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S. HRG. 112–177 

ARBITRATION: IS IT FAIR WHEN FORCED? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 13, 2011 

Serial No. J–112–47 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Blumenthal, Hon. Richard, a U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut ........ 4 

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ............................... 4 

Franken, Hon. Al, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota .......................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 108 

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 111 

Klobuchar, Hon. Amy, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota ................... 12 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 112 

WITNESSES 

Bland, F. Paul, Senior Attorney, Public Justice, Washington, DC ...................... 9 

Drahozal, Christopher R., John M. Rounds Professor of Law, Associate Dean 

for Research & Faculty Development, University of Kansas School of Law, 

Lawrence, Kansas ................................................................................................ 14 

Pierce, Deborah, M.D., Associate Director, Department of Emergency Medicine, Einstein at Elkins Park Hospital, Elkins Park, Pennsylvania ............... 7 

Schwartz, Victor E., Esq., Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 12

Swanson, Lori, Attorney General, Minnesota, St. Paul Minnesota ..................... 5 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Christopher R. Drahozal to questions submitted by Senators 

Cornyn and Grassley ........................................................................................... 37 

Responses of Victor E. Schwartz to questions submitted by Senators Grassley 

and Cornyn ........................................................................................................... 45 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

American Arbitration Association (AAA), Richard W. Naimark, statement ....... 50 

AARP, Washington, DC, statement ....................................................................... 54 

Bland, F. Paul, Senior Attorney, Public Justice, Washington, DC, statement ... 59 

Drahozal, Christopher R., John M. Rounds Professor of Law, Associate Dean 

for Research & Faculty Development, University of Kansas School of Law, 

Lawrence, Kansas, statement ............................................................................. 87 

Fair Arbitration Now, Washington, DC, October 12, 2011, letter ....................... 106 

Miscellaneous Organizations, May, 2011, joint letter .......................................... 114 

National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), Washington, DC, October 

13, 2011, letter ..................................................................................................... 118 

Pierce, Deborah, M.D., Associate Director, Department of Emergency Medicine, Einstein at Elkins Park Hospital, Elkins Park, Pennsylvania, statement ...................................................................................................................... 119 

Santoni, Jane, Attorney at Law, Williams & Santoni, LLP, Towson, Maryland, 

October 14, 2011, letter ....................................................................................... 148 

Schwartz, Victor E., Esq., Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, 

DC, statement ...................................................................................................... 151 

Swanson, Lori, Attorney General, Minnesota, St. Paul Minnesota, statement .. 164 

Watts, Craig, Fairmont, North Carolina, letter .................................................... 170 

(1) 

ARBITRATION: IS IT FAIR WHEN FORCED? 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Al Franken, presiding. 

Present: Senators Franken, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Blumenthal, 

and Cornyn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. AL FRANKEN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 

Senator FRANKEN. The hearing will come to order. I want to 

thank all the witnesses for being here today and thank everyone 

for being here. 

We are in the middle of a vote, I believe, so some of my colleagues will be joining me shortly. I want to thank Chairman 

Leahy for giving me the opportunity to chair this hearing. And a 

special thanks again to the witnesses for sharing your time and expertise with this Committee. Before I introduce today’s witnesses, 

I would like to take a few moments to clarify my intent in calling 

today’s hearing. 

The topic of mandatory arbitration is much more interesting 

than its dry-sounding title might suggest to people who do not 

know much about it, which includes almost everyone, every consumer and every employee. Today we are likely to discuss such 

wide-ranging legal issues as Federal preemption, statutory construction, and class actions in situations as varied as chicken farmers to cell phone users to auto dealers. To the extent possible, I 

would like to keep today’s hearing focused on mandatory arbitration as opposed to other voluntary types of alternative dispute resolution, or ADR. I am not aware of any introduced legislation to 

‘‘ban arbitration.’’ I think everyone in this room can agree that 

there are some circumstances in which ADR, including post-dispute 

arbitration, should be encouraged. So let us focus our attention 

today on mandatory arbitration, which raises the most concern for 

me. 

I would also like to use this hearing to broadly highlight all of 

the efforts that have been made over the years to properly limit the 

use of mandatory arbitration. I am far from the first Senator to 

champion this issue. Senator Feingold, a former colleague on this 

Committee, was a true pioneer, and Senator Feingold partnered 

2 

with fellow Committee members to bring relief to certain groups 

particularly affected by mandatory arbitration. 

The Ranking Member of this Committee, Senator Grassley, led 

the charge in limiting the use of mandatory arbitration clauses for 

poultry and livestock producers in contracts with their processors. 

He was able to secure the passage of a provision in the 2008 farm 

bill. I would like to submit for the record a letter from Craig Watts, 

a Fairmont, North Carolina, chicken farmer. He is one of many 

farmers who, under this law, has chosen to opt out of the arbitration clause in the contract he signed with his chicken processor. He 

notes that in his 20 years in contract poultry: ‘‘I know of no examples of anyone ever taking a dispute to the ‘court of arbitration.’ 

For a farmer it is just too expensive . . . But in the 2008 farm 

bill, Congress recognized how unconscionable these mandatory arbitration clauses were . . . and it resulted in the farmer getting 

to choose to keep it or opt out . . . it has not led to a wave of 

lawsuits as many had said . . . but I do believe it is an incentive 

to do business above board.’’ 

Another member of this Committee, Senator Hatch, led a similar 

effort to provide relief for auto dealers. In the Senate, this bill had 

66 cosponsors. Thanks to Senator Hatch’s efforts, America’s auto 

dealers are now on a level contractual playing field with the big 

auto manufacturers. 

These efforts all preceded my work on limiting forced arbitration 

for employees of defense contractors. They also preceded my introduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act this Congress and the bill 

I recently introduced with Senator Blumenthal, the Consumer Mobile Fairness Act. These bills, like the ones that have come before 

it, seek to limit the use of forced arbitration clauses in contexts 

where one party suffers from a substantially weaker bargaining position. These particular bills focus on consumers and workers who 

sign form contracts with corporations. 

Critics may argue that these contracts were entered into voluntarily and that we are compelled to honor forced arbitration clauses 

or risk abolishing entirely the freedom to contract. I think several 

of today’s witnesses can speak to this issue better than me. 

I am very honored today to introduce Minnesota’s Attorney General and my friend, Lori Swanson. In 2009, Attorney General 

Swanson sued the National Arbitration Forum on behalf of Minnesota consumers. At the time, the National Arbitration Forum 

was the country’s biggest arbitrator of consumer credit disputes. In 

the course of her investigation, Attorney General Swanson revealed 

that the NAF, which presented itself to the public as a neutral arbitration company, was, in fact, working behind the scenes with the 

companies, against the best interest of consumers. In fact, the NAF 

boasted to the companies, ‘‘customers don’t know what to expect 

from arbitration and are more willing to pay,’’ and that ‘‘customers 

ask you to explain what arbitration is then basically hand you the 

money.’’ But I will leave it to Attorney General Swanson to tell the 

rest of the story. 

We are also pleased to have with us Dr. Deborah Pierce, currently the Associate Director of Emergency Medicine at Einstein at 

Elkins Park Hospital. She will share her experience from a previous employer and the subsequent arbitration process that she enVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:30 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 071582 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\71582.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
3 

dured after bringing a gender discrimination claim against that 

employer. Her story illustrates many of mandatory arbitration’s serious problems, which have led me to question the merits of our 

current system. 

We are joined also today by Paul Bland, a senior attorney at 

Public Justice. Mr. Bland has devoted nearly his entire career to 

representing consumer clients in countless cases around the country. He has a true wealth of knowledge on a range of issues, particularly consumer arbitration. Mr. Bland’s experience litigating 

consumer cases after Concepcion will give us a realistic and, I 

think, sobering look at the prospects for consumer-enforced corporate accountability going forward. 

We also welcome Professor Christopher Drahozal—I was so nervous about getting that pronunciation correct. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. It does not mean I will get it right the next 

time. Professor Drahozal is the John M. Rounds Professor of Law 

and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development at the 

University of Kansas School of Law. Professor Drahozal has written extensively on the law and the economics of arbitration. 

We also welcome Victor Schwartz, who is a partner at the firm 

of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, and of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform. Thank 

you, all of you, for joining us. 

Before I turn it over to today’s witnesses, we are going to need 

to take a recess. I am sorry about that. I know that you are all 

eager to testify. I can see you almost frothing. But we are going 

to have to take a quick recess so I can go to the floor and vote. I 

should be back in 10 to 15 minutes, and by then I think we will 

have the other members who are down there, no doubt voting, too. 

We have two votes. That is what has occasioned this brief recess. 

So the hearing stands in brief recess. 

[Recess at 2:14 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.] 

Senator FRANKEN. I want to thank all of the witnesses for indulging us. We voted, and so we are back in session, and before I 

turn it over to the Ranking Member and the witnesses, I want to 

reiterate my sincere goal that today we can find some common 

ground. We may not all agree on the best ways to move forward 

and on which legislative proposals are needed, but I hope we can 

walk away with a few areas of agreement. I will suggest the obvious: that there is a role for Federal courts in our justice system. 

This past August, Justice Kennedy replied to a reporter’s inquiry 

about the Court’s current docket, and he said this: ‘‘The docket 

seems to be changing . . . A lot of big civil cases are going to arbitration. I don’t see as many of the big civil cases.’’ Personally, I 

am troubled that our private arbitration system is, at least in part, 

eclipsing the United States Supreme Court, the highest Court in 

the land. Perhaps today’s hearing can help us determine whether 

there is a sound middle ground—one where we use arbitration to 

the fullest fair extent, but allow our Supreme Court to fulfill its 

role as the true final arbiter. 

And now to my friend, the Ranking Member, Senator Cornyn. 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Senator CORNYN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am old 

enough to remember why alternative dispute resolution came of 

age and of interest, primarily because people found that the time 

that it took to get cases litigated and then appealed and get a final 

resolution and the cost of litigation gave rise to the demand for a 

more expeditious and a less costly means of resolving disputes. 

Of course, it is not for everything. But what it means as a practical matter is that sometimes arbitration is the only cost-effective 

means of resolving a dispute because you cannot find a lawyer to 

take your case because you may be a person of modest means, may 

not be able to recover attorneys’ fees. So there is an important role 

for arbitration. 

I think there are just a few other points I want to make quickly. 

In my view, the scholarship and research uncovers several myths 

about arbitration. First of all, most arbitration is contractual. It is 

agreed to ahead of time. It is not imposed. It is agreed to. And, of 

course, when it is not agreed to—let us say there is some fraud in 

the inducement of the contract—there are remedies to void arbitration agreements. But most of them are a convenience to the parties 

and, as I said earlier, a more cost-effective and more timely way 

of resolving relatively small and including some larger disputes. 

But studies show that arbitrators have no discernible bias in favor 

of business interests or against consumers and employees. 

Second, it is a myth that consumers have no meaningful choice 

about submitting an arbitration due to inferior bargaining power. 

Third, it is a myth that arbitration procedures lack due process 

protections. 

Fourth, it is a myth that consumers and employees still will have 

access to arbitration even if pre-dispute arbitration agreements are 

barred. 

