49–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 114–8 

STOP ADVERTISING VICTIMS OF EXPLOITATION ACT 

OF 2015 

JANUARY 27, 2015.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GOODLATTE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 285] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 285) to amend title 18, United States Code, to provide a penalty for knowingly selling advertising that offers certain commercial sex acts, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 

without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 3 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 3 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 3 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 4 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 4 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 5 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 5 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 5 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 5 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 5 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 5 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 5 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 7 


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1POLARIS PROJECT, INTERNET BASED HUMAN TRAFFICKING, http://www.polarisproject.org/ 

component/content/article/1-national-human-trafficking-hotline/257-Internet-based. 2 AIM GROUP, ONLINE PROSTITUTION-AD REVENUE CROSSES CRAIGSLIST BENCHMARK, JULY 2013, available at http://aimgroup.com/2013/07/10/online-prostitution-ad-revenue-crosses-craigslistbenchmark. 3See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009); United States v. X-Citement 

Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 4 ‘‘Knowingly’’ does not have a uniform Federal definition. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits define ‘‘knowingly’’ as meaning a defendant committed a criminal act ‘‘voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident.’’ Fifth Circuit Instruction 1.37; Tenth Circuit 

Instruction 1.37; Eleventh Circuit Instruction 9.1A. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits employ an 

instruction to the effect that ‘‘ ‘knowingly’ . . . means that the defendant realized what he was 

doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake 

or accident.’’ Seventh Circuit Instruction 4.10; Ninth Circuit Instruction 5.6. Other circuits have 

taken a case-by-case approach to the definition of ‘‘knowingly.’’ 

Purpose and Summary 

H.R 285 clarifies that 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which criminalizes the 

knowing sex trafficking of minors and others through force, fraud, 

or coercion, can be violated when a defendant knowingly advertises 

a victim for a commercial sex act. This provision requires the government to prove that defendants accused of benefitting financially 

through the sale of such advertising knew that the victim was a 

minor or a victim of force, fraud, or coercion. The bill is technology 

neutral and applies to both advertisements online, as well as traditional advertisements. 

Background and Need for the Legislation 

Pimps and traffickers sexually exploit children through street 

prostitution, in adult strip clubs, brothels, sex parties, motel rooms, 

hotel rooms, and other locations throughout the United States. The 

growth of the Internet and other technological advances, including 

mobile smartphones, has greatly facilitated the commercial sexual 

exploitation of children by providing a convenient way to market 

these victims to potential purchasers. Individuals can now use 

websites to advertise, schedule, and purchase sexual encounters 

with minors. According to the Polaris Project, U.S. law enforcement 

has identified online advertisements as the primary platform for 

buying and selling sex with minors, and an FBI study found more 

than 2,800 minor victims were advertised on just one online advertisement service in 2008.1 It is estimated that revenue from online 

advertisements of prostitution generally (not just involving minors) 

surpassed $45 million in 2012 alone.2

H.R. 285 clarifies that the existing Federal sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, extends to traffickers who knowingly sell sex 

with minors and victims of force, fraud, or coercion through advertising, as well as people or entities that knowingly benefit from 

such advertising. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, 

when a Federal statute contains an explicit mens rea provision, 

that standard applies to every element of the offense.3 Under current law, the government can show that a defendant either knew 

or recklessly disregarded the fact that a victim was a minor or involved through force, fraud, or coercion. H.R. 285 requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who 

benefits from the advertising of a trafficking victim under 18 

U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) knew that the advertising involved a victim who 

the defendant knew was a minor or a victim of force, fraud, or coercion.4


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5 47 U.S.C. § 230. 

6 Courts generally apply Section 230(c)(1) immunity where: (1) a defendant is a provider or 

user of an interactive computer service; (2) the defendant is being treated as a publisher or 

speaker of the challenged content for liability purposes; and (3) the content at issue is information provided by another information content provider. Courts have overwhelmingly found that 

defendants that provide access to online content are providers or users of an interactive computer service as broadly defined by section 230, and accordingly immune from civil liability. See 

Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668 

(7th Cir. 2008). 

H.R. 285 clarifies that people who advertise sex trafficking can 

face criminal liability. The bill is technology neutral and applies to 

both advertisements online, as well as traditional advertisements. 

