-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re L. A. PRIDMORE, Minor. May 10, 2018

No. 340084

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2016-846649-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and STEPHENS and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to the 

minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused physical injury or abuse to the 

child and reasonable likelihood of future injury or abuse), (b)(ii) (parent who had opportunity to 

prevent the physical injury or abuse failed to do so and reasonable likelihood of future injury or 

abuse), (g) (without regard to intent, failure to provide proper care or custody and no reasonable 

expectation that parent would be able to provide proper care or custody within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age), (j) (risk of harm if child returned to parent), and (k)(v) (parent 

abused the child and abuse included life-threatening injury). We affirm. 

Respondent, a divorced physician, had visitation with the child on the weekend of 

September 9 to 11, 2016. While in respondent’s exclusive care, on September 11, 2016, the

almost two-year-old child displayed symptoms of being in a critical state of breathing distress. 

After administering some preliminary efforts, respondent called 911. The child was rushed by 

ambulance to Providence Hospital in a critical state of respiratory distress and unconsciousness. 

The child had to be intubated several times to keep him alive. He was transferred to the 

children’s Intensive Care Unit at Children’s Hospital for further emergency medical care. In 

addition to cardiac distress, he was experiencing circulatory concerns and low core body 

temperature. Toxicology tests revealed the presence of fentanyl, an opioid 100x more potent 

than morphine.

Police investigations later revealed that respondent had been addicted to fentanyl, was 

using it during visitations with his son, and had left it on a counter in reach of his son. 

Respondent never informed anyone of the possibility that the child was exposed to fentanyl, 

despite the severity of the child’s medical emergency. Instead, respondent attempted to hide his 

fentanyl use, telling the child’s mother that the child had possibly ingested berries at a park and 

removing a bottle of fentanyl from his apartment during a search by police following the 
-2-

incident. Respondent was charged with second-degree child abuse, pleaded no contest, and was 

incarcerated during the pendency of this case.

On appeal, respondent does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the abovementioned statutory grounds supported termination of his parental rights. Respondent only 

challenges the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s 

best interest. Whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 

(2013). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests for clear 

error. In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485, 496; 845 NW2d 540 (2013). “A finding is clearly 

erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 

115 (2011).

The trial court must weigh the evidence available on the whole record in determining the 

child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). It may consider 

such factors as “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” 

In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 

Other considerations include the length of time the child has been in foster care or placed with

relatives, the likelihood that the child could be returned to respondent’s care within the 

foreseeable future, and respondent’s compliance with the case-service plan. In re Frey, 297 

Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

Respondent’s Substance Abuse and Violence. Respondent first argues that the trial court 

erred in finding that it would be in the child’s best interests to terminate his parental rights 

because he showed the trial court that, with therapy and substance-abuse treatment, he would be

able to parent the child within a reasonable time. The record does show that, when in prison,

respondent attended AA, NA, and EA meetings and a class in substance-abuse education. While 

under constant supervision in prison and with no access to outside sources, it appears that 

respondent was able to remain drug free and made statements to the trial court about his intention 

to stay drug free once released from prison. 

Yet, the record also shows that respondent has a history of refraining from substance 

abuse when he is confronted and supervised, but then relapsing when the supervision goes away. 

His ex-wife, the child’s mother, testified, for example, that respondent repeatedly abused alcohol

throughout their brief marriage. Even more alarming, respondent has a history of violence, both 

threatening and actual. The child’s mother testified that respondent would repeatedly squeeze

the child’s nose shut until the child’s face turned red and his arms flailed. She also testified that 

respondent choked her and slammed her into walls and the refrigerator, even when she was 

pregnant. In one outburst, respondent threatened to kill the child and his mother by chopping 

them up with an axe. Respondent also threatened to burn down the house and to commit suicide. 

Eventually, the child’s mother obtained a PPO against respondent. Shortly thereafter,

respondent left for Africa on a medical mission and, while there, he emailed her that he was 

going to get help, attend alcohol counseling, and get therapy. After he returned, instead of 

having the PPO served on respondent, she gave him a second chance, letting respondent back in 
-3-

the home. Yet, respondent failed to keep his promises. Instead, his use of alcohol and violence 

escalated until the child’s mother called the police and they served respondent with the PPO. 

