FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ISAAC BARANOWICZ,  No. 04-71327

Petitioner-Appellant, Tax Court Nos.

v. 15515-84  25399-86 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

41668-86 REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from a Decision of the

United States Tax Court

Submitted November 18, 2005*

San Francisco, California

Filed December 23, 2005

Before: Jerome Farris, A. Wallace Tashima, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

*This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

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COUNSEL

Steven D. Blanc, Hochman, Salkin, Rettig, Toscher & Perez,

P.C., Beverly Hills, California, for the petitioner-appellant. 

Bethany B. Hauser, United States Department of Justice, Tax

Division, Washington, D.C., for the respondent-appellee. 

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge: 

Isaac Baranowicz (“Baranowicz”) appeals the United States

Tax Court’s determination that his former wife, Lora Baran

(“Baran”), is entitled to “innocent spouse” relief under

§ 6015(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”). The tax

deficiency in dispute resulted from several deductions

claimed on the couple’s joint tax returns that were subsequently disallowed by the Commissioner. Following the couple’s divorce in 1987, Baran sought, and was granted,

“innocent spouse” relief under § 6015(c). On appeal, Baranowicz contends that the Tax Court erred by granting such

relief to Baran and allocating the tax deficiencies solely to

BARANOWICZ v. CIR 16687
Baranowicz. We conclude that Baranowicz lacks standing to

appeal the Tax Court’s decision; therefore, we dismiss the

appeal. 

BACKGROUND

Baranowicz and Baran were married in 1966. During the

years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982, the couple took passthrough depreciation deductions attributable to limited partnership interests in equipment leasing ventures similar to

those deemed improper tax shelters. See, e.g., Whitmire v.

Commissioner, 178 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1999); Waters v.

Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1992); Young v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1083 (11th Cir. 1991). The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) subsequently issued a notice of

deficiency for the amount of the deductions the couple had

claimed.1

After the couple divorced, Baran filed for “innocent

spouse” relief pursuant to § 6015(b) and (c), maintaining that

the deficiencies were solely allocatable to her ex-husband.

The Commissioner granted her request, relieving Baran of liability for the deficiencies. Baranowicz objected, but the Tax

Court also found that Baran was entitled to “innocent spouse”

relief under I.R.C. § 6015(c). Baranowicz now appeals the

Tax Court’s determination. 

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the Commissioner challenges our

jurisdiction, contending that Baranowicz lacks standing to

appeal from the Tax Court’s judgment. We have held: 

There are still limits on who may appeal, however,

which include the constitutional requirement that a

1Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), when a married couple files a joint

return, each spouse is jointly and severally liable for the taxes. 

16688 BARANOWICZ v. CIR
litigant present an actual case or controversy for the

court to resolve. See U.S. Const. art. III. 

A party must satisfy three conditions to have constitutional standing to sue: It must allege some concrete injury in fact; that injury must be fairly

traceable to the defendant’s actions; and . . . it must

be likely, and not merely speculative, that a favorable decision will provide redress. 

Knisley v. Network Assoc., Inc., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61 (1992); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002); Simon v.

E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). “These

requirements must be met by a party appealing a judgment.”

Id. (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.

43, 64 (1997)); see also Wolford v. Gaekle (In re First Capital

Holdings Corp. Fin. Prod. Sec. Litig.), 33 F.3d 29, 30 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“These same criteria apply in determining the

question of standing on appeal.”). 

We have previously held that a non-requesting spouse,2

such as Baranowicz, lacks standing to challenge the Tax

Court’s “innocent spouse” determination. Estate of Ravetti v.

United States, 37 F.3d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir. 1994). The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998

(the “Restructuring Act”), however, specifically added a provision to I.R.C. § 6015 requiring that the non-requesting

spouse be given “adequate notice and an opportunity to

become a party to [innocent spouse] proceeding[s].” I.R.C.