Under current law, Section 1595 of Title 18 extends the possibility 

of civil liability to defendants who violate Section 1591. However, 

under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,5 online 

publishers of third-party advertisements are generally immune 

from civil liability for such advertisements.6 H.R. 285 does nothing 

to disrupt or modify the civil immunity already provided by Section 

230. 

During markup, the Committee rejected an amendment to exempt sex trafficking advertisers from the existing mandatory penalties in Section 1591. The amendment would have provided special 

treatment and potentially more lenient sentences to those who traffic children through advertising, rather than through other means. 

The trauma to the child is no less when they are trafficked through 

advertising—in fact, it is arguably worse, given that online advertising makes it easier to sell these children even more frequently. 

Hearings 

The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R. 285. 

Committee Consideration 

On January 21, 2015, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill H.R. 285 favorably reported by voice vote, a quorum 

being present. 

Committee Votes 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the following 

rollcall vote occurred during the Committee’s consideration of H.R. 

285. 

1. Amendment #1, offered by Mr. Johnson. The amendment exempts traffickers who committed their crime through advertising 

from the existing mandatory minimum sentences in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591. Defeated 7 to 20. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) .................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Forbes (VA) .........................................................


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ROLLCALL NO. 1—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Poe (TX) .............................................................. X 

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................

Mr. Gowdy (SC) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) ..................................................... X 

Ms. Walters (CA) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Buck (CO) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Trott (MI) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ........................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) .......................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi (PR) ......................................................

Ms. Chu (CA) .............................................................

Mr. Deutch (FL) .........................................................

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) .....................................................

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Ms. DelBene (WA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Jeffries (NY) .......................................................

Mr. Cicilline (RI) .......................................................

Mr. Peters (CA) .........................................................

Total ............................................................. 7 20 

Committee Oversight Findings 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures 

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new 

budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 


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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate 

With respect to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, an estimate and comparison prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 

of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not submitted to the 

Committee before the of filing of the report. 

Duplication of Federal Programs 

No provision of H.R. 285 establishes or reauthorizes a program 

of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the 

Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 

21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings 

No provision of H.R. 285 directs a specific rule making within the 

meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 551. 

Performance Goals and Objectives 

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 285 clarifies that 

18 U.S. C. § 1591, which criminalizes the knowing sex trafficking 

of minors and others through force, fraud, or coercion, can be violated when a defendant advertises such a victim for a commercial 

sex act. 

Advisory on Earmarks 

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 285 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI. 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by the 

Committee. 

Section 1. Short title. This section cites the short title of the bill 

as the ‘‘Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act of 2015.’’ 

Section 2. Advertising that Offers Certain Commercial Sex Acts. 

This section expands 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to include the advertising of 

commercial sex acts involving a minor or an individual engaged in 

such an act through force, fraud, or coercion. Additionally, this section adopts a knowing standard for those accused of benefitting financially or otherwise from the sale of advertising depicting these 

individuals under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2). 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported 

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 


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TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—CRIMES 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 77—PEONAGE, SLAVERY, AND TRAFFICKING 

IN PERSONS 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion 

(a) Whoever knowingly— 

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within 

the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 

States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 

advertises, or maintains by any means a person; or 

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 

from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act 

described in violation of paragraph (1), 

knowing, or, except where, in an offense under paragraph (2), the 

act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in 

reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, 

fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of 

such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 

years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall 

be punished as provided in subsection (b). 

(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is— 

(1) if the offense was effected by means of force, threats of 

force, fraud, or coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or by 

any combination of such means, or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, øor obtained¿ obtained, 

or advertised had not attained the age of 14 years at the time 

of such offense, by a fine under this title and imprisonment for 

any term of years not less than 15 or for life; or 

(2) if the offense was not so effected, and the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, øor obtained¿ 

obtained, or advertised had attained the age of 14 years but 

had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by a fine under this title and imprisonment for not less 

than 10 years or for life. 

(c) In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew 

that the person had not attained the age of 18 years. 

(d) Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way 

interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be 

fined under this title, imprisoned for a term not to exceed 20 years, 

or both. 

(e) In this section: 


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1 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2015). 

(1) The term ‘‘abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal 

process’’ means the use or threatened use of a law or legal 

process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in 

order to exert pressure on another person to cause that person 

to take some action or refrain from taking some action. 

(2) The term ‘‘coercion’’ means— 

(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint 

against any person; 

(B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a 

person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any 

person; or 

(C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal 

process. 

(3) The term ‘‘commercial sex act’’ means any sex act, on 

account of which anything of value is given to or received by 

any person. 

(4) The term ‘‘serious harm’’ means any harm, whether 

physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or 

reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the 

surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of 

the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity in 

order to avoid incurring that harm. 

(5) The term ‘‘venture’’ means any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity. 

* * * * * * * 

Dissenting Views 

INTRODUCTION

H.R. 285, the ‘‘Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act of 

2015,’’ amends the Federal sex trafficking statute 1 to prohibit the 

advertising of certain commercial sex acts. We agree with the bill’s 

laudable goal of prosecuting those who facilitate sex trafficking, but 

disagree with the bill’s expansion of mandatory minimum sentencing because of the serious public policy concerns it presents. 

While the acts prohibited by the legislation will often warrant long 

sentences, mandatory minimum sentences are the wrong way to 

determine the punishment under this or any other criminal statute. Specifically, mandatory minimum sentencing distorts rational 

sentencing, wastes taxpayer money, and often leads to sentences 

that are not appropriate under the facts of particular cases, even 

when as applied to serious offenses. 

No matter how well-intentioned H.R. 285 may be, we do not believe these significant public policy concerns can be disregarded. An 

amendment rejected during the markup would have ameliorated 

our concerns by clarifying that mandatory minimum sentences 

would not apply to the new offense, while still providing that offenders could be punished under the statute’s maximum penalty. 

Unfortunately, without this important change, we are unable to 


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2 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2015) subjects to liability ‘‘whoever knowingly—(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in 

an act described in violation of paragraph (1).’’ 

support this legislation and accordingly we dissent from the Committee views on this legislation. 

DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND

H.R. 285 is primarily intended to prevent the advertising of acts 

of commercial sex trafficking via the Internet. The bill amends section 1591 of title 18 of the United States Code, which deals with 

the Federal crime of sex trafficking, to include advertising of certain commercial sex acts as a punishable offense. Section 1591 currently prohibits conduct such as recruiting, enticing, harboring, 

transporting, and providing victims or benefitting financially from 

commercial sex acts involving minors, or adults who are forced or 

coerced into participating in the acts. H.R. 285 also amends section 

1591 to include advertising in its penalty provisions, which impose 

mandatory minimum sentences of 10 or 15 years, depending on the 

circumstances of the crime. 

For offenses under section 1591(a) of the current statute, one 

may be punished for acting ‘‘knowingly’’ or ‘‘in reckless disregard’’ 

of the fact that a victim is a minor or one whose participation in 

the acts was forced or coerced. For instances where one benefits 

from a sex trafficking venture in violation of section 1591(a)(2) 

when the conduct of the venture in violation of section 1591(a)(1) 

consists of advertising, section 2(b) of the bill requires knowledge 

as to these facts and the ‘‘reckless disregard’’ standard would not 

apply. 

CONCERNS WITH H.R. 285

By adding advertising to the list of prohibited conduct related to 

sex trafficking, H.R. 285 may subject a range of communications 

providers and facilitators to mandatory minimum sentences. Regardless of the nature and circumstances surrounding the offense, 

the role of the offender in the particular crime, and the history and 

characteristics of the offender, H.R. 285 would require a judge to 

impose a 10- or 15-year sentence. Even if everyone involved in a 

case—the arresting officer, prosecutor, judge, and victim—believes 

that the mandatory minimum would be an unjust sentence for a 

particular defendant in a case, H.R. 285 would nevertheless mandate that it be imposed. 

The imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 or 15 

years is particularly troublesome when one considers the possible 

scope of defendants who could be prosecuted under H.R. 285. Notably, the prohibition on advertising does not explicitly apply only to 

a sex trafficker who places an advertisement, and could conceivably 

be applied to individuals and entities who facilitate, but have a 

minor role in, publishing the advertisement. Those who are employed by a venture that benefits financially from the advertisement, but whose role in the organization does not place them in the 

chain of decision making with respect to acceptance or publishing 

of illegal advertisements could also be prosecuted under the bill.2

In the online context in which advertising networks are often complex and automated, there may be circumstances in which an emVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:30 Jan 28, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR008.XXX HR008

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3 United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties 

in the Federal Criminal System, at 148 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/ 

default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/201110 

31-rtc-pdf/Chapterl07.pdf. 4 Id. at 81, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressionaltestimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapterl04.pdf. 5 Bureau of Prisons, Historical Information, at http://www.bop.gov/about/history/ and Inmate 

Statistics: Offenses, at http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statisticslinmateloffenses.jsp. 6 Bureau of Prisons, Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 78 Fed. Reg. No. 

52 at 16711 (Mar. 18, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-03-18/pdf/2013- 

06139.pdf. 7Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Dep’t of Justice—2013, at http://www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2013.htm. 8 U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Summary: Fiscal Year 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Bill 5–7 (Jan. 13, 2014), at http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news.cfm? 

method=news.view&id=5aa8e660-f52e-4074-945f-9618eb963ae9. 9 Id. 

10 Horowitz, supra n.7. 

ployee of a communications company may be found liable under the 

statute, but whose role in the offense is so attenuated that it would 

not warrant a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 or 15 years. 

Mandatory minimum sentences are the wrong way to determine 

punishment under the Federal sex trafficking statute, or any other 

statute. Mandatory minimums not only lead to unjust outcomes for 

individuals, but also have serious systemic consequences by contributing to the problem of overincarceration. As of September 

2010, 75,579 Federal prisoners—more than one-third (39.4%)— 

were serving mandatory minimum sentences.3 This represents a 

155% increase from the number of Federal prisoners serving mandatory minimum sentences in 1995 (29,603).4 Since Congress enacted harsh mandatory minimums in the 1980s, the Federal prison 

population has exploded by over 800% to more than 216,000 inmates today.5

In addition, higher than warranted sentences resulting from 

mandatory minimum sentencing strain public finances. For example, the average cost of incarceration for a Federal inmate in fiscal 

year 2011 was $28,893.40.6 In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice 

has referred to the increased year-to-year spending on Federal prisons as ‘‘unsustainable’’ and a threat to public safety.7 For fiscal 

year 2014, close to a third (28.8%) of the Justice Department’s 

$27.7 billion budget was earmarked for Federal prisons and detention.8 Every dollar expended on lengthy mandatory minimum incarcerations is a dollar that cannot be spent on crime prevention, 

victim services, training, investigation, and prosecution.9 Absent 

smarter sentencing policies and reformation of mandatory minimum sentences, prison populations and their associated costs will 

continue to escalate.10 We need to take steps to ensure that sentences are appropriately severe, but are not set beyond levels that 

no longer serve legitimate criminal justice purposes. 

An amendment offered by Representative Henry C. ‘‘Hank’’ Johnson, Jr. (D-GA) that would have addressed these significant concerns was defeated by a vote of 7 to 20 during the markup. The 

amendment would have removed application of the statute’s mandatory minimum prison sentences to advertising and instead allow 

a judge to apply an appropriate sentence under the circumstances 

of the case up to the statute’s existing maximum penalty of life in 

prison. Given the complicated nature of internet communications 

networks and other forms of advertising, which would be affected 

by this bill, the role of the judge in evaluating each case is particuVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:30 Jan 28, 2015 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR008.XXX HR008

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larly important. While long sentences may be appropriate under 

the facts of a particular violation of law, Congress cannot know the 

facts of every case in advance. Removing mandatory minimums 

while still permitting the lengthy statutory maximum penalty of 

life imprisonment, as Representative Johnson’s amendment would 

have done, would provide the appropriate spectrum of sentences for 

culpability and proportionate punishment. 

CONCLUSION

We must do more to combat sex trafficking by taking steps such 

as strengthening our laws and providing additional resources for 

law enforcement and victim services. In our haste to combat this 

tragic crime, however, we must also consider the public policy implications of our legislative actions. Unfortunately, the expansion of 

mandatory minimum penalties resulting from H.R. 285 would 

make it an inflexible and often inappropriate means of addressing 

the range of those who could be prosecuted under the statute. 

For the foregoing reasons, we must respectfully dissent. 

MR. CONYERS, JR. 

MS. JACKSON LEE. 

MR. JOHNSON, JR. 

MR. GUTIERREZ. 

Æ 


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