multisectarian, the game was played between them on 

zero sum logic. On the one hand, the 14th of March 

were backed by Saudi Arabia regionally, and by the 

United States on the international level. On the other, 

the 8th of March were backed regionally by Iran and 

Syria and internationally by Russia through Iran. An 

international tribunal67 was created under Chapter 7 

of the UN Charter since the Lebanese Government 

was not able to convene and decide this issue. This 

tribunal was seen by March 8th as a tool of the imperial world, specifically the United States, to punish 

Hezbollah for being a part of the axis of resistance.

After the assassination of Hariri, Syria was considered the main culprit by the 14th of March group, 

based on some threats that were made to Hariri directly by the Syrian President.68 In fact, the tribunal 

later issued its indictment, accusing members of Hezbollah as the main culprits for the assassination of 

Hariri. Hezbollah denied any responsibility, refusing 

to hand over the accused members, and Lebanon entered a new round of volatility and instability where 

sectarianism was high, especially between Sunni 

and Shia.
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During this period, the leadership was powerless 

in how to stabilize Lebanon. What really created the 

negative momentum of instability were the dynamic 

and the clash between the international ring and the 

regional one. Do not forget that the United States was 

still in Iraq, with Bush at the helm of the U.S. administration and his grand design for the new Middle East.

In this realm, the role of Lebanese leadership from 

all factions was minimal, limited, and at the whim of 

the bigger players, whether regional or international. 

Here we go back to our theory and prove its relevancy again; the stability of Lebanon was not yet in the 

hands of its leadership. In order to assuage and deflate 

the tense situation in Lebanon, Speaker of the House 

Nabih Birri convened the leaders of the constituencies of the Lebanese sectarian map. Good intentions 

were shown from all parties, as if there were no connections between what was in Lebanon and what was 

happening in the region.

On July 12, 2006, the sixth Arab-Israeli war started; not between Israel and the Arab states, rather it 

was between a nonstate actor Hezbollah against the 

strongest, most advanced army in the Middle East, 

the Israeli Defense Force—considered a postmodern 

army. Without going into the complex analysis and 

characteristics of this war, we could say the following: Israel lost because it did not win. Hezbollah won 

because it did not lose. Israel was shocked, surprised, 

and found itself ill-prepared for this kind of war, a 

hybrid between asymmetric and conventional.69 Israel 

was not able to measure its success against a shadowy 

enemy. Although Israel bombed and destroyed a bank 

of targets, how was it to relate this war to politics? 

Especially after Israel reached an impasse on how to 

terminate the war when the war started to follow the 
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law of diminishing returns. Hezbollah got stronger, as 

well as Iran and Syria. The political ramifications were 

huge and altered Bush’s project and vision for the new 

Middle East.

At the beginning of the war, Hezbollah was accused by some Arab countries, Sunni mainly, and the 

Arab League as dragging Lebanon to unnecessary 

war.70 After the tide of war started to tilt toward Hezbollah, the Arab league changed its stance by supporting Hezbollah against Israel. This attitude never 

deceived Hezbollah on the real intentions of the Arab 

Sunni states vis-à-vis Hezbollah or Iran and Syria. Hezbollah was praised in the Arab and Islamic world as 

the only entity, not even a state, that was able to stand 

firm against Israel and maybe even defeat it. We could 

see, for instance, posters of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, hung all over the 

streets of Cairo. The streets of the Arab world transcended the fact that Nasrallah is a Shia, and focused 

on the achievement against Israel.

This sensation, however, was not really felt in 

Lebanon. The war did not change the stance of Hezbollah’s opposition, and it was accused of deceiving 

the Lebanese by promising not to wage war, but actually violating its promise. Even Nasrallah himself said 

during a TV interview, “we would not have snatched 

soldiers if we thought it would spark a war.”71 Moreover, the 14th of March faction accused Hezbollah of 

costing Lebanon more than U.S.$4 billion.

The reconstruction of Lebanon after the war of 

2006 also followed our Three Ring Model theory, as 

far as the financial aids that were given to Lebanon. 

The regional players fought each other in Lebanon; 

Lebanon was destroyed in this fight. The same regional players poured their money to rebuild the damage 
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that their war caused to Lebanon. Hezbollah tagged 

this war as a divine victory.72 Israel tagged it as the 

Second Lebanese war; the first was in 1982. The UNSC 

Resolution 1701 implemented the cessation of hostilities, and added the United Nations Interim Force in 

Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the role of a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah.

The straw that broke the camel’s back between the 

Lebanese factions, and endangered the cohabitation, 

was the semi-civil war of May 7, 2008, if the July’s war 

was considered the culminating point for Hezbollah 

as far as war is concerned. It is also considered the 

maximum point of maturity for the party of God; Hezbollah’s dilemma was, what to do after defeating, 

or denying, Israel the victory? What to do with this 

excess of power? 

On May 7, Hezbollah invaded Beirut and on May 

6, the Lebanese Government considered Hezbollah’s 

communication network as a direct violation of the 

state’s sovereignty.73 This Weberian74 approach of the 

Lebanese government at that time was a matter of life 

and death for Hezbollah. Hezbollah could not endanger its military operations by using the official networks of the state against the most advanced country 

in the world in electronics, eavesdropping, and cyber 

warfare. Hence the invasion of Beirut by Hezbollah 

and its proxies under the Slogan: “the arms to protect 

the arms.” It was a dangerous deviation by Hezbollah of how and where to use the arms of resistance; 

however, Nasrallah created the necessary mental formula, rationale, and justification for his act, at least for 

his group and allies.75 In fact, Hezbollah, due to the 

huge disparity and excess of power that it held vis-àvis other factions internally, invaded Beirut on May 7, 

2008. This super quick victory in urban Beirut proved 
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that Hezbollah had been preparing for all possible 

contingencies concerning its operational security.

Whether it was a miscalculation or an intended 

decision by the government—maybe both—to disable 

Hezbollah, this decision had proven to be a precarious situation for Lebanon. Moreover, it showed the 

grand design of Hezbollah for Lebanon, and its role 

in the regional struggle for primacy. In addition, it exposed the weak points of Hezbollah, especially within 

its military design. The 7th of May mini-sectarian war 

unearthed the fault lines among the sects in Lebanon, mainly between Shia and Sunni, given the fact 

that Beirut historically is considered the capital of the 

Sunni. Hezbollah was demonized regionally by the 

Arab-Sunni street, though Nasrallah hailed May 7th 

as a glorious day.76

The Christian leadership of Lebanon were spectators on the 7th of May war, though divided between 

14th and 8th of March factions. The main battle, 

whether directly or indirectly, was between Sunni 

and Druze on the one side and Hezbollah on the other. 

The 7th of May did not deviate from the pattern of 

the Lebanese politics, after each civil war regardless 

of its context and dynamics, an imposed political solution had to be reached. The Doha agreement was the 

imposed political solution on Lebanon and the main 

points in this agreement were:77

• The parliament will convene to elect the agreedupon candidate, General Michel Sleiman, as the 

new Lebanese President.

• A government of national unity to be formed 

with 30 ministers, 16 to the majority, 11 to the 

opposition, and 3 for the president. All parties 

pledge by virtue of this Agreement not to resign or obstruct the work of the Government.
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• In accordance with the electoral law of 1960, the 

district (qada’) will be adopted as the electoral 

constituency in Lebanon.

This imposed political solution gave Lebanon a 

leeway from instability and volatility for a short period of time. It was a tactical calculation by the Lebanese factions, as well as by the regional players, to 

acquiesce to Doha agreement. Said differently, it was 

a battle within a fierce long war that is still raging 

where every party prepares for the next round. This 

next round took place in Syria after the so-called Arab 

Spring hit the foundations of the Middle East regional 

order, especially the Arab world. 

THE ARAB SPRING SYNDROME

If the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the partition of the region according to the Sykes Picot78 secret 

agreement in 1916, and the Arab revolution against it, 

are considered the most important Arab Black Swan 

events at the beginning of the 20th century because 

of the creation of the Arab nation-states, we could say 

that the so-called Arab Spring is so far the most devastating Black Swan event in the 21st century for the 

Arab world.

In the first Black Swan event, the Arab nationstates were created, though at the expense of the 

Ottoman Empire, which was considered the Islamic 

Khilafa. The new nation-state transcended the micro 

divisions at the religious, sectarian, tribal, and ethnic 

levels. The Arab Spring Black Swan event had undone 

the first one, as we say in the computer parlance. A 

new sample of an Arab state started to develop. In a 
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gaze from above into the region, we can notice the following after almost 3 years of this earthquake:

• The fall of the state; there are governments but 

no governance.

• The new-old player is political Islam with different platforms: the Muslim brotherhood, the 

Jihadist, Wahhabis, Justice and Development 

Party (AKP) in Turkey, and so on.

• No modifications on the state’s recognized borders, and no partition as well; the fault lines are 

again as before, the religious, sectarian, tribal, 

and ethnic—Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon, 

just to mention a few.

• The volatility in the new format of the Arab 

state is very high, depending on the constituencies of each country.

During the first event, the nation states were created and, although we fought for union and for borders, this creation transcended the religious, sectarian, and tribal fault lines. When the Arab Spring hit 

Syria on March 15, 2011, we could say that the rules 

of the geopolitical game for Lebanon were altered 

for good. The regional ring followed a new dynamic, 

highly dangerous for Syria and Lebanon. The local 

ring followed an unprecedented hectic behavior; the 

level of uncertainties reached its highest peak. In this 

new dynamic, some of the old historical paradigms 

that used to govern the relationship between Lebanon 

and Syria, whether in peace or conflict and war, broke 

up for good. Old players were no more efficient; new 

ones emerged.
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Analyzing Lebanon’s Status Following 

the Three Ring Model.

During the 1975 Lebanese civil war, the geopolitical earthquake hit Lebanon hard. The dynamics of the 

Three Ring Model canalized the currents of change 

into Lebanon, the weakest point in the region, due to 

the presence of the PLO, and after the October war between Arabs and Israel, lead to a serious energy crisis 

for the West. In 2011, the United States withdrew its 

forces from Iraq permanently, even without reaching 

an adequate agreement with the Iraqi government. 

This withdrawal created a geopolitical vacuum in the 

region that had to be filled. 

In this instance, Iran was ready for regional hegemony, due to its grand strategy that includes Iraq, 

Syria, Lebanon, and even the Gaza strip where Hamas 

is located. The linchpin and the center of gravity of 

the Iranian grand strategy is Syria par excellence. Iran 

with Syria is a regional hegemony; Iran without Syria 

is limited at its best to southern Iraq where the Shia 

twelver are the majority, thus creating a buffer for 

Iran. So the grand design to deny Iran the regional hegemony would be as the prominent strategic Chinese 

thinker Sun Tzu said “to attack the strategy” of Iran 

indirectly.79 The two main important means for Iran 

to achieve its regional hegemony are Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the July 2006 war, Hezbollah 

survived the Israeli might. In 2011, Syria is where the 

geopolitical earthquake is passing.

This regional jockeying for primacy was triggered 

by the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as said earlier; this 

withdrawal has revived among the regional great 

powers the security dilemma, since this withdrawal 
127

gave Iran an unprecedented opportunity to fill the 

geopolitical vacuum due to its huge influence in the 

Fertile Crescent, from Iraq to Gaza, through Syria 

and Lebanon.

When the Syrian regime started to lose ground 

inside Syria, Iran had to interfere through Hezbollah’s military. The culminating point was the battle of 

Al-Qusair in Syria where Hezbollah was the defining 

factor in the victory of the Syrian regime; though the 

Lebanese government adapted the policy of noninterference vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. The new slogan for 

Hezbollah to interfere militarily in Syria is to protect 

the resistance, and foil the conspiracy of the West, 

mainly the United States and Israel.80 The geopolitical 

goals of Hezbollah for interfering in Syria are:

• To protect some Shia villages inside Syria, as 

well as some Shia sacred Shrines.

• To create a buffer space inside Syria to protect 

the main Shia villages and cities inside Lebanon, of which are along the Lebanese-Syrian 

borders. Thus the routes for jihadists will be 

blocked toward Lebanon.81

• Al-Qusair is highly important strategically for 

the regime in Syria as well; it is the backyard 

that protects the capital Damascus. It is the strategic link between the capital and the coastal 

area of Syria where the majority of the Alawis 

reside.

• The presence of Hezbollah in this area blocked 

the routes for jihadists, and denied them any 

access to Syria, whether to fight along the rebels or smuggle weapons.

• Last, but not least, is the Iranian decision to 

fight in Syria via Hezbollah under the slogan, 

one for all, and all for one; referring to the tri-
128

partite summit in Syria in 2010 between Assad, 

Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Nasrallah. The main 

absentee was the Lebanese President, though 

Lebanon as a country was the main dish on 

the table.

Paradigm Shift.

Hezbollah’s interference in Syria is unique. It 

marks the first time that a Lebanese faction fought in 

Syria; even holding territory with the acquiescence of 

its government. It is the first time for Lebanon to be 

a secured soft belly for Syria, instead of historically 

being the weakest point. It is the first time that Syria 

is volatile, the Golan Heights are unstable, and yet 

southern Lebanon is stable. In this major paradigm 

shift, Lebanon is forced by the regional and international dynamics to be carried by the flow. Hezbollah 

has two agendas, local and regional. The primary 

objective of the two is the regional agenda. Thus, the 

Lebanese policy of noninterference toward Syria is irrelevant for the party of God. Lebanese factions see 

Hezbollah interference in Syria as a sectarian war, 

though the geopolitical game is the main issue. 

All of the discussion previously mentioned is putting Lebanon into a precarious situation, where the 

future of Lebanon is at stake. Even the leadership of 

all factions is powerless in this situation, due to its 

complexities, and the lack of means to influence. In 

Lebanon, we can say “Who is capable is not willing, 

who is willing is not capable.” Even if Hezbollah is 

capable, they are not willing. The willing are the 14th 

of March faction, but they are not capable. Thus, Lebanon is going through the same pattern of internal strife 

that may lead to a new kind of civil war, even though 
129

Hassan Nasrallah suggested that the Lebanese could 

fight each other in Syria, just not in Lebanon.82 This 

could be a new paradigm shift, as Syria is the buffer 

zone, the battle ground for the Lebanese to settle their 

accounts instead of vice versa. 

 The Lebanese dilemma today is the Syrian catastrophe. What kind of Syria will emerge after the civil 

war? Will it be religious or secular? How will the 

power in Syria be redistributed? What would the role 

of minorities be? What would be the implications on 

Lebanon? Will Syria mirror the Lebanese situation, 

divided along sectarian lines? How will the consequences unfold in Lebanon in case of the defeat, or the 

victory of the regime, and as well as Hezbollah? What 

would be the implications on Lebanon, if Syria turned 

to be a de facto partitioned country? (See Map 5-5.)

Map 5-5. A De Facto Partitioned Syria.
130

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we discussed the role of leadership 

in a Lebanon that swings between volatility and quasistability. We proved that the theory of the Three Ring 

Model and the pattern is still relevant to analyze the 

case of the Land of the Cedars—Lebanon. The case of 

Lebanon never really changed in its essence; the circle 

and the arrow concept is still applicable since Lebanon 

is still in the same geographical location, the Fertile 

Crescent, where old games keep reemerging, but in a 

different morphology.

Since its inception as an idea starting from 1842 

until today, Lebanon is a volatile country due to many 

factors, geographical, political as well as cultural. 

The Three Ring Model applied at the macro level will 

help understand the historic fate of Lebanon and perhaps predict the future. However, this does not relieve us from going deep in the micro level to get the 

holistic picture.

But the question still is: Can we escape this fate 

in Lebanon? Should we repeat permanently the Sisyphus’s task? Are we doomed? Should we surrender 

to the negative dynamics of the Three Ring Model? 

Is democracy for Lebanon a killer? Are we doomed 

to choose between authoritarianism, occupation, and 

democracy? These are the questions constantly posed 

to me by my students from all factions and sects. Usually my answer is also based on the Three Ring Model 

and the pattern discussed earlier. 

When civil war occurs in Lebanon followed by 

an imposed political solution, it means that the three 

rings of our theory are in sync, not clashing. During 

this historical moment, the Lebanese elites from all 

factions, religions, and sects should take the opportu-
131

nity to counter the myth of Sisyphus and try to create a political platform to buffer Lebanon from all the 

ills of the region and the global order. Unfortunately, 

these elites are taken prisoners by their own will, and 

sink into the whirlpool and the dynamics of the Three 

Ring Model. Thus, Lebanon will oscillate for the foreseeable future between volatility and quasi-stability, 

but always in favor of instability and a high risk of being swollen into civil war again and again. May God 

protect and save the land, the Land of the Cedars.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/geopolitics.

2. See mapsofwar.com/ind/imperial-history.html. I suggest to visit 

this site and play the video in focusing on the location of Lebanon as the main geographical intersection of all old empires that 

invaded the region. Unfortunately, they are still relevant today.

3. Alvin Toeffler, The Third Wave, New York: Bantam, 

May 1, 1984.

4. The map is available from www.bible-history.com as modified by the writer to clarify the idea of the Fertile Crescent.

5. This theory is developed by the writer while teaching at 

university level, the course “History of Lebanon and the Middle 

East,” also while teaching Geopolitics, especially the Case study 

of Lebanon. 

6. Richard N. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity, What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.

7. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The ‘New Middle East’ Bush Is Resisting, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2006/08/22/AR2006082200978_pf.html.
132

8. As it happened on May 7, 2008, in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, between mainly Hezbollah Amal Movement from one side; 

and Future Movement and the Druze of Walid Jumblat on the 

other side. It was a mini-civil war with different aspects from the 

previous civil wars, however. The Doha agreement is considered 

as an imposed political solution and led to the election of the President and to the parliamentary elections.

9. See www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Flint_Colin_Struc

ture_Agency_Identity_Peace_Networks_Geopolitical_Codes_

Visions_Agents_Actors_Representations_Practices_Spaces_Powers_

Environmental_Geopolitics.html.

10. In the current government, as well as the previous one, 

all we have in the statement that deals with the national security 

strategy is the triad of the people, the army and the resistance, 

meaning Hezbollah, where Hezbollah is the strongest and calling 

the shots all the time.

11. In 2010, the remittances to Lebanon amounted to U.S.

$8,406 million, available from www.migrationinformation.org/

datahub/remittances/Lebanon.pdf.

12. Riad Kobaissi, from Michel Chiha to Rafik Hariri: Continuity and Discontinuity in the Process of “Lebanonization,” 

available from https://ecommons.lau.edu.lb:8443/xmlui/bitstream/

handle/10725/1155/Riad_Kobaissi_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1.

13. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, January 1969, pp. 207-225.

14. T. David Mason, Sustaining The Peace After Civil War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2007, p. 45, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=819.

15. Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, Westport, CT: 

Praeger, September 30, 1976.
133

16. The source of the map is available from publishing.cdlib.

org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft6199p06t&chunk.id=d0e1095&toc.

id=&brand=ucpress.

17. The 12 members include four Maronites, three Druses, 

two Greek Orthodox, one Catholic, one Shia, and one Sunni. 

18. Cited by Ghenwa Hayek, Dislocations: Space, Nation, and 

Identity in Lebanese Fiction, 1970-2003, Providence, RI: Brown University, 2011, p. 24, available from https://repository.library.brown.

edu/fedora/objects/bdr:11196/datastreams/PDF/content.

19. Ibid.

20. Especially the Maronite Patriarch Elias Howayek, available from www.matnfiles.com/news_details.php?id=3304.

21. History of Lebanon, Switzerland of the East (1943 AD—

1969 AD), available from www.lgic.org/en/history_lebanon19

43.php; or www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1380862/LebaneseNational-Pact.

22. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “What is a ‘Black Swan’?” available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=BDbuJtAiABA.

23. Farid El-Khazen, “Permanent Settlement of Palestinians 

in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 

10, No. 3, 1997, available from almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/

khazen.html.

24. Approximately 150,000 refugees came to Lebanon, available from www.lgic.org/en/history_lebanon1943.php.

25. In the Eisenhower Doctrine (January 5, 1957), the Cold 

War period after World War II, U.S. foreign-policy pronouncement by President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised military or 

economic aid to any Middle Eastern country needing help in resisting communist aggression, available from www.britannica.com/

EBchecked/topic/181513/Eisenhower-Doctrine.
134

26. Nicholas Nassif, Al Riasaa Al Lubbnaniah fi Mahab al Reeh, 

(The Lebanese Leadership Is Exposed to Storms), Beiruit, Lebanon: Issam Fares Center for the Lebanese Affairs, 2007, p. 20.

27. It is told that U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy was assigned to negotiate the election of Fouad Chehab. When he visited Raymond Eddeh, a prominent Lebanese politician, to tell him 

about the deal, Eddeh refused and presented his candidacy for 

the presidency under the slogan that Lebanon is democratic, an 

interview with Nicholas Nassif, a writer and journalist.

28. El-Khazen.

29. Nassif, p. 14.

30. The 3 “Nos” of Khartoum, available from www.sixdaywar.

org/content/khartoum.asp.

31. What was the 1969 Cairo Agreement between Lebanon and the 

PLO? available from www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_lebanon

_cairo_1969.php.

32. It is said that the General of the Army at that time, Emile 

El-Bustani, who was heading the Lebanese delegation to Cairo, 

agreed on the agreement after it was promised he would be the 

next Lebanese President. Even this agreement was ratified by the 

Lebanese Parliament without being read and debated publicly. 