So I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses and 

their suggestions, if they are critics of the Federal Arbitration Act 

or contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise, what 

their suggestions are to us for making it cost-effective in the sense 

that it is within the reach of ordinary consumers who may be people of modest means. And it also is something that could be done 

on a timely rather than a protracted basis. Cost and time are the 

reasons why alternative dispute resolution came in vogue and why 

I think it still has an important role to play. But I look forward 

to hearing from the witnesses. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

As my distinguished Ranking Member was voting, he missed my 

opening statement, in which I said that we are all in agreement 

that arbitration can be very important and definitely has its place. 

And today I would really like to confine—we do not have to confine, 

but focus on mandatory arbitration. And I know that Senator 

Blumenthal would like to make a statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Franken, and I want 

to thank Senator Franken for his leadership, thank the witnesses 

5 

for being here today, particularly my former colleagues, the Attorney General of Minnesota, Attorney General Swanson, and thank 

her for her excellent work in this area. 

I agree with our distinguished Ranking Member that cost and 

time are greatly to be valued. Saving them is a profoundly important objective, and it is an objective well served by alternative dispute resolution and even by arbitration in many cases, but not 

when it is abusively applied and made mandatory, often without 

sufficient information to consumers, often imposed on them, as is 

the case in some of the instances where Attorneys General have 

taken action to protect consumers. And protecting consumers and 

employees is indeed the objective of two measures that I have supported with Senator Franken: the Arbitration Fairness Act and the 

recently introduced Consumer Mobile Fairness Act, designed to 

protect cell phone consumers from abusive practices. 

So I am very interested in what you will tell us today, and I am 

very grateful to you for being here and for your work in this area, 

whatever your point of view. There is a legitimate debate on this 

issue, but most important, there is the legitimate goal of protecting 

consumers against the increasingly pervasive use of mandatory 

binding arbitration clauses. These can be a scourge on consumers 

when they are imposed and applied abusively, and I hope that the 

Congress can take action to provide more tools to law enforcement, 

such as our Attorneys General and our Federal authorities, to protect employees and cell phone users and homeowners and others 

from the potential excesses in this area, so thank you very much. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Blumenthal has partnered with me on the Consumer 

Mobile Fairness Act, which is about consumers. The Arbitration 

Fairness Act is about both consumers and employees. We have both 

represented here today. 

Before we come to the witnesses, I would quickly like to take the 

opportunity to submit documents for the record. First is the letter 

from poultry farmer Craig Watts, which I mentioned in my opening 

statement. I have letters of support from a coalition of more than 

40 advocacy groups for the Arbitration Fairness Act and the Consumer Mobile Fairness Act. 

[The letters appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. The AARP has also submitted a statement for 

the record in support of the Arbitration Fairness Act that highlights the effects of forced arbitration on America’s seniors. 

[The AARP statement appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. I also have a statement for the record from 

Chairman Leahy, who was not able to join us today. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Now I will turn it over to today’s witnesses, 

beginning with Minnesota’s Attorney General, Lori Swanson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORI SWANSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

MINNESOTA, ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 

Ms. SWANSON. Well, good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for your leadership and, Senators, it is good to be here. I appreciate 

yours as well. 

6 

You know, the right to have disputes resolved through an impartial judge or jury is something that is deeply embedded in our 

American values and in our culture, yet millions of American consumers have given up that right to have their day in court without 

even knowing it through fine-print language contained in various 

customer agreements. 

Many large corporations, ranging from banks to phone companies 

to utilities, have put into the fine print mandatory arbitration 

clauses through which the consumer waives in advance the right 

to have their day in court, to have their dispute resolved in court. 

The consumer waives this right even if they do not notice the 

clause and even if they did not have any meaningful opportunity 

to negotiate the clause. 

In 2009, our office filed a lawsuit against the National Arbitration Forum. The Forum was the largest arbitration company for 

consumer disputes in the country. It handled more than 200,000 

arbitration claims a year, and according to its own statement, it 

said that it was listed as the arbitrator in hundreds of millions— 

hundreds of millions—of consumer contracts. 

The lawsuit alleged that the forum deceptively represented to 

consumers and the public that it was independent and neutral, operated like an impartial court system, was not affiliated with any 

party, and did not take sides between the parties. In fact, the National Arbitration Forum had extensive ties to the collection industry and was, in essence, an arm of the collection industry. 

The forum, despite its public statements to the contrary, worked 

behind the scenes alongside companies and creditors against the 

interests of ordinary consumers to convince credit card companies 

and other debt buyers and other corporations to insert mandatory 

pre-dispute arbitration clauses into these hundreds of millions of 

contracts and then to appoint the forum to decide the disputes, essentially putting itself as part of the collection process. It encouraged creditors and corporations to file claims, essentially to file 

lawsuits, against consumers whose claims it would then adjudicate. 

It sometimes drafted the arbitration claims—in other words, essentially drafted the lawsuit that was going to be filed against the consumer—and referred creditors to the debt collection firms which 

then went after the consumers. 

It also had extensive financial ties to the collection industry. A 

group of New York private equity funds engineered two transactions in which they simultaneously took control of one of the 

country’s largest debt collection enterprises and affiliated itself 

with the forum through an infusion of $42 million, essentially 

being on both sides of the equation. The forum went to lengths to 

conceal these ties to the public and to consumers. 

The case ultimately settled with a consent judgment barring the 

forum from the business of arbitrating credit card and other consumer disputes. And although that case dealt with a problem company, it did not and cannot deal with the systematic problems with 

consumer arbitration and mandatory binding clauses. 

Through our investigation of the forum, we conducted interviews 

of over 100 consumers, talked to arbitrators, and talked to employees of the forum, and those conversations told us that consumers 

7 

are not getting a fair shake and due process of law with these 

types of claims. 

First, there is unequal bargaining power between consumers and 

large corporations that present the consumer with take-it-or-leaveit contracts. In almost every interview we did of consumers, people 

told us, ‘‘We did not know about the clause, we were not aware of 

the clause, nor did we feel we could do anything about the clause.’’ 

The forum’s own documents describe it this way. They say, ‘‘The 

customer does not know what to expect from arbitration and is 

more willing to pay.’’ Or ‘‘Consumers ask you to explain what arbitration is and then basically hand you the money.’’ Those were 

marketing documents that the forum gave to creditors convincing 

creditors to put clauses like these in. 

In addition, the forum’s own documents said, ‘‘Well, we have to 

insert these clauses in because consumers will not agree after the 

fact to arbitration.’’ No, I think a lot of consumers would not agree 

after the fact to arbitration if they feel they are not getting a fair 

shake and due process of law. 

It was also apparent that arbitrators have a powerful incentive 

to favor the dominant party in arbitration. The arbitration company knows who is bringing it the business, who is filing claims, 

and they have an incentive to favor that corporation. We heard 

from arbitrators who were deselected or not given more business 

after ruling in favor of the consumer, arbitrators who were not 

given more business after refusing to award attorney fees against 

the consumer, and we heard from employees who said they were 

told to assign certain arbitrators to certain cases who would be 

friendly to the creditor or not put the creditor to the proof and require the creditor to submit evidence that would sustain an arbitration award. 

In addition, to make matters worse, it is often not the original 

creditor that files the arbitration claim. In today’s world debt buyers will buy debt from cell phone companies and credit card companies and then resell that debt many times over. And so oftentimes 

the person filing the arbitration claim is a debt buyer many times 

removed from the initial transaction, and consumers told us because they did not know who the arbitration company was, oftentimes they did not even appear or respond to the papers because 

they were not aware they had agreed to it, did not recognize the 

name of the arbitration company. 

Only the U.S. Congress, because of court rulings, has authority 

to make meaningful reform to this area of the law, and I appreciate 

your leadership in having this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Swanson appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Attorney General. 

Now we go to Dr. Pierce. 

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH PIERCE, M.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE, EINSTEIN 

AT ELKINS PARK HOSPITAL, ELKINS PARK, PENNSYLVANIA 

Dr. PIERCE. Thank you. Chairman Leahy, Chairman Franken, 

Ranking Member Cornyn, and distinguished members of the ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:30 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 071582 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\71582.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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mittee, thank you for the invitation to speak to you today about my 

experience with mandatory arbitration. 

My name is Deborah Pierce. I am currently the associate director 

of emergency medicine at Einstein at Elkins Park Hospital and the 

assistant residency director of the emergency medicine residency at 

Albert Einstein Medical Center in Philadelphia. 

In June of 2004, I began working on a part-time basis with a 

physician practice group in suburban Philadelphia in a community 

hospital emergency department. After working successfully on a 

part-time basis for a year, I was offered a full-time position. The 

salary they offered me was much less than what I had been making, but the Chairman of the practice assured me that I would recoup my initial loss in salary after I became a partner in 2 years’ 

time. 

When I signed my employment agreement, I was unaware that 

it contained a mandatory arbitration clause. Even if I had known 

to look for such a provision, it would have meant nothing to me. 

I am an E.R. doc. I take care of people. I love doing that. I was 

offered a job that was giving me the opportunity to do what I love 

to do. And my choice was either to accept the terms of my contract 

or to not get the job. 

During my 2 full-time years with the practice, my job performance was never questioned, and there were no concerns expressed 

to me about being voted into partnership. Every male physician before me had made partner after their first 2 years. Yet at the end 

of 2006, the Chairman told me that the partners had voted to deny 

me partnership and not renew my contract. 

Four months later, a male physician with less experience and a 

history of performance problems came up for partner. Instead of 

being granted partnership, he was given an additional 9-month 

probationary period to improve what the Chairman testified were 

serious problems with his clinical practice. After the 9 months, he 

was made a partner. No such extension was granted to me, and in 

addition, I learned of other females who had been denied the promotion in a similar manner. This evidence was presented during 

my arbitration. 

At the time I worked for the practice, it was a virtually all-male 

partnership where 17 out of 18 of the partners were men, and the 

pattern has not changed since I was denied partnership. The sole 

female partner left, and the practice remains an all-male partnership. 

I brought my gender discrimination claim before the EEOC, and 

it determined that the practice violated Title VII in not affording 

me the same treatment as it did my male counterpart. The EEOC 

determination letter is attached to my written statement. 

Because of the arbitration clause, my only recourse was to arbitrate my claim before the American Health Lawyers Association, 

otherwise known as AHLA. I expected the arbitration process to be 

fair and assumed my case would be heard by an unbiased arbitrator with knowledge of employment discrimination law. What I 

experienced was the exact opposite. 

From the very first day of the arbitration, I had serious doubts 

that my arbitrator would be unbiased and fair. There were indications that the arbitrator had a previous relationship with the hosVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:30 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 071582 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\71582.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
9 

pital and the practice. Also, arbitration was far more costly than 

I could have ever anticipated. I was required to pay half of the arbitrator’s $450-an-hour fee, and the entire process cost me more 

than $200,000, forcing me to take out a home equity loan. Employees of lesser income could never afford to arbitrate their claim. 

The costs were also driven up because the arbitrator let the practice get away with behavior that, in my understanding, would have 

been sanctioned in a courtroom. The practice withheld and destroyed evidence that was critical to proving my claim. My attorneys filed sanctions motions, which were granted. For one of the 

motions, though, the arbitrator awarded me $1,000 in sanctions 

and then charged me more than $2,000 in fees for his time deciding 

on the motion. It is my understanding that this would not happen 

in a court of law. 

