lationsl Buresm 01 v »< " JUL 1 0 1974

7HO160

The Public Need and the Role of the Inventor

Proceedings of a Conference

held in Monterey, California

June 11-14, 1973

Edited by

Florence Essers and Jacob Rabinow

Office of Invention and Innovation

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Frederick B. Dent, Secretary

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Richard W. Roberts, Director

1%

3%%

Issued May 1974
Library of Congress Catalog Number: 73-600324

National Bureau of Standards Special Publication 388

Nat. Bur. Stand. (U.S.), Spec. Publ. 388, 215 pages (May 1974)

CODEN: XNBSAV

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1974

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

(Order by SD Catalog No. C13. 10: 388). Price $5.55.

Stock Number 0303-01261
Abstract

This book presents the proceedings of the Conference on the Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, held at Monterey, Calif., on June 11-14, 1973. The conference, based on a recommendation of the National Inventors Council, was sponsored by the Office of Invention and Innovation, Institute for Applied Technology, under a grant from the Experimental Technology Incentives Program, NBS. The pur- pose of the conference was to study the climate for invention and how to make it one in which America's

inventors can flourish for the common good. Eighteen invited papers were presented. In addition, the proceedings includes statements from the chairmen of the three sessions: Charles S. Draper, Jacob

Rabinow, and Myron Coler. The proceedings are divided into three sessions with an edited version of the

floor discussions following the papers. Following the presentation of papers, the participants of the con- ference separated into six workshop panels. Their recommendations are presented at the end of this volume.

Key words: Antitrust doctrine; employed inventors; entrepreneurship; innovation; invention; needs of

society; new enterprises; Patent Office; patent system; technological policy making; technology.

Ill
Foreword

The Conference on the Public Need and the Role of the Inventor was based on a recommendation by the

National Inventors Council to the Secretary of Commerce, and was made possible by a grant from the Experimental Technology Incentives Program of the National Bureau of Standards.

The ETIP program was initiated in fiscal year 1973 as part of the President's program to stimulate

technological innovation for the solution of national problems. The objective of the program is to learn how

the Federal Government can provide policies and incentives which will encourage greater technological innovation in the private sector. The recommendation of the National Inventors Council also arose from the Council's concern about the

technological problems facing our Nation: increasing international competition, dwindling productivity,

massive environmental problems, and the necessity for improving the quality of life for its citizens.

The Council felt that the challenge is to revitalize our capacity for beneficial technological innovation,

strengthening our industries at home and bolstering our trade position abroad.

Yet, the Council recognized that there is considerable difference of opinion about the value of the patent

system and about the processes of invention and innovation. Nor do we know enough about the barriers that

impede the conception and nurture of new ideas and their development into new products and processes.

We need to know more about what the climate for invention is and how to make it one in which America's

inventors can flourish for the common good.

The Conference was organized to bring together experts in the fields of invention and innovation to present their views on these problems, with the hope of educating those not familiar with the issues involved, of stimulating further interest and discussion, and of recommending action in those instances where

action is called for, "and studies to be made in those areas where further information is most urgently

needed.

The National Bureau of Standards is pleased to present the Proceedings of the Conference on the Public

Need and the Role of the Inventor. Publication of this text expresses our appreciation to the participants

and to all those who contributed to make this a successful conference.

Jacob Rabinow, Chief

Office of Invention and Innovation

F. Karl Willenbrock, Director

Institute for Applied Technology

IV
Preface

The purpose of this conference was to examine the economic and social effects of invention and innovation, and the ways in which they are influenced by selected legal and institutional structures.

The conference also addressed itself to the inventor's contribution to the invention and innovation

process, comparing the roles played by independent and employed inventors. The foreseeable trends in policies and practices affecting the inventor were also examined.

The conference was attended by representatives from Government, industry, universities, research institutes, trade associations, and the patent bar.

Following the presentation of the papers, the conferees participated in six panels on the following subjects: — The Role of the Patent System — The Role of Industry — The Role of Government — The Role of the Educational System — The Role of the Independent Inventor — The International Aspect

The recommendations of the panel workshops follow the papers in this volume.

One of the main topics of concern to the conference was the recent deterioration of the regard held for the

patent system. The Panel on the Role of the Patent System made recommendations with a view toward

strengthening the patent system and Patent Office procedures, and toward preventing the erosion of the

validity of patents in the courts.

The conferees were also concerned with the lack of uniformity in Government patent policy, and the

problem of Government retention of patents. The Panels on Government, Industry and Education each

recommended that the Government adopt a uniform patent policy, and that it should not retain patent rights

to inventions resulting from Government-supported work, but only retain a license to practice for Government use, thus releasing inventions for further development and public use. The role of the employed inventor was discussed in several papers, the systems of employee compensation in other countries being presented by Dr. Neumeyer. While recognizing that many companies in the

United States have an enlightened policy toward encouraging and rewarding inventors they employ, the

Panel on Industry recommended that national guidelines should be established that could be adapted to individual circumstances in those companies that do not have such a policy. A minority report was submitted

by Robert Kuntz of the American Society of Professional Engineers.

The Panel on the Role of the Independent Inventor recommended that more information be developed on what knowledge and services are needed by inexperienced inventors, and that Government procurement practices encourage inventions by independent inventors. They also counseled against changing

present patent practices which are favorable to the independent inventor.

V
The role of the university in training innovators was examined by the Panel on Education, and several

recommendations were made: — that Government-financed fellowship programs be set up to encourage creative engineering — that more innovation centers be created at or near universities — that funds be set up for research and development activities in areas of critical national needs — that industry internship experience be encouraged — that some provision be made for continuing education for engineers

The international aspects of patents and incentives for inventors were discussed by the sixth panel. The

panel felt that every effort should be made to develop a world patent system, with the exception that the

"first-to-invent" system should be retained in the United States. It was further recommended that the

United States participate in international conventions related to inventors or patents, and that continuing

studies be made on matters pertaining to patents and innovation, both in the United States and the rest of

the world.

Other studies, too, were recommended by the panels on matters on which they felt there is insufficient

data: — A study of changing attitudes of the courts over recent decades with respect to patents — Organization of seminars with Federal Judges with respect to the patent system — A study of Patent Office fee structure — A study on the economic benefits of the patent system — A study by the Patent Office as to what is involved in "quality review" — A study on the patent-antitrust relationship — A study on whether the independent inventor should get tax incentives, and financial, technical and administrative help — A study to illuminate concentrated areas of technological research and development by competitive

countries in the world market — A collection and dissemination of information on the importance of inventors and the patent system to the national well-being.

The editors of this book would like to thank the members of the program committee: Drs. C. E. Anagnostopoulos, M. Coler, C. S. Draper, N. Kapany and J. Stedman; and Mrs. D. Blackmon, Miss C. Crosby, R.

B. Johnson and Mrs. S. R. Torrence of the arrangements and finance committee. Additional thanks go to the

session chairmen: C. S. Draper, of the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc., and M. Coler of New York

University. Special thanks are due to Mrs. Sandra Wean and Mrs. Muriel Nichols for typing the manuscript

and to Ms. Rebecca Morehouse and Ms. Miriam Oland for production of these proceedings using modern

electronic typesetting techniques.

Jacob Rabinow

Florence Essers

VI
Contents Page

Foreword IV

Preface v

SESSION T Chairman: C. S. Draper

Opening Remarks

C. S. Draper 1

Inventions, Innovations, and Incentives

Betsy Ancker-Johnson 5

Discussion 9

An Economist Looks at the Patent System

R. D. Tollison 11

Discussion 14

Trends in Technological Policy Making

D. V. De Simone 17

Discussion 20

New Enterprise Generation

R. S. Morse 23

Discussion 29

Inventor-Entrepreneurship and National Priorities

N. Kapany 31

Discussion 36

Invention and Innovation in the University

J. Adams 37

Discussion 43

The Invention of the Transistor— An Example of "Creative-Failure Methodology"

W. B. Shockley 47

Discussion 88

SESSION II Chairman: J. Kabinow

Opening Remarks

J. Rabinow 9j

Antitrust Doctrine vs. the Individual Inventor: Friend or Foe?

J. Stedman 93

Discussion 99

The Inventor in a Changing World of Patents

A. R. Whale 103

VII
Page The Role of the Patent Office in the Process of Invention and Innovation

E. J. Brenner Ill

Discussion 115

U.S. Patent System: Fraud on the Inventor and the Public (and What Can Be Done About It) I.Kayton 119

Discussion 126

NBS and the Inventive Process

R.W.Roberts 131

SESSION III Chairman: M. Coler

Opening Remarks

M. Coler 137

The Inventive Process — Where Does It Need Stimulation?

W. B. McLean 139

Discussion 142

The Employed Inventor and the Corporation

C. E. Anagnostopoulos 145

Discussion 149

The Institutions and Environment for Inventors in IBM

D. De Witt 153

Discussion 156

The Role of the Inventor in an Industrial Laboratory

J. Rajchman 159

Discussion 164

Systems to Stimulate Employee-Inventions in Europe

F. Neumeyer 167

A European Perspective of the Inventor Ecology

H. Romanus 175

Discussion 182

SESSION IV

WORKSHOP PANELS ON RECOMMENDATIONS AND QUESTIONS

FOR FURTHER STUDY

The Role of the Patent System

J. Stedman, Chairman 185

VIII
Page The Role of Industry

C. E. Anagnostopoulos, Chairman 187

The Role of Government

W. B. McLean, Chairman 189

The Role of the Educational System

W. Bollay, Chairman 190

The Role of the Independent Inventor

S. Ruben and B. Walker, Chairmen 191

The International Aspect

J. Rabinow, Chairman 191

Participants 192

Appendix A. The Inventor— His Motivations and Society

S. Ruben 195

Appendix B. Excerpts from F. Neumeyer, The Employed Inventor in the United States,

MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971 198

IX

SESSION I-June 11, 1973

Opening Remarks

C. S. Draper*

Civilization is the crowning achievement that humanity has built up slowly and painfully during long

ages of effort. There is no retreat for mankind from

this way of life, a way that depends upon artificial

modifications in the environment. The essential

changes from natural states have always been forced

by individuals, groups and organizations from basic

motivations to realize situations with reduced un- pleasantness in living and improved compatibility

with the desires and needs of human beings. The

complex of activities and resources devoted to providing means for accomplishing desired results

by altering natural situations is called Technology.

It is generally true that accepted benefits often have

their price in effects on the environment that are incidental, undesired and damaging. When

troublesome results become too difficult, Remedial

Technology is required to keep environmental conditions within tolerable limits. Thus, the benefits from

automobiles for purposes of transportation are ac- companied by undesired air pollution that may be

held to acceptable levels by applying "smog-control"

technology to engines or by difficult-for-the-publicto-accept severe restrictions on the use of automobiles.

History tells that many civilizations have come

into existence primarily on the basis of new

technology, and have advanced beyond the levels

current in competing countries. Situations of this

kind have sometimes developed great nations and

powerful empires that exercised strong influences on the progress of mankind. In several instances

recorded by history, high achievement and recognition were followed by disaster because the beneficial

technology used for generating great strength was

not accompanied by effective remedial technology.

Thus, urban technology made great cities possible,

butVemedial technology was not advanced to levels

thatVrovided capabilities for preventing sickness

and starvation, for sanitation, for good transportation, for reliable food supplies and for effective

'Chairman of National Inventors Council

defense against the armies of rival powers. Another

basic problem of political entities, such as the

Roman Empire, was communication and transportation over great distances. Rome's empire disintegrated because the remedial technologies of rapid

communication and fast transportation were lacking

and civilization suffered a severe setback that lasted

for several centuries.

Material and spiritual desires and needs of mankind are not absolute but continually change as

travel and developments of technology modify local

environments. Bathrooms with clean water and good

sanitary equipment are today regarded as necessities, while even three or four generations ago much

less convenient facilities were generally regarded as adequate. Today, almost all homes have electric

light and power, telephones, radio, television, and

one or more automobiles — things that within a few

decades have passed from desired conveniences or

luxuries for a relatively few people of affluence to generally recognized needs for everybody. Artificial

alterations of natural circumstances by the use of

technology are fundamental to all civilizations. The

extent of these modifications varies with the level of

sophistication in the societies involved and the cli- matic conditions under which they exist. Technological devices are much more apparent in, for example, London, than on the island of Tahiti. Progress in

new developments, as desires develop strength to become needs, and as requirements for remedial

technology build up when more benefits from artificial changes are accepted, comes faster for civilizations with high levels of technology than for societies

existing closer to the state of nature. Progress for the

United States of America as it achieved world

leadership has always depended upon spiritual

strength, rational thinking, creativity and the ability

to develop, innovate and generally apply technology

to the desires and needs of society.

Motivations for the complex of activities that combine to form the functional chains of technology

come from ideas that have transformed from desires

1
to needs by interactions among the individuals who

make up society. Needs include the essentials for

generally comfortable survival, for reasonably

pleasant levels of spiritual and recreational wellbeing and for stimulating events and projects under

consideration or in progress able to command interest and favorable reactions from large enough

numbers of citizens to provide significant political

power in support. The inherent nature of these

needs is determined by the course taken by mankind

as civilization developed on the basis of capabilities

provided by technology. Maintenance of benefits

and progress toward ever-more-agreeable living for

everybody depends on the continued practice of existing benefits and advances in means to realize

remedial measures for reducing undesired effects to tolerable levels. This background of circumstances

makes it certain that technology will remain a primary concern and activity of mankind as long as needs

are determined by the ways of civilization.

Technology, already developed and in operational

use, may be kept in service by persons trained in

routine maintenance of operating systems, but

progress requires knowledge of real-world circumstances, imagination of desirable results and un- derstanding of all the phases of technology as- sociated with transforming novel ideas into benefits

for significant numbers of human beings. The overall

process of realizing benefits from new concepts is called Innovation. Many activities are involved, including: engineering, testing, production design,

promotion, manufacture, selling, distribution, ser- vice, etc. All of these phases can be carried out by

people with routine education-and training using

material produced by manufacturing operations on

the basis of information presented in routine patterns. It is also true that compensation for the ser- vices rendered is adequately provided by the conventional forms for transferring value, such as wages, salaries, stocks, bonds, dividends, options,

etc. This means that all components of the innovation process, except the all-important sine qua non

initial phase of creative imagination, are provided for

by the ordinary workings of the business, industrial

and financial communities.

Innovation cannot meet the desires and needs of

society unless inputs defining problems of today and

tomorrow that are important to society are clearly

understood. The essential input from creativity oc- curs when inventors conceive and demonstrate

feasibility of novel, practical means for providing

2

benefits to society. Unless this beginning phase is present to start new developments, progress will cease. Ideas essential for the germination of pioneering technology come from one source — creative individuals with the special talents that make them

capable of becoming inventors.

Invention and its various inter-relationships to the

environment are different in various ways from all the other component activities that make up

technology. Four of these ways are mentioned here

for the purposes of discussion: (1) Without the

availability of fundamentally new concepts,

imagined and revealed by an inventor or group of inventors in forms adapted for starting new activities,

significant advances in technology will not occur. (2)

Benefits for all the persons of society can be realized

only when inventors reveal the essential information

from which novel developments of pioneering

technology can be derived. If information of this

kind exists but is completely withheld by the inventors, the situation is as if no new idea had appeared.

(3) Information existing but held secret by inventors

except for their own limited operations cannot serve

as the basis for general benefits to society. In

general, restrictions on ideas and pertinent data will

not lead to the broad benefits for society that would

be possible with complete cooperation from inventors. (4) Once the novel information associated with an invention or inventions is revealed, it is similar to water poured from a bucket on desert sands. Unrevealed information is like water in a bucket; it is under control. Once information is generally

revealed, it is beyond control just as water poured on

sand cannot be returned to the bucket.

Because advancing technology is essential for the

maintenance and progress of civilization, a fundamental need of society is invention, the necessary

element for the genesis of all pioneering technology.

It follows that the inventor plays an indispensable

role in the survival and advancement of human

society. Because of this fact, society has a primary

obligation to protect inventors and encourage their

creative contributions to technology.

There is no way that the ordinary operations of the

marketplace naturally and directly reward inventors

for the values their ideas and results have created.

Once the pertinent information on an invention is made available to everybody, the inventor has no

directly effective hold on his contribution and cannot

expect ordinary business operations to provide him

with income. To avoid this unfair situation and to en-
courage creativity, it is important to make special ar- rangements for compensating inventors in return for

their revolutions of ideas with significant potential

for benefiting society. Rewards to meet this special

objective are based not only on the notion of fairness

to inventors but also on the establishment of a compensation system strong enough to attract effective

attention from creative individuals toward the

problems of improving technological benefits to

society.

The desirability of including special protection

and rewards for inventors based on the unique and

essential nature of their contributions to society and

the fact that when significant information is revealed

the natural "marketplace" value of the information

disappears, caused many nations of earth to establish patent systems. In particular, as one of the

fundamental principles of its national policy and law,

the new United States of America established a system to protect inventors and encourage invention

that has been a major factor in its long climb toward

leadership among nations of earth.

The current state of affairs associated with inventors and the patent system is the primary subject for

discussion by this conference. I am sure that en- lightenment on existing situations and prospects for

the future will develop as papers from our distinguished members are presented. My best wishes go

with all of you.

3

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

Inventions, Innovations, and Incentives

Betsy Ancker-Johnson

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology

The Government has a responsibility to transfer the results of its research and development activities

to wider use in the private sector. Last year, in the President's Science and Technology Message, and

this year, in his budget, a strategic approach to technology was adopted as a national policy. The strate- gy includes increased funding, new emphasis on critical problems of special, national concern, and an

effort to provide incentives to inventors, entrepreneurs, and research managers. The Department of Commerce is taking steps to promote actively the licensing of Government-owned patents, and the Experimental Technology Incentives Program in the National Bureau of Standards is asking such

questions as "What cost-effective Federal actions can be taken to facilitate the commercialization of the

technical inventions of the individual and small R. & D. firms?"

Key words: Government patent policy; government R. & D.; technology enhancement efforts; technological innovation; technology transfer programs.

The national resources devoted to science and

technology are steadily increasing. Federal obligations for scientific research and development, including facilities, will go from $17.3 billion in 1972 to $18.3 billion in 1974. At the same time, industry's ex- penditures for R. & D. also are rising, from $11.4 billion in 1972 to an expected $13 billion in 1974. Thus,

the combined Federal and private investment for R.

& D. in 1974 should exceed $31 billion, the highest

ever. Of this total, 69 percent will be spent by industry, about 14 percent by universities, the same by

Government itself, and about 3 percent by nonprofit

institutes.

This great R. & D. effort has many public benefits.

It creates wealth and builds a healthy economy. It provides a strong national defense. It gives us new

and useful products and processes and creates jobs.

It provides the means for environmental improvement and consumer protection. And, of course, R. &

D. supports education, medical care, the rebuilding

of our cities, transportation, housing, and many

other great social needs.

But the public is not receiving benefits, in many of

these social areas, commensurate with the R. & D.

effort — or, I believe, with the potential inherent in

such an effort. In fact, other nations, recognizing

similar potential, have established advanced governmental programs whereby they attempt to increase

the use of technology for public purposes. These

frequently are called technology enhancement efforts. Late last year my office undertook a study of

the technology enhancement programs of five

foreign countries. The conclusion of the study was

that the governments of the five countries visited

(Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,

Japan, and the United Kingdom) strongly support invention, innovation, and the commercialization of

research findings that they consider to have two

criteria. First, they must be in the public interest.

Second, they must appear to have good industrial

potential for both domestic and foreign markets. The

impetus for the study included such problems as the

declining U.S. balance of trade, which in 1971

became unfavorable for the first time since 1893. In

1972 this negative balance was $6.3 billion. (In April

1973, happily, U.S. trade was in surplus by about

$200 million.) Even in technology-intensive products,

one of the mainstays of our foreign trade, the U.S.

has been experiencing a steady decrease in its share

of the world market. Many leaders in Government

and business believe that not enough of this

country's technology is being translated into civilian

5
products and processes — perhaps because of the ex- istence of institutional, legal, business, governmental, or other deterrents to investment in new

technologies.

The first of two questions I'd like to pose today for

your consideration is, "Shouldn't the American

public be receiving more of the potential wealth from

its tax expenditures of $17 billion this year for R. &

D.?"

Concern over our national policies impinging upon

this question reaches the highest level of government. President Nixon emphasized his personal con- cern when he said, in his Science and Technology

Message last year, "Federal research and development activities generate a great deal of new

technology which could be applied in ways which go

well beyond the immediate mission of the supporting

agency. In such cases, I believe the Government has

a responsibility to transfer the results of its research

and development activities to wider use in the

private sector."

Translating R. & D. Results into Wider Use

Technological innovation, although closely related

to invention, is much more complex. The recent Battelle Memorial Institute report "Science, Technology, and Innovation" defines innovation as "a complex series of activities, beginning at 'first conception,' when the original idea is conceived; proceeding through a succession of interwoven steps of

research, development, engineering, design, market

analysis, management decision making..." culminating in, as the report calls it, " 'first realization,' when

an industrially successful 'product,' which may actually be a thing, a technique, or a process, is ac- cepted in the marketplace." Most commonly, this

process of innovation is a long one. In 10 innovations

Battelle studied, the average duration was 19.2

years, ranging from 6 years for the video tape

recorder to 25 years for hybrid corn, and 32 years for

the heart pacemaker.

There have been many attempts, with limited success, to hasten this process of innovation. Some have

been passive, on the theory that Government

patents, to take one element, if made freely available, would be used. This theory is based on the as- sumption that there must be "acres of diamonds" in

Government technology — an application of the old

Horatio Alger-era expression signifying that wealth

lies at everyone's doorstep, waiting to be discovered.

One passive attempt to unlock "free" technology

came during, and immediately following, World War

II. Patents of enemy aliens were made freely available to U.S. industry. Although many of the patents

were of high commercial quality, almost no licenses

were requested, and the patents generally fell into

disuse.

To cite another case, the employees of the National Bureau of Standards have received more than

400 patents, Government-owned, of course. On

about 250 which are active, there have been granted

only 34 non-exclusive licenses. (There was the ex- ception of Abner Brenner's patents for a revolutionary chemical process for plating nickel on a metal sur- face without electricity, for which about 200 licenses

were issued. Such breakthroughs are exceptional.)

The truth is that we know of very few products or processes from Government-sponsored technology

that have reached civilian markets. In one study,

mostly of Department of Defense inventions, only

approximately 12 percent of the available inventions

were commercialized.

A simple statistical comparison between the

number of Government-owned patents, on the one

hand, and privately owned patents, on the other,

shows an imbalance favoring the private sector. Last

year there were approximately 3,200 patents issued on Government inventions. (This breaks down to about 1,200 issued to the Government on employees'

inventions; 200 assigned to the inventors, for inventions resulting from R. & D. financed by the Government; 1,000 issued to the Government on contractors' R. & D.; and 800 issued to contractors on

Government-sponsored R. & D.). Essentially the

same rate of Government-sponsored patented

technology has prevailed for several years. While

Government's R. & D. expenditures are 50 percent

higher than industry's, its proportion of patents is- sued is ridiculous — less than 5 percent of the more

than 70,000 domestic patents per year. Another way

of looking at it is that there are almost 1 million

"live" U.S. patents, of which the Government owns

only about 22,000.

In contrast to the passive programs, there have

been, through the years, various "active" programs

to take technology developed by or for the Government and transfer it into wider use in the private sector. The Department of Agriculture, for more than a century, has won renown for its extensive program

to transfer agricultural technology from the experi6
ment station to the farmer. The State Technical Services Act of 1965 was an attempt, through a program

in the Department of Commerce, to apply the same

pattern to the industrial sector and to assure increased utilization of technology, especially in small

businesses. After 4 years' experience with the program, the Congress declined to fund it further, and

it expired.

Often cited as examples of specialized technology

transfer programs are those of the Department of

Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Yet

they have had their limitations. A congressional staff

study for the Senate concluded in 1967, "The

transfer of technology from Federal military-space

programs to commercial application is intrinsically

inefficient compared to directed research and

development sponsored for specific purposes by industry. Only the massiveness of the recent Government investment makes the promise of private sector gains possible.... The surest way to increase

technological change is to provide incentives and

remove disincentives for all of American industry to make privately funded scientific and engineering efforts."

Many students of the civilian technology transfer

problem have emphasized the role of incentives. In

the report "Technological Innovation: Its Environment and Management," published in 1967 by the

panel of the Commerce Technical Advisory Board

headed by Dr. Robert Charpie, a key conclusion was

that, as a nation, "We should seek to provide incentives that will increase the Nation's total innovative

potential and should aim our efforts at companies

where the extra incentives are genuinely needed, or

will provide the maximum innovative response per

dollar spent." Another key conclusion was that "a

unique cost-benefit opportunity exists in the provision of incentives aimed at encouraging independent

inventors, inventor-entrepreneurs, and small

technologically based businesses. The cost of special incentives to them is likely to be low. The

benefits are likely to be high."

Not until last year, in the President's Science and

Technology Message, and this year, in his budget,

was a national strategic approach to technology—embracing incentives — adopted as national policy. The President's strategy is aimed at insuring

that our overall R. & D. efforts are focused on top

priority needs, that our considerable scientific and

technical capabilities are effectively utilized, and

that the public receives a proper return on the public

dollars invested in Federal research and development.

This strategy includes the increased funding

which I spoke of earlier. It includes new emphasis

on critical problems of special, national concern such as energy. The thrust of this R. & D. budget, as with last year's, is to encourage partnership with

private industry, examples being coal gasification

and the breeder reactor. And the strategy embraces

incentives to inventors, entrepreneurs, and research

managers.

The Office of Management and Budget, in its special analysis of the Federal R. & D. programs, stated,

"Beyond the prime incentive of the favorable

general economic climate, the Federal Government

recognizes that additional actions may be desirable

to encourage non-Federal investment in R. & D. and

its application." Consequently, the 1974 budget provides funds for enlargement of two programs inaugurated in 1973. One is in the National Science Foundation and is designed to improve our understanding

of the effects of further investment in R. & D. on economic growth and productivity. Another is the

Experimental Technology Incentives Program in the

National Bureau of Standards which is being funded

this year by an initial allocation of $7 million. In

ETIP, we are asking such questions as — and this is the second crucial question I should like to pose

today— "What cost-effective Federal actions can be

taken to facilitate the commercialization of the

technical inventions of the individual and small R. &

D. firms?"

A Rational Program for Technology Transfer

I would like to suggest that one practical step

toward answering that question would be to implement the President's program including those

aspects designed to provide the necessary incentives

and mechanisms to transfer Government-owned

technology to the private sector. In an effort to speed

the commercialization of Government-sponsored inventions by private industry, the President last year

directed the Secretary of Commerce to develop

"plans to promote actively the licensing of Government-owned patents."

Several steps have been taken, in response, by

7

533-210 OL - 74 - 2
this Department. For one thing, our National Technical Information Service (NTIS), in cooperation with

other Government agencies, has launched a patent

promotion program aimed at carrying out the President's directive. NTIS regularly publishes in the

Federal Register a number and title listing of

Government patents and patent applications available for licensing. NTIS has published a special issue

of its Weekly Government Abstracts devoted to Government Technology for Licensing, and plans to issue this on a regular basis.

Another step is that Battelle Memorial Laboratories of Columbus, Ohio evaluated 350 Governmentowned patents and selected 40 which are believed to have good commercial potential. Battelle has

developed experimental communications packages.

With these tools we are exploring opportunities for

technology transfer to Government agencies and to the private sector.

A third step is that the General Services Administration has issued new regulations permitting the exclusive licensing of Government-owned inventions

for limited periods. These regulations, however, are being challenged in the courts as unconstitutional.

Fourth, I have appointed, in my office, a Government Patent Task Force to examine all aspects of

Government patent policy. One premise on which I established it was that, if the Government en- couraged its own employees to invent and to apply

for patent protection for their inventions, the public

interest would be served.

While this study will not be completed for several

months, some impressions already are emerging.

For example, I believe that we should adopt a national policy and establish a system under which the

Government inventor is permitted to share equitably

in the monetary rewards from his invention.

As it is now, inventions by Government inventors—made in line of duty — belong to the Government; and the Government, generally speaking, obtains entire title and then prosecutes the application.

Thus, the Government inventor is distinguished

from the corporate inventor, who, in theory, can ex- pect generous monetary rewards, and whose employer is probably vitally interested in commercializing the invention.

It is probably fair to say that a Federally-employed

inventor rarely discloses with commercial gains in

mind, and normally has no monetary incentive; as a

result, the commercial aspects of his invention may

well be lost. The challenge to my task force — and ultimately to me and policymakers in the Executive Branch and

the Congress — will be to consider changing Government patent policy relating to Government employee

inventions, to change it rationally by bringing its provisions on employee rewards into line with

general corporate policy respecting corporations'

employees, to provide proper incentives for the

Government inventor. In whatever changes are recommended, we shall assure that they reflect the

overall public interest.

I should remind you that the Government has

direct and automatic financial partnership in any

profit made on an invention, because of the tax

structure of the United States. Any profit made by

an individual or a corporation is taxed heavily. In the case of corporations the tax is roughly 50 percent on

profits over $25,000, not even including taxes on

salaries, on the distribution of dividends, sales tax,

etc., which are part and parcel of our economic life. The question is not whether the Government

"gives away" anything to a particular group; the

question is, what does the country get for the

money? If we facilitated the exploitation of Government-owned patents, the public would gain new

technology, new and useful products and services,

new jobs and means for environmental improvement

and consumer protection — to name a few advantages. Such gains would be consistent with the

constitutional purpose of the patent system, namely

to promote the general welfare.

I have asked two questions: First, "Shouldn't the

American public be receiving more of the potential

wealth from its tax expenditures of $17 billion this

year for research and development?" Second,

"What cost-effective Federal actions can be taken

to facilitate the commercialization of the technical

inventions of the individual and small R. & D.

firms?" To the first question, I have answered,

Emphatically yes! To the second, I have suggested

that, if the Government encouraged its own employees to invent and to apply for patent protection

for their inventions, the public interest would be

served.

8
Discussion

Question: Does Boeing have an inventor's incentive program?

B. Ancker-Johnson: Yes, I believe the patent policy that Boeing has is a relatively small fee that is paid upon making the disclosure, something like $50

or so, another $50 when the application is filed, and

another $50 or $100 when the patent is issued. But

something like 20 percent of the profits from any

patent is paid to the inventor, and that can indeed be

a very considerable income.

Question: In our system, as in Boeing, there's a

trivial immediate reward to the inventor. This is,

however, used as one of the measures of his technical success, and presumably he's rewarded salarywise. However, whether the patent is well written from the standpoint of being useful to the company is a matter on which the patent attorney will be

very definitely measured, and he won't work there

very long if he writes patents that aren't any good. It would seem to me that that is the proper focus, and

I would like to ask, is there really any evidence about

whether companies that follow one practice or the

other with respect to direct rewarding of inventors

have been more successful in acquiring and commercializing inventions?

B. Ancker-Johnson: There are two points you

brought up. You mention the patent attorney that's

not going to be around very long if he doesn't write an application that has good claims. One of the

things that is not done well, in my opinion, currently

in the government, is the writing of the disclosures

because they are not generally thought of as being

disclosures that will be used by the public for commercial gain. That can change very easily if the at- titude changes.

With reference to your second question, the fact

is that some industries do reward their inventors by

means of royalty payments, and some don't. I do not

know of any data that shows whether or not one

system does seem to work better in stimulating invention, compared to another. That would be an interesting study to undertake, if the data can be obtained. But whether or not there should be a uniform

situation in the private sector, I personally feel that

government should set the style here, of trying to re- ward its inventors by one means or another, in order

to stimulate the use of this tremendous amount of

potential invention.

N. Parrish: At the University of California I'm in

the continuing education group, putting on a number

of programs including telling the individual how he can obtain a patent, and courses in brainstorming

that enable him to expand his thinking so that he can

better write the patent. Does your office offer support for this type of program?

B. Ancker-Johnson: Oh, yes. We have within the

Patent Office a considerable amount of literature

that is specially prepared for the private inventor.

One thing that I'm really proud about in the Patent

Office is that the examiners have a very high regard

for the individual inventor and do everything they can to help him.

A. Ezra: We are one of your friendly competitors,

from the Experimental R. & D. Incentives Program.

I would like to make one comment about the

licensing of Government patents. I think I happen to be one of the few people in the United States who

managed to negotiate an exclusive Government

license in my previous job before I came to the National Science Foundation. And let me tell you one

of the most glaring difficulties there in making commercial use out of even an exclusive Government

license. I discovered that the Government will not

enforce its patent against infringers, whereas a

private company will enforce against an infringer,

against even a non-exclusive license. In other words,

it is up to the licensee of a Government patent, even

an exclusive licensee, to prosecute infringers, which

is a very large expense, and that I found was a great

handicap in trying to get commercial use of it.

B. Ancker-Johnson: What we're trying to do is to avoid that by the license being issued to someone,

who then can take the litigation and defend the

patent. So it would no longer be the responsibility of

the original source, but those that got the patent

would be the ones to defend it.

A. Ezra: I have one other comment on that: as long

as they insist that the Government own the patent

rights, if it turns out that some fortunate licensee of

a Government patent is making millions of dollars,

9
then the Government has the right to march in and

say: "Give a license to Joe Blow down the road, who

is a competitor, because he is also a taxpayer," and

I've found quite a bit of resistance to that.

W. B. Shockley: My own feeling is that I don't believe in specific monetary rewards for patents, and

I don't think I'd like to work in a large laboratory

where this was done, because when you have a conference and you know if you got the disclosure out,

that would clearly show that you had the conception,

then you get in on the ground floor and the other people at the conference don't. I've seen people act that

way. I think it would be unpleasant. I would much

prefer, myself, that the management use good

judgment. The fellow who gets his name on the disclosure may not necessarily have been the man who

did the most creative job.

10
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 1 1-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

An Economist Looks at the Patent System

Robert D. Tollison

Council of Economic Advisers, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C.

20506

This talk sketches the way an economist might view the tradeoffs involved in the social institution of

a patent system. If the output that a patent is designed to protect can be loosely labeled as "information," then there will always be a tension between the need for patents to stimulate the production of new information and placing a short-run monopoly price on a good that, once produced, is inherently

non-rival in consumption. A patent system is probably a socially efficient way to make this tradeoff,

although the fact that societies impose different standards and procedures in the patent process suggests that study and discussion of patent reform may be worthwhile.

Key words: Economic tradeoffs; monopolies; new information; patent reform; patent system.

Thank you, Dr. Draper. I guess the best way to characterize how I feel at the moment is that there

is reputed to be an epitaph on W. C. Fields' tombstone which says: "On the whole, I'd rather be in

Philadelphia." That's exactly the way I feel, because

I don't think that between Dan De Simone and Jack

Rabinow, they could have found a more totally

unqualified economist to look at the patent system.

I would admit to being an economist, but I have little or nothing to do with the issues of patent policy in

my responsibilities in the Government, and in my doings in professional economics I've never written

about the patent system, and I've read very little about the patent system, except in the last few

weeks. But anyway, Jack said, "Why don't you come

on, and tell us about how an economist would look at the patent system." So, I warn you, these disclaimers are warning that you may have to jump on me for inaccuracies, data, or outlook, or whatever

you might think to be wrong in the question and

answer period that follows.

I would like to do two things, just to set a basis for

discussion. I would like to talk about some of the

trade-offs, philosophic, if you will, involved in the

way economists would look at what inventors do,

which is produce knowledge, produce information,

and how this might happen in a price system, or the

way we allocate and produce goods. And then I'd

like to talk a little about what the trade-offs I talk

about in a very general way have to do with the

patent reform.

To talk about the way an economist would look at the patent system, I'd like to reason by process of an

analogy. I recognize that this is a dangerous but

potentially useful way to reason, and I'll leave it to you to decide whether the analogy is worth anything

when I'm done. I think this might be more useful

than sort of looking at the specific technical and

legal and economic details of what's going on with

respect to patents, and whether government takes

away their employed inventors' rights, and other

more specific issues.

I would like to take you back to a Garden of Eden

sort of world, where there's an oasis which has a

spring, and the people who live there, and the

camels, all can come and drink, and there's no scarcity. It's essentially timeless: the water flows, it's super-abundant, there's an infinite supply of water,

and there's absolutely no scarcity in this place. If

you confronted an economist with that set of circumstances, and asked him should you place a positive

price on that water, he would probably respond to the effect: "What function would a price perform;

you don't have to ration the water, because there's

plenty of water around, there's no long queue to get

the water, there's no crowding of camels and people

11
at the water-holes. So price can't perform a rationing

function since there's no scarcity, you don't have to have people exploring to find new springs. Price just

has no rationale in this setting; if anybody gets a net

benefit from consuming the water, he should be al- lowed to do so at zero price. There would be no entry

fee. And everybody's good-natured, so nobody builds a fence around the spring." So might run the

response of a typical economist.

You have to be careful in making the analogy, but

I think a reasonable case might be made that the existing stock of knowledge that society has at any

point in time might be like that spring. Take the ex- ample of a theorem. When a theorem is developed

by a mathematician and it's printed up and distributed around, if I consume that theorem, I don't

reduce the amount of that theorem that you can con- sume; I don't change the total quantity of knowledge

by your letting me have access to the knowledge.

Using a little more technical terminology, the

theorem and the spring are what an economist would

call a "purely public good." Given the assumptions

I've built up, there's literally no cost to allowing

someone else to know that theorem. Now, notice I haven't said to use that theorem to make a profit;

I've said only to know it. Under that sort of timeless, no-scarcity assumption, if you scratched an economist and asked him

what he thought of that, he might say, "Well, price

has no function to perform, social welfare would be

higher if you didn't charge a price for access to these

things."

How might you go from that sort of situation to see

a patent system emerge? I guess, to carry on the

analogy, a number of things could happen. The guy

who found the spring might be a reasonably wise fel- low and say, "These people would be willing to pay

a price to get this water. I don't know how much of

a price they'd be willing to pay, but we could do

some experimentation, and after all, it doesn't cost

me much to build a fence around this thing and keep

the people out." It could arise for that reason alone,

just sort of self-interest maximizing behavior by an

individual who found the spring. Or the King might

take the spring, or the strongest guy might get his

henchmen out and put up the fence and rope off ac- cess to the spring. Or the spring might become

crowded, or the camels drinking at the water might

cause a sanitary problem (here, of course, "clean

water" becomes scarce). So there might be motivation for somebody to look at this situation and say,

"Well, I can sell that: I can take economic power

over the spring, and somehow make an income."

I suspect that patents, or the expropriation of

knowledge, arose in a very natural fashion like this,

and ultimately got written into laws. But the question

that you would pose at that point is, "What does a

positive price and building a fence around the spring

get you from a social point of view?" That's a

question, I think, that an economist might pose.

Well, it does a couple of things. If it were getting

crowded, or if the entrepreneur had some incentive

to control access to the spring or to the source of

knowledge, then a price would do one thing for him:

it would ration who got it. The entrepreneur would

raise price and restrict access and control who got to use the spring or the source of information.

But it would also do another thing. If you again

scratched an economist he would say, "This guy

would behave like a profit-maximizing monopolist

since it's the only spring around (for the time being)." So what does economic theory tell you that a

profit-maximizing monopolist would do? He would

restrict output, he would raise price, and there

would be a flow of income set up from consumers to the monopolist, and there would be a little left over

loss to society which nobody captures, called "lost

consumer surplus."

Price rations who gets the water, but the formation of "ownership" of a single spring also generates

some monopoly inefficiency. If we slightly expand

the setting to make water scarce, placing a positive

price on the water, even a monopoly price, will give

somebody an incentive to go out and look for new

springs. Pricing the water sets up a flow of income

to someone which other people can observe, and if they wish, follow the example of the guy who ex- propriated the spring, go look for new knowledge, go

look for new springs.

The trade-off that I would try to pose to you in the

way a pricing system might work in a market society

to produce and allocate knowledge or information

and invention, is that on the one hand, there may be

a case for not pricing the information that is generated. After all, that is recognized in most

patent systems, because they expire at some point,

and the knowledge becomes freely available. But

there's also the other function of price to get people

to go look for more knowledge.

So that would be a sort of rough and ready sketch

12
of what you trade off: you trade off a certain type of

pricing, the public grant of a monopoly right, which

presumably from an antitrust point of view, people

would be in general opposed to, against setting up a process of getting knowledge produced. And I think

it's fair to say that the patent system is probably a

fairly efficient social system for making that tradeoff, between future production and putting a price on

the existing stock of knowledge. After all, patent

systems are a quite general sort of thing that we see

in societies and their constitutions.

Although you see patent systems in general, you

see different societies who make these trade-offs differently. They do patent business differently. The

Patent Office is run differently. They grant different

types of patents. And I think the presumption of

that, to me, is simply that the U.S. patent system

may not be optimal. You may not be fine-tuning this

trade-off between monopoly against wider dissemination of the information as well as you could.

You may not be getting that trade-off exactly right,

and there may be some form of gain from trade to worrying about how we do our patent system.

As far as I understand, and I have no profound un- derstanding of the existing issues of patent reform,

but you could run down a list of things that people

have proposed. Take the objective of reforming the

process of granting patents. Most every time I've heard it expressed, it is to insure that only valid

patents are issued. I don't wish to get into any sort of

numbers game with respect to the number of cases

litigated, etc., because I simply don't know that data.

But the objective of reform seems to be to insure that

only valid patents are issued. Now, speaking as an

economist, I think that's an objective that we could

all agree on. From a social point of view, you don't

want to grant or write monopolies into the law that

don't have to be written into the law.

What are some of the things that are talked about

to get at that objective? You could rank them from

the situation where there's very little disagreement

that there's room for improvement to where the heat

starts getting generated, and that's probably what I ought to do. One of the first things that comes to mind is that you might allocate some more dollars to the budget and manageriaUy reform the Patent Office. Again, I'm treading on thin ice, because I don't

know how the Patent Office works; I just presume

when they talk about inefficiencies in the Patent Office, that it's true, that it's an inefficient operation,

and that, for instance, any one of you, if running the

Patent Office were some monopoly like the Post Office, could bid for it, take over and charge a fee for

examinations and make a profit. It's inefficient in

that sense, that you could enter that business and do

it better than the guys who are currently doing it.

I would find it hard to disagree with an argument,

for instance, that the Patent Office ought to have a

better information system, that it might be worth

some budgetary dollars, some cost of other things

foregone in the public budget, to spend dollars to make the Patent Office more manageable, either to increase examiners or increase the efficiency of ex- aminers so that they can spend more time per patent

and do a thorough job of deciding whether it meets

the criteria in the law of a valid invention. I would

think that none of us would have a hard time disagreeing with that, except one might argue that it's going to cost budgetary dollars, and where are they

going to come from? I would accept that, and I really

don't have any idea how many budgetary dollars it might cost. Some of the other things that have been proposed

in patent reform have to do with procedures in

getting the patent. One of the things that has been

proposed is to have a patentability brief written.

Now, I don't know whether that differs from current

procedure or not, but I take it that the Patent Bar

has been opposed to a lot of these reforms on the

very simple premise that they raise costs of being a patent lawyer. Literally, if you have to expend more

effort to represent the client, the process is more

complex, if there's a great deal more time on your

feet defending the applicant, etc., those kinds of

proposals would raise costs to the Patent Bar.

Whether they would raise system costs or not, in the sense of sort of netting out the cost of the examiner's

time vs. the information supplied by the applicant,

I don't know. I really don't know how one would formulate a position on that kind of thing without a

great deal more information than I have about how

it's currently done.

Another procedure that's been proposed is to have

an oath of invention. I guess my reaction to that is that it would raise a penalty to fraud; you would get

into trouble, in effect, if you took this oath and it was

later found out that you withheld information that

was relevant to determining whether your invention

met the criteria of patentability. An oath is not too

costly a thing, to me, for an individual to take who is

13
making a patent application, but it does raise a

penalty to fraud. It does help you meet this objective

of only issuing valid patents.

There are a whole set of other procedural things

that have been proposed which have to do with, for

instance, having some sort of public counsel — making the hearings for a patent open, or reasonably

open — that is, opening up the process between the

patent lawyer, his client, and the examiner. Apparently, the Justice Department would like to have

their own counsel in the Patent Office who could

sort of choose which cases he wanted to challenge on validity grounds. And there have even been

proposals, I think, to allow competitors to come in

and complain in the patent proceedings. With virtually no knowledge of the way existing procedures

go, I think that I would have some problems with

protecting the rights of secrecy of the applicant, and

I don't know that I would want Antitrust to have a judicial agent there to challenge selectively. I don't

know whether one could find a more amenable ombudsman role where information from outside can be

conveyed into the process for the examiner to hear,

but not in such a way that the inventor's rights of

secrecy are violated in a serious way. I think that a

trade-off could be made, but since I'm not a lawyer,

I'm not sure 100 percent of what's involved there, or what sort of process one could set up to open up the

examination of a patent to a more general audience

than the three people who apparently currently do it. There is one other area tied to patent reform, and

that's the Scott Amendments. Is it fair to say that

everyone knows what the Scott Amendments are?

What they amount to are a series of amendments

which would be placed on a patent reform bill. It makes legal, by definition, a whole bunch of pricing

practices for holders of patents — that is, licensing

practices of all sorts are sort of written into the law

as legal. I would say a couple of things about this.

First, this issue is related to the patent system, obviously, because it affects the income of the inventor.

It affects how he can use his patents and how he can

generate income from them. But it seems to me that

Antitrust apparently has the position on this, that

many of the devices proposed to be made legal by

definition in those amendments can have quite pernicious social consequences — market segmentation,

pooling of patents, etc. Many of the famous price-fixing agreements which we have in American industrial history were built around patents or a patent base.

The Antitrust position is that if these practices are necessary, if various forms of price discrimination

and restrictive licensing agreements are necessary

to bring the invention into existence, then they're

willing to tolerate them. If they're not, they're going

to be very skeptical of them. To me, as an economist,

that's a reasonably sensible position to be in. To pose a trade-off differently, if you want to grant

inventors the right to be more perfect monopolists,

literally to extract more income from their monopoly,

then I think I would say you might want to consider

trading that off against the length of the patent,

lower the life of the patent, and allow inventors to capture more income immediately.

It seems to me that the only rationale we would

have for tampering with the law on the ability of a monopolist to price like this is that somehow the income flow that we set up under patents is not sufficient to induce the supply of innovation and invention that we want.

I think if the Scott Amendments are attached to a patent reform bill, you are just asking for trouble,

because I think the Scott Amendments won't stand on their own merits as a part of that legislation. I, for

one, would rather see some of the objectives of

reform of the patent system met, as such, than to tie

the Scott Amendments to them and just complicate

the issues, so to speak, by getting the problems of income flow to the inventor confused with meeting the

objective of only issuing valid patents under criteria

that we agree upon.

Discussion

I. Kayton: Why do you call patents a monopoly?

R. D. Tollison: What is a monopoly under the law?

It's a single seller of something; is that correct?

I. Kayton: No, it's control of the source of supply

over a relevant market. There are practically no

patents that control a relevant market.

14
R. D. Tollison: Would you like to elaborate on that,

rather than assert it?

I. Kayton: Yes, I would. A very valuable form of

patent property is in the form of the patent on the

Accutron watch. That's very valuable, and it's property, very significant property. It is not a monopoly

because this does not control a relevant market.

How many people here have an Accutron watch on?

How many people here have a wrist watch on? I've now demonstrated what I intended to show. The

patent on the Accutron watch is valuable, it's property, it is not a monopoly. And monopoly is a pejorative term.

R. F. Tollison: Why? It's a technical term.

J. Rabinow: I agree with Dr. Kayton that the word

monopoly has a bad connotation, and this is the only

objection we have to it; otherwise, from the

economic point of view it makes no difference, of

course. From the Congressional point of view it does; Congress does not like the word monopoly.

R. D. Tollison: Why do we write the word

monopoly into the law? We do have an antitrust law

that uses the term.

J. Rabinow: Yes. I would suggest that you read the

speech by Judge Rifkind who said that it's time to divorce the antitrust laws from the constitutional

rights of patents, because he says it's curious that

the basic law is the patent law, and the later law was

antitrust.

You talked about the efficiency of the Patent Office. If you talk about the quality of patents, you are

quite right; if you talk about efficiency, you are not

right. They're quite efficient, but they don't spend

very much time, and for the time they spend on a patent they do quite well. Unfortunately, the average

patent's total work takes about 15 to 20 hours — if you compare that with the search that goes into a court case, where hundreds and thousands of hours

go, it's obvious that the Patent Office simply cannot

make the search, and it's not surprising that new art

is discovered. I think that Dr. Brenner, who will talk

about the Patent Office, will bring these things up.

I noticed that Dr. Ancker-Johnson was quite upset

when you say they aren't efficient. They're efficient;

they just don't do a good enough job, which is not the

same thing, of course.

R. D. Tollison: O.K., I didn't mean inefficient in

any pejorative sense; I just meant that it's possible

that more budgetary dollars could go into the Patent

Office.

J. Rabinow: That's certainly so, but unfortunately

Congress doesn't want to see it that way.

B. Ancker-Johnson: I've just come from the

Senate budget hearings, and in that hearing I asked

the Senators if we could shell out enough money to give the Patent Office 94 more positions for just that

purpose, and make the examination better, and I just

about got shot full of holes. "You're always coming

up here asking for more money," and "Why are you

always asking for more money when the workload is approximately the same?"

Now, just a couple of days before that I was over

visiting the Patent Office again, and I had a long talk

with some of the examiners. You know what their

beef is: "We want to do a better job on the search.

Everybody is always telling us that we have so many

that we have to turn out in such and such a time, and

that's not professional. We want to do the job

better." Now, somewhere in here we've got to have

a balance. We could spend lots more money in the

Patent Office and make each search much better,

and that would make all the examiners happy,

because they're all professional, good people — al- most all of them — every outfit has some duds. But

generally they're very good. On the other hand, you

can't exactly expect the taxpayer to pay and pay and

pay. So we've got to find some sort of balance, and

that's what I think we have to recognize.

15

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

Trends in Technological Policy Making

Daniel V. De Simone

Federal Council for Science & Technology, National Science Foundation,

Washington, D.C. 20550

Federal programs and policies contribute to technological advances in numerous ways. Many Federal

incentives for technological innovation have been proposed over the years, but none has been put into

effect. We need to develop a better basis for choosing courses of action. Three Federal programs recently begun are aimed at this deficiency: the systematic assessment of the

state of industrial technology by the Department of Commerce, a study on the barriers to technological

innovation by NSF, and the experimental incentives programs being conducted by NSF and NBS. These

are small-scale pilot projects, but the experiments and studies will help us understand more about the

factors influencing technological advance. As a result, decision makers will be better equipped to deter- mine what should be the nature and extent of Federal encouragement of private investment in technological innovation.

Key words: Experimental incentives programs; Federal incentives; technological policy making;

technology assessment program.

Thank you, Jack.

After this morning's session, one would get the impression that this was the annual meeting of the

American Bar Association. Last night when I came

in, I noticed the big billboard for this conference and

it said "National Inventors COUNSEL."

Jack mentioned that I used to be associated with

the National Inventors Council, and I am very proud

of that. Several years ago, the Council decided that

it would be a nice thing to have a meeting out here in

Monterey, California, and I was asked to arrange for

it. So, I went to see the boss and I put the proposition

to him, and the upshot of that discussion was that our next meeting was held in Washington. I couldn't

deliver.

By way of contrast, several years later, Jack, too,

decided that it would be a good idea to have a meeting of the National Inventors Council in Monterey,

and so he went to see the boss. Jack is a very loquacious guy. It would have taken you or me 20 minutes

to argue the case, but he did it in about 5 seconds

flat, whereupon the boss signed the travel orders and

apologized to Jack for having kept him waiting.

That's how we finally made it out here. There's a

saying back in the Capital City that Billy the Kid

may have been the fastest gun in the West, but Jack

Rabinow is the fastest tongue in Washington. If he

were the Speaker of the House, the rest of the Congress would be out of business.

Anyway, I'm delighted to be here. Last year began

as an auspicious one for Science and Technology. In

unprecedented ways, the Federal Government extolled the virtues of invention and innovation. It had

all the earmarks of a marriage, if not of the heart

then at least of convenience. Seldom have science

and technology been given such billing, first in the

State of the Union Message, and then in the President's Special Message to the Congress on Science

and Technology.

In his State of the Union Message in January of

1972, the President announced that he would soon

unveil "a new program of Federal partnership in

technological research and development with

Federal incentives to increase private research."

Two months later, on March 16, 1972, he sent the

Congress his Special Message on Science and

Technology, in which he outlined an incentives program and other initiatives aimed at improving the

17
climate for innovation. So 1972, we would have to say, was an extraordinary year of declarations, one

of those peak years of interest in technological innovation.

Now, to say that there have been peak years of interest in technological innovation implies that there

have also been valleys (years in which the interest in

technology faded). It is unfortunate, but nonetheless

true, that just as fashions come and go, so does the

interest in the technological health of the country.

There have been, broadly, four cycles of concern

about technological innovation since the second

World War. The peaks of these cycles — that is, the

years of greatest concern for technology — occurred

in the late 1940's, the late 1950's, the early to middle

1960's and the past 2 years. These peaks of concern,

not surprisingly, coincided with times when we were

also concerned about the health of our economy,

both domestically and in the context of international

trade. National security and prestige also contributed to these peaks of interest.

The low points between the peaks seem to occur whenever things look rosy and bullish. When the

economy is booming, and a sense of security

prevails, the concern for future technological ad- vance ebbs, and eventually gets lost in the noise

level of euphoria. There is a natural tendency to at- tribute good times to things that are being done now;

in good times, rarely do people perceive their happy

state to be the result of policies that were pursued

diligently and wisely years before. Even less do they

perceive that if things are to go well in the future,

then thoughtful actions must be taken now. Which

leads us to a law of science policy that has to do with cause and effect. The longer the interval between

policy and payoff, the greater the burden of carrying

the policy through.

Now, as you'll hear from our next speaker,

research and development are very risky investments. The private return on such investments is often highly uncertain; the reward, if any, lies elusively in the mists of the future. It takes intense

dedication and resolve to take an idea, big or small,

whether in government or in private industry, and to build this idea into something of consequence that

solves a national problem, or creates a new market,

or launches a new business or company. There has

to be patience, and devotion, and commitment over

a long period of time. In government, as in industry,

such qualities are rare.

Now, let's look at this problem from a national

standpoint and in an historical context as well. From

its beginning, America has been blessed with a marvelous breed of inventors, innovators and en- trepreneurs with vast natural resources at their

disposal — almost, you might say, the spring in the

Garden of Eden, that Dr. Tollison referred to, and

the acres of diamonds that Betsy Ancker-Johnson

referred to. With these vast natural resources at their disposal, and in a free and relatively competitive environment that nurtured creative achievement, these technological frontiersmen made this

country the envy of the world. Other nations

clamored for our high technology products and ser- vices and our productivity rose to meet demands at home and abroad.

Now, as we approach the bicentennial, we see a

different picture: — In many fields of world commerce, our

technological edge is shrinking, and in some cases we have been overtaken by others. — For the first time since 1893, our balance of

trade in 1971 showed a deficit, and in 1972 this

deficit grew to almost $6-1/2 billion, the largest trade

deficit ever. — There is increasing concern that the rate of in- crease in our productivity may be inadequate compared to the rates in other advanced industrial countries. — Rising aspirations with respect to environmental quality, pose new challenges in the production of

goods and services. — One of the results of 2 centuries of social

change is a maze of intricate regulatory requirements and restrictions, some valid and some that are perhaps questionable, that may be inhibiting innovation and discouraging entrepreneurial initiative. — The level of risk and economies of scale

required for some technological developments are so great that individual firms are sometimes unable to tackle them alone; and to cite just one more factor, — Many people have become hostile to technology

or, as illustrated by the space program, have become

jaded, and now take technological achievements for

granted.

I don't have to tell this audience that these are not

times for complacency or hostility toward technology, for the trends I have outlined are persuasive

evidence that we can no longer take for granted the

continued rise and preeminence of American

18
technology. And that is why a salutary and conducive climate for innovation is so important to the future of this country.

Federal programs and policies contribute to technological advance in at least six different ways.

First, the Federal Government is directly responsible for sponsoring or performing research and

development in such fields as national security,

space exploration, and health research. That's a

clearly defined role. Second, the Federal Government also has a responsibility to stimulate the

transfer into the private economy of the technologies

developed at public expense. The hope is that additional net benefits may be derived from the investments in such fields as defense and space.

Now, the third role is not so obvious. As the lar- gest single purchaser of most products — for example, computers, aircraft and buildings — the Federal

Government can require and encourage improvements in these items by conditioning its purchases on the satisfaction of specified performance standards, which, in effect, advance the state of the art. The fourth role, and one that is featured

prominently in this conference, as you have already

seen, is the Federal Government's responsibility for

maintaining the patent system. The fifth role is the

responsibility for supporting basic science.

The sixth role is indirect and often subtle, but

nonetheless important. It comes as a result of

Federal laws and policies which do not have as their

purpose the encouragement or discouragement of

technological innovation, but which nevertheless

may have this side effect. This indirect role of the

Federal Government is inherent in laws and policies

that influence the rate and direction of research and

development, competition in the economy, the allocation of productive resources and countless other

economic and personal decisions that range from

determinations of whether or not to invest in a new

enterprise, to personal decisions such as the desirability of pursuing an education in science or engineering. Examples of this sixth category are regulatory laws that specify permissible activities in such

fields as patent licensing, product safety— incidentally, we have a Commissioner of the new

Product Safety Commission with us today, Dr. Larry

Kushner— transportation, and energy production

and distribution. All of these laws have been enacted

for other than technological reasons; nevertheless,

many of their side effects contribute to what we call

the climate for technological innovation.

Earlier, I mentioned the peaks of national concern

that have occurred since World War II. During these

peaks, many incentives for technological innovation

have been proposed. Most of these proposals have

centered on large scale, across-the-board tax credits

that would have given preferential treatment to cor- porate expenditures for research and development,

and which would have cost billions of dollars in tax revenues which, of course, other taxpayers would

have had to make up. Other proposals have called

for amendment of the antitrust laws so that private

enterprises could engage in a much wider range of

joint research and development activities.

None of these proposals has ever been adopted

and put into practice. And the reason is that the

proponents were unable to carry the burden of proving that their proposals would, after restructuring

the tax laws and the rules of competition, result in a net benefit to society as a whole. Perhaps this burden of proof is impossible. But the problem has al- ways been that the factual basis for even attempting

to carry this burden of proof was never at hand. And

as soon as each cycle of concern for the health of

American technology subsided, so did the quest for

evidence to support incentives for technological innovation. Therein lies the problem: we need to develop a better basis for choosing courses of action.

Dr. Tollison mentioned this morning that there are

a number of ways in which one can finely tune the

patent system. But where is the factual basis for

deciding which one is likely to be the most successful? We just can't afford the fire-drill approach

which has generally characterized technological policy making in the past. Whenever these peaks of concern have occurred, we have gone into the fire

drill mode and in the intervening years of apparent

good times, economically and internationally, the

fire engines have been put away.

There are three Federal programs that were an- nounced and begun last year, which are aimed at

this deficiency in the shaping of public policy. One

of these programs is a systematic assessment of the

state of industrial technology, which the President

has directed the Department of Commerce to undertake. Another, is a comprehensive program of

study on the barriers to technological innovation in our society, which the President has assigned to the

19
National Science Foundation. And the third consists

of two so-called experimental incentives programs,

of which I'm sure most of you are aware. One of

these, called the Experimental R. & D. Incentives

Program, is being conducted at the National Science

Foundation. The other, referred to this morning,

called the Experimental Technology Incentives Program, is under way at the National Bureau of Standards. These programs will be covered in detail later

in the conference. At this point in the proceedings,

I need only point out that the assessments and studies, per se, are aimed at the knotty questions con- cerning barriers, alleged and perceived, to technological innovation in the economy.

Through the experiments, on the other hand, NSF

and NBS will seek to learn by doing rather than studying. These experiments will be analogous to the

small-scale pilot projects that are undertaken in industry to determine whether a full-blown program is

likely to pay off. They will involve partnership ar- rangements between the Federal Government, on

the one hand, and industrial groups, universities,

state and local governments, on the other. Now, the

experimental incentives program, conducted partly

at NBS and partly at NSF, is a modest undertaking,

as it should be. It is characterized by a sense of humility which ought to come as a relief to the tax- payers of this country. For the purpose of these ex- periments is to learn, through small scale trials, what

is worth doing and what is not, rather than to launch

into a major program of one sort or another, which

has a tremendous price tag attached to it, without

any indication of whether it is relevant to the

problem or will be successful in solving whatever it

is setting out to do.

In combination with the studies and assessments,

the experiments will help us to understand more

about the factors influencing technological advance.

From the experience and insights that will have been

gained, the decision makers will be better equipped

to determine what should be the nature and extent

of Federal encouragement of private investment in

technological innovation. By decision makers, here

I mean, of course, the people in the Office of

Management and Budget. That's where, ultimately,

the question of funding gets decided. No one should

expect that this program will make a discernible,

short-term impact on our economy, as some have

suggested. It's not intended to do this. We will, in effect, be learning to crawl before we try to walk,

which is a perfectly honorable procedure. And we

will learn just as much from failures as from successes. That is what pilot projects, of course, are for.

I believe that there will be dividends along the way

and I'm thinking particularly of the potential that

this experimental incentives program has for dramatizing the importance of invention, innovation and

entrepreneurship to the well being of our nation.

Several years ago, I had the privilege of working on a study of the problems of technological innovation with a distinguished panel of experts and

scholars, which included Dr. Richard Morse, our

next speaker, and Professor John Stedman, from

whom we will hear tomorrow. In 1967 we published

a report on "Technological Innovation: Its Environment and Management," which concluded, "The

major effort should be placed on getting more

managers, executives and other key individuals,

both in and out of government, to learn, feel, un- derstand and appreciate how technological innovation is spawned, nurtured, financed, and managed

into new technological businesses that grow, provide

jobs, and satisfy people." We said that 6 years ago,

and to sum up, I believe that the need for such un- derstanding and appreciation is even greater today

than it was then.

Discussion

Question: The Department of Commerce has a program called DISC. Do you think that we could have

something that would parallel this from the standpoint of the inventor, perhaps that the government

would allow him a certain tax credit for having come

up with a creative idea that would benefit the

country?

D. De Simone: The DISC program, as you

probably all know, is a program that is designed to improve our export picture, and it does provide certain deferments of profits earned in the export of

American products and services. There is one

recommendation in the President's Message on

20
Science and Technology which, in effect, would implement the very first recommendation of the Charpie Panel Report that was referred to. That is to provide for inventors a loss carry forward period of 10

years rather than the current 5-year period. This

would help a great deal, we thought, when we un- dertook the Charpie Panel Study. We still believe

that it would help a great deal. Your suggestion

would give to inventors an analogous preferential

treatment to the DISC Program, but you put it in

terms, as I recall, of an inventor having achieved a successful commercial product or the introduction

and use of an invention of any kind, and at that point

being given the deferral of preference of the DISC

Program. It seems to me that if the invention is successfully introduced into commerce, that this is

really not the kind of concern that we had on the

Charpie Panel; we're concerned about the inventor

who has to go through this long period of developing

a product, of getting it successfully introduced, and

being able as a consequence to cover the expenditures he has incurred over a longer period of time

than is now permitted under the Internal Revenue

Code. My instinct says that it would be better to concentrate on that situation than on special tax

preferences for one who has successfully introduced

his invention into commercial use, because he will

get his reward, by definition under your question.

R. L. Fullman: I wonder if you could amplify why

you believe there is a special ignorance about the

consequences of Federal policies relative to technology as compared with other fields? I grant all of this uncertainty but I don't see why it's different

with respect to technology. I would tend to hang the

adjective timid, rather than humble, on these experimental incentive programs, which I really question even provide enough funds for adequate experiments to get information.

D. De Simone: That's why I said that nobody

should expect them to make a discernible impact on

the economy. The Experimental Technology Incentives Program, which is now going into its second

year, is funded at a level of $7 million. The Experimental R. & D. Incentives Program at NSF, I believe, has been allocated to date — $2 million. It's really a small amount; and on the other hand, I don't

think that's too bad, because I think anybody who's

faced with trying to do something with the concept

of experimental incentives has to realize it's a very

difficult proposition to develop experiments which

are relevant to what are perceived beforehand to be

important technological policy problems, and after

their completion can be generalized and applied to the entire economy.

21

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

New Enterprise Generation

Richard S. Morse

MIT Development Foundation, Inc., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Mass. 02139

The national environment for innovation is examined: in government, industry, the university, and the

public.

The administration is concerned for the environment of science and technology, but centralized

leadership and responsibility for long-range analysis and planning are absent. New rules and policies, or new legislation by Congress are needed.

Industry has been trying new methods in the management of R. & D., both in establishing centers for entrepreneurship within the company, and providing venture capital to acquire new technology outside

the company. The key to success in these enterprises is the entrepreneur who can judge the market and

bring a new product into public use. Universities should study the mechanisms that industry is using; there is need for research in these

areas, and a need for a coupling of effort between the university and the industrial community. The

university can also play an important role in teaching entrepreneurship.

The President should delegate authority either in the Executive Office or in the Department of Commerce to review the problems of invention, innovation, and entrepreneurship for the generation of new

enterprises. New approaches should be tried to expedite the public use of technology and a closer rela- tionship among government, industry, and the university.

Key words: Entrepreneurship; environment for innovation; government policy for innovation; industry

R. & D.; new enterprises; university R. & D.

In the early days of the Commerce Technical Advisory Board, or C.T.A.B., which was organized by

Dr. Hollomon, then Assistant Secretary of Commerce—Science and Technology, a number of stu- dies were conducted with respect to important national problems in which science and technology

were relevant. One of the better reports generated

by C.T.A.B., "Technological Innovation: Its Environment and Management," dealt with most of the

topics with which we are concerned today and has

been widely read since its publication in January

1967. The success of the early Commerce Technical

Advisory Board was not just the fact that it comprised an interested and concerned group of people

with diverse backgrounds such as we have at this

meeting, but after we wrote a report a serious at- tempt was at least made to implement the recommendations. Such an attitude is very important in

Washington. There is hardly a subject of national concern that has not been studied by one or more

committees and reports published. I hope something

will happen as a result of this meeting, but special

techniques are necessary to initiate action in government.

Many of our discussions relate particularly to problems of the inventor and I in no way wish to deprecate his role in society. It is perhaps, however,

more appropriate to discuss the "innovation

process." This process often involves the inventor in

one of its early phases, but when you come right

down to it there aren't very many individual, successful, lone inventors in the United States. The

total "innovation process" should be better un- derstood and placed in perspective relative to our

national environment. If this meeting is going to have any future impact, we should think in terms of

specific recommended changes in the environment

within which the innovation process operates in

America. Such changes may take the form of new

rules, policies or regulations to be adopted by exist

23

533-210 OL - 74 - 3
ing Departments or Agencies or new legislation by

Congress.

The role of the entrepreneur is becoming recognized as an essential ingredient of our changing

technological society. The term "entrepreneur"

means a "ball carrier," i.e., a motivated individual

who takes an idea whether it be in the form of a product, process or technique and assumes

complete responsibility for its effective and rapid introduction into public use. He usually does this

within an industrial organization or in concert with

venture capital and some form of new enterprise activity outside the firm. Venture capital is also now

established as an organized business operation.

Quite often neither the inventor nor the en- trepreneur subsequently demonstrates the ability to run "the company" or "the business" as it becomes

a large viable enterprise. In Boston, for example,

there is a successful, technically based company

which was founded by a typical inventor/entrepreneur. This founder has now resigned as President and his title is "Inventor-at-Large." He just

wants to get back and invent; he probably still will

be pretty good at it and the company is undoubtedly

better off to employ his talents in non-management

areas.

There is a very definite lack of understanding with

respect to the total innovation process within the

Government, our less innovative industries and

universities. The mechanism by which the innovation process operates, particularly in terms of new

enterprise generation, is relatively unknown in many

parts of the country. The availability of venture

capital varies greatly between different sections of

the country and financial and legal expertise tends

to be concentrated in relatively few sections of the

United States. The role of science, alone, as a stimulus for the creation of employment has been grossly

misrepresented. There is certainly no evidence to support the thesis that greater support of R. & D.

necessarily means either a higher standard of living

at the national level, improved profits for an industrial company or a higher employment level. New

technology is brought to the marketplace by a "people transfer process," not by reports or merely more

money for science per se. The "Entrepreneur"

operating in the proper environment is primarily

responsible for making things happen in the

technology transfer area.

Government leadership in the area of innovation

or new enterprises has been almost totally absent.

The C.T.A.B. report on "Technological Innovation:

Its Environment and Management" was published

in 1967 and yet little definitive government action

has been taken to implement its recommendations.

The Technical Services Act failed to recognize the

real mechanisms by which new technology is introduced into the marketplace and, hence, failed to produce any significant, useful results. No one individual in Washington apparently has the appropriate authority and responsibility for promulgating action to render the innovation process more effective. Certainly, the record of the Small Business

Administration is unimpressive and almost all of the

major SBIC's involved in financing of new technical

ventures, except those associated with banks, have

now been abandoned.

The National Science Foundation has only

recently been concerned with any phases of the innovation process and, historically, has had a history

of supporting more basic science in our universities.

Recent NSF and NBS programs are moving in the

direction of developing a better understanding as to how science and technology may be brought into

public use. Success in this area will require people

in these agencies with a broad background in the

management of technology, new innovative

mechanisms for its commercialization as well as new

contracting procedures. Neither the National Academy of Sciences nor the National Academy of Engineering has addressed itself to the general problem

of creating a national environment necessary for

technical innovation and more effective application

of science. Maybe our new Assistant Secretary of

Commerce — Science and Technology can assume

greater responsibility in this area. There is no better

mission for the Commerce Department than to recognize the tremendous importance of technology

as an essential ingredient in the competitive position

of the United States in world trade, a solution to many domestic problems and the creation of a higher level of employment.