The Cairo agreement was annulled by President Amin Gemayel 

in 1982 after the PLO was routed out of Lebanon after the Israeli 

invasion.

33. Roger J. Azzam, Liban l’instruction d’un crime: 30 Ans de 

guerre (Lebanon to Investigate a Crime: 30 Years of War), Cheminements (Pathways), October 1, 2005.

34. Mentioned in Michele Steinberg, Kissinger Plan for Lebanon: Death by ‘Democracy’, available from www.larouchepub.com/

eiw/public/2005/2005_20-29/2005_20-29/2005-21/pdf/41-42_21_

int.pdf.
135

35. Region in the suburb of Beirut consisting of mostly 

Christians.

36. Is it a conspiracy theory approach? Maybe, personally, I 

do not take it seriously, however, the dynamics of the geopolitical 

game at that time made Lebanon the killing zone of the region, as 

is Syria today.

37. As’ad AbuKhalil, Hafez Al-Assad in 1976, available from 

english.al-akhbar.com/node/8733.

38. Map of Lebanon during the civil war of 1975, available 

from www.pbs.org.

39. AbuKhalil.

40. Hafez Asaad Speech, available from www.youtube.com/

watch?v=bdckwk_bNgY.

41. Lebanon—The Riyadh Conference and the Arab Deterrent 

Force, available from www.mongabay.com/history/lebanon/lebanonthe_riyadh_conference_and_the_arab_deterrent_force.html.

42. Cited in Michael J. Totten, “Contentions No Peace without 

Syria,” Commentary Magazine, 2009, available from www.commentarymagazine.com/2009/08/31/no-peace-without-syria/.

43. What is Wilayat al-Faqih? See www.al-islam.org/shiapoliticalthought/3.htm.

44. Soner Cagaptay and Tyler Evans, “Balancing Iran,” The 

American Interest Magazine, September-October 2013, available 

from www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1469.

45. H. E. Chehabi, Houchang Chehabi, ed., Distant Relations: 

Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 

April 3, 2007.

46. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the 

Shia of Lebanon, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, August 25, 

1987, p. 174.
136

47. Benni Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the ZionistArab Conflict, 1881-2001, Updated Ed., Westminster, MD: Vintage, 

August 28, 2001, especially the chapter dealing with the 1982 invasion. I was in the military academy during the election of Gemayel; the only deputy who really defied this election is a Christian Greek orthodox named Albert Moukhaiber.

48. The same fighting happened between Hezbollah and 

Amal movement in the South and in Beirut. Both are Shia twelver.

49. Unpublished paper presented to the Center of Future Strategic Studies in Cairo, Egypt, 2006.

50. Albert Mansour, Al Inquilad Ala al Taef, Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia: Dar Al Jadid, 1993.

51. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, September 10, 1987, especially the Foreword of 

Albert Hourani.

52. Bryan Caplan, Social Intelligence: The Wisdom of Muawiya, 

available from econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/11/social_intellig.

html.

53. Marius Deeb, Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace 

Process, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, June 

12, 2003.

54. Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance 

and Power Politics in the Middle East, London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 

July 7, 2009.

55. William Harris, “Twilight Lebanon, 1990-2011,” Middle East 

Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 2013, available 

from www.gloria-center.org/2013/03/twilight-lebanon-1990-2011/.

56. The term of the Lebanese President is only 6 years, could 

be renewed or extended only through amending the constitution.

57. Camille Mnassa and Elias Hraoui, “Awdat Al Joumhouriat 

min al douwailat ila al dawla,” (“Return of the Republic from Statelets to State”), Dar Annahar, Beiruit, Lebanon, 2002, p. 402.
137

58. Ibid., p. 403.

59. Ibid., p. 405.

60. Ibid., pp. 604-605.

61. Harris.

62. Declaration of the Maronite Bishops, September 20, 

2000, available from www.oocities.org/capitolhill/parliament/2587/

declaration.html.

63. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign 

Affairs, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/46271/charleskrauthammer/the-unipolar-moment.

64. “The former French Foreign Minister tagged USA after 

the fall of USSR as a Hyper-power,” The New York Times, 1999, 

available from www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/news/05iht-france.t_0.

html?pagewanted=print.

65. Jean-Marie Colombani, Nous sommes tous Américains

(We Are All Americans), available from www.lemonde.fr/idees/

article/2007/05/23/nous-sommes-tous-americains_913706_3232.html.

66. Resolution 1559, 2004, available from www.un.org/News/

Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm.

67. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UNSCR 1757, available 

from www.stl-tsl.org/en/.

68. An op-ed written by Ahmad Al Jarallah in the Kuwaiti 

newspaper, Alsiyasa, available from www.aramaic-dem.org/Arabic/

Archev/AL_Seyassah/37.htm.

69. For more details, read Elias Hanna, “Lessons Learned 

from the Recent War in Lebanon,” Military Review, Vol. 87, No. 5.

70. Hassan M. Fattah, “Arab League Criticizes Hezbollah for 

Attacks,” The New York Times, 2006, available from www.nytimes.

com/2006/07/17/world/africa/17iht-arabs.2224812.html?_r=0.
138

71. Nasrallah, “We wouldn’t have snatched soldiers if we 

thought it would spark war,” Haaretz, available from www.

haaretz.com/news/nasrallah-we-wouldn-t-have-snatched-soldiers-if-wethought-it-would-spark-war-1.199556.

72. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah speech at the Divine Victory 

Rally held in Beirut, Lebanon, available from english.alahednews.

com.lb/essaydetailsf.php?eid=709&fid=11.

73. Hezbollah has built its own network of communication 

parallel to the state’s one; it wanted full secrecy and maximum 

operational security for its war against Israel, available from 

arabic.people.com.cn/31662/6405199.html.

74. According to Max Weber, one of the major features of the 

state is to monopolize the coercive force within a delimited recognized and legitimate territory.

75. Nasrallah May 7th speech.

76. Therese Sfeir, “Nasrallah Hails May 7 as ‘Glorious Day’ 

for Resistance,” Daily Star, available from www.dailystar.com.lb/

News/Politics/May/16/Nasrallah-hails-May-7-as-glorious-day-for-Resistance.ashx#axzz2e8Bq6u4h.

77. Letter dated May 22, 2008, from the Permanent Observer 

of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed 

to the President of the Security Council, available from www.

securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2008392.pdf.

78. I suggest reading James Barr, A Line in the Sand: The AngloFrench Struggle for the Middle East, 1914-1948, 1st Ed., New York: 

W. W. Norton & Company.

79. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Book 3, “Attack By Stratagem,” 

available from suntzusaid.com/book/3.
139

80. Nasrallah speech.

81. The Jihadists Sunnis consider the Shia as deviants from 

Islam, they are Infidels just as are the Christians.

82. Matthew Levitt and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Hizb Allah’s Gambit in Syria,” West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, August 27, 

2013, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/hizb-allahs-gambitin-syria.

141

CHAPTER 6

THE CASE OF THE ISRAELIS 

AND PALESTINIANS

Eyal Pascovich

THE PALESTINIANS

It was Abba Eban, Israel’s legendary Foreign Minister, who coined the famous quote “The Palestinian 

Arabs have never missed a chance of losing an opportunity [for peace].”1

 It seems that his observation 

keeps being true, even in the years that passed, during which the Palestinians have continued too long in 

vain for the realization of their nationality within the 

framework of an independent state.

There are many factors at the base of the Palestinians’ failure thus far in achieving full realization 

of their national rights. The Palestinian leadership 

throughout the 20th century and in the beginning of 

the 21st—its nature, weaknesses, and the decisions it 

made over the years—played a considerable part in 

shaping the current reality. This particularly refers 

to Yasser Arafat, who led the National Palestinian 

Movement for 4 decades, from the 1960s until the 

beginning of the millennium; however, it also refers 

to the leaders who preceded Arafat and those who 

succeeded him.

Pre-Arafat Era.

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, its 

triumph in the Israeli War of Independence, and the 

Palestinian catastrophe that followed—the Nakba—
142

constitute a key traumatic event in the history of the 

Palestinian people. In the struggle between the two 

national movements—the Palestinian and the JewishZionist—over the same piece of land, the triumphant 

movement was the one that had succeeded in establishing a leadership and institutional foundations 

for the budding state throughout nearly 3 decades of 

British Mandate. 

In contrast, the National Palestinian Movement 

had suffered from a delayed national awakening,2 an 

institutional weakness and a divided and conflicted 

leadership—largely between the two rivalry families, 

Husseini and Nashashibi, whose members held the 

most important positions in the Palestinian society 

during the British Mandate era. Among them emerged 

Haj Amin al-Husseini, who is considered the first 

Palestinian leader.

Haj Amin, member of the Jerusalemite al-Husseini family, was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem in the 

early-1920s, when he was only 26 years old, and later 

also President of the Supreme Muslim Council. These 

two roles positioned him as the highest religious authority—and to a large degree also the political one, 

though not without disagreements—for the Arabs of 

Palestine. During the 1920s, the Palestinians, under alHusseini’s leadership, steered clear from taking part 

in any representative institutions the British attempted to establish for the citizens of Palestine, both Jews 

and Arabs, although the Arabs’ clear demographic advantage at the time would have granted them a nearly 

absolute dominance. 

While violent events between Arabs and Jews in 

Palestine throughout most of the 1920s were not common, the 1929 Western Wall Uprising, which was incited, to a large degree by al-Husseini, had marked 
143

the beginning of the ongoing violence in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Al-Husseini had aspired—and 

succeeded—in utilizing these events to add a religious 

aspect to the national-territorial conflict in Palestine 

and by which to recruit the Arab countries and the 

Islamic world in favor of the Palestinians’ struggle. 

The Western Wall Uprising strengthened al-Husseini’s leadership although his rivals, mainly among the 

Nashashibi family, had continued to subvert him and 

consequently undermined the National Palestinian 

Movement’s cohesiveness and strength.

Under al-Husseini’s leadership, in 1936, the Palestinians initiated wide-ranging riots against both the 

Jewish residents and the British rule, an uprising that 

earned the title “The Great Arab Revolt.”3 Nevertheless, after 3 years of uprising, the Palestinians have 

lost more than they gained—they suffered many casualties, their economy was devastated, and even their 

minor political accomplishments rapidly dissipated. 