I lost the arbitration, and the content of the arbitrator’s ruling 

demonstrated that he neither applied applicable law to the facts in 

my case nor considered the majority of the evidence in my favor. 

After the arbitration, my attorneys wrote to AHLA, arguing that it 

failed to provide to me the services for which I have paid significant sums and that AHLA and the arbitrator failed to meet their 

obligations as described in AHLA’s Rules of Procedure and Code of 

Ethics. AHLA responded by asserting that it does not certify or attest to the abilities, competence, or performance of its arbitrators 

and does not make any ‘‘warranties about the ability of the arbitrator to weigh facts and law.’’ And I have attached to my statement both copies of those letters. 

For me, the mandated arbitration process took away my faith in 

a fair and honorable legal system which is supposed to protect the 

rights of citizens. Mandatory arbitration is allowing employers to 

ignore this country’s civil laws, civil rights laws, and never to be 

held accountable. I hope this process today results in a much needed change in the law so that no one who follows me has to endure 

what I experienced. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pierce appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Dr. Pierce. 

Now we go to Paul Bland. 

STATEMENT OF F. PAUL BLAND, SENIOR ATTORNEY, PUBLIC 

JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. BLAND. Thank you very much, Senator Franken. 

Mandatory arbitration is a very unfair system in America for at 

least four reasons. 

First of all, you have disputes between corporations and individuals in which you have one side—the corporation, who writes the 

contract—basically picking the company who picks the arbitrator 

who is going to decide the dispute. So you have a battle, you have 

a dispute, and one side is essentially picking who the judge is who 

is going to decide that. That is unfair. 

Second, it is not a transparent system. It is very secretive. It is 

hard to find out what happens in arbitrations. They are closed. 

Most of them issue decisions but there is no written decision. It is 

very hard for a consumer to find out what has happened in preVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:30 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 071582 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\71582.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
10 

vious cases. Unlike the court system, there is no public accountability. It is secretive. 

Third is that there is no judicial review. No one ever looks over 

to see whether or not someone is getting it right. So if an arbitrator 

makes even a blatant error of law—some courts have said things 

like ‘‘wacky decisions of law’’ by arbitrators are not reviewable by 

a court. That is really a problem. 

Fourth, after the Supreme Court decision last spring in the Concepcion case, where the Supreme Court overturned about 15 State 

Supreme Courts and literally over a hundred different lower-court 

decisions and invented a new rule of Federal law, now supposedly 

the Federal Arbitration Act prevents individuals from joining together in a class action in almost any circumstances, and there is 

a dispute about quite how broadly that should be read, but it is 

very hard to have a class action arbitration now. 

Corporations uses these arbitration clauses as a shield against 

any kind of liability even if they break the law. Now, different companies use them as a shield in different ways. First, you have companies where the way they use them as a shield is to try to make 

it impossible for anyone to really bring an effective individual case 

against them. So, for example, most arbitrators are lawyers, and 

generally the people who show up on the arbitrators list that you 

get from the major companies are all lawyers who have worked for 

an industry. We just heard about the lawyer from the American 

Health Lawyers Association is going to be deciding a dispute 

against a health company. Similarly, I have had cases, for example, 

against a title insurance company. You get a list of arbitrators, and 

every one works for title insurance companies or for law firms who 

principally represent title insurance companies. That is not a very 

fair deal. 

In the employment setting, there is a huge amount of data, and 

the employment data shows, first of all, that compared to court, 

employees who go to arbitration end up winning far fewer cases 

than they would win in court. A professor named Alexander Colvin 

has done a comprehensive study of the employment data of the 

American Arbitration Association over many thousands of cases 

and found that. 

Second, even for the employees who do win something, they tend 

to win, on average, significantly less sums in arbitration than they 

would have won in court. It simply does work in that area. Now, 

there is not anywhere near the same kind of data for consumer 

cases because there are so few cases that consumers take to arbitration, but in the employment area the data is pretty clear. 

With nursing homes, the trade associations just openly admit 

that the reason that they want mandatory arbitration clauses is to 

hold down liability. It is much harder to win a case when you are 

taking a case in front of a lawyer from the American Health Lawyers Association than a jury because the lawyer principals represents health companies and they are going to be more likely to 

find for the nursing home. 

So there are some companies that try to use arbitration to win 

the individual case. There are other types of companies, really big 

companies, that do mass consumer businesses where what they are 

interested in is just trying to ban the class actions. For them, they 

11 

are actually fine with having a fair individual arbitration because 

hardly any cases actually go to individual arbitration. 

Now, there are a lot of consumer cases where class action is not 

appropriate. The case is big enough, or there are lots of consumer 

cases involving identity theft or lemon laws or this kind of thing 

that are individual cases. But there are a lot of types of cases 

where the only way a case can be brought is as a class action. So, 

for example, you get a lot of scams, hidden overcharges hidden 

deep in the bill, formulas that are rigged so that people end up not 

getting the sort of rebate that they are supposed to get, bait-andswitches where people are promised one interest rate and get a different interest rate, things where contracts are broken, you are 

promised something and you do not get it, where it is the same for 

everybody, the exact same contract is broken in the same way or 

the same practice violates the same law for millions of people. And 

the vast majority of those people never figure it out because the nature of most consumer scams is that it is buried in the fine print 

in a way that people do not know about it. So there are not going 

to be a whole lot of cases. 

In that sort of setting, say a million people are cheated out of 

$50, perhaps 100 of them figure it out. You know, from the perspective of a big company, from an AT&T or from a Bank of America, if all 100 consumers who figure it out out of the million get 

their money back, they have not lost anything, because for the 

other 999,900 people they just get to keep the money. So for them, 

they can have a really fair arbitration system, but the point is that 

by banning class actions, they keep many of these cases from going 

forward. 

I looked at Professor Drahozal’s testimony. He talked about in 1 

year there were less than 1,000 cases in the entire United States 

that were handled by the American Arbitration Association where 

a consumer sued a business, in the entire United States. The small 

claims court in Silver Spring that I walk past every day on my way 

to the Metro to go downtown handles more than that many cases 

every month. 

Last year I had three class action settlements where we got sent 

checks out to cheated consumers, where we sent checks to more 

than 100,000 consumers. The entire United States, all the arbitrations brought by consumers in America were less than 1,000? So 

by myself last year I was involved in—not by myself. I had a bunch 

of other lawyers working with me. But, anyhow, my team of lawyers, we had three cases where we got a hundred times as many 

consumers their money back as the total number of people who 

even went to the American Arbitration Association? 

The point of consumer arbitration is to suppress claims, and that 

is just an extremely unfair way, and it is bad for America. It encourages business to cheat people and get away with it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bland appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Bland. 

Now we go to Mr. Schwartz. 

12 

Oh, I am sorry. Mr. Schwartz, hang on 1 second. I apologize. 

Senator Klobuchar has just arrived, and she has to go, so I would 

like to give her—you have only 30 minutes. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. I will actually stay for the rest 

of the witnesses, but I did want to just thank Attorney General 

Swanson for being here. What great work you do on behalf of consumers in Minnesota. We have worked together for a long time, 

and I just want to thank you for being here, and thank you for 

holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FRANKEN. Mr. Schwartz. 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ESQ., PARTNER, 

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE 

FOR LEGAL REFORM, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cornyn and 

Mr. Blumenthal, thank you for having me here today. It may count 

against my time—I hope it does not—but, Senator, about 20 years 

ago you and I had a phone conversation. Somebody told you that 

I had a sense of humor and could do good imitations, and you 

heard them and you said, ‘‘Mr. Schwartz, I think you should stick 

to your day job.’’ So I did, and I hope I do it all right today. 

Senator FRANKEN. Something tells me I wish you had not. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Anyway, I am glad you are here, and it does 

not count against your time. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. My background is pretty simple. For 40 years I 

have been involved in the litigation system. I have had the privilege to represent plaintiffs and defendants. I was a law professor 

and a dean. I write a casebook that is used in most American law 

schools. Today I am testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, which is an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of 

Commerce. But my views, as Senator Cornyn and others have 

heard me before now, are strictly my own. 

A minister I knew named Albert Sikkelee, a very brilliant man, 

gave me a piece of wisdom that I never forgot. He said ‘‘. . . 

something that is not in context is pretext.’’ And to look at either 

the litigation system or the pre-dispute arbitration agreements that 

way alone is not very good. You have to look at them together. In 

some of Senator Cornyn’s remarks, he did just that. 

People are going to differ about this, but I agree with Professor 

Ware that no one is really forced to sign an arbitration agreement. 

Even with cell phones, there are some cell phone companies that 

do not make you sign a pre-arbitration agreement. And the way it 

is in our competitive world, if people really wanted to sell something and they could do better by not having the agreement in 

there, they would do it. Now, the product might cost more or the 

service might cost more, but that is a factor of our marketplace. 

There is a lack of awareness sometimes, but our system of justice 

I think should encourage awareness, encourage people to look. And 

13 

one benefit of this hearing and work you have done is to let people 

realize that they should look carefully when they buy. Professor 

Drahozal has some very good things to say about that. 

I think eliminating pre-dispute arbitration agreements is going 

to really benefit lawyers. That I know. In my own firm, if they get 

rid of all litigation, Shook, Hardy & Bacon would have to turn to 

some alternative employment. And the plaintiffs’ lawyers who are 

on the other side, they have lobbied for legislation that would abolish pre-dispute arbitration agreements. If I were stylie plaintiff’s 

lawyer, I probably would, too. Litigation is profitable. That is part 

of their business. Contingency fees can reach 50 percent. That is 

what they do. 

Consumers do not really benefit from litigation. Lawsuits are not 

fun. Maybe some people in this room have been in them. You have 

some Attorneys General here. But being in court is not what it is 

on television. It is a woe. Learned Hand said, ‘‘Short of disease, a 

lawsuit is a person’s worst nightmare.’’ That is the alternative we 

are talking about. And getting a plaintiffs’ lawyer to help you is 

getting more and more difficult. When I practiced, we rarely took 

a case that would be less than $25,000. Today, on average, it is up 

to $60,000. So if there is no pre-arbitration agreement, the person 

is not going to get a lawyer in many, many cases. 

Professor Drahozal’s data shows even more challenge for employees to get a lawyer to help them when they have been fired and 

I have seen that in my own life experience. Somebody who has 

been fired from his job calls me, he cannot afford a lawyer, they 

do not have an arbitration agreement. They go nowhere. 

Class actions have been, we could be here for hours debating 

about them, but they are not always a rose petal for consumers. A 

recent one involved Bluetooth. I did not even know what a 

bluetooth was, but it something you stick in your ear and you can 

hear things better. Anyway, people claimed that the Bluetooth did 

not warn them boldly enough that if you turn it up too high, it 

would affect your hearing adversely. A class action was brought. 

What was the result? A hearing loss society got $100,000. The attorneys got $850,000. The people who had the Bluetooth that was 

allegedly too loud got nothing. So up it went to the Ninth Circuit, 

and there is a group called the Center for Class Action Fairness. 

It is very small, but they intervened and they got the Ninth Circuit 

to overturn the district court, but still no money has been granted 

to those who used the Bluetooth. 

Now, taking one case of arbitration or taking one case of class 

action does not give you the whole picture. But the fact is that 

class actions are not good for all people all the time. Sometimes 

consumers lose. 

