The Honor able Samuel H. Ma y s, J r., United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the Western District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0571n.06 No. 09-1159 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA P laintif f-App ellee,

v. KEVIN STEP HENS Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COU R T F OR

TH E EAST ERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: CO LE a nd M c KEA G UE , C ir c uit Judg e s; MAYS, Distr ict Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Following in v e s ti g a ti o n s o f d r u g tr a f f ic k ingby the Sunny side Ga ngin S agina w, Mi c hig an, pr os e c uto rs ob ta ine d guil ty ple a s f ro m and c on vic tio ns a g a ins t numerous g angmembers. Ke vin Stephens pled g uilty to distributi o n o f cr ac k cocaine and w as

se nte nc e d to 26 2 mo nth s im pr iso nme nt. He no w a

pp e a ls, arguin g that th e dis tr ic t c ourt inc or re c tly char acte rized him as a car eer offe nder for the purposes of sentenc ing and failed to take into acc ount pe rt ine nt s e nte nc ingfa c tor s und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ). We fi nd th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly

c a te g or ize d St e ph e ns a s a c are e r o ff

e nd e r u nd e r t he Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s (“ Gu ide lin e s” ) a nd did not err in se ntencingStephens. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the se ntence

. I. Over the cour se of se vera l y ear s the Sunny side Gangsold crac k coca ine on the South Side (or “ Sunny side” a

rea ) of Sag inaw, Michig an. In 2005, the g overnme n t ar re s t ed, indi cted, a ndNo. 09-1159

USA v. Ste

phens

- 2 - convicted se vera l ga

ng members, a

nd in 2007 launched a

second w ave of investigations. Dur ing the

course of this second investig ation, Stephens – who appa rently joined the g angsometime that y ear – was twice involved in controlled p u rchases of c rac k coca ine. Followingthe sec ond purcha se, po lic e sto pp e d th e c ar i n w hic h St e ph e ns wa s a pa sse ng e r, and , u

po n tr ans po rt ingSte ph e ns to j a il, discovere d that Stephens was conce aling just ove r 8 g rams of cra ck coca ine in a body cavity . At the time he was a

rre sted, Stephens – who as both a juve nile and an a dult had been c onvicted of

numerous cr imes, including a rson, possession of a loaded handg un in public, possession of coc aine, attempted deliver

y of a c ontrolled substance , unlawful use of a motor vehic le, and f

leei ng and

e lud ingthe po lic e – w a s o n p aro le fr om b oth fe lony and mis de me ano r c on vic tio ns . I n November

of 2007, the g overnme nt indicted Stephens, along with nine other g ang members, on various drug char g es. Stephens himself wa s char g ed with conspiringto distribute and dis tr i b u t i n g c r a c k c o c a i n e . O n Ju l y 2 1 , 2 0 0 8 , S t e p h e n s p l e d g u i l t y t o c o u n t 2 2 o f t h e fi rs t

s u p er ce d i n g i n dictment: possession with int ent to distribute 5 or more ( in this case 11) g rams of

coca ine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a )(1) . As part of the plea a g ree ment, the g overnme nt

rec ommended that the court calc ulate Stephens’s Guidelines sentenc ing r ang e as be tween 120 a nd 15 0 mo nth s. Th e a g re e me nt a lso state d that if the c ourt de te rm ine d in ste a d th a t Ste ph e ns wa s a

c are e r o ff e nde r a nd a c c or din g ly

imp os e a hig he r s e nte nc e , th e n St e ph e ns wo uld be pe rm itt e d to wi thd ra w h is guil ty ple a and pr oc e e d to t ri a l. F oll ow ingthe c ou

rt ’s a c c e pta

nc e of Ste ph e ns ’s g uil ty ple a , th e Un ite d St a te s Pr ob a tio n O ff ic e r p re pa re d the Pr e se nte nc ing I nv e sti g a tio n Rep or t ( PSR) , in which she c oncluded that Stephens in fa ct qualified as a care er of fende r under

the Guidelines, a

nd that the Guidelines sente ncing rang e should thus be betwee n 262 and 327 months. After adoptingNo. 09-1159