§ 6015(e)(4). Therefore, we must re-examine the question

presented in Estate of Ravetti in light of this statutory change

made by the Restructuring Act. 

2We refer to the spouse who does not request innocent spouse status as

the “non-requesting spouse.” 

BARANOWICZ v. CIR 16689
A. A non-requesting spouse had no standing to

challenge an “innocent spouse” determination prior

to the Restructuring Act. 

[1] Prior to the enactment of the Restructuring Act, I.R.C.

§ 6013(e) governed the granting or denial of claims for “innocent spouse” relief. Section 6013(e) provided for relief from

joint and several liability for tax deficiencies where the “innocent spouse” could show that it would be inequitable to hold

her liable because she did not know, and had no reason to

know, of the understatement. I.R.C. § 6013(e) (repealed

1998). 

In Estate of Ravetti, we held that a non-requesting spouse

did not have standing to challenge the tax court’s determination that his spouse was entitled to relief under § 6013(e).

Estate of Ravetti, 37 F.3d at 1394. We explained that the petitioner suffered no injury that could be redressed on appeal

because he was liable for the full deficiency regardless of

whether his spouse was granted relief under the “innocent

spouse” provision. Id. We reasoned that the nature of joint

and several liability was such that our determination would

not affect the petitioner’s tax liability, and “the only harm

would be to the IRS, in depriving it of an additional source

from which to recover.” Id. at 1395. 

[2] Although we expressed no opinion on whether the petitioner may have been entitled to equitable contribution under

state law, we did explain that the Tax Court’s determination

would not control any state court proceeding under the

Supremacy Clause because a state court would not “purport

to determine how much [either party] must pay the IRS.” Id.

at 1395-96. In addition, we explained that res judicata would

not apply because the petitioner was not a party to the “innocent spouse” adjudication. Id. at 1396. Accordingly, under the

law of this Circuit prior to the Restructuring Act, a nonrequesting spouse lacked standing to appeal a Tax Court

determination under § 6013. Id. at 1395-96. 

16690 BARANOWICZ v. CIR
B. I.R.C. § 6015(e) does not grant non-requesting

spouses standing to challenge “innocent spouse”

determinations under § 6105(c). 

[3] In the Restructuring Act, Congress amended the I.R.C.

to grant non-requesting spouses the right to receive notice of,

and participate in, “innocent spouse” determination proceedings. See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(4). Because our decision in Estate

of Ravetti was partially based on the fact that a non-requesting

spouse had no right to participate in the Tax Court’s “innocent

spouse” determination, its validity has been called into question by the amendment adding § 6015(e)(4). See Corson v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 354, 364 (2000) (“[T]he enactment

of section 6015, including the creation of a stand alone proceeding in section 6015(e), has injected into this calculus considerations not present when cases such as Estate of Ravetti

v. United States . . . were decided.”). Accordingly, we must

now determine what bearing, if any, the Restructuring Act has

on the right of a non-requesting spouse to appeal the grant of

§ 6015(c) relief to the requesting spouse. 

First, Baranowicz contends that the Tax Court’s determination constitutes an actual injury insofar as it causes the entire

tax deficiency to fall upon his shoulders. Baranowicz concedes, however, as he must, that his obligation to pay the deficiencies will not change based upon this court’s (or the Tax

Court’s) decision. While Baranowicz maintains that

§ 6015(e)(4) somehow obviates Estate of Ravetti’s reasoning

on this issue, he fails to explain why.3 As in Estate of Ravetti,

the Tax Court’s grant of relief to Baran has not caused Baranowicz a redressable injury, and therefore, it remains that “the

only harm would be to the IRS, in depriving it of an additional source from which to recover.” Estate of Ravetti, 37

3There is no evidence that Congress intended to re-define the principle

of joint and several liability of couples filing joint returns by adding

§ 6015 to the I.R.C. Section 6015 merely carves out an exception for when

joint and several liability does not apply. 