There are benefits to pre-dispute arbitration. They are usually 

faster, they are usually cheaper, and they can produce results that 

are helpful to individuals who are involved in them if you look at 

it as a whole. 

There are predatory practices, but we heard from a distinguished 

Attorney General there are a lot of cops on the beat to stop wrongful behavior. And there is individual bargaining power, somebody 

saying, ‘‘I simply will not do it.’’ 

14 

Some have suggested that after a dispute arises, that is the time 

for arbitration. At least in my experience it is when people on each 

side of a dispute game the system. If the claim is inexpensive, 

defendents simply will not pay. If it is big, they plaintiffs to the 

litigation system. You do not reach agreement or having the dispute go. 

I am glad these hearings are being held. I do not think the problems with pre-dispute arbitration are ones that have to be handled 

through legislation. All forms of dispute resolution have problems. 

Class actions have problems. Litigation has problems. But here 

there are self-correctives to the system, and I think they are the 

best approval. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwartz appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Schwartz. What was the impression that you did for me on the phone? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. This is what I said: ‘‘I am going to tell you this 

right now. I think it is something you should be encouraged to do.’’ 

Senator FRANKEN. I got it. Mario Cuomo. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Professor Drahozal. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, JOHN M. 

ROUNDS PROFESSOR OF LAW, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR RESEARCH & FACULTY DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS SCHOOL OF LAW, LAWRENCE, KANSAS 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I cannot do impressions, and I will not even try, so I apologize in advance. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cornyn, members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the chance to be here today to talk 

about consumer and employment arbitration. 

What I am going to focus on in my remarks is what I focused 

on in my statement, which is empirical research on consumer arbitration. And I am going to talk about consumer arbitration because 

that is what my research has focused on. 

A couple of clarifications to Mr. Bland’s comment on what the 

AAA caseload looks like, just to start with. First is the AAA had 

its own class arbitration caseload at the time, and so comparing 

class actions in court to the AAA’s consumer individual caseload is 

not really the right comparison. And I do not know what the numbers are of how many parties were involved in the class arbitrations, but that comparison does not work. 

And the other thing that does not quite work is if you look at 

small claims courts, the vast majority of those dockets are debt collection cases, and a very small part of this AAA caseload was debt 

collection cases. The majority, 60, 70 percent, were individual consumer cases brought by consumers as claimants. So it is clearly not 

a huge docket, but the comparisons understate the importance, I 

think, of the cases that are being dealt with. 

I very much appreciate Mr. Bland’s highlighting of the empirical 

evidence in the employment arbitration setting. Again, my particular expertise where I have done the research is consumer cases, 

but frankly, most of what I have found I think is consistent with 

15 

what the employment studies have found, and I will talk about 

that as well. 

I do think it is important that we talk about empirical research 

because anecdotal cases are useful, and highlight things that happen or can happen, but only when you look systematically across 

types of cases, types of disputes, the legal system as a whole, do 

you get a sense of how important or unimportant certain things 

are. And so, again, I was heartened to hear Mr. Bland referring to 

empirical studies because I do think they are a very important part 

of this undertaking. 

A couple of points to highlight from the empirical research that 

I have done. The first is that in evaluating arbitration—and Mr. 

Schwartz made this point as well—you need to compare it to something. You need to have a control group. And the logical control 

group is the court system. And so if you look, for example, at arbitration cases, in the debt collection context particularly, it is absolutely true that businesses win the vast majority of cases, 94 or 96 

percent. But when you compare that to the control group—courts, 

small claims courts, other courts—the win rate is at least as high, 

if not higher, in court for businesses. Again, this does not necessarily mean arbitration is fair, but it means you need to have a 

baseline for comparing the results to. You cannot just look at arbitration and say, yes, it is good, yes, it is bad. 

Similarly, you have to compare like cases in arbitration and in 

court. It can be really hard to do that. Comparing debt collection 

cases is a place where I think you can do a pretty good job. They 

are relatively consistent. The challenge with employment arbitration—Professor Colvin’s study is a very good study, but even he 

recognizes the cases that are in arbitration are probably different 

from the ones in court. And following up on Mr. Schwartz’s comment, if, in fact, arbitration is more accessible for lower-income employees, what you would, in fact, expect to see is lower amounts 

awarded in arbitration because there are different claimants in arbitration than there are in court. And Professor Colvin acknowledges that possibility and suggests that his data is, in fact, consistent with that conclusion. 

Similarly, the businesses that were studied were ones that had 

their own dispute resolution process where they dealt with cases 

before they got to arbitration. It would not surprise me at all if 

those businesses, in fact, settled the hard cases and only arbitrated 

the easy cases. And if that is the case, again, you would expect to 

have a lower win rate in arbitration, not because arbitration is unfair but because the cases that are in arbitration are different. So 

you have to be very cautious in interpreting empirical results. 

The second point is as a general matter—and you all have experienced this as much as I have, I am sure—legal changes cause 

changes in parties’ behavior. Parties respond to changes in the 

rules. And so if there is a change in the legal rules governing the 

enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, I would expect 

businesses to respond. One way I would expect them to respond is 

by increasing prices or lowering wages or not raising wages as 

much in the employment context. And in particular, in the credit 

card context, which I have done some recent work on, I would expect that the effect would be harshest or strongest on the highestVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:30 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 071582 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\71582.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
16 

risk customers, the ones who have the fewest other options for getting credit, because if you look at the factors that explain why credit card issuers use arbitration clauses, the riskiness of their credit 

card portfolio is an important factor. Credit card issuers are more 

likely to be involved in litigation if they have credit card bills that 

are not paid. And so, not surprisingly, the issuers turn to arbitration in that setting. If they cannot turn to arbitration, one response 

that they might take is just not to lend money to these folks at 

all—that is not necessarily the case, but a possible consequence. 

Then the final point, which is consistent with the empirical evidence, which is also something Mr. Schwartz suggested, is to the 

extent that lower-income consumers/employees are better able to 

bring claims in arbitration, if arbitration is not there, those agreements are not going to happen after the dispute arises. The vast 

majority of arbitrations arise out of pre-dispute clauses, and that 

is true not just in settings of unequal bargaining power. It is true 

between businesses and big businesses. In international arbitration, the vast majority of claims arise out of pre-dispute clauses, 

and that is because once there is a dispute, the Mr. Schwartzes and 

Mr. Blands of the world cannot agree that they want to go to arbitration, so they just stay in court, which is the default. 

I am looking forward to having the chance to answer the Committee’s questions, and, again, I appreciate the opportunity to be 

here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Drahozal appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Professor Drahozal. 

Well, I guess I will start the questioning. Attorney General 

Swanson, the testimony you gave is that basically the fix was in 

with the National Arbitration Forum right? 

Ms. SWANSON. I think that is a fair assessment. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. And they were the biggest arbitrator of 

consumer arbitration? 

Ms. SWANSON. Biggest arbitrator of consumer arbitration in the 

country. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Now, I reviewed some of Mr. Schwartz’s 

past writings, and in them he criticized State Attorneys General for 

engaging in lawsuits on behalf of injured persons in their States, 

saying that it was ‘‘a subversion of 200 years of law,’’ and that it 

violated the idea of equal protection under the law. 

Attorney General Swanson, if State Attorneys General like yourself could not bring claims on behalf of your citizens and those 

same citizens were required to submit to arbitration, what type of 

redress would those Minnesotans have available to them, or would 

the wrongs simply go unaddressed? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I think in many cases 

the wrongs would go unaddressed. We live in a world where consumers, unfortunately, often find they are dealt an unfair hand by 

large corporations. The reality of the world we live in is that many 

private lawyers charge more by the hour than a lot of our citizens 

make in a week. And so if you are that individual citizen, it can 

be oftentimes very hard for you to be able to get an attorney, and 

I think that Attorneys General play a very important role in enforcing the law, holding wrongdoing accountable, making sure that 

17 

we have a fair marketplace and a level playing field for businesses 

that do follow the law. 

I saw some of Mr. Schwartz’s other testimony at one point when 

he was trying to stave off regulation. I noticed he said, well, we do 

not need certain regulations because we have Attorneys General on 

the beat. And I think it is important that we have Attorneys General on the beat in order to enforce the laws. You know, what we 

are talking about is making sure that consumers get a fair shake. 

In the recent Supreme Court case involving AT&T, in the majority opinion Justice Scalia said, ‘‘The times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.’’ The reality of these fine-print contracts is that they are very long and 

they have gotten longer. They are very dense. I think our original 

Constitution is 4,000 words, and some of these consumer contracts 

are 20,000 words or more, drafted with terms that are very much 

lopsided against the consumer and to give every advantage to the 

company. 

Senator FRANKEN. Adhesive contracts or contracts of adhesion 

are really where you have no choice. 

Ms. SWANSON. Where you have no choice. They are presented to 

the consumer, take it or leave it. The reality is if you are trying 

to do business, they are presented to you. You are not going to negotiate; you are not going to red-line out a term. You are going to 

take it or not. And so when mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 

clauses are put into contracts, it is basically asking the consumer 

to give up their legal rights, their fundamental American legal 

right to have their day in court, without oftentimes knowing it, and 

as we have seen with our case involving the National Arbitration 

Forum, sometimes in ways that are very detrimental and unfair to 

the consumer. 

Senator FRANKEN. Dr. Pierce, thank you for appearing before us 

today and sharing your, frankly, horrific story. Mr. Schwartz wrote 

in his testimony, ‘‘It is important to remember, and not gloss over 

the fact, that arbitrators such as those in the AAA and other organizations are professionals. They are independent legal experts who 

abide by a comprehensive set of rules and procedures . . .’’ 

I was wondering how that squares with the response you received from the American Health Lawyers Association after you 

complained that the arbitrator assigned to your case lacked the 

knowledge and experience to adequately handle your claim. The association wrote, and I quote, ‘‘In the process of selecting an arbitrator, the AHLA ADR service makes no warranties about the ability of the arbitrator to weigh facts and law.’’ 

Does Mr. Schwartz’s claim that these are legal experts who abide 

by a comprehensive set of rules and procedures make sense to you? 

Does it jive with your experience? 

Dr. PIERCE. No, that was exactly not my experience. My experience started out with the first day of the arbitration, which was 

held in the arbitrator’s office, we were given the library space to 

use and walked into the library space and noticed that two rows 

of binders in the library had the name of the hospital that I had 

the issue with on the binders and clearly demonstrated that his 

law firm had done business, what looked like significant business 

to me, with the hospital in the past. 

18 

One day we actually got to the law offices early and found the 

chairman of the department, of the emergency department, walking out of the arbitrator’s office with a cup of coffee, clearly having 

just had coffee with the arbitrator prior to us getting there. 

And then during the actual arbitration—I am not an attorney. I 

honestly cannot probably represent all of the legalese correctly, but 

during the arbitration there were multiple times that my attorneys 

told me that decisions were made and people’s testimony changed 

and things happened that would never have happened in a court 

of law. We had one physician who had given a deposition, and during the arbitration she gave the exact opposite testimony, and it 

was very significant testimony. It was about this probation vote 

and whether or not they had done one for me. And she completely 

changed her idea, and the arbitrator said—or my attorneys asked 

her if she had changed her testimony, and she acknowledged she 

did and said—when they asked why, she said, ‘‘Well, I have subsequently talked to my attorneys and talked to the Chairman of the 

department and realized that the story was different than I 

thought.’’ And they challenged this to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator said essentially—and forgive my paraphrasing, but essentially that is fine, I am glad her memory is better. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Well, I think we get the idea. This was 

a guy who worked for a firm that had obviously done cases for the 

people you were arbitrating against, and when the AHLA says that 

they do not have to appoint anyone who has the ability to weigh 

facts and the law, I think that tells a lot. 