This country will never compete in the world markets on the basis of cheap labor and our most successful exports have generally been based on the application of combined management and technical

skills. We used to talk about the Japanese as being

copiers, but no competent industrialist says that

24
today. Until recently, innovation in Japan was relatively unknown, individualism was suppressed, and

a worker tended to go with Mitsubishi or some other

large corporation and was pretty well indentured for

life. Honda, Sony, Nippon Steel and Toyo Kogyo, the

maker of the new Mazda car, and major Japanese

shipbuilders represent new, technically based enterprises with an impressive record of innovative

management operating with aggressive and effective

government support. In this country, the Federal

Government tends to be a watchdog over big busi- ness. In Japan, the government operates in partnership with industry in an attempt to enhance productivity and industry's ability to compete in the world

markets. The Germans had the Wankel engine a

long time ago, but we now see Japan assuming a

position of technical leadership in this and other

areas where Germany and America were once the

principal competitors. The United States has no monopoly on new technology and the flow of science

and of technical ideas is now very rapid throughout

the world.

It might be interesting to review some aspects of

the current national environment. First, the Government, industry, and the public have become disillusioned with respect to science and technology. Regardless of the reasons, this is, in fact, apparent.

Certainly the idea that our massive Apollo Space

Program would suddenly create jobs and solve

problems associated with our declining quality of life has been greatly oversold. The NASA Technological

Utilization Program has certainly not been successful. The technological achievement of Apollo was

certainly outstanding, but large numbers of highly

qualified people were taken out of the economy and

few of them can ever get back into the current competitive business environment. Neither NASA, nor Congress, really understood the mechanisms by

which so-called "space technology" might have been

employed for the benefit of the public and the useful,

practical applications of this tremendous technical

and management achievement were greatly exaggerated and misrepresented.

Industry is becoming more concerned with the

costs of R. & D. and our more innovative industries are making radical organizational changes in their

research organizations. In general, they are decentralizing research and development work in order to get better coupling with the marketplace. In the current, highly competitive world-wide business climate

few industries can now afford the luxury of the older

"central lab" established on the theory that products

will "come out of basic research." Notable exceptions, such as Bell Labs, etc., are fortunately still operating.

A few years ago a survey of the Fortune 500 determined that about 60 percent of these large, industrial

companies were going into the "venture capital"

business or at least thinking about it. The reasons

are interesting. Non-innovative, large companies

cannot hire first-class entrepreneurs. The incentive

for this new business activity was not the idea of just

making money via the investment route. Our larger

organizations had decided to go outside the firm via

the venture capital route as a means of attracting the

entrepreneur and developing windows on new

technology that was not otherwise easily available.

Innovative companies in this country now recognize

that the development of new technical products or entry into a new market area is highly dependent on

the efforts of a very few talented entrepreneurmanagers with a specific mission. They want the

"ball carrier," who is technically innovative, market

oriented, to develop a product and go do something

with it. Unfortunately, many of our major companies

don't even know the word "innovation," and there

are wide variations in management attitudes and approaches to commercial development within American industry. Change in the management of R. & D.

is taking place in more innovative companies on a very large scale at the present time.

Many companies are doing their product development by establishing centers of entrepreneurship

within the firm. Many of these same companies are

also engaged in so-called, "external entrepreneurship." The concept of "external entrepreneurship"

involves the use of venture capital to permit the

acquisition, by a variety of mechanisms, of an interest in the small, technical enterprise. One of our major oil companies, for example, has funded inventors and small companies in new technological fields

both here and abroad with provision for a minority

position in the new enterprise. A major chemical

company insists on a majority position, or 100 percent control. A wide spectrum of experiments are now going on in industry, perhaps on a scale larger

than most people realize. This is good. The key to success is the entrepreneur and, particularly, his

25
ability to judge the market at the right time — and

later manage a business. Science, technology and

money are usually of secondary importance to the

other essential ingredients to successfully launching

a new product.

Less innovative industrial sectors of the country

should review the mechanisms employed by more

successful companies in their efforts to enhance the

effectiveness of R. & D. and product development

activities through the use of new organizational

mechanisms. The experiments that some of these innovative companies are doing are very interesting,

although it may be too early to determine their

degree of success. These new concepts should be

carefully monitored, research on the process un- dertaken and reported. R. & D. is not only very ex- pensive, but there is always a great shortage of really

first-class, innovative managers, scientists and engineers, and entrepreneurs.

Student attitudes have changed. Students in

today's world aren't anti-business, but they're antinon-innovative business. They don't care if it's a big

company or a small company; they are perfectly

willing to work with Texas Instruments or 3M

because they view those companies as being innovative where an entrepreneur-employee can participate in the action. Surveys of students,

knowledgeable people, and major company executives reveal consistent attitudes when asked to name

the 10 most innovative and most non-innovative U.S.

companies. The non-innovative companies are generally unsuccessful in attracting any of the

talented graduates of our better universities. Companies have an image and this is important in at- tracting those employees that will determine their

future and customers in a competitive business.

In the venture capital area, there are more sources and amounts of venture capital available today than

at any time in the past. On the other hand, there is less and less interest in funding so-called "start- ups," the inventor or the zero phase company, if you

want to call it that. The reason is very simple: the

venture capitalists are doing very well with enterprises that are already "in business." They are making very good deals and getting a large part of

the equity.

Recent trends in our tax structure and SEC regulations should be of concern to anyone interested in

the generation of new business enterprises and the

respective roles of venture capital and the entrepreneur. We now have a narrower gap between

the tax on capital gains and personal income. This

means that there is less incentive for the wealthy individual investor to back a new technical venture

and, historically, the small, new enterprise and the

"inventor" tends to be funded by friends and individual sources of risk money. We have also had a

radical change in rules governing stock options, all of which act to the detriment of founders and key

employees of a new business. It appears that the

changes in such regulations, while made in an apparent effort to forestall inappropriate benefits for

executives of large companies have, in fact, primarily harmed the small company. The new company

can never compete with the large organization in

terms of salary, pensions, benefits or assurance of

employment. Stock options were the one incentive

to permit a new company to attract those few key individuals who clearly determine success or failure of

the firm. The so-called qualified stock option plan is now essentially worthless for a small company with

unlisted stock, and other compensation mechanisms

are required. All of these changes were made on the

theory of people in Washington that somebody was

getting away with something, without having the

knowledge of the impact of such action on a small

venture. If a small company wants to hire a real first- class manager from GE or Du Pont, it can't offer

security. It can't offer salary. It can offer a very

exciting life and feeling of accomplishment. Unfortunately, it is getting very difficult to now offer the

prospect of capital gains under present IRS and SEC

rulings.

The R. & D. organization of the Federal Government is also undergoing change. We have now initiated a general attitude of relevance with respect

to R. & D. and this is perhaps long overdue. President Nixon has decentralized the position of

Science Advisor, a concept perhaps not as disastrous as the academic community believes. Historically, the President's Science Advisor and PSAC

have frequently become far too heavily involved in

"project" analysis and the details of technical programs rather than a concern for policy and the en- vironment of science and technology. These changes

should be viewed not with alarm, but constructively.

If we can attract the proper qualified people, the

new system will work.

The newly proposed Office of Technology Assess26
ment will be established within and by Congress. If

Congress proceeds to operate in the R. & D. area

rather than do long-range analysis and planning as an aid to its funding and legislative responsibility,

such action should be viewed with concern. If the

NSF and other Executive Departments and Agencies can maintain a high level of scientific, technical

and management competence, the Executive and

Legislative branches of government now have an opportunity to jointly enhance the usefulness of

science and technology. Perhaps NSF and the

newly proposed Office of Technology Assessment

will also recognize the need for introducing specific

changes in the national environment for en- trepreneurship.

Our universities have a great opportunity to study

these new mechanisms that industry is using for ex- pediting the product development cycle within the

firm and the support of new enterprises outside the

firm. There is an urgent need for more information

and research work in the field and many good thesis

opportunities. We should also have a closer coupling

between the university and the industrial community

such as now takes place in some limited areas. Studies at the Sloan School at MIT a few years ago

identified some 250 companies that had been

generated out of MIT and its associated laboratories,

such as the Draper and Lincoln Laboratory. The

total MIT complex is now currently operating a total

budget of about $250 million a year and unlike the at- titude of most academic institutions, MIT has en- couraged its faculty and staff to be concerned with

the public application of research activities and

recognize that MIT has a responsibility to the local

community as well as the nation as a whole. The

country's first and largest publicly owned venture

capital corporation had a net worth of about $500

million at the time of its recent merger with another

industrial corporation. A very large number of the

new enterprises in which this organization had invested were a direct result of people and/or

technology associated with the MIT community and

over 90 percent of this net worth of $500 million comprised ownership in such MIT related ventures.

In an effort to expedite the so-called technology

transfer process, generate new, technically-based

enterprises, employment, and, hopefully, bring

benefits to both the community and MIT, the MIT

Development Foundation, Inc. was established as a Massachusetts Charitable Corporation on April 3,

1972. This organization represents a form of experiment that, hopefully, will provide a new mechanism

for expediting the public use of some of the research

activities conducted by MIT and perhaps other institutions in the Boston area, alumni, or independent

inventors. The Foundation operates as a separate

corporation with a majority of the directors appointed by the MIT Corporation. The Foundation

was organized for the benefit of MIT, although it may collaborate with other universities or institutions. Initial financing of this "Experiment in New

Enterprises" has been by MIT and a series of sponsors, currently including: Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., Cabot Corp., Dow Chemical Co., Dresser

Industries, Inc., Eastman Technology, Inc., Exxon

Corp., The First National Bank of Boston, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., Johnson & Johnson, Macmillan, Inc., Monsanto Company, Martin

Marietta Corp., G.A. Saxton & Co., Inc., Alfred P.

Sloan Foundation, Texas Instruments, Inc. Most of these organizations are interested in supplying venture capital for new ventures and, perhaps

more important, assisting in the critical market appraisal process faced by the Foundation in its analysis of new technologies to determine their potential

usefulness. The industrial sponsors of the Foundation certainly view this operation as an experiment,

but they are interested in developing windows on new technologies and most of them have an or- ganized division or department whose sole responsibility is to lend some form of financial support as

well as marketing and management assistance to new, technical ventures outside the firm.

An important function of the Foundation involves

support of a continuing research program to develop

a better understanding of the technology transfer

process, the role of the entrepreneur, venture

capital, improved coupling mechanisms between industry and the university, and teaching in the field

of "New Enterprises," their organization, financing

and management.

The MIT Development Foundation has now

analyzed over 75 projects and identified four potential new ventures which may be worthy of funding as new business enterprises. In each case, it is intended that the Foundation will keep an equity position for the benefit of MIT. A potential manager/entrepreneur is first identified by the Foundation and

then a new company is organized with him assuming

responsibility for its business plan and subsequent

27
successful implementation. This is an example of a new organization which should permit the operation

of an effective coupling mechanism between the industrial and academic sectors of society. No doubt

other approaches should be tried in an effort to ex- pedite the public use of technology and closer relations between government, industry and our universities.

Problems associated with innovation, invention

and entrepreneurship for the generation of new enterprises have been inadequately understood by

either the Executive or Legislative Branches of the

Federal Government. Because of our changing internal environment as well as our deteriorating competitive position vis a vis new, emerging, industrial

countries, the President should delegate appropriate

authority and responsibility either within the Executive Office or to an appropriate Department, such as Commerce, to review this general problem and make

appropriate recommendations with suggested

mechanisms for their implementation, either by Executive action or initiation of necessary legislation.

In the 1967 report, "Technological Innovation: Its Environment and Management," for example, it was

suggested that a change in IRS regulations be initiated to permit a longer loss-carry-forward period

for small companies in order to overcome disadvantages which accrue to a small operation vis a vis

those of a large corporation. Because of the recent

changes in the structure of our personal income

taxes, we now have a diminishing discrepancy

between taxes and capital gains and income with the

potential threat of minimizing incentives for venture

capitalists to invest in ventures. Special incentives

may be required whereby, for example, special tax

credits are permitted to encourage investment in

new companies, particularly those with a high

technological base. For some time so-called "1244

stock" has made it possible for investors to make

deductions in cases of business failures, but this

mechanism has never been widely employed, nor been effective as a means for stimulating venture

capital from the private sector. Neither Congress,

nor our operating departments, have clearly un- derstood the appropriate role of the patent system as

a mechanism for encouraging the commercial applications of Government-sponsored R. & D. We still do not have any uniformity of contract patent policies governing the use of inventions by government

contractors, nor have all branches of the Government clearly recognized the need for exclusive

licensing to encourage necessary development work

with private funding to expedite certain product

development activities. Some of our most competent

industrial talent has always remained unavailable to government programs in peace time because of our

patent policy and contractual difficulties in doing

"business" with the Government.

Rules and regulations of both the SEC and the

IRS have radically changed the incentives of

qualified stock options which, historically, have

represented an essential ingredient in the ability of

the new enterprise to attract and hold key technical

management personnel so essential for its success. Within our own Government laboratories, there are, no doubt, many potential useful ideas, products and

processes, but no effective mechanism has been employed for their commercial exploitation by industry.

While entrepreneurship is probably an inherent

characteristic of an individual, it appears that the

teaching process can enhance a latent interest in

qualified individuals. A few of our graduate schools

such as the Sloan School at MIT have been teaching courses in R. & D. Management and New Enterprises for over a decade. More of such activities

should be undertaken by the academic community,

particularly in close collaboration with industry. Our

universities should also conduct experiments in an

effort to find new methods for the more effective

public utilization of this country's great technical

resources, including the science and technology

generated within the university and by the Government.

The concept of "relevance" has now been clearly

enunciated by the Administration as a fundamental

guide to be employed in the development of R. & D.

policy and program. We also, however, need greater

support from the Federal Government by our regulatory agencies in the Executive and Legislative

Branches. Hopefully, as a result of this meeting, the

President will delegate responsibility to an appropriate Department head within the Executive

Branch to review this situation and make recommendations for action in the near future.

28
Discussion

J. Hahi now: I predict that a market analysis is completely useless when the invention is really new.

In really new innovations there's no way of knowing;

that is, nobody could predict what radar would have

done, what the computer business would have done;

maybe the transistor was an exception, we'll hear

from Shockley and he'll tell us; maybe that was a case where they could see the future clearer. My

contention is that you cannot predict logically, that

invention comes, sometimes, completely illogically.

Do you want to comment on this?

R. Morse: Well, I would agree with you, Jack; perhaps I didn't put my comments in the right perspective. I meant to say that the normal industrial

method of operating to meet their market needs or

their growth problems, are associated first with

identifying the market.

M. Harris: Recent studies show (many of you know

the Sussex Study of Chris Freeman and other

groups, and they're very large studies) that a lot of

very important developments did not fail because of

technological failures, they failed because the people either did not understand or did not know the

marketplace. I don't want us to write off the man

who has the great single invention, but I also want to warn all of us who are interested in taking one of

these inventions that unless we do understand the

marketplace, we haven't got a chance.

J. Rabinow: I agree with you also. That's absolutely correct that many inventions fail because of, not

technology, but because the market wasn't ready.

That doesn't mean that it could have been predicted;

it simply means that the market cannot absorb all of

the inventions that people can put on the market,

and I think that's inherent in the system. I think this

is the dice we play. The only thing is that the inventor should know what the odds are, and unfortunately, he doesn't.

29

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

Inventor-Entrepreneurship and National Priorities

Narinder S. Kapany

Department of Physics, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 94305

Because he is capable in science, invention, management and business, the inventor-entrepreneur has

a high potential for solving some of the urgent problems of mankind today.

The attributes of the inventor and of the entrepreneur are briefly examined: the inventor-entrepreneur

combines these talents in a bold, imaginative way. Although some national problems are of such a nature that they must be solved by massive, largescale interdisciplinary effort, there are still many high-priority areas that can be attacked by the

inventor-entrepreneur.

The optimum climate for nurturing his efforts must include: — A strong technological and industrial base — A free-enterprise economic system — A healthy reception by the financial community and a sympathetic public attitude — A cooperative, benevolent government attitude. The inventor-entrepreneur is a pioneer— a champion of innovation — and as such, he deserves attention, support, and a chance to share the responsibility for solving the problems of society today.

Key words: Business management; inventor-entrepreneur; national priorities; national problems;

technological innovation.

The changing nature of our society, our domestic

and international responsibilities, increasing demand for better life, and greater opportunity for a

larger number of members of the society are factors

creating some very urgent problems for mankind

today. These are problems of a magnitude hitherto

unprecedented. The solution to these problems will

require humane and constructive efforts on the part

of a large number of people, something similar to the

mobilization of scientific research during war time.

We, however, need full-time interdisciplinary teams

combining professional men of different specialities:

natural scientists, social scientists, doctors, engineers, teachers, lawyers and many other inventive

minds. The key to success in achieving our national

goals and priorities is a much greater interdisciplinary, interfacial interaction. Today we need the

development of science for overcoming some very

urgent problems and to provide the basis for real

growth and survival. It is in this context that

inventor-entrepreneurship acquires a very significant role, inasmuch as it combines the capabilities

in science, invention, management and business. In

these four functions we can sum up the "20 links of

the productisation chain" that were talked about this

morning. However rare this talent may be, its potential role in the world of tomorrow must not be over- looked, and means for fostering and assisting such

people should be actively pursued.

The Inventor

We are dealing with three different items here:

viz. inventor, entrepreneurship and national priorities. What is an invention? The dictionary says: "invention is the act or process of inventing; skill in

generating or contriving; mental fabrication or concoction; the process of devising or producing by independent investigation and experimentation,

something not previously known or existing." An inventor, therefore, is "one who invents, especially one who has originated some method, process or

device, or who devotes his time to inventing."

An inventor maintains, consciously or subconsciously, an inventory of useful bits of technical in31
formation. On one hand are his technical solutions,

and on the other are the worthwhile problems for

which he would like to find solutions. He continuously updates these two inventories, and once again,

consciously or subconsciously, rearranges them

whenever he encounters a new bit of technical information, a new solution, or a new problem. It is essentially a process of reshuffling all the bits of information from a large number of mental pigeon holes,

throwing them together and rearranging them, much

in the way a jigsaw puzzle is solved.

The act of inventing can be subconscious. I don't

know how many inventors here have invented in

sleep, but I have. I recall one fine morning, I got up

and remembered that while I was at least half asleep

I had thought of a method for measuring the refractive index of liquids photometrically. The idea is simple: you shine light into a glass rod, and when

you imbed it into the liquid to be tested, the critical

angle for total internal reflection changes and therefore the amount of light transmitted through the rod

changes. A photodetector placed at the other end of

the rod thus measures the refractive index of the

surrounding liquid. The irony of this mechanism of

the inventive process is that maybe a lot of us invent

during sleep and don't remember it the next morning!

As we all know, there are many other factors that can nurture the inventive process. These are various

forms of incentives, training, accidents, etc., etc. You recall Newton's accidental discovery of the law

of gravity from the observation of a falling apple.

An inventor is generally thought of as a person interested in what he is doing, primarily from a technical standpoint. But whether we admit it or not, most

inventors spend a lot of time selling. Whether it is an independent inventor, an inventor working in a large

corporation, or an inventor working for the Government, he must sell his invention to a potential manufacturer, a marketeer, to his boss, or his colleagues.

However, inventors have had to adapt to many

drastic changes of environment in recent years.

There have been significant changes in the company

and client attitudes, in team inventing process, in

large resource requirements for solutions to a number of problems. In addition there remains the

age old problem of the attitude of "not-inventedhere" on the part of potential clients.

The Entrepreneur

So much about an inventor, what's an en- trepreneur? Again, relying on the dictionary, the

meaning of the word entrepreneur is: "One who un- dertakes to start and conduct an enterprise or business, assuming full control and risk." An en- trepreneur is not necessarily an inventor; he is most

inspired to couple an idea or an invention, his own or someone else's, to the marketplace. And this

coupling process has within it many intricate and

critical links which need to be fully recognized and

respected. He understands intuitively, by training or by experience, the process of finance, marketing,

production and management. Of course, one can

take each one of these areas and divide them further

into large numbers of subcategories. An en- trepreneur is an inspirer and organizer of men and

women; he faces with vision and determination the

ficklemindedness of the venture capitalist. (The

previous speaker correctly stated that in this country

there is more venture capital available today than

ever before, but as far as new high technology start- up situations are concerned, it is just about as constipated as it can get.) The entrepreneur also faces

with vision and determination the hazards of the

marketplace, the conservatism of the bankers, the

unreliability of his vendors, the uncertainty of

technical development programs and the absolute

certainty of rising costs due to inflation. He also

knows how to evaluate realistically the "investments

to return ratio," and a good entrepreneur knows

when to stop the development of a certain product or process. In other words, he doesn't get married to an

idea; if the development costs go out of hand, he

knows when to stop it. Most of all, he recognizes the

complete array of talents that are required to make

an enterprise successful. He understands his own

personal strengths and weaknesses, selects appropriate and competent people to complement him,

inspires them, trains them, organizes them, and then

delegates to them. With all this, and an awful lot of

luck, he may succeed.

The Inventor-Entrepreneur

A person who combines the talents of an inventor

and an entrepreneur is rare, but he is invariably very

bold and imaginative. An entrepreneur is invariably

triggered to initiate a new enterprise by one or more

32
of the following factors. He may be dedicated to his

idea or invention and committed to couple it to' an

identified need in the marketplace. He may be imbedded in a large company and terribly frustrated by

the slow moving and unimaginative hierarchy. I will

present an example. An engineer became annoyed

with his management in a large company and started a small basement operation smack dab opposite the

headquarters of the large corporation. In a period of a few years he expanded his operation into about a $5 million a year business. By that time his temper

had cooled down so he sold his company to another

corporation for $5 million. He installed a ticker tape

at his home and gradually lost most of his money in

the stock market.

Of course, in motivating an entrepreneur, money

and power are important factors, although these may

not be the dominant factors. Many inventor-entrepreneurs possess that unique psychological and

personality makeup needed for success. In the

growth of a corporation accidents can have a positive

effect, but there is no substitute for a viable plan and

hard work.

A basement operation can mushroom into a big

business. Hewlett-Packard started off as a garage

operation a number of years ago. They received an

initial order from Walt Disney and with a great deal

of technical ingenuity, business agility and some

luck, built it up into one of the most successful

scientific corporations in the United States.

This breed of man, an inventor-entrepreneur, is rare but they have mushroomed in recent decades,

primarily in the United States. Take the example of

Land. He started work, not on cameras but on a

plastic polarizer film. He worked on it for some time,

didn't really find any application for it and got into

cameras, and we all know what he has done with

that.

Varian Brothers started work on the Klystron at Stanford, built it and related developments into a

large and successful corporation. Arnold Beckman

started with spectroscopic instruments and built

Beckman into a successful instrument company.

Another interesting and more recent example is of

Dr. Alex Zaffaroni. He developed the basic

technique of paper chromatography and was involved in the development of Synalar and the birth

control pill. A few years ago he decided to leave the

presidency of a large drug firm, and started a new

operation called Alza Corporation, dedicated to new

and revolutionary methods of drug delivery. Zaffaroni's basic theme is that a large portion of human

anatomy is bombarded with drugs, generally through

the gastrointestinal tract, while the drug is needed

only by a certain small portion of the body — hence

the need for a localized drug delivery system using

unusual scientific phenomena. He did not have a

specific fully developed product, but because of a

high degree of credibility amongst the financial circles he managed to raise nearly $30 million. I believe, after nearly 3 years, his company is on the

threshold of introducing some very exciting

products: viz, an Ocusert insert which is placed

under the eyelid to deliver continuously medication

for glaucoma patients. Other similar drug delivery

methods for birth control, etc., also seem to be well on their way.

The climate for nurturing an inventor-entrepreneur requires a number of elements: 1. There

must be a strong technological and industrial base,

preferably nationwide; 2. It obviously has to be imbedded in an economic system of free enterprise; 3. There must be a healthy reception by the financial

community and, of course, sympathetic public at- titudes; 4. There has to be a cooperative and

benevolent Government attitude.

It's quite interesting how these elements have

evolved naturally in this country, although recently

we're probably losing some of the edge. When we go

abroad and compare the situation we invariably con- clude that there is still a great deal more potential for an inventor-entrepreneur in the United States. Let

me give you an example. In Europe I was involved in a joint venture as a member of the Board of Directors

of a Belgian company. We acquired nearly one-third

of that 50-year-old company's stock in return for our

technology. While we were negotiating with our partners, who happen to be one of the largest holding

companies in Europe, I delayed our agreement for at least 3 weeks because I have always believed that

the management of the company must get incentives

through stock options. Six months after the agreement was signed I was authorized to offer stock options to the top management; viz, the general

manager, the director of research, the director of

marketing and so on. To my great surprise every one

of them refused to take any stock options because

they felt that it might be considered unethical to

33
acquire a portion of the company in which they

worked, and also feared incurring the displeasure of

the majority shareholders. This gives an indication

of the kinds of problems with incentives and motivation that exist in other parts of the world.

Looking at the other side of the picture, the inventor-entrepreneur is exposed to a number of hazards.

Because he's generally preeminent as an inventor

and perhaps has even acquired fame for his invention, he's suspect as a manager or a businessman.

The situation is even worse if he also happens to have a Ph. D. At times his name and/or his invention

will be touted by the vested interests to a point of

being oversold. This overselling frequently subjects

him to the pressures of the speculative investors and

the stock market. He generally has a high visibility

and that makes him a hero at times and a bum at others. By and large there is no middle course. And

when the times go really rough, the bankers very

hurriedly relegate him to the back dungeons of the

laboratory. He is often frustrated, frequently

maligned and sometimes prostituted. In spite of all these hazards he invariably flourishes, grows and

continues to invent and engage in entrepreneurship!

National Priorities

How does all this play a role in national priorities?

When one dwells upon national problems and priorities, one thinks of problems of very large magnitude

that require governmental action or action by very

large corporations. This is true only in part. National

priorities fall into two categories: those that have

been recognized, and others that have not been

recognized by the powers that be. Among the recognized priorities there are also two sub-categories:

viz, those that are being acted upon and others that are not being acted upon. The latter generally fall prey to the lip service of the politician, and we have

a lot of those, too! The unrecognized priorities are the ones that constitute the largest potential damage

spots for the society. Therefore, there is a great need

to deploy a concerted effort in the area of technological forecasting and to find mechanisms and

procedures whereby some national problems can be

taken out of the political arena, in order that concerted effort on them can go on regardless of who is

in or out of power. This may well appear to be a

search for Utopia, but it is something that must be

worked out. There is such a thing as shift of national priorities,

and it's a logical phenomenon; environments and

problems change and therefore national priorities

must change. But they must change on a planned

basis and they must change in such a manner that a

significant fraction of precious national resources

are not sacrificed. Generally the most vulnerable resource is trained professional manpower. We saw

an example of that only a few years ago when hundreds of thousands of scientists and engineers were

thrown out of jobs. We realize how expensive it is for

the Nation to train a scientist or an engineer. A shift

in economy which renders jobless very well-trained

professional people, who are entirely capable of solving other relevant problems of the society, is a criminal national waste. Such a fiasco can be

avoided by adequate definition of new priorities and

shifting the resource on a well-planned time scale.

This is not intended to defend every scientist and en- gineer who lost his job in the last few years, because

it is also true that science and engineering have

developed a horrendous hierarchy, and there are many people who are sitting in the ivory tower and

don't really belong there. Whereas there had to be a cure for this ailment, we must cure the disease and

not kill the patient!

I would like to try and illustrate to you that an inventor-entrepreneur can find niches in areas of national interest and priorities. Some of these illustrations may be familiar to you. We talk about an ener- gy crisis. Why did it come upon us so suddenly? We

should have been able to predict it many years ago

and prepare ourselves for it. An average inventor-entrepreneur can be overwhelmed by the fact that multimillion dollars a year are being spent by the

Government on laser fusion activity. This is an activity where deuterium pellets will be subjected to high energy laser radiation from all directions, the

electrons are heated to a point where you get fusion

action. This may provide controlled and a clean source of energy. However, there remain a large

number of other very sophisticated problems which

are looking for imaginative and ingenious solutions.

There is no reason for an inventor-entrepreneur to be discouraged, since there lies a very potent role for

him in these areas. For example, when we look at the

fact that there's a lot of photon energy falling on the

surface of the earth, even on a cloudy day, it becomes clear that solar energy, when economically

34
harnessed, will indeed be a very useful source. However, three problems need to be solved. Firstly, we

need a very high efficiency absorbing layer, an effectively black layer with very low IR emission;

secondly, we need windows with high light transmission for the solar energy and high reflectance for the

infrared generated by absorption of the sun's energy.

Thirdly, we need an efficient energy conversion/storage mechanism. Now, you may not need the resources of a very large company for the demonstration of the feasibility of some clever solutions to these problems. Although it is possible that most

new inventions related to solar energy utilization will

not find their way to the market place when looked

upon from marketing, manufacturing or business

standpoint, there is also no question that enough

solar energy is available on most areas of the globe

to be able to produce economically feasible domestic

solar water heaters, space heaters and air conditioning units. Along the same lines let us consider the

amount of wastage of energy. The efficiency of a

large percentage of our equipment and machinery is very low. Consider a simple optical problem: you're

illuminating streets in every city of the country during the night and the filament of the lamp that is illu- minating a portion of the street is sending out energy

in all directions. The percentage of photons emitted

by the light sources that reach the retina of human

beings is extremely low. By some clever thinking and

new developments it might be possible to control the

directionality of light with respect to the observers

and thus reduce the amount of energy consumed.

You can go through other national priorities of

today, such as pollution. You've heard about auto ex- haust detection devices, self-contained toilets, pollution surveillance and monitoring, sterilization, etc. All of these problems present a fertile ground for an

inventor-entrepreneur.

In the area of crime there exist many opportunities for potential inventions. For example, the

method of fingerprinting used today is primitive.

Black ink is used on your fingers and the quality of

the image is generally less than optimum. In the

1970's, surely there are easier and more efficient

methods available.

The area of medical instrumentation is full of fantastical potential. I will give you a couple of examples. At this time, in order to stop bleeding in the

stomach or in some other portion of the body we invariably have to undergo surgery. However, it is within the state of the art today to insert some kind

of an endoscopic device using Fiber Optics which

goes in the stomach and not only permits visualization of remote regions but also conducts laser radiation or cryogenic probe in order to coagulate the

bleeding region.

Recently there have been some very exciting

developments for helping people who have been

paralyzed by a stroke. The theory is rather interesting. It was believed that as a result of stroke a certain portion of the brain dies and therefore some

motor actions, memory, speech or whatever, are impaired and generally other portions of the brain cannot take over the function. The recent theory is that

for every muscular action there is a positive force as well as a braking force. According to this theory the

"brakes are jammed" as a result of stroke. The

treatment consists of going down to the appropriate

portion of the brain and touching it with a cryogenic

probe in order to "release the brakes." I have seen

patients suffering from the effects of a stroke of 7 or 8 years ago and partially paralyzed on one side, un- dergoing hours of surgery, a couple of weeks of convalescense, and walking out of the hospital. There

are a number of problems still remaining: the accurate determination of the spot where the treatment

is to be performed; the need for navigating the probe

accurately; and a requirement for surgical devices,

whether they are lasers or cryogenic probes, that will

allow the surgeon to manipulate accurately,

preferably with the aid of some optical visualization

scheme.

In the area of education, we are at the threshold of a revolution. Why should books be used only for

reading? Why cannot there be talking books, and not

only talking but translating books — a book in which

you turn the page and place a little gadget on it to speak distinctly to you in English, or with the

pressing of another button to translate the material

into another language, such as French, German,

Japanese, etc.? The technology to achieve this is here today and, for an inventive mind, there are nu- merous potential solutions to the problems.

Potential breakthroughs in areas of critical social

need are unlimited and there are opportunities for a small inventor-entrepreneur in them. In the area in

international trade, we have heard a great deal

recently. J. J. Severan Schreiber, in his book "The

35
American Challenge," nearly 10 years ago predicted

that in the 1980's the United States industry in Europe will be the third largest economic force in the

world. Although today we have some problems in the area of international trade, we have enough inventive brains in this country which, if focussed on the

national priorities of other nations, perhaps developing nations, can solve many of their problems with our know-how and create excellent economic opportunities for us. I'm not trying to minimize the

problems involved in technology transfer and doing

business abroad. They exist, but if the profits are at- tractive enough they are worth solving. There's no

reason why a number of the developing nations have

to go through the development cycles that we went

through 30 or 40 years ago and have already

discovered some of the solutions to be obsolete or even undesirable. We can make available to them

solutions that are cheaper, more modern and pertinent to their environments.

To sum up, I'm not saying that the inventor-entrepreneur is the panacea of the society, and that

he's the answer to all problems. More importantly,

I have not said that he's superior to the professional

manager or the professional businessman. Nor am

I saying that this is the most opportune time from an

economic, venture capital, climate standpoint to en- courage a large number of inventor-entrepreneurs

to get into the act. However, I do contend that an inventor-entrepreneur is a pioneer with unusual

imagination, and a burning desire to do his own

thing. This is a rare and effective national resource. He is a champion of innovation, and at the same

time, a champion of the system of free enterprise.

He is the creator of the yet unborn industries and

also an inspirer of inventors and technology. I'd like

to submit that he deserves attention, support, and

more importantly, his share of responsibility in the

handling of the problems of society today. Thank

you.

Discussion

I. Kayton: How do you protect this delicate flower, so that he can be nurtured?

N. Kapany: "Protect" is a bad word. I think a true

inventor-entrepreneur really doesn't need protection, he needs encouragement from the financial

end, from the marketing end, and so on. Government

could help him a great deal; the Small Business Administration could play some role in these areas. As

you know, there are such things as Government

purchases from small business. But I happen to feel

that a true inventor-entrepreneur is so dynamic, so strong headed, that all he needs is encouragement,

and not a lot of protection.

J. Rabinow: The fact is that in other countries they

do specific things: in the five countries that have

been studied, that Dr. Ancker-Johnson spoke about,

there are positive government programs — in

Canada, Japan, England, Western Germany, and

France — to help new companies. The government

invests money, industry invests money, government

guarantees loans and so on. The United States has never needed this because we've been always so

successful, until a few years ago, that it was as- sumed there was enough market to take care of

situations like this; and so for the first time in our

history we worry about this entrepreneur. In the

past, the Horatio Alger story was strong enough to carry itself. And apparently it did. But the other

countries do do specific things; I can give you, if you

like, some of the facts about it.

J. Stephens: I have a comment with respect to

local rather than governmental encouragement of an

inventor. I picked up an idea at the Woods Hole

Conference which I have put to what I consider good

use in the years that have intervened since then. A

speaker at that meeting made what I thought was a very innovative point. And this was, that the ideas

which an inventor may have produced, if ingenious,

but which might not, just because they were ingenious, have a market, should still be commended. In

other words, if a man has a good idea, good in terms

of being a clean, ingenious solution to a problem,

compliment him, pat him on the back. Don't say,

"How can you make a dollar out of this particular

idea?" And I think this is a very interesting point,

and the speaker at that time, whose name I hesitate

to mention because he's already getting so much

publicity, said that if you want inventors really to work for you, compliment them and love them, even

though they don't make a dollar for you.

36
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

Invention and Innovation in the University

James Adams

Design Division, Mechanical Engineering Department, Stanford University,

Stanford, Calif. 94305

Universities are not fulfilling their potential as a source of public need-oriented invention and innovation. Their potential is inhibited by three constraints: risk, time, and business.

There is an academic risk to the student in undertaking projects where the outcome must be uncertain. The risk to the faculty lies in the fact that the academic rating procedure treats entrepreneurial activities as unusual and academic publication as usual. Time is another constraint: there is insufficient time in the academic year to develop a product and

market it. The business constraint is a lack of knowledge as to how ideas could be carried to reality with a just division of the compensation among the students, faculty, university, Government, and commercial

business interests involved. Government funding might help to solve the risk and time constraints by forming peer groups and al- lowing employment of long-term professional support.

People in the educational community would appreciate help on solving the business-Governmentuniversity relationship problems. Frameworks must be found and publicized in which universities can

put their intellectual resources to work in a more applied way and gain reasonable financial and intellectual rewards.

Key words: Academic risk; business-Government-university relationship; faculty risk; time constraints; university entrepreneurial activities.

As an engineering professor, I'm quite used to talking about theoretically perfect things. It therefore causes me no pain to say that a university

should be a theoretically perfect place for invention

and innovation, especially invention and innovation

which is responsible to public needs. After all,

universities have been brooding about public need

intensively for the past 8 or 10 years. Universities

collect people who are intelligent, intellectually independent, and curious. They are one of the few institutions where thinking is acceptable as a full-time

job. One might therefore easily think that universities should be an optimum environment for invention

and innovation to flourish.

My message is that universities are not fulfilling

their potential as a source of public need-oriented invention and innovation. They certainly are sources

of invention. However, this invention usually results

when one of two situations occurs. The first occurs when individuals with a strong drive to invent join

the university. People with a drive to invent and

suitable talent find the university a reasonable en- vironment for invention. However, such people are

not all that numerous in the university. The second

situation occurs if high-technology programs are un- derway, which naturally result in inventions and innovations. A good present example is the research

occurring in solid-state devices.

However, if one considers invention with a small

"i" (not radar, the transistor, or the computer) and

if one looks at the teaching and instructional end of

education, there are some fairly serious inhibitions

to invention and innovation in the university. There

is little that occurs, for instance, in the low-technology, commercially oriented area. There is a scarcity

of activity in what might be called middle-technology, focusing upon the application of technology

which was new and exciting a few years ago. I think

that this is unfortunate, because even if one ignores

the direct contributions the universities could make

37
to invention and innovation, one must look at the

contributions they make in the form of people. Good

or bad, a lot of bright people go to universities and in a sesise universities are a filter and a conditioning

system on the people that come out.

I am head of a group of nine faculty members at Stanford which is called the Design Division of the

School of Engineering. This group is about 15 years

old and was started by a man named John Arnold,

who at the time was a somewhat controversial educator with a high interest in creativity among technical people. The group's activities center in mechanical engineering, although it does have a cross-departmental program with the art department and

works closely with other engineering departments.

The Design Division is somewhat unique in en- gineering education in that it has an overriding con- cern with open ended problems. It is problem- rather

than tool-oriented in that the main emphasis is to give people an idea of how to use various tools to solve problems, rather than to improve the tools

themselves. It is concerned with emotional and intellectual aspects of design (aesthetics) as well as the

physical, and is concerned with public need.

Another factor that makes our group somewhat

unique is that we place a large emphasis on projects

done by the students and faculty as a teaching

technique. We have found, along with many others,

that it is not too effective to tell students stories

about the accomplishments of others if one is trying

to teach design, since such stories are usually

doomed to the status of advice, which is usually

tolerated, sometimes rejected, and hardly ever given

the importance of experience. We therefore try to collapse the time needed for experiences and lead

the students through them.

Our projects range from short (a week or two) individual projects leading to designs on paper or in

mock-up form, to long (a year or more) projects leading to prototype hardware. They range in orientation

from mechanical to purely visual, and from "big picture" to extremely detailed. In a given year, our stu- dents are involved in perhaps a thousand projects,

most of them minor and not leading to anything marketable. However, in many cases, ingenious and

well-detailed prototypes of marketable items

emerge. Figures 1 through 8 show a few examples of

student projects. Figure 1 is purely an exercise in

conceptualization and visualization. The problem

was to design a device into which a golf ball could be

dropped. The golf ball was to fall out of the device

exactly one minute later and raise as much visual

hell as possible on its way through. Figure 2 is a music synthesizer that is controlled by the movements of a dancer. This was a project that required

a great deal of consideration of the emotional

aspects of design.

Figure 3 is a device which allows analogue data,

such as an EKG, to be superimposed upon an x-ray

movie. Figure 4 is a prototype of a machine that

punches holes through paper cleanly, cheaply, and

in a programmed manner. Figure 5 is a prototype

baby incubator which controls biological contamination by controlling air flow and utilizes radiant heating. It maximizes access to the infant, and thereby

solves a serious problem. Figure 6 is a hand-held ul- trasonic camera for medical scanning. Figure 7 is a prototype of a unidirectional vehicle and figure 8 is a percussive breathing device of cystic fibrosis patients. Other recent student projects include a lowcost silencing device for a commercial blower, a machine that would convert water-weeds to cattle

food, a grinder to convert dried garbage to rawmaterial for wallboard, a flowmeter utilizing heat

transfer, and all types of toys and games.

38
The reason for mentioning these projects is that

they have several characteristics in common with

most of our student projects. First of all, they were

generally built on inadequate or zero money. They

came into being through a large amount of student

and faculty labor, student and faculty money, and

various parts and services which were bootlegged in one form or another. Secondly, nothing ever hap39

533-210 OL - 74 - 4
pened to take them past the stages shown in the

photographs. That is significant to the message I am

trying to make. These projects were done for educational reasons that we consider quite important.

These educational aims were fulfilled. However, the

projects, together with all of the thinking and effort

that went into them, were essentially dropped at that

point.

The activities of the Stanford Design Division were initially more educationally unusual than they

now are. Many schools are now placing an increased

emphasis on project work and we are fairly confident

that we are riding on a pendulum swing that is returning middle and low technology to schools

along with an increased emphasis on application.

We therefore believe that the type of project work

we are involved in is going to increase in universities.

The question to ask at this time is, "Well, if en- trepreneurs go to college, if project work is on the

rise and if it results in output which has something

to do with societal needs, then why can't something

be done in the universities to carry this work to the

marketplace, rather than merely to the stage where

students are awarded grades or degrees and photographs are taken?" I think that there are three reasons which inhibit entrepreneurial activities in

universities which could transform thinking done in

the course of research and instruction into marketable products. These three reasons are all curable,

and I think they will be cured. However, some conscious efforts on the part of universities, governments, and the commercial sector are necessary to cure them.

The three reasons can be briefly labeled as risk,

time, and business. I would like to discuss each in

turn, beginning with risk, which is perhaps the most

important one. Risk is an inhibiting factor to the stu- dent, the faculty, and the university administration,

none of whom is used to entrepreneurial risk. Looking first of all at the student, those who come to the

highly-rated universities are carefully filtered. They

in general have high verbal and mathematical aptitude, excellent references, a good achievement

record and above all, high grades. Generally, they

are grade-oriented, since it is through getting good

grades that they have been rewarded. This tendency

may come to a peak in engineering schools, where

one finds the students who have opted for subjects

(physics, trig, maybe calculus) which are considered

extremely challenging in most high schools. Such

students are not used to taking academic risks. The

ultimate example of this I can point to is embodied

in a small but constant number of graduate students

(not from Stanford, happily) who will not take design courses because we cannot give them a copy of the

last exams (which we do not give) and tell them exactly how they can earn an "A" in the course. They

instead take analytical courses which follow familiar

patterns and in which they have no trouble at all earning an "A".

There is academic risk in a design course

(although not as much as many students think, since

the "good" students usually continue to get the high

grades) and the farther the project is taken, the

higher the risk becomes. I have advised several Ph.

D. students on design-oriented dissertations, which

diverged from the standard engineering Ph. D. for40
mula in that they were more oriented towards project work and less towards hard science. The baby

incubator included in the photographs was the outcome of a Ph. D. dissertation. These students were somewhat less secure during their work than those

working on a more conventional dissertation. It was

more difficult for them (and for me) to see where

they were, where they were going, what their "contribution to knowledge" would be, and what they were learning that would make them unique. In

general their work took them at least as much, if not

more, time, and was more difficult to publish. The

incubator work was published in the Journal of

Pediatrics, because it did not seem to fit well in en- gineering journals.

Although project work is extremely satisfying in

that the results are real and represent (usually) the

successful ordering of a complex problem, and

although we believe it to be extremely valuable educationally, some risk is involved and the present

system sometimes causes the risk to be seen as probably frustration, time wasted, lower grades, and

less academic status. There is similar risk to faculty.

Stanford's "recommendation for appointment to the faculty" form, when completely filled out, runs

to 20 or more pages in most cases. However, in all of

this information, there are actually only two items of

extreme importance. One is called "bibliographical

information." The instruction for this section reads,

"please attach a complete list, in bibliographical

form, of scholarly publications grouped as books,

monographs, significant book reviews, articles (indicate volumes and pages, the scholarly journal in

which the review or article appears). If pertinent, list other writings such as abstracts, technical reports,

speeches, etc. with an indication of why they are deemed significant. Attach a statement of not more

than a page discussing the two to four most important items on the candidate's list of publications,

stating in clear and nontechnical language why they

are deemed significant. Please indicate the author

of this statement."

There is nothing here about invention, innovation,

or entrepreneurship. During the last year I was

chairman of two search committees, one looking for a person who would have proven design competence

in the area of electromechanical devices, the other an architect. Neither of the two people we hired was

a prolific publisher. However the first man had a

great deal of experience, some patents, and a large

amount of accomplishment in design. The second

had an excellent professional record and was wellknown in the field. It was a struggle to fit these men

and their accomplishments into the "appointment

form." This is merely symptomatic of a larger

problem, which is that the academic rating

procedure treats entrepreneurial activities as unusual and traditional academic publication as

usual. It therefore requires an unusual effort to hire

and keep faculty members who are active in invention and innovation unless they also are prominent

in a traditional field.

The other portion of the appointment procedure

that is important is a so-called search report, which

documents the candidate's competence by opinions

from persons outside the university who are judged

to be in the candidate's peer group. This peer-group

judgment is equally important in promotions and in

general academic success. Such peer-group

judgment can be somewhat risky in fields such as invention and innovation.

A friend of mine who is in our group at Stanford is a kinematician and I sometimes envy him his

academic situation. Kinematics had an upsurge 20

years ago or so under the leadership of people such

as Ferdinand Freudenstein and the development of

the computer. The kinematicians now have a nice

academic club going with a journal and a tight peer

group. They deal in fairly abstract mathematics and

produce work which is intellectually beautiful,

although debatably applicable. They can, however,

operate well within the university structure since

they attest to each other's competence and publish

easily. Such good words and publications are much

rarer among faculty involved in project activity such

as that discussed earlier.

I consider myself a teacher of design, not invention and innovation. However, a common problem

exists concerning peer-group judgment. Although

friends of mine in design would willingly attest to my

overall competence, they would no doubt be much

less willing to describe any specific designs I have

done as being exceptional. This is not so much a function of my design capability as of the tendency

of those involved in design (or invention) to be less

charitable to the acts of others in similar activities

than those involved in more disciplinary fields. This

is partly because entrepreneurs are more oriented

toward competing than cooperating. Such things

hurt faculty involved in such activities. Visibility

41
also becomes a problem if one is involved in a risky

venture. Another faculty member in my group was

for 2 years deeply involved in a project which was a cooperative venture with the Mission Coalition (a

community self-help organization) in San Francisco.

This was just when "Public Need" was becoming a catch phrase, when interdisciplinary work was being

encouraged, and when the late 60's were in full flower. This faculty member put a great amount of

energy into this work, eventually acquired NSF

backing, and was by many measures a success. However, the work was mostly exploratory and did

not produce traditional publications. He had a lot of

valuable experience, learned a lot, and involved a lot of students in highly intellectual work. However,

these 2 years came out of an initial 5-year appointment and put him in a great deal of trouble as far as demonstrating what he had done towards tenure.

Although his activities were not in the area of invention and innovation, his personal problems are

similar to those he would have had were he entrepreneurially oriented. In these days when universities are not expanding and jobs are hard to get, junior faculty do not gain much by taking risks. The

academic rewards system discourages risk taking on

the part of the faculty as well as on the part of the

students when invention and innovation are con- cerned.

Besides risk, two more inhibitions to invention and

innovation in universities are the time situation and

business patterns. A student's lifetime in a university ranges between 4 and 8 or 9 years. In a typical

course, a student expends approximately 100 hours.

When courses or academic quarters are over, most

students physically and emotionally leave what they

are doing the instant the course concludes. In fact,

most students are in the habit of working in short intense bursts with discontinuities between. The

faculty reflect this time pattern to some extent,

although they do have much longer things going on

in conjunction with a few longer-term students (Ph.

D. candidates). However, in general the time in a

university is chopped up in a way which is not consistent with carrying things through the entire en- trepreneurial process. You simply do not get

something into the market place in 100 hours, or 10

weeks, or in any other of the commonly accepted

academic time units. This lack of continuity for

development and marketing is an important inhibiting effect on entrepreneurial activities in the university.

As far as business is concerned, I can be brief

since Dr. Morse alludes to the problems involved in

his paper. When he described the MIT Development

Corporation as a charitable organization which

would donate its profits to agencies including ones

outside of MIT, I had several reactions. My first, of

course, was to quickly write him a proposal. My next

was a distinct feeling that the charitable nature of

the institution sounds as though taxes are involved.

My next reaction was one of envy, since I do not un- derstand enough about the relationship between

universities, Government, and business to put

together an organization of this sort.

I do not think that I am the only person around

universities who is vague about how to make money

off invention and innovation and I include many people in the business side of university organizations.

I think that a great amount of understanding is necessary here before universities can comfortably

bridge the gap to marketing products, for instance.

In many cases those of us in Design at Stanford have

avoided business questions merely because they led

to complexities that we did not want to consider during the heat of the academic year. Certainly it should

be possible to clarify means by which ideas could be

carried to reality with a just division of the spoils

between the students, faculty, universities, governments, and commercial business interests involved.

However, this knowledge is presently hard to come

by.

I mentioned risk, time, and business as inhibiting

factors in extracting more public-need-oriented invention and innovation from universities. Let me

conclude by briefly mentioning things that need to happen before problems in these areas can be over- come. As far as risk is concerned, something has to happen so that there is intellectual, monetary, and

prestige reward for those involved in academia and

taking risk in an entrepreneurial, inventive, or innovative venture. A peer group must be established

somehow that can give judgment on accomplishments in this area that is as influential as the

judgments available in traditional academic fields.

A nice way to accomplish this and simultaneously

do something about the time problem is at the

Government level with funding, because funding

seems to form peer groups and allows the employment of long-term professional support. It seems to me that astronautics became much more of a legitimate discipline when NASA and other agencies

started pouring money into it. I think that this is un42
derstandable, since money allows long-term

research to be done and peer-groups assemble both

to meter out the money and judge the work. At the

present time, funding sources are not tuned to the

type of work we do at Stanford, for instance. They

are not compatible with developments where the

outcome is unknown. If we want to put a student or a class to work on a 1-quarter or 1-year project and

we do not know the outcome or about the problem a year ahead of time, it is extremely difficult to find

government funding to back it. If we want to carry

something to the point where it is a candidate for a commercial push we also run short on money

sources. Money is available for backing a proven

commercial candidate from conventional sources. However, there is an embarrassing time before this

point is reached when it is difficult to find support in a university.

I think that schools will become more involved in

entrepreneurship as a money source as well as an

educational area and that a peer group will form in

time. However, some type of institutionalized support and official recognition of this area must occur

in order to support the people who must do the work.

The technology and knowledge are available. The

only think lacking is critical mass, which comes

generally from an infusion of money.

As far as business is concerned, I think Dr.

Morse's start at MIT is excellent not only for MIT

but as a pattern for other people. I think that a lot of

people in the educational community would appreciate help on solving the business-Governmentuniversity relationship problems and such

knowledge will come either from the experiments of

such people as Dr. Morse or from Government at- tempts such as the Technology Incentives Program.

Frameworks must be found and publicized in which

universities can put their intellectual resources to work in a more applied way and gain reasonable

financial and intellectual rewards.

Discussion

A. Ezra: If you recall, this morning Dr. AnckerJohnson referred to that report which was put out by

Battelle on a contract with NSF on 10 innovations.

One of the prime observations in that report was that

if you really want to bring about technological innovations, find if you can a technological en- trepreneur. And these are getting scarcer than hen's

teeth these days. That means several recommendations have been made along these lines. At the last

Woods Hole meeting in 1965, there were about 40

recommendations, 18 of which were picked up by us and put into this experiment which we call innovation centers that we are initiating at the National

Science Foundation. In fact, there is even one major

recommendation in the Charpie report which forms

the basis for these innovation centers. And the idea

is to do just what Jim Adams is talking about. In

universities we have a combined effort between the

Business Administration School and the Engineering

School. Instead of giving the kids a hypothetical

class project, you give them something for real

where they carry it all the way from the gleam in

somebody's eye, not just stopping at the design,

which you normally do, but actually building a prototype, seeing what manufacturers' costs are, preparing a business plan, preparing cash flow projections,

capital for projection, etc., and actually selling it if

you can to industry. The main object of this is of course educational, to see if we can produce more

technological entrepreneurs. This thing is going to be run as a pretty rigorous experiment in the sense

that there will be a control group consisting of stu- dents who wanted to take this course but weren't al- lowed to because we put them into the control group

(if we can pull that off) and we have to see what percentage of students that took this course really

became technological entrepreneurs. These people

are needed not just in private industry, but in the

Government also. I'm talking of people like the

Hyman Rickovers and the Billy Mitchells and so

forth. This is one of the things that the National

Science Foundation is trying. The inherent policy

here, that we have to prove is, will such an approach

produce more technological entrepreneurs in the future, will these guys as a result of this particular program bring about more innovation, will new products

come into the marketplace, will they generate new

jobs, and so forth? The idea is that we have to come

up with some kind of a quantitative analysis to show

us what are the benefits provided for every buck that

we spent and if, hopefully, the stuff turns out to be

a success, then we could recommend it to the administration as a policy for the country; that is, set up a certain number of innovation centers at $1 million per year.

43
S. Yerazunis: I've worked with Jim a long time and

I have to agree with everything he's said. It's very

crucial, the rewards system, the recognitions; the

university makes it very difficult to do these things.

Funding from the outside is very important. I'm

going to visit with Jim to see how he's managed to keep his group going. At RPI we do have one

unusual project that has survived for 5 years, has

been very productive, because of NASA's support in

the neighborhood of $100,000 per year, addressing

problems relating to unmanned missions to Mars.

It's design, it's inventive, it's conceptual, it has the

continuity Jim can't get in his projects. We run about

30 students or more per year, with about 6 faculty.

They are very real problems; they go all the way

from ideas to prototypes, proving, feasibility, and so

forth. I would encourage this group in its workshop

on education to think very seriously about coming

out with some strong positions. I think that we can,

in fact, in education create the attitude in many stu- dents, fit them for this kind of activity, but we do

need support from the outside, until we can create an internal image that this activity is of intellectual

quality, stature, and scholarship, but to be measured

by different standards. At the university level we

face very formidable obstacles.

S. C. Gilfillan: I approve of Professor Adams' ideas

of project methods in invention, and the last

speaker, likewise. The sciences have advanced inseparably from the education in the sciences. I think

it must be the same in invention, and that chemists

and engineers should be trained, some of them, to be

inventors. Of course not all of them are suited for

that. A professor of engineering said that many of his

engineering pupils had the ambition to be a machine

jockey; that is, to get good pay from superintending

the operation of machinery. Perfectly useless to try

to make such a man an inventor. But others have it

in them, as could be determined by psychologic

tests, their early lives and so forth, to be inventors

and they might have definite courses in the art and

development of a science of invention.

R. Morse: The tax problems are complicated. I spent 4 months with more lawyers than I want to name, before we set up this Foundation. We do have

a tax exempt ruling which permits industry or others

to make donations on a tax exempt basis to the Foundation. We're using that money for operations. We

ourselves are not going to invest much money in

44

these ventures; we can use our sponsors, such as Dow, Monsanto, and Texas Instruments.

I would want to put in a plug, in the sense that we

are now at the Sloane School looking for a full professorship. RCA has given a million dollars to both the Sloane School and to the Harvard Business

School, in the field of innovation. So industry is not

completely unmindful of this problem, and I can't

speak for the academic characters with whom I cavort periodically, but I think it's fair to say that the

man for this job may not necessarily have to have all the usual trappings associated with publications. If you know anybody that wants the job, the chair is open. It's good pay.

I'd like to make another comment: that "entrepreneurship breeds entrepreneurship." In areas where entrepreneurship has worked, it tends to work

even more so. At Stanford it has worked, as you

know, and it has in Cambridge. On the other hand,

it doesn't happen very much up at Harvard, at least

not as much as at some of the other universities. But,

historically Harvard has taken a position, rightly or wrongly, that they're against any Government work

or classified information type of activity. All the presidents at MIT since I've been around there have al- ways said that MIT should become involved with industry; they do have an obligation to make jobs in

the area, and it's caught on. It's a thing to do. In the

Charpie Report we had the information that nothing

happens in Chicago or Philadelphia, vis-a-vis Stanford or Cambridge. And I think mainly because it had happened, the lawyers, the bankers, the total

community knew how to do things, and it was a thing one did. You did it because you knew another fellow

had done it. And I think this is terribly important.

J. Rabinow: That's a definition of climate.

L. L. D. Shaffer: I'm here representing what is called the Oregon Inventors Council. I enjoyed Mr.

Adams' comments very much because it's primarily

what we're doing up at the University of Oregon. He

said that in terms of the rewards system, the student

faces the low grade concept because of project work

and this makes it hard to get jobs. From my ex- perience up in the Pacific Northwest, we find that

the students that get involved in projects are eagerly

sought for by employers, because they've done

something different. They've taken the time to get

involved in something that's beyond the standard course work.
You mentioned three things: risk, time, and

money. The risk involved in terms of the peer group

judgment: this is true. But there are a few lights

shining perhaps in the darkness. The other day, for

example, a faculty member that hasn't spoken to me

in 5 years invited me for a cup of coffee, and maybe

I'll get a drink next time. But there are these things

coming about, sir, particularly when we find that

people in the area — Oregon and Washington — are coming into the university to talk about particular

projects, to say "thanks" or to talk about them and

to express their concern. And as a result this is a

countervailing power, you might say, that's starting

to react in terms of this peer group judgment concept. In terms of time, this is a hard one, because

quarter systems are quarter systems, and students

come and go. But there is one way that we found that

helps to resolve this, and that is the idea of continuity. Where one student leaves off, the next student

takes over and this is understood and built into the

program. So as a result we have projects that are not

only just a few years old but some that are four and

five, and I like to think they're getting better all the

time. With respect to money, this is a hard one and

we always look for funding because there are so many things to do.

The last comment I have to make, Mr. Adams, has

to do with your new interest in getting involved in

housing. If you plan to build these houses out of

wood, we'll be glad to sell you the lumber, and at a very good profit.

J. Adams: That sounds interesting; I'd like to visit

you if I could get to Eugene. One comment I wanted

to make, because I probably stuck my tongue

between my teeth and said the wrong thing. I think

the thing that the students see is an apparent risk.

We have the same experience, that companies,

especially these days, seem to be very eager for people who show any sort of project interest or entrepreneurial interest, as opposed to straight en- gineering science. And in fact we get so happy with

our students we usually give them very high grades

in the courses so their overall grades are good anyway. However, this still doesn't keep a lot of stu- dents from being fairly worried when they look down

the path from in front and don't see the conventional

rewards system existing there.

R. J. Kuntz: Since there are quite a few individuals

here from academia, I'd like to comment on your

presentation related to something that's been of

great concern to us. And that is what has happened

to the Bachelor's Degree program, and the drift away

from applied technology, or the technology content

of the Bachelor's program. I think everyone realizes

that an engineer is probably 20 times more likely to be an inventor than just about anyone else involved

in the process. Did I hear a rumble somewhere?

J. Rabinow: That happens to be correct, even

though there are physicists present who are also

good engineers.

R. J. Kuntz: And I think it's interesting to note that

if we examine the basic curriculum for a Bachelor's

in engineering it is very difficult to find any guidance

whatsoever in the area of invention or innovation, or anything at all about the patent system or the operation of patent law, or the process one has to go

through, and last, but not least, what the individual

is going to be asked to sign when he accepts employment as an engineer when he graduates. If we're

concerned about it we ought to be providing some

input to these new people entering the profession,

since they are more likely to have an influence on

the whole patent system, as to what it's all about and

provide some guidance so that they can use their intellect to contribute to the system. If we don't, the

system, I'm afraid, is in real trouble. Would you like

to comment on what Stanford is doing in that area?

J. Adams: I think there is a change. I think Stanford is, in fact, putting more such things as patents

back into the program. We start a new graduate program this year which devotes roughly a quarter to things having to do with entrepreneurials. protection

of intellectual property and so on. There's a great

variation in engineering schools, and being

somewhat full of ego, I tend to think of Stanford as one of the so-called leading institutions. I think you

can see a swing back towards application. There are

a lot of schools which are still swinging away and I don't know what to say there. It's kind of horrifying.

J. Rabinow: Many schools where I have talked oc- casionally are teaching creativity and invention; it takes a long time to change courses, but it's being

changed.

I. Fleischmann: I think this is about as good a time

as any to get in a commercial for one of the programs

at the Patent Office. I want to credit a former Commissioner of Patents under whose administration we

45
got underway our Annual Briefing Conference:

that's the former Commissioner Ed Brenner, who's

in our midst, and our current commissioners have

made it possible to continue the program. Your

discussion this afternoon has concerned me basically because of the lack of information imparted by

members of the faculty of our universities to the en- gineering students, and we have this information

from the 100 plus new examiners we bring in from

our colleges and universities each year. I want to

refer to our Annual Briefing Conference; No. 7 will

take place on February 15, 1974. We invite the members, the faculty, the deans of our engineering

schools, to come to the Patent Office for a one-day

program to get a feel and appreciation for the patent

system in action. Your chairman this afternoon has

participated in the program for the past 6 years, and

we have found that those who attend reap a great

deal of benefit from this program. So a cordial invitation is extended to attend our Annual Briefing Conference. And if special coverage is necessary at any

time during the year at the Patent Office, we will be

glad to assist in every way possible.

46
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of Conference on the Public

Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Invention of the Transistor — "An Example of Creative-Failure

Methodology"*

William Shockley

Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J. 07974

Presents a general historical perspective on the invention of the transistor, from the standpoint of the

patents issued and the men involved in the inventions. Five applications for patents on transistor devices were filed prior to the first public announcement of the transistor on June 30, 1948. The development of the essential inventive ideas for these five patents

is described.

Several attempts to make semiconductor amplifiers failed. These failures were used creatively by the team involved— an example of effective research, of which one of the principal elements is the "will to think." The day-to-day development of important ideas and the interaction between them are presented.

The story is continued through the invention and realization of the junction transistor.

Key words: Creative-failure methodology; invention of transistor; junction transistor; patents; semiconductor amplifiers; will-to-think.

1. Introduction

1.1. Three Men and Five Patents

The invention of the transistor can be described

from many different viewpoints. I shall use several

in this lecture. For the framework upon which to as- semble and interrelate the many specific incidents

that form the pattern of the story, I have chosen one

of the fundamental features of inventions in presentday society — patents.

Five applications for patents on transistor devices were filed prior to the first public announcement of

the transistor on June 30, 1948. I shall describe how

the essential inventive ideas for these five patents

developed. In the story I shall use these five inventions as landmarks on the path to creativity. Thus

from the point of view of specific technical contributions, the story of the invention of the transistor

might be appropriately called a tale of five patents.

But in justice the story might also be told as a tale

of many men. An attempt to partition appropriate

credit to every individual whose contributions were

significant to the final achievements is an impossible

'Copy right retained by Dr. Shockley and Bell Laboratories.

task for at least two reasons: too many individuals

were involved and satisfactory criteria for judging

the relative merit of the contributions do not exist.

Therefore I shall follow the decision of the Nobel

committee that awarded the physics prize for 1956

jointly to John Bardeen, Walter Housner Brattain

and me. Furthermore, we are the three who did contribute what has proved to be of most enduring value

in the five patents.

The social consequences of the application of the

transistor invention are, of course, what is really of

most significance. However, they are not a part of

the story of the invention. There is, however, another

significant aspect that it is appropriate to discuss

here — the aspect that is part of the title of this

lecture— "Creative-Failure Methodology." The transistor was not invented until after several attempts

to make semiconductor amplifiers had failed.

How these failures were used creatively by the team

involved and under the stimulating conditions for

research at Bell Laboratories is an important feature

of the history. Several phrases give meaningful insights about effective research. Most important, and

most difficult to create, is "the will to think" — the

theme that runs through "the magic month" when

47
the point-contact transistor was invented and the fol- lowing 5 weeks that led to the invention of minority

carrier injection in the junction transistor.

The relationship of patents to motivation has a long history in the United States. The key concept

was embodied in the U.S. Constitution in section 8,

Powers of Congress. The first power delegated to Congress concerns taxes. The relevant power is the

eighth. It concerns patents and reads:

"The Congress shall have power to promote the

progress of science and useful arts, by securing for

limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive

right to their respective writings and discoveries."

This "exclusive rights" paragraph has, indeed,

contributed forcefully to our Nation's technological

progress. I regard it as an outstanding example of

the practical conservative wisdom of the framers of

the Constitution. It draws into the service of the Nation, in addition to those idealistic or compulsive inventors whose motivations are either altruistic or instinctive, also those profit-motivated inventors who

would regard it as naively improvident to fail to realize gains from the fruits of their efforts. The patent

law, by offering the competitive advantage of legal

protection of exclusive rights, appeals even to selfish

motivations and induces those who would otherwise

be as secretive as possible about their discoveries to share their knowledge and contribute to the progress

of others — even to the progress of potential competitors. To be granted the patent that ensures the ex- clusive rights, the inventor is required to make his

discoveries available in understandable written form

in the specification of his patent application.

Furthermore, his teaching must stand the test of

being adequate for one versed in the related practical art to be able to achieve the results claimed in

the invention.

A closely related aspect of the patent law is frequently misunderstood by young workers in industrial research laboratories. Many young

scientists resent being restrained by their organizations from telling the world about their accomplishments until after patents have been filed. They come

to the erroneous conclusion that it is the patent

system that prevents them from claiming scientific

recognition for their work. Actually, the opposite is true. If it were not for the rights that their organizations acquire by obtaining patents, then the effective

way for the organizations to receive returns from investments in research would be to maintain secrecy.

In other words the patent system permits, rather

than prevents, publications.

A vital input to the preparation of this contribution

came as a by-product of procedures at Bell Laboratories designed to optimize the advantages offered

by the "exclusive rights" paragraph in the Powers of

Congress. In determining which of two competing

inventors should be granted the patent, priority of

conception and diligence are weighted heavily. The

date of conception of the invention is usually

established by the record of when it was clearly disclosed to and understood by a coworker. Usually

such endorsements by witnesses are made on the

pages of laboratory notebooks. These records are of

vital importance in establishing facts in patent litigation. Consequently, information on the issuance and

status of such notebooks is carefully maintained in

organizations like Bell Laboratories.

These carefully preserved records were essential

in the research that I undertook 25 years after the

birth of the transistor that led me to identify the

"magic month" and to reconstruct the sequence of

events and their interactions during that period. This

research is discussed in detail in sections 3 and 4.

1.2. Can Creativity Be Taught?

One of my principal purposes in selecting the format for this presentation is to choose one that might

encourage creativity on the part of the readers. A

basic truth that the history of the invention of the

transistor reveals is that the foundations of transistor

electronics were created by making errors and fol- lowing hunches that failed to give what was ex- pected. Pure inspiration contributed less to progress

than did perseverance and the willingness to try

again after an experiment or an idea had failed to deliver the wanted result — evidence for the truth of

the saying that "inspiration is ninety percent perspiration." "Creative-Failure Methodology" is a phrase designed to characterize the importance of

making constructive responses to failures and errors. The emphasis on this aspect of transistor history in my presentation is intended to stimulate the

creativity of receptive readers who may learn from

our experience that failures need not be accepted

simply as causes for low self-esteem but can instead

be recognized as opportunities to learn so that these

failures become stepping stones on the path to

creativity.

48
Can creativity be taught by experiences that illustrate how progress can be made by floundering

around while looking for the hunch that will produce

a breakthrough? My experience in some educational

experiments makes me believe that creativity can be

enhanced by teaching students to live more comfortably with their own limitations. This can be ac- complished through experiences involving searching

unsuccessfully for hidden key attributes in problem

situations that they then do discover largely on their

own and thus learn that persistence does pay off. The teaching method uses a diagram called the

creative search pattern. 1 This is illustrated in

figure 1. In general it is not intended to be a map to

1 For details see "Mechanics" by William Shockley and Walter A. Gong. (Charles

E. Merrill Books, Inc., Columbus. Ohio. 1966).

I CSP: Creative Search Pattern

Question (Chaos)

9

Hunch. Hunch

Familiarity

Transfer

Associative^

Memory |'

Old ACORS

Result

\

New ACOR

Irrelevant old ACORS

Payoff f & II

hunch • if

Y.u ok

«"• I «*»

Search -thinking

tools

1. Action

2. Simplest cases

3. Pencil-paper

4. Symbols.diagrams

5. One to one correspondence,

analogies

6. Idealized

limiting cases 7 Conceptual

experiments

Memory reservoir

of ACORS

[Scientific logical structure ACORS QLF Qualified Law Form

Key Attributes

Comparison

operations

Orderly

Relationship

.What it is always true

CE Qualified-eduction

When No matter what

When not : But not if

tell how to do research but instead to understand the

natural blundering process of finding one's way

when unfamiliar material is dealt with. Thus, it indicates that a number of poor hunches will occur

that serve to increase one's familiarity with the subject matter involved. If one has stored in his memory

a collection of patterns that are logically similar to the one that is finally found in the problem, then a payoff hunch is likely to occur in which the benefits

of the previous experience are transferred to the new

situation — a relationship established by associative

memory.

This type of teaching has been tried experimentally in high school, undergraduate college situations

and in my own experience with graduate students

and in my own research. The result of an experiment

involving 3 successive years of Stanford freshmen

students is shown in figure 2. The data there was

gathered 4 years after the first teaching experiment

occurred. The students who entered by freshman

seminar entitled "Mental Tools for Scientific Think4.0

at<o

x

X

Q

I

o

<

Of. ><

o

Q.

UJO

<

O

3.5

3.0 -

2.5

2 0 -

1.8

EXPERI- CON- GPA

MENTAL TROL PERIOD • O 67-68

A A 68-69

69-70

37=N=55 I

A

a

A

A

A

A °

*

¥ m '!««

|o •*>

O A

RANDOM

I * SELECTION \

I A I

I

500 550 600 650 700 750 800

AVE. SAT (WEIGHTED: 67% MATH., 33% VERBAL)

Figure 1. The Creative Search Pattern (CSP), including seven

search-thinking tools, and the scientific logical structure based on ACOR, QLF and QE that are four basic science-thinking

tools.

The hunches that do not pay off are examples of creative-failure methodology.

FIGURE 2. Results of a controlled experiment on randomly

selected applicants for a Stanford Universityfreshman seminar

on mental tools for scientific thinking.

In the four quarters subsequent to the two in which the seminar wa9 taken, the "experimental" students outperformed the controls at a significance level of better than 0 • 05.

