J-S13030-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERRON LEI JENKINS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 460 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0010633-2019

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: June 14, 2024

Erron Lei Jenkins (“Jenkins”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (the “trial court”) 

following his convictions of terroristic threats, simple assault, flight to avoid 

apprehension, and harassment.

1 On appeal, Jenkins challenges the weight of 

the evidence supporting his terroristic threats, simple assault, and harassment

convictions. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in rejecting Jenkins’ weight of the evidence claim, we affirm. 

On September 4, 2019, Jai Lynn Williams-Smoot (“Williams-Smoot”), 

decided to terminate her relationship with her paramour, Jenkins. N.T., 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 5126(a), 2709(a)(1).
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9/20/2023, at 22. Williams-Smoot asked Jenkins to return her belongings and 

her dog from Jenkins’ mother’s residence, where she and Jenkins had been 

living. Id. Jenkins and Williams-Smoot agreed to meet at the Taco Bell in the 

North Side neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Id. Jenkins arrived at the Taco Bell 

in Williams-Smoot’s vehicle. Id. Williams-Smoot got into the vehicle and ran 

errands with Jenkins before going to Jenkins’ mother’s residence to pack. Id.

at 25.

After packing her belongings, the two departed the residence and 

stopped at a gas station. Id. at 27. Jenkins then sat in the driver’s seat and 

refused to take Williams-Smoot home or let her out of the vehicle, despite her 

repeated requests. Id. Jenkins stated that he was “kidnapping” her. Id. at 

28. Subsequently, Jenkins drove the vehicle, making various stops before 

stopping at another gas station, where a state trooper was present. Id. 

Jenkins threatened to harm Williams-Smoot if she attempted to speak to the 

trooper. Id.

Thereafter, Jenkins drove them to his mother’s house and again

threatened Williams-Smoot with violence if she made a scene. Id. at 30. In 

his bedroom, Jenkins forced Williams-Smoot to remove her clothes and

threatened her with a hammer. Id. at 32-33. Jenkins also grabbed WilliamsSmoot’s face, causing her nose to bleed onto her clothes. Id. at 33, 50. 

Jenkins then fell asleep, and Williams-Smoot retrieved her phone from under 

Jenkins’ pillow to text her mother about her situation. Id. at 35.
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The next day, Jenkins became aware that the police were looking for 

him. Id. at 37. Consequently, he forced Williams-Smoot to drive to 

Washington, Pennsylvania for several hours before returning to his mother’s

residence, where police responded to the reported kidnapping. Id. at 37, 39. 

Jenkins fled the residence and police arrested him shortly thereafter. Id. at 

40. 

The Commonwealth charged Jenkins with numerous crimes, including 

one count each of terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, simple assault, flight 

to avoid apprehension, and harassment. The case proceeded to a

consolidated jury/non-jury trial, with a jury deciding the terroristic threats, 

unlawful restraint, simple assault, and flight to avoid apprehension charges, 

and the trial court deciding the harassment charge. The jury found Jenkins 

guilty of terroristic threats, simple assault, and flight to avoid apprehension

and not guilty of unlawful restraint. The trial court then found Jenkins guilty 

of harassment. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Jenkins to an 

aggregate term of nine to twenty-three months of incarceration, followed by 

four years of probation. 

Jenkins filed a timely a post-sentence motion, asserting, inter alia, that 

his convictions were against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied 

the motion. Jenkins timely filed an appeal and a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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On appeal, Jenkins presents the following issue for review: “Whether 

[the trial court] abused [its] discretion in denying [] Jenkins’[] post-sentence 

motion requesting a new trial where the guilty verdicts for terroristic threats, 

simple assault, and harassment were against the weight of the evidence?” 