I will go to the Ranking Member. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, I think we would all agree that not only 

must a process for dispute resolution be fair in fact but that there 

has to be an appearance of fairness, too, for people to have confidence in the outcome. But I want to quote another famous Minnesotan besides the distinguished Chairman and the Attorney General of Minnesota, and that is Warren Burger. Warren Burger was 

recognized as one of the primary advocates of alternative dispute 

resolution, and he said in one quote, ‘‘The notion that most people 

want black-robed judges, well-dressed lawyers, and fine-paneled 

courtrooms as the setting to resolve their dispute is not correct. 

People with problems, like people with pain, want relief, and they 

want it as quickly and as inexpensively as possible.’’ 

So I happen to agree with Professor Drahozal that it is important 

that we not make judgments here, just as in an arbitration or in 

a court of law, based on anecdote, and some of what we have heard 

from Dr. Pierce and Attorney General Swanson and others is very 

deeply concerning. But I do think the courts are equipped, by and 

large, to deal with those because, of course, even under the Federal 

Arbitration Act of 1925, the court can still invalidate an arbitration 

contract on the basis of fraud, duress, or unconscionability. You 

mentioned contracts of adhesion, one type of those. 

But I guess I would like to get a clarification, General Swanson. 

You are not suggesting by your testimony that contracts to arbitrate should be unenforceable as a general rule, are you? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cornyn, I think 

right now the law is such that contracts that are in consumer contracts generally are held by courts to be enforceable. What I have 

19 

tried to do with my testimony is explain some of the problems we 

have seen with arbitration when it comes to consumers who do not 

have much clout, do not have much power against a big corporation 

that does, and some of the unfairness that we have seen result 

from that when it comes to making sure that people have their 

legal rights protected. 

Senator CORNYN. We have three former Attorneys General here 

on the panel, it just happens, so all of us have had the experience 

of heading up a consumer protection division and finding recourse 

for people who need justice to be done. But what I do not understand is, are you suggesting that they should be unenforceable? Or 

is the ability of a court to set aside an arbitration, a contract to 

arbitrate pre-dispute on the basis of fraud, duress, or 

unconscionability? Are those not adequate to address the injustices 

that you have seen? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cornyn, no, I do 

not believe those are adequate to address the types of abuses that 

we have seen. You know, the Arbitration Fairness Act has been introduced by Senator Franken based upon all of the interviews and 

evidence that my office has seen with consumers and arbitrators as 

well as employees of the National Arbitration Forum who were told 

basically do not assign certain arbitrators, make sure whatever arbitrator you put on a claim is anti-consumer or, by gosh, let us 

make sure that an arbitrator does not ask for evidence. Based upon 

all of that, I certainly support the Arbitration Fairness Act that 

would eliminate pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in, 

among other consumer contracts. 

Senator CORNYN. So what recourse would a consumer have if 

they have, let us say, a $100 dispute? Would they have to hire a 

lawyer on an hourly basis at $450 an hour or $100 an hour? Would 

they have to find a way to get a lawyer to represent them on a contingency fee? But $100 is not enough money really to enable you 

to find a lawyer to help you litigate that. 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cornyn, under the Arbitration Fairness Act, I do not believe anything would prohibit a 

consumer from agreeing after the fact to arbitration if they wanted 

to. The kinds of abuses I am talking about are in these pre-dispute 

arbitration clauses when consumers waive their legal rights beforehand, before a dispute arises. I think they would always be at liberty to agree in an arm’s-length transaction to arbitration or to file 

a claim in small claims court. I know those differ from State to 

State. In our State I think you can file claims up $7,500, and they 

would be at liberty to do that as well. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, I guess the difference that I would have 

with you is you apparently do not agree that contracts should be 

enforced when they require arbitration. That is your position. 

Ms. SWANSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cornyn, I think the 

courts, by and large, have enforced contracts where they require 

arbitration as the U.S. Supreme Court just did. My position would 

be that the law should be changed by the U.S. Congress, that the 

Congress is the only body that can change the law, and that it 

ought to change the law to be more protective of consumers. 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Schwartz, I just happen to be old enough 

that I remember practicing law in San Antonio, Texas, when I was 

20 

a district judge, when listening to the call of Warren Burger and 

others who complained about the cost and the delay associated 

with getting resolution of claims called for a new system of alternative dispute resolution. And, actually, we would have courts 

hold—we created a settlement week where people could mediate or 

arbitrate or otherwise resolve their legal disputes short of a fullblown jury trial with all of the attendant costs and delay related 

to that. 

How do we reconcile, in your view, the concerns that have been 

expressed, which I am sympathetic to, that in some instances these 

contracts to arbitrate are not done on an equal bargaining basis or 

that they do not actually serve the ends of justice? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. There are, as you suggested, Senator, means to 

address those. If an arbitration agreement has you have to arbitrate in another city and it is far far away, it is unenforceable. If 

they try to eliminate punitive damages, it is unenforceable. And I 

think there are individual cases where people can complain about 

the system, but there are avenues in existence to remedy those. 

And when Attorney General Swanson went after a bad company, 

she remedied it. In response to Senator Franken’s earlier observation about my discussion about Attorney General roles, I believe 

that enforcing the laws of your own State against fraud is absolutely the role of the Attorney General. If the Attorney General 

goes into tort law and tries to be a plaintiff’s attorney, I do not 

think that is a good idea. 

So I think there are avenues in existing law to provide for the 

bad apples. The good apples are, as you are suggesting, for thousands of people who cannot get representation for small claims. If 

it is an after-dispute situation, the companies are not going to just 

mail a person a check. They have sort of got the person over a barrel, and that is why eliminating pre-dispute arbitration is not a 

good idea. More people will suffer than would gain. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to have 

to leave, unfortunately, because of the joint address to Congress. 

The President of South Korea is here addressing Congress. But 

thank you very much for holding the hearing. 

Senator FRANKEN. If you have a second before you leave, I just 

would like to bet you a steak dinner that you cannot find before 

4 o’clock the mandatory arbitration clause in here. 

Senator CORNYN. I do not know what that is you are handing 

me. 

Senator FRANKEN. I am sorry. It is terms and conditions for a 

checking and savings account in a bank. 

I am kidding. You do not have to do that. I would not do that 

to you. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, my point is, Mr. Chairman, that even 

though consumers may not know there is an arbitration provision 

in the contracts, there is a positive societal good for having an expeditious and inexpensive way to have these small claims resolved 

without litigation. I have spent most of my professional life in a 

courtroom, and like others here on the panel who have as well, giving someone a guarantee to a jury trial for a small dispute when 

they cannot find a lawyer to represent them, with tremendous 

delays associated with repetitive appeals, is not my ideal of justice. 

21 

We need to provide an opportunity for people to have a forum that 

is fair and involves efficient resolution of disputes appropriate to 

the nature of the dispute and subject to the existing law. That is 

my position. 

Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. I understand that. 

We will go now to Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Franken, and thank 

you for your leadership in this area, which I think has been very, 

very valuable. Attorney General Swanson, you can tell the people 

of Minnesota that they are well served by Senator Franken’s leadership. 

I want to ask you first, part of the problem in the National Arbitration Forum practices resulted from the arbitration clauses essentially being concealed or obfuscated. Is that correct? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Blumenthal, that is part 

of the problem. The National Arbitration Forum actually employed 

a vice president of clause placement who was in part paid commissions to go out to large corporations and convince them to put 

clauses in the agreements. It would help write the clauses that 

would go into the agreements and then afterward would actually 

help file and write the claims that would be used against consumers. But, absolutely, that was one of the problems, is the 

clauses were concealed and not very obvious. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you would agree, Mr. Schwartz, that 

that kind of practice really is abusive and should be illegal? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. If the laws in Minnesota were violated, they 

should be prosecuted. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, in your view, you would condemn 

such practices, would you not? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. The type of things that the Attorney General 

spoke of on their surface—I have not looked at the whole case— 

do sound like that they are illegal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Would you agree that clauses that are not 

fairly explained and indeed are concealed or obfuscated requiring 

arbitration are abusive and should be illegal? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, fairness is in the eyes of the beholder, so 

I have difficulty answering that question at that degree of generalization. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So that a clause that is concealed in fine 

print, deliberately hidden from consumers, would be OK with you? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. That is a ‘‘When did you stop beating your wife? ’’ 

question. I mean, if somebody deliberately makes it so obscure that 

no reasonable person could find something, then you walk into 

unconscionability, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, isn’t the problem really today in the 

wireless and the cable industry and many industries where there 

really is effectively no consumer choice, that not only is there a 

lack of what you have called ‘‘equal bargaining power’’ but also that 

consumers cannot, even with due care, discern that there is a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause? Isn’t that part of the problem 

today? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I think that there should be, and there are, alternative as—when we talk about cell phones, some companies do not 

22 

require mandatory arbitration agreements, and that market forces 

should be used to have people have situations where they have a 

choice. And if there is just no market for it, then there is no market 

for it. 

Again, I am not talking about something where somebody is engaged in behavior that violates a State law. That was something 

that the Attorney General went after. But fine print is part of our 

lives. There is fine print on a lot of things, and that alone is not, 

to me, an unlawful practice. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I do not disagree with you that fine 

print is not unlawful. The question is how the fine print is depicted, and I would be willing to say, without knowing the answer—and I learned as a prosecutor never to ask a question if I 

did not know the answer—that you have defended and prosecuted 

cases where there were in effect unfair practices that may not have 

violated the law but your feeling was they should have violated— 

there should be a law to prohibit them. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I have not had the privilege that you have had 

to be Attorney General of a State or a prosecutor. I have been a 

plaintiffs’ lawyer, and I have done defense work. But I have not engaged in criminal practice of law on either—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But there are many contracts that you 

have encountered that essentially were misleading if they were not 

properly explained? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. This is just my personal life. I have not encountered that type of thing, and if I ever have, I simply would not deal 

with that merchant or deal with that service provider. But that 

would be—that is a personal answer in my life. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, in fact, in many instances of consumer life, consumers may have no choice, even if there is no gun 

pointed to their head, which is, again, the phrase you used, but to 

use a service or buy a good where pre-dispute mandatory arbitration is imposed. And we are not talking about arbitration that is 

knowingly entered into after there is a dispute. We are talking 

about mandatory pre-dispute arbitration without in any way dismissing your arguments that there may be benefits to knowing and 

informed arbitration clauses after the dispute has arisen. 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I want to know more about—and you can share 

with me, or this hearing is not the end of all hearings on this subject—precisely the type of situation that you are talking about 

where the person absolutely needs the service. I mean, a surprise 

to some in this room, I lived in a world where there were no cell 

phones, and I kind of made it. I was all right. So that is why I 

want to get a little bit more specific. If somebody cannot eat or cannot buy food in a supermarket, that is something I would want to 

think about. But I do not think where I go to Shopper’s Food Warehouse—maybe they will give me a discount for mentioning them— 

that there is some agreement when I am buying those groceries 

that I cannot sue them if the food is bad. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, my time has expired. I appreciate 

your—— 

Senator FRANKEN. We will do a second round. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I appreciate your testimony, and I am 

grateful that there will be a second round. Thank you. And in the 

23 

meantime, I am going to try to find the arbitration clause in here, 

although I have not been promised a steak dinner. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. If you can find it, you will have a steak dinner. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. And that goes for you, Mr. Schwartz. Would 

that be fair to you to ask you to find the arbitration clause in that 

document? 