49
ing" took the seminar for the first two quarters of

their freshman year. The seminar was over-subscribed and I selected the experimental students

who took it by constructing matched groups of stu- dents, based on their scholastic aptitude tests for

verbal and mathematical ability (with math rated

twice as heavily as verbal). From these matched

groups I selected by chance approximately half of

the students in the range of scores shown on the

figure. The follow-up study of the effectiveness of

the seminar on the students' intellectual performance consisted of determining the cumulative

grade point average for the following four quarters,

comprising the final quarter of the freshman year

and the three quarters of the sophomore year. In- spection of figure 2 shows that on the average, stu- dents who took the seminar obtained better grades

for the following four quarters than those who did

not although both groups were matched in terms of

their potential when they entered Stanford and their

interest in studying my seminar. The result is significant in the sense that if the points shown in the ran- dom selection region of figure 2 had been assigned

randomly to the experimental and control group,

then there is only about 1 chance in 20 that the experimental group would have ended up as much

ahead as they actually did.

Somewhat similar results were obtained with

ninth grade students and with freshmen students at San Jose State College. It is on the basis of this

background that I hope a description of the failures

and confusions that went into the creating of the

transistor will contribute towards the creativity of

readers of this article.

1.3. Format of This Presentation

This presentation is organized by presenting in

section 2 a general historical perspective on the invention of the transistor starting with some of the

factors that motivated the workers as early as 1939,

8 years before the invention of the transistor. This

treatment hits the high points and does not delve

deeply into the interactions that occurred among the

three men and led to the five patents. For con- venience in following this discussion, table 1 presents certain key information on the five patents.

(The reader with sophistication may consider a table

with at least two and perhaps four patents for

transistors to be an inconsistency in an article havTable 1. The Five Transistor Device Patents filed before the Public Announcement on 30 June 1947

No.

Patent dates Inventors c Invention d Conception

Reduction to practiceDiv. CLP.

FUed Issued b

1 26 Feb 48 3 Oct 50 WHB RBG Electrolyte F.E.T 20 Nov 47 21 Nov 47 0

2 26 Feb 48 3 Oct 50 JB Inver. Layer IGFET 23 Nov 47 ? 0

3 26 Feb 48 17 Jul 51 RBG Elect-Form Inver. Layer Dec 47 ? Dec 47 ? 0

4 17 Jun 48 a 3 Oct 50 JB WHB Point-Contact Transistor 15 Dec 47 23 Dec 47 3

5 26 Jun 48 25 Sep 51 WS Junction Transistor 23 Jan 48 e Apr 50 e 3

g

a Originally filed 26 Feb 48; abandoned and re filed to include

current gain at collector. "Patent numbers: 2,524,034; 2,524,033; 2,560,792; 2,524,035;

2,569,347.

°John Bardeen, Walter Houser Brattain, Robert Bernard

Gibney, William (Bradford) Shockley.

"Modern terminology is used: IGFET = insulated-gate, fieldeffect transistor. (1) is inversion-layer channel FET with electrolyte gate. (2) is IGFET with inversion layer channel. (3) is electrolytic processing to form inversion layer. (4) and (5) are the basic

point contact and junction transistor patents.

e The dates are late November 1947 for the p-n junction with

drop of electrolyte, see discussion of Claim 29 under 4 Dec 47

in the "Magic Month," subsection III A. 'Includes "divisions" and "continuations in part" of these

patent applications.

e One CLP. on negative resistance from transit time, con- ceived on 24 Jan 48, had in turn two additional C.I.P.'s.

50
ing in its title the phrase "the invention of the

transistor." Perhaps it was a compromise. Consider

an alternative attempt to be more precise such as "the inventions of the point-contact and the junction

transistor together with several precursors.")

Table 2 contains a listing of amplifying principles

that had been conceived prior to the public an- nouncement of the transistor. These are discussed

in the following sections.

Table 2. Amplification concepts conceived before public

announcement on 30 June 1948

Field Effect Schottky-Barrier and Depletion '39 Insulated-Gate Thin Layer ('32?) '45 Inversion-Layer Electrolyte '47 Inversion-Layer Insulated Gate '47 Junction Field-Effect Transistor '47

Point-contact collector current gain '47-('48)

voltage gain from reverse bias p-n junction '47 injection across p-n junction '48 negative resistance from transit time-effects '48

New research was carried out in preparing this

lecture. In September of 1972, about 2 months earli- er than the 25th Anniversary of the invention of the

transistor, I undertook research on just what had

gone on at the time of the invention of the transistor.

Probably no one had previously taken all of the

laboratory notebooks of the three men principally involved and of their colleagues and endeavored to trace out the day by day development of important

ideas and the interactions between them. The details

of this history have been organized in section 3 entitled Creative-Failure Methodology and "The Will to Think," the section that follows the historical perspective.

Section 4 extends into 1951 so as to cover the conversion of the junction transistor from a patent application to the device that launched the solid-state era about 1951.

2. Historical Perspective on the

Invention of the Transistor

2.1. Pre-WorldWarll

One of the most important motivations in the entire transistor program at Bell Telephone Laboratories was imparted to me by Mervin J. Kelly shortly

after he had been promoted to Director of Research

from his position as Head of the Vacuum Tube

Development Department. My personal contact with

Kelly began in 1936, when he recruited me as a fresh

Ph. D. from MIT to work with C. J. Davisson in the

Physical Research Department. Kelly arranged for

me to have an initial indoctrination experience with

high frequency vacuum tubes. This included spending some months of 1937 in the Vacuum Tube Department. During that time Kelly gave me an

eloquent pep talk — one that had a long-lasting influence on my own motivations. He pointed out that

relays in telephone exchanges caused problems and were expensive to maintain. He felt that electronics

should contribute to telephone exchanges in addition

to making long distance transmission possible.

After I left the Vacuum Tube Department and

returned to Physical Research, I kept Kelly's objective in mind. The move put me in contact with

Walter Brattain and his interest with copper oxide

rectifiers and with the theories of their mechanisms

of rectification then recently developed. On the 29th

of December 1939 I wrote a disclosure of what in

principle was a sound concept of a semiconductor

amplifier. The leisurely time scale of the ensuing

events is interesting to compare with the accelerated

developments that occurred 8 years later during the

"magic month" discussed in the next section.

Research on my notebook entries show that experiments based on the 1939 disclosure were carried out

before 6 February 1940. However, my disclosure

waited nearly 2 months, until 27 February 1940, before it was witnessed by J. A. Becker, Walter Brattain's supervisor. Two days later, on leap year day of

1940, Walter Brattain and I both signed a modification of the earlier disclosure. This disclosure, shown

in figure 3, shows a more or less standard copper

oxide varistor unit with two lines of metal forming

electrodes on the surface of the oxide. It would today

be called a Schottky-barrier, field-effect transistor.

51
^ *S

-4

|c2^~o^^ <r>*.'J&.

t

"fc. ^Ife^c. Ur-4 ^ ^

«L~i>-

«

ICS /K. CI

Figure 3. 77ie disclosure of a theoretically-sound, Schottkybarrier, field-effect transistor, signed by W. Shockley and W.

H. Brattain on 29 February 1940.

It was prophetic of developments that were to come

20 years later as parts of integrated circuits using

field-effect transistors.

The early results that Brattain and I obtained in

experiments related to these disclosures were not

encouraging. Shortly after, we quite willingly

responded to calls to apply ourselves to different areas of research and development related to America's entry into World War II. Eight years elapsed

after the 1940 disclosure before significant field effects in copper oxide were achieved. These 1948

results were reported in one of the three letters to the editor in the Physical Review published simultaneously with the public announcement of the

transistor by Bell Telephone Laboratories.

Perspective on the hiatus in research on semiconductor physics is clearly presented in laboratory

notebook 18194 which Walter Brattain used both before and after his period of war related activities. His

last prewar entry on page 39 is dated 7 November

1941— one month before Japan was to bomb Pearl

Harbor. A gap of more than four and one half years

elapsed before Brattain made his next entry on 23

April 1946. Page 40 starts with one sentence: "The

war is over." The remainder of page 40 describes an experiment with a point contact on germanium: "All

points rectify n-type." It was a prophetic combination of structure and semiconductor. Eighteen

months later on 16 December 1947 on page 193 of

the same notebook Brattain was to report that the

addition of a second gold point contact on a piece of

n-type germanium achieved power gain.

In 1945, during the last months of the war, Kelly once again took actions that indirectly contributed

to the transistor program. He invited me to make a

series of return visits from the Pentagon back to Bell

Telephone Laboratories. I returned full time immediately after the explosion of the atomic bombs

that ended the war with Japan.

Kelly's invitation to visit was preparation for my

post war position at Bell Telephone Laboratories as Co-Supervisor of a solid-state physics research

group. A visit to the Laboratories' Holmdel facility

had reawakened my interest in semiconductor amplifiers. At Holmdel Kelly had arranged a demonstration of a radio set lacking vacuum tubes. In this

radio the amplification was accomplished by pointcontact detectors. These semiconductor devices

acted as negative resistances, a phenomenon

probably due to heating effects that lowered their re- sistance as occurs for thermistors. These devices indicated that semiconductors held exciting potentials

but they themselves had many shortcomings — so many that they were failures in pointing the way to make semiconductor amplifiers — but creativefailures in stimulating the will to think of better approaches.

During my visits in 1945, a series of ideas led me

again to the concept of a field-effect amplifier. I do

not now recall, or for that matter did the research

that I did on my laboratory notebooks while preparing this paper suggest, that in 1945 I saw clearly how

closely these field effect ideas were related to the

copper-oxide concepts of 1939 and 1940. The

sequence of ideas in 1945 had a different starting

point than the Schottky barrier of 1939.

The basic field-effect concept of 1945 is shown in

figure 4. Here a thin layer of n-type semiconductor

is represented. This layer forms one plate of a paral52
INPUT

OUTPUT

(a)

INPUT

+ + + +

OUTPUT

(b) INPUT

+ i -IOUTPUT

© 0 © -WV-]

(c)

Figure 4. The theory of a field-effect transistor using a thin layer of semi-conductor: (a) The structure of the transistor with no control voltage applied. (6) The situation prevailing

when a positive charge is placed on a control plate so as to increase the conductance of the semiconductor, (c) The situ- ation when a negative charge is put on the capacitor plate so

as to reduce the conductance of the semiconductor.

lei plate capacitor, the other plate being a sheet of

metal. Charging the capacitor alters the number of

electrons on the semiconductor. This modulates the

conductance of the layer much as did the reverse

bias on the copper plate in the concept of figure 3. A number of experiments on the field-effect structure of figure 4 were undertaken. These had become

possible in 1945 because of the great advances in

semiconductor technology that had taken place in

point-contact, or "cat's-whisker," radar detectors

during World War II. The work at Holmdel had

played a key role in this and so had also the metallurgical work at the Murray Hill Laboratory. Silicon and

germanium, both elements of the fourth column of

the periodic table, had become two of the technologically best-controlled semiconductors in existence.

Methods of using impurities from the third and fifth

columns of the periodic table to act as acceptors and

donors had been developed. The designations p-type

and n-type were in common use. Compensation of

donors and acceptors had been used at Murray Hill

to control or adjust resistivity and, indeed, had been

patented by J. H. Scaff and H. C. Theuerer. A particularly important form of high purity, n-type germanium had been developed. In point-contact

rectifiers it would stand high reverse voltages, also

called "back" voltages, and was referred to as "high

back-voltage germanium." This germanium was to play a vital role in the point-contact transistor of

patent 4 in table 1. Thin films of silicon that had been deposited, lar- gely by the work of Gordon Teal, seemed ideally

adapted to field-effect experiments. My calculations

showed that very substantial modulation of the re- sistance should occur. None was observed. On 23

June 1945, 1 wrote that the effects were at least 1.500

times smaller than what I predicted should have

been observable.

I brought my calculations to the attention of John

Bardeen. In October of 1945, he had joined the

Laboratories as a member of the solid-state group.

He was a theoretical physicist with a background in

solid-state physics founded on research carried out

while he was obtaining his Ph. D. under Professor

Eugene Wigner of Princeton University. When I did

research for the 25th Anniversary of the transistor,

I found an entry in Bardeen's laboratory notebook

recording my request to him to check my calculations. On November 7, 1945, 2 weeks later, he

verified my formula.

2.2. Scientific Aspects of the Failure of the

Field-Effect

Attempts to observe the field-effect and use it for

amplification failed during 1945 and early 1946. But

this failure became a stepping stone on the path to

creativity. On 19 March 1946 John Bardeen recorded

53
in his notebook his explanation for the failure: the

electrons drawn to the surface of the semiconductor,

when it was negatively charged as represented in

figure 3, were not free to move as were the electrons

in the interior. Instead, they were trapped in surface

states, as represented in figure 5, so that they were

immobile. Thus, in effect, the surface states trapped

the induced charge of electrons and thereby

shielded the interior of the semiconductor from the

influence of the positively charged control plate. The

externally applied field was thus blocked at the sur- face and did not penetrate.

n r-i m

^ -©

-©

+ +

r=i fh

+ +

r=i

-e»-§ ®-

FIGURE 5. Bardeen's explanation of the failure of the field

effect structure through the presence of surface states.

(a) The structure with no applied voltage, fb) The capture in surface states of the electrons induced by the surface charge.

"Creative-Failure Methodology" is the phrase that

I formulated some two decades later to describe

what we intuitively put into action when frustrated

by the failure of the field-effect experiments. Bardeen's concept of surface states as shielding the interior from external fields gave a practical significance to what had before been largely a theoretical concept. Both Igor Tamm in Russia (co-winner of

the 1958 Nobel prize in physics for work on Cerenkov radiation) and I had done theoretical calculations showing that surface states should exist.

However, no significant observable implications of

these had been proposed. Indeed our surface states

were of a highly mathematical nature and related to perfect crystalline surfaces. In contrast, Bardeen's

concept of surface states was more empirical. His

states were undefined in terms of their quantum

mechanical origin and allowed for the possibility that

defects on the surface might contribute to their ex- istence—concepts in harmony with knowledge about

the states due to donors and acceptors in the interior

of the semiconductor.

Bardeen quickly recognized the value of his

proposal. His surface states had broad implications

and their use was not restricted solely to explaining

the field-effect failure. His surface states also

resolved a number of mysteries about semiconductor surfaces including their rectifying characteristics

when contacted either by metal points or else by

other semiconductors — a dramatic example of creative-failure methodology in action.

Our semiconductor research team abandoned ef- forts to make a field-effect transistor and instead

emphasized research on new science related to Bardeen's surface states. The course of action that we

intuitively put into action is what I have subsequently analyzed as an effective feature of creative-failure methodology valuable for research re- lated to applications:

I have referred to this creative principle as respect

for the scientific aspects of practical problems.

Figure 6 represents how this principle works in

general with the interpretation of its vital role in

creating the transistor indicated by the phrases in

parentheses: The attempt to make a semiconductor

CREATIVE PRINCIPLE: RESPECT FOR

SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

APPROACH TARGET

X

PRACTICAL

PROBLEM

(NO FIELD EFFECT)

PRACTICAL

RESULT

(TRANSISTOR)

7V

1

n

RESEARCH ON

RELATED

SCIENCE (SURFACE

STATES)

NEW EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS: NEW

FACTS

NEW

BASIC SCIENCE

lw=S I JAN 731

FIGURE 6. Respect for the scientific aspects of practical problems—a feature of the creative failure methodology which led

to the invention of the transistor.

54
amplifier was blocked by a practical problem. But

how we responded to this failure to reach the practical result was creative. The failure stimulated Bardeen's creative suggestion of the surface states. Our

research on the science related to the surface states

led to new experimental conditions and to new observations. As discussed below under the "magic

month" heading of section 3, the new experimental

conditions produced a particularly revealing observation that suggested that at long last the blocking

effect of the surface states had been overcome. This

new possibility motivated "the will to think"

phenomenon that led to the phenomenal degree of

creativity that followed immediately thereafter.

There may be today, 25 years after the invention

of the transistor, an ironic aspect of the emphasis

that I have given to "respect for the scientific

aspects of practical problems" as an important creative principle in industrial research. By assigning so much emphasis to this feature of creative-failure

methodology — a feature that I helped to establish — I may have become out-dated and be reflecting at- titudes that are more appropriate to the experiences

that I recall of the 1940's than they are to industrial

research today.

In 1946 when the semiconductor research group

focussed emphasis on the basic science, I recall that

leaders of some other groups of the Research Department suggested, emphatically, that we should

put more stress on practical semiconductor

problems — those related closely to the difficulties in

the telephone plant. Our group was of one mind and

we followed the wise course of working, not upon

such practical but messy semiconductors as selenium, copper oxide and nickel oxide, but instead on

the best understood semiconductors of all— silicon

and germanium. For these semiconductors, not all of the theoretical concepts, developed largely during

World War II, had been experimentally verified; ac- cordingly, we elected to concentrate upon the resulting gaps in this branch of science, among them the

recently proposed surface states. We felt that it was

better to understand these two simplest, elemental

semiconductors in depth rather than to attempt to add piecemeal contributions to a variety of other

materials. Thus we assigned highest priority to the

primarily scientific aspects. But in our selection of

emphasis, we did choose those scientific aspects

that were related to the problems that blocked our approach to the long-range, practical goal — the creation of a semiconductor amplifier, later to be called

the transistor.

My feeling of being out of date occurred after I had stressed the creative principle of "respect for

scientific aspects of practical problems" at Bell

Laboratories during a rehearsal in February 1973 of

a lecture version of this presentation. During a subsequent luncheon conference, a young scientist told

me that he was puzzled about my reasons for according such emphasis to the "respect for the scientific

aspects of practical problems." The approach that

I endorsed so vehemently seemed so natural to him

that it scarcely called for any emphasis at all. I felt separated from his appraisal by a "generation gap":

What in 1947 had been, in the eyes of at least some

colleagues, a pioneering advance from the Edisonian

methods of trial and error to achieve practical goals

was now, 25 years later, to be taken for granted. And

the transistor story had probably helped to bring this

about. By giving such a strong sales pitch to what

today did not need selling, I had made my words

become an echo of the past.

2.3. The Invention of the Point-Contact

Transistor

The research on silicon and germanium and their

surface states led to a series of experiments. As

described on figure 6, these created new experimental conditions and led to the discovery of new scientific facts. A detailed description and interpretation

of the sequence of events is the subject of section 3. As will be described there, a period that I have

called "the magic month" began with a breakthrough observation on 17 November 1947 and

culminated with what I shall take as the starting

point here — the reduction to practice of the pointcontact transistor— an achievement recorded, as discussed above, on page 193 of Brattain's notebook.

The famous prototype structure of the point-contact

transistor came into existence on 16 December

1947 — the date at which Walter Brattain used a wedge-shaped piece of plastic to press two narrowlyspaced, parallel-line, gold contacts against a block of

high-back voltage germanium. This prototype is shown in figure 7. The observation that it amplified

and oscillated is recorded in that very famous

notebook entry— the one written by Walter Brattain

in 1947 on the day before Christmas. It appears in

figure 8. The date of 23 December cited in figure 8

55

533-210 OL - 74 - 5
FIGURE 7. The original point-contact transistor structure comprising the plate of n-type germanium and two line-contacts of

gold supported on a plastic wedge.

and shown as the date of "reduction to practice" in

table 1 is the generally accepted date for the birth of

the transistor. However, 15 and 16 December 1947,

are equally significant because, as discussed under

those dates in section 3. these are the dates of con- ception and of first successful amplification. Actually, amplification was obtained even earlier with

semiconductor devices using electrolytes. But these

earlier devices had such poor frequency response

that they failed to hold promise of developing into

useful amplifiers. But they were creative-failures

and did directly stimulate the research that led to the point-contact transistor. One such device was

covered by the Brattain-Gibney invention, patent 1 of table 1. Another was incorporated in patent 5, the

junction transistor.

The point-contact transistor, patent 4 of table 1 was originally filed, not on 17 June 1948 as shown in

table 1, but on February 26, 1948, simultaneously

with patents 1, 2 and 3. The issued version of patent

4 states in its first paragraph that it is a continuationin-part of the earlier application that had actually

been abandoned. The reason for abandoning and

refiling (I was told by R. J. Guenther shortly before

he retired as General Patent Attorney almost exactly on the date of the 25th Anniversary of the transistor)

was that the original filing failed to mention current

gain at the collector— an important feature in obtaining power gain and in simplifying the design of circuits. (Current gain is covered in the issued patent

in col. 10, line 35 and col. 16, line 26.)

Patent 3, of table 1, involved treatments of

semiconductor surfaces electrolytically — concepts

important to the theory of the point-contact

transistor. Both versions of patent 4 depended heavily upon the concept of an inversion layer on the

semiconductor surface caused by surface charges,

related to Bardeen's surface states. The most appropriate surface conditions for these charges were

produced by electrolytic treatments, specifically

those treatments that were the subject of patent

number 3 of table 1; indeed an example of the treat- ment specified in patent 3 is described in detail in a paragraph of the point contact transistor patent (col.

8, lines 8 to 44).

The concept of surface inversion layers was an es- sential stepping stone along the path of development

of transistor technology. It was also prophetic. As

discussed further below, in actuality inversion layers

were probably not important for the point-contact

transistors in pilot production in 1948 nor for the

junction transistors or junction field-effect

transistors that came somewhat later. However, the

surface-state concepts of inversion layers disclosed

in patents 2 and 4 are probably now playing an es- sential role in MOS (metal-oxide-semiconductor)

field-effect transistors in integrated circuits.

The importance attributed to the inversion layer

in early 1948 may be appreciated by reading the

claims of the point-contact transistor patent; for ex- ample, claim 1:

"1. A circuit element which comprises a block of

semiconductive material at which the body is of one

conductivity type and a thin surface layer is of the

opposite conductivity type, and an emitter electrode

making contact with said layer, a collector or electrode making contact with said layer disposed to collect current spreading from said emitter electrode,

and a base electrode making contact with the body

of the block."

56
(a)

DATE Jb-tJt ? / l1?7

CASE No. J ?l 7 f- ?

8 DATE fyjLc % f \1H7

CASE No. ^ P 1 "3 ?

- 7

Cl^,- JLe^Jta^r^ ****

s

4.

2.1 iV 5

!

• J

(b)

**rMr- ^ ^ ^

;t^r^

H, ft, W*^,

jl L si ^Ltes /i^*- u--^

l cri' ; -

<H7

i

l

i»,K<V*T*-

rJ

i i •

FIGURE 8. Notebook entry of 24 December 1947 describing the point-contact transistor demonstration of 23 December 1947 at Bell Telephone Laboratories.

FIGURE 9. Patent figures for the point-contact transistor (patent 4 of table 1 )

Figure 8 shows the wedge structure of figure 7. Figure 16 represents the potential profile which traps holes at the surface. The importance of the inversion layer on the surface

is emphasized in figure 3 (copied from patent 3 where details are clearer than in the corresponding figure of patent 4).

57
These concepts are clearly illustrated in figure 9. Figure 3 (taken from patent 3 is almost identical with

a more congested figure of patent 4) shows the inversion layer and the emitter and collector electrodes.

Figure 8 from patent 4 shows the drawing of the

wedge structure discussed for figure 7. Figure 16

from patent 4 shows a potential energy diagram for

the p-type channel of the inversion layer, the holes

being represented as small circles.

Means of forming the inversion layer were a central topic in patent 3. Indeed, the final claim 9 of the

issued patent read directly upon the inversion layer

shown in figure 4.

"9. A block of high back voltage germanium

material of which the main body is of n-conductivity

type, having on a surface thereof a thin layer of the

order of 10~5 cm in thickness whose characteristics are of the p-type, separated from the body of the

block by a high resistance barrier."

Thus it is evident that patent 3 of table 2 contains a claim essential to important general concepts of the

first four patents. (The significance of this feature

was put in perspective by Bardeen in his Nobel lecture as quoted below, see 9-12 December 1947 in

sec. 3.)

The prominence of Gibney's name on the five

patents and in the notebooks raised questions in my

mind as I did the research for this lecture. What had

happened to Gibney? Why had he left? I wondered

if lack of recognition in respect to his significant contributions might have provoked him to go away mad

during the following 6 months or so. My speculation

was unsound. I learned the truth by telephoning to him at Los Alamos. He had indeed left with a dislike

for his situation in New Jersey— but not with his

situation at Bell Telephone Laboratories. He was

mad at the New Jersey weather. The New Jersey

winters had contributed to strep throats, colds, and

other health problems for all of his family including

his children. The problems had been most severe for

the preceding winter of 1946-1947. Furthermore, it turned out that both he and Mrs. Gibney, although

they had not known this when they married, had

years before fallen in love with New Mexico. When

in the fall of 1947 Gibney saw an advertisement from

the Los Alamos Laboratories seeking a man with his

scientific background, he applied. Actually, during

part of the magic month, he was at Los Alamos for

interviews. Since the spring of 1948 he has been at

Los Alamos. For 20 years he was in charge of a group

doing physical metallurgy and graphite research.

I had recruited Gibney into the group shortly after

it was formed to add otherwise lacking expertise in

physical chemistry. The great loss that we suffered

when he left for Los Alamos, prior to the announce- ment of the transistor, was later balanced by the

acquisition of Morgan Sparks. Sparks played, as I shall describe in section 4, an essential role in bringing useful junction transistors into existence.

Speculations and Anecdotes Related to the Public

Announcement of the Transistor

What was the scientific atmosphere at the time

the transistor was announced? What was the press

reaction? Would, in any event, the transistor have

soon been invented somewhere else? What were some of the key scientific matters left undecided at the time of the announcement? I shall endeavor to put these questions in perspective by describing my

own recollections of the events that occurred at approximately the same time — close to the first of July

1948 when r news stories of the invention of the

transistor first appeared. Some of the important

scientific questions concern the role of the inversion

layer on the surface and the phenomena associated

with the emitter point.

Figure 10 is a chart that was used at the public

presentation to describe the region of interaction

that surrounds the emitter point. Power gain occurs when the collector point is placed in this region. This

diagram suggests how the transistor might have

INTERACTION BETWEEN

TRANSISTOR ELECTRODES

EMITTER-. ^-COLLECTOR

FIGURE 10. A chart used at the time of the public an- nouncement of the transistor illustrating the concept of

the region- of interaction surrounding the emitter

electrode.

58
been discovered elsewhere by a study of the effect

upon the voltage and conductance of a probe point

when placed in the region of the interaction sur- rounding another current carrying point. Such

research would have led to observing phenomena

that, one would think, could easily have suggested

the amplification mechanism of the point-contact

transistor. That this did perhaps come very near to happening at Purdue University in mid-1948 is suggested by the following facts.

An important motivation to the Bell Laboratories

group resulted from competition with the outstanding semiconductor group at Purdue University,

directed by Professor Karl Lark-Horowitz. Interest

in making semiconductor amplifiers must have existed at Purdue University. The idea that semiconductor amplifiers could probably be realized had al- ready had a long history. (One example is discussed

below in connection with table 2.) At a meeting of the

American Physical Society in May of 1947 a doctoral

candidate at Purdue, Ralph Bray, had undertaken

research on what was equivalent to a forward biased

emitter point, although not so recognized then. What

Bray concluded, and reported in more detail in a paper read in 1948 two months before the announce- ment of the transistor, was an explanation of how the

"spreading resistance" of a point contact depended

upon the emitter current. He used large forward cur- rents that produced electric fields of 100 volts per

centimeter. Bray concluded that these high electric

fields caused the resistivity of the germanium to decrease. ("Hot electron" experiments carried out

at Bell Laboratories later showed that high electric

fields actually tend to increase the resistance.) It is hard to guess how long it would have taken for Bray

or his colleagues at Purdue to discover that the effect that they were analyzing was in actuality the injection of minority carriers into the germanium if transistor related research at Bell Laboratories had

not already published the answer in January of 1949.

Before the announcement of the transistor, I had

proposed injection as a key feature of the junction

transistor, patent 5 of table 1. Experiments,

described in more detail in the next section, had also

indicated that injection might be an important

mechanism for point-contact transistors. Several

programs to resolve the question were undertaken

of which the best known is the Haynes-Shockley ex- periment that measures "drift mobility" of injected

minority carriers. The first definitive result to be

published was submitted to the Physical Review on

1 December 1948 by E. J. Ryder and me and

published in the 15 January 1948 issue. Figure 11

shows the essential features. A circular slice of highback voltage n-type germanium was cut into the

shape of a piece of pie and two metal electrodes

were applied, one at the point and the other on the

crust, or rim. When we applied a flat-topped voltage

pulse across these electrodes with the narrow point

negative, we observed a flat-topped current pulse of

just the magnitude expected from the specimen's

low-voltage resistance. There was no change in re- sistance although our fields were more than 10 times

larger than those Bray had used. However, when we

reversed the voltage and made the narrow end positive, we did observe a decreasing resistance and a current pulse that increased with time. By assuming

that holes were injected from the positive electrode

we interpreted these observations as follows. When

the positive electrode was the narrow end, then the

high current density caused injection of holes into

this restricted region and thereby produced a substantial reduction of the resistance of the specimen

with a resultant increase of current. On the other

hand, when the large end was positive, the efficiency

of hole injection was less, because the current density was less, and the holes injected were injected into a region that contributed much less to the resistance

of the specimen so that the increase in current was

negligible throughout the duration of the voltage

pulse.

constant vol tag

pulse: generator

VOLTAGE PULSE © IS +

Time time-*-

Figure 11. The Ryder-Shockley experiment demonstrating conductivity modulation by hole injection at a positively biased

electrode.

59
As I pointed out above, this experiment was closely related to the injection concept of the junction

transistor. My historical research into photographic

files unearthed the presentation of injection shown

in figure 12. I speculate that the date of this figure

was probably in 1949 or early 1950 — a conclusion

based on the somewhat wistful expression on my

face. During that period the theory of the junction

transistor was well developed but the goal of producing one with desirable characteristics was frustratingly out of reach. I was photographed elucidating junction-transistor theory on a blackboard diagram. The proportionality at which I was pointing

suggested that the unwanted current of carriers from

the base layer to the emitter should vary inversely as the conductivity of the emitter layer.

Figure 12. The author presenting the theory of the junction

transistor probably in 1949 or early 1950.

The concept of injection across an emitter junction completed the invention of the junction

transistor of patent 5 in table 1 and added one more

item to the list of table 2, Amplification Concepts

Conceived Before Public Announcement on 30 June

1948. The specification for the application for patent

5 also contained a discussion of negative resistance

arising from transit time effects — a consequence of

familiarity that I had acquired during the initial portion of the indoctrination period arranged by Dr.

Kelly when I was assigned to work with Dr. F. B.

Llewellyn. This transit time disclosure was later

developed into a continuation in part of patent 5 that

resulted finally, as shown in table 1, in three additional issued patents.

In all cases, save one, the dates in table 2 of con- ception are established within narrow limits from

records in laboratory notebooks. The insulated-gate,

thin-layer, field-effect concept may have been a significant aspect of the Lilienfeld patents that issued

in 1930, 1932, and 1933. Two dates are shown for collector current gain in the point contact transistor.

Although gain may have been achieved in 1947, it was not clearly recognized in the 26 February 1948

filing of patent 4. It was, however, clearly expressed

in the continuation-in-part filed on 17 June 1948, less

than 2 weeks before the public announcement of the

transistor.

Do these observations cast any light on the

question of when the transistor would have been invented had it not happened at Bell Telephone

Laboratories? Sometimes a long time may elapse before a vigorous effort is mounted to overcome an obstacle that blocks progress. However, once "the will

to think" is motivated, as discussed in section 3,

progress accelerates enormously. In the case of the

amplifying principle of injection across a p-n emitter

junction, such motivation would have occurred soon

at Bell Laboratories if I had not invented injection on

the 23d of January 1948. This reasoning is presented

in detail in the junction-transistor portion of section

3. An example of how the existence of established

possibilities upon motivations accelerates accomplishments is illustrated by the success of thin film,

field-effect experiments like those whose failure was

used by Bardeen as a stepping stone to his theory of

surface states. Shortly after Bardeen's theoretical

proposal in 1946, very feeble field effects were observed by G. L. Pearson at the low temperatures of

liquid nitrogen. But room temperature results

remained negligible. However, once semiconductor

amplification had been achieved, then after only a few months, substantial field effects were observed

by Pearson at room temperature, using structures

essentially of the form of figure 4. Pearson and I re- ported on them in one of the first three publications on transistor effects. These publications appeared

in the Physical Review and the public announce- ment was scheduled to coincide with the date of

their publication.

Further evidence that the invention of the

transistor might have been inevitable and not much

longer in coming is illustrated by the following personal anecdote about an experience at the Naval

60
Research Laboratory. The incident occurred during

the week at the end of June 1948 between a private

transistor demonstration for members of the Department of Defense and the subsequent public presentation to the press. Ralph Bown, then the Director of

Research, and I responded to an invitation to discuss

at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington

their proposal that the public announcement of the

transistor might be made jointly with them. One of

their scientists had been carrying out experiments

aimed at producing a semiconductor amplifier. This

project was, they thought, far enough along so that

these developments should also be recognized. After

Bown and I had discussed with them the new scientific interpretations, based largely on the theory of

inversion layers, and had stressed to them the fact

that their program had not actually achieved power

gain, they gracefully withdrew their suggestion. This

story shows that other competent laboratories were

actively in pursuit of the same goal.

The initial impact of the public announcement of

the transistor was disappointing to those of us who

were most intimately involved. Figure 13 is representative of the exhibits at the press conference. It shows two typical vacuum tubes compared with a packaged, point-contact transistor. The

New York Times report of the press conference was

discouraging to us. It occupied four paragraphs of

the News and Radio column on the radio page of

their July 1st issue:

"A device called the transistor, which has several

applications in radio where a vacuum tube ordinarily

is employed, was demonstrated for the first time

yesterday at Bell Telephone Laboratories, 463 West

Street, where it was invented.

"The device was demonstrated in a radio receiver,

which contained none of the conventional tubes. It also was shown in a telephone system and in a television unit controlled by a receiver on a lower floor. In

each case the transistor was employed as an amplifier, although it is claimed that it also can be used as an oscillator in that it will create and send radio waves.

"In the shape of a small metal cylinder about half an inch long, the transistor contains no vacuum,

grid, plate or glass envelope to keep the air away. Its action is instantaneous, there being no warm-up

1

FIGURE 13. A typical exhibit at the first public announcement of the transistor comparing representative vacuum tubes with a packaged point-contact transistor.

(Comparison with the point. of a pencil dramatized the smallness of the transistor in the cutaway picture. This photograph was fur- nished by W. G. Pfann whose group made the transistors used in the demonstration. Pfann later achieved fame by inventing zone refining and applying it to germanium— the process that achieved unprecedented chemical purity of crystals.)

61
delay since no heat is developed as in a vacuum

tube.

"The working parts of the device consist solely of

two fine wires that run down to a pinh^ad of solid

semiconductive material soldered to a metal base.

The substance on the metal base amplifies the cur- rent carried to it by one wire and the other wire carries away the amplified current."

The emphasis on "no warm-up delay" does accurately describe the atmosphere at the time. During

the next 5 years lecturers who demonstrated

transistors found that the almost instantaneous

emergence of sound from the loudspeaker after a

transistor radio was first turned on usually brought

a gasp from the audience who were used to waiting

for warm-up times of about 1 minute before a vacuum-tube radio would go into action.

3. The "Magic Month" and the Birth

of the Point-Contact Transistor

3.1. "The Will to Think" and CreativeFailure Methodology

"The will to think" is a phrase that properly

describes the actions of the semiconductor research

group at Bell Telephone Laboratories after a crucial

new fact was observed on the 17th of November

1947. I first heard the phrase "the will to think" from

Professor Enrico Fermi in 1940 when he was

researching atomic energy. Several of us at Bell

Telephone Laboratories were also exploring the

possible military significance of nuclear fission in

response to a request from the National Academy of

Sciences. In the course of our research, James B.

Fisk (who moved from President to Chairman of the

Board of Bell Laboratories on almost exactly the

date of the 25th Anniversary of the transistor) and I had invented the "lumped" moderator principle for

producing chain reactions and had been calculating

optimum dimensions for the periodic structures of

nuclear reactors. Fermi's group was undertaking

similar investigations at Columbia University.

Neither group knew of the other's invention. During

the conference when I first heard Fermi use "the

will to think" phrase, neither he nor I mentioned the

possibility of using "lumps" or uranium in a "pile."

Fermi was designing experiments to study the

slowing down of neutrons in graphite. He had confidence that such experiments would be carried out

because financial support by the U.S. Government

had already been assured to the project. He said that

this assurance gave him "the will to think." In these

four words he distilled the essence of a very significant insight: A competent thinker will be reluctant

to commit himself to the effort that tedious and ex- acting thinking demands — he will lack the will to think — unless he has conviction that, if by thinking

he does create new and significant ideas, then these

ideas will be used in worthwhile ways. This, Fermi

told me, was why the assurance of financial support

gave him the will to think of what would be the optimum design for his experiments.

Many years later Fermi gave me another valuable

word. This time it was one related to transistors. I had discussed with him aspects of semiconductor

theory related to minority carrier injection at emitter

junctions. I defined quasi-Fermi levels and said that

these concepts deserved a more compact label He

suggested "imref." I introduced this word into the

scientific literature in the first paper on microwatt

junction transistors, coauthored by M. Sparks and G.

K. Teal. A footnote reported that the most appropriate authority had suggested imref. (If in doubt,

spell imref backwards.)

How a significant contribution to "the will to think" had a major impact on the activities of the

semiconductor research group is shown in the

statistics of figure 14. The data are based on

research that I undertook a few days after the

transistor's 25th birthday. It shows on a month-bymonth basis the number of pages in laboratory

notebooks used by Bardeen, Brattain and myself.

The "magic month" of November 17 to December

17, 1947 has been extended to 5 weeks so as to include the famous notebook entry of Brattain of

Christmas Eve, 1947. For each of three men, a dashed line shows the number of pages used per

month on the average for a preceding period of about

1 year.

The abrupt increase in activity shown in figure 14

started during the week of 17 to 24 November for

Bardeen's and Brattain's notebooks. During that

week Brattain used 15 pages and Bardeen used 10

pages compared respectively to 8 and 0 the week before. Compared to their long-term average weekly

rates of filling pages, these 1-week records were

more than 4 times faster for Brattain and more than

10 times for Bardeen. Chance statistical fluctuations

62
can be ruled out as the explanation for the high activity of the 17 to 24 November week simply by inspection of figure 14 — the persistence of the high

level for the magic month through the whole first

quarter of 1948 is clear evidence that the 17 to 24

November week initiated a real jump upwards in activity. My own increased notebook activity started 3

weeks later on 8 December. In the following week,

I used 5 pages — about 10 times my long-term weekly

average — thus starting a pronounced upward trend

that lasted many months.

60

J. BAROEEN I 7 NOV - -24 DEC

W. H. 8RATTA1N

f PAGES PER MONTH

DURING INTERVAL

40

20

-PREVIOUS AVERAGE

W-SHOCKLEY

20-

—1 i I i I— 0 N

1 947

F M

1948

|W = S ' JttN 73|

Figure 14. The influence of "the will to think," initiated on

17 November 1947, upon the rate at which notebook entries were made related to the patents of table I.

(Areas represent total pages and ordinates represent rates. For Brattain's notebook

the period of 25 April to 25 May 1948 was not comparable to earlier dates because he

shared additional new notebooks with technical assistants.)

What initiated this dramatic step-up of tempo?

What stimulated the will to think of items worth entering as permanent records in our laboratory

notebooks?

These questions are answered by understanding

the "breakthrough observation" which occurred on Monday, November 17. This important event is recorded in the notebook entry of Walter Brattain

shown in figure 23. This breakthrough observation

led at once to a "breakthrough interpretation": the

discovery of a way to overcome the blocking effect of

the surface states that, so frustratingly, had caused

our many failures to make a field-effect amplifier

during the previous 2 years.

This breakthrough interpretation was based on

the "new facts" resulting from "new experimental

conditions" brought about by the "research on the

related science (surface states)" in the language

used to define the research principle of "respect for

the scientific aspects of practical problems" — the

chart of figure 6. All the needed facts for the

breakthrough interpretation are recorded in figure

15: p-type silicon in the circuit diagram and, in the

text, the new fact that "a plus potential as shown increased the effect and the opposite potential

reduced the effect to almost zero."

When it was made in November 1947, the

breakthrough interpretation was a basic new insight

about the science of semiconductor surfaces. Twenty-five years later, the interpretation is simple — perhaps obvious — to an electronic device engineer.

Here is the background:

According to Bardeen's surface-states theory, the

surface of the semiconductor might be so charged as

to repel majority carriers. In the case of the p-type

silicon specimen of figure 15, a positive surface-state

charge would repel holes. If photons of light fall on

the semiconductor and generate hole-electron pairs,

then the field just below the surface will separate

them, electrons going to the surface and holes to the

interior. This separation will cause surface potential

to become more negative. Such effects had been observed and were being actively studied by Brattain— a key feature, in the phrasing of figure 6, of the

research on the scientific aspects of the practical

problem that surface states had prevented the

achievement of amplification by using the field-effect.

Brattain used an intermittent flashing light that

produced an AC voltage on the silicon surface. This

voltage change was detected and measured by using

the metal plate parallel to the silicon surface.

The observations reported in figure 15 initiated

the burst of creativity evidenced by the statistical ef- fects of figure 14. In the following text, to emphasize

the tempo of "the magic month," I have prominently

displayed the date including the day of the week at the beginning of many of the paragraphs.

63
142 DATE I^AAt- I 1 I 1 V 7

CASE NO. 3 I? I "3 1

"

«..! '^f

1 ^

oojmTM~ tit kuFIGURE 15. Brattain's notebook entry of 17 November 1947 that motivated the "will to think" that initiated the "magic month"

culminating in the invention of the point-contact transistor on 16 December 1947.

(This figure shows the upper three-quarters of page 142 of Brattain's notebook

18194. In subsequent figures such headings are deleted and in some cases consecutive pages are joined continuously.)

3.2. The Magic Month and the Birth of the

Point-Contact Transistor

Monday, 17 November 1947. On this date, as recorded by Brattain in figure 15, Gibney made the

key suggestion that voltage be applied between the

metal plate and the semiconductor while both were

immersed in an electrolyte. By this means a strong

electric field was generated perpendicular to the

semiconductor surface. The effects observed by

Brattain showed that, when the polarity of the applied field was such as to make the silicon surface

more positive, there was an increase in the negative

photovoltaic change produced on the surface by the

light. This new phenomenon could best be explained

by assuming that the internal field inside the

semiconductor had been increased so as to repel the

majority holes further from the surface, and, more

important for the experiment, to draw photoelectrons more effectively to the surface and thus to enhance the separation of the hole-electron pairs.

This is the significance of Brattain's words "that a

plus potential as shown increased the effect."

Similar reasoning explains why "the opposite potential reduced the effect to almost zero."

At long last, Brattain and Gibney had overcome

the blocking effect of the surface states — the practical problem that had caused our failure to succeed

in making a field-effect transistor work.

The phrase "accident favors the prepared

mind" — in this case minds prepared to try to make

field-effect amplifiers — applies to what happened

next. In the phrasing of figure 6, the new experimental conditions and the resulting new facts motivated

the will to think of ways to achieve a practical result.

Within a week, the inventions of patents 1 and 2 of

table 1 were conceived.

These inventions included at least one field-effect

concept that was far ahead of its time. This was the

inversion-layer, insulated-gate, field-effect transistor

of Bardeen's patent 2 of table 1. The basic concept

was clearly expressed by Bardeen, as discussed

below, on 23 November 1947. However, more than

10 years had to elapse before the IGFET (insulatedgate-field-effect-transistor) became a useful device.

Indeed, the useful IGFET technology was founded

on earlier development of silicon junction transistor

technology; for example, diffused source and drain

regions, not contemplated in Bardeen's patent.

These techniques needed even further refinements

to produce the silicon dioxide insulating layers suitable for the MOSFET (metal-oxide-semiconductorfield-effect-transistor) of integrated circuits.

The role of the will to think provoked by the

breakthrough observation of 17 November 1947 appears clearly in Bardeen's recognition of the role of

the inversion layer. His concept of inversion layers

had been well developed before. So had his interest

in field-effect amplifiers. But the inventive combination was not conceived before the breakthrough observation. Then, only 4 days later, the inversionlayer, electrolyte combination was actually used in a device that controlled current. These observations

about inversion layers and field-effect amplifiers are

similar to those discussed in section 4 about injection in junction transistors. In each case all the con- cepts needed for the inventive combination were

available -to Bardeen or to me long before either he

or I conceived of the new inventive combination.

The discussion presented in this section calls for a remark relevant to the influence of the "exclusive

64
rights" paragraph in the Powers of Congress

discussed in section 1. The research on history of the

magic month, indeed the impact of the breakthrough

observation itself, became clearly evident by virtue

of the records which were preserved because of the

nature of the patent laws.

From these records it thus becomes obvious in

retrospect what caused the burst of activity for Bardeen's and Brattain's notebooks in the first week of

the magic month.

Thursday, 20 November 1947, Only 3 days after the

new facts were observed, Brattain and Gibney wrote

a disclosure of the concept of patent 1 on table 1,

suggesting that electrolytes could be used to produce field-effect amplifiers. As shown after the

final paragraph, reproduced in figure 16, this disclo- sure was witnessed on the same day by John Bardeen and H. Moore. In this case, the time lag was

not — as it was for my 1939 conception — two months

between the conception of the invention and the witnessing of the disclosure, nor even the 2 weeks that

had elapsed in 1945 for Bardeen's checking of my

field-effect calculations. Why did things move so slowly then? At those earlier dates, we were doubtful

that thinking would produce worthwhile action. But

after 17 November 1947,- it was different. The

discovery that surface-states could be overcome

aroused in minds conditioned to search for semiconductor amplifiers, the will to think and to act.

Friday, 21 November 1947. One day after its conception, a device covered by both patent 1 and

patent 2 of table 1 was reduced to practice. The ar- rangement that was used is shown in figure 17 and

may be understood in terms of the figures from the

issued patents 1 and 2 shown in figure 18. A point

contact to a p-type surface layer on n-type germanium is surrounded by a drop of electrolyte that is insulated from it by a layer of wax (9 and 27 in fig. 18).

Contact to the electrolyte is made by a circle of

metal (13 and 26 in fig. 18) that is formed from the

heavier wire in figure 17.

Figure 17. The experimental apparatus of patents 1 and 2

consisting of a point-contact passing through a drop of electrolyte with a "grid" electrode in the form of a ring (not visible

in the figure) in the electrolyte.

i vj^v«v^*'

1?>~^' t^oJn, M.fhjfccL W;*/<*/

FIGURE 16. The disclosure by Brattain and Gibney of the con- ception of patent 1 of table I and the signatures of Bardeen

and Moore who witnessed it on the same day, 20 November 1947.

Actually at least three separate ideas are involved

in this device. The use of the electrolyte to produce

a high field at the surface is covered by the claims of

Brattain-Gibney, patent 1. The layer that insulates

the metal point from the electrolyte and also the inversion layer are covered in Bardeen's patent 2.

Saturday, 22 November 1947. On this day Bardeen,

who had participated in the conception of figure 18

and in making the observations, filled seven pages

of his notebook with a report and an analysis of the

data gathered the day before. In it he stressed the

role of an inversion layer on the silicon surface.

"As noted by Brattain and Gibney, this effect

might be used to control the resistivity of thin films

('Shockley effect'), and thus lead to a control element. It occurred to the writer that the effect might

be observed in the thin n-type layer on the surface of

65
BY

ATTORNEY

INVENTOR

J. BARDEEN

BY

ATTORNEY

FIGURE 18. Corresponding figures from the issued version of patents 1 and 2 showing the structure of the electrolytic semiconductor

amplifier.

a block of p-type Si. It was suggested that this be

tried because thin films so far developed did not exhibit normal rectifying characteristics."

The final paragraph of this notebook entry of Bardeen's emphasized the "will to think" relevance of

the new experiments to the practical goal of an amplifier: "...these tests show definitely that it is possible to introduce an electrode or grid to control the

flow of current in a semiconductor."

Sunday, 23 November 1947. The impact of the new

facts stimulated Bardeen's will to think more incisively about amplifiers. Figure 19 shows his discussion of the mechanism of current flow from a point

contact made to the inversion layer on the surface.

Figure 20 shows how he conceived the invention of

patent 2 in table 1 and figure 21 shows the same diagram as printed in the issued patent.

Monday, 24 November 1947. On this date Bardeen

disclosed his invention for Walter Brattain's signature as a witness. Two days later, on the Wednesday

before Thanksgiving, I also wrote "witnessed and

understood" under this disclosure.

Bardeen's patent 2 of table 1 is, in the language

developed 25 years later, a form of an insulated-gate,

field-effect transistor with an inversion-layer channel. The use of a second electrode contact to the inversion layer, like the second electrode shown in

figure 3 proposed in 1940, does not appear to have

been included in patent 2. Instead the current that

was controlled was considered to flow out through

the inversion layer gradually leaking across the barrier into the underlying base. The basic concept of

saturating drain currents, so important for field-effect transistors, was first to appear 4 years later in

my field-effect paper.

Thursday, 4 December 1947. This is the date of the

very informative discussion of three experiments entered in Brattain's notebook shown in figure 22. The

experiments designated I and II had both been successfully tried. One of these, experiment I, was the

previously discussed concept of patent 1. The third,

marked III, anticipates the structure of the pointcontact transistor of patent 4. The second experiment, designated II, was based on a suggestion that

I had made of placing a drop of electrolyte across a

p-n junction. This proposal was probably reduced to practice by G. L. Pearson within a few days of

Thanksgiving, 27 November 1947.

A digression on patent-writing art and the junction

transistor. Experiment II, like experiment I, was a

66
success as an amplifier at low frequencies—frequencies so low due to the limitations imposed by the response of the electrolyte that experiment II was a failure as a possible telephone amplifier. But Experiment II was a creative failure in

several ways. One of these occurred, as discussed

below, on 8 December. Another was its significant

role in the preparation of the patent application for

the junction transistor— indeed the electrolyte across p-n junction is figure 1 in patent 5 of table 1. The dates that I have given for conception and for

reduction to practice for patent 5 are not in

November 1947 as would be in keeping with Brattain's report that Pearson had been successful before 4 December 1947.

f

/

FIGURE 19. Bardeens notebook entry ofSunday, 23 November 1947 on the theory ofcurrent flowfrom a point-contact through an inversion layer on a semiconductor circuit.

cxm

$r££<Ka^*.q &' C^Ce^tc^d-'cj l^^"**^*^ ^J^aJ^^c

'far? }^s£yr\ P

Figure 20. Bardeens. conception of patent 2 in table I that anticipates an insulated-gate field-effect transistor with an inversion layer

channel.

67
POLYSTYRENE

HN-TYPE

SILICON

P-TYPE

SILICON

METAL

Figure 21. The version of Bardeen s conception ofthe insulated- gate inversion layer channel structure as it appears in the issued

form of patent 2 of tabt. I.

glycol-borate extraction method required a hammer,

a nail, and a vise.) Claim 29 of patent 5, which I shall

analyze as an example of the art of patent writing, is a typical example of several similar claims in the

junction transistor patent that read on the structure

of the device employing glycol-borate across a p-n

junction (a structure that the patent specification

does indeed clearly teach how to construct):

"29. An electrical translating device comprising

a body of semiconductive material having two zones

of unlike conductivity type separated by a barrier,

means of establishing current flow between said two

zones, and means separate from saidfirst means for

controlling the impedance to such current flow introduced by said barrier.'''' (Emphasis added here for

purposes of exposition.)

y*^<- jOs-

, | j

j j

* i «-»* (?-*^. ICS*

T

Figure 22. Three key experiments recorded in Brattains note- book on 4 December 1947.

Patent 5 teaches in detail how to make "electrolyte on p-n junction" amplifiers. Furthermore,

some of the allowed claims in patent 5, the junction

transistor patent, read directly on experiment II. The suggested electrotyte, glycol-borate, was then

a readily available laboratory commodity, being used

in standard electrolytic capacitors. (The customary

1 do not recall now that I was impressed then, when

the patent was filed, by the ingenuity of this claim.

It was only in the course of the research reported in

this article that I really appreciated the quality of

patent-writing art displayed by Rudi Guenther who

was the attorney. Claim 29 reads directly on the

structure of experiment II, figure 22; and yet, this

claim is so constructed that it reads equally well

upon a three-layer sandwich-type transistor such as the one in figure 12 that I am shown explaining on a blackboard. For the case of the electrolyte across the

p-n junction, the "means separate from said first

means" of Claim 29 obviously signifies effects

produced by voltage applied to the electrode in the

drop of electrolyte. But the identical phrase does indeed apply equally well to the case of the three-layer

structure of the true junction transistor. For this the

three-layer structure the "barrier" is the collector

junction and the "means separate from said first means" signifies injection across the emitter junction followed by diffusion through the base layer.

Guenther had structured the patent application, including Claim 29, so that the specification clearly

taught how to practice the electrolyte embodiment

on which Claim 29 read. But at the same time

Guenther had kept Claim 29 broad enough to cover

the concept of the true junction transistor, which,

while described in detail in patent 5, we did not then

know how to make. As a matter of fact, however,

those "skilled in the art"— or did they subsequently

become skilled? — did successfully make them about

2 years later at approximately the same date that

patent 5 was issued.

68
In table 1 , 1 have put a date of 23 January 1947 for

the conception of the junction transistor and April

1950 for the reduction to practice. Both dates apply

to a proper three-layer, junction-transistor structure.

If the drop of electrolyte were accepted as a form of

junction transistor, then both the "conception" and

the "reduction to practice" dates would fall in

November 1947. Actually, none of the electrolyte

devices of table 1 turned out to have any practical

value. In April 1949, another possible date for

"reduction to practice," a germanium transistor was

made with a geometry like the original point-contact

transistor of figure 9, but with the gold contacts

replaced by p-type stripes making p-n junction connections with the n-type base. (The method of fabrication is discussed with figs. 38 and 49.) Power gains

as high as 16 were obtained. However, a good 3-layer

structure was not achieved until about 1 year later. Thus the dates shown in table 1 for patent 5 are the

realistic ones for a true junction transistor.

This discussion of the "electrolyte on p-n junction" devices described in Brattain's note of 8

December 1947 has carried the discussion far ahead.

I shall now return to the "magic month."

Monday, 8 December 1947. On this date several

significant stepping stones were laid on the path to the point-contact transistor. As shown in figure 23

from Walter Brattain's notebook, observation of significant voltage and power gains were reported over the signatures of Bardeen and Brattain. The amplifying device which they used consisted of the drop of

electrolyte and point-contact structure of patent 1.

Figure 23. The achievement of voltage gain on 8 December 1947

by Bardeen and Brattain using high back-voltage n-type

germanium.

However, a key new feature was the material

used — high back-voltage, n-type germanium — later a central feature in achieving the voltage gain of the

point-contact transistor. As figure 23 shows, Brattain

reported that the key suggestion was made by Bardeen while the three of us had a luncheon discussion. The circumstance of this discussion presents an important illustration of the mixture of cooperation and competition that characterized the interactions within the semiconductor group.

Monday, 8 December 1947. Background for the

subject of discussion at the luncheon is given by the

last of several of my own notebook entries for the

same date — the date that initiated my own steppedup tempo of notebook pages per month. These entries commence with the disclosure in figure 24 of

the junction, field-effect amplifying principle that

thus authenticates the 1947 date on table 2. The

topic connected with the lunch conference of 8

December appears somewhat lower on the same

Figure 24. The disclosure of a junction, field-effect transistor

structure by Shockley on 8 December 1 94 7.

69
page and is reproduced on figures 25 and 26. What

this disclosure proposes is that a wide p-n junction

operated at high reverse bias might be used to obtain

voltage gain. Placing drops of electrolyte at localized

intermediate points on the junction might control

reverse current using relatively small voltages applied to the electrolyte and thus produce large voltage changes across the p-n junction.

it-.

A

'Vs—-j

7>U

I . . -I/O.

-pjp-^ J^c-o- 'ylr-i^

a. J.

\

n5.—-J tit

t/^L ..."it>,

J I 1 A

Figure 25. 77ie proposal of using a wide p-n junction with electrolyte to obtain

voltage gain from Shockleys notebook on 8 December 1947.

70
FIGURE 26. A continuation from figure 25 of the disclosure of

8 December 1947.

Typical examples of creative-failure methodology

are illustrated by the circumstances related to the

suggestion of figures 25 and 26. The idea was

unquestionably half-baked. Almost certainly the

device employing "electrolyte on the p-n junction"

operated in ways that we probably did not conceive

of and would not have been effective in the arrangement that I discussed with Bardeen, as recorded in

figure 26. The actual working mechanism of experiment II (described in Brattain's notebook on 4

December shown in figure 22) was probably the formation of surface-channels near the junction. These

would then increase the reverse current. However,

this half-baked, reverse-biased junction idea of 8

December did (as Brattain's reference to Bardeen's

suggestion on fig. 23 indicates) serve as a stepping

stone in Bardeen's thinking and led him to consider

the advantages of using a rectifying contact at high

reverse bias and thus to suggest trying high backvoltage germanium. The suggestion paid off. Later

the same day, he and Brattain obtained voltage gains

with the patent 1 or 2 form of device with which they

were experimenting as Brattain reported in the 8

December 1947 entry of figure 23.

This voltage gain was an important step forward on the path to the point-contact transistor. They ar- rived there 8 days later.

Tuesday to Friday, 9 to 12 December 1947. During

the remainder of the week, a series of experiments

was tried. Exactly 9 years later in Stockholm — Nobel

prizes are awarded on December tenth — John Bardeen discussed these experiments in the first of his

two Nobel Lectures. In "Le Prix Nobel" he

published the lecture as "Semiconductor Research

Leading to the Point Contact Transistor" and wrote

as follows:

"It was next decided to try a similar arrangement

with a block of n-type germanium. Although we had

no prior knowledge of a p-type inversion layer on the

surface, the experiments showed definitely that a

large part of the reverse current consisted of holes

flowing in an inversion layer near the surface. A

positive change in voltage on the probe [the ring in

the electrolyte of figure 17 and 18] decreased the reverse current. Considerable voltage as well as cur- rent and power amplification was observed.

"Because of the long time constants of the electrolyte used, amplification was obtained only at very

low frequencies. We next tried to replace the electrolyte by a metal control electrode insulated from

the surface by either a thin oxide layer or by a rectifying contact. A surface was prepared by Gibney by

anodizing the surface and then evaporating several

gold spots on it. Although none made the desired

high resistance contact to the block, we decided to see what effects would be obtained...."

The culmination of these efforts, as described in

Brattain's notebook, was achieved in the first 2 days

of the week starting on 15 December 1947.

Monday, 15 December 1947. On this day Brattain

recorded experiments in which the electrolyte had

been replaced by evaporated gold. The gold was divided into two areas, spots A and B. Figure 27 shows

the last nine lines of Brattain's notebook entries for

15 December 1947 appearing on the bottom of page

191 to the top of 192.

The polarity of the effects with a gold spot are consistent with hole injection: a plus voltage on spot B

would inject holes into the n-type germanium that were then collected to increase the positive current

71

533-210 OL - 74 - 6
Figure 27. Brattain's notebook entry of 15 December 1947 describing an experiment

involving a concept of the point-contact transistor.

flowing out of A, the directions corresponding to a "negative direction of current flow."

But the crucial circumstance that occurred on 15

December was to move the two point contacts from

the gold spots to the germanium — an advance in

research technique specified by the two prepositions

"off and "on to." As one more example of the

human fallibilities that characterized the creation of

the transistor— a trivial example compared to some

of my conjectures about making transistors by

evaporation — note that on figure 27 the key feature

of leaving the gold spots and working on the germanium—the act described by the preposition

"off" — indeed, the first feature of the breakway that

would create the point contact-transistor within 32

hours — was spelled "of": "of the gold and on to the

germanium."

But no matter how it is spelled, the experiment

worked. Brattain reported voltage gains with both

points on the germanium. This experiment appears

to be the first clear conception of the point-contact

transistor and accounts for the date of 15 December

1947 for patent 4 in table 1. Tuesday, 16 December 1947. As Brattain's

notebook entries show, this was the date at which

the point-contact transistor was reduced to practice

in the form shown in figure 7. Figure 28 describes

the structure constructed under Brattain's direction

by his assistant, E. G. Dreher. In figure 29 Brattain

reports both a voltage gain of 15 and a power gain of

1.3. On the next page (not shown here in a figure) he

reports probably the first example of current gain for a point-contact transistor— a voltage gain of 4 as- sociated with a greater power gain of 4.5 thus implying a current gain of more than 1.1 — a feature that in

due course led to the later filing date discussed in

table 1. Clearly, the transistor had been born. But had it been "invented?" This is a question of patent law.

Tuesday, 23 December 1947, was the date of the

private demonstration for executives that is described in Brattain's famous notebook entry of

Christmas Eve, 1947, figure 8. Although this date of

23 December 1947 has been publicly accepted in

some instances as the date for the birth of the

transistor, as discussed above, my research on

laboratory notebooks documents that 16 December

is the first date when a point-contact transistor did

amplify. The period of 29 days from the

breakthrough observation of 17 November to the

point-contact amplification of 16 December thus includes so many creative contributions and starts and

finishes with such significant events as to deserve

the title "the magic month."

There is an element of obvious, and entertaining,

naivete about accepting the day before Christmas

Eve of 1947 as the date of the birth of the transistor.

The demonstration of 23 December was attended by

Harvey Fletcher, the Director of Physical Research,

to whom I reported, and Ralph Bown, the Director of

72
o&^otXcT to^ctL^r ^a-m

W. '-df. **** <^XL^

^

tuFIGURE 28. Brattain's notebook entry for 16 December 1947 describing the construction of the "wedge" arrangement for bringing two point-contacts close together in a point-contact transistor.

Research, to whom Harvey Fletcher reported. To believe that such a demonstration occurred on the first

day that a transistor had worked — the schedules of

these executives — the reliability of the demonstration equipment — a decision by the research

scientists that they were sure — what better definition of naivete? But this is an example of creativefailure methodology in public relations. The 24

December 1947 notebook entry is dramatic; hearing

speech amplified by the transistor was in the tradition of Alexander Graham Bell's famous "Mr. Watson, come here, I want you!" (Unfortunately, there

is no record that these words were transmitted

through a transistor during the 23 December 1947

demonstration.) Thus the failure to date correctly

the birth of the transistor led to a warm Christmas

Eve atmosphere for the first coming of age of a

transistor that achieved the goal of aiding people,

when separated, to communicate more easily than

ever before with each other.

There is no record that Brattain's and Bardeen's

experiments of 16-22 December were formally witnessed by others — an important factor of "reduction

to practice." The 24 December notebook entry was

witnessed by others who confirmed the recorded

facts about the 23 December demonstration. Thus

the date of 23 December does appear on the records

of the Patent Department as the date of "reduction

73
:

1

j

!

;

.

!

4< 6,

Hp

P.C. Jo -IVO*!

--2. =. /ft

I. 3

Figure 29. ^ continuation of the 16 December 1947 notebook entry reporting the

first record of power gain with a point-contact transistor.

to practice." A test of reduction to practice in patent

law is whether a businessman would be prepared to

invest in development. There was, of course, no

doubt about this at the Laboratories — or was there on 23 December?

I have a clear recollection that Harvey Fletcher

did raise a significant question to this effect:

"How do you know you really have amplification

in the telephone conversation demonstration? It may

be simply matching of impedances? Making an oscillator would be a valuable confirmation."

Actually the input and output voltage measure- ments had already clearly shown true power gain.

But it is noteworthy that Brattain's 24 December

notebook entry continues after the report of the 23

December demonstration to record that an oscillator

was constructed on 24 December and did, indeed,

oscillate.

74

The identification of the exact date of the "invention" of the transistor is a legal matter. If "conception" is taken as the definition of "invention," then

15 December is a date confirmed both by my

notebook research and by the Patent Department's

records. First observation of amplification was 1 day

later. "Reduction to practice" in a legally sound

form was 23 December. In any event, it was a wonderful start for a 4-day Christmas weekend.

The Patent 3 Story. Patent 3 was conceived and

reduced to practice in connection with the point-contact transistor. The surface treatments devised by

Gibney played an essential role in making point-contact transistors at that time. I recall a most trying

week somewhere in late December or early January

when for some reason the treatments failed and no

transistors worked. As discussed earlier in connection with figure 9, Gibney's patent dealt with the

electrolytic processes used for preparing the surface
and for cleaning-off the oxide products while preparing an inversion layer for use with contacts as shown

in figure 9.

4. The Invention and Realization of

the Junction Transistor

4.1. Pre-Invention Explorations That Missed

the Key Concept of Minority-Carrier Injection

The completion of the invention of the junction

transistor was accomplished with conception of an

emitter junction to inject minority carriers into a sufficiently thin base layer. These injected carriers

would then diffuse to the collector junction. Satisfactory collection efficiency and voltage gain would

then result from reverse-bias on the collector junction—a concept already proposed as discussed in

connection with figures 25 and 26. All of these ideas

had been considered in work that I had done before

the point-contact transistor amplified — with one ex- ception—the recognition of the importance of injection. It took exactly one calendar month after the

demonstration of the point-contact transistor on 23

December 1947 before the missing piece was inserted to complete the concept of the junction

transistor.

An aside is appropriate here. Frankly, Bardeen

and Brattain's point-contact transistor provoked

conflicting emotions in me. My elation with the

group's success was balanced by not being one of

the inventors. For the next 5 years, I did my best to

try to put the Labs — and myself— in the lead for

transistor patents. (Most of my 90-odd issued U.S.

patents relate to the transistor.) Such efforts account

for much of my "will to think" peak of notebook

pages for the month ending on 25 January 1948 as shown in figure 14. One example is worth discussing

as an illustration of how easy it was to miss the concept of injection while trying to invent transistors

based on p-n junctions.

31 December 1947. On New Year's Eve I was alone

in Chicago between two meetings that came so close

together that a return to New Jersey seemed impractical. I used this opportunity for uninterrupted ef- forts to invent new semiconductor amplifying principles. In 2 days I wrote enough to fill a bit more than

19 notebook pages. My notebook was at the Laboratories and I used a pad of paper and mailed the disclosures back to my co-supervisor, S. O. Morgan,

who witnessed them and asked Bardeen to do the same. Later these pages were rubber-cemented into

my notebook where they remained available for

study while writing this article.

The pages from which figures 30 and 31 were

reproduced were three of the five which were written on New Year's Eve. The other 14 were written on New Year's Day.

The structure shown in figure 30 has two p-type

regions separated by a strip of n-type formed by

heating a thin film of germanium lying upon a plane

formed by two ceramic insulators separated by a

thin layer of antimony-bearing alloy. The antimony

diffuses into the germanium converting a strip into

n-type. I shall not consider the naivete of the fabrication scheme. I shall instead focus on a blind spot in

the amplification concept. These notebook entries

reveal that I missed an obvious opportunity to recognize the possibility of minority carrier injection into a base layer and did so even while considering a device containing a base layer and while drawing

energy-band diagrams almost indistinguishable from

those for true junction transistors.

Figure 30 shows the structure of the device and

also contains an energy band diagram representing

the variation along a line extending from the p-type

emitter through the n-type base to the p-type collector. It looks precisely like the diagram for a true

junction transistor. But that wasn't the idea at all. How the amplification concept of this disclosure

differed from that of a true junction transistor is represented in the lower diagram of figure 31. The

antimony was supposed to convert the germanium

to strong n-type near the antimony-bearing, metalcontact B, while barely converting it at all near the

surface. Thus the barrier for hole flow was low near

the surface and high near B, as indicated in the diagram. By applying negative voltage to B, the barrier

could be made so low that holes could easily flow over it to reach the reverse-biased collector. The disclosure also suggests using the structure as a junction, field-effect transistor with a superficial p-type

layer channel lying over the n-type stripe gate.

What is conspicuously lacking is any suggestion

of the possibility that holes might be injected into the

n-type material of the stripe itself, thereby becoming

minority carriers in the presence of electrons. Why

this idea did not occur to me then or even much

earlier is baffling. Eight months before in the same

notebook I had written an analysis of thermal

75
C

22 i

^4 Sil

"I 3

3. 7s 3

Z

3-

2

a^JL

Figure 30. //ow; a disclosure of31 December 1947 in Shockleys notebook should have,

in spite of its practical shortcomings, suggested that minority carrier injection would

be important in making transistors.
UnsU Al2I

Figure 31. A description of the proposed mechanism of operation of Shockley's 31

December 1947 conception showing how it missed out on minority carrier injection

from the emitter.

generation of minority holes in n-type material and

how their contribution to the saturation reverse current of a p-n junction depended on their diffusion

length. I then had the bum-hunch that the activation

energy for reverse current would measure the energy gap. But in any event, in April 1947, 1 had in hand

all the necessary mathematical machinery needed

to derive the p-n junction current-voltage formula

that would have included injection from a forward

biased emitter junction but had simply done nothing

about it. There had been at least two other opportunities in

1947 for me to think of injection. In April, I had

proposed a lightning arrestor composed of a sequence of very thin p-type and n-type layers in series. In a high electric field, the shallow potential

77
hills would be flattened out so that carriers of either

sign could go straight through: i.e., a form of electric

breakdown would occur. In September, I had

proposed a high speed thermistor that also involved

minority carriers passing over the potential energy

maximum for them in a layer of the opposite conductivity type. But for none of these ideas had the concept of injection of significant densities of minority

carriers been singled out as potentially useful.

The completion of the basic junction transistor

concept came about as an accident — one for which

I had a prepared mind. It had features of respect for

the scientific aspect of the practical question of how

exactly the point-contact transistor works and also

of creative-failure in the sense that what came out of

the effort was not really what I had been looking for

at the time. It all happened 23 January 1948.

4.2. The 23 January 1948 Disclosure

23 January 1948 was the day when I made

notebook entries that disclosed the basic conception

of the junction transistor including several closely

related inventions. I was not trying, as I was on New

Year's Eve, to invent an amplifier. Instead I was trying to devise experiments to determine whether or not an inversion layer really played an important role

in the point-contact transistor. I had speculated

about placing an n-type contact on top of the as- sumed p-type inversion layer. I thought that this contact might adjust to the electrons of the underlying

n-type body rather than to the potential of the holes

in the inversion layer. This led me to think of a structure having three layers of semiconductor of alternating conductivity type. I had considered such

structures before but not in terms of a three-terminal

amplifying device. As soon as I became really

familiar with the three-layer concept and the possibility of current flow between the two outer layers by

minority carriers diffusing through the middle layer,

my reservoir of orderly logical patterns, as represented on figure 1, came into play and I had the

payoff-hunch: I recognized that one of the p-n junctions could be reversed biased, as for my concept of

8 December 1947 of voltage gain, and that the

minority carriers could control the reverse current.

I recognized the structure for a p-n junction

semiconductor amplifier— later to be called the

junction transistor.

The resulting disclosure, written on a pad at home

and later rubber-cemented in my notebook, is shown

in part on figures 32 to 36. Their content is discussed

in the captions. They were witnessed 4 days later on

January 27 by J. R. Haynes. Figure 37 shows the four

corresponding figures from patent 5 including the

electrolyte-junction structure, the "near miss" of

figure 30, the structure of the original disclosure of

figure 32, and finally a rrj^re orderly, three-layersandwich, junction-transistor structure. I have

quoted above Claim 29 of patent 5 and discussed

how it was so contrived as to read all the examples

of figure 37. In contrast, Claim 1 reads simply and

directly on the sandwich structure:

"1. A solid conductive device for controlling electrical energy that comprises a body of semiconductive material having two zones of one conductivity

type separated by a zone of the opposite conductivity

type, said two zones being contiguous with opposite

faces of said zone of opposite conductivity type, and

means for making electrical connection to each

zone

"

Claim 1 is a straightforward definition of the junction

transistor. A satisfactory reduction to practice of the

Claim 1 structure was not achieved until the middle

of 1950. I wonder how Claim 29 would have stood up

in a patent suit if the teaching to achieve Claim 1 had

been challenged. Actually by the time patent 5 had

issued, techniques for fabricating Claim 1 structures

were well along.

I have referred above to my conjecture that the

junction transistor would probably have been invented later in 1948 by someone else at Bell Laboratories if I had not already disclosed it in January.

The key item in my reasoning is an observation

made and recorded in his notebook on 13 February

1948 by John N. Shive and subsequently reported by

him in a conference that I attended 5 days later. Shive had tried a new way to bring emitter and collector points very close together. He made a thin

"sliver" of germanium and placed the points on opposite faces. He obtained good transistor action.

This success was hard to explain if transistor action

occurred through an inversion which in his arrangement would have required a much longer path over

the surface from emitter to collector than would

have resulted in power gain if the points had been on

the same face of the specimen. Shive's notebook entries between 13 and 18 February included some

78
D.\ rs CASE N«: 3. % y j

Figure 32. 77te /rsi o/^i;e page* dated 23 January 1948 from Shockleys notebook

containing the record of the conception of the junction transistor.

It proposes using evaporation for fabrication- a poor idea. But it does lead into the concept of minority carrier injection through a thin base layer.

speculations about mechanisms that would permit

holes to flow through the thin specimen from emitter

to collector. These mechanisms included the formation of p-type regions and the spreading of wide

space charge layers — concept on a par with some of

my bum-hunches, for example, figures 30 and 31.

However, none of Shive's proposed mechanisms included injection of minority carriers that then diffused through the base layer until collected. Incidentally, it was Shive himself who later introduced

the words "minority" and "majority" that have

proven to be so convenient to describe such effects.

I recall being startled when Shive presented his

findings at the conference on 18 February 1948. My

junction transistor concept had been witnessed but

had not been generally promulgated. I felt that I did

not want to be left behind on this one much as I recall feeling that I had been on the voltage-gain idea

of 8 December 1947; Bardeen had then effectively

used creative-failure methodology by converting my

very half-baked, voltage-gain idea into a big forward

step towards the point-contact transistor that he and

Walter Brattain achieved 8 days later. At the con- ference where Shive presented his observations, I

79
s

-J- , ^-/^

. v.

3SL. tL

< 1 h

r 1/ ~rju T- *o . 0 (7 /

-as* ^ p

U. , 'J ,

Q 0

tf^ V

- (J^

f ^

/r j A 1

II 1 ^ r * J V

t T - &

d V

\h

A c i •a* a cruu u

n*4^ - ~<-\ "fe 't 0

iL-tl/ ^

1 D 0 V c

c£*J\2 r -t?Bi - **= 4-

/ JUL ,j D

^zja—

p.

><-

>

Figure 33. T^e second page of the 23 January 1948 disclosure of the junction

transistor.

The basic amplifying considerations are clearly explained.

made it a point to explain how they could be interpreted by my carrier-injection model of an emitter

junction. If I had not given this interpretation at once, I am sure that Bardeen or someone else would

have proposed minority-carrier injection within a very short time— possibly even during the next 5

minutes. From that point on, the concept of using p-n

junctions rather than metal point contacts would

have been but a small step and the junction

transistor would have been invented.

These observations suggest that the proof provided by the success of the point-contact transistor

would have so stimulated "the will to think" that,

after Shive had tried the radical experiment of points on opposite sides, the thinking needed to complete

the invention of the junction transistor would inevitably have occurred and probably at most no more than a few months later. The junction transistor, in one embodiment or another, was the amplifying device that played so

large a role initially in solid-state electronics that it

is fair to say that its realization was the development

that did effectively launch the solid state era of electronics. It continues to dominate bipolar circuitry.

80
)AJL'fi CASK Nc. (3

C^T^-C- Zj&^ g^Ljy Co

3^ Si

wz

1

tuK

f

HP

FIGURE 34. 77ie i/wrd page o/«/ie 23 January 1948 disclosure including an appreciation of the importance of heavy doping of the emitter to reduce unwanted base-to- emitter currents.

A half-baked idea about metal electrodes in the semiconductor to reduce base series resistance is discussed.

But this launching required much more than the

concept disclosed in the junction transistor patent,

patent 5 of table 1. The specification of that patent

did teach those skilled in the art to make junction

transistors — indeed before the junction transistor

patent issued — but not until other inventions were made that permitted converting the concept of the

junction transistor patent into a working reality.

4.3. Making the Junction Transistor a Reality

The tempo of the magic month was followed by a period of more gradual development. New technology needed to be developed to conquer the fabrication

problems of the junction transistor. Morgan Sparks

undertook a program of trying to make good p-n

junctions. The first major effort consisted of

dropping molten germanium of one conductivity

type onto heated plates of the opposite type.

24 March 1949 dates the notebook entry of figure

38 describing how Robert Mikulyak, working under

Sparks' direction, produced a form of junction

transistor. A drop of molten p-type germanium fell onto a heated slice of n-type germanium. The

solidified droplet was later polished down so as to make a slab structure.

81
a,

<J

V

0 « -t-L tv (

7 0 I

i*- a

V

) i (y

1 0 i—

p. ^ A. ^ f t V

vO

1—(j <r

^ - -^%^£> #

f

: 0

,0-0 3-0 ^ a ! J [T 0

/*~« J?

0 P- £o / u 0 k . t- ° — c L

.—cJ^- - A

^ > ttl.

V, — u

(i

5«». < ,u fi jU 1

—^t-L/v L £^ V WW•0

\ *> J

-4-1,

3

( T

7~<

'-y f < 7

-7?

(*- •> 0

1/ I CJ —vc

FIGURE 35. The fourth page of the 23 January 1948 disclosure containing one idea

that became a division of patent 5 of table I: the importance of heavy doping under

the metal contacts to reduce contact resistance.

6 April 1949 dates the notebook entry covering the

resulting transistor. It was done as shown on figure

39 by sawing through the p-type drop with a thin wire

so as to leave two parallel bars of p-type sitting on

top of a large block of n-type. If a junction transistor

of proper form is described as a sandwich with a base layer of cheese lying between emitter and collector slices of bread, then Mikulyak's transistor

consisted of two fingers of bread lying on top of a cake of cheese. As his notebook entry shows, this

device did give power gain. It may be the first example of a transistor with p-n junctions for both emitter

and collector. It did not, however, achieve the structure of Claim 1 of patent 5 discussed above.

The essential missing ingredient needed to put the

junction transistor across was good crystal growing

techniques and the use of compensation of donors

and acceptors through the technique of "double doping." The crystal growing story is an important one. Gordon Teal who had worked on semiconductor

preparation towards the end of the war was enthusiastic about growing large crystals for purposes of

both research and development. He was unsuccessful in selling this program in the chemistry department and to me. My position at the time was that we

could do adequate scientific research by cutting

specimens from the relatively large crystals that appeared naturally in the polycrystalline ingots resulting from solidified melts, Gordon Teal bootlegged on

a shoestring basis a program of preparing a crystal

grower without an official authorization. (Indeed, he

reminisces about fears imparted to him by manage82
FlGURE 36. The fifth page of the 23 January 1948 disclosure discussing what might

be called "ribs" of high doping in the base. This diagram does not appear to follow

what was called for on the fourth page.

Also on this page is the start of a discussion dated 24 January 1948 of negative-resistance transit-time devices. This topic became a continuation in part of patent 5.

ment that his obstinacy might cause him to lose his

job.) Later, J. A. Morton, who had the responsibility

of developing transistors for manufacture, bought

Teal's program and supported it. Morton wished to avoid having grain boundaries cause variations in

point-contact transistors.

Subsequently, the proper way to produce good p-n

junctions was discovered by Sparks and Teal to consist of changing the composition of the melt as the

crystals grew. Good p-n junctions were produced

from apparatus like that of figure 40.

12 April 1950 dates the notebook entry of figure 41

that shows how Morgan Sparks chemically etched a specimen made by double-doping so as to produce

the desired three layers. The etch raised the base

layer so that it could be contacted by soldering to it. Figure 42 shows the first, large-area junction

transistor that was made by this means in the late

spring of 1950. It was embedded in wax and soldered

to a large block of copper to provide cooling. It had

a thick base layer that produced such long diffusion

times that it would not operate above about 20 Kc.

However, it did produce 10 or 15 watts of audio

power. In the summer of 1950, I discussed it at a semiconductor conference in Reading, England, and

described its characteristics. These were in keeping

with the theory that I had published in 1949 in the

Bell System Technical Journal about p-n junctions

83
Figure 37. Figures from the junction transistor patent, patent 5 of table I.

Figure 1 shows the drop of electrolyte across the p-n junction, the structure discussed as Experiment II in Brattain's notebook

entry of 4 December 1947 reproduced in figure 22. Figure 2 is the conception of 31 December 1947 reproduced in figure 30. Figure 3 is a

true junction transistor structure. Figure 6 is a close copy of the diagram of the first theoretically correct junction transistor disclosure

as shown in figure 32.

FIGURE 38. A 24 March 1949 entry from the notebook of R. M. Mikulyak illustrating how a drop of p-type germanium was made to fall on a heated n-type slice in an attempt to make a p-n junction.

84
FIGURE 39. A transistor using p-n junctions made from a specimen prepared by letting a drop of molten p-type germanium fall on a heated n-type base gave power gain on 7 April 1949.

and junction transistors. This post-deadline paper

that I presented at the Reading meeting was omitted

from the report of the meeting. While giving lectures

in London during the 25th Anniversary celebration

of the invention of the transistor — one of the lectures

upon which this presentation is based — I remarked

on this omission. A member of the audience then re- minded me that in 1950 I had been unwilling to reveal how the transistor had been fabricated by

double doping. This was probably why it was not included in the reports of the transistor conference at Reading University in 1950.

December 1950 was the date at which significant

hastening of the junction transistor development oc- curred. Because of my experience in operations

research during World War II, I had been called in

the late fall of 1950 to consult on operations research on our combat forces in Korea. I found that proximity fuses were not in use in mortar shells. Proximity

fuses would have been very important in fighting

that limited war. After my subsequent contacts with

the Quartermaster General as a member of another

consulting group, I urged that transistors should be

actively considered for use in proximity fuses. I made further inquiries at Bell Laboratories and was

convinced by R. L. Wallace, who was an expert on

transistor circuitry, that a good, small-area, highfrequency junction transistor would be far superior

to point-contact transistors for proximity fuses. No

such transistors had then been made.

This stimulated us to take up the double-doping

program in which no one had shown any interest. In

January of 1951, Morgan Sparks succeeded in growing new crystals with suitably thin base layers.

These were cut into rods having small cross sections

and which were made into individual transistors.

Figure 43 shows an example. True to Wallace's prediction, these had enormous technological impact.

The public announcement of these microwatt

transistors occurred in the summer of 1951. This is the date at which I feel the transistor era was really

finally launched.

When I am asked how we felt about the

transistor's future shortly after its invention, I reply

by quoting a paragraph written in mid-1950 from my

book "Electrons and Holes in Semiconductors":

"It may be appropriate to speculate at this point

about the future of transistor electronics. Those who

have worked intensively in the field share the

author's feeling of great optimism regarding the ulti- mate potentialities. It appears to most of the workers

that an area has been opened up comparable to the

entire area of vacuum and gas discharge electronics.

85
FIGURE 40. A crystal-growing apparatus of the form developed

by G. K. Teal being observed by Mr. E. Buehler, who grew most of the crystals used in semiconductor development and re- search at Bell Laboratories for many years, and M. Sparks

who fabricated the first of the good junction transistors.

Already several transistor structures have been

developed and many others have been explored to the extent of demonstrating their ultimate practicality, and still other ideas have been produced which

have yet to be subjected to adequate experimental

tests. It seems likely that many inventions un- foreseen at present will be made based on the principles of carrier injection, the field effect, the Suhl effect, and the properties of rectifying junctions. It is quite probable that other new physical principles

will also be utilized to practical ends as the art develops."

To speculate here about the future of solid-state

electronics is not part of a presentation on the invention of the transistor.

F igure 41. A disclosure of 12 April 1950 by Morgan Sparks of

his technique for making a base layerfor contact in fabricating a junction transistor.

FIGURE 42. The first successful, sandwich-structure, junction

transistor.

86
FIGURE 43. An example of the first micro-watt junction transistor, the device that may be said to have launched the transistor era.

4.4. Conclusion

I shall close the junction transistor story with an

anecdote — actually still one more example of a form

of creative-failure methodology. The original junction transistor of figure 42 would have been lost if Bob Mikulyak, who had helped to make it, had not

retrieved it from refuse that had accumulated during

a clean-up campaign. Consequently, he was later

able to supply it in response to its need to appear in a transistor exhibit for display at the Murray Hill

Laboratory. He requested that it be returned to him

when the exhibit was taken down.

When the exhibit was opened, Mikulyak was sur- prised to find the label "replica" on the junction

transistor as shown in figure 44. I suggested that the

"replica" label was a device to protect this valuable

original — a bum hunch as we were to discover.

When new building construction started at Murray Hill in 1972, the exhibit was removed and the

transistor again disappeared. Mikulyak once more

succeeded in retrieving it from refuse.

I learned this story while preparing lectures for

the 25th Anniversary of the transistor. I talked to the

Publication Department about preparing a slide

showing this transistor being held by Mikulyak who

had been involved in its original creation and twice

in its subsequent preservation. I was disconcerted

to be told that the original junction transistor was

carefully preserved and known to be at the moment

in the possession of AT&T. Furthermore, it would

not be made available to be photographed with

FIGURE 44. The junction transistor displayed for many years on the concourse at the Murray Hill Laboratory of Bell Tele- phone Laboratories.

Was it really the original junction transistor?

Mikulyak because it was being photographed in a movie about the 25th Anniversary.

To determine the fact about the "replica," I asked

Mikulyak to give it an ohmmeter test. He called back

to report that it was indeed a replica. He had not

needed an ohmmeter. A fingernail test sufficed. The

"copper block" of figure 44 was plastic painted with

copper paint.

This anecdote is my closing example of creativefailure methodology — one of many which occurred

in the history of the transistor program. The practical output was my persuading Bob Mikulyak to be

photographed, as shown in figure 45, as I awarded

him with the replica.

Figure 45. The presentation in September of 1972 to Robert

Mikulyak of the junction transistor exhibit at Murray Hill.

87

533-210 OL - 74 - 7
To summarize in a few words the intended impact

that I hope this paper may have upon creativity, I use a picture that was given to me after I had

rehearsed it at Bell Telephone Laboratories in

February of 1973 by a member of the audience. He

felt that this picture distills the essence of creativefailure methodology. It read:

"When life gives you lemons, make lemonade."

I have since found this quotation to be an applicable

comment for me to make about other research areas

in which I have worked as well as to transistor electronics.

Discussion

Question: Who owned the patents?

W. Shockley: Bell Labs owned them in the United

States until sometime in 1956 or thereabouts, when

I joined up with Beckman to try starting something.

We paid them $25,000 for patent rights, and then the

consent decree came in and the patents would have

been for free anyhow. I don't think I'd like working

in a place where your rewards were so dependent

upon the value of the patent.

J. Rabinow: I think this is a point that's worth taking up. I don't want to belabor this business of what

an inventor deserves when he works for a company,

but, Bill, I think that was oversimplified this morning, that if you invent you get so many dollars; I think any intelligent management would weigh all the other factors, like how secretive you are as against how cooperative you are. As I listened to your story, which is a very

fascinating thing, how haphazard inventions are made, even by intelligent people, I was wondering:

were you aware of the commercial importance of it,

in getting your names on the thing and rushing, as you were, because you knew this was scientifically

very important? I don't question the motivation of

the invention, but you were obviously very anxious

to get it on paper, to document the exact dates. Was

that because of commercial importance or because

of the fact that you wanted your name on them for

future glory? And I don't mean to belittle the glory.

W. Shockley: I think it was a mix of the two, and

I'm not sure how well I could balance that out.

J. Rabinow: Did you realize it was going to be commercially very important?

W. Shockley: Well, certainly by 1950, when I wrote

a book. I think we felt it would be very important

right from the start, simply because we knew we

were doing something new and different. As soon as

it had worked, the reaction of some of the managerial people at Bell Labs, of course, was very clear.

This was really a well-held secret up until this public

announcement.

J. Rabinow: When people talk about great inventions, you find that most of them come out of small

laboratories; this is a special case, and the interesting thing about the transistor is that you had a readymade market, once you recognized how important it was. If you were in some little company and came up

with a point contact transistor and tried to sell it to a big company, I think you wouldn't sell it. They

would say, "Well, wait till it works right, wait till all the problems are licked." But because you had your

own customer built in, a tremendous customer, and

your own money, I think this is a most unusual combination. Almost no invention is made by the company that is its own user. Usually they sell it to somebody else, and that was a very special case.

I. Kayton: I joined the Labs in 1952, and at that

time I was told a story given as the truth— perhaps

it was apocryphal— that the patent department and

management so fully realized the commercial importance of your contribution that in preparing the

patent application they had three of their very best

patent attorneys write applications independently of

each other, and that they selected the ones that were

best. This was told to me by a division patent counsel, and I was wondering if that were true. W. Shockley: I don't remember that story; I doubt

it, but I could be wrong. I wrote most of the disclo- sure on the junction transistor patent myself, and

this may have been the first time I really worked

closely with Rudi Guenther, but we did a lot of

things otherwise. So I'm not aware of that on the

junction transistor patent. The thing that impressed

me on coming back to it was the ingenuity on that

Claim 29, and some of the other claims.

88
J. Stephens: Was the generality of that first patent

application the work of the attorneys, or the inventors?

W. Shockley: You mean Claim 29? I don't re- member having appreciated that; if I'd thought that

thing up and realized what it was, I would have had

no doubt that I had made a big contribution. It must

have been that Guenther did it and I didn't even

bother to read it.

A. Ezra: What led you guys to start doing research on semiconductors anyway? Was it a result of a market survey that said, if you invent a transistor you

will make a lot of money?

W. Shockley: No, the work on the semiconductors

was part of the really very wise and farsighted

research policies at Bell Labs. The organization

there was a concept of Mervin Kelly's, which he

came to toward the end of the War. Brattain was

away working on magnetic anomaly detectors, Bardeen had not been hired, and I was doing operations

research in the Office of the Secretary of War. He

visualized this group and set up two co-heads. This

was a solid state physics group; the other fellow was

S. O. Morgan, who had one ingenious patent worth

mentioning; he was particularly concerned with

dielectrics and piezoelectrics, and I think he had the

first patent on using heavy hydrogen, deuterium, to

alter critical temperature of a piezoelectric. There

were several areas of this, all of which had to do with

the properties of crystalline material which were

relevant to phenomena that might be used to control

electrical signals. And that's as closely defined as the work was. That's typical of the type of research

emphasis they would have. Ferromagnetism was

one, dielectrics was another; piezoelectrics was

another, semiconductors. I think there were five; I seem to have left one out.

I remember at another time, myself, trying to sell Bell Labs on doing something in the nuclear physics

fields, of getting some Van de Graaff generators.

They weren't so interested in the nuclear pile business, because these were things in which other organizations might well have a much larger fraction of

their interest, than the Bell system. But in terms of

these materials, in influencing or controlling signals,

which are so central to the whole communication

business, there this was a very logical business. In

that, the sort of freedom and support we had was

high.

I remember one other thing that we were wise

about; it has to do with respect for the scientific

aspects of practical problems. I recall some people

coming around and saying, "Well, you're working on

silicon and germanium; those are really pretty well

under control, why aren't you working on selenium

or copper oxide or nickel oxide — those are the things

we are using in the telephone plant?" Well, these we

knew were relatively messy things; besides that,

there were some gaps in the science of silicon and

germanium, and they were pretty well understood.

That, I think, is another sound research principle,

that if you are trying to extend a field, sometimes one

of the best ways of doing it is to find a place in which

you are maybe most advanced, but there's another

step, you don't know where to go. Well, the surface

state was exactly that sort of thing. I remember before we had any low-temperature stuff, Gerald Pear- son and I went down to the Bureau of Standards and

borrowed low-temperature equipment and cooled off

silicon and germanium specimens; and later on Bardeen and Pearson wrote papers on this. So the

freedom to work on this basic stuff was very high. It

fitted into a research principle that I haven't tried to quote for a long time that came from Ralph Bown,

who was at that time Director of Research and later

Vice President for Research, and was a very

thoughtful, eloquent man. He wrote the foreword to my book on Electrons and Holes in Semiconductors.

He talked about several freedoms: one was the

freedom to do things, and another one was the

freedom to refuse to do things. And we didn't have

anything to do with these suggestions that we should

look hard at these practical semiconductor materials.

J. Rabinow: I once heard Dr. Kelly speak, and he

said that one of the things that he did when he

became the Director of Bell Labs, was to shake the

place up — that he reorganized it. He said that every

laboratory should have a boss that comes in once in

awhile and reorganizes and changes things, just

because it's necessary to do it for the good of society.

89

SESSION II -June 12, 1973

Opening Remarks

Jaceb Rabinow*

This is going to be a short session, I hope,

although I expect that there'll be considerable

debate today. We are going to discuss the basics of

the patent system.

What we hope to get out of this meeting in general

are several things: one, of course, is a book which

will reproduce the wise and foolish things we've said

and will say here. Another result will be a set of

recommendations.

The last item will be the questions we are asking

because the patent system, above all things, is a kind

of mystery. It's a religious kind of thing with most

countries of the world; everyone says that a patent

system is good to have, but no one knows how good

it is. I have asked many economists in Washington,

"What is the patent system worth to the country?"

and not one of them has the vaguest idea. It's time

that we found out. Today we shall have some discussion aoout antitrust laws and the patent system. We'll hear Dr.

Kayton, who is mild most of the time, discuss what

the patent system is not to the inventor. We'll hear

John Stedman, who believes that the antitrust laws

do not really conflict with the basic patent ideas.

Tomorrow you will hear about the way inventors

in large corporations look at the patent system, how

Government inventors look at invention, and so on.

It is obvious that the patent system is in trouble.

It's in trouble because when the Constitution was

written, there were no large corporations. It did not

take a million dollars to put a record player on the

market, as it took in my case. Reading machines did

not take half a million dollars per sample. Today

there's no such thing as a local technological busi- ness. You're national and international even if you

make can openers. Your business is large, in

general; this means that the common tale of the inventor as a little guy who has a basement shop is no

longer true. You're either big, or you're nothing. So

the question is, is the patent system still working,

and if it works, for whom, and how?

*Executive Director of the National Inventors Council

Searches in the Patent Office are getting much

more difficult, both because the number of patents

is very large and getting larger very fast, and

because the subtlety is increasing. It does so for two

reasons: technology is getting much more so- phisticated, and the difference between patents is very often much smaller, because there are so many

patents in the same field. What do we do about this?

A simple answer would be to triple the size of the

Patent Office and increase the salaries of everybody

to $36,000 and thus, maybe, get the best people. But

Congress seems to have the opinion that this is not

a practical solution.

You've heard that the courts often hold patents invalid, and the question is, why? No one knows why.

There are a lot of questions we have to ask.

So I hope we'll get out of this conference a great

many good questions, more than we are going to have answered, because the answers are not easy to come by. These questions will be relayed by means

of the book and personal recommendations of the Inventors Council to Dr. Ancker-Johnson, whom you

met yesterday. We sincerely hope that the Inventors

Council will have a great impact, if not on changing

the patent system, at least on preventing the patent

system from being changed in the wrong direction.

An announcement I would like to make: there was

originally a Patent. Trademark and Copyright Foundation at George Washington University, which for

lack of funds went out of existence. But I'm glad to report that the PTC Foundation has been reinstituted; it is now at the Franklin Pierce Law Center

somewhere near Boston — I think it's in Belmont.

Those of you who are interested in the kind of work

that the PTC Foundation did — and I think it was

beautiful work — can contact them. The original

Foundation was the first to look into the patent

system and cut out some of the nonsense and fic- tions that were told about patents. For example,

many years ago the PTC Foundation looked into how

many patents are utilized during their lifetime, and

it was amazing to learn that half the patents of the

United States are used at least sometime during

91
their lifetime. This was quite contrary to the popular

fiction that only 2 to 5 percent of all patents are used.

We would like to know, for example, what patent

royalties are collected in the United States. How

many dollars do we collect from foreign countries?

It is said to be something between $1 and $2 billion,

which is more than enough to pay for the Patent Office 50 times over, and yet no one is sure. I'm glad

Dr. Neumeyer will be speaking tomorrow— maybe

the way we find out about our patent system is to go

to Europe and ask the Europeans — perhaps they

know.

92
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

Antitrust Doctrine v. the Individual Inventor: Friend or Foe?

John C. Stedman

University of Wisconsin School of Law, Madison, Wis. 53706

The perennial conflict between antitrust and patents is currently reflected in the Scott (Patent Bar)

and Hart proposals pending before the Senate. The Scott proposal would apply a "rule of reason," giving a patentee considerable freedom in imposing various restrictions upon licensees. The Hart proposal

would apply a "reasonably ancillary" test, narrowly circumscribing the patentee's freedom in this respect. The question is: which is more advantageous to the inventor, independent or employed?

Restrictions in patent licenses, while they may enable the patentee to maximize his return from the in- vention, may at the same time provide protection from competition and thus lessen the competitive fears and hopes of competitive advantage that provide the main economic force underlying inventive activity.

Thus, paradoxically, the short-range advantages of restrictive licejnsing may operate long-range to the detriment of the inventor. Deeper research into the subject is urgently needed, but tentatively one may

suggest that enactment of a law enlarging a patentee's freedom to impose licensing restrictions may

prove, in the long run, advantageous to institutions that seek to minimize the forces of competition (in- cluding competition in research and innovation), but disadvantageous to small concerns and individual inventors, independent or employed, whose welfare depends upon competitive achievement and innovative activity.

Key words: Antitrust; Hart proposal; inventors; patent licenses; patents; Scott proposal.

Introductory Comment

The battle between Antitrust and Patents is al- most as old as the battle between the sexes — if I may

exaggerate somewhat — and almost as complex and

inconclusive. It has been going on for ages — at least

for 3 1/2 centuries. It was in 1624, after all, that Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies which

prohibited all monopolies in England, but made an

exception in the case of patents for inventions with

the important proviso, however, "that they be not

contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by

raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of

trade, or generally inconvenient." Taking a leaf from

that book, our courts and Congress have been trying

for over 80 years to give meaning to and mark the

limits of that proviso even though it is not stated in so many words in either our antitrust or patent law.

The issue is especially important today. It is frequently suggested that our antitrust laws stand as an impediment to invention and innovation, and just as frequently asserted, that they provide the major

incentive to invention and innovation. The intensity

of the controversy is evidenced by the sharply opposing approaches to the subject currently being of- fered for Congressional consideration. I refer to what are generally known as the Scott and the Hart

amendments. Actually, neither proposal has been introduced yet in this Congress, but both are waiting

in the wings ready to come on stage whenever it seems appropriate.

These are the proposals that I am taking as my

text. I am not approaching them, however, from the

usual point of view. The typical discussion in this area centers on the impact of the antitrust laws, or changes in the antitrust laws, upon the patent

system, and vice versa — to put it in economic and industrial rather than legal terms, the interaction of

competition and monopoly, respectively, with invention and innovation. My concern, as the title of my

talk indicates, is with the effect of these respective

proposals upon the individual inventor, whether independent or employed.

The issue is more complex than would appear at

first glance. It is not solely a question of how free is the inventor— or the inheritor of the rights in his in93
vention (typically, his employer) — to grant licenses

and fix the terms of such licenses. There is the

further question of what effect the licensing practices he is permitted to engage in may have upon the

market for inventions. And there is the still further

question of the long-range effect of given practices

as compared to the short-run effects.

Before I get into details let me make explicit a couple of premises upon which I base my discussion.

They are, I think, fairly obvious and require little more than a mere statement of the propositions.

First, innovative activity on the part of private

commercial and industrial enterprise is induced by

economic considerations — the push of the competitive threat or the pull of greater profit. There are ex- ceptions, of course. One may innovate because the

law requires him to — the introduction of an anti-pollution device is an example. Occasionally, no doubt, an innovator may be inspired by curiosity, pride, a sense of public service, etc. (whether he is indulging

a luxury or being foolhardy depends, of course, on

his Dun & Bradstreet's rating). On the whole, however, the premise probably holds up quite well.

The second premise is that invention, for the most

part, stems from the economic stimuli for innovation. While non-economic motives may play a more

important and frequent role in the case of the inventor than in the case of the innovator, the old adage

that "necessity is the mother of invention" still holds

up weU if we define "necessity" as the need or

desire for economic gain. Certainly a major premise, even though not the sole premise, of the patent

system is that one will be more disposed to invent if there is the promise of a pot of gold at the end of the

rainbow.

The Patent Bar— Hart Amendments

The question is, what bearing do the proposed

amendments referred to at the beginning have upon

these incentives to innovate and the resultant incentives to invent? Before we can even attempt to answer this question — and the answer, let me

emphasize, is not easy to come by— it is essential

that we look briefly at these proposed amendments

and what they do.

First, a quick comment regarding the origin of the

present controversy. As I indicated at the outset, the

history of patent-antitrust conflict goes back

decades, even centuries. The immediate conflict

begins with Recommendation 22 of the President's

Patent Commission. Recommendation 22 urged the

incorporation of a "rule of reason" in the patent

laws. Explanatory comment made it clear that the

Commission was not really seeking to cut back existing antitrust law application, but rather sought to provide a rationale for antitrust treatment and put a stop to further encroachment. Administration patent

revision bills subsequently introduced did not include this recommendation. Later on, however,

amendments considerably more detailed and sweeping than the Commission recommendations were

proposed, originating apparently with the Philadelphia Patent Law Association. These suggestions were ultimately introduced by Senator Scott as amendments to the Patent Revision bill. Thereafter,

these proposals were worked over and somewhat

tightened up by the Department of Commerce and

various patent bar representatives. Neither the

original Scott amendments nor subsequent revisions

were ever actually incorporated into the Patent

Revision bill. The present version, involving only

minor changes from the previous modified

proposals, are currently being urged by the American Patent Law Association and the Patent Section

of the American Bar Association for inclusion in a Patent Revision bill if and when one is re-introduced

in the present Congress.

What about the Hart proposals? Heretofore, the

opponents of the above suggestions — which I will

refer to from now on as the Patent Bar

proposals — have limited themselves to resisting the

proposed amendments. This time they have gone

further. Senator Hart, emphasizing that he continues

to feel that no provisions concerning antitrust should

be incorporated into the patent bill, nevertheless has

publicly offered certain statutory proposals that he

intends to introduce as a backfire in case the Patent

Bar proposals are introduced. And there the matter

stands, as of now.

Let me compare the two proposals, as briefly as I can considering their complexity.

Senator Hart and the Patent Bar are in agreement

that a flat refusal of a patentee to license at all is permissible. They also agree that unrestricted, unlimited licensing of a patent is OK. These are about

the only things they do agree upon. Everything else

is a study in contrasts.

The Patent Bar bill (I will refer to both as bills

although, as I point out previously, neither has actually been introduced) proposes its recommenda94
tions as a part of the patent law — an authorizing,

permissive statute. The Hart bill is offered as an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission

Act— a regulatory act designed, among other things,

to preserve competition. The Patent Bar bill,

generally speaking, would tell a patentee what he

can do; the Hart bill, in general, tells a patentee what

he cannot do.

Both contain certain general provisions regarding

restrictive licenses. The Patent Bar bill would apply

a broad, general "rule of reason" test. The Hart bill adopts the approach the Antitrust Division has been

urging for several years, namely, that the restriction

be ancillary to a valid contract, that it be reasonable

as such, and that it go no further than is reasonably

necessary. The Patent Bar bill says that a limited

license, i.e., one that licenses less than the entire

patent, is permitted. The Hart bill permits a limited

license only if it meets the ancillary test just referred

to.Turning to specific provisions, the Patent Bar bill states that price restrictions, restrictions upon the

resale of patented articles, tie-in arrangements,1 a veto power in the licensee over the grant of other

licenses, and restrictions on activity that lies outside

the scope of the patent, are not legalized by the

proposed amendments, presumably leaving the

question of their legality or illegality to be determined by existing or other law. The Hart bill states

positively, that all of these license limitations are illegal. Both bills permit the grant of an exclusive

license, but the Hart bill requires that it carry with

it a right to sublicense. The Hart bill prohibits the

mandatory imposition of package licenses, though it permits voluntary package arrangements. The

Patent Bar bill is silent on this point, though a royalty provision I will mention in a moment may implicitly permit such packages. The Hart bill prohibits exclusive grant-backs. The Patent Bar bill

is silent on this point.

With respect to royalties — and royalties are a very

important part of the picture since they can often influence conduct almost as significantly as express

restrictions do — the Patent Bar bill again leaves the

patentee with considerably more freedom than does

the Hart bill. The Patent Bar bill permits post-expiration royalties provided they are based on pre-expiration activity. It permits both package royalties

1 There appears a certain inconsistency between the tie-in provision (*271(hX2)) and

another provision (*271(e)). that I will not take time to discuss.

and royalties based on an end product of the

patented invention. It permits discriminatory royalties. The Hart bill, though it expressly permits lump

sum and minimum royalties, declares that a royalty

not reasonably related to the patent is illegal. A

running royalty (whatever that means), a royalty

based on number of units, or a royalty based on

usage after the patent falls into the public domain,

is also illegal.

As for patent pools and cross-licensing, the Patent

Bar bill permits these if they are non-exclusive. The

Hart bill is silent on the subject.

I should add that both bills contain additional significant provisions not of immediate relevance to the

present discussion. For instance, the Patent Bar bill contains certain provisions regarding challenge of

patent validity. The Hart bill requires that licenses

be filed with the FTC and, within limits, be available

for public scrutiny.

So much for the detailed provisions. How do the

two bills stack up as far as the inventor is concer- ned? Several significant points stand out: (1) As I said before, neither puts any limits on a patentee's

freedom to refuse absolutely to grant any licenses at

all, or conversely, to license freely and unrestrictedly. (2) The Patent Bar bill, also as I have previously mentioned, emphasizes what a patentee can

do, whereas the Hart bill emphasizes what he cannot

do. (3) The Hart bill tends to discourage — and by

comparison, at least, the Patent Bar bill tends to en- courage—the granting of licenses on restrictive or

limited terms and the use of a patent as a leverage

device to obtain advantages beyond the patent, for

instance, through the imposition of certain tie-ins,

through grant-backs, etc. (4) At the risk of over- generalization, let me suggest that the Patent Bar bill tends to apply basically the old Holmesian approach,

namely, that a patent gives the patentee a complete

right to exclude within the scope of its claims, and

anything he does with it that does not extend his control beyond that exclusion is permissible. The Hart

bill, in contrast, tends to apply what seems to have

become increasingly the Antitrust Division approach—and for that matter, the approach of most

courts. This approach concedes the legitimacy of the

patent monopoly, namely, the right to exclude, but

tests all conduct other than exclusion by its effect on

competition (giving due consideration, however, to the existence of the relevant patent or patents). This

approach brings into issue such questions as validity, the presence or absence of competitive patents,

95
the effect of a gang-up resulting from licensing some

but not others, the effect of the licensing practice

upon competitive research and the incentive to invent, and so on. In saying this, it is only proper to note that in some respects the Hart proposal goes

further than this. In adopting the doctrine that only

"reasonably necessary" restrictions may be imposed, for instance, it demands that the patentee be

guided by public interest considerations rather than

by his own judgment as to how he wishes to exercise

his legal right of exclusion.

This, I think, gives a reasonably accurate picture

of these two competing proposals. Let me turn now

to the central question— central for immediate purposes, at least. Which of these approaches best serves the interests of the inventor, both short-range

and long-range? In posing the question in these

terms, I am bypassing the issue that usually enjoys

the center of the stage in most discussions of this

subject, namely, what approach is called for in the

public interest? In dealing with that question, the

advantage or disadvantage to the inventor is only

one, albeit a very important one, of the factors to be

considered. In my discussion today, I make this factor the central issue.

Impact of These Respective

Approaches Upon the Inventor

In evaluating the respective approaches of the

Patent Bar and Hart bills, we can start with a proposition I mentioned earlier, namely, that the re- ward to the inventor is determined by the worth of

the protected invention in the market. This, in

general, is true whether the patentee assigns it, licenses it, or keeps it to himself. It is also more or

less true where the inventor is employed, although

in this case compensation will be skewed by the

supply and demand factor as applied to the labor

market, and by the employer's guess as to what the

value will be of whatever results from the employee's efforts.

What goes to make up this market value? There

is, of course, the value that attaches to the simple

right to use the invention, although this value

becomes less and less as more and more are free to use the invention — a point that the patent bar and

others point out in criticizing compulsory licensing

proposals and governmental free-licensing policies.

The other value — indeed, the value that is created

by the patent statute — comes in the power to ex- clude, whether asserted by the patentee incidental

to entrepreneurial activity, transferred to others

through assignment, waived in return for a valuable

consideration through licensing, or used as leverage

to obtain advantages with respect to other commodities or services (tie-ins), other patents (package

licensing and grant-backs), or insulation from competition in other areas (agreements not to compete).

The important point to note here is that all of these

values stem from competitive considerations. A

licensee or assignee pays for patent rights to the extent that they give him a competitive advantage,

either by strengthening his own competitive position or by weakening the position of his competitors. In

short, a patent — and the patent system

generally — has meaning and value only within a competitive system. Let me say that again, because

it is crucially important: A patent has meaning and

value only within a competitive system. A patent

gives protection against competition. That is all it does, all it was ever intended to do. But no one in his

right mind is going to pay good money for protection

against competition if competition poses no threat to him.

Once we recognize this fundamental fact, we introduce a new dimension into the licensing picture.

The situation turns out to be considerably more complex, economically, than might have appeared at

first glance. Every sale of rights under a patent, and

I am including licenses as well as assignments, has

a dual aspect. One is the immediate impact of the

transaction in terms of the return received in

exchange for the patent right; the other is the collateral impact in terms of the effect of this sale upon

subsequent sales, whether the sale of additional

rights under the same patent, the sale of other patent

rights by the same patentee, or the sale of rights,

now or in the future, by other patentees. There is nothing startling or unusual about this. It is the

familiar story of supply and demand, the traditional

operation of the market and the interaction of buyer

and seller in that market.

With this elementary introduction, let's see how

these market forces operate in the patent licensing

area. It is essential at the outset to distinguish

between the immediate, short-range effect of a given

licensing transaction and its more remote, longrange effect. I will look at the immediate transaction

first.

96
It is a truism, I would think, that the more freedom

the owner of a patent has in setting the terms of his

license, the greater his opportunity to maximize his

return from such licensing. As just pointed out, a

licensee may pay, not only for the affirmative right

to use the invention, but even more for protection

against others using it. Actually, the process is often

more complex than this. A license may be worth

more to X than to Y and if a patentee is free to discriminate in the royalty rates he sets, he can take advantage of this fact. A patentee who is himself en- gaged in business can reap greater rewards if he can

protect himself against competition, at the same

time that he receives a return from a licensee. This

he can do through price, quantity, field of use or territorial restrictions. X may desire only a narrow

license and be unwilling to pay more for a broad one,

but if the patentee can restrict X to his narrow area,

Y may be willing to pay more for a different area knowing X is not a potential competitor. A licensee

will normally pay more for a license that is exclusive

or semi-exclusive than for one that is non-exclusive.

What all this comes down to is this: There are three entities involved, namely, the patentee, the

licensee, and other licensees. Each has a double in- terest in the patented invention, to wit, (1) the right

to use it and (2) protection against others being able

to use it. The patentee, of course, starts out with

both of these rights by virtue of issuance of the

patent, so his interest lies in getting as much as he

can in the way of royalties or other benefits, without

giving up any more of his exclusionary rights than he

has to. A limited license does just this: it enables the

patentee to grant a narrow right of usage, albeit a

right as broad as the licensee really desires, reserv- ing to himself the remaining areas, either for his own

immediate advantage or for parceling out to other

licensees. But a narrow grant to X licensee is, to that

extent, a protection against competition to Y licensee—a protection for which Y may be willing to pay.

The advantage to the patentee of being able to license in this manner is obvious — and it is freedom

to do so that a flexible, generous licensing law gives

him.

And so, one may reach without too much difficulty, the conclusion that the Patent Bar bill approach

is likely to have real advantages to the inventor if one

looks at the matter solely from the standpoint of

licensing a given, existing patent. As I have previously suggested, this is likely to be true to some extent for the employed inventor as well, since the

greater value to the employer should sooner or later,

and more or less, mean increased compensation for

those who created the value.

But what about the other side of the coin? What

happens to the market for inventions if widespread

restrictive licensing is engaged in? Here, one is given pause.

It is familiar learning that my actions of today, un- dertaken quite soundly in my own best interests,

may adversely affect what others, and I as well, do

tomorrow. A load of fresh vegetables brought to market today may reduce the price paid for tomorrow's

load. Profit-taking on the stockmarket depresses the

price levels of stocks. In a more generalized ex- amination of this phenomenon, Garrett Hardin has

pointed out in "The Tragedy of the Commons" how

cashing in one's rights today may pervasively reduce

the rights of all, including one's self, tomorrow. So,

I repeat, what does happen to the market for inventions?

I have suggested previously that it is the force of

competition, whether in terms of the attraction of

monopoly or semi-monopoly, or fear of what one's

competitors may do, that provides the chief

economic spur to invention. As for the role of the

patent system in all this, I suppose there are two

major situations in which patent licensing or nonlicensing practices can act as a genuine stimulus to invention — and thereby strengthen the demand for

inventions and for the services of inventors. First, a

flat refusal to license at all should act as a spur to competitive research, inventing around, or whatever

you choose to call it. The patentee, with his

monopoly, may be able to relax, temporarily, but

others cannot if they are to stay in business. Second,

unlimited, unrestricted licensing— in effect, writing

off the patent system insofar as competition is con- cerned—retains product competition to the full, ex- cept as it may be affected by other factors, and again

provides a spur for invention in the hopes of one's

obtaining advantages over one's competitors. [I

should mention a third and concededly rather common situation. This involves the licensing of complementary patents, i.e., patents on inventions that

work together, so that failure to license results in

blockage. Reluctantly, because of the pressures of

time, I am going to pass over this area. It is too complex to deal with briefly. And under either proposed

bill, reasonable licensing provisions will probably

turn out to be acceptable.]

97
But to get on with the discussion: In the limited

licensing situations which are the subject of both the

Patent Bar and the Hart bills, the effect of the limitations is invariably to permit the various parties,

patentee and licensee as well, to use the invention in

designated ways or on designated terms, and at the

same time to insulate themselves to considerable extent against competition in their chosen fields. If it

is true, as I believe it is, that the pressures or fears

of competition are what stimulate invention, then it follows that removal or lessening of these pressures

or fears will lessen the stimulation — in other words,

reduce the demand for inventors.

There are indications that this does, in fact, happen. Schumpeter, one of the great economists,

emphasized that competition through product differentiation was replacing price competition in

oligopolistic industries (industries dominated by a

small number of large producers) but as far as I know he did not follow through and explain why the

members of such industries should be any less

disposed to seek the quiet, comfortable, non-competitive life in the technology area than they were in

the price area, provided they could find the means

for doing so. The legalization of limited and restrictive licensing, including pools, provides such a means. In recent times we have seen the efforts of

the automobile industry to mark time in the development of emission-control devices. There is the Antitrust Division action against the aircraft manufacturing pool based on an alleged solid front of disinterest vis a vis outside inventions. There is the cur- rent case charging United Aircraft with discouraging

R. & D. on the part of TRW. There are the continuing complaints about the "Not Invented Here" syndrome on the part of large concerns. I grant you that one swallow does not make a summer. Nevertheless,

these are straws in the wind that should give pause

to one who seeks a thriving invention industry and is concerned for the welfare of the inventor, independent or employed.

What I have suggested in this discussion is an interesting paradox: As the owner of an existing

patent, it is to my immediate advantage to have maximum freedom and flexibility to license or not as I choose, and to license on such terms as I see fit. But

in the very act of licensing in such a manner I, and

the myriad other patentees who follow the same

course, run the real risk of seriously weakening the

market for further inventions by contributing to a

structure of comfortable, instead of uncomfortable,

monopolies, or to industry structures in which competitors are so few as to result in oligopolistic or shared-monopoly conduct.

I am fully conscious of the fact that I have been

talking theory, and that I have not made a clear,

iron-clad case for the proposition that inventors, as

a body and in terms of long-range interests, are

better off with the Hart-type proposals than they are with the Patent Bar-type proposals. But I see nothing

to indicate that those who take the contrary position

have made their case either. What is needed here is a close, hard, down-to-earth look at what actually

goes on at the various levels, in terms of the forces

and factors I have been discussing here this morn- ing—a hard look that is needed at various levels.

After all, the courts and Congress are driving blind

just as much as we are.

Meanwhile, if I were a monopolist or a would-be

monopolist, seeking to preserve my monopoly position, I would probably welcome a law based on the

Patent Bar pattern. I would do likewise if I were an

oligopolist. But if I were a small concern, trying to obtain or maintain a foothold in my industry, or if I were an independent inventor, dedicated to making

inventions, and hoping either to exploit them or to find a market for them, or an employed or employable researcher looking for an employer who really

wanted and needed my services, I think I would

prefer to let the law stand as it is. If I had to take a

position, I think I would opt for the Hart

proposals — or, at least, a debugged version of them.

At the minimum, I would want to take a hard

look — much harder than has been taken to date — before jumping on the band wagon with those

who would lead me down the garden path in the

other direction.

98
Discussion

J. Rabinow: I am not, by law, allowed to comment

either on the Scott amendment or the Hart bill, but

there are things I can say which are factual. The

Hart bill, among many things, also proposes that the

life of the patent will be 12 years from the date of filing, and the maintenance fee after 4 years becomes

$1,000. This will rise by 20 percent per year, which

means that in 12 years the small company, which

John and I both like very much, will have to pay

some $15,000 for each patent. The Scott amendment

gives the patent owner certain rights which the Hart

bill doesn't.

There is one fact that you people should know:

The President's Commission recommended that the

argument between the antitrust laws and the patent

laws should be clarified, and they suggested this

without any specific recommendation, saying that

Congress has the duty to clarify this once and for all. When I testified before Senator McClellan, I said

that I as an inventor have no strong feeling about

what my patent rights are v. the antitrust, but I'd like

to know what the rights are, once and for all. It should not be a matter of a man in the Department

of Justice making the decision whether he is going to

fight me or not fight me. I simply want to know what

the law is. When that bill was finally written, that

item was deleted. When we in the Inventors Council

asked the counsel for Senator McClellan why it was

deleted, we were told that the Department of Justice

fought against this one item and said, "If this item is done in any form, the Department of Justice will oppose the whole bill and the bill will never get out of

Congress." And the Department of Justice to this

day insists that it, and not the law, decides which

things are rule of reason, which things shall or shall

not be opposed in court. John, I think it's your duty

to tell us why the Department of Justice does not

want Congress to clarify this very fundamental is- sue.

J. Stedman: Let me make two or three comments.

One: it is important to distinguish between the Hart

bill and the Hart bill. There are two Hart bills. One

has actually been introduced, and that is Hart's own

version of what the patent structure should be; in

other words, his patent revision bill. The other one

is the one which has not been introduced, which is a special amendment. He said, "I will introduce if it becomes necessary," but he hasn't introduced it yet.

and it would be an amendment to the Federal Trade

Commission.

On the matter of clarification, I think all I can say

to what Jack has said is "Amen." There is a desperate need for clarification of the law in this

area. I think I've made that perhaps both implicit

and explicit in my discussion, and I emphasized the

fact that 350 years of confusion is enough. But I think there were two questions that were left: one was whether it should be part of the present patent

revision bill. This, for some rather complex reasons,

I really don't think I ought to attempt to go into. I

really think it should be handled separately. I thoroughly agree with Jack that this is a responsibility that Congress should have. As far as having a duty

to explain what the Antitrust Division does, there

was a time when I was in the Antitrust Division, and

I considered probably at that time, if somebody

asked me, I did have such a duty. I have not been in

it for 15 years or more, and so I don't think I have

any duty to explain why they take a particular position, and thankfully I don't, because I don't know

why they do myself at times. I have a feeling in this

particular instance that they have serious reservations as to whether the injection of a rule, just in

terms of a rule of reason, really would clarify the law.

And here I think I feel impelled to say that I agree;

I think it would confuse the law rather than clarify it, as things stand at the present time.

I. Kayton: I'm aware that I'm speaking later today,

and I would like to address myself now to Professor

Stedman's comments in one area to which I will not

be addressing you later. And I don't really want to let

this opportunity go by, because Professor Stedman

has, in a most gracious way, led you down the most

pernicious garden path I have ever seen. He very

beautifully referred to Schumpeter's exposition on

the significant new kind of competition that's

meaningful in our society; namely, feature or product competition, as being very significant alongside of price competition. What Schumpeter was

suggesting by that is that the nature of the game has

changed today because of technology, and that for

the first time we can look to the introduction of competition into our industrial society because of

technological innovation. Professor Stedman tells you that competition is lessened by various

techniques, looked at after the patent has issued,

99
which is totally beside the point, is irrelevant

and immaterial to you and our considerations here.

What is relevant is, how do you inject this competition into society? How do you get the innovation?

How do you generate the incentives to innovate? The

antitrust laws have never since the beginning of

time, do not now, nor can ever inject competition

into our society, and certainly not technological feature product competition. There is only one legal

mechanism for doing that, end that is the patent incentive system used to induce people to invent.

Now, if you think of a practical example in the form

of a bathtub, with a stopper in the bottom, and a faucet at the top, and the water in the tub being the

competitive factors in our society, the antitrust laws

are the stopper in the bottom designed to prevent the

competition from leaking out, and as a passive inactive device, cannot inject water into it. The patent

system, on the other hand, is that active mechanism

that introduces into our society the technological

competition which today means more than anything

else.

J. Stedman: Thank you, Irv, for making my speech

much more eloquent than I possibly could. I think,

actually, this is what I was talking about all the way

through; namely, the importance of the patent

system; and what I was emphasizing at the last, and

in my reference to Schumpeter I was accepting

Schumpeter's approach, but I was pointing out that

he had not given us a full answer to, in a monopoly or

oligopoly structure, how you prevent people from

stopping innovating, and ceasing to differentiate;

and the main point I was trying to make was that

there is a very important part that the patent system

can play in this area of competition in the form of

competitive research. My concern was that with the

increased flexibility of licensing of this particular

type, that the result of this is to write out of the market the competitive incentives that the patent

system provides, instead of maintaining it. It's recognized that every time — this may be a slight ex- aggeration, but not very much of one — every time one licenses a patent, he is eliminating the competition that comes from innovation and new invention.

This is what you are doing, exactly.

J. Rabinow: It isn't so, John. The fact is, every time

I license a patent, and I have done this a few times

in my life, someone wants to compete with me and

starts inventing like crazy. Not only that, but he

says, "If that jerk could invent, I could invent." This

is one of the basic fundamentals of invention, that if Jack Rabinow could do it, a million guys could do it, and I'm not saying this to belittle my invention, I'm

pretty good at it. But I do this to others: If I see that

guy invent an improvement, I say, "I could do it better." I could give you fact after fact of how this

was actually accomplished in the case of post office

equipment, watches, and anything else you like.

What happens is that when you invent, and give a

license to one company, immediately their competitor comes to a couple of guys and says, "Hey, he's

got an interesting new product; he's opened a whole

new field." They begin to invent. It is simply not true

that when you give a license you stifle competition.

I deny this point of view; I can give case after case

if you wish me to.

Question: Where have the Scott amendments been

published so that we can look at them in detail?

J. Stedman: The Bar Association ones — I don't

know that they have been published yet. They have

been distributed in a printed form; I'm sure you

could get them by writing the Chairman of the

Patent Section of the American Bar Association, or the APLA; and the Hart amendments could be obtained, I suppose, either from Senator Hart's office, or they were published in the Patent, Trademark,

and Copyright Journal, as put out by the Bureau of

National Affairs in Washington.

M. Harris: Jack, both you and Professor Stedman

are right on this point. My own experience is that

when you take little gadgets and small developments

and license them, people start inventing around

them. But in the big developments, where a company takes a license to manufacture polyethylene

and has to build a $2 to $3 million plant, they do a minimum of R. & D., just enough to support that on- going plant, but it really does stifle the innovation in

those areas, so you have this whole spectrum. The

generalizations are all wrong.

J. Rabinow: That's interesting, because in the case

of Nylon — this would argue that once Nylon was invented, it would stifle competition. The fact is that

there are more plastics now than there ever were. While it's true that Nylon may be a basic patent that

Du Pont has and it stifles Nylon development, I ar- gue, "What do you mean by stifle; they invented it." But the fact is that many other plastics were

developed.

100
M. Harris: People who took licenses on making

fiber Nylon, mostly are just going along on the way

they did it.

J. Rabinow: What's wrong with that?

M. Harris: I didn't say there was anything wrong;

I was just saying that's what's happening.

J. Rabinow: Who is stifled? You invent Nylon, I buy a license and make Nylon stockings; just what

is being stifled?

J. Stedman: I suspect the real answer is, you cannot generalize in this area; that in different situations you will have different things. Sometimes, if I can get a license, I may be inclined to go ahead and

do something, whereas I wouldn't if I couldn't

because I wouldn't be able to use it anyway. But the

point I was trying to make is that in the very act of

obtaining a license, and I think it's a valid point, I have substituted an invention that somebody else

has made for the effort of trying to do something

myself.

J. Rabinow: That's a very interesting point, that

because I invented a watch regulator, it prevented

somebody else from doing it. I deny this; watches

had been built for the last 300 years, and I was the

guy who said, let's make an automatic watch regulator. Are you saying that I stopped other people from

inventing the watch regulator because I invented it?

J. Stedman: No, I said that they would invent more

if you hold the patent to yourself.

J. Rabinow: But what stopped them from doing it

for 300 years? Suddenly I developed a watch regulator. Now, other people say, "Well, there are other

ways of regulating watches." How did I prevent anybody from inventing an art that's been in existence

or how did some chemist prevent anybody from inventing Nylon because he invented it?

J. Stedman: That's the point I've been trying to make: that a person does make inventions but that

if he can get the invention from somebody else he

may be less inclined to make an invention than if he

is forced to engage in inventing for himself.

J. Rabinow: I don't understand the argument. You

mean if I can buy an invention from him, I won't invent it myself. That means I was going to invent it but because he did it first I'll buy it from him. I don't

understand this kind of logic. This implies that inventions are much more rational than they really are.

J. Stedman: And inventors, too.

J. Rabinow: And inventors — that's correct.

H. Forman: There was testimony given before the

McClellan Committee by representatives of a small

group of independent inventors that called themselves the American Society of Inventors. I can recall a colloquy between their spokesman and Senator Hart, who happened to be presiding that day.

These gentlemen said, "When we make an invention

in a given field with our limited resources, about all we can do is hope to manufacture, if we can do it at

all, in a single community, a state, or the east. We

don't have the facilities to manufacture across the

country. Now, this limits our opportunity to capitalize on our inventions and it also deprives other areas

of the country of our inventions. If you deprive us of

the right to grant licenses to people on a territorial

basis we say, Senator Hart, this is anti-competitive.

This is not introducing and adding to competition;

this is destroying competition." Senator Hart said, "I think you may have something there." Now, why

didn't he recognize this in his bill? We have good antitrust laws and we should keep them but there's no

reason why they should prevent the Scott amendments from doing their job in promoting utilization

of inventions.

J. Stedman: First, I'll refer you to Senator Hart

rather than attempt to answer the question myself.

I think we could recognize, Howard, that this is an

incredibly complex situation. There may be situations where this kind of licensing may be perfectly

permissible, where it is permissible under the

present law, and that what is needed is a harder look

and a closer examination to see in what circumstances some of these things should be permitted

and in what circumstances they should not be permitted. This is exactly what I am saying when I say

we need to take a much harder look than we've ever

taken. My difficulty with the Scott amendments, and

I must say I have the same difficulty with the Hart

amendment, is that neither of them takes this position. They lay down and attempt at a flat rule and the

situation you referred to may be fine in the case of

the company you referred to. In another situation, it may be very bad. If two, three or four concerns, let's say, in an industry dominated by three or four con101
cerns get together and engage in this limited type of

thing, then you're in a mess.

J. Rabinow: I think that we agree it is time that

Congress take a look at the antitrust laws versus

patents.

J. Fulleylove: You made the generalization that, as

I recall, patents only had meaning and value in a competitive environment. I wonder if you are not

overlooking a certain situation where an invention is widely used and the patentee merely looks for a re- ward by broadly licensing any and all who may use

his invention. A case comes to mind of the Townes

patent which our Foundation has assignment of and

has been licensing, a case where we can make no

claim whatever to having contributed the use of the

laser or the maser through our managing of the

patent. All we tried to do is to bring about some

return to Townes and to the scientific community

through our receipt of royalties from companies

which have been formed and gone into business

making lasers. Is that not an exception to your

generality?

J. Stedman: I guess I would say that if somebody

is willing to pay for the license, it is because he is

either concerned that he won't be able to compete if he doesn't have the license, or that if he gets a

license this may give him an advantage that others

may not have.

J. Rabinow: I would like to read a few statistics

which are very interesting, just for your information.

The United States applied for 85,000 patents in 1963;

in 1965 we applied for 89,000 patents; in 1970 we applied for about 101,000 patents. Japan at the same

time, in 1963 applied for 36,000 (we applied for

85,000 at that time); in 1965 we applied for 89,000;

they applied for 60,000. In 1970 we applied for

101,000; Japan (natives applying for native patents,

not for foreign patents) applied for 101,000 patents

exactly equal to us in 1970, with a smaller population. Plus, in "utility" patents they applied at the

same time for 140,000 more, so their total filing in

1970 was 241,000 patents, which is 2-1/2 times the

patenting effort of the United States in 1970. This is very important; Japan is now firing, with a smaller

population, 2-1/2 times as many patents (you can

argue that utility patents are not equal to our

patents; this I leave to the patent lawyers; I think essentially they are). I could give you other statistics,

which I'll do during the day, about how the foreign

companies are doing in certain specific fields. And

this is worrying our Congress, and this should worry

us. Should we increase the rewards to wise guys like

me, or should we not, quite aside from what it does

to the antitrust laws?

102
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Inventor in a Changing World of Patents

Arthur R. Whale

The Dow Chemical Co., Midland, Mich. 48640

It's time we overcome our collective hardening of the attitudes about changes in the patent system.

The simple choice is whether the design of change will pass by default to those in the courts or Congress

who march to different drummers, or whether those who use and understand the system will meet the

challenge of change.

The patent system faces an identity crisis. Three positive approaches would help set thinking straight:

1. Emphasize the patent system's effectiveness in areas of its intended operation in the useful arts.

2. Foster understanding of the interdependence of invention and innovation in making the patent

system work in the public interest.

3. Work for a no-fault divorce between patents and antitrust to rectify the subservient status now as- signed to patents. At the same time, we should move to reconstruct the patent system rather than repair it. Recognizing

that the concept of patents remains sound, we should give consideration to carefully circumscribed adversary proceedings made practicable by deferred examination and maintenance fees and administered

by an independent Patent Office. Thorough discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of these ap- proaches should lead to a patent system of increased vigor and the restoration of confidence in the patenting process without distress to the substantive aspects we seek to preserve.

Key words: Adversary proceedings; antitrust; deferred examination; independent Patent Office; in- novation; inventor; patent system; useful arts.

There is no doubt that the inventor's world of

patents is changing in many ways. For one thing,

he's finding it increasingly difficult to go it alone,

considering the expense of getting and enforcing

patents and, indeed, of making inventions of interest

in today's sophisticated technologies. But the

system, fundamentally, must recognize the importance of individual inventors, regardless of how

or where their work is done. At the same time, it must recognize the public's interest in enjoying the

fruits of inventions for which the public grants the

patent privilege.

At this particular juncture in history, we are see- ing a concert of attacks on the patent system. These

demand our attention. They override, in my view,

the parochial interests of individual inventors and

patent lawyers and corporations. For that reason,

I'm going to direct my comments principally to what

I consider the most urgent matters I could bring before you. Fd like to discuss some attitudes and factors which I believe are implicated in the problems

facing the patent system, and I'll venture some suggestions for basic changes in the machinery of

patenting.

To begin with, consider the following: the Patent

Office and the courts disagree about 70 percent of

the time as to validity [l] 1

. One Government agency

has received a hunting license to shoot down the

patents issued by another Government agency [2];

and a typical antitrust appraisal of patents was ex- pressed by a court recently when it said: "Monopolies—even those conferred by patents — are not

viewed with favor [3]."

Consider also a decision of May 10, 1973, from the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court held, in

Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, that a trade secret in commercial use for more than 1 year

could not be protected under a state trade secret

statute if the subject matter was appropriate for

patenting [4]. This would seem to effectively

foreclose inventors from the trade secret option. The

decision is monumental in its implications. It's in

1 Figures in brackets indicate the references at the end of this paper.

103

533-210 OL - 74 - 8
direct conflict with those of several other Circuits,

and it has been appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Kewanee decision may be good business for

patent lawyers, but I predict it's going to be opposed

by the Patent Bar because it's bad law. In any event,

it puts an added premium on dependability of the

patent system. Indeed, the whole concept of patenting is only viable if it is reasonably dependable in its implementation; and dependability means nothing

more than the issuance of patents by the Patent Office that will stand the threshold test of novelty and

be judged as to validity in the courts by consistent

application of the law.

Unfortunately, the fact that less than 1 percent of

patents reach the courts does not properly suggest

the dimensions of the problem. This was generally

referred to yesterday by Dr. Ancker-Johnson. But

what is often missed is the fact that the uncertainties

as to what a court will do with patents influence all kinds of transactions involving the inventions.

We are, indeed, at a "crisis in the law of patents,"

as Professor Kayton has observed in a recent study

of the validity of patents in the various judicial circuits [5]. It is, however, and I think this is extremely

important to bear in mind, a crisis of confidence in

the patenting process, and not in the patenting

concept.

Nevertheless, tinkering with the process will not

be enough. We should see that the patent system is viewed for what it is: a positive and independent

force for progress, and not a miscast remnant of the

past, or an unfortunate exception to the antitrust

laws.

Directions of Philosophic Change

It seems to me there are three faulty premises that

have been grinding away at the patent system for

some time. These have contributed to an underlying

distrust of the so-called "patent monopoly." We

need to urge a better understanding of the

philosophy of patents in order to create a more

favorable and realistic climate for evaluating the

system.

Science v. Useful Arts

The first faulty premise is that the patent system

is not doing its job because it is not encouraging

"science," as distinguished from the "useful arts"

[6]. We hear this most often from the scientists,

which is particularly unfortunate because the influence of the scientific community has increased

dramatically in recent years. This has been due essentially to the emergence of science as an instrument of national policy through the reaches of the

space program and the fallout technology it has

produced.

I suggest that the patent system was never intended to promote the progress of science, in the sense of the quest of knowledge for its own sake.

Scholars have demonstrated, I think rather conclusively, that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,

from which the patent system derives, associates

"useful arts," "inventors" and "discoveries" in one

class, and "science" (in the sense of general

knowledge), "authors," and "writings" in another

[7]. This separate classification gives rise to separate systems of patents and copyrights.

Indeed, in 1790 the first patent law was passed by

the Congress. It was called "An Act to Promote the

Progress of Useful Arts." Shortly thereafter, the first

copyright law was passed; it was called "An Act for

the Encouragement of Learning." The two systems

were not confused in the Constitution, and we

shouldn't confuse them today in testing the effectiveness of either to do its job.

Invention v. Innovation

The second faulty premise is that the bundle of

rights comprising the patent grant is not equally

operative in encouraging invention and innovation.

Such reasoning makes it easy to justify restricting

the ways in which a patent may be used; but it denies the attributes of personal property to patent

ownership, despite plain language in the statute that

says patents are personal property [8]. Moreover,

the conceptual separation of invention and innovation is damaging to the public interest served by

patents and is contrary to the Constitutional purpose

behind the patent system.

No progress, in terms of the public interest, comes

from invention alone. The act of inventing, however

rewarding to the individual, is nothing more than an

act of self-gratification unless the invention is brought to public use, if not by the inventor, then by

his designee during the life of the patent, or by

someone who reads the patent and does something

with what it teaches.

104
Public notice of the invention through the publication of the patent discharges the patent owner's

obligation in exchange for his grant. But that does

not exhaust the right of the inventor to bring the

public the fullest benefit of his work in the form of an

innovation, which Mr. Webster defines as "the introduction of something new," and which Mr. De

Simone, in his report on technological innovation,

defines as "a complex process by which an invention

is brought to commercial reality" [9].

I cringe when I hear the patent system defended

on the ground that it encourages invention, without

hearing the other shoe drop. You and I know that a man with an inventive turn of mind will invent, no

matter what. But whether he will invent in areas

requiring heavy investment of time and capital, and

high degrees of risk, or be able to innovate from what

he has invented, may well depend on whether he can

look to reasonable prospects for patent coverage on

the results of his work. Perhaps we should explain

this more carefully to some of the critics of the

patent system.

The point at hand is that the patent system must

be justified or condemned for its effects on

innovation as well as on invention. And if innovation

is elevated to such an important consideration in the

functioning of the patent system, as it should be, the

patent owner's use of his patent in the innovative

process should be given all the latitude the patent

grant permits. In short, if implementation of the

patent statute is to be responsive to the Constitutional mandate, it must encourage the patent owner

to innovate as well as to invent.

Antitrust v. Patents

The third faulty premise is that the patent laws

must always give way to the antitrust laws in any apparent conflict [10]. Now, Professor Stedman has

tried to swear back of the patent system by about

300 years, but I would confine myself to the ex- istence of the patent statutes and the antitrust

statutes in this country. We sometimes forget that

the antitrust laws are junior in origin to the patent

laws in the United States by some 90 years, and that

they developed from circumstances totally unrelated

to the use of patents. It was no less than Justice

Douglas, a man not frequently identified as a friend

of the patent system, who wrote [11]: "The patent

laws which give a 17-year monopoly on 'making,

using or selling the invention' are in pari materia

with the antitrust laws and modify them pro tanto."

Nevertheless, in 1969 the Department of Justice

announced that patent license provisions would be

tested for antitrust compliance according to two

principles: first, whether a particular license provision was necessary to the patentee's exploitation of

his lawful monopoly, and second, whether less

restrictive alternative provisions were available

which would more likely foster competition [12].

There followed an intensive period of "luncheon

legislation" by members of the Patent Unit of the

Antitrust Division, in which they espoused their view

as to what was right and wrong in patent license

provisions. Professor Oppenheim, an eloquent and

widely respected voice within the antitrust bar, was

moved during this period to express the lawyer's la- ment: "Shall [the Bar] advise [clients] on the basis

of what the law is, or on what the Antitrust Division

believes the law ought to be?" [13]

Where, indeed, is the requirement in the patent

statute that a patent owner only license on terms

necessary to exploit his invention? Or that he select

terms that are the least restrictive of available alternatives? Where does it say the patent owner has an

obligation to use his patent only in a way that fosters

the kind of competition with which the antitrust laws

are concerned? Certainly not in the Constitution,

which speaks in Article I, Section 8, of promoting

the progress of useful arts, not of competition.

I believe, however, that patents do foster competition, but a special kind of competition — competition

in value, as distinguished from price. As Professor

Stedman pointed out, patents encourage inventing

around a patented invention to obtain something entirely new. not merely the old thing made cheaper.

I know of no greater stimulus to invent than a valid

patent blocking the way to copying a successful invention.

Unfortunately, the incursion of antitrust in the

normal functioning of the patent system has become

so pervasive that an antitrust counterclaim is almost

automatic in suits by patent owners for infringement. The theory is that probably, in today's climate,

some conduct or practice of the patent owner can be

found that would offend the anti-patent sensitivities

inherent in today's antitrust philosophy, and thereby

aid the defendant's cause. So you can see that uncertainties and opportunities to intimidate prevail in

abundance.

105
Former District Court Judge Rifkind has called for

what he termed a "divorce between patents and antitrusts" [14]. He suggests that patents not be subject to an antitrust defense. If the defendant really

wants to press an antitrust claim, Judge Rifkind

urges that he should do so by independent action in

order that litigation on the patent can proceed, with

the merits of the patent alone at center stage.

We are already fixed with the stigma of

"monopoly" as a description of the patent grant. We

even take the bait and try to argue that it really isn't a monopoly. I used to go to bed at night worrying

about people who were talking about the patent

"monopoly," and you see what happened to me. So

I finally gave up. I now think, Professor Kayton to the contrary notwithstanding, that we should face

the fact that it is a monopoly, and we shouldn't be

embarrassed to say so! But when we speak of the

patent monopoly, we should also make sure that people understand how fragile and purposeful and con- ditioned that monopoly really is.

It seems to me it serves neither the purpose of antitrust nor of patent concepts to assign dominant and

subservient status to these vitally important instruments of our competitive economy. Rather, both

should recognize their functions as complementary,

and each should go about its separate business.

The philosophic changes to correct the faulty

premises I have outlined would go far to building a more dependable patent system, but they are not

enough. We need also to take a critical look at the

time-honored procedures for patenting, and see if perhaps their time has ended.