USA v. Ste

phens

Stephens repe atedly

and er roneously maintains that he wa s sentence d under t h e Armed 2 Caree r C riminal Act (“ ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1). In fac t, Stephens was sente nced a s a ca ree r offe nder unde r the Sentenc ing G uidelines, U.S.S.G. §4B1.1. - 3 - this rec ommendation, the di strict court offere d Stephens an opportunity to withdraw his g uilty

plea; Ste ph e ns de c lin e d, and

ins te a d s ta te d th a t he wa s “ g oin g to g o w iththe c are e r o ff e nd e r. ” At

a hear ing on January

29, 2009, the district court sente nced Stephe ns to serve 262 months in prison. This appea l followed. II. Stephens’s first ar g ument in this appeal is that the district court er red by sentenc ing him as

a ca ree r off ender under the Sentencing Guidelines. “L eg al conclusions reg ardingapplication of the 2 United States Sentencing Guidelines ar e re viewed de novo .” Un ite d S tat es v . B as s , 315 F.3d 561, 5 6 4 -6 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Hov er , 293 F.3d 930, 933 (6th Cir. 2002)). As we have r epeatedly

considere d and re

jected Stephens’s exact argument, we find that the district court did not err in categ orizing Stephens as a car eer offe nder unde r the Guide lines. Under the Guidelines, a

defe ndant qualifies as a ca ree r off ender if: “(1) the def

endant wa s at least e ighte en y ear s old at the time the defendant commit ted t he ins tant offe nse of conviction; (2) the instant offe nse of c onviction is a felony that is either a c rime of violenc e or a contro lled

su bs tanc e of

fe ns e ; and (3 ) the de fe nd ant ha s at le a st two pr ior fe lony c on vic tio ns of

e ith e r a c ri me of violence or a controlled substanc e off ense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a ). F ollowing the r ecommendation of the PSR , the district c ourt conclude d that Stephens qualified a s a ca ree r off ender on the basis of prior convictions in 2002 for attempted delivery of cocaine and in 2003 for the Michig an cr ime ofNo. 09-1159

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Ste ph e ns app arently

be lie ve s th a t he wa s se nte nc e d und e r t he pr ov isi on

of the AC CA 3 enhanc ing se ntence s for those pr eviously convicted of

“violent fe lonies,” see 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e).

“ [ W ] e t r e a ta

‘ c r i m e o f v i o l e n c e ’ u n d e r

§ 4 B 1

. 1 ( a ) o f

t h e g u i d e l i n e s t h e s a m e a s a ‘ v i o l e n tf e l o n y’ un de r t he Ar me d Ca re e r C ri min a l A c t, 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( e )( 1)

. . . b e c a us e bo th l a

ws sh are e sse nti a lly the same de finitions (if not the same titles).” Uni te d S tat es v . F or d , 560 F.3d 420, 421 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (c itation omit ted). Unde r the ACCA: [T] he ter m “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceedingone y ear , or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or ca rry ing of a f irea rm, knife, or

destructive de vice that would be punishable by imprisonment fo r s uc h te rm

if c omm itt e d b y

an a du lt, that— (i) has a s an ele ment the use, attemp t ed use, or threatened use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another ; or - 4 - flee ing and eluding pol ice in the t hird deg ree under MCL § 750.479a. Stephens does not dispute that he wa s at least eightee n y ear s old at the time of the instant offe nse and that both his prior conviction fo r atte mpt e d d e liv e ry of c oc a ine and his pr e se nt c on vic tio n f or po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te

coca ine base constitute controlled substance offe nses. He doe s, howeve r, objec t to the

c ha ra c te ri zat ion of fl e e ing and e lud ing in the thi rd de g re e – o ne of his tw o p re dic a te fe lon ie s – a s a “cr ime of violence .” Un de r t he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s: [T] he ter m “cr i m e of violence” means a ny offe nse under

fede ral or state law, punishable by

imprisonment for a ter

m exceeding one y ear , that -- (1) ha s as an ele ment the use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of another , or (2) is burg lary

of a dw elling, a

rson, o r ex t o rt ion, involves use of explos ives, or other

wise invo l ves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another. U. S.S. G. § 4 B 1. 2( a ). F le e ingand e lud ingis d e fi ne d und e r M ic hig an la w a s f oll ow s: 3No. 09-1159

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( ii ) is b u r g la

r y , ar s o n , o r e xto rti o n , inv o lv e s u s e o f e xp lo s iv es, or otherwise involves c onduct that pre sents a ser ious potential risk of phy sical injury

to another; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B ). Th e PSR d e sc ri be d St e ph e ns ’ v iol a tio n o f M CL § 7 50 .4 79 a

a s f oll ow s: 4 This incident took pla ce on Fe bruar y 27, 2003, when Sag inaw police of fice rs wer e dispatched to a

n are a in r esponse to shots being fired. When office rs ar rived in that are a, they noticed a bur g undy

four- door vehic le which wa s also suspected in a shooting that ha d occur

red se vera l day s ear lier. Off icer s followed the vehicle a nd noticed it was oc cupied by four subjec ts. W hen off icer s attem pted to stop the ve hic le , the ve hic le sp e d up and a tte mpt e d to make a

tur n. Sub se qu e ntl y , th e ve hic le h i tt wo t re es p ri o r t o t h e d ri v er ex i t i n g t h e v eh i cl e an d b egi n n i n g t o ru n . Al t h o u gh office rs lost [ Stephens] while in pur s u i t , they found him hiding unde r a va n afte r backtr acking

. One of the passenge rs i n the vehicle was Domini que P hillips who was e i g h tm o n t h s p r e g n an tw i t h t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s b a

b y. (PSR at 14.) - 5 - A driver of a motor ve hicle who is g iven by hand, voice, emer g ency light, or siren a visual or aud ib le s ig n a l b y a p o li c e o r c o n s e r v a ti o no f f ic e r , a c ti n g in

th e la w f ul pe rf or manc e of his or he r d uty , dir e c tin g the dr ive r t o b ri nghis or he r m oto r v e hic le to a stop shall not willfull y fail to obey

that direc tion by incre asing the spee d of the vehicle, e x tinguishing the lights of the vehicle, or otherwise attempting to f lee or elude the police or conse rvation off icer

. MCL § 750.479a(1) . A driver commits the offense in the third-deg ree if the violation “re sults in a collision or acc ident,” if the violation “oc curr ed in an a rea wher e the spe ed limit is 35 miles an hour

or less,” or if the driver has a previous conviction for a ctual or attempted fourth-de g ree flee ing a nd eluding or similar misconduct. MCL§ 750.479a(3)

. 4 This is not t he first time that we have addre ssed the question of whe ther fle eing and eluding in the third deg ree under MCL § 750.479a constitutes a c rime of violenc e or violent fe lony . I n 2004,No. 09-1159

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- 6 - we c oncluded that it does for purposes of the SentencingGuidelines. Se e Un ite d Stat es v . M ar tin , 378 F.3d 578, 580 ( 6th Cir. 2004). We then determined that the re asoningin Martin applied to the analog ous car eer

criminal provisions of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Un ite d S tat es v . La Cas se , 253 F. App’ x 553, 556 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007). In 2009, howeve r, t he S upreme Court vacated and

rema nded our holding in LaCass e “for further consideration in li g ht of” Begay v. United States , 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (holding that the New Mexi co off

ense of driving under the influenc e of a lcohol was not a viol ent felony within the meaning of the ACCA) a nd Chambers v. United States , 129 S. Ct . 687 (2009) ( holding that the I llinois offe nse of f ail u re -t o -r ep o rt was not a violent fe lony within the meaningof the ACCA). LaCass e v. U nited States 129 S. Ct . 992 (2009). On r emand in LaCa sse , we c oncluded “ that neither Begay nor Cha mb e rs alters our ear lier hol ding that Michiga n’s ‘fle eing and eluding ’ statute . .

. qualifies as a viol ent felony ” under the ACCA. Un ite d S tat es v . La Cas se , 567 F.3d 763, 764 ( 6th Cir. 2009). L aCasse sought panel rehe aring and en banc r eview, both to no

a va il, and the n a g a in p e tit ion e d th e Sup re me Court to g ra nt c e rt ior ari – w hic h the Court de c lin e d to do on J anuar

y 25, 2010. LaCass e v. U

nited States , 130 S. Ct . 1311 (2010). I n Ma rti n , which g overns the que stion of whether the Michig an of

fe n s e o f flee ing a

nd eluding in the third deg ree constitutes a cr ime of violence under the Guidelines, we wrote: I n decidingwhether

an off ense a mou n t s t o a “c rime of violenc e” unde r these two tes t s , we h ave applied a “ cate g orica l approa ch,” w hich is to say we have looked at “the f act of conviction and the statutory definition of the pre dicate of fense ,” not the “under ly ing fac ts reg arding the offense,” to deter mine whether either test is satisfied. . . . Be cause flee ing a

nd eluding does not have as an e lement “the use , attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of ano t h er , ” t he per

tinent question is whe ther the offe nse “other wise involves conduct that prese nts a serious po te nti a l r isk

of ph y sic a l in

jur y to a no the r. ” We b e lie ve that it do e s.No. 09-1159

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- 7 - Ma rti n , 378 F.3d at 581-82 (numer ous citations omitted). Endorsing this c ateg orica l a pproac h, the LaCass e c o u rt a d d e d

( in th e te r ms a p p li e d in Begay and Cha mb e rs ) that the “ statute at issue her e involves ‘ag g ressive’ conduct that ‘pre sents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury ’ to another .” 567 F.3d at 767. I n short, afte r considering under the cate g orica l approa ch the f actor s that make up the Mic hig an o ff

e ns e of fl e e ingand

e lud ing in the thi rd

de g re e , w e have re pe a te dly and c on sis te ntl y he ld t hat th is o ff

e ns e is always a

c r i m e o f v i o l e n c e o r

a v i o l e n tf e l o n y. Perhaps be cause he er

roneously believes that he was se ntence d under the ACCA, Stephens focuse s in this appeal on attac king our post-rema

nd holding ( conce rning the ACCA) in LaCa sse , 567 F.3d at 764, rather

than on attacking our ear lier holding (conc erningthe Guidelines) in Ma rti n , 378 F.3d at 580. Stephens rests his challeng e to LaCa sseon tw o po int s or argume nts : fi rs t, that ou r p os trema nd LaCa ssedecision conf licts with Begay

and Cha mb e rs ; and se c on d, that the Ei g hth Cir c uit in a rec ent ca se spec ifically has re pudiated the LaCa sse rea soning. As to the first point, St ephens argues t hat when the S upreme Court vacated t he orig inal panel de cision in LaCa sse , the cour t was

“ se nd inga

me ssa g e . . . th a t LaCa ssewas out of a l i gn m en t” with Begay and Cha mb e rs . E ve n if Ste ph e n s i s c o r

r e c t l y i n t e r

p r e t i n g t h e S u

p r e m e C o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o n t o v a c a t e an d r e m an d , o u r po strema nd LaCass e de c isi on

c le arl y re pr e se nts bin din g a

uth or ity in thi s cir c uit

ho ldi ngthat Begay

and Cha mb e rs had no ef

fec t on the conclusion that flee ing a nd eluding in the third deg ree under Michig an law constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. Se e LaCa sse , 567 F.3d at 764. More

rec ently , moreove r, we have fo und that even f leeingand eva ding in the fou rth deg ree under Michig an law also constitutes a crime of violence under the ACCA. See U nited States v. Y

oung , 580No. 09-1159

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This all said, we do wish to express that we ar e somewhat conce rned w ith the direction our 5 case law has been takingby expanding, whe re the Supreme Court in Cha mb e rs and Begay instead a pp e ars to b e mov ingtow ard na rr ow ing , the de fi nit ion of “ c ri me of vio le nc e ” or

“ vio le nt f

e lon ie s” within the meaning of the Guide lines or the ACCA. - 8 - F. 3 d 3 7 3 , 3 7 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( o v er tu rn i n g United States v. Forem an , 436 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2006)), cert de nied by Young v. United States , 130 S. Ct . 1723 (2010). 5 As to his second point, while Stephens is corre ct that the Eig hth Circuit has rea ched a differ ent co n cl u s i o n i n consideringwhether a similar offe nse in Minnesota constitutes a c rime of violence, see U

nited States v. Tyler , 58 0 F .3 d 72 2, 72 6 (8 th Cir

. 20 09 ), the fa c t th a t a sis te r c ir c uit dis a g re e s w ithour c a se law d oe s n ot d e mon str a te that our law is wrong , or t hat we are fre e to ig nore circ uit prece dent. See, e .g. , Bo nn e r v . P e rry , 564 F.3d 424, 430 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Darrah v. City of O ak Pa rk, 2 5 5 F. 3 d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2001)) (“ A pane l of this Court cannot overr ule the decision of a

nother pa nel. The pr ior dec ision remains controlling authority unless an inco n s istent decision of the U nited States Supreme Court re quir es m o d i fication of the dec ision or this C ourt sittin g e n b a nc ov errule s th e pr ior de c isi on .” ). B oth

the Se ve nth

Cir c uit and the Te nth

Cir c uit , mor e ov e r, have in t

ur n e xplic itl y

de c lin e d to fo llo w the Ei g ht Cir c uit ’s le a d a nd ins te a d a g re e d w ith

our re asoning in LaCass e and Y oung . See U

nited States v. Dismuke , 5 93 F .3 d 5 82 , 5 92 n. 3, 59 6 ( 7th Cir. 2010) (“A lthough . . . the E ighth a nd the Eleve nth Circ uits have rea ched the opposite conc lusion . . . we think our colleag

ues i n the Fifth, Six th, and Tenth Circuits have the be tter of the a rg ument.”); Un ite d S tat es v . M c Con ne ll , 605 F.3d 822, 829- 30 (10th Cir. 2010). Ste ph e ns , und erstand a

bly , w ou ld p re fe r t

hat Ma rti n , LaCa sse , and Y oung had not bee n de c ide d; t hat he dis a g re e s wi th our pr e vio us ho ldi ng s, ho we ve r, sure ly do e s n ot p ro ve tha

t he sh ou ldNo. 09-1159

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Steph e n s a ls o e r

r o n e o u s ly ar g u e s th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s s e n te n c e o f St e p h e n s a s a

c are er 6 offe nder c onstitut es a “ s u b s t an t ial deviation from the guideline ra ng e,” a nd that the district court neede d to “explain how this case is sufficie ntly compelling to support a var iance of this magnitude.” I n fac t, a def

endant’ s car eer

offe nder qua lification is fac to re d into the Guidelines rang e. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) -(c )

. As the district court c orre ctly noted at sente ncing , g i v en that Stephens qualifies as a

car eer offe nder, “ [t ]he resulting guideline ra ng e . . . wo u ld come to 262 to 327 mon ths .” (R . 2 23 (1 /27 /09 Se nte nc ing Tr .) a t 8. ) I n oth e r w or ds , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t de viate from the Guide lines rang e at a ll, but ins tead se ntence d at the low end of that rang e. Stephens conc edes that the district court aske d his trial attorney whet h er the re w ere any 7 objections, and that the trial attorney responde d that there wer e none. N onetheless, Stephens a rg ues that we should re view for abuse of discretion rather than pla in error beca use the district cour

t did not ask Ste ph e ns him se lf whether

Stephens had a

ny objections, and so Stephens did not have an opportunity to object. Stephens c ites no authority for the pr oposition t hat a de fenda nt’s attorney

does not repre sent the def

endant f or the purpose of making objections. I n t h i s instance, more over, the district court ac tually asked w hether there wer e “[a]ny

questions or objections to the sentenc e from - 9 - preva il i nth is c a s e . A c c o r d in g ly , w e f in d th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id

n o t e r r in c o n c lu d in g th a t t

he Michig an off

ense of third-deg ree flee ing a

nd eluding constitutes a “c rime a violenc e” w ithin the meaningof U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, a nd th er ef o re c orre ctly

cate g orized Stephens as a c are er of fende r

un de r t he Se nte nc ing

Gu ide lin e s. III . Stephens next ar g ues that the district c ourt err ed by failing to take into a ccount h i s ag e, absenc e of pr evious g un char g es, and minor roles in pre vious crimes whe n consideringsentenc ing fac tors under 18 U. S .C. § 3553(a), a nd that as a r esult his sentence is procedur ally unrea sonable. 6 Ordinar ily , we review se ntence s under a “def ere ntial abuse-of

-discre tion standard.” Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). As S t ep h en s failed to objec t on these g rounds bef ore the district

c o u rt, h o w e v e r , w e r e v ie w St e p h e n s ’ s s e n te n c e f o r p la in e rror . S

ee United States v. Vonne r , 516 F .3 d 3 82 , 3 85 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (e n b anc ). Pla in e rr or re vie w i nv olv e s f

our p ro ng s: 7No. 09-1159

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the defendant .” (1/29/09 Sentencing Tr. at 14 ( emphasis adde d).) Stephens, in other words, did have the opportunity

to object, but chose not to do so. - 10 - First, ther e must be an e rror or def ect – some sor

t of “[d] eviation from a leg al rule”

– that has not been intentionally relinquished or a

bandoned . . . . Sec ond, the leg al err or must be clea

r or obvious, rather than subject t o rea sonable dispute. Third, the e rr or mus t ha ve a ff e c te d the a

pp e lla nt' s su bs tanti a l r ig hts , w hic h in

the or din ary

c a se means he must de m o n strate that it “a ffe cted the outc ome of the district c ourt proce eding s.” Puck ett v. United States , --- U.S.

--- -, 129 S.Ct . 1423, 1429 (2009). F ourth, if these thre e prong s are satis fi ed , t hen the c ourt “ha s the discretion to remedy the er ror – discr etion which oug ht to be exercised only

if the er ror ‘ seriously

aff ect[s] the fa irness, integ rity or public re putation of judicial proce eding s.’” Id. (empha sis in original). I n r e vie wi nga

c ourt ’s se nte nc ingde c isi on , we l oo k to wh e the r t he se nte nc e wa s b oth proce durally

and substantively

rea sonable. See United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). As a within-the-Guidelines sentenc e, Stephens’s sentenc e “enjoy s a rebuttable presumption of re asonable ness.” See U nited States v. Lay , 5 8 3 F. 3 d 4 3 6 , 4 4 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Vonner , 516 F.3d at 389-90); see also Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). As the Supreme Court has explained, in reviewinga sente nce, w e: must first ensure that the dis t ri ct court committ ed no sig nificant proc edura l error , such as f ailing to c alculate (or imprope rly calc ulating) the Guidelines rang e, tre ating t h e G u i d el i n es as m an d at o ry , fa i l i n g t o c o n s i d er t h e § 3 5 5 3 (a ) f

ac t o rs , s el ec t i n g a sentenc e base d on clea

rly err oneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenc e – including an explanation for a ny deviation from the G uidelines rang e. Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. at 50 -5 1 ( c itatio n o mit te d) . 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ) “ te lls the se nte nc ingjud g e to

c on sid e r (1 ) of

fe ns e and of

fe nd e r c ha

ra c te ri sti c s; (2 ) the ne e d f

or a se nte nc e to r e fl e c t th e ba sic a imsNo. 09-1159

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- 11 - of sentenc ing, na

mely (a) ‘just punishment’ (retr ibution), (b) deterre nce, ( c) inc apac itation, (d) reha b i l i t at i o n ; (3) the se ntence s leg ally available ; (4) the Sentenc ing G uidelines; (5) Sentenc ing Commi ssion policy

statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarr anted dispar ities; and (7) the ne ed for restitution.” Ri ta , 551 U.S. at 347-48. “The district court is not require d to refe r ex plicitly to eac h of the statutory

sentenc ing f

actor s when imposing a

sentenc e.” United States v. Simmons , 587 F.3d 3 4 8 , 3 5 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . M orris , 448 F.3d 929, 932 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). That said, the di strict judge “must ‘make an indi vidualized assessment base d on the fa cts prese nted,’ a nd must discuss all relevant statutory fac tors to fac ilitate ‘rea sonable a ppellate r eview.’ ” Id. (citing Ga ll , 55 2 U .S. 38 ; Mo rri

s , 448 F.3d at 932). Duri ngthe se nte nc ing he ari ng , the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d th is t o s a