Historian Abd al-Wahab ak-Kayali lays the blame for 

the revolt’s outcomes on the Palestinian leadership:

The Palestinian nation’s leadership did not rise to the 

level of challenges faced by it. It was characterized by 

narrow-mindedness, personal ambitiousness and submissiveness. It was unable to provide a true response 

to the fact that Britain had fully embraced the Zionist 

movement. . . . Rather, the political Palestinian leadership had nourished the division between clans and 

opposed recruiting the masses and organizing them in 

a revolutionary structure, a structure that may have 

been suitable for the confrontation with Zionism and 

colonialism.4

A devastating outcome of the 1936-39 revolt was 

the self-imposed or forced departure of most of the 
144

political Palestinian leaders from Palestine. Haj Amin 

al-Husseini was forced to leave as early as 1937 during 

a cessation in the revolt, in light of British attempts to 

arrest him. During World War II, he had established 

ties with Adolf Hitler and the German Nazi party, 

and his image gradually fell apart.5 As al-Husseini’s 

exile period became prolonged, his influence on the 

Palestinians’ fate gradually declined until it finally 

came to an end. The Palestinians’ tragedy is that their 

first national leader lived a long life and passed away 

in Lebanon in 1974, with the prime of his success 

far behind.6

Thus, during the most important years of the national struggle in Palestine, the years following World 

War II, the Palestinians were left orphaned. One of the 

leaders who remained in Palestine at the time, Jamal 

al-Husseini (also a member of the Husseini family), 

was one of the leading witnesses on their behalf in 

the hearings of the Anglo-American Committee of 

Inquiry on Palestine’s affairs held in 1946. Al-Husseini’s somewhat pale performance7

 and his choice of 

negative approach, attacking the Jewish community 

and furthermore strongly objecting to the British authorities, made a negative impression compared to 

the confident leadership of the two main witnesses on 

behalf of the Zionist movement, David Ben-Gurion 

and Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first 

Prime Minister and President of the State of Israel, 

respectively.

The unified and charismatic leadership of the Zionist movement in Palestine and its organized institutions, which comprised a fairly stable infrastructure 

for the budding Jewish state, had a meaningful effect 

on the outcome of the battle between the two nations 

over the Holy Land. The Anglo-American Committee 
145

hearings’ failure was one of the factors that affected 

Britain in its decision to return the Mandate granted 

to it over Palestine to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which determined in November 29, 

1947, on the British Mandate’s end and the partition of 

Palestine into two independent states, Arab and Jewish. The latter was planned to span over 60 percent of 

Palestine’s area, despite the fact that, at the time, the 

proportion of Jewish people did not exceed one-third 

of its population.

It was one of the greatest achievements of the Zionist diplomacy, and proof of the fiasco of the Palestinian leadership. The latter’s weakness and lack of cohesiveness had gradually turned it into a marionette 

in the hands of the Arab states, and with their encouragement the Palestinians turned down the UN’s Partition Plan.8

 Retrospectively, this tactic would prove to 

be devastating for generations to come; however, at 

that time, it may have been perceived as reasonable 

in light of the Arab states’ pledge to take all necessary measures for the derailment of the Jewish State’s 

establishment.

Immediately after the UN’s approval of Palestine’s 

partition plan, the first part of the 1948 war began. 

In this phase, the Palestinians fought alone, and the 

lack of strong leadership played against them.9 After 

the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, 

the second part of the war began with the invasion 

of the Arabs’ armies into Israel. Despite the Arabs’ 

numerical superiority, Israel won the war, and the 

Palestinians experienced a catastrophe that earned 

the name Nakba (Arabic for disaster). Of the Palestinians, 730,000 became refugees in the Arab countries 

and about 160,000 remained in the Jewish State’s territory and were absorbed into it as a minority.10 The 
146

Palestinian leadership vanished without a trace, and 

the Palestinian national struggle entered a long 

hibernation period.

The Palestinians would require a new leadership 

and a historical turning point in order to reawaken 

their national resurrection. Yasser Arafat and the 1967 

Six-Day War intended to transpire this shift.

The Arafat Era.

Yasser Arafat (aka Abu Amar), the founding 

leader of the Palestinian people, was somewhat of an 

enigma. Indeed, countless books have been written 

about him, as well as quite a few biographies, however, many details about his life and personality remain in the dark.11 Thus, for instance, Arafat insisted 

that he was born in Jerusalem, as would be appropriate for the Palestinians’ leader. However, the common 

opinion is that he was actually born in Cairo, Egypt, in 

1929 and spent only part of his childhood in Palestine. 

After completing his BA studies in civil engineering 

from an Egyptian university, he relocated to Kuwait 

in search for work. In Kuwait, he led a group of Palestinian students who, in the late-1950s, established the 

Fatah, reversed acronym of the Palestinian (National) 

Liberation Movement. In early-1965, the movement 

began executing low level acts of terror against Israel.

Concurrently with the Fatah’s development as 

an independent organization, in 1964, the League of 

Arab States has established the Palestine Liberation 

Organization (PLO). The PLO was structured as a 

political organization right from the start. Ahmad AlShuqayri, who held several political positions during 

the British Mandate, was appointed PLO Chairman. 

Shuqayri’s PLO leadership lasted only 3 years, during 
147

which he had attempted, unsuccessfully for the most 

part, to establish wide support among the Palestinian 

public and to develop fundamental military and civil 

contents. Shuqayri’s image as one of PLO’s founders 

has faded into obscurity by his successors, who portrayed him as a puppet-in-chief under the control of 

the Arab states.12 Similarly, Yahya Hammuda, who 

served as Chairman after Shuqayri, did not leave his 

mark, and by the end of the 1960s, Arafat was elected 

PLO Chairman, and Fatah became the central organizational member in the PLO.

Now Arafat held two positions, PLO Chairman 

and Fatah Chairman. The combination of these two 

functions would play a significant role in Arafat’s duality from 1974 onwards, when he will find himself, as 

PLO Chairman, as a legitimate political leader in the 

eyes of part of the international community, following 

the Arab League’s and UN’s recognition of the PLO as 

the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

However, as Fatah’s Chairman, Arafat led the organization into a prolonged succession of terror attacks against Israel, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day 

War which resulted in Israel’s takeover of the West 

Bank and Gaza Strip—from Jordan and Egypt, respectively—and the implementation of a military rule in 

these areas. The one million Palestinians in the occupied territories, most of whom were refugees from 

1948 and their descendants, were united again under 

Israeli rule, and the Palestinian nationalism was reawakened. The occupation provided a booster for the 

use of terror; at this point, Fatah was joined by new 

terror organizations—the Palestinian Fronts—most 

of which have united under the PLO and Arafat’s 

leadership.
148

Among the Fronts’ leaders were a few of Arafat’s 

arch enemies.13 Nonetheless, Arafat had succeeded, 

thanks to his leadership skills and due to the shared 

desire for a Palestinian revolution, in uniting the 

different factions and in earning both internal and 

external legitimacy. Most Palestinian factions have 

accepted Arafat’s authority, except for the Islamic 

faction which, at the time, was insignificant.14 Arafat 

was successful in preventing the development of an 

alternative leadership by using “divide and conquer” 

tactics and by offering bribes, which resulted in the 

reinforcement of his political standing. In this way, 

Arafat firmly ruled the National Palestinian Movement almost until his last breath.

A review of Arafat’s speeches throughout the 

1970s, and even more so during the 1980s, reveals 

countless pragmatic expressions on the need for holding an international peace conference; the condemnation of violence; a call for Israel to join the negotiation 

table; and the recognition of the UN’s resolutions on 

the Palestinian issue which, in fact, constitutes Arafat’s recognition of the State of Israel in the pre-SixDay War borders.15 However, at the same time, Fatah 

and the Palestinian Fronts continued to execute terror 

attacks against Israel, mostly under Arafat’s decree.

Despite its acquaintance with his shortcomings, 

the majority of the international community preferred 

to recognize Arafat’s leadership. This was both for 

the lack of an alternative leader and thanks to his political and verbal maneuvers (Arafat was nicknamed 

“a political acrobat” and “the man with a thousand 

faces”), which enabled him to establish himself as a 

political leader, the only one among the Palestinians. 

In this essence, Ghassan al-Immam, a Saudi poet, has 

described him:
149

This old man is a player without a land or a playing 

field,

But he plays with all the balls and on all fields,

The catch is that in soccer he holds the ball in his hands,

He kicks the basketball with his feet,

He plays handball with his head,

When the referees call on him, he demands that 

someone else will take the rap,

He is never suspended because his game-plan is 

amusing,

He never sits on the bench because he is irreplaceable, 

There’s no one in the world that can foul like he does,

And when he loses the game, he wins the crowds’ 

applause.16

Contrary to the international community’s approach, Israel (and the United States) adhered to their 

refusal to recognize the PLO or to negotiate with it. 

Israel also refused to recognize the Palestinians’ right 

for a state, and, at the most, offered them autonomy, 

as outlined in the 1978 Camp David Accords between 

Israel and Egypt (the Palestinians did not attend the 

Camp David summit). Israel encouraged the development of a moderate Palestinian leadership—municipal and political—in the Territories, though without 

much success. In any event, Israel preferred negotiating with Jordan on the Territories’ future; however, 

the latter demanded to be handed back the entire West 

Bank and East Jerusalem.

Concurrently, a more nationalistic political leadership developed in the Territories, and another member of the famous al-Husseini family surfaced, Faisal 

Husseini. However, the latter’s closeness to Arafat, in 

combination with the PLO’s control over Palestinian 

politics from abroad,17 prevented Husseini from being 
150

perceived as an alternative leader to Arafat, both by 

Israel and the Palestinians themselves.18

Despite the PLO and Arafat’s leading role in the 

Palestinian national struggle, they were caught by 

surprise by the outbreak of the popular uprising in 

the Territories—the Intifada—in December 1987. To 

avoid the likelihood of the riots seeping into his territory as well, King Hussein of Jordan had announced 

a couple of months later, in July 1988, of his country’s 

disengagement from the West Bank and Jerusalem, 

and that he was no longer a partner in the attempts 

to resolve the Palestinian problem. PLO now stood 

alone. Nonetheless, Israel remained steadfast in its refusal to negotiate directly with it; on the other hand, 

the United States recognized the PLO in November 

1988, following an additional moderation in the views 

presented by the PLO and Arafat.19

Another accomplishment of Arafat was the 1991 assembly of an international conference on peace in the 

Middle East, the Madrid Conference, with the participation of Israel and the Arab states. Indeed, the PLO 

and Arafat, who had been calling for the assembly of 

such a conference for years, did not directly attend it 

because of Israel’s objection; nevertheless, Arafat controlled every move made by the Palestinian delegates 

in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Indeed, the Madrid Conference and the subsequent bilateral talks did not produce any progress. 

Nevertheless, the two were essential for setting the 

stage for the initiation of the Oslo, Norway, process, 

which would make the realization of the Palestinian 

national dream closer than ever.
151

Arafat and the Oslo Process.