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I think that would be fine, but I do not want to 

do it here because I do not want to interfere with the President of 

South Korea. I will do it—— 

Senator FRANKEN. I think he will be done with his speech before 

you find it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman. First of all, let me 

thank you for holding this hearing. I think Americans today are 

the people in the history of the planet who are most bedeviled by 

fine print, and it is an unfortunate and noxious part of most of our 

daily lives. As Mr. Schwartz had pointed out, it is not illegal for 

there to be fine print, but, nevertheless, we do find that there is 

an enormous amount of mischief that is often buried in the fine 

print. Indeed, your Attorney General who is here discovered really 

a systematic racket run for the purpose of cheating consumers by 

not just some little fly by-night corporation but by the largest arbitration company in the country. 

So it is hard to deny that this is a really significant issue when 

you look at how bad the practices are, how one-sided the negotiating posture is, and just the plain experience of it. I mean, you 

can just stack up people like Dr. Pierce over and over again who 

have had miserable experiences with arbitration, did not know, for 

instance, that the companies that appeared before the arbitrators 

all the time got to pick who the arbitrators were; and if you ruled 

against them, they could knock you out. It is like picking a panel. 

If you do not get a hanging judge, you throw them out until you 

have got all hanging judges, and because you are coming in case 

after case, you can basically filter out anybody who will decide for 

consumers. Unless you are that lucky person who got that arbitrator for the first time, who decided for you before they came in 

and swept you out for having had the temerity to decide for a consumer. And the problem of take-it-or-leave-it contracts makes it 

just so much worse, and I think Mr. Schwartz was stretching the 

credulity of this Committee a little bit when he suggested that one 

could get by in this modern age, particularly in a busy life, as he 

has, without access to, say, a cell phone. Maybe you have a lot of 

staff people who can run around with you and answer the phone, 

but I think for most Americans, a cell phone is a pretty basic thing, 

and I do not think anybody feels they have negotiating leverage in 

that contract. 

Take a look at a credit card contract. Those used to be a page 

or two long. Now they are 20 pages long. We have an entire agency 

that has had to be built to try to cope with the tricks and the traps 

that were built into the credit card contract, such as declaring the 

24 

day over at 11 in the morning so that when they opened the mail 

after 11 in the morning, mail that came in that day was late, and 

the consumer could be whacked with a significant interest rate increase. That is the kind of practice that creeps into the fine print. 

And so I think it is really important that we do this. 

My observation on this is the following: The Bill of Rights provides, ‘‘In suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds $20, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.’’ Fairly 

strong, clear language. 

The Bill of Rights also provides in the Second Amendment that, 

‘‘A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free 

state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be 

infringed.’’ 

I would be interested in how many of my colleagues on the other 

side of the aisle would be willing to concede that in hidden language in a pre-dispute contract you could be obliged to give up your 

Second Amendment rights. I think we would hear pretty strong 

blowback from some very big organizations and from a lot of folks. 

And yet for some reason the individual right to a trial by jury does 

not seem to have the same energetic defense. And that was interesting because we just had in the Judiciary Committee Justice 

Scalia and Justice Breyer for kind of a novel discussion about the 

role of the Court, and they both agreed how important the jury was 

not just as a little machine that sat in the judicial system to do 

fact finding, but in the overall plan of the American system of Government, it was part of the architecture that the Founders put together of bicameral legislature, of independent judiciary, of separate executive, and of a jury where, when all else failed, you could 

get heard by a jury of your peers. And it strikes me that there is 

a lot more at stake here than just settling disputes when the right 

to the jury that is in the Constitution is so readily dealt away. 

Attorney General Swanson, your reaction? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Whitehouse, I agree with 

that. I think that it is very much a strong part of our American 

history and culture as well as in the Constitution that people ought 

to have their right to have their day in court. Yet millions upon 

millions of consumers in America are losing that right to have their 

day in court before a jury in the fine print of these outrageously 

long contracts without even knowing it and without having meaningful choice. As we have seen in our case involving the National 

Arbitration Forum, often that has resulted in a tremendous injustice where essentially the little guy, the consumer, ends up not getting a fair shake. And, you know, in the case of the National Arbitration Forum, you essentially had that arbitrator who by his own 

words was in hundreds of millions of consumer contracts in America acting as the judge, the jury, the law clerk, and almost the 

plaintiff all in one. And it engaged in conduct that would never be 

tolerated in a court of law, that would not be allowed in a court 

of law, going out there hustling clients to sign up with it so they 

could then deprive people of their legal rights. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. What industries are the worst offenders in 

terms of—I should not say ‘‘worst offenders.’’ What industries do 

American consumers engage with who are the most frequent conVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:30 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 071582 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\71582.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
25 

tracts that American consumers enter into? Cell phones, credit 

cards. Who else? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Whitehouse, it runs across 

the table. In addition to the ones you mentioned, it is utilities, it 

is satellite television services, virtually—pick a service contract 

that has—you know, the 20-, 30-page service contracts, it is in 

there. You know, in the financial services industry, they will put 

arbitration clauses in. 

An area that is increasingly a problem are these debt buyers. It 

is oftentimes not just the initial creditor now who is pursuing a 

claim, but credit card companies, cell phone companies, others will 

sell debt for pennies on the dollar, maybe 3 cents on the dollar. Billions of this debt is bought and sold every day in this country. Debt 

buyers will generally only buy a data stream of electronic records 

of consumers who might owe money, and so we have seen many 

abuses where debt buyers, who oftentimes are the third or fourth 

debt buyer removed from the initial contract, pursue people who either do not owe the money—maybe they have a similar-sounding 

name or a similar address; maybe they were a victim of identity 

theft; maybe they paid back the money long ago. Yet arbitration 

has even been used as a sword against them. 

And so imagine the surprise of a consumer who was handed a 

20- or 30-page fine-print contract from an original creditor, only to 

have that creditor sell the debt ad nauseam down the stream to 

companies they have never heard of and then to get hauled into arbitration by an arbitration company they have never heard of in a 

faraway State. We heard from people like that, and they said, ‘‘We 

did not feel we had a fair shake. We did not even respond to the 

arbitration claim because we did not think it was for real. We had 

not heard of the plaintiff, and we had not heard of the arbitration 

company.’’ And that is not giving the American consumer a fair 

shake. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well, thank you, Chairman, for your efforts to see that American consumers do get a fair shake. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. 

I was really struck by what you said about the Constitution because, in fact, this is a bank contract, and on page 86 of this contract, you do give up your right to bear arms. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. I mean, it is an amazing coincidence about 

that, and I think that it is too bad our colleagues are not here to 

be as upset about that as they would be. 

I was also struck by your talking about—picking up on what Mr. 

Schwartz said about having lived in a world without cell phones. 

In fact, in your written testimony you testified that, ‘‘Consumers 

and employees voluntarily enter into these contracts.’’ And I would 

submit that they do not know their—I do not think this is voluntary. And Dr. Pierce did not know, and Dr. Pierce is probably— 

how many degrees do you have? A few. How many? Just give me 

some idea of what they are. 

Dr. PIERCE. I have a bachelor’s in chemical engineering, a master’s in biochemistry, and a doctorate, medical doctorate. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. So you are probably in the top, you know, 

50 percent of education in this country. 

26 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Right? 

Dr. PIERCE. I hope so. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. And you were not aware that you had an 

arbitration agreement. OK. Mr. Schwartz testified that, ‘‘Consumers and employees voluntarily enter into these contracts. It 

may seem extraterrestrial, but I have lived in a world where people 

did not have cell phones or the gadgetry we see in our daily lives. 

Folks did survive.’’ 

Mr. Bland, this seems to me to suggest that if consumers do not 

like mandatory arbitration clauses, they should just avoid them, 

and this strikes me as kind of dubious. In your opinion, is it really 

possible to live a normal, 21st century life and manage to avoid arbitration clauses? What would they have to live like, exactly? 

Mr. BLAND. Well, these clauses are in everything. I mean, they 

are in everything. I have seen a mandatory arbitration clause in 

an organ donor transplant contract. I have seen mandatory arbitration clauses in pet kennel contracts. You want to take your cat in 

while you go out of town. You cannot buy a new car in the United 

States without signing an arbitration clause because the car finance company has made all the new car sellers—at least if you 

finance the car. To get a car you have to have an arbitration 

clause. The major cell phone companies all have arbitration 

clauses. 

There is almost nothing you can buy on the Internet—if you 

want to buy a computer—almost any service or good you want to 

get on the Internet, you click a box, and if you open up the box and 

scrolled and scrolled and scrolled and scrolled and scrolled and 

scrolled, et cetera, you know, at some point you would find the arbitration clause buried way in there. It is ubiquitous throughout 

American society now. 

The idea that, yes, you know, you have a choice to live in a world 

where you do not have a phone or a credit card or a car or play 

computer games or have, you know, children who eat—— 

Senator FRANKEN. The Unabomber could have avoided a mandatory arbitration clause. 

Mr. BLAND. And he was a very free man out there, you know. 

He enjoyed all sorts of freedoms in that cabin, I am sure. But, yes, 

exactly, it is completely unrealistic. And the idea that it would be 

an organ donor transplant or that it is a requirement before you 

can get into a nursing home, you know, the vast majority if not 

over 90 percent of nursing homes in America have mandatory predispute binding arbitration clauses. I talked to a ton of people who 

were in these homes who had no idea that that was there. They 

signed something. A lot of these people are in pain. I represented 

a client who was a stroke victim who they got to sign one of these 

arbitration clauses. She had no idea. Actually, I should not pick her 

out like she is particularly—I mean, even though she is particularly vulnerable, I have talked to over 1,000 consumers doing case 

intakes for consumer cases. I have never met a consumer who 

knew that the arbitration clause was there before a lawyer had told 

them, usually me. It is like being an oncologist giving people bad 

news. They say, ‘‘Do I have a lawsuit here? ’’ It is like, ‘‘Actually, 

you probably do not have a lawsuit because there is an arbitration 

27 

clause that is going to bar you from suing, and you have to go to 

someone who they pick.’’ And people cannot believe it. They are furious. They are outraged. The idea that all these people chose to 

do this, this idea that there is this voluntary choice, that all these 

Americans are out there saying, ‘‘Gosh, what I was really hoping 

to do was be forced into mandatory arbitration in front of this company in Minnesota.’’ You know, I do not meet those people in my 

real life, and I answer my phone a lot. 

Senator FRANKEN. Professor Drahozal in his testimony talks 

about empirical evidence. In service of empirical evidence, he says 

that 82.9 percent or 247 of 298 credit card users do not use mandatory arbitration clauses, which I think implies to anyone who reads 

it that mandatory arbitration is not widespread. But that does not 

reflect the number of credit card users, does it? So when we are 

using empirical research, there are numbers and then there are 

damn lies, right? 

Mr. BLAND. Yes, Senator. 

Senator FRANKEN. I am sorry. That was—— 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. I would be happy to talk about those numbers, 

but I am not going to take up your time. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. 

Mr. BLAND. A tiny number of banks control nearly all the credit 

cards in America. If you take Citi and American Express and Discover and Chase and so forth, if you get about seven or eight credit 

card issuers, you are up over 90 percent, if not over 95 percent—— 

Senator FRANKEN. So, in other words, the big issuers are the 

ones with the arbitration contracts—mandatory arbitration—— 

Mr. BLAND. Although right now at the moment, four of the biggest credit card issuers do not have the arbitration clauses or class 

action bans because there is an antitrust suit which alleged that 

they had all gotten together and agreed to have essentially the 

same arbitration clause. And so to settle the antitrust case, four of 

the biggest banks in America are sort of taking a time-out in which 

they agreed to a settlement and which they said that they would 

not use mandatory arbitration for 31⁄2 years. And then, you know, 

of course, on the 181st day of the fourth year they are going to rush 

and put these things back in. And then you will have upwards of 

95 percent of all American credit card holders having arbitration 

clauses again. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Well, I think it is important to be careful 

how we use empirical data. I would like to go to Senator 

Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Professor, I wanted to ask you about some of the empirical work 

that you have done. Have you focused specifically on mandatory 

pre-dispute—— 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Yes, there are two different types of studies that 

you do. One is you look at the arbitration proceedings and see how 

the arbitrators decide things, and the vast majority of those proceedings arise out of pre-dispute agreements. So the proceedings 

are the result of arbitration clauses in form contracts. And then the 

other type of study is to actually look at the contracts, so the credit 

card data that Chairman Franken referred to is data I collected 

from a Federal Reserve web page that now has available every 

28 

credit card, supposedly anyway, virtually every credit card contract 

in the country, and those are all pre-dispute. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you divide your research into clauses 

that are mandatory and clauses that offer some choice? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. When looking at the arbitration clauses, a lot of 

credit card issuers do not have arbitration clauses at all, but they 

tend to be small banks or credit unions. So there are choices out 

there for consumers. So there are lots of choices in that sense, although not many consumers take them up on it. 

Within the clauses themselves, some of them have opt-out provisions that are similar in result to the poultry contracts that the 

Chairman referred to earlier, where the contract shows up and the 

consumer has the option under the terms of the contract to opt out. 

So those in a sense have a choice, at least formally. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you know what proportion of mandatory arbitration clauses—or strike that. Do you know what proportion of arbitration clauses are mandatory and are pre-dispute as 

opposed to post-dispute? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. By definition, all arbitration clauses are pre-dispute because they are clauses in a contract. There are arbitration 

agreements that are entered into post-dispute, and I do not know 

of any evidence of the number of those agreements. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, there by definition would be decisions made post- or pre-dispute to enter into arbitration. Is that 

correct? In other words, you can decide after the dispute arises to 

enter into the arbitration or you can agree before? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Right. In the latter case, there is no good evidence on how many agreements there are, post-dispute agreements, but there are very few arbitrations that arise out of postdispute agreements. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And have you looked at what the costs are 

relatively to those arbitration clauses that are agreed to after the 

dispute as opposed to mandated pre-dispute? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. In the evidence I have looked at and the evidence 

I have seen, both in the employment context and in the consumer 

context—there are just not enough cases—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And the reason is that there are very few 

instances where consumers are offered any real choice. Isn’t that 

correct? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. I guess I would say there are very few circumstances in which parties after a dispute arises can agree to arbitrate, because at that point it is in one party’s interest to be in 

court. It is either going to be in the business’s interest if they want 

to try to go to an expensive forum that the consumer will not be 

able to bring a claim in, or it is going to be in the consumer’s interest if they have a claim that they think that they want to get before a jury, for example. 

So you are right, I agree. After a dispute arises, parties cannot 

agree. But I think it is because of the litigation dynamics at that 

point that they just cannot come to an agreement to arbitrate. 

They will just plow ahead in court, which is the default. 

I am sorry. I may not be understanding your question. I apologize. 

29 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. No, I think you have answered the question that there really is not enough data to show that the costs and 

the time that we are trying to save really are the result, necessarily the result of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses because the others are relatively rare, for whatever reason. 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. I would say it is the other way around, though. 

You are not going to get the cost savings in arbitration if you limit 

it to post-dispute because nobody is going to agree post-dispute. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you may be right—— 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. So the cost savings are pre-dispute. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You may be right, but you do not have research to show it as you sit here. 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. The research, the data that are available suggest 

very rare incidence of post-dispute agreements. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Because they are relatively rare. 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. In other words, almost all of the clauses 

are mandatory pre-dispute clauses that are imposed by companies 

like AT&T or the bank—and I do not want to single out the bank 

that—and I have read it, and quite honestly—and I have had some 

litigation experience myself. . . . I cannot really understand it. 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Credit card contracts are actually much better, 

for what it is worth. They have a lot of bold print about arbitration 

in general, and you can actually search them on the Federal Reserve web page. My guess is we could find it fairly quickly if we 

had Google and could do it electronically. But, yes, they are long 

contracts, and there is a lot of stuff in them. Agreed. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. It strikes me, Professor Drahozal, that 

there is a lot of import to the statement that you made—I think 

I have it exactly right because I wrote it down just as you said it— 

‘‘nobody is going to agree post-dispute to an arbitration clause.’’ 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. I guess I would say very rarely, but yes. You 

probably quoted me right, but very rarely—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. When you have a post-dispute arbitration, 

it is between two construction companies that have an issue, and 

they do not want to hassle it out, they do not want to be in court, 

they do not want the lawyers involved. They are going to have a 

long-term relationship. They are friends. The CEOs probably play 

golf together. They need this sorted out. They bring in an arbitrator, and they agree whatever the outcome is going to be, that 

is what it is. But they are big players, and that is the sort of archetypal post-dispute arbitration agreement—— 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. No, no. Actually, most big businesses that use arbitration agree in contracts as well. If you look at the data on international arbitrations, which are big players—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. No, no. I am asking about post-dispute. 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. They have very few post-dispute arbitration—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And they tend to be big companies that 

are trying to sort out some problem, right? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. No, actually—I mean, the rates are similar. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. What do they tend to be? 

30 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. The rates are similar between consumers, employees, and big businesses. Nobody uses post-dispute arbitration— 

again, I am exaggerating, ‘‘nobody.’’ It is very rare. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But you are saying that for effect, and I 

understand you did not mean that to be 100 percent true. 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. I was being a little sloppy. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But there is a point that is buried in 

there, which there is a reason that nobody is going to agree postdispute. It is because these are one-sided agreements that somebody loses advantage by virtue of this. Otherwise, they would be 

empirically just as willing to agree post-dispute as pre-dispute. No? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Yes, and the advantage varies depending upon 

the case. Sometimes it is the consumer who loses, sometimes it is 

the business who would lose. And since it is pre-dispute, they can 

work it out and they do not know—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. How often do you suppose it is the business in a large-scale consumer arbitration clause that—empirically, 

how often do you think it is the business that loses as the result 

of that rather than the consumer once the—— 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. That is hard to know. There actually is—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE.—dispute arises? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. There are no systematic data either way as to 

how often it is the consumer or how often it is the business. There 

actually is a case involving the motor vehicle franchise arbitration 

statute, which makes unenforceable arbitration clauses between 

car dealers and manufacturers. There actually is a recent case 

where the car dealer wanted to arbitrate, and the business said, 

No, the statute says these agreements are unenforceable. So you do 

see it. It is hard to know how often, I agree, but that is a lack of 

data, and there are attempts to find out the answers to those questions. But it certainly happens, absolutely. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And if you have one of these consumer 

take-it-or-leave-it arbitration clauses that are in a general contract, 

are they limited to small dollar amounts, or do they have a threshold so that if it turns out to actually be a really big deal for somebody, they still have their right to get before a jury and that this 

is really just a way of sort of clearing the decks of the small clutter, 

the $100 disputes here and there? Is there a cap on them once the 

dispute gets to a certain point you actually get to go back to the 

jury again? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. No, it is usually the other way around. There is 

a floor. The American Arbitration Association’s policy is that consumers can always go to small claims court. An increasing number 

of credit card contracts have that as well. So it is in some ways the 

other way around, that up to a certain point for very small claims, 

whatever the threshold is for small claims court, which varies by 

State, consumers or businesses both can still go to court. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But if it is a bigger claim and, therefore, 

more dangerous to the company, then that is when they push you 

toward arbitration under the clause? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Well, I would say there is probably an in-between 

category—these were the cases that Mr. Schwartz would be talking 

about—where the claims are big enough—and, again, there is some 

data that is consistent with this—that the claims are big enough 

31 

that they could be brought in arbitration, but they are not big 

enough to get a lawyer to justify going to court. But then beyond 

that—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But that was not my question. My question was: In terms of the way these arbitration clauses are structured, your testimony is that the structure is that they tend to kick 

in for higher-dollar claims and let you out for lower-dollar claims. 

They give you a right to small claims court, but if it is a more significant claim than small claims court, that is where you really are 

barred by the arbitration clause. Do I have that correct? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. I would say there are three categories. There are 

the very small claims where you can go to small claims court under 

the clauses. There are the mid-sized claims which are not big 

enough to justify going to court, but that you could bring in arbitration. And then there are the very big claims that you would want 

to go to court for. And the theory or the argument is—and, 

again—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And the arbitration clause covers both of 

the latter two? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. Both of the latter two. And so the implicit deal 

that you can make in pre-dispute arbitration that you cannot make 

in post-dispute arbitration is the consumer gets the right to bring 

the mid-sized claims in arbitration in exchange for giving up the 

right to bring the big claims in court. And, again, there is some 

data consistent with that, but it is a hard thing to study. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And one last question, if I might, for the 

Attorney General. You have looked at a lot of this. You are pretty 

expert. You brought the case against the arbitration company, your 

office did. If you are in one of these consumer contracts, like a telephone or a credit card or other type of contract, how variable is the 

nature of the claims themselves? Does it tend to be that each one 

is its own type of claim and it would be really hard to aggregate 

them? Or would it be more likely that they would be the type of 

claim that you could actually probably get a couple hundred consumers together because they are all being screwed the same way, 

to be blunt about it, and, therefore, if you did not have the arbitration clause, you would actually have no trouble getting a lawyer 

and getting into court even if you were in Professor Drahozal’s second category because so many other people are being treated just 

the same unfair way you are that you can aggregate it and you can 

actually get some justice that way? What is your take on that? 

Ms. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Whitehouse, my take on 

that is that they tend to fall into the latter category. In other 

words, there is a lot of commonality oftentimes between the claims. 

It might be a corporation engaged in a systemwide deceptive trade 

practice where consumers are basically cheated out of smaller 

amounts of money, but cheated in the same way oftentimes using 

the fine-print language of the contract to first cheat the consumer 

or deceive the consumer, but then they are using the contract language to try to take away their rights. So my impression is there 

is a lot of commonality. In fact, some of the claims that we as State 

Attorneys General bring, obviously not being able to represent a 

private individual, we have to bring cases where the public interest 

is affected, and I think certainly a lot of the cases that we bring 

32 

could be claims that people could also bring on their own potentially because of the uniformity. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And by definition, if it is systematic deception by the company, it is going to sweep a large number of consumers into the same category of deceived consumer. 