y re g ard ingthe 35 53 (a ) f

a c tor s: As c ouns e l have bo th ind ic a te d, the g uid e lin e s that we have sp e nt a g oo d d e a l of

tim e wi th a re , in de e d, a dv iso ry . T he y ’r e a fa c tor to b e c on sid e re d b y

the c ourt

. We have a lso c onsidered e ach of the 3553(a ) fa ctors, par

ticularly the g ravity

of the offe nse; clea

rly in this i nstance , t h e gentleman’ s persona l criminal history weig hs heavily in the balanc e. And the se ntence is a lso sig nificantly aff ecte d by the cour

t’s consideration of the nec essity for pr otection of the public. This ge ntleman has be en involved in cr iminal mis conduct, by my view, since he wa s 13 y ear s of age

. Despite sig nificant run- ins with the criminal justice sy stem, litt le has aff ecte d his behavior. This ge ntleman, on the other hand, duringhis tenure with the bur eau is in nee d of both educa

tional and vocational training . Indeed, that will be a re commendation that is made to the bure au. Pursuant to the S entenc ing Reform Act of 1984, and in consideration of each of the 3553(a) fac tors, the g entleman will be committed to the custody of the United States B ur e a u o f P ri so ns fo r a

te rm of 26 2 mo nth s. (R. 224 (1/29/09 Sentencing Tr.) at 12.)No. 09-1159

USA v. Ste

phens

- 12 - The district cour

t’s explanation of the 3553(a) fac tors, while brief, is le g ally sufficie nt. A s the Supreme Court e x plained in Ri ta , 551 U.S. at 356-57, The sente ncing judge should se t f orth enoug h to satisfy the appellate court that he

. . . has a r easone d basis for e x erc ising his own leg al decisionmaking a uthority

. . . . Un le ss a pa rt y c onte sts the Gu ide lin e s se nte nc e g e ne ra lly un de r § 35 53 (a ) –

that is argues that the Guidelines ref lect an unsound judgme nt, or, for e x ample, that they do not ge nera lly treat c erta in de fenda nt c hara cter istics in the proper way – or ar g ues for depar ture, the judg e norma lly

need sa y no more. We have in the past found no abuse of discre tion where a trial judg e addr essed the 3553( a) f actor s in a “t er se” ma

nner, use d “g ener ic lang uag e to desc ribe the de fenda nt’s crimes,” and “w ithout elabor ation char ac terize[d] the ‘nature a nd circ umstances’ of the off enses a s ‘serious.’” See Simmons , 5 8 7 F. 3 d at 3 5 9 (c i t i n g Vonner , 516 F.3d at 392). As we e x plained in Simmons , “[i] n light of the judg e’s br evity , such analy sis is short of i deal in assuring this court that the trial judg e in fa ct did his full duty . On its own, howeve r, it surely does not overc ome the def ere n ce we must acc ord lower c ourts in sentencingcriminal def endants.” Id. Her e, fac ing no objection from Stephens, the district court in sentenc ing Stephe ns expl icitly mentioned that it w as considering Stephens’ cr iminal history , “ea ch of the 3553(a) fac tors, particula rly the g ravity

of the off ense,” the fa ilure of pa st runins with the law to reha

bilitate Stephens, and Stephens’s ne ed for “educ ational and voc ational training ”. While it could have addr essed t h e 3 5 5 3(a) fac tors at g reater leng th, the district court simply did not “devia[te] from a leg al rule,” and so did not commit any err or – much less plain e rror . Se e Pu c k e tt , 129 S. Ct . at 1429.No. 09-1159

USA v. Ste

phens

- 13 - IV. As we have consistently reje cted St ephens’ s argument that the Michig an cr ime of flee ing a nd eluding in the third deg ree is not a “cr ime of vi olence ” withi n the m eaning of the Guide lines, we find that the district co u rt did not err in cha rac terizing Stephens a s a ca ree r off ender . As the district court’s a naly sis of the 3553(a) fac tors, while brief , was suff icient, we also find that the district court did not err in se ntencing Stephens and that Stephens’s sentenc e was not proce durally unrea sonable. Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM the district court’s se ntence

.