Under the PPO, respondent was not allowed to have any contact with her or the child other than 

supervised visitation. 

Respondent subsequently moved into his parents’ home and, in exchange for dismissing 

the PPO, respondent agreed to a provision in the divorce decree that required him to submit to 

six months of drug testing and ten months of supervised visitation. He was also required to take 

an anger-management course. He agreed that he was required to have supervised visitation 

because his behavior was unsafe around his son. The divorce was finalized and the supervised 

visitation took place at respondent’s parents’ home, where respondent continued to live. As soon 

as the drug testing stopped, however, respondent started to use fentanyl, first stealing the drug 

from his mother and later purchasing it through an online blackmarket. Respondent became 

addicted to fentanyl and lost his job. Respondent admitted that he treated patients while under 

the influence of fentanyl, which made him groggy and impaired his judgment. After the incident

leading to his imprisonment, respondent’s license to practice medicine was suspended.

Respondent testified that he was working with an attorney and a group called Health 

Professionals Recovery Program to get his license reinstated, but there was no guarantee that 

respondent would ever be granted the opportunity to practice medicine again.

The psychologist who administered respondent’s psychological evaluation found that 

respondent had a propensity toward substance abuse. Whenever respondent had faced difficult 

challenges in his life, he had turned to substances. The psychologist further opined that, even if 

respondent had told the physicians at the hospital where the minor child was being treated about 

the fentanyl, he could not say that he would change his recommendation for termination because 

the fact that respondent, a physician with knowledge of how dangerous this substance was, left it 

within reach of his young child demonstrated a major breakdown in judgment. The psychologist 

recommended that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the 

child because the child, age 21⁄2 at the time of termination, was at the critical age for forming a 

bond with parental figures, and the evidence showed that respondent would have no contact with 

the child for at least two years and most likely more. 

After taking testimony and other evidence, the trial court addressed the best-interest 

factors set forth in MCL 722.23(a)–(l). It found that the majority of the factors weighed in favor 

of termination. The trial court found respondent to have a “morally deficient character”

demonstrated by his addiction to drugs, his continuing to practice medicine while under the 

influence of fentanyl, and his decision to delay medical attention for his child by putting “his 

own liberty ahead of his son’s life.” Respondent’s earlier domestic violence against the child 

and the child’s mother also weighed in favor of termination. The trial court found that, during 

the child’s crucial period for parental bonding, any bond that existed between respondent and the

child would be lost because of respondent’s incarceration. Respondent’s two-year sentence in 

the abuse case had a no-contact clause in it and there was no guarantee that respondent would be 

permitted contact with the child while on probation. Further, the trial court found that any bond 

that might have existed on respondent’s part was not sufficient enough to guarantee that 

respondent would look out for his child’s welfare. The trial court thus denied respondent’s 

request for another chance to prove that he could properly care for the child. 
-4-

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Respondent’s actions clearly and 

repeatedly endangered the health and safety of the child. Despite being given numerous 

opportunities to protect the child, respondent continued to place his own interests above the 

interests of the child. The trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental 

rights.

Parent Is Not a “Relative” Under MCL 712A.19a. Respondent also argues that the trial 

court erred by declining to consider the child’s placement with his mother as a factor weighing 

against termination. According to respondent, the child’s mother is a “relative” under MCL 

712A.19a, and therefore the trial court was required to consider that placement before 

terminating respondent’s parental rights. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 

NW2d 144 (2012).

Respondent’s argument is without merit. The trial court recognized that the child was 

placed with the child’s mother, but declined to weigh that in respondent’s favor, noting that the 

child’s mother is not a statutory “relative” under MCL 712A.19a. The trial court was correct on 

both a plain reading of the statute as well as binding precedent from this Court. See MCL 

712A.13a(1)(j) (providing an exhaustive list of individuals who qualify as a “relative”); In re 

Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 413; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (“[B]ecause BS’s biological mother 

was not a ‘relative’ for purposes of MCL 712A.19a, the trial court was not required to consider 

that relative placement.”).

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle