Filed 2/26/16 P. v. Villareal CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RUFUS VILLAREAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B265182

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA103488)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Wade D. Olson, Judge. Affirmed.

Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.
2

In the underlying action, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Rufus 

Villareal pleaded nolo contendere to charges of receiving a stolen motor vehicle 

and possession of a controlled substance. Later, he filed a petition or resentencing

under Penal Code section 1170.18, a provision enacted pursuant to Proposition 47 

that permits defendants convicted of certain felonies to be resentenced as if 

convicted of a misdemeanor. The trial court granted the petition in part and denied 

it in part, concluding that only appellant’s conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance was eligible for resentencing. After an appeal was noticed from that 

ruling, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. 

Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude that no arguable issues exist, 

and affirm the ruling on the petition for resentencing.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2013, an information was filed, charging appellant in 

count one with receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d), and in count 

two with possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. 

(a)). Accompanying the charges were allegations that appellant had suffered four 

prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).1 On the same date, pursuant to a

plea argument, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and admitted the 

special allegations. The trial court placed appellant on probation for three years, 

subject to a suspended sentence of seven years and eight months in prison, 

comprising terms of three years on count one, eight months on count two, and four 

years for the prior convictions. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 

indicated.
3

In November 2014, the electorate approved Proposition 47, which makes 

certain drug-related and theft-related offenses misdemeanors. (People v. Rivera

(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091.) Proposition 47 also added section 1170.18, 

which creates a post-conviction resentencing procedure for persons convicted of 

felony offenses now classified as misdemeanors. (Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1092-1093.) Subdivisions (a) and (b) of that statute authorize resentencing 

for those reclassified offenses, which include possession of a controlled substance 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11377) and specified theft-related offenses, provided the 

value of the property in question was less than $950 (People v. Nichols (Feb. 3, 

2016, H041979) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, ___ [2016 Cal.App. LEXIS 80, *5] 

(Nichols)). Under subdivision (a) of section 1170.18, a person “‘currently 

serving’” a felony sentence for a reclassified offense who satisfies certain 

eligibility criteria may seek resentencing. (Rivera, supra, at p. 1092.) 

In April 2015, at a probation revocation hearing, appellant admitted that he 

had violated the conditions of his probation. After revoking probation, at the 

unopposed request of defense counsel, the trial court set aside appellant’s 

suspended sentence, and imposed an aggregate sentence of four years, comprising 

three years on count one and an additional year for one of the prior convictions. 

The court also imposed a concurrent two-year term on count two, and struck the 

remaining three prior conviction allegations. 

In May 2015, appellant submitted a petition for recall of his sentence and for 

resentencing pursuant to section 1170.18. On June 3, 2015, the trial court granted 

the petition in part and denied it in part, concluding that only appellant’s 

conviction for possession of a controlled substance was eligible for resentencing. 

In resentencing appellant, the court imposed a concurrent term of 364 days on that 

conviction. This appeal followed. 
4

DISCUSSION

After an examination of the record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed 

an opening brief raising no issues, and requested this court to review the record 

independently pursuant to Wende. In addition, counsel advised appellant of his 

right to submit by supplemental brief any contentions or argument he wished the 

court to consider. Appellant has neither presented a brief nor identified any 

potential issues. 

Our independent review of the record discloses no error in the trial court’s 

determination that appellant’s conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle is 

ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.18. Although the reclassified 

offenses enumerated in that statute expressly encompass receiving stolen property 

(§ 496), they do not include the offense of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, as set 

forth in section 496d. (Nichols, supra, ___ Cal.App.4th at pp. ___ [2016 Cal.App. 

LEXIS 80, at *5 - *14].)

Accordingly, as explained in Nichols, the latter offense is not eligible for 

resentencing under section 1170.18. (Nichols, supra, ___ Cal.App.4th at pp. ___ 

[2016 Cal.App. LEXIS 80, at *5 - *14].) In sum, because the record demonstrates 

that appellant’s petition for resentencing was properly denied insofar as it targeted 

appellant’s conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle, we conclude that no 

arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
5

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

COLLINS, J.