Directions of Procedural Change

In my view, many courts have reacted with a

distinct anti-patent bias in the patent disputes before

them. This has been due partly to the climate of

suspicion created by overly zealous antitrust

pronouncements and intervention, partly to a lack of

understanding of the legitimate function of patents

in the real world, and partly to the readiness of members of the Bar, and of the clients that hire them, to exploit the intimidating character of an antitrust

defense or counterclaim.

But more is obviously involved. Remember, the at- titude of the courts has grown out of many years' ex- perience with the present system. I've not joined

those who advocate special patent courts, or special

judicial handling of patent matters, as the solution to the problem. Rather, I suggest we first look carefully

at what seems to trouble the courts the most. Instead

of changing the judges, maybe we should change the

system.

If we do this — if we look at what's troubling the

courts — we find as a recurring theme in judicial

criticism the absence of adversary proceedings in

the patenting process. By this is meant the lack of

opportunity for third parties having specific interest

in the subject matter under consideration for

patenting to produce the art and the arguments as to why a patent should not be granted. Former

Supreme Court Justice Fortas has said [15]

"The skepticism about the Patent Office

procedure, perhaps stemming largely from its differences from familiar judicial and quasi judicial

proceedings, is, in my opinion, the fundamental

stumbling block in the way of obtaining more sympathetic treatment of patents in the courts. Until we

can materially reduce the vast differences between

Patent Office procedure and conventional quasi judicial proceedings, I do not believe much progress

will be made in reducing judicial hostility to patents."

Similar views, sometimes much less kindly put, have

come from other judicial sources [16].

Another irritant is what the courts interpret as a lack of cooperation on the part of inventors and at- torneys in bringing knowledge of the prior art to the

attention of the Patent Office. In truth, this has been

parlayed far out of proportion to the facts. Seldom is the examiner not informed of prior patents or literature, of which the attorney has knowledge and which

he believes to be revelant to patentability. The trouble is that in some circuits the permissible dimensions of attorney judgment in such matters have

shrunk to the point where the attorney must be a virtual insurer that the court will agree with him as to what is relevant — under penalty of being guilty of

some degree of turpitude ranging from fraud to lack

of candor.

There's also the practical problem, however, of

the continuing increase in the publication of

technological information in the United States and,

particularly, abroad. The Patent Office search files

now contain some 12 million patents and are increasing by about 450,000 new patents and about 25,000

106
non-patent documents each year [17]. So the burden on the Patent Office, as well as on the inventor

and the attorney, to cover the pertinent literature in

the field of an invention is apparent. Help is obviously needed.

Adversary Proceedings

/ suggest we consider some form of adversary

proceedings in the Patent Office. This would be

directly responsive to the expressed judicial concerns. It would also be responsive to the prior art problem. The facilities and abilities of the Patent Office have simply been inadequate, within the limitations of budget, space, personnel, and retrieval

technology, to handle the job alone. Inputs from

other interested parties would improve reliability of

the examining process and the confidence of every- one in the patent system.

Now, implementation would not be easy. The two

principal elements of such proceedings would be

publication of pending applications and limited participation in the examining process by parties other

than the applicant. Applications could be published

a designated time after the first Office action or after

filing. Following publication, third parties could submit art and arguments concerning patentability.

But— and this is essential — no such procedure

should give third parties the chance to shorten the

life of any patent that issues, or give them access to records of the applicant outside the Patent Office.

It's of interest to note that the Commissioner of

Patents, in a talk on May 10. 1973. announced a new

procedure for the Patent Office [17]. This would,

within existing law, introduce a limited form of adversary proceeding. An applicant whose application

is allowed will soon be permitted to request that it be

published. Interested parties can thereafter, for a

limited period, submit art or information for consideration by the examiner before the patent goes to

issue. We will follow the Commissioner's innovation

with interest.

Deferred Examination

But how can a change so drastic, and one that will

occupy additional time of examiners in evaluating

the submissions of outsiders, be handled by a Patent

Office staff of reasonable size? / suggest we consider

a system of deferred examination. Now, under

deferred examination, an applicant could elect

within a specified period of years when to subject his

application to examination. Thus, he would enjoy a period after filing in which to decide whether or not

he wished to proceed with the expense of examination and prosecution, and the Patent Office would be

spared the time of examining applications in which

the applicants lose interest. Such a practice would

not be without its difficulties, particularly if coupled

with publication and the right of third parties to ask

for examination [17]. But in my view the difficulties are not insurmountable, and there might be off- setting gains for everybody.

Experience in Holland indicates that about 60 percent of applications are never called up under their

system of deferred examination [18]. One might

argue the relevance of the Dutch experience to the

U.S. picture, but it certainly is indicative of the

direction, if not the degree, we could expect from

such a practice. I believe it merits our study.

Maintenance Fees

If we enact such innovations, are we in danger of

pricing patents out of the reach of many inventors?

I think quite probably the answer is "yes," particularly under present prospects for extracting proportionately more money from the Congress, and certainly under the schemes I've seen for recovering

fixed percentages of Patent Office expenses from

fees. So I believe we should consider a system of

maintenancefees.

For years I've been in a lonesome minority favoring a system in which payment of Patent Office fees

could be deferred for several years, then presented

annually as a condition of maintaining patents in

force. It seems to me that individual inventors and

corporations alike would benefit by delaying payment until there was money coming in, or at least the

prospects of it, to cover the fees. If a patent were not

of sufficient interest to justify its upkeep, the public

would receive the free right to use the invention at a date earlier than the normal expiration of the patent.

Separate Agency

But what about the Patent Office itself? For years

the Patent Office has had to justify its budget to the

Congress on the material balance between what it takes in and what it puts out. Dr. Ancker-Johnson

mentioned yesterday that this again had happened

in the 1973 hearings.

107
Quality is difficult to measure, but one of the least

reliable parameters of quality is quantity. But quality

underlies validity, and there's the problem. With the

number of patent applications and the Patent Office

search files growing steadily each year, consider the

effects of searching more and more documents in

shorter and shorter times to increase that output,

and yet issuing intelligible, thoroughly considered

Office actions with inadequate staff. Something has

to give, and unfortunately that something is often

quality.

The Patent Office has many dedicated and highly

competent employees. Much has been done lately to increase its mechanical efficiency. But the Patent

Office is an old-line Government agency, with perhaps more than its share of entrenched diverse

philosophies, interpretations, and procedures. In

some respects it's a bundle of little patent offices

pulling in different directions, and the Commissioner of Patents is virtually without authority to fire

incompetent and insubordinate employees in either

the professional or service arm of his organization.

To compound these difficulties, it appears to this

outsider that the Patent Office is a stepchild in the

Department of Commerce. The Patent Office

periodically suffers from the paralysis of political uncertainties in the Department of Commerce, and it's doing so today.

/ suggest the Patent Office be made a separate

agency. This would give the Patent Office greater

authority in implementing the patent statute and

handling its administrative problems. It's true that

the clout of a major government department would

no longer be available in dealing with intergovernmental matters and with budget problems. But re- sidence in Commerce has not brought, in my

judgment, the advantages of belonging that outweigh

the burdens.

For example, one might have expected more consideration for the needs of the Patent Office in

spending the money appropriated to the Commerce

Department last year to find ways of stimulating the

innovative process, pursuant to the President's

Message on Science and Technology [19]. At this

meeting we've heard much about the Experimental

R. & D. Incentives Program and the National R. &

D. Assessment Program. Although Mr. De Simone

indicated they were finally funded at considerably

lower levels, they were established with something

like $18.5 million and $2.1 million, respectively, for

studies and recommendations.

I can't help but feel that some of this money (except the money spent for meetings like this!) could

have been better committed to expanding the search

capabilities of the Patent Office. The Commissioner

has noted that some 2,340,000 U.S. and foreign

patents need reclassifying [20]. This would have

been another worthwhile project, and these investments would have contributed in a very tangible way

to the objectives of the President's program. Perhaps the Patent Office would have fared better by

stating its own case. In any event, operating as an independent agency, the Commissioner should be

more his own man to shape the Patent Office more

closely to the dimensions of its mission.

Pending Legislation

It's prudent to note, as Professor Stedman has al- ready mentioned, that the only patent legislation

now pending before the Congress is S.1321. introduced by Senator Hart [21]. You may recall that

Senator Hart led a 3 to 2 majority in defeating last

year's administration-sponsored bill. S.643, which

enjoyed fairly wide support among inventor and Bar

groups. It would be well for us to assume that he

could muster the same majority in support of S.1321.

A corresponding bill has been introduced in the

House by Representative Owens, along with a catalog of quotations unfavorable to the patent

system and to the Patent Bar [16].

Despite one's immediate reaction to proposals

from such unfriendly quarters, I note with interest

the inclusion in S.1321 of provisions for adversary

proceedings, deferred examination, maintenance

fees, and the Patent Office as a separate agency. Except for the broad proposal with respect to the

Patent Office, however, I object strenuously to the

specific implementation described for these

proposals. Nevertheless, if the basic concepts

should meet with the approval of the Department of

Commerce, inventors, and the Bar and of other

groups working within the patent system, we may

have common ground for patent reform legislation.

I hope that passions have cooled sufficiently with

respect to antitrust legislation that patent matters can move forward with or without the Scott Amendments or its substitutes.

108
Summary

What I've been saying is that it's time we defended the patent system in terms of its intended

operation and not be drawn into disputes as to whether it promotes science in the same manner it promotes the useful arts.

I suggest the same concern for the tendency to ex- clude innovation from a proper part in implementing

the patent system. We must think of invention and

innovation as a necessary duality in making the

system work as it should. Otherwise, the system will

diminish in scope and in effectiveness, and the

public's interest, as expressed in the Constitutional

purpose, will not be fully served.

Fostering the concept of divorce between patents

and antitrust will untangle much of the philosophic

confusion. Legislation in that area, however, should

not delay patent legislation.

My personal view is that the time has come, to borrow language from a famous infringement case,

for the patent system to undergo reconstruction

rather than repair. I'm suggesting attention be given

to a carefully circumscribed system of adversary

proceedings, made practicable by deferred examination and maintenance fees, and administered by an independent Patent Office. I believe such a combination would increase confidence in the patenting

process and restore dependability to the patent

system, without distress to the substantive aspects

we seek to preserve.

Finally, I want to convey a sense of urgency that

we get on with the job and overcome the hardening

of the attitudes that's marked some of our activities

in the past. We face the question of whether the

design of change will pass by default to those in the

courts or in Congress who march to different drummers, or whether inventors and others who use and

understand the system will meet the challenge of

change. Thank you.

Bibliography

[1] Address by Honorable Robert Gottschalk, Commissioner of Patents, before the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the State Bar of Texas, Houston, Tex.. July 7, 1972.

[2] United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 176 U.S.P.Q. 289 (1973). The Court specifically said it is not giving the Government

"a roving commission to question the validity of any patent

lurking in the background of an antitrust case." But the

Court also indicated how easy it would be to put the patent on the line. There need only be a challenge to the "basic as- sumption" that the patent is not valid.

[3] Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. The Laitram Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 769, 772 (1972). Quoted with apparent approval

from the decision of the District Court. 165 U.S.P.Q. 147,

149(D.Ct.,E.D. La.. 1970).

[4] Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, et al., 178

U.S.P.Q. 3 (C.A. 6, 1973).

[5] Irving Kayton, "The Crisis of Law in Patents," Patent Resources Group, Washington. D.C. (1970).

[6] Arthur R. Whale. "The Scientist and the Patent System,"

Am. J. Hosp. Pharm. 22:311 (June) 1965.

[7] Karl B. Lutz, "Patents and Science — A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution." Geo. Wash. Law

Rev. 18:50 (Dec.) 1949.

[8] 35 U.S.C. 261. "Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property."

[9] "Technological Innovation: Its Environment and Management." Report of the Panel on Invention and Innovation to the Department of Commerce (1967). Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office.

[10] Arthur R. Whale, "Antitrust Encroachment on Patent Imperatives," Chi.-Kent Law Rev. 47:125 (Spring) 1970.

[11] Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13. 24 (1964).

[12] Address by Assistant Attorney General (now Federal District Judge) Richard W. McLaren before The Patent, Trademark and Copyright Institute of The George Washington

University, 161 U.S.P.Q. II, III (No. 11, 1969).

[13] S. Chesterfield Oppenheim. "The Patent-Antitrust Spectrum of Patent and Know-How License Limitations: Accommodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?" Idea 15:1 (Spring) 1971. Professor Oppenheim concludes that "the

patent laws do not obligate the patentee to promote the kind

and extent of competition demanded by the antitrust laws."

[14] Simon H. Rifkind. "Patents and Antitrust — Time for a

Divorce," Bull. Am. Pat. Law Assn. 695 (Oct.-Nov.) 1972.

[15] Abe Fortas, "The Patent System in Distress," Idea 14:571 (Winter) 1970-1971.

[16] Floor remarks of Representative Wayne Owens on introducing Patent Reform Act of 1973 (H.R. 7111). P.T.C.J. 125:D-1

(Apr. 26) 1973. See also. Judge Hubert L. Will. "The Patent System — One Man's View," APLA Quart. J. 1:49 (Dec.) 1972.

[17] Address by Honorable Robert Gottschalk, Commissioner of Patents, before the American Patent Law Association, St. Paul. Minn., May 10. 1973.

[18] Netherlands, Report of the Octrooiraad, "Deferred Examination," Ind. Prop. 12:369 (Dec.) 1972.

[19] President's Message to Congress on Science and Technology. Mar. 16. 1972, P.T.C.J. 70:D-1 (Mar. 23) 1973. The President declared that "a strong and reliable patent system is important to technological progress and industrial strength"

and that "we must make the most effective possible use of the incentives which are provided by our patent system."

[20] Address by Honorable Robert Gottschalk, Commissioner of Patents, before the Patent Resources Group. Bahamas. Mar.

29. 1973.

109
[21] Senate Bill 1321. 93rd Congress, 1st Session (Mar. 22. 1973). Senator Hart. In his introductory remarks on the floor of the Senate, Senator Hart said: "the evidence is strong that our system tends to frustrate invention and tie up technology so the public cannot benefit from it." To the extent this is true,

it is a consequence of excessive antitrust zeal against the

licensing of patents in ways best suited to moving inventions

in commerce. (Combined discussion follows next paper by Edward J. Brenner.)

110
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388. Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 1 1-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Role of the Patent Office in the Process of Invention and

Innovation

Edward J. Brenner

Association for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation, 2001 Jefferson

Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. 22202

Examines how well the U.S. Patent Office is doing its job now, and presents some suggestions that might enable it to do a better job in the future. Within the financial limitations under which it must operate, the Patent Office performs an efficient screening operation, rather than a validity proceeding, which would take far more time and money.

Two general suggestions are given for future improvement: first, that an Assistant Secretary for Invention, Innovation, and Intellectual Property be appointed in the Department of Commerce, to serve as

a focal point for these activities; and secondly, that a systems analysis approach be taken to weigh the

merits of various ideas for reforming the patent system.

Specific suggestions are also made for consideration: adoption of deferred or selective examination;

a system of petty patents; a greater role for the Patent Office in litigation; continued efforts to improve

mechanized searching; the institution of satellite search centers and a system of advisers to inventors; and a review of the patent system to eliminate some of the technicalities that may invalidate patents.

Key words: Advisers to inventors; deferred examinations; innovation; invention; mechanized

searching; patent litigation; Patent Office; patent system reform; petty patents; satellite research centers.

I'm very happy to be able to participate in this

conference. Unfortunately, when the Woods Hole

Conference was scheduled I was out of the country

at some other meetings and was unable to be there,

but I remember the first conference like this. I think

it was about 1965; it resulted from a recommendation of a panel of the National Inventors Council suggesting they get together people from different areas

that would be interested in the patent system, and I chaired that conference. We had speakers from the

business community, the scientific community, inventors, judges, Congressmen; and I thought I must

be in the wrong place, because nobody seemed to be

talking about the same subject. But I think maybe it was a first as far as getting people together in sort of

a public forum. However, yesterday I thought maybe

I was back there again, when I heard somebody from

the Executive Branch of the Government at the

White House proposing that it would be a good idea

to institute a system of oaths in filing patent applications, to eliminate fraud. Now, honestly. I think we

all know that all patent applications filed in the

United States require oaths, and have for decades,

as far as I know; but I think it helps to point out one

of the problems of communication in this business,

and how little the average person knows about this

subject. This includes many influential people in the

Executive Branch, as well as in the Congress and in

the Judiciary. They know very little about invention

and innovation, and I think this is what a conference

like this is intended to do: to help bring out some of

the problems we face in this regard.

Now, as far as the program goes, you will note that

I plan to speak on two subjects; namely, how well

the U.S. Patent Office is doing at the present time;

and secondly, whether it could do things differently or better in the future of the patent system and for

inventors.

Very briefly, my position on these two points is that in regard to Patent Office operations, I may be

111
biased, but I think it's doing quite well; it's not perfect, but really doing a pretty good job, within the

limitations under which it must operate.

As to what could be done in the future, I think

there are many things that could and should be done,

and I'll just mention a few of these. I think it will be

interesting to note how closely in some of these

respects I'll be tracking along with Dick Whale in his

earlier remarks, and we both prepared these re- marks completely independently.

Considering the Patent Office's present operations, I think if you figure that under the budget

limitations imposed by Congress, and considering

that the world is changing constantly and getting

more complex, as Jack points out, I think the Patent

Office is doing quite an efficient job. Furthermore,

I think one important point to keep in mind is that

any system operated by human beings is not going to be perfect, so if anybody is looking for a perfect

patent system, it just isn't in the cards, in my

judgment.

One of the major operations of the Patent Office

is to examine patent applications, and to grant

patents or refuse to grant patents. I think, considering there are over 100,000 applications each year, on

all kinds of different subjects, they make a great

contribution to the matter of certainty with regard to the way the system operates. About 30 percent of the

patent applications filed become abandoned

because they're not patentable, in the judgment of

the examiner. In most of the other cases, the scope

of the claim is usually trimmed down to something

more reasonable in terms of the contribution that's

made; and I think that that is a great contribution to the certainty of the system. I think that they do a re- markably efficient job, as Jack says, in this sort of

screening operation; it's not a validity proceeding in

any real sense of the definition; there just isn't that

much time available or that many resources available. But as I say, I think they make a great contribution for what they do.

I think things have improved in some respects in

the Patent Office over the last 10 years, when you

consider the magnitude of the job that must be done.

About a decade ago there was talk about the crisis in

the Patent Office; the Patent Office was going to collapse, and the period of pendency was over 3 years,

aiming towards 4 years, with a great deal of difficulties. Well, due to the efforts of a lot of people, this

pendency has been reduced now to 2 years, and is

aiming at its goal of 18 months. I think once the office gets there, this is going to make an important

contribution to get this technology out earlier, and to

let people know what the patent situation is relatively early in the game.

The Office, I think, has gotten in the habit of

recognizing they have a twofold responsibility: one,

to grant patents on meritorious inventions, and

secondly, not to grant them on inventions that don't

meet the standards.

The cost per ease runs in the hundreds of dollars;

this is the cost in the Patent Office, as well as probably the patent attorneys' costs in handling

most of these cases. Now, this contrasts with figures

that have been quoted for validity reviews in the

court. I quote a report of the American Bar Association, that says, "Any litigation, even the simplest,

that must go all the way through the District Court

and the Court of Appeals, will cost a minimum of

$50,000." Now, this is over a hundred times more

than the resources that the Patent Office is receiving. So, when I hear people say, and there are many

influential people that will say this, including

present and past members of the Supreme Court,

that the Patent Office has got to carry out a proceeding which is equivalent to what we have in litigation

in all the cases, I just say it isn't in the cards,

because I don't really believe that the Patent Office

is ever going to have a budget of $2 or $3 billion and

have a staff of 50,000 or more. It just doesn't make

sense. I agree with Dr. Ancker-Johnson: it's a question of balancing what reasonably can be done

under the circumstances, what are the needs of the

system.

But there are many programs under way. In the international area there is the Patent Cooperation

Treaty, which would mean more value per dollar for

the inventor. The Patent Office instituted a disclo- sure document program, which proved quite popular

with independent inventors as well as some foreign

inventors. There are many things that have been

done that I think have improved the system. But the

system really gets back, basically, to Congress. The

question of what kind of system you have depends

upon the substantive patent laws of the United

States as enacted by Congress. The question of how

this system operates, including the Patent Office, is very much controlled by the budgets that have been

approved by Congress. I think probably most Commissioners of Patents in their annual budget have

112
had proposals for increased numbers of examiners.

I did, too; but we never got them. One year, out of

the 150 more we requested, we got 75 positions approved, but then there was a salary increase, and the

amount of money we had to pay in additional salaries

was equivalent to the dollars that we got for the additional examiners. So we got 75 more positions, but no

examiners. I think, realistically, that you can't ex- pect any order of magnitude of increase in the ex- amining corps; you've got to figure out other ways of

improving the system.

Now, what can be done in the future? Well, there

doesn't seem to be any shortage of ideas. The Presidential Commission had a lot of them. Senator McClellan's Bill S.643 had ideas. Senator Hart's Bill,

Congressman Owen's Bill, the ABA, the APLA, and

even the Justice Department have some ideas.

Justice Clark and Justice Fortas have ideas. There's no shortage of ideas. The question, though, is

specifically what can and should be done for the future? How do you mold together all of these ideas?

Well, I would like to first mention two general

points that I think would help in the future, and then

a half dozen or so specific ideas that I think should

be given serious consideration.

The first major point I'd like to make is that I think we're not going to get any place with a substantial improvement in the area of invention and innovation in the patent system until the Executive Branch

of the Government recognizes its importance and

establishes an organizational structure accordingly.

Now, Dick mentioned his views about an independent agency; I personally, based upon my ex- perience, don't think that would particularly help,

and it could create some problems. My particular approach is that, as a minimum, I would think that in

the Department of Commerce we ought to have an

Assistant Secretary for Invention and Innovation

and Intellectual Property. In other words, within the

Government, someplace, sombody's got the ball. Like Dick Morse said the other day, who is it? Where do you go? Actually, there's no place; there

are all kinds of different islands, you might say,

where you can go and talk about a piece of the total

picture, but no one person that speaks with authority

or carries the authority in the Executive Branch of

the Government. We ought to have a position, I think, at least the equivalent of the Assistant Attorney General for antitrust.

The second general point I would make is that for

the future, I think we need to take a professional approach v. what I would call sort of an amateur seat- of-the-pants approach. I think there's enough information in the picture now, or information that could

be generated, to make a systems analysis approach

to the operations of the patent system, and from that

to be able to weigh better the pros and cons with re- gard to these various proposals.

I think that this is one way of dealing with all kinds

of different types of people, including economists. I guess my greatest claim to fame is that for 3 years I worked as an economist. I probably made more

economic calculations than I think a lot of the other

economists have that speak very much on the subject because apparently they're too busy writing

books and giving speeches and things like that. But

it's an important point, I think, as to whether

changes make sense or not. I would hope that under

these technology incentive programs in the Department of Commerce and the NSF. that some of these

programs would be directed to getting experience or data which would help with regard to the future

operation of the patent system.

Now, Dick mentioned quantity and quality, and

these are words that always come up in the operation

of the patent system. I think we have a pretty good

handle at this point on the quantitative aspects of the

operation of the Patent Office, although, would you

believe it, 10 years ago when I came in the office and

said, "How long does it take to examine an application?" people said, "We don't have any idea." But

also, in addition to the quantitative aspects, the

quality is very important. We did start an extensive

study and analysis of what makes quality, and we

were starting to generate some very interesting information when I left and this program was dropped.

I think this was unfortunate, because otherwise by

now there would be a considerable amount of quality

information in the picture. Quality is a very interesting subject. What the heck do you mean by quality?

Let's say we talk about a particular invention here,

and let's say everybody in this room agrees

unanimously that it's a meritorious invention and the

patent was valid on it. That doesn't niake a bit difference if the Supreme Court votes nine to nothing

that it's invalid. That's the way the game goes.

If you look at the operation of the courts, they will

frequently criticize the judgments in the Patent Office, but they seem to totally ignore the fact that in

the judiciary everything doesn't come out 100 per113
cent clean-cut. In fact, nearly 20 percent of the cases decided by the District Court are overturned by the

Court of Appeals on the same record, on the basis of a clear error. I think this is one of these human factors. Also, how does the Supreme Court explain a 5-4

decision? I mean, what about those other four

judges? It's very much a question of judgment in this

matter of patent quality; and reasonable men can

differ, and I think we just have to accept that. So, in

other words I think there is too much theory and

maybe not enough facts in the picture and that these

should be obtained.

Now, moving to specific ideas, I'd like to mention

a few that I think should be given serious consideration. I think the facts would help to judge what impact they might have with regard to benefits as well

as problems that are created. Also, I think there's a

little bit of market research in here. You can propose

a new program and you can figure that it'll be ac- cepted to a certain extent. You try it out and it doesn't work that way at all. The patent system is not cast in concrete. If a new idea looks like it has

reasonable chance of success, you've got to try it and

then learn from experience as to whether it works or

not, or whether it requires future modification.

I think we ought to take a close look at deferred or

selective examination, as it is called. However, I think it has to be carefully evaluated, not only with

regard to its benefits, which seem to be quite apparent, but also with regard to its problems. There

are a lot of problems in the Patent Office. I re- member we made a close analysis of this — all the

pros and cons. Relative, say, to the Dutch system, it looked like it would be about a standoff in the United

States if you figured in all the pluses and minuses.

True, you save for a while some examining manpower, but eventually things will catch up with you

and then you have a lot of the disadvantages. Anybody that has to cope with all this tremendous

number of publications in foreign languages under

these deferred systems would know what you're

talking about. The Japanese situation is almost impossible right now in trying to cope with 250,000

documents a year being published, all in Japanese.

But, nevertheless, I think that perhaps a proposal

like the new European patent system, which maybe

will have only a 2-year deferment, might give a more

clean-cut resolution here and provide greater

benefits.

Secondly, I think the United States ought to take

a look at the matter of petty patents which are now

used in a number of foreign countries, although I would really call them more of a utility copyright. In

other words, this protection might be granted for

new inventions or devices, which might not necessarily be unobvious, but protection would be limited

in terms of years and would give protection just

against copying. Thus, I think petty patents are something you should take a close look at as a means

of taking a little pressure off some of the marginal inventions while maintaining, as the Supreme Court

says, an extremely high standard of invention for

regular patents.

A third area I think that should be looked at very

closely is a greater role for the Patent Office in the area of litigation. There are all kinds of possibilities

here such as in the area of pre-litigation, including

the reexamination proposals that are in S.643. The

Commissioner is now proposing this on a trial basis, as published in the Federal Register, and is looking

for written comments anytime up to October or so of

this year. I used to be in favor of specialized patent

courts but I have sort of given up on that because I just don't think it's in the cards from a political

standpoint in view of the opposition by the American

Bar Association and probably the Federal judiciary.

Rather, I think we'll have to figure out ways of using

the Patent Office in an advisory role to the court. My

favorite proposal at the moment is in case of litigation, or incipient litigation, either one of the parties

could request the Patent Office to make a decision on validity and perhaps on infringement, presenting

to the Patent Office any new evidence in the picture.

I think this could provide a missing element. At the

present time the Patent Office does a pretty good job

based on the information it has available, but it doesn't have all of the prior art that's available and

some mechanism has got to be devised to bring this

prior art to the attention of the Patent Office. I, for

one, think that when you have to make a judgment

on a question of unobviousness, it is particularly difficult. A lot of you probably will be surprised to find

it is a question of law to be handled by lawyers and

judges. Thus, I think that administrative judges such

as you could have in the Patent Office, who have

backgrounds in science and technology and ex- perience in the patent law and with the process of invention and innovation, should be able to make

pretty sound judgments. In fact, I think the Federal

Courts would be happy not to have to cope with

some of this tremendously complex technology that

obviously, and the judges will admit this, they don't

114
understand, for example, computer technology, high

powered organic chemistry, etc. Another area where the Patent Office could improve, I think, is in the area of patent documentation. There are presently programs underway, particularly in connection with the Patent Cooperation

Treaty, to provide English language abstracts of the

world's foreign patents and the technical literature

relating to patentable subject matter. Mechanized

searching, I think, is something that's way off in the

future as far as providing any help to the Examiner,

but I think work has got to be continued on this.

I also think serious consideration should be given

to instituting what I call satellite search centers

where classified sets of U.S. and foreign patents

would be available to inventors and members of the

public. Also, I think the system could use in major

cities some invention advisers or counselors to provide general advice to inventors. They now turn to disreputable people who usually con them out of a

lot of money so that they become very disenchanted

with the whole invention process.

Finally, I think the whole patent system should be

reviewed to eliminate some of the technicalities that

now invalidate patents. I think that in the case of an

inventor who has a meritorious invention, the system

should work to protect that invention rather than the

present situation where there are innumerable

technicalities that may trip up and invalidate the

patent. I don't think this is the way the system

should work.

So, in conclusion. Jack, I am pleased to be able to participate here because I agree with Stark Draper

and you that invention and innovation are important

to the country. The patent system plays an important

role in the process of invention and innovation. The

Patent Office has an important role to play in the

operation of the patent system. I don't think there is any single solution, but rather the situation requires a lot of things to be done and a lot of effort on different people's part. I believe the Patent Office has

played a key role in the past and has an even more

important role to play in the future. Thank you very

much.

Discussion

N. Parrish: Mr. Whale indicated that the inventor

will continue to invent without reward. I wish to take

exception to that. I speak for myself because from

1952 to 1955, I got 7 patents granted and 15 disclosures. When I found that I was getting nothing but

certificates, a dollar and a pin, I ceased to turn out

the patents and it was over 5 years before I even con- sidered turning in another one. Also, you suggested ways to fine or penalize the

inventor by pushing for a delayed charge to maintain

his patent. He may find that he cannot pay this

charge; therefore, his opportunity to profit from his

innovative ideas is dead.

A. R. Whale: Maybe there's some misunderstanding as to what I intended to convey. I see maintenance fees as being a device for payment that I think should appeal most particularly to the individual inventor and to the small companies. It's a way of deferring the immediate charges, which I think are going to continue to increase in the future,

until there is some money coming in or at least a

patent which can be offered to the bank as collateral.

Question: Might I make a suggestion on this maintenance fee that possibly could help? Let us consider an anti-shelving clause that would be put in for

the small inventor assigning his patent to a large cor- poration so that if his patent is shelved, then there

would be enough fines involved, if it is maintained

and kept shelved, that this will help on your maintenance program.

J. Rabinow: As the Chairman, I would say that the

shelving argument should be separated from the fee

argument because the fee has been experienced in

Europe, but the shelving is a very difficult question.

Ed. would you like to comment on the fee system?

That's a very fundamental question to come up here.

E. Brenner: I think I've always been in favor of

giving strong consideration to maintenance fees.

When I started out as Commissioner. I was in favor

of close to a 100 percent recovery by fees, because

if the Patent Office were essentially self-sustaining,

we ought to be able then to staff and operate in an effective way and have a minimum of negative action

by Congress. But I've changed my ideas considerably in the last decade. Now I feel that we need

low fees in the patent system because it operates in

the public interest. I think we've got to make a case

that the patent system generates much more than its value. This may be difficult to sell, but I think that

it's a disincentive to have any substantial fees in the

patent system. If we have to have them, then I think

it should be on the tail end of those inventions that can pay for them.

115
J. Rabinow: I would like to make a statement about

the fees since I have paid them. I have something

like 100 patents in foreign countries. What happens

to me is that I abandon patents when I don't sell them, and I would like to suggest that this is a terrible thing to the inventor, particularly the small inventor. In the United States it took me 9 years from

the time I got the patent to sell the watch regulator,

which did make me a third of a million dollars so far.

I got the patent issued in about 8 to 9 months; it took

9 years to sell it. If I had had to pay fees. I would certainly have abandoned it. The fiction that the fees are a simple substitute for the initial fee, which is going to get larger and larger, is the fiction that taxes

which are hidden are equal to outright, single taxes.

If the fees can be spread out they invariably add up

to much more than a single fee. Because inventors

usually are ahead of their time, I think that maintenance fees are a hidden trick by which patents are destroyed. Certainly they will hit the small man

much harder than the big companies who can afford

them.

By the way, you did ask one question that Dick did

not answer: "that inventors will invent anyway."

Would you like to comment on that?

A. R. Whale: Well, I've been an inventor in a small

way as a pilot plant engineer. But we're not talking

about that kind of invention. I'm talking about the individual with the inventive turn of mind. He's going

to — I think — perhaps not in your case, but in most

cases, invent. Now whether he's going to invent the

kinds of things that involve money, investment, is another question. But it's just like an old ball player

retiring; he's going to keep throwing the ball around

for a long, long time.

J. Rabinow: About this I would like to give some

facts, gentlemen. I have in my notebooks now some

1800 inventions — good, bad, many indifferent. I have

205 U.S. patents, which is a statistic all by itself. I say this to you, not because I want to brag, which I don't mind doing, but because what is important is

this: I have plotted over the years what I invent, how

many inventions I make, and what happened to me

at the time. And I don't invent automatically. When

I worked for the Bureau of Standards and calibrated

water current meters, I invented nothing. I would

have, maybe, one idea in my notebook during 1 year.

Then I was thrown into war work under Dr. Ellett,

who is sitting here today, and my inventing shot up

tremendously because I was given an environment

where they wanted inventions; there were problems

thrown at us. I invented like crazy. That went on

until the Bureau of Standards got involved with the

battery additive. We were accused of being a bunch

of crooks; the Director was fired; my invention rate

dropped to zero for 6 months, because I was so busy

fighting this battle; they were going to split the Bureau, which they eventually did; I was very unhappy

about this. I quit the Bureau of Standards and

opened my own company and became a consultant.

Suddenly the invention rate went up to some six

times higher than it was at the Bureau of Standards.

I worked for many companies with many more

problems of various types, and I invented like mad.

Then I sold some stock in my company, and the invention rate went to near zero because I was busy

with Wall Street; and when you are busy with Wall

Street you don't invent.

It's not true that you invent "anyway;" you invent

when you are busy inventing, and you don't invent

when you are selling stock.

Then I sold my company to Control Data; the invention rate went down to about a third, because

Control Data limited my field of work to reading

machines only; they did not want many inventions

because they wanted to improve the old machines.

Then I got a job at the Bureau of Standards a year

and a half ago, a position where I don't have any

need to do technical work, and my invention rate is almost zero again. Now you could say that I got stu- pid suddenly last year; that's not very easy to justify.

I admit that I get stupider as I get older, but not all

in 1 month. And I didn't get smart suddenly when I opened my business either, but the fact is that when

you plot these curves, I'm willing to bet that if I take

Mr. Zepell here, or any of the inventors — Sam Ruben, Costas, anybody else — I will bet that there is a

correlation between what they invent and what they

are doing. It is not true that you automatically invent. I think that if you hang me by the heels, I'll invent, and the invention will be how to get out of that

situation. But I doubt that I'd be inventing magnetic

fluid clutches when I am hanging by the heels.

S. Yerazunis: Mr. Brenner, do I interpret your re- mark with regard to mechanized searching being far

off in the future to indicate that the Office does not

now use a computer system for searching, and does

not anticipate computer information systems for this

purpose?

E. Brenner: Well, sir. yes and no. The Patent Of116
fice does have a couple of systems that work either

by mechanized sorters or computers, but they are an

infinitesmal amount of the total search base. Actually, one of the problems you find after you've

worked on this for many years is that the Patent Office's human system is quite efficient; the files,

despite the millions of documents, are organized

pretty efficiently, and a person can make a pretty

skilled search, particularly when he's worked in this

field for many years. It's tough for computers to compete with that, and I know Jack, who's got a lot of experience here, personally doubts whether your

computer can do the quality job that a human being

can.

I personally think eventually the magnitude of the

documents is going to increase so much in the future, you're going to have to have a way of computer

selection, to select a limited number of documents,

25 or 50 documents out of a bigger mass, but this

computer system is competing with human classifications, so the answer is that it's going to be a long,

long time; I think it will be a decade or two before

you see any significant improvement from a computer standpoint.

J. Rabinow: There are things a computer can do;

but if they can search, they can also invent— it's of

about the same difficulty. If you catch me later I can

give you the history; I was on committees working on

this.

J. Rajchman: Mr. Brenner mentioned that the

Patent Office has already, in March of this year, instituted a provision whereby prospective litigants can come to the Patent Office to ask advance clarification in a case; and later, he proposed that this

could be extended. Now, my question is, to what

degree can the Patent Office do all of this on its own,

without any Congressional action? It would seem to me that this would be an extremely constructive way

to lessen the burdens of the judicial process. I was

involved myself in many of the judicial problems,

and I think that if the Patent Office could come in as an expert party, in some reasonable, practical, constructive way, this would be very helpful. If this

could be done without involving Congress, on the

discretion of the Commissioner, that much the

better.

E. Brenner: The program I think you're referring

to is presently a proposed program; it's published for

comments, to see whether people think it's a good

idea or not, and it might be changed if it's got any

shortcomings. I think it's a very ingenious way to get a little experience. I'm not so sure how many people

will take the opportunity, but I think you've got to

try. If this doesn't work, maybe there are some other

ways.

Actually, a lot of foreign countries have post-examination proceedings, like the Netherlands, England, Germany, Japan. I remember, when I was on

the Presidential Commission, we looked at those,

and we shied away from any inter-parties sort of opposition because these get to be very costly. I know

in Esso, every time a Shell case issued, we automatically opposed it; every time an Esso case issued,

they opposed it. We had hundreds of cases in which

we were opposing each other, and we really didn't

know why we were doing it. So the Commission

recommended sort of an ex parte affair— a reex- amination where third parties could cite prior art to the Patent Office. This is in the present patent revision bills, and I think would be a good step forward.

The Commissioner is going to try to see whether

maybe some applicants might not volunteer. Under

the proposed Patent Office system, it's up to the applicant to decide whether he would like to publish

his appbcation and allow other people to cite art against it. It's different from the reexamination

proposal, where anybody would have the inherent

right to cite art against any granted or published appbcation.

J. Sutton: I would like both Mr. Whale and Mr.

Brenner to comment on the problem of prior public use of an invention, because I think that even after

you have this proposed program of an ex parte appbcation at the Patent Office to cite prior art, you don't

have anything about the prior public uses; that is to say, the acts which have taken place as contrasted

to the documents that have been published. In at

least half of the cases that I'm involved in, where the

patents are held invabd, they are done so because of

a prior public use, which invalidates; and at least in

the Ninth Circuit, that seems to be the way it is. I think in the procedures that are proposed, even in

the Bills that are pending, and also in the proposed

Commissioner's solution, we have no facing up to

that problem of prior public use.

A. R. Whale: That leaves, though, at least 50 percent of the cases that could benefit by such a proceeding— those that involve issues not related to prior public use. There are pubhc use proceedings,

117
which perhaps Ed will touch on, available in the

Patent Office even today, very seldom used. I think

probably the answer is going to come from the increased alertness of attorneys specifically to pursue

the evidence of existence of uses that could be con- strued as public. Because it is such a personal thing

within the knowledge of the individual, I don't see

that it's going to be reached by anything that I've seen on the horizon.

J. Sutton: Well, if I recall S.643, it did have a provision for calling the attention of the Patent Office to prior public use, and actually provided for a proceeding along that line. It's true the present

public use proceedings are used very seldom, about once a year. The problem is that this can only be

against pending applications. Usually you don't

know about what's pending, and furthermore, the

Patent Office has been very reluctant to get into

that, because it really isn't particularly expert in this

type of proceeding. But I don't see, under proposed

new litigation, or even in this proposed approach by

the Commissioner, why you couldn't go all the way

with public use proceedings. Some people have ar- gued that there's an advantage in doing it early in the

game where the evidence is still around, rather than

20 years later. I remember, for example, this Eniac

case, talking about prior public use, 25 years ago,

you know, witnesses trying to remember, I don't

know how they remember way back that far.

J. Rabinow: They don't; I know that case. I read

the original application, and the case was a mess.

B. Walker: Has there been any ruling on electronic

printing, i.e., Xerox, constituting a printed disclo- sure to invalidate a patent by the inventor or by

somebody else, if more than one year before the filing, even if the sheets are produced in limited number?

E. Brenner: That seems to me to be posing a legal

question, and I don't know whether there's enough

information to answer it.

B. Walker: I think it's getting to be very important,

because there are so many people making Xerox copies of all kinds of things, and Xerox is, I understand, electronic printing, so technically it is a printed publication; and how many do you have to get out to invalidate your patent, either by the inventor or by somebody else?

E. Brenner: I know on the Presidential Commission we struggled tremendously with the impact of

new technology, including microfilm. I think we

finally wound up with a disclosure in tangible form

as distinquished from oral or verbal. But it is a very

ticklish subject and has quite a legal impact.

J. Rabinow: I think that is too technical and legal a question, and should be left to Congress.

L. Shaffer: This question is directed to Mr.

Brenner. You mentioned that some thought had

been given to satellite search centers. Would the

satellite search center be located where the patent

libraries are now; and has any thought been given to the possibility of expediting the work involved in ex- amining patents by utilizing the inventor and his

time, or possibly his agent? In other words, would it be available to the public, too? To help get the

backlog down?

E. Brenner: Satellite search centers have been

proposed for about 15 years, and I personally think

it's now time to take some action. I would hope

under this Technology Incentives Program, from

either in the NSF or the Bureau of Standards, that

the money would be available to try this out on an ex- perimental basis, probably in these libraries where

you already have U.S. patents. These would be in

classified form, probably on microfilm, U.S. and

foreign patents, and maybe in certain fields of high

public interest, like environmental protection. I think that this could help in the whole system; the

more the people know about the prior art, the less

time they waste in reinventing the wheel, and fewer

patent applications come into the Patent Office that are obviously unpatentable.

J. Rabinow: There have been many other suggestions, that a special group be set up in Washington by the Government to do searching only.

118
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

United States Patent System: Fraud on the Inventor and the

Public (And What Can Be Done About It)

Irving Kayton

Patent Law Program, The George Washington University, 2011 I Street, NW.,

Washington, D.C. 20006

The inventor is the creator of progress, and our main hope to solve most of society's problems. In order for him to be motivated to continue inventing, he needs to have his property rights protected. By

and large, the United States patent system no longer affords that protection.

There are some Federal circuits where, because of the rules of law enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals, a patent cannot be held valid, irrespective of the merit of the invention. The law of expected return dictates which patents get litigated — there's no such thing as a per se good

patent. The reason is the legally outrageous proposition which has been imposed on the public, the bar. and the bench, either fraudulently, through arrant ignorance or simple misconception, that all patents

are monopolies. Monopolies are bad — therefore, patents are bad. The truth is that practically no patents are monopolies. Patents are property— and where there is competition, either by product alternatives or by licensing, you cannot control price and you do not control a relevant market and you do not have a monopoly.

A revision of the patent statute is suggested which would reverse the alienation of the small inventor

from the patent system and restore the system to its earlier effectiveness in promoting the useful arts.

Key words: Inventor; monopoly; patent system; property rights; validity of patents.

Ayn Rand, speaking through her protagonist in

The Fountainhead, said, "Men have been taught

that the highest virtue is not to achieve, but to give.

Yet one cannot give that which has not been created.

Creation comes before distribution, or there will be

nothing to distribute. The need of the creator comes

before the need of any possible beneficiary. Yet we

are taught to admire the second-hander who dispenses gifts he has not produced above the man who

made the gifts possible. We praise an act of charity;

we shrug at an act of achievement."

My friends, I have not come to praise Caesar; I have come to bury him. I've come to read the

epitaph, symbolically, of the people in this audience

who kept their hands up in response to my request

for a count of those who view themselves as inventors and either do not work for a company or do work

for a company with gross annual sales of less than

$75 million. I consider that my obligation to those of

you who kept your hands up, to Dr. Schockley,1 to

1 Nobel Prize winner for his invention of the transistor and the development of

transistor theory.

Dr. Kapany,2 to Jack Rabinow,3 requires that I point

out to this audience certain fundamental, elemental

truths.

It is the inventor who is Ayn Rand's creator, the

first-hander. The patent lawyers, the judges, and the

businessmen who bring the already extant creation

to market, are the second-handers. They do not

create; they are necessary, but they do not create.

There are thousands of investment bankers; there

are thousands of patent lawyers; there are hundreds

of Federal judges; there is only one creator for each

invention, except in rare instances. The second-handers may keep moving continuously but without the

inventor it is a treadmill exercise productive of

nothing but remaining in place. The process of creation and its commercialization stop at top dead

center without the inventor

Having said that, it is nonetheless the case that

the things that are necessary to nurture the creator

2 Prolific inventor in the fiber optics field.

3 The inventor of several hundred patented inventions, many of which have formed

the basis for financially successful entrepreneurial activities.

119

5 33-210 OL - 74 - 9
are also necessary to nurture significant second-handers, such as the people who bring the product to market.

What is required for this process of creation and

commercialization from the point of view of the inventor (including his wife and children) as well as the

second-hander? I'm convinced that Jack Rabinow

would not invent if inventing meant his wife would

go hungry; he would sell shoes. What is it that's

necessary for the innovator who brings the product

to market? Even a thief, let alone a creator, can tell you what that is. Simply put, once you have stolen

something, or have created something, you want law

and its reputed order to protect it for you. No thief

will go through the effort of stealing if he does not

have a safe-deposit vault that will protect the

products of his theft. No businessman will go

through the effort of investing, working, sacrificing,

and making his money vulnerable to loss unless he

has some reasonable assurance that there is an or- derly property system which will guarantee that that

for which he worked will be protected for him.

Inventors need that protection as well since they

too are human beings. Risk capitalists, absent that

established, orderly property right, simply will not

invest. What in heaven's name is so complicated

about this self-evident truth? In the jungle, without

property law, the biggest and the strongest apes take

the bananas. In our civilized society, with a breakdown in property law, the biggest and the strongest

institutions take the property. It doesn't take much

to understand that if a viable property system for invention breaks down, then, to the extent that invention continues by the compulsive few who must spew

forth inventions despite the fact that their families are starving, those inventions which are spewed

forth will be taken by the strong.

Who are the strong? They are the large corporations with the most effective merchandising capability, the most efficient production capacity, the

best financial resources, and perhaps the most

political clout. And so, as in the jungle, this property

will be taken away.

Now, it has been argued, that's not so bad,

because those large apes or corporations are efficient. Is there not, in fact, a benefit to society to stepping on Jack Rabinow's neck and having a large

corporation take his inventions free of charge and

use them to the advantage of society?

Well, there is a serious problem with the approach

posed by the question. It is that without the property

right that will enable the inventor to protect that

which he created, he will in fact stop inventing. This

does not mean that a society without the orderly ar- rangements of property in invention will not function. It will function. There is no reason why we cannot give all inventors salaries, or give them inventors' certificates with a stipend from the central

presidium, and have them function that way. The

Soviet Union does precisely that. There are a lot of

good inventions in the U.S.S.R. I'm not opposed to that approach, if it works. But that approach happens not to be the mechanism that the framers of the

Constitution thought was the most effective for us. The mechanism that we have is an exclusionary

right for a fixed period of years. That exclusionary

right is the means that is supposed to, in our free enterprise system, generate that excitement of activity

for a "piece of the action" that's going to do more

than just a salary as motivation for creation.

Now, that's not true for all people. A lot of people

much prefer an orderly, quiescent, economic situation with a regular and good salary. They work better

that way. But, as we now know, from the work done

by Professor Jewkes4 and others, half of the significant inventions during this century came from people outside that environment. They came from individuals and from inventors in small companies.

Great inventions often come from the minds of the

inexpert because they are too untutored to know that

what they invented couldn't be done.

Now the fact of the matter, my friends, is that I don't want to lose those inventions for the future. I do not believe that the major problems of society will

be solved by political institutions. I do not believe

that any of our real problems will or have been

solved by lawyers, or judges; but I know, based on

inductive logic, that most of society's problems will, or can be, solved by technological innovation and invention.

That is why as a lawyer and second-hander, I am

in love with people like Jack Rabinow and Dr.

Shockley, who happen to be lovable human beings

anyway. But I am also in love with the inventors who

are garrulous, ill-dressed, smelly, dirty, but who

create. They, my friends, perform the function that

we second-handers are incapable of performing, and

without which we are bereft of any hope for the future. The creators are, in fact, the salt of the earth!

4 Jewkes et al. The Sources ofInvention, pp. 82-85 (St. Martin's Press. 1958).

120
The property concept that I have defined and ex- plained is simplicity itself. Property as a legal concept requires as indispensable the right to exclude

others from the enjoyment of the thing which is the

subject of property. That is what property has al- ways been; that is the jurisprudential definition of

property; and that is what property always will be for

so long as we have it. The question, then, is: Does the United States

patent system purvey and convey a protectable property right to inventors and to those who must invest

capital to bring the invention to the marketplace?

The answer is, by and large, it does not. There rarely

has been a group in society that has been as duped,

deceived, taken advantage of, and misused, as that

group known as inventors. And it's always done by

us second-handers; i.e., by the people who take the

invention to market, by the patent lawyers, and by

the judges.

More recently, totally confused politicians and ill- informed consumer advocates have joined the

deceivers and destroyers.

It is the case that top managers of large corporations, aware of what I am going to tell you about in

the next few minutes, know patents to be what they

are — an expensive and tragic joke in the scheme of

the property system of the United States. I have

spoken with the heads of some of the largest cor- porations in the United States who, after reading my

analytic materials and data on holdings of patent invalidity and noninfringement,5 as well as resorting to

their own in-house experiences, realize that as an institution patents are so rarely, expensively and unpredictably enforceable that they are more burden

than help to the advancement of industry and the

useful arts.

I spoke at the Licensing Executives Society's an- nual meeting not long ago, where I was asked to comment for the assembled Society on the reputed

practice of some corporations which license trade

secrets and sell show-how and start up capability,

but throw the patents in free. When corporations

either do or think of doing that they are recognizing

and trying somehow to cope with reality. You cannot

condemn a business organization for doing what the

law forces it to do. By the same token, you can recognize that no competently advised large corporation

today is going to take a license under a bare patent,

5 Kayton. The Crisis ofLaw in Patents (Patent Resources Group. 1970).

where that's all that you have to offer, unless the

patented invention falls into certain fantastic categories such as a cure for cancer or the Wankel rotary

engine. Almost always what they are willing to buy

is a capability for establishing the business or product line. The bare immunity from suit which is

all a patent license nowadays provides is simply not

enough to justify expending financial resources.

I want to recount for you now a representative

telephone conversation which I must have had 40 or 50 times a year for the past 3 or 4 years with people

whom I've never seen before, and don't know. Typical phone conversation: Ring, ring, ring. "Professor

Kayton?"

"Yes."

"I have an invention, and I want to get it patented.

I want to do something with it." My first question, then, is: "Why? Why don't you

just give it to the world?"

He answers, "Well, I want to make some money."

Now, if that's the answer, which it always is (believe it or not, even inventors want to make

money — not just investors in greasy chicken

franchises, but inventors, too, want to make money;

for some biological reason there's this compulsion to

eat, and clothe themselves) I say,

"OK, if you want to make money, then I will talk

with you. The question that I must ask you first is: Can this invention be kept secret?"

Now, if the answer is, "Yes, it can be kept secret,"

and very few answer, "Yes," I say, "Excellent. Keep

it secret, do not file a patent application, do

everything necessary to maintain the secrecy, and

manufacture or carry out the process yourself. You

will stand a good chance of being materially re- warded. If you cannot keep it secret, if you cannot

manufacture it yourself, then you are in almost hopelessly serious trouble, unless you can answer 'Yes'

to a couple of more questions." The question that

follows is: "Are you independently wealthy?" If the

answer is "No," and it is always "No," the next

question I ask is, "Is your invention such that you

can reasonably expect a manufacturer of that invention to make at least several million dollars a year by

bringing your product to market?" And I'll tell you

the answer to that is almost always, "Yes." That's

based on the well-nigh universal wishful thinking of

inventors and love of their intellectual products.

Then I say, "If the answer is yes, then you must be

sure that you can raise sufficient capital, not merely

121
to file and prosecute your patent application, which

comes typically to only a few thousand dollars; but

you must raise enough money, if you're going to rely on the bare patent rights and nothing more, to

litigate your patent. This is so because if your

patented invention is worth anything substantial, as surely as day follows the night, it will be stolen from

you by an infringer under the euphemistic banner

and crusade that you are a monopolist and the patent

is invalid. This is in lieu of the often actual and correct statement that the infringer is a thief and pirate.

And you have to raise that risk capital for that purpose alone."

"Well, how much is that?"

"Well, if it's a really good invention, that is, commercially valuable, you can expect effective litigation to cost you between an absolute minimum of

$100,000 and up to as much as $1.5 million for the

first time around up to a U.S. Court of Appeals."

"All right, I'm going to go get the risk capital; I'm

going to go and talk to people."

I say, "Of course, you can't talk to anyone without

a patent application, and more often than not you

cannot talk to anybody, anyway, even with a patent

application."

"Why?"

The answer to this is simply that a risk capitalist

won't invest anything in an invention, where the invention is in an unenforceable property system. Why

should Lehman Bros, or any investment banker invest $5 million to commercialize a patented invention when the moment its marketability is proven a

large corporation which had no research and

development costs nor risks when undertaking tests or marketability, will steal it and knock them out of

competition. All the inventor and banker will get is expensive litigation, as a general proposition. One

other possibility does, however, exist. The potential

infringer may take a license from the patentee while

he is getting ready to compete. With the present

posture of the law, however, he may never have to pay anything. To begin with he need pay nothing at the outset since most licenses require payments as

royalties based upon production and during tool-up

time the licensee is not in production. When the day

of full production arrives and royalties start accruing, the licensee may and often does say, "We repudiate the contract; sue us." If the economics of the

situation justifies, the patentee will bring suit and

will lose 80 percent of the time. 6 In the Eighth Circuit the patentee virtually always loses. There have

been no patents, but one, held valid in the Eight Circuit since prior to 1966 in a series of cases which

demonstrate, in the speaker's view, a profound lack

of understanding of the law on the part of that Circuit.

I am now going to tell you exactly what the

problems are that have produced this tragic (for

society) state of affairs. I will explain the philosophical and practical reasons for them and what the single most effective and practical real solution to them

is, in my view. I will also point out why there is no

real hope of our ever achieving this solution,

although we may try as long as we are alive. The actual data on holdings of invalidity and of noninfringement, show that there are at least two or more patent

systems in the United States. There are some

Federal circuits where, because of the rules of law

enunciated by the United States Courts of Appeals,

a patent cannot be held valid, irrespective of the

merit of the invention. Those rules of law say the fol- lowing: If an invention involves a combination of elements such as three layers of doped semiconductor

material with three electrodes connected at different

points, then that invention is a combination of old

elements; and a combination of old elements cannot

be much of an invention. Therefore, if you can find one printed publication that shows three electrodes

hooked up somewhere and another printed publication showing three pieces of germanium doped in

various ways, the patent is automatically invalid for

obviousness.

Now, this rule of law enunciated that way is used

most of the time in the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits

of the United States. Fortunately, in the Ninth Circuit of the United States, there is also a case styled

Reeves Instruments v. Beckman Instruments,1 that

says the equivalent of the speaker's oft-repeated ex- hortation to reason: "You damned fools; don't you

know that all inventions are combinations and all combinations must be made of the building blocks

at hand and thus must be of already known elements? No human being is capable of inventing a

6 The reasons for this high percentage have little to do with the merit or lack of merit

of the patent as I have documented in conjunction with the statistics in The Crisis of Law in Patents, supra. A detailed breakdown of my data on holdings of invalidity and

noninfringement is presented in the two statistical tables which are appended.

7 Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F. 2d 263. 1970 USPQ

74 (9th Cir. 1971). cert, denied, 404 U.S. 951, 171 USPQ 641 (1971).

122
combination, the elements of which are new and of

which he is ignorant. Only God can do that."

With less despair and frustration than that of the

speaker, Judge Learned Hand similarly said, some

30 years ago, "It is idle to say that combinations of

old elements cannot be inventions; substantially

every invention is such a 'combination.' " He then

presented a rational real-life approach to un- derstanding when a novel invention is worthy of

patent protection.

"In appraising an inventor's contribution to the

art, as we have often said, the most reliable test is to look at the situation before and after it appears....

Courts, made up of laymen as they must be, are likely either to underrate, or to overrate, the difficulties

in making new and profitable discoveries in fields

with which they cannot be familiar; and, so far as it

is available, they had best appraise the originality involved by the circumstances which preceded, at- tended and succeeded the appearance of the invention. Among these will figure the length of time the

art, though needing the invention, went without it: the number of those who sought to meet the need,

and the period over which their efforts were spread:

how many, if any, came upon it at about the same

time, whether before or after: and— perhaps most

important of all — the extent to which it superseded

what had gone before. We have repeatedly declared

that in our judgment this approach is more reliable

than a priori conclusions drawn from vaporous, and

almost inevitably self-dependent, general propositions." 8

This standard was followed in Reeves v. Beckman.

Within the Ninth Circuit, therefore, we have the

two opposite rules of law, although the Reeves v. Beckman view is followed only rarely. In those jurisdictions in which the statistics on validity are rational and reasonable, i.e., the Sixth and Seventh

Circuits and the United States Court of Claims,

where the holdings of validity may average 45-50

percent, the patentee clearly doesn't get his patent

held valid automatically. He has to split his viscera

to prove that his invention is great and his patent

valid, but at least in those circuits he is given a reasonable chance to do that. He can win.

And so that's the posture of our situation. Now,

there are some people including some very informed

and knowledgeable people who say, "Oh, well, after

» Safety Car lighting Co. v. General Electric Co., 155 F. 2nd 937 (2d Cir. 1946).

all, only the doubtful patents are litigated. Strong

patents (and weak patents) are never litigated,

never." That statement is categorically incorrect.

Whether a patent is litigated is determined in real

life by the solution in each instance of the following

equation: E(X)= Px

' f(X). This is the "law of ex- pected return." It tells you whether you're going

to litigate in the following way: "The expected re- turn of any given situation (i.e., that which the

situation is worth to you or that which you should

be willing to pay to have the situation or that

for which you would be willing to put X dollars

down in a bet) is equal to the probability that you will

succeed (Px) in the venture (whether it's a flip of a

coin, a horse race, or patent litigation), multiplied by

the total amount you will get, (f(X)), if you do succeed. If Px

" f(X) is an amount substantially in ex- cess of the costs of litigation, no rational businessmay may properly refuse to litigate. Suppose the

total value of the infringement over the life of the

patent (e.g., the infringer's profits) is $60 million,

and the probability of the infringer winning the in- fringement suit with the particular facts in the case

is only 10 percent. Nonetheless, this means that even with such a poor probability of success it's well worthwhile for the infringer to litigate if the

litigation expenses are substantially below $6 million. Now, I have been in situations where I have

said to my opposing counsel, "You know you don't

stand more than one chance in 10 of winning even in

this unpredictable court." And he responded, "Yes,

but the lawsuit's going to cost my client half a million

dollars, and he sees a potential profit over 17 years

of something like $64 million. The difference

between half a million and one-tenth of $64 million

is substantial." Of course it is, and if I were in his

situation I would have done as he did; and if I were

the head of the client corporation I would do exactly

what the president did. Businessmen do and must

function that way.

The law of expected return dictates which patents

get litigated. As in the above example, strong patents

are often litigated. Whether a given patent is good,

bad or indifferent in a given situation simply cannot

be determined by whether or not it is litigated.

There's no such thing as a per se good patent. The

question is, is it a patent that will be enforced in a court of law? On balance, 80 percent of the time it

will not.

123
Another critical patent problem deals with the law

relative to licensing patents. In a heartrending situation, Lear v. Adkins9 was a case in which an individual inventor licensed his gyroscope invention to a corporation. After taking the license the corporation refused to honor it; it refused to pay the royalties due. Until then it had been the rule that if you

get benefits under a license, you're not allowed to at- tack the validity of the patent. In fact, this is a basic

principle of all contract law. But the Supreme Court

held that would-be monopolists (e.g., the little inventor, Mr. Adkins, whose contract called for some

royalties from Lear, Inc.) must be kept in check. In

express violation of basic contract law, the licensee

was freed to attack the validity of the patent at any

time after the license contract is executed irrespective of how valuable the contract had been to the

licensee until then. 10 There was no concomitant

statement that there is some social good involved in

making sure that valid patents owned by small

patentees are not litigated so as not to legally harass

those patentees into bankruptcy by large corporations. No such statement was made and there is no

such Supreme Court policy!

Why are we in this abysmal condition? I submit

that there is one major reason. That reason is the

legally outrageous proposition which has been imposed on the public, the bar, and the bench either

fraudulently, through arrant ignorance or simple

misconception, that all patents are monopolies. The

term monopoly in this country, rightly or wrongly, is akin to a loathsome disease. Irrespective of anything good in the patent system, if "all" patents

are monopolies, then patents must inherently be

bad. The logic is simple. Monopolies are bad. All

patents are monopolies. Therefore all patents are bad and more particularly this patent is bad and

must be held invalid in order to protect the public.

No matter what the patent statute says, therefore,

about validity, I, as a member of the judiciary, must

interpret it in such a way so that it is held invalid.

Look at Lear v. Adkins or virtually any patent case today and you will see the words "patent" and

"monopoly" used either interchangeably or in apposition. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Custom Recording Co. (171 USPQ 502, 509) the court

pointed out:

9 395 U.S. 653. 162 USPQ 1 (1969).

10 Note that it had always been the laiv that the rest of the world,J.e., everyone other than a licensee, is alwaysfree to attach a patent's validity.

"It is well recognized that 'monopolies in trade or business in this country.. .are generally denounced

as odious, intolerable, and contrary to public policy

and common right.' 36 Am. Jur., Monopolies, Combination, and Restraints of Trade, *4."

This view is part of the air that we breathe, we virtually take it in with our mother's milk. Is it any

wonder therefore that in determining the question of

validity, courts have gone through the following

reasoning, as did the Ninth Circuit in Ashcroft v. Papermate Manufacturing Co. ?

"The history of the American patent system is replete with the continuing tension between a strong

public policy against monopoly and a desire to en- courage inventions which will benefit the public.

This tension has been resolved by the courts setting a high and exacting standard for patent validity."

The pathetic thing of course is that practically no

patents are monopolies. In order for anything to be

a monopoly, it must meet the definition of monopoly

which in its simplest and most meaningful form is:

"Exclusive control of the supply of any commodity

or service in a given market; hence, in popular use,

any such control in a given market as enables the one having this control to raise the price of a commodity or service materially above the price fixed by

free competition."

This definition appears in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition. I do not cite the

dictionary for the purposes of using it as authority,

but rather because this definition is the one that

most reasonable lawyers, economists and men un- derstand when they use the term monopoly. In this

definition we are constrained under our law to interpret the word "market" to mean "relevant market," as the Supreme Court of the United States has

expressly required in Walker Process Equipment,

Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.

Clearly patents are property. That is, there is the

right to exclude others from the use of the rest as there is for all forms of property, such as Black Acre,

your automobile, a book or your wristwatch. These

things which are property are rarely monopolies

although any form of property may be used in a monopolistic way.

If your use of the property results in extensive

control of a commodity or service which defines a relevant market, then you have a monopoly. A patent

124
almost never gives such control. Why? It is rare to have a patent which is so dominant that it controls a relevant market. That is to say, it is practically never

the case that during the 17 years of a patent there

are not sufficient technological alternatives so that

whatever it is that the patent controls, it is not a relevant market. The patent on the Accutron watch is a valuable piece of property, and as all property it carries the right to exclude others from making and

using the tuning fork type of watch mechanism. Is it a monopoly? Of course not, because the relevant

market, if it is not all time pieces, is certainly all wristwatches; but the Accutron share of the market

is probably not more than 4 percent. Even if the

technology which the patent controls does define a

relevant market, there can be no monopoly if the

patentee either licenses widely or is willing to license to competitors. Where there is competition

either by product alternatives or by licensing, you

cannot control price and you do not control a relevant market and you do not have a monopoly.

As defined above not one patent out of 10.000

either controls a relevant market by the nature of the

invention, or if it is inherently capable of doing so, is not licensed to others, thereby destroying the

monopoly effect. I have said publicly on several oc- casions that I will give anybody $1,000 for every

patent since 1790 which he can produce which in

fact has constituted a monopoly if he will give me

one dollar for every United States patent which is not a monopoly. With some four million issued

patents I would be instantaneously independently

wealthy if anyone should accept the challenge.

The fact remains that there is no way in our

society to make the pejorative word "monopoly" less

than loathsome even if anyone were disposed to try.

As long as patents are verbally equated in one-to-one

correspondence with that "unmentionable" term,

good and valid patents designed to reward and en- courage the small inventor will regularly be held invalid.

There is one significant way to reverse the alienation of the small inventor from the patent system and

restore the system to its earlier effectiveness in

promoting the useful arts. It alone will, in my view,

do more in this regard than all the other solutions,

panaceas and proposed patent reform bills put

together. I suggest only that one short paragraph

replace the first sentence of *261 of the patent

statute which says; "Subject to the provisions of this

title, patents shall have the attributes of personal

property." Instead, it should read,

"*261. A patent is personal property and shall be

treated as such subject to the provisions of this title. Like all property, a patent may constitute a monopoly through control of a relevant market. Control of a relevant market is not possible where a significant alternative to the patented invention exists

in that market or where the invention is widely

licensed or offered for license. In the instance where

a valid patent does control a relevant market and

thus is a monopoly for a period of years under this title, it is expressly exempt from the antitrust

proscriptions of any statute of the United States as a partial incentive to promote the progress of science

and useful arts."

There is nothing in this proposed paragraph that is untrue. Everything is legally sound. It conforms perfectly with the law as it is! It does, however, fly head- on into the prejudices and irrational biases which

most judges, lawyers, politicians and consumer advocates hold. These biases have been absorbed at least as early as their freshman college course in

economics, if not with their mothers' milk.

Confronted with the pristine truth of this proposed

paragraph, however, judges — and all of us— will be

forced to think rather than to automatically react. It

is my belief that confronted with this truth the

Supreme Court could never again cite with favor, as

it recently did, 11 the district court's words that

"monopolies — even those conferred by patents —

are not viewed with favor."

What is the prospect for such a statutory state- ment of legal truth being passed? Very little. The

main beneficiaries, i.e., the public and the small inventors and small inventive corporations don't un- derstand and therefore cannot become a viable

political force for its passage. The others, such as the Patent Section of the Antitrust Division, most

lawyers and politicians and more recently consumer

advocates are apparently so committed to sacrificing

the patent system and its socially beneficial role in

the misguided belief that this will in some way control illegal monopoly of the giant corporation variety,

that they probably cannot be looked to for support or even much objective evaluation.

11 Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., US.

173 USPQ 769 (1972).

125
But you. whoever you are, having heard this analysis and solution can do something to correct the

headlong race toward destruction of what should be

a socially valuable institution. Only you know what

that something is. Whatever it is. won't you please

do it?

Discussion

J. Rabinow: I would like to add one comment: I

will read the comment first and then the man who

said it. "I have made very little profit from my inventions. In my lifetime I have taken out 1,180 patents

up to date. Counting the expenses of experimenting

and fighting for my claim in court, these patents

have cost me more than they have returned to me in

royalties. I have made money through the introduction of sales of my products as the manufacturer, not

as an inventor. Signed: Edison. Saturday Evening

Post, September 27, 1930."

The other comment I would like to retell is from

another inventor by the name of Sherman Fairchild,

who owned Fairchild Camera, Fairchild Semiconductors, Fairchild Recording, half of Long Island,

and the largest block of IBM stock in history. We

were discussing inventions. He had patents of his own. and he said. "Jack, inventions aren't worth a damn but inventors are very valuable people." And

this, of course, agrees with what you say.

A. Ezra: This is not a facetious question, it's a seri- ous one. Is there a fundamental conflict of interest

between the legal profession and a simple law, which

requires an army of lawyers and judges to interpret?

I. Kayton: I believe that there is always a conflict

between individuals and institutions. The perfect institution invariably gets fouled up because it must

be inhabited by and implemented by human beings.

W. Johnston: In reviewing all the cases which have

been held invalid, do you notice any one characteristic: were they weak in any way?

J. Rabinow: Dr. Kayton said very clearly that when

the money is large they will be tried. I would like to add one specific case. I have 205 patents; only one was ever in court. Let me use fictitious names. Company A has my exclusive license on the watch

regulator. They licensed a Company B. Company B

pays them about 5 cents a clock. The amount of

royalties that Company A collects is on the order,

then, of about $150,000 a year from Company B. I get

much less than that. Over 17 years, this amounts to something of the order of $2 million. Company B decided, therefore, not to pay that royalty, and to say

that they were not infringing the patent. They did not

want to try it for validity; they simply said, "We're

making something else, not covered by Rabinow's

patents."

I said to the attorneys, "Their clock clearly infringes; I don't understand what argument they can

possibly raise." The attorneys said, "Look, it's two

million bucks, it's worth a hundred thousand to find

out." They took it to court, the court held that they

were infringing, they paid us the hundred thousand

they owed us. By keeping the license in effect, they

did not risk anything if they lost, because if they lost,

they lost a hundred thousand, and if they gained,

they gained $2 million. This is a perfectly good illustration of what a sensible businessman would do.

I. Kayton: I would also like to respond to the

question about the characteristics of the patents. It

is literally not possible to tell whether a patent is a strong or a weak patent by looking at a reported judicial opinion. The only way you can do that is to read the entire record of the case, and I have done

that under certain circumstances where I've studied

fraud in the procurement issue cases. But I can tell you one other item of information which I did not

develop, but which was developed at New York

University School of Law as part of a doctoral dissertation. And it was this, for those of you who are interested in improving the patent system and the

Patent Office. Over a period of 6 years where the

data was analyzed, it was the case that when you had

litigated patents wherein, in the litigation, the prior

art set up as a defense was the same as the prior art that was in the Patent Office prosecution, the patent

was held valid 75 percent of the time, which is a very

strong indication that the Patent Office standards

are quite reasonable when gauged against the judiciary's standards. That is to say, if they all considered

the same prior art, there is only that 25 percent difference between the two, and that can be accounted

for in many ways. But I don't consider that a significant difference, and I for that reason really get upset

when the really ignorant federal judiciary in this area

talks about the outrageous standards in the Patent

126
Court of Appeals Patent Validity Holdings as Reported in U.S.P.Q.

After the Trilogy and After

i r/"> lilt Wi j\ 1061 —1 Qfi 1 1701 17UJ^ After the Trilogy* before Anderson's — Anderson's —

Black Rock** Black Rock***

T 33.3% (3/9) dl.bvc (3/8) 00.0% /am \ (0/1) O 25.0% (7/28) ZO.U'%> (6/23) OA C\fTJ 2U.0%> M IC\ (1/5)

o 26.4% (5/19) 25.0% (4/16) 33.3% (1/3)

d. 13.6% (3/22) 16.6% (3/18) 00.0% (0/4)

c 45.9% (16/35) 40.0% (8/20) 53.2% (8/15) 47.8% (10/21) 41.6% (5/12) 55.5% (5/9) 7 46.1% (35/76) 50.8% (30/59) 29.4%) (5/17) 8 — UU.U7C /A/1 C>\ (0/18) 00.0% (0/17) 00.0% (0/1) 9 15.0% (8/53) 19.0% (8/42) 00.0% (0/11) 10 14.3% (1/7) 20.0% (1/5) 00.0% (0/2) D.C 16.7% (1/6) 33.3% (1/3) 00.0% (0/3)

Totals and averages 38.4% (121/315) 30.3% (89/294) 30.9% (69/223) 28.2% (20/71)

After February 1966, and up to and including U.S.P.Q. of March 8, 1971. **After February 1966, and up to December 8, 1969. ***After December 8, 1969 and up to and including U.S.P.Q. of March 8,

1971.

PATENT RESOURCES GROUP

Washington, D.C.

April 10, 1971 Reproduced with permission from:

Kayton, The Crisis of Law in Patents (Patent Re- sources Group 1970) as updated to U.S.P.Q. oi March 8, 1971.

Court of Appeals Patent Validity and Infringement Holdings as Reported in U.S.P.Q.

(After Trilogy February 1966 and Up To and Including U.S.P.Q. of March 8, 1970)

Valid but

Circuit No. Valid Valid and infringement

infringed not yet

decided

1 33.3% (3/9) 11.1% (1/9) 2 25.0% (7/28) 17.9% (5/28) 3 26.4% (5/19) 5.3% (1/19) 17.6% (3/18) 4 13.6% (3/22) 9.1% (2/22) 5 45.9% (16/35) 37.2% (13/35)

6 47.8% (10/21) 28.6% (6/21) 4.8% (1/21) 7 46.1% (35/76) 34.1% (26/76) 2.9% (2/68) 8 00.0% (0/18) 00.0% (0/18) 9 15.0% (8/53) 5.7% (3/53) 10 14.3% d/7) 14.3% d/7)

D.C 16.7% (1/6) 16.6% d/6)

Totals and averages 30.3% (89/294) 20.0% (59/294) 2.0% (6/294)

Reproduced with permission from: PATENT RESOURCES GROUP

Kayton, The Crisis of Law in Patents (Patent Resources Washington, D.C. Group 1970) as updated to U.S.P.Q. of March 8, 1971. April 10, 1971

127
Office, failing to keep in mind that when the same

art is considered, the Patent Office comes off pretty

well. It's only when the infringer puts in $2 or $3 million finding prior art that the examiner did not find

in his 4-hour search, that there is a real difference.

B. Walker: How about inventions where the

proposed royalty is less than the cost of litigation?

Suppose the proposed royalty were $100,000 or $500,000; your estimate of litigation is a half a million to a million and a half. A great deal of money

can be made with patents on which you get less than

half a million dollars; I had one on which I got

$400,000, had 17 interferences that I had to pay for,

plus taking it to the Supreme Court, and that cost

$160,000, quite a bit less than you recite, and I still made money on it.

I. Kayton: I'm very glad that you raised that

question because it gives me an opportunity to bring

out a critical thing that I couldn't get into my speech,

and that we must keep in mind. If the patent system

is as putrefied as I say it is, not the concept of property rights in patents, but the way it's being handled now, why in heaven's name are so many patents

being taken out by large corporations? Seventy

thousand were issued. The answer is very simple:

the body is dying and decayed, but the cost of burying the body is far greater than the inconvenience of

standing the stench. What I mean by that is, if you

don't maintain a strong patent position by taking out

patents, you are vulnerable to litigation costs. The

one thing that's keeping the patent system alive is the astronomical cost of litigation. Because of that

defect in our legal system, patents remain significant, and the patent system is utilized.

Specifically, with respect to your question, as these statistics go on and on, the amount that companies are willing to settle litigation for goes down

and down, and believe me, I've been in all of those

situations and have expressly negotiated for small

inventors and said to opposing counsel, "Now, cut

out the baloney, you guys; I know exactly what this

is going to cost you; I know exactly what I can pry

out of you in discovery," and in fact, I exploded one

case with discovery that would have tripled the costs

for the other side. I'm not proud of it; it's just the

way it was.

B. Kemp: I would like to know what your explanation is, Dr. Kayton, of the fact that so few patents actually go to court to challenge their validity.

I. Kayton: Why are so few litigated, you mean?

What expectation would you have? Do you know

how many are litigated? There are approximately

650 infringement suits brought every year; approximately 150 go through final judgment; and approximately 250 go through some significant stage of

litigation. That's a lot, to me.

J. Rabinow: This is one of the items that we would

very much like to know, and one of the things I would like to have the ETIP program find out: how

many important patents are litigated, those which

are important in dollars. By the way, many patents

are not litigated now for quite another reason: companies do make cross-licensing deals, and they don't

bother litigating. For example, the large automobile

companies don't sue each other, and airplane companies, computer companies, all have made cross- license deals. So, it's a little hard to say whether important patents would be litigated or not, when you

have so many cross-license arrangements.

B. Kemp: Even aside from cross-licensing arrangements, if a company gets challenged and the whole

patent declared invalid, anybody can get into that

area.

J. Rabinow: There are many reasons why you

would or would not sue another company, as you say,

third party interests, fifth party interests, etc., so it's a very legal problem, as any lawyer knows, and it's not a simple thing to debate here.

C. E. Anagnostopoulos: Do you know what percentage of the patents that are litigated are between

a large corporation and a small inventor?

I. Kayton: I have not the slightest idea, but just

names come to my mind like Beckman Instruments

v. Comtronics, Lear .v. Adkins, etc., but I have no

data, at all.

C. E. Anagnostopoulos: I think that's important,

in view of what you have said.

J. Rabinow: What keeps coming out in this meeting, and in all the meetings I've attended for many

years, is that there's so little data of how the patent

system operates. It's amazing, and Dr. Ancker-Johnson is trying hard to correct this. The answers to questions that one asks, like this, simply are not

known.

128
R. Kuntz: We are living in a society that's

somewhat swayed by public opinion. We see now an

anti-technology movement in the country; why go to the moon when there are riots in the streets? I submit that this is a hazardous public attitude, and then

we find that patent legislation doesn't have a breath

of a chance of getting called up for hearings in Congress because our representatives know that the

public just couldn't care less. How in the world do

we stimulate the public to become the forcing function on our representatives in government to see the

intrinsic importance this whole field has on our economy and our nation?

I. Kayton: Senator Hart, in introducing his bill to the Senate, said, "Mr. President (of the Senate), the

most boring subject in the world is patent law.

There's probably no subject that's more boring, and

I apologize for introducing this patent reform bill,

because I know it's death." He then went on to point

out that there's nothing more important in society

than this bill, and completed his statement by saying, "I apologize for boring you." I don't know the

answer to your question.

J. Rabinow: This is why this kind of a meeting has

to be held: because you do scratch history, and

maybe the scratches sum together into something

that changes it; if you don't try, you certainly won't

get it. So you cast bread upon the water, you publish

books, you make speeches, and if you don't do this,

what can you do? This is the way democracy

operates — sometimes it doesn't move, but sometimes it does move. I've been in Washington since

1938; now and then somebody catches fire — this is very important.

129

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Pubuc Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

NBS and the Inventive Process

Richard W. Roberts

Director, National Bureau of Standards

If we are to compete for international markets, we need more and better science, and we need a continuing supply of marketable inventions. The role of the inventor at the National Bureau of Standards,

and the services offered to the outside inventor by the Bureau, are described. The aims of a major new NBS effort — the Experimental Technology Incentives Program — are explained, and suggestions are requested for additional experiments that ETIP could perform.

Key words: Experimental Technology Incentives Program; inventors; National Bureau of Standards;

Office of Invention and Innovation; technological innovation.

The United States has achieved the highest standard of living in the history of civilization. Material

goods abound, we are fed and overfed through the

efforts of a very small number of farmers, the wonders of applied medical knowledge have increased our life expectancy dramatically, and there are opportunities for travel, leisure, and recreation un- dreamed of by previous generations.

We attribute these blessings to a combination of

factors: abundant natural resources, a people

dedicated to achievement, and the vast contributions of science and technology. It is unfortunate

that many tend to overlook the vital contributions of

the inventor. True, certain names such as Edison

and Bell are familiar to every schoolchild, but the ef- forts and successes of thousands of others, to whom

we owe so much, are lost in the mists of time.

Today many inventors are scientists and engineers who create as part of their job, but thousands

of others are barbers, lawyers, laborers, housewives, and students, who tinker and create with

the hopes of turning a profit in their own time.

And, let's face it, inventors were contributing long

before science was an established profession.

Thousands of processes and devices, from glass

making to the steam engine, were developed before

there was a National Bureau of Standards or cor- porate R. & D. laboratories.

We all recognize that the world today is extremely

complex. Knowledge grows faster than we can as- similate it, and the costs and problems of marketing

an invention are vast impediments to the innovative

process. But despite the difficulties, we need invention and innovation more today than at any time in

history.

Let me show you why. Despite our present af- fluence, our position in world markets is deteriorating. In 1971, for the first time in this century, the

United States had a negative balance of trade, and

in 1972 the negative balance was $6.3 billion.

Exports of American goods rose 110 percent over

the past decade; Japanese exports quadrupled.

Since 1960 our productivity has risen 32 percent;

Japanese productivity tripled over the same period.

And many nations, including West Germany,

France, and Japan are investing a greater proportion

of their resources in R. & D. than we are. There are other causes for concern. The number

of foreign patents taken out in this country is rapidly

increasing. In some areas, the majority of new

technology is foreign based. In textile weaving, for

example, about 70 percent of recent patents were

foreign, in tunneling, 69 percent, and in tracked air

cushion vehicles, 49 percent. If the trend continues,

we will end up dependent on foreign technology in

many areas. And, of course, there is inflation. One of my

friends has suggested that if we devalue the kilogram as we have devalued the dollar then we would

get more food per dollar. I'm not so sure that's the

answer!

One of the answers, of course, lies in more and

better science, technology, and invention and innovation in this country, coupled with Government

policies and initiatives to foster such progress. And

that's one of the reasons we're here today.

The United States has always recognized the need

to nurture the growth of invention. That need was

formalized by the dedicated group of radicals who

invented our form of government. They included a

131
section in the Constitution "to promote the useful

arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective

writings and discoveries."

Benjamin Franklin, one of the architects of the

Constitution, was himself an inveterate inventor. His

creations, more than those of most inventors, have

stood the test of time. The Franklin stove is still widely used, and probably half of this audience wears another of his inventions, bifocal spectacles.

American inventors have long played a major role

in the feeding of our growing population. Lately, the

phrase "green revolution" has caught the public

fancy, or at least the fancy of the press. This revolution refers to the development of new strains of rice,

wheat, and corn that give greatly improved yields.

But I believe that we had an earlier "green revolution" in this country when Eh Whitney invented the

cotton gin, Cyrus McCormack perfected his reaper,

and a dozen others developed ploughs, seed planters, grain threshers, and corn huskers.

The impact of some of these inventions is impres

sive. In 1791, the United States produced 138,000

pounds of cotton. In 1795, 3 years after Whitney

developed the cotton gin, we produced 6,000,000

pounds. That's what I call rapid economic impact!

Before you jump to the conclusion that American

farmers readily accepted every new invention that

came along, though, consider the story of Charles

Newbold. Newbold took out a patent in 1797 on a

cast iron plough with which a team of two oxen could

turn a straight, even furrow. But suspicious farmers

believed the iron would somehow poison the soil, so they went on using their wooden plough and a team

of 8 to 10 oxen. Newbold, after investing $30,000 and

remember this was 1797, when $30,000 was a massive investment, gave up in disgust. Goes to prove

that you can't sell that better mousetrap if the market isn't ready.

Over the years, American inventors have contributed in many areas. There's no need for me to chronicle the achievements of Thomas Edison, Alexander Bell, George Westinghouse, and a host of

other American inventors, including such contemporaries as Bill Shockley and Edwin Land. But there

is a need for me to re-emphasize that if we are to compete for international markets, we need more

and better science, and we need a continuing supply

of marketable inventions.

During my career I've been very conscious of the

role of the inventor.

Before coming to NBS just 4 months ago, I had

spent over 12 years at the General Electric Company, Research and Development Center in

Schenectady. GE has always encouraged invention.

Thomas Edison, one of the company's founding

fathers, was an inventive genius, and his traditions

if not his methods are carried on today. Let me give

you a recent case history involving man-made

diamonds.

Ever since 1797, when diamond was first shown to be a form of carbon, man has dreamed of making,

rather than mining, his diamonds. In 1951, GE

launched a major program to produce diamonds in

the laboratory. A team of four scientists, Bundy,

Hall, Strong, and Wentorf, was assembled and

several approaches were explored. The one that paid

off involved a great deal of inventiveness in the field

of superpressure and temperature control. By 1955,

using a process in which graphite is dissolved in molten metal and subjected to pressures of nearly a million pounds per square inch (36.9 megapascals),

small quanitities of industrial-grade diamonds were produced in the laboratory. This process was

patented, and in 1957, man-made abrasive diamonds

were introduced to the marketplace. This particular

invention had several results, one being the creation

of a whole new enterprise for General Electric.

Today, the GE production facility is one of the lar- gest sources of industrial diamonds in the world, and

American diamonds are now used by every industrial nation. Furthermore, the creation of a domestic

supply reduced our dependence on a single, over- seas source for a strategic material. Finally, the

ability to tailor the properties of industrial diamonds

to specific uses has resulted in an abrasive tool today

that will perform 5 to 10 times better than its 1957

natural counterpart.

The industrial stones, small and unattractive by

esthetic or jewelry standards, are used today for

cutting, grinding, and polishing the hardest of

metals, ceramics, glass, stone, concrete, and gem

diamonds themselves.

Following the commercial success of abrasive

diamonds, two members of the original team, Strong

and Wentorf, pushed on in the quest to produce

gem-quality diamonds. The process they developed

involves the dissolution of a small mass of man-made

diamonds in metal at about 2500 °F (1370 °C) and at 900,000 psi (33.2 megapascals). The metal is held in a tube that is about 50 °F (28 °C) cooler at the ends

than in the middle. The carbon dissolves in the metal

132
and diffuses toward the cooler end zones of the tube,

where it crystallizes out of solution around small

seed crystals of diamond. This process takes several

days, and holding the temperature and pressure constant is quite an accomplishment. The stones

produced by this process are indistinguishable from

natural stones with one exception — price. The manmades are much more costly, and a major

breakthrough will be required to put them on a competitive basis.

While at GE I had the privilege and pleasure of as- sociating with Dr. William Coolidge. Dr. Coolidge,

the inventor of the x-ray tube, was a charter member

of the Inventors Council, a group on which he served

until 1963.

In the last 4 months I've learned a great deal about

the Bureau's famous inventors. One of them, of

course, is with us today, and that's Jacob Rabinow.

When Jack first came to NBS he was assigned to the

calibration of fluid meters. Almost immediately he

began improving on the equipment in use, and he's never stopped inventing. When the second World

War broke, Jack was switched to Ordnance work, as were many others at NBS. One of his major developments was the acceleration integrator which determines whether a shell has been fired, in which case

it will be allowed to arm, or has been dropped, in

which case it won't arm.

Shortly after the war, Rabinow was asked by the

NBS computer development group to devise a rapid

acting clutch for use with computer input/output

devices. What he came up with was a clutch based

on a new physical principle — the control of frictional

forces between solid surfaces and a magnetic fluid

by application of a magnetic field. The magnetic

fluid, consisting of a suspension of iron particles in a lubricant, becomes solid and transmits torque

within milliseconds after a magnetic field is applied.

This device caused a new sensation — literally

thousands of industrial engineers contacted NBS for

details, and several hundred came to see the device

and get first-hand information. The clutch went into

widespread commercial production, being used in a

variety of control devices, servomechanisms, and

even automobile transmissions, with the French

Renault still using the principle.

Another development for which Jack is justly

famous is his optical reading machine. In this device

each character being read is matched with each

letter of the alphabet and the closest match is

selected. In this way broken or degraded letters can

be handled with ease. A model of his machine is on

display in the Smithsonian Institution, and the principle is now used in most optical reading devices.

In all, Jack holds over 200 patents, and while not

all of them were taken out while he was at NBS, he

still developed more patents while in Government

service than any man in history.

But don't let me give you the impression that NBS

has had only one famous inventor. Far from it. For

example, in 1947 Abner Brenner developed a chemical method for plating nickel on a metal sur- face— electroless plating he called it. In his process

the metal to be plated is merely dipped into a hot

solution of nickel chloride and sodium hypophosphite. No electricity is applied, and nickel of up to 97

percent purity is deposited on the object at about the

same rate as in conventional electroplating. The

process is now a multimillion dollar industry, and

while the patent was in force over 200 companies

were licensed to use the process. More than that

number are probably using it today.

During World War II a Bureau team, including

Harry Diamond, Allen Astin, and Wilbur Hinman,

developed the radio proximity fuze for use in bomb

detonation. The proximity fuze is essentially a tiny

radio transmitting and receiving set contained within

the bomb. When the radio waves reflected back to the receiver reach a sufficient intensity, indicating

proximity to the ground, an electronic switch

detonates the projectile. A host of problems had to be overcome in developing this device, including

operation at —40 °F, miniaturization to fit into the

bomb, and development of a tiny wind-driver generator to power the device. At the end of the war over 8

million fuzes had been built commercially, using at peak production 25 percent of the total facilities of

the electronics industry and 75 percent of all plastic

molding firms.

I mentioned Harry Diamond in connection with

the proximity fuze. He was involved in many other

Bureau inventions, one of the most interesting being

the development of radio navigation devices for aircraft. Using a ground-based transmitter and instrumentation developed by Diamond and associates, a Bureau-equipped plane made history's first

completely blind landing in 1931. In 1933, the first

point-to-point flight in zero visibility was made from

College Park, Md., to Newark. N.J. Showing the courage of his convictions, or faith in his inventions,

133
Harry Diamond went along on that historic flight.

Even Charles Lindbergh tested the system, making

two blind landings in 1933. The whole object of the

NBS work in the early thirties was to put radio

navigation and landing on a routine basis, something

we haven't accomplished yet.

But enough about NBS inventors. Let me turn now

to the subject of what NBS has done for inventors

generally. In a very broad sense, the Bureau and its work are resources to all inventors, big or small. Our

staff is expert in topics ranging from activation analysis to Zener diodes, and provides consultation to those having problems in our areas of competence.

New knowledge generated at the Bureau is made

available to all inventors through scientific publications, and our volumes of Standard Reference Data

are often the key element in a decision as to whether

a proposed process is viable or not. Other NBS services to inventors are much more

direct. In 1964 we created an Office of Invention and

Innovation under the direction of Dan De Simone.

One of the functions of this office is to work closely

with the National Inventors Council. We are fortunate to have Len Hardland on our staff, as Len has

been involved with the Inventors Council from its inception in 1940. One of Len's functions is to direct

to the proper Government agencies those proposed

inventions that still come rolling in. And come they

do! In a recent 4-month period we answered nearly

800 letters concerning inventions and another 1 ,000

requests for publications. Now in charge of the Office is our friend Jack Rabinow, who returned to NBS a short time ago after a successful industrial career. We were a major participant in the Woods Hole

Conference on Creative Engineering Education in

1965. The principal aim of this conference was to ex- plore the opportunities for teaching the techniques

of invention and innovation in engineering schools.

The consensus of the conference was that creativity

could be taught to college engineering students. As

a direct result, many curricula were modified to include courses in creative engineering, including

those of Stanford, MIT, Santa Barbara, Dartmouth,

Georgia Tech, and others.

A few years later Dan De Simone served as the

Executive Secretary of the Commerce Panel on In- vention and Innovation. The Panel Report,

"Technological Innovation: Its Environment and

Management," also called the Charpie Report, after

the Panel Chairman, is a classic statement of the

problems encountered in innovation, together with

recommendations for smoothing the way for commercialization of inventions.

The Office of Invention and Innovation has also

been a key factor in the spread of State invention expositions. These affairs, which with Bureau en- couragement have now been held by 27 States, bring

together inventors and firms who are looking for new

technology. Some notable success stories have

resulted, such as the contacts made at the Minnesota Exposition that led to formulation of the

Rolite Company to manufacture camping trailers.

There is a major new NBS effort — the Experimental Technology Incentives Program, or ETIP — that

we hope will have quite a positive impact on inventors and small R. & D. firms.

ETIP, proposed by President Nixon in his 1973

budget message, seeks to increase the application of

technological invention and innovation to such

problems as productivity, employment, pollution,

energy conservation, and the negative trade balance.

ETIP will not seek to foster the development of

specific new technology, rather it is aimed at the

development of Federal policies to stimulate the flow

of technology to the marketplace.

Before policy can be shaped in a meaningful way,

we must have knowledge and experience concerning

factors that influence invention and innovation. And

developing that knowledge is the task of ETIP.

ETIP assumes that invention and innovation in

the private sector is strongly influenced by Federal

policies and programs. The program will start by

testing this hypothesis in three broad areas: procurement, regulation, and invention and innovation by

lone inventors and small R. & D. firms.

We will look at such questions as: — What cost-effective Federal actions can be

taken to facilitate the commercialization of the

technical inventions of inventors and small R. & D.

firms? — What alternatives in Federal or Federallyassisted procurement policies and practices would

be cost-effective in stimulating technology, invention

and innovation and thereby increasing productivity

and improving the U.S. competitive position? — Can Federal regulations issued to protect public

health, safety and well-being by controlling goods

and services offered to the public be used to provide

a positive stimulant to technological invention and

innovation?

134
ETIP has defined the desired experiments and

statements of work for each of the three major policy

questions, and participation has been solicited from

the private sector. Most of the experiments will be

performed in cooperation with technologicallyoriented private organizations and other Federal

agencies, with NBS monitoring progress of these investigations.

The Federal Government has for many years provided assistance to small businesses. This

assistance has been in .the form of loans, loan

guarantees, or management advice and assistance.

Unfortunately, in qualifying for such assistance,

firms associated with new technological products

and services and lone inventors have been at some

disadvantage because the Government has avoided

the risks involved in making loans to firms that

produce new technology.

To improve this situation experiments are now

being developed that will identify those policies or programs that may facilitate technologicallyoriented small businesses. The validity of the experiments will be judged on the basis of whether or not

inventors or small R. &. D. firms are able to ac- celerate the commercialization of new products or processes.

In developing plans for these experiments, the fol- lowing general assumptions have been made: — The historic role of the inventor and small R. &

D. firm as a prolific source of technological innovations will continue. — The relative value and probability of success of

inventions can be compared. — The cost-effectiveness of revised policies to stimulate innovation by lone inventors and small R.

& D. firms can be compared. — The results of a systematic set of experiments

aimed at improving the commercialization of the inventions of inventors and small R. &. D. firms would

permit the identification of better policies or programs.

Let me give you a few examples of what we mean: — At present, the Small Business Administration

provides support to small businesses primarily on

the basis of their managerial competence and financial soundness. In conjunction with SBA,

procedures could be tested so that decisions to support new ventures are extended to those that are

especially technologically attractive. The experiment would be to provide SBA with the technical ex- pertise needed to make sound technological

judgments either through funding private engineering consultants or through making available technical consultants in Federal laboratories. If, by this

means, a significant increase in technological innovation is stimulated, more permanent institutional

arrangements would be proposed. — A series of experiments could be conducted in

cooperation with SBA to examine the effectiveness

of providing objectives and accurate market information to small businesses concerning their advanced technological products or services. Assessment of the market potential for the product would

be provided by funding technical market analyses.

Results would be furnished to appropriate en- trepreneurs when it is anticipated that a commercially viable innovation is found. The ability of the

firm to use this information to gain needed financing

will then be followed to examine whether market

surveys or market development assistance might be

provided by SBA as an additional service to small

technologically-oriented firms. — In conjunction with State-sponsored product

development corporations such as those recently

established in several States, means would be

developed to provide managerial, marketing, financial and other assistance to inventors and small R. &

D. firms with promising technical inventions. Such

assistance will be directed towards bringing together

the entrepreneurship, financial backing, and market

know-how needed to carry technical inventions

through to successful commercial application.

These examples are illustrative and are by no means exhaustive.

So let me close with a request. We are actively

seeking suggestions for additional experiments. I look to this audience for a good deal of input. Most

of you are familiar with the processes and problems

of inventions. You are aware of those barriers to invention that government action can overcome.

I encourage you to apply your inventive skills to the ETIP program, helping us design and test technology-transfer mechanisms.

135

5 33-210 OL - 74 - 10

SESSION Ill-June 13, 1973

Opening Remarks

Myron S. Coler*

It might be appropriate in these opening remarks

if I made one or two rather personal comments. Unlike the members of the morning panel who come

from large organizations such as the Government,

Monsanto, IBM and RCA, I have been a so-called

small inventor and a small entrepreneur. However,

I am not one of these people who think that there is a great mythological contest going on between the

great companies and the little companies. Certainly

there are some very rough individual moments!

In terms of the larger purposes of this meeting it

is well to note that when we talk of affecting the international balance of trade, we are talking of units

in the neighborhood of $100 million. We are not

going to affect $6 billion shifts in an economy with

just a handful of roughly $1 million enterprises. So, sooner or later the development has to be big to be

significant for the National economy. For major

growth developments must either go over to the

larger companies or less frequently, the small

developmental company grows to be larger as in the case of Xerox or Polaroid. Hence, for present purposes we should not consider the individual small inventor or enterpreneur in isolation.

Similarly, if a public corporation, in which a family

or an institution holds stock and counts on dividends were to announce suddenly that for the next 10 years

they were cutting dividends in order to help and re- ward the small inventors employed by the company,

there might be a rather fast shuffle of stock portfolios. Obviously, the value of inventions and hence

the value of inventors are not intrinsic but depend

increasingly on the marketplace.

I do want to call attention to the fact that we often

tend to be a bit careless in our use of such words as "invention" and "patent." We often act as if the

terms were unique; when you get stuck, you go to the dictionary. Unfortunately, the dictionary does

not deal with many nuances and important legal and

marketplace distinctions. Thus, for example, there

are real inventions which are not patentable. Again,

*Member of the National Inventors Council

there are inventions which are not suitable for

patenting but which are patented because someone

wants to negotiate with a block of 30 patent applications instead of 25. Contrariwise, certain inventions

which may be very appropriate for patenting may,

because of trade practices, be carried out as trade

secrets.

Despite their generality, observations of this kind

may lead to important distinctions in the way different so-called inventions will be handled and the

real local meaning of such terms as "environment"

and "incentive." Let me give you two extreme examples. If we have a mechanical device, it is usually

self-evident (although it may require careful ex- amination) how the device is or may be constructed

and operated. Infringement tends to be readily detected.

On the other hand, let us take an example from

the chemical industry: the area of catalysis. Even

among companies which patent very extensively,

certain details of catalysis, the manner of making the

catalyst and incorporating it, and so forth, may be

treated as "secret art." That is why "know-how" is often just as important as the related

patents — technically if not legally.

I would at this time add my emphasis to a point

which has been mentioned by several people. In

many cases we do not sell the invention. We sell the

know-how, the entree, the customer list and many

other intangibles. However, the best legal instrument is the patent. So people may appear to negotiate and fight only about the patents. But it really is not that simple.

Thus, such a court decision as maintaining that

the licensor can no longer require that the licensee

not challenge the validity of a patent will, I predict,

lead to more licensing which requires "all cash on

the barrel head," and hence some very difficult pricing problems.

Inventors — especially of limited resources — are

not going to go through the hard years of

researching, developing and marketing only to find

that their "winnings" are in complete jeopardy

137
because the licensee finds it convenient to raise

validity questions even without merit.

There can be invaluable legislation on patents and

judges can make decisions of profound importance,

etc. But, I submit, that to the extent that we are interested in methods of providing incentives, we cannot legislate inspiration, and we cannot simply argue

incentives. We must find a different approach. I think that many of us here might contribute to that

need.

138
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Inventive Process —Where Does It Need Stimulation?

William B. McLean

Naval Undersea Center, 271 Catalina Blvd., San Diego, Calif. 92132

The patent system is crucial for the development of our national economy. Its influence is exerted by

providing a period in which risk capital needed for development can realize a return through production.

The inventor and his returns are only incidental to this process. Many areas of new development exist where the returns to the economy would be great but the Government is the only organization capable of starting the development. These include: (1) Satellite communications; (2) Two-way cable TV; (3) Floating cities; (4) Undersea cities and oil and mining operations; (5) Submarine tankers. Government ownership of patents is inconsistent with the purpose for which the patent system was created because it has no reasonable means to grant exclusive licenses.

Key words: Government help to innovation; Government ownership of patents; innovation; inventor; patent system.

Ladies and gentlemen, one of the advantages of

being changed from the first day to the third day is that you learn a lot about the things that you don't

need to say, particularly with this group. I was going

to talk about the importance of innovation and invention to our total problem of balance of trade and the

decline in the number of patents, and I was going to remark about the fact that we were now beginning to understand what Kruschev meant when he was over here and said that they were going to bury us in

economic competition; the world is starting to do

that. But I think Dr. Ancker-Johnson and Dr.

Roberts both said plenty about the fact that we need

more innovation, and I believe I can skip over that.

Then I was going to talk about the inventive

process, and the at least 21 steps that we go through

in order to get from an invention to a product; and as

far as I'm concerned we should really start back with

the conception of the inventor at the time the DNA

molecule is first put together, which later will result

in a man with an inventive pattern in his mind, but

this process of how the individual then has to be

trained, and how he has to have a pattern that allows

disorder, how he has to get random combinations,

was pretty well covered by both Dr. Kapany and Dr.

Shockley; so I probably can skip through that, too. They also spoke about the need for artistic talent,

and how to put things together, and that you needed

one individual who could form an integrated whole,

and could finally bring it together and demonstrate

that something would work.

I also thought it would be useful to talk about why

the patent system wasn't working, but after listening

to Professor Kayton's impassioned speech yesterday, I think that anything I could add to that would

be well in the form of an anticlimax. I certainly

agreed with the things that he was saying, for the

record.

One of the things that I did disagree with, and I'm

not sure who said it, was that we really didn't need

very much Government money to start the economy

going, or to make a change in the inventive process,

the innovative process. It seems to me that we have

a lot of important areas that we could advance

towards, where the initial investment is so large that

I doubt that any single company or group of companies can take the risk involved. One of these, where

the Government has already helped, is in the area of

satellite communication. I think the fact that we now

have synchronous satellites with communication

systems operating will improve our total worldwide

communication net, and will certainly involve a lot of new innovations and new inventions.

I think, closer to home, the next big step in communications is the installation of two-way cable TV.

I think this is an area where the Government has

139
been detrimental rather than helping; the few companies who have tried to get it started have been opposed by Government regulations. I think in the

State of California we have an outstanding example

of that, in which a company which had invested

about $25 million in cables in the Los Angeles area was legally, by an initiative in the State of California

which received the support of 60 percent of the people, was enjoined from carrying out their operation.

This obviously was illegal; the initiative is poorly

written, and it wasn't something that should have

been done in the first place; but because it is possible to manipulate a democracy, they did get 60 percent of the people voting against something which

ought to be a very important public good. I think the

cable TV makes possible an educational system; it makes possible sales; it can be important in training

and entertainment; it even has a very frightening

thing to the politicians, it would get an instantaneous

expression of opinion on what they were saying. I think if we had a system of two-way communication

throughout the country, we also would have a change

in the transportation problem; we wouldn't have to drive so many automobiles down to the corner

grocery; we could send things on a one-way trip instead of a two-way trip.

Now there is another area that I think is important, and which will require considerable initial investment. Dr. John Craven has been trying to work

with our Government, and with the Government of

Japan, to get the financing to build a floating island

for demonstration that such a proposition is valid,

and he was proposing that they build a floating

island that would first be used as an oceanographic

exposition in Okinawa, and then would be towed

over to Hawaii, where it could serve as an exposition

for Hawaii. The cost for such a device is about the

same price, about $50 per square foot, as property in

downtown Honolulu; and in a floating island you get

the buildings as part of the structure, and they come

for free. So. economically it shouldn't be a very hard

problem. But I think if we had such cities available, or had demonstrated that this is a possible concept,

we would have an opportunity for a whole host of

other innovations which would start the economy

going again. Well, fortunately Japan has decided

they'll go ahead with the project, and they're going

to build such an island for Okinawa, but the U.S.

Government has not decided to help with the project.

We've also located, on the north shore of Alaska,

a large deposit of oil. This would help us in the

problem of Saudi Arabia cutting off our supply of oil,

but it's a very inhospitable area to set up the operation to recover oil, because it's awfully cold. We

have in the ground a large thickness of permafrost,

and the buildings that you build tend to sink into it; but just offshore, about 50 miles out. you have a lot of water at 30 °F and it can't get any lower than 30°;

there's no wind; the weather is an asset at that point;

but what you need is an undersea city. Now this is not a case where we need to develop new technology, we just need an investment to build a city under

the floor of the ocean. We started to look into it to see what technology needed to be developed about

ten years ago. We found at that time there were

about 10.000 miles of tunnels underneath the sea

floor, and that there were daily about 4,000 people

working below the sea floor. All these tunnels had a termination on the ground, but nevertheless they

had to face all the other problems of supporting the ocean pressure, of construction, etc. We have some

beautiful pictures of undersea mines in Sweden,

with whole machine shops below the ocean floor. Again, I think that if we had such a city, then the

technology necessary to make it lower cost would

immediately develop. This would lead to the design

of submarine tankers, because the only way to get to such a city without coming through the ice interface

is by submarine; and I think the submarine tanker

would open up the northern trade route that was the

thing that Columbus was trying to find. The ocean in

the Arctic is reasonably deep; it is 2-3,000 fathoms,

and except for the narrow straits at one end, you

have a path for international commerce across the

top of the world which would be opened up by the

provision of a submarine tanker. I've asked some of

the people in the oil companies why they don't do

this, and they say: well, the Government has all the

technology on submarines in general, and the initial

investment in such a project is too much for any one company to undertake. General Dynamics has done

the study of a good submarine tanker, has it available to anybody that wants to look at it, but I don't

think it's a project that will get off the ground unless

the Government is willing to help support it. Well, Jack Rabinow asked me to talk about the

role of the inventor in the Government, and before

1952, when we both went to work, the role of the inventor in the Government was very favorable; that

140
is, we could retain all commercial rights to a patent,

and we could retain all foreign rights. The $25,000

award that Myron Coler mentioned that I got for the

Sidewinder I used to file for foreign patents in the

other NATO countries, and I was real lucky,

because the filing in the foreign countries eventually

ended up with about $1.5 million return on the units

manufactured abroad. It isn't very often that that

happens to a Government employee.

I believe that the Government is being very selfish. After 1952 the Government changed its policy;

people began wondering why the Government was

funding all this research and development, funding

up to 70 percent of the research and development in

the country, and not taking title to all the inventions

which they were producing. Well, of course the reason the Government wasn't taking title was

because it had no possible way of utilizing patents.

The patent system was set up to provide an incentive

to produce new things and to cover the costs of

producing new things; and the Government just

doesn't want to get into that business. If it did, I'm

sure that all the people in industry would be very un- happy if suddenly the Government started competing with them relative to the inventions which they

hold. And I can't see Congress funding the capital

investment that is needed on some of these wild

schemes that we would like to propose. So the

Government is really holding on to something, both

from its own inventors and from the inventors that

work on contracts with the Government, which it

can't possibly use.

I also had some recommendations on Monday that

I haven't heard anybody else propose, and I'd like to

just end with those. I'd like to first suggest that Dr.

Ellett, after listening to all the problems of how to fund the Patent Office, said. "Well, why don't you

just put them on a percentage of the take?" and it seems to me that would be a very important way of

funding. The inventors would much rather have a percentage of the gross income than they would a

flat payment, because I don't think anybody at the

start knows how to price a patent. If we put the

Patent Office on a percentage of the total income

from their patents, I think both the legal attention

and perhaps the Patent Office attention would shift

around to the point of trying to get more valuable and

more valid patents. So I would agree with the recommendation that Dr. Ellett made.

I have another feeling, and that is that patenting

and development really is an individual matter until

you have your first working model. I think if the

Patent Office could return to the system they had

originally, when they first set up the patent system,

of not granting a patent until you have a working

model, then we would eliminate a large number of

patents that are taken out just for nuisance value;

you'd eliminate the patents that just plain won't

work, like the perpetual motion machines, because

you really can't demonstrate a working model. We

now have gotten to the point where we have storage

mechanisms which would eliminate the original

problem, which was that there wasn't any place to store all the models that people made. We could now

store videotape or demonstrations of the models

working in a form where people could look at them

and see how they were working. Also, if you had a model of a patent before you granted the license, you

could include in the certification of the model some

of its characteristics on how it works, and we then

could have a system that requires that nobody can produce something with a different trademark unless it meet the minimum specifications that you

have for your model. At the present time there is nothing in the broad language that says how well a system has to work, and yet one of the things we are faced with is that a lot of our systems don't work

very well. We can get one good unit and then

everybody copies it, and it's very hard for the con- sumer nowadays to tell the difference by just looking

at them, as to which units work and which units

don't work. It's particularly true in the area of

plastics, where they all look alike, but they are tre- mendously different in their strength, their re- sistance, their wear capabilities, etc. I think we need

something like the Japanese "Passed for export,"

which means that it's a good product. Certification

of quality really ought to be a Government function

similar to the patent function.

My last recommendation is that we need to revise

the tax structure, and probably this body won't have

much influence on that; but it seems to me we have

a tax structure whose main objective is to equalize

the income of all people in the country. If you were

able to accomplish equalization, there would be no

capital to do anything imaginative, anything new. You don't build pyramids in a society where all the

income is equal, and I think we need some

141
mechanism where people and companies can accu- mulate enough risk capital so that we can get major

projects started; otherwise, the Government has to do it. And in some countries the Government is

doing it, and those are the ones that are competing

with us most effectively, economically.

One of the other things I learned in the last 2 days

is that if you stop talking, then everybody else will

start.

Discussion

J. Jancin, Jr. : Would you elaborate on the percentage of take; I'm not familiar with that idea.

W. B. McLean: I'm not sure that I could give a percentage other than that you ought to be able to set it

at such a value that the Patent Office would become

self-supporting, if that's an objective. It ought to be

easy to take the total income from patents and divide

it into the cost of running the Patent Office. I suspect that it is not a very high percentage: I'd

guess l/10th of 1 percent.

J. Rabinow: Dr. Ellett, who was Bill McLean's and

my boss many years ago, suggested that instead of

giving a fixed fee to the Patent Office that the fee be

based on the royalties you collect. This, I think,

could be done. In other words, the income tax form

could have a special line of royalties collected and a

certain percentage could be assigned to the Patent

Office. The difficulty is that many patents do not collect royalties, because many of them are used by

companies where it goes into their general pool of

profits and there's no way, in General Electric, for

example, or Control Data, where I worked, to assign

a dollar value to the value of the patent. It's easy

enough when it is licensed to somebody else but the

difficulty, even in cross licensing, for example, is,

again, there's no cash. Control Data took my patents on reading machines, for example, and cross licensed them with three companies and nobody

would be able to put a dollar value because there

were no dollars exchanged. We just cross licensed

45 patents against 150. It could be applied, however,

to individual inventors.

I'd like to suggest this for your consideration, that

the patents should be treated differently when they

are gotten by corporations as against private inventors. A corporate patent, as you have heard several

times, is a defensive thing. I believe that IBM does

not make money in any real sense on patent royalties. They sell computers. General Motors does not

make money on patents even though they have a

great many for various defensive and trade reasons.

They sell cars. So that a patent to a large corporation

is a defensive thing; it's a trade thing; it is not a way

of getting money. As a matter of fact, I am told that

many of their patent staffs cost more than the royalties they collect, but they are valuable for other

reasons, obviously. It may well be that the patent

system of the United States should be so changed

that the patents issued to corporations should have

different rights, different durations, different ways

of issuing as compared to an individual inventor.

One of the suggestions is that the fees could be different and that the search should be done by the at- torney, when he's a corporate attorney, and it should

be made by the Patent Office, when he's a private

inventor. In that case, the fees to the private inventor could follow Dr. Ellett's idea, that the private inventor pay a fee according to the royalties he collects.

B. Walker: On the question of percent of gross

from the patents, I wonder if you really mean gross

or net, because you can have some very severe costs

in connection with getting a patent. I think that

should be maybe net, and then, also do the taxes on

royalties accomplish almost the same result? Taxes

will probably amount to at least 50 percent of the

gain on royalties, whether to an individual or to a corporation, but the Government very seldom

figures a net basis. If the Patent Office produces

something that results in a lot of taxes, maybe the

Patent Office should be credited with the taxes

derived from the patents, either in royalties or in in- come. W. B. McLean: I would agree entirely that the

requirement that the Patent Office should be self- sufficient is pure nonsense, but in that area of pure nonsense you can make some things less nonsensible; I mean, you can provide a rationale that is un- derstandable to the accountants for not increasing

the patent fees to a completely unreasonable level.

In other words, the Patent Office has to do a good

job if the patents are going to be of any stimulus at

142
all to the economy, and that's a Government function. If it isn't a Government function, we could just

abandon the whole patent system, but I was just trying to make a reasonable method of funding the

Patent Office. I don't think that you really need to have a reasonable method. As Jack has said very often, the income to the country from the patents

makes the total cost of the Patent Office look

miniscule. What is it? At least $2 billion versus $30

million?

K. Hansen: You've had considerable experience in

the Government laboratory area. I wonder what your

comment would be on the following observation.

There has been a definite phenomenon since World

War II of establishing Government laboratories.

Most of them were, in the very beginning, concretely

mission oriented and I believe that there is a rather

remarkable record of inventiveness, innovation and

accomplishment. It would appear that in the last 5 to 8 years, however, there has been a change in the approach, that more and more of these laboratories

have been legislated out of their mission and we

have seen the solution looking for a problem. It seems to me that a good deal of real inventive and innovative capability has been locked up. I've sat in

Government and seen a parade of Government

laboratories come by, offering all kinds of ideas that

they would like to work on, as a basis for staying

alive. I wonder if you have a comment on this.

W. B. McLean: I think that the change that has oc- curred is that all of the laboratories in the Government are now on a national industrial funding base,

where they have no fixed budget for the year. The

capital that they have to work with is based on the

projects that they can sell. The review process in

Washington has gotten to the point where it's almost

impossible to sell anything because there are so many people that can say, "No." I think the laboratories are having exactly the same problem that industry is having in dealing with the Government in

Washington, and that is that the number of things

you have to present, in order to get one accepted, is very large and the chance that anything really new

will be accepted is almost zero. There's just too

much review. We used to be able to go to the Chief

of a Bureau in the Navy and he had the fund allocating authority. If he liked your idea, it went ahead. He

called in his people and said, "Do it," and they found

the cash. Now. the cash is so well distributed, there

are so many reviews that nobody can really change

things once they get underway. As Jack said, when

you spend all your time on proposals, funding, and

accounting, you have no time to be inventive. I think

the inventive rate in the Government is probably

well down at the present time. I can't think of any

new project that is really important that has gotten

started in the last 10 years.

R. Fullman: You mentioned that you were going to skip some things that you had intended to say about

the significance of invention and innovation to the

economy and the elements of trade problem because

they have been discussed before. Now, those subjects were armed-waved at, if you'll forgive the ex- pression. We heard some motherhood statements

but I don't think we heard any real sound evidence

type of talking yet in this whole conference about

really what is the evidence of how important innovation is, to what aspects of progress in the economy,

have we fallen behind or are others just catching up

with us — anything quantitative that you really had

available to tell us about in that respect, I'd certainly

appreciate it if you would peek through those notes

and bring them back out. W. B. McLean: I'm afraid I don't have a good

answer. I think it's important but it's a feeling I have. Of course, it's obvious if we are going to have

to put out a large part of our capital in order to get

energy, rather than developing our own, we are going

to be in trouble and we've got to do something else.

We've got to be in the same position, I think, as Japan if we can't be self-sufficient.

R. Kuntz: I think the subject of the Government

patent or the patent emanating from Governmentsponsored research and development is sometimes

dealt with too lightly. The data that has been accu- mulated is overwhelming and tells us what the lack

of incentive in the system can do. The policies of the

Government, either in retaining title or retaining

license to practice, have had a highly detrimental ef- fect on the application of this technology. The inventor has no incentive to disclose under a Government

procurement situation because there's no pay-off for

him. The company only maintains housekeeping in

filing those disclosures so that he can stay clean with

respect to the procurement officer. In the event that

there is a filing and the Government retains right,

that patent never sees the light of day because no

one is going to fund it with the capital necessary to

143
bring it to the marketplace without an exclusive

license to practice. What do you suggest in the use

of Government patents?

W. B. McLean: I suggest that Government patents

should cease to exist. I think they're a complete fal- lacy. You might just as well publish it in the open

literature, as to try to take out a Government patent,

because there's just no feasible way for the Government to license anybody on an exclusive basis; and

if you don't have an exclusive license, what's the reason for putting any money in to develop it? So,

open publication would be equivalent to the system

we now have, and I think would be much preferable.

M. Coler: Apropos of Dr. McLean's last remark, I want to bring up again the fact that know-how transmission is basically a kind of service industry, and

the Government is not geared to serve its licensees

in the same sense that a company or an inventor,

who sells license rights, helps tailor them to specific,

problems. The Government is not going to help you

get a pilot plant on stream.

J. Rabinow: Regarding the question on hard

statistics, the statistics are these: that while initially, an industry starts with a great invention, if you look

at the number of patents issued in any industry, you

find that the relation between the size of the busi- ness and the number of patents is very close.

Nobody knows whether patents lead an industry or

follow it; they probably do both. So if you look at the

half-life of a patent art, as it develops in the Patent

Office, the number of patents rise and then

gradually fall, and then they're looked at once every

5 years. You'll find that if you study the number of

patents issued in any industry, you know how the industry is doing. They're an infallible measure of the

activity of an industry, because as an industry gets

developed, of course people patent more. And if you

look at the history of some of the new arts, you'll find

that the foreigners are now outstripping us. While

the total number of patents filed in the United States

by foreigners is now about 33 percent or so, in certain arts it's 60 and 90 percent. When somebody says

that the balance of trade is fiction, I suggest you

come to me and I'll give you a list of four pages of

arts which are very active today, where the

foreigners are outstripping us in the United States;

in some instances, 90 percent of the patents are filed

by foreigners. This means that that art will certainly

be foreign. And it means the manufacturing will fol- low it, and the trade will follow it, because the

patents are infallible guides when there are large

numbers, not individual patents.

M. Coler: I disagree with Jack on what I call the

Goldilocks theory, where you have one kind of

patent for the big bear and one kind of patent for the

little bear, because little bears have a habit of

becoming big bears, and sometimes big bears

shrink. You can't say, these people patent for

nuisance and protection, and these people patent for

the original intent of the patent system; it's not that

simple, and I think it would be the same as saying

that a dollar in G.E.'s pocket is only worth 90 cents,

but if he's poor it's worth $1.25. I don't think it's administratable, but we can argue about that later.

144
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Employed Inventor and the Corporation

C. E. Anagnostopoulos

New Enterprise Division, Monsanto Company, St. Louis, Mo. 63166

The idea that the goals of the employed inventor conflict with those of the corporation is an outmodec

fallacy. The creative challenges of the modern corporation are totally compatible with the creative drives of the employed inventor. Through invention, he discovers new and useful solutions to problems.

Through innovation, the corporation commercializes such technical advances. Corporate growth and

profitability today depend upon planned and systematic innovation.

Such innovation requires not only the technical certainty of a useful invention, but also an evaluation

and reduction of its commercial risks by such criteria as corporate fit, market timing and potential busi- ness volume. The presumed conflict between the employed inventor and the corporation is at this inter- face between his empirical proof that his invention works and the corporation's pragmatic assessment

of it as a business risk. Actually, this point of stress is a constructive interfacial tension that can be most productive if kept in dynamic equilibrium. This is a task for a middleman who, more than a research director, is a technological entrepreneur; technically well-grounded and with a full grasp of corporate objectives. His role: motivating interpreter to both the employed inventor and the corporation, having the respect and con- fidence of each.

Key words: Corporation; employed inventor; innovation; invention; research director; technological en- trepreneur.

I am honored and delighted to share with you my

views on this somewhat controversial topic of the

employed inventor and the corporation. In my

opinion, there are some important aspects to this

relationship that need to be brought to light and ex- amined. And these are quite aside from what I see to be the obvious advantages of being an employed inventor rather than being an unemployed inventor.

As the general manager of the New Enterprise

Division, I am charged with developing product lines

new to the company and offering good growth and

profit potential. Obviously, the role of the employed

inventor is vital to this function. It is a role that was

mine in my earlier career with Monsanto. It was

then, and it is even more today, a source of excitement and challenge to me. Whether you are an inventor or an academician or

a corporate R. & D. manager, you are sure to know

what I mean when I speak of this type of excitement

and challenge. It is a kind of exhilaration of the

spirit; the galvanic charge that courses through any

creative person at grips with an opportunity to ex- press his creativity through invention or innovation.

I have put it in terms of technological creativity for our purposes today, but it does not differ from the

thrill of creative science or creative art. It is a

deliberate pursuit of what psychologists would call

the "Aha!" experience. Such creative problem solving is instinctive to us as the highest expression of

human intelligence.

Our bodies of science are living monuments to man's instinctively inquiring mind. Similarly, he is forever applying his knowledge creatively to invention and innovation because he has an instinctively

reasoning or problem-solving mind. I am not at all sure whether man's first technological innovation

was the use of fire or of the fig-leaf bikini. In either

case, he has been inventing and innovating ever

since.

I shall be referring to invention and innovation

quite often today, and primarily in a corporate frame

of reference. If you understand what I mean by those

145
terms, you may then better understand what I am

trying to say. By my definition, invention is the

bringing of new products or processes into existence. Innovation, by my definition, is the bringing

of such inventions into commercial use. We should

agree further that, in the corporate world,

"research" refers to the inventive function. The innovative function we call "technical development."

But let us take a closer look at the meaning of invention. By anyone's definition, it is essentially the

creation of new technology. Any invention worthy of

the name must meet three criteria: (1) It must be a

solution to a problem; (2) it must be original in concept; and (3) it must be useful in the broadest sense

of that term. In short, an invention must solve a problem in a novel and useful way.

The first two of these three criteria yield quite

easily to empirical proof. The invention either solves

the problem it was meant to solve or it doesn't.

Similarly, it is either an original solution, or someone

else beat you to it. Failure in either of these criteria

sends the project back to the drawing board or the

bench.

It is the third criterion — that of the usefulness of

the invention — in which proof is by no means self- evident. It is a value judgment of "Who needs it how

much?"; the pride of the inventor versus the prejudice of the rest of the world. The classic example of

the inventor's view toward usefulness was voiced by

Benjamin Franklin. You probably know the anecdote

about his being asked by a friend to explain what

good was some minor invention. Franklin is reported

to have answered his friend by asking him, "What

good is a newborn baby?"

To the public, however, the usefulness of an invention is the ultimate measure of its meaningfulness. This criterion of the utility of a problem-solving

and novel product or process is the interface

between invention and innovation or, in industry,

between research and technical development;

between the employed inventor and the corporation.

Unfortunately, the public is very pragmatic about

what it considers to be a useful and therefore desirable innovation. The corporation depends upon that

public for a marketplace. It must be equally pragmatic in deciding what to offer to its market. And it

is this type of realism that has led, in my opinion, to a very outmoded and faulty inference about the relationship between the employed inventor and the cor- poration.

There is an obsolete misconception that corporate

management has some type of built-in or reflexive

resistance to anything new or different.

From this follows a faulty inference that

technological creativity is basically incompatible

with the corporate function.

The result of such thinking is the fallacious conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict

between the goals of the employed inventor and

those of the corporation.

I should like to examine this misconception with

you in some detail. In doing so, I believe that we can

gain some important insights to the very meaningful

relationships that exist between the employed inventor and the corporation.

The concept of corporate management as re- sistant to change has been obsolete for more than a

half-century. That long ago there was a strong trend

among corporations to establish internal research

laboratories to generate new technologies for their

technically-oriented business. In this, they were fol- lowing the leads of General Electric, American

Telephone and Telegraph and Eastman Kodak, all three of whom established strong research functions

around outstanding academic scientists early in this

century: Whitney at GE, Jewett at A.T. &T., and

Mees at Eastman.

Since World War II, and spurred by the

technological breakthroughs of that era, practically

all of industry has been embarked on a search for

new and dramatic ways to grow creatively. Corporations have engaged in the most vigorous competition

for any creative business activity that is technically

sound, uniquely effective and profitably productive.

They have undertaken continuing programs of

research and technical development deliberately

designed to obsolete their current products and

processes through next-generation technology. Their

reasoning in this has been simple: If anyone is going

to obsolete their products or processes, it had better

be done by them.

Their goals have been equally simple: to protect

or gain the proprietary position that ensures the

greatest profit margin. As a result, corporate

management today accepts and invites innovation as

a crucial means of keeping up with, or moving up on,

its equally innovative competition.

In other words, the key to corporate profitability

and growth today is the orderly use of planned and

systematic innovation. I have given special emphasis

146
to the words "planned" and "systematic" because

they relate directly to this question of the utility of an

invention; to the interface between the inventor and

his employer.

As for the idea that technological creativity is basically incompatible with the corporate function,

this may be a derivative of the line of thought, popularized by C. P. Snow, about a "cultural gap"

between science and the rest of the world. It is true

that the scientific method of appeal to evidence is shared by all scientists and engineers, including inventors. But there is a world of difference between

the purposes of scientific inquiry and scientific invention. The purpose of scientific inquiry is to prove

a hypothesis. If it is successful, its result is the

discovery of new knowledge. In contrast, the purpose of scientific invention — as I mentioned before—is to solve a problem in an original and practical way. A scientific discovery looks like a mathematical equation, and it is the beginning of a new

area of knowledge. But a technical invention looks

like a device or a recipe, and it is an end point of a current area of knowledge. It boils down to the difference between Edison's light bulb and Einstein's

E=mc2

. Incidentally, it has been almost 100 years

since the light bulb was invented — and we have

progressed to lasers, masers and holography, but

scientists still have not succeeded in devising an ex- periment that can prove what the nature of light

really is

The corporation has its scientists, too. Their pursuit of knowledge has commercial objectives, but

their goals are to prove or to disprove theories. A

negative result is as productive as a positive one, just so long as the inquiry shows beauty, precision,

generality and importance to its area of knowledge.

The scientist's assignment is to search out facts, and

his satisfaction comes from demonstrating them

reproducibly.

The inventor, on the other hand, is more of a

technologist than a scientist. Like the engineer, he

uses his scientific knowledge and creative skills to build things; to bring things into novel combinations

that work and solve a problem. His assignment is to find a new and better way of making a device or a system work, and his satisfaction comes from the

tangible proof of having done this.

To me, these goals and satisfactions of the employed inventor sound remarkably like the goals and

rewards of the corporation!

The corporation asks of the employed inventor,

"Can you put us into this business? Can you find a way to do this better? Can you give us a proprietary

advantage in this market area?" Those are very

creative challenges. And I see them as being totally

compatible with the creative drives of the employed

inventor.

How, then, can there be any validity to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between

the goals of the employed inventor and those of the

corporation?

Consider the advantages that the corporation offers him. Literally millions of dollars worth of physical resources are put at his disposal in terms of field

and laboratory facilities, computer capabilities, etc. He is put into close communication with colleagues

of his own and other scientific and engineering

disciplines with whom he can cross-pollinate to gain

fresh insights to his professional problems. He is frequently a member of a team or group which

together is working on the problem. He does not

need to feel alone nor does he need to be alone in his

struggle unless he wants to be so — and only when he

wants it that way. He has the incentive of participating in shared corporate objectives. With timetables

as well as objectives, he is prevented from wasting

his time on the truly impractical; protected, if you

will, from getting caught up in the misleading artistry of invention for invention's sake.

At the same time, of course, this means that he

can't invent just anything he wants to invent; he

can't choose his problems to solve in terms of his

own personal interests. But I find that the employed

inventor has very little difficulty identifying with the

corporate problems available to him.

It is also true that the employed inventor has very

little chance of becoming a millionaire from an invention. But he also is in no danger of going broke if the invention doesn't work! Again, I find that the

recognition of an important problem uniquely solved

is much more satisfying to the inventor than is money without such recognition. His name on the

patent is much more important to him than the fact

of assignment.

Finally, the employed inventor has advocacy of his

function and objective evaluation of it through his

management. The corporation is his only customer

but, on the other hand, he is working on assignment.

This implies the acceptance by the corporation of

147
the invention if it is assessed as a marketable -in- novation.

This is where we reach the crux of the matter.

This is the interface of the inventor's technical certainty that his invention works and the corporation's

question of its risk as a marketable product. This is the area of dynamic conflict between the employed

inventor and corporate management.

I see this to be a dynamic tension or stress rather

than a conflict, however. The inventor's job is to minimize the uncertainties of his invention as a novel and useful solution to a problem. It is un- derstandable that the inventor, as he minimizes

these uncertainties, assumes that he is increasing

the utility— and marketability — of the invention. But

the corporation cannot make that same assumption.

What seems like a logical marketing opportunity to the inventor, because the invention is useful, novel

and works, is not yet a marketing opportunity in the

eyes of the corporation. There remains the very important corporate step of evaluating the business

risk involved.

The management of risk is perhaps the most crucial function of a corporation. It must foresee and

quantify the potential risks and rewards of one

course of action and weigh these against the potential risks and rewards of an alternate course. For an

innovation, the decision-making process is one of

risk evaluation and reduction.

Quite aside from the certainties of an invention's

novel and useful solution to a known problem — in

other words, despite the inventor's achievement of

his objective, the business risk of the invention must

be evaluated against existing alternatives. The three

basic criteria for this corporate evaluation of the invention are its corporate fit, its market timing and its potential volume or size.

Corporate fit involves the question of whether the

new product or process is reasonably compatible

with the corporation's business goals and objectives.

This is not often a major question, for the employed

inventor welcomes and follows guidance on the areas in which he should be working.

Timing is more of a problem. This calls for a determination of whether the product or process is so innovative that it is too far ahead of its time, in which

case the market is not ready to accept it. It is also

possible that the corporation's product or process

that could be obsoleted by the invention still holds a healthy competitive advantage over the competition.

The corporation might hold up on the invention as a next-generation product or process to be innovated

when competition catches up with their present advantage. Timing also can find the invention to be too

late; a "me, too" product or process in comparison

with the competition's newest entry — or perhaps a step or two behind.

Size is the most critical test of the business risk.

Assuming a proper fit and good timing, what is the

invention's potential as a contributor to the sales and

profits of the corporation? If its market is limited

and its sales potential small, can a place be found for

it in a present product line? Is there any chance of

finding new markets for it that would give it a sufficient sales volume soon enough to justify it as a new

product line? What are the chances of finding such

markets? The larger the corporation, the more important this question becomes. And the tension

mounts at the interface of technical certainty and

business risk.

It is extremely important that this tension between

the employed inventor and the corporation be maintained in a dynamically productive equilibrium. And

I am not sure that this has been accomplished

generally to date. You will recall that, following

World War II, corporations went on a researchminded binge. They invested heavily in research

facilities and talent, gave their scientists a mandate

to create miracles and then left them to their own

devices while they waited for their miraculous

products. This was particularly true of the chemical

industry. Its technologists followed their own interests in turning out strange molecules which were

then exhibited around the circuit of other chemical

companies by "dog and pony shows." The result was

an incestuous marketing interchange within the

chemical industry which had become a slave to its own technology.

By the early 1960's corporate disillusionment with

research had set in. Management turned to newly

emerging marketing concepts to combat its competition. With the seller's market now a buyer's market,

the customer became management's prime concern. And the customers' needs became a rigid template

for industrial research. The result was twofold: (1) it reduced the corporation's risk in technical innovation, but (2) it also reduced its chances of coming up

with truly innovative products.

What happened to industrial research both in the

fifties and in the sixties were overreactions which

148
created disequilibrium between employed inventors

and corporate management. Research for its own

sake has no place in a profit-seeking organization. If

technology dominates management policy, the cor- poration easily can find itself inventing products and

processes for which it has no management, manufacturing or marketing skills. On the other hand, if technology is throttled by management policy, the

corporation soon may find its markets usurped by innovative competition.

I believe that the pendulum is now steadying itself, and the relationship between the employed inventor and the corporation is finding a balanced and

optimum course. The man-in-the-middle through all of this, of course, has been the research director.

During the research-enchanted fifties he was the

equivalent of a housemother. During the disenchanted sixties, he was assigned the grim task of

executioner. What should be his true role in the

dynamic tension I have described between the employed inventor and the corporation?

If we persist in the misconception that there is ir- reconcilable conflict between the employed inventor

and the corporation, it would follow that the research

director would have to fulfill one of two different

roles. As in the relationship that has come to exist

between the corporation and organized labor, the

research director would have to be equivalent to either the "shop steward" for the inventors or the

"shop foreman" for management. In the former

case, he would be squarely on the side of the inventors. In the latter, he would be squarely on management's side. In neither case could he make effective use of the interfacial tension between technical invention and commercial innovation.

Actually, what is needed is a genuine middleman;

one who can do two essential tasks: (1) He must be

able to motivate the technologists to apply their

skills creatively to practical objectives, and (2) he

must be able to convince management that the

achievement of those practical objectives is deserving of appropriate boldness in risk-taking.

What I am advocating is the type of research

director who has both the strong technical

background needed to work with technologists and

a grasp of corporate needs and goals which gives him

status with management.

This, in essence, means a research director who

is also a technological entrepreneur. Innovation is a

series of proposed-disposed relationships across both vertical and horizontal barriers within the cor- poration. The technological entrepreneur must be in

the core of this matrix. He should be the bridge

between the employed inventor and the corporation,

having the respect and confidence of both.

His would be the task of continuing to strengthen

the stature and role of the employed inventor. But he

would also be charged with responsibility for halting

technical projects that were wide of corporate objectives. Both technically and managerially, he would

be a communicator, interpreting the business risks

to the employed inventor and interpreting technical

uncertainties to corporate decision-makers.

With such policies and practices, the employed inventor and the corporation surely would become less aware of their assumed differences and more aware

of their broadly shared interests and goals.

Discussion

M. Harris: Implicit in the discussions here the last

few days, and other places, is that corporate structures are no longer interested in R. & D.; and I maintain that they're not only as interested, they're

probably more so, and more critically so, than ever

before. The only thing they're asking for today is an

accountability. The reason is very simple: two

decades ago the R. & D. budgets were a small part

of the total profit picture; today they're almost

equivalent. In several companies in which I happen

to be a director, the total R. & D. budgets are close

to $100 million; the profits are about $100 million.

This is a very different picture than when the R. &

D. budgets were a few percent of the total profit picture.

I wanted to ask one very important question,

though, when I saw the title. I don't want to pry into

the inner workings of your company, but along these

lines a number of companies in recent years have

tried the "new venture" route by way of either

setting up small independent operations, completely

autonomous companies, or buying into them. Have

you looked into this matter, and do you have

anything to report? There are varying experiences

now, and I'd certainly appreciate hearing yours.

149
C. Anagnostopoulos: I would like to keep that

short, if I may, not because I'm not interested,

because if I'm let loose I will make it too long. In

Monsanto we started this about 5 years ago, when we

started a separate division, self-sufficient in terms of

all its operations, manufacturing, marketing,

research, to undertake new ventures. We call it the

"New Enterprise Division." Through the 5 years that

this has been in existence, I think we've lived

through every statement about new ventures that I have read, whether it refers to an independent inventor or to a large corporation. When we started,

there was no "how-to" manual and we had to write our own, and believe me, we are half-way through

the first volume, and we expect it to be a 10-volume

presentation some day, if we write it. So I believe

that the main thing that one has to recognize is that

when you set up an independent operation in a large

corporation for new ventures, you have to realize

that you cannot duplicate the outside world of small

business and independent inventors. There is no way that you can get an independent inventor and

put him in the fish bowl of a large corporation — no

way. He will not survive in it. An employed inventor

is a different kind of an animal from an independent

inventor, or from a technical entrepreneur, which I

call the individual who is both an inventor and a businessman at the same time. So, there's no point

trying to imitate the outside world; you just have to realize that you are going to take the best advantage

of your employed inventors, the ones that come to the corporation because that is where they like to do

their inventing. They're not the same kind of an

animal as the outside inventor. So, comparing the

two is useless. Oh, you might compare it because

you would like to see the differences, or because it's an interesting discussion during a cocktail hour. But

there is no comparison between the two. and to try

to displace an outside inventor, transplant an outside

inventor into the corporation, you're sure to fail, and

I think most of the companies that have failed in this

aspect, it is because that is what they tried to do.

M. Coler: When you talk about the independent inventor, the entrepreneur, the scientists and

technologists: these are not biological distinctions.

Man is a remarkably adaptable creature. When I worked for Union Carbide, I worked in the mold that

Costas described. When I was an independent consultant, I worked in that mold. To succeed in each of

these molds you have to perform differently, perhaps. Some years ago a man wrote a book and | dedicated it to pedestrians. When you're walking

you're a pedestrian; when you're in the car you're

not a pedestrian. You can be an inventor; you can be

a businessman; when you're investing in your

friend's invention you're a much different person

than when you're buying stock in Monsanto.

C. Anagnostopoulos: I'm in trouble, because I have an example of an individual who apparently can

be both an independent inventor and a hired inventor. I'm at a disadvantage because I've always been

a hired inventor, and not an independent one.

J. Rabinow: I'm not sure that's a disadvantage

when I think of some of the experiences I had as a businessman. I don't disagree with you, Costas, but

your own admission is that the constraints in a large

corporation are quite different from a small corporation; and the thing you say about the market size is very important. When I worked for Control Data, I'd

come up with an idea, and the boss would say, "How

much market can we get out of this?" "I don't know,

a million, maybe," and he would say, "Forget it." He's absolutely right; in his place and in your place,

I'd do exactly the same thing. So when I talk about

large corporation constraints, I do not mean it as a

criticism. I wish I were a large corporation; I didn't

make it twice. I would then do all the stupid things

that large corporations have to do; there's no choice;

and the thing that you must do is say that nothing

less than $10 million, in your company, is worth doing. This means automatically that you must make

the right choices as to whether it will or will not

make $10 million. This, nobody can do. There is no way on this earth of predicting the sale of new

items — nobody could have predicted the computer;

nobody predicted Xerox; nobody predicted Polaroid.

This is why you must encourage inventions without

knowing what they're going to do; this is a terrible

act of faith, that you must take Bill McLean and say,

here's a couple of million bucks, go and do your

guided missile, and if you fail we'll fire you, and if you succeed, we'll make you a hero. This is what

society must do. I don't disagree, for example, with

Myron Coler, that there is no physical difference

between small and big business; but there is a difference that mathematicians have expressed very

well. When a thing is very different in magnitude, it

is different in quality. It must change. I think,

150
Costas, you yourself say that when the size is large,

your rules of inventing are quite different; and this

is the penalty. This is why General Motors did not invent the Wankel, although they knew how Wankel

operates long before Mr. Wankel; this is why Honda

had to develop their engine; this is why computers

did not come out of IBM; they came from Eckert and

Mauchley, who were two college students. This is why 60 percent of Du Pont's products were not

developed at Du Pont. And when you talk of large

corporations, you must make a very sharp distinction between chemical corporations and those which

are not chemical. You are different from General

Motors in a very real way, as you know. Your patents

are much more important to you than they are to General Motors. I think the large corporations will

not innovate because they are in their own strait -

jacket, which is size.

C. Anagnostopoulos: I agree with what you said,

and there is nothing wrong with large corporations

not having the major breakthrough inventions to their credit. I think there is room for the independent inventor. I don't think that the large corporation

should be blamed for that. Its role is primarily in innovation, not in invention. One without the other,

there's no point in doing it.

B. Kemp: The issue is not only the one you've

raised, the question of what happens when a company this size, for its own purposes, decides not to pursue a particular invention. From a social point of

view, the real question then becomes, how can you

facilitate some other company, large or small, to take

up that idea, to go ahead and utilize that product for

the society as a whole? I think what we really ought

to be thinking of are ways to facilitate that process.

You mentioned one of them; that is, go to the small

company. What happens with those ideas, which if they were made public knowledge, would really be

useful to somebody who could get to them? That

seems to me to be a major social issue.

C. Anagnostopoulos: I believe that you have a

point there, and that, of course, comes under the

category of how can we take best advantage of all the

creativity that exists in our country, regardless of

where it is located and whether or not that unit in

which that creativity is located is interested in it or

not. I have no idea of how we can take the total inventive capability of our country and pool it. We're

making some attempts at this; there are the research

institutes, the venture capital groups. In our particular case, for example, if anybody wants any of the

patents that we do not use, they can contact us. We

have a policy of patenting, for example, in our company. We don't keep secret anything except improvements on the same theme. We don't have a major discovery that we hold back. Variations on the

same theme, we do hold back, because we call those

trade secrets, etc. I really have no answer to that,

and I don't think there is an ideal answer to that

question, but it's an area that I think all of us have

the responsibility of addressing ourselves to.

H. Forman: I think part of the purpose of this con- ference is to come up with solutions and get to the

top administration in this Government as to how to

utilize the inventions that you don't want to use. I have some thoughts; I'd like to hear others, and

hopefully, we can come up with recommendations.

C. Anagnostopoulos: I think that's a total subject

large enough that we can't really attack it right here now. I think you are probably giving the large cor- porations a little more credit than they deserve. I don't think that we or the Du Ponts have that many

ideas that we are putting away. And if there are

ideas, many of them are still in the very beginning,

and they're really not that useful. I think that in the

competitive environment in which we live today, we

really try hard to use all the good ideas that we have;

and there aren't that many in our vaults; at least, I don't think so.