Israel’s recognition of the PLO in 1993, the signing of the two Oslo accords between the two sides, 

and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority 

(PA), headed by Arafat—all constituted the greatest 

accomplishment of all times for Arafat, the PLO and 

the Palestinian people, in spite of the PLO and Arafat’s crisis in the beginning of the 1990s following 1) 

their inability to control the Intifada; 2) the fall of the 

Soviet Union, which provided the PLO financial and 

diplomatic support; and 3) the Arab States’ termination of financial support for the PLO (due to Arafat’s 

support of Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf 

War). Relinquishing the use of terror and opting for 

diplomacy brought the PLO and Arafat back into the 

center stage.

At this point, Arafat was holding three roles: Fatah Chairman, PLO Chairman, and the Palestinian 

Authority (PA) Chairman (although he preferred the 

title President). As someone who dedicated his life for 

the Palestinian national struggle and did not see any 

disparity between his own interests and those of the 

Palestinian people,20 Arafat carried on with his past 

behavior patterns in his new role, too. He maintained 

his old centralized work style, and continued bribing 

his internal opponents-competitors or belittling them 

by using “divide and conquer” tactics. Needless to 

say, he kept on treating the PA funds, which originated mainly from the European Union and the Arab 

states, as if they were his own (just as he had done 

before with PLO funds)—although his corruption was 

never personal but rather political; Arafat himself continued living in somewhat of asceticism.
152

The onset of the Oslo process brought about a 

great deal of antagonism from the political opposition 

in Israel and the PA.21 The Islamic movements in the 

Territories—the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and 

the rising power, the Hamas movement, which was 

established with the Intifada outbreak at the end of 

1987—did not follow the PLO and Arafat’s lead and 

sought to prevent the danger, in their view, in relinquishing the dream of Greater Palestine. From 1994, 

the two organizations began executing suicide terror 

attacks in Israeli cities—an unknown weapon in the 

Palestinian arena at the time—which brought about a 

decline in the support for the peace process among the 

Israeli public. Arafat was accused of turning a blind 

eye and not being firm with Hamas and the PIJ, and 

that the two constitute for him—as someone who always waved two flags, diplomatic and terror—a type 

of alternative for the Fatah’s violent activity against 

Israel (Fatah laid down its arms by force of the Oslo 

Accords).

On the other hand, it was claimed that Arafat had 

difficulty employing harsh measures against the Islamic movements out of fear that the latter would turn 

against him and put his rule at risk. When he felt that 

Hamas and PIJ went too far, for instance, in the wave 

of terror attacks on Israeli cities in February-March 

1996, he definitely employed a firm hand against them. 

But then again, it was too late. Several months before, 

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin had been murdered by an Israeli assassin who was seeking to put 

an end to the peace process. Rabin’s substitute in office, Shimon Peres, a member of the left wing Avoda 

party and one of Oslo’s architects, had lost the May 

1996 elections to the right wing Likud party candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu, who was opposed to the 
153

Oslo process; this was a direct result of the Hamas and 

PIJ’s terror attacks, and exactly what they set out to 

accomplish.

The opponents of the peace process on both sides 

have attained their objectives, and the Oslo process derailed during the second half of the 1990s. The original 

timetables were disrupted, and the trust between the 

two parties gradually shattered. Only the return of the 

Israeli Avoda party to government in May 1999 and 

the appointment of its leader, Ehud Barak, to Prime 

Minister breathed new life into the peace process.

In July 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton assembled 

the two sides, headed by Barak and Arafat, to a peace 

summit in the presidential country retreat of Camp 

David. This summit’s goal was to discuss, for the first 

time, the three core issues in the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict—the borders, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian 

refugees—and to sign on a permanent peace agreement to end the conflict. The failure of the summit has 

brought about a renewal of the blood cycle between 

the two sides; the establishment of a Palestinian state, 

which seemed to be close at hand, has turned once 

again into a distant aspiration.

The Camp David Summit, the Outbreak of 

the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the Twilights of the 

Arafat Era. 

The narrative surrounding the events that led to 

the 2000 Camp David summit’s failure and to the unprecedented round of violence that started 2 months 

later, which is known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, is 

controversial. According to the Israeli account, Arafat was offered a generous agreement, including farreaching Israeli concessions, territorial and others. 
154

However, Arafat, as usual, avoided making a decision 

in favor of ending the conflict and instead opted to 

return to terror, perhaps out of hope that it would enable him to return later on to the negotiation table in a 

better position.22

Clinton had also placed the blame for the summit’s 

failure on Arafat.23 On the other hand, others describe 

the situation in a different way, perhaps slightly more 

balanced, and claim that the root of the failure lies in 

the somewhat-rushed way the summit was organized, 

lacking sufficient preparation and missing several essential intermediate stages. Arafat was dragged into 

the summit against his will, following Barak and specifically Clinton, who was determined to end his second term in the White House with a positive accord. 

Some also criticized the behavior of these two at the 

summit—Barak who thought, in his overconfidence, 

that he would be able to coerce his conditions for a 

peace agreement on the Palestinians24 (who claimed, 

on their part, that Barak’s offered agreement had 

not met their needs and expectations whatsoever25); 

and Clinton, whose subjective, pro-Israeli mediation barred, from the onset, any chance for reaching 

a Palestinian willingness to accept his ideas for 

compromise.

Indeed, Arafat’s suspicion toward his Israeli counterpart and toward the American mediator played 

a significant role in the summit’s failure. With all 

the weight of responsibility on his shoulders, Arafat 

chose to postpone the final decision. In the same vain, 

Akram Haniyeh, a member of the Palestinian Delegation to the summit, wrote:

On those sunny days, Arafat led one of the most difficult battles of his life. . . . He comprehended the 
155

enormous burden of the mandate that was handed to 

him as well as the extent of the deposit entrusted in 

his hands as a leader of a nation, whose strength and 

source of pride stem from the fact that it is protecting the holy sites existing on its land. [Arafat’s] comprehension should not be interpreted as arrogance 

but rather as an understanding of the full weight of 

responsibility, because he entered this battle on behalf 

of the Palestinian people, the Arab states, the Islamic 

nation as well as the Christians. . . . He had to protect 

the holy city [Jerusalem, or al-Quds in Arabic], which 

was tied with important figures, from Caliph Umar 

ibn Al-Khattab to ala a-Din al-Ayyubi, and with his 

people he had to fight the battle alone.26

Additional narrative differences refer to the issue 

surrounding Arafat’s involvement in the outbreak of 

the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2001. The narrative 

developed by Ehud Barak and adopted by the Israeli 

public and media, accuses Arafat of being responsible 

for the violent events’ outbreak and escalation. The 

latter included violent clashes between Palestinian security forces and the Israeli military, and the return 

of suicide terror attacks into Israeli streets, this time 

not only by the Islamic organizations but for the first 

time also by the Fatah. Barak and Ariel Sharon from 

the Likud right wing party, who replaced him in office as Israeli Prime Minister after the elections held in 

February 2002, ascertained that Arafat was no longer 

a negotiation partner (the last attempt for negotiation 

between Barak and Arafat was the Taba Conference in 

January 2002, after the violent events’ eruption, however, this negotiation never stood a chance in light of 

the upcoming elections in Israel). 

Nevertheless, there is yet another narrative. High 

ranking officials in the Israeli military Intelligence 

Directorate, Aman, claimed that the violent events 
156

have erupted spontaneously—a day after a provocative visit of Ariel Sharon, then Head of the Israeli 

political opposition, in the Temple Mount—and not 

as a pre-planned plot by Arafat. Furthermore, they 

claim that Arafat had difficulties in controlling the 

violent events, and elements within the Palestinian 

security forces and the Fatah movement that inflamed 

the events did not follow Arafat’s orders. However, 

this narrative did not fare well with Barak’s agenda 

and later on with Sharon’s, and Aman’s leading echelon aligned with them and rewrote its intelligence 

assessments.27

The continuation of the violent events led Israel to 

take action against the PA’s government institutions 

and security forces, and the PA’s strength increasingly 

weakened. Under Israel’s lead, a public diplomacy 

campaign was launched with the goal of undermining Arafat’s image while accusing him of corruption 

and assisting terrorism.28 Arafat spent his last years 

imprisoned, in essence, in the Mukataa’ (the Palestinian governmental offices in Ramallah), condemned 

and isolated from the world and, in many aspects, also 

from his own people. Appropriately for the Yasser 

Arafat myth, the cause of his death in November 2004, 

at the age of 75, was also never entirely clarified—an 

unusual blood disease, AIDS, or perhaps another reason (the Palestinians claim that he was poisoned by 

Israel, adding a touch of martyrdom to his death).29

Examination of Arafat’s image is not without risks. 

An examination of a myth or a symbol may be interpreted as a premeditated act: as an aspiration for delegitimacy, iconoclasm, or alternatively—as worship 

and reverence. The mere point of view may determine 

the outcome. 
157

The most important aspect is the way in which 

the Palestinians themselves perceived Arafat and the 

mark he had left on them (and not how much he was 

loathed by Israel). Hence, in this case, the myth may 

be more important than reality, since Arafat’s main 

role was to make an impression, to become a symbol 

that translates the Palestinians’ dreams and desires 

into a historical reality.30

All of the following, and more, contributed to the 

creation of the myth of Yasser Arafat.

1. Arafat’s dismissal of his personal identity in favor of the Palestinian revolution and the mystery surrounding his personal life as well as his intents and 

final goals of the Palestinian national struggle (which 

possibly were not completely clear to him either);

2. His intentional ungroomed appearance and his 

insistence on wearing a keffiyeh and military uniforms, 

even after he was recognized as a political leader; and, 

3. The countless times he survived elimination 

attempts by his opponents from within and without 

(including by Israel, evidence for the importance it 

conferred on him and on his leadership).31

The duality in his words and actions throughout 

the years, even after the onset of diplomatic dialogue 

between him and Israel, had served well both his 

supporters and opponents. He provided bountiful 

justifications for the claims made by both sides. Ironically, Arafat was concurrently referred to as both the 

problem and the solution; one could not live with or 

without him. The leadership void he left behind him 

is confirmation of these observations.

Finally, in the eyes of the Palestinians, despite 

the fact that it may seem as if Arafat’s image was 

slightly tarnished during his last years, he would be 
158

remembered as the greatest Palestinian leader of all 

times; as the one who led his people for more than 40 

stormy years, filled with impressive accomplishments 

and magnificent failures, almost within a hand’s 

reach of a realization of their aspiration for national 

independence.

Post-Arafat Era.

Arafat did not nurture a natural successor during 

his lifetime—not among PLO’s veteran generation nor 

among the younger generation in Fatah. His position 

as PLO Chairman was filled by Mahmoud Abbas (aka 

Abu Mazan), a veteran member of the organization. In 

January 2005, Abbas won the majority of votes in the 

elections for PA Chairman.