Ms. SWANSON. That is exactly right, thousands, tens of thousands, or more consumers similarly situated. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. OK. Thank you very much again, Chairman. I think this has been a very helpful hearing, and I appreciate 

that you—— 

Senator FRANKEN. What do you mean ‘‘been’’ ? 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well, I have to leave now so it is going to 

be less interesting after I am gone. 

Senator FRANKEN. That is for sure. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. I am sticking around for a third round. I am 

not sure if you have to go. You do? OK. Well, you just got me. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But I would like to thank the witnesses 

very much for being here. You have been excellent, and this has 

been very informative, and I really appreciate your work, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. I am going to just ask a few more 

questions. 

Mr. Bland, in terms of the last question that Senator Whitehouse 

asked and that General Swanson spoke to, the commonality of 

small kinds of ripoffs, essentially, can you give us maybe one or 

two examples of those kinds of things? 

Mr. BLAND. Sure. AT&T added onto its monthly bill $3 for roadside assistance. I do not know if you know what it is. The idea, I 

guess, is that if you get lost, you know, AAA would be able to find 

you because they could use the GPS on your cell phone. They do 

not ask people whether they want this or not. They do not get any 

approval. They do not get any prior authorization. You just suddenly have this new service you did not order which costs $3. They 

do this for millions of people. 

So we had a class action in Florida saying that they should not 

be allowed to charge people for some hidden charge in the bill that 

people did not authorize, did not agree to. It breaks the contract. 

It is a deceptive trade practice and so forth. 

Senator FRANKEN. But according to Concepcion, can you file 

that? 

Mr. BLAND. Well, we argued—I represented the plaintiffs in this 

case. We argued that Concepcion had an exception that in limited 

cases where you can prove that without a class action that people 

would not be able—that they would be completely shut out and get 

no justice, the catch phrase in the Supreme Court is they would not 

be allowed to ‘‘effectively vindicate’’ their rights, that if you could 

prove with evidence that without a class action people would not 

be able to effectively vindicate their rights, that the class action 

ban should be struck down. 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against us, and they 

said in their decision—which I think is wrong, but you have seen 

a lot of courts doing this in the wake of Concepcion. The Eleventh 

Circuit said that we have proven that only an infinitesimal number 

33 

of consumers would ever be able to get their rights under the consumer protection laws vindicated, and everyone else would be out 

of luck, even if everything that had happened to them was illegal, 

but that still, according to the Supreme Court in Concepcion, the 

way this Federal court of appeals read Concepcion meant that the 

class action ban had to be enforced and the arbitration clause had 

to be enforced and the case was thrown out. 

So you have a bunch of people who are scammed all in the exact 

same way, and only an infinitesimal number of people are going to 

be able to go forward under arbitration in individual cases to get 

their money back, and everyone else is out. And so AT&T basically 

is rewarded because they have done something that is a scam—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Let me get this right. So the court ruled that 

because an infinitesimal number of people could get their money 

back, their $3 a month back, then you could not go to court? 

Mr. BLAND. It is not clear if this court—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Because infinitesimal was good. 

Mr. BLAND. Yes, that was good. 

Senator FRANKEN. It was better than zero. 

Mr. BLAND. Well, you know, it is possible—— 

Senator FRANKEN. It had to be zero? 

Mr. BLAND.—if it had been zero we still would have lost. I mean, 

they basically said that the Supreme Court wants these class action bans enforced so strongly, you know, even if we had been able 

to prove that no one ever, no matter what, could ever get through 

to arbitration, if the arbitration had been on—you know, the class 

action had to be on Mars on Leap Day or something, I still think 

that that court was going to say that the Supreme Court was telling it that you always have to enforce the contract. 

Senator FRANKEN. You told me also about American Express or 

something? 

Mr. BLAND. Yes. We represent a guy who is an accountant and 

extremely involved in math, and he got an American Express card 

because he wanted the rebate. You are supposed to be able to get 

up to 5 percent back. So he goes out and spends a bunch of money 

on his American Express card, and he checks the rebate. It takes 

him pages to try and figure out the formula that is set out in their 

contract, and he realizes that the rebate is much, much smaller 

than the formula that is set out in their contract. And he tries to 

get information from the bank, and they stonewall him and so 

forth. We end up bringing a class action. 

It turns out that American Express just routinely cheats people 

on the rebate. The rebates are much smaller than they are supposed to be. You have a formula that is promised to you up to 5 

percent. Nobody gets 5 percent. And you never get what the formula promises you. They simply have rigged a lower formula that 

gives you less than the rebate. 

So we had a case in which we proved in court that this case 

could not be brought in an individual action. Almost nobody except 

for our accountant math whiz client even would ever figure this out 

that they were being cheated from this sum. But even say there 

were another 100 people like him who figured it out, they would 

not ever be able to find a lawyer. So even if they figured out how 

they were scammed and they figured out that you go to arbitration, 

34 

they would not know how to bring the right kind of claims under 

the consumer protection acts and sort of get their actual remedies 

back. But the point is that American Express is doing this to millions of people, and we have a Federal district judge in New Jersey 

who says it does not matter if nobody will ever get their money 

back from being cheated here, that the point of arbitration clauses 

is supposedly in 1925 Congress loved arbitration so much that it 

loved it way more than contract law, which does not let you have 

exculpatory clauses, and loved it way more than consumer protection laws, and that the Arbitration Act just wipes this all away. 

That is the way that Court reads Concepcion. So we are appealing. 

We think that that is a little extreme. It goes beyond that Concepcion is terrible but not that terrible. But, you know, there is a 

bunch of cases like this in which courts are throwing out class actions where it has been proven that without the class action no one 

will get any remedy. It is incredibly unfair. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. I believe one of the witnesses, either Mr. 

Schwartz or Mr. Drahozal—I think it was Mr. Schwartz—said that 

one of the myths is there is not due process. There were several 

myths that were listed, and one of them was that there is not due 

process in arbitration. 

General Swanson, would you like to speak to that? Is there discovery? Is there appeal? What can you do? 

Ms. SWANSON. Well, arbitration is very different than a court of 

law. First of all, you start with this selection bias where the people 

who are appointing the arbitrator are the corporations that draft 

the arbitration clause, and they get the power of deciding essentially what company will serve as the arbitration company, so they 

compose the panel of deciders, if you will, for that case. So that is 

sort of the first step along the way of the due process problems. 

In addition to that, we have heard from many consumers when 

they do get hauled into an arbitration forum with an unknown 

company where they did not even know they had agreed to arbitration, they will ignore the paperwork, not respond to it because they 

do not think it is for real. They think it is a scam, and they simply 

throw it away, and then a judgment ends up being entered in their 

name without any ability on their part to appear. 

In addition to that, no transparency. In court the dockets are 

generally open. You know where the filings are. You can read the 

record. In arbitration they are not, and so there is no transparency. 

They are secret proceedings, generally no appellate rights from arbitration, and so you are stuck with whatever the ruling is, and if 

you have one of those unfair arbitrators, then generally there is no 

ability to appeal it as you would in court. Everyone has a right to 

appeal final judgment of a district court, and that does not exist 

in arbitration. 

Then, in addition to that, oftentimes arbitrators do not provide 

written records or written orders. A judge will usually elaborate 

and give a written order in terms of their rationale, what the findings are, why they ruled a certain way. Oftentimes arbitrators do 

not do that. It is simply you win/you lose, and that really can undermine consumers’ confidence, understandably, in the integrity of 

the process. They do not know why they lost. They just know they 

35 

lost. And so a lot of those due process protections that are just fundamental to a court of law can be lacking in arbitration. 

Senator FRANKEN. And there is no written decision, I mean, you 

do not have to produce a written decision in arbitration. 

Ms. SWANSON. There is no requirement usually that a written decision be produced. An arbitrator could, but usually not. And so 

usually it is just judgment entered for corporation, $5,000, without 

any reasoning. 

Senator FRANKEN. That hardly seems like due process. 

Mr. Bland, I just want to read Professor Drahozal’s conclusion 

because he talks about—and I think he spent a great deal of his 

career studying the empirical evidence here. Is that correct? 

Mr. DRAHOZAL. A fair bit. 

Senator FRANKEN. A fair bit of your career. So your conclusions— 

these are the conclusions: ‘‘To reiterate: my view is that sound public policy should be based on careful empirical study and not simply 

anecdotal reports. The available empirical evidence does not support the view that arbitration is necessarily unfair to consumers. 

Rather, that evidence suggests that pre-dispute arbitration clauses 

make some, if not many, consumers better off’’—it suggests that— 

‘‘and that broad-ranging restrictions on arbitration may well be 

counter-productive.’’ 

Does that seem like pretty thin gruel to you? 

Mr. BLAND. It reminds me of the people who say that we have 

to keep studying global warming until it is too late to do anything 

or the people who used to say that you had to study, you know, 

whether or not whether cigarette smoking was bad for children. I 

mean, at some point there is a certain level of common sense, I 

think, that the Congress can act on. Here we have got a system in 

which one side to a dispute is essentially picking the judges in a 

non-transparent system where you cannot bring a class action even 

if everyone is treated the same and it is a small amount of money 

and that means it shut down everything, and you also have no 

meaningful judicial review. 

I do not know why you need empirical evidence to get the idea 

that that is not a fair system. I do not see why you cannot apply 

some principled understanding as to what a justice system should 

be like. When the Founding Fathers said things like, well, we want 

to have a right to a jury trial, or they set out a variety of things 

you get to confront witnesses and so forth, they did not first go in 

and do studies to see, well, gee, you know, we are going to convict 

more people where you could not confront a witness or not. They 

could tell it was a fair idea. The idea of saying that you are going 

to have a system where one side picks the judges essentially, I 

think that that is clearly unfair in general. What happens is you 

have got the stronger party to a dispute setting up a system that 

systematically, repeatedly, predictably, and, in fact, in reality always ends up favoring them—or not always ends up favoring them, 

but the vast majority of the time ends up favoring them. And the 

idea that we need to study that more, I mean, we can always study 

everything. We could hire 100 professors to do studies forever. And 

is the chamber ever going to come in and say, you know, ‘‘It turns 

out it is not that fair to let our guys write the contracts on how 

to do disputes, you know, the studies finally proved scientifically 

36 

that letting us pick the judges turns out to favor us’’ ? You know, 

I do not think we have to wait for that day because for one thing 

I will be dead, it will be so far from now. No matter what they do 

with the genome project, I will be dead by then. It is just never 

going to happen in our lifetime that they are going to admit that 

there is finally enough evidence. 

You have enough evidence to tell that this is unfair. I think the 

Congress should act. I think your bill is great. I think you are a 

hero to the consumer movement with pushing this cause, and we 

are really grateful for it. 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, thank you for saying that. We have been 

here a long time, and I do not want to try everyone’s patience. I 

just want to thank you all for your testimony. I think you are right, 

Mr. Schwartz, that this is not the end of this, I am sure. And I 

want to thank you all for coming today. 

The hearing will stand adjourned, and we will keep the record 

open for 1 week. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions follow.] 

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