151

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Institutions and Environment for Inventors in IBM

David DeWitt

IBM Corporation, Route 52, Hopewell Junction, N.Y. 12533

IBM seeks to create and maintain in its laboratories an environment conducive to innovation. Inventors are aided by instruction in patent practice, prompt and competent evaluation of submissions, and

the help of experienced patent attorneys. Innovation is encouraged by a system of recognition and re- wards for patents issued and outstanding technical contributions. The IBM Fellow appointment is an attractive long-range objective for inventive people: it is a lifetime appointment which gives the Fellow freedom to do innovative work of his own choosing, with ap- propriate support.

The IBM institutions for encouragement of innovations were introduced about 10 years ago, and have

been modified from time to time. They are still being evaluated, but the results have been largely favorable.

Key words: Environment for innovation; IBM Fellow; institutions for inventors; inventors; rewards for inventors.

The IBM company believes very firmly that innovation is an essential requirement for continued

success as a business. Internally it has set up institutions which facilitate, encourage and reward invention and its reduction to practice. The following

quotation is from a Corporate Instruction to Laboratory Management:

Subject: Innovation in Engineering, Programming

and Technology

IBM must create and maintain in its laboratories an environment conducive to innovation.

New concepts must be welcomed by management at all levels, funds and facilities must be

provided for the development of appropriate

proposals, and employees must be kept aware

of management's encouragement of creative

ideas. For the Company's continued successful

growth, every effort must be made to prevent

the press of day-to-day operations from stifling

innovation.

This instruction calls for the establishment of

formal programs to assure that creative expression within IBM will be utilized with increasing

effectiveness, and the atmosphere for individual

professional development will be enhanced.

While internal invention is fostered, IBM desires

the maximum of freedom of action to use inventions

made elsewhere and this is obtained by the use of

IBM's patent portfolio to exchange patent rights or by royalty bearing agreements. To be effective we

require patents essential to the best practice of our

technologies and those of related industries. Such

patents are more likely to come from early work

when a field is new than from the final optimizations

of actual product development. An environment

must be created which stimulates the disclosure

and reduction to practice of ideas whose time has

not come yet.

IBM must employ the patent system defensively

to protect its internally developed ideas and maintain its freedom to use them. For this reason good

ideas must either be patented or published at an

early date so that the rights are not lost to a later re- inventor. An encouraging environment is required to stimulate early disclosure and prosecution of ideas

not required by the project to which the inventor is assigned.

The elements which IBM uses to create an en- couraging environment for invention and its disclo- sure are:

153
1. Constant reminders from management that invention is wanted in the form of publicity about IBM

inventors. There are articles in house publications,

releases to the local press and attractive graphic displays in the laboratories.

2. Instruction of engineers and scientists in

patent practice, notebooks and disclosure forms

which are easy to use and a system for the prompt

and competent evaluation of submissions.

3. On-site patent attorneys experienced in the

fields covered on the site.

4. Arrangements to permit reduction to practice

of good ideas not applicable to the inventor's as- signed work.

5. A system of recognition and fixed financial re- wards for disclosed inventions which are filed or published.

6. A system of unusual recognition and substantial financial reward for outstanding technical contributions, both patented and unpatented.

7. The IBM Fellow appointment which is a career

goal for creative people who want to work as individual contributors.

A very real fact of life is that projects can be

planned and scheduled but invention cannot, particularly those inventions which open new prospects.

Hence for many inventors there is a serious motivational conflict between service to the urgencies of

the project and the pursuit of a new idea. It is easy

for the inventor to make his own evaluation and decide to reject the idea. Only 10 percent of submitted

disclosures are filed with the Patent Office and

about 1/3 are published. Hence the majority of disclosed ideas are closed and it is easy for a modest inventor to assign to a good idea the average probability of acceptance of all disclosures. In proportion to his own technical competence to reduce an idea to practice, the inventor knows in advance how much

work is likely to be needed to demonstrate an idea

which needs more than constructive reduction to practice. These impediments to disclosure and pursuit of invention are very real and apply specially to the best technical people who are the very ones

selected for difficult and urgent projects. To continuously demonstrate the importance of invention

to the business, a great deal of personal publicity is given to inventors with pictorial displays in laboratory public space, bulletin board displays and publications. Outstanding inventions and contributions get

the most intensive publicity but every inventor is

publicly recognized at the time of his first filed invention and further recognized as he achieves

further stated levels of accomplishment.

The company makes it easy to disclose invention.

There is a good manual (Patents in IBM) which ex- plains the workings of the patent system and the

tools for the inventor. There is a readily available re- gistered notebook which has all of the features

needed for a personal notebook for all technical activity but with the built-in features which encourage

and remind the inventor to make it a good legal

record of invention. There is an invention disclosure

form which is used to disclose invention directly to the professional patent attorneys. No elegance is required. It can be handwritten with hand sketches,

copied pages from the notebook can be included and

any other documented material. The communication

path is directly from the inventor to the attorneys.

There is no requirement or implied requirement that

management filter what the inventor perceives as patentable novelty. He selects his witnesses.

Timely and competent evaluation of disclosures

is an important process. We have experimented with

many schemes and are still using a variety of

methods on the various sites but there are common

elements. The two most important elements in the

initial evaluation are the technical evaluator who is a senior practitioner of the art and the experienced

attorney. The technical evaluator looks for novelty,

feasibility, importance to IBM and to others and ease

of avoidance. The attorney uses his existing

knowledge of the field to make an initial determination of patentability. The most common scheme for

selecting technical evaluators is for laboratory

management to assign the task for defined areas to senior people as a part-time responsibility. As an ex- ample, in the Yorktown Research Laboratory there

are nearly 30 assigned. I know 12 of them well and

can characterize them as members of management

who are very familiar with both the history and the

newest work in their fields. Most of them are current

personal contributors to important advances.

The initial evaluation takes place in a meeting of

the technical evaluator and the attorney, usually

with the inventor present. Typically it takes about 3

months from disclosure to evaluation, with 6 months

as a limit. The evaluation determines whether the invention will be filed, published or closed in advance

of a formal search and final decision on patentability. The inventor can ask for reconsideration by

154
another technical evaluator if he is in serious disagreement with the decision. A decision to close is never final if what is required is further work on the

inventor's part or if later information suggests that

the evaluation was wrong.

After a decision to file or publish the process

becomes the business of the inventor and the attor- ney. There is a formal search and final decision on

patentability with the inventor participating in the

analysis of the material uncovered. While the inventor must furnish the invention and the teaching of

how it is practiced he can do this in the form natural

to his own work and the attorney makes it into a

patent application with properly constructed claims.

In the case of publication, either may prepare the

material but the attorney must insure that the publication will secure the desired future freedom of action.

The greater the novelty of an invention, the more

likely it is that quantitative analysis and/or experimental work is needed to establish its feasibility and

value. For many inventions this work is added to the

inventor's assigned tasks and is done without any

special arrangements. To provide for those cases where the inventor needs more free time and support facility, there are formal provisions in most

product development laboratories for what is called

Creative Development. At the present time about

100 such individual arrangements are active. It is required that the work not be part of the planned

technical program and the study only go far enough

to show initial feasibility after which further work

must become part of a regularly funded plan.

There is a formal system of recognition for inventive achievement, based on the number of inventions. For the first filed invention an inventor

receives some publicity and an engraved deskpen.

Beyond that a point system is used, with three points

for a filed invention and one point for a publication.

On reaching the first 12 points the inventor received

$1,600, a set of distinctive jewelry, a diploma for his

office wall and publicity. Every 12 points thereafter

he gets another $1,600, another diploma and more

publicity. Co-inventors receive a full complement of

points as though they were each individual inventors. For outstanding contributions, whether or not

patentable, there is a policy of making exceptional

awards. They are made both at a site level and at the

corporate level. There is a set of jewelry, diplomas

and publicity. The corporate awards have been

made at an elegant, several-day, all expenses function at a big New York Hotel with wives and

husbands invited. Local awards are made at banquet

functions. The local money awards extend into the

thousands of dollars and the corporate awards into

the tens of thousands with $60,000 as the highest to one individual so far. In some cases second awards

have been made for the same contribution as its importance became more apparent.

The IBM Fellow appointment provides an attractive long-range objective for inventive people who

might otherwise perceive increased managerial and

executive responsibility as the only worthwhile

career path. It is a lifetime appointment which gives

the Fellow the freedom to do innovative work of his

own choosing with appropriate support. He has ac- cess to all of the laboratories and is encouraged to maintain outside professional and university contacts. Fellows are expected to be available for consultation and may be asked to work on short-term

special studies.

How well does this set of institutions create an en- vironment for innovation and its prosecution? We

have some measurements but no way of being definitive.

The system has not made a prolific inventor out of

every technically qualified person. About 40 percent

of the engineering population has some stake in the

point system but only about 7 percent have 12 or more points and less than 1/2 percent have 48 or more. The contributing fraction will probably increase, because the full set of institutions is less

than 5 years old and much of our technical population was hired in the past 10 years.

It is not easy to compare the system with alternatives because it has had increments to its features over time. When its initial form was introduced

about 10 years ago, there was a 40 percent increase

in the disclosure rate. The patent attorney community believes that the system has increased the rate of

disclosure, made the technical population more interested in patents and more qualified and

knowledgeable. An important result has been to

produce earlier and more thorough patent activity

which has facilitated product clearance.

The perceptions of the engineering population

have been surveyed from time to time and two significant improvements were indicated. One was to increase the amount and the frequency of the finan155
cial reward for points and the other was the Corporate Instruction requiring that arrangements be

available for reduction to practice. Interview results are largely favorable, showing a belief that the company is interested in patent disclosures and that

reticent inventors are encouraged. The negative

comments, fewer in number but very significant,

show a belief that too many trivial or insufficiently

worked out ideas are submitted, with the implication

that some must leak through the evaluation system.

The system of rewards for points does have the

weakness that it can motivate some people to exploit

the system by the vigorous defense of ideas of little value. The management of at least one of our laboratories believes there is a very small but troublesome

fraction of the population who do just that. At

present the only control is the quality of the evaluation. One feature of the point system which makes

exploitation possible is the possibility of being re- warded for publications only. There are very few

people in this category, however.

The system I have described is relatively new, incompletely justified and not very rigorously compared with a set of well understood alternatives. It is hard for me to be objective because it so contrasts

with the non-system I worked under at another company for the first half of my career. Consider me an

enthusiastic advocate. My hope is that you people

will ask hard questions and unmercifully point out

weaknesses. I hope to come away sadder but wiser

with ideas for reconsideration and more so- phisticated measurements than those we have used.

Discussion

W. H. Calkins: I would like to know what percentage, roughly, of your major projects in which your

research laboratory is engaged, originated through

this kind of a program?

D. DeWitt: I'm searching for a way to answer the

question. Everything that's disclosed as an invention

goes through this program, and people are highly

motivated to disclose things. So you're really asking

me to search it out by exception. Do I know of

something important going on in the company which

did not originate by an IBM disclosed invention?

And I would have to say, yes; for instance, we are working in the field of magnetic bubbles; we've

recently published and we're doing some inventive

work there, and I believe the original idea came from

Bell Telephone Laboratories. But at the same time,

I've looked at the records of the people working

there, and I did it for one reason, because some of

them are evaluators, and I wanted to evaluate the

evaluators, in order to report to you about the

system. There are people who are doing what I consider very important inventive work, which is the

basis for our thinking that it's a very important field to stay in. W. H. Calkins: I guess I'm searching for how many

innovative changes and directions for brand new

programs arise from the grass roots this way.

D. DeWitt: I don't have real statistics; we have not

been branching out as a business; as you know, we

tend to stay in our business, which is very large and

has kept us very busy. When we were so busy with

card machines, apparently we were a little late in

getting into stored program machines, etc. So I can't

claim that IBM has branched out and done great

things; now they've done some things which are socially useful and are carried for that reason; we have

a blood analysis machine which falls into much less

business than a big company is supposed to undertake, but we've done it because it's important,

and it came from an independent inventor within the

company, motivated because his brother died of a

rare blood disease. So there's one example in that

direction.

F. Neumeyer: Do you advise the same type of incentive system to employees of subsidiaries abroad?

D. DeWitt: I can't honestly answer that question.

I had so much to learn in order to make this talk that

I didn't do research except on the United States.

However, we have in the group here a gentleman

who might know the answer to that.

J. Jancin, Jr.: The plan is essentially the same

throughout the world. As you know from your previ- ous studies with respect to inventor recognition and

remuneration, this has not always been the case.

B. Walker: How does IBM evaluate outside inventions, and are many accepted, and does the outside

156
inventor have the right of appeal that the inside inventor has?

D. DeWitt: I'm not an expert on that either; all I can say is that I've had some personal experience in

evaluating outside inventions, because they were in

my field of expertise. One of the parts of the process,

I know from practice, is to refer them to people

within the company who know something about it.

J. Jancin: I wouldn't call it an appeal; we always

make an effort to review things properly and fairly,

and everything is open to reconsideration. For rather

obvious reasons there has to be a matter of control

in the way that information that comes in from outside the company is handled and maintained within

the company; and as a result, we have one group,

very small, two individuals in New York, that come

within what we call the IBM commercial development area, and they handle what we refer to as the

outside submissions. Every outside submission

that's submitted to the company goes to this particular group, which then seeks evaluations, and maintains communications with the outside en- trepreneur; and then it's taken from there.

K. R. Hansen: With so much spotlight on the inventor, what system do you have for those who

develop the invention to commercialization? Do they

have a similar program?

D. DeWitt: Yes, I mentioned that we have rewards

for outstanding contributions, whether they're

patentable or not; and in general, when there has

been a successful completion of an important project, or when somebody has made a significant contribution that wasn't patented, and in the area of

softwear it's very difficult, as some of you may know,

to get patents, we make these special awards. I actually looked at the dollars involved. Last year we

handed out almost 10 times as many dollars for outstanding contributions awards as we did for outstanding patent awards.

K. R. Hansen: Do you actually keep a case history

of the contributions of the development people in

order that when the work is done, the record is there

as to who's going to get what part of the pie?

D. DeWitt: I would have to confess that we don't do

as good a job at that as I think we should. There is one problem: you don't know what an outstanding

thing is going to be done until it's happened, and

most of the time while it's on its way to being an outstanding accomplishment, it's in great risk of being an outstanding disaster, and you don't sit around

planning for hero medals.

F. Barron: Have you done any research on the intellectual and personal characteristics of the individuals of recognized productivity under your

system? I ask this because I've noted in this con- ference a certain lack of attention to the problem of

identifying potential inventiveness.

D. DeWitt: No. I wouldn't say we have. I can do it with young people; I've brought a lot of young people

into the business, and I don't have any trouble telling

which ones are going to be inventive and which ones

are going to be analytical, and which ones are going

to be very good managers. You can usually tell in

about three trips to the blackboard whether somebody's inventive, but that's all. No, I don't know of

any internal research that we have done on that. We

have had people in telling us what the inventive

process consists of, and we've had college professors

who have sets of slides and talked to whole laboratories. But it could be done.

157

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

The Role of the Inventor in an Industrial Laboratory

Jan. A. Rachman

RCA David Sarnoff Research Center, Princeton, N.J. 08540

The industrial research laboratories of large corporations have been a great success: as one of the main mechanisms for harnessing the process of innovation they have benefited their sponsors, society

and the scientist-inventor. To the imaginatively inclined technical man they have provided a living and

a place in society. Furthermore, a seasoned laboratory provides broad options to the individual to pursue

his ambitions according to his talents, as it exploits with subtlety the fact that it is at the crossroads

between science, production and the market place and therefore finds good value in individual genius,

cooperative work as well as managerial initiative. To a great many technical men the industrial laborato- ry offers the proper arena for undertaking technical innovations. The personal experiences of the author,

at RCA Laboratories, as individual contributor as well as manager, illustrate the point.

The present antitechnical crisis has various symptoms. In the industrial laboratory, budgets are no

longer lush, there are problems with non-growing staff, and there is a shift from science to engineering

that is accompanied by short range expectations. More alarming are symptoms of disillusionment el- sewhere, mostly with the young, among whom many fewer aspire to science and technology. As one

possible remedy a plea is made for society to show far greater appreciation and respect toward technical

innovators in addition to bestowing them with essential material awards.

Key words: Antitechnical crisis; industrial laboratory; industrial research; scientist-inventor; technical

innovations.

When Jack Rabinow asked me to talk about the

role of the inventor in an industrial laboratory, I was

rather hesitant. Having spent my professional career

in just such a laboratory as a member of the staff, an

inventor if you will, and later in management, I have,

in fact, had a great deal of inside experience. But

being so much of an insider I don't have a clear-cut

general view of the situation. Perhaps I feel as though I were in a forest and saw all the trees but

had no clear view of the forest as a whole. Also I find

it difficult to tie the situation in an industrial laboratory with the wider issues of the declining patent disclosure rate in the United States, the problems with

research budgets, the antiscientific attitudes, the

unfavorable balance of payments, and other bad

symptoms that Jack mentioned to me when he called

me and about which we have heard so much in this

meeting. However, I accepted because I believed

that a few thoughts I have may be of some interest.

Right at the moment I have a further difficulty in

that Dr. Anagnostopoulos has taken much of my

thunder as he has already explained most brilliantly

the workings of a laboratory of a large corporation.

I would like to recapitulate briefly, though I am

afraid less eloquently but perhaps differently, some

of the things he has said, and add a few comments.

The industrial research laboratory has flourished

in the 20th century because some forward-looking

companies such as General Electric, Bell Labs, RCA

and others, have recognized that it simply makes

good business sense to organize the venture of innovation. Generally they started bv having some

original idea, and they found that in order to implement that idea they needed a group of specialists.

They found, rather empirically, that when they had

that group of men, these men in fact innovated other

ideas beyond the original one, ideas which gave

them a tremendous competitive edge, not only in improving their own products, but generating new

products. The laboratories grew, and all the other

companies were forced to have research laboratories

also. The war provided a tremendous stimulus, that

was sustained by the cold war. As a result of all these factors, the ever flourishing industrial laboratories ushered a profusion of fantastic innovations,

whose enumeration I won't bore you with, because

it would be completely trite, but which have truly

revolutionized our lives. I would like to emphasize

the fact that we have witnessed a complete revolution.

It would be an oversimplification to say that the

industrial laboratories were the sole instrument of

159

533-210 OL - 74 - 11
these innovations; obviously many other factors

have influenced them; our whole makeup and our whole civilization did it. But, I believe that the industrial research laboratory was, in a way, a key

mechanism which was at the crossroads between

science, invention, the needs of the market as perceived in the most subtle way; that is, the needs of

the market as it existed and also perhaps more importantly in imagining what the market might be,

and therefore it was in the most sensitive nerve of

the whole system. Therefore, it had a tremendous

leverage in the whole enterprise of innovation. More

pragmatically, the total dollar investment in these

laboratories was a rather negligible investment compared to dollar value of the continued flow of goods

and services that originated from them.

The advent of industrial laboratories provided

steady employment for the individual inventor.

Therefore a young man interested in devoting his life

to imaginative inventive work, no longer had the

necessity of choosing a hazardous life leading to "rags or riches," but could choose a career with a steady salary. Then, as the laboratories flourished

and competed for talent, the salaries, at first miserably small, grew and became quite good. In the

sixties the scientific research personnel became well

paid; in fact, very well paid in relation to the en- gineering or practicing profession. Furthermore,

perhaps more remarkably, the occupation of

scientist and inventor became respectable. For ex- ample, if you had to register your occupation in a

hotel, you could put "scientist" or "inventor"

without fear of being taken for a peculiar absentminded irresponsible person, but someone with a

perfectly legitimate and responsible occupation. In

the public eye, this is a very important point. In

other words, the public accepted or even respected

the scientist for having made great contributions and

his employers started to pay him reasonably well.

Thus the industrial research laboratories of the

large corporations have been a great success: as one

of the main mechanisms for harnessing the process

of innovation they have benefited their sponsors,

society and the scientist-inventors.

This relatively fine situation started to change in

the early 1970's together with a general disillusionment about the pursuit of science and innovation, in

industry. Government and the public at large.

Worse yet, research scientists and inventors are

starting now to have doubts as to their own mission.

We are going through a crisis in the last few years

that has the various symptoms we have discussed

here at some length. For one, the budgets of the

laboratories have been much harder to obtain. Some

restraint is legitimate because the budgets in the sixties were increasing at the rate that was so much

greater than that of the gross national product that

if continued for 50 years the whole national gross income would be devoted to research! Unfortunately

the necessary budgetary restraint has been too large

and too abrupt. There's a great deal of unemployment among talented people. One of the most seri- ous consequences is that there is a lack of enrollment in colleges in technical fields. Fewer patent

disclosures are being applied for. Generally, there is an attitude of pessimism. It is possible that we have

already passed through the worst of that period, but

we are still in a crisis.

In a period of crisis there is a feeling of uncertainty among many that translates itself often in an over- conservative behavior and sometimes in panic. To

my mind, this period can become a very favorable

time for constructive thinking. During the time of

tremendous expansion of the laboratories we were

too busy with the expansion itself. We were in such

a hurry for great and big things that we did not have

time to think rationally about our aims, either our

technical or our organizational aims. The time of crisis is a time for rethinking some of our goals, the

goals of our projects and those of the organization.

Perhaps it is better to welcome the inescapable with

fortitude rather than to shed tears.

I would like to switch gears from this pseudohistorical introduction and address myself to the industrial research laboratory, particularly from the

point of view of the scientists, engineers and inventors in its employ.

The salary in most industrial laboratories is determined largely according to merit and it is usually administered with sagacity and with great care. Salary

administration is a large subject on its own right, of

course, and though I am not a professional I believe

that on the whole, it's a very fair system and one that

is working very well and that, generally, does

produce a large discrepancy between people who

have merit and those who do not. (By the way, such

outright recognition of performance, prevalent in the

United States, does not always exist in other countries, e.g., Japan, where the social climate does not

160
permit it.) The salary is usually the main, if not the

entire compensation of the inventor. Some laboratories have extra compensation for patents and

awards. I would like to comment about these in our

laboratory.

Patents are important to our laboratory, as they

are for all industrial laboratories, for the many

reasons that were abundantly spelled out in this

meeting. As we cannot possibly exploit all innovations we make or even fully those that we do exploit,

we have an important business of patent licensing

that gives further special importance to patents.

However, we do not have an elaborate system of incentives related directly to patentable inventions.

We merely pay a flat modest fee for each filing of a patent disclosure in the Patent Office.

On the other hand we have an achievement award

system in the laboratory. A number of awards are given annually to individuals and teams for the best

work performed. These are relatively substantial

monetary awards combined with public recognition

that is significant within the laboratory, the community and the profession.

So much for compensation. Now I would like to say a few words about the climate for work which, in

many ways, is as important as the compensation. In

the first place, the research person is encouraged to have as much initiative as he possibly can and to initiate projects on his own as much as possible. Many

of the projects have originated from the scientists

themselves and not from management, although of course many projects have also originated from different levels of management. Next, we encourage

the laboratory staff to have as much coupling as possible with the planning function in the corporation, which today is very significant. Secondly, we

try to have a very great deal of coupling with the

scientific community through professional meetings,

publications, etc. Perhaps the most important couplings are with the

Product Divisions. This is so because the innovations that we try to introduce must be accepted by

the Product Divisions and a large part of the success

resides in their convictions about our proposals. The

laboratory is a central corporate organization independent from the Divisions; and by and large each

Product Division is also independent and decides on

its own what it will do. Thus mutual agreement is of essence. To facilitate the transfer of results from the

laboratory to the Divisions, we have a rather unique

system in our corporation that you might be interested in hearing about. It is really very simple, the

trick is called "money." Part of the laboratory's

budget is earmarked so that we can assign the

Product Division to work for us in areas at our discretion. This is the opposite of what many corporations do, where the laboratory does work for the

Divisions. When we have developed a certain idea to

sufficient degree, we can go to an appropriate

Product Division and ask them to carry it further.

We have some initial money to start the project going, though not enough for the 21, 39 or whatever

steps that were mentioned necessary to make it all the way to the product. These monies are relatively

trivial as far as corporate money goes but they are

sufficient to support one or two men. Usually we ar- range for an equal number of men on Divisional

money. Of course, we see to it that the right personnel is assigned to the project. Thus these projects

turn out to be miniature schools of management for our staff. It turns out that this system for transferring laboratory results, though requiring relatively

small amounts of money, has a tremendous leverage

in the company. Many important innovations can be

traced to this route. Coming back to the individual within the research

laboratory — and I will be increasingly thinking of our own RCA Laboratories — in the final analysis how

does the scientist-inventor fare under all these conditions? Perhaps one way of looking at the situation

is to note that the research laboratory is somewhat

of a self-contained world in miniature engaged in

unusually vital activities that entail most of the complexities associated with real action. The young man

who comes into this world comes from an academic

environment where concern for publications and initial authorship are only natural since ideas in their

most pristine form constitute the substance of life. He comes into an organization where achievement

is the ultimate goal and where ideas are still paramount but no longer the end in itself. He finds

that achievement requires group action, this in turn

requires cooperation and sharing of ideas not only

for intellectual enrichment but also for providing a group spirit. Thus the notion of the single scientistinventor having free reign for his individual genius

and the notion of groups with some effaced individual stardoms come often into conflict for the individual. Actually, a seasoned laboratory knows how

best to take advantage of the values of individual

161
genius and those of cooperative group actions — and

as Jack often pointed out in this meeting — in real life seemingly contradictory values need not be necessarily considered in an adversary sense. This very flexibility or perhaps subtlety of the mature laboratory organization provides a number of

options as far as the career of the individual is concerned. The man who is better at influencing others

than having ideas, or enjoys it more, gradually shifts to directing others. In this case he often comes

gradually to no longer care whether it is his idea or

that of others and he becomes a manager. He may

even come to the point when he no longer cares whether he manages research or not and becomes a top executive with wider responsibilities in the cor- poration. Other men, having many ideas and being

very sensitive to good ideas in their group and also

being good at influencing others, become leaders of

research at various management levels. They are intellectually inspiring and leading. Still others prefer

the individual pursuit in their work. For our senior

outstanding scientists with this preference, we have

a position of Fellow, similar to Life Fellow at IBM

mentioned by DeWitt. Presently we have about 15

Fellows at RCA Laboratories, who are all very

eminent in their fields. Besides these career possibilities within the Laboratory, there are excellent opportunities for transferring to a Product Division,

with one's own ideas, as the leader of a group to continue the steps of innovations that were started at the Laboratory, or in many other circumstances

made explicit by the everyday associations with the

Product Divisions.

Do all the material benefits and the career possibilities make the industrial laboratory the best of all possible worlds for the applied scientist or for the inventor? The answer is a relative "yes." As with all human institutions, even the best, it provides the

right environment, not for all, but for a great many,

if not most inventively inclined men. There are of course those who are so impatient when a project

they have initiated and made successful in the

laboratory is not immediately taken up by the cor- poration, or so disappointed when it is not taken up

at all, that they leave to' start their own companies.

Those eventualities are probably inevitable (particularly in good business cycle times) and in any case

are desirable, acting as they do as antidotes to the

lethargy, bureaucracy, shortsightedness and other

shortcomings possible and perhaps inevitable even

in the best run laboratories and sponsoring corporations who do not like to lose their most prominent

and active men and acting also as avenues for individuals who aspire to carve for themselves a prominent place in industry — as captains of industry

if not as millionaires.

I would like now to shift from general abstract re- marks, as prompted by Jack Rabinow and Dr. Coler,

and relate a few of my personal experiences. The

RCA Laboratories have been engaged in a great deal

of imaginative research and I had the good luck of

being associated with some of it. My early work with

electrostatically focussed electron multipliers did

result in a product that surprisingly is still going well

today. Perhaps it is not generally known that RCA

Laboratories was the first, or at least among the very

first, to engage in electronic computers. We did this

in 1939, and I was associated with that work from the

very beginning. We invented many basic parts of

computers, both analog and digital. Among these

were various types of arithmetic and logic units. Of

special interest was a resistive matrix digital core

converter, that today would be called a read-only

memory. This is an invention that is near to my heart

as at the time it was at first difficult to have it ac- cepted and later it provided a very important element for ENIAC. This period also has an interesting

episode relating to the subject of our discussions.

Because of our expertise we were asked by the

Government to build a large electronic computer, a

job that the Laboratories management turned down

because of its magnitude, and that was taken up by

the University of Pennsylvania and eventually

resulted in the ENIAC. As an enthusiastic young inventor and engineer I was greatly disappointed by

that decision, though still so eager for novel fields

then useful for defense that I plunged myself in work

with an idea for using the betatron as a microwave

generator.

As it turns out I became engaged in computer

works soon afterwards. This is through an association with the Institute for Advanced Study and Dr.

John von Neumann who knew us well through his

consulting. We were to develop the memory, indispensable for a stored program machine, which

eventually gave me a lifelong interest in memories

for computers. I invented a special tube, a selectively addressable storage tube, that in modern terms

could be called an example of "integrated vacuum

tube technology," and which was the first electronic

162
truly random access memory. This tube was

produced by RCA in pilot quantities and worked in

several installations quite well until it was replaced

by magnetic core memories. Actually I conceived

the core memory and we developed many of the

pioneering technologies for the system, circuits,

materials, processes, testing, etc. As it turns out

often in the history of technology, my ideas on the

subjects were similar to those of another inventor,

Forrester at MIT, who holds the most important

patent claims following a patent controversy with us. When we had developed our first memory planes, I was promoting the core memory within RCA and

tried to interest our ferrite plant, then engaged in

making television yokes, to make cores. "How many

tons of ferrites are you going to sell?" was their

question. Their naivete was matched by mine as I did not know what the market might be, except that

I knew that cores would be sold in millions, and of course my seemingly wild predictions turned out to be conservative. Actually RCA did not go into the

memory core business until much later when it was

already shown by others to be substantial. A group

of the very few associates I had at the time decided

that RCA was missing an opportunity, as indeed it was, and left to start a small company (that eventually, after much effort, succeeded quite well).

Within my own experience there are many examples in which the laboratory and the company were

very foresighted. Outstanding among these was the

eventual decision to enter the computer field as a main growth opportunity. This entailed a considerable enlargement of research in computers. I was in

charge of that effort during the period of greatest ex- pansion and became a director and manager of

research with practically no vestiges of invention or technical work of my own. In that period we

pioneered at the laboratories many new innovations.

Some of these were further developed in the cor- poration through the mechanisms I mentioned

above. This period had been one of extraordinarily

high technical production from which we have

derived many technical benefits, whose enumeration

I will resist to impose on you. I was very sorry that

the business conditions forced our eventual

withdrawal from the computer business 2 years ago.

Let me comment on recent times and consider one

area of forward looking research of our laboratories.

This is in holography. While holography is an outstanding invention, it has yet to see commercial applications and RCA is perhaps the best poised to

offer the first ones. I will cite three possibilities.

First, we did develop a way of recording color television through holographic techniques that produces

extremely good quality pictures and has a number of

advantages for pre-recorded television reproduction,

such as simplicity in use, a low cost of medium replication, etc. Because we worked on an entirely different system to accomplish the same purpose that

turned out to be somewhat better for home use, we

are considering the holographic system for other

uses. Secondly, we have started a small commercial

enterprise to make identity cards, that holographically encode credit card numbers or other data. The

third application, perhaps at the moment still the

most experimental, and one that I have been greatly

interested in, attempts to provide to the computer

field a memory storage device that could combine

the attributes of mass storage of discs with that of

nimble and fast access of transistor or core memories. This would eliminate today's memory hierarchy

with many of its headaches. This is an ideal that

would have tremendous implications.

Perhaps I have elaborated too much about my ex- periences and RCA. so let me come to the original

theme of this meeting and one of the items of interest, namely, what can we do about the crisis of inventors? One of the results of the crisis in research

laboratories in the specific area of electronics, is a

shift from science to systems and devices. There

was a time, roughly in the early sixties, that doing

science was much more honorable than inventing,

and amongst the professional people, being a

Scientist (with a capital S) was quite "the thing" and

"inventor" was almost a derogatory term. I think

that in the professional societies you could really fee)

that distinction very strongly. I believe that our

present crisis is restoring the respect for the inventor and the systems man, the man who has the

imagination to choose that physical phenomenon

that will do the most good to accomplish a certain

purpose, and not be in love with a certain physical

phenomenon because of its beauty and the possibility of finding more intriguing wrinkles in it. The new

trend is salutary because there tended to be a lack

of balance between science and invention. The

danger in that route that I see is that some parts of

management tend to equate that trend with shortterm results too easily, and they tend to equate an

engineering shift towards 2-year time scales; for163
getting to realize that the conception and imagination of great goals, are relatively long range undertakings. Indeed, many of the technological goals

that are really significant for corporate industrial

laboratories must be founded on an inherent need

with social benefits that are also translatable in

profits for the sponsoring company and whose at- tainment resides in great part in solving a technical

problem. Such goals are usually few, but extremely

important and long range in nature, and their

characteristic is to spell out the desired result but

not specify the technology leading to it. Hence

imaginative and persevering inventors and systems

men with a strong admixture of scientists, provide

the most hopeful team.

Finally, I would like to offer a comment on the

present crisis that relates to the esteem given to the

inventor-scientists. As mentioned before, in the

period of the last two decades, when the research

laboratories, led by industrial laboratories, started

to provide really good pay, the inventor-scientist also

gained respect in society. The young were interested

in enrolling into scientific and technical subjects in

colleges, and these were filled to the brim. Today the

respect is being eroded and the enthusiasm of the

young greatly cooled with resultant penuries in

technical college enrollments. I would like to suggest

that merely looking at the essentials of monetary and

straight-forward career considerations may not be

enough to remedy the condition. The uncertainties

about the real place in our society and the esteem he

will have, may well be at the root of some of the feeling of the prospective young inventors. After all, the

talented technical imaginative man that is a prime

factor in fashioning our modern society is still a rare

individual, as Professor Kayton so eloquently told

us. While most of these men have self-esteem, all are

greatly sensitive to esteem and respect from society.

A climate that makes heroes out of those relatively

few who can advance technology rather than heroes

of the many more who can utilize that technology to make a lot of money would help in this regard. Perhaps the scientist-inventors themselves are somewhat at fault here, as they emphasize the tangible final results of their work in terms of gadgets

more often than the cultural, intellectual and

esthetic values that should be an equally important

fruit of our enlightened rational civilization. All too

often in the popular mind the man who became the

president of a corporation with a huge salary has

really "made it," whereas the inventor is still "some

kind of a nut." These attitudes have to be changed.

Adequate financial award to inventors and scientists

is certainly indispensable for this, but in itself not

sufficient. The attitude of the public towards science

and inventors is an essential element in our society

that the public must recognize as being not only

heavily based on technical gadgets but on rational

and imaginative thinking of man.

Discussion

W. D. Johnston: What percentage of salaries, additionally, has to be paid to get this additional output

which you are striving for?

J. Rajchman: We really don't know that there is any particular relation between awards and output.

I don't think there is any data, because some laboratories don't give any awards, and others give quite a

bit. However, I can answer the question from the

way we think. The overall system of awards encompasses the merit in the first place. In other words,

the salary of a good man is very much higher than

the salary of a poor man, so the fact that he is doing

great inventions is already reflected in his compensation. The extra compensation is really not the significant thing, I would say.

E. Hardy: Do you believe that the education the

young people get has contributed to the crisis in that

they're not invention-oriented, and if so, what can we

do about it?

J. Rajchman: That's a tremendously large and important question. There, again, I don't pretend to have the answers. I think a lot better preparations

could be had. Generally, I think that some of the

brightest people we have are extremely wellprepared intellectually; that is, they know their stuff

very, very well. However, they tend to have too much

of an analytic approach to life; the intuitive approach, and the tolerance to ambiguity that are necessary in real life and in invention, are much too

low. However, the people who are really good

164
develop that rather fast. So, it's a very good question

as to whether one should teach that in college. The

point is that the college years are the only years in

which you have actually the time to get a rigid

discipline in analytic thinking. It is a question in my

mind, whether during that time you should be actually nursed into all the other parts of life. Shouldn't

you simply learn them as you go? After all, you

shouldn't learn everything in school; what you

should learn mostly is to learn how to learn.

H. I. Forman: Do you concern yourself with where

your projects will take you, and how the ideas of your

inventors will fit in with your prospects for getting a good patent structure?

J. Rajchman: Yes, We can answer yes, or we can speak for 2 hours.

165

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

Systems to Stimulate Employee-Inventions in Europe

Fredrik Neumeyer

Consultant in International Industrial Property Law, Faltmarskalksvagen 39, 161

35 Bromma, Sweden

An analysis is made of systems, in Europe and elsewhere, to stimulate employee-inventions by legal

and voluntary incentive systems, which are part of the overall pattern of the economic and political

regime prevailing in a country. The following countries are examined: the Soviet Union, Sweden,

Denmark, Norway, Finland, Austria, Holland, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and Canada. The legal in- centive systems in these countries include tangible and intangible rewards. Tangible rewards are: extra compensation, tax relief, standard cash payment, or release of the rights of invention. Intangible re- wards include the right to be mentioned in the patent, and honorary titles conferred on the inventor. The

objects of these measures are human beings; we need their imagination; and generosity and justice to them will be repaid by them manifold.

Key words: Awards to inventors; employee-inventors; European incentive systems for inventors; Japanese incentive systems for inventors; legal employee-inventor incentive systems; Soviet Union in- centive systems for inventors.

I have been asked to talk to you about "Systems

to Stimulate Employee-Inventions in Europe." You

have invited me and my colleague for a trip of about

6,400 U.S. miles to this Conference. Your expectations of our knowledge and experience must therefore be enormous and I must say frankly that I feel

unable to live up to this. My only excuse for accepting the invitation is that I want to give you as much

factual information as possible to contribute an answer to some of the 19 questions listed in the program as relevant to the Conference.

Before I start, please allow me to make two important remarks as to the subject matter of my talk. One

is that I wish to extend my remarks also to some

countries outside of Europe. In today's world situation the perspective of the problem treated here cannot be strictly limited to European countries. Commercial, political and legal cooperation between

countries makes this limitation artificial and reduces

the understanding of the problems which are rather

similar in the whole industrialized world, as well as

in the world being in a state of transition into industrialization.

The other remark is that systems to stimulate employee-inventions by legal and voluntary incentive

systems are by no means an isolated problem to be

seen in a vacuum, a closed world of law or of cor- porate policy. These systems are applied by employers with the definite expectation of a valuable intellectual performance of the employee, in return for

benefits granted. The working cooperation between

employer and employee embraces at the same time

many other obligations and rights of a legal and

voluntary character on both sides, which together

represent what we often call "industrial labor relations." In addition, we should always keep in mind

that invention incentive systems — their structure,

function and not the least, their success — are part of

the overall pattern of the economic and political

regime prevailing in a country. The latest international developments show, in addition, an interesting

trend that countries "starting from scratch" —

mean developing countries — have started to combine parts of legal systems used in a number of industrial countries in this field, into a single national

statute with the idea of creating in this way a more

or less flawless and perfect system. No proof has,

however, been given that this theory does work in

practice.

Let me start now with a short survey of what I call

167
"legal incentive systems." By this I mean certain

principles in national laws made mandatory in connection with production of inventions and technical

innovations by employees, as well as recommended

in certain important international (conventions) and

model laws. It will be suitable in this connection to distinguish between intangible incentives and tangible incentives. The best-known type of tangible incentives is extra-compensation to the inventor as cash award. A number of European countries have

regulated the right to extra-compensation for inventions assigned to the employer and used by him, in

express law provisions. This is the case in the special laws on employee-inventions as valid in Sweden

(sec. 6), Denmark (sec. 8), Finland (sec. 7), Norway

(sec. 7), Germany (sec. 9 and 10), in the patent acts

of Holland (sec. 10(2)), Austria (sec. 6-19), Switzerland (sec. 332 service contract law), Italy (sec. 23),

Portugal (sec. 9) and Japan (sec. 35(3)).

In addition, the extensive ordinance on inventions

and discoveries of the Soviet Union of April 1959

has laid down the principle that the owner of a certificate of authorship of an invention and the owner

of a diploma for a scientific discovery are entitled to special compensation and certain other benefits depending on the specific situation (sec. 15). Details are regulated in a special ordinance of the same

date. All seven East-European communist countries

outside of the Soviet Union (Albania, Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic,

Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia) have also compensation rules, although in some countries modified as compared with the Soviet Union.

Employers unfamiliar with such award systems

feel often uncertain how to assess any "reasonable

compensation" or are generally negative about being

able to apply any workable system of this kind. The

legislators in countries with mandatory rules on

reasonable compensation have, however, been quite

conscious of this situation. We find, therefore, as

part of a number of laws prescribing special compensation, express reference to some circumstances

which should be considered when assessing compensation. In two countries, Germany and the Soviet

Union, one has, in addition, gone much further and

issued detailed "guidelines" (Germany), and tables

of amounts of money to be paid to inventors in different practical situations (Soviet).

A practical example of directing attention to certain general circumstances in fixing this compensation is the Swedish law (sec. 6) which refers for as- sessment to the (economic) value and the (technical)

scope of the inventive right acquired by the employer as well as to the significance the inventor's

employment may have had in the creation of the invention. Compensation is only paid "to the extent

that the value of the title acquired by the employer

exceeds what might reasonably be considered compensated for by the employee's wages and other

benefits derived from his service." Similar wording

is found in the laws of Denmark, Norway, and Finland. The German law bases amount of compensa

tion on the scope of title acquired by the employer.

In case of "limited" acquisition of right in Germany,

prerequisite of compensation is that the employer

actually uses the invention (sec. 9, subs. 1; sec. 10,

subs. 7). Austrian law is quite similar to the German

law. Compensation in the Soviet Union is based on

the savings made during one year and additional

amounts for performances like that where the inventor has actively supported the introduction of the

invention into operation by producing drawings,

models or the like, and whether the invention is used

by a number of different people-owned enterprises,

and not only by his own firm. Dutch law is based on

the doctrine that the inventor has to be compensated

for the loss of the patent on his invention which is owned by the employer, also in this country with the

reservation that extra-compensation will only l)e

made if the inventor has not been adequately compensated earlier by salary or other benefits. Some

years ago even the Swiss law on service contracts

was revised (new art. 332) and adapted to the con- cepts used in the cited European countries.

Before continuing with examples for regulation of

other "tangible" incentives to employee-inventors,

some words must be said about the German

guidelines for just compensation of inventors in

private service, which were issued by the Federal

Department of Labor in July 1959. These rules — being more or less a systematic manual of economic

evaluation of all thinkable cases of producing inventions during employment — have been studied by ex- perts in many other countries (including the United

States) with a mixture of fright and admiration.

These German guidelines were originally issued in

October 1944, by the Federal Minister for Weapons

and Ammunition, Hermann Goering, in the midst of

burning World War II. The guidelines present a complete value analysis of all possible types of employee-inventions laid down in 43 main sections and

168
ending up in a system of mathematical formulas for

the assessment of the value of inventions, of which

the most simple formula runs: V=E X A,

in which E is the "value of the invention" to be

properly assessed by one of four different methods:

(1) analogy to royalty agreements for free inventions,

(2) in terms of usefulness of the invention to the

employer, say by profit or savings made, (3) by

straight estimation of value, or (4) by analogy to the price that an outright sale of the invention

would bring. A is the "share factor" expressed in

percentage constituting the part played by the inventor, from which is to be deducted the part

played by the enterprise in which the inventor is employed. A more complete presentation of the

German system you can find in my so called

"Senate study" of 1963 ("The Law of Employed

Inventors in Europe," study No. 30, U.S. Senate

Subcommittee on Patents, 87th Congress, 2d

Session).

The guiding rules sketched here do not constitute

binding legal provisions of German law, but rather

recommendations and working rules, to which

courts and arbitration boards may look for guidance

without being bound to follow them. There exists,

however, a relatively strong presumption that compensation assessed along the lines of these rules is reasonable (see Schade-Schippel, Das Recht der Arbeitnehmererfindung, Kommentar, 4th edition/178,

Berlin 1964).

Now, you ask me: is all this just a kind of

academic play? Well, it is not. Since the issuance of

the German special law in July 1957 the arbitration

board installed at the Patent Office to interpret the

law and to reach peaceful settlement between disagreeing employers and employees has issued more

than 1,000 suggestions of consent, of which a large

percentage referred to the assessment of a reasonable financial compensation for the employee-inventor. Supplemented by a series of ordinary court decisions (mostly in disputes about various types of contracts) and decisions by German labor courts there

exists today a body of law which gives some

guidance as to the principles of compensation payments and their size in current German law.

We find decisions and recommendations for extra- compensation in the form of lump sums, royalties or

other income sharing derived from turnover or

profits made by the use, licensing or sale of employee-inventions by his employer, or combinations

of them.

A well known practical problem in the field of

extra-compensation by cash awards is that at the

time when law prescribes settlement of these claims

(which is usually some months after an invention has

been offered to the employer), or (by contractual ar- rangement between the parties) when a domestic

patent has been granted by the Patent Office, the

economic value of the invention to the employer is not known yet. To fix compensation at this stage

remains more or less an act of speculation or an educated guess. This is a well known fact, but to over- come it has not shown any unsurmountable difficulties. The employer may offer a low lump sum combined with a royalty on turnover or sale per piece,

weight unit, number of installations, or whatever it may be. He may offer the inventor a relatively high

lump sum in return for the obligation of the inventor

to refrain from any future claims, once and for all. This latter method may, however, be illegal according to the law of certain countries.

The laws of some countries admit expressly readjustment of paid compensation if it can be proved

that substantial changes of market situation, general

technological development, or use of the invention

have occurred. Developments may be both in favor

of or to the disadvantage of an invention. The

general validity of contracts may not be endangered

by such a provision. Article 12, subsection 6 of the

German special law gives opportunity for such a rearrangement, if both parties agree to it (see

Schade-Schippel, Op. cit/279 ff). Repayment of al- ready executed payments is not allowed.

The German legislator also favors compensation

for employee-inventions by special tax relief. An or- dinance of June 1951 provides that the tax for income attributable to patentable service inventions

of an employee is to be reduced by 50 percent. The

ordinance prescribes at the same time that compensation paid to the employed inventors by employers

may not be "unreasonably high." This is to prevent an employer from evading taxes for himself by transferring income to inventors in his service. American

corporations sometimes practice the method to in- crease cash awards to their inventors by assuming

income tax or applicable local withholding taxes.

These questions have again become high actuality

169
in the United States through the recent decision of

the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Rogallo Parawing

case where the court decided that the 35,000 dollars

awarded by NASA to the two inventors was not a

"prize" excludable from gross income (Internal

Revenue Code, sec. 74 b). An elaborate system to exploit the provisions of the American Internal

Revenue Tax Act (of 1954, sec. 1235) in favor of employed inventors has been suggested by a leading

U.S. patent expert, William Woodward, formerly

with Western Electric (compare Practicing Law Institute, Current Problems in Federal Taxation, New

York 1960; new presentation of these problems by

Woodward is under preparation).

Another type of payment to inventors should be

mentioned here which is practiced in a number of

European industrial countries as well as in the

United States. That is a standard cash payment offered to all employees, in one or more installments,

who have disclosed inventions, for which patent applications have been filed (and patents later be

granted) in the home country, and in foreign countries. Payments being usually between 100 and 500

U.S. dollars per application, followed sometimes by

higher standard payments for each foreign patent

application. These payments should not be mixed up

with extra-compensation for the creation of new inventions discussed before. The function of the standard payments is exclusively to encourage the inventor to produce without delay all documents and

signatures, drafts of answers to official patent office

actions and the like, for the employer and his patent

personnel. It is just a "lubrication oil" in the administrative corporate machinery.

Another European country with more than 20

years experience with mandatory rules for reasonable compensation is Sweden. The official government arbitration board, instituted to furnish opinions

and rulings in cases of dispute brought before them

either by employers or employees, has produced

between 40 and 50 advisory opinions, many of which

contain basic statements ("Dicta") for assessing

compensation in connection with section 6 of the

Swedish special law. An observation in connection

with this activity is that the majority of board cases

in Sweden were started by government employees.

The explanation for this is most likely that government employees — as in most countries — are subject

to prefixed unelastic rules of salary and promotion,

and have found here a source to increase their ordinary income, and are willing to fight for it. Another

observation is that the size of compensation as- sessed by the Swedish board, compared, for instance, with payments suggested and made in Germany, is greater. In recent years, Swedish Government Defense and Telecommunications agencies

have in certain cases paid up to 150,000 Swedish

Crowns (about 35,000 dollars). The inventions in

question either carried large annual savings of

government operations with them (in terms of millions of Crowns), or substantial accountable quality

improvement of weapons, telephone services, or the

like. The relatively high amounts of money paid in

Sweden are also affected by the fact that inflation in

Sweden is bigger than, for instance in Germany.

To the group of tangible incentives for employeeinventions I also count the fact when an employer

abstains, wholly or partly, from his legal right of

ownership to such inventions. Sometimes an employer judges the economic or competitive value of an employee-invention not to be attractive enough in

the short run or long run of his business activities,

and releases these rights to the inventor. Especially

foreign invention rights are often released in this

way. Ordinary employee-inventors have, as a rule,

not much advantage of such property rights. I have,

however, seen examples in my practice that inventors have been enthusiastic about such "presents," even preferring them over any kind of cash awards.

Prerequisite of such a positive reaction is that the inventor has already some established international

reputation in the engineering world, and that he has

some business talent and experience. Inventors of

that kind do exist, to a limited extent.

Now a short glance at the legal treatment of extracompensation in two big industrial countries: the

Soviet Union and Japan. As mentioned before, on

the same day the Soviet government issued the basic

Statute on Discoveries, Inventions and Innovations

Proposals, April 24, 1959, it also put into force an ex- tensive regulation on compensation for the three

categories: scientific discoveries, inventions, and innovation proposals (Prop. Ind. 1960/3 ff). Excepting

"service inventions" of a similar type as in most

Western countries, section 7 of this Soviet regulation presents scales of compensation amounts from

200 to 200,000 rubles and from 100 rubles to 50,000

rubles for inventions or innovation proposals respectively, depending on the amount of annual savings

made by their use. For scientific discoveries, com170
pensation is maximized by law to 50,000 rubles (sec.

3(1)). As a curiosity of tangible rights granted to Russian authors of discoveries, and inventors and innovators who have provided valuable proposals, article 77 of the Statute, of April 1959 is cited, which

says that such persons "shall be entitled to additional dwelling space on equal terms with scientific

workers." This just shows that incentives can vary

from country to country.

When asking leading officials at the Patent Office

in Moscow for statistics about paid compensations

they could not be produced by them since the law

decentralizes such payments to heads of local

government and local unions out in the country, having no obligation to report to Moscow. I understand,

however, that the new invention law under preparation for the Soviet Union now will introduce some

centralized register for paid compensations.

Looking at Japan we find that Japanese law has

been familiar with the concept of payment of

reasonable monetary compensation to employed inventors ever since the enactment of their Patents

Act of 1921. Today, 50 years later, we have a brand

new Japanese Patent Act in force since January 1,

1971, in which, however, the relevant article 35 on

employee-inventions is entirely unchanged compared with the preceding Act of 1959. The article

defines the "service invention," reserves a non-exclusive license to the employer free of cost (an ar- rangement similar to a U.S. shop right). In addition,

the article fixes the right to reasonable compensation for the employee-inventor in case the employer

has acquired from him a patent application, a granted patent or an exclusive license for the use of

the invention (art. 35 (3)). Subsection 4 of article 35

reminds of some European law regulations in providing that the amount of compensation is to be determined by the amount of profit which the employer

derives from the invention, and the extent to which

the employer has contributed to accomplish the invention.

Some knowledge about how much compensation

is actually paid to employee-inventors in Japan can

be derived from an interesting document which I have recently received, and which refers to the payment of compensation for service inventions made

by Japanese Federal civil servants, in force as internal office rules since April 1, 1969. The head of the

Patent Office, or the chief of the government agency

administering a special fund shall pay compensation

not exceeding 3,000 Yens, in case government either

acquired the right to obtain a patent for a service-invention or the granted patent for such invention. If

the government receives income from the utilization or disposal of a patented service-invention the head

of the Patent Office shall pay compensation per

calendar year according to a specific table. Maximum compensation per inventor per year shall not

exceed 1 million Yens ($1.00 is 260 Yens). The above

rule shall be applied "mutatis mutandis" when the

invention is not a service-invention. For utility

models and design patents the payment shall not ex- ceed 1 ,500 Yens.

If I understand the situation correctly, most provisions of article 35 of the Japanese Patent Act, including the right to reasonable compensation mentioned before, can, however, be eliminated by contract. This is in contrast to German and Scandinavi- an law, where these rules are mandatory and cannot

be "contracted away."

Returning for a moment to European countries,

we may put forward a general question of interest in

connection with cash awards to employee-inventors:

How much do these payments really cost employers? There are no statistics or collection of

figures about this, either national or international ones (government agencies may have some internal

material on it). Being familiar with a number of individual cases in some industries and government

agencies in various countries, and finding that cash

awards for inventions naturally dominate in

research-oriented corporations and organizations my

conviction is that funds of companies used for these

purposes can practically be neglected (bonus payments made annually to directors and high officials

in American stock corporations would in comparison

make a more accountable amount of money). Really

large award payments for employee-inventions such

as, for instance, firms like the German Siemens were

forced to make for the invention of the electronic

microscope, or by the Swedish Defense authorities

for improved small firearms and air shelter constructions, are exceptions hardly affecting the average

situation. Research about these problems by a nonprofit organization, preferably some university institution, on a national and international basis would

be most welcome.

Another question put by outsiders, or say legislators not familiar with the specific problems of this

field, is: Are employed scientists, engineers or

171
research workers really interested to receive financial incentives? There is no single answer to this.

Their interest may vary depending on age, education, their personal economic situation, the

economic situation of their country, the political

system prevailing there. A young scientist or en- gineer may be much more interested to collect visi- ble proof of his productivity as a successful patentee, or author of scientific papers, books or the like,

instead of receiving some cash award. On the other

hand, he may need immediate financial support (he

wants to marry, buy a house, go to a university). He

may also be under ideological pressure from his own

employer, from colleagues or the society he is living

in, which expects a certain attitude from him. A

Soviet citizen, for instance, is bound to be conscious

of the role he has to play as a citizen in a demanding

society. Further, in bad times of general unemployment an employed inventor will be willing to accept

modest, or no incentives, if he only can keep his job.

Closer investigations of these questions by research

grants would be most interesting. Some attempts

have been made in the United States in the 1950's by

the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) in

New York, and by the late colleague Joe Rossman.

Leaving now the discussion of legal incentives of a tangible character I turn to the intangible incentives given to inventors. The main representative of

this group of measures goes in professional discussion under the name of "droit moral," or in German

literature called "Erfinderpersonlichkeitsrecht"

(law of the inventor's personality). Both terms mean

that the inventor, or the inventors, have a right to be

mentioned with their full name in all patent documents. This sounds both simple and natural, but can

lead to confusion and many disputes. Most national

patent acts contain some provision with regard to

citation of the name of the inventor. Their wording

is more or less vague. German law, for instance,

prescribes that the applicant has to cite the inventor

within 3 months after filing and to assure that, to the

best of his knowledge, no further persons share the

invention.

The French Patent Act of 1968 says in this respect

just that the inventor has the right to be mentioned

as such in the patent. He may also oppose being

mentioned (sec. 4).

The British Patent Act says under section 1 that an application for a patent may be made by any per- son claiming to be the true and first inventor of the

invention, or his assignee. The official Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law in England (the "Banks Committee") complained in 1970

that this requirement is difficult to comply with (Op.

cit. 157), but suggests that applicants "should" name

those believed to be the inventors and that they be

named in the published specifications (Op. cit. 158).

It should also be mentioned that one reason why

most countries with a patent act have included some

provision on the citation of inventor's name is most

likely that the Paris Convention for the Protection of

Industrial Property of 1883 at the Revision Conference of London in 1934 introduced a new article

4 ter with the wording: "The inventor shall have the

right to be mentioned as such in the patent." At the

end of the year 1972 the London text of the Convention had been ratified by 19 member countries only

(Ind. Property 1973, No. 1/15), but later revisions including this article 4 ter have been ratified by 36 nations (in Lisbon 1958) and by 22 nations (in

Stockholm 1967). The article has, therefore, now

wide application. It might be mentioned that Japan

up to now never cared to introduce any "droit

moral" of this kind. The regulation of the "droit

moral" contains, however, according to the opinion

of some influential organizations in certain countries, serious flaws. Many laws do not make citation

of inventor's name a clear-cut mandatory rule, the

patent offices do not check correctness of the information given by an applicant, and there are no sanctions for misuse.

A debate about these regulations may come up in

connection with the Munich Diplomatic Conference

on the European Patent in September which is aimed to adopt and sign the two conventions on the

European patent.

In addition to the more or less self-evident incentive to have its creative authorship documented by

citation of his name, employers sometimes wish to encourage meritorious inventors and innovators by

bestowing them with some kind of honorary title. I have found only one country which does this by force

of law, and that is the Soviet Union. Already in 1938

the presidency of the Highest Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

issued an ordinance to bestow on scientists who by

special performance through scientific discoveries

"have contributed to the upswing of the economy,

the culture and science, the increase of power and

glory of the U.S.S.R." the title of a "Hero of Socialist

Work," followed by another ordinance in 1940 creat172
ing the honorary title of "Meritorious Scientist" for

extraordinary practical-scientific activities. At the

same time as the before-mentioned basic law on inventions and discoveries was issued in April 1959, a decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

(No. 435, art. 5) introduced two additional honorary

titles: "Meritorious Inventor of the Republic" (a

badge in gold), and "Meritorious Rationalizer of the

Republic" (a badge in silver).

Another country in which this kind of incentive is not unfamiliar is the United States. Presenting honorary titles to outstanding inventors is practiced in

various industrial corporations. This kind of action

in the U.S. is, however, entirely voluntary and individual, and not based on any law. Just as examples

I may mention Radio Corporation of America

bestowing the title of "Fellow" on scientists of the

RCA Laboratories if they have done outstanding

work. The title carries no tangible reward, but may

give the receiver more freedom to pursue personal

research projects (compare Neumeyer, The Employed Inventor in the United States, Cambridge,

Mass. 1971/131), one bearer of such a title is today

sitting among us. Another American corporation en- couraging their creative employees by all kinds of

tangible and intangible incentives is the Minnesota

Mining and Manufacturing Company. For their most

distinguished inventors a club was founded and title

is given opening membership to the top layer of their

many innovators.

A system very similar to the one of RCA was introduced by the International Business Machine

Corporation. IBM instituted an honorary incentive

system by appointing employees who have outstanding records of sustained innovation and creativity to the title of "IBM Fellow." The elected persons are

for a limited time free to pursue any research project

they desire in their chosen field.

Mindful of the limited time I have to present the

complex subject matter of systems to stimulate employee-inventions I wish to point only at two more

countries, illustrating that the climate of general

support of stimulating measures to creative employees by law does not exist everywhere. A definitely negative attitude in official circles (representing

primarily employer organizations) we find in today's

Great Britain and in Canada. Some official state- ments may be sufficient to prove this.

The "Banks Committee" which was appointed to examine the British Patent System presented in July

1970 to Parliament a report (Cmnd 4407, London

1970), in which chapter 16 treats the problems of employee-inventions. There it is stated that evidence

given "by industrialists was unanimously against the

introduction of any statutory obligations on employers to reward employee-inventors" (Op. cit. 137).

Six well known and unproved reasons against such

systems were cited: (1) the inhibiting effect on effectiveness of R. & D. departments, (2) the difficulties

to assign staff to work which is less likely to result in

inventions, (3) secrecy created between staff members, (4) difficulty to identify real inventor in today's

team work, (5) that employees making important

contributions which are not patentable, cannot

qualify for special awards, and (6) legislation relating

solely to patentable inventions would discriminate

in favour of only one of many employee-contributions. In its summary the Banks Committee recom- mended that "the Department of Employment and

Productivity should give special consideration in the

general context of industrial relations to the en- couragement of voluntary award schemes to reward

employee-inventors on the lines of the schemes al- ready in operation in many organizations." The

Committee does, however, not care to describe any

such scheme in use in England.

In Canada the Economic Council of Canada had

been requested in 1966 by the government to study

and advise regarding patents, trademarks, copyrights and registered industrial designs, and carry

out studies that would be a first and necessary step

in the determination of a cohesive economic policy

in relation to these matters as a whole. As a result a

large "Report on Intellectual and Industrial Property" was presented by the Council in January 1971.

With regard to patents certain policy recommendations were made (ch. 5) including the questions of

special awards to employee-inventors. The Council

makes the following remarks:

"It is our impression that large companies with

major continuing research programs are usually able

to discern why, in their self interest, if they wish to retain and encourage unusually creative individuals on their staffs, they should take care to provide appropriate incentives and rewards to such individuals. If, however, it should come to light that a

significant number of Canadian companies are

falling down in this regard, consideration might well

be given to appropriate adaption to Canadian cir173
cumstances of certain provisions of the West German patent law regarding rewards to individual inventors working within corporate organizations."

(Op. cit/98f)

This statement is unusually confused, badly worded

and partly directly incorrect. Does it represent the

total lack of interest of the Canadian Government in

these questions? There seem to exist serious reasons

to analyze these problems in Canada much closer

than the Economic Council has done.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I have now cited all

kinds of law paragraphs and committee statements

about employed inventors, but at the end I want to remind you that the objects of all these measures are human beings. They react as such the same way as we all do. Generosity and justice to them will be re- paid by them manifold. They are in all countries just a small minority of people, but in spite of this we

need their imagination and their belief in change and

renewal.

(Combined discussion follows next paper by Mr.

Romanus.)

174
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SPECIAL PUBLICATION 388, Proceedings of the Conference on the

Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, June 11-14, 1973, Monterey, Calif. (Issued May 1974)

A European Perspective of the Inventor Ecology

Harald Romanus

Nordenskioldsgatan 86, 115 21 Stockholm, Sweden

Examines the hazards and impediments to inventors, and the methods that some states — in particular, Sweden — are taking to remove these impediments.

Inventors need technical help to develop their ideas, financial help, advice on patenting, and aid in

selling their ideas to industry. Having grown from a small beginning in the 1930's, the Swedish Board for Technical Development now has the know-how and resources to perform these services for inventors

who they consider are worthy of help. The Board also evaluates proposed legislation affecting inventors,

and studies the climate of invention activities. The practices of the Swedish Board for Technical Development are being followed in other European

countries in an effort to support the first link in the innovation chain — invention.

Key words: European efforts to aid inventors; inventor; inventor ecology; Swedish Board for Technical

Development.

"Nobody shall devise or invent something new,

nor shall he use or practice anything such, but

everybody shall in civic and Christian love follow his

neighbor." This is an old Swedish statute for a medieval guild. In fact, it implies a prohibition

against making inventions. It certainly must have

been a cold climate for inventors. But evidently

some inventors must have stuck their necks out anyhow, since it was found necessary to put in a clause

against them in the statute.

I was reminded of this statute when I read the

somewhat provocative question in the conference

program: "Should we call a halt to inventions?" I don't think we should; I don't even think we could.

Creative instinct is a very innate quality of the

human mind. I will not go back to the introduction of

the use of fire or the invention of the wheel. Nor will

I take up the question of whether it was the inventive

mind which prompted man to branch out from the

ape and descend from the trees to live on the ground,

or the changed conditions of life, when he was forced

to live on the ground, which made him inventive in

order to survive.

Anyhow, I am a firm supporter of the belief that

the inventive ability of mankind will not become extinct, even in a very inhospitable ecology. But the inventors may become passive and scarce, and that

would be bad enough. The question, therefore, in my

opinion should read: "Do we have enough inventors,

and do we make use of them in the most efficient

way:

Different kinds of inventors

First, some words about different kinds of inventors. Who are the typical inventors? Certainly not

Edison, Marconi, Eastman, or any of the other worldfamous ones. They are the figureheads who had not

only the luck to enter a new technical field at the

right moment, but also the ability and the endurance

to carry through the development work, and the marketing of their ideas. Certainly we would like to have

more of this kind of inventors.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have the ec- centric inventors, with such inventions as the lightning-conductor umbrella, the rotating Christmas tree, or even perpetual motion machines. Some call them

crackpots, and they certainly are, but I hesitate to use that word, because I don't think we should hurt

their feelings. Unfortunately, they also get a lot of

publicity in some magazines and newspapers, and

therefore contribute to the general conception of inventors. They are a nuisance, but we can't get rid of

them. By suitable means we could eliminate some of

the troubles they cause. More important is that we

175

533-210 OL - 74 - 12
might help some of them to get rid of their irrational

ideas and channel them into more productive work.

Between these extremes lies the main bulk of inventors—not so conspicuous and glorified as the

bigshots, and most of their inventions are not revolutionary. The industrial value of each single invention

is often not very impressive, but as a whole they give a steady contribution to technical progress. If the inventor succeeds in getting a fair share of the

economic value of the invention, it could also mean

a lot for his personal economy.

Unyielding tenacity is not an uncommon quality in

real inventors, but economic talent and the power to carry through successful business negotiations are very rare, indeed. I dare say that technical creativity

and economic talent are almost mutually exclusive

qualities in the same man. The heritage may include one of them, but very seldom both. In fact, when I have to deal with an inventor who is extremely successful in selling his inventions, I might become a little suspicious, and take another look at his inventions. They often turn out to be superficial, and not

give the entrepreneur what he expects in the long

run. Such a man is a clever salesman, but not a real

inventor.

Of the groups I have mentioned, it is the middle

group that is most sensitive to the environment. I

will postulate that we can increase or reduce the

number of such inventors and, in addition, their effi- ciency, by changing the climate for inventors.

Is the inventive effort adequate?

This brings me to another question in the con- ference program: "Is the inventive effort of the

United States adequate for our present and foreseeable future?" My answer is that up to now I have not

found a single country in the world in which the

general support for inventive activities, in my

opinion, has reached the optimum level, seen from

the point of view of the interest of that country. As a contrast, I might add that I would not dare to make

the same statement about the money and assistance

spent on R. & D. in some countries.

Most inventors in Scandinavia, and I'm sure also

in other countries in Western Europe, dream of the

United States as the land of promise, abounding with

milk and honey. I'm not presumptuous enough to believe, after some short visits to your country — or

rather continent — that I have a clear conception of

the situation of your inventors. But I have found that

you yourselves are not overly satisfied with the situation. Even the first two speakers of the conference,

Dr. Draper and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce Dr. Ancker-Johnson, made it clear that you

have a desire to encourage the creation of more inventions, and that you are planning incentives to that

end. My following reflections are based on the same

attitude.

Hazards and impediments on the inventor's

route

Now some words about the hazards and impediments which the inventor usually encounters on his

route from the conception of the invention idea to the stage where he can leave it in other hands, or market it himself. I will naturally restrict myself to the independent inventor. The inventor in an industry or a research institute working on an invention

for his employer has a quite different situation.

Material resources and specialists for different

phases of the development work will be supplied by

the employer. The inventor is relieved of most of the

daily troubles which the independent inventor has

to overcome in his work. He may have other kinds of

troubles, such as his relation to the employer, the

general climate for inventors in his environment, and

last but not least, the important question about

economic compensation for his invention.

In any case I will not talk about the independent

inventor. There is no standardized inventor route.

Each one has to find his own trail. It is an adventurous trail, and most often he will meet some unex- pected impediments on his way, which he has to overcome. In many cases overcoming such a crucial

point may actually imply the real birth of the invention.

Most of the troubles appearing during the development work, however, have no relation to the proper

idea of the invention and have nothing to do with the

creative process. They are problems in the most

varying fields of the technique, such as the physical

and chemical properties of different materials, calculations and design at the drawing board level or sometimes a scientific analysis, testing methods and

testing equipment, etc. Usually they are only routine

work for a man skilled in the special profession con- cerned. But if the inventor cannot find the right man,

trust his confidentiality, and pay the costs, the

176
problem may assume very great dimensions in his

mind and even endanger a positive result of his

work.

A common critical point is the stage when the inventor has completed and tested his first model,

and — as is usually the case — its performance does

not satisfy his expectations. It is then important to analyze the deficiencies and to determine whether

they are intrinsic in the principle of the invention or only due to trivial failures in the construction of the

model.

For an independent inventor in the above-mentioned situation or encountering other unexpected

impediments in his development work, it is often difficult to make a balanced evaluation of the nature

and seriousness of the troubles, all by himself, and

of the prospects of carrying through the invention to

a practically useful solution. Unfamiliarity with some

of the obstacles involved and the psychic stress of

the situation may induce him to draw the conclusion

that he has been on a wrong trail and the invention

is useless, even in cases in which a man in the

proper profession could have circumvented the impediment. And the invention goes into the drawer

together with a lot of disappointment and shaken

self-confidence. Once in the drawer the invention

will seldom come out again. If you tell the inventor

that you could see some good features in his invention and ask him why he doesn't start the experiments over again, he will have all kinds of excuses. But the real reason is that he doesn't like to open the

drawer; there are too many unhappy feelings in it. The patent question

Now to the patent question, which contains some

important and interesting differences between the

American and European systems.

The purpose of the patent systems is to provide

legal protection for the inventor's intellectual

achievement, the invention. But contrary to the protection for other producers of intellectual property,

such as authors, painters, composers, etc., who are automatically protected by the law without any action on their part — or in some cases after a simple

registration — the protection for inventors is a complicated and costly procedure. In America the rights

of the inventor are principally acknowledged from

the very birth of the invention. The European inventor, on the other hand, has no legal protection whatsoever until he has filed a patent application with the

Patent Office. In professional language this is the

"first-to-invent" principle versus the "first-to-file'

principle.

I don't think most of you could realize what this

means to the inventor in his practical work. A European who conceives an invention idea always runs

the risk that someone else subsequently will get the

same idea and immediately file a patent application.

In that case, the first man has no possibility at all of

getting a patent for his idea although he is the first and true inventor.

Naturally this means a psychological press on the

inventor to run as quickly as possible to the Patent

Office, and he often does, even before the invention

idea is sufficiently developed for patenting. Unlike

Pallas Athena, who sprang fully developed out of the

head of Zeus, most inventions have to pass a long

chain of developments including amendments, improvements and adaptation to practical functions before they reach a stage that is practically useful and

competitive. For full protection this might necessitate a long series of patent applications, some of

which later may prove to be worthless, and still all improvements made from time to time may not be

covered. It is almost inconceivable to the European

inventors that the inventor in the United States can

go on developing his invention without worrying

about a patent application, only making dated notes

in a properly verified way and, when the invention

has reached operability, file an application for those

attributes he needs to have protected. This is not to speak about the "year of grace" — the right to wait

up to one year after marketing the invention before

the patent application is filed— which to the European inventor sounds absolutely too good to be true.

It is impossible here to deal with all other differences between the American and European

patent systems. I shall comment on only one more.

Early publication of all patent applications 18

months after the priority date is compulsory in some

European countries and also in the new international European patent system now being prepared

for Western Europe. 1 To an inventor with limited resources and an invention idea for which he needs

some years of development work this may put him in a real dilemma. If he must use outside experts or workshops for certain parts of the development work

he will have to do so without using the legal protec1 Its final shape was decided at an international diplomatic conference in Munich in October 1973.

177
tion which a patent application is meant to give him.

Otherwise his idea will be spread all over the world

18 months later, with the consequence that big companies and research laboratories may put their immense resources on the problem and arrive at the

final, practically useful solutions ahead of him. Also

the American inventor should keep this early publication in mind when he considers filing patent applications in Europe.

It is commonly said that the patent law has the

purpose of providing legal protection for the intellectual property of the inventors, and should be

modeled to promote inventiveness in the country.

Exaggerating a little, I would say that in practice the

problem of the law rather is to perform the patent

granting function with as little hampering and

distorting effect as possible on the natural inventing

activities.

I have met very few European inventors active in

developing an invention, who do not feel that the

time and money they have to spend on the patent

question are "stolen" from the real development

work and often also force them to deviate from the

most efficient development route. They may often

give the hazards built into the patent system unrealistic dimensions, with the consequence that they

are working under a permanent nervous strain.

It was in this respect a striking experience to me

to meet American inventors. They never started a discussion of an invention at the patent question but

jumped into all kinds of technical and economical

problems. To me they sometimes appeared almost

too negligent of the patent matter, maybe because I was still biased by the European attitude.

Of course there are complaints against the U.S.

patent law too — high cost of litigation, doubtful

validity of patents, etc. — and you are at present

working on a revised patent law. But I would urge

you never to give up the "first-to-invent" principle.

It is more apt to fit the needs and practical developing ways in the field of inventions and is thereby

more promotive to inventiveness than the "first-tofile" principle can ever be.

Financing the development work

Another impediment to the inventor is the financing of the development work. Often very modest

costs for certain steps in the development work may

force him to deviate from the most efficient way, or even skip the whole thing before the experiments

have reached the stage where an evaluation of the

idea is possible. From the society's point of view this

seems irrational, considering the desire for a steady

flow of new inventions as an incentive to technical

progress, and the very small costs compared to the

sums spent on science and research. The cheapest

way to accomplish the first study and experiments

of an invention is to let the inventor do it himself. To

have it done in a research laboratory would cost five

times as much.

Marketing the inventions

Inventions made by employees are usually marketed by a company, the employer. This matter is dealt with in another paper by Dr. Neumeyer. If the

employer is not interested in a certain invention, the

inventor may be in the situation of an independent

inventor. The third alternative, where the employer

only claims a part of the inventor's right, leaving the

rest to the inventor, is more interesting. An increased use of this alternative could be beneficial to society and to technical progress.

Most of the independent inventors do not start a company of their own for the manufacturing or marketing of the invention, but want to sell or license the

invention rights. However, almost all of them — and

often the most ingenious and creative ones — lack

talent and experience in the very special field of

negotiating and contract writing. They often contact

the industries too early, before having thoroughly

developed the invention and produced the necessary

"presentation material," such as basic experiments,

models and test results, which would make it easy

for the industry to form an opinion on the marketing

prospects. They talk too much about their dreams

and too little about technical facts, and they have

often no realistic conception of the inherent

economic value of the inventions.

The inventors, therefore, in most cases ought to use skilled advisors for this kind of job, or delegate

the whole thing to them. The trouble is only that the

consultants and firms offering to help the inventors

to sell their patents are of varying quality, and it is very difficult for the inventor to find out whether or not they are doing an adequate selling effort.

My teacher long ago in National Economics at the

Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Professor

Sven Brisman, used to say that inventors are a necessary element in the technical progress, but the

inventors' economic return taken as a whole for all

178
inventors is certainly negative. It is the big income

of the few and the optimistic hopes of the rest that

keeps the whole business running. I believe this to be true also today, at least for inventors in Europe.

How it is in the United States I would not dare to say— there is a common belief in Europe that the inventors have better chances in the United

States — but it would be an interesting subject for a

study.

On the other hand, an investigation by the OECD

(Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development) and other investigations have shown

that the annual growth of the GNP cannot be ex- plained only by contributions of capital and labor.

The rest is credited to a third factor, the technical

progress, and inventions are certainly an important

element in that factor.

When contrasting these findings with the state- ment of Professor Brisman the situation neither

seems reasonable from the inventors' point of view

nor efficient with regard to the technical progress.

Improvements of the environment for the

inventor

In countries with a liberal economic system and

free competition a reasonable balance among the

different parties concerned in industry and commerce is a prerequisite for good-effective functioning. A weak party will tend to become even weaker

and get less favorable working conditions. That is what has happened to the inventors in most countries, although to a most varying extent. In some

European countries the inventor is not even to be

named in the patent, and it is claimed that the

independent inventor nowadays has no raison d'etre.

In the United States the inventor situation has

deteriorated, much less, but this does not mean that

there is the balanced state referred to above.

In many countries there has long been a general concern about the diminishing rate of new inventionbased industries, and a demand for action to turn

this trend. To this end some kinds of institutions or corporations for the development and exploitation of

practically useful results from scientific research

and other inventions have been established. In Europe, they are usually state supported or based entirely on government grants, but should in the long run become self-sustaining. The biggest one in Europe is the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) established by the British Parliament in 1948. As far as I know none of the European

bodies have up to now become self-sustaining in the sense that they pay normal interest on the invested

capital. In the U.S. the Research Corporation, and

I think also some others, have been successful in

that respect.

The demand for self-sustainment has the con- sequence that they normally do not invest in inventions which have not been developed far enough so

that their commercial use can be appraised. Therefore they decline to discuss the big stream of inventions offered to them by private inventors whose

ideas are in immature state with insufficient presentation material. Therefore, they have in practice,

proved to be of little value to the average inventor.

In some countries another kind of institution

aimed primarily at the genesis and the very first

development steps of invention ideas has appeared,

especially in recent years. As a common denominator for such institutions, the term "Invention Office"

is used. The invention offices should in principle

give the inventors advice, personal assistance (i.e.,

in finding suitable experts, laboratories, workshops,

etc.) and, when necessary, economic grants for the

cost of certain steps in the development work. Of

course this must be done together with a successive

screening of the inventions. The first screening, in

which eight- or nine-tenths of the ideas drop out,

should be liberal. It is better to pay for a simple

laboratory test, a model covering the basic principle

or an expert analysis, than to have long discussions

with the inventor on a purely theoretical basis. The

first selection thus should be on the safe side as to the possible usefulness. During the following

development steps more and more facts will be

available and more of the inventions will be dropped.

For the inventions remaining, when the development

work has reached the stage where satisfactory

presentation material is available, the inventor

should be helped to contact suitable industries or development corporations and — if he so wishes — be

helped also with the contract negotiations.

The ownership of the invention at all times

remains with the inventor, and he has no obligation

to follow the advice of the office, if he does not agree

with them. In any case, the office has reasonable

means to direct him by the possibihty of granting

him economic support for certain development

steps, when it finds it advisable.

With regard to financing, the invention of179
fices — contrary to the development and exploitation

institutions — should not strive to become self- sustaining. Their purpose is to spend the grants they

get from the government or foundations, together

with their income from the fees they may charge for

some of their services, in the best way to promote

the utilization of inventive ideas. If an invention,

which has been economically supported by the office, is marketed and the inventor gets an income

from it, he usually shall pay back the grants he has

received. There has been much discussion whether

the office also should have a further part of the income from the invention, e.g., in the form of a royalty, but this has been found not to be justified. The

society is in fact a silent partner in every successful

invention, and gets, through the ordinary income

taxes, a large share of the profits from it. The office

therefore can dispense with the complicated way of

writing special royalty contracts and enforcing them

many years later.

A basic principle of the offices is the obligation for

the staff to observe secrecy. This is of special importance in European countries, because it induces

the inventor to contact the office in the very early

stages of the invention. Otherwise many inventors,

who are extremely anxious not to disclose their invention to any outsiders before they have filed a patent application, (due to the first-to-file system),

may wait too long and make unneccessary mistakes

before they contact the office.

Invention offices exist at present in the Scandinavian countries and in some other countries in

Europe. They are rapidly expanding in staff and

financial resources. Establishment of new offices is considered in other countries. In the U.S. the Office

of Invention and Innovation seems to be an institution intended for such purposes. But I cannot comprehend why the office does not get appropriations

for expansion of its activities, which most certainly

would prove to be profitable to the country in stimulated inventiveness and revived industry. I have also

found some embryos of local Invention Offices in the

United States and Canada, which, however, lack the

small funds necessary for helping some inventors in

their first steps of invention development.

Another measure to improve the situation for the

inventors is the granting of inventor fellowships,

which can be done by the invention office or another

body. In contrast to the ordinary inventor grants,

which is given for the development of a certain invention, the fellowship is not connected with any

specific invention but intended to relieve the inventor of the daily work for his livelihood during a certain period, to enable him to spend his time on inventive activities. Granting of inventor fellowships was

started in Sweden 2 years ago with 10 fellowships

annually, which is a small number compared to the

fellowships for scientists.

Invention expositions are one way to facilitate

contact between the inventor and interested industries or entrepreneurs, when he has produced sufficient presentation material on his invention. Unfortunately most of the invention expositions in Europe

are pure business enterprises aiming at attracting a great public and caring little about what is really

useful to the inventors. The value of these expositions in bringing about real contracts with producers

has been disputed. Another kind of exposition concentrates on assistance to the inventors. However,

they are often poorly arranged and advertised due to lack of economic resources. The State Invention Expositions in the United States, sponsored by state agencies or local chambers of commerce, seem to be

a very good solution. I am sorry I have not had a chance to visit one. The really big problems to tackle in the environment of the inventor, however, are the general conditions in a country under which the inventors have to

live and work. These conditions include the laws, the

educational system, the taxation regulations, the at- titude of the society towards inventiveness, the social standing of the inventor as a profession, inventor

awards, publicity, and many other elements.

Laws affecting the invention field concern, for instance, patents, antitrust questions and employee inventions. Laws on employee inventions exist in

several European countries and a general investigation is being made by the International Labour Office (ILO) in Geneva. Eventually this question will

have to be solved also in the United States.

In the educational field there are the age-old

questions, whether or not the common school system

frustrates creative thinking, and whether it is possible to teach ordinary people to become creative and

to invent. As to taxation, unfavorable tax rules will

counteract the pursuance of many invention ideas,

whereas favorable ones may have a strong stimulating effect.

There has been a tremendous industrial evolution

in the last hundred years, but the inventors are in

180
many respects lagging behind. In some cases changes have even been made in a direction which

clearly aggravates the situation for the inventors, as

for instance the introduction of the compulsory early

publication of patent applications in Europe.

One or another of these problems have at different

times been studied by special committees. But the

long-term environmental problems have such a wide

scope and are so interconnected that they ought to be watched and studied by a permanent body, which

could initiate investigations and submit observations

or proposals to the government. Some of the Invention Offices are trying to perform such a function,

but their staff is too small and too busy with the individual problems of inventors to enable them to set aside special people for long-term environmental

studies. In the United States, the National Inventors

Council seems to be the right body for this important

work.

How about the inventors themselves? Sometimes

they are "geniuses" wishing to be left alone. More

often they feel isolated in a cold climate — more often

so, I think, in Europe than in the United States. All

other professionals in the field of innovation have

their own associations, where they can meet and

discuss their problems, and which can speak for

them in public debate.

Where any inventor associations exist at all, they

are usually small and have little money, relying only on membership fees. In Europe, however, some of

them have grown to national associations, recognized by the government for submitting observations on legal propositions and other questions from the

government. A few of them also are given annual

grants from government funds to enable them to ex- pand their work on current inventor problems and to take part in foreign conferences.

In the United States I have found many local as- sociations, some of which are one-man organizations

and fade away with him. None of the local associations seem to have contacts with any other. Why not

bring them together in a congress, as is done with

scientists on questions of national interest? If I should venture to voice an opinion, I would say that

you have to be a little inventive yourselves, and invent ways and means to support the inventor as- sociations, making them a useful element in the efforts to encourage the creation of more inventions.

The efficiency of the inventor's work

In my whole paper I have made a lot of statements

about the inventor's way of working, the chief

hazards in his work, his need for outside assistance

at certain steps, and when and why the invention

often goes into the drawer. Yet all the statements are based on no other facts than my personal experience

from contacts with many individual inventors. I have no statistically relevant grounds for transferring this

experience to the whole universe of inventors, to speak generally about the frequency and the seri- ousness of the different situations and characteristics of development work. And furthermore, I have never found a scientific investigation based on

interviews with inventors as a group through

representative sampling.

Knowing that even well-planned industries spend

a great amount of money on time studies and MTMmeasurements for continued streamlining of every

element in the production line to save even a fraction

of a percent in time and cost, it seems really as- tonishing that no such study has been made of the

development process of inventions.

This process still usually remains in a free and

wildgrown state, and we know there are many bottlenecks and impediments that have a very disturbing effect on the time schedule and efficiency of the

work. A systematic study here ought to give indications for possible improvements of a quite different

order of magnitude than in the factories.

Therefore, if the U.S. Government now is going to spend money on projects to stimulate inventiveness,

it seems to me that one of the basic and most urgent

projects should be a broad and thorough interview

investigation of the inventors' way of working and

the different factors that affect the efficiency of their

work.

Having the privilege to speak here from a European perspective I cannot help dreaming of what might

be the conclusions if the same investigation— with

the same questionnaire— could be made simultaneously in some other inventor environments, say, for

instance, Canada and one large and one small

country in Europe. The result could indicate which

factors are fundamental and independent of the en- vironment, and how other factors fluctuate due to varying environmental conditions.

181
Should we encourage our young men and

women to invent?

Let me finally take up still another question from

the Conference program: "Should we encourage our young men and women to invent?" As much as I feel

that more inventors would be beneficial to the

society, I must reluctantly answer "No." In my

opinion society still has a long way to go before inventors generally are given a reasonable chance to succeed. Young people without special preferences,

looking around to choose a profession that could give

them a fair income and position in life, ought not to be advised to start as inventors unless they have

shown a very special talent for such work. There will

be many people, anyhow, who cannot think of

becoming anything else but inventors— just like

some feel a calling to become authors or ac- tresses—in spite of all warnings of future hardships.

The best way to encourage inventor activities at present seems to be to support those who start on

the inventor route by their own free choice, and

assist them to overcome certain impediments in

their work.

This brings me back to where I started, to the inventor ecology. The present situation is certainly not

very favorable, but I am sure it will never be necessary to create a game reserve for inventors to preserve the specimen on earth. On the other hand,

if we improve their environment, their number and

activity will increase, and they will give a far greater

contribution to technical progress.

Discussion

C. Rodenberger: I would like to ask the question

of the two gentlemen as to what role, if any, did the

university play in invention and innovation in the European scheme?

H. Romanus: Naturally they are making inventions, but mostly as independent inventors. The employee invention law in Sweden makes an exemption

for teachers at universities. They are not regarded as employees; they own their own inventions. If they

are not teaching, they can have a contract for

research, and then it depends on the contract who

owns the inventions. But certainly there are a lot of

inventions made at the universities. But we don't

have universities directed entirely on inventions; it's a by-product. Most of them can do what research

they wish, and that means they can do invention

work, too.

R. Kuntz: Do you feel that the system that has

evolved in this country affecting the employees who

invent, is satisfying his human needs, and giving him

the incentive that's necessary?

F. Neumeyer: Well, Bob, to answer this I would

need to write another book, of course. But, as you

know yourself, the legal regulation of this field is practically not existing in the United States, with the

exception of certain types of Government employees. From our European view, we think that

there might be, a possibility to develop a more

uniform improvement of incentives. But in a country

of this size, I can't give you this recommendation. I think there could be developed a long list of useful

and positive suggestions to increase incentives for

American inventors, for this is also obviously the

meaning of the message of President Nixon of March

1972. But it's up to you to find the best way. We cannot give you any advice, but we just can tell you facts

from other parts of the world.

N. Zepell: I wanted to find out if it's true — I heard

a few years ago — that in Common Market countries,

there will be a patent law that will cover all those

countries. Is this correct, or is this rumor incorrect?

F. Neumeyer: The history of harmonization of

patent acts, industrial property legislation in Europe,

in this connection is a long story which goes back

several decades. The first draft for a European

patent, for the member countries of the Common

Market, is more than 20 years old, but was later on

stopped by France. But about 4 years ago a new

development occurred which made the whole

development much more exciting and fast, with the

result that this fall in September we'll have a diplomatic conference in Munich, at which two European

conventions will be signed: one which we call the

Inner European Patent Convention, and the other

one, the Outer one. The Inner one is meant to give a uniform European patent for all nine member countries of the European market, which means that my

own country is not included. The Outer Convention

will be signed at the same time, in which all European countries can take part, and go into the market

182
with certain remarkable advantages. So, in a few

months there will happen very important things in

Europe in this field, and I'm sure that the experts in

the United States will follow very carefully what's

happening there. We are looking forward to a new

situation which has never existed before in the history of European patent legislation.

183

SESSION IV-June 14, 1973

WORKSHOP PANELS ON RECOMMENDATIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR

FURTHER STUDY

The Role of the Patent System

J. Stedman, Chairman

The Panel expressed serious concern regarding

the sharp deterioration that has occurred in recent

years with respect to the esteem in which the patent

system has been traditionally regarded, and wishes

to make some suggestions for improving that unfortunate situation.

To this end, our basic recommendation is that we

strongly urge the National Inventors Council to secure the appointment of a group to study these

proposals, and other proposals that may be suggested, and to come up with some firm recommendations. Since many of the things we suggest are matters that may require legislation, this group should

be expected to report within a year, so that they

would have materials available for a forthcoming

Congress.

The Panel has 14 specific suggestions. The first two relate to efforts to provide more flexibility in the

patent system than it has at the present time.

1. Provision for a petty or utility patent, so that

courts and the Patent Office would not be limited to a choice between awarding too much or giving

nothing at all, which is the only choice that they

often have at the present time.

2. Provision for patents of addition, similar to that

found in various countries, in which, if an inventor

makes an invention and obtains a patent on it, and

later makes some improvement which does not merit

a patent in itself, nevertheless it can be added to the

original patent for the remainder of that patent

period.

The next two proposals deal with the "integrity"

of the patent system.

3. Some kind of an opposition proceeding, with careful protective devices, so that an application would

be subject to review from the standpoint of why the

patent should not issue.

4. Obligation on an applicant to disclose relevant information that is known to him at the time of his application (to a considerable extent he has this duty

now).

The next five recommendations deal with Patent

Office procedure.

5. Deferred examination, again with some very careful protective devices.

6. Make the Patent Office a separate agency.

7. Take advantage of developments in computerized

searching and data collection. This does not mean

that the computer makes the decision, but it can be

of great help to human beings in arriving at the decision. Whether this is done in the Patent Office, as a matter of general Government operation, by tapping

the resources of private industry or on an international basis is something to be determined by the

study group.

8. Consider reexamination of the fee structure covering both application procedures and the furnishing

of services and materials by the Patent Office, in

order to lighten the burdens, especially at the outset,

upon applicants.

9. Consider the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Invention, Innovation, and Intellectual Property, for the purpose of dealing with

those agencies in the Commerce Department which

are directly involved in the questions of invention

and innovation. These would include the National

Technical Information Service, the Office of Invention and Innovation, the Office of Technical

Forecasting and Assessment, and any others that

may be appropriate.

The remaining five recommendations deal with

court procedures.

185
10. Give consideration to what appropriate steps

might be taken to achieve greater uniformity in the

courts as far as patent decisions, patent doctrine,

etc., are concerned.

11. Encourage the use by judges of masters for dealing with complex factual questions.

12. Encourage the use of court-appointed experts by

courts, especially those that are technologically

ignorant. The expert's function would be to hold the

judge's hand, so to speak, and give him some idea of

where he is going.

13. Provide for references back to the Patent Office

in patent litigation, for the purpose of getting a second guess from the Patent Office as to how, in

the light of the information that has been presented

in court litigation, they would view a particular

patent in terms of validity.

14. Give consideration to the possibility of developing an administrative procedure for dealing with

patent litigation, especially in the areas of validity

and infringement — highly technical questions, both

of them — in lieu of the traditional court litigation

that we have always used. This could include such

procedures as the Court of Claims' practice of using

special commissioners to deal with such problems.

In addition to these specific suggestions, we note

a number of areas in which we feel that information

is greatly needed, information that at the present

time is lacking. We recommend, therefore, that certain studies be made, looking to a better understanding of how the patent system is operating, and to developing means for improving its effectiveness.

These include the following:

1. A study of changing attitudes on the part of the

courts over recent decades with respect to patents.

Such a study could conceivably be made by the

American Bar Association Foundation, or the

recently reconstituted Patent, Trademark and Copyright Foundation.

2. Organization and operation of seminars with the

Federal Judges, presumably through such an institution as the Judicial Conference, for the purpose of

exchanging ideas, and for the purpose of educating

the judges — because many of them do need education—with respect to the operation and effectiveness

of the patent system.

3. A study of the Patent Office fee structure, including the effect upon applicants and applications of

higher fees; examination of the validity or invalidity

of the self-support theory of Patent Office fee

setting; development of means for reducing fee burdens in appropriate cases; a look into the excessive

divisional cases that now exist, etc. This project

could presumably be handled by the National Bureau of Standards.

4. A study to determine, and gather data concerning,

the economic benefits of the patent system.

5. Development of regional search centers and

patent advisory offices, presumably tied in with re- gional Commerce Department offices, and of means

for providing additional assistance to inventors,

especially assistance to those in need.

6. A study and report by the Patent Office to clarify

what is involved in the so-called "quality review,"

how it operates, and what it accomplishes or is intended to accomplish.

There were four other areas of concern where it was our feeling that meaningful resolution of

problems could come only if patent people and

patent institutions were to work together with the

other affected institutions concerned with these

problems, for the purpose of reaching a satisfactory

resolution of the conflict:

1. The question of international harmonization,

which involves considerations that go beyond the

patent system itself.

2. The employer-employee relationship.

3. Government patent policy, which involves ramifications that are quite outside of, although they

directly affect the patent system.

4. The patent-antitrust relationship. A majority of

the panel expressed concern — concern that is not

limited to themselves but is deemed to be of

widespread existence among others as well — regarding what they feel is the steadily increasing en- croachment of the antitrust laws upon the patent

domain. All of the panel was in full agreement that

the patent-antitrust relationship is a crucially important one, that there presently exists a serious conflict I between them, and that the public interest demands

the resolution of this conflict at the earliest possible

moment, consistent with reaching a wise and

satisfactory adjustment.

186
The Role of Industry

C. E. Anagnostopoulos, Chairman

The activities of the workshop panel covered

herein are divided into two parts. The first are three

recommendations that were the results of significant

discussion within the group, and the second are the

personal observations and concerns expressed by

Robert J. Kuntz, P.E., to the panel and to the as- sembly. The latter part was included in the report

and presented to the assembly at the direction of the

panel chairman, since it represents a philosophy and

school of thought previously not illuminated in the

National Inventors Council.

Panel Resolutions

Inventors Who Are Employees

Recognizing that creativity is a unique human

quality, and creative problem solving is instinctive

to man as one of the highest expressions of human

intelligence; and further recognizing that our social

well-being is critically dependent upon creativity,

therefore: The Panel recommends that guidelines be

established for the enhancement of creativity and inventiveness in the corporate enterprise system and

that such guidelines implement the theory of positive reinforcement and include award systems that are adaptable to variations that may exist in the en- vironment in which inventors practice.

The Position of the United States in the World

Market

There is increasing concern for the position of the

United States in the world market, the deficit of payments, the number of patents of origin compared to some of the other highly industrialized countries,

and the concentration of research and development

which can have a significant impact on the United

States' technological competitive capability in the

world market. Therefore: The Panel recommends

that investigations be conducted to illuminate con- centrated areas of technological research and

development by competitive countries in the world

market, and that the information be made available

to the affected sectors of our system. This information would also be used as a guide in establishing priorities in the allocation of national resources for

research and development.

Government Patents

Recognizing that the Government may stimulate

the invention of many new products, materials, and

processes because of its significant involvement in

the funding of research and development; and recognizing that the present policy of the Government

concerning the ownership and/or use of patents

resulting from these inventions lacks uniformity in

the various departments and agencies, and Government owned patents seldom result in direct benefit

to our social well-being, therefore: The Panel recom- mends that a uniform policy be adopted by the

Federal Government against Government patent

ownership and the Government retain a license to practice for Government use only, and that the inventor's position in such patents be similar to that of a Government Employee.

Remarks by Robert J. Kuntz, P.E.*

Classification of Inventors

There have been many discussions concerning the

rights of employed inventors to retain some interest

in inventions that are assigned to their employers.

Responses to the questions raised by individual inventors or groups representing their interests have

referred to the individual who is employed to invent,

paid a high salary, and is given laboratory facilities

in which to experiment and develop his inventions

for the employer. Such an individual recognizes and

accepts this position with the full realization that the

employer has purchased his creative talents and that

his job is to invent. However, the majority of patents

issued are the results of activities of individuals who

are employees but are not hired to invent; rather,

they are employed to carry out specific job assignments. Invention is ancillary to the job, and the employee's productivity has little or no relation to the

invention process. Therefore, when considering the

recognition and rights of inventors, three entities

must be realized. They are:

* President, California Society of Professional Engineers

187
1. The independent inventor who is in essence a

private practioner. This individual solves problems,

creates inventions, and markets or develops his

patents independent of the employment arena.

2. The employed inventor who is specifically hired to invent and enjoys all of the rights, privileges, and

recognition that that position in corporate enterprise

affords him. This individual clearly recognizes his

role as being paid to invent.

3. The employee who invents, but is not hired to invent. This individual is employed to perform a myriad of functions for his employer which can

range from design to sales. His productivity is gauged and evaluated independent of his inventive

capability. Invention is ancillary to his job assignment.

The Constitutional Purpose of the Patent

System

It is axiomatic that the dependence of our social

well-being necessitated the free flow of new ideas

and creativity, and this free exchange of information

was the primary concern of the founding fathers of our Constitution when they uniquely provided a re- ward to creative persons by granting them an exclusive right to their inventions. The patent system was

established as the Government-protected means to reward inventors for their free and public disclosure

of their findings.

Many changes have taken place in our society

since the founding of the Constitution. Presently, a

significant majority of patents issued have been

preassigned to the inventor's employer, and as such,

there is no direct benefit brought to the inventor by

the patent. In the present environment, it must be

recognized that there are two entities that exist in

the invention process. One is the inventor who conceives the idea and creates the invention. The other

is the innovator who provides the resources to bring

the invention to the marketplace so that our social

well-being may benefit from the new products,

processes, and materials. One is useless without the

other. If the inventor does not disclose, there is nothing to develop and market. If the resources are

not available, a creative idea or invention will never

reach fruition.

Recognizing these facts, there must exist a bilateral and mutual dependence of these two entities—the inventor and the innovator — in fulfilling

the intent of the Constitutional provisions, and the

proper functioning of the patent system cannot be

achieved if either interest is subordinated to the

other.

Unfortunately, every conflict between social interest and corporate interest has necessitated

resolution through legislative means. Many Government agencies and numerous laws have been

established to protect the public's interest in fields

that could have been adequately addressed by independent or collective actions of private origin. Often

the competitive aspects of our system which have

benefited the public with the highest standard of liv- ing known to man, have prevented singular action to resolve deficiencies. Environmental, labor, pure

food and drug, child protection, and numerous other

laws have been passed.

The impact of invention and creativity on our social well-being is so profound and covers every facet

of society, that National concern is mandatory. The

conflict that has developed between inventors and

innovators can only be adequately resolved through

legislative action if for no other reason than the fact

that it is necessary to establish uniformity in practice which does not affect the relative competitive

position of all segments of our institutions. The Moss

Bill (HR 2370) provides a legislative resolution and

recognition of the rights and interests of both the inventor and innovator. This legislation should be objectively analyzed in light of the Constitutional in- tent; i.e., disclosure for the good of the public.

Guidelines

In the interim, lacking a legislative resolution to the rights of inventors and innovators, guidelines

should be established by national organizations

which consider the social, economic, and philosophical needs of both entities. These guidelines should

provide for incentive and award systems that relate

to the worth of the invention. Disclosures that are not subjected to the patent process should be

released to the inventor for independent exploitation or publishing.

The theory of positive reinforcement should be applied to stimulate disclosure. The inventor should be

kept involved in the evaluation process and provided

the proper encouragement with appropriate feedback. The principal of "find 10 reasons why it will

188
work" should be adopted by corporate evaluation

boards.

Procedures should be established by corporate

enterprise which simplify the disclosure process and

remove all impedances to proper documentation for

those employees who invent. Technical and legal

assistance should be available. The inventor should

be given the courtesy of rebuttal. There should be a

full release of inventions of no interest to the corporation to the inventor, and inventions performed

outside of the employment situation should not be

considered of corporate interest but the sole interest

of the inventor.

Education

Efforts should be made to include discussion and

provide information to students concerning the invention and patent process. Since engineers are 20

times more likely to invent than all other occupations collectively, there should be an infusion of course study concerning the patent system, invention, creativity, innovation and the law into the

Bachelor's Degree curriculum. Additionally, there

should be developed public education to achieve

greater support for the patent system by illuminating

the benefits to our social well-being that this system

has provided through new products, processes, and

materials.

The Role of Government

W. B. McLean, Chairman

We believe that the present policy of assigning all patents resulting from work supported by the

Government, to the Government, hinders rather than

promotes the utilization of the technology involved.

Therefore, we recommend that the title of inventions

resulting from Government-supported work be left with the inventor in order to achieve his assistance

in putting them to work. Specifically, we suggest

that the present administration review the last Bill

introduced by Senator McClellan to try to enact an

across-the-board Government patent policy, the nature of which was to encompass the Kennedy policy

memorandum of 1963, as further amended by the

Nixon memorandum of 1972, on the same subject,

plus certain additional features. We believe that this

Bill should now be reconsidered for possible enactment. This will be consistent with existing policy

that inventions are National assets which should be

exploited.

In addition to this recommendation, we also raised

the following questions:

1. Can data be developed to show the importance

of the Patent Office function, to avoid the assumption that it should be self-supporting on fees alone?

2. Would gains result from making the Patent Office an independent activity?

3. Should the independent inventor get tax

breaks?

4. Should we have maintenance fees on an ascending scale?

5. Should we set minimum requirements on the

share an inventor should retain of the fruits of his invention?

6. Should we provide the little inventor with help,

financial, technical, administrative, to get his invention appraised, tested, produced, or utilized, as we

understand is now being tested out in Sweden, with

a special office to communicate with the small inventor?

7. Should we try to establish a list of the X most

wanted inventions?

8. Can we set up a mechanism by which senior

citizens could take some of the risk necessary to utilize innovation? When people approach retirement

age, a lot of them are looking for something useful to do. Some of them have collected capital which could

be usefully put to work; could a mechanism be set up by which these people could communicate with

the younger inventors who probably now have most

of the ideas, in such a way that a useful product

could result to society?

189
The Role of the Educational System

W. Bollay, Chairman

University Patent Policy

The Panel recommends that the Department of

Commerce attempt to persuade all governmental

agencies which have anything to do with educational

institutions to agree on a common patent policy for

dealing with educational institutions, and that this

be an enlightened policy, not retaining the patent

rights to the Government, which means that the

patents would not be used, but to grant patent rights

to the educational institutions; and secondly, that

they also attempt to persuade the universities to adopt equally enlightened patent policies with

respect to the individual inventor.

Fellowship Programs

We believe that Government-financed fellowship

programs to encourage scientific research should be

supplemented to encourage creative engineering

and invention and innovation on the university level.

We recommend that the Department of Commerce

take a position of leadership in helping to define the

criteria for selection, and in making sure that funding is set up for such fellowship programs.

Innovation Centers

We endorse the idea of establishing innovation

centers at or near universities, and recommend the

expansion of such programs. We believe the Government should condition the award of funds upon the

requirement that there be willing and helpful

cooperation between the key departments, such as the School of Engineering and the Business School.

It is also desirable that the Government not try to force all innovation centers into one pattern. We

further believe that it is important to have inventors

and innovators in residence at these innovation centers, to make sure that it is the best experience

which is transmitted to the students.

Research and Development for Critical

National Needs

We recommend that the Department of Commerce provide leadership in the initiation of

research and development activities in areas of criti- cal national needs, and award research contracts

either to industry or to universities which have com

petence in the areas involved. We suggest that

fund of $25 to $50 million per year be set up for such

programs, that half of it should be for projects of

clearly recognized national need, and the other half

should be open for unsolicited proposals.

Source Material

We recommend that the Department of Commerce assist the universities in providing source

material which can be used for teaching patents,

patent law, and creative engineering.

Industry Internships

We recommend that industry could make a contribution to the university community by encouraging internship experience by qualified graduate stu- dents to work with some of their outstanding inventors and innovators.

Continuing Education for Engineers

Recognizing that continuing education for en- gineers is a very serious problem, and that the half

life of an engineer is now about 5-10 years, we

recommend that earnest consideration be given to

this problem, and that some universal provision be

made for the continuing education of engineers.

190
The Role of the Independent Inventor

S. Ruben and B. Walker, Chairmen

The substantially unanimous opinion of the panel

was as follows:

1. In the past, the independent inventor has made

important contributions and it is believed that he is

still important. Information should be collected and

disseminated on this subject.

2. We recommend that the NIC or other suitable

group put out a list or lists of inventions needed for

the public good and to aid our balance of trade.

3. We advocate collecting and disseminating information on public counseling services available to inventors and innovators with no more than a nominal

charge.

4. We urge that more information be developed on what knowledge and services are needed by inexperienced inventors and potential inventors.

5. The practices of the Small Business Administration procurement and some other Government

procurement agencies should be amplified and encouraged where new inventions by independent inventors are involved.

6. Do not increase obstacles to the independent inventor such as:

a. Do not change the capital gains treatment

available to an independent inventor on

proceeds of an exclusive license.

b. Do not shorten the present 17-year life of an

invention unless going to 20 years from the time

of filing with suitable extension if unduly

delayed by interference.

c. Do not increase the filing fees.

d. Do not institute a maintenance fee on patents

issued to independent inventors.

We also have one added as a minority report: As

an added incentive to the independent inventor,

allow such an inventor a depletion allowance on income earned on his patent.

The International Aspect

J. Rabinow, Chairman

1. Every effort should be made and continued to develop a world patent system. The committee

recognizes the great difficulties and the legal and social problems of doing this but feels that at least a

single technical document could be produced which

describes the inventions and defines the claims. The

laws applicable to patents could still be different.

2. The committee was unanimous that the "firstto-invent" system is better than the "first-to-file"

system now used throughout the world. It recom- mends that the first-to-invent system be maintained

in the United States. It further recommends, however, that with this exception to the maximum extent

possible, the U.S. patent system shall be harmonized

with those of the rest of the world.

3. We recommend that a detailed and continuous

study be made of how the Common Market patent

situation of Europe will affect U.S. applicants.

4. We recommend that there be a continuous

study by a permanent Government agency of matters pertaining to patents, innovation, and related

matters. Among these may be the work of the Office

of Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris

and other such bodies.

5. We recommend that a very thorough in-depth

study be made of the incentives provided to inventors in various South American, European, and

Asiatic countries. This recommendation is made

with the view that the legal guarantees given to employed inventors as to their rights may be applicable

to U.S. inventors as well, and the similarities and differences in their positions here as related to inventors in other countries should be better understood.

6. We recommend that the United States participate in international conventions or conferences

related to employed inventors, such as the one we

were told about by Dr. Neumeyer that may be held

in the near future in Europe.

7. We recommend that hard data be developed on

the amount of royalties collected by U.S. firms, by

European firms; on royalties they collect from each

other; and, if possible, the amount of taxes paid on such royalties both here and abroad.

The Committee felt that such data should also be

developed for royalties paid on patents where the ar- rangements are internal to the United States.

191

5 33-210 OL - 74 - 13
PARTICIPANTS

James Adams

Department of Engineering

Stanford University

Stanford. Calif. 94305

C. E. Anagnostopoulos

Monsanto Company

800 North Lindbergh

St. Louis, Mo. 63166

Betsy Ancker-Johnson

Assistant Secretary for Science and

Technology

Department of Commerce

Washington, D.C. 20230

Donald Baker

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Donald W. Banner

Borg-Warner Corporation

200 S. Michigan Avenue

Chicago. 10. 60604

Frank Barron

University of California Santa Cruz, Calif. 95060

Lawrence B. Biebel

Biebel, French & Bugg

2500 Winters Bank Building

Dayton, Ohio 45402

William Bollay

4592 Via Vistosa

Santa Barbara, Calif. 93105

Theodore L. Bowes

Westinghouse Electric Corporation

Research & Development Center

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15235

Jay Boyce

231-B No. Euclid Street Anaheim. Calif. 92801

Edward Brenner

The Association for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation

Suite 1007 - Crystal Plaza 1 2001 Jefferson Davis Highway

Arlington, Va. 22202

William H. Calkins

E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company

Wilmington, Del. 19898

George D. Colchagoff

Proformagen, Inc. 4425 Cass Street San Diego, Calif. 92109

Myron A. Coler

New York University

Suite 7D. One Fifth Avenue

New York, N.Y. 10003

Robert Daly

Stanford Research Institute 333 Ravenswood Avenue

Menlo Park, Calif. 94025

Herbert L. Davis, Jr. 136 Washington Place

Ridgewood, N.J. 07450

Joseph H. DeFrees

Allegheny Valve Company

419 Third Avenue

Warren, Pa. 16365

Daniel V. De Simone

Federal Council for Science and Technolo

gy

National Science Foundation

Washington, D.C. 20550

James Deters Borg-Warner Corporation

200 S. Michigan Avenue

Chicago, 111. 60604

David DeWitt

IBM Corporation

Route 52

Hopewell Junction, N.Y. 12533

James D. D'lanni

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

142 Goodyear Boulevard

Akron, Ohio 44316

Roger G. Ditzel Iowa State University Research Founda

tion, Inc. Ames, Iowa 50010

Charles S. Draper

Charles Stark Draper Laboratory

68 Albany Street Cambridge, Mass. 02139

J. E. Drummond

Maxwell Laboratories, Inc. 9244 Balboa Avenue

San Diego, Calif. 92123

Orval T. Ellsworth

Ellsworth Associates

Stanford P. O. Box 6101

Palo Alto, Calif. 94305

Ralph L. Ely. Jr. Research Triangle Institute Research Triangle Park, N.C. 27709

Arthur Ezra

National Science Foundation

Washington, D.C. 20550

Thomas E. Feare Chemical and Engineering News

1155 16th Street. NW.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Isasc Fleischmann

U.S. Patent Office

Washington, D.C. 20231

Thomas D. Fontaine

University of Florida

Gainesville, Fla. 32601

Howard I. Forman

Rohm and Haas Company

Independence Mall West

Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

James Fulleylove

Research Corporation

405 Lexington Avenue

New York, N.Y. 10017

R. L. Fullman

General Electric Company

P.O. Box 8

Schenectady, N.Y. 12301

S. C. Gilfillan 870 Hilgard Avenue

Los Angeles, Calif. 90024

W. Gary Goodson

Itek Corporation

10 Maguire Road

Lexington, Mass. 02173

Patricia S. Grant

Money Magazine

Time and Life Building

Rockefeller Center

New York, N.Y. 10020

William E. Hanford

Olin Corporation

120 Long Ridge Road

Stamford, Conn. 06904

Kenneth R. Hansen

Adlai Stevenson Institute 3030 Klingle Road

Washington, D.C. 20008

Darrel G. Harden

University of Oklahoma

Norman, Okla. 73069

Leonard S. Hardland

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Edgar E. Hardy

Monsanto Research Corporation

P. O. Box 8, Station B

Dayton, Ohio 45407

Milton Harris

3300 Whitehaven Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20007

Thomas J. Hogan

National Science Foundation

Washington, D.C. 20550

192
Julius Jancin, Jr. IBM Corporation

1601 North Kent Street Arlington, Va. 22209

Frank S. Johnston

Office of Naval Research

Arlington, Va. 22217

William D. Johnston III 5309 Riverdale Road

Riverdale, Md. 20840

Harry Kantor

2806 Woodstock Avenue

Silver Spring, Md. 20910

Narinder S. Kapany

2126 Greenways Drive

Woodside, Calif. 94061

Irving Kayton

George Washington University

Washington, D.C. 20006

Bernard A. Kemp

George Washington University Medical

Center

Washington, D.C. 20037

Lillian Kraff

468 South Roxbury Drive

Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212

Robert J. Kuntz

National Society of Professional Engineers

7800 Willow Crest Way

Fair Oaks, Calif. 95628

Lawrence M. Kushner

Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety

Commission

Washington, D.C. 20207

Pierre Lamontagne

Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A OH5, Canada

Theodore H. Lassagne

Counsel, Huebner & Worrel

610 South Broadway

Los Angeles, Calif. 90014

Clarence Lindquist

Office of Education, HEW

Washington, D.C. 20202

Anthony C. Mamo

R.C. Ingersoll Researcn Center

Wolf & Algonquin Roads

DesPlaines, 111. 60018

John T. Maynard

du Pont Experimental Station

Wilmington, Del. 19898

William B. McLean

Naval Undersea Center

271 Catalina Boulevard

San Diego, Calif. 92132

Richard S. Morse

MIT Development Foundation

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

50 Memorial Drive

Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Frederik Neumeyer

Faltmarskalksvagen 39

161 35 Bromma, Sweden

Franz O. Ohlson, Jr. Aerospace Industries Association, Inc. 1725 De Sales Street NW.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Norman C. Parrish

University of California Berkeley, Calif. 94701

Gerald P. Parsons Limbach, Limbach & Sutton 3000 Ferry Building

San Francisco, Calif. 94111

Barbara J. Patton 20282 La Paloma

Saratoga, Calif. 95070

Robert B. Pond

The Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, Md. 21218

Jacob Rabinow

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Jan Rajchman

David Sarnoff Research Center

RCA Laboratories

Princeton, N.J. 08540

Martin D. Robbins

Denver Research Institute University of Denver

Denver, Colo. 80220

Richard W. Roberts

Director, National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Charles A. Rodenberger

Texas A. & M. University

College Station, Tex. 77843

Harald Romanus

Nordenskioldsgatan 86

115 21 Stockholm, Sweden

Jack Roth

Inventors Workshop International

223 S. Beverly Drive

Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212

Samuel Ruben

Ruben Laboratories

271 North Avenue

New Rochelle, N.Y. 10801

Eric P. Schellin

National Patent Council

1225 19th Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Leslie L. D. Shaffer

Oregon Inventors Council

University of Oregon

Eugene, Oreg. 97403

William B. Schockley

Bell Laboratories

600 Mountain Avenue

Murray Hill, N.J. 07974

Alan A. Smith

Director, The PTC Research Foundation

68 Leonard Street Belmont, Mass. 02178

Gene W. Smith

5008 La Canada Boulevard

La Canada, Calif. 91011

John Stedman

University of Wisconsin

School of Law

Madison, Wis. 53706

John A. Stephens

Excel-Mineral Co. 4400 Via Abrigada

Santa Barbara, Calif. 93105

Malcolm L. Sutherland

Morton, Bernard, Brown, Roberts &

Sutherland

1054 31st Street, NW.

Washington, D.C. 20007

John P. Sutton Limbach, Limbach & Sutton 3000 Ferry Building

San Francisco, Calif. 94111

Robert D. Tollison

Council of Economic Advisers

Washington, D.C. 20506

Peter P. Toma

Latsec, Inc. 7852 Ivanhoe Avenue

La Jolla, Calif. 92037

Thomas Ubois

National Science Foundation

Washington, D.C. 20550

Brooks Walker, President

Shasta Forests Company

1280 Columbus Avenue

San Francisco. Calif. 94133

Richard Walton

10 West HiU Place

Boston, Mass. 02114

E. J. Wedrall

Brea, Calif. 92621

193
Arthur R. Whale

The Dow Chemical Company

Midland, Mich. 48640

Thurman White

Newsweek Magazine

Market at Polk Street San Francisco, Calif. 94102

F. Karl Willenbrock

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Richard S. Woodbury

Southwest Research Institute 8500Culebra Road

San Antonio, Tex. 78284

Stephen Yerazunis

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, N.Y. 12181

Nathan A. Zepell

Product Development

1359 Santa Teresita Drive

Santa Barbara, Calif. 93105

194
APPENDIX A

The Inventor — His Motivations and Society

Samuel Ruben*

Inventors today are recognized by society as a factor in the progress of our civilization.

This was not always so, for the inventors who initiated the beginning of the industrial revolution were treated with suspicion and hostility, often by

the very people who in the long run benefited by

their efforts.

This was particularly highlighted by violence in

mass reaction in England and France with the introduction of textile machinery. Kay, the inventor of

the flying shuttle, was mobbed when he introduced

his invention in Lancashire. A mob destroyed the

spinning frame invented by Hargrave. Crampton,

the inventor of the spinning mule, hid it for fear of a

similar fate. Jaquard barely escaped being drowned

in the Rhone by angry weavers on account of his new

loom. In Nottingham there were riots on the introduction of the stocking loom. Today the climate

is different and sometimes the inventor is afforded

recognition and honors, particularly if the product of

his efforts results in widespread acceptance. The

growth of industries is dependent upon invention

and innovation, for one reads in company statements

that some of their major revenue producers were not

in existence 20 years ago.

We have come to take inventions for granted and

the beginnings of many have been forgotten in the

dimmed vision of time. Even such a common utensil as a fork or the progeny of the wheel, namely the

vehicles, are hardly thought of as inventions. Today

the younger generation takes such a popular utility as the television set or other modern appurtenances

as something related to advertising programs and

not as an application of imaginative thought in the use of modern technology.

The modern technological inventions of today are

in a different class from those of earlier days of our

patent system on account of the tremendous expansion in science and technology with its accompanying increase in the diffusion of knowledge. They tend

to become a more sophisticated project in order to

* Member, National Inventors Council

properly integrate the imaginative concept to present technology.

Self motivation is a necessary factor to catalyze

the generation of imaginative concepts.

In a lecture on motivation given by that eminent

Nineteenth Century scientist, Michael Faraday, he

stated, "...in the pursuit of science we first start with

hope and expectations; these we realize and

establish, never again to be lost, and upon them we

found new expectations of further discoveries and so go on pursuing, realizing, establishing and founding

new hopes again and again." This motivating

philosophy could be applied to invention. The true

inventor is motivated by the intellectual excitement

of the thought process and will resist adverse premature opinions of others who lack imaginative thinking.

In general, progress has always required creative

thinking and a determined effort in the pursuit of

bold dreams, however imaginative. Goals become

reality only when ideas are complemented by a working technology.

The most important factor that an imaginative individual is endowed with is an inner sense of

direction. The effectiveness of this inner sense of

direction requires the understanding of the concept

in relation to the existing science and technology.

This involves the planning and practical embodiment of the imagined concept and persistence in

order to bring it to effective realization as a real

world invention.

No achievement in the history of technology has

had a greater impact on civilization than did the

means of generating electric currents by rotating

conductors in a magnetic field, or in the induction of

current in one coil from another by variation of the

exciting electromagnetic field. Sir Robert Peel, then

Prime Minister, visited Faraday in his laboratory of : the Royal Institution in London and seeing a model

of the magnetoelectric generator, inquired, "Of what

use is it?" Faraday is said to have replied, "I know

not, but I wager some day your government will tax

it." How true this prophecy was, for with the com195
mercialization of magnetoelectric-produced electricity since 1880 the government income from electric utility taxes has become an increasing source of revenue. It took 35 years before a commercial embodiment of Faraday's discovery of magnetoelectric

generation in the form of a dynamo took place.

If one is ahead of the times it may well happen

that the acceptance of a proven development does

not take place until the expiration of a patent covering the invention and with it goes the hope for protection, reward and recognition of one's intellectual

property.

I have experienced this situation on various occasions in the past when the time and state of the art was such that my inventions reached wide-scale

commercial application at the time of expiration of

my patents.

While such experiences are discouraging, they

point out the need for an independent inventor to avoid depending upon a single invention. I was able

to realize the hopes given by our American Patent

System by having inventions that fitted into the new

and developing technology at the right time in

reference to the state of the art. The translation of the imaginative concept in

respect to today's technology requires an accumulation of a broad mental tool storage of the facts of

science and technology made possible by continuous

study and experience. In the particular field I have

been engaged in during the past 50 years I have

found an important mental tool source to be the un- derstanding derived from an early recognition of the

importance of the science of materials and more

specifically in later years, the analytic study of the

periodic table of the elements and their electron configurations.

Conceptual creativity of a high degree has been

the product of independent activity by individuals

working alone or in a limited size group who have

confidence along with the habit of creative thinking.

An increasing number of new products will be

derived from those best trained in the complex of

scientific thought which is the basis of technology.

It will, to a certain extent, depend upon whether

enough encouragement is given to engineering stu- dents to apply independent thinking for snythesis of

new products with the basic knowledge acquired

rather than just being a listener, reader and

memorizer. Some of the combined academic and

work application courses are in the right direction of

real world problem thinking which is conducive to

creativity.

The independent inventor will always be important, though to a lesser degree in view of the large

expansion since World War II, in organized industrial and Government sponsored development projects.

He is in a position to be able to think away from or independently of popular trends with respect to a

given project. The statement implying necessity as being an innovator of invention may also be related

to the factor of inner recognition which may precede

real world recognition of a need. In the course of the

complete development of an invention there are factors of importance to commercial success such as the cooperation of one's laboratory associates and

the very important part played by the entrepreneur.

A necessary ingredient for success is that the

management of the prospective licensee manufacturing organization have the courage and foresight

to carry a development through the production trials

and tribulations encountered with all inventions before they become sought-for commercial products.

Along with progressive management, a licensee

must have the cooperation of the engineering department which must complement the inventor's work

in reference to production problems and design to meet public acceptance.

While most of this essay has been related to the

independent or self-employed inventor, the

problems of the organizational inventor need increased consideration. This is particularly so since

by necessity a large percentage of potentially creative individuals need support derived from a steady

job. They need encouragment and recognition of

their efforts to bring out the best work. Invention in a group may involve both the conceptual inventor

and the technological improvement type.

The accomplishments of the inventor of a practical conceptual invention should not be obscured by

being in a large group organization. His work, if of

proven value, should be made known by trade or- ganizations and professional societies. He should not

only be the recipient of professional recognition but

should in some manner participate if an extraordinary increase of income to his employers is directly

derived from his contribution.

Fewer men are willing today to undertake the

risks of independent activity compared to former

196
days when money requirements were not so great nor was employment in research and development

plentiful.

Science with its systematic extension of information provides a translating knowledge from which

technology has acquired the substance of its explosive growth. It has given the inventor an increasing

supply of mental tools to compose his imaginative

concepts and their translation to practical reality.

The computer with its ability of coordinated retrieval

capacity will in time become a great aid toward real

world application of imaginative thought.

Today, because of the disregard of the secondary

effects of explosively enlarged applied technology,

we note adverse effects on our environment. It has

become necessary to consider equal effort to prevent

further adverse effects and correct those derived

from the past. One can observe from the world

literature that less emphasis is advocated on the advancement of technology by invention and en- trepreneurship. This has been highlighted in an address by Dr. C. Stark Draper, President of the Stark

Draper Laboratory at MIT. He stated that engineers

and technologists will have to think of all developments from a viewpoint of overall situations in which

the desired subsystem and remedial subsystem be

considered in their true perspective as inseparable

parts of a complete system technology. Any effective

attack to improve existing bad situations and to prevent others from appearing must come from

system technology in which engineers consider the

beneficial results and undesirable part as a common

problem.

One hurdle an independent inventor sometimes

has to overcome even with demonstrable models and

data is the inherent reluctance of the technical staff

of his prospective licensees to accept outside ideas.

In industry this is known as the NIH factor (not invented here).

Some managements override a biased preliminary

opinion and form their own judgment on trial results.

The American patent system is a basic source of

encouragment for the inventor, for it provides him

with a means of protecting his intellectual property

which is the practical result of his imaginative thinking, giving him hope for reward and recognition.

This system has enabled me to function as an independent inventor and maintain a laboratory for the

past 50 years with support, except for the first 3

years, derived entirely from licensees and sales of

patents.

I am most grateful for the opportunities afforded

by our American patent system.

197
APPENDIX B

Excerpts from The Employed Inventor in the United States, F. Neumeyer, (MIT Press,

Cambridge, Mass., 1971)*

EVALUATION OF UNIVERSITY

EMPLOYER INVENTION POLICY

Suggestions for a University Patent Organization

and Its Tasks

1. There should be some kind of formalized university-employee invention policy and program handled

by a permanent university office or an office

authorized by the university in all universities with

research activities.

2. The program should be administered by a full- time legal staff, assisted and supervised by a committee of faculty, research staff, and graduate stu- dents.

3. The office should preferably have six main functions:

a. To publish (and from time to time update)

general regulations in the invention field for the

information of all faculty members, employees,

students, consultants, and temporary guests; to prepare standard forms for important invention

procedures, such as invention assignments, fil- ing of patent applications and invention disclo- sures; and to provide guidelines in general

patent law. 1

b. To assist all types of university employees

working under Federal Government and state

research contracts and grants in fulfilling contract requirements concerning inventions and

data, including the drafting and prosecuting of

waiver applications to respective departments,

agencies, or other supporting bodies or or- ganizations.

c. On application, to assist employees in

domestic and foreign patent prosecution and in

getting into contact with one or more nonprofit

or profit invention-exploiting institutions or

firms.

* Reprint is courtesy of MIT Press.

1 This could be carried out with the assistance of law professors and students to inspire them to study this special 'field of law and to lecture about it, especially in universities with science and engineering departments.

d. If supported by the regents of a university or a majority of faculty members, to procure the

utilization of university-employee inventions by

licensing or selling non-Government-owned

patents through the university office or a delegated body and to administer the income

from such activities for the benefit of the

university and the inventors.

e. To create a loose, nationwide head organization of all university and college administrations

in the invention field, which would have annual

meetings for the purpose of exchanging ex- periences, would publish pamphlets in this

field, and would cooperate with public service

institutions such as the Civil Service Commission's Office of Career Development (Section of

Federal Incentive Awards Program), the

Federal Council for Science and Technology of

the Department of Commerce, and the Patent

Office.

f. On application, to assist employees in placing

copyrightable material commercially, for instance with domestic and foreign publishers,

schools, educational institutions, film and educational equipment producers, or manufacturers of various kinds.

4. State laws and regulations concerning the handling and allocation of industrial property rights

produced by employees of state institutions should

be made more uniform.

Suggestions Regarding Rights and Duties of

University Inventors

1. University inventors should have to disclose to the

university administration all inventions made during

ordinary service or employment, including inventions made in the course of special research projects

where the inventor has used university facilities. 2

2. If a university inventor is unable to analyze the

2 The administrative, legal, and economic relations between a university inventor and his employer depend on the character of the invention and the circumstances under which it was made.

198
character of his own invention he should have to consult the invention office of his university.

3. Unless prohibited by Government contract, a

university inventor should always be entitled to a

substantial share of income (profit) from inventions

made by him and assigned and commercially exploited by the university, a licensed enterprise, or a licensed institution.

4. The percentage distribution of income from

university inventions between the parties cannot be

generally fixed in advance. It depends, among other

things, on who is paying for the costs of patenting,

negotiating, licensing, or sale, and eventual additional development costs for producing a marketable

product or process.

5. Net income retained after expenses by a university from assigned employee inventions should be

used for general university purposes, substantially

to promote those research fields most useful in

terms of broad educational objectives, including the

school from which income from invention was

received.

6. Income from employee inventions should not affect salary and other official income to which a university employee is entitled.

7. In all financial or other economic arrangements

between a university administration and university

inventors, due concern should be given to the public

interest, since most universities are public institutions.

8. Disputes between university inventors and the

university about correct analysis of the type of invention made, allocation of right, patenting and exploitation of inventions, and distribution of income

from licensed or sold inventions should be referred

to a special Federal board or court deciding such

questions for all nonprivate employees, i.e.^ Government, state, or municipal employees. Employees of

private universities enjoy the same right.

EVALUATION OF INDUSTRY-EMPLOYER

INVENTION POLICY

The case studies of this chapter show that when

industrial corporations have a conscious employeeinvention policy, regulations regarding advance as- signment of ail future inventions an employee can

make, as a condition of employment, are universally

used and are in principle alike. Advance assignment

provisions in contracts with employees seem to be

legally permissible. 3 The scope of such assignment

provisions, however, can vary substantially, for instance in defining the engineering field or field of

science for which inventions are required to be as- signed, the group of assignees to whom the invention

rights are granted, or the time period for which as- signment will be in force. A negative feature is that

extra compensation or other special benefits above

the salary in return for inventions are rarely

promised in these contract provisions, even if invention-award systems exist. 4 Token awards in the form

of standard cash amounts of some one hundred dollars each are not considered by the author to be

extra compensation in this connection; neither are ordinary bonus plans to reward the merits of a small

exclusive group of top employees and managers. 5 Nonmonetary (honorary) inventor awards are practiced in a great number of different ways in special

award plans not a part of the employment contract.

Many of these have the character of a patriarchal,

eighteenth-century attitude toward the employee, a

pat on the shoulder by the patron, who knows best.

Company-wide, state-wide, and nationwide

publicity for successful employed inventors does occur and is sometimes encouraged by industrial

employers. 6 Inventor awards expressed in salary

raises, company promotion, or special work assignments are for obvious reasons difficult to assess

statistically, but they naturally play an important

role in research-minded industries working under

hard domestic and international business competition.

The selection of groups of employees eligible for

invention awards depends usually on whether the

employee is required to sign an invention assignment agreement as a condition of employment. J. H.

O'Meara, for instance, has found that among a group

of 83 companies the types of employees required to sign assignment agreements were distributed as in

table 3.6.

3 Compare the common law situation as analyzed in Chapter 2.

4 There are a few exceptions, for instance in the aeroplane and aerospace industry, and Gulf Oil Corp.

5 Some exceptions: Polaroid Corporation, General Electric Co.. Du Pont de Nemours

extend bonus payments or shares of stock expressly to employees who are outstanding

as inventors.

6 Examples: IBM, RCA, Westinghouse Electric.

199
Table 3.6. Employees required to sign invention-assignment

agreements in 83 selected companies.

Number of Percentage

Tvn#» nf pmnlnv^p nfUl tntfll LUlal pomrm nipc

All ZD oo

DO 70

All m 'inQiio m^nt 9Q OO3^

Some management 26 31

All salesmen 20 24

Some salesmen 22 26

All production 2 2.4 Some production 37 45

Source: J. H. O'Meara, "Employee Patent and Secrecy Agreements," NICB, Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 199, New York,

1965, p. 15.

To make more general statements about the employee selection policy practiced in industry, more

extensive statistics would be needed, but the

author's research shows a trend similar to the one

related by O'Meara. The emphasis on requiring invention assignment by R. & D. personnel (hired to invent and to develop) is natural, but in practical industrial life there are many equivocal categories.

"Occasional inventors" not hired specifically to create new technology have often produced valuable

inventions during employment.

I will evaluate the material presented in this

chapter by concentrating on some points only.

Among suggestions that can be made for an improved industrial employee-inventor policy some are negative, aimed at abolishing certain practices, and

some positive, proposing new or improved measures. My suggestions are as follows:

Abstain in invention-assignment contracts from

1. Blanket provisions covering assignment of all inventions made by an employee "in the field of business" or in the business of the employer, "present

and prospective."

2. Invention assignment in favor of those other than

the direct employer with whom employment contract is executed. Domestic and foreign subsidiaries,

associated companies, and the like, to be excluded

as assignees except with special compensation.

3. Clauses compelling employee to assign inventions

made after conclusion of employment.

Express clearly in invention assignment contracts

that

1. The invention assignment is limited to inventions

conceived and made during employment.

2. Assignment is limited to the field in which the employee is actually intended to work at the time of employment and in which he may have special ex- perience and education. 7

3. All disclosures of inventions offered by an employee will be examined by the employer within a

definite period and the result will be communicated

to the employee, giving the reasons for the decision

in writing.

4. Inventions made during employment and having

substantial commercial value to the employer will

result in reasonable extra compensation in cash,

above salary, and some honorary measures.

5. Any productive employed inventor is eligible for

bonus plan payments irrespective of his current

level of salary.

6. Domestic (U.S.) rights will be treated differently

from foreign rights, the latter to be left to the inventor unless special interests of the employer require

world-wide rights in his favor.

7. Inventions assigned by an employee, which after a certain period of time are not used by the employer, will be released to the inventor free of cost.

Make these provisions

1. That cash awards to inventors be constructed in

such a way as to relieve the inventor partly or wholly

from income tax or other tax claims.

2. That in important cases above a certain commercial level, where an invention award is given or refused to an employee, the employee has the right

to appeal the company decision to a central mixed

governmental-industrial arbitration board, or a special Federal court (to be created).

3. That in corporate engineering and research fields

in close financial cooperation with Government

agencies and departments invention-award provisions for employees be shaped in cooperation with

the affected Government offices.

7 If working tasks are substantially changed during employment, definition of fields

of inventions should be changed by modification of contract.

200
Experiences from a more open, more widespread

and positive industrial employee invention policy

will improve the usefulness of such policy and lead

to more employee inventions to choose from, expansion of industrial production and higher innovation

pace, which in turn will increase employment opportunities.

EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENTEMPLOYER INVENTION POLICY

As we saw in the Overview of this chapter, serious

thought on the creation of a nationwide Federal invention and patent policy goes back about 30 years.

Criticism of patent policy and suggestions for

change are as old as the policy itself. The discussion

gained intensity as Government became more and

more engaged as sponsor of research and development on a large scale after the end of World War II. Particular impact on the general discussion of

Federal patent policy was made by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Aeronautics and

Space Act of 1958, both containing extensive special

provisions on inventions and patents applicable to their new fields of technology. Senator Russell

Long's periodic forays injecting "title provisions" for

employee or grantee inventions into more than a dozen Federal laws concerned with scientific and

engineering research and frequent Congressional

hearings preceding such legislation "kept the pot

boiling." 8 (The more important of these Federal laws

are listed on page 212 of this chapter.)

Consistent with the subject matter of this book,

my evaluation of employee patent policy is restricted

to those parts of the policy which concern the relations of employers— in this chapter Government

agencies, departments and commissions — in their

capacity as employers, sponsors, and contract-ordering principals of their own employees, grantees, or

contractor's employees. These relations have been

evaluated in the light of the specific studies of four

Government departments as presented in the

preceding part of this chapter. All conclusions and

suggestions for future policy here presented are made with a strong feeling of caution. Some of the

great obstacles to recommendations for an efficient

uniform Government-employer policy toward inventive employees and grantees are, of course, the

8 Research by Caruso, Forman, Holman, O'Brien, Rossman is mentioned in footnote

1 of this chapter.

heterogeneous premises with regard to the type of

people representing employees, on the one hand,

and with regard to the objectives of their performance (inventions, discoveries, improvements,

suggestions) on the other hand.

An efficient, reasonable, and uniform policy must

be guided by an acceptable compromise between the

public interest, the employers' interests and the employees' (and grantees') interests. The employees

range from those with a minimum of professional

training, education, and experience up to research

and science leaders with lifetime's accumulation of

those assets. It will be easier to establish common

policy rules for assignment, release, or other allocation of inventions produced by all employees than to establish rules for reasonable awards, because the

merit of reaching certain research results or other

valuable performance and the usefulness of these

results to the employer when expressed in dollars

and cents will rarely be more than a rough guess.

These difficulties, however, should not prevent us from establishing an improved employee-invention

policy. Any chosen system is open to future improvement.

Some conclusions and suggestions of the author of

this part of the book are the following:

1. Uniform regulations regarding disclosure and submission of all inventions made by Government employees within their assigned job responsibilities and

official duties should be drafted and brought to the

knowledge of all employees upon starting the job.

(Executive Order 10096 is not uniformly applied by

all departments and agencies, neither is its text presented to all employees.)

2. Determination to patent, publish, or keep secret

patentable employee inventions should he with the

employing agency, but the employee should have the

express right to appeal these determinations to a

special court or board.

3. Similar regulations should apply to important

technical, commercial, and educational information,

data, trade secrets (for industrial employees), knowhow, and other nonpatentable results produced by

Government employees and employees of Government contractors.

4. Decentralized handling by individual employing

departments and their subordinate divisions and

bureaus to determine allocation of employee inventions and to give awards seems appropriate.

201
5. Copies of all rights and awards determinations

should be collected and surveyed by a central

Federal office, suitably the Civil Service Commission or the Department of Justice. Summaries of

such determinations should be printed regularly. 9

6. A special Federal court or board should be

established as a place of appeal for all determinations (regarding both allocation and awards) made on

departmental level. It must be open to both parties.

Chairman of such a court should be a Federal judge

assisted by assistant judges or a jury with competence in law, Government personnel administration, and engineering. Procedure of the court should

be public, free of cost, and without compelling the

parties to choose legal advisers (lawyers) to represent them. 10 The Government Patents Board at the Patent Office must be dissolved, and its rulings

must be published without delay. The functions of

this new special Federal court have to be defined in

order not to interfere with ordinary Federal courts,

especially in regard to contract litigation. Existing

Atomic Energy Commission and National Aeronautics and Space Administration invention boards

should become divisions of such a court.

7. A division within a suitable Government agency

(for instance, the Civil Service Commission or the

Bureau of Standards) should be established to advise

Government employees on all legal and commercial

questions regarding Government inventions. This or- ganization should be staffed by experts in patent

prosecuting and in patent licensing and selling, both

domestic and foreign. 11 The Division's work would

be similar to that of the nonprofit invention-exploiting institutions such as Research Corporation and

Battelle Memorial Corporation. 12

8. A Federal periodical should be started, reporting

regularly the pending and decided law cases regarding allocation of inventions and awards for inventions of Government employees. Surveys and annual

"Provisions must be made for exemptions from publication in special cases of military secrecy or substantial commercial competitive interest.

10 The latter point makes it possible to the employee as the weaker party economically apd in law competence to freely choose personal legal advice.

11 A great number of such experts have been working for many years in various Government agencies, especially in the branches of the Department of Defense, AEC,

NASA, and the Patent Office.

12 Foreign examples: National Research Development Corporation in London, INFOR and EFOR in Sweden, now Swedish Development Corporation.

statistics based on the extensive material accessible

at the Award Office of the Civil Service Commission

and the Federal Council for Science and Technology

(Patent Advisory Panel) should be published. Invention incentive and patent plans introduced by industrial corporations and faculty and staff invention

regulations at universities should be reported. Important developments in law, Government and industry policy in the field of employee-invention

management from other countries and international

institutions are to be reported. 13 Abstracts of individual case histories of employee inventions of

general interest should be presented in some way,

perhaps in brochures like those of the Civil Service

Commission or like NASA's annual incentive award

programs.

9. Government experiment stations should be

established to carry out developing and prototype

work for Government employee inventions not

developed and used by the Government and owned

by the employee. 14

10. Employees of foreign corporations or institutions

supported by U.S. Government funds or foreign

grantees of U.S. Government should normally leave

title to U.S. patents to the U.S. Government but

should be allowed to keep rights in their own

country. 15

11. Inventive capacity of Government employees (as

shown by granted patents, published articles,

awards and prizes) should be officially accepted by

Government employers as substantial merit for

promotion.

12. In industrial research supported by the Federal

Government or in cooperative Government-industry

research both governmental and industrial employees should receive the same invention awards

and honors (not excluding "special treatment" by

their direct employer irrespective of the individual

award). The same should apply to State Government

employees, who now are sometimes bound by special provisions of state laws regarding state-supported research.

13 These should include work prepared by the International Labor Office, the Bureaux Internationaux pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle (BIPPI), and

the Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriete lndustrielle (AIPPI).

14 Such a suggestion was made by former Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge

in his book Cartels — Challenge to a Free World (Toronto: Progress Publishing Co..

1945). but it was never adopted.

15 In Germany and Sweden this is, in fact, a national legal obligation.

202
FORM NBS-114A (1-71)

U.S. DEPT. OF COMM.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

SHEET

1. PUBLICATION OR REPORT NO.

NBS-SP-388

2. Gov't Accession

No.

3. Recipient's Accession No.

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

irroceeaxngs or une LiOnierence on une ruuiic inccq etna tne

Role of the Inventor"

5. Publication Date May 1974

6. Performing Organization Code

7. AUTHOR(S)

Florence Essers and Jacob Ft abinow, Editors

8. Performing Organization

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20234

10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address

Same as 9.

13. Type of Report & Period

Covered

Final

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Based on recommendation of National Inventors Council

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-600324

16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant

bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.)

This book presents the proceedings of the "Conference on the Public Need and the

Role of the Inventor," held at Monterey, California, on June 11-14, 1973. The

conference was sponsored by the Office of Invention and Innovation, Institute for

Applied Technology, under a grant from the Experimental Technology Incentives

Program, NBS, and was based on a recommendation of the National Inventors Council.

The purpose of the conference was to study the climate for invention and how to

make it one in which America's inventors can flourish for the common good. A total

of 18 invited papers were presented. In addition, the proceedings include statements

from the chairmen of the three sessions: Charles S. Draper, Jacob Rabinow, and

Myron Coler. The proceedings are divided into three sessions with an edited version

of the floor discussions following each paper. At the conclusion of the presentation

of papers, the participants of the conference separated into six workshop panels.

Their recommendations are presented at the end of this volume.

17. KEY WORDS (Alphabetical order, separated by semicolons) Antitrust doctrine; employed inventors; entrepreneurship ; innovation; invention; needs

of society; new enterprises; Patent Office; patent system; technological policy making;

t Prhnnl ngy

18. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

|~X) UNLIMITED.

I I FOR OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT RELEASE

TO NTIS.

19. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS REPORT)

UNCL ASSIFIED

20. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS PAGE)

UNCLASSIFIED

21. NO. OF PAGES

215

22. Price

$5.55

USCOMM-DC 66244-P71