Unlike his predecessor, Abbas benefits from an image of a pragmatic, moderate, and honest man, and 

therefore he receives the international community’s 

trust. However, Abbas is lacking the prestige, respect, 

and reverence Arafat received from the Palestinian 

people, and it is doubtful whether he would be able 

to lead a diplomatic step of historical compromise 

with Israel which will force the Palestinian side to 

also make painful concessions—of the Greater Palestine dream and the realization of the 1948 Palestinian 

refugees’ right of return. Abbas, indeed, received acrid responses from the Arab world and the Palestinian 

arena on a specific quote he had made in November 

2012 in a TV interview that was interpreted as if he 

recognized the fact that the right of return would not 

be realized. However, these responses quickly faded 

away—evidence, perhaps, for the fact that everyone 

understands that Abbas lacks the public mandate to 

make a decision on this issue.32
159

Abbas’ weakness allowed Hamas to raise its head 

and to confront the Fatah and the PA’s security apparatuses, an act it did not dare do when Arafat—who 

benefited from the Hamas’ reverence—was alive. Initially, this Islamic movement won the elections held in 

January 2006 for the Palestinian Legislative Council, 

which is the Palestinian Parliament. One of Hamas’ 

top officials, Ismail Haniyah, was appointed the Palestinian Prime Minister, the second most important 

position in the PA (this position was tailored at the 

request of Israel in 2003, when Arafat was still alive, 

with the intent to bypass him33). In light of the PLO, 

Fatah and the PA Institutions’ weakness—among 

other things, due to Israeli activity against them during the Al-Aqsa Intifada years—Hamas successfully 

carried out a revolt in the Gaza Strip in June 2007; it 

removed Fatah from government and instituted an 

independent government under the leadership of Ismail Haniyah, a government which was never recognized by Israel. In essence, the PA was divided in two, 

and in fact, Abbas is now governing the West Bank 

territories only.

Hamas’ victory in the elections and gaining control 

over Gaza brought about pragmatization in the movement’s viewpoints. Its leaders, headed by Haniyah 

and Khaled Mashal (head of Hamas’ Political Bureau 

and, in the past, a target of a failed Israeli assassination 

attempt34), have started to exhibit pragmatic standpoints, at least outwardly,35 and the scope of terror 

against Israel considerably declined. However, Israel 

stood firm in its refusal to have contacts with Hamas, 

and stood by the increasingly weakening Abbas as the 

sole negotiation partner.

Unlike Arafat, Abbas had placed all his hopes on 

diplomacy while vigorously opposing terror and vio-
160

lence (during his time in office, the Al-Aqsa Intifada—

which did not produce any accomplishments for the 

Palestinians—came to an end). Nevertheless, he was 

faced with an Israeli leadership suffering from great 

flaws too. Indeed, during Ehud Olmert’s term in office 

as Israeli Prime Minister (2006-09), negotiations with 

the PA (which, as previously mentioned, since 2007 

had control over the West Bank only) was renewed, 

and a great deal of progress was actually made in talks 

between the two sides on the core issues, including—

perhaps—far-reaching Israeli concessions.36 However, 

like Abbas, Olmert, too, earned very little public support due to his part in Israel’s failure in the 2006 Lebanon War and his alleged involvement in several corruption affairs, which eventually forced him to resign 

from office. His old-new successor as Prime Minister, 

Benjamin Netanyahu, declared his intentions to promote the idea of “two states for two nations,”37 however, in fact, he did nearly nothing to fulfill it.

With no other options, Abbas was forced to bypass 

Israel and turn to international channels. In 2011, the 

PA submitted a request to the UN Security Council to 

approve its acceptance as a full UN member independent state on the basis of the 1967 borders (hence—

pre-Six-Day War).38 Nevertheless, this tactic, too, produced limited accomplishments only.39

Abbas suffered an additional blow in April 2013 

with the resignation of his right-hand man in recent 

years, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. 

Fayyad, who received a great deal of trust from the 

international community, the United States, and Israel, was appointed in 2001 during the Arafat era as Finance Minister in the PA government. He had the job 

of cleaning up corruption and establishing appropriate administrative procedures (in the past he served 
161

as the International Monitory Fund’s representative in 

the Territories). Concurrently with his successful term 

in office as Finance Minister, Fayyad was appointed 

the PA’s Prime Minister (PM) in the summer of 2007, 

following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza and Ismail Haniyah’s appointment as PM in the Hamas government 

in Gaza. Fayyad, who was perceived as a U.S. ally and 

of the West, never gained popularity among the Palestinians or among the governing political party in the 

West Bank, the Fatah, in which he has never been a 

member. However, during his term in office as PM, 

he was very successful in developing the Palestinian 

economy and building the governmental institutions 

for the budding state—two areas that were neglected 

during Arafat’s era.40 Fayyad’s resignation has left Abbas alone, once again.

Thus, the Palestinian people continue to shift, 

decade after decade, from cautious optimism to pessimism and despair which are so familiar to them—

despair from Israel, that keeps on piling obstacles for 

peace; despair from the Arab states and the international community that deserted the Palestinians; and 

despair from their own leadership, that has failed, so 

far, in realizing their national dream.

It seems that both Palestinians and Israelis aspire to 

a different leadership on both sides—strong, far-sighted, ready to make painful historical compromises and 

having a wide-ranging internal legitimacy—a leadership that would end the long lasting conflict between 

these two nations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Abba Eban, “International Affairs in the Modern Age,” The 

New Diplomacy, Winter 1983-84, p. 229.
162

2. One of the leading researchers of Palestinian history in our 

time, Professor Rashid Khalidi from Colombia University, disagrees with the consensus among Israeli historians, according to 

which, the Palestinian nationality awakened mainly as a reaction 

to the Zionist thriving. Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The 

Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

3. To intensify this uprising’s popular and national nature, it 

is often referred to in Palestinian literature as “The Great Palestinian Revolt.” Israeli historiography refers to this revolt as “the 

bloody clashes”—to diminish its significance.

4. Abd al-Wahab ak-Kayali, Ta’rikh Falastin al-Khdith (The History of Modern Palestine), in Arabic, Beirut, Lebanon, 1985, p. 313.

5. See Klaus Gensicke, Alexander Fraser Gunn, trans., The 

Mufti of Jerusalem and the Nazis: The Berlin Years, London, UK: 

Vallentine Mitchell, 2011.

6. For a more detailed account of Haj Amin al-Hussaini life 

and ideology, see, for instance, Zvi Elpeleg, David Harvey, trans., 

The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian 

National Movement, London, UK: Frank Cass, 1993.

7. Jamal al-Hussaini had also decided to emphasize Haj Amin 

al-Hussaini’s absence: 

The Arabs [in Palestine] assume that in your hearings, you 

wanted to hear the Arabs’ opinion from their well-known 

leaders and representatives. However, in this inquiry they 

perceive themselves lacking the presence of their first and 

foremost leader, the Grand Mufti, who is irreplaceable. . . .

See Esriel Carlebach, ed., Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 

on Jewish Problems in Palestine and Europe [in Hebrew], Vol. 2, 

Tel Aviv, Israel: Leinman, 1946, p. 352.

8. Jamal al-Hussaini has declared in this context that “the partition line shall be nothing but line of fire and blood.” See Rony 

E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab 
163

Refugee Problem (A Case Study), Geneva, Switzerland, and Paris, 

France: E. Droz, 1959, p. 58.

9. Thus, Albert Hourani, the notable expert on Middle Eastern 

Affairs, wrote, based on the writings of Musa al-Alami, one of the 

most respected Arabs in Palestine: 

The Palestinian Arabs failed, because they have fought peasants and guerilla war with outdated methods, whereas their 

opponents fought a totally modern war. They lacked central 

command, as well as unification around the goal, they had 

limited weapons, they were untrained and had nearly no 

experienced officers. There was no unified action, each city 

or village defended itself; not one of them had sent assistance to the other; and the districts far from the battlefront 

remained inactive, while others were conquered one by one.

See Albert Hourani, “Arab Refugees and the Future of Israel,” BBC, as brought by Haaretz daily newspaper (in Hebrew), 

December 1, 1949.

10. A lively debate exists among historians surrounding the 

number of Palestinian refugees and particularly surrounding the 

causes for their exodus. Researchers identified with the “New 

Historians” group, whose studies have been published in the last 

2 decades, point out to a series of deportation acts of Palestinians executed by Israel during the 1948 war. See in this reference 

Benny Morris’ monumental book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Avi Shlaim, another “New Historian,” claims 

that the results of the war were predetermined by a conspiracy 

concocted by Israel and Jordan, both of which wished to prevent 

the establishment of a Palestinian entity. See Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the 

Partition of Palestine, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 

The “New Historians” stirred up fierce opposition among some of 

the researchers studying this era; See, for instance, Efraim Karsh, 

Fabricating Israeli History: The ‘New Historians’,” London, UK: F. 

Cass 1997.
164

11. See in this context, Arafat’s 1983 interview with Arab 

journalists:

Who exactly are you?

I am a fighter in the ranks of the Palestinian 

revolution.

Is your name Yasser Arafat?

That is the name by which I have been known since my 

university days.

Where are you from?

From the very heart of the Palestinian people.

The Palestinians would like to know more about their 

leader; permit us to ask once again who are you?

I am a son of the Palestinian people and a fighter in the 

ranks of the revolution.

See Danny Rubinstein, Dan Leon, trans., The Mystery of Arafat, 

South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1995, p. 25.

12. For this reason precisely, only a few works have been written about Shuqayri. See, for instance: Yaniv Ronen, The Forgotten Leader: A Biography of Ahmad Al-Shuqayri [in Hebrew], a Ph.D. 

Thesis, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, 2010.

13. I.e., George Habash, a Christian, who led the Popular 

Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Among the Fronts’ leaders 

and members were many Christians, all of whom followed Arafat’s leadership, who was Muslim.

14. For this reason, the Palestinian National Movement and 

its different components—PLO, Fatah, and the Fronts—earned 

the title “the secular faction.”

15. I.e., in his first speech before the UN General Assembly in 

1974, Arafat said: 

We do not wish one drop of either Arab or Jewish blood to 

be shed; neither do we delight in the continuation of killing, 

which would end once a just peace, based on our people’s 

rights, hopes and aspirations had been finally established. 

. . . I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national 

independent sovereignty over its own land. Today I have 
165

come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. 

Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. . . . War flares 

up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be 

born.

See unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/A238EC7A3E13EED18525624

A007687EC. In his second speech before the UN General Assembly in 1988, he said:

Our National Council stressed the need to convene an international conference on the Middle East problem, with the 

issue of Palestine as its core . . . the international conference 

will convene in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the basis of guaranteeing the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people, 

the foremost being their right to self-determination. . . . The 

Palestinian National Council reiterated its rejections of terrorism; it reiterated its rejection of terrorism of all kinds, 

including state terrorism. . . . In my capacity as Chairman of 

the PLO, I declare from here once more: I condemn terrorism in all its forms. . . . 

Available from www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal5.htm.

16. Rubinstein, p. 35.

17. Until 1982, the PLO was located in Lebanon. Following 

the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in that year, it relocated to Tunisia.

18. More on local politics in the Territories from 1967 until 

the end of the 1980s can be found in Emile Sahliyeh, In Search 

of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967, Washington, DC: The 

Brookings Institution, 1988.

19. In a symbolic act following King Hussein’s speech on Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank, the Palestinian National Council declared in November 15, 1988, on the establishment 

of the State of Palestinian. The declaration of independence reads: 

The State of Palestine herewith declares that it believes in the 

settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means. . . . It rejects the threat or use of force, violence 

and terrorism against its territorial integrity or political in-
166

dependence, as it also rejects their use against the territorial 

integrity of other states. . . . 

Available from www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal3.htm.

20. Thus, for instance, Arafat explained the fact that he remained unmarried until his 60s by saying that he is married to a 

beautiful woman named Palestine, or alternatively—that all Palestinian women are his wives and all the children of Palestine are 

his own. His marriage in 1990 to Suha Tawil, a Christian woman 

34 years his junior, was originally kept a secret. The Palestinian 

public and leadership never received Suha as their own, and rumors surrounded the nature of their relationship. The two have 

one daughter named Zahwa.

21. Israeli political opposition claimed that Arafat’s support 

of the Oslo process and his recognition of Israel were nothing but 

a conspiracy as part of the “stages theory,” which means—in their 

view—that Arafat’s consent to the two states’ solution was a tactic 

and temporary one and an intermediate stage toward the final 

stage: realization of the dream of Greater Palestine and the annihilation of the State of Israel.

22. Shlomo Ben Ami, Israeli Delegation member to the Camp 

David summit, later wrote the following: “The Palestinian side is 

unable, as long as it is led by Arafat, to make a historical decision 

to end the conflict.” See Shlomo Ben Ami A Front Without a Rearguard: A Voyage to the Boundaries of the Peace Process (in Hebrew), 

Tel Aviv, Israel: Miskal-Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed 

Books, 2004, p. 534.

23. Bill Clinton, My Life, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, 

pp. 915-916, 937-938, 944-945.

24. See, for instance, the analysis of Ron Pundak, one of the 

Oslo Accord’s architects: 

Barak is a man with amazing powers of concentration and 

analysis, used to coping with novel and stressful situations. 

He may have failed precisely because of these qualities. His 

approach to negotiation had elements of arrogance and the 

fallacy that he alone understood the ‘big picture’. His strate-
167

gic vision and historical insight failed him as he attempted 

to impose his operating style on partners who were not 

ready for it.

See Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 40.

25. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the 

Fight for Middle East Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 

2004, p. XII.

26. Ben Ami, pp. 236-237.

27. Ephraim Lavie, “Intelligence Activity in the Palestinian Arena—A Critical Assessment” (in Hebrew), Mabat Malam, 

a journal for intelligence and security affairs of the Israel Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), No. 52, December 

2008, p. 31-32.

28. This public diplomacy campaign was led by an entity tied 

to the Israeli military Intelligence Directorate—the Intelligence 

and Terrorism Information Center, available from www.terrorisminfo.org.il/en/index.aspx. This led to criticism according to which 

the Intelligence should not be dealing with public diplomacy.

29. Arafat was buried in Ramallah after a funeral ceremony 

in Cairo. The Palestinians’ request to bury him in Jerusalem was 

denied by Israel. The funeral was characterized by disorder and 

uncontrolled outburst of emotions from the Palestinian crowd.

30. Rubinstein, pp. xii-xiii.

31. In addition, Arafat also survived a plane crash in the Libyan Desert in April 1992; appropriately, Arafat was nicknamed 

“the man with nine lives.”

32. Harriet Sherwood, “Mahmoud Abbas Outrages Palestinian Refugees by Waiving His Right to Return,” The Guardian, November 4, 2012, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2012/

nov/04/mahmoud-abbas-palestinian-territories.
168

33. Initially Mahmoud Abbas held this position, and after a 

few months he was replaced by Ahmed Qurei (aka Abu Alaa), 

also a member of PLO’s veteran echelon. Qurei held this position 

until the 2006 Legislative Council elections.

34. Many of Hamas’ military and political leaders, among 

them the movement’s founder, Ahmed Yassin, were assassinated 

by Israel during the 1990s and particularly during the Al-Aqsa 

Intifada in the beginning of the 2000s.

35. See for example, Amira Hass, “Haniyeh: Hamas willing to 

accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders,” Haaretz, November 9, 

2008, available from www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-hamas-willingto-accept-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders-1.256915.

36. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years 

in Washington, New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2011, pp. 650-

656. Later on, Olmert claimed that the two sides were very close 

to signing a final peace agreement, however, Abbas’ hesitance 

thwarted it. See Avi Issacharoff, “The Hope, the Fear and the Accusations: The Peace Agreement that Remained on the Napkin,” 

Walla, May 24, 2013, available from news.walla.co.il/?w=//2644736.

37. See, for example, Netanyahu’s address in Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009, available from mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/

Pages/Address_PM_Netanyahu_Bar-Ilan_University_14-Jun2009.aspx.

38. See the transcript of Abbas’ speech before the UN General 

Assembly, available from www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/

cache/offonce/pid/28905.

39. In October 2011, Palestine was accepted as a full member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization. In November 2012, the PA’s status in the UN was 

upgraded from a nonstate observer entity to a nonmember observer state, available from www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/

single-view/news/general_conference_admits_palestine_as_unesco_

member_state/#.Uh2d6NxBRdg; and www.un.org/ga/search/view_

doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/19.

40. See Salam Fayyad, “Why I’m Building Palestine,” Foreign 

Policy, Vol. 183, December 2010, p. 60.
169

PART III:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

171

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Anastasia Filippidou

Leadership is essentially a human-centered activity comprising a number of elements—leaders, followers, context—all with different personalities and attributes. One of the main arguments of this book is that 

the most important factors that distinguish effective 

leaders often lay largely outside the control of an individual leader (context, resources, circumstances, etc.). 

Although a leader must have the ability to exploit the 

opportunities offered by external factors, a leader, irrespective of how good, cannot always really guarantee 

effectiveness by his own actions. Leadership perceptions help form decisionmakers’ views, but they also 

prescribe political attitudes and behaviors. States may 

fail to cooperate even if they have compatible aims 

and preferences, because decisionmakers make incorrect inferences about their motives and intentions.1

THE PRAGMATISM OF AN ETHICAL 

FOREIGN POLICY

Main questions that arise from the research are: 

Is the foreign policy of the United States toward the 

Middle East achieving its objectives? If not, does fault 

lie with the theory or the execution? U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East seems to have two images: 

one is what Christopher Lasch2 called in the 1970s “the 

culture of narcissism” and the other is a feeling of insecurity expressed as elevating threats into existential 

ones. Both images have led to unsuitable and wrong 
172

policies. The United States has alternated a foreign 

policy in the Middle East of cooperation and confrontation and has been consistent at playing the “divide 

and rule” game contributing to existing divisions or 

creating new ones. As a result, often seemingly rational foreign policy decisions have failed to deliver the 

expected outcomes. Partiality and unfairness can hurt 

both the realist part of the U.S. foreign policy agenda 

by diminishing its actual power as well as the idealist 

portion of it and by undermining the U.S. appeal as 

the embodiment of certain ideas and values. 

Historically U.S. foreign policy has identified the 

lack of democracy as a central cause of the problems in 

the Middle East. However, the uncompromising stance 

of imposing the right type of democracy has been and 

remains unlikely to succeed in the Middle East. This 

has led to accusations of double standards and as J. 

Mann points out “most of the other governments in 

the region, including US’s long-time partners in Saudi 

Arabia and Egypt, could not meet the democratic standard Bush was setting for the Palestinians.”3

According 

to K. Dalacoura, “democracy promotion policies have 

limited outcomes because neither a politically neutral nor a more forceful approach can initiate reform 

if it is not already under way for domestic reasons.”4

After all, a political system is only one of the many 

facets of a functioning state, and actually it is often 

a subservient facet in an Islamic state. As Colin Gray 

argues, “there is no prospect that major potential belligerents will grow rapidly into the character of liberal 

democracies.”5

At times U.S. foreign policy has failed to recognize 

and accept the region’s cultural diversity, the power 

of outward and inward focused Islam, and its traditions which differ fundamentally from the West. Pol-
173

icy planning and implementation seem to have been 

quite uninformed by an understanding of the region’s 

history, culture, and politics. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been misguided 

in its belief in a Western-style democratization, and 

it has suffered from being simplistic and idealistic in 

its approach to extremely complex realities. Difficulties arise if the terms Islam and democracy are used 

in a monolithic manner rather than acknowledging 

the flexibility and adaptability and “the diversity of 

actual experience.”6 Homogeneity is neither possible, 

nor should it be desirable. Past attempts to introduce 

different types of governance such as socialism and 

nationalism have each met with differing degrees of 

enthusiasm within the Middle East. However, common to all was the deep impact of Islam. This is also 

true for democracy which cannot hope to retain its 

Western secular ideals as it is absorbed and adapted 

by Muslim societies.

Monocausal explanations for foreign policy provide simplistic analyses and misleading decisions. 

There appear to be a number of paradoxes U.S. foreign policy has to deal with. The first paradox is that, 

although the United States needs an ally in a strategically vital region such as the Middle East, the region 

is hostile also because of such an alliance, which often 

leads to accusations of U.S. double standards. However, the second paradox is that despite the low standing of the United States among many in the Middle 

East, only a U.S. President appears to have the authority, legitimacy, and power to bring conflicting sides 

together for meaningful talks. The third paradox is 

when the United States adopts a more insular foreign 

policy, there are calls for the “responsibility” of the 

powerful “to do something”; however, if the United 
174

States interferes, it is accused of meddling and of 

partiality. 

Following from this, the fourth paradox is for the 

United States to try and maintain the status quo, but 

at the same time not being able to affect the change 

necessary to achieve this goal. The problem is that the 

very status of the United States denotes the existence 

of a distinct imbalance of power and the need to maintain this imbalance in order to prolong this status. As 

Eagleton puts it, “the task of political hegemony is to 

produce the very forms of subjecthood which will form 

the basis of political unity.”7 This nonetheless has led 

to charges of neo-imperialism. The fifth paradox that 

has caused controversy, objection, and accusation of 

double standards is the application of military power 

in order to promote and establish democratic regimes 

in strategic areas, according to the United States. 