Jenkins’ Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

According to Jenkins, the trial court misapplied pertinent legal standards 

in evaluating his weight of the evidence claim as the court ignored inconsistent 

and vague testimony given by Williams-Smoot on cross-examination and 

discussed the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth. Id. at 19-21. As evidence that the testimony provided by 

Williams-Smoot lacked credibility, he points to the fact that she did not 

attempt to flee sooner or to seek help and that there was no evidence 

indicating he forced his way into the vehicle, threatened her, or used physical 

force. Id. at 21-22. Jenkins additionally asserts that after he and WilliamsSmoot returned to his mother’s home, she did not attempt to leave—even 

after Jenkins fell asleep—and left the home with him after he learned the police 

were looking for him. Id. at 22-23. He further highlights inconsistencies in 

Williams-Smoot’s testimony, such as her claim that he made her nose bleed, 

noting that the only clothing with blood on it was found on a shelf in the 

bedroom. Id. at 22. Jenkins contends that the trial court did not appropriately 

consider the inconsistencies in Williams-Smoot’s testimony, and, as such, the 

factfinder had to speculate as to what to believe. Id. at 23.
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The following legal principles apply to a trial court’s consideration of a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting a conviction:

An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new 

trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the 

testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than 

reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would

not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, 

in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the 

trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

Thus, to allow an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague 

and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial 

court.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046-47 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Our standard of review for weight of the evidence claims, however, 

differs from that of the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise 

of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has 

had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an 

appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings 

and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict 

was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new 

trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).
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Jenkins fails to recognize the two standards of review, and instead seeks 

for this Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor and find Williams-Smoot’s 

testimony lacked credibility. It is well settled, however, that the factfinder is 

“the sole arbiter of the credibility of each of the witnesses,” including 

“questions of inconsistent testimony and improper motive.” Commonwealth 

v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Indeed, the 

factfinder “is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s 

evidence in the manner that it sees fit.” Id. (citation omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1130 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that 

“any conflict in the testimony goes to the credibility of the witnesses and is 

solely to be resolved by the factfinder”) (citation omitted). To that end, the 

factfinder is free to believe or disregard any part of a witness’ testimony. 

Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 464 (Pa. 2019).

Here, the trial court rejected Jenkins’ weight of the evidence challenge, 

finding Williams-Smoot’s testimony was not so vague or inconsistent to be 

“unworthy of belief.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/2023, at 8. Although Jenkins 

believes there were a number of inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, the trial court was permitted to resolve these inconsistencies in 

favor of finding that the verdicts were supported by competent evidence; we 

decline his invitation to reweigh the evidence. See Commonwealth v. 

Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that “[a]n appellate 
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court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact”) (citation 

omitted); Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 270 (Pa. Super. 2021) 

(concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

appellant’s weight challenge where he merely asked this Court to assume the 

role of factfinder and reweigh the evidence in his favor). Moreover, contrary 

to Jenkins’ claim, the trial court did not utilize an incorrect standard in 

addressing his weight challenge. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/2023, at 6, 8 

(setting forth the proper standard of review for weight challenges).2 There is 

simply no support for his claim that the trial court resolved his weight claim 

by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth; to 

the contrary, the trial court expressly states that in making its determination, 

____________________________________________

2

 Jenkins also baldly asserts that the trial court “did not address the evidence 

regarding the actus reus of the crimes.” Jenkins’ Brief at 21. In so arguing,

Jenkins attempts to raise a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support his convictions. See Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 

349 (Pa. Super. 2022) (differentiating between a weight challenge and 

sufficiency claim and noting in a sufficiency claim, the appellant claims “that 

there is insufficient evidence to support at least one material element of the 

crime for which [a]ppellant has been convicted.”) (citation omitted). This 

claim is waived, however, as he not only fails to cite to any pertinent authority 

to support it, but he did not include this issue in either his Rule 1925(b) 

statement or his statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(providing that an argument should be “followed by such discussion and 

citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”), 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not 

included in the [s]tatement and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”); 2116 ( “No question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly 

suggested thereby”).
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it reviewed “all the evidence admitted at trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 

9/28/2023, at 8.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting 

Jenkins’ challenge to the weight of the evidence to support his convictions. 

We therefore affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 06/14/2024