BARANOWICZ v. CIR 16691
F.3d at 1394-95. Accordingly, because the Tax Court’s determination does not affect Baranowicz’s personal tax liability,

this argument does not support his standing to appeal. See id.4

Second, Baranowicz argues that § 6015(e)(4) demonstrates

Congress’ explicit recognition that non-requesting spouses

have a tangible stake in the outcome of “innocent spouse”

determinations, and that this interest is sufficient to support

Article III standing. Although Baranowicz’s argument has

some surface appeal, we conclude that it is insufficient to confer Article III standing. 

[4] Section 6015(e)(4) states that: “[t]he Tax Court shall

establish rules which provide the individual filing a joint

return but not making the election under subsection (b) or (c)

with adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party to

a proceeding under either such subsection.” I.R.C.

§ 6015(e)(4) (emphases added). While § 6015(e)(4) demonstrates Congress’ intent to grant non-requesting spouses the

statutory right to intervene as parties in § 6015(c) proceedings

in the Tax Court, “if the intervenor does not have the kind of

interest that confers standing, then, even if he is called a

‘party,’ and even if he is a party for other purposes, he cannot

force the litigation to judgment or take an appeal.” Korczak

v. Sedeman, 427 F.3d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986)) (emphasis in

Korczak); see also Yinguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 732 (9th

Cir. 1991) (holding that a mere “philosophical interest in the

outcome of litigation is insufficient to confer a right to

appeal”). Moreover, we must also bear in mind that the Tax

Court is not an Article III court and, therefore, is not fully

4We note that state law cases involving joint tortfeasors, who are jointly

and severally liable, have reached the same result. See, e.g., Holt v. Booth,

2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he exoneration of a joint

tortfeasor from liability does not ‘aggrieve’ the other individually liable

tortfeasor(s) insofar as that word is understood to apply to a party’s standing to appeal.”). 

16692 BARANOWICZ v. CIR
constrained by Article III’s case or controversy limitation.

Thus, we cannot conclude from the mere grant of participation rights in § 6015(c) proceedings in the Tax Court that

Congress intended to recognize that unsuccessful non requesting spouses in such proceedings suffer an injury sufficient to

confer Article III standing on appeal. 

As the Seventh Circuit recently explained in Korczak, “intervention can be and is used more broadly (or loosely) to

denote a situation in which the resolution of a dispute can be

expedited or made more accurate or otherwise improved by

allowing someone to enter the litigation, conduct discovery,

examine and cross-examine witnesses, and otherwise disport

himself as a party would . . . .” Korczak, 427 F.3d at 422. The

court went on to note that “[w]hether such participations are

called ‘intervention’ or something else, and the participants

are called ‘parties’ . . . or something else,” does not affect

whether the parties have Article III standing. Id.

[5] Here, there is no evidence that Congress intended to

create a new right granting a non-requesting spouse standing

to appeal from the Tax Court’s adverse innocent spouse determination. As discussed supra, Baranowicz cannot show that

he has a sufficient tangible interest to support Article III

standing because his tax liability would remain the same

whether or not we were to affirm or reverse the Tax Court’s

determination. Estate of Ravetti, 37 F.3d at 1393-95. 

[6] Absent a showing of some concrete harm, we must

reject Baranowicz’s argument that the mere grant of participation rights in the Tax Court under § 6015(e)(4) is sufficient to

confer on him standing to appeal. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at

68-69; Yinguez, 939 F.2d at 732; Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman,

313 F.3d 1094, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002); Didrickson v. U.S. Dep’t

of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that an intervenor “must have independent jurisdictional

grounds on which to pursue an appeal,” and that “[a]n interest

strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a suffiBARANOWICZ v. CIR 16693
cient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties”).

CONCLUSION

Because Baranowicz has failed to show any redressable

injury, he lacks standing to appeal the Tax Court’s determination under I.R.C. § 6015(c). This appeal is therefore

DISMISSED.

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