The sixth paradox for U.S. foreign policy decisionmaker is to try and help a Middle Eastern country, on 

this occasion, however without meddling; that is to 

participate in a transition to peaceful politics but to 

have a selfless foreign policy and not try to influence 

domestic politics of the host country. The concluding 

paradox is the kind of leadership U.S. foreign policymakers would prefer a host country to have. In the 

sense that if U.S. foreign policymakers were facing 

a strong leadership in a Middle Eastern country, although this strong leadership could on the one hand be 

less compromising, it could affect more effectively its 

own people and state and it could also influence more 

and shape the reactions of other people and states. If, 

on the other, U.S. policymakers were facing a weak 

leadership. 

Although this weak leadership would be more 

malleable and possibly more prone to reach an agree-
175

ment in a peace process, it could not really affect the 

actions of its own people; it would not be able, for instance, to maintain support and implement an agreement. Consequently, often U.S. foreign policymakers 

chose to support “reliable” leaders, which, in its turn, 

led to the promotion of preferred political systems. 

For instance, during the Cold War U.S. foreign policy 

supported “friendly” but authoritarian regimes as 

this was considered preferable to risking the emergence of an alternative regime, including a participatory regime, that would, however, have less friendly 

relations with the United States.8 For instance, during 

the uprisings in Egypt in 2011, the looming question 

for U.S. foreign policymakers was whether to support 

Hosni Mubarak, the friendly authoritarian leader who 

represented an “island of stability” or to support the 

protesters seeking his ouster and thereby risking an 

unfriendly leader coming to power.9

More relevant to this point, and to the case studies of this research, is when U.S. foreign policymakers faced a similar dilemma following the victory of 

Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections, during which 

Washington overtly backed Mahmoud Abbas. This dilemma raised the question about the U.S. willingness 

to support outcomes of democratic elections given its 

outspoken rhetoric on the subject.10 This links with the 

first paradox mentioned earlier and the accusations 

of double standards, rendering U.S. foreign policy 

efforts counterproductive. Hence, often the dilemma 

has been what kind of leadership to facilitate and support in a transitional phase: a strong or a weak one. 

However, since this decision will be contextual, a state 

must have a clear and “confident” foreign policy and 

must know what its own foreign policy vision and 

aim is. To this end, U.S. decisionmakers would have 
176

to decide if the driver behind their foreign policy is 

complacency or meaning. The former focuses on the 

present only, while the latter cares about the past and 

future actions and decisions. After all, as Joseph Nye 

observes, “having the resources of power does not 

guarantee that you will always get the outcome you 

want. To do so requires well designed strategies and 

skillful leadership”; in effect what Nye calls “smart 

power.”11

U.S. foreign policymakers would have to constantly try and strike a balance and a harmony on the previously mentioned paradoxes, which is not always possible, even if there is will. In other words, U.S. foreign 

policy toward the Middle East will have to be adaptive 

and flexible on the one hand in order to show ability 

and will; but foreign policy will also have to be consistent on the other, so that it can show commitment 

and impartiality. For this to happen, however, and for 

foreign policy to be effective, it has to transcend party 

politics, and it has to bridge gaps between continuity 

and adaptability. Establishing and maintaining a “benevolent hegemony”12 is not that easy. 

Ideally, cooperation should be based on nonhegemonic attitudes and on the principle of reciprocity. 

Foreign policy, by its nature, involves a distorted, subjective image of reality inasmuch as it is formed based 

on national interests. For instance, perceptions toward 

Middle Eastern leaders have been highly subjective 

and varied within U.S. foreign policymakers. The 

same leader has been viewed and treated over time 

very differently by U.S. policymakers and advisors, 

even if the actions and behavior of the specific leader 

has remained consistent. Depending on who is governing or advising the United States, different leaders 

in the Middle East have been viewed as pariahs to be 
177

toppled or as pariahs to be tolerated or even promoted. 

Alternatively, pariahs with whom “we could do business with” one day are abandoned the next if perceptions of their utility changes. It is worth mentioning at 

this point that, historically, certain U.S. Presidents and 

decisionmakers appear to have developed what could 

be described as an obsessive behavior toward foreign 

leaders unrelated to the views of the current political 

establishment. Examples of this would include Fidel 

Castro, Saddam Hussein, and the Shah of Iran. 

In an interdependent world where co-existence 

is vital, any state’s foreign policy is constraint to one 

degree or another by a complex combination of external and domestic factors. Political domestic pressures 

inherent within a liberal democracy demand rapid 

results which, in turn, increase the likelihood of counterproductive and short-term tactics and approaches. 

Based on the above, an effective U.S. foreign policy 

would have to be reactive and proactive, depending 

on the context, situation, and circumstances. 

The capacity of U.S. foreign policy to influence the 

behavior of a Middle East country (recipient country) 

depends on the interaction of the values the United 

States and the recipient attribute to an issue in which 

the United States attempts to exert influence. If an issue is of high value for the United States but low for 

the recipient and vice versa, there will be lack of trust, 

and thus the efforts of U.S. policymakers to influence 

the recipient country or efforts to establish cooperation 

between two countries are likely to fail. In this sense, 

there has to be an alignment of values between U.S. 

foreign policy aims and the recipient country’s aims. 

Understandably, this would rarely be realistic, hence 

the suggestion is not to expect to have the same values 

as such, but for there to be empathy and acceptance 
178

of what is important for a recipient country and take 

that into consideration when forming foreign policy. 

This is not to be idealistic but just pragmatic, owing to 

interdependence and the need for coexistence. 

The aim should be to achieve an altruistic, but at 

the same time pragmatic, foreign policy, and it is human capacity for justice that makes this possible. But, 

it is also human tendency toward injustice that makes 

it necessary. This would require constant knowledge, 

adaptation, flexibility, and a vision that transcends 

party politics and short-term policies. Given the complex environment within which decisionmakers operate, they rarely have the time to become proficient 

in the intricacies of foreign affairs. Thus for expediency, they tend to fall back to known constructs and 

to “how things are done here,” with which they are 

familiar. Although this has been helpful at times, on 

many occasions old attitudes applied to new complex 

realities has been ineffective and inefficient. To promote its national interests in the long term, the United 

States might have to prioritize the local interests and 

almost altruistically help the regions overcome their 

internal divisions and problems. Why? Because of interdependence and the role history has attributed to 

the United States. 

Main leadership theories have been reviewed in 

order to set the foundations for analysis of asymmetric 

leadership in transitional processes. The complicated 

and contradictory nature of asymmetric leadership in 

transitional processes is also emphasized. Different 

leadership types are examined, which has highlighted 

that, with the exception possibly of toxic leadership, 

it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine that a 

specific type is better than another in every situation. 

As such, it is apparent that some leadership styles are 
179

likely to be more effective in certain situations, and 

that a really effective leader is one who is able to determine the context of the situation and use the most 

effective leadership behavior required at the time. Effective leaders understand the context of the situation, 

add this to their understanding of themselves and others and adopt the appropriate skills and methods to 

achieve the desired outcome. Furthermore, categorizing a leader as one type or another runs the risk of being refuted as a result of shift in leadership behaviors 

dictated by broader political circumstances. 

The concept of asymmetric leadership is based on 

the notion that, when political leaders find themselves 

in a position which compromises their intents, which 

is often the case during transition, they adapt and adjust to the new realities not necessarily because they 

accept the causes for change but because they need 

and want to survive. Leaders in transitional processes 

can find themselves in situations that compromise 

their intentions, which is often dictated by broader 

political circumstances and changes in the political 

environment. This idea of a constantly changing environment and its consequences validate the concept 

of asymmetric leadership. Asymmetric leadership can 

change its position in response to new issues coming 

to light during a peace process as well as in response 

to the needs and wants of themselves, their followers, 

and of their political adversaries. 

A significant challenge for asymmetric leadership 

is the apparent failure of these leaders to adjust to 

normalization politics. This can be due to the unequal 

dynamic involved in asymmetric leadership, and the 

weaker position in which this type of leadership can 

find itself. When a transition process moves toward 

the normalization phase and the need for substantial 
180

reform decreases, leaders must adjust, and instead 

of leading, they have to become followers of the 

new structures, policies, and institutions. Insecurity 

in office and security out of office can make staying 

in peace a preferable option for political careers and 

lives. However as Chapters 3 and 4 have shown, more 

often than not there are much more mundane and 

pragmatic reasons behind a leader’s motivations and 

incentives, such as self-preservation. The majority of 

the leadership types adopt the normative approach 

that leadership is a positive phenomenon generating 

change for the greater good. This, however, as the 

previous chapters have shown, is just not always true. 

A selfless leadership is not always pragmatic. With 

asymmetric leadership the realities of leadership do 

not always match the expectations for ideal leaders. 

In asymmetric leadership in transitional processes, 

the inequality of the relationships and the volatility 

of the situation leaders appear to be particularly adept at adjusting and adapting their leadership styles 

to suit the situation. Adaptability, as we saw, can be 

achieved successfully by having high levels of selfawareness, but it may also be down to self-preservation and the need for the leadership to survive. Hence 

asymmetric leadership could also be characterized as 

survivalist leadership and its focus can be more shortterm and result-based rather than long-term and 

inspiration-based. 

In light of the unpredictable and always changing 

nature of asymmetric and survivalist leadership, understandably, multiple challenges arise for those who 

have to face and deal with such types of leadership. 

Empirically, in protracted conflicts, more pragmatic 

processes with mutually beneficial outcomes have 

led to successful transitions to stability and peace. In 
181

sum, the book has underlined the extent of versatility required of effective leaders in terms of style and 

approach. 

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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

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197

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

ANASTASIA FILIPPIDOU is a lecturer at the Centre for International Security and Resilience at Cranfield University, United Kingdom (UK). Prior to her 

employment at Cranfield University, she was a Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department KCL, Brunel 

University, and she was a teaching fellow at the War 

Studies Department. Dr. Filippidou worked with the 

Centre for Defence Studies, delivering courses on terrorism and counterterrorism for the Home Office. Her 

research and teaching focuses on strategy and conflict resolution; psychology of war and peace; and the 

role of leadership in ending terrorist campaigns. Dr. 

Filippidou holds a B.A. (Hons); PgCert; and a Ph.D. 

from the Department of War Studies, King’s College 

London, UK.

ELIAS HANNA is a retired Lebanese Army General, 

who has participated in training courses in military 

academies in Europe as well as in the United States. 

His main interests include geopolitical and security issues concerning the Middle East. General (Ret.) Hanna 

currently teaches geopolitics and causes of war at the 

American University of Beirut and Notre Dame University. He also has a weekly geopolitical television 

show on the Lebanese MTV- General View.

EYAL PASCOVICH is an adjunct lecturer at the Departments of Political Sciences at the University of 

Haifa and Tel Aviv University in Israel. Formerly, he 

was an analyst officer in the Israel Defense Forces’ 

military intelligence and the Israeli Counter Terrorism Bureau, as well as an advisor to the Israeli Prime 

Minister’s Office.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editor

Dr. Anastasia Filippidou

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil