J-S23010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

ADAM BOATWRIGHT, JR.

Appellee No. 1487 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered November 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0001008-2020

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2022

The Commonwealth appeals from an order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of York County granting a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint 

against Appellee, Adam Boatwright, Jr. pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Based 

on our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Carl, —A.3d—, 2022 WL 

1397689 (Pa. Super., May 4, 2022), we hold that the trial court erred by 

refusing to exclude from its Rule 600 calculation a 74-day period that fell 

under a York County judicial emergency declaration in response to the 

pandemic. Since exclusion of this time period defeats Appellee’s Rule 600 

motion, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

On December 8, 2019, a criminal complaint was filed charging Appellee 

with driving under the influence of alcohol. A preliminary hearing was 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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scheduled for January 21, 2020 but was continued to February 18, 2020. 

Appellee failed to appear at his preliminary hearing, and the magisterial 

district justice sent a request for a bench warrant to the court. A formal 

arraignment was scheduled for March 20, 2020, but Appellee entered a waiver 

of arraignment. A pretrial conference was scheduled for June 18, 2020, but 

on May 27, 2020, it was cancelled due to the pandemic. The May 27, 2020 

notice of cancellation stated, “Due to ongoing pandemic precautions your Pretrial Conference has been cancelled and will not be rescheduled.” 

In a series of orders, our Supreme Court declared Pennsylvania courts 

closed for the period between March 16, 2020 and June 1, 2020 due to the 

pandemic and suspended Rule 600 during this period. 

On May 27, 2020, the President Judge of the York County Court of 

Common Pleas, the Honorable Joseph Adams, issued a Covid-related judicial 

emergency declaration (“Declaration” or “Judge Adams’ Declaration”) from 

May 27, 2020 through August 31, 2020. The Declaration provided in relevant 

part:

Per the Supreme Court’s Order dated May 27, 2020, authorizing 

President Judges to declare judicial emergencies in their judicial 

districts, I declare a judicial emergency in the 19th Judicial District 

through August 31, 2020. During the emergency, the following 

shall apply:

. . .

(3) Suspend statewide rules pertaining to the rulebased right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial.
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Any postponement caused by the judicial emergency shall be 

considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable 

time for purposes of the application of Rule 600. . .

Id.

At the Commonwealth’s request, a pre-trial conference was scheduled 

for November 23, 2020. Appellee failed to appear at his pre-trial conference, 

and a bench warrant was issued. On May 17, 2021, Appellee was brought in 

on the bench warrant. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that 

the status hearing would be scheduled by the trial judge’s chambers. A status 

conference was not scheduled until September 16, 2021, when the prosecutor 

contacted the trial judge’s chambers and asked for a status hearing. 

A status hearing was scheduled for September 28, 2021. During this 

hearing, Appellee’s attorney moved for dismissal of the case under Rule 600. 

She later filed a written motion seeking dismissal.

On November 3, 2021, the court held a hearing on the Rule 600 motion

and granted the motion. The Commonwealth timely appealed to this Court, 

and both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

The Commonwealth raises a single issue in this appeal:

1. The trial court erred in granting [Appellee’s] motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Specifically, the trial court erred in 

not including in its excludable delay calculations the time periods 

designated in the multiple judicial order signed by the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court and signed by the then-President 

Judge Adams suspending the statewide rules pertaining to the 

rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial. Factoring 

in this time, the Commonwealth was within its adjusted 

mechanical date for Rule 600 and the trial court erred in granting 

[Appellee’s] motion.
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Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

When presented with a speedy trial claim arising under Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, our standard of review is well settled.

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial 

court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, 

as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record 

of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the 

[trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is 

not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule 

[600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection 

of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of 

society. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy 

trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's 

right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain 

those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. 

However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not 

designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith 

prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial 

rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner 

consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In 

considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor into 

the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 

accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law 

enforcement as well.
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Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370 (Pa. Super. 2018). The 

Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, 

that it acted with due diligence throughout the proceedings. Commonwealth 

v. Kearse, 890 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Rule 600 provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written 

complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from 

the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In 

computing the Rule 600 deadline, however, we do not necessarily count all 

time following the filing of the complaint. Rather, “periods of delay at any 

stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the 

Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the 

computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods 

of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

The Rule 600 analysis entails three steps:

First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. Second, we 

determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 

600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the 

mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.

If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the 

due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([D]). As we have 

explained, Rule 600[] encompasses a wide variety of 

circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the 

control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the 

Commonwealth’s lack of diligence. Any such period of delay 

results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[] 

extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600 

run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to 

trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss 

the charges.
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Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956–57 (Pa. Super. 2017).

The mechanical run date in this case was December 8, 2020. The court 

found that four periods of time were excludable from the Rule 600 calculation,

1

making the adjusted run date October 2, 2021. The court held that dismissal 

was necessary under Rule 600 because (1) the Commonwealth failed to bring 

this case to trial as of November 3, 2021, the date of the Rule 600 hearing 

(one month past the adjusted run date calculated by the court), and (2) the 

Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in prosecuting the case. 

Notably, the court rejected the Commonwealth’s request to exclude the 

period between June 19, 2020 and August 31, 2020 pursuant to Judge Adams’ 

declaration that the judicial emergency in York County ran through August 31. 

Had the court agreed to exclude this time, Appellee’s Rule 600 motion would 

have been unsuccessful, because the adjusted run date would have been in 

mid-December 2021, more than one month after the Rule 600 hearing. The 

court gave two reasons for refusing to exclude this time. First, Appellee was 

only entitled to a non-jury trial because his maximum sentence was six 

____________________________________________

1 The first two periods were delays caused by Appellee—specifically, 28 days 

between January 21, 2020 and February 18, 2020 when Appellee continued 

his preliminary hearing and 176 days between November 23, 2020 and May 

17, 2021 when Appellee failed to appear on his bench warrant. The third 

period was between March 17, 2020 and June 1, 2020, when Rule 600 was 

suspended due to the Supreme Court’s emergency orders. The fourth period 

between June 1, 2020 to June 18, 2020 was excludable due to the cancellation 

of the pre-trial conference due to the pandemic. None of these time periods 

are at issue in this appeal.
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months. Since eleven other non-jury cases were scheduled for trial between 

June 19 and August 31, the Commonwealth could have brought the present 

case to trial during this period. Statement Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, 

1/11/22, at 7-8. Second, the May 27, 2020 notice of cancellation stated that 

Appellee’s pre-trial conference “has been cancelled and will not be 

rescheduled,” yet after August 31, 2020, the Commonwealth repeatedly 

scheduled Appellee’s case for status conferences instead of trial. Id. at 6-7.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the court erred by declining to 

exclude the 74 days in question from its Rule 600 calculation. Based on our 

recent opinion in Carl, we answer this question in the affirmative. 

Carl is almost a carbon copy of the present case. There, as in this case, 

the Commonwealth appealed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York 

County dismissing a criminal prosecution under Rule 600. Like the present

case, (1) the York County court denied the Commonwealth’s request to 

exclude a 63-day period (June 29, 2020 to August 31, 2020) on the basis of 

President Judge Adams’ Declaration, and (2) the court found that the 

Commonwealth could have brought the case to trial because fifteen other nonjury trials had taken place during this period.

Carl held that the trial court erred by refusing to exclude the 63-day 

period in disregard of the plain language of Judge Adams’ Declaration:

Construing Subsection (3) [of the Declaration] in accordance with 

the plain meaning of its words, we find that it clearly and simply 

directs that rule-based, “prompt trial” time computations are 

suspended for the duration of the judicial emergency at hand. The 
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intended effect on Rule 600 computations in criminal cases 

existing at that time is thus evident: such computations are to be 

held in abeyance and shall not include days transpiring during the 

effective time of the Declaration until the expiration of the 

declared emergency, at which time resumption or commencement 

of such computations may proceed.

As for the separate and final paragraph of the Declaration, we do 

not agree with Mr. Carl’s position that it limits Subsection 3’s 

suspension of prompt trial rules to only those instances where 

postponements occurred. Rather, the final paragraph states, “Any 

postponement caused by the judicial emergency shall be 

considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable 

time for purposes of the application of Rule 600.” 

Reading the Declaration as a whole leads to the conclusion that 

the final paragraph serves as a supplement to Subsection (3) that 

extends the Rule 600 exception therein to postponements “caused 

by” the judicial emergency, which would thus include even those 

consequential postponements occurring after the expiration of the 

emergency.

Given the uncertainties of the covid pandemic’s course, it was 

reasonable to anticipate that the judicial emergency would have 

downstream effects, such as the possible creation of a protracted 

criminal case backlog. Upon the eventual expiration of the 

declared emergency, however, Subsection (3)’s time computation 

suspension would expire with it. 

The prospective posture of the Declaration’s final paragraph, 

however, addresses this potential void by providing an ongoing, 

explicit, local policy in those cases that continue to experience 

postponements stemming from the judicial emergency even after 

the emergency state, itself, has been lifted.

The final paragraph, therefore, functions as a judicial response to 

the anticipated need for fair time computation and case 

management demands in the wake of any emergency-caused 

postponement, occurring either during or after the emergency. It 

does not, however, in any discernable way limit the immediate, 

preemptive, and plain mandate in Subsection (3) to suspend 

statewide rules pertaining to the rights of criminal defendants to 

a prompt trial “during the emergency.”
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As such, we find that the 60-day time period in question should 

have been excluded from the Rule 600 time computation in Mr. 

Carl’s case. The proper consequence of this exclusion would have 

been the extension of his adjusted run date to December 6, 2021, 

and thus would have obviated the need for an inquiry into the 

Commonwealth’s due diligence in bringing him to trial in 

compliance with Rule 600(C).

It was error for the trial court to reach the due diligence inquiry 

where the adjusted run date had not yet lapsed. Indeed, for the 

trial court to conclude that due diligence required the 

Commonwealth to take upon itself the task of adding back time to 

Mr. Carl's time computation that the Judicial Emergency 

Declaration so plainly excluded by virtue of Subsection (3) was 

error.

Id., 2022 WL 1397689, at *5-6. 

This analysis is binding upon us in the present case. The plain language 

of Judge Adams’ Declaration requires exclusion of all time between June 18, 

2020 and August 31, 2020. This holds true even though other non-jury trials 

took place during this time period and even though the Commonwealth 

scheduled this case for another pretrial conference after the May 27, 2020 

notice instead of for trial. The proper consequence of this exclusion should 

have been extension of Appellee’s adjusted run date to mid-December 2021 

and thus obviated any need for an inquiry into the Commonwealth’s due 

diligence in bringing him to trial in compliance with Rule 600(C). 

Because the court erred by failing to exclude this time period, and 

because its exclusion defeats Appellee’s Rule 600 motion, we vacate the order 

dismissing this case and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

memorandum.
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Order vacated. Remